[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
U.S.-MEXICO SECURITY COOPERATION: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE MERIDA INITIATIVE
2008-PRESENT
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 23, 2013
__________
Serial No. 113-30
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
or
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio BRAD SHERMAN, California
JOE WILSON, South Carolina GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
TED POE, Texas GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
MATT SALMON, Arizona THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina KAREN BASS, California
ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
MO BROOKS, Alabama DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
TOM COTTON, Arkansas ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
PAUL COOK, California JUAN VARGAS, California
GEORGE HOLDING, North Carolina BRADLEY S. SCHNEIDER, Illinois
RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas JOSEPH P. KENNEDY III,
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania Massachusetts
STEVE STOCKMAN, Texas AMI BERA, California
RON DeSANTIS, Florida ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California
TREY RADEL, Florida GRACE MENG, New York
DOUG COLLINS, Georgia LOIS FRANKEL, Florida
MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii
TED S. YOHO, Florida JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
LUKE MESSER, Indiana
Amy Porter, Chief of Staff Thomas Sheehy, Staff Director
Jason Steinbaum, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere
MATT SALMON, Arizona, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina Samoa
RON DeSANTIS, Florida THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
TREY RADEL, Florida ALAN GRAYSON, Florida
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable William R. Brownfield, Assistant Secretary, Bureau
for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.
Department of State............................................ 6
Mr. John D. Feeley, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau
of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State........ 15
Ms. Elizabeth Hogan, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator,
Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for
International Development...................................... 24
Ms. Clare R. Seelke, Specialist in Latin American Affairs,
Congressional Research Service................................. 44
Mr. Steven Dudley, director, InSight Crime....................... 54
Francisco E. Gonzalez, Ph.D., Riordan Roett senior associate
professor, Latin American Studies, John Hopkins University
School of Advanced International Studies....................... 75
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable William R. Brownfield: Prepared statement.......... 8
Mr. John D. Feeley: Prepared statement........................... 17
Ms. Elizabeth Hogan: Prepared statement.......................... 26
Ms. Clare R. Seelke: Prepared statement.......................... 46
Mr. Steven Dudley: Prepared statement............................ 56
Francisco E. Gonzalez, Ph.D.: Prepared statement................. 77
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 88
Hearing minutes.................................................. 89
U.S.-MEXICO SECURITY COOPERATION: AN
OVERVIEW OF THE MERIDA INITIATIVE
2008-PRESENT
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THURSDAY, MAY 23, 2013
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m.,
in room 2212 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Salmon. This committee is now called to order.
Good morning and welcome to the first of a two-part series
on security cooperation with Mexico and Central America under
the framework known as the Merida Initiative.
As you all know, violence at the hands of drug cartels
along our southern border continues to affect our own security,
as well as cross-border commerce. Our communities are
threatened by organized criminals who traffic drugs, money,
weapons, and human beings across our border just as they
continue to threaten security and governance in Mexico and the
rest of the region.
Mexico is our third largest trading partner and we are
Mexico's largest trading partner. By the way, Mexico is
Arizona's, my home state, number one trading partner. So it is
clearly in both countries' national interest that we cooperate
to defeat these destabilizing and ruthless drug cartels.
Since the 2007 signing of the Merida Initiative, Mexico and
the United States have been doing just that; working together
to disrupt and dismantle the drug cartels, working to improve
Mexican and regional justice systems, and to strengthen our
shared border to include air and maritime control. As we
approach the fifth anniversary of the Merida Initiative, I
wanted to take this opportunity to take an honest look at our
efforts in cooperation with Mexico, evaluate the effectiveness
of the full range of counter narcotics efforts, and determine
how we move forward to improve and make better use of our
taxpayer money.
With the PRI back in power in Mexico, under recently-
elected President Enrique Pena Nieto, there will be some
changes to our cooperation with Mexico, so I have asked our
distinguished panel of government witnesses to provide us with
details about what these changes are likely to be and how they
will affect our efforts. I would like to know whether our law
enforcement and intelligence agencies will be able to
effectively combat drug trafficking organizations under what I
understand to be a move toward centralized control under the
Mexican interior ministry; and to what extent will this
centralization possibly derail the productive working
relationships formed over the last 5 years between our men and
women in the field and their Mexican counterparts.
The second panel of private-sector experts will give this
subcommittee their unvarnished view of the Merida Initiative
over the last 5 years. And we hope to learn their views on the
effect of the changes under the new Mexican administration will
have in achieving its original goals of the Merida Initiative.
I look forward to looking closely at Pillar III of the
current framework, building a 21st century border, and hearing
their experts' views on how we can improve border security so
we can protect our citizens without hampering our vibrant trade
relationship with Mexico.
As chairman of the subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere,
I have chosen to focus on opportunities for economic growth and
energy independence throughout our region and these
opportunities around the United States and Mexico.
Unfortunately, the scourge of transnational drug trafficking
organizations will disrupt these opportunities if the United
States and Mexico do not cooperate to take down the cartels and
enforce our laws. So I am doing all I can to make security
cooperation between the U.S. and Mexico as on solid footing as
it can possibly be with our shared commitments.
I also want to thank Secretary Brownfield of the State
Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs; Mr. John Feeley, the Principal Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for Bureau of Western Hemisphere
Affairs; and Ms. Elizabeth Hogan, the Senior Deputy
Administrator for Latin America and USAID.
I would also like to thank the witnesses who will testify
in our second panel, Ms. Clare Seelke from the Congressional
Research Service; Mr. Steven Dudley, the director of Insight
Crime; and Dr. Francisco Gonzalez, a Latin American expert from
Johns Hopkins. Thank you all for being with us today for what I
know will be an informative and very productive hearing.
I would like to recognize the ranking member for opening
statement.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, good morning. Thank you
to our witnesses who are here today.
Today's discussion comes at a critical time for both the
U.S. and Mexico. For the U.S., the concept that comes on the
heels of President Obama's recent visit to Mexico and Central
America earlier this month; a time when the threat or spillover
violence by drug trafficking organizations in Mexico, along our
southern-western border has escalated; and at a time when the
U.S. Congress is reviewing its financial commitment in
considering historic immigration reform, impacting over 11
million people.
For Mexico, it comes nearly 6 months after that historic
return of the PRI.
On December 1, 2012, PRI candidate, Enrique Pena Nieto, was
inaugurated for a 6-year term, vowing to focus more on reducing
violent crime in Mexico and combatting the drug trade. In
particular, President Pena Nieto has aimed to refocus the
nature of the U.S.-Mexico relationship to send on an economic
and energy forum agenda by calling for a review of the current
U.S.-Mexican security strategy. Thus far, Pena Nieto has moved
to centralize security policy, an indication that he is far
more skeptical of the nature of U.S. involvement in Mexico's
security than previous President Calderon.
Yet, President Pena Nieto moved to reform the structure of
Mexico security structure by placing the Federal police and
intelligence service under the authority of the Interior
Secretary could be a significant setback in cooperation between
an array of U.S. and Mexican Federal agencies.
Similarly, efforts to centralize police commands and create
a militarized police force to replace current military forces
engaged in public security could undermine law enforcement
cooperation. Nonetheless, maintaining strong cooperation
between the U.S. and Mexico is paramount for both our nations'
economies and national security. Our nations share common
democratic values and similar desires of peace and economic
prosperity, as well as a common border extending nearly 2000
miles.
Additionally, the U.S. is Mexico's largest trading partner
and largest foreign investor. Mexico, the fourteenth largest
economy in the world is the third largest U.S. trading partner
after Canada and China. Combined annual trade between our two
nations is $460 billion. In this regard and as part of the
Merida Initiative, both countries have accepted a shared
responsibility. The U.S. Congress has appropriated more than
$1.9 billion for Fiscal Year 2012, twice the Merida Initiative.
For its part, Mexico has invested nearly $10 U.S. for every $1
committed by the U.S. As of September 2012, Mexico had invested
over $10 billion toward the Merida program.
Mexico, however, remains a major producer and supplier of
illegal narcotics to the U.S. including heroin, meth,
marijuana, and cocaine. More than 60,000 deaths are a result of
drug-related crimes and violence in Mexico between 2006 and
2012. Although more possible than that, indications of progress
have at times been mixed. For instance, we have helped to train
more than 7,500 Federal and 19,000 state justice sector
personnel, 4,000 of which are Federal investigators that did
not exist before. Yet, those suspected of involvement in
organized crime can be held by authorities for up to 80 days
without access to legal counsel. Yet, many inmates await trials
as opposed to serving out the sentences. Normally, the U.S.
Agency of International Development has concentrated most of
its work in support of judicial reform at the state level. In
terms of human rights, there is concern the Mexican military
has committed more human rights abuses since it has been tasked
with carrying out public security. The U.S. must continue to
work with Mexico to improve their institutions that investigate
and prosecute human rights abuses and strengthen protection for
human rights defenders.
In conclusion, the landscape in Mexico has changed,
politically, economically, and in terms of security. But the
need to combat drug trafficking organizations and stem the
violence from their activities remain a mutual concern. I look
forward to hearing from our panelists and their assessment of
our individual and joint effort in regards to the Merida
Initiative thus far and how both our respective nations can
improve our efforts moving forward. Thank you.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. I would like to also recognize the
most distinguished Ileana Ros-Lehtinen from Florida.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Well, thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you so much Mr. Ranking Member for holding this important
hearing, one of the most critical partnerships that our nation
enjoys, that with Mexico, our ally to the south.
In a speech in 1984, President Ronald Reagan said,
``Closer to home, there remains a struggle for survival
for free Latin American, allies of ours. They valiantly
struggle to prevent communist takeovers, fueled
massively by the Soviet Union and Cuba. Our policy is
simple. We are not going to betray our friends, reward
the enemies of freedom or permit fear and retreat to
become American policies, especially in this
hemisphere.''
And still many years later, we are still looking for a
coherent strategy on how to advance U.S. interests in the
region, how to promote democracy, how to better hold
accountable those regimes that oppress their own people. And
that is why I would like to thank my friend from New Jersey,
Albio Sires, for joining me and introducing our bipartisan
legislation H.R. 1687, Countering ALBA Act of 2013 which urges
the President to sanction those persons who are officials or
acting on behalf of ALBA governments who are responsible for or
complicit in the commission of serious human rights abuses
against citizens of ALBA countries. And I hope that we can move
that bill forward. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. I would like to recognize the
gentleman from New York, Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Chairman Salmon, and of course,
Ranking Member Sires, for convening this hearing today to
discuss the current status of the Merida Initiative. I look
forward to hearing from our distinguished witnesses here today,
all of whom are very involved and very knowledgeable on the
subject of the Merida Initiative and all of Latin America.
I believe the Merida Initiative is an essential policy tool
to facilitate cooperation between the United States and our
southern neighbor, Mexico. The Merida Initiative allows the
United States and Mexico to maximize our respective resources
by coming together with the common goal to fight trans-border
crime, organized crime and corruption. Building a capacity for
rule of law, and providing technical assistance and law
enforcement training are important aspects of this agreement.
I was pleased to see the Initiative grow from a bilateral
security agreement with Mexico into a key component of a
broader regional security strategy. U.S.-Mexico relations do
not exist in a vacuum. It is vital that this agreement
continues to complement a broad U.S. regional engagement plan.
Addressing the security concerns of Mexico does not stop at
simple bilateral relations. The United States must address the
region as a whole. The Caribbean Base Security Initiative, the
Central America Regional Security Initiative, and the Colombia
Strategic Development Initiative, along with the Merida
Initiative, contribute to a comprehensive regional approach
that accounts for sophisticated criminal networks and complex
cross-border threats throughout the hemisphere.
I look forward to hearing particularly from my good friend,
Ambassador Brownfield, who could possibly speak about the
importance of regional partnerships, particularly when
discussing the work of Colombia as a regional partner for many
countries including Mexico and Guatemala.
Through my recent travels to the region, I heard first hand
the impact of U.S. assistance in a variety of sectors. Aspects
of U.S. security and assistance agreements that address the
needs of vulnerable populations such as women, indigenous
people, and Afro-Colombians are particularly important. These
populations are routinely exploited by criminal networks and
armed conflicts. They are all too often the unheard victims of
a lack of rule of law and the menace to civil society. By
building a U.S. engagement strategy that accounts for the
integration of ethnic minorities and disenfranchised persons,
the United States can work with partner nations to lay the
foundation for a safe and secure region.
I look forward to hearing again from our witnesses on how
we can further advance the needs of vulnerable populations
through these critical partnerships. The people of Mexico, the
people of the Caribbean, the people of Central and South
America can benefit greatly from continued U.S. support and
assistance that is based on a broad, regional vision for shared
security prosperity and between the United States and our
southern neighbors. Thank you. I look forward to hearing the
testimony.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the
gentlemen from American Samoa, Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do also want
to thank you and our ranking member for convening this
important hearing and I certainly want to extend my warm
welcome to our witnesses this morning.
Mr. Chairman, it goes without saying that the U.S. does
have a significant interest in the security of our neighbor to
the south. Statistics have shown that when Mexico is safe, our
own communities in the U.S. are also safe. I applaud the
efforts of the current administration's supporting Mexico's
endeavors to reduce its elevated rate of crime, violence, and
drug trafficking.
I also want to note, in fact, and want to associate myself
with the comments made earlier by my good friend and colleague
from New York and I associate myself particularly in the
interests that we have taken to find out what Mexico has done
in its treatment of the indigenous populations there in Mexico.
I saw this as one of the ironies, Mr. Chairman, that we--the
celebration of the Cinco de Maya recently, one of the things
that maybe a lot of our fellow Americans are not aware of. A
gentleman by the name of Benito Juarez was a pure Indian,
indigenous Indian, was often raised by monks and came through
the ranks of becoming eventually the Lincoln and George
Washington of Mexico, in fact, when they tried to get rid of
French colonialism at the time. And that is the reason why the
Cinco de Mayo is in reference to the leadership and the
services of this indigenous Indian by the name of Benito Juarez
who is revered and honored throughout Mexico.
My question is have the indigenous peoples in Mexico been
provided proper treatment by the central government for all
these years? And I definitely will be asking more questions
concerning this matter.
And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. Now I would like to turn to our
witnesses. First, I would like to welcome Ambassador
Brownfield. It is a wonderful opportunity to have you again. I
am very looking forward to what you have to say, thank you.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ambassador Brownfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Normally, I
would defer to my regional colleague to speak first and give us
some basic orientation, but Mr. Feeley looks so fierce this
morning I will take advantage of this opportunity and then step
out of the line of fire before he speaks.
Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sires, members of the
subcommittee, thank you very much for the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss U.S.-Mexico security cooperation
under the Merida Initiative. I do have a written statement
which I will, with your permission, enter into the record and
provide this brief, oral summary.
Members of the subcommittee, we do not start our discussion
of Merida today at point zero, since our two governments agreed
in 2007 that we share responsibility for the security threats
affecting Mexico and will cooperate in solving them, the United
States has delivered $1.2 billion in support and assistance to
professionalize Mexico's law enforcement and build capacity
under the rule of law. The Mexican Government for its part has
invested more than $10 for every dollar contributed by the
United States to these shared challenges. And we have had an
impact. More than 8,500 justice sector officials and more than
19,000 federal, state, and local police, have received training
under Merida. Secure Federal prisons have increased from 5 to
14, and their quality has increased even more. The U.S.
Government has provided $111 million worth of inspection
equipment that has resulted in more than $3 billion in elicit
goods seized in Mexico.
More than 50 senior members of drug trafficking
organizations have been removed from the streets of Mexico and
more than 700,000 Mexican students have received civic
education and ethics training under the Merida Initiative.
Mr. Chairman, this subcommittee should take great pride in
its support for the Merida Initiative and what it has
accomplished for the American and Mexican people.
Ladies and gentlemen, a new President of Mexico was
inaugurated last December. As with all new governments, the
Pena Nieto government came to office, determined to formulate
its own national security strategy and place its own stamp on
the U.S.-Mexico bilateral relationship. The new government has
sent some clear signals on the direction it wishes to go. It
wants a single point of contact in the Mexican Government to
coordinate Merida Initiative programs and operations, and
greater focus on crime prevention and economic and social
development. It wants greater engagement by Mexican state and
local government and a sharper focus on human rights. It wants
to strengthen the Mexican Attorney General's office,
professionalize the police, and build a new gendarmerie to list
some of the policing burden from the Federal police and armed
forces.
Mr. Chairman, I have no problem with these signals. They
are logical. They are coherent. They are good ideas. There are
a number of details yet to be defined, but what we have now is
fully consistent with our strategic approach to the Merida
Initiative where we support the four Pillars, shift focus from
equipment to training, and transition from Federal to state and
local institutions. As the President said in Mexico City 2
weeks ago, it is the people of Mexico who decide how we will
cooperate in Mexico.
We have made an unprecedented and historic start to
cooperation under the Merida Initiative during different
administrations in both Mexico and the United States. I expect
to report even more progress to this subcommittee in the months
ahead.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Brownfield follows:]
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Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Mr. Feeley.
STATEMENT OF MR. JOHN D. FEELEY, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY, BUREAU OF WESTERN HEMISPHERE AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Feeley. Thank you very much, Chairman Salmon, Ranking
Member Sires, members of the committee. I hope I don't look too
ferocious this morning. Bill has a tendency to exaggerate.
I also thank you for the opportunity to testify along with
my colleagues on the U.S.-Mexico security relationship and the
Merida Initiative. It has been my privilege to serve at our
Embassy in Mexico on two occasions; first, in the days and
months after 9/11 when we were forced to reexamine how
neighbors must confront the horrors of terrorism in democratic
societies. And most recently, as I welcome some of you to
Mexico, in 2009 to 2012, as our Charge d'Affaires and our DCM,
when our Mexican partners and we truly transformed our security
in commercial relationships in service of the American and
Mexican people.
I must thank as well the U.S. Congress for its consistent
bipartisan strong support of the U.S.-Mexico relationship, in
general, and the Merida Initiative, in particular. Merida is a
success story and this committee's commitment to and
stewardship of this new paradigm and bilateral cooperation has
been a cornerstone of that success. And I would just note that
between 2007 when we began this and current day, there have
been over 25 congressional delegations to Mexico. I look behind
you and I see some of our staffer colleagues, Eddie Acevedo,
Ramon Zertuche, Mark Walker, Joske Bautista. I also recall John
Mackey in another era with whom we work closely. The
cornerstone of our success has been our cooperation.
Begun under the Bush-Calderon administrations and
reaffirmed and now strengthened in the Obama and Pena Nieto
administration, the United States and Mexico cooperate to
vouchsafe our mutual security in ways that quite frankly were
simply unimaginable when I reported for duty in Mexico the
first time over a decade ago. This commitment to our shared
security transcends political parties and it extends across
both governments. It has enriched and broadened our
relationship.
As the Assistant Secretary mentioned, on May 2nd, President
Obama traveled to Mexico to meet with President Pena Nieto. The
Presidents reaffirmed their commitment to improving the lives
of all citizens and working with mutual respect and
responsibility across a broad range of issues. President Obama
emphasized our co-responsibility for the violence associated
with the elicit flows of drugs, guns, and cash.
The Merida Initiative is based on the recognition that our
countries share responsibility for combatting the transnational
criminal networks and protecting our citizens from the crime,
corruption, and violence they generate. The four Pillars that
the United States and Mexico agreed to in 2010 and the
Presidents Obama and Pena Nieto have reaffirmed, remain our
flexible organizing construct. Under these Pillars, we are
accelerating our efforts to support more capable institutions,
especially police, justice systems, and civil society
organizations, to expand our border focus beyond security, to
facilitating legitimate trade and travel, to cooperate in
building strong communities resistant to the influence of crime
in Mexico.
Our success is due in large part to the brave efforts of
the Mexican Government and people to confront transnational
criminal organizations. Our assistance has provided crucial
support to the Mexican Government in its efforts to enhance the
rule of law, promote human rights, and advance justice sector
reforms while enhancing the bilateral cooperation between our
two governments through the provision of equipment, technical
assistance, and training.
As the Assistant Secretary mentioned, President Pena Nieto
and his team have consistently made clear to us their interest
in continuing our close collaboration on security issues, most
recently during the visit. The Pena Nieto government has stated
that it intends to give particular emphasis to crime prevention
and the rule of law. The United States fully supports this
refinement and I stress refinement of our strategic partnership
and we continue our on-going transition from major equipment
purchases toward training and capacity building together.
Mr. Chairman, working together we have truly transformed
the bilateral agenda. Our efforts to address crime and violence
and enhance citizen security will continue to evolve and will
reflect the views and priorities of both governments. Mexican
authorities agree that our cooperation must continue and that
the Merida Initiative provides a flexible framework for this
partnership.
Mr. Chairman, thank you, and the members of this committee
again for your support of the Merida Initiative. Your support
has helped make this a catalyst for dramatically-improved
relationship beyond just security. I look forward to continuing
the work with this Congress. And I will be happy to answer your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Feeley follows:]
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Mr. Salmon. Thank you, Mr. Feeley.
We have a couple of votes that we need to take, but I would
like to have you, Ms. Hogan, make your statement first and then
we will recess and then we will come back after the two votes
and I apologize for inconveniencing you.
STATEMENT OF MS. ELIZABETH HOGAN, SENIOR DEPUTY ASSISTANT
ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN, U.S.
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Ms. Hogan. Thank you very much. Chairman Salmon, Ranking
Member Sires, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to appear before you today and I am grateful
for the subcommittee's interest in USAID's contributions to the
Merida Initiative. USAID considers insecurity related to high
levels of crime and violence in Mexico to be a grave threat to
the remarkable development advances of recent decades.
Analysis in Latin American countries indicates that high
levels of crime and violence are a leading constraint to
economic growth because it discourages international investment
and drains domestic resources. Since the inclusion of Pillar IV
within the Merida Initiative in 2010 we have worked alongside
our Mexican partners to prevent crime and violence in areas
that have been most affected by narcotrafficking, with the
particular focus on at-risk youth. We do so by helping to
create safe, urban spaces for youth; provide them life and job
skills; increase their access to educational opportunities;
improve the ability of government to keep citizens safe; and
strengthen the capacity of communities to address the root
causes of crime and violence. Because communities along the
U.S.-Mexico order are especially vulnerable to drug
trafficking, we are developing and testing models to reduce
crime and violence in nine communities in the cities of Ciudad
Juarez, Monterrey, and Tijuana.
As we identify successful approaches, the Government of
Mexico is poised to bring them to scale in other parts of the
country facing similar challenges. We are tapping into the
expertise of countries and cities that has successfully
addressed gang violence and reduced crime. For instance,
through an agreement signed last year with Los Angeles, USAID
is sharing that city's successful gang reduction and use
development approaches with our partners in Mexico. We have
also shared other U.S. experiences in crime prevention such as
the Cease Fire models employed in Chicago and Boston.
We are also partnering with the private sector to make our
efforts more sustainable. For instance, we are working with
Intel and Prudential in the cities of Monterrey and Tijuana to
train at-risk youth from tough neighborhoods for productive
employment in the technology and construction fields. Our
effort to reach at-risk youth is already bearing fruit. In
Ciudad Juarez, approximately 88 percent of the youth who took
advantage of our program re-enrolled in middle school. In
Tijuana, 70 percent of our enrollees are either back in school
or employed 6 months after program completion. And the nine
focus communities have all developed community master plans
which will help them make the best use of local resources to
reduce crime and violence.
Because insecurity thrives in environments where corruption
is rampant and impunity emboldens criminals, we are continuing
our long-standing efforts through Merida to strengthen the
institutions charged with ensuring the rule of law and the
protection of human rights. We work closely with Mexican
justice institutions as they transition from a closed,
inquisitorial criminal justice system to a more open and
transparent accusatorial one.
A 2012 impact study conducted in five states implementing
justice reforms indicated that they were already having the
desired effect. States reported a marked decrease in pre-trial
detentions and case backlog in large part due to an increased
use of alternative dispute mechanisms. Victim assistance units
have been strengthened and serious crimes are receiving longer
sentences compared to states that have not yet implemented
justice reforms.
Mexico is scheduled to enact these reforms nationwide by
2016 and we are poised to help them in that effort.
Through Merida, we are also supporting the government's
effort to prevent, protect, and advocate for human rights. In
2012, we trained more than 150 journalists and human rights
defenders on practices and technologies that can help protect
them and their work. We are also supporting human rights
training for Federal and state police offices in the
government's new victim assistance unit. This includes
supporting master's degrees for 300 police in human rights and
developing training curricula that incorporate internationally-
recognized standards. In addition, we are partnering with local
organizations on campaigns to prevent torture and support the
implementation of human rights reforms.
Mr. Chairman, the Government of Mexico has been a full
partner in our shared endeavor to reduce crimes, support youth,
strengthen the judicial sector and advance human rights. Our
main interlocutors, including the Under Secretary for Human
Rights and the Under Secretary for Crime and Violence
Prevention and SETEC which is the government agency that
overseas justice sector reform have all expressed their
interest in not only continuing, but expanding our close
working relationship.
We look forward to continuing to partner with them as they
press ahead with their ambitious reform agenda.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hogan follows:]
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Mr. Salmon. Thank you. This committee will be in recess
until we commence our voting. Thank you.
[Recess.]
Mr. Salmon. The subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere is
reconvened. I would like to thank the distinguished panel for
their testimonies and the time that you have allocated to be
with us here today.
Ambassador Brownfield, as of March 13th, roughly $1.1
billion of the $1.9 billion in the Merida funding appropriated
between Fiscal Year 2008 and Fiscal Year 2012 have been
delivered. I understand at least $95 million in 2012, Merida
funding, remains on hold. And there appears to be between $600
and $700 million in funds yet to be delivered. What is the
current status of the Merida pipeline and should we be
concerned that deliveries remain largely unchanged since fall
of 2012? And are those funds being reprogrammed to align with
the shift in priorities expressed by the Pena Nieto government?
If so, what should we expect this reprogramming to look like?
Finally, how will centralization of security cooperation
under the Mexican Interior Ministry affect the on-the-ground
efforts and relationships formed and the information and
intelligence sharing that is necessary to get ahead of the
cartels?
Ambassador Brownfield. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Excellent
questions and let me try to knock off all of them in some sort
of order. Our own calculation is that we have delivered on $1.2
billion of Merida assistance funding and appropriations since
Fiscal Year 2008. And since Congress has appropriated $1.9
billion in INL money, simple math tells you how much therefore
remains at this stage undelivered. That would include, of
course, about $200 million of Fiscal Year 2013 which has not
yet come to us at all due to the process. So my own figure is I
am looking at about $500 million that is in play right now.
You correctly point to an issue, not the only issue and
that is that we are still working through the directions of the
priorities of the vision of the new Government of Mexico and
Enrique Pena Nieto. I signalled for you, as did John, some of
the areas that they have identified as priorities. We are
comfortable with those areas. We don't yet have a defined
strategy that we can say we can program and implement against.
We are continuing to work programs that we have had in place
for the past several years. You correctly note that a chunk of
this money, $95 million, is currently on hold due to the other
House here in the United States Congress and we are working to
resolve those issues together with the Government of Mexico.
Finally, you mentioned one specific issue that we are also
working through and that is the desire of the Government of
Mexico to have what they call the single window or the single
point of contact for coordination of Merida Initiative material
through the Government Ministry, the Government Secretariat,
Secretaria de Gobernacion. We are working through those issues.
I have no objection to the concept, in principle, nor does
anyone. It is very logical to have a single point of contact, a
go-to person for decisions, but how to implement that on a
multi-hundred million dollar program that involves dozens of
different agencies and thousands of different people is what we
are still working through. We owe you great clarity on that. We
are working it with the Government of Mexico. I would hope by
the time you call us here again for another hearing, we would
have a definitive answer.
Mr. Salmon. Wonderful. Thank you. I would like to point out
that for every dollar that we spend, it is my understanding
Mexico spends $10. It is a pretty good bang for the buck. And
that probably leads to the next loaded question. I know how
important this funding is, but I would like to ask this
question and any member of the panel can address it. Given the
current U.S. budget constraints, the status of the Merida
Initiative funding pipeline and the fact that Mexico is a
middle-income country, is continued aid to Mexico through
Merida justifiable? And if you had to pare down, what areas
would you argue for maintaining and why? And I apologize, my
time has kind of run out, so if there is anything you want to
supplement in writing afterwards that is great, too. But I
would love a short response on that.
Mr. Feeley. Mr. Chairman, I will go ahead and start. The
funding for the Merida Initiative, as you note, has indeed been
on a downward slope. The reason for that very simply is that
when we began this we began with some big ticket items that
Mexico desperately needed to improve their mobility to get non-
intrusive inspection equipment to its ports, to get IT
platforms, et cetera.
As we have provided that leveraged assistance, Mexico, as
you mentioned, has spent its own money. And that is right and
that is just and that is the way it should be. Where we have
begun to evolve, even before President Pena Nieto and his team
came in is a greater focus on training, on capacity building.
This is the added value that we have by providing FBI agents,
DEA agents, our Justice sector people.
I will let my colleagues speak more specifically to the
sectors, but I would say, in general, absolutely, it is still
necessary and the partnership that this has, not bought, I do
not want to use that term, but the partnership that this has
engendered has also had a very positive effect across the rest
of the bilateral relationship, not just in the security sector.
And you will note that Merida is very much a whole of
government effort and we have one of the perhaps unintended
secondary consequences of our 5 years now of Merida is that it
has engendered on the Mexican side a genuine inter-agency
process, something that quite frankly, a decade ago didn't
exist.
Ambassador Brownfield. Mr. Chairman, if I could offer from
the INL perspective a set of numbers to indicate that not only
do I agree with you, but I think we are moving in that
direction. As we learned in Colombia, when your program is
successful, part of the price of success is the numbers, the
funding made available to you to address it goes down.
