[Senate Hearing 112-738]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-738
TERRORIST NETWORKS IN PAKISTAN
AND THE PROLIFERATION OF IEDS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 13, 2012
__________
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
William C. Danvers, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON NEAR EASTERN AND
SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland MIKE LEE, Utah
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware MARCO RUBIO, Florida
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Barbero, Gen. Michael, U.S. Army, Director, Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization, U.S. Department of
Defense, Washington, DC........................................ 5
Prepared statement........................................... 8
Carpenter, Jonathan, Senior Economic Adviser, Office of the
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 12
Prepared statement........................................... 15
Casey, Hon. Robert P., Jr., U.S. Senator from Pennsylvania,
opening statement.............................................. 1
(iii)
TERRORIST NETWORKS IN PAKISTAN AND THE PROLIFERATION OF IEDS
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THURSDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Near Eastern and
South and Central Asian Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:31 a.m., in
room SR-418, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert P.
Casey, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senator Casey.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. CASEY, JR.,
U.S. SENATOR FROM PENNSYLVANIA
Senator Casey. The hearing will come to order. Thanