[Senate Hearing 112-739]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-739
BENGHAZI: THE ATTACKS AND
THE LESSONS LEARNED
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 20, 2012
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
William C. Danvers, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Burns, Hon. William J., Deputy Secretary of State, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 8
Prepared statement........................................... 10
Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator from Massachusetts, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator from Indiana, opening
statement...................................................... 6
Nides, Hon. Thomas R., Deputy Secretary of State for Management
and Resources, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC........ 11
Prepared statement........................................... 13
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Letter from Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Senators
John F. Kerry and Richard G. Lugar............................. 37
(iii)
BENGHAZI: THE ATTACKS AND
THE LESSONS LEARNED
----------
THURSDAY, DECEMBER 20, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:03 a.m., in
room SH-216, Hart Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Kerry, Boxer, Menendez, Cardin, Casey,
Shaheen, Lugar, Corker, Risch, Rubio, Inhofe, Isakson, and
Barrasso.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY,
U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS
The Chairman. The hearing will come to order. My apologies
to everybody for the switch in time, but as everybody knows,
with the loss of our colleague, Senator Inouye, the course of
events was uncertain yesterday. And it was decided that his
remains will be brought here at about 10 a.m. And everybody
felt that it would be inappropriate for us to be simply having
a hearing and to prevent Senators from being able to attend.
And all of us would like to attend that. So we are going to try
to compact this into the period of time we have between now and
about quarter of so that Senators can get over there to take
part in that ceremony. In addition, obviously with the switch
in time, some colleagues and others have not yet gotten here.
I do want to share some thoughts at the appropriate time
about Senator Lugar and Senator Webb and Senator DeMint, who
will be leaving the committee. But I think I will wait until
some more of our colleagues are here to be able to share those
thoughts.
I want to thank everybody for joining us this morning.
As everyone is aware, Secretary Clinton is recovering from
a serious virus and concussion. And given her condition, it was
simply not possible for her to appear here today. We all wish
her a speedy recovery. And in her place we have both deputies
from the State Department, and I want to thank them for coming
in on short notice.
Let me emphasize this, please, to everybody. All of you who
know Hillary know that she would rather be here today. I know
how deeply she feels the importance of the discussion that
we're having today, and I assure you it is not her choice that
she is not here today. And she looks forward to appearing
before the committee in January, and I want to make that clear.
I also want to emphasize that every member of this
committee felt the loss of Ambassador Chris Stevens and his
team in a very personal way. We knew Chris Stevens well before
he came before us for confirmation. He was a Pearson fellow for
Senator Lugar and the committee. We knew the depth of his
character, of his intelligence, and his dedication. His death
was a horrible blow in personal terms to the committee, as well
as to the country and to his family.
It evoked an outpouring of emotion on our committee from
the condolence book in our office in the Capitol to the private
gestures of members of this committee who shared their grief in
private ways--at Senate 116, signing the condolence books,
touching the picture, saying a prayer.
Equally tragic was the loss of three courageous men whom I
have personally never met, but whose families I had a chance to
greet and hug when the military brought their loved ones'
remains back one last time to Andrews Air Force Base. That
heartbreaking and solemn ceremony brought home the impact of
our Nation's loss.
Glen Doherty was a former Navy SEAL. He was also from my
home State, and I talked a couple of times with his family. And
Tyrone Woods was a former SEAL, Sean Smith, an Air Force
veteran; all people for whom service to country was their life.
So today we again say thank you to all of them, to the fallen
and the families. They all gave to our Nation, and we are
grateful beyond words for their service and their sacrifice.
From the very beginning of the Benghazi events, every
member of this committee has shared with the President and
Secretary Clinton our determination to get all the facts about
what happened and why in Benghazi. We submitted many questions
to the State Department to be incorporated into this
investigation, and we are very pleased that they have been.
We have had a number of classified briefings for our
members, and yesterday the committee heard from Ambassador Tom
Pickering and ADM Mike Mullen. We heard them deliver a very
frank and comprehensive set of findings of the Accountability
Review Board.
Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mullen are two of
America's most distinguished and capable public servants.
Ambassador Pickering has served as an Under Secretary of the
State Department and an Ambassador to seven countries, among
them India, Russia, Israel, and other important nations.
Admiral Mullen, as we know, was the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
I think that their backgrounds, their service to our
country, showed up starkly in the quality of the Board's
report. And I want to thank them for their extraordinary
service to our country, and I want to thank Secretary Clinton
who appointed them--who selected them.
The report pulls no punches. It tackles head on many of the
questions that we have been asking. The report makes 29
recommendations in total, 5 of which are classified. Secretary
Clinton has embraced every single one of them. In fact, she has
gone above and beyond the Board's recommendations by taking
immediate steps to strengthen security at high-threat posts,
and requests from Congress the authority to reprogram funds to
increase diplomatic security spending by $1.3 billion. In
Washington where too often we see the recommendations of blue
ribbon panels ignored, delayed, or deferred, as they were for a
long time on even the 9/11 Commission, I think the Secretary's
swift action underscores how determined she is to apply the
lessons of Benghazi.
Clearly mistakes were made, and we learned of those
yesterday in very stark terms about the mistakes leading up to
the attacks. The report makes that very clear, and one of the
most candid and important observations was the failure by
certain leaders to see the forest through the trees. There were
clear warning signs that the security situation in Libya had
deteriorated, and going forward it is important, and I think it
is important for all of us to think in terms of going forward,
that we need to do a better job of ensuring a free and open
dialogue among ambassadors, their embassy security personnel,
and officials in Washington where decisions on security
staffing levels and funding are made.
Now, as we draw the lessons, I want to be crystal clear
about something else. Congress also bears some responsibility
here. Congress has the power of the purse. We use it for any
number of things, but it is our responsibility. And for years
we have asked our State Department to operate with increasingly
lesser resources to conduct essential missions. And because of
the gridlock and excesses in the Senate and Congress itself, we
have not even been able to pursue the regular order of
authorizing legislation. That must change. And in the next
session of the Congress, I hope it will.
As in any government entity, we know that when a budget is
cut and money is fungible, you stretch every dollar. So for
some time now, overseas resources have been withheld or cut,
and important foreign policy objectives have, in some cases,
been starved. Consider that last year we spent approximately
$650 billion on our military. By contrast, the international
affairs budget is less than one-tenth of the Pentagon's.
Secretary Gates has spoken about this and strongly urged the
Congress to redress that imbalance, but we have not yet.
Admiral Mullen once pointed out, ``The more significant the
cuts, the longer military operations will take, and the more
and more lives are at risk.''
So we need to make certain that we are not penny-wise and
pound-foolish when it comes to supporting America's vital
overseas interests. Adequately funding America's foreign policy
objectives is not spending. It is investing in our long-term
security, and more often than not it saves far more expensive
expenditures in dollars and lives for the conflicts that we
fail to see or avoid.
We need to invest in America's long-term interests in order
to do the job of diplomacy in a dangerous world. And this
report makes that crystal clear.
Since 1985, I have had the privilege, as most of you, of
making official journeys to one trouble spot or another.
I have met a lot of our men and women in the Foreign
Service, as all of you have, and we have sat and talked about
the work that they do and the lives that they lead. They spend
years learning the languages of a country so that they can be
on the front lines of direct diplomacy--foreign policy
outdoors, as my dad used to call it.
When my father served in Berlin after World War II, I
remember my mother sometimes looking at the clock nervously in
the evening when he was late for coming home to dinner in a
city where troops guarded the line between East and West, and
the rubble of war was still very fresh. But my father knew that
what he was doing was worth whatever the risk might have been,
and so do the Foreign Service personnel that we send all over
the world today. They want to be accessible to people on the
ground. They need to be accessible to people on the ground when
they are representing
our country. They want those people to see and touch the face
of America.
It is no understatement that our diplomats are on the front
lines of the world's most dangerous places. They leave their
families behind. They miss holidays at home. They risk their
safety to make the world safer and to protect the interests of
our country. They do not join the Foreign Service to get rich,
and sadly many of them are only--their names are only learned
when a tragedy like Benghazi takes place. Our diplomats do not
wear a uniform, but they swear the same oath as the men and
women of our Armed Forces, and their sacrifice is no less
important.
So take note, everybody. As we learned yesterday, the
Board's report calls for an investment of $2.3 billion a year
over 10 years in order to meet the fundamental charge of
protecting our personnel overseas. We owe it to them, to our
responsibility, and to the memory of Chris Stevens and those
others who have lost their lives to make good on that request.
And I make that clear today.
Some may ask why we are in Benghazi. The reasons are really
central to everything that we want our Foreign Service to do.
They are central to advancing America's values and furthering
our security. We are in Benghazi because that is where the
revolution in Libya began. That is where the vanguard of the
transition is today. That is where some principle actors in the
future of Libya come from.
We were there to learn and help Libyans deliver on the
promise of their revolution. And many of our most important
contacts and the future leaders of Libya reside in the volatile
east. We have to be on the ground outside the wire reaching out
to those people. That is the enterprise of U.S. foreign policy
today to help men, women, and children around the world share
in the vision of democracy and the values of freedom, and
through it to bring stability to whole regions of the world and
reduce the threats to our Nation.
I believe we all ought to be very proud of what we have
achieved in Libya. By taking military action when we did, we
liberated a country that had been under the yoke of a dictator
for more than 40 years. We gave the Libyan people a fighting
chance for their future, and I am convinced that we prevented
the slaughter of thousands of innocent lives.
The tragic events of the last 9/11--2012--illustrate the
magnitude of the challenge ahead, that the thousands of
everyday Libyans who marched in outrage against the militias
with signs declaring their love for Chris Stevens and for the
United States, their gratitude for our country, provide, I
think, a measure of hope. That demonstration of affection for
America and for our envoy who gave his life, for those people
summed up exactly why we must not look inward and walk away.
Finally, let me just say that what happened in Benghazi
really cannot be seen in isolation. There is a truth about
diplomacy and Foreign Service that needs to be processed
through the committee and the Congress and the country as we
examine the events of Benghazi. We have an expeditionary
diplomatic corps, and they do face very real risks every day;
day in and day out.
Bad things have happened before, and bad things will happen
again; unfortunately in the future. There will always be a
tension between the diplomatic imperative to get outside the
wire and the security standards that require our diplomats to
work behind high walls, concertina wire, and full body
searches. We do not want to concertina wire America off from
the world. Our challenge is to strike a balance between the
necessity of the mission, available resources, and tolerance
for risk.
We have talked about this on this committee. We have had
hearings specifically about the design of our embassies, the
danger of becoming a fortress America. And we need to be safe,
but we also need to send the right message to the people that
we are trying to reach.
I distinctly remember feeling and seeing the difficulty of
this in Vietnam where villagers would examine us suspiciously
and give us a stare, an unmistakable stare, that raises many
more questions than we are ever able to answer.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, I have revisited that stare. As
you pass through a village with masses of guns, and big armored
personnel carriers, and Humvees. And the look of confusion and
alienation from average Iraqis or Afghans who just do not
understand why we are rumbling through their streets that way
is unmistakable. I will tell you, every diplomat worth their
salt feels this tension and worries about the misimpression our
security footprint can create in the minds of the very people
that we are trying to reach, an impression that is starkly
revealed on their faces when you are surrounded by gun-toting
security personnel.
So balancing our values and our interests with the risks
inherent in 21st century diplomacy is sort of fundamental to
the questions raised by the events in Benghazi, by what we are
here to talk about today. To paraphrase Ambassador Ryan
Crocker, we need to be in the business of risk management, not
risk avoidance.
So there are costs, but that is no reason to retrench from
the world, and it is, I think, a reason to honor the memory of
Ambassador Stevens and the others who were deeply committed to
a strong American role in the world. That is why he was out
there.
So in the end, colleagues, we are all Americans first.
We cannot lose sight of that fact, particularly in the face
of this tragedy. And we are very pleased that Secretary Burns,
Secretary Nides, have come here today. Secretary Burns recently
established the Christopher Stevens Youth Network to honor
Chris' memory by building bridges of understanding and
compassion between American youth and their Middle Eastern
peers. And we look forward to continuing that work with them.
Senator Lugar.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR,
U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA
Senator Lugar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I join you in
welcoming back Secretary Burns and Tom Nides, both who are good
friends of the committee. And we extend our very best wishes to
Secretary Clinton as she recovers from her mishap.
The Secretary's pace of activities has been, during the
last several years, extraordinary by any measure, and we are
grateful for her devoted service to our country and for the
courtesy she has shown to our committee throughout her tenure.
Our hearing today gives us a chance to review events at our
consulate in Benghazi that resulted in the deaths of Ambassador
Christopher Stevens, Foreign Service officer Sean Smith, two
U.S. Embassy security personnel, Glen Doherty and Tyrone Woods.
Many questions have been raised about this tragedy, including
whether we had sufficient intelligence ahead of time and
whether there was a breakdown in security protocols.
Our interest in these questions is especially personal
because of our respect and affection for Ambassador Stevens,
who became a good friend of this committee while he was
detailed to my staff during 2006 and 2007. His advice to me on
the complexities of events and relationships in the region was
invaluable. After he went back to State, he continued to brief
staff from time to time, and he returned to meet with me after
his remarkable tour as the United States representative to the
rebels in Benghazi. All of us have read accounts of Chris
Stevens' extraordinary service.
It should be clear to everyone he was personally
instrumental in advancing United States interests in Libya.
Chris was providing the kind of energetic leadership we
need for our embassy teams. He went beyond the embassy walls to
meet and converse with soldiers, militiamen, shopkeepers, and
villagers, as well as with ministers, and generals, and
bureaucrats. Like U.S. Embassy personnel around the world,
Chris and his team recognized that effective diplomacy in this
era carries substantial risk.
Nevertheless, it is up to the President, the State
Department, and the Congress to ensure that our diplomats have
enough support and security to do their jobs as safely as
possible. And just as we give our men and women in uniform the
weapons they need to carry out their mission, we must make sure
our diplomats have all the tools that they need, which include
a safe place to work.
Embassies are both outposts of the U.S. government and
symbols of our country, and as such, they have been prime
targets for terrorists. Almost every day the United States
receives threats against its embassies, consulates, and other
diplomatic facilities overseas.
When I became chairman of this committee for the second
time in 2003, one of the first things I did was to initiate an
inquiry into embassy security. We conducted a hearing and
numerous briefings on the topic, and my staff interviewed
dozens of security and diplomatic personnel at embassies around
the world.
I also commissioned a GAO report that was completed in
2006, and that report noted the significant progress that had
been made by the State Department in building secure embassies
in a cost-efficient manner. It recommended that the State
Department
develop an integrated and a comprehensive facilities plan to
more closely track costs and results.
Working with former Secretary of State Powell, we initially
were successful in getting extra money to accelerate the
embassy construction program. But in my view, funds for this
purpose have never caught up to the threats faced by our
diplomats in the post-9/11 world. There have been suggestions
that cross-considerations contributed to the inadequate
protection in Benghazi.
Last week as preparations for this hearing were getting
under way, the State Department announced it would seek $1.4
billion in the 2013 budget for an increased security proposal
based on a recent review of the worldwide security posture. I
am pleased to see that the proposal notes, ``We must ensure we
strike the right balance between security and engagement.'' I
will be interested to hear from the panel how the Obama
administration would apply these funds and how they would
affect the pace of new embassy construction and staffing levels
in the diplomatic security service.
In the end, however, our embassies are unlikely to be both
effective and safe if Congress fails to devote adequate funding
to the 150 Account, which pays for State Department operations.
We should not forget lessons learned in the 1990s when the
sharp budget cuts at the State Department at the same time we
were establishing many new embassies in the former Soviet Union
and the Balkans. This funding squeeze resulted in clear
deficiencies in our overall diplomatic capabilities that took
years to correct.
The State Department budget remains a popular target for
cuts. In recent years, we have avoided the type of funding
decline that the State Department experienced in the 1990s. But
it is still common for Congress to vote on indiscriminate
proposals that show little understanding of the contributions
of the State Department to the safety and prosperity of our
country.
Diplomacy is not a luxury. It is essential to American
national security, especially in an era of terrorism. We should
fund the State Department as the national security agency that
it is.
I look forward to a discussion with our witnesses, and I
thank the Chair.
The Chairman. Senator Lugar, thank you very much. If I
could ask the committee, I am going to just take a moment.
I will not ask questions. I am going to yield my time so
that others have more time because I took a little longer with
the opening.
But I just want to say a special thank you--this will be
Senator Lugar's last hearing. It is the committee's last
hearing in this session. And I think whether you have served as
chairman or as ranking member, Dick, you have been just an
extraordinary influence on all of us. I know the Nunn-Lugar
initiative is synonymous with bipartisanship in serious foreign
policy, and it stands as an amazing legacy.
But I will always remember the work we did on the
Philippines, your efforts on the floor. You have always had
this amazing humility and sense of purpose in finding the
common ground and reaching out to people on both sides of the
aisle.
Every member of the committee has joined in presenting you
with a resolution, and I just want to read just the
introduction. ``Whereas throughout his 36 years in the United
States Senate, Richard Lugar has served Indiana and the United
States with grace, distinction, and tenacity, and will have
many more contributions still to a Nation he reveres and that
reveres him.'' And we want to present this to you, everybody on
the committee, my friend.
[Applause.]
Senator Lugar. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you very much. I am very grateful to have
had this opportunity to serve with each one of you. Thank you
for this very special tribute.
The Chairman. Thank you, sir. Well, it is small compared to
your service, but we honor you.
And then finally, we are also going to be losing Jim Webb
and Jim DeMint. Jim, as we all know--Jim Webb came here and did
something very few freshmen can do by getting a major piece of
legislation passed, a new GI bill. And on the committee, he has
been really critical to our thinking about the Far East. He was
the first American to visit Burma in 10 years, and I am proud
to say I think I may have been the one who was there before
that. But he changed the policy. He knew we had to lift the
sanctions and move it. And his contribution to our thinking
about the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the continued efforts on
Vietnam MIAs has been a superb contribution. He is a great
thinker, and we appreciate his service.
And Jim DeMint--Jim DeMint and I have obviously disagreed
on a number of the treaties, a number of the initiatives in
front of the committee. But one of the great things about Jim
DeMint is you know where he stands. He knows what he believes;
we do. He has been a terrific advocate for his point of view,
and we are confident that in the new hat that he is going to
wear, we are going to continue to debate and continue to feel
his presence. And we thank him very much for his service on the
committee also. So we thank both of them.
Gentleman, thanks for putting up with our early efforts
here on the committee. We appreciate your patience. And thank
you very, very much for being here today.
Who is first? Secretary Burns, you are you going to lead
off? Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. BURNS, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Burns. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members
of the committee, thank you for this opportunity.
Secretary Clinton asked me to express how much she regrets
not being able to be here today. And I would like to join you,
Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Secretary and the men and women
of the Department of State in expressing our deep respect and
admiration for the many years of service of Senator Lugar to
our Nation.
Since the terrorist attacks on our compounds in Benghazi,
State Department officials and senior members from other
agencies have testified in four congressional hearings,
provided more than 20 briefings for members and staff, and
submitted thousands of pages of documents, including the now
full classified report of the Accountability Review Board.
Secretary Clinton has also sent a letter covering a wide
range of issues for the record. So today I would like to
highlight just a few key points.
The attacks in Benghazi took the lives of four courageous
Americans. Ambassador Stevens was a friend and a beloved member
of the State Department community for 20 years. He was a
diplomat's diplomat, and he embodied the very best of America.
Even as we grieved for our fallen friends and colleagues,
we took action on three fronts. First, we took immediate steps
to further protect our people and our posts.
We stayed in constant contact with embassies and consulates
around the world facing large protests, dispatched emergency
security teams, received reporting from the intelligence
community, and took additional precautions where needed. You
will hear more about all this from my partner, Tom Nides.
Second, we intensified a diplomatic campaign aimed at
combating the threat of terrorism across North Africa. We
continue to work to bring to justice the terrorists responsible
for the attacks in Benghazi, and we are working with our
partners to close safe havens, cut off terrorists' finances,
counter extremist ideology, and slow the flow of new recruits.
And, third, Secretary Clinton ordered an investigation to
determine exactly what happened in Benghazi.
I want to convey our appreciation to the Accountability
Review Board's chairman and vice chairman, Ambassador Tom
Pickering and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ADM
Mike Mullen, and also Hugh Turner, Richard Shinnick, and
Catherine Bertini.
The Board's report takes a clear-eyed look at serious
systemic problems; problems which are unacceptable, problems
for which, as Secretary Clinton has said, we take
responsibility, and problems which we have already begun to
fix.
Before Tom walks you through what we are doing to implement
fully all of the Board's recommendations, I would like to add a
few words based on my own experiences as a career diplomat in
the field.
I have been a very proud member of the Foreign Service for
more than 30 years, and I have had the honor of serving as a
chief of mission overseas. I know that diplomacy by its very
nature must sometimes be practiced in dangerous places. As
Secretary Clinton has said, our diplomats cannot work in
bunkers and do their jobs. When America is absent, there are
consequences. Our interests suffer, and our security at home is
threatened.
Chris Stevens understood that as well as anyone. Chris also
knew that every chief of mission has the responsibility to
ensure the best possible security and support for our people.
As senior officials here in Washington, we share that profound
responsibility. We have to constantly improve, reduce the risks
our people face, and make sure they have all the resources they
need.
That includes the men and women of the State Department's
Diplomatic Security Service. I have been deeply honored to
serve with many of these brave men and women. They are
professionals and patriots who serve in many places where there
are no Marines on post and little or no U.S. military presence
in-country. Like Secretary Clinton, I trust them with my life.
It is important to recognize that our colleagues in the
Bureaus of Diplomatic Security, and Near East Affairs and
across the Department at home and abroad get it right countless
times a day, for years on end, in some of the toughest
circumstances imaginable. We cannot lose sight of that. But we
have learned some very hard and painful lessons in Benghazi. We
are already acting on them. We have to do better. We owe it to
our colleagues who lost their lives in Benghazi. We owe it to
the security professionals who acted with such extraordinary
heroism that awful night to try to protect them. And we owe it
to thousands of our colleagues serving America with great
dedication every day in diplomatic posts around the world.
We will never prevent every act of terrorism or achieve
perfect security, but we will never stop working to get better
and safer. As Secretary Clinton has said, the United States
will keep leading and keep engaging around the world, including
in those hard places where America's interests and values are
at stake.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Burns follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deputy Secretary of State William J. Burns
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, thank you
for this opportunity. Secretary Clinton asked me to express how much
she regrets not being able to be here today.
Since the terrorist attacks on our compounds in Benghazi, State
Department officials and senior members from other agencies have
testified in four congressional hearings, provided more than 20
briefings for members and staff, and submitted thousands of pages of
documents--including now the full classified report of the
Accountability Review Board. Secretary Clinton has also sent a letter
covering a wide range of issues for the record. So today, I would like
to highlight just a few key points.
The attacks in Benghazi took the lives of four courageous
Americans. Ambassador Stevens was a friend and a beloved member of the
State Department community for 20 years. He was a diplomat's diplomat,
and he embodied the best of America.
Even as we grieved for our fallen friends and colleagues, we took
action on three fronts:
First, we took immediate steps to further protect our people and
posts. We stayed in constant contact with embassies and consulates
around the world facing large protests, dispatched emergency security
teams, received reporting from the intelligence community, and took
additional precautions where needed. You'll hear more about all this
from my partner, Tom Nides.
Second, we intensified a diplomatic campaign aimed at combating the
threat of terrorism across North Africa. We continue to work to bring
to justice the terrorists responsible for the attacks in Benghazi. And
we are working with our partners to close safe havens, cut off
terrorist finances, counter extremist ideology, and slow the flow of
new recruits.
And third, Secretary Clinton ordered an investigation to determine
exactly what happened in Benghazi. I want to convey our appreciation to
the Accountability Review Board's chairman and vice chairman,
Ambassador Thomas Pickering and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen. And also Hugh Turner, Richard Shinnick, and
Catherine Bertini.
The Board's report takes a clear-eyed look at serious, systemic
problems. Problems which are unacceptable. Problems for which--as
Secretary Clinton has said--we take responsibility. And problems which
we have already begun to fix.
Before Tom walks you through what we're doing to implement fully
all of the Board's recommendations, I'd like to add a few words based
on my own experiences as a career diplomat in the field. I have been a
very proud member of the Foreign Service for more than 30 years, and
have had the honor of serving as a Chief of Mission overseas.
I know that diplomacy, by its very nature, must sometimes be
practiced in dangerous places. As Secretary Clinton has said, our
diplomats cannot work in bunkers and do their jobs. When America is
absent, there are consequences. Our interests suffer and our security
at home is threatened.
Chris Stevens understood that as well as anyone. Chris also knew
that every Chief of Mission has the responsibility to ensure the best
possible security and support for our people. As senior officials here
in Washington, we share that profound responsibility. We have to
constantly improve, reduce the risks our people face, and make sure
they have the resources they need.
That includes the men and women of the State Department's
Diplomatic Security Service. I have been deeply honored to serve with
many of these brave men and women. They are professionals and patriots
who serve in many places where there are no Marines on post and little
or no U.S. military presence in-country. Like Secretary Clinton, I
trust them with my life.
It's important to recognize that our colleagues in the Bureaus of
Diplomatic Security and Near East Affairs and across the Department, at
home and abroad, get it right countless times a day, for years on end,
in some of the toughest circumstances imaginable. We cannot lose sight
of that.
But we learned some very hard and painful lessons in Benghazi. We
are already acting on them. We have to do better.
We owe it to our colleagues who lost their lives in Benghazi. We
owe it to the security professionals who acted with such extraordinary
heroism that awful night to try to protect them. And we owe it to
thousands of our colleagues serving America with great dedication every
day in diplomatic posts around the world.
We will never prevent every act of terrorism or achieve perfect
security--but we will never stop working to get better and safer. As
Secretary Clinton has said, the United States will keep leading and
keep engaging around the world, including in those hard places where
America's interests and values are at stake.
The Chairman. Secretary Nides.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. NIDES, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR MANAGEMENT AND RESOURCES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Nides. Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, members of the
committee, I also want to thank you for this opportunity.
I want to reiterate what Bill has said. All of us have a
responsibility to provide the men and women who serve this
country with the best possible security and support. From
senior departmental leadership studying the priorities, to the
supervisors evaluating security needs, to the Congress
appropriating sufficient funds, we all share this
responsibility. Secretary Clinton has said that as Secretary of
State, this is her greatest responsibility and her highest
priority.
Today I will focus on the steps we have been taking at
Secretary Clinton's direction and that we will continue to
take.
As Bill said, the Board reports take a clear-eyed look at
serious, systemic problems for which we take responsibility and
that we have already begun to fix. We are grateful for the
recommendations from Ambassador Pickering and his team. We
accept every one of them, all 29 recommendations. Secretary
Clinton has charged my office with leading a task force that
will ensure that all 29 are implemented quickly and completely,
and also to pursue steps above and beyond the Board's report.
The Under Secretary of Political Affairs, the Under
Secretary for Management, the Director General of the Foreign
Service, and the Deputy Legal advisor will work with me to
drive this forward.
The task force has already met to translate the
recommendations into 60 specific action items. We have assigned
every single one to the responsible bureau for immediate
implementation, and several will be completed by the end of
this calendar year. Implementation of each and every
recommendation will be under way by the time the next Secretary
of State takes office. There will be no higher priority for the
Department in the coming weeks and months.
And should we require more resources to execute these
recommendations, we will work closely with the Congress to
ensure that they are met.
As I said, Secretary Clinton wants us to implement the
ARB's findings and do more. Let me offer some very clear
specifics.
For more than 200 years, the United States, like every
other country around the world, has relied on host nations to
provide security for our embassies and consulates. But in
today's evolving threat environment, we have to take a new and
harder look at the capabilities and the commitments of our
hosts. We have to reexamine how we operate in places facing
emerging threats, where nationalist security forces are
fragmented or may be weak.
So at Secretary Clinton's direction, we have moved quickly
to conduct a worldwide review of our overall security posture
with particular scrutiny on the number of high-threat posts.
With the Department of Defense, we deployed five interagency
security assessment teams made up of diplomatic and military
security experts to 19 posts in 13 countries, an unprecedented
cooperation between our Departments at a critical time. These
teams have provided us a roadmap for addressing emerging
security challenges.
We are also partnering with the Pentagon to send 35
additional Marine detachments. That is about 225 Marines to
medium- and high-threat posts where they will serve as visible
deterrence to hostile actors. This is on top of the approximate
150 detachments we have already deployed.
We are aligning our resources to our 2013 budget request to
address physical vulnerabilities, and we have reinforced
structures wherever needed, and to reduce risk from fire. And
let me add, we may need your help in ensuring that we have the
authority to streamline the usual processes to produce faster
results.
We are seeking to hire more than 150 additional diplomatic
security personnel, an increase of about 5 percent, and to
provide them with the equipment and training they need. As the
ARB recommended, we will target them squarely at securing our
high-threat posts.
I want to second Bill's praise for these brave security
professionals. I have served this Department for only 2 years,
having come from the private sector. However, I have traveled
to places like Iraq and Afghanistan and Pakistan, and I have
seen firsthand how these dedicated men and women risk their
lives every day. We owe them a debt of gratitude as they go to
work every day to protect us in more than 270 posts around the
world.
And as we make these improvements in the field, we are also
making changes here in Washington. We have named the first-ever
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for High Threat Posts
within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. We are updating our
deployment procedures to increase the number of experienced and
well-trained staff serving in those posts. And we are working
to ensure that the State Department makes decisions about where
our people operate in a way that reflects our shared
responsibility for security.
Our regional Assistant Secretaries were directly involved
in our interagency security assessment process, and will assume
greater accountability for securing our people at our posts.
We will provide the Congress with a detailed report on step
we are taking to improve security and implement the Board's
recommendations. We will look to you for support and guidance
as we do this. Obviously part of this is about resources. We
must equip our people with what they need to deliver results
safely, and we will work with you as needs arise. But Congress
has a bigger role than that. You have visited our posts. You
know our diplomats on the ground and the challenges they face.
You know our vital national security interests are at stake,
and you know that we are all in this together.
We look forward to working with you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman, for your support and counsel and for this opportunity
to discuss these important matters. We would both be happy to
take your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nides follows:]
Prepared Statement of Deputy Secretary of State Thomas R. Nides
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, members of the committee, I also
thank you for this opportunity.
I want to reiterate what Bill said: All of us have a responsibility
to provide the men and women who serve this country with the best
possible security and support. From senior Department leadership
setting priorities . . . to supervisors evaluating security needs . . .
to Congress appropriating sufficient funds--we share this
responsibility. Secretary Clinton has said that, as Secretary of State,
this is her greatest responsibility and highest priority.
Today I will focus on the steps we have been taking at Secretary
Clinton's direction, and that we will continue to take.
As Bill said, the Board's report takes a clear-eyed look at
serious, systemic problems for which we take responsibility and that we
have already begun to fix.
We are grateful for the recommendations from Ambassador Pickering
and his team. We accept every one of them--all 29 recommendations.
Secretary Clinton has charged my office with leading a task force that
will ensure that all 29 are implemented quickly and completely--and to
pursue steps above and beyond the Board's report. The Under Secretary
for Political Affairs, Under Secretary for Management, director general
of the Foreign Service, and deputy legal advisor, will work with me to
drive this forward.
The task force has already met to translate the recommendations
into about 60 specific action items. We have assigned every single one
to a responsible bureau for immediate implementation--and several will
be completed by the end of the calendar year.
Implementation of each and every recommendation will be well
underway by the time the next Secretary of State takes office. There
will be no higher priority for the Department in the coming weeks and
months. And, should we require more resources to execute these
recommendations, we will work closely with Congress to ensure these
needs are met.
As I said, Secretary Clinton wants us to implement the ARB's
findings--and to do more. Let me offer some specifics.
For more than 200 years, the United States--like every other
country around the world--has relied on host nations to provide
security for our embassies and consulates. But in today's evolving
threat environment, we have to take a new and harder look at the
capabilities and commitment of our hosts. We have to reexamine how we
operate in places facing emerging threats, where national security
forces are fragmented and political will may be weak.
So, at Secretary Clinton's direction, we moved quickly to conduct a
worldwide review of our overall security posture, with particular
scrutiny on a number of high-threat posts.
With the Department of Defense, we deployed five Interagency
Security Assessment Teams--made up of Diplomatic and military security
experts--to 19 posts in 13 countries . . . unprecedented cooperation
between our Departments at a critical time. These teams have provided a
roadmap for addressing emerging security challenges.
We're also partnering with the Pentagon to send 35 additional
detachments of Marine Security Guards--that's about 225 Marines--to
medium and high threat posts, where they will serve as visible
deterrents to hostile acts. This is on top of the approximately 150
detachments already deployed.
We are realigning resources in our 2013 budget request to address
physical vulnerabilities and reinforce structures wherever needed, and
to reduce the risks from fire. And let me add: We may need your help in
ensuring we have the authority to streamline the usual processes and
produce faster results.
We're seeking to hire more than 150 additional Diplomatic Security
personnel--an increase of 5 percent--and to provide them with the
equipment and training they need. As the ARB recommended, we will
target them squarely at securing our high threat posts.
I want to second Bill's praise for these brave security
professionals. I have served in this Department for only 2 years,
having come from the private sector. However, as I have traveled to
places like Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, I have seen firsthand how
these dedicated men and women risk their lives. We all owe them a debt
of gratitude, as they go to work every day to protect our more than 275
posts around the world.
As we make these improvements in the field, we're also making
changes here in Washington.
We named the first-ever Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
High Threat Posts within the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. And we're
updating our deployment procedures to increase the number of
experienced and well-trained staff serving at those posts.
We are working to ensure that the State Department makes decisions
about where our people operate in a way that reflects our shared
responsibility for security. Our regional Assistant Secretaries were
directly involved in our Interagency Security Assessment process and
they will assume greater accountability for securing their people and
posts.
We will provide this committee with a detailed report on every step
we're taking to improve security and implement the Board's
recommendations.
We will look to you for support and guidance as we do this.
Obviously, part of this is about resources. We must equip our people
with what they need to deliver results safely, and we'll work with you
if needs arise. But Congress has a bigger role than that. You have
visited our posts, you know our diplomats on the ground and the
challenges they face. You know our vital national security interests
are at stake--and that we are all in this together. We look forward to
working with you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your support and counsel. And for this
opportunity to discuss these important matters. We would be happy to
answer your questions.
The Chairman. Thank you very much, Secretary Nides and
Secretary Burns.
Senator Lugar is also going to yield his time, so we will
go directly to Senator Boxer.
Senator Boxer. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. And,
Senator Lugar, I will miss you very much.
I want to join in sending my very best wishes to Secretary
Clinton as she recovers. And would you please tell her that all
of us do? We would like to get that message to her.
And I send my deepest thanks and grief once again to those
that we lost, to the families of those that we lost. I know
they are suffering, especially in this holiday season.
I praise Secretary Clinton for ordering a truly independent
and tough investigation of what happened in Benghazi. I
attended a classified briefing with most of my colleagues
yesterday, and while I cannot say everything or much, I can say
this. I found this to be an extraordinary presentation. It was
clear. It was tough. And I believe if we do not listen and
follow the recommendations, it would be a disaster for our
people out there in the field. And I believe that we will.
And I thank our chairman and our ranking for having this
hearing because I know it is the end of the year, but we have
to change the way we view the security at our missions because
times are changing and he needs are changing.
Look, let us be clear. The administration requested $2.6
billion for embassy and diplomatic security for fiscal year
2012, but the House cut this request by more than $300 million.
Now, we, the Senate, helped restore some of the funds, but it
still was $200 million short.
Now, I love our military bands. As a matter of fact, I
always go to the concerts. And it is just important to note
that in the House, there was an amendment to cut some funds
from the military bands, which failed, and the funding for the
military bands is $388 million.
So all I want to say is we need to get our priorities
straight around here, and we cannot walk away and invite
another tragedy. And as much as people like to say, well, it is
not the money, it is the money. You cannot protect a facility
without the funding. I am looking at the security at our
schools now just after the tragedy in Connecticut, and it costs
money to get the facilities hardened, to get the personnel that
are needed.
So Ambassador Stevens was a proud Californian. There is a
hole in all of our hearts.
I am going to get to my questions, and I guess I am going
to ask it straight out. Do you plan in the next budget to
request the funding levels that are necessary for protecting
all of our facilities?
Mr. Nides. The answer to that is ``Yes,'' Senator. I am all
too aware, as we all are, of the constraints in which we are
living. To remind the committee, as you all are well aware, for
everything we do at the State Department, and that includes
protecting over 275 locations around the world, for all of the
assistance we provide, including the assistance to Israel, all
of our programs, including PEPFAR--everything we do at the
State Department, as Secretary Clinton has articulated many
times, it is less than 1 percent of our Federal budget.
Senator Boxer. So my question is, Are you going to submit
to us a plan and the money request that you believe you need,
absolutely paying attention to fiscal constraints?
We are not asking for bells and whistles. But will that be
what you truly believe you need? Because I hope so, because you
cannot count on us to know what the needs are.
Mr. Nides. There is no question, Senator Boxer, that we
will be doing so. As you know, Secretary Clinton asked us--or
ordered us--to come to the Congress and amend the 2013 budget
request to do three things: to pay for additional Marine
deployments in some of our high-risk posts, No. 2, to add $750
million for our construction costs, and, three, to increase
diplomatic security about 5 percent.
We are now in the midst of the 2014 budget process. We
intend to come back to this committee once we do our
assessments. As you know, as I pointed out earlier, we had an
assessment team between the Department of Defense and the State
Department and looked at 19 high-risk posts. My assumption is
we will be coming back to do that.
Senator Boxer. I do not want to cut you off, but I have to
because I only have a minute.
Mr. Nides. Please.
Senator Boxer. So you are going to ask us for what you
need, and that is important.
Mr. Nides. Yes, absolutely.
Senator Boxer. And second, the troubling thing here is that
there were repeated requests to implement security upgrades in
Tripoli and Benghazi, and as we look at this report, we know
what happened. And I would like to know, do you intend to put
into place a process that would allow for a second review of
these requests by another body within the State Department,
because it seems like what happened is the request came. It
went to one particular individual or desk, and then it never
saw the light of day.
Mr. Nides. Senator, the answer to that is ``Yes.'' You
know, one of the recommendations that ARB has is that we, in
fact, look at the requests, how they are given to us, how we
examine those requests. And, yes, we will learn from the
incidents in Libya and very clear about digging into those
requests. As I pointed out earlier, we have already begun to
set up individual tasks to look into that.
Senator Boxer. May I ask one last quick question? Thank
you. Was it appropriate to rely so heavily on Libyan militias
to guard American personnel? How was that decision made, and
how do we avoid these types of failures? Are there standard
policies and procedures for the hiring of guards? Was Libya an
anomaly, or are there other facilities around the world where
we are relying on the same type of forces?
Mr. Nides. Well, as you know, Senator Boxer, we rely upon
the Vienna Convention, which we have for over 200 years. The
fact for us on the ground is that we rely on the local
governments and the government's forces to protect us. We have
to do that because we do not have the ability to have enough
troops on the ground, and most of the countries will not allow
us to.
So one of the tasks that Secretary Clinton asked us to do
when we sent out the assessment teams, to ask two very clear
questions: Countries intent to protect us and their ability to
protect us. And sometimes those two are different. And as we
see what we refer to as the new normal, we have to constantly
ask ourselves those questions, and that is what we are doing.
Senator Boxer. Would you write to us and let us know if
there is any other facilities that are relying on militia?
Thank you.
[The written answer by the State Department to Senator
Boxer's question follows:]
Host governments are obligated to protect diplomatic missions under
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. Libya was
unique, but I will be happy to send up experts to brief you on our
security posture in high threat places. In the case of Libya, the
militia forces are affiliated with the Government of Libya and the 17
February Brigade personnel were supplied to us by the Libyan
Govermnent. Thus, these militia forces were host-nation-provided
security.
The Accountability Review Board provided a comprehensive evaluation
of serious security challenges that we have already begun to address.
Secretary Clinton has accepted all of the Board's recommendations and
has asked Deputy Secretary Nides to lead a task force to ensure the
recommendations are implemented quickly and completely, as well as to
pursue steps above and beyond those recommended in the Board's report.
We look forward to working with the Congress as we take measures to
improve security at our posts around the world.
I thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Boxer.
Senator Corker.
Senator Corker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I, too, want
to thank Senator Lugar for many, many years of great service,
and we will miss him.
And I also want to wish Secretary Clinton a speedy
recovery. I do think it is imperative that--we appreciate both
of you being here. I think it is imperative that she come
before this committee, and I think it would be really a shame
to turn the page on this without--and go to a new regime
without her being here. So I do look forward to that happening
whenever her health permits.
But I thank you for being here, and I do want to say that I
was on the ground in Libya right after this happened and was
with our team there, and witnessed the shock of them losing the
colleagues they lost. Met the JSOC folks who were nothing short
of absolute American heroes in what they did. But also
witnessed the despair of a group that felt like I think, they
were out on a tether and did not have the support of
Washington.
I am dismayed that this hearing is already centered on
additional money, which may well be needed, but as Senator
Boxer just said, we would have no idea because we have never
done a top-to-bottom review of the State Department ever since
I have been here in the minority for 6 years. And I hope that
will change with this next Congress. So we have no idea whether
the State Department is using its money wisely or not, and I
think that is a shame.
To each of you, I will tell you, what I saw in the report
is a department that has sclerosis, that does not think outside
the box, that is not using the resources that it has in any
kind of creative ways, is not prioritizing. I cannot imagine
sending folks out to Benghazi after what we saw from the
security cameras and the drones--I cannot imagine that we had
people out there with a lack of security existing. And it seems
to me that what the State Department would have done is to
prioritize, and if, in fact, we cannot have people safely
there, not send them there.
So I would just like a brief response from Secretary Nides
as to why we did not prioritize that. Secretary Clinton just
sent up a notification to Congress asking for $1.3 billion. Why
did she never ask for any notification or change of resources
to make sure Benghazi was secured? Why did that not happen?