May I offer you three sets of numbers, just mine, I don't
speak for Beth from the USAID side, but the INL funding. In
Fiscal Year 2012 we received from Congress $248 million for
Merida. In the 2013 Continuing Resolution we received $199
million. For Fiscal Year 2014, we have requested $148 million.
The number is going down precisely as you suggested that it
should, but from my perspective it is going down in a
predictable and systematic way that I can then plan against as
opposed to having a surprise out there waiting for me at the
end of each fiscal year.
Ms. Hogan. And from USAID's standpoint, we are
transitioning out of several sectors in Mexico in order to be
able to focus and concentrate on Merida and global climate
change. We are getting out of health. We have already, in fact,
gotten out of the health sector in Mexico. We are transitioning
out of higher education and private sector competitiveness. And
so our funding requests on the development assistance account
have gone down steadily from $34 million in Fiscal Year 2012
down to $23 million in Fiscal Year 2013 and we see ourselves
going to $12 million in Fiscal Year 2014. So we are very much
in sync with your observation about the Mexican Government
being able to fill in that space and lead their own development
path in those sectors.
Mr. Salmon. You know, it is actually nice to see programs
in government that actually go down over time. That is a good
thing. I would like to recognize the gentleman from New York,
Mr. Meeks.
Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me just follow that
for a second because I am a strong supporter of the Merida
Initiative and I think it is good. But let me just ask this
question because sometimes what you are trying to do is
convince your colleagues that it is the right thing to do, et
cetera.
So the first question is what metrics does the State
Department and USAID utilize to show that the program is
successful, that we could then utilize to tell our colleagues
this is a successful program and this is how it has been
evaluated because many say oh, you just spend money, what good
is it? You just throw money at it.
So can you tell us what the metrics are?
Ms. Hogan. I would be happy to begin that discussion with
you because that is so very important. That is such a very
important question to be able to track progress as it takes
place.
I would say that we are very, very focused on monitoring an
evaluation of our programs in Mexico as we are globally. And
just to give you a couple of examples from the justice sector,
the study that I referenced in my opening comments looks at the
time in which it takes a prosecutor to resolve a case. In the
states that are implementing the reform, we have been able to
see that it is taking them less than half the time to prosecute
a case than it does in states that have not yet had the reform
go forward.
We are also tracking the amount of pre-trial detention and
we have seen a very sparing use of pre-trial detention in
states that are doing reforms, you know, that Mexico has had a
history of having too many people in pre-trial detention. Now
they are only focusing on those that are at the greatest risk
of fleeing. So those are the kind of interim indicators that we
are looking at on the justice side. There are many more and I
am happy to give you examples of those after my testimony.
On the youth side, when we are talking about do we know we
are effective in our programs with at-risk youth, as I
mentioned again in my testimony, we see the numbers that are
re-enrolling in school, the numbers that are going on to get
licit employment. But we also at the end of the day want to be
able to show that in the communities where we are working we
will see a reduced level of crime and violence because that is
the ultimate goal. And so we have done a baseline study in the
nine communities where we are working, and by February 2014, we
will be able to say definitively whether or not those programs
have indeed achieved the goal of reducing crime and violence.
Mr. Meeks. And might as well stay with this real quick
because the concerns always are as we drive crime down,
especially in big cities, in the rural areas and other areas
where there is not a lot of commerce, et cetera, that is where
the cartels and other ones seem to emanate and those are
primarily places where the indigenous live, et cetera. So I was
wondering, could you tell, as I mentioned in my opening
statement, what effect the Merida Initiative has in regard to
helping the plight of minorities in that region or in Mexico,
how is that working? Mr. Feeley?
Mr. Feeley. I would be happy to take that, Mr. Meeks, and
thank you very much for your consistent companionment in
advising how we deal with in Merida with indigenous and
marginalized populations.
First with regards to just one comment to add on to about
monitoring. On April 16th, President Pena Nieto in Monterrey
laid out what was the sort of strategic chapeau for what we
hope will be the emerging security strategy. He laid out six
lines of action, he called them. And very importantly, one of
those was monitoring and evaluation. So we take that as a very
positive sign and we are going to continue to encourage it.
With regard to Mexico and the protection of indigenous
people and indigenous populations, it is important to note that
early in February this year, the new government created the
Commission for Dialogue with indigenous communities. They hope,
and it is our encouragement, that the indigenous communities
will be able to have their human rights protected through
government attention to their needs, preservation of their
right to autonomy, and self determination. This forum will be
very important for continuing that.
Additionally, since 2003, long before Merida started, the
Mexican Government has had the National Commission for the
Development of Indigenous Communities. This is a semi-
autonomous institution created in the Secretariat of Social
Development. We support very strongly, and you should be aware
that the Merida dollar that the American people put into Mexico
very strongly supports through out public affairs section
working with indigenous communities to empower them in Mexico.
We have several programs. One of them is with the--it is called
the Study of U.S. Institute for Scholars, SUSI. We have brought
up 60 grantees. We continue to sponsor this program. We also
have something and this is my USAID colleagues can speak in
greater detail, but it is something called the SEED program
which provides scholarships to young people and educators.
When I was in Mexico, I had the privilege of presiding over
several ceremonies with these people. Probably the most
effective thing I have ever seen is to send an educator from
the Tzotzils communities in Chiapas to the United States for a
community college degree for training in English and then see
that person return. We have created an alumni network with a
special focus on indigenous communities in Mexico. So it
remains a very high priority for us, sir.
Mr. Meeks. And I hope, begging the chairman's indulgence, I
just had one, first let me correct myself so I don't get the
scorn of Mr. Brownfield. I said Ambassador, but I had forgotten
he is now an Assistant Secretary.
Ambassador, let me just ask you real quick, could you
speak, as I said in my opening statement about the importance
of regional partnerships, particularly when discussing the work
of Colombia and others in the area, working together to make
sure that--they talk about the tourniquet effect, that one, we
are not pushing drugs one way because of networks. I know that
you have done this. Could you just tell us that very quickly?
Ambassador Brownfield. Sure. Congressman, you may call me
Ambassador whenever you wish. I promise not to be offended.
You know where I am on this because you and I have had this
conversation a number of times before and that is we must
address the drug issue and the transnational organized crime in
a regional and hemispheric way, otherwise, as we have been
saying for the last 30 years, we squeeze the balloon in one
place and it is just going to expand in some other place.
How are we doing it? We have this, in essence, a four-part
strategy that involves Colombia in the south, heavily focused
on, originally Plan Colombia and then the Strategic Development
Initiative; Mexico at the northern end through the Merida
Initiative; Central America in the middle through CARSI; and
eventually, ladies and gentlemen, we are going to have to pay
greater attention to the Caribbean because the logic is as we
begin to bite and take hold in Central America that Caribbean
is going to become an issue.
We have some good news here. Colombia clearly is by
everybody's account a success story. Mexico, Bill Brownfield
would argue that we have reached the turning point and we are,
in fact, seeing now on the ground real-life results of the
joint effort under the Merida Initiative. Central America we
are now ramping up. The logic that I saw in Colombia for 3
years and for a number of years before is that that will begin
to bite. We have a partner that we have to make greater use of,
although I acknowledge that they have been enormously helpful
so far. That is the Government of Colombia which has received
over $8 billion of funding provided by this Congress since the
year 2000 and are now in a position to export much of that
capability. They are doing more police training in Central
America than we are. They are doing as much monitoring and
surveillance of drug trafficking, aircraft and boats in the
Caribbean as we are. We are getting, if you will, Dr. Meeks, a
return on our investment of the last 10 years.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you very much. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and
Ranking Member for this excellent hearing and thank you to our
panelists as well.
Although other regions often dominate the headlines, Latin
America remains central to our country's security and our own
prosperity. Mexico is a vital ally in this region. It is
instrumental to the economic and security outlook of our
country. And given the strong ties and the interests that bind
our two nations together, it is important to reexamine the
Merida Initiative to ensure that it is living up to its promise
of bringing a greater measure of human rights and the rule of
law in Mexico as Mexico struggles to address these challenges.
According to reports, the new Mexican Government has called
for an end to direct access by U.S. law enforcement officials
with their Mexican counterparts on security matters. I am
concerned that this shift by Pena Nieto could impact our
national security. It could hinder mutual security operations
regarding narcotrafficking, regarding terrorism. And in
addition, I am concerned that Mexico is not doing enough to
protect its southern border. Just like the Colombians are
training law enforcement and military personnel in the region,
Mexican authorities should be doing the same. And with that in
mind, we have got to reexamine our own approach to the violent
crisis in Central America.
Last year, joint operations with our allies in Central
America were crucial in disrupting elicit networks, eliminating
drug smuggling cells. I am concerned about the growing
destabilizing threat of violence throughout Central America.
However, these programs have been frozen for more than a year
due to a hold from the Senate side. This undermines our
national security. It lets our friends hanging out there to
dry.
So Mr. Feeley, can you give us a status update on the hold
and I will ask you to respond when I finish. Also, what is the
strategy of the administration regarding this money, given the
fact that the reprogramming deadline for Honduras funds is in
the beginning of June in just a few days?
And Ambassador Brownfield, you said it was okay to call you
that, I would like to turn our attention to Bolivia for a
moment. As we know, in 2008, Bolivia expelled our U.S.
Ambassador, expelled the DEA. And in 2011, I urged Secretary
Clinton to oppose the framework agreement between the U.S. and
Bolivia, citing that Morales does not want to be a partner of
the U.S. He undermines our interest in the region. And just
this month, Morales violated the constitution again by seeking
a third term, expelling USAID officials from Bolivia. However,
despite all of these expulsions, the State Department continues
to fund counternarcotics operations in Bolivia. The request for
Bolivia was $15 million in Fiscal Year 2011; Fiscal Year 2012,
$7.5 million; and the administration's request for Fiscal Year
2014 is $5 million. When will the administration realize that
our tax dollars can be better spent elsewhere? And is there a
plan to change our current footprint?
And we will begin with you, Ambassador Brownfield.
Ambassador Brownfield. Sure, Congresswoman. In fact, I will
address the Bolivia question and then turn all of the others
over to John.
