[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
TSA'S EFFORTS TO ADVANCE RISK-BASED SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 14, 2013 and APRIL 11, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-5
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
82-579 PDF WASHINGTON : 2013
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Vice Brian Higgins, New York
Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Ron Barber, Arizona
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Dondald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Jason Chaffetz, Utah Beto O'Rourke, Texas
Steven M. Palazzo, Mississippi Tulsi Gabbard, Hawaii
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Filemon Vela, Texas
Chris Stewart, Utah Steven A. Horsford, Nevada
Keith J. Rothfus, Pennsylvania Eric Swalwell, California
Richard Hudson, North Carolina
Steve Daines, Montana
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Greg Hill, Chief of Staff
Michael Geffroy, Deputy Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Richard Hudson, North Carolina, Chairman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana,
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Ranking Member
Lou Barletta, Pennsylvania Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Susan W. Brooks, Indiana Eric Swalwell, California
Michael T. McCaul, Texas (ex Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
officio) (ex officio)
Ryan Consaul, Staff Director
Dennis Terry, Subcommittee Clerk
Tamla Scott, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
THURSDAY, MARCH 14, 2013
Statements
The Honorable Richard Hudson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Witnesses
Mr. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
For the Record
The Honorable Eric Swalwell, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Statement of Stacy K. Martin, President, Transport Workers
Union Local No. 556.......................................... 21
Statement of Joanne Smith, Senior Vice President, In-Flight
Delta Air Lines.............................................. 24
CAPA Opposes TSA's Changes to Prohibited Items List............ 25
Press Release, March 5, 2013................................... 26
Press Release, March 6, 2013................................... 26
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Richard Hudson for John S. Pistole....... 41
THURSDAY, APRIL 11, 2013
Statements
The Honorable Richard Hudson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 43
The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 48
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 49
Witnesses
Mr. Ken Dunlap, Global Director, Security & Travel Facilitation,
International Air Transport Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 51
Prepared Statement............................................. 52
Ms. Sharon L. Pinkerton, Senior Vice President, Legislative and
Regulatory Policy, Airlines for America:
Oral Statement................................................. 56
Prepared Statement............................................. 57
Mr. Geoff Freeman, Chief Operating Officer and Executive Vice
President, U.S. Travel Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 59
Prepared Statement............................................. 61
Mr. Michael C. Mullen, Executive Director, Express Association of
America:
Oral Statement................................................. 64
Prepared Statement............................................. 66
Mr. Christopher U. Browne, Airport Manager, Washington Dulles
International Airport, Testifying on Behalf of The American
Association of Airport Executives:
Oral Statement................................................. 69
Prepared Statement............................................. 71
David A. Borer, General Counsel, American Federation of
Government Employees:
Oral Statement................................................. 75
Prepared Statement............................................. 76
For the Record
The Honorable Richard Hudson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of North Carolina, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security:
Editorial...................................................... 44
Statement of Carie Lemack, Director, Homeland Security Project,
Bipartisan Policy Center and Daughter, Judy Larocque
(passenger on AA11).......................................... 45
Statement of Paul Hudson, President, FlyersRights.org.......... 80
Letter From David W. Whitmire to Chairman Richard Hudson....... 81
Statement of Brandon Fried, Executive Director, Airforwarders
Association.................................................. 83
The Honorable Eric Swalwell, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Statement of Veda Shook, International President, Association
of Flight Attendants--CWA, AFL-CIO........................... 89
Statement of Laura R. Glading, President, Association of
Professional Flight Attendants............................... 94
The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Louisiana, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Transportation Security
Letter From the Wounded Warrior Project to Hon. Tulsi Gabbard.. 101
Letter From DAV to Chairman Michael McCaul and Ranking Member
Bennie G. Thompson........................................... 101
TSA'S EFFORTS TO ADVANCE RISK-BASED SECURITY
----------
Thursday, March 14, 2013
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:10 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Richard Hudson
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Hudson, Rogers, Barletta, Brooks,
Richmond, Thompson, Jackson Lee, and Swalwell.
Also present: Representatives Payne and Gabbard.
Mr. Hudson. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee
on Transportation Security will come to order. Now the
subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony on TSA's risk-
based security programs from the administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration, the Honorable John
Pistole.
I would like to welcome everyone to the subcommittee's
first hearing of the 113th Congress and thank our distinguished
witness for taking the time to be here today. You have a tough
job, Administrator Pistole. When I visited your headquarters
last month, I was impressed by your operation and the team you
have assembled. We appreciate your service and look forward to
hearing from you today.
The topic of today's hearing is risk-based security, which
is naturally the next step in advancing security procedures.
After all, why should the Federal Government devote precious
taxpayer dollars to low-risk people, places, or things? One
move Administrator Pistole has made to devote more resources to
risk-based security is to remove certain items from the
prohibited items list for passengers' carry-on items.
It is critical that Members of this committee, on both
sides of the aisle, work with you as we move forward with the
implementation of any new policy changes. As I said, you have a
difficult job, and we want to support you. But we must have
open and clear communications and it should be a priority for
us to put a strategy together so that you are not faced with
Congress pushing back against simple, common-sense things you
are trying to do, because they felt like they didn't have
enough information.
Moving forward, we must help each other in advance of major
policy changes to educate the rest of our colleagues in the
House and appropriate stakeholders on the reasoning behind such
decisions. The open and proactive approach will reduce pushback
like the kind we have seen the last few days. And allow all of
us to work together on rolling out the risk-based security
policies that directly benefit passenger safety, ease of
travel, and ultimately make TSA a leaner, more efficient
agency, and effective agency.
Understandably, immediately after 9/11, risk-based security
was easier said than done. Federal agencies, including TSA,
first had to figure out a way to analyze risk in a reliable way
and then share and operationalize that information. Ten years
and $65 billion later, the TSA has finally begun to embrace and
implement risk-based security at airport checkpoints. It has
been a long time coming but it is very welcome.
Those of us familiar with the progress TSA has made toward
risk-based security over the last 2 years are grateful for it.
Programs like PreCheck are an encouraging step in the right
direction. Just last month, I had the opportunity to visit the
Charlotte Airport and see the very impressive operation there,
very professional individuals are working for TSA at that
airport.
But the fact is that TSA still has a long way to go to
improve its effectiveness and its efficiency.
My constituents back home in North Carolina recognize that
the terrorist threat requires us to remain vigilant in our
daily lives, patient when it comes to security measures we are
forced to undergo at airports, and understanding of the
enormous resources required to keep us safe.
Just like ordinary Americans, Washington must continue to
tighten its belt and learn to do more with less. Seeking out
efficiencies is imperative when the Federal Government is
carrying over $16 trillion in public debt and every day, we
borrow over $4 billion just to pay down interest on that debt.
We must find ways to come together over common-sense savings
that are bipartisan and practical at all levels of government
and TSA is no exception.
In my view, TSA implements risk-based security in a
responsible way. It could be a win-win for our security and for
our economy.
First, it takes the focus off lower-risk individuals like
elderly and disabled children.
Second, it gives TSA the opportunity to evolve its
procedures and reduce its long-term operational cost. With the
privilege of serving in the Congress and as Chairman of this
subcommittee, cutting unnecessary and wasteful Government
spending is one of my top priorities.
To that end, I have four primary objectives for this
subcommittee during this Congress.
The first is advancing risk-based security programs and
policies, which is of course, the topic of today's hearing.
Second, addressing technology procurement and looking at
flaws and looking at ways we can improve the procurement
process.
No. 3 is streamlining TSA's regulatory process.
No. 4 is strengthening collaboration with the private
sector.
I would love to see TSA succeed on all these fronts and
think that under Administrator Pistole, they have taken
meaningful steps in the right direction. I will do everything
in my power to assist in this process and part of that means
asking tough questions and occasionally offering criticism.
While we may not agree all the time, I view opportunities like
today as a chance to work together, Administrator Pistole, to
do what is right for the American people.
As we interact in the coming years, I look forward to
continuing a productive conversation with Administrator
Pistole, with stakeholders inside and outside of Government,
with Ranking Member Richmond and the bipartisan Members of this
subcommittee on the difficult issues that we face.
[The statement of Chairman Hudson follows:]
Statement of Chairman Richard Hudson
March 14, 2013
I would like to welcome everyone to the subcommittee's first
hearing of the 113th Congress, and thank our distinguished witness for
taking the time to be here today. You have a tough job, Administrator
Pistole. When I visited your headquarters last month I was impressed by
your operation and the team you have assembled. We appreciate your
service and look forward to working with you.
The topic of today's hearing is risk-based security, which is
naturally the next step in advancing security procedures. After all,
why should the Federal Government devote precious taxpayer dollars to
low-risk people, places, or things? One move Administrator Pistole has
made to devote more resources to risk-based security is to remove
certain items from the prohibited items list for passengers' carry-on
items. It's critical that Members of this committee, on both sides of
the aisle, work with you as you move forward with implementation of new
policy changes.
As I said, you have a difficult job and we want to support you, but
we must have open and clear communication. It should be a priority for
us to put a strategy together so that you are not faced with Congress
pushing back against the simple, common-sense things you're doing.
Moving forward, we must help each other, in advance of major policy
changes, to educate the rest of our colleagues in the House and
appropriate stakeholders on the reasoning behind such decisions. This
open and proactive approach will reduce pushback, like the kind we've
seen the last couple days, and allow us all to work together on rolling
out risk-based security policies that directly benefit passenger's
safety, ease of travel, and ultimately make TSA a leaner, more
effective agency.
Understandably, immediately after 9/11, risk-based security was
easier said than done. Federal agencies, including TSA, first had to
figure out a way to analyze risk in a reliable way and then share and
operationalize that information.
Ten years and $65 billion dollars later, the TSA has finally begun
to embrace and implement risk-based security at airport checkpoints.
It's been a long time coming.
Those of us familiar with the progress TSA has made towards risk-
based security over the last 2 years are grateful for it. Programs like
PreCheck are an encouraging step in the right direction. Just last
month I had the opportunity to visit the Charlotte airport and see
their impressive operation first-hand. But the fact is TSA still has a
long way to go to improve its effectiveness and its efficiency.
My constituents back home in North Carolina recognize that the
terrorist threat requires us to remain vigilant in our daily lives,
patient when it comes to the security measures we are forced to undergo
at airports, and understanding of the enormous resources required to
keep us safe.
Just like ordinary Americans, Washington must continue to tighten
its belt and learn to do more with less. Seeking out efficiencies is
imperative when the Federal Government is carrying over $16 trillion in
public debt and every day borrows over $4 billion just to pay down
interest on the debt. We must find ways to come together over common-
sense savings that are bipartisan and practical at all levels of
Government and TSA is no exception.
In my view, if TSA implements risk-based security in a responsible
way, it could be a win-win for our security and our economy. First, it
takes the focus off lower-risk individuals, like the elderly and
disabled children. Second, it gives TSA the opportunity to evolve its
procedures and reduce its long-term operational costs.
With the privilege of serving in the Congress and as Chairman of
this subcommittee, cutting unnecessary and wasteful Government spending
is one of my top priorities.
To that end, I have four primary objectives for the subcommittee
this Congress:
(1) Advancing risk-based security programs and policies, which is
of course the topic of today's hearing,
(2) Addressing technology procurement flaws,
(3) Streamlining TSA's regulatory process, and
(4) Strengthening collaboration with the private sector.
I would love to see TSA succeed on all of these fronts and think
that under Administrator Pistole they have taken meaningful steps in
the right direction. I will do everything in my power to assist in this
process and part of that means asking tough questions and occasionally
offering criticism. While we may not agree all of the time, I view
opportunities like today as a chance to work together to do what is
right for the American people.
As we interact in the coming years, I look forward to continuing a
productive conversation with our witness, Administrator Pistole,
stakeholders inside and out of Government, Ranking Member Richmond, and
the bipartisan Members of this subcommittee on the difficult issues
that we face.
Mr. Hudson. At this time, as soon as the Ranking Member who
was not able to join us yet, we will--and seeing as the
Chairman is not here, we will move directly into testimony from
our witness.
We are pleased to have Administrator Pistole before us
today on this important topic. Mr. Pistole has been the
administrator of the Transportation Security Administration at
the Department of Homeland Security since 2010. As TSA
administrator, he oversees the management of approximately
60,000 employees, the security operations of more than 450
Federalized airports throughout the United States, Federal Air
Marshal Service, and the security for highways, railroads,
ports, mass transit, and pipelines.
The Chairman recognizes Administrator Pistole to testify.
STATEMENT OF JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you and good afternoon Chairman
Hudson and former Chairman Rogers, other distinguished Members
of the subcommittee and those who will be joining us, thank you
for the opportunity to testify today on risk-based security
changes TSA is making to better protect our Nation's
transportation systems and the traveling public from acts of
terrorism while facilitating the best possible movement of
people and goods.
I also want to thank the Members of the subcommittee for
your support for our risk-based approach we are using to carry
out our transportation security responsibilities.
Virtually all of the RBS, as we call it, changes we have
made thus far have been positively received and help us to move
away from that one-size-fits-all approach that was stood up
after 9/11. Given my recent decision to remove certain items
from what is called the prohibited item list, the subject of
this hearing is quite timely and I would like to address that
issue up front.
So over the last 2 years, based on questions raised by the
Senate in my confirmation process, I requested a team of TSA
security experts to assess items on this prohibited item list
and to make recommendations on whether we should modify the
list in any way.
My decision to change the items that I announced on March 5
followed a careful analysis of a number of different factors
and I will run through those briefly.
First, we evaluated the latest intelligence and threat
information from the U.S. intelligence and law enforcement
communities, that is: How are terrorists trying to attack us
now and how has that changed since 9/11?
Second, we considered the potential increased risk to
passengers, flight crew, fellow air marshals, FAMs, and the TSA
workforce.
Third, we assessed how a change would impact our security
operations at the checkpoint and the traveling public.
Fourth, we evaluated whether the change would increase the
risk of a successful terrorist attack to bring down an
aircraft.
Fifth, we looked at how our current policy aligned with
international security standards.
Sixth, given current budget restraints that you mentioned,
we assessed how this change aligns with our goal to provide the
most effective security in the most efficient way.
Seventh, we are mindful of the issues raised by the flying
public about interactions with TSA over the years and concerns
raised by many in Congress including the subcommittee to apply
more common sense to aviation security, including specifically
reviewing prohibited item lists.
Finally, we discussed the pros and cons of continuing to
restrict the traveling public from carrying a particular item
aboard a commercial aircraft which is in part responding to the
``hassle factor'' that TSA has come to represent for so many
Americans.
The deliberate approach we took in my final decision is
consistent also with the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
for TSA to ``not risk or to set risk-based priorities to
protect transportation assets,'' and to ``give priority
attention to improving the ability of screening checkpoints to
detect explosives on passengers.'' Again, this is from the 9/11
Commission report.
Now while I can't go into specific detail in this open
hearing setting, we do know from the intelligence community
that terrorists such as al-Qaeda and their affiliates and
inspired groups remain focused on attacking Western aviation in
particular. We also know that the threat to aviation from these
groups is from nonmetallic improvised explosive devices such as
the liquids explosive plot we saw from the United Kingdom in
2006, the bomb used by the so-called Underwear Bomber on
Christmas day 2009, the toner cartridge printer bombs from
Yemen placed onto our air cargo flights destined for Chicago in
October 2010 and most recently, the improved next generation
underwear device also from Yemen intended for a passenger jet
on its way to the United States, but fortunately in a stunning
intelligence coup, intercepted by a foreign intelligence
service in April 2012.
Now while the ultimate goal that a terrorist might be the
successful attack within the United States, against a U.S.
commercial aircraft changes to aviation security that we have
made here since 2001 have resulted in every attack attempt
since 9/11 emanating from overseas aboard aircraft flying to
the United States.
So we are--over the past several years, TSA has placed a
great deal of emphasis on not only the layers of security we
have here in the United States, but working with our
international partners to strengthen the international security
standards and achieving harmony among the international
community. So in that regard, in August 2010, ICAO, the
International Civil Aviation Organization changed aviation
security standards to permit knives with a blade length of 6
centimeters, approximately 2.36 inches or less to be carried in
the cabin of the aircraft.
Since that global change and excluding U.S. originating
passengers there have been over 5 billion commercial airline
passengers world-wide allowed to carry these knives. We are
unaware of a single incident involving these small knives on
commercial aircraft.
With hardened cockpit doors, better identification of
individual passengers against terrorists watch lists, and
thousands of armed pilots here in the United States and the
demonstrated willingness of passengers to intervene in a
determined way, it is the judgment of many security experts
world-wide, which I agree with, that a small pocket knife is
simply is not going to result in the catastrophic failure of an
aircraft. An improvised explosive device will. We know from
internal covert testing, searching for these items which will
not blow up an aircraft can distract our security officers from
focusing on the components of an IED.
Since my announcement last week, there have been a number
of reports in the media, some of them accurate, some not,
regarding the specific type of knives and sporting equipment
that would be allowed.
In general, we are talking about a small pocket knife and
other common items such as a corkscrew with a folding bland, 6
centimeters or less in overall length.
Other types are excluded. I have examples of those on your
charts if at the right time you care to see those or to help
inform the subcommittee.
Similarly, box cutters and other razor knives remain
prohibited. Of note, the type of knife we will permit is more
restrictive than international security standards given by ICAO
or even what is currently permitted to be brought into Federal
buildings across the country. So these are more restrictive
standards that we are allowing in the cabin of the aircraft.
I clearly understand the concerns expressed by many
including flight attendants, Federal air marshals, and some
Members of Congress and others with respect to the potential
increased risk to passengers and flight attendants. In fact, my
decision to be more restrictive in the specific type of knife
permitted was based on extensive discussion with my leadership
team and concerns raised by the Federal air marshals.
Similar concerns were express in 2005 when a previous TSA
administrator changed the prohibited item list to allow small
scissors less than 4 inches in length, screwdrivers less than 7
inches in length, and knitting needles and things like that on
the list.
Contrary to claims that we would see a rash of assaults on
passengers and flight attendants using these items, that simply
has not been the case. In fact, GAO published a report after
that change, did a follow-up assessment and said there had been
no, zero, security incidents where these items had been used
aboard an aircraft.
The fact remains accurate through today and underscores a
point that in aviation security, it is not the object per se
that is dangerous but the individual who intends to use that
object to inflict harm that presents the danger.
There are many other changes TSA has made to strengthen our
capabilities to keep terrorists off commercial aircraft. Many
of these changes reflect risk-based security initiatives we
began implementing over 2 years ago, in an effort to shift away
from that one-size-fits-all approach.
Similar to my decision to change the prohibited item list,
these initiatives reflect analysis of the best available
intelligence and sound risk management in principles.
So in conclusion, I would like play a brief FBI video
reenacting the nonmetallic IED used by the Underwear Bomber on
Christmas day 2009 which demonstrates the destructive power of
these well-designed and concealed devices that terrorists keep
trying to use to kill us.
This is what I believe our TSA should be focused on and
when we get the video, we can see it. So----
Ranking Member Richmond, good afternoon to you also sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Pistole follows:]
Prepared Statement of John S. Pistole
March 14, 2013
Good afternoon Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today about the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) on-going efforts to expand and improve our risk-
based, intelligence-driven operations.
Since its creation, TSA has continuously refined and evolved our
security approach by examining the procedures and technologies we use
while ensuring the freedom of movement for people and commerce. The TSA
functions as a critical component of our Nation's counterterrorism
efforts with a highly dedicated workforce working around the clock and
across the globe to execute our transportation security
responsibilities. Every day we work closely with public and private-
sector stakeholders in the aviation, freight rail, mass transit and
passenger rail, highway, and pipeline sectors to employ an
intelligence-driven, risk-based security approach across all modes of
transportation.
TSA continues to take steps to further enhance our layered approach
to security through state-of-the-art technologies, better passenger
identification techniques, and other developments that strengthen our
capabilities to keep terrorists off commercial aircraft. TSA will
always incorporate random and unpredictable security measures
throughout the airport, however, and no individual will be guaranteed
expedited screening. Airport security checkpoints are only one part of
a multi-layered system for aviation security. Other parts include
information gathering and analysis, passenger pre-screening through
Secure Flight, explosives detection, canine teams, Federal Air
Marshals, and closed-circuit television monitoring. With the tools that
exist today, if we can confirm a person's identity and assess through
information they voluntarily provide, and combine that information with
our other layers of security, we can expedite the physical screening
process for many people.
We continue to make steady progress in transforming TSA into a
high-performing counterterrorism agency. TSA is dedicated to preventing
terrorist attacks, reducing the vulnerability of the Nation's
transportation systems to terrorism, and improving the experience of
the nearly 1.8 million air passengers who fly each day in the United
States. We remain committed to providing the most effective security in
the most efficient manner.
risk-based security initiatives
About 18 months ago, TSA began to make a fundamental shift from a
``one-size-fits-all'' method of screening in favor of procedures
designed to manage, or mitigate, risk. We introduced and expanded
several risk-based security initiatives, reflecting decisions I made
based upon the best available information and intelligence, managing
risk with reasonable and effective security measures. We found strong
support for our initiatives among passengers, the airline and travel
industries, business and community leaders across the country, and
industry and global security partners abroad. I am grateful for the
expressions of support from Members of Congress and this committee.
Numerous risk-based changes have already gone into effect Nation-
wide, including expedited screening procedures for children 12 and
under and adults 75 and older, for airline pilots and flight attendants
at 29 of the Nation's busiest airports, and for active-duty military
personnel holding valid military identification at eight airports. We
continue to work with the Department of Defense to implement a broader
solution that will expand military members' access to every TSA
PreCheckTM participating airport, which will expedite the
security screening process for these individuals, while continuing to
allow our Transportation Security Officers to fulfill their mission.
These initiatives have significantly reduced pat-down screenings and
allow our Transportation Security Officers to fulfill their mission
while improving the travel experience for these individuals.
expedited screening
I have established an aggressive target that by the end of calendar
year 2013, TSA will provide expedited screening to 25 percent of the
individuals currently processed through security screening. Achieving
this target will mean that approximately 450,000 of the 1.8 million
passengers who travel on average each day from the Nation's airports
will undergo some form of expedited screening. That could mean leaving
their shoes on, leaving their 3-1-1 compliant liquids in their carry-on
bags, and leaving on their light outer jacket as they travel through
the TSA PreCheckTM lane. It could also mean another form of
expedited screening available through our standard screening lanes such
as that available for children ages 12 and under and adults ages 75 and
over.
tsa precheck
One of the most visible components of risk-based security is our
TSA PreCheckTM initiative. TSA PreCheckTM enables
us to focus efforts on passengers who may pose a higher risk to our
transportation network, while providing expedited screening and a
better travel experience for those low-risk passengers that have
voluntarily provided information about themselves. The TSA
PreCheckTM initiative currently includes U.S. citizens who
are members of existing U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Trusted Traveler initiatives including Global Entry, NEXUS, and SENTRI;
Canadian citizens who are enrolled in the NEXUS program; and eligible
U.S. citizen airline frequent flyers traveling domestically. Certain
other populations about whom we know more information, such as Federal
judges, are also eligible for TSA PreCheckTM. We are
continuing to evaluate other populations and develop solutions to
expand these populations and add new ones. In January, I signed a
memorandum of understanding with the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, Major Cities Chiefs Association, and the National
Sheriffs Association to extend TSA PreCheckTM eligibility to
these law enforcement groups.
Since its initial rollout in October 2011, TSA
PreCheckTM has been made available at 35 airports. Nearly 7
million low-risk passengers have been screened with the expedited
procedures of TSA PreCheckTM. TSA has received positive
feedback from passengers who have opted into TSA PreCheckTM
and we expect participation in this risk-based screening initiative
will continue to grow as more and more people become aware of the
opportunity. Last month, I announced the addition of Austin, Cleveland,
Memphis, Nashville, and Raleigh-Durham, which will all begin offering
TSA PreCheckTM by the end of March, and we continue to
evaluate other airports to include in the program.
passenger screening canines
The National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program has played an
integral role in protecting the Nation's transportation systems since
1972, when the Federal Aviation Administration first started the
program. The program remains a vital component of our layered approach
to transportation security today as new security threats are recognized
across all transportation sectors. During 2011, TSA expanded the
program by deploying Passenger Screening Canines (PSC) teams. These
teams are comprised of a Transportation Security Inspector and a canine
trained to detect explosives carried or worn by a person. The teams now
operate at 24 airports across the country, working to detect explosives
odors at checkpoints and in both the sterile and public areas of
airports.
TSA is currently funded to field 120 PSC teams, and the agency
plans on deploying the full allotment of teams by the end of calendar
year 2013. These teams will provide coverage at up to 30 airports,
utilizing risk-based security methodologies to deploy the new PSC teams
to high-priority airports.
Additionally, PSC teams now provide support to TSA's Managed
Inclusion pilot initiatives at Indianapolis, Tampa, and Honolulu
International Airports. The Managed Inclusion concept provides TSA with
real-time threat assessment capability at a checkpoint and enables TSA
to improve security, operational efficiency, and the passenger
experience. By assessing passengers in the screening queue, passengers
deemed lower-risk are able to undergo expedited screening procedures.
During Managed Inclusion operations, the PSC teams are located at the
screening checkpoint and all individuals approaching the checkpoint are
screened for explosives by these teams. These individuals are also
assessed for suspicious behavioral indicators by Behavior Detection
Officers (BDO). If the canine team does not alert on an individual and
a BDO does not observe suspicious behavioral indicators, the individual
may be eligible for expedited screening through the TSA
PreCheckTM lanes. These assets were also part of the surge
capability deployed most recently to Louis Armstrong New Orleans
International Airport to support screening the large numbers of
attendees departing the city following the Super Bowl.
improving customer service
TSA continues to improve customer service at airports around the
Nation. Through the Passenger Support Program, we established a group
of our own officers to serve as Passenger Support Specialists (PSSs) at
airports. They provide real-time support to individuals who may require
additional assistance through the checkpoint screening process. These
individuals may include passengers with clothing and medical equipment
questions, or those who may require additional information regarding
our checkpoint procedures. TSA started training PSSs at airports
Nation-wide in January; to date, more than 3,000 officers have
volunteered for the program, and nearly 2,500 have completed the
training. The initial results of the program have been very positive,
and we look to expand on this program so that more of our current
officers Nation-wide achieve the collateral duty PSS certification.
In 2012, TSA launched ``TSA Cares,'' a new helpline number designed
to assist travelers with disabilities and medical conditions prior to
getting to the airport. Travelers may call the TSA Cares toll-free
number with questions about screening policies and procedures as well
as what to expect at the security checkpoint. When a passenger with a
disability or medical condition calls TSA Cares, a representative will
provide assistance either with information about screening that is
relevant to the passenger's specific disability or medical condition or
the passenger may be referred to disability experts at TSA.
air cargo
In 2007, Congress passed, and the President signed into law, the
``Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act,'' which
required TSA to implement a system to ensure that 100 percent of all
cargo transported on passenger aircraft is screened at a level
commensurate with checked baggage. TSA and the air cargo industry met
the 100 percent screening requirement for domestic uplift through
implementation of the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP), which
enables TSA-regulated entities in the air cargo supply chain to conduct
screening prior to cargo being uplifted by air carriers. This approach
allows for distribution of screening responsibilities throughout the
air cargo supply chain, thus avoiding screening ``bottlenecks'' and
improving the flow of commerce. As of December 2012, the CCSP included
1,138 participant locations certified by TSA as Certified Cargo
Screening Facilities, which screen over 60 percent of the cargo, with
the remainder screened by air carriers.
To meet the 100 percent requirement for international in-bound
cargo, TSA adopted an approach that consisted of incorporating the
Trusted Shipper Concept into the current Standard Security Programs.
This utilizes risk-based, tiered screening protocols based on
established criteria related to the shipper's business relationships
with air carriers and international freight forwarders, as well as
shipper history, shipment volume, and frequency. The Trusted Shipper
Concept was originally set forth in response to an attempt by
terrorists to conceal explosives in all-cargo aircraft bound for the
United States from Yemen. TSA has implemented the Trusted Shipper
concept for all-cargo carriers, and requires them to screen 100 percent
of all non-trusted shipments to the same standards as those required
for passenger carriers.
TSA continues to collaborate with CBP to enhance its ability to
identify and target high-risk or ``non-trusted'' shipments for enhanced
screening. An outcome of this collaboration has been the Air Cargo
Advance Screening Pilot (ACAS), a joint TSA-CBP initiative which
utilizes CBP's Automated Targeting System (ATS) to analyze both shipper
and shipment data to identify high-risk cargo that requires enhanced
screening prior to loading. As of February 2013, there are 74 entities
participating in the ACAS pilot, and over 64 million shipments have
been successfully processed.
In addition, TSA developed the National Cargo Security Program
(NCSP) as a critical component of the U.S. strategy to enhance global
supply chain security and sustain 100 percent screening on
international in-bound cargo required by Federal law. Through NCSP
recognition, TSA determines if a foreign government's air cargo
security program is commensurate with current U.S. air cargo security
standards introducing efficiencies for both Government and private
industry by reducing duplicative requirements, allowing screening to be
completed earlier in the supply chain, and permitting the optimal use
of distributed screening locations so that screening can occur at
various nodes along the supply chain. To date, TSA has recognized the
security programs of 34 partner countries which represent, when
implemented, an estimated 67 percent of the in-bound cargo on-board
passenger aircraft.
surface transportation
Under Section 101 of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(Pub. L. No. 107-71) (codified at 49 U.S.C. 114) TSA has responsibility
for not only aviation security, but also for surface transportation
security. The approach TSA takes in securing the non-aviation
transportation systems involves a significantly smaller investment of
TSA personnel with more direct responsibility placed on the owners and
operators of these systems. Within the mass transit and passenger rail
domains, TSA engages with State and local partners to identify ways to
reduce vulnerabilities, assess risk, and improve security efforts
through collaborative risk assessments and by conducting baseline
security assessments. These assessments are conducted with emphasis on
the 100 largest mass transit and passenger railroad systems measured by
passenger volume, which account for over 80 percent of all users of
public transportation.
Since 2007, TSA has completed 92 transportation security exercises
with various transportation modes under the Intermodal Security
Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP) in collaboration with security
partners in industry, State, and local organizations. These exercises
are designed to continuously improve the risk posture of transportation
systems serving the Nation. To date, I-STEP has produced and shared
more than 390 multimodal security best practices and lessons learned
with security partners, and has hosted more than 3,345 participants at
transportation security exercises focused on enhancing security
preparedness of the Nation's mass transit, freight rail, highway, and
pipeline sectors.
Between fiscal year 2006 and fiscal year 2012, approximately $1.8
billion in Transit Security Grant Program funding was awarded to
transit owners and operators and their dedicated law enforcement
providers to enhance security through operational activities such as
counterterrorism teams, mobile screening teams, explosives detection
canine teams, training, drills/exercises, and public awareness
campaigns. This funding allows for entities to increase mitigation of
terrorism risk through site hardening, equipment purchases, and other
capital security improvements.
global engagement
TSA's efforts to secure the Nation's transportation networks extend
beyond our borders. TSA has a globally deployed outreach and engagement
workforce that includes TSA Representatives who coordinate closely with
foreign government counterparts and International Industry
Representatives who serve as direct liaisons to regulated foreign
airlines. Through their interactions, TSA is able to coordinate with
the entities affected by our security decisions while promoting
international security and commerce. TSA has seven Regional Operations
Centers whose mission is to deploy Transportation Security Specialists
to conduct air carrier inspections on all carriers flying into the
United States, and conduct airport assessments at all last points of
departure from foreign locations.
In December 2012, Congress passed, and the President signed into
law, the ``No-Hassle Flying Act (Pub. L. No. 112-218),'' which grants
TSA the authority to waive checked baggage rescreening requirements for
flights from international pre-clearance airports that install U.S.
comparable checked baggage screening processes and equipment. The
discretion this act provides is consistent with TSA's on-going
transition to a more risk-based and intelligence-driven
counterterrorism posture, and we anticipate that it will assist us in
our efforts to improve the traveling experience. TSA evaluates
applicable security screening measures at 14 foreign pre-clearance
airports to ensure comparability with TSA screening standards.
Currently, pre-clearance airports are located in Aruba, the Bahamas,
Bermuda, Canada, and Ireland.
conclusion
The Nation continues to face evolving threats to our transportation
system. TSA will continue to effectively implement an information and
intelligence-driven, risk-based security system across all
transportation modes while increasing the level of engagement with our
workforce to shape them for success and drive operational and
management efficiencies across the organization. TSA strives to achieve
these goals as it continues to protect the Nation's transportation
systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. We
appreciate your continued support as we strive to ensure that our
workforce is well-prepared and given the proper tools to meet the
challenges of securing all modes of transportation. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to answering
your questions.
Mr. Hudson. Is staff cueing the video? Is that what we are?
Okay. Maybe we will come back to the video. Mr. Pistole, we
appreciate you being here and know your time is valuable. At
this point, the Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority
Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr.
Richmond, for any statement he may have.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you Chairman Hudson and Administrator
Pistole, I apologize for being late but I was with your boss
and I would assume you know how that goes. Let me thank you for
being here with us today and providing the subcommittee with
information about how TSA intends to improve its risk-based
approach to security screening.
I also look forward to hearing more about TSA's efforts to
secure our surface and mass transportation systems and
particularly its efforts to address rail security. As terrorist
threats to our Nation's transportation systems continue to
evolve, it is vital that our approach to transportation
security adapts to the threats and addresses the
vulnerabilities.
Since TSA's establishment, its aviation security policies
have sparked dissatisfied comments from the flying public.
Airport screening has been described as lengthy, invasive, and
at times, humiliating. I am sure you have heard these same
concerns, and understand that you have initiated risk-based
screening procedures to address those very concerns.
Among the programs developed in accordance with risk-based
approach is the expansion of the PreCheck program which allows
for certain frequent flyers to voluntarily submit additional
information prior to arrival at the airport, to receive
expedited screening. I am supportive of the ultimate goal of
this policy and I look forward to working with TSA to sustain
and expand these programs.
I also look forward to working with you to improve how all
of these programs will improve the screening experience for all
passengers, not those just in the expedited programs. As my
fellow colleagues can attest to, we must develop a
comprehensive approach when expediting security screening, one
that will have greater applicability for the general flying
public.
You recently announced a change in the prohibited items
list that has been widely criticized. While I as a Member of
Congress profess to know what I know and know what I don't
know, I generally yield to those with the experience and the
expertise in making those decisions. So in that sentiment, I
would not question your judgment, but I will question the
process.
We have a number of stakeholders from flight attendants to
TSA agents to passengers to airline pilots that should always
be, at least in the conversation, not dictate policy, but
should be involved in the process. So I do not believe that
important decisions such as that can properly be made in a
vacuum or without advance comment and continued conversation
with the stakeholders that I mentioned.
I look forward to working with you to accomplish our goals
and your goals. On a separate note, we must also address the
importance of protecting our transportation systems and
ensuring their resiliency throughout any man-made or natural
disaster.
New Orleans, my hometown, is home to the Louisiana, I mean
to the Louis Armstrong International Airport which serves as a
primary transportation hub for the region. Last year New
Orleans welcomed over a record 8.5 million visitors with nearly
half of those people arriving by airplane.
In addition to the airport, my district is home to three
critical deep water ports, the Port of New Orleans, the Port of
South Louisiana, and the Port of Baton Rouge. These ports make
up the largest port system in the country, and one of the
largest in the world, connecting 32 States to world-wide
markets. Louisiana's extensive network of railroads, barges,
interstates, highways, and airports, ensure that raw materials
and finished products reach millions of Americans in a timely
and efficient manner.
A natural or man-made disaster affecting the New Orleans
area, can severely impact the flow of commerce and potentially
disrupt the region's economy. Administrator Pistole, I look
forward to working with you, Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member
Thompson, and the other Members of this committee to ensure
that our transportation systems remain a priority.
Again, I thank you for being here today and I look forward
to the hearing. I yield back.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentleman. I am told that staff has
the video ready. Do we want to put that up now?
[Video.]
Mr. Hudson. The Chairman's understanding is that that is
the size of the IED in the latest attempt that was thwarted
through intelligence.
Mr. Pistole. That is right Chairman, and this is the type
of device that I want our security officers looking for, just
for comparison purposes, it is not much different than the size
of this cup of water.
Mr. Hudson. Great, I appreciate that. I will now recognize
myself for 5 minutes for the purpose of asking questions.
Mr. Pistole, there has been a lot of discussion the last
few days about the TSA's decision to allow penknives on
aircraft. I would argue that there has been more coverage
surrounding the difference in blade lengths than the report of
the alleged IED slipping through security undetected. How can
we trust that risk-based security is working and that your team
is focusing on real threats like the one that we saw in the
video, when we just saw reports of a serious lapse in safety
for the traveling public?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Chairman. That is what risk-based
security is all about. Trying to identify what are the most
significant risks to, in this instance, aviation security, and
making sure that our officers and our entire U.S. Government,
National security team, is trying to be as precise and focused
on those threats that can cause the greatest damage.
So if you would like, I could show, for the subcommittee,
what these items are that have already been on the list,
allowed since 2005. If we could show, so on the left here, if
you can, it is kind of hard to see from there, but we have
items such as the scissors and the knitting needles and the 7-
inch screwdrivers.
Those have all been allowed since 2005. So we have had
billions of passengers, approximately 620 million a year,
travel in the United States with these items permittable,
permissible and there has not been a single incident involving
those, in terms of attack on passengers, flight crew, Federal
Air Marshals, anybody.
What is on the right of that white divider there, are the
small pocket knives, penknives, that I announced last week,
would now be permitted for those eight reasons that I
identified in my opening statement.
Now just in terms of contrast, we also have, over here,
those items that would still be prohibited, because of their
nature. We went to describe those in some detail. Even though
some of them may be shorter than the 6 centimeters, because of
their construction or their use, some have been described as
skinning knives for hunters, other things are simply tactical
weapons. Those will still be excluded, as well as box cutters.
So just in terms of contrast, these are things we will
continue to exclude. These are the things, that given the
overall intelligence from the community, these are not things
that terrorists are intending to use. It is those, the non-
metallic IEDs that can blow up an aircraft, that is the
greatest threat. That is what risk-based security is all about.
Mr. Hudson. I appreciate that. Will screeners undergo
additional training that will focus on how to better detect
explosives and other major threats instead of some of these
items that you have now taken off of the list?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, and that is an on-going process. So what
we have had, really since Christmas day 2009, is how do we best
detect, not only through our security officers, but our
technology? So for example, last year with this second, next
generation plot that came out of Yemen, what we learned is that
the explosives that the terrorists were using was a new type of
explosive that our explosive detection equipment, not only here
in the United States, but worldwide, was not calibrated to
detect.
So we went back and recalibrated all the explosive
detection equipment we had. Additionally, our canines, who are
such valuable parts of our layer of security, they had not been
trained to detect that type of explosive, because it was a new
one. Never seen before in the world. So we went back and
trained them, imprint them with that type of scent so they
would be able to detect that.
So it is that type of on-going risk-based intelligence-
driven, so we take the intelligence and then we train our
security officers to detect these type of devices. If I could
just comment on that Newark situation. So this is part of
Internal Red Team testing that we do. We are always trying to
push our officers to make sure that they can find the most
dangerous items.
In that instance, it was a small device, obviously because
of sensitivities I won't go into detail. But it was not much
larger than a deck of cards, but at least half the width or the
depth of it. So in that instance, it was artfully concealed by
our security officer who was doing the covert testing. Although
a pat-down was done, it was not found. So what we did was give
immediate feedback, say okay you did the pat-down, but you
didn't find it. Here is why. So that is what we use then as a
training tool for our security officers around the country.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you sir, I appreciate that. Are you
looking at any additional items that you may want to take off
of the prohibited items list and what is that process like for
looking at future?
Mr. Pistole. So again, this goes back to my Senate
confirmation where I had a specific request from a particular
Senator who asked particularly about small knives. So as part
of my confirmation, I had to agree to review that. So this has
been an on-going process for over 2\1/2\ years.
We look for, obviously, the latest intelligence. But it
really comes down to how can we best utilize our resources,
however limited they may be. With sequestration and future
budgets, and all of those issues, that you are very well aware
of, how can we make sure we are most focused on those items?
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, sir. The Chairman now recognizes the
Ranking Minority Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from
Louisiana, Mr. Richmond, for any questions he may have. Mr.
Richmond, you are recognized.
Mr. Richmond. Administrator Pistole, you speak, just
starting where you left off which is your Senate confirmation
and your agreement to look at small knives. I know that you
have a Prohibited Items Working Group. Did you use that group?
Did you bring in stakeholders to talk about the shift in a
policy concerning small knives?
Mr. Pistole. The initial working group was formed
internally, obviously I wanted to get the TSA opinion before I
went outside to see, okay what does TSA say about this? That
involved a number of people across the organization, including
input from the workforce around the country through a couple of
different mechanisms.
One is what we call the Idea Factory. It is kind of like an
electronic suggestion box, where people can send in
suggestions. We received over the last 2\1/2\ years, I have
seen hundreds and hundreds of suggestions to do just that, to
remove small items, small knives, and other things from the
prohibited item list.
This working group convened and met for 2 weeks in 2011 and
then following up last year to assess the entire list from
several respects--what the intelligence tells us; what are the
threats; how are they impacted, and those seven or eight things
I went through in my opening statement.
Then looking at what does that mean in terms of our
resources at the checkpoint. Does this help the checkpoint?
Just for example, Congressman, every day still today, we of
course find on average four guns at checkpoints, which slows
things down.
But we also find about 2,000 of these small pocket knives
every day across the country, about 2,000 of these small pocket
knives. Now, on average, that takes 2 to 3 minutes for the
pocket knife to be identified in the carry-on bag through the
X-ray, for that bag to be pulled, for the bag to be opened, and
then for that--the knife to be found and then the bag closed up
and then run back through the X-ray--so anywhere from 2 to 3
minutes times 2,000 incidents every day.
Mr. Richmond. Well, again, I started by saying that I don't
question your judgment because you do what you do, and we have
to trust that you are making the right decisions. My question
is whether the number of professional associations and the
airline pilots, the law enforcement officers association, the
flight deck officer association, Federal Government employees,
and the flight attendants association--did they have real and
meaningful input?
I am not asking you to defer to them, but a lot of times it
helps if they are at the table when you are making a decision
so that they are privy to the information that you have.
Mr. Pistole. Understood, Congressman. I recognize that
based on a classified intelligence briefing that I provided for
12 representatives of flight attendants' associations
yesterday, I could have done a better job of bringing them in
earlier, giving them that classified intelligence briefing to
tell them about what the actual threats are, the on-going
threats are, the on-going threat, where they are coming from,
how they are being advised.
So I could have done a better job of that, not only with
the flight attendants. I did notify a senior representative of
the flight attendants association on November 30 of my
intention to change the list as it involved knives. I also did
a similar notification to a senior representative of pilots
association after that, and the--also briefed the--the homeland
security advisory council for the Department of Homeland
Security in September of last year on this idea, and got
feedback in a closed setting with them.
So, yes, there were several opportunities that I did. Then,
of course, with the international community, with ICAO, with
the European Union, with Canada and Australia, that we
participate in. But yes, to answer your question.
Mr. Richmond. I will switch off of that. I am sure some
other Members may cover it. In your testimony before
Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, you mention
that the delay in funding for TSA's threat assessment and
credentialing infrastructure modernization program may delay
the development and deployment in the changes to the TWIC
program.
Can you tell me a little bit more about that? What programs
and where are we?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, so as you know, Congressman, we are very
much interested in moving forward with a universal enrollment
plan which would allow for individuals, whether it is a TWIC
card, a hazmat endorsement, other types of security threat
assessments and vetting, to be consolidated, to get away from
these stovepipes that frankly exist now.
So the sequestration is potentially delaying the
implementation of testing for the one visit under TWIC that we
are so much interested in----
Mr. Richmond. Correct, right.
Mr. Pistole. So we are--so yes, there is potential for
that. If we don't get through this, then we will be adversely
affected on the timing of that.
Mr. Richmond. I see that my time is expired, so Mr.
Chairman, I am going to yield back. But I wanted to ask
unanimous consent that the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr.
Payne, be authorized to sit and question the witnesses during
today's hearing.
Mr. Hudson. No objection.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. You are welcome, Mr. Payne. Thank you.
Let's see. At this time, the Chairman recognizes the
Ranking Minority Member of the full committee, the gentleman
from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson, for any questions that he may
have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like unanimous consent to enter my opening
statement into the record.
Mr. Hudson. Without--no objection whatsoever. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
Chairman Hudson, thank you for holding today's hearing and
congratulations on your appointment to lead this important
subcommittee. I would also like to congratulate my colleague, Mr.
Richmond, on his election as Ranking Member.
This subcommittee has a legacy of bipartisan cooperation and
productivity. This is the only subcommittee to have produced an
authorization bill for the component of DHS it oversees in each of the
past two Congresses. The TSA Authorization bill produced by this
subcommittee in the 111th Congress, passed the House with nearly 400
votes. Unfortunately, that measure never saw action in the Senate.
This subcommittee also produced an authorization bill in the 112th
Congress. However, that bill was never considered by the full
committee. TSA has not been re-authorized since it was established by
Congress in 2001, and this lack of Congressional input shows. While
some progress has been made to improve TSA's performance and
functioning, many programs and activities need reform.
For instance, TSA invests millions of taxpayer dollars in new
security technologies without fully vetting them; TSA continues to
deploy and utilize so-called ``Behavior Detection Officers'' despite
the fact that this method of screening has not been scientifically
validated by an independent third party; and TSA is currently under
review by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission for failure to
have a standard EEO process.
The common theme is that each of these deficiencies point to a
failure to implement processes that are common in other Government
entities. TSA's apparent reluctance to employ accepted processes and
procedures was recently highlighted by a decision that makes policy
changes without substantive engagement with key stakeholders.
The decision to allow certain knives and other items through TSA
checkpoints without meaningful engagement with flight attendant
representatives, law enforcement officials, the employees responsible
for implementing the changes, air carriers, and other key stakeholders
has caused chaos and anger. The backlash that has occurred from this
decision may have been avoided if a routine process to review security
policy changes had been undertaken. But instead, TSA's actions have
left many Americans wondering why they cannot take regular shampoo in a
carry-on bag but can take a knife.
Because of these missteps, I will reintroduce legislation passed by
the House last Congress codifying the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee today. This legislation encourages TSA to formally engage and
collaborate on policy decisions with key stakeholders.
An integral part of a reliable risk-based process is information.
We cannot call our screening process risk-based or reliable if it uses
measures that have not been scientifically validated.
And because the overwhelming majority of people who fly are not
dangerous, a reliable risk-based process must benefit a large
population--not just a few cherry-picked groups.
In a speech before the Brookings Institution last month, Secretary
Napolitano stated that by the end of 2013, TSA expects that 1 in 4
passengers will qualify for expedited screening. I support that goal.
However, last year, only 1 in 12 passengers qualified for expedited
screening.
I look forward to hearing from TSA about how it will more than
triple the number of passengers receiving expedited screening in the
remaining 10 months of the year without compromising security.
Before yielding back, I would like to thank Administrator Pistole
for appearing before the subcommittee today. Mr. Chairman, I ask
unanimous consent that statements in opposition to TSA's announced
change to the prohibited items list that the committee received from
the Transport Workers Union and Delta Air Lines be inserted into the
record along with public statements opposing the changes made by The
Coalition of Air Line Pilots Association; The Association of Flight
Attendants; The American Federation of Government Employees;* and The
Federal Law Enforcement Officers' Association.**
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* The information was not received at the time of publication.
** The balance of these documents were offered for the record by
Representative Swalwell.
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With that Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Thompson. Welcome, Mr. Pistole. Sorry we didn't connect
yesterday, but such is life. It would have helped me going
forward.
In this group that you put together to come up with this
policy, did it include Federal air marshals?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, it did. It did and in fact in my opening,
I noted that because of their strong presentation, their
articulation of the risks and everything else involved, I
actually changed what I was leaning toward in terms of simply
harmonization with the international standards to make it more
restrictive. So yes, a strong input from the Federal air
marshals.
Mr. Thompson. What about flight attendants?
Mr. Pistole. No, I did not have similar input from them.
Mr. Thompson. You had similar?
Mr. Pistole. Did not.
Mr. Thompson. Did not.
Mr. Pistole. Did not.
Mr. Thompson. Okay. I have a young lady who works on the
committee who kind of lists some of the item that with this
policy we will be able to take on a plane. I found out that a
decision was made that we can take two golf clubs on a plane.
How did we come to decide on two rather than three or four or
one?
Mr. Pistole. So the working group who--which I described
earlier--looked at all the implications and the consensus and
the recommendation was two clubs for whatever reason, and it
could be one, it could be--it is still up to the airlines
whether they would allow that. So it is not a bag of clubs. It
is two.
Mr. Thompson. You say it is up to the airlines.
Mr. Pistole. Well, the airlines can still decide what they
allow in terms of the overhead bin.
Mr. Thompson. I am just trying to get some of the history
in how we arrived at this. This is a hockey club--puck,
whatever. This is a big deal. I am trying to figure out how
this could not be perceived as something potentially dangerous
to the people on planes.
Now, it might not bring the plane down, but I think it
could cause serious harm to the people who are flying on the
plane and I would have--like to have--seen more thought go into
it. But it is, you know, you have decided the policy. You
talked to Congressman Richmond that right now you are losing
time with knives going through the machine.
Explain to me now the difference that if you see a knife
going through there that is 2.45 inches long, how are you going
to stop it, and how that will be in a shorter period of time
than the present policy.
Mr. Pistole. A couple of factors there, Congressman. One is
that our policy would require the person--the passenger to take
that out and put it in the bin just like they would any other
metal device or something. So it is basically the divestiture
of that. So then as it goes through the X-ray, obviously it
will be there just to be seen just like a watch or anything
else would.
We are giving discretion to the TSOs to say they have been
looking at these size knives for years. Our average TSO, as you
know, have 5 years' experience. They are very good at this, but
they will have discretion as to whether that is right around
there, so there is not going to be measuring. They are
instructed not to open the knives. We don't want any open
knives at the checkpoint.
Then if it appears to be in compliance with the new policy,
they will let that go. We had a good briefing with--AFGE, the
union, when we notified them of the policy. One of the first
questions was, well, will we give proper training to them; and
then second, will you not punish them or penalize them in case
they make an error in judgment. We responded affirmatively in
both of those.
So, yes, absolutely, they will be trained.
Mr. Thompson. So it is your testimony before this committee
that the present policy that you have announced and proposed to
implement does not cause any harm to the traveling public?
Mr. Pistole. There is obviously any number of scenarios
that could be raised. The flight attendants raised some with me
yesterday. When we get into the ``what if'' category, that is
what risk-based security is about--``what if'' and then we fill
in the blank. Then we make judgments and decisions based on the
probability, what the intelligence says, and then what the
consequences may be.
So, there is no guarantee here. So no, I am not saying
that. There is no guarantee. Part of this is just the question
of what the American people and Congress think TSA's role and
responsibilities are.
Mr. Thompson. So if Congress now says maybe you should
reassess this policy, are you prepared to do that?
Mr. Pistole. Obviously, if Congress in a bipartisan way has
legislation that goes to the President and he signs, then
obviously we will adopt those--whatever those issues are. Given
all the input that I received, including the excellent input
that I received from the flight attendants yesterday, I think
the decision is solid and stands and we are planning to move
forward with it.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
The Chairman will now recognize other Members of the
committee for questions that they may wish to ask the witness.
In accordance with our committee rules and practice, I plan to
recognize Members who were present at the start of the hearing
by seniority on the subcommittee. Those coming in later will be
recognized in the order of arrival.
We will begin with the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers.
You are recognized.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pistole, thank you for being here and we are very
fortunate to have you in this very important job. I have found
you in my years on this committee to be very competent and
capable. I want to commend you on this list that you have come
out with. I would like for it to be little longer, but you have
made a good start and I think it is common sense what you have
done.
I do want to talk to you. You know, I am a big fan of the
PreCheck program. I think it is a great risk-based approach to
screening. But as I have talked to you in the hearings before
and in private before, we have got to push it out a little bit
faster and work some of the kinks out. As you know, a lot of
people are still confused about it. It is not at all the
airports. There is some inconsistent application.
Can you tell us, are you working with the airline partners
on ways to clear up what the program is, how people can get in
it, where it is available, where it is not? Can you kind of
talk to us about that?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, thank you, Congressman. The airlines have
been great partners on this, the five major carriers, and then
there are several others that are coming on-line later this
year. So as you know we are currently in 35 airports, the 35
busiest airports. I announced recently the extension of five
more airports, so we will be at 40 here by the end of this
month.
We will add some additional airports later this year, but
we will also look at the major airports, the category X
airports to add additional PreCheck lanes at those airports.
So, for example, at Atlanta-Hartsfield, on Monday morning,
instead of one lane or two lanes we may have three or even four
PreCheck lanes open to handle that Monday morning rush of
commuters going through there.
We are also looking at ways to expand the known population
in ways that allow additional people to go through. You are
aware of what we are doing with what we call managed inclusion,
pilot program in Indianapolis, Tampa, and now Honolulu. That
has been successful.
As Ranking Member Richmond knows, we used a variation on
that the day after the Super Bowl in New Orleans, where instead
of 12,000, 13,000, 14,000 people at travel on average, 39,000
people left New Orleans that morning. Obviously the passive
screening canines that you are such a strong supporter of,
those are key enablers for this strategy to move forward.
We are also working with a private industry. We put out a
request for white papers that are due April 1, where there
would be a partnership between us and a private company that
they would do vetting for our criteria individuals who may want
to sign up for a program such as PreCheck. They do the vetting
to our criteria, we then vet them and then we increase the
population that way.
So----
Mr. Rogers. Would that be something that the traveling
public would pay for out--themselves to get this----
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
The other aspect is it has been complicated for some to
sign up for global entry. The custom border protection which
again it is a great program, $100 for 5 years, $20 a year
allows you expedited re-entry to the country, but it has been
complicated for some. So what we are working on with NTSA is to
have a TSA PreCheck sign up through a TSA structure so you
don't have to go through CDP, you can go through a DHS portal
to say, yes I want to go international travel, that is fine, I
want just domestic.
What we found the last quarter of calendar year 2012, 41
percent of the people signing up for Global Entry, just wanted
the TSA PreCheck benefits. So exactly to your question, how can
we maximize that. That is what we are doing.
Mr. Rogers. But you know that--I talked to you about this
before--but there is a--I also would like to see you get to the
point to where once you sign up and approve the PreCheck, it
works across all airlines.
Mr. Pistole. Right.
Mr. Rogers. I know your airline partners have some
proprietary concerns about that data.
Are you working toward a database that would protect their
proprietary interest, but also allow travelers who use multiple
airlines to use PreCheck?
Mr. Pistole. We are. The airlines again have been good
partners in this. We are not quite there yet, but----
Mr. Rogers. How long do you think it will be before you get
there?
Mr. Pistole. I will have to get back with you on that,
Congressman, because it has been something that frankly I have
been hopeful that we would have already been there, but frankly
I think because of some mergers and other issues that
complicated things a little bit for everybody.
Mr. Rogers. Then last, foreign repair stations.
Been 10 years since we have been waiting on a rule. Can you
tell us that is gonna happen real soon? You gonna have us a
rule pushed out?
Mr. Pistole. I can tell you that.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Rogers. Can you tell me and mean it?
Mr. Pistole. So--well I actually--there is actually good
news. Today I got an update that OMB has accepted the rule, so
that starts a clock. So there will be a public notice of that
shortly, and so we actually for the first time in quite a while
we are making progress.
Mr. Rogers. Great, do you know how long that clock is gonna
tick?
Mr. Pistole. Well--so they--have a review period. I would
have to check with that, 60 or 90 days in this instance,
because it is a final rule. Then, you know, like we will be--
until sometime this year, I just--that is where we are----
Mr. Rogers. You are certain some time this year it will be
finalized?
Mr. Pistole. Should be.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Rogers. That is a lawyerly response.
Mr. Pistole. Should be, yes.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from California,
Mr. Swalwell.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I ask unanimous consent that the statements in opposition
to TSA's announced change to the prohibited items list that the
committee received from the Transport Workers Union and Delta
Airlines be inserted into the record, along with public
statements opposing the changes by the Coalition of Airline
Pilots Association, the Association of Flight Attendants, the
American Federation of Government Employees* and the Federal
Law Enforcement Officers Association.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information was not received at the time of publication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Hudson. No objection.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Stacy K. Martin, President, Transport Workers Union Local
No. 556
March 14, 2013
Thank you Committee Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson;
Subcommittee Chair Hudson and Ranking Member Richmond for having this
important hearing today on ``TSA's Efforts to Advance Risk-Based
Security.'' And, thank you for affording Transport Workers Union,
(TWIT) Local No. 556 the union that represents the flight attendants of
Southwest Airlines the opportunity to submit a written statement. As
the United States House Committee that has Congressional oversight for
the U.S. Department of Homeland Security that includes the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) I applaud your efforts to
examine all aspects of protecting the American people from harm and
injury.
TWU Local No. 556 represents nearly 11,000 flight attendants at
Southwest Airlines. Our members are mortified by the announcement of a
little more than 1 week ago by TSA Administrator Pistole that allows
weapons back on airplanes. As a result, we have been working nonstop to
ask that the TSA reverse this adverse decision that will leave my
fellow flight attendants and the passengers that we protect and serve
open to airplane mayhem. In our opinion the new rules, which take
effect April 25, 2013 are not rational and go directly against efforts
that seek to protect the aircraft, passengers, and crew from danger.
It is a reported fact that on September 11, 2001 passengers in-
flight phoned relatives before their planes crashed and stated that box
cutters were used to attack some of the crew and passengers. And,
similar box cutters, small knives, were found on aircraft that day that
had been grounded.\1\ As a response, items that could be used as
weapons like box cutters, sharp items, some sports gear, oddities that
can be easily compounded to create an explosive and obvious weapons
were banned as carry-on items. But, now 12 years later, because U.S.
aviation security has improved since the 2001 attacks and the
likelihood of a similar plot like that of al-Qaeda succeeding against a
commercial airliner is remote, we relax our standard? And, furthermore
it is questionable why such a change would be made just in order to
align our TSA standards more closely with International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) standards.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Box Cutters Found on Other September 11th Flights'', CNN.com/
US; http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/23/inv.investigation.terrorism/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the Congressional committee that has oversight of the TSA we ask
that you demand the decision be reversed for the following reasons:
(1) The decision is irrational and makes no logical sense.
(2) The decision was made in a vacuum without input from
stakeholders.
(3) With sequestration budget cuts in effect, air marshal coverage
that has been in place since 9/11 will be lessened.
The Decision Is Irrational and Makes No Logical Sense
The reasoning is inherently flawed. Simply put, what sense does it
make to allow any weapon on airplanes? These weapons were banned and
appropriately so. I would agree that we don't need just an illusion of
safety, but we need to have secure and safe skies.
Each and every time flight attendants that I represent board an
aircraft we sweep the aircraft for potential threats and weapons. If
the TSA is now going to allow items that threaten the safety and well-
being of passengers why sweep? This goes against the very core of the
layered approach of risk-based safety management that hitherto has been
the reported goal of the TSA.
To change what has worked for 12 years just to meet ICAO standards
is beyond understanding. What happened in the United States on
September 11, 2001 did not happen in other countries. It happened here,
in the United States, on U.S. soil, with U.S. citizens, under U.S.
control, and with U.S. aircraft. Would the United States blame other
countries for banning items on-board aircraft that would protect the
security of their citizens? I think not! It should not be about
catching up to ICAO standards it should be about protecting our
citizens.
Another reason that has been given for this change is so that the
TSA can concentrate on other items. Of course, we are in agreement that
other items that can destroy lives and property should be a focus.
Continuing the layered approach of security that has been in effect
over the last few years has been successful. The TSA should continue to
scan for items that are detrimental to the well-being of passengers and
crew alike. But, depending on a locked cockpit door to satisfy safety
should not be all that is considered going forth. This change just
leads down the slippery slope of eventually allowing more weapons on-
board. And then what, issue guns and knives to flight attendants?
That's not an option that we see as intelligent or valuable.
An airplane arriving at the gate with passengers and crew aboard
that have arrived safely is the goal. Not an airplane that arrives with
only one or a few survivors; that gives another meaning to ``dead'' on
arrival. We know as a result of
9/11 that the destruction that a terrorist seeks to inflict is not only
emotionally debilitating but also cripples financially. Reversing a
decision that opens up opportunities for injury and destruction is at
best, reckless.
It's widely known and accepted what a weapon is. And, some weapons
are obvious--a gun, a knife. Other weapons are not so obvious. Yet,
prisoners have used improvised weapons like sharpened toothbrushes to
injure and kill other prisoners. We understand that it is rational that
a risk-based approach be taken and that all risk cannot be eliminated.
But reversing banned items that have previously been associated with
risk is not logical when the objective is to mitigate risk and to
reduce, as much as possible, the potential for anyone to commit a
deliberate attack against our transportation systems. A better solution
would be to keep the obvious weapons banned and continue to look for
the not so obvious. Furthermore, anything that can easily be used as a
weapon should not be allowed to be carried on the aircraft in any form,
whether on the person, in the arms or in carry-on baggage.
The Decision Was Made in a Vacuum Without Input From Stakeholders
As stakeholders of the security process, TSA's risk-based approach
includes partnerships, and acknowledges involvement in the process.\2\
However, in this effort TSA did not reach out in an efficient manner
for input and feedback. As a result, stakeholders, including major air
carriers that are against the change (Delta, Southwest Airlines, and
USAir), and the Coalition of Flight Attendants, which we are members,
see this change as a step in the wrong direction, backwards, and are in
opposition to it occurring in April.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Official website of the Department of Homeland Security, http:/
/www.tsa.gov/stakeholders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The TSA said the latest decision will bring the United States into
basic compliance with international standards by allowing knives
shorter than 6 centimeters, or 2.3 inches, aboard aircraft. However,
the safety of passengers and crew should not be compromised as an
alternative to provide a swift traveling experience. At the expense of
safety we should not force compliance with standards that are not
germane to our situation and experiences.
The TSA also has reported that the decision to keep box cutters and
razor blades on the prohibited items list was made because there was
``too much emotion associated'' with their use in the 9/11 hijacking
incidents. As the TSA has accepted the process of stakeholder
involvement there is no need for them to make these types of decisions
based on emotions. It is fact that weapons similar to the ones that are
now being unbanned were used in the 9/11 hijacking incidents.
Consulting with other stakeholders prior to a decision would have been
more prudent and would have added substance to the decision.
With Sequestration Budget Cuts in Effect, Air Marshal Coverage That Has
Been in Place Since 9/11 Will Be Lessened
It has been reported that the Federal Air Marshall (FAM) Service
budget will be cut by 8.2 percent as a result of the sequestration.\3\
Allowing previously-banned weapons back on airplanes while losing some
of the valuable service of the FAM program is not logical. Incidents
will have a more likely chance of happening and succeeding, as
suspected terrorist will have more means and ability to carry out plans
that could result in destruction.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Homeland Security Today: OMB Details Sequestration Plan''
www.hstoday.us/index.php?id=3408&no cache=l&tx[...]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FAM program has been a successful layer within the layered
safety approach administered by the TSA. With the absence of funding
and the strain that will be associated on TSA airport agents as well,
it is not rational to lessen the list of items that can be carried on-
board. It is not necessarily true that by allowing these weapons that
they should be able to have a watchful eye and perceptive to other
deterrents that can bring havoc aboard aircraft. Actually allowing
previously-banned items creates more work than less. Just the fact that
as a result of allowing these previously-banned weapons TSA agents
would need to ``measure'' the length and width of the knife, calculate
how it operates (locked or fixed blade) and whether the grip was molded
or not, is more than enough to concentrate on and can distract them
from seeing objects that are more obscure but just as deadly. The
public expects a safe environment, not just the perception of one.
conclusion
Nobody who works in aviation wants to go back to pre-9/11
procedures, when terrorists could physically storm the cockpit. I'm
glad the pilots I fly with can operate behind locked doors and land a
plane safely even if there is a disturbance in the passenger cabin.
Security is about more than preventing terrorism. Incidents of
``air rage'' were on a dramatic rise prior to 9/11. Over the past dozen
years, added security and zero tolerance for violence have led to a
decline in abusive behavior and physical attacks in the passenger
cabin.
Aside from showing a revolting, cavalier attitude about the lives
of flight attendants and passengers, the idea that we can live with ax-
wielding mayhem at 30,000 feet without compromising the overall
security of air travel is nonsense.
Pilots, flight attendants, airline ground workers--and passengers--
are partners in safety before, during, and after a flight. Sure, a
trained pilot can land a flight even during an emergency--but why adopt
a policy that could lead to repeated airborne emergencies?
Neither the current nor former head of the agency that's supposed
to prevent terrorism seems to understand much about the actual
psychology of terror. The point is not necessarily to take down a plane
or cause a large number of casualties. The goal of a terrorist is to
terrify people and make daily life impossible.
Can a determined psychopath wielding a knife, machete, or battle-ax
strike terror into the hearts and minds of passengers at 30,000 feet?
And into the hearts and minds of millions of people who would see news
of any such an event repeated endlessly on TV, the internet, and social
media?
The question answers itself. TSA must reverse course. That's why
the Transport Workers Union Local No. 556 has joined the Coalition of
Flight Attendants Unions, the Federal Law Enforcement Officers
Association, and other concerned citizens in a petition drive and
campaign to stop this absurd scheme from taking effect. And, that is
why we have submitted this statement as well.
TWU Local No. 556 appreciates this opportunity to voice our
position on such an important manner. We will continue to work together
with other stakeholders to prevent ``acts of violence'' wherever they
may take place, and make our skies as safe as possible.
We urge the House Homeland Security Committee to commit to whatever
process necessary and available to reverse the decision of the TSA to
allow weapons back into the cabin. These items can remain in checked
baggage as before and not increase a threat in the skies.
______
Statement of Joanne Smith, Senior Vice President, In-Flight Delta Air
Lines
March 14, 2013
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to present the views of
Delta Air Lines and thousands of Delta flight attendants as you examine
TSA's efforts to shift to a more risk-based approach to aviation
security. We have long supported and partnered with the agency to
advance its goal of focusing on significant threats, and we appreciate
having the chance to discuss TSA's recently-announced change to the
prohibited items list in this context.
The commercial aircraft cabin is a unique environment affected by
rules and policies set and overseen by three different Government
agencies: The TSA, FAA, and OSHA. Each agency has a distinct mission,
but all are critical to the safety of passengers, crew, and aircraft.
While TSA's primary aviation mission is security--the prevention of
terrorism within the aviation system--it is each airline's job to
integrate the many safety and security rules and policies to which we
are subject into a safe and secure travel experience for the public and
our employees. At Delta, we manage this task through our Safety
Management System (SMS)--a proactive, predictive, data-driven tool to
collect and analyze information, identify hazards, mitigate risks, and
promote safety awareness across Delta's global organization. While this
system was developed primarily to improve the safety of our operation,
we have expanded it to include security matters because safety and
security are so integrally linked.
Delta flies more than 160 million passengers each year, and several
hundred events occur where our flight crews--mainly flight attendants--
experience serious passenger misconduct ranging from failure to follow
crew instructions to more significant events involving drug abuse or
psychotic episodes. In addressing these incidents, our in-flight crews
have often been verbally and physically abused, and in some instances
Federal Air Marshals and/or fellow passengers have had to intervene to
help bring the situations under control. As the demand for travel
increases and through examination of the data we collect through our
Safety Management System, we recognize that instances of reported
passenger misconduct are not decreasing. In view of how the data is
trending, we believe that the re-introduction of small knives into
aircraft cabins will only intensify passenger misconduct situations.
Therefore, we have serious concerns about the recently announced
changes to the prohibited items list to allow small knives onto
aircraft. The following two examples illustrate the sorts of incidents
our crews are seeing with increased frequency, which certainly would
have been worse had knives been accessible to the unruly passengers:
On a flight between Minneapolis and Los Angeles, a passenger
engaged in an altercation with the passenger seated next to
him. The passenger was issued a warning and seemed to calm
down, but became belligerent again and had to be subdued by a
flight attendant and other passengers. The first attempt to
restrain the passenger with tuff-cuffs resulted in the tuff-
cuffs breaking, after which the passenger used them to cut a
flight attendant under his nose and across his lip. FBI and
local law enforcement responded upon arrival, resulting in the
passenger's arrest.
A passenger aboard a flight between Los Angeles and Liberia,
Costa Rica was screaming and yelling at other passengers
aboard. When the in-flight crew attempted to calm him down, he
spat on a flight attendant and kicked her, after which other
passengers assisted with restraining him with flexicuffs. He
continued to scream, yell, and kick his way through the flight,
and at one point got out of the flexicuffs and attempted to
headbutt the flight attendant. Three passengers had to take the
passenger to the ground and use seat belts to restrain him. The
passenger was arrested upon arrival.
Make no mistake--we applaud Administrator Pistole's drive to shift
TSA's resources away from addressing every threat or perceived threat
to focus on the most significant. Delta was one of the first airlines
to pilot the TSA PreCheck program, and participated actively in
development of the TSA Known-Crewmember program--both of which allow
TSA to shift focus from low-risk passengers to those who pose higher
levels of risk. We fundamentally believe that the agency can only
succeed in its dual mission of securing the aviation sector and
facilitating commerce if it continues to undertake efforts like these.
While allowing passengers to carry small knives aboard aircraft may
not enhance the risk of catastrophic acts of terrorism occurring aboard
aircraft, it does significantly increase the danger airline passengers
and crewmembers face from unruly passengers relative to the little
improvement the change will likely make to the customer security
process flow. Furthermore, the absence of consultation with
stakeholders before the change was made is a step backward from the
good strides TSA has made in recent years to partner with industry to
implement effective security measures that complement airline
operations, rather than hinder them.
There is one other issue I would like to address--whether or not
re-introduction of knives into the aircraft cabin is appropriate
because it is consistent with the ICAO (International Civil Aviation
Organization) standard. Delta flies to over 300 destinations in nearly
60 countries worldwide, at 46 of which TSA requires that we implement
more stringent security measures because the level of threat to a U.S.
airline and U.S. passengers is more serious than in other locations. At
most if not all of those locations, the local government's security
regulations are consistent with ICAO security standards, which are
minimum security standards, but TSA requires that we do more. In other
locations--Japan and Canada are two good examples--local governments
implement security measures that are more stringent than the minimum
ICAO standards. We would simply note that in the case of small knives,
we don't believe that harmonization with minimum ICAO standards is
sufficient justification for reintroducing this threat to our flight
crews and our passengers.
It is our hope that in the days and weeks ahead, TSA will be
willing to reconsider its decision to allow small knives aboard
aircraft. And as always, we at Delta remain committed to engaging with
the agency as a partner to develop effective security solutions and
improve the aviation security system.
Thank you again for this opportunity to share Delta's views.
______
CAPA Opposes TSA's Changes to Prohibited Items List
Washington, DC (March 7, 2012).--The Coalition of Airline Pilots
Associations (CAPA) which represents over 22,000 professional airline
pilots at carriers including American Airlines, US Airways, UPS
Airlines, ABX Air, Horizon Airlines, Southern Air, Silver Airways,
Kalitta Air, Miami Air, Cape Air, Omni Air and Atlas Air, is opposed to
the recent Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) decision to
make changes to the TSA's ``Prohibited Items List''.
TSA Administrator John Pistole announced plans to change the
``Prohibited Items List'' effective April 25, 2013 to include
permitting small knives in carry-on luggage as well as certain sports-
related equipment. According to a TSA statement about the planned
changes, ``The decision to permit certain items in carry-on luggage was
made as part of TSA's overall risk-based security approach and aligns
TSA with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Standards and
our European counterparts.''
``While CAPA welcomes the periodic review of items banned from
being carried on the airplane, we categorically reject a proposal to
allow knives of any kind in the cabin,'' stated CAPA President Mike
Kam. ``We believe the threat is still real and the removal of any layer
of security will put crewmembers and the flying public unnecessarily in
harm's way,'' he added.
CAPA is deeply concerned that industry stakeholders were not
consulted prior to implementing these changes. ``Crewmembers are a
critical component to aviation security and, as trusted partners to
TSA, should be involved in these processes.'' President Kam stated.
``CAPA's Security Committee is concerned that the proposed changes to
the prohibited items list could represent a step backwards in aviation
security,'' added CAPA Security Representative Steve Sevier.
CAPA vigorously supports fully funding critical programs such as
the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program (FFDO), which deputizes airline
pilots as Federal law enforcement officers to defend the flight deck,
and the Crewmember Self Defense Training Program (CMSDT) which teaches
both pilots and flight attendants techniques on how to defend
themselves in the aircraft, including when confronted with edged
weapons.
``It is clear that the FFDO and CMSDT programs are needed now more
than ever as they represent a critically important role in protecting
our passengers, crewmembers, cargo, and aircraft,'' stated CAPA
Security Representative Bill Cason.
______
Press Release Submitted For the Record by Hon. Swalwell
flight attendants union coalition blasts tsa decision to allow
dangerous items onto aircraft
For Immediate Release, March 5, 2013
Washington, DC.--The Flight Attendants Union Coalition,
representing nearly 90,000 Flight Attendants at carriers Nation-wide,
issued the following statement blasting today's announcement by the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to allow knives and other
dangerous objects into the aircraft cabin, relaxing an over decade-long
ban.
``Today's announcement to permit knives back into the aircraft
cabin is a poor and short-sighted decision by the TSA. Continued
prohibition of these items is an integral layer in making our aviation
system secure and must remain in place.
``As the last line of defense in the cabin and key aviation
partners, we believe that these proposed changes will further endanger
the lives of all Flight Attendants and the passengers we work so hard
to keep safe and secure.
``Flight Attendants are the front-line safety and security
professionals on-board every commercial passenger aircraft in this
country and must be given the tools and training to protect ourselves,
our passengers, and the aircraft. Despite repeated requests for updated
training to include basic self-defense maneuvers to allow us to defend
ourselves, Flight Attendants still do not receive mandatory training
about how to effectively recognize and defend others against attacks
aboard the aircraft.''
______
Press Release Submitted For the Record by Hon. Swalwell
fleoa calls tsa policy on knife carry dangerous and ill-advised
For Immediate Release, March 6, 2013
Washington, DC.--Today, the Federal Law Enforcement Officers
Association (FLEOA) expressed its strong objection to TSA's new policy
permitting certain knives to be carried aboard commercial aircraft.
After learning of TSA's released policy change, FLEOA President Jon
Adler stated, ``In light of the staff and resource constraints placed
on us by the sequester, why would TSA choose to elevate the risk of
Americans getting injured at 30,000 feet? If the TSA policy makers were
engaged in close quarter combat with a psycho wielding a 2-inch blade
at 30,000 feet, they might reconsider the foolishness of their
decision.''
In response to questions regarding the safety logic of allowing
golf clubs as carry-on items, TSA spokesman David Castelveter stated,
``These are popular items we see regularly. They don't present a risk
to transportation security.'' FLEOA respectfully disagrees with that
assessment, and can call on a variety of tactical experts to illustrate
why.
FLEOA referenced the recent fatal brutal attack on fallen hero Eric
Williams (BOP Correctional Officer) to illustrate the hazardous
ramifications of TSA's knife policy. Officer Williams was savagely
attacked at close range by an inmate who stabbed him repeatedly in the
neck with a plastic-edged weapon. TSA's policy would expose FAMS, law
enforcement officers flying armed, airline crew, and all passengers to
a similar set of potentially fatal circumstances.
``There is no justifiable reason for implementing this policy, and
it only serves to place law enforcement officers and flying Americans
at greater risk,'' added Adler.
FLEOA plans to engage law makers to address this ill-advised
decision by TSA.
Mr. Swalwell. Good afternoon, Administrator Pistole.
After September 11, zero planes have been taken down by
sharp objects where sharp objects would have been used.
Mr. Pistole. Correct.
Mr. Swalwell. My understanding, there have been zero
attempts as well.
Mr. Pistole. There was one attempted hijacking
internationally. If you are talking about domestically, there
have been zero attempts. Internationally there was one attempt
in 2009, it was a hijacking attempt with a plastic knife.
Unsuccessful obviously.
Mr. Swalwell. Also zero major stabbing issue with sharp
objects?
Mr. Pistole. Zero that I am aware of.
Mr. Swalwell. For me then, that begs the question that when
we look at the number of attempts or successes that have taken
place involving sharp objects, post-September 11, the answer is
there have been zero.
That begs the question, can that number get better? The
answer is no. But it also begs the question, can that get
worse? To me, the answer is, yes. It can get much worse.
So I ask, how does allowing sharp objects on board now
accomplish the goal of maintaining zero planes being taken
over, or having zero incidents involving sharp objects? I also
understand, Administrator Pistole, that the shift towards risk-
based threat assessment, and I appreciate the shift towards
focusing on IEDs.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you.
Mr. Swalwell. But just because this is a new threat does
not mean that old threats still exist. I would imagine that if
we were to ask how many incidents occurred before September 11
involving sharp objects, we would also have found that the
answer is zero, yet the threat was still real and tragically we
paid the price on September 11.
On this board, three knives--then reflected by the checks
and the X.
I think most people out there would have a hard time
telling the difference between what is allowed and what is
banned. I am--and I am wondering, do you think that any one of
these knives would be more or less dangerous than the other?
Do you think one of these knives would be more or less
successful in taking over an airplane and causing another
terrorist attack?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Congressman.
You raise a number of good points, and our working group,
and experts considered those issues in quite some detail. In
terms of some context, the international--again, air community
has allowed these--anything 6 centimeters or shorter since
August 2010, again no attempts.
Here in the United States, obviously, you see these items.
Terrorists don't need to use those, they don't need to use
these, they have things on board already, whether it is in
first class, a metal knife or fork, whether it is a wine glass
or wine bottle that they break and use. There is any number of
things that could be used as a deadly instrument.
The whole purpose of risk-based security is to take
information that we have, both about terrorist intent and
tactics, to make sure that we are preventing prior attack--
attempts and the hijackings, obviously of 9/11 which multiple
layers of security that I am sure you are familiar with, not
just physical security.
On the classified side, the intelligence about who is
traveling, where they are trying--all those things. So it
really gets again to what is the intent of the person on-board
as opposed to the object. So if we simply focus on objects,
then we are always behind the eight-ball. The whole purpose is
to focus on the intent of the person, and so it really comes
down to the mission of TSA.
Is it to prevent disturbances by inebriated passengers on
board? I don't think so.
Mr. Swalwell. Administrator, but wouldn't you agree that if
we looked at the checked knives that would still be allowed,
these screen-checked knives, which appear to be just slightly
smaller in size than what would not be allowed, that in an
orchestrated attack they could do great damage to our flight
attendants and great damage to our passengers and perhaps,
hopefully not, but great damage to people on the ground when a
plane could be used to as a missile?
Mr. Pistole. Well, sir if you are asking whether I think
individuals with those small pocket knives could take over an
aircraft, take control of it, I don't think so, because of all
the other layers of security we have in place, including the
thousands of Federal flight deck officers who are armed in
cockpit, the hardened cockpit doors, the response of the
valiant crew and the passengers who would not allow that to
happen.
If we had a group of terrorists if you will get on a plane
here in the United States, without anybody else in U.S.
intelligence, law enforcement community knowing about those,
they haven't come up on anybody's radar, then we have had a
failure of the U.S. National security program, rather than just
at a checkpoint.
Mr. Swalwell. I would just conclude, Mr. Chair, by saying,
you know, for 11 years we have not had an incident, since
September 11, and I think largely because of a lot of the good
work TSA has done and so that is why I am asking, why now, and
why do we want to go back?
So thank you, Administrator.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Congressman.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Barletta.
Oh, rookie mistake.
The Chairman now recognizes the Congresswoman from Indiana,
Mrs. Brooks.
Mrs. Brooks [continuing]. Having been a former United
States attorney, I actually served at the time that TSA was
formed, and have been a member of the Joint Terrorism Task
Force--have helped lead that effort, and have been involved
with law enforcement and our former agency the FBI for quite a
number of years, and have been a defender of TSA and have even
visited TSA in my new role at the Indianapolis International
Airport just within the last month, and visited with TSA David
Kane running that agency there.
I have certainly been impressed by the manner in which TSA
and your previous agency of FBI goes about making the threat
assessments, goes about making changes in rules and regulations
and the amount of time and effort that goes into making those
changes, and have incredible faith in our law enforcement
agencies.
I know that the Indianapolis Airport is now part of, as we
talk about changes, whether it is in the type of items allowed,
but you have also just started a risk-based security program as
you have mentioned called Managed Inclusion.
It is being piloted at the Indianapolis Airport as well as
Tampa. Can you please expand on that a bit about Managed
Inclusion?
What the experience has been, what the customer experience
has been, how it is being administered, and how it is impacting
not only the efficiency, but what your hope is with respect to
the safety of the passengers and of those who travel, certainly
the pilots and the flight attendants who travel.
How is managed inclusion brought into the whole risk
assessment procedures that TSA is administering?
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you Congresswoman Brooks.
Yes, managed inclusion is a natural outgrowth and one of
the initiatives of risk-based security from the standpoint that
I have heard from this committee many times and from many
Members of Congress and the flying public, the fact that
virtually everybody traveling every day is not a terrorist, so
why treat them as such?
So the idea is to have a PreCheck lane where those who are
in PreCheck and we have had over 7 million people now go
through PreCheck including Indianapolis and I have received
positive reports from David Kane, the FSD there, Federal
Security Director in terms of the interaction and hopefully you
have had a positive experience also.
Managed inclusion is the recognition that if we can assess
with some confidence that travelers who are in a regular lane
do not have an explosive device on them such as we saw in the
video, something like that through a passenger screening
canines who--a dog that screens basically the vapor so it
doesn't pick up on that and then the--protection officers don't
observe any suspicious behavior, then if the regular queue is
busy and the PreCheck lane is not so busy, then people could be
invited to go through that. So we started that November 1 in
Indianapolis.
The day before Thanksgiving, which everybody knows is a
fairly busy travel day, at that checkpoint, of course one of
two checkpoints in Indianapolis, we actually had 31 percent of
the traveling public go through the PreCheck lane and again, it
was a matter of as they went through, they are allowed to keep
their jacket on, their belt, their shoes, their liquids,
aerosol, gels, and their laptop in their carry-on bag.
Then we basically asked them as they came through in terms
of trying to get in terms of trying to get feedback from them,
how was that--people almost unanimously said, hey great,
appreciate this. So we give them cards, say well if you did
enjoy this, basically as a free sample, sign up so you can have
at least a high competency you would be able to go through that
on a regular basis.
So we are piloting it and we will continue that in
Indianapolis, Tampa, and I mentioned Honolulu. We are looking
at some other airports that it might make sense in, but it
really helps us try to provide the most effective in the most
efficient way for the most significant threats.
Mrs. Brooks. Is that essentially the type of system you
used after the Super Bowl in New Orleans and that will there be
those types of efforts at other airports where you have large
conventions and large gatherings of people?
Mr. Pistole. Exactly, Congresswoman.
So the notion that in New Orleans as I mentioned, where
there are special events, where there is a huge influx of
people, we actually sent in over a hundred security officers
and then as we reconfigured the--one of the main checkpoints
where there were six lanes to make five of them basically
PreCheck lanes. So there, even though there are long lines with
these 39,000 people, they, people were moving instead of just
standing there for minutes at a time, people were moving
virtually the entire time and got very positive feedback from a
number of people, especially Ravens fans.
Mrs. Brooks. Absolutely.
Thank you very much.
I yield back.
Mr. Hudson. Thank the gentlelady. I see that the gentlelady
from Hawaii, Ms. Gabbard has also joined us today. I ask
unanimous consent that she be permitted to participate.
Without objection, so ordered.
At this time, the Chairman will recognize the gentlelady
from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
Congratulations for your leadership of the committee.
Congratulations to my friend and colleagues, Mr. Richmond for
his service as the Ranking Member. Mr. Pistole, welcome, and as
you know, we have had a very strong working relationship along
with the Ranking Member over a number of years.
I remember distinctly the creation of TSA being on the
Select Committee on Homeland Security and I remember distinctly
sort of directing the TSO process of recruitment to be more
effective way before your time to reach out into neighborhoods
across America and I think you have generated a team that is
committed. I have supported you in your uniform change. I have
supported you in the sense of the law enforcement concept. I
congratulated you on the Democratic Convention and how
professional those individuals were.
Let me also acknowledge, Tom McDaniels, who I know is well-
trained having come from this committee who is here with you
right in back of you.
But let me say that process is obviously a concern and I
have always commented that to hear an announcement in the news
however a Member might have missed some other notice to their
office is really both disappointing and challenging because you
are associated with TSOs and I have spent a lot of my
legislative career defending the competency of such.
Let me just ask a quick question, how will sequester impact
you--it needs to be quick--I understand there might be a
thousand that is going out by attrition and others. Can you
just say yes, about a thousand will go out through attrition or
retirement?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, about a thousand through the end of May--
--
Ms. Jackson Lee. Will you cut any others on top of that?
Mr. Pistole. Well so we have not put a hiring freeze on yet
and we are just starting to limit overtime slightly but as----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So there may be longer lines?
Mr. Pistole. There may be later this spring clearly going
into summer.
Ms. Jackson Lee. When I said was sequester, no one knows
until we get to the epicenter, the crisis, the school let-outs,
et cetera.
So today, as we speak and on April 1, can a mother with two
or three children carry her bottle of water and specialty-type
orange juice through the line?
Mr. Pistole. No, now you say special types, obviously is
uniquely necessary liquid----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me just say, she likes a special
brand, it is not sold in the concessions so these innocent
bottles of orange juice and water cannot be taken in.
Mr. Pistole. They cannot.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If I was to splash a flight attendant with
orange juice and water, and I know there are flight attendants
there and I have great respect for them, I assume they would
still be standing. If it was a bottle of water and I was a
disgruntled passenger----
Mr. Pistole. Yes, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. They would be okay.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We would think. Certainly wouldn't want
them to be thrown but if you just took the water, they would be
okay?
Mr. Pistole. Sure.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So here is the question and let me be
above-board. You may have had a meeting with the flight
attendants. Over the years I have introduced legislation for
mandatory defensive training. You had an answer to a question
that I would beg to differ. You are absolutely right, my good
friend is going to allow me just to share his example.
I thank him for his leadership. You are probably right, Mr.
Pistole, that the airplane would not go down. But what you have
is a compact area that flight attendants are dealing with
passengers and under the new laws, no doors will be open for
their relief.
My question to you, I am going to either leave out the
little manicure set, but if I was to take this knife, and I
like my friend very much, and to go like this to him, would he
bleed?
Mr. Pistole. I assume.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would he bleed?
Mr. Pistole. If you are saying you stabbed him?
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is correct.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right.
Mr. Pistole. I assume he would bleed.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So what we would have is either an
organized series of activities that might injure every single
flight attendant that is on that plane making that plane almost
a moving disaster target.
Now we know that we have some very energetic passengers
potentially that would come to the aid of these flight
attendants. But as far as I am concerned it would be a
demobilized and a crisis situation that would occur and I
understand the logic that says my TSOs have more important work
to do. But my concern is, if it can injure then it is a
problem. Your suggestion is that these are not eligible because
they equate to something that could be explosive.
Some years ago we were talking about technology to detect
what this might be. I am sorry we didn't get to that point. But
the very fact that we have--and I will not do anything to my
good friend--let me clear the record, nor would I do anything
on an airplane.
But we cannot in any way suggest that someone with some
sort of mental illness, some sort of situation that brings
about a tragedy, some series of incidences that we have had
with a airline pilot who had some sort of medical emergency
that required him to be tied down and as I--as I know, let me
just say this, generally speaking, domestic flights--generally
speaking, air marshals are there but no one knows what the
schedule is. I just want to leave it at that. Is that accurate
sir?
Mr. Pistole. Yes ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right.
So here is my final point to the Chairman. A final point
is, it is very difficult for me to believe that we don't have
mandatory training for our flight attendants, that the solution
will be that we will add voluntary hours, and you can answer me
whether you have the money to voluntarily train them I am not
sure, I know it is an airline issue, but that the fact that
that you are allowing a weapon that can cause a terrible injury
and you are allowing it to come on without pausing for a moment
with the concerns of Members of Congress.
I would like this to go back to the drawing table and I
would like Congress not to have to have to introduce
legislation, though I intend to do so for that reason. You need
to stop this now. These cause bleeding, these cause injury,
these can cause a terrible tragedy and I don't want to take it
to the next length, it can possibly cause someone to lose their
life.
Mr. Pistole. If I may respond.
Mr. Hudson. Yes, thank the gentlelady and I will allow the
administrator a brief moment to respond.
Mr. Pistole. Yes, and first, Congresswoman, let me thank
you for your strong support for the workforce at TSA. You have
been a true champion of the workforce throughout your tenure,
so thank you for that.
I think there is a fundamental disagreement of philosophy
as to whether TSA should be responsible for disruptive
passengers who are not terrorists, so I view what the enabling
legislation of TSA and our mandate is to keep terrorists off
planes. So whether the object as I had for almost 27 years as
an FBI agent having a weapon on me, a hand gun when I traveled
because I was authorized to carry that, that not of concern
because my--there was no intent to do harm.
If the suggestion is that we should somehow be able to
screen for mentally and unbalanced or people who drink too much
on flights and to try to keep them off the plane, I believe
that is outside the scope of our mandate and we sure don't have
the budget to do that. So, I don't think you are suggesting
that but I just wanted to be clear that that is not what we are
focused on.
The fact is, there are so many objects already on flights
that can cause the type of harm you are talking about, my
question would be what is the intent of the person with that
dangerous object? If it is a person as you describe versus a
terrorist, then it is a challenge and I think it is a good idea
to work with the airlines to provide additional training on a
four flight crew, everybody involved and we do not have the
funding for that.
Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the administrator for the answer.
We understand we have a hard stop at 4:30 and so I want to
get through Mr. Payne and Ms. Gabbard's questions, and my hope
is we can get through a second round as quickly as possible.
Ms. Gabbard. I thank the Chairman.
Mr. Hudson. At this point, the Chairman recognizes the
gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to thank the Ranking Member, Mr. Richmond on
the committee, and also the Ranking Member of the whole
committee, for being here.
You know, in just listening to you, Mr. Pistole, you know,
I don't remember hearing you say that the TSO has more
important things to do, but, you know, I don't think there is
anything more important than making sure and securing the
safety of passengers. Irrespective of what size the knife is, I
think it is a flawed policy.
If for the reasons that you must mentioned, why give anyone
another opportunity if they are intoxicated, if they are
mentally ill, to--for them to be in the position to have
something that they then could use is a problem. So--but that
is not my main focus. The committee has done a great job in
bringing that issue to light.
I represent the 10th Congressional district of New Jersey
that includes Newark Airport, which has unfortunately had a
troubling security record over the last several years. It is
interesting, you know, one of the planes that emanated in 9/11
came out of Newark, and the reason that this committee exists
now because of that tragic event, you know, 11 years ago.
Major security breaches continue to occur there. So I am
deeply concerned that the proper resources are not being
allocated to Newark Liberty, and that insufficient training is
being--is not being conducted to ensure that TSA management has
the resources and the ability what was necessary to make travel
safe and secure for the people in my district and the millions
of people who use that airport every year.
You know, these breaches are nothing less than alarming.
Just last week, the press reported on some very disconcerting
results of a covert so-called ``red team'' test that was
conducted by TSA at Newark International Airport. It was
reported that the TSA had failed to detect a fake bomb being
carried through the airport by an undercover TSA investigator.
Now, in its response to this, TSA stated that due to the
security-sensitive nature of these tests, TSA does not publicly
share the details about how they are conducted and what
specifically is tested or the outcomes.
You know, nevertheless, you know, I opened a newspaper
today to read another report stating TSA does not report all
incidents to its management and that Newark Airport is one of
the worst offenders.
Now, if the details of security-sensitive-nature tests are
not being released to the public, I want to know how I read
this in the press. So my first question to you is: What is
being done to make sure that these major breaches at one of the
most busy airports in the Nation are not reoccurring?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Congressman.
First, we have a strong Federal security director there,
Don Drummer, who works closely with the Port Authority police.
I met with Mr. Foye--the head PAP--Pat Foye last week and head
of security with the Port Authority in New York to go over some
of those issues, because we have had some incidents at Newark.
The whole purpose of the red team testing--those are our
folks who I would describe as ``super terrorists,'' because
they know exactly what the technology's capabilities are of
detection. They know exactly what our protocols are. They can
create and devise and conceal items that only the best
terrorist in the world would be able--not even the best
terrorists would be able to do. So these are super terrorists
in terms of covert testing.
I would be glad to give you--show you the exact item that
was used in that covert testing. I did that yesterday with the
flight attendants' representatives in a classified setting. So
you can see what the object is and how it was concealed. I will
tell you exactly what happened. We just don't publish that
because we don't want terrorists to----
Mr. Payne. I am not very concerned about what the item is.
I am concerned how it got through.
Mr. Pistole. Well, I think if you saw the item and got a
description of what the covert test was, you would have an
appreciation for how it got through and where we did not do the
job we should have. So we give immediate feedback to the
security officer who was close, but missed it. Then we then use
that as a training tool for the rest of our workforce.
Mr. Payne. So, you know, I am very concerned about the
press getting this if it is a covert operation. You know,
terrorists read newspapers as well.
Mr. Pistole. I am concerned about that also, Congressman.
That--they should never become public. Somebody leaked that
information. I don't know who. We are looking into that. If we
find out who leaked that information, whether it was a TSA
employee or another agency, there is a number of--we did--that
happened on February 9, and then it was briefed 2 weeks later.
It was the day of the briefing to a number of people where it
got leaked to the New York Post.
Mr. Payne. Okay.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Payne. I yield back.
Mr. Hudson. The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from
Hawaii, Ms. Gabbard.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to
you and the Ranking Member and Members of the committee for
allowing me to participate.
I just have one question. I will try to keep it brief.
Administrator Pistole, thanks for being here.
In your prepared testimony, you cited TSA's efforts to
expand active military members' access to PreCheck. I applaud
this effort. I have had the honor and privilege of serving with
many amazing heroes in our country, but have some concerns that
have been brought up by the Wounded Warrior Project that the
screening of severely injured and disabled service members and
veterans is frequently a confusing and humiliating process.
The screening that we have heard is often inconsistent with
published TSA protocols and results in some negative
experiences for these great individuals, such as removing
clothing items, belts or shoes can be difficult with someone
who has lost an arm or a leg, for example. We have also heard
of complaints about the--scope--which your screeners use, that
it can be viewed by others, and veterans being asked to remove
clothing in front of other travelers or remove their
prostheses, despite guidance that the screening can be done
without that removal.
So I am aware of the call center that has been established.
Two questions--I am curious how many people actually use the
call center, as well as besides that what is being done to
ensure that they receive a screening experience that is
dignified?
Mr. Pistole. Well, thank you, Congresswoman, for your
interest. I share your concern about the way we treat these
heroes. We are making progress in terms of how we deal with
wounded warriors, particularly--local here, where they are
released from Walter Reed and they go to Reagan or Dulles
Airport and it is their first flight.
We do have much improved protocols there because we see a
number of wounded warriors. Part of our challenge is around the
country, and in Honolulu, I will take a look at that.
I don't know the answer--the number off-hand in terms of
the call center. We do receive most of the calls are questions
of information, rather than complaint. I would be glad to share
that with you. I just don't have those details.
We are putting out a new overall policy and protocols for
persons with disabilities which could encompass a wounded
warrior. So anybody with a medical situation, anything that
could be considered out of the norm where they may need
additional assistance, customer engagement, we have in all 450
airports designed what we call ``passenger support
specialists.'' This is something Congress urged us to do a
couple of years ago. We have put that in place now.
So there is an individual at every airport that can--is
there to assist, particularly the wounded warriors who need
that.
I am given a note on the call center. In fiscal year 2013
thus far, we have had 20,000 calls. I would be glad to give you
a breakdown of that.
Ms. Gabbard. Thank you. I would appreciate that information
mostly because, as you said, this may be working for the first
flight, for people who are leaving the hospital and making
their way back home. But as you know, these are people who are
facing incredible challenges for prolonged periods of time, not
only for themselves, but for their families, and should not be
subjected to this type of treatment.
Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentlelady.
We are up against a 4:30 hard stop. We will try to get in a
second round of questions here. I will begin by recognizing
myself.
Administrator Pistole, it appears to me that every year,
even with budget cuts, the number of personnel at TSA continues
to grow. Just last week, we also saw on the news an order for
$50 million in new uniforms that were partially made in Mexico,
and learned that as part of the union-led agreement, the
Transportation Security Officer's uniform allowance nearly
doubled to $446 per year, which is more than the basic uniform
allowance for service members in the Army, Air Force, Coast
Guard, and Marines and Navy.
This leads me to wonder, is risk-based security failing to
work? Or are we ignoring the efficiencies that it is supposed
to bring about?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Chairman.
First, that we had a contract expiring February 17 on the
uniforms. DHS writ large started an initiative 2 years ago, I
believe it was, for all departments of officers with uniforms
to have a consolidated contract to achieve efficiencies and
save money. That is still in process, so we had a contract
expire on February 17.
The $50 million is actually the cap for 2 years, rather
than what has been reported that--for 1-year cost. So that is
for 2 years. It is up from 2012. Part of that is because of the
collective bargaining agreement. We did increase the uniform
alliance. That is one of the 11 items that we agreed to
negotiate with the union on.
So we did give them an additional allowance. It is still
well below the OPM allowance, the overall allowance. I have a
chart that I would be glad to share with the subcommittee
comparing it to DOD in terms of officers and enlisted and how
that all comes out. There has been a lot of misreporting on
that, I will say, and so we will be glad to give you the
figures to address--exactly address that.
So I share your concern about the costs and will look to
keep that in line.
Mr. Hudson. But in terms of personnel growth, is it that
risk-based security is not working? Or is it that for some
reason we haven't seen the ability to find efficiencies?
Mr. Pistole. No. Actually, we have found efficiencies. I
will say there was a significant increase between 2010 and
2011. Also in 2011, we had additional officers which was a
response--administration-Congressional response to the
Christmas day attack of 2009. Then additional advances in
technology and staffing to try to detect those nonmetallic,
along with VIPERs, K-9s, and inspectors. So those were all
things that were added to our budget so then that was--we have
the increase from that.
So that was really the defining point. I do expect to see
some efficiencies down the road as risk-based security matures
and we are able to put more people through the PreCheck lanes.
I just don't have the figures for you now, but I look forward
to working with you on that.
Mr. Hudson. Absolutely. That will be my interest, as well
as looking for ways to find these efficiencies to reduce the
cost to the taxpayer as we get smarter and leaner at what we
are doing, so thank you.
I am gonna yield back the balance of my time to allow the
Ranking Member an opportunity to follow the question.
So at this time, I recognize the gentleman from Louisiana,
Mr. Richmond.
Mr. Richmond. Administrator Pistole, what I will do is just
ask all of my questions up front so that you can answer them,
and I will try to leave some time for the Ranking Member of the
full committee. I will leave some time for him, but, like I
say, the Ranking Member of the full committee.
Going back to what Congresswoman Gabbard said about our
wounded warriors, if there is any set of people in this country
that deserve to have their own PreCheck, Trusted Traveler, or
Global Entry, then it is our wounded warriors. Then I would
just ask that we consider putting them in a Trusted Traveler or
PreCheck so that they don't do it.
I have personally witnessed it happen to wounded warriors.
It is not something that they deserve. I know that you share
that sentiment.
Mr. Pistole. I would agree.
Mr. Richmond. So I am asking that we really look into
figuring out a program for them, whether it is a pilot, whether
it is including them in another.
In with that, I have been getting a lot of complaints from
my local airport about the treatment of TSA officers that are
there. I know that there are some EEOC complaints and some
others.
I think that in the court documents, you have--your office
has argued that you all are exempt from a lot of those
employment laws. Besides--can you give me a list of the ones
that you think you are exempt from?
Mr. Pistole. I am not sure what the individuals will be
referring to, Congressman. When Congress created us and the
administration created us, they did create us as a hybrid or a
unique organization that was not necessarily Title V, the
normal employment rules in there.
We have been in discussions about other opportunities for
employees, and I would have to look at in detail what they
would be referring to.
Mr. Richmond. Well, I will get you that list. I will also
get you a letter detailing the complaints that I have received
from my local agents as I walk through the airport. Now it is
turning into e-mails and phone calls about just unfair work
conditions and harassment and retaliation.
I would just give you an example, because I think Super
Bowl was a phenomenal success.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you.
Mr. Richmond. The airport and TSA provided the workers on
the line with water. The water was 3 years old. It was visibly
dirty from storage. So that I think is just an unacceptable
treatment for people who are really working very hard and who
are partners with us.
So I will get you a list. I don't want to take any more
time because I want the Ranking Member to have it. But I would
like a response to those when I get it to you.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes Ranking Minority Member of the
full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson,
for any questions he may have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pistole, last Congress this committee identified a
security gap that would allow an individual on the no-fly list
to take flight training on a plane with a maximum take-off
weight of more than 12,500 pounds.
I would like to have the clerk put on the screen a
situation that occurred in 2010 in Austin, Texas, what happened
when a plane hit buildings like that.
Is that still the case today?
Mr. Pistole. So, there have been steps taken under risk-
based security to assess vulnerabilities and the consequences
of something like this happening.
As I recall now, the Cessna single engine may be 3,000
pounds or something. So, what we have done is work with FAA to
limit the time that a person would be able to be FAA--get an
FAA airman certificate before they would be able to solo. Then,
of course, they have the medical exam requirements.
So that time is down to within a few days.
But, to answer your question, yes, there still is a--a gap
there that somebody--a U.S. citizen, not a non-U.S. citizen--a
U.S. citizen could--but they would not be able to solo. They
would be with a flight instructor. So a lot of the issues that
were raised previously have been addressed, but there is still
that--issue.
Mr. Thompson. I can appreciate it. But right now, we can
train a person to fly who is on the no-fly list. There is
nothing to prevent us from training.
Mr. Pistole. So they could be trained in the sense that
they would be with an instructor and then they would submit
their application or they could get the temporary FAA
certificate. But they would not be able to solo. They would not
be able to----
Mr. Thompson. I understand. But if I am a bad guy, I don't
need the certificate or anybody else. You have taught me how to
fly the plane.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. I am on the no-fly list.
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. At this point, that is still the case.
Mr. Pistole. That is the case. That still is an issue that
has to be addressed.
Mr. Thompson. What is your plan on addressing it?
Mr. Pistole. Yes, so, it is--out there and I welcome
Congress' look at how that could be addressed. But it really is
a matter of the timing of making sure that the check against
the terrorist watch list is done prior to certification.
Mr. Thompson. Can you just set a policy that----
Mr. Pistole. Well, sir, FAA also, so we need to work with
FAA. We can set the policy but they are the ones who issue the
certificate.
Mr. Thompson. So, are you prepared to tell the committee
that since we can train somebody to fly who is on the no-fly
list, it is your recommendation that that person not be allowed
to fly unless they are first pre-cleared to not be on the no-
fly list?
Mr. Pistole. Well, that would be the best security. There
is a lot of aspects to that.
Mr. Thompson. I guess I am not trying to do semantics, Mr.
Pistole. Right now, some of us see that as a problem, that we
can still train people to fly who are on the no-fly list. I
think if that requires legislation, which it should not, and I
think we will talk to you and people at the FAA to see if we
can get it resolved.
Mr. Pistole. So far, you have just addressed that briefly.
The other aspect, which you are not asking about, but is the
intelligence collection which a no-fly person----
Mr. Thompson. I asked the question that I wanted to. It
doesn't matter whether I didn't ask about anything else.
Mr. Pistole. I was offering additional information that may
help----
Mr. Thompson. That is fine. All I want to know is: Do you
train people to fly who are on the no-fly list? The answer I
would assume is yes.
Mr. Pistole. Some private flight schools can train anybody
who comes in.
Mr. Thompson. That is fine.
Mr. Pistole. Hopefully, if they are on the no-fly list, my
former organization, Joint Terrorism Task Force, would know
that person is going to a flight school, and that is my point.
Mr. Thompson. Right, Mr. Chairman, do you plan to cooperate
with EEOC on their investigation with TSA?
Mr. Pistole. We have been cooperating. We plan to continue
cooperating on whatever issues there are.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentleman, I thank Administrator
Pistole for his testimony, and Members for their questions.
Members of the committee may have some additional questions for
the witness, and we will ask that you respond to these in
writing.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Richard Hudson for John S. Pistole
Question 1. As you know, this subcommittee has previously expressed
interest in the status of the Repair Station Security Rule that has
been pending now for a decade. The consequence of this Government
inaction and the subsequent ban on FAA's ability to certificate new
foreign repair stations impedes U.S. manufacturers' and aviation
maintenance companies' ability to compete in the global marketplace. At
the same time, TSA in 2011 communicated to industry that the rule would
be completed in the fourth quarter of 2012. It is the committee's
understanding that TSA had sent the rulemaking to DHS late last summer
and DHS finished their review of the rulemaking early this year.
According to the Office of Management and Budget, however, they have
not yet received the rule. What is your understanding of the status of
this rulemaking? Should we ask for a time frame?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. We've heard positive feedback from the air cargo
industry about TSA and CBP's Air Cargo Advance Screening pilot. Can you
provide us an update on that program? Are you close to issuing new
regulations?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. You recently said that by the end of this year, 25
percent of all travelers would be eligible for some form of expedited
screening.
How confident are you that TSA will achieve that goal?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3b. Can you explain how you intend to reach the 25
percent?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3c. What percentage of passengers currently goes through
expedited screening?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3d. How many PreCheck airports will there be by year 2014?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. We've received notification that NetJets and several
other charter companies have had difficulty or have been denied from
joining the Known Crewmember Program despite the fact that they must
undergo the same rigorous safety training and background checks as
commercial pilots. Can you provide this committee with information
regarding the reasoning behind TSA's decision to exclude these
particular groups?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. Furthermore, there have been reports of harassment and
invasive searches performed on these pilots as a result of their
appearance as commercial air crew, but inability to prove Known
Crewmember status. In several cases at White Plains, NY, Columbus,
Ohio, and Manchester, NH, it appears as though there has been a
concerted effort by TSA to single out NetJets' pilots, even going so
far as to humiliate them by announcing their arrival at security over
the terminal's PA system. Can you assure this committee that you will
look into these reported incidents and that if they have occurred you
will work to rectify the situation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. Don't you think it's a little confusing to have so many
trusted traveler-type programs within the Department of Homeland
Security? I count 7--PreCheck, Active Duty Military, People under 12
and over 75, Known Crewmember, Global Entry, NEXUS, and SENTRI.
``Global Entry Light'' makes 8. Has there been any effort to
consolidate these programs?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
TSA'S EFFORTS TO ADVANCE RISK-BASED SECURITY: STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVES
----------
Thursday, April 11, 2013
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:03 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Richard Hudson
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Hudson, Rogers, Brooks, McCaul,
Richmond, Jackson Lee, Swalwell, and Thompson.
Mr. Hudson. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security will come to order. The
subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony from
transportation security stakeholders on TSA's risk-based
security programs. I now recognize myself for an opening
statement.
I would like to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses
for taking the time to prepare for and participate in this
hearing. TSA's risk-based security has many stakeholders, all
with a vested interest in seeing continued security and
efficiency success. These include domestic and international
airlines, airports, flight crew personnel, passengers, State
and local governments, freight forwarders, manufacturers, and
many others. The purpose of this committee is to provide an
open process for these voices and many others.
Stakeholders across the board have been very vocal about
the changes that TSA is making to its operations, and today's
hearing represents just one of many opportunities to examine
these alterations. While today's time frame does not allow for
every group to be represented on the panel, we have invited
several to submit a written statement for the record.
We all may not agree on the decisions that should be made,
but I hope we can all agree that these are incredibly important
discussions and debates that we are engaged in. Moving forward,
I hope that we will continue to work together in order to
better understand how we can improve passenger safety, ease of
travel, and ultimately implement leaner, more efficient
policies throughout the system.
One of the key ways to accomplish this is to work directly
with TSA to ensure that expectations are met and standards
assured. However, for this to occur, TSA must become more
transparent and communicate more effectively. This will allow
travelers and all stakeholders to gain a greater understanding
of why they are being subjected to one type of screening versus
alternate methods, for example.
Carie Lemac, whose mother, Judy Larocque, died on American
Airlines Flight 11 on September 11, made a critical point in a
recent op-ed. She said, and I quote: ``When travelers are aware
that the threat is real, they are the largest and most likely
effective group of behavior detection officers we can hope for.
But right now, they are not aware.''
TSA's failure to work with all stakeholders and effectively
message new policies has consistently led to pushback. This
particular snag is where TSA has repeatedly demonstrated a
lackluster performance.
At this time, I would like to submit Ms. Lemack's op-ed, as
well as a written statement from Ms. Lemack, for the hearing
record. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Editorial Submitted For the Record by Chairman Hudson
carie lemack: tsa's knife reversal is part of its job
TSA's decision to remove some banned items is less important than
behavior detection.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Carie Lemack, March 14, 2013.--Last week, the Transportation
Security Administration announced its decision to allow weapons onto
planes. A little more than a decade has passed since terrorists boarded
the same flight as my mom, Judy Larocque, and used box cutters as their
weapon of choice to begin the deadliest attack on our Nation's soil.
Now TSA officials are permitting passengers to carry on small blades,
bats and other potentially deadly items. Have they forgotten?
The answer is, no.
TSA, like so many of us directly affected by 9/11, operates with
the memory of the attacks etched into every fiber of the organization.
At first glance, I want to condemn its officials for allowing weapons
back on planes. But I am obliged to understand the reasoning behind the
changes, and perhaps more important owe it to my mom and to the many
others who were lost, to support efforts to improve our Nation's safety
and security, even when it is uncomfortable to do so.
It is far too easy to decry TSA's changes to the prohibited list of
items allowed to be brought onto a plane, though some have good reason
to do so. I do not fault flight attendants and others who feel their
safety and security are at risk, because it is. However, it is not
TSA's role to remove all threats to people on planes.
Role of the agency
According to its website, TSA ``was created to strengthen the
security of the Nation's transportation systems and ensure the freedom
of movement for people and commerce.'' As officials have repeatedly
claimed, their goal is to prevent a catastrophic attack, not one that
affects a handful of people. Not much comfort to a flight attendant
accosted by an unruly passenger with a newly approved small blade, but
then again, any sharp object, be it a pen or a first-class passenger's
metal silverware, can be used to cause harm by someone bent on doing
so.
And that is the crux of the issue. For years, security experts have
been calling for ``risk-based'' approaches to aviation security. Focus
on keeping the bad guys off the plane, not the bad items. It's how the
Israelis, largely considered the gold standard in aviation security,
have been doing it for decades.
In my view, perhaps the biggest challenge posed by the change in
the prohibited items list is that of the message it sends to other
travelers. Too many think the changes reflect a decrease in the threat
to our aviation sector. This is simply not true. But too little
attention is paid to reminding people (without scaring them) that
dedicated terrorists remain determined to strike at American aircraft.
Remember Richard Reid (more commonly known as the ``shoe bomber''),
or Christmas day 2009 (when the so-called underwear bomber tried to
blow up a plane over Detroit), or the cargo planes scheduled to
transport doctored printer cartridges, timed to explode over U.S.
airspace, had the plot not been thwarted at the last second.
Public awareness
All risk-based approaches to security are founded on behavior
detection. When travelers are aware that the threat is real, they are
the largest and likely most effective group of behavior-detection
officers we could hope for. But right now, they are not aware. And this
is where TSA has fallen down on the job.
If TSA wants to focus on a risk-based approach to security,
allowing certain weapons on planes is not the complete picture. It
needs a full cadre of specially trainer officers (today fewer than 10%
of screeners are fully trained in behavior detection) and system-wide
adoption of the technique (currently, only a handful of airports fully
utilize the system).
But perhaps most important, officials need to clearly inform the
American public that the threat is real, and that it will take each of
us doing our part to defend against it. Whether it means paying more
attention in public areas, being prepared when going through security
lines so the officers can more efficiently do their jobs, or advising
authorities when spotting something that does not look right, we all
need to chip in. And if we do, let's just hope we can be ready should
someone decide to pick a knife fight in the sky.
Carie Lemack is a daughter of Judy Larocque, who was killed on
American Airlines Flight 11, and director of the Homeland Security
Project at the Bipartisan Policy Center.
______
Statement of Carie Lemack, Director, Homeland Security Project,
Bipartisan Policy Center and Daughter, Judy Larocque (passenger on
AA11)
April 11, 2013
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Richmond, Members of the committee, I
appreciate the opportunity to submit my thoughts on the need for the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to conduct risked-based
security, as well as the need for thoughtful public discourse by our
lawmakers and all stakeholders on the issues surrounding the safety and
security of the American people.
The recent proposed changes to the prohibited item list (PIL) and
the ensuing outcry from certain stakeholders remind me how important it
is that we not allow our emotions nor complacency to restrict us to a
narrow view of what transportation security needs to be. Rather, our
safety and security depend on keeping the big picture in mind, on
remaining vigilant to the constant, real, and ever-evolving threat our
transportation sector faces.
Sadly, my family knows far too well what happens when complacency
and a narrow view of what can happen dictate how we handle security. On
the morning of September 11, 2001, the morning that my mom, Judy
Larocque boarded American Airlines 11, the prevailing views were that
hijackings were crimes committed by political activists, not suicide
bombers. We now realize that the threat is far greater than to those
who simply work and travel on aircraft. The threat whose last line of
defense is at an airport security checkpoint is against thousands of
innocent people potentially hundreds of miles from the airport itself.
I never expected to become an expert in aviation security, and
would gladly have traveled down another career path, one my mom would
have supported and cheered me on in. I do not have that luxury. Today
my sister and I have to live a life without my mother. Mom will never
know her grandchildren. She will never give us another hug, nor ever
say our names again.
It is because of what happened to her that I am submitting
testimony today. Transportation security is too important to allow
politics or misunderstandings to come in the way of what is best for
the American public. It disheartens me that the discourse I have seen
since the proposed PIL changes were announced are not as productive as
I hope they could and should be.
TSA is proposing to allow small blades on planes. When I first
heard the news, I admit I was shocked. But I have met with many
Transportation Security Officers (TSOs), many officials who work at TSA
headquarters, and even two TSA administrators. I know these people on
the whole to be as concerned with the safety and the security of the
American public as I am. They are intelligent individuals who I believe
would not want to endanger the traveling public. I decided not to let
my initial emotional reaction be the only thing to color my view of the
change.
So I listened and learned. I found out that the new PIL would be
more in line with international regulations, though more strict. Having
flown on a large number of international carriers around the globe, I
recognized that if I had not let their standards affect my willingness
to fly then, why would I change my mind now?
I also realized that while it felt uncomfortable to say ``knives
will be back on planes'', the reality is, they are already are. First-
class passengers receive knives with their meals. Knitting needles,
tweezers, and so many other sharp objects are permissible under today's
standards. And, as we all know, it is simply a fact that an active
imagination can turn even the most innocuous-seeming object on an
aircraft into a lethal weapon, should they have the intent.
And that is how I ultimately came to my most important decision--
the only way to have truly risk-based security is to focus on the
dangerous people, not just the dangerous objects. I cannot claim to
have invented this notion. As anyone who has flown into or out of Ben
Gurion Airport outside of Tel Aviv knows, this is exactly how the
Israelis handle transportation security. Risk-based security is a
method that, to date, has worked with great success for them and can in
the United States as well if given the chance and resources.
However, this approach is neither simple nor inexpensive. TSOs need
proper training. Currently, less than 10% of the work force has had
such training, and behavior detection, as this type of security is
called, is implemented in only a handful of airports. I hope this
committee will focus on the need for more training and for broader
implementation of the one method that, if correctly executed, is
considered to be the gold standard of aviation security.
It saddens me that so much of the rhetoric surrounding the proposed
changes to the PIL has focused on whether or not small blades can cause
harm. Of course they can. No one disputes that. Does a flight attendant
have every reason to worry about an unruly passenger assaulting him or
her with a blade? Of course he or she does. But that threat already
exists, and will continue to exist even if all blades are banned. There
are simply too many ways one can hypothesize that a member of the
flight crew or a passenger could be harmed on an aircraft for that to
be the discussion.
TSA's role is ``to strengthen the security of the Nation's
transportation systems and ensure the freedom of movement for people
and commerce.'' Even the 9/11 Commission, led by Governor Tom Kean and
Congressman Lee Hamilton, now co-chairs of the Bipartisan Policy
Center's Homeland Security Project, recognized the need to focus on the
threats to the entire aircraft, recommending in their report that ``The
TSA and the Congress must give priority attention to improving the
ability of screening checkpoint to detect explosives on passengers''
(The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: Official Government Edition,
2004).
While no one wants to see anyone injured on an aircraft, least of
all those whose job it is to keep people safe, TSA simply cannot
protect against every conceivable type of possible injury. Rather, TSA
is looking to prevent catastrophic attacks, and they have come to the
reasoned decision that those items proposed to be taken off the PIL
cannot cause a catastrophic attack. I note that the box-cutters and
mace instrumental to the attack on my mom's plane remain on the PIL.
I may be naive, but I remain hopeful that ALL stakeholders (and I
believe that is the entire American public) can agree that TSA has a
very difficult, but important job, and that we all must come together
to help them do it. If we disagree with a decision, we need to come up
with a practical solution to the issue being addressed, not just
complain. Instead of mocking the men and women who chose to be on the
front lines of transportation security on shows like ``Saturday Night
Live'' (something I will note would never be acceptable to do to other
law enforcement or military personnel), we need to stand with them and
accept that our safety and security is something we all need to be
engaged in.
Finally, we need to remember that the threat facing our
transportation sector is very real. While Richard Reid (who you might
remember as the failed shoe bomber), Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
(otherwise known as the ``underwear bomber''), and Ibrahim Hassan al-
Asiri (the al-Qaeda explosives expert believed to have constructed the
printer cartridge bombs in 2010) may not be household names, their
colleagues are still bent on causing destruction to American aircraft
and American lives. We cannot rest on the success of TSOs, intelligence
officials, and countless others who have kept us safe since the day my
mom boarded AA11--we must be one step ahead of those looking to board
future flights with intent to harm. We need to unite as a Nation in
this effort, and remember that we are all on the same side. I am
grateful for the time and effort that you and your dedicated staff are
devoting to this most important issue and thank you for the opportunity
to contribute to this hearing.
Mr. Hudson. Every day, TSA's operations impact millions of
travelers directly through their screening operations, but
there are millions more Americans whose taxes help fund TSA,
even if they have never set foot inside an airport. As an
advocate for my Congressional district, for example, as all of
us up here, we represent approximately 750,000 potential
fliers. The Charlotte Douglas Airport, right outside my
district, saw over 41 million travelers in 2012.
Helping to facilitate this travel in a safer, easier way
benefits everyone. Whether it is a business transporting
freight, families taking a vacation, a salesman traveling for
work, or Grandma trying to visit for the holidays, beyond the
dollars and cents, there is a human element to risk-based
security, or RBS.
With that in mind, I make some specific points, and I look
forward to discussing these and other issues in great detail
today. No. 1, RBS is in desperate need of private-sector
ingenuity. Take PreCheck, for example. The administrator's goal
is to have one in four travelers go through some form of
expedited screening by the end of the year. While this is
certainly a worthy goal that I support, the Federal Government
simply can't do it alone.
Marketing the programs to travelers, streamlining agency-
wide operations, and simplifying the screening experience will
take private-sector innovation. TSA must be willing to partner
in order to reach this goal.
No. 2, these programs allow our screeners to be more
efficient. Spending less energy on those that are low-risk
means that screeners are able to spend more time looking for
those items that present the greatest threats to passengers and
crewmembers. RBS allows us to prioritize in a manner that
better ensures security while easing the burdens on travelers,
businesses, and screeners.
No. 3, we must find a way to conduct screening at a lower
cost. Risk-based security is not only about targeting resources
towards the threats; it is also about reducing wasteful
spending on screening low-risk people and goods.
We must look for efficiencies in the current system, and
while many have been proposed by experts and the Government
Accountability Office and other groups, and through such
programs as the Screening Partnership Program, there remain
several recommendations that deserve to be fully evaluated. The
bottom line is, TSA must do a better job of generating tangible
cost savings as a result of risk-based security.
Yesterday, Congress received the President's fiscal year
2014 budget, which included $7.4 billion for TSA. While I am
pleased to see that there is a slight reduction in the current
funding levels, given our fiscal situation, as well as a strong
emphasis on risk-based security on the budget, I am
disappointed that TSA was unable to find more significant cost
savings overall. I believe risk-based security is an excellent
opportunity for finding efficiencies and saving tax dollars. I
intend to press TSA on that issue and look forward to our
witnesses' testimony and perspective on that, as well.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of
the subcommittee, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond,
for any statements that he may have.
Mr. Richmond. First, let me thank Chairman Hudson and the
Ranking Member of the full committee, Mr. Thompson, from
Mississippi, for their work and leadership that they have
provided.
I want to welcome the witnesses today, because you all are
the stakeholders in TSA's risk-based screening effort, and I
look forward to hearing your thoughts. One of the things that I
try to pride myself on is knowing what I know, but more
importantly, knowing what I don't know and relying on those
people who do it every day for their expertise.
So as we develop policy from the sky down, we really need
to get the input from people who are on the ground and have to
implement it and know how practically to get it accomplished.
Last month, Administrator Pistole testified before the
subcommittee and presented his vision for TSA as an
intelligence-driven, risk-based counterterrorism agency. I
appreciate the administrator's efforts to implement policies
that reject a one-size-fits-all security philosophy. He has
modified several screening processes to accommodate passengers
with disabilities, children, and the elderly. He continues to
work on expanding a Trusted Traveler program which will
hopefully expedite screening operations and reduce lines at
checkpoints.
I was very happy to learn of the administrator's recent
announcement that TSA will allow active-duty members of the
military to participate in the PreCheck program. He has also
agreed to establish a program that will ease screening active-
duty wounded warriors and veterans.
These efforts demonstrate a commitment to engaging in a
rigorous risk analysis and making common-sense changes to
policies impacting the flying public. In addition to being
common-sense changes, these new policies are entirely
consistent with TSA's mandate to ensure the safety and security
of the traveling public against acts of criminal violence.
The successes of these risk-based strategies are a direct
result of the active engagement and involvement of
stakeholders. That is why it is important that we hear from
those stakeholders today, those who work in the airports with
the traveling public and the contractors who supply services to
TSA. As we all know, the people working in the trenches are the
first to know and understand when something will not work. We
need to understand the issues they face and how they believe
TSA can better secure the flying public.
Last, Mr. Chairman, in recent weeks, there has been much
controversy surrounding the administrator's announcement to
remove certain knives from the prohibited items list. There is
no doubt in my mind that the process of bringing in
stakeholders and soliciting their advice could have been
handled a whole lot better.
As I said at the hearing last month, I do not believe that
decisions like these can be made in a vacuum. There must be a
conversation and advanced warning to stakeholders, especially
those implementing the changes and those most affected by them.
Moving forward, we must be deliberative in our efforts to
institute risk-based policies and utilize existing mechanisms
like the Aviation Security Advisory Committee to engage all
stakeholders before making final policy decisions.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of
the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr.
Thompson, for any statement that he may have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would also want to
thank our witnesses for appearing today.
Since TSA's policy change regarding the prohibited items
list was announced, Members on both sides of the aisle have
expressed deep frustration with TSA's failure to formally
engage the stakeholders impacted by the decision, such as
flight attendants and the front-line workforce.
Two weeks ago, I, along with over 130 other Members of
Congress, wrote the TSA administrator to express our concerns
about the failure to formally consult stakeholders before
implementing a policy change that will permit passengers to
carry knives on a plane. If anyone doubts the potential danger
of small knives, I hope that Tuesday's tragic event at Lone
Star Community College will serve as a wake-up call.
Unfortunately, despite these tragic events, it is my
understanding that the knives on a plane rule will take effect
as planned. In an effort to avoid such missteps by TSA in the
future, I recently introduced a bipartisan Aviation Security
Stakeholders Participation Act of 2013. This legislation
requires TSA to formally engage key stakeholders through the
Aviation Security Advisory Committee when developing policies
that impact millions of passengers and stakeholders. Today,
this committee will demonstrate the value of consultation with
those affected by the policy decisions that we in Congress and
the administration make.
I look forward to hearing from all the witnesses we have
here today. I am particularly eager to hear from Mr. Borer, the
general counsel for the American Federation of Government
Employees, regarding the impact TSA's recent decision to remove
knives from the prohibited items list will have on screeners
and the directions they have received from TSA.
Regardless of the policy at issue, its implementation can
only be successful if the front-line workforce has clear
direction on how to carry it out. I am also interested in
hearing from the witnesses regarding their thoughts on TSA's
shift to a so-called risk-based security model. While the term
risk-based sounds appealing at first glance, I believe we need
to give a close examination of how TSA is defining what
constitutes risk and have a serious discussion about the levels
of risk we are willing to accept.
Prior to 9/11, we accepted the risk of having passenger and
baggage screening conducted by private security companies. In
the aftermath of that tragic day, Congress overwhelmingly
supported Federalizing the screener workforce in an effort to
lessen the risk of another such tragedy occurring.
With time, however, I feel that memories of that day and
the lessons learned have begun to fade, leading the cause for a
massive and even force transition back to a privatized
screening workforce. Last year, in their on-going efforts to
expand the use of contract screeners, critics of TSA placed
language into the conference report for the FAA Authorization
Act allowing subsidiaries of foreign-owned companies to obtain
contracts for screening at domestic commercial airports and
stripping the administrator of his discretion to approve or
deny an airport's application to privatize its screeners
through the Screening Partnership Program.
They did so without any public debate on the changes and
without this committee, the committee of jurisdiction, having a
single Member assigned as a conferee. The Government
Accountability Office recently reported that TSA's evaluation
of contract screeners are insufficient to determine how their
performance compares with Federal screeners. TSA has reported
numerous security breaches by contract screeners, including the
failure to detect prohibited items, improperly clearing
passengers at SPP airports, and mishandling sensitive security
information.
In addition to concerns about performance, there are
serious concerns about cost. According to data provided by TSA,
it cost taxpayers 46 percent more to use contract screeners at
Rochester International Airport in 2012 than it would have cost
to use a Federalized workforce. In response to these concerns,
I, along with Representative Richmond and Lowey, introduced
H.R. 1455, the Contract Screener Reform and Accountability Act,
yesterday. This legislation will prohibit subsidiaries of
foreign-owned corporations from obtaining contracts for
screening services at domestic commercial airports, require all
security breaches at airports with contract screeners to be
reported, require training for the prior proper handling of
sensitive information at SPP airports, and mandate covert
testing of contract screeners and impose penalties of
compromising testing.
I am pleased that Senator Brown of Ohio has introduced
companion legislation in the Senate. I look forward to working
with the Members of this committee to fix the problems
associated with the use of contract screeners prior to calling
for their expanded use.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have several distinguished witnesses
before us today on this important topic. Let me remind the
witnesses that their entire written statements will appear on
the record.
First witness, Mr. Ken Dunlap, currently serves as the
global director for security and travel facilitation at the
International Air Transport Association. The International Air
Transport Association, IATA, is the trade association for the
world's airlines, representing approximately 240 airlines and
84 percent of total international air traffic. IATA supports
many areas of aviation activity and helps formulate industry
policy on critical aviation issues. The Chairman now recognizes
Mr. Dunlap to testify.
STATEMENT OF KEN DUNLAP, GLOBAL DIRECTOR, SECURITY & TRAVEL
FACILITATION, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
Mr. Dunlap. Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond,
Ranking Member of the committee Mr. Thompson, and Members of
the subcommittee, it is really a pleasure to be here to speak
to you today.
You know, aviation is responsible for making the world a
better place, both in terms of the human spirit, connecting
people and cultures, and driving economic growth. It is safe
and secure, and we profoundly thank those who work tirelessly
to keep it so.
There are, though, two central challenges facing civil
aviation here in the United States. First, the Department of
Homeland Security is confronting persistent adversaries engaged
in a cycle of fashioning increasingly sophisticated attacks,
and we all need to be ready. This committee has heard
intelligence estimates describing devices such as the printer
cartridge bombs, underwear bomb No. 1, and the enhanced version
2.0, and that is not to mention gel- and liquid-based
explosives.
Second, passenger numbers are increasing, and we need to
make more room and lessen the hassle. In 2012, airlines
globally carried more than 2.9 billion passengers; 787 million
passengers traveled to, from, and within the United States, and
of that, 718 million passengers flew on U.S. airlines. By 2030,
the footprint of aviation will cover nearly 6 billion
passengers, 82 million jobs, and $6.9 trillion in economic
activity.
These challenges imply that in the future, TSA will need
improved security infrastructure, streamlined operations, and
perhaps most importantly, enhancing focus on risk-based
security. Let me just spend a minute talking about risk-based
security.
So everything comes with risk. You cross the street, you
take a shower, you eat a meal, you go to a conference, you even
testify before Congress, and there is risk, and that is just
life.
Air transport is not any different. However limited, there
is risk. One of the biggest challenges today is striking the
correct balance between risk and regulation. Let me be clear:
We cannot accept 100 percent risk. Any regulation that
completely would eliminate risk would shut down this industry.
That is an equally unacceptable solution.
What is needed is a pragmatic approach that balances the
two, and that means changing our mindset when we regulate. We
have to put desired results at the center of our efforts. We
have to understand that a proliferation of bureaucracy and
rules don't equate to effective passenger security. We have to
recognize that 99.9 percent of all the passengers in all the
air freight we travel--and perhaps even a higher percentage
than that--pose no threat to aviation.
So these are principles that lead us to risk-based
security. So I know that is utopia, but where are we today?
Well, we are spending a lot of money, $8.4 billion a year and
rising, to support security system mandates that have grown
exponentially since 2001, and this is just what the airlines
are required to spend. This is well-intentioned, but not
effective spending.
Next, risk-based security is still in its infancy here in
the United States. TSA has made 14 policy changes in support of
RBS, but they only touch really a small subset of airlines and
passengers. TSA needs to be given the chance to evolve as much
of the system as possible so that the majority of passengers,
airlines, and crew members benefit, and consultation and
collaboration need to be the cornerstones of risk-based
security. Frankly, we are not there yet.
Government and industry have a strong history of working
together on safety. It is a well-developed model for our
collaboration and security.
Last, I want to note that the industry is taking up the
challenge to develop risk-based measures, as well. IATA is
working with public and private partners around the world to
modernize and improve the passenger screening process through
our Checkpoint of the Future program, and we hope that by 2020
passengers can be screened and experience an uninterrupted
journey from curb to aircraft door.
In conclusion, business as usual is simply not an option
anymore for aviation security. Rigid requirements and formulaic
processes need to be replaced by risk assessments, global
standards, and outcome-focused targets.
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, Mr. Thompson,
Members of the committee, thank you again for the opportunity
to speak here. The future of aviation is bright, and your
collaboration is vital to our continued success.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dunlap follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ken Dunlap
April 11, 2013
tsa's efforts to advance risk-based security--stakeholder perspectives
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee it is a pleasure to provide a stakeholder perspective on
TSA's efforts to advance risk-based security.
IATA's 240 member airlines crisscross the globe every day, safely
carrying passengers and cargo to their destinations. Aviation is
responsible for 56.6 million jobs globally and 3.5% of global GDP. Here
in the United States, it contributes $669 billion dollars to the GDP
which is equivalent to 4.9% of the U.S. economy. In 2011, airlines
carried more than 2.8 billion passengers. You've heard all of this
before. But these numbers are expected to grow globally over the coming
years, with nearly 6 billion passengers, 82 million jobs, and $6.9
trillion in economic activity by 2030.
With this projected growth will come the need for improved security
infrastructure, streamlined operations, and, perhaps most importantly,
next generation passenger and cargo screening.
Despite the difficult decade that we have been through, the
industry did not take its eye off of the ball on the top priorities of
safety, security, and sustainability.
We committed to carbon-neutral growth from 2020 and to cut
our net carbon emissions in half by 2050 compared to 2005.
Last year was the safest in aviation history with just 1
accident for every 5 million flights on Western-built jet
aircraft. And there were no hull losses with Western-built jets
among IATA's 240 member airlines.
And we developed a roadmap through 2020 to build a passenger
Checkpoint of the Future.
That said every activity comes with risk. Cross the street, take a
shower, eat a meal, go to a conference, and there is risk. That's life.
Air transport is not different. However limited, there is risk. One of
the biggest challenges today is how we strike the correct balance
between Risk and Regulation.
We cannot accept 100% risk. And any regulation that completely
eliminated risk would shut the industry down--an equally unacceptable
solution. A pragmatic approach is needed to balance the two. But I am
not sure that we have achieved a common understanding on defining where
that balance should be with regulators.
If we don't find that balance soon we will lose the goodwill of our
passengers and shippers, clog our airports, slow world trade, and bring
down the level of security that we have worked so hard to build up.
IATA believes that the prevailing one-size-fits-all proscriptive
model for security is not sustainable. If we don't evolve, the system
will grind to a halt under its own weight.
That means changing our mindset:
We must put desired results at the center of our efforts. If
we want to keep bombs off of airplanes, it does not matter
whether we use machines, dogs, intelligence, or any combination
thereof.
We must understand that bureaucracy and rules do not equate
to effective security. The Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) consolidation of their Emergency
Amendments for international carriers is a step in the right
direction . . . and we need more of it.
And we must recognize that 99.9999% (if not more) of
passengers and freight pose no threat to aviation. So we need
to make better use of the information that is available to
assess the risk of the people, objects, or situations that can
pose threats.
These principles would lead to security that is driven by the
desired outcomes not the processes, which is pragmatic not
bureaucratic, and that is efficiently focused on mitigating risks
rather than on mechanistically repeating procedures ad infinitum.
passenger security
If that is utopia, where are we today?
We are spending a lot of money--some $8.4 billion a year and
rising--to support a security system that has grown exponentially since
2001. And this is just what airlines spend, let alone the cost to
passengers and on other parts of the value chain. This is well-
intentioned spending. Air transport is secure. But there are
inefficiencies. For example, our most trusted employees and people with
high-level security clearances--even Members of Congress--are screened
in the same way as our least-known passengers.
Processes are cumbersome. Before 9/11 the average checkpoint
processed 350 passengers per hour. Today it is below 150.
Resources are being stretched. The TSA admits it is concerned that
we are running out of space to accommodate the growing footprint of the
security areas at airports.
And customers are unhappy. IATA research found that wait times at
checkpoints were the most frequently-cited gripe in the security
process. 37% of our passengers think that security screening is taking
too long.
But how do they define too long? According to our survey about 27%
of passengers would like to see a wait of no longer than 5 minutes. 51%
of travelers would be satisfied if the maximum wait was no longer than
10 minutes. 21% believe times between 10 and 20 minutes are acceptable.
So these measurements indicate that a target wait time of 5-10 minutes
would make nearly 73% of passengers satisfied with the checkpoint wait.
Interestingly, when we ask this question of business and leisure
travelers the results are nearly the same.
We think that this is an important number that regulators need to
aim for as they design new checkpoints and immigration lanes and try to
optimize existing ones.
Our collective failure to get full buy-in from air travelers means
that they are not partners in the process, merely silent and sometimes
intimidated and resentful participants.
We have a growing problem. I emphasize ``we.'' Security is the
responsibility of states but delivering it effectively requires the
cooperation of the whole value chain. We are accountable to our
passengers and they do not care if the delays and hassles they
encounter are the result of Government, airline, or airport processes.
All they remember is an unpleasant experience making them less willing
to travel by air and sending ripples across the economy. With enough of
those ripples a city may see connectivity decline.
Government and industry have a strong history of working together
on safety. It's a well-developed model for our collaboration on
security. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), for example, has
revitalized its aviation security advisory committee and added an
international subcommittee. I want to thank DHS Secretary Janet
Napolitano and TSA Administrator Pistole for their leadership on this.
There is still plenty of room to improve engagement between industry
and Government in the United States and elsewhere, and this sets a good
example.
Risk-Based Security
Integral to risk-based security and IATA's Checkpoint of the Future
is the concept of differentiation to ensure that we deploy our
resources where they will have the biggest impact on reducing risk. But
you can only differentiate if you have the information for risk-based
decisions.
As I said earlier, the vast majority of our passengers pose no
security risk. Yet we screen them identically. We need a model that
allows us to match limited security resources to the level of risk. We
are not advocating for profiling based on religion or ethnicity . . .
or proposing infringements on privacy. The proposal is to use
information that is already being provided to governments for purposes
of border control. Advance Passenger Information (API) and Passenger
Name Record (PNR) information could also be used to provide automated
guidance for decisions on the level of screening each passenger
receives.
Such pre-screening is an important part of risk-based security and
not surprisingly our passengers understand this as well. In the same
survey we asked passengers whether they would voluntarily share
additional information in exchange for faster security screening. 73%
reported back that they would. If you compare the responses of business
travelers against those of leisure travelers you see strong support in
both groups, with business travelers slightly more favorable. If you
look at those business travelers who travel 10 or more times per year
nearly 85% would volunteer information in exchange for quicker
screening.
The importance of these findings is two-fold. One, for the first
time we can document overwhelming support from the traveling public to
voluntarily provide information in exchange for expedited screening.
Two, business travelers and leisure travelers equally support the idea.
This shatters the old myth that only business travelers who fly a lot
would find sharing information of value.
In the mean time, passengers are already seeing some of what the
future holds. Voluntary ``Known Traveler'' programs are already used by
25 or more immigration and security authorities. For example, under
Homeland Security Secretary Napolitano and Transportation Security
Administrator Pistole we have seen an important move to a risk-based
approach to screening by rolling out PreCheck. I would add that such
programs maintain a random element to eliminate predictability.
IATA estimates that known traveler lanes can improve checkpoint
throughput by as much as 30%. Creating a separate screening area for
those travelers requiring additional attention will boost efficiency
another 4-5%. That is a 34-35% increase in passenger processing
capability, without adding infrastructure.
checkpoint of the future
The industry is taking up the challenge to develop risk-based
measures as well. IATA is working with public and private partners
around the world to modernize and improve the passenger screening
experience through the Checkpoint of the Future program. Our vision for
2020 is simply an uninterrupted journey from curb to aircraft door,
where passengers proceed through the security checkpoint with minimal
need to divest, where security resources are allocated based on risk,
and where airport amenities can be maximized.
The goals of the Checkpoint of the Future are:
Strengthened security.--Through focusing resources based on
risk, increasing unpredictability, making better use of
existing technologies, and introducing new technologies with
advanced capabilities as they become available.
Increased operational efficiency.--By increasing throughput,
optimizing asset utilization, reducing cost per passenger, and
maximizing space and staff resources.
Improved passenger experience.--Reducing lines and waiting
times and using technology for less intrusive and time-
consuming security screening.
Allow me now to highlight the scope and the roadmap of the
Checkpoint of the Future project. Over the last 3 years the program has
evolved into an industry-led and IATA-supported initiative. That means
that airports, security equipment manufacturers, Interpol,
universities, governments, and airlines are working together to make a
new checkpoint a reality. We can put numbers behind the collaboration.
Our Advisory Group, which provides oversight, has 16 key senior
executives from every corner of aviation. They guide 110+ experts who
are working to assemble the technology, policy, and procedures needed
for a checkpoint of the future. All have volunteered I would add.
To date this team has developed a concept definition and blueprints
to take us through checkpoint evolutions from today to 2014, 2017, and
2020. In addition, the stakeholders have developed an Operational Test
and Evaluation Program (OT&E) that will evaluate the key Checkpoint of
the Future components in light of our overall goals.
I am happy to report that we concluded component trials in 2012
with our airport partners at Geneva, Heathrow, and Amsterdam. For 2013,
we are planning a dozen new trials that will support rollout of the
first checkpoint in 2014. We certainly hope that we can bring several
of these trials to airports in the United States.
So what will the checkpoint look like in the future?
With a view toward the near term, the Checkpoint of the Future in
2014 focuses on integrating new procedures to facilitate risk-based
screening and decision making, optimizing resource and asset
utilization, and integrating available technology and repurposing
existing equipment. The emphasis is therefore to introduce new and
innovative procedures that maximize the opportunities presented by the
existing checkpoint configuration.
The 2017 Checkpoint of the Future, or the medium-term vision, is
focused on updating technologies and processes to increase the security
value of the checkpoint, while maintaining a strong focus on customer
service to enable greater passenger satisfaction. It includes some
major advances in risk assessment, dynamically delivering a result to
the checkpoint to enable greater automation, and a better passenger
experience. It envisages increased use of biometrics and remote image
processing, coupled with advances in screening technologies and
targeted algorithms to achieve less divesting and faster throughput.
From 2020 and beyond it is envisaged that the passenger will be
able to walk through the security checkpoint without interruption
unless the advanced technology identifies a potential threat. A
passenger will have a level of security screening based on information
from states of departure and arrival through bilateral risk assessments
in real time. In terms of the passenger experience, there will no
longer be the burden of divesting by default, and there are expected to
be little to no lines as a result of the enhanced speed at which
screening can occur.
Just as one-size-fits-all is not a desirable situation for
screening today, neither will it be for the next generation of
screening. The Checkpoint of the Future project offers many options and
suggestions that can help move screening towards being more efficient,
effective, and passenger-friendly. We are confident that the important
collaboration between the airline industry, airports, manufacturers,
ICAO, and global regulators will continue to improve security and
efficiency in passenger screening.
Early on I referred to a security utopia. This would see rigid
requirements and formulaic processes replaced by an approach guided by
realistic risk assessments, global standards, and outcomes-focused
targets. Air travel would be more secure. And we--industry and
Government--would be prepared to address efficiently and rapidly new
and emerging threats in the knowledge of what data tells us.
Our success in safety has many lessons to point us in the right
direction. Over decades, industry and governments have built global
standards and processes that improved safety performance and adapted to
emerging concerns. We have made aviation safer while also largely
having processes invisible to the passenger. Passengers take safety for
granted. That should be our inspiration for security--effective and
hassle-free security for both passengers and cargo.
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to speak to you today
about the future of aviation security. IATA applauds your commitment to
improving aviation security and making the experience more enjoyable
for passengers. The future of flight is bright, and your collaboration
is vital to our continued success as an industry.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Dunlap, for your testimony.
Our second witness is Ms. Sharon Pinkerton. Ms. Pinkerton
is the senior vice president for legislative and regulatory
policy at Airlines for America. Airlines for America is the
trade organization of the principal U.S. airlines, representing
the collective interest of airlines and their affiliates who
transport more than 90 percent of U.S. airline passengers and
cargo traffic.
The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Pinkerton to testify.
STATEMENT OF SHARON L. PINKERTON, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY POLICY, AIRLINES FOR AMERICA
Ms. Pinkerton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member,
Mr. Thompson, and Members of the subcommittee for inviting
Airlines for America to talk to you today about this important
issue. We want to thank you for your leadership. We were very
interested in the meeting, the hearing you held with
Administrator Pistole.
There are a few issues that touch our Nation's National
security and our Nation's economy the way risk-based security
does. We share a common goal with TSA and with Members of this
subcommittee, and that is the safety and security of our
passengers and our employees. That is our highest priority.
Because of that priority, we have been pleased to work
cooperatively with TSA on programs like Known Crewmember and
with CBP on Global Entry and cargo screening programs like
ACAS.
Since you all travel very frequently, I know, you know well
that effective security and efficient movement of passengers
and cargo are not and should not be mutually exclusive goals. A
risk-based security approach is an indispensable tool in
achieving effective security in a way that actually facilitates
travel and commerce.
We think risk-based security ought to accomplish three
goals: Enhanced security, streamlined passenger screening, and
expedite the movement of goods and cargo. A risk-based approach
recognizes that one-size-fits-all security is no longer the
optimum response to threats. It reflects the realization that
potent intelligence resources and better use of technology in
the screening experience produce a far more sophisticated
security assessment than in the past.
Risk-based intelligence-driven analysis has been widely
accepted as an approach to aviation security for some time
around the world. Risk-based security is not, though, a stand-
alone solution. It is part of a multi-layered approach that TSA
has embraced.
TSA's PreCheck and Known Crewmember programs and customs
Global Entry program represent what I would call the beginning
of these known traveler programs. They do not--I want to
emphasize--represent the full realization of those programs. A
lot of important work remains for each of them.
Moreover, these programs have to be pursued recognizing the
need for timely coordination and communication with
stakeholders. Our primary recommendation to you all today for
improving the PreCheck programs, Global Entry, Known
Crewmember, is that these programs must be expanded. We can't
stress enough the importance of allowing TSA to focus their
very limited resources on unknown and elevated threat
passengers.
Expansion of PreCheck shouldn't be airport-centric, nor
should it be airline-centric. We don't need that program
limited to a small group of people. We need to enlarge the
group of people who are included in those programs.
Broader-based recruitment of qualified passengers is
needed, and TSA should provide the leadership and ownership of
this program. We completely agree, they can take some good
lessons in innovation from the private sector, and we support
that, and we will continue to work them. At the same time, they
do need to provide some leadership in this area.
Their recent announcement that they are pursuing efforts to
expand PreCheck through third parties or Global Entry Light, as
the administrator mentioned, are good steps in the right
direction. However, we would caution that the multiplicity of
programs, whether it is SENTRI down on the Southern Border,
NEXUS on the Northern Border, Global Entry Light that the
administrator talked about, PreCheck, third-party PreCheck, it
is confusing for travelers and stakeholders and sometimes
Members of Congress. TSA needs to consolidate Trusted Traveler
programs into one recognizable branded program and increase
their efforts to recruit eligible passengers.
We have got good news on Known Crewmember. I heard the
bell's reached, so I am going to run through the rest of my
testimony. We have done great work on Known Crewmember. We have
processed 5 million crew members. We are also supportive of
TSA's managed inclusion program. I think we need to recognize
these programs are growing around the world and, as such, we
need to think about mutual recognition with other trusted
countries programs so that we can expand that way.
Then last, but certainly not least, in light of the
President's budget that was released yesterday, we have to say
that we are opposed to this incredible increase in taxes that
was proposed in the President's budget. The TSA--the whole
purpose behind risk-based security is to try to drive
efficiencies to increased safety and security, but also to
reduce cost. A funny thing has happened in the past 5 years.
While aviation has been hit by a global downturn, high fuel
prices, TSA's budget has increased by 8 percent, while
passenger traffic has actually decreased by 4 percent.
So we would urge you to consider that, as we already pay
close to $4 billion in DHS taxes and fees every year, we don't
think raising taxes is in the answer.
Thank you again for allowing us to have this opportunity. I
will look forward to taking your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Pinkerton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sharon L. Pinkerton
April 11, 2013
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee, my name is Sharon Pinkerton, and I am senior vice
president of legislative and regulatory policy for Airlines for
America, the trade association for the leading U.S. airlines. Today,
A4A members and their affiliates transport more than 90 percent of all
U.S. airline passenger and cargo traffic.
overview
We share a common goal with the TSA: The safety and security of our
passengers and employees is our single highest priority. As such, we
have been pleased to work cooperatively with the TSA on programs
including Known Crewmember and TSA PreCheck. As all of you who travel
frequently know well: Effective security and the efficient movement of
passengers and cargo, are not mutually exclusive goals. A risk-based
approach to security is an indispensable tool in achieving effective
security in a way that facilitates air commerce.
Such an approach needs to accomplish three principal goals:
Enhance security overall;
Streamline passenger screening; and
Expedite the movement of goods.
Prudent TSA policies, investment, and deployment of resources can
make aviation security both more effective and more efficient. Those
outcomes, in turn, enhance travel and trade, which benefits the
customers and communities that airlines serve as well as our Nation's
economy.
the case for risk-based security
A risk-based approach recognizes that ``one-size-fits-all''
security is no longer the optimum response to threats. It reflects the
realization that potent intelligence resources and extensive screening
experience produce far more sophisticated security assessments than in
the past. Risk-based programs consequently play to our Government's
strengths in this area.
Risk-based, intelligence-driven analysis has been a widely accepted
approach to aviation security for some time. The 9/11 Commission, for
example, in 2004 called for thorough, risk-based analysis in evaluating
aviation-security issues.\1\ This, however, is not a stand-alone
solution; it is part of the multi-layered approach to security that TSA
has emphasized.
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\1\ In its final report, the Commission stated: ``The U.S.
government should identify and evaluate the transportation assets that
need to be protected, set risk-based priorities for defending them,
[and] select the most practical and cost-effective ways of doing so . .
. ''. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States, at 391 (2004).
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TSA's PreCheckTM and Known Crewmember programs, and
Customs and Border Protection's Global Entry program represent the
entry into the security mainstream of known traveler programs. They do
not, I want to emphasize, represent the full maturation of those
programs. Important work remains for each of them. Moreover, these
programs should be pursued recognizing the need timely coordination and
communication with stakeholders.
the need to expand risk-based security
The known passenger programs--PreCheckTM and Global
Entry--should be expanded to realize their full potential. This will
allow limited resources to be focused on unknown and elevated-threat
passengers. That is a goal that TSA shares. Expansion of
PreCheckTM should not be limited to customers who are
members of airline frequent-flyer programs--which is a point that we
have made before--or who have signed-up for Global Entry. Broader-based
recruitment of qualifying passengers is needed and we believe that TSA
should provide the leadership for that effort. Finally, in
collaboration with TSA and the representatives of flight-deck and cabin
crewmembers, we continue to enlarge the Known Crewmember program.
We also support TSA's Managed Inclusion pilot program. It enables
TSA to assess passengers in the screening line and divert passengers
deemed lower risk to expedited screening procedures.
With respect to cargo security measures, passenger airlines have
met the 9/11 Commission Recommendations Act requirement to screen 100
percent of air cargo departing U.S. airports. In addition, with TSA's
assistance we have met the screening requirement for international
inbound cargo.
The growing reliance on risk-based aviation security in the United
States and elsewhere highlights the desirability of exploring the
mutual recognition of security programs. We do not suggest that U.S.
authorities aim for universal recognition of such programs. We believe,
however, that in a limited number of instances the congruence of the
programs may justify mutual recognition. This could benefit regulators,
as well as passengers and shippers.
the tsa security passenger tax should not be increased
As the TSA is able to improve its efficiency through risk-based
screening program, we see no need for additional tax funding at this
time. It is simply common sense: If the TSA can more people to risk-
based screening, it should need fewer resources, not more, and as such
we are strongly opposed to a provision in the Senate-passed budget
resolution that would immediately double and eventually triple the TSA
security passenger tax. Airlines, passengers, and shippers collectively
paid a record $2.3 billion in TSA taxes and fees last year. Indeed,
they already pay more than their fair share of Federal aviation taxes.
TSA's budget has increased 18 percent since 2007 while the number
of passengers carried by U.S. airlines fell 4 percent in that period.
We believe there are opportunities to achieve greater efficiencies at
TSA--without greater taxes. We look forward to working further with TSA
and the administration to expand the risk-based security measures that
the subcommittee is reviewing today. That is the appropriate way to
handle TSA's operating costs
conclusion
Risk-based aviation security has proven its worth. But more can be
accomplished with it. We appreciate the subcommittee's continuing
interest in assuring that risk-based security fulfills its promise.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Ms. Pinkerton, for your testimony.
As everyone heard the bells, we are going to try and plow
through--continue for a few more minutes here. Our next witness
is Mr. Geoff Freeman, the chief operating officer and executive
vice president of the U.S. Travel Association. The U.S. Travel
Association is a nonprofit trade organization that represents
the common interest of the U.S. Travel Industry and promotes
increased travel to and within the United States through
marketing initiatives and advocating for beneficial travel
procedures.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Freeman to testify.
STATEMENT OF GEOFF FREEMAN, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER AND
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, U.S. TRAVEL ASSOCIATION
Mr. Freeman. Thank you, Chairman Hudson, and Ranking Member
Richmond, Ranking Member Thompson, other Members of the
committee. Appreciate you plowing ahead, as well as holding
this hearing in the first place.
As you know, travel is critical to each of your districts
and to the American economy as a whole. That is why TSA's
ability to build an effective risk-based security screening
process is just as much an economic security issue as it is a
National security issue.
If we get it right, travel will increase, consumer spending
will rise, and the number of jobs in your districts will grow.
In fact, the 2010 survey found that if we could streamline
aviation security screening, frequent travelers said they would
take two to three more trips each year. That is the potential
here if we get this right.
Today, I would like to discuss how do we create this better
environment by focusing on three areas; No. 1, the
inefficiencies and costs in the current system today; No. 2,
some successes and opportunities around risk-based screening;
and, No. 3, several concrete recommendations for TSA, as well
as Congress, as we move forward.
When we look at the inefficiencies and cost drivers in TSA,
the greatest challenges is that, until recently, we have
embraced a one-size-fits-all approach that attempts to
eliminate all risk. This approach led to a layer upon layer of
security for the traveler, and it also led to millions of
frustrated travelers and unsustainable costs at TSA.
Over the past 8 years, TSA's budget has increased by more
than 60 percent, while as the Chairman mentioned the number of
travelers has remained flat. More striking than that is that
DHS acknowledged in its 2012 budget request that the cost of
screening per passenger had risen by 400 percent.
As U.S. Travel, former Homeland Security Secretary Tom
Ridge, and many others have said, there has to be a better way
of doing this. That better way begins with managing risk,
rather than a fruitless attempt to eliminate all risk. It is
here that Administrator Pistole deserves great credit. PreCheck
is the best example of a truly risk-based program that
increases security and efficiency and could efficiency reduce
TSA's cost.
Also, as TSA develops its risk-based initiatives, it
deserves credit for seeking greater input from the travel
industry and passenger advocates. The reconstituted Aviation
Security Advisory Committee is a positive step in the right
direction. There is room for improvement, however, in TSA's
communications with stakeholders, as we recently saw on the
prohibited items list, but the trend is favorable.
There is also three areas for improvement in PreCheck that
I would like to highlight. First, PreCheck enrollment today is
limited and cumbersome. A traveler in New Orleans would have to
travel 5 hours to Houston to go for an interview and come back.
This process is not sustainable when it comes to growing
enrollment in this program. Travelers will also have to spend,
we estimate, upwards of $10,000 with a single airline to enter
PreCheck through that mechanism.
Second, the unpredictability once enrolled remains too
high, even for those travelers who are members of Global Entry
and have received a background check.
Finally, the current low utilization rates can frustrate
other travelers and certainly isn't the best use of precious
limited resources.
So with those challenges before us, there are three
recommendations that we have for TSA. One is to partner with
the private sector to market and enroll travelers into
PreCheck. It is time to provide the private sector with an
incentive to go out and grow this program. We support TSA's
move in this direction and are proud to join the company CLEAR
in its proposal to TSA.
Second, TSA should grant enrollees access to PreCheck lanes
when flying on any eligible airline at a participating airport.
This will require more partnership with the airlines to
complete.
Third, TSA can increase predictability by using in-depth
background checks and approved identity verification, which
will lead to lower rates of randomized screening.
The final recommendations we have are for you and for other
Members of Congress. First, Congress should encourage TSA to
revise or roll back security screening procedures as long as
TSA's decision is accompanied by sound intelligence and a
continued focus on the most dangerous threats.
Second, Congress should support TSA's efforts to partner
with the private sector, support increased funding for CBP
staffing to clear the backlog of those who wish to join the
Global Entry program, and strengthen passenger advocacy within
TSA.
Finally, Congress must resist the temptation to eliminate
all risk. Risk management is TSA's best approach to preventing
catastrophic events and efficiently processing millions of
travelers.
Thank you for your time today. Thank you for holding this
hearing.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Freeman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Geoff Freeman
April 11, 2013
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to offer testimony on behalf of the U.S.
Travel Association (U.S. Travel), the National, non-profit organization
representing all sectors of America's travel industry. U.S. Travel's
mission is to increase travel to and within the United States.
The travel industry provides good, domestic jobs that cannot be
outsourced. In 2012, travel spending in the United States totaled $855
billion, which generated a total of $2 trillion in economic output. The
travel industry also directly supported 7.7 million jobs and was among
the top 10 employers in 48 U.S. States and the District of Columbia.
For example, travel directly employs more than 9,500 North
Carolinians in the 8th Congressional District and contributes over $952
million annually to the local economy. Similarly, travel directly
employs more than 24,000 Louisianans in the 2nd Congressional District
and contributes more than $2 billion to the local economy.
Travel is not only a vital economic engine--it is a hallmark of our
free and open society, and its various components are essential to our
daily lives. I applaud the subcommittee for holding this important
hearing on TSA's implementation of risk-based security. The U.S. Travel
Association firmly believes that security and efficiency are equal and
obtainable goals--and both protect our country and safeguard our
economy. Moving too aggressively in one direction imperils the other,
and that's why we are such strong advocates of risk-based security.
My testimony today will focus in three areas. First, I'll examine
major drivers of inefficiency and cost in passenger screening. Second,
I'll highlight key successes and opportunities for improvement in risk-
based security. And third, I'll offer U.S. Travel's recommendations for
what TSA and Congress can do to build a more efficient and secure
aviation system.
drivers of inefficiency and cost
Many of today's problems in aviation security stem from a refusal
to acknowledge or accept any risk in the system. In the past, continual
layers of security were added to address almost every conceivable
threat. What's worse is that few efforts were made to scale back,
eliminate, or tailor these layers for fear of being perceived as
``weak'' on security.
As a result, travelers were stuck with an inefficient, one-size-
fits-all security screening process that hurt our economy and burdened
American taxpayers.
A 2010 survey conducted by Consensus Research found that travelers
would take two to three more flights per year if the hassles in
security screening were reduced. These additional flights would add
nearly $85 billion in consumer spending back into the U.S. economy and
help support 900,000 jobs. A similar survey conducted in 2011 found
that four of the top five passenger frustrations relate directly to the
TSA checkpoint.
Rapid budget growth is also driven by a one-sized-fits-all
screening process. In its fiscal year 2012 budget request, DHS
acknowledged that the cost of screening per passenger rose by over 400
percent between 2001 and 2011. And from 2004 to 2012, the TSA's budget
increased by more than 60 percent, while the number of passengers
screened remained almost flat.\1\ After just 11 years, TSA's budget is
now roughly equal to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
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\1\ U.S. Travel Association, ``A Better Way: Building a World-Class
System for Aviation Security.'' http://www.ustravel.org/sites/default/
files/page/2011/03/A_Better_Way_032011.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
security, efficiency, and tsa's mission
U.S. Travel believes these trends can only be reversed by using a
risk-based approach to aviation security. In 2010, U.S. Travel
commissioned a Blue-Ribbon Panel (BRP)--headed by former Secretary of
Homeland Security Tom Ridge--to examine problems in aviation security
and recommend solutions.
First and foremost, the BRP challenged TSA, Congress, and all
aviation security stakeholders to set aside the notion that security
and efficiency are mutually-exclusive goals. Specifically, the final
BRP report states:
``Some in Congress appear to have calculated that there are no
political consequences to an inefficient and costly system, but great
political consequences to a successful terrorist attack. This is a
classic Hobson's Choice that the American traveling public repudiates.
The debate Congress must engage in is not strong security versus weak
security, but rather how to create a world-class aviation security
system that effectively manages risk, increases efficiency, and
embraces the freedom to travel.''
The Blue-Ribbon Panel was also unanimous in its support for risk-
based security and laid out three critical elements of a risk-based
strategy in its final report. First, TSA and Congress must clearly
identify the types of threats TSA is responsible for preventing.
Second, relying on the latest intelligence, TSA must apply its limited
resources to the highest-priority threats. And third, TSA should always
strive to provide the greatest level of efficiency in passenger
screening, while maintaining security.
tsa's successes in risk-based screening
With support from Congress and the private sector, TSA is now using
a more risk-based approach to aviation security and Administrator
Pistole deserves our gratitude for his leadership on these issues.
Specifically, U.S. Travel applauds TSA for creating and rapidly
expanding PreCheck. This program is the best example of a truly risk-
based initiative that increases security and efficiency, and could
eventually reduce budgetary costs.
In addition to PreCheck, as TSA expands its risk-based efforts,
Administrator Pistole and TSA are improving their outreach to
stakeholders, travelers, and non-traditional partners. For the first
time since 2006, TSA reconstituted the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee (ASAC) and I'm proud to serve as chair of the newly-created
Passenger Advocacy subcommittee. TSA is also hosting roundtables and
listening sessions with travel businesses around the country to hear
their suggestions for improving aviation security.
opportunities for improvement
Going forward, TSA can still improve its outreach to stakeholders,
as we saw with their recent decision to change the prohibited items
list. TSA can use the ASAC to brief stakeholders in a classified
setting and to receive their candid feedback.
There are also three aspects of PreCheck that must be improved if
the program is to reach its full potential.
First, there are far too many barriers preventing a large number of
ordinary travelers from joining and using PreCheck. One barrier is the
sheer difficulty of enrollment through the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's (CBP's) Global Entry program, which features a cumbersome
and confusing on-line application process, and is a prime example of
the difficulty a Government agency can have in creating streamlined and
customer-friendly services.
To be a part of Global Entry, CBP requires an in-person interview--
but only offers these interviews at 33 permanent locations. Chairman
Hudson, your constituents are fortunate, in that they would only have
to travel some 30 miles to Charlotte International Airport for a Global
Entry interview. However, Ranking Member Richmond, your constituents
would have to travel much further. If a person living in New Orleans,
wishes to join Global Entry, the closest CBP interview location is in
Houston, Texas, and requires a 5-hour, 340-mile round trip drive--or,
of course, a flight. Clearly, this is not convenient for millions of
low-risk travelers.
Of course, if an individual does not want to be part of Global
Entry and instead wants to be enrolled via an airline, there are many
difficulties associated with this enrollment process as well. Perhaps
the most significant obstacle is the cost of joining PreCheck through
an airline frequent flier program. If a person wishes to qualify for
PreCheck through a sponsoring carrier, U.S. Travel estimates that it
would cost roughly $10,000 in airfare paid to a single airline in order
to accrue enough frequent flier miles.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ TSA considers enrollment criteria for PreCheckTM to
be Security Sensitive Information. The U.S. Travel Association
calculated an estimate of the cost to join PreCheckTM by
multiplying the average 2010 passenger yield (the average fare paid by
domestic passengers per mile flown) of 13.49 cents by 75,000 (the
number of miles needed to become Platinum customer on Delta airlines).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Second, PreCheck can be too unpredictable and is inconsistent
across airlines. For example, while passengers should always be subject
to randomized screening, we believe that this level could be lowered if
passengers could offer more personal information, have a security
threat assessment conducted and have biometric credentialing employed
to verify identity. By gathering more background information from
individuals who wish to provide it, TSA would offer a more risk-based,
predictable, and expedited screening process.
Unfortunately, the current airline-based structure does not allow
for the collection of more information--instead, the airline PreCheck
enrollment process uses flying history as the central element of
additional background data. Because TSA has decided that this level of
information merits a high randomization rate, PreCheck contributes to
the overall inefficiency of the current system by forcing too many
people to go through the standard screening process.
Furthermore, PreCheck's structure as an airline-by-airline,
airport-by-airport effort is not particularly risk-based. Once a
traveler is enrolled in PreCheck through a frequent flier program, they
can only use the expedited screening lanes when flying with that
particular airline. In our opinion, risk should not be determined
customer loyalty.
Limited enrollment and high unpredictability lead to the third area
of improvement for PreCheck--low utilization rates. While TSA is to be
applauded for having screened some 7.5 million passengers through
PreCheck to date, this number is small when compared with the roughly 2
million people who fly each day in the United States and the roughly
700 million passengers who fly each year. We must do better, and more
people must be part of this program for it to be a true risk-based
solution to aviation security.
recommendations for tsa
To improve PreCheck, we recommend that TSA focus its efforts on
three high-priority areas.
First, TSA should partner with the private sector to create more
accessible and secure enrollment options. U.S. Travel fully supports
TSA's request for private sector proposals to expand PreCheck and U.S.
Travel is proud to join CLEAR--a risk-based security technology
company--in its proposal to TSA.
We believe CLEAR can:
Rapidly expand PreCheck through its existing customer base;
Continue to grow the program through effective marketing
strategies and partnerships;
Increase security through its verified identify platform and
in-depth background checks, and
Provide improved levels of customer service for enrolled
travelers.
Through an innovative public/private partnership with TSA, private-
sector companies can quickly help the agency boost enrollment and
utilization rates for PreCheck, and reduce TSA's budget by shifting
operational costs from TSA to the private sector. These types of
partnerships also provide new, important revenue streams to local
airport authorities, an added benefit in tight budgetary times.
Second, TSA and DHS can make PreCheck truly risk-based by allowing
travelers to qualify for the program by aggregating their frequent
flier miles across multiple airlines. Additionally, once a passenger is
enrolled in any DHS low-risk traveler program--through either CBP, an
airline, or any future enrollment platform--those passengers should
automatically be granted access to every PreCheck lane until they no
longer qualify.
TSA can also offer enrollment opportunities that can reach beyond
the CBP Global Entry by harnessing other Government programs that
assess the security of populations--like the Transportation Worker
Identity Credential and the Hazardous Materials Enrollment program--and
granting them access to PreCheck.
Third, TSA can increase predictability through better line
management, the use of biometric credentialing, and more in-depth
background checks. In-depth background checks and secure forms of
identification enable TSA to know more about a passenger and lower
rates of random screening. TSA can also increase efficiency by allowing
PreCheck passengers selected for randomize screening to move
immediately to the standard screening lane, rather than the back of the
waiting line before the travel document checker. Line management, the
use of biometric identity verification, and in-depth background checks
are all functions that could be carried out by approved private-sector
providers for PreCheck.
role of congress and closing
Finally, Congress can also do three things to support TSA's risk-
based screening efforts.
First, Congress should encourage TSA to revise or roll back
security screening procedures whenever possible. As TSA considers new
measures to enhance security based on risk and intelligence
information, there should be a continuous assessment of existing
screening protocols and standard operating procedures to see what's
become obsolete or unnecessary. Without a continuous assessment of
security layers that can be removed, or that have been replaced by
something better, we risk needlessly bogging down the system.
Unfortunately, as we've seen recently with the change to the
prohibited items list, when TSA does remove layers, or change standard
procedures, there tends to be little engagement with stakeholders and
with the flying public. We hope that TSA can do better in this regard
so that changes, when made based on risk, are also discussed in advance
with constituencies that need to understand the changes, and why they
were made.
Second, Congress can assist and improve TSA's risk-based programs
through legislation. Legislative priorities should include expansion of
PreCheck through private-sector partnerships, support for increased
Customs and Border Protection staffing to clear the backlog of Global
Entry interviews, and strengthening passenger advocacy within TSA.
Last, in everything you do, remember that security and efficiency
are equal and obtainable goals. TSA is vital to security but the agency
also impacts businesses, jobs, and our quality of life. The country
that put a man on the moon, and has led the world for centuries in
innovation and technology, can have a world-class, efficient, and
secure aviation system.
Again, thank you Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and all
Members of the subcommittee for inviting me to testify today. I look
forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Freeman, for your testimony.
I apologize to our witnesses and the folks here
participating, but we are down to about 5 minutes to make it to
this vote. So, without objection, the subcommittee is in recess
subject to the call of the Chairman. The subcommittee will
reconvene 10 minutes after the conclusion of the last vote in
this series.
[Recess.]
Mr. Hudson. The subcommittee will come to order. I
certainly appreciate everyone's patience for dealing with our
vote interruption there. Did want to point out that Mr. Freeman
had to leave. We appreciate him giving his testimony before he
left. Members will be--have the opportunity to submit questions
to Mr. Freeman in writing.
At this point, we will move directly back into witness
testimony. Our fourth witness is Mr. Michael Mullen, who
currently serves as the executive director of the Express
Association of America. The Express Association of America
represents the four large integrated express delivery
companies, including DHL, FedEx, TNT, and UPS, and focuses on
issues that affect shipments requiring expedited, time-
definite, door-to-door transportation, logistics, and
warehousing services into and out of the United States.
The Chairman recognizes Mr. Mullen to testify.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL C. MULLEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, EXPRESS
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
Mr. Mullen. Thank you, Chairman and Ranking Member
Richmond. I appreciate this opportunity to be with you today.
As I have testified to this committee before, the Express
Association of America has led the partnership with the U.S.
Government in the development of the Air Cargo Advanced
screening, or ACAS, pilot. ACAS is a voluntary pilot project in
which the security data on U.S.-bound shipments is submitted to
the National Targeting Center as early as possible in the
supply chain, and the NTC completes the risk assessment much
earlier than previously.
ACAS represents a new partnership between the
Transportation Security Administration and U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, in which the two agencies have jointly
staffed an air cargo targeting and risk assessment center. Over
the past 2\1/2\ years, over 70 million shipments have been
analyzed through the pilot. Less than 6,000, or less than 0.1
percent, have required additional screening to verify the
contents. No shipments have been identified as a threat to the
aircraft or required a do-not-load response.
ACAS represents a significant step forward in TSA's
participation in a risk-based security effort that has both
improved security and facilitated a smoother flow of goods
across borders. In addition to the four integrated express
delivery companies which began the pilot, five passenger
carriers and three freight forwarders are operational
participants in ACAS. Twenty additional companies are in
various stages of testing in anticipation of joining ACAS.
A high level of very productive cooperation among TSA, CPB,
and the private sector continues to be a hallmark of the ACAS
pilot, with frequent meetings to discuss both policy and
technical issues. We have conducted realistic tabletop
exercises to explore the operational procedures in place to
respond to do-not-load scenarios and have tested the
communications and information dissemination paths that would
be used in the event of a real-world incident.
The process of co-creation that works so effectively in
establishing the ACAS pilot will also be used for drafting the
regulation, and the private sector will be fully engaged in
this effort.
But one issue has come up that threatens to derail the
progress made under ACAS. One option being proposed for the
ACAS regulation is to require the shipment data, which is the
house air waybill, to be linked to the conveyance data, or the
master air waybill. For some participants, this would represent
a real step backwards, which EAA members strongly oppose.
Separating the shipment data from the conveyance data has
been critical to the success of ACAS, and it should continue.
We hope the Government will continue to maintain the
flexibility that allows ACAS to accommodate various business
models in the air cargo industry.
So I would like to mention six key lessons that we have
learned from the ACAS pilot, and the rulemaking effort to
formalize ACAS through regulation should incorporate these
lessons. First, the air cargo industry has made enormous
investments in security. Before any new regulations are
proposed to improve what is already a very secure system,
Government agencies should consider the operational impacts and
weigh those against the marginal increase in security. This is
the real backbone of risk-based security.
Second, limited data can be used effectively to target
risk.
Third, penalties should only be imposed in cases of gross
negligence or willful circumvention of the rules, and not for
the timeliness or accuracy of information.
Fourth, the Government is capable of adapting IT systems
and operational procedures to accommodate various business
models, and this flexibility is critical to ensure security
measures do not create competitive disadvantages.
Fifth, relevant Government intelligence regarding a
specific shipment must be shared with the private sector when
appropriate.
Sixth, international harmonization of the air cargo
security programs is critical to find a common global solution
that recognizes the different air cargo business models and
shares risk assessment results.
TSA has made significant progress in adopting a risk-based
approach to air cargo screening requirements over the past
year. Through the mutual recognition agreement with the
European Union, TSA has taken a major step toward improved
trade facilitation. This agreement required extensive work to
ensure that correct standards were in place across the entire
European Union, and TSA deserves great credit for persevering
through the negotiations to reach the final goal.
I very much appreciate the opportunity to discuss these
issues with you, and I am looking forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mullen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael C. Mullen
April 11, 2013
i. progress of the air cargo advance screening (acas) pilot project
As I have testified to this committee before, the Express
Association of America--which includes DHL, FedEx, TNT, and UPS--has
led the partnership with the U.S. Government (both U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) and the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA)) in the development of ACAS. Over the past 3 years, this pilot
has expanded significantly both in terms of countries covered and
industry participants. Today, over 70 million shipments have been
analyzed through the pilot. Less than 6,000, or less than .1 percent,
of these shipments have required additional screening to verify the
contents. No shipments have been identified as a threat to the aircraft
or required a ``do not load'' response.
Several additional participants have joined the project. In
addition to the four integrated express delivery companies which began
the project, 5 passenger carriers and 3 freight forwarders are
operational participants in the ACAS pilot. Twenty additional companies
are in various stages of testing in anticipation of joining ACAS.
A high level of very productive cooperation among TSA, CBP, and the
private sector continues to be a hallmark of the ACAS project. Frequent
meetings are held among these three parties to discuss both policy and
technical issues. We have conducted realistic table-top exercises to
explore the operational procedures in place to respond to ``do not
load'' scenarios that have tested the communication and information
dissemination paths that would be used in the event of a real-world
incident. The lessons being learned from the pilot, addressed below,
are the basis for continually expanding our mutual understanding of
optimizing the air cargo security environment of the future and are
pointing the way forward to a regulatory approach that will meet the
needs of both the Government and industry. The process of ``co-
creation'' that worked so effectively in establishing the ACAS pilot
will also be used for drafting the regulation, and the private sector
will be fully engaged in this effort.
But one issue has come up that threatens to derail the progress
made under ACAS. One of the keys to the success of ACAS to date has
been the Government's willingness to accept the information on a
shipment basis, separated from the data on the conveyance that will
bring the shipment to the United States. This separation allows ACAS
participants to send the data far in advance and allows the Government
to complete the risk assessment early in the supply chain, often before
the shipment is loaded on a plane. Recently CBP has been indicating
that when ACAS is regulated, they will require the shipment data (house
airway bills) to be linked to the conveyance data (master airway bill),
which would represent a real step backwards. The problems with this
approach are explained in more detail below. The express industry
strongly opposes this step and hopes CBP can continue to maintain the
flexibility that allows ACAS to accommodate various business models
within the air cargo industry.
ii. lessons learned
The ACAS pilot has demonstrated that a close partnership with
industry and across Government agency jurisdictions in development and
execution of new security measures can improve the safety and security
of global networks while minimizing negative operational and economic
impacts. Several key lessons have been learned during the pilot, and
any rulemaking effort to formalize ACAS through regulation should
consider the following:
Industry and Government Working Together As Partners.--
Seeking industry input before proposed rulemakings are drafted
allows for broader operational impacts to be considered in
order to improve effectiveness. The absence of penalties during
the ACAS pilot phase reduced ``threshold anxiety'' as a barrier
to participation. Penalties should only be imposed in cases of
gross negligence or willful circumvention of the rules, and not
for the timeliness or accuracy of information (for reasons
outlined immediately below).
Limited Data Can Be Used Effectively To Target Risk.--
Separation of shipment and transport data was a necessary
precondition to providing information earlier in the supply
chain. The limited information on the shipment transmitted for
ACAS is available much earlier than other data required for
customs clearance, and ``risk-based targeting'' against this
limited data set has proven effective to provide a risk
assessment sufficient to qualify a shipment as ``trusted''.