Mr. Nides. Thank you, Senator. As you know, we have fully
and completely embraced the recommendations----
Senator Corker. I understand--by the way, you all have had
18 ARBs in the past, and you have never fully implemented one
yet--not one. So I do not want to talk about this ARB. I want
to talk about why you did not ask for the resources for
Benghazi just like was done this week on this ARB. Just tell me
why.
Mr. Nides. As you know, Senator, we must reexamine all of
our high-risk posts and determine the situation as we see as
new evolving risks are occurring. As you are well aware, we are
in a situation where the Middle East is evolving, democracies
are growing, militaries are forming, and we must look at each
and every one of those sites and every one of our posts and
reexamine under a new normal----
Senator Corker. You were aware of the security risks there.
We have read the cables. You were fully aware, and either you
send people there with security or you do not send them there.
I do not understand why you did not send a notification up with
the cables coming in, with concerns about security. Why did you
not do just what you did with this ARB seeking additional
funds? I do not understand.
The Appropriations Committee has never received from the
State Department a notification asking to shift funds for
security in Benghazi. I just want you to tell me why that did
not happen, because you do it all the time. It happens almost
weekly.
Mr. Nides. Senator, as you know, we are constantly
evaluating our security. We are constantly reevaluating where
we need funds. And we are constantly evaluating the current
situation the ground in all of our countries. As you know--as
you are well aware, we have risks all over the world, and we
are constantly evaluating and determining at the time.
And clearly, as the ARB points out, mistakes occurred. We
need to look at those mistakes. We need to examine those
mistakes. We need to make ourselves accountable for those
mistakes. And we need to figure out how to make sure this does
not happen again.
I should point out, as you know, we get this right about 99
percent of the time. We would like to be at 100 percent without
question. We have over 275 posts around the world. Our men and
women are in danger all over the world, and we attempt to try
to do this 100 percent. And we hope that this ARB and the
recommendations, we will actually learn from them and we are
determined to make sure this does not happen again.
Senator Corker. Just one last point. There has been a lot
of talk about money, and it is just amazing every time there is
an issue we start talking about more money. The fact is that
you had 16 site security team personnel on the ground. They
were at no cost to the State Department, totally funded by the
Defense Department, no money issue. They had been there for a
long, long time. They had been extended multiple times at no
cost to you other than the lodging for them to be there. The
Defense Department totally pays for them.
Tripoli asked that they be extended, and you did not do it.
This has nothing to do with money. Why did you not do that?
Mr. Nides. As you know, Senator, that team was in Tripoli,
it was not in Benghazi. Members of that team visited Benghazi a
few times. But the team, just to be clear, was posted in
Tripoli.
Senator Corker. And they would have been a team--we only
had a person there on the ground 40 days a year. I assume they
would have traveled and been there when we had our Ambassador
there. So I just do not understand. You talk about money, but
you had 16 people there free from the Defense Department they
requested that they stay, and you denied that. I do not
understand that.
Mr. Nides. They were extended three times, Senator, and
they--but more importantly, the team was, in fact, in Tripoli.
And some did, in fact, visit Benghazi a few times during their
time.
The Chairman. Senator Corker, let me just say I think you
asked good questions, but I also would ask you to review
Admiral Mullen's and Ambassador Pickering's request because it
has a very specific set of requirements with respect to funding
they talked about.
Senator Corker. I have reviewed it, and I will say that
there have been 18 ARBs. Not a single one of them has ever been
fully implemented. So I understand about this process. I am
just saying that the culture within the State Department to me
is one that needs to be transformed. This committee can help.
Maybe the next Secretary of State can help. But the fact is
there is a lot of work that needs to be done there.
The Chairman. Senator Menendez.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, want to
say to Senator Lugar that he is leaving behind an extraordinary
career and lasting legacy. I am sure he is going to serve in
many other ways in the future. We appreciate your service, and
we certainly remember Ambassador Stevens as the hallmark of
what Foreign Service is all about.
Our challenge--both here at home and abroad--is that, in
the context of terrorism, terrorists have only to be lucky
once. We have to get it right 100 percent of the time. It is a
heavy burden and not an easy one. Obviously, this time we did
not get it right, but the State Department acknowledges where
it made a mistake.
What I find extraordinary, as Congress is always very good
at doing, is that it only casts blame on one side, but never
seems to take any responsibility of its own. I still hear
voices that will not take responsibility. There have been about
18 Accountability Review Boards but, if I am not mistaken, this
is the first that is inside the administration.
Obviously, this is going back and forth, and you cannot
even implement all of the Accountability Review Board's
recommendations since a significant part of the recommendations
are about resources and Congress does not have the resources to
meet those recommendations.
We need to frame this in the context of making sure that we
collectively--both the State Department and Congress--take our
responsibilities to protect our embassies and our diplomatic
personnel abroad.
In that respect, reading directly from the unclassified
section of the report, the Accountability Review Board says,
``Among various departments, bureaus, and personnel in the
field, there appears to be a very real confusion over who
ultimately was responsible and empowered to make decisions
based on both policy and security considerations.''
Can you tell me, Ambassador Nides, how we are going to
change that? It sounds like there are silos. It sounds like
there was a lack of understanding, and a lack of clear
definition of responsibility. How are we going to meet that
challenge and change it in terms of that recommendation?
Mr. Nides. As recommended by the ARB, we are going to focus
very clearly on the issues of organizational structure within
Diplomatic Security. We are, two, going to look very closely at
the involvement of the Bureau, which oversees the countries in
which the security recommendations are put forward. We are
going to make sure that communications between the field and
diplomatic security is correct. And we will, as suggested,
continue to make sure there are double checks to make sure that
those requests are evaluated and looked at with a lot of
eyeballs.
So we are going to learn from what the ARB has suggested as
we look at the security requirements, but be very clear-eyed
about the requests and the determination on the security
situation on the ground.
Senator Menendez. So, are we going to have a more
horizontal effort within the State Department instead of silos?
Both in sharing information and knowledge, but with a clear
delineation of who takes the ultimate responsibility?
Mr. Nides. Yes, sir. We need to learn from this, and I
think that was one of the lessons that came out of the report,
and we intend to incorporate that not only in our thinking, but
in our actual reality of how we do our operations.
Senator Menendez. Now, one of the other elements of the
report is intelligence: in essence, an intelligence failure. We
have relied upon specific threats as the basis of reacting and
preparing, versus a careful consideration of a deteriorating
threat situation, in general, as a basis for improving security
posture. Can you talk about how the State Department seeks to
pursue that new reality?
Mr. Burns. Yes, Senator, sure. I mean, that is a challenge
that we need to be much effective in addressing, both within
the State Department and also, I think, throughout the
intelligence community.
The truth is across Eastern Libya for many months before
the attack took place in Benghazi, there was a troubling
pattern of deteriorating security, not all of which was
directed at the United States. But there has been a tendency,
not just in the case of Eastern Libya, but I think across the
world in recent years, for us to focus too much on specific
credible threats, and sometimes lose the forest for the trees.
And I think that is something that, you know, we were
painfully reminded of in the case of the Benghazi attack that
we need to do better at. And there are some specific
recommendations that the Accountability Review Board has made
that we will implement relentlessly. And the State Department
will certainly work with the rest of the intelligence
community.
Senator Menendez. Finally, we read from the Accountability
Review Board report again and listened to the testimonies of
both Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mullen, where they made
it very clear that, while many mistakes were made--and they
outlined and responded to each of them--a significant problem
was resources. We can hide our heads in the sand, or we can
ultimately meet that challenge. They say it is imperative for
the State Department to be mission oriented rather than
resource constrained, particularly with its increasing presence
in risky areas of the world that are integral to U.S. national
security.
So, in that respect, I hope that when the State Department
presents its new budget it asks for what the Accountability
Review Board has recommended as one of its suggestions. I also
hope that, in fact, it also gives us the sense of the reforms
that you are pursuing so that Congress will feel empowered to
be responsible, and to therefore, help the Department of State
meet the challenges of our diplomatic support.
The Chairman. Senator Risch.
Senator Risch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, it is
really unfortunate that we have to go through an incident like
this in order to get our act together, if you would. Everybody
here has been to embassies all over the world, and what has
already struck me is, first of all, I feel really good when I
see those marines standing there and they say, good morning,
sir, when you walk in.
But usually before that, you have to go through a tranche
of these locals, as you have told us, that are operating under
a 200-year-old agreement to protect our operations in their own
countries. And, you know, the world has really changed over the
last 200 years, and you get a real sense of incompetence when
you go through there. Generally, those people are confused.
Most of them you wouldn't meet going into a theater here in the
United States having the kind of competency that they have.
So I guess what you are going to have to do is instead of
treating all these the same, each one is going to have to be
treated differently. Every host country is going to have to be
treated differently because our reputation in the world or the
feeling about Americans in the world has changed dramatically
over the last 200 years, and there is countries where, such as
Western Europe, where we don't have to have what we have. And
yet you go to other places, and I have been shocked in some of
the countries I have been in that are not countries friendly to
the United States and seen the minimal amount of Marine
presence that we have had there.
And then, of course, we all learned, I think, at least I
did for the first time--or I guess I had heard it, but it
didn't stick previously--that the Marines are there to guard
the documents. And I mean, that is shocking. Their first
obligation ought to be to protect Americans that are serving in
that embassy. I am hoping that is going to change. I am sure it
will change.
And it would seem to me the rules of engagement really need
review. I looked at those people streaming through the front
gate in Benghazi. That wouldn't have taken that much to stop
that attack if, indeed, they would have responded to it
immediately, it seemed to me. Again, you are looking at film,
and I understand it is a lot more sterile than actually being
there on the ground at the time.
But when armed people are coming through the front gate, it
would seem to me it is time to do something about it, and
nothing was done about it until virtually everybody was in.
So, again, I really don't have any questions for you. I
have looked at the review board. We all have our own view of
maybe what should be stronger, what should be less. But the
bottom line, the take-away for me is things are going to have
to be done a lot different than what they have been done. And
we really need to discriminate amongst countries as to what
kind of effort that we put forward.
So, with that, I will yield the rest of my time. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. No, thank you very much. Good observations.
Senator Cardin.
Senator Cardin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also want to add my congratulations to Senator Lugar for
his incredible career. We are losing a real partner on this
committee in the U.S. Senate, but I know you will continue your
service to our country. Thank you very much.
And to Secretary Burns and Nides, I thank you for your
service, and our prayers once again go out to those who we lost
in Benghazi.
I want to follow up on--and one other point I might make,
Mr. Chairman, and that is I know you have worked on the State
Department authorization bill. I think it is important in the
next Congress that we have full committee discussions on the
State Department Authorization Act so that we can weigh in in a
more deliberative way on the policies that are under the
jurisdiction of this committee.