I will not talk to the larger issue. I will talk to the
specific issue that you have asked and that is what is our
plans in terms of the future of INL operations and programs in
Bolivia. And you are correct. I have reached the same
conclusion that you have. I will tell you that I am proud of
what the INL section called the NAS down there has accomplished
in Bolivia over the last 30 years. I think they have delivered
great value for the American people and for that matter for the
Bolivian people. That said the time has come for us to go.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Amen.
Ambassador Brownfield. It is my intention to close down our
section in a reasonable and orderly fashion and I would be
stunned were you to see a request for Fiscal Year 2015 for
additional funding to support INL activities in Bolivia.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. We will have you end
right there. Amen and hallelujah.
Mr. Feeley, we just have a few seconds, but the strategy
about Honduras and the hold on the Senate site for all the
region funds.
Mr. Feeley. Thank you, Congresswoman. You are absolutely
right. We have had looked to Honduras as one of perhaps the
places with most concern where institutions are weak, where we
have very willing partners, but quite frankly capacity that
needs to be bolstered.
You are correct that there is a hold in the other chamber
of the U.S. Congress. We have worked with the staff members to
explain what we have done in terms of improving the human
rights performance of Honduran military and police. What we
have done with our own DEA and our own trainers in terms of
developing SOPs, standard operating procedures, to be able to
provide support to the Honduran police. We have also walked
through a significant amount of internal review, based on what
happened during Operation Anvil, earlier. And we have got not
just a lot of lessons observed, but quite frankly a lot of
lessons learned. We have taken that process very seriously. We
remain engaged. It is a high priority for us to be able to
continue to support the government in Honduras because it is
one of the most critical places.
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much to both of you. Thank
you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. Mr. Sires.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, last week,
the OAS released a report on drug policy in the Americas which
proposed the notion of legalizing production, sale and use of
marijuana, and urged stability amongst the hemispheric nations
to deal with the drug problem. It seems to me that it is
counter to what we are trying to do. I am not shocked at the
OAS to come up with something like that.
But can you just talk a little bit about this, both of you?
Mr. Feeley. Certainly. Let me start out. I will turn over
the specific details of the report to Bill. But let me just say
that the United States Government, as you well know, advocates
a holistic approach to drug policy. The report that came out
last week was commissioned by the leaders in Cartagena last
year in a discussion that President Obama had participated in.
They put it into the CCAD and what they need--CCAD being the
commission to study drugs in the OAS.
We believe that we need a baseline. We recognize that our
policy, our holistic policy that looks at the drug problem as a
health problem, not just as a criminal justice problem, but
also undeniably as a criminal justice problem, one that may
have--we have dedicated tremendous amounts of money here,
almost $10.7 billion is the request this year for greater
prevention, greater education, alternate routes to be able to
deal with drug problems here in the United States. And the
request for this report we welcomed, frankly. We are looking at
the report and I would note that the report does not make a
recommendation. It simply lays out several scenarios that could
occur if countries were to follow certain routes. With that, I
will let Bill go a little bit deeper.
Ambassador Brownfield. Let us not go into detail on the
drug study, Congressman. It is a very long document. It is over
200 pages in length. My simple summary would be the first part
of it, the so-called analytical part was not bad,
professionally done. The second part, the so-called scenarios,
what might happen if the following things happened was--I found
less satisfactory. At the end of the day, the report was not
actually the resounding call for legalization that the media
has suggested. And I must admit, I went on line and I entered
in OAS Drug Study and the first 15 screens of what I got all
had the title OAS calls for legalization of marijuana, which
actually was not what the drug study said, but you would have
to get to the sixteenth screen before you would realize that
had you gone on line to read it. So you don't have to now. I
have saved you a vast amount of searching.
We have gone at this and we have made three or four basic
fundamental points. One, all governments of all countries of
this hemisphere have signed on to the three U.N. International
Drug Conventions. We all must abide by those because we have
ratified them. Second, legalization, the so-called legalization
issue, is a matter of national policy. One international body
is not going to dictate legalization, certainly not to the
United States of America and I doubt to any other nation in the
world. Third, as John just mentioned, the approach to drugs has
to be comprehensive and holistic. We have to address all the
issues. You don't just get to pick one and say if we solve that
we have actually solved the problem. We have tried that in the
past. It does not work. And fourth and finally, the United
States Government through ONDCP, the Office of National Drug
Control Policy, put out a new national drug strategy about 6
weeks ago. It is actually a good strategy. It is different. I
recognize that you all take a look at it when you have a moment
because it does attempt to address many of the issues that the
OAS Drug Study identified, public health as part of the issue,
looking at alternatives to the criminal justice system,
bringing down demand. These are good ideas. We don't disagree
with them and these are the things we wish we could have a
discussion about in the OAS context as opposed to a somewhat
simplistic argument based upon a false premise.
Mr. Sires. Moving on to the Merida and our efforts and I
know that some people think that it hasn't reached the
Caribbean yet. I would say, I would disagree with you. I think
that the real drug movement now comes from the Caribbean. I
think they have moved on. I think a lot of the drugs that come
into this country and in Europe goes through the Caribbean. I
was just wondering if you could talk a little bit about that
because as we make this effort with Mexico and the rest of the
countries, you know, I think the balloon has popped already in
the Caribbean.
Ambassador Brownfield. Congressman Sires, I would never
disagree with you. Of course, I acknowledge and agree that the
Caribbean is a current problem and more to the point a growing
problem in terms of drug movement through the region. That, in
fact, is my operating assumption. We might differ as to
precisely how much is moving through it right now. We do not
differ on the fact that one, it is growing, more is moving
today than a year ago. Second, many of the Caribbean states are
vulnerable to penetration by large, multi-billion dollar
criminal enterprise. And third, we do--we, the United States of
America do not have the resources and assets in the region that
we had back in the 1980s and the 1990s, the last time that the
Caribbean was overwhelmingly the preferred point of entry for
illicit product into the United States of America. And my
argument is we had better think about this today when we have
some flexibility in terms of how to prepare for this situation
than waiting for 2 years when we will be confronting a crisis.
I think you and I agree on that and my own guess is eventually
we owe you a clearer vision as to what our thinking is to
strengthen the ability and capabilities of the Caribbean states
to be able to resist, combat, and eventually defeat this effort
in the years ahead.
Mr. Sires. Thank you very much.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. Mr. Smith.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
calling this very important hearing. Let me just ask two
questions first of Mr. Feeley. On Monday, I chaired a hearing.
It was the third of a series on Jacob Ostreicher. On June 4th
it will be 1 year, 2 years I should say, that this man has been
held against his will for 18 months in the infamous Palmasola
Prison and I visited him there. It is a horrific gulag place
run by the inmates. Sean Penn made a very interesting
recommendation, and the feedback, or the backlash in Bolivia
and the media by the leadership there is very telling and that
is to poll support for the Dakar Rally and to ask the sponsors
to reroute the Dakar Rally so that it does not include Bolivia.
One, it would also mean that people who are part of it run the
risk of being incarcerated themselves because businessmen and
women need to be put on high alert that it is not safe to do
business in Bolivia. So will the administration support?
Secondly, in January, I and three other Members of Congress
including Mr. Pierluisi-Pedro from Puerto Rico, wrote a letter
to President Obama, then Secretary of State Clinton, Assistant
Secretary of State Jacobson, and the U.S. Ambassador to Mexico,
regarding the extremely troubling case of Dr. Manuel Placer.
Dr. Placer is a U.S. citizen from Puerto Rico. He has been
imprisoned in Mexico for nearly a year. It is our understanding
that upon arriving at the airport in Mexico City in June 2012,
Dr. Placer was arrested and imprisoned by Mexican authorities.
He was charged under Mexican law with theft, a crime Dr. Placer
alleged to have committed during a prior visit to Mexico in
January 2011. This seems to be nothing more than a commercial
dispute and yet he is being treated like a criminal. We
understand that the presiding judge in the case declined to
admit into evidence documentation that Dr. Placer was not in
Mexico at the time of the alleged crime. We further understand
that a Federal judge asked to review the case found significant
problems with the manner in which the presiding judge handled
the matter and then remarkably he sent the case right back to
the same judge.
In our letter, my colleagues and I strongly urged U.S.
Government through the Department of State to be proactive in
ensuring that his due process and human rights are protected
consistent with the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and all other relevant international and
domestic legal obligations. We received a response from State
in March. To describe it as perfunctory would be charitable. I
also note that in February, Congressman Pierluisi and I met
with Eduardo Medina-Mora, the Mexican Ambassador to the U.S.,
to express our grave concerns. The Ambassador, former AG as you
know, did not know of the case, but he pledged to look into.
Months later, nothing has changed.
So my question to you, are you aware of the cases, of that
case? What is the U.S. Government doing to address the serious
concerns that we have raised? Clearly, more needs to be done.
The situation is unacceptable. We have a U.S. citizen
languishing in a Mexican prison on charges that are commercial
in nature and he has evidently been denied the right to present
evidence that shows him to be innocent. He wasn't there. I met
at length with his attorney. Met with his family. He wasn't
there. Now if that is not true, they are lying. But I don't
think they are. The evidence seems overwhelming. Can you pledge
to me and my colleagues that you will look into this matter and
brief us, but hopefully take some action?
And finally, to Ms. Hogan, in your testimony you talked
about training 150 journalists in human rights defenders. My
question to you is does that also include your definition of
human rights defenders, does it include abortion rights
advocates?
Mr. Feeley. Mr. Smith, I will go ahead and begin. Thank you
very much. First of all, in general, let me thank you very much
for your very strong advocacy for American citizens detained
overseas. You know better than anybody the case of Jacob
Ostreicher, and the case of Manuel Placer. You also know that
we face these situations all over the world and that the
Department of State has as its absolute highest priority the
protection of American citizens while they are overseas. We
have in the case of Mr. Ostreicher, as you know, he was
released on bail, partial house arrest last year. He is still
there. Mr. Mehmet with whom you have met on multiple occasions
and previously with John Kramer, continue to meet with him. We
will remain in steady contact. Roberta Jacobson, the Assistant
Secretary, is in regular contact with Miriam. We raise this
repeatedly. We will continue to do so.