Further, the threat is posed by the shipment itself, not the
route that a package takes. To date, targeting has been
successfully done on the house bill data associated with the
shipment. Mandating transport data such as the master airway
bill (MAWB) routings or flight numbers, full Automated
Manifests System (AMS) manifests, Harmonized Tariff System
(HTS) numbers or any other commercial data as part of the
advanced security filing not only fails to significantly
improve targeting, but would also challenge the operational
feasibility to provide data in a timely manner. Therefore, any
decision to require the MAWB to be linked to the house bill
data in advance of the departure of an aircraft poses a
significant burden on the pilot--especially where the origin of
the shipment is in the same country as the ``last departure''
airport for a flight bound for the United States--and could
threaten the success of ACAS. Further, data provided for ACAS
can be ``raw data'' where typographical or other clerical
errors do not substantially affect the targeting capabilities.
ACAS Analysis Is Limited To Security.--While it is tempting
to use advanced data for other purposes, the success of ACAS
has been in part driven by the common goal to prevent a bomb
from entering the network. This singular focus of utilizing air
cargo advanced data for security risk assessment remains the
top priority among private and public-sector participants.
Regulatory risk assessment to interdict IPR violations, illegal
drugs or other controlled substance trafficking, or other trade
functions can and should be the focus of CBP officers upon
arrival in the United States. Any attempt to expand the ACAS
scope to achieve the simultaneous completion of both security
and regulatory risk assessments pre-departure would undermine
achieving the primary goal of protecting the supply chain
against terrorist attacks.
Flexibility Is Critical For Effectiveness
IT Systems.--ACAS has demonstrated that data can be
transmitted via multiple types of IT systems and in various
formats. This flexibility in the interface reduces the
barrier to participation and avoids unnecessary costs and
time delays associated with updating a company's IT system.
Furthermore, the flexibility reduces the risk of
competitive disadvantages arising from existing differences
in the functionality and capacity of corporate IT systems.
The final IT filing system developed for ACAS must remain
flexible. It should continue to accommodate multiple data
submission formats and provide for the return messaging
options required by some business models of the entities
utilizing the system.
Operational Requirements for Different Business Models.--
The air cargo industry is not one-size-fits-all; the
regulations and programs should not be either. Challenges
and opportunities differ between business models, and the
system can be flexible regarding who transmits the data and
when. While the jointly-held overriding goal is to
intercept a high-risk shipment as early as possible, data
can be transmitted by multiple partners, depending on who
may be in possession of the shipment data. No specific time
limit is necessary, as long as data can be transmitted in
raw form as soon as available. Further, the Government
targeters have the ability to prioritize shipment reviews
based on the urgency/timeliness of the shipment itself,
thereby helping to address concerns for last-minute
shipments in the just-in-time supply chain.
Information Sharing Remains Key.--The private sector is
providing shipment level data to the Government. At the same
time, any Government-held intelligence of concern regarding a
specific shipment must be shared with the private-sector ACAS
participants when appropriate. Information sharing should
include:
For a shipment that rises to the level of a DNL, the
carrier in possession of the shipment must be given all
information to quickly identify and isolate both that
shipment and others in the network that may be similar.
Other ACAS participants must also be made privy to the
full information--for them to identify and isolate similar
high-risk shipments.
Finally, a secure means to provide broader threat
information to the appropriately-selected security staff
within the ACAS carrier is needed. It would improve
internal risk targeting prior to a shipment ever entering
the network.
The Air Cargo Network Is Highly Secure.--Air cargo operators
are highly motivated to ensure their systems are not targeted
by a terrorist weapon and have made major investments in
creating a secure aviation network based on multiple layers
both from Government regulations and additional corporate
security measures. Of the millions of shipments screened
through ACAS over a period of more than 2 years, less than one-
half of 1 percent has required additional measures to verify
the contents, and no terrorist threats have been detected. This
indicates that existing measures are working effectively to
deter attempts to exploit the network for terrorist purposes.
Before any new regulations are proposed to improve the security
of what is already a very secure air cargo system, Government
agencies should consider the operational impacts and weigh
those against the marginal increase in security. This is the
backbone of ``Risk-Based Security.''
International Harmonization Critical For Long-Term
Effectiveness.--Most of the industry partners involved in the
ACAS pilot are operating on a global scale. There are several
initiatives similar to ACAS being planned in multiple
countries, and preliminary pilots were conducted between the
express carriers and four European countries last year. It is
vital that the U.S. Government seek early alignment with
international organizations and other partners/countries to
develop internationally-recognized standards, procedures, and
processes for advanced shipment data provision to minimize the
level of variability of systems and requirements and avoid
duplication of data submission and security risk assessment
where possible. The goal should be to develop a common global
solution that recognizes and supports the different air cargo
business models and to achieve mutual recognition of security
programs and risk assessment results. The global solution
should harmonize data requirements and eliminate duplication by
ensuring shipment data is only submitted to one country for a
single security risk assessment that is accepted by the other
countries involved in that movement. This will allow
international trade partners to share information globally and
quickly, both reducing unnecessary cost and complexity while
improving governments' risk assessment capabilities.
iii. screening issues
TSA has made significant progress in adopting a risk-based approach
to air cargo screening requirements over the past year. By completing
the mutual recognition of screening protocols and information sharing
with the European Union last June, TSA more than doubled the size of
the National Cargo Security Program (NCSP). The NCSP recognizes other
countries with air cargo security protocols that provide a level of
security comparable to the United States, and allows operators to
conduct necessary screening much further upstream prior to a shipment's
departure for the United States.
Due to the mutual recognition agreement with the European Union,
TSA has provided the air cargo industry with considerable more
flexibility and taken a major step toward improved trade facilitation.
This agreement required extensive work to ensure the correct standards
were in place across the entire European Union, and TSA deserves great
credit for persevering through the negotiation to reach the final goal.
ACAS has served to illuminate issues around the operational
protocols for screening shipments considered to be elevated risk. ACAS
information analysis can result in a requirement to screen a shipment
at origin, before it begins a trip to the United States that may
involve several plane changes. Through the NCSP, the results of this
screening, and the identification of a package as non-threat, stays
with the shipment as it moves through the supply chain. TSA is
continuing to engage in discussions with the private sector about how
ACAS can be leveraged to reduce overall screening requirements through
an automated approach to identifying shippers as ``known''. Carriers
need to conduct necessary screening based on a shipper's known status
at the time and the location in the supply chain that is operationally
optimum, ensuring full compliance with TSA requirements. This principle
needs to be the centerpiece of any future modifications to the
screening regime based on the ACAS experience.
iv. acas: the new public-private partnership
ACAS represents a breakthrough in the development of public-private
partnerships to achieve mutual security and trade facilitation goals,
or, as the CBP Commissioner has described it, ACAS is a ``game
changer''. To establish ACAS, CBP and TSA employed an approach that has
come to be known as ``co-creation'', in which the private sector
determined at the outset an operational concept for the project, how
the data would be transmitted, and how the reaction to the results of
the risk assessment would be managed. These pillars of the project were
then discussed with the Government and refined to ensure the effort
would meet their requirements. The private sector also decided the pace
and direction of the expansion of ACAS to additional countries, within
a set of priorities that was determined by CBP and TSA. This approach
differs significantly from the normal method of allowing the business
community to comment on the Government's approach to a security issue
only after a regulation has been drafted.
Based on the success of this approach, CBP and TSA intend to use a
similar method to evolve ACAS toward a regulatory framework. After the
pilot project has run for a sufficient amount of time and the results
are analyzed, the ACAS private-sector participants will engage with CBP
and TSA to draft a regulation that is based on the operational lessons
learned from the pilot and that incorporates the flexibility and
feasibility of the approach employed in the pilot. The regulation will
also not attempt to employ a ``one-size-fits-all'' approach, but will
recognize the different business models of the ACAS participants and
provide a flexible approach to ensuring optimum security, tailored to
the specific industry entities in the air cargo environment. While
participation in ACAS is now voluntary, CBP and TSA have often pointed
out that the primary benefit of engaging in the ACAS pilot will be the
opportunity to engage in the regulation writing process.
The private-sector ACAS participants have organized themselves into
three working groups that are focusing on the policy aspects of the
regulation, the messaging protocols to submit ACAS information and
receive the Government's response, and screening issues. The three
groups have been meeting since late last year and are prepared to
engage with the Government to discuss the key issues the regulation
will need to address and a framework for including the lessons of the
pilot. That process is just getting underway, and is being conducted
under the auspices of the Commercial Operations Advisory Committee, or
COAC, which is CBP's main Federal advisory committee. The goal is to
produce the first draft of the regulation over the next year.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Mullen, for your testimony.
Our next witness is Mr. Christopher Browne. Mr. Browne is
the airport manager of Washington Dulles International Airport
and is testifying on behalf of the American Association of
Airport Executives. The American Association of Airport
Executives is the professional association that represents
airport management personnel at public use, commercial, and
general aviation airports. The Chairman recognizes Mr. Browne
to testify.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER U. BROWNE, AIRPORT MANAGER, WASHINGTON
DULLES INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE
AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF AIRPORT EXECUTIVES
Mr. Browne. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Members of
the committee. It is indeed a pleasure to be able to join with
you today to discuss this important subject and why it is so
important to airports across the country.
As noted, I am here representing the American Association
of Airport Executives and the thousands of airport
professionals across the country who manage, build, and operate
our Nation's airports.
If I may, I would like to use a brief analogy, however, to
help illustrate why airport supports RBS and how it plays into
the broader context of what we are talking about. If you will,
think of our aviation industry as a three-legged stool, where
each of the legs are interdependent on each other for their
cooperative success. The first leg of that stool, the airports,
public agencies operated as businesses. The second leg of that
stool, airlines, private companies using private capital for
their business purposes. The third leg of the stool are the
Federal agencies, FAA, CBP, and TSA, and this is where I think
we are very different than any other industry that I can think
of and, indeed, unique, because our Federal agencies play not
just a regulatory oversight role, an essential one and one we
very much need, but they play key operational roles, whether it
is an FAA air traffic controller, a CBP inspector, or a TSA
screener. These are folks that fulfill key operational roles
that, if left unfilled or under-resourced, the business model
for all of us fails.
So for that reason, airports are very much vested in the
success of the TSA and, in particular, this program. RBS, as
you know, as has been discussed--and more particularly,
PreCheck--is an opportunity where the TSA can use its resources
to highest and best use, where they can begin to focus more of
their resources on those folks that present higher risk and
allow the vast majority of travelers to undergo modified
screening protocols that are actually creating higher
throughput at our checkpoints.
It is important, I think, to remind ourselves of the
obvious. Everybody that goes through PreCheck is, indeed, being
screened. So it is important to us as airports that we achieve
the benefits of PreCheck, primarily a much better use of
limited resources among the TSA, much better customer service,
and, in fact, enhanced security.
Think of the difference it can make at Dulles, where today
if we have a security screening checkpoint lane that can
process 125 people an hour, what it means for that lane to then
be able to screen 250 or more passengers per hour. That is
better customer service, it is a better use of resource, and
any business would see it as a huge productivity gain.
The problem right now is that with PreCheck, the
populations identified don't get us the numbers we need for
success. Administrator Pistole has said that by the end of this
year, 25 percent of all travelers in this country will be
PreCheck-eligible. I can tell you we are nowhere near that
Dulles today.
Global Entry, elite fliers, children under 12, these are
all good populations worthy for participation in PreCheck, but
collectively they don't add up to the numbers needed. In fact,
for PreCheck to really succeed, we need to see 50 percent, 60
percent and more of the travelers qualifying for it. Then we
really get the economies of scale and the highest and best use
of these resources and, by the way, I truly believe, enhanced
security.
The problem thus far is that airports have not been able to
participate at the level we can. Every passenger that comes
through our front door is an airport customer, and I am
agnostic as to whether they are Global Entry or not, first-time
flyer, or frequent flyer. The fact is, it is a huge population,
and we as airports need the opportunity to tap in and identify
those folks among that population that qualify for PreCheck.
That is why we have aligned with other airports and CLEAR,
previously mentioned, the leading biometric technology company,
to come up with a plan that we have submitted to the TSA for
their approval that would allow us to identify these
populations and significantly grow PreCheck.
We urge the TSA to act quickly on this proposal, allow us
and other airports to test it, and then maybe by the end of the
year, we might start seeing the kind of 25 percent numbers
Administrator Pistole has spoken to.
In closing, you know, RBS and PreCheck is a win-win for all
of us. I think we need to do everything we can to enhance
customer service, enhance security, and be mindful of the smart
and intelligent use of limited resources that the TSA will have
with or without sequestration. Airports are very much willing
and anxious to play a significant role in that process.
With that, I will close, and I would be happy to take any
questions you may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Browne follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher U. Browne
April 11, 2013
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, Members of the
subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today
to offer the views of airport executives on the Transportation Security
Administration's efforts to advance risk-based security. I am
testifying today on behalf of the American Association of Airport
Executives (AAAE), which represents thousands of men and women across
the country who manage and operate the Nation's airports. I am actively
involved with AAAE as vice-chair of the association's Transportation
Security Services Committee. In addition to my work with AAAE, I
currently serve as vice president and airport manager of Washington
Dulles International Airport.
airport executive support precheck and want to facilitate rapid program
expansion
Mr. Chairman, I want to focus the majority of my comments today on
TSA's PreCheck program, which, as you know, offers expedited screening
and a better travel experience to low-risk passengers who have
voluntarily provided information about themselves for Government
vetting.
Airport executives are enthusiastic supporters of PreCheck, and we
believe that Administrator Pistole and his team deserve immense credit
for their leadership in moving forward with the program and other risk-
based initiatives. The work of TSA to bring 40 airports on-line to date
with PreCheck is notable, and we are encouraged by the goal established
by Administrator Pistole to expand the program further as part of
broader efforts to provide expedited screening by year-end to 25
percent of individuals currently processed through security screening.
In today's difficult budget environment and with passenger levels
increasing at many airports across the country, it is imperative that
TSA deploy limited Federal resources effectively. PreCheck offers great
promise in that regard--although steps must be taken in short order to
greatly expand the number of eligible individuals who participate in
the program. Absent a robust, critical mass of participants, the
program will ultimately fail to fully achieve its objectives of
enhanced security and efficiency.
A lack of program participants could also exacerbate wait time
problems for the majority of travelers who must use ``non-PreCheck''
lanes for screening--a situation that neither the traveling public nor
you as policymakers will accept in the long-term. While we appreciate
the action the agency is taking in the short term through the ``Managed
Inclusion'' pilot and other initiatives to more fully utilize PreCheck
lanes for expedited screening, it is clearly in the long-term interest
of the agency and the traveling public to ensure that as many
individuals as possible are enrolled in and utilizing the PreCheck
program and associated processes.
The steps that TSA has taken to this point through its largely
airline-centric approach to facilitate participation from a limited
pool of elite fliers and with Global Entry participants have provided a
good start, but the agency must greatly accelerate enrollment in the
program to gain widespread participation. Airport executives have a
long history of facilitating participation in trusted traveler
programs, such as Registered Traveler, and we are eager to play a more
active role in the days ahead to significantly grow enrollment in
PreCheck.
Ultimately, airport executives would like to see the program
expanded to accommodate as many additional, qualified travelers as
possible through a community-based, airport-centric approach that
allows vastly larger populations of travelers to enroll and participate
in PreCheck-approved programs on an airport-by-airport basis and to
become trusted through Government-approved vetting protocols.
Unfortunately, airports currently lack the ability to enroll our
customers into a TSA-approved system for vetting and program
participation, leaving a prime opportunity for program expansion
unutilized. By simply establishing security standards and technical
specifications and allowing airports to enroll our customers into the
program--just as participating air carriers currently do--TSA could
significantly increase the opportunity for program participation and
set us on a course for meeting the growth necessary to make PreCheck a
success. Airport operators--as a regulated entity with deep ties to the
communities they serve--are uniquely situated and qualified to
facilitate enrollment in the PreCheck program, and we are eager for the
opportunity to do so.
Mr. Chairman, from my perspective as an airport manager, I want to
make sure that customers who utilize my airport have a predictable,
consistent, efficient, secure experience through the screening process
to the fullest extent possible. PreCheck has great potential for
helping to achieve those goals, but the program must evolve to cover a
much wider pool of participants at our facilities beyond Global Entry
members or those who are fortunate enough to have status on a
particular air carrier.
Airports hold the key to ensuring the future success of the program
by encouraging additional enrollment and by designing an approach that
makes sense at individual airport facilities, which can vary
dramatically in terms of passenger mix, airport layout, and other
critical factors. With robust airport involvement, the program can and
should grow and give qualified participants assurances that when they
fly out of Dulles International or any other particular airport, they
will have the predictable, consistent experience they need and value.
airports are eager to partner with tsa to expand precheck participation
AAAE and airports have long supported the trusted traveler concept
that underlies PreCheck, and we are actively working with TSA in an
effort to rapidly expand the population of passengers participating in
the program. We are also working collaboratively with TSA to address
related issues affecting program expansion, including checkpoint
configuration, queue management, modified LEO response expectations,
and public outreach and communication.
Airports long ago recognized that there was great potential value
in terms of enhanced security and efficiency with the deployment of
trusted traveler programs. Airports have also understood that they are
uniquely situated to bring interested parties together to chart a
course that would result in the successful deployment and operation of
these types of programs.
Over the past decade, AAAE and individual airports have worked
closely with TSA and the technology community to implement other
specific trusted traveler programs, including Registered Traveler. In
roughly 1 year, the RT program enrolled more than 250,000 travelers at
24 airports, proving the security and efficiency benefits that adoption
of these programs provides. AAAE is encouraged by and supportive of
recent private-sector initiatives aimed at facilitating the wide-scale
utilization of the trusted traveler approach at airports across the
country.
Based on our prior success with trusted traveler initiatives, AAAE
has encouraged TSA to utilize community-based, airport-centric
enrollment options to facilitate the flow of additional information to
the agencies on a significantly expanded number of low-risk passengers
for eligibility in the PreCheck program. In addition to providing the
volume of passengers necessary for TSA to realize the operational
efficiencies for which the programs are designed, airport-specific
public enrollment options will allow airport operators to proactively
and directly participate in and promote the risk-based programs that
they support.
By playing such a key role, airport operators will also benefit
from local implementation of National programs that enhance security.
Airport involvement will also bolster the relationship between airport
operators and local TSA staff, increase affinity to airports, and
assist TSA in reducing the complexity while enhancing the customer
experience at passenger screening checkpoints. The success of TSA's
efforts to advance intelligence driven risk-based security approaches
is a top priority for AAAE and its airport leadership.
Airports are confident that in partnership with TSA they can help
facilitate the deployment of robust trusted/known traveler programs
that focus on enhanced security above all else in addition to
expediting the travel experience. These two pillars are the primary
values that air travelers want and that each of you as policymakers
rightly will demand. By bringing efficiency back into the Nation's
airport screening checkpoints, TSA screeners will be able to better
focus their resources on the critical task of providing more rigorous
screening to individuals about whom we know less than those who use the
system the most and have voluntarily submitted background information
for extensive vetting and clearance.
tsa must remain focused on its primary mission of passenger and baggage
screening
While not the primary focus of today's hearing, we also wanted to
bring to the subcommittee's attention our concern with proposals that
continue to emerge to expand TSA's authority beyond its primary mission
of passenger and baggage screening. Expanding the agency's reach and
responsibilities--particularly to areas already in capable local
hands--runs contrary to efforts to more effectively align scarce
resources with the areas of greatest threat in a risk-based approach.
As you know, airports play a critical role in aviation security,
serving as an important partner to TSA in helping the agency meet its
core mission of passenger and baggage screening. The significant
changes that have taken place in airports over the past decade with the
creation of the TSA and its assumption of all screening duties have
been aided dramatically by the work of the airport community, and we
will serve as a critical local partner to the agency as it continually
modifies its operations, including some of the risk-based security
initiatives that are under discussion today.
In addition to partnering with TSA to meet its core mission,
airports as public entities provide a critical local layer of security,
performing a number of inherently local security-related functions at
their facilities, including incident response and management, perimeter
security, employee vetting and credentialing, access control,
infrastructure and operations planning, and local law enforcement
functions. These important duties have long been local responsibilities
that have been performed by local authorities in accordance with
Federal standards and subject to Federal oversight. Airport operators
meet their security-related obligations with a sharp focus on the need
to protect public safety, which remains one of their fundamental
missions. The professionals who perform these duties at airports are
highly trained and have the first responder authorities and
responsibilities that we all value immensely.
From a security and resource perspective, it is critical that
inherently local security functions--including incident response and
management, perimeter security, employee vetting and credentialing,
access control, infrastructure and operations planning and local law
enforcement--remain local with Federal oversight and backed by Federal
resources when appropriate. We urge the subcommittee and Congress to
reject efforts to Federalize local security functions at airports.
airport credentialing and access control should remain with local
airport control
One area of particular concern for airport executives that we are
compelled to highlight for the subcommittee is an on-going effort to
``harmonize'' or ``modernize'' various aspects of existing
transportation worker vetting programs. In the aviation environment,
the background check process for workers operates successfully as a
Federal/local partnership with the Federal Government holding sole
responsibility for security threat assessments and other necessary
Government checks for prospective workers and with local airport
authorities operating and managing enrollment, credentialing, badging,
criminal history background check adjudication and access control
systems in accordance with strict Federal standards.
The current system for aviation ensures the highest level of
security by combining the unique local experience, expertise, and
knowledge that exists at individual airports with Federal
standardization, Federal oversight, and Federal vetting assets. Local
involvement provides a critical layer of security and gives airports
the operational control they require to ensure that qualified employees
receive the credentials they need to work in the airport environment.
In contrast to the long-standing locally controlled credentialing
and access control apparatus that exists in the aviation environment,
the credentialing/access control system in place in the maritime
environment with the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) program is relatively new. Under the TWIC model, the Federal
Government or its contractors are responsible for virtually all aspects
of the process, including worker enrollment, applicant vetting,
credential issuance and some elements of access control. In our view,
the early results of TWIC have been uneven at best despite hundreds of
millions of dollars in Federal investments. The existing system in
aviation operates at no cost to the Federal Government.
Some have suggested abandoning the successful local systems and
processes already in place at airports with badging and access control
to expand TSA and the Federal Government's control over more of the
process as is the case with TWIC in the maritime environment. Airport
executives oppose any move to shift any additional functions in
aviation to the Federal Government as is contemplated under the
agency's Universal Enrollment System (UES) and believe that such a move
would diminish security by reducing or eliminating a critical, extra
layer of security that is already in place in airports and absent with
the TWIC approach.
Pursuing such an approach as planned under the UES would scuttle a
successful local/Federal model that has worked well for decades,
eliminate local operational control, stymie significant efforts already
under way at airports across the country to upgrade and biometrically
enable existing airport badging and access control systems, and
significantly increase costs to the aviation industry with no
demonstrable security benefit.
While the desire to centralize and Federalize the process for all
transportation worker vetting programs in the name of modernization or
harmonization may be understandable from the Federal Government's
perspective, airport executives are concerned about Federal intrusion
into existing processes that have worked well for decades. Airports are
also very concerned about having to help foot the bill for these
initiatives--estimated at $633 million through 2025 in appropriations
and new fees as part of the Technology Infrastructure Modernization
(TIM) program and associated UES--for changes that provide them with no
demonstrable security or operational benefit. The current system in
aviation operates efficiently and effectively at a fraction of the cost
of other transportation vetting programs and at no cost to the Federal
Government. We want to ensure that remains the case.
TSA can and should continue with its efforts to modernize and
harmonize its internal vetting programs without the need to expand the
Federal Government's responsibilities to include credentialing and
access control in the aviation environment. As the subcommittee and
Congress consider the TIM and UES programs, we urge you to exempt
aviation from any new fees or requirements in recognition of the
existing, successful, locally-controlled credentialing and access
control model and the significant investments that have been made
locally over the years to those systems. Efforts to Federalize any of
these processes or functions are unnecessary and wasteful and should be
rejected.
conclusion
With Federal resources under severe constraint and with more than
700 million passengers traveling through the U.S. aviation system each
year--a number that is expected to grow significantly in the years
ahead--it is imperative that TSA remain focused on its primary mission
of passenger and baggage screening while pursuing risk-based approaches
to enhance security and efficiency. AAAE and airport executives are
encouraged by TSA's recent efforts with PreCheck, and we are eager to
partner with the agency to expand the program to additional populations
and airports through community-based, airport-centric approaches.
I appreciated the opportunity to be here today and look forward to
any questions you have.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Browne, for your testimony.
Our final witness is Mr. David Borer, who currently serves
as general counsel for the American Federation of Government
Employees. The American Federation of Government Employees is
the largest Federal employee union, representing 650,000
Federal and D.C. Government workers Nation-wide and overseas.
The Chairman recognizes Mr. Borer to testify.
STATEMENT OF DAVID A. BORER, GENERAL COUNSEL, AMERICAN
FEDERATION OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
Mr. Borer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Richmond, Members of the subcommittee. On behalf of the over
650,000 Federal employees, including 45,000 transportation
security officers represented by AFGE, I thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
I also want to express our union's appreciation of Ranking
Member Richmond and Mr. Thompson for the SPP bill introduced
yesterday.
AFGE is on record supporting the principle of risk-based
security. It can focus TSA's work on genuine risks while
eliminating unnecessary procedures and identifying low-risk
individuals. PreCheck and Known Crewmember, as we have heard
this afternoon, are promising, successful programs that we hope
to see expanded.
However, the decision to end the ban on knives was
hopelessly flawed and failed to account for the very real risk
posed by those knives. It is just common sense. Allowing knives
through the checkpoint and onto the aircraft increases the
safety and security risk. TSOs, air marshals, flight
attendants, pilots, passenger groups all oppose the new policy.
Even some airline CEOs have spoken out against lifting the
knife ban, a rare consensus of opinion between labor and
management in the airline industry.
Despite all of the unfounded criticism, TSA and the
officers that we represent have made air travel safer. Enormous
quantities of deadly contraband, including knives, have been
stopped at the security checkpoints. Where private security
companies failed us on September 11, TSA has had an effective
record in preventing further attacks.
TSA's sudden policy change without consulting TSOs and
their union makes no sense. TSOs know that a policy change like
this will increase risks for themselves and others and will
have unintended consequences like longer security lines. Their
input could have prevented this dangerous policy change.
While AFGE was not consulted, published reports indicate
that lobbyists for the knife industry were. Those lobbyists now
claim to have been instrumental in winning the change and even
``an anonymous TSA official'' is thanking them for their
``assistance'' in lifting the ban.
The knife industry has no responsibility for aviation
safety and security, only a commercial interest. They should
have no role in this process.
But my testimony today is not concerned simply with the
failure to consult with AFGE and other key stakeholders or the
lack of notice about the knife rule. This is about--as it
states in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act,
``ensuring the safety and integrity of all persons providing
services with respect to the aircraft providing passenger air
transportation.''
Despite repeated statements by the agency, preventing the
catastrophic loss of an aircraft is not TSA's only mission, and
we reject the implication in that statement that collateral
casualties in the cabin or at the checkpoint are therefore
acceptable risks.
The prohibited items list is a critical component of
accomplishing TSA's mission. Small scissors and nail clippers
have been allowed in the past. Other changes have been made.
But under this latest change, items actually designed and used
as weapons will now be allowed onto the aircraft.
One knife manufacturer is already advertising the
development of new knives for use as ``weapons'' on-board
aircraft, knives that are designed to comply with TSA's new
policy. The transition from an absolute ban on knives to a
policy that requires a TSO to quickly determine the size and
type of a knife will result in resistance from certain
passengers. We are concerned about training for TSOs. We are
concerned about long lines at the checkpoint. We are especially
concerned about assaults by irate passengers.
Assaults and batteries are already almost routine for TSOs.
There have been two in the last 2 weeks. When our union
contacted the TSO recently assaulted in Honolulu Airport, one
of the first things she said was, ``What would have happened if
that person had a knife?''
The changes to the PIL have also caused outrage among the
Nation's flight attendants. They, too, have seen a growing
number of assaults and batteries, so much so that the term
``air rage'' has now entered our collective vocabulary. While
TSA notes that no flight attendant in the United States has
been attacked with a knife, you should know, Mr. Chairman, that
flight attendants in other countries have been attacked with
knives as recently as 2011. Several of the terrorists on
September 11 are known to have been armed not just with box
cutters, but with pocket knives.
Flight attendants are also confronted by the same irate
passengers our TSOs deal with at the checkpoint. In fact, in
some cases, passengers have committed an assault and battery on
a TSO at the checkpoint only to be waived through by a
supervisor and allowed to board an aircraft.
In conclusion, if we learned anything from September 11, it
is that desperate and fanatical people can wreak havoc and
commit acts of death and destruction in air travel. Knives must
continue to be banned from commercial aviation. TSA's mission
is to reduce, not to increase, the risk in commercial aviation.
Knives have no place on airplanes ever again.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Borer follows:]
Prepared Statement of David A. Borer
April 11, 2013
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee, my name is David A. Borer, and I am the general counsel
of the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (AFGE). On
behalf of the members of our union, which represents more than 650,000
Federal employees, including 45,000 Transportation Security Officers
(TSOs) working on the front lines of aviation security, I thank you for
the opportunity to testify today regarding stakeholder perspectives on
the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) efforts to advance
risk-based security.
risk-based security
AFGE and the TSOs we represent are on record supporting the
principle of risk-based security. Careful, risk-based analysis can help
to focus TSA's work on genuine risks to safety and security, while
eliminating unnecessary procedures and identifying low-risk individuals
who require less scrutiny. However, risk-based security decision
analysis like the kind that resulted in the decision to end the ban on
knives, is not a model that should be duplicated. The decision to end
the ban on knifes was hopelessly flawed and certainly failed to account
for the risk posed by knives.
Operational experience and common sense tell us that allowing
knives through the checkpoint and onto the aircraft increases the
safety and security risk to TSOs, crew members, and passengers. TSOs,
air marshals, flight attendants, and pilots oppose the new policy
because it increases the risk they face on the job. Even some airline
CEOs have spoken out against lifting the knife ban; a rare consensus of
opinion between labor and management in the airline industry.
The TSOs represented by our union share with TSA the goal of
ensuring the safety and security of air travel in the United States.
Our TSOs are sworn to protect air travelers and their families and
loved ones, as well as the hundreds of thousands of workers who make
commercial aviation possible. Despite all the unfounded criticism
heaped on TSA and these officers, the bottom line is that they have
been successful in making air travel safer. There has not been a repeat
of the September 11-style attacks since TSA was put in charge of
aviation security. Enormous quantities of deadly contraband--including
knives--have been stopped at the security checkpoints, preventing it
from being carried onto the aircraft. Where private security companies
failed us on September 11, TSA has had an effective record in
preventing further attacks.
failure to consult with afge and the tsos
Against this background, TSA's sudden change of policy, without
consulting TSOs and their union in any formal way, makes no sense. We
understand that, to be successful, TSA must stay several steps ahead of
terrorists through procedures and technology that evolve in response to
real-time intelligence developments. TSOs have the hands-on operational
experience to know that a policy change like this will increase risks
for themselves and others, and will have other unintended consequences
like longer security lines. Their input could have proven invaluable in
the process leading up to the decision of whether to change the ban on
knives. It seems illogical, then, that TSOs are often the last to be
informed of screening changes they are to implement, and are routinely
denied any meaningful input to inform those decisions. In this case,
TSOs and AFGE were informed of the policy change, just minutes before
the public announcement, by a TSA official who kept looking at his
watch for fear that he was going to miss the announcement. The
extremely short briefing permitted virtually no dialog, nor was our
input sought in advance. TSA Administrator Pistole has referred to TSOs
as ``effective'', ``professional'', and ``integral'' to the agency's
mission. However TSA's refusal to engage with the largest segment of
its workforce and their duly elected exclusive representative has
actually hampered the agency's ability to seamlessly function as an
intelligence-driven, risk-based operation.
This failure to consult with key stakeholders on the front line of
aviation safety and security became all the more intolerable when
reports were published indicating that lobbyists for the knife industry
were consulted. In fact, they now claim to have been ``instrumental''
in winning the change, and they quote an anonymous TSA official as
thanking knife industry representatives for their ``assistance'' in
lifting the ban. Administrator Pistole issued a brief denial that he
had considered the views of knife industry representatives in making
his decision, but TSA has not denied that the meetings took place nor
disclosed what role they played in influencing TSA staff responsible
for developing the policy for the administrator's review and approval.
The knife industry has no role nor any responsibility for aviation
safety and security, only a commercial interest. If they are to be
considered a stakeholder at all, they must be considered subordinate to
the stakeholders who have a direct role in keeping air travel safe and
secure.
Despite unlimited opportunities to engage AFGE--the exclusive
representative of every one of the 45,000 TSOs working at our Nation's
airports--since the summer of 2012, TSA defiantly and deliberately
ignored every opportunity to hear first-hand the valid concerns of the
workforce regarding the knife policy. There is nothing in the Aviation
and Transportation Security Act (Pub. L. 107-71) that absolves TSA of
the duty to engage AFGE as the exclusive representative of TSA
employees. In granting a representation election for TSA employees, the
Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA) stated that the following
rights apply to exclusive representatives irrespective of the extent of
collective bargaining. The FLRA wrote:
``For example, 7114(a)(1) provides exclusive representatives with not
only the right to `negotiate collective bargaining agreements covering'
unit employees, but also a separate right to `act for' those employees.
Additionally, 7117(d)(1) gives certain exclusive representatives the
right to `consultation rights[,]' separate and apart from the right to
engage in collective bargaining. Further, 7114(a)(2)(A) entitles the
exclusive representative to be represented at certain `formal
discussion[s] . . . concerning any grievance or any personnel policy or
practices or other general condition of employment [.]' In this
connection, the Authority has held that the definition of `grievance'
is not dependent on the scope of a negotiated grievance procedure. See
*247 Luke Air Force Base, Ariz., 54 FLRA 716, 730 (1998), rev'd 208
F.3d 221 (9th Cir. 1999). As such, the right of an exclusive
representative to attend formal discussions under 7114(a)(2)(A) does
not require the existence of a collective bargaining agreement. U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration
and AFGE, 65 FLRA 242, 246 (2010).''
Administrator Pistole himself also recognized both the obligation
of the agency to consult with AFGE as the exclusive representatives of
TSOs and the importance of labor-management consultation to assist the
agency in accomplishing its mission of transportation security.
According to the Determination dated February 4, 2011 (Determination),
``Labor management relations must be results oriented, designed to
solve problems and resolve issues rather than defer resolution through
resorting to lengthy, multiple, adversarial avenues.'' The
Determination further noted that ``TSA management must . . . act in a
manner characterized by cooperative problem solving approaches to
raising, addressing, and seeking resolution of issues.'' Determination
at Page 5 and 15. President Obama also signed Executive Order 13522 to
create labor-management forums throughout the Government to ``establish
cooperative and productive labor-management relations'' throughout the
Executive branch. AFGE is a member of Department of Homeland Security
labor-management forum established in 2011 by Secretary Janet
Napolitano.
On March 21, 2013 Rep. Bennie Thompson, Rep. Eric Swalwell and Rep.