I want to follow up on both Senator Corker and Senator
Menendez's points on intelligence. Recommendation 21 is very
clear on this, that post 2001 intelligence collection has
expanded exponentially. That is true. The Benghazi attacks are
a stark reminder that we cannot overrely on the certainty or
even likelihood of warning intelligence and that careful
attention should be given to factors showing deterioration,
threat situations in general, as a basis for action.
Let me just point out that it was clear in Benghazi that
the security was deteriorating. Maybe not a specific threat. We
didn't have information about that. That was also clear.
We also knew that the local security team was not 100
percent reliable. And yet the security details that we had in
Benghazi, as the report points out, were inadequate.
So I would like you to expand more on how we are going to
institutionalize careful attention so that we do not allow a
situation such as Benghazi to occur in the future. You can't
eliminate all threats. We know that. But we also understand
there was not adequate security at the Benghazi facility based
upon the deteriorating circumstances.
How do we institutionalize that careful attention to make
sure that in those types of dangerous assignments that we have
adequate security? And I want to add one more thing.
Ambassador Stevens knew Libya perhaps better than any other
American. His judgment will never be second-guessed.
But it is important that in dangerous posts that there be
more than just the head of mission, who is responsible for the
security, no question about it. But that he has the best advice
on a broader basis as we go into these types of circumstances.
How do we institutionalize that?
Mr. Burns. Let me start, Senator, because you raise a very
good point. I think the truth is, as I said before, first with
regard to the intelligence that in eastern Libya, there was a
troubling pattern that had developed. A lot of the violence and
the security incidents were intra-Libyan. You know, some of
them were directed at the U.S. and Western targets, but not all
of them.
And I think we made the mistaken assumption that we
wouldn't become a major target for those----
Senator Cardin. But this was also the anniversary of 9/11.
There was a lot of reasons to believe----
Mr. Burns. There were. There were a number of different
motives, potential motives, as the ARB report makes clear. And
as you said, Senator, Chris Stevens understood Benghazi as well
as anyone and understood the risks as well as anyone.
But I think one of the painful lessons we have learned is
the importance of being able to take a step back and try to
analyze better the broader pattern of security challenges that
were emerging and so that there is a sense of responsibility on
the part of all of us in the State Department for trying to
better understand those challenges and not be so fixated on
specific credible threats and then take that into account in
dealing with what were the obvious security inadequacies made
obvious by the Accountability Review Board in Benghazi.
Senator Cardin. I know that I am going to be interested and
I think all the members of the committee are going to be
interested as to how you institutionalize that review that goes
beyond just specific threats. And I would hope you would share
that with us.
Secretary Nides, you mentioned that there is a streamlining
process so that you can move quicker to implement. You also
mentioned there may be some concerns with additional Marine
assignments with the host country.
Is there anything that we need to be aware of, as you
implement these recommendations, as it relates to bureaucratic
streamlining that may require congressional attention or
problems with host countries as we want to put more Marines in-
state, in-country?
Mr. Nides. Senator, thank you.
It has been an unprecedented cooperation between the State
Department and the Defense Department I should say. I mean, not
only did they agree to send very competent, very trained
officials with our State Department colleagues to those 19
posts immediately, right after the incident, to evaluate all
these countries during the period of time of the current unrest
that is going on.
But two, one of the recommendations that came back that
General Dempsey along with SECDEF Panetta and Secretary Clinton
and the White House agreed to, that the use of additional
Marine detachments would be enormously helpful. Again, the
Senator is correct. The mission of those Marines is, in fact,
statutorily to protect classified information, but there is
also no question, for all of us who have come into those
embassies with the Marine detachments, they are a deterrent.
They are imposing deterrence, and it comes with a lot of other
things.
So the additional request of the 35 additional detachments,
which include about 250 additional Marines, we are also going
to be asking to build potential barracks on our grounds, where
we possibly can. So the marines, the five individuals in each
detachment, could actually potentially live on the facilities
that are close by.
So the cooperation between the Defense Department and the
State Department, in my view, is somewhat unprecedented for a
situation like this, and we will be coming to the Congress for
not only the appropriations to pay for that, but also
potentially the authorities in which we will be working with
DOD and come and discussing that with the relevant committees.
Senator Cardin. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Cardin.
Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to begin by commending Senator Lugar on his service
to our country. And what I am about to say I hope you will take
as a compliment. I have been watching you since I was in high
school, and I mean that as a compliment.
Growing up in Miami, foreign policy somehow found its way
into our local politics, too, and I have a passion for foreign
policy partially by watching your career. I am just pleased
that I got a chance to serve with you for 2 years on this
committee.
I also want to thank both of our witnesses for being here
today and for your service to our country. I do that every time
because I know how unrewarding the job could be at times, but
how rewarding it could be at others. So thank you for being
here.
I want to say this report has really furthered our
understanding of what happened in Benghazi, and I appreciate
it. There is one part of it that I am, I don't want to say the
word ``concerned,'' but I am a bit puzzled by. And that is that
it places a lot of the blame on lower level officials,
particularly Assistant Secretary level officials.
And why I find that quite puzzling is because Benghazi and
Libya, in general, is not some remote outpost. It is not
Luxembourg. I mean, this is a country that we were involved in
militarily not so long ago in a high-profile intervention.
And so, I am curious because on page 5 of the report, the
unclassified version, it talks about the--you know, it was just
not a priority for Washington. The special mission was not a
priority for Washington when it came to security-related
requests, especially those relating to staffing.
So I want to understand who Washington is, and in that
frame of mind, I think, Secretary Burns, I have a number of
questions. I know that Secretary Clinton visited Libya in
October 2011. Did the security situation, the deteriorating
security situation come up during her visit there, whether with
the country team or in her interactions with the Libyans?
Mr. Burns. Well, Senator, I am sure in general terms that
it did. I wasn't on that trip. So I don't know specifically.
I can speak to my own experience. I also visited Libya----
Senator Rubio. In July, correct?
Mr. Burns. I visited in July. I also visited in September
after the attack in Benghazi. And so, I can speak to my own
experience. And you know, as Secretary Clinton has said, all of
us as senior leaders in the Department are accountable and
responsible for what happened. And I certainly fault myself.
You know, I accompanied the remains of my four colleagues
back after the attack in Benghazi. I had been in the Middle
East on a trip and cut short a trip to Iraq to come back with
them. And on that long flight home, I certainly had a lot of
time to think about sharper questions that I could have asked,
sharper focus that I could have provided.
Senator Rubio. But on your visit in July or September as
well--did you go in July?
Mr. Burns. September--I was in July.
Senator Rubio. After--correct?
Mr. Burns. Yes.
Senator Rubio. Did that issue in specific come up? Did the
folks on the ground there say to you, ``We are really worried
about what is happening here with security. We have made a
number of requests.''
Mr. Burns. There was no specific discussion of that. I did
talk to Ambassador Stevens in general terms about the security
situation, but we didn't talk about specifics at that time.
Senator Rubio. Now Secretary Clinton met with the Prime
Minister of Libya in March. Do you know if the security
situation came up in that meeting?
Mr. Burns. This is in March of?
Senator Rubio. Of 2012.
Mr. Burns. I am certain it did. We certainly emphasized the
importance of not only improving the security capabilities of
the Libyan interim government at that time, we offered a number
of programs to help them build those institutions, which
remained one of the greatest weaknesses of the Libyan interim
government. That was a central feature, as it was in July, when
I met with the Prime Minister as well.
Senator Rubio. But in that particular meeting, you don't
know if that--you are pretty sure that the issue came up. You
just don't know the full content?
Mr. Burns. I don't know all the details. No, sir.
Senator Rubio. Well, you met with the Deputy Prime Minister
in June of this year. Did it come up in that meeting?
Mr. Burns. It did. And again----
Senator Rubio. What did they say?
Mr. Burns. Well, the focus there was on urging them and
offering support for their development of security
institutions, which at that time, and to this day, are still
extremely weak.
Senator Rubio. All right. Who in the Department reviewed or
was briefed on the cables that were sent from the post in June
and August 2011 regarding the security situation? To what level
did those cables get reviewed?
Mr. Burns. Well, they certainly would have been reviewed up
through Assistant Secretary level, and it may be that some of
my colleagues on the seventh floor saw them as well.
Senator Rubio. So beyond that level, were any senior
officials
beyond the Assistant Secretary level made aware of the repeated
requests from the posts for extended or additional security? In
particular, there were requests made in March and July 2011. Do
you know, beyond the Assistant Secretary level, those requests
were ever forwarded in a memo or in some other written
document?
Mr. Burns. I am not aware of any specific memo that went
beyond the sixth floor with regard to those specific requests
at that time. No, Senator.
Senator Rubio. Do you know if anyone beyond the Assistant
Secretary level going up to the Secretary's level, were they
made aware of the more than 200 security incidents that had
occurred in Benghazi in the 13 months leading up to the attack?
Mr. Burns. There were certainly memos that came up to the
seventh floor that talked about the deteriorating security
situation in eastern Libya. Yes, sir.
Senator Rubio. And finally, after all these different trips
to Libya yourself, the Secretary, others, other senior
officials in the State Department, were there any memos
produced after those visits to the tune of basically saying we
have been to Libya, and by the way, there are two things.
The station is concerned about security in general, and the
Libyans are concerned about their ability to provide security
as we are relying on them.
Do you know if any memos were produced in that or any high-
level meetings about that topic took place above the Assistant
Secretary level? Were there any meetings convened, memos
produced on that issue?
Mr. Burns. Well, there were certainly meetings that took
place at senior levels with regard to the situation in Libya in
general and particularly with regard to the concern about the
very weak security capabilities of the Libyan Government at
that time. And so, certainly, that was the subject of fairly
consistent concern.
And as I said, we made a number of offers and on a number
of occasions pushed the Libyan interim government to try to
move to accelerate their efforts to develop those institutions,
which related directly to the security----
Senator Rubio. So my last question is beyond the Assistant
Secretary level. There was a general and specific awareness of
a rapidly deteriorating security situation in Libya, of the
repeated requests from the team on the ground for security, and
of the inability of the Libyans to----
Mr. Burns. Senator--sorry. Senator, what I would say is
there was certainly a general awareness of both the
deteriorating security situation in eastern Libya, and also
there was not only a general awareness, but a real concern
about the difficulty that the Libyan interim government was
having in developing capable security institutions.
Senator Rubio. Above the Assistant Secretary level, that
awareness existed. Correct?
Mr. Burns. The awareness with regard to the incapacity of
the Libyan interim government in developing security
institutions; yes, sir. And we worked hard to try to push the
Libyans to move faster in that direction.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Rubio.
Senator Casey.