We watched with great interest the hearing that you held
the other day and saw what Sean Penn had to say. I will tell
you that we are looking at that. It is under study. I don't
have an answer for you, but we do owe you an answer on that and
I wanted to just reassure you that the case of Jacob Ostreicher
is one that we keep very much--I have a small little checklist
that has three or four names on it. Gross, Ostreicher, Dr.
Manuel Placer is always on there. I have a personal connection
to this. My wife is from Puerto Rico. I know Pedro Pierluisi
for many years before. I have been in touch with him. I have
been in touch with Gabriel Guerra-Mondragon. You describe very
accurately what I understand to be the facts of the case. Keep
in mind that the American Government and our consular officials
are not overseas able to take a position on merits of the case.
However, ensuring that judicial transparency and a level
playing field is granted to American citizens who are
incarcerated overseas is our highest priority.
Manuel has been visited on a number of occasions by our
people. We stay in touch. We have followed the case being
remanded back. I can assure you that Ambassador Wayne is aware
of this case. Our Consul General, Susan Abeyta, in Guadelajara
is aware of this case. And we will stay in very close touch
with both Congressman Pierluisi's office and with anybody who
is advocating on his behalf.
And let me just once again thank you. Mexico is the home to
more American citizen prisoners overseas than any other
country. When I was in Mexico on two occasions, I spent a good
bit of my time working these types of cases. You mentioned
somebody who will be a key player and I believe and I pledge to
you that I will raise this with Ambassador Medina Mora. I'll be
meeting with him tomorrow. We do a regularly-scheduled
breakfast to stay in touch. He absolutely is aware of the case
because you raised it to him and we will raise it with him.
Thank you.
Mr. Smith. Is there time for Ms. Hogan? Can Ms. Hogan
answer that question, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Salmon. Absolutely.
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ms. Hogan. Thank you, Mr. Smith. Our human rights
protection programs are aimed at those who are at most serious
risk of harm based on their exposure of human rights violations
that are occurring in Mexico. So in that group we count
journalists, certainly, but also bloggers, human rights leaders
who are exposing very serious issues that could come back to
haunt them, if you will. Abortion advocates are not part of
that group.
Mr. Smith. I appreciate that clarification. I yield back.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you, Mr. Smith. Before I recognize the
next distinguished congressman, I would like to just recognize
that in our audience today we have the police director, General
Jose Roberto Leon Riano from Colombia. And I just want to say
job well done, job well done. [Applause.]
Proud to work with you. The Chair recognizes the gentleman
from America Somoa, Mr. Faleomavaega.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
Member again for this very substantive and important hearing
concerning our bilateral relationship with the country of
Mexico. I hope I won't be redundant and being repetitious. Some
of the most excellent questions and concerns that have already
been expressed by my colleagues, but I will try in somewhat of
a hopeful, some fashion, and try to see if you could--members
of the panel will be helpful to me.
We currently have a 2,000 mile border relationship with
Mexico and with a trade relationship in excess of $460 billion
trade. And in the process, we have taken the Merida Initiative
having four basic philosophical goals and objectives in terms
of how we can interact and work closely with the Government of
Mexico as we have done for the last 4, 5 years.
I am just curious. I think we have the total population in
Mexico now is about 110 million. Am I correct on that? I had
mentioned earlier about one of the ironies and it seems that
people hardly hear the fact that Mexico's founding father, the
Abraham Lincoln and George Washington, was an indigenous Indian
by the name of Benito Juarez from one of the tribes of the
Yucatan area. As an orphan raised by monks and despite all the
height of bigotry and discrimination that was given against
indigenous Indians at that time, Benito Juarez rose above that
and eventually became the leader of Mexico and it was through
his leadership that caused the Cinco de Mayo celebrations that
we often think about and the fact that this is how Mexico got
rid of French colonialism and it was through the leadership of
Benito Juarez.
I say this because I am just curious, out of the population
of 110 million, how many are indigenous Indians? Do we have
statistical data on that, Mr. Feeley?
Mr. Feeley. Sir, I am sure we do. I will confess I will
have to get back to you be specific. What I will tell you is
that the vast majority of the population of the 110-112 million
Mexicans is Mestizo. The indigenous populations are primarily
concentrated in the two southern states, Chiapas and Oaxaca. As
you rightly point out, it is an enormously rich tradition, one
that Mexicans are very proud of.
I do have to get back to you. I would think that it is
relatively small, again, because the nature of Mexico and its
development in the 20th century and even prior has been of what
they say in Spanish is Mestizaje, the mixing of indigenous with
peninsulares, the original folks who came from Europe.
One thing I will just add is that Mexico, my friend, Arturo
Sarukhan, the former Mexican Ambassador here used to say, if
soft power really mattered, Mexico would be a super power. The
richness of the indigenous culture in Mexico simply cannot be
overstated. And again, as I mentioned earlier with Mr. Meeks'
question, one of the pillars of our public diplomacy
programming is to reach out to those indigenous communities and
give them a platform for not just coming to the United States,
but also for showing and preserving the diversity of that
culture.
Mr. Faleomavaega. I note with interest you have mentioned
that President Pena Nieto has set up this commission in
February to address the needs and the issues affecting the
rights of indigenous peoples. Was this something that started
with President Pena Nieto as if this issue or this problem with
indigenous Indians just seemed like it fell through the cracks
for the last 100 years in my humble opinion. Am I correct on
this? Or correct me if I am wrong.
Mr. Feeley. No, sir. I think what you will see is an
evolution and perhaps a heightening of focus. Keep in mind that
there has been in Mexico for quite some time a National
Commission for the Development of the Indigenous Communities.
There have been, as you know, as far back in the Zedillo
administration and the Salinas administration in the early
'90s, there were serious problems with the indigenous in terms
of their rights not being respected, land rights not being
respected. Mexico has worked through a difficult time, much in
the way the United States worked through its civil rights
issues.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Well, unfortunately, I have about 100
more questions I wanted to ask, Mr. Chairman, but I know my
time is running out. I will submit a series of questions in
writing.
Mr. Salmon. I was just going to suggest that. If you have
any questions in writing and we are going to have a Part 2 of
this hearing, too, later at a different date, but anything you
would like to submit.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the
members of the panel.
Mr. Salmon. That concludes our opportunity to hear your
testimony and our questions. Thank you so much. We are just
really honored to be able to work with you and count on us as
allies and it is time for us to change the guard, so thank you
very much.
[Recess.]
Mr. Salmon. Okay, we are going to proceed with the second
panel. And I am really thrilled, we have Clare Seelke. Am I
saying that right? Seelke. Sorry.
Clare Seelke is a specialist in Latin America affairs at
the Congressional Research Service, CRS is a nonpartisan
research agency that serves the members and committees of
Congress and their staffs that is located in the Library of
Congress. Ms. Seelke came to CRS in 2003 as a presidential
management fellow. As part of her fellowship, she completed
rotations with the State Department in the Dominican Republic
and with the U.S. Agency for International Involvement in
Washington, DC. She currently focuses on Mexico, Bolivia, and
Central America with a special focus on security issues. Ms.
Seelke holds a master's of Public Affairs and a Master of Arts
in Latin American Studies from the University of Texas at
Austin. Prior to graduate school, she obtained her
undergraduate degree from University of Notre Dame and served
as a volunteer in Guayaquil, Ecuador. By the way, my daughter
just completed a mission for our church in Guayaquil, Ecuador.
So that is kind of neat.
Next, we have Mr. Dudley and let me see. I have got your
introduction. Steven Dudley, director and head of Research
Mexico, Central America, and Caribbean, InSight Crime. Dudley
is a senior fellow at American University Center for Latin
American and Latino Studies in Washington, DC, and a visiting
fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center for International Scholars.
He is the former bureau chief of the Miami Herald in the Andean
Region and author of ``Walking Ghosts: Murder and Guerrilla
Politics in Colombia.'' Dudley has also reported from Haiti,
Brazil, Nicaragua, Cuba, and Miami for NPR and the Washington
Post, among others. He has a B.A. in Latin American history
from Cornell University and an M.A. in Latin American studies
from the University of Texas at Austin. He was awarded the
Knight Fellowship at Stanford University in 2007 and is a
member of the International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists.
And then finally, Francisco Gonzalez. Dr. Gonzalez is
associate professor of Latin America studies at the Johns
Hopkins University, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced
International Studies. Before joining SAIS in Washington, DC,
Professor Gonzalez taught at the SAIS Bologna Center in Italy
and he was a junior faculty member of the University of
Oxford's Department of Politics and International Relations in
Great Britain. Professor Gonzalez was the recipient of the
British Academy of Post-Doctoral Fellowship which he served at
Nuffield College, Oxford. And prior to that he was a lecturer
of politics at St. John's, Oxford. His research interests
include the politics of Mexico's democratization process,
political impacts of financial and economic crisis in Latin
America and more recently Europe, transitions to democracy and
authoritarian rule and the growing influence of the Hispanic
community and the politics of the United States. Professor
Gonzalez is author of two books, both published by Johns
Hopkins University Press, first, ``Dual Transitions from
Authoritarian Rule: Institutionalized Regimes in Chile and
Mexico, 1970-2000,'' was named Outstanding Academic Title of
2008 by Choice, the magazine for academic libraries. Second, in
the spring of 2012, he published ``Creative Destruction?
Economic Crises and Democracy in Latin America.'' He is a
regular participant in commentary shows on CNN in Espanol,
Voice of America, the Diane Rehm Show, and Al Jazeera
International. Professor Gonzalez received the Excellence in
Teaching Award at SAIS in 2006 and again in 2012. He is one of
the few SAIS faculty members to have received this honor twice.
Dr. Gonzalez earned his master's MPhil in 1997, doctoral DPhil
2002, degrees in politics from the University of Oxford and his
BA in Politics and Public Administration from El Colegio de
Mexico, 1995.
Ms. Seelke.
STATEMENT OF MS. CLARE R. SEELKE, SPECIALIST IN LATIN AMERICAN
AFFAIRS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Ms. Seelke. Chairman Salmon, Ranking Member Sires, thank
you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the
Congressional Research Service. As you requested, my testimony
focuses on the rationale behind the Merida Initiative and how
the Initiative has evolved over time.