Cedric Richmond, along with 133 other Members of Congress sent
Administrator Pistole a letter expressing concern about the changes in
the PIL and, in part, questioning the apparent lack of consultation
with AFGE, unions, and other stakeholders. On April 3, 2013
Administrator Pistole responded in a letter that included an enclosure
in which the administrator mentions informal conversations with TSOs,
and the National Advisory Council, a body with no standing that
represents no one at the agency. Administrator Pistole even mentions
2,000 votes in support of expanding the list of permitted items on the
Idea Factory, a form of on-line poll at the agency. Considering TSA
employs over 45,000 TSOs, a vote of support of slightly over 4% of the
total TSO workforce indicates an overwhelming lack of support from the
majority. This alleged worker ``input'' is contrary to the
consultations with the exclusive representative required by the FLRA
and the Pistole Determination.
changes to the prohibited items list (pil)
This is not simply about failure to consult with AFGE and other key
stakeholders, or lack of notice, or a breakdown in procedures. This is
about ``ensur[ing] the safety and integrity of all persons providing
services with respect to aircraft providing passenger air
transportation,'' as referred to in ATSA. 49 U.S.C.
44903(h)(4)(C)(i), (emphasis added). TSA would have us believe that the
agency's mission is limited to matters concerning the catastrophic loss
of an aircraft. But, the mission is much broader, as the above passage
from ATSA indicates, and the prohibited items list is critical to
accomplishing that mission.
TSA has previously modified its PIL to allow TSOs to clear
passengers with items such as knitting needles, small scissors, and
nail clippers through checkpoint. But in March, the agency announced
that, for the first time since 2001 passengers would be able to carry
items that not only can be used as weapons, but actually are weapons
through checkpoints and onto planes. Make no mistake about it: A blade
of 2.36 inches is a weapon whether it folds, locks, or is fixed.
The transition from an absolute prohibition on knives to a policy
that requires a TSO at a fast-moving checkpoint to determine the size
and type of a knife will result in inevitable resistance by certain
passengers. Although the administrator has stated TSOs will be trained
to refrain from opening folding or pocket knives, AFGE fails to see
what will prevent a determined passenger from opening the knife at a
checkpoint. Assaults and occasional battery are already almost routine
for TSOs. Under the new policy, those irate passengers will now be,
potentially, armed with a knife, increasing the risk of injury or
worse.
That TSO is a member of AFGE. When the union contacted her after
the incident to see if she needed our assistance, one of the first
things she said was ``what would have happened if that person had a
knife?'' Admittedly, this incident took place at the exit lane, not at
the checkpoint screening equipment. But it demonstrates the threat TSOs
face every day when they go to work; a threat that will only increase
as more knives pass through the airport.
Based on our members' experience, I predict that it won't be long--
perhaps days, maybe less--under the new policy before some passenger
will start a verbal altercation with a TSO. An irate passenger will not
be able to resist arguing over the length of the knife, its design, or
other reasons a TSO may have decided it must be excluded. Passengers
snatch items out of TSOs hands all the time. Now we face the risk that
a passenger will say something like ``give me that knife, I'll show you
it's not too long.'' Or, ``I'll show you it's not a locking blade.''
Suddenly there's an angry passenger with an open knife at the
checkpoint.
TSA's answer, at least informally, has been that no knives should
be opened at the checkpoint, none will be measured. Management tells us
it's a TSO judgment call and TSA will not second-guess the officer's
decision. We're told if something happens, ``call a supervisor.''
Saying that is how the policy should be implemented is easy. But
officers with thousands of hours of experience on the checkpoint know
that making it actually work that way in the day-to-day operation, with
millions of passengers streaming through the checkpoint, is impossible.
The changes to the PIL have also caused outrage among the Nation's
flight attendants. They too have seen a growing number of assaults and
batteries, so much so that the term ``air rage'' has entered our
collective vocabulary. TSA's carefully worded letter to Members of
Congress notes that no flight attendant in the United States has been
attacked with a knife. Several of the terrorists on September 11, were
armed with pocket knives, not just box cutters. Flight attendants in
other countries have been attacked with knives as recently as 2011.
Beyond the everyday threat of terrorism, flight attendants are
confronted by the same irate passengers our TSOs deal with at the
checkpoint. In fact, in some cases, passengers have been known to
commit an assault or even a battery on a TSO at the checkpoint, only to
be waived through by a supervisor and allowed to board a flight.
The new PIL also has the potential to increase screening lines at
checkpoint at a time when sequester is thinning the ranks of TSOs
through unfilled positions, loss of overtime, and possible furloughs in
the future. TSOs also are concerned about training for the new PIL when
the sequester has placed additional pressure on training time that was
too limited to begin with. In short, TSOs are very, very concerned.
conclusion
Finally, there is something very troubling about the dismissive way
TSA treats the increased threat that knives pose to TSOs, flight
attendants, and passengers. TSA management does not deny that there is
some risk posed by knives. Yet, they just keep repeating the talking
point: No catastrophic loss of the aircraft. That statement is a veiled
reference to the cockpit door, locked and reinforced since September
11, presumably impenetrable by assailants with small knives. By
omission, TSA's statement concedes that there may be some casualties in
the cabin as a result of knives on planes, just not enough to result in
the catastrophic loss of the aircraft. Even the U.S. military is more
open about what it considers to be acceptable collateral casualties.
With this focus exclusively on catastrophic loss of the aircraft, TSA
demonstrates an approach that is directly in conflict with the mission
to ensure the safety and integrity of all persons providing services in
the airline industry.
If we learned anything on September 11 it is that desperate and
fanatical people can wreak havoc and commit unspeakable acts of death
and destruction in air travel. Knives must continue to be banned from
commercial aviation because allowing passengers to carry knives
increases the risk to safety and security at the screening checkpoint
and on the aircraft. TSA's mission is to reduce or prevent breaches of
safety and security, not increase them. If TSA does not reinstate the
knife ban for the reasons cited above, then Congress should impose the
ban. Knives have no place on airplanes, ever again.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Mr. Borer.
Before I begin questioning, we have some additional
statements for the record that I would like to submit at this
time. The first is from Paul Hudson--no relation--president of
FlyersRights.org. The second is from David Whitmire, president
and CEO of K2 Solutions Incorporated. The third is from Brandon
Fried, executive director, Airforwarders Association.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Paul Hudson, President, FlyersRights.org
April 11, 2013
the tsa has lost its way
A new policy announced by Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) Administrator John Pistole on March 4 will allow knives in carry-
on baggage with blades under 6 centimeters (2.36 inches) starting April
25. This shocking announcement was sprung on the public without warning
with no vetting, public comment period, or input from those
representing flight attendants, pilots, and passengers--those actually
at risk.
Terrorists will soon be able to board U.S. airliners with knives as
sharp as the then-permitted box cutters and knives used by the 9/11
hijackers. TSA screeners will also have a whole new set of complicated
time-consuming inspections for knives that may further slow up airport
security.
The 9/11 Commission Report noted that the al-Qaeda hijackers used
knives to kill several flight attendants and the pilots on all four
hijacked flights, that were then used to kill nearly 3,000 by
destroying the World Trade Center and damaging the Pentagon. The FAA in
2001 did not prohibit knives with blades under 4 inches because: (a)
They did not consider them dangerous, (b) some local laws permitted
carrying knives, and (c) they were hard to detect so banning them could
slow down security screening,
Others have suggested that allowing knives will raise the
consistently-poor performance test scores of screeners and thereby make
the TSA look better. The 9/11 hijackers were also reported to have
trained killing sheep with pocket knives and were well aware of the lax
FAA policies on permitting small knives.
TSA claims international standards required this change, but this
is false. The International Civil Aeronautics Organization (ICAO), the
special U.N. agency which makes aviation security recommendations, has
no such requirement, standard, or recommendation. ICAO merely indicates
that some nations permit knives under 6 cm and others do not, just as
some permit gels and liquids and others do not. Some also permit
smoking and others do not. No recommendation of ICAO calls for
permitting knives in the passenger cabin. Anyone wishing to carry a
knife may place it in checked baggage, and the TSA could supply mailers
to return confiscated knives to their owners.
On March 14, TSA Administrator Pistole told Congress ``terrorists
don't use knives anymore'' and his internal studies show that looking
for them distracts screeners from looking for bombs. He reaffirmed his
new knife policy will be implemented as planned. Really, terrorists
must be rejoicing at such revealing comments from the top aviation
security official for the United States Government. This is one step
from ``bring it on'' and ``oh by the way, we are not really ready to
stop you.''
Given my deep, 24-year involvement in aviation security, I have for
months sought a meeting with Administrator Pistole to discuss this and
other TSA policy issues. On December 21, 2012, after the Lockerbie/Pan
Am Flight 103 memorial service at Arlington National Cemetery,
Administrator Pistole personally gave me his word he would meet with
me. I lost my beloved 16-year-old daughter Melina in that 1988 bombing
and became an aviation security activist in her memory. Since December
21, however, four requests to schedule that meeting have been ignored.
If the head of TSA ignores his own promises to meet with
representatives of those most affected, what chance does the ordinary
citizen have for grievances to be addressed?
The TSA now has 10,000 complaints per year, but has no effective
system for resolving them. Administrator Pistole has arrogantly ignored
numerous meeting requests to meet with stakeholders or provide for any
public input prior to announcing the new knife policy on March 4. While
the TSA performs a vital function of keeping terrorists from attacking
America using civil aviation, unless it resolves its many problems,
perhaps with new leadership, it may not survive in its present form.
______
Letter From David W. Whitmire to Chairman Richard Hudson
April 11, 2013
The Honorable Richard Hudson,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, United States House
of Representatives, 429 Cannon House Office Building,
Washington, DC 20515.
Re: Testimony in Support of the Transportation Security
Administration's Effective Utilization of Canine Teams to Aid in the
Advancement of Risk-Based Security
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to present written
testimony advocating for the effective utilization of canine teams for
the Transportation Security Administration and the Department of
Homeland Security in support of the United States' on-going efforts to
improve and advance security measures. As president and chief executive
officer of K2 Solutions, Inc., it is my distinct honor and privilege to
provide you with pertinent information derived from extensive
experience in the canine industry to assist in your efforts to resolve
certain areas of concern within the TSA Explosives Detection Canine
Program, as identified in the January 2013 report published by the
Government Accountability Office, and to provide expert analysis on
possible methods for enhancing the TSA's Risk-Based Security
initiatives by leveraging successes from both the private and
Government sectors.
K2 Solutions, Inc. (K2), a Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small
Business, is an industry leader focused on fulfilling customer
requirements by providing solutions ranging from the rapid fielding of
technology and systems integration to the deployment of security
products and services. Taking concepts to combat, and offering tailored
solutions to our clients within the public safety sector, is a by-
product of our diligence in research, development, testing, and
evaluation. K2's leadership team, comprised entirely of Special
Operations Veterans, has a deep understanding of asymmetric threat
behavior and user requirements. This knowledge has been extensively
relied upon and has served as a basis for enabling K2 to develop
countering techniques, training, and rapid adaptation of security
protocols to produce new systems in support of our clients' needs. In
2007, K2 initiated a canine program in order to provide our troops with
the capability to detect explosives and explosive pre-cursors during
combat operations through the utilization of highly-trained explosives
detection canines. Subsequently, K2 developed training techniques,
which enabled us to provide the Department of Defense with canines
capable of performing off-leash detection services. These canines
currently are used by the DOD to fill the gap in Stand-off Detection of
Explosives and Explosives pre-cursers (SDE2P).
K2's success in providing highly-trained explosives detection
canines for the administration of security services is evidenced by
multiple DOD and military contract awards, follow-on contracts, and the
exercise of contract options; but the truest and most rewarding
testament to our efficacy lies within the stories imparted by members
of the United States Military, who have nobly served this country and
returned to tell tales of incredible achievement and sacrifice on the
part of their canines. It is the inveterate awareness of precisely what
is at stake, should a canine fail to detect an explosive, that compels
K2's adamancy in accepting nothing short of excellence, 100 percent of
the time.
To date, K2 has successfully procured, trained, and assessed over
1,570 canines, and provided certifications and re-certifications for
more than 800 explosive-odor and narcotic-detection canines to
military, law enforcement, and civilian clients around the world. This
includes six major contract awards in support of the Marine Corps'
Improvised Explosive Device Detector Dog (IDD) Program, U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM), and the British Military Working Dog
Program.
The success of the canine programs we have been associated with is
a result of the company's focus on three essential areas of practice:
Comprehensive analyses of programs and training initiatives, including
follow-on training; continuous support and facilitation of research and
development; and formulation and use of innovative technologies and
services, such as explosive detection solutions that provide safe
standoff distance to personnel using the technology.
One subject raised in the GAO report was concern regarding the
Passenger Screening Canine Team evaluations, which are currently
conducted internally by the TSA. While internal evaluations can be
constructive if carried out regularly and uniformly, the TSA would
realize a greater benefit by engaging external sources to administer at
least some percentage of the evaluations. The use of external
evaluation teams has proven highly effective in providing consistent
and objective results. Under a contract with Johns Hopkins University,
K2 executed initial training using in-house resources available at the
K2 K9 training facility, followed by intensive on-site training, to
provide the University of Maryland with canines capable of detecting
person-borne explosives in a matter of 14 weeks. This type of detection
capability is very similar to the type of detection for which the TSA
PSC is intended. Because canine detection of person-borne explosives is
a relatively new technology, it was imperative to seek external
certifications to ensure objectivity and credibility. One of the main
reasons this program has been so effective is that the International
Police Work Dog Association (IPWDA) was engaged to provide the
certifications for the University of Maryland Program. It is worthy to
note that the outcome of the certification was a 100 percent rate of
passage, and the canines in the program have continued to exceed
expectations. Regular testing and evaluation by an accredited objective
entity such as the IPWDA is a critical component of any successful
canine program.
A second issue noted in the GAO report relates to areas of weakness
in PSC teams' effectiveness due to inadequate or insufficient training.
PSC teams can provide invaluable security support when equipped with
the proper initial training and requisite follow-on training. The PSC
requires more specialized training than the traditional canine, and
such training is every bit as essential for the handler as it is for
the canine. The latest Person-Borne Explosives Detection Dog (PBEDD)
Teams, trained for purposes almost identical to Passenger Screening
Canines, have not only the ability to consistently detect person-borne
explosives present in average amounts, but also to alert with
remarkable accuracy on even trace amounts of odors. However, even a
canine team trained to the highest degree of excellence cannot be
expected to maintain such rates of success in the absence of follow-on
training. The creation of effective PBEDD teams starts with the
assessment and selection of the right canines, which subsequently
undergo advanced training on a monthly basis to guarantee continued
high-level performance. Furthermore, because canine teams are a
partnership, training must be a team requirement; thus, training should
always be provided to the canine and the handler concurrently.
Perhaps the most pertinent of the issues addressed in the GAO
report was the discovery of inconsistent and inaccurate explosives
detection (e.g. false alerts) observed in some PSC teams. As stated,
PSC teams can be inordinately valuable when they are properly trained
and effectively utilized. In order for this to occur, the misconception
that canines used for such purposes are capable of performing only for
short periods of time, easily susceptible to fatigue or stress-related
inadequacy in performance, must be quashed. Extensive operational
experience in this area, along with data and information collected
through comprehensive research and development conducted in conjunction
with agencies such as the Office of Naval Research, has repeatedly
demonstrated that the limitations of PBEDD teams are borne out of the
handicaps of the human, not those of the canine. This fact is confirmed
by the accounts of our military members, who offered stories of their
canines' success under the most extraordinary and unexpected
circumstances. Upon return from theatre, one Marine reported that his
dog accurately alerted on an explosive during their eighteenth hour on
patrol, saving the lives of the Marine as well as his teammates'.
Another Marine recalled the evening he was playing fetch with his
canine counterpart when the dog suddenly alerted on an explosive in a
nearby field, and again, saved the lives of countless Marines occupying
the base nearby.
These stories, while anecdotal in nature, force unabated
reflection; acutely resonating within, and compelling us to remove the
rose-colored lenses and collectively establish a solution that
addresses and abrogates the vulnerabilities within systems established
for the very purpose of protecting our citizens and securing our
Nation. The United States does not stand before terrorists and shake a
weak fist; it targets, tracks, and destroys, countervailing their
prospects and vitiating the contingency of execrable threats. The same
resolve must be applied in the execution and sustainment of services
implemented to protect our interests at home.
Over the past decade, the United States has spent significant
resources, and borne considerable sacrifice in developing battle-
proven, highly effective canine detection capabilities. One of the
great benefits we have as a result of this effort is a clear template
showing what works and what does not when it comes to optimizing canine
detection programs. As our Nation shifts focus from theatres of
operation to greater protection of the homeland against a wide array of
threats, it is imperative that we responsibly transfer and repurpose
our high-end canine capabilities to entities such as the Department of
Homeland Security without degrading or losing them entirely. For the
TSA, the roadmap is clear. In order for the TSA PSC learns to attain
proficiency, strength, and consistency in performance, a commitment on
the part of those facilitating the program to embrace innovation and
utilize proven training techniques is imperative. Arming PSC teams with
a quality canine, proper initial training, advanced follow-on training,
and the knowledge and tools necessary to accurately document
inconsistencies for further analysis will lead to prodigious success.
Respectfully,
David W. Whitmire,
President and CEO, K2 Solutions, Inc.
______
Statement of Brandon Fried, Executive Director, Airforwarders
Association
April 11, 2013
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to present the views of
the Airforwarders Association (AfA) on the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) efforts to advance risk-based security.
The Airforwarders Association represents 360 member companies
employing tens of thousands of employees and dedicated contractors. Our
members range from small businesses employing fewer than 20 people to
large companies employing well over 1,000 and business models varying
from domestic to worldwide international operations. Additionally, a
few of our members operate their own aircraft. In short--we are the
travel agents for freight shipments. We move cargo throughout the
supply chain in the most time- and cost-efficient manner whether it is
carried on aircraft, truck, rail, or ship.
With respect to the subject of this hearing, the Airforwarders
Association commends TSA's continuing review of policies and the
movement to develop risk-based security strategies. Safety and security
are at the core of our members' livelihood. We fully embrace the
concept of risk-based, multi-layered security to balance risk and
freedom of commerce. Our members have invested millions of dollars in
security screening equipment, secure systems and facilities, employee
background checks, and annual security training in an effort to secure
our portion of the global supply chain.
The Airforwarders Association also commends the efforts of U.S.
Customs and Border Protection on its willingness to engage the private
sector on the Air Cargo Advanced Screening (ACAS) pilot. As Mr. Mike
Mullen notes, the pilot has proven to be extremely successful in the
express operator domain. With respect to ACAS, we have three points for
the U.S. Government to consider:
(1) Ensure sufficient data from the airforwarder community before
moving to rulemaking.--While the express carriers have proven
that transmitting limited information on a shipment can enable
CBP to produce an adequate risk assessment, we believe that
additional analysis is warranted for the airforwarder
community. There are significant differences in the business
models of express carriers and airforwarders. To date, only
three airforwarders are currently in the operational phase with
several more transitioning to this critical stage. We urge that
CBP not move to rulemaking until additional airforwarders have
the opportunity to participate in the pilot at the operational
level. We believe that CBP will increase its knowledge of the
airforwarder community by extending the pilot and will
ultimately improve both the data quantity and the data quality
from the airforwarder community leading to a more thorough
integration and understanding of the different kinds of
transactions performed by forwarder participants.
(2) Flexibility of data transmission.--The submission of ACAS data
must be flexible to allow freight forwarders to submit data
using various technology mechanisms.
(3) International harmonization.--We also strongly encourage the
U.S. Government to advocate the benefits of harmonization to
our international partners. It is critical that the United
States work with the international community to develop
recognized standards, procedures, and data provision. Attaining
a global solution will allow international trade partners to
share data globally and allow for both the optimization of the
supply chain and a robust global risk assessment of cargo.
Thank you for this opportunity to share the views of the
Airforwarders Association.
Mr. Hudson. I now recognize myself for some questions. The
first question I would like to offer up and let each of you
take a shot at, if you are interested, on a scale of 1 to 10,
how would you rate TSA's performance over the last 2 years in
terms of implementing risk-based intelligence-driven approach
to security? Please explain your response. Why don't you start
from my left to right, I guess.
Mr. Dunlap. Mr. Chairman, I am probably not prepared to
give a number, but I think in terms of recognizing the strides
that TSA has made over the past 2 years, you have to say that
they are a world leader in taking some of the theories behind
risk-based security and turning those into procedures that we
see at airports.
They are very important in influencing other regulators
across the globe to take a look at different risk-based
procedures, so I think that the administrator and the
Department have done a commendable job trying to move forward a
policy that will be flexible not only for the new threats that
are emerging, but also for the growing passenger numbers that
we see.
So I would like to see a larger group of passengers be able
to benefit from all these risk-based measures. When the whole
system is risk-based, then I think it would be fair and
appropriate to come back to you with a number. But let's just
say that there is a strong degree of leadership that we are
seeing from the TSA, and we certainly appreciate that on the
industry side.
Mr. Hudson. Great.
Ms. Pinkerton. I would echo that sentiment. I think the TSA
has gone from talking about risk-based security to actually
developing some real programs. I would give them very high
marks for the Known Crewmember program. It is--as I mentioned--
had 5 million crew go through that program. It is only at 29
airports. There is a commitment to spread that out across the
system. So I think they have done--they get very high marks for
Known Crewmember program.
On PreCheck, again, I applaud them for standing the program
up, but as you have heard today, quite a bit need--more needs
to be done to really realize the full potential of that
program.
Mr. Mullen. Mr. Chairman, I would agree with my colleagues.
On your scale, I would give them at least a nine in the area of
air cargo. There were a couple of knee-jerk reactions right
after the 2010 Yemen bomb incidents that required some
discussion to get sorted out as to what they really wanted the
private sector to do, but since then, they have been very
transparent about the process. As I said in my testimony, they
have engaged in frequent and robust discussions with us, where
they have been very willing to adopt private-sector solutions
to meet our common goals of improving air cargo security
without imposing unreasonable and operationally-disruptive
procedures on the industry, it would end up in a lot of
additional cost with no perceptible increase in security. So,
you know, I have heard some of the criticisms about their
passenger operations, but in the air cargo world, they are
really doing well.
Mr. Browne. I, too, applaud Administrator Pistole for
taking this on. It is obviously a very difficult, but timely
effort. I don't share my colleagues' optimism quite yet with--
in terms of assessing a nine to it. I think we have got a long
way to go with respect to PreCheck if we are going to get the
numbers I have described in order to claim success.
I think we have got a lot more ahead of us, I would say
more ahead of us than behind us.
Mr. Borer. Mr. Chairman, I think on the risk-based security
side, they are doing a very good and thorough job. I think
where we saw them go off the rails with the knife policy is
more, I think, driven by some of the shortcomings we have seen
on the labor relations side and not involving their employees.
Our front-line officers understand what it takes to execute
on some of these programs. I think more involvement there can
help steer these things in a way that will be effective on
execution.
Mr. Hudson. Well, I appreciate those comments. I am running
low on time. But I guess I would like to kind of throw back to
you, very briefly, what do you see as the next steps in your
area, in terms of advancing risk-based security with passenger
cargo? What are your areas of expertise? If anybody wants to
take a stab at that.
Ms. Pinkerton. Well, I would say, with respect to PreCheck,
the administration has floated a couple of ideas, Global Entry
Light, as well as this third-party idea. I think they really
need to decide which way they are going to go, make a decision,
and then go for it, to expand the program, instead of trying to
piecemeal the program in the way they have done to date.
Mr. Mullen. Mr. Chairman, in the air cargo environment, I
would say the next steps are to continue to implement the
requirements for 100 percent screening of cargo on passenger
planes in a way that incorporates flexibility and the
willingness to look at innovative solutions there, conduct that
screening as far upstream as it is possible to do it. So I
think that is the area where they need to do some focus in the
near future.
Mr. Browne. I would suggest that we really need to work
with private industry to leverage the benefits of technology to
really make this scalable and to tap into the resources in
particular that airports can provide this equation.
Mr. Borer. I would just echo what the others have said. I
think scaling up programs like PreCheck and Known Crewmember
are a benefit to all parties here. It speeds up the process. It
reduces the--what our officers are asked to do at the
checkpoints so they can concentrate on the greater risks, so it
is really a win-win kind of a program.
Mr. Hudson. All right. Well, I thank you.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Minority Member of
the subcommittee, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Richmond,
for any questions he may have.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you to the panelists. This question is really
for all the panelists, and you can weigh in as you want. But we
know that Aviation Security Advisory Committee has been very
active in the past, and your organizations have worked closely
with TSA on Aviation Security Advisory Committee. Can you
explain for the committee the benefit of TSA consulting with
you all and the advisory committee prior to implementing
policies and--that impact you all?
Mr. Dunlap. Mr. Richmond, thank you. I need to preface my
remarks by saying, I am a member of the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee. My remarks are solely mine alone and they
don't reflect the TSA, DHS, or the ASAC committee.
I think one of the most important strides we have made in
stakeholder consultation over the last at least 3 to 5 years is
that the Department has revitalized, strengthened, and launched
an Aviation Security Advisory Committee that has a rather
broader portfolio than it did in the past to tackle some of the
very important issues that are there.
So I think as we look in the future, the talent that is
assembled in this body, the support that it is receiving from
the TSA only tells me that it has a bright future if it is
asked to comment on some of the more controversial,
contentious, or forward-looking proposals that are out there.
So I can give you my commitment that I certainly am
prepared to take on these important issues. I know that we have
a structure in place that will. I am always, and always will
be, a believer that more consultation that is with the industry
and with stakeholders and with victims will give you better
U.S. National policy as an end result.
Mr. Richmond. Ms. Pinkerton.
Ms. Pinkerton. Yes, thank you. I am also a member of the
Aviation Advisory Subcommittee on Passenger Advocacy. So my
observations would be this. I agree that having the structure
in place is critical to engaging stakeholders. As you find with
any other commission, committee, advisory committee, sometimes
there is a tendency to talk amongst ourselves a bit too much
and--but I think it is critical to have the structure, if it is
utilized correctly, and the recommendations are actually
implemented.
Mr. Mullen. Congressman, I am a member, too, of the
subcommittees of the ASAC. I mentioned in my testimony the
process used to create the ACAS project became known as co-
creation, where the Government actually presented the problem
to the private sector and let them develop a solution that came
back and met both the requirements of business and Government.
I think that is the kind of approach that the ASAC can use
to really meet their goals much more effectively. That--it
provides a forum for that kind of robust discussion, where they
can thrash out all the issues with the relevant stakeholders
before something is implemented in a rule or a regulation. So I
think the process has tremendous value.
Mr. Browne. It seems to me that decisions are going to be
made and very often, many of us are going to disagree with
those decisions. But it is particularly troublesome when
decisions are made in the absence of consultation or
collaborative discussions.
Having been in this industry a long time, I will say that
the TSA over the years has improved in this regard. But I will
also say that it is pretty notable that in those instances
where there seems to be the most uproar, it has been where
there has been the least dialogue. It is almost not the
decision itself. It is the process by which we get to the
decision.
The ASAC is a means of helping with that process.
Certainly, we are very much committed to that.
Mr. Borer. Certainly, the ASAC is a good program and more
consultation is better than less consultation. The AFGE is not
a member of ASAC, and in--it is an anomaly to me that you
wouldn't include the front-line employees or representative of
the front-line employees in such a labor-intensive operation.
I think we have a lot of input that would be valuable. We
would love to participate. So if anything, I think ASAC needs
to be expanded.
Mr. Richmond. Thanks--and I will follow up on that
question, and if you all can answer yes or no, that would be
great, because I have about 15 seconds left. Do you think it
would be beneficial to codify ASAC into law so that you don't
have a gap after expiration and everyone knows exactly what is
expected in the consultation? So if you could answer that yes
or not, it would keep me from going over too far.
Mr. Dunlap. Yes, no, and we would like to see an
information-sharing and advisory committee added, as well.
Ms. Pinkerton. Yes.
Mr. Mullen. Yes.
Mr. Browne. Yes.
Mr. Borer. Yes.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I don't have any time to yield back, but I
will say it, because everybody else says it. I yield back.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentleman. I think we certainly got
some unanimity on that last question.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, the
former Chairman of this subcommittee, Mr. Rogers, for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Pinkerton, I read with some distress recent news
reports that the Department of Homeland Security is close to
finalizing an agreement with the UAE to place a CBP pre-
clearance facility at the airport in Abu Dhabi. I was in the
airport in Abu Dhabi last week on my way to Afghanistan, and I
can tell you first-hand, they don't have any United States
carriers at that airport.
It is the global hub for the UAE-owned Etihad Airways. I
have two questions. No. 1, in your opinion, would this move fit
a--would this agreement fit into the broader Department-wide
efforts to implement risk-based security that we have been
discussing here today? No. 2, what effects do you believe it
would have on the American commercial aviation industry?
Ms. Pinkerton. Well, thank you for that question,
Congressman Rogers, because the nature of this agreement really
strikes a blow at the U.S. airline industry. We were made aware
of this decision earlier this week, and as you so correctly
point out, what is distressing about this agreement is that it
is going to be providing a service that is only going to
benefit one airline, a foreign airline.
At a time when U.S. carriers have been struggling to
survive, we just earned 21 cents a passenger last year for the
first time after a decade of losses, we expect the governments
of Asia and the Middle East to do their best to make sure that
their carriers succeed.
But we are surprised when our Government goes to the aid of
a foreign airline. It completely picks winners and losers on a
competitive--global competitive field.
Mr. Rogers. So what do you think its effect is going to be
on our U.S. commercial aviation industry?
Ms. Pinkerton. Well, frankly, we think the deal should be
blocked. We have been working very, very closely with the
airport community here in this country to try to address what
have been persistent and excessive wait times at Dulles, at
Miami, at JFK, and what we have done is we have joined together
with our labor partners, with airports, with the travel
industry, and we are asking Congress, Members of Congress to
block this deal.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Ms. Pinkerton. We think we need to fix our issues here at
home first before we start servicing other parts of the world.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I agree, and I would also--before I move
on to my next question, I do want to say, I wholeheartedly
endorse your concept of unifying our Trusted Traveler programs
into one well-branded, simple-to-understand entry program that
can be used. I know as much about PreCheck as pretty much
anybody in the Congress, and I am a member of PreCheck, I am a
member of Global Entry, and I still have problems getting
through with various airlines.
TSA points to the airlines, and the airlines point to TSA.
If it is driving me nuts, I can imagine what it is doing to
somebody who is an infrequent traveler or less frequent
traveler and who doesn't understand it. I think that would be a
great step in the right direction to unify that system.
Mr. Browne, I really think a lot of John Pistole. I think
he is a sharp fellow and his heart is in the right place, but
he recently stated that TSA would provide screening to 25
percent of the individuals currently processed through security
screening by the end of the year. That is an admirable goal, as
I think you said in your opening statement.
Do you know if he really meant just the Category X
airports? Or did he mean 25 percent of the people who go
through our airports in this country? You may not know. I just
have heard the 25 percent, and I hate to believe that--I don't
believe that is true. Do you know----
Mr. Browne. I don't know specifically. I have understood it
to mean, in the case of Dulles, that 25 percent of our
passengers would be PreCheck-eligible by----
Mr. Rogers. Oh, just Dulles?
Mr. Browne. Well, no, sir, but I can speak only for Dulles
being one of the 40 airports where PreCheck is offered. I would
have to defer to Mr. Pistole to confirm whether that is system-
wide or only among the 40 airports.
Mr. Rogers. Yes, I would ask the staff to try to get me a
copy of that quote so I can see if he was just referring to
Category X airports, because I just think it is--I think it is
going to be impossible to do that, much less across all the
airports.
But what do you think is achievable? Let's just--and,
again, I want to limit it just to the Category X airports. What
do you think is achievable by the end of this year? I think
right now, we are probably only moving 1 percent or 2 percent
through. What is realistic by the 7 months from now, 8 months?
Mr. Browne. I don't believe that we are going to achieve
the 25 percent goal unless we bring significant new populations
into the mix. It may be----
Mr. Rogers. So by December 31 of this year, you think it is
impossible to hit 25 percent in the Category X airports?
Mr. Browne. Well, not necessarily. If we receive approval,
for instance, airports and industry to roll out some of these
trials where we can begin to enroll many of our other
passengers who are in the other programs you have noted, it may
be possible. I am not aware, but it may be that the TSA has
other populations that they are considering for admitting into
the PreCheck program.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. My time is expired. Thank you very much.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Swalwell.
Mr. Swalwell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I begin, may I enter into the record and have
unanimous consent that I enter opposition to TSA's announced
change regarding the prohibited items list, letters from the
committee--the Association of Flight Attendants--CWA and the
Association of Professional Flight Attendants?
Mr. Hudson. So ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Veda Shook, International President, Association of Flight
Attendants--CWA, AFL-CIO
April 11, 2013
We thank Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and all of the
Members of the Transportation Security Subcommittee for your diligence
on this important topic for aviation security. We appreciate the work
of the subcommittee to review the TSA's efforts to advance risk-based
security. On behalf of the 60,000 flight attendants we represent as
members of the Association of Flight Attendants--CWA, AFL-CIO (AFA) I
submit the following testimony for review as the committee considers
``stakeholder perspectives.''
AFA has testified on risk-based security and the work of the TSA on
several occasions and most recently before the Subcommittee on Aviation
of the U.S. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on
November 29, 2012. That testimony in support of the risk-based approach
is relevant in the context of this hearing, but the recent announcement
of an abrupt policy shift to lift the ban on knives in the aircraft
cabin overshadows progress towards a risk-based security program.
Today's testimony includes our objections to this policy change. We are
concerned with the TSA administrator's process to reach this decision
without considering the experience of flight attendants and other key
stakeholders, and dispute inaccuracies put forth by the TSA
administrator regarding the lack of notification of the policy change
provided to me.
knives in the cabin introduce risk--threaten safety of passengers and
crew
At the most basic level, the question of whether to allow knives in
the aircraft cabin for the first time since 9/11 is a simple one: Does
such a policy change increase or decrease risk? No one can credibly
argue that allowing thousands of knives onto aircraft every day
decreases the risk to passengers and crew.
TSA has attempted to dismiss this increased risk with a wave of the
hand, stating repeatedly that ``small knives cannot cause a
catastrophic loss of the aircraft.'' First, it should be noted that
small knives did cause the loss of four aircraft on 9/11. To deal with
that contradiction, TSA has continued the ban on certain small knives,
like box cutters and tactical knives, dismissively saying that allowing
them would be too ``emotional.'' Speaking on behalf of AFA flight
attendants, I have to say that trying to berate our position as
``emotional'' is insulting. It disrespects the lessons of our past, the
heroes who were the first to die in a war we did not know we were
fighting, and this the courage of this Nation's flight attendants who
every day face the challenges of serving on the front lines of aviation
security.
But TSA goes further, saying that improvements in cockpit security
since 9/11, including the locked and reinforced cockpit door, have
eliminated the possibility that terrorists with small knives can take
over the aircraft and cause a catastrophic loss. We have grave concerns
with the lack of understanding of the necessary interaction between the
cockpit and cabin in flight. Further, this cynical position assumes
that casualties in the cabin are acceptable due to an attack by a
terrorist or an irate passenger with a newly permissible knife, so long
as the cockpit is not breached. Needless to say, flight attendants
object to that callous calculation of acceptable casualties and we
believe it fails to accurately recognize the mission of the TSA.
The TSA administrator's excuse for the abrupt policy shift on
knives and other potential weapons in the cabin is yet another in a
long line of excuses that does not hold up. In discussing this issue
with the media and on Capitol Hill the reaction has been surprise over
how TSA could possibly have concluded that it was appropriate to remove
knives from the prohibited items list. It simply does not make sense.