Senator Casey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And I want to reiterate what has been said by many on this
panel today about Senator Lugar's great leadership and been a
mentor to so many of us, even when he didn't know he was being
a mentor, and a great example to us. We are certainly grateful
for his service, and I know he will continue to serve in
another capacity or many capacities.
We also want to express again the condolences that I have,
I know, and so many in this room today, about the loss that the
State Department suffered, Ambassador Stevens and the others
who were killed. And that is why the questions that we are
debating are so grave and so meaningful.
Reflecting upon the challenge that you both have and the
State Department has in light of the report and in light of the
subject matter that led to the report, because of that, I guess
you try to think in your own life what experiences are relevant
to inform the questions that you have or the points that you
want to make.
Two are relevant in my life. One is the traveling that I
have done across the world as a member of this committee--three
times in Pakistan, three times Afghanistan, several trips to
the Middle East. The last time, Senator Shaheen and I were
traveling together, and seeing the difficulty of providing
security not only for folks in embassies and consulates, but
when Members of Congress travel and the danger that we feel
sometimes, even with the knowledge that we have security around
us.
So getting that balance right, but as you know, we do have
to get it right every time. And taxpayers expect that, and they
expect us to put forth every effort. They expect it of you.
They also expect it of us.
The other experience I have as a State official leading
investigations and audits of public agencies and at times
kicking the hell out of them, really hitting them hard, being
very critical, calling for people to be fired, demanding
accountability for tax dollars and for results.
I do know this, though, when a report is issued and
findings are made, you can't simply have us in Congress, or in
the case of State officials in my experience, just yelling and
screaming about the results and yelling and screaming about
recommendations. You have to implement them.
Resources matter. Whether it is personnel or, in the case
of some of the work that I did, information technology,
hardware, whatever it takes, we have got to dedicate the
resources. You cannot get the results that you want just by
yelling and screaming. You have got to have investment in
resources.
Third. The third point I would make is that your
credibility as a department will be greatly enhanced by the
pace of implementation, by the demonstrable success you have--
in other words, the taxpayers can see that you have made those
changes--and by the steps that you are taking now in the next
couple of days and weeks.
That is mostly important for the broader concerns that we
have, but it is especially important when you come back here
and ask for dollars. So I will stand with anyone to say that
resources matter. I know that from personal experience. But
your credibility would be enhanced when you ask for those
resources, when you can specifically focus on what those
resources will go for, and how you are going to be able to
change the dynamic.
So let me just--I don't have much time, but with that
predicate, let me ask a question that I am not sure has been
raised yet. Or maybe two quick questions.
No. 1, host country cooperation and partnership. I know
there is great variance or it varies by country and by
situation. But if either of you, Deputy Secretary Burns or
Deputy Secretary Nides, can speak to the question of the
challenge of having host country partnership?
And then, Mr. Nides, if you could just quickly one more
time walk through the timeline of implementation of some of the
recommendations?
Mr. Burns. Well, first, Senator Casey, I mean, obviously,
one of the lessons of all the changes that have taken place
across the Middle East in the last couple of years, as you have
revolutions and then post revolutionary governments coming into
place, is that the development of security institutions in
those countries and their capacity for following through on
their Vienna Convention obligations for protecting foreign
diplomats is very uneven and sometimes extremely weak. And that
is something that we have to both understand and adapt to, and
that is exactly, as Tom described earlier, what we are
determined to do as we make changes and strengthen our security
at our diplomatic facilities over the coming years.
Mr. Nides. And Senator, we have done four very quick
things. No. 1, we quickly went up here and asked the
Appropriations Committee for additional funds for 2013. As you
know, the 2013 appropriations process is already well on its
way, as you know.
No. 2, we formed the ISAT teams and got them out into the
field immediately with DOD to the 19 posts, and we will have
recommendations on those high-risk posts very soon and very
quickly.
No. 3, we took the 60 tasks--excuse me, the 29
recommendations and broken them down into 60 specific tasks,
and assigned them. I had my first meeting 2 days ago with the
steering committee, with the task force, and divided them up,
giving them timelines, dates, making sure we will execute many
of them, hopefully, before the end of this calendar year and be
able to set up for the next Secretary to come in and make sure
that we are executing the rest of them.
Then finally, obviously, we named the first-ever Deputy
Assistant Secretary for High Risk Posts. We have taken those
four very quick action steps as we proceed in taking the
recommendations of the ARB.
Senator Casey. Anything you can do to keep us updated as
you go. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Casey.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me first say that I agree with the sentiments of
Senator Rubio in his reference to you, Senator Lugar. Except
since we were both in high school at the same time, I didn't
get that message. [Laughter.]
But you have done a wonderful job for a lot of years, and
we respect you.
Both Senator Corker and Senator Rubio talked about some of
the events leading up to the disaster. However, they assumed, I
guess, that everyone already knew, and I think it is imperative
for us to put these things in the record so that we know what
signs were out there.
I am referring to the one sentence on the report that says,
``The Board found the intelligence provided no immediate
specific tactical warning of the September 11 attacks.'' We
will run over some of these things and then ask you both if you
agree with that statement. If it is more than a yes or no
answer, you could do it for the record.
In April, two former security guards for the consulate in
Benghazi threw IEDs over the consulate fence. In May, the
offices of the Red Cross in Benghazi were hit by an RPG.
The Red Cross closed their doors, and they got out of town.
In June, militants detonated an explosive at the perimeter
gate of the Benghazi consulate, blowing a hole through it large
enough for 40 people to go through. In June, a rocket-propelled
grenade hit the convoy carrying the British Ambassador to Libya
in Benghazi, and they, like the Red Cross, got out of town.
They left.
In June, Ambassador Stevens wrote that the al-Qaeda flags
were flying over the government buildings and training
facilities in that area. In August, security officers stated
that they did not believe the Benghazi consulate could
withstand a ``coordinated attack.'' That was in August.
In August, a State Department cable--we are talking about
cables now, information that came to you folks--discussed the
location of approximately 10 Islamist militias and al-Qaeda
training camps within Benghazi. On September 4, Ambassador
Stevens warned that Libyan officials had introduced a state of
maximum alert in Benghazi.
And then, finally, on September 9, Ambassador Stevens
requested additional security, 2 days before it happened. Like
the rest of the members of this panel, I knew him. I knew him
quite well. I had a great deal of respect for him.
Now in light of all these findings, these are facts that no
one has argued with, do either one of you want to say that you
agree with the statement that I read first in the report saying
that there were no warnings?
Mr. Burns. Well, Senator, the statement in the report that
says that there was no specific tactical threat I think is a
statement of fact. But you are right to point out the pattern,
the troubling pattern of deteriorating security in eastern
Libya in each of the incidents that you discussed.
The reality is that amongst that deterioration or part of
that deterioration was a lot of intra-Libyan violence as well.
Some of it was targeted against the United States. We did not
do a good enough job, as the report highlights, in trying to
connect the dots between that troubling pattern, even in the
absence of an immediate tactical threat.
Senator Inhofe. OK. And Mr. Secretary Nides, I will assume
that you pretty much agree with the statement he made.
Now there isn't time to go into it, but for the record, if
you would please respond, I would appreciate it very much.
Mr. Nides. Yes; I do. Yes; I do.
Senator Inhofe. Then there are two questions. One not so
significant. It is pretty obvious. And the other is the most
significant question that isn't asked, is not covered in the
report, that I would like to get your response to.
The first is, Were the comments of Ambassador Rice
completely inaccurate regarding her assertion on five TV shows
5 days after the event with the video responsible for the
deaths of Ambassador Stevens and three other Americans?
And the second question, and this is the one that is
important, because we all knew, we had testimony. And I will
read the testimony of the CIA before the house. It said,
``Although the intelligence community knew from day one that
al-Qaeda terrorists were responsible for the deadly Benghazi
consulate attack, someone cut reference to al-Qaeda and
terrorism from the overview they released on September 14
instead of those talking points they added.''
Now somebody in the White House--because this report went
to the situation room--someone in the White House changed the
talking points from General Petraeus and the CIA before they
were given to Ambassador Rice. I assume that they were changed
and that she was not aware of it or she was aware. That is not
too pertinent.
Someone changed it. Do either one of you guys know? Do you
care?
Mr. Burns. Senator, here is what I would say. What happened
in Benghazi was clearly a terrorist attack. Secretary Clinton,
on the day after the attack, said quite directly that what
happened in Benghazi was an assault by heavily armed militants
on our compound.
Later that same day, President Obama spoke to an act of
terror. What was not clear at that time was exactly which
terrorists were involved, what their motives were, exactly how
this came about, whether this had been planned well in advance
or was more a target of opportunity. And I am convinced,
Senator, that my colleagues in the administration who addressed
this issue and the intelligence professionals, on whom they
relied, operated in good faith.
Their focus was on being as factual as possible, and their
focus was on action. And you have to remember, sir, at this
time there were mobs coming over the walls of our Embassies in
Cairo and Tunis and Sana'a. And that was what people were
focused on.
And so, the initial inaccuracies, because just as the ARB
report points out, there were no protests before the attack
took place. It took several days for the intelligence community
to conclude definitively that there weren't any protests and
that there weren't any----
Senator Inhofe. Let me respond to that because we are
running out of time.
Mr. Burns. Sure.
Senator Inhofe. And I want to give Secretary Nides an
opportunity to respond. Specifically----
The Chairman. Well, we have actually--we have actually run
out of time.
Senator Inhofe. Well, I know. Others did, too.
Specifically, the report from the CIA references al-Qaeda
and terrorism. That is specific. It can't be any more specific
than that. So I will get your response. If you have time, if
you will give Mr. Nides time to respond, that is fine. If not,
he can do it for the record.
The Chairman. Well, I want him to do it quickly. I am
trying to honor other Senators who want to get to the Inouye
ceremony. But I think we have time if you can do it quickly.
Mr. Nides. No, I concur with Secretary Burns's comments,
and I do think that the interagency was operating in good
faith. As someone who was in the room during those 3 days with
Secretary Clinton, our full and complete focus was on saving
lives. Sitting there with her as she made calls to leaders of
all those countries where our men and women were in danger,
that was what our focus was, and that is what we spent our time
and energies on.
Senator Inhofe. And you don't know who changed the talking
points?
Mr. Nides. I do not. This was an interagency process. I am
not aware of how that occurred. It was an interagency process.
The Chairman. Senator, we would be happy to help you follow
up to get that pinned down. I think there is actually some
testimony with respect to that within the intel community--or
within the Intel Committee.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you both for being here this morning. I think the
report, the Accountability Review Board report was very direct.
It was very honest about pointing out that mistakes were made
within the agency.
And hopefully, now as the result of the report, as you all
have indicated, we can move forward. We can hold people
accountable. We can make the appropriate changes and follow up
on the lessons that are learned as a result of this tragedy in
Benghazi.