By the mid-2000s violence perpetrated by transnational
criminal organizations had begun to threaten citizen security
in Mexico. The Merida Initiative was conceived in 2007 in
response to then President Calderon's unprecedented request for
increased U.S. support in helping Mexico combat drug
trafficking and organized crime. Prior to that time,
U.S.-Mexican drug cooperation had been plagued by mutual
mistrust. As originally designed, Merida consisted mainly of
U.S. training and equipment for Mexican security forces engaged
in anti-drug efforts. Congress has appropriated $1.9 billion
for Merida through Fiscal Year 2012 while the Mexican
Government invested more than $46 billion in related efforts
from 2008 to 2012.
The United States also provided extensive intelligence
sharing and logistical support for Mexican anti-crime
operations. To complement bilateral efforts in Mexico, the U.S.
also pledged to address drug demand, weapons trafficking, and
bulk cash smuggling.
Acknowledging that Mexico could not effectively confront
organized crime with tactical victories alone in 2010, the
Merida Initiative evolved to focus on the Four Pillars
previously discussed: Disrupting organized crime groups,
strengthening the rule of law and human rights protections,
building a 21st century border with emphasis on the Mexican
side; fostering strong and resilient communities through
prevention programs; and services for at-risk youth. From
Fiscal Year 2012 forward, the largest amount of funds requested
has fallen under Pillar II for criminal justice sector reform.
There has also been increasing support for justice sector
reform and prevention programs at the state and local level.
Weak government institutions and underlying societal
problems have allowed the drug trade to flourish in Mexico and
many Mexican analysts welcomed the Merida Initiative shift in
focus. Some continued to argue, however, that border
modernization and community-building programs have been
underfunded. In addition, most Mexicans continue to have
reservations about the anti-organized crime efforts under
Pillar I because of the perception that they contributed to
record levels of violent crime.
On balance, Merida dramatically increased bilateral
security cooperation and efforts under Pillar I helped the
Calderon government arrest or kill record numbers of criminal
leaders. Many of those leaders have been extradited to the
United States to stand trial, but few, if any, have been
successfully prosecuted in Mexico.
At the same time, Mexico also experienced record levels of
organized crime-related violence partially in response to
government efforts as criminal organizations split, fought
against each other and proliferated. As the violence increased,
so too, did popular opposition to the government security
strategy. On December 1st, Enrique Pena Nieto of the PRI took
office pledging to enact bold structural reforms to boost
Mexico's economy and to broaden relations with the United
States beyond security issues. The over-arching aim of his
security strategy is to reduce violent crime in Mexico, a goal
that President Obama has pledged to support.
The Merida Initiative is now being adapted to complement
President Pena Nieto's goal of violence reduction. Although
that adaptation may be somewhat slow and difficult it could be
necessary to ensure that U.S. and Mexican priorities complement
one another moving forward.
Six months after President Pena Nieto took office, details
of this government security strategy, particularly how it plans
to combat crime without exacerbating violence have not been
fleshed out. The Pena Nieto government has asked for increased
U.S. support for judicial reform and prevention efforts with
the United States has already been provided through Pillars II
and IV of Merida. Pillar III, building a 21st century border,
could also dovetail well with his goal of increasing U.S.-
Mexican trade. Some are concerned, however, that the Pena Nieto
government has limited direct U.S. involvement in some
intelligence and law enforcement operations under Pillar I.
So what are the implications for U.S. policy? As President
Pena Nieto influenced his security strategy, Congress may wish
to examine how the government's priorities align with U.S.
interests. Congressional approval would be needed should the
State Department seek to reprogram some of the $500 million in
funding already in the pipeline for Merida or shift additional
new funding toward Mexico's new priorities. Should conflicts
occur between Mexican and U.S. priorities, Congress may
consider how those conflicts should be resolved.
Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the opportunity to
testify before you today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Seelke follows:]
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Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Mr. Dudley.
STATEMENT OF MR. STEVEN DUDLEY, DIRECTOR, INSIGHT CRIME
Mr. Dudley. Good morning.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. Ranking Member, members of the
subcommittee, I am grateful for the opportunity to appear
before you on behalf of InSight Crime and the Woodrow Wilson
Center to discuss security issues in Mexico and United States'
efforts to address these issues through the Merida Initiative.
This testimony, I should note is an abbreviated version of
the full testimony which I submitted for the congressional
record.
Since its beginning in 2008, the Merida Initiative has by a
series of important programs outlined here by Clare, ranging
from prevention strategies to technical assistance and
equipment, opened the way for unprecedented cooperation between
the two nations. The cooperation helped Mexican authorities
capture 25 of 37 designated kingpins, severely debilitating
several of the large criminal structures. The Calderon
government also initiated important judicial sector reforms and
started to restructure the country's security forces in order
to deal more effectively with criminal organizations.
At the same time, Mexico has lived through an unprecedented
spike in violence. Homicide rates tripled during President
Calderon's time in office. Targets included politicians,
police, military personnel, and civilians. Response by military
personnel, at least in some cases documented by human rights
organizations was excessive and may have included extra
judicial executions of suspects or civilians.
Meanwhile, criminal gangs have fragmented. They have
diversified their criminal portfolios and draw much of their
income from local revenue sources such as drug peddling, an
increasingly large local drug market, extortion, kidnapping,
theft, and other activities. The most formidable of these
organizations is known as the Zetas, a military-minded group
that is focused on controlling physical territory and has a
wide portfolio of activities. It has also grown exponentially
during the last few years. Because its revenues come from local
criminal activities that can be practiced anyway and by
virtually anyone, the Zetas have created the ultimate
democratic model of organized crime. It is a model that can be
easily replicated across Mexico and is therefore inherently
vulnerable to suffering internal splits itself.
Perhaps the most enigmatic example of these challenges that
the Mexican Government faces and during the last 5 years of its
time is Ciudad Juarez. Between 2007 and 2011, this city went
from about 300 homicides per year to over 3,500 per year. The
astounding spike in violence during that period has been
matched only by the surprisingly precipitous drop in homicides
which is back down about one per day. There are many ways to
explain this drop in violence. The most cited explanation is
that in the war between the two largest criminal groups in the
area, one became the winner, the Sinaloa Cartel. In this
narrative, this criminal group is maintaining order in the
underworld, something that seems like an oxymoron and hardly
sustainable.
But in Juarez, the government and Juarez citizens also took
action. The government initiated a program aptly named Todos
Somos Juarez. We are all Juarez. Multi-million dollar
educational and violence prevention strategy of the type the
U.S. Government already assists under Pillar IV of the Merida
Initiative. Citizens, with the help of the Federal Government,
have created roundtables that regularly interact with
authorities demanding accountability and results and fostering
greater trust between them and their city officials. These
officials include the city's police chief, Julian Leyzaola, who
many give credit to for the drop in crime and violence. The
cornerstone of his policy, however, is to arrest anyone who
they see as a threat. Some say these mass incarcerations are a
systematic violation of human rights and may lay the groundwork
for another round of violence.
Finally, it is worth noting increased cooperation between
the U.S. and Mexican law enforcement that has also played an
important role in the battle for Juarez. U.S. and Mexican
investigators from both sides of the border told me that they
were cooperating on a more regular basis since Merida began.
Agents on both sides said this cooperation has led to real
results including arrests on the Mexican and U.S. sides of the
border.
For his part, President Enrique Pena Nieto has said he will
focus his efforts on reducing violence. But since taking office
in December, the President has only given a broad outline of
how he will achieve this goal. In some respects, it feels the
same as the Calderon strategy. Pena Nieto has, for the most
part, left Army troops and Federal police in many of the same
hot spots where Calderon used them. He has said he will
continue reforms, although both police and judicial reform seem
to be stalling already under his administration.
There are some more subtle shifts in policy. Pena Nieto has
reduced the role of the marines by some 40 percent. The army's
role also appears to be moving more toward a less confrontation
strategy although evidence of this shift is more anecdotal than
quantitative.
In another subtle shift under Pena Nieto, the Attorney
General's Office has reduced the number of drug prosecutions to
a 15-year low. In general, you might say while Calderon tried
to bully his way toward a more manageable security situation,
Pena Nieto appears more interested in taking a selective
approach and possibly reducing the pressure on criminal groups
involved in drug trafficking as a way to lower the temperature
of this confrontation. Thank you for your time. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dudley follows:]
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Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
Dr. Gonzalez.
STATEMENT OF FRANCISCO E. GONZALEZ, PH.D., RIORDAN ROETT SENIOR
ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR, LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES, JOHN HOPKINS
UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the
committee. Thank you for the invitation to testify today. I ask
that my whole written testimony be made available to the public
and I will summarize my presentation into three points and look
forward to your questions.
Point one, focused originally on training and the sale of
military and police equipment to help Mexico pursue the so-
called war on drugs, the Merida Initiative had, in my view, a
significant and welcomed change of focus in 2010 by emphasizing
institution building, specifically, helping Mexico to introduce
the law, the rule of law in the country. Many police records,
think tanks, policy documents in Washington, DC, and Mexico
City, make the mistake of saying that the aim is to help Mexico
strengthen the rule of law. This is incorrect. The reason is
there has not been a rule of law in Mexico. I wish that the
thousands and thousands of innocent Mexicans in jail had such a
good advocate as congressmen here, Congressman Smith, as we
heard during the previous panel. Alas, they don't.
Creating the rule of law is by far the most important
positive medium to long-term contribution that American
taxpayers' money can bring about in Mexico. One of the reasons
why the early years of the Merida Initiative ended up
surrounding by controversy was that by providing means to
strengthen Mexico's military and police forces and given the
absence of the rule of law in Mexico, complaints of serious
abuses started piling up regarding the conduct of Mexico's
military and police forces against innocent civilians.
Second point, there has been a worsening general perception
of U.S. operations in Mexico. A turning point for Mexican
public opinion about U.S. helping the war on drugs occurred
after a whistle blower uncovered the so-called Fast and Furious
Operation carried out by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives between 2006 and 2011 which allowed
more than 2000 AK-47 weapons to walk into Mexico to try to
arrest kingpins. This operation unraveled after the tragic
death due to one of these weapons of a U.S. Border Patrol
Agent. The Mexican Attorney General has confirmed that some of
these weapons have been recovered in crime scenes where at last
150 Mexicans were maimed or lost their lives, but few officials
have either from the U.S. or Mexico even blinked an eye.