The tragic knife attack at the Lone Star Community College this week in
Houston highlights the dangers of a small knife in the hands of someone
who wishes to harm others. Even in that setting, with multiple exits
and the ability to call for additional help, 14 people were injured. It
is critical that we recognize the dangerous scenario of a small knife
in the wrong hands within the confines of the enclosed aircraft cabin
and closely seated passengers traveling at thousands of feet in the
air.
TSA argues that relaxing the ban would merely put the American
aviation security policy on par with that of Europe, Asia, and Africa.
Never mind that we should be the leaders in aviation security,
especially on this issue. This attempted justification exposes TSA's
inconsistency. TSA has modified ICAO's standards to prohibit locking
blades. So, the announced policy change will not harmonize the U.S.
policy with the international standard and, therefore, any claimed
benefit of such harmonization as justification of the policy change is
illusory.
TSA also claims that allowing a certain size of knife will actually
reduce the time TSOs must take to screen baggage, thereby freeing them
to concentrate on other prohibited items such as improvised explosive
devices. Common sense dictates otherwise. A blanket prohibition of
knives, as opposed to a case-by-case evaluation of knife size, is
clearly the more expeditious procedure. No one could argue that setting
the stage for a fight over the size of an open knife is a good idea for
public safety. So, once again, the justification offered is simply
illusory.
This abrupt policy change does not make sense for combating
potential terrorist attacks nor for de-escalating the daily
disturbances we handle in aircraft cabins that are fuller than ever,
while flight attendant staffing has been cut. On a daily basis, flight
attendants address, de-escalate, and when necessary, direct other
passengers to help contain disturbances on the aircraft.
In April 2012, on a U.S. Airways flight from Los Angeles to
Phoenix, a passenger suddenly charged down the aisle and tried to ram
the drink cart into a flight attendant, all the while screaming threats
against the lives of everyone on board. He was subdued with the help of
passengers, several of whom had to sit on him for the duration of the
flight.
In November 2007, a United Airlines flight from Washington Dulles
to Sacramento made an emergency landing in Fargo, North Dakota due to a
serious threat to the air craft, the flight attendants and all of the
passengers on the flight. A series of aggressive actions by a 25-year-
old man led flight attendants to prepare for the worst. Passengers were
briefed to help, if necessary. The culmination of aggressive actions
was when the man rushed up the aisle towards the cockpit while shouting
that everyone on the plane was going to die. One flight attendant
physically blocked him, and a second rushed forward to help while the
third called to detail the threat for the cockpit. Not until flight
attendants shouted forceful commands did passengers get up to assist
and help contain the aggressor. The pilots locked in the cockpit later
told investigators it sounded like a fist fight outside the door--and
it was.
Just last month, as a Delta Air Lines flight from Minneapolis to
Atlanta began its final descent, cabin pressure change led to crying
and tears for a 2-year-old boy sitting on his mother's lap. As the
boy's mother tried to soothe him, the man sitting next to them
allegedly used a racial slur and told the mother to ``shut up'' her
son, then turned and slapped the toddler with an open hand.
There are countless stories like this and that is why the
experience of flight attendants has led to such strong opposition by
our union and the entire Coalition of Flight Attendant Unions,
representing 90,000 flight attendants across the industry. Introducing
knives into any one of these scenarios could prove deadly and there is
no question that it makes everyone in the cabin less safe.
We support risk-based security, but it makes no sense to introduce
risks into the system. Multi-layered security, including prohibition of
items that could pose a threat, ensures U.S. aviation is the safest in
the world. The ban on dangerous objects is an integral layer in
aviation security. Not every decision can be presumed correct simply
because it's labeled ``risk-based security.'' The decision to allow
knives on planes is clearly not correct. We must always apply a risk-
based approach to solve for transportation security which includes the
entire aircraft and all of the passengers and crew within it.
Flight attendants take very seriously our role as aviation's first
responders and, since 9/11, also its last line of defense. We promote
improved security because we are the professionals who are charged with
the safe passage of the travelers in our care. We are aghast at the TSA
administrator's position that TSA's job is limited to guarding against
``devices that could take down an aircraft,'' while failing to even
consider the experience of flight attendants who know first-hand of the
very real dangers of small knives in the cabin. TSA cannot explain nor
justify this policy change to the more than 100,000 flight attendants
who put their lives on the line every day for aviation security. Nor
can TSA explain it to the millions of air travelers who fly every day
and their families who expect them to arrive safely. Surely, the
traveling public deserves better.
policy should never take effect without stakeholder involvement
Air Marshals, Transportation Security Officers, and pilots agree
with flight attendants, as do many airline CEOs. There is a consensus
among those in aviation security. The people on the front lines know
this is a bad idea. At times, the TSA administrator has asserted that
these stakeholders and 9/11 families were advised on some level prior
to the announcement of the new policy. In each of these cases, that has
turned out not to be accurate. TSA has the ability to review policy
changes with the Aviation Security Advisory Committee, which includes
certain stakeholders in aviation security. AFA has our own security
expert who serves on this committee. Even this committee, which is set
up to interact with TSA on a regular basis for review of security
issues, was not consulted. Genuine engagement and consultation with
stakeholders demands a much more open and honest approach.
Although the key stakeholders in aviation security were not
consulted, we have learned that lobbyists for the knife industry were
consulted. This causes us to question whether the policy change is
indeed based on misplaced efforts to improve security, or instead
driven by corporate interests. Already we are experiencing the
chilling, disrespectful effects of an industry emboldened by what they
believe is a boon to business. Note the following on-line description
from ``Gear Patrol'' of a knife that has already been created based on
the new TSA policy:
emerson hummingbird
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Bonus: Best TSA-Approved Premium Holdout.--Ernest Emerson, the
maker of high-end tactical folders popular with military and law
enforcement, is rumored to be modifying his Hummingbird blade to be
TSA-compliant. A craftsman who focuses on utility over art, Emerson is
a proponent of knives as both tool and weapon, and he designs and
builds them for hard use, with 154cm high carbon steel and a chisel-
grind edge. While we advocate you remain seated with your seatbelt
securely fastened during flight, an Emerson would be the EDC [``every
day carry''] you'd want if you get the call, ``Let's roll''.
This description is found at: http://gearpatrol.com/2013/04/05/
keep-calm-carry-ons-5-best-tsa-approved-pocketknives/.
The 60,000 members of the Association of Flight Attendants--CWA who
still grieve the loss of our member heroes on United flights 175 and 93
along with the members of Association of Professional Flight Attendants
who were crewmember heroes on American flights 11 and 77, are not only
disgusted by this advertisement, but horrified that this is what we
will face on our aircraft after April 25 if this policy is allowed to
take effect.
Flight attendants and passengers did not know what they faced on
September 11, 2001. We were trained to survive a hijacking, to keep
everyone calm and safe until the aircraft could land. It was the heroic
actions of flight attendants on those flights that ensured our country
had some of the first intelligence of that horrific day. That
intelligence made its way to the flight attendants and passengers on
flight 93 and they in turn acted without reservation to sacrifice their
own lives to save countless others on the ground. They are heroes and
we will never forget their actions, nor will we ever disgrace their
memory by forgetting the lessons we learned. Let not one more American
have to make the heroic choice they made that day. Let us not invite
another tragedy by failing to apply what we know can happen today.
Let us not allow the heroism of that day to be exploited for dirty
profits. And do not set up a scenario where flight attendants must
attempt to handle a knife fight that breaks out when passengers take it
upon themselves to enforce a disturbance in the cabin.
These are the scenarios that the traveling public and the Nation's
flight attendants will face because those on the front lines of
aviation were not consulted in this process.
afa was not notified or consulted on policy change
In an April 3, 2013 letter, TSA Administrator Pistole responded to
a letter from Congressman Bennie Thompson and 133 Members of the House.
In his response, TSA Administrator Pistole states that on November 30,
2012 he ``provided notice of his pending decision [to AFA] . . . and
asked for [my] input.'' His letter goes on to state that ``TSA received
no feedback from AFA until after TSA Administrator Pistole's March 5,
2013, announcement.''
Nothing could be further from the truth. On November 29, 2012 I had
the honor to testify before the House Aviation Subcommittee of the
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. The purpose of that
hearing was to discuss ``TSA Impacts on Passengers & Industry.'' At the
hearing, I defended TSA's risk-based approach as well as the important
work the Transportation Security Officers perform.
At the end of the hearing, Congressman Ribble indicated that his
daughter-in-law, a Southwest Airlines Flight Attendant was not in favor
of knives being in the aircraft cabin and that he was likewise
concerned. In response, I strongly agreed with his position and stated
on the record:
`` . . . I used to take my knife to work . . . I am much more thankful
to know not that I don't have a knife, but that nobody else has a knife
on the plane. While I miss that aspect of being able to travel with
that, I feel much more confident to know that the potential threat does
not exist.''
At that hearing, I clearly reiterated AFA's long-standing position
on prohibiting knives in the aircraft cabin.
On November 30, 2012 I received a phone call from TSA Administrator
Pistole thanking me for my supportive testimony. The vast majority of
our brief conversation focused on AFA's support of TSA's comprehensive
risk-based approach to security. As a momentary aside, I even expressed
my disbelief over a fellow witness's advocacy for permitting knives in
the cabin. As I recall, TSA Administrator Pistole casually mentioned
that he was reviewing the prohibited items list, which of course
includes knives, and I responded that I understood his responsibilities
as part of risk-based screening to ``look at everything.'' At no time
during or after the conversation was I left with the impression that
TSA Administrator Pistole was planning to amend the prohibited items
list nor did I reverse our position that knives do not belong in the
cabin. Between my testimony and our phone conversation, there should be
no doubt that both my union and I personally support the continued ban
on knives. Nothing that the TSA Administrator said in that brief call
can legitimately be called ``notice'' of the pending policy change, and
certainly nothing approaching ``consultation'' took place.
As additional facts have come to light, it is clear that the TSA's
abrupt policy change was actually considered over a number of years.
But, it was not until 30 minutes before TSA announced its policy shift
that I received a phone call from TSA informing me that the agency was
about to announce that knives would be allowed back on the aircraft for
the first time since 9/11. There was never any notice. Never any
meaningful dialog. Never any attempt to engage in consultations with
AFA on behalf of the tens of thousands of flight attendants we
represent who, as the head of the Air Marshall's union has said, ``will
be sitting ducks'' if this policy change is allowed to go into effect.
Bottom line: The TSA administrator attempts to distract attention
from the real issue at hand by mischaracterizing a call he initiated to
thank me and my union for standing up for risk-based security.
conclusion
The April 25 effective date is fast approaching and serious
concerns are mounting about the risks created by the policy change.
This committee is right to look into problems with how TSA engages its
stakeholders. But, let me be absolutely clear that our primary concern
is that knives should never be in the air craft cabin. In our view, an
appropriate process of consultation would have prevented TSA from
concluding that such a change should be implemented.
We encourage the Transportation Security Subcommittee to do
everything in its power to extend the April 25 implementation date and
to ultimately ensure a ban that would keep knives out of our aircraft
cabin permanently.
Let us learn from the lessons of our past and make sound decisions
for our future.
______
Statement of Laura R. Glading, President, Association of Professional
Flight Attendants
Proudly Representing the Flight Attendants of American Airlines
11 April 2013
introduction
Chairman Hudson, Ranking Member Richmond, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for allowing me the opportunity to submit the
following testimony. Furthermore, thank you very much for your recent
strong statements regarding TSA's policy-making process. Although we
may not all agree on the recently announced change in the prohibited
items list, I believe there is bipartisan agreement that the decision-
making process did not include input from each critical stakeholder. I
appreciate your support in holding TSA accountable for this oversight.
The attacks of September 11, 2001 changed the commercial aviation
industry, and the flight attendant profession in particular,
dramatically and forever. The protocols and security measures that were
instituted after those tragic events had one single intention: To keep
us all safe. On March 5, 2013, Administrator John Pistole of the
Transportation Security Administration announced a policy change that
would once again allow knives of a certain size on-board aircraft
departing from U.S. airports. The policy is ostensibly justified by the
``risk-based analysis'' this hearing seeks to better understand.
Although we support risk-based security and the periodic review of
TSA's prohibited items list, the Association of Professional Flight
Attendants, representing over 16,000 American Airlines employees,
vehemently rejects the TSA's attempt to make such a sweeping policy
change without the input of key stakeholders. As first responders and
the final layer of security on-board the aircraft, flight crews are
critical resources and should be involved in TSA's decision-making
process. Had flight attendants and others been involved from an early
point in the discussion, Administrator Pistole would not have arrived
at such an ill-advised conclusion.
the 9/11 commission report
The official report of the events leading up to the attacks of
September 11, 2001, details, to the extent possible, the tactics
employed by the terrorists who perpetrated the attacks. According to
the report, which references the heroic efforts of American Airlines
Flight Attendants Betty Ong and Amy Sweeney to relay information to the
ground throughout the hijacking, the terrorists used knives to stab
passengers and flight attendants and gain entry to the flight deck.
Among the passengers stabbed on American Airlines Flight 11 was
Daniel Lewin who had served 4 years as an officer in the Israeli
military. Despite his training, he was stabbed and incapacitated while
attempting to stop two of the hijackers who had been seated in front of
him in first class.
Small knives and pepper spray irritants were the weapons employed
by the hijackers. APFA remains convinced that such weapons, in the
hands of highly-motivated, coordinated, and trained criminals, pose a
significant threat to the security of an entire airplane. There is no
justifiable reason to allow small knives into airplane cabins.
tsa's mission
In the wake of the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress passed
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act which was signed into law
by President Bush in November 2001. According to the Act, the function
of TSA is to secure all modes of transportation. This is reflected in
the following statement from the agency's website:
``Today, more than a decade since its creation, TSA has grown and
evolved yet remains committed to its mission. The agency employs a
risk-based, intelligence-driven, multi-layered strategy to secure U.S.
transportation systems, working closely with stakeholders in aviation,
rail, transit, highway, and pipeline sectors, as well as the partners
in the law enforcement and intelligence community.'' (``September 11,
2001 and TSA.'' Web. 17 March 2013)
In the opinion of the APFA, the TSA has completely vacated its
mission and obligations with regard to this policy decision. Not only
does the introduction of knives to the airplane cabin put U.S.
transportation systems at risk, but the policy decision was made
without any input from aviation stakeholders. Flight attendants were
not consulted on the issue and APFA was not informed of the decision
until the day of its announcement. The mechanism for robust stakeholder
input exists in TSA's Aviation Security Advisory Committee. Members of
the ASAC include a flight attendant, pilots, and members of this
hearing's witness panel and their colleagues. If such a committee
exists, it must be to play a role in the policymaking process at TSA.
The failure to consult ASAC is, at best, a terrible oversight on the
part of Administrator Pistole.
tsa's justifications
Administrator Pistole's public explanation of the proposed change
is unconvincing:
``A small pocket knife is simply not going to result in the
catastrophic failure of an aircraft, '' John Pistole, Congressional
testimony, March 13, 2013.
Administrator Pistole cites the armored flight deck door, pilot
training and protocols, and the increased vigilance of the flying
public as reasons a hijacking could not be undertaken with small
knives. Flight attendants and many others in the industry reject this
reasoning.
Even prior to the attacks of 9/11, flight deck doors were closed
and locked. Today, reinforced doors remain vulnerable. On all flights,
the doors are opened for pilots to use the lavatory or coordinate with
other crew members, leaving a window of vulnerability.
Today, pilots are trained not to open the flight deck door under
any circumstances and to land the plane immediately in the event of an
attempted hijacking but this system is any but foolproof. If a pilot
were to look out into the cabin and see a family member, possibly a
flight attendant-spouse, a colleague, a friend, or a small child being
threatened with a blade to the throat, we can reasonably expect human
nature to trump training. Additionally, it is not always plausible for
a pilot to ground the aircraft, as it may be over a body of water
during an incident.
Passenger vigilance has certainly increased in the years since the
attacks of
9/11. Passengers have worked with flight crews repeatedly to thwart
would-be attackers, bombers, and deranged passengers. We all remember
the heroism of passengers on-board United Airlines Flight 93 who saved
an untold amount of lives by sacrificing their own to disrupt the
terrorists' plans. However, as evidenced in the 9/11 Commission
Report's account of the events on-board Flight 11, the majority of
passengers aboard that 767 aircraft were unaware that the situation was
any more serious than a routine medical emergency in first class. In a
large wide-body plane, particularly with three classes of service,
relatively few passengers have a line of sight to the flight deck door
during the few seconds when a hijacking may be attempted. Their
reaction cannot be relied upon to thwart such an attack. Additionally,
on a flight with a predictably low load factor, a team of six or eight
terrorists, armed with pocketknives, could easily overpower the few
remaining passengers and crew.
Removing these items allows officers to focus on detecting non-
metallic improvised explosive devices, which can blow up an airplane
(paraphrased Congressional testimony of Administrator Pistole).
Flight attendants reject the notion that TSA officers cannot screen
for both explosives and weapons. Keeping air travel safe requires both.
Allowing certain knives on-board will not make security checkpoints
more efficient because the new policy does not allow screeners to
ignore knives. On the contrary, TSA officers will now be responsible
for ensuring that knives meet the required criteria for size and blade-
locking, potentially slowing down the process even more and providing
ample distraction from the task of identifying non-metallic IEDs.
``We have yet to see a single incident where a passenger was
injured using a knitting needle or scissors.'' (``Small Pocket Knives--
More Support Than You Might Think. '' www.bios.tsa.gov 18 March 2013)
Since 2005, certain small scissors and knitting needles have been
allowed on-board aircraft. In Congressional testimony, Administrator
Pistole touted the fact that there have been zero attacks on passengers
or crew with those items. Flight attendants and other stakeholders
agree with the sentiment expressed by Rep. Eric Swalwell who stated,
``That number cannot get better, but it can get worse with this new
policy.'' Despite the lack of reported attacks involving knitting
needles and scissors, the threat remains, as the 9/11 terrorists used
unconventional weapons, such as box-cutters.
Allowing small knives is a slippery slope. There is no reason to
put flight attendants, pilots, and most of all passengers in a position
where they may be defending themselves or the entire airplane against
armed attackers.
typical flight attendant duties exacerbated
According to internal American Airlines reporting, there were
nearly 1,200 reported instances of passenger misconduct in 2012 alone.
Flight attendants have the unenviable task of addressing and de-
escalating myriad in-flight disruptions. During a US Airways flight
from Los Angeles to Phoenix in April 2012, an unruly passenger stormed
the aisle, attempting to drive the drink cart into a flight attendant,
while verbally threatening all those on-board. Introducing weapons into
situations such as this one makes the job of a flight attendant
needlessly difficult and dangerous. In the absence of a Federal Air
Marshal, there is no readily accessible official with police powers on
board an airplane. Violent, dangerous, possibly deranged, or drug-
induced passengers are the responsibility of flight attendants. Arming
them with even small knives is a grave mistake.
In conclusion, the APFA's top priority is the safety of all
passengers. That is why we ask that you, the Members of the
subcommittee, to join us in opposing TSA's dangerous policy change and
demand that any future risk-based security policy decisions be made
with the direct input of flight attendants.
Mr. Swalwell. Mr. Chairman and our witnesses, thank you for
being here today. I have to say that, since the administrator
announced that knives will now be taken off the prohibited
items list, I scratched my head wondering why we would want to
make our passengers and crew more vulnerable today than they
were since the policy was implemented and why we would want to
recklessly and dangerously put them at risk.
From what I have gathered in this last month, since it was
announced, it seems that the administrator is saying that TSA
and its TSOs--their officers who are at the weapons screening
and screening stations at the airports--are having a tough time
distinguishing and spending so much time on knives that it
prohibits them from looking at liquids and new emerging
threats.
To me, that is really the administrator saying that TSA can
walk but not chew gum, or it can chew gum but not walk, but it
cannot chew gum and walk at the same time. I think we must have
a TSA that can look at old threats and also continue to protect
us against new threats.
Earlier Mr. Freeman, who is not here any longer, stated
that if we get this right with regard to TSA, our economy
improves. But my job and our job as a committee, I believe, is
to make sure that we don't get it wrong, because if we get it
wrong, we saw what happens to our economy and passengers and
crew and people on the ground. If we get it wrong, things go
very, very bad very, very fast.
Before this policy, TSA only had to screen objects that
were prohibited, sharp objects that are prohibited. Now this
policy asks TSOs to measure the knives, and knowing anyone who
travels, I don't imagine they are going to be measuring their
knives the night before.
So, Mr. Borer, what I imagine is a situation something like
this. I am a football fan, and we have all seen NFL referees
measuring first downs. Now, I can imagine that at the airport
screening lines we are going to have TSA agents taking out the
tape and measuring whether these knives are 2.36 inches or
longer. If that is the case, do you think that is going to
allow the TSA agents to focus more on liquids or is this going
to hold up our lines and actually make them less capable,
prepared, and ready to focus on liquids?
Mr. Borer. You have hit on a very central concern that our
union has, Mr. Congressman. The TSA has assured us--we haven't
seen it in writing, but they have assured us that, no, nobody
is going to measure any knives at the checkpoint. They
acknowledge it is not a good idea to have millions of
passengers going through the checkpoint every day and have a
lot of open knives, you know, people waving them around, oh,
look at this, how long is this one?
You know, so supposedly there is no--no knives are going to
be measured, and it is going to be left up to the TSO's
judgment. But I would be willing to bet that the scenario you
described about nobody--none of the passengers are going to
measure their knives? Yes, they are. They are going to come to
the airport, and they are going to know exactly how long their
knife is, and if it is left to the TSO's judgment call and they
say, well, no, it looks like it is too long, and TSA has
assured us they aren't going to second-guess the judgment call,
well, that passenger is going to second-guess the judgment
call. He is going to say, oh, no, it is not too long. Let me
see that----
Mr. Swalwell. Then we go to the instant replay, right?
Mr. Borer [continuing]. Open it back up, and now we have
got a guy with a knife again. So----
Mr. Swalwell. I have another question, Mr. Borer. TSA will
allow non-locking knives, but locking knives--locking knives
are allowed, non-locking knives are not allowed. Do you see the
same problem with your agents now having to decide whether a
knife is locking or not-locking?
Mr. Borer. They have only got just seconds, really, with
each passenger and their belongings. To distinguish one from
the other that quickly, looking at the screen or even looking
in the bag, it is going to slow things down.
Mr. Swalwell. Here in this picture, just for the record,
one of them is locking and one is not locking. I can't tell the
difference.
My concern is, as Mr. Borer mentioned, our TSOs are not
trained right now for this policy to be implemented on April
25. I believe we can have a risk-based security program which
all of the witnesses agree upon, including Mr. Borer, and still
protect against sharp objects, which if used dangerously on an
airplane can hurt the staff, can hurt our flight attendants,
can hurt the passengers.
So I would support, Mr. Chairman, considering delaying this
or even propose that, if we want to use our Trusted Traveler
program, this could be a compromise here where we look at the
Trusted Traveler program, allow those individuals to carry
these new knives that will be allowed, see if it works with
that small pool before we just blanketly allow anyone,
regardless of their criminal record or regardless of their
mental health status or risk, to bring knives on the airplane.
I must--I think our TSA must be able to protect against old
threats and new threats. Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman recognizes the gentlelady from Indiana, Mrs.
Brooks, for any questions she may have.
Mrs. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This question is for Mr. Mullen. I am from the Indianapolis
area and to the north, and we are the second--we have the
second-largest FedEx hub, and also Indiana is often the
logistics capital of the country and a lot of air cargo, as
well as other cargo, goes through Indiana.
You talked about in your testimony the shipment and
conveyance data shouldn't be separated. You mentioned--and I am
curious, because your industry, as I understand, provides the
shipment information to the Government, and the Government then
should be doing the same when there is a shipment of concern.
Can you explain that a bit further? Is there information that
you think should be provided that you are not currently
receiving? How quickly are you receiving information from TSA
and CBP?
Mr. Mullen. Yes, thank you, Congresswoman Brooks. This has
been an important issue to the success of the ACAS pilot,
because previously, information was reported by air manifest,
and it was information about the shipment and the aircraft that
was bringing the shipment to the United States. It took some
time for the carriers to develop that report so it contained
all the information needed.
For ACAS, we separated those two things. The Government
just asked for the data on the shipment itself, which is seven
data elements, and those can be provided long before the
package is ever put on a plane. The purpose of this--and it was
a lesson learned from the Yemen bomb incidents in 2010--the
purpose of this is to prevent the package from ever getting on
a plane.
So the Government can take that shipment information and do
the risk analysis and get back to us very quickly about whether
something is good to go or not. So that is the process that we
want to see continued in the regulation. But data on the
aircraft can be provided at a later time in the supply chain,
and so the Government will still get all the information it
needs in that regard.
Mrs. Brooks. While I know it would be wonderful if we could
achieve 100 percent screening of all international inbound
cargo on passenger aircraft, TSA's implemented a risk-based
strategy which includes TSA classifying cargo as trusted or
non-trusted. Do you think this strategy has been successful?
Can you tell us about that?
Mr. Mullen. Yes, I think it has been successful. I think it
is working very well. As I said, in ACAS itself, over 70
million shipments have been analyzed, and there--none have been
determined to be a threat. So part of that is the analysis of
how well-known a shipper is, but there are very good procedures
in place. We really can't go into them here, but there are
excellent procedures in place to determine when someone is
known or unknown and clear procedures for what the carriers
need to do to conduct appropriate screening on what is unknown.
So this system is working very well. I can tell you that
100 percent of the potential high-risk shipments are being
screened. The ones that are determined to be compliant and non-
threatening, which is the overwhelming majority, don't--aren't
required to be screened. The data analysis should be sufficient
for those.
Mrs. Brooks. How long do you predict this will be a pilot
program?
Mr. Mullen. Well, a discussion is going on right now
between the Government and the private sector about how to move
into the regulatory process. The Government's goal for getting
the initial draft of the regulation out is around the first of
the calendar year. Some parts of the private sector feel it
might take a little bit longer than that, but the process is
underway, and it should be--in terms of the way these things
move in the relative near future.
Mrs. Brooks. Well, thank you. I will tell you, I was U.S.
attorney shortly after 9/11, before TSA existed, as TSA was
stood up, and we have come a long way from that time in the
Justice Department from 2001 to 2007. So I really just applaud
the efforts the private sector is playing with Government in
this role and liked your characterization of the three-legged
stool. Very important. I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
Jackson Lee, for any questions she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman very much, and I
thank the Ranking Member for his leadership on a number of
issues dealing with TSA, and I believe this committee takes its
responsibility seriously. I always have said this from the time
that I have been on this committee, while things are calm,
people make suggestions as to why you have the Homeland
Security Committee and the comparable one in the United States
Senate. Having lived through 9/11 as a Member of the United
States Congress, having gone to Ground Zero during the recovery
period, and seeing that kind of pain, I would simply say that
if some drastic and untoward action, a terrorist action that
impacted American lives and other lives, we would ask the
question why we have a Homeland Security Committee.
So let me thank all of you that contribute to not only
those issues of security, but also commerce and the movement of
people, which I think is extremely important.
It happens that we are interested in a particular line of
questioning, but I do want to indicate the importance of ASAC,
and I would like to see whether or not--I think all of the
members are a member of ASAC except AFGE. Is that correct?
While I do that, let me acknowledge--I see uniformed
personnel, so let me acknowledge flight attendants in the room.
I have always indicated that all of us become first responders.
Obviously, interpretation can be in one direction for police
and fire, but when you put your life on the line, as we know
that has occurred in several incidences along--on airplanes, as
they were in flight, we know that first line of defense
sometimes after the new laws about pilot cabin and security of
the cockpit, we know that they are right in the mix.
So let me say thank you to them. If there are any pilots in
the room, let me say thank you to them. If there are any
pilots--any first responders overall in the room, let me thank
them, as well.
So I understand that Mr. Dunlap, you are a member of the
ASAC committee?
Mr. Dunlap. Yes, I am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Did you all have a full discussion of
knives and its relation to being removed off of the prohibited
items?
Mr. Dunlap. As a matter of fact, I was not in any meetings
with the ASAC in which that occurred.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay. I take it that no one else will see
or raise a hand that they have been in any meetings where that
occurred. I have made it very clear that I believe this is
wrong-headed and really misguided.
Just a couple of days ago, tragically, in my jurisdiction
surrounding area--not exactly my Congressional district, but in
the Houston area--at a particular community college, a stabber
took a particular-type knife--in this instance, it could be
called a box cutter, and that is certainly on the prohibited
list, but they took that kind of instrument and stabbed 14
people.
Now, some would say, well, that is that kind of knife or
that kind of box-cutter, because that is something different. I
never know--none of us, Mr. Borer, can determine what someone
will use that may be an instrument of injury or death. What is
your comment on that, sir?
Mr. Borer. Well, you are right, Congresswoman Jackson Lee.
The stabbing that took place in Texas, I understand the blade
was three-quarters of an inch long. The blades that are now
going to be allowed on the aircraft are 2.36, almost 2\1/2\
inches. I think it is without question that a blade that size
in the hands of someone who is intent on causing harm can
either kill or seriously injure people on the aircraft.
Ms. Jackson Lee. My time is short. Were you engaged in any
discussions regarding personnel with the idea of knives on a
plane?
Mr. Borer. Our union was informed just minutes before the
announcement was made.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You represent the TSO?
Mr. Borer. Forty-five-thousand TSOs Nation-wide.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I have advocated for professional
development training, enhanced development training. Let me
just ask, have you seen any enhanced professional development
training that you could put your hands on over the last year or
2?
Mr. Borer. No, we have not.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you understand or have you known that--
I travel and I speak to a lot of the officers--that some
officers are on the security area for 6 hours straight without
a break?
Mr. Borer. That does happen in some locations, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you think that the sequestration will
have a more devastating impact than what might be represented?
Mr. Borer. We are already seeing that, and it is only going
to get worse. There is a letter out again today from TSA
executives saying that, while they haven't done furloughs yet,
it may be coming. They are trying to manage the sequestration,
but the--it is starting to pinch, obviously.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If the Chairman would just yield for just
a moment, I just have this question. Do you think--we know that
the change in the prohibited list, which would include knives,
comes up on April 24. My good friend, Mr. Swalwell, made a very
good point about how you are going to have to spend time
discerning what is what. Even if you are not discerning it and
pulling it out at the site, you are going to have the person
for a secondary inspection, which is going to take time. Do you
think it would be reasonable and valuable and certainly not
embarrassing if we delayed that time frame from April 24, which
is in the middle of sequestration and shortage in staffing, to
a later time for more thought, review, and understanding and
training?
Mr. Borer. I think a delay is good. Keeping knives off the
airplane even for a day longer is good. But I think ultimately
our position won't change. Knives do not belong on airplanes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I struck a compromise that leads to
knives not being on airplanes, but certainly April 24 is too
precipitous and too uncertain to move forward with knives on
the airplane.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentlelady. I will let the
gentleman respond briefly, if you like.
Mr. Borer. I can't disagree whatsoever.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Ranking Member.
Mr. Hudson. I thank the gentlelady for her questions. At
this time, I would recognize the Ranking Member for a motion.
Mr. Richmond. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that
statements in support of H.R. 1344, which is the Helping Heroes
Fly Act, that the committee received from the Wounded Warrior
Project and the Disabled American Veterans, be inserted into
the record.
Mr. Hudson. So ordered.
[The information follows:]
Letter From the Wounded Warrior Project to Hon. Tulsi Gabbard
April 8, 2013.
The Honorable Tulsi Gabbard,
502 Cannon House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Congresswoman Gabbard: As an organization whose mission is to
honor and empower wounded warriors, Wounded Warrior Project (WWP) is
committed to assisting service members and veterans thrive within the
community. For wounded veterans living with prosthetics or other
service-connected conditions, airport screening is often a frustrating,
degrading, and lengthy process. With that concern, we welcome the
introduction of the Helping Heroes Fly Act, H.R. 1344, and the
improvements it proposes to screen these men and women in a manner
befitting their service.
Wounded warriors should not have to sacrifice their privacy,
encounter conflicting screening policies and procedures, or be subject
to significant travel delays. We welcome the steps proposed in H.R.
1344 to foster expedited screening and to protect the privacy of
warriors going through the screening process. We also commend the
proposal to require the Transportation Security Administration to
consult with veterans' service organizations in the development of
improved screening.
We look forward to working with you to advance this legislation and
toward improving the airport screening process for those who have
served.
Sincerely,
Charlie Abell,
EVP for Government Affairs.
______
Letter From DAV to Chairman Michael McCaul and Ranking Member
Bennie G. Thompson
April 9, 2013.
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul,
Chairman, House Committee on Homeland Security, H2-176 Ford House
Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson,
Ranking Member, House Committee on Homeland Security, H2-117 Ford House
Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Thompson: I am writing on
behalf of the DAV, a Congressionally-chartered National veterans
service organization with 1.2 million members, all of whom were wounded
or injured as a result of active duty in the United States Armed
Forces. The DAV is dedicated to a single purpose: Empowering veterans
to lead high-quality lives with respect and dignity. We accomplish this
by ensuring that veterans and their families can access the full range
of benefits available to them; fighting for the interests of America's
injured heroes on Capitol Hill; and educating the public about the
great sacrifices and needs of veterans transitioning back to civilian
life.
H.R. 1344, the Helping Heroes Fly Act, would direct the Assistant
Secretary of Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), to provide expedited air passenger screening to severely injured
or disabled members of the Armed Forces and severely injured or
disabled veterans.
With many of the members of DAV suffering from the loss of limbs
due to their wartime service in defense of our Nation, we are finding
it increasingly difficult to understand the screening policies of the
TSA affecting those with prosthetic limbs, wheelchairs, and scooters
boarding aircraft.
While TSA offers a variety of outstanding services, such as
Notification Cards, TSA Cares, pat-down screening, multiple types of
imaging and metal detection screening, and the compassionate TSA
Military Severely Injured Program, amputees are not exempt from
additional screening when necessary. In fact, screenings experienced by
our members lack uniformity, understanding, and compassion.
At some airports, our amputee members receive relaxed screening,
while at others these screenings are horrific. Perhaps it is TSA's
purpose to make screenings unpredictable. Some screenings have required
these amputees to expose their prostheses when they lack the ability to
reposition their clothing, and TSA agents are not allowed to help them,
nor do they allow spouses or traveling companions to enter search areas
to assist the amputees.
We applaud Representatives Gabbard, Richmond, and Joyce for
introducing this legislation and for their continued support of
America's wounded and injured veterans. While the DAV does not have a
specific resolution from our members on this subject, it would be
beneficial to many of our members. Accordingly, we support the passage
of this legislation. I look forward to working with you and your staff
to continue the DAV mission of empowering veterans to lead high-quality
lives.
Sincerely,
Barry A. Jesinoski,
Executive Director, Washington Headquarters.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you.
Mr. Hudson. Thank you.
I would like to thank all the witnesses for the testimony.
Thank you for your patience today dealing with the schedule of
the vote in the middle of our hearing. Thank the Members for
their questions. Thank the audience and the members of the
flight attendants that we see in uniform here and others who
stayed for the entire hearing. Thank you for that.
Members of the committee may have additional questions for
the witnesses. We will ask that you respond to those in
writing.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned. Thank
you.
[Whereupon, at 3:24 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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