I appreciate Secretary Clinton's taking responsibility for
what happened and, as she points out in her letter to this
committee, for going even further than the recommendations in
the report to address the mistakes that were made.
The Chairman. If I could just interrupt you there? I want
to put the letter from Secretary Clinton to me and to Senator
Lugar in the record at this time.
Senator Shaheen. Good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
One of the things that you pointed out is that you have
gone out to--or there have been teams to assess the 19 State
Department locations around the world where they are high-risk
areas, and I wonder if you can talk about the metrics that are
being used as we think about how we determine what is a high-
threat, high-risk location and how we are then responding to
those metrics.
Mr. Nides. We tasked the teams between the Defense
Department and the State Department with a variety of questions
to ask. The principal question to ask was, What was the ability
for the host government to protect us? Not just their
willingness, because all of the countries in which we examined,
every one of them without question wanted to protect us. And
so----
Senator Shaheen. Right, and I appreciate that you gave us
that information in your testimony.
Mr. Nides. Yes.
Senator Shaheen. But I wonder if you could be a little more
specific. When we asked that question, what then is the
followup to that?
Mr. Nides. Sure. The security professionals then examined
the practical things: the abilities for fire, protections of
perimeter, how close are they to the street.
I mean, very exact. In fact, we then asked them for
recommendations, three sets of recommendations--immediate
recommendations, what things need to be done tomorrow, things
that could be done between now and 6 months, and then 6 months
to a year.
So we got very exact, detailed assessments from each one of
the teams. We then put them all in a matrix, and we were
basically going through each one of those requirements, putting
budget requirements to it, prioritizing them, and we will be
coming back to this institution, enlisting and helping you
think through that.
But we are getting very exact. This was not an esoteric
discussion. It was very clear and very specific requirements
for each one of those posts.
Senator Shaheen. And apropos Senator Corker and Senator
Casey's questions about implementation of the report, have we
attached a timeline to all of the various recommendations for
when those are going to get done, and is that something that
can be made available to this committee?
Mr. Nides. Yes, we have already--as I pointed out, we broke
the 29 recommendations down into individuals tasks.
As mundane as that might sound, it is critically important.
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Mr. Nides. We have assigned individuals to each task.
We have given the dates that we want the tasks completed
and whatever recommendations that will actually derive from
that. So we can certainly share that with the committee at the
appropriate time.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Also can you talk about the coordination between the State
Department and the Department of Defense? There is a New York
Times story today that points out that at the time of the
crisis in Benghazi, the Pentagon had no forces that could be
readily sent.
The closest AC-130 gunship was in Afghanistan. There were
no armed drones within range. There was no Marine expeditionary
unit available to the African Command.
And given the potential for further unrest in Syria, in
Egypt, and across the Middle East, it seems to me that that is
a question that is really critical as we look at how we
continue to provide protection for our personnel on the ground.
Mr. Burns. Well, Senator, first with regard to the specific
issue of Benghazi, Admiral Mullen addressed this publicly
yesterday----
Senator Shaheen. Right.
Mr. Burns [continuing]. And it was addressed in the report.
And his judgment and the ARB's judgment is there was simply not
enough time to have used military force to respond and make a
difference in that situation. But you raise a very good broader
question. It is certainly something that we will be working
through with our colleagues in the Pentagon and elsewhere in
the administration.
Senator Shaheen. Mr. Chairman, given again the potential
for unrest across the Middle East, I would hope that we would
follow up on this specific question because it seems to me to
be critical as we look at the situation going forward.
And I will just conclude by adding my personal thanks and
appreciation to Senator Lugar. It has truly been an honor to
serve with you, and you leave a tremendous legacy for this
committee and for the country.
Thank you.
The Chairman. Senator Shaheen, thank you.
Let me just say that I have thought a lot about what you
have just said with respect to the availability of teams or
forces with respect to emergency extraction and/or emergency
response in various parts of the world, and I think it is
something we really need to pay attention to and think about in
terms of deployment and preparedness. So we have got to do
that.
Senator Isakson.
Senator Isakson. I will be real fast so Senator Barrasso
can also ask questions, too.
Let me quote my predecessor in the Senate, Senator Sam
Nunn, by saying they don't make them any better than Dick
Lugar. I would like to echo that statement.
Dick, you have been a great public servant and a great
friend. We appreciate you very much.
My statement is in your report--in the report by Admiral
Mullen and Secretary Pickering, it says there was a culture of
pushback in the State Department. Not a question, but a
statement. I have seen that culture of pushback. I have been to
embassies in Africa that have made requests, security-related
requests that basically were really minor, like securing
ground-level residence of an apartment building in Malabo,
Equatorial Guinea, that couldn't get done until a United States
Senator asked for it.
So I think the State Department really needs to look at
their process internally to see to it there is a flow to the
top of important security requests coming from embassies, and
that is just a statement on my part.
My question is, Secretary Nides, you made the statement,
and I will read the following, ``And let me add, we may need
your help in assuring we have the authority to streamline the
usual processes and produce faster results.''
And this is related to security. What process is inhibiting
faster results in terms of security in our embassies?
Mr. Nides. I was using it broadly speaking. As you know,
every time we put a contract out, there is a bidding process
that needs to take place. Nothing can be done quickly, as I am
learning as someone who has come from the private sector into
the Government again for the second time.
And it is done rightly, right? The people--bids are put
out. Contracts are awarded. There is a process. That process,
unfortunately, takes time. We have oversight that has to be
done. The contracts are rewarded and are challenged. And so, we
may need to ask for some authorities to allow us to expedite
some of those, and that is what I was generally talking about
in security and other construction.
Just to build a wall at an embassy could potentially take
months to go through the contracting process, to get an
agreement, to get the bid. So we may need to come to this
institution to protect ourselves for challenges that we have
during the contracting process. And that is what I was
referring to, sir.
Senator Isakson. So it is competitive bid requirement?
Is that right?
Mr. Nides. Yes, I am not an expert in it, I should be
honest with you. But there is--what I am an expert on, there is
nothing can get done quickly. And I think it is--and some of it
is legitimate. Some of it needs to be done quickly, and we will
need to get the authorities in which to do that.
Senator Isakson. What we should do, Mr. Chairman, is
investigate negotiated bid because there is a way around the
competitive bid process in a security situation where you can
react quickly, and we ought to give you that authority.
The Chairman. That is a very, very good suggestion,
Senator, and we will do that for sure.
Senator Isakson. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank you.
Senator Barrasso.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And first, to Senator Lugar, in Wyoming, we have the code
of the West. And, No. 1 is, live each day with courage, and No.
2 is, take pride in your work. And you really are the
embodiment then of the code of the West. So you are always
welcome in the Rocky Mountain West, and specifically in
Wyoming. So thank you so much for your leadership, Senator
Lugar.
Senator Lugar. Thank you.
Senator Barrasso. Now for our guests, President Obama
claims that the moment he heard about the attack on the United
States consulate in Benghazi, he said he gave three directives.
And one of those was find out who did this so we can bring them
to justice.
In Secretary Clinton's letter to us just 2 days ago, she
states, ``We continue to hunt the terrorists responsible for
the attacks in Benghazi and are determined to bring them to
justice.'' Have you identified the terrorists responsible for
the deaths of these four brave Americans and the additional
injuries and the destruction of the U.S. facilities?
Mr. Burns. Senator Barrasso, first, just to restate that we
are absolutely committed to bringing those responsible to
justice. We are absolutely committed to bringing every resource
of the U.S. Government to bear to accomplish that.
We are pursuing this through a number of different
channels, some of which can best be discussed in other
settings. But as you know, the FBI is leading the
investigation. The State Department is very actively supporting
this.
I have been in Libya to talk to the Libyan leadership about
the importance of their cooperation in the investigation. I
think we are making some progress. Our charge on the ground,
Ambassador Pope, works every day on this issue in support of
the FBI.
I was in Tunisia last week to emphasize to the Tunisian
President and Prime Minister the importance we attach to
cooperation since they are detaining one of the suspects in the
Benghazi attack, and I believe we are making some progress
there.
So the answer, sir, to your question is we don't have all
the answers yet, but we are working this relentlessly, and I
think we are making some progress.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you.
With regard to implementation of the recommendations of
this report, you go through the report and Senator Corker
referred to 18 different Accountability Review Boards over a
number of years. A recurring theme seems to be stovepipe
decisionmaking. I mean, just earlier today, I have heard the
bureaucratic verbiage of what got to the sixth floor, what got
to the seventh floor.
That doesn't mean anything to Senators or to people at home
around the country that see a terrible situation and failed
security effort. And truly, what is the State Department going
to do to get beyond this, what goes to what floor to make sure
that this doesn't happen again?
Mr. Nides. Senator, as someone who has spent a lot of time
in corporate America as well, there is plenty of stovepiping
that goes on there, too, as you are well aware.
We have got to learn from this. We have got to hold people
accountable, which we are doing, and we have to change
processes to make sure we are getting it right.
We are going to relook at them from how we make our
decisions as relates to the security decisions, how the Bureau
reacts to that, who is making decisions. And we are going to
have to embrace this and hold ourselves accountable. Secretary
Clinton has been very clear to us, we are accountable for
executing these recommendations, and we are going to have to
learn from this quickly and get to the bottom of the answers
that are set up as it relates to the specific tasks that are
laid out for all of us to look at.
Senator Barrasso. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In the interest of time, I will cease questions there.
The Chairman. Thank you, Senator Barrasso.
Let me just say, as we conclude, I was just thinking, you
know, this is a good process. Not a fun process, and it is not
meant to be, but it is open accountability.
I have been impressed by the directness and professionalism
of the report that was delivered to us yesterday, but I am also
impressed today by the just obvious combination of some pain at
the losses that took place for which, obviously, everybody
feels a sense of responsibility within the Department and the
acknowledgment, difficult as it is, that mistakes were made and
things have to be done differently.
So I just want to salute both of you for coming in here,
and I think good questions have been asked, legitimate ones,
and this process will result in improvements. I am confident of
that.
So we thank you very, very much for coming in today. It has
been, I think, very, very helpful, and we will look forward to
working with you with the committee to make sure that the
implementation is as effective as possible and to make sure
that we do our part, that the Congress steps up here in ways
that are important.
I think Senator Corker's questions about the money, you
know, we have got to analyze it and see where the improvements
can be made. There is no question in my mind that we need
additional resources in significant ways, and we are going to
have to document that and do all the things necessary to make
it clear.
So thanks very, very much for coming in today. We wish you
well and look forward to picking up whenever the next hearing
will be with the Secretary.
Thank you.
Thanks. We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 9:46 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
Additional Material Submitted for the Record
Letter From Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton to Senators John
F. Kerry and Richard G. Lugar
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