As of February 2012, more than 1,000 of these weapons
remained walking around Mexico.
Another incident that acted as a significant eye opener for
both Mexican society and the U.S. Government was the ambush of
a U.S. vehicle with diplomatic plates carrying two CIA agents
which came under attack by Mexican Federal police forces. In
addition, President Calderon allowed U.S. unmanned planes to
operate in Mexican territory without even most of his close
collaborators knowing about this. For many, Calderon's strategy
had gone berserk and as a consequence there was a significant
public opinion backlash against the no strings attached access
given to U.S. law enforcement, intelligence, and military
forces.
Point three, it is my view that it is right that lowering
the levels of violence, official impunity, and homicides has
become the Mexican Government's top priority. My own position
after having heard many family friends, working colleagues,
acquaintances scattered around my country from Mexico City to
Morelos to Michoacan to Jalisco to Coahuila to Nuevo Leon, is
that every day living conditions during the last 6 years have
deteriorated significantly. Extortion, almost unheard of among
the backbone of middle class in Mexico, doctors, lawyers,
economists, engineers, has become endemic in the last few
years.
A case that helps to illustrate the climate of intimidation
that society is under given the collusion between drug trading
organizations and high-ranking members of local, state, Federal
Governments, and police and military officers occurred to
someone my family knows well. The individual in question is a
prestigious heart surgeon, who is well known for his
involvement with good causes in his city. A military platoon
was sent to take over his house without a search warrant. His
crime, his daughter's mother-in-law was a State Attorney
General who resigned and threatened to go public about
systematic corruption and close links between the military
stationed in the area and the drug trafficking organizations.
The military ransacked, robbed, destroyed, and defecated in the
doctor's house. The doctor, an influential individual in the
city went to see the General in charge of the garrison station
there. He was told the action had been just a taste of what
could happen to him and his family if his daughter's mother-in-
law opened her mouth.
Mexican President Pena Nieto's decision to recentralize law
enforcement and intelligence functions under the Secreatria de
Gobernacion is not necessarily bad. The restoration of basic
oversight functions centrally is a necessary prerequisite to
reign in significant fragmentation, bordering on anarchy that
Mexico has experienced during recent years. For the record, I
am not and have never been a member of any political party.
Neither have I ever worked for any government or any public
project. I am proud to be a teacher and my weapons are my
reasoning and my independent voice. I think the most important
action that U.S. representatives of taxpaying American citizens
can take is to deepen their commitment to help Mexico create
the rule of law. The U.S. tradition of open all trials,
presumption of innocence, trial by a jury of peers, and the
basic notion of equality before the law are essential if Mexico
is to consolidate its democracy and prosperity in the medium to
long term. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gonzalez follows:]
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Mr. Salmon. Thank you.
We are going to have to go vote very, very soon. We have a
series of three votes and that is it for the day and everybody
kind of heads off to the four winds after that. So I am going
to abbreviate our questions and as soon as each of us gets a
chance to ask a question, we will adjourn. But thank you so
much. There are so many things to talk about and more questions
to ask and I am sure we will interface with you again more at
other times.
But Mr. Dudley, I would like to address one particular
issue. You noted there has been a major decrease in drug
prosecutions by the Mexican Attorney General's Office since
Pena Nieto took office. In your written testimony you said that
Pena Nieto's administration is more interested in reducing the
pressure on criminal groups involved in drug trafficking as a
way to lower the temperature of this confrontation.
In practical terms, are you suggesting that the new Mexican
Government may be willing to sacrifice actual results for the
perception of reduced drug-related crime?
Mr. Dudley. Thank you for the question. I think that they
are trying to change what those results look like. I think that
if they were making the priorities if it were their priority
list, their priority list may not look the same as the United
States' priority list. In other words, if the United States'
priority list of getting the five largest drug kingpins, for
them, if these are not the five largest motors of violence or
people who are engendering the type of disruption and violence
that is occurring and described very well by Dr. Gonzalez, then
perhaps those would be their priorities.
So I think it is a shift in priorities. And I don't know
about the number of prosecutions. What I can say is the number
of cases opened with regards to a specific type of crime which
are very closely related to drug trafficking crimes. They call
them crimes against health literally, but they are mostly drug
trafficking crimes, so possession, movement, you know,
purchasing, those sorts of things. And those are down to a 15-
year low. And then simultaneously with the idea and in fact,
some military personnel have said this in public already that
there is a notion of perhaps pulling back a little bit,
lowering the number of road blocks, not going out and having
sort of massive sweeps any more. Maybe it is a more effective
way. It is harder to say. Maybe it is more targeted. But you
can certainly see those subtle shifts in the way in which they
are approaching this.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. Mr. Sires.
Mr. Sires. Thank you. Thank you for being here today. Dr.
Gonzalez, you don't seem to think much of this effort to
centralize the security. Obviously, they ruled for 71 years and
they were pretty much centralized. So I was just wondering if
you can just elaborate on that a little bit, why you don't
think this--why do you think this is going to be effective or
not effective.
Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you, Mr. Congressman. I think the jury
is still out there, as Mr. Dudley said. I think this approach
is less provocative. An analogy would be it seems like the
previous administration, President Calderon's administration
kicked the hornet's nest, there, and everywhere.
This administration seems to want to target operations and
as I said before, we reserve our judgment regarding the
outcomes.
It is very important that there are fewer windows of
opportunity where the systematic impunity and corruption that
takes place in the country continues to happen. An important
example is the current takeover of the state of Michoacan by a
general who has taken over the control of municipal, state, and
Federal law enforcement authorities. During Calderon's period,
each of these three levels of government were doing their own
thing. And it is the voice in the street throughout Mexico that
80-90 percent of municipal police forces are in the paycheck of
the cartels. Likewise, very high percentages of the state
police forces. Centralizing it is not necessarily a silver
bullet to solve the problem. It at least helps to close down
some of those gates through with impunity and corruption
operate on a daily basis and allow inexcusable things like the
one I related to happen.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to the
panel. I apologize. We had a lot going on today, but this is an
area of interest to mine. We traveled last year in August down
to Mexico City and met with the Federal police, the military
and Mexico City law enforcement. And I understand some of the
training, but one thing that concerns me is the new President
seems to have pulled back some of the resources from the
border. And we know that is where Americans are concerned that
we are seeing cross-border violence and we are seeing whatever
the number is today of murdered Mexican citizens, murdered by
the drug cartel in that border region.
So Dr. Gonzalez, I would just ask you to comment a little
bit about the perception of the President pulling his resources
back to a more central location. Is that a positive thing? And
it may be. I talked with Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary
Robert Jacobson recently about this from the U.S. State
Department's perspective, but I would be curious to hear your
perspective. Is that a strategy that may have long-term
positive effects, or do we see some concern of pulling back
resources from the border area on the Mexican side?
Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you for your question, Congressman. The
main aim, at least in the short term, is to be less provocative
by the current Mexican Government. In particular, there is a
keen sense that it is very important to restore peace along the
border given the very significant economic relationship that
the U.S. and Mexico have close to $1 trillion, $\1/2\ trillion,
to 2011, 2012, annually, with some of these places like Nuevo
Laredo, like Tijuana, like Juarez, like Matamoros, being the
bridges that connect this incredibly vibrant exchange. The
government has decided to pull back resources to concentrate
first and foremost in the south, the states of Michocan,
Guerreo, maybe start going into Sinaloa, further up in the
Pacific and Sonora, to try to reign in, in particular, a lot of
the gangs that have established deep social roots within the
communities. They want to be able to have permanent police and
military presence on their central control there to try to root
that out. That is also the route for a lot of the
methamphetamine comes through.
My sense and again, there are no results, so the jury is
out there, my sense is that the earlier tactic of pulling back
from the border is to be less provocative, to allow for
restoration of some social sense of peace among society in the
large cities of the border, given the very significant role
they play in economic affairs. I don't think they have
abandoned the border. I don't think this is the strategy that
will be followed to the next 6 years. I think this is part of a
strategy and, as I said, currently, the idea is to concentrate
further down south where, in fact----
Mr. Duncan. In the essence of time, I think 40,000 people
have been killed in the border region by the drug cartel. Is
that because the military or the police forces had provoked the
Mexican drug cartel? Were there a large number of that 40,000
that have been killed involved in law enforcement or are these
random cartels fighting one another? And how does a pullback
strategy change that situation where the cartels are actually
fighting each other and will we see fewer deaths because of the
pulback? I am trying to understand the strategy.
Mr. Gonzalez. It varies according to cities. Cities like
Juarez, for example, violence became so fragmented that there
was no line of command, no police chief of military chief could
take the phone and call someone on the other side, the leader
of a cartel and say pull back. Things had become so outsourced,
almost on a block by block basis that no one could control
violence. Thankfully, that was not the case or it didn't get to
that stage in places like Tijuana. It was on the brink. Places
like Nuevo Laredo are still struggling with that.
The idea is if you want to create cordon sanitaires and not
go kick the hornet's nest, many of the dead, around 80-90
percent, are drug trafficking cartels fighting over
transportation routes and some officials who have fallen in the
line of duty. The idea of creating the cordon sanitaires is to
be less provocative, to bring the levels of violence down.
Mr. Duncan. So part of the pullback is just to bring the
forces in, build loyalty with the Mexican Government and do
away with some of the corruption, kind of gather your forces,
understand the loyalty factors and then come up with a strategy
going forward is what I am understanding you saying.
Mr. Gonzalez. That is my sense, Congressman, which is a
very significant difference from the previous approach which
was, as I said, going out here, there, and everywhere by the
Calderon administration in the sense of a majority of Mexican
public opinion that created a very negative spillover.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you so much. I yield back.
Mr. Salmon. Thank you. I really appreciate this
distinguished panel. It has been incredibly helpful. I am sorry
we didn't get to ask more questions. We are going to have to go
vote now so this subcommittee meeting is now adjourned. Thank
you.
[Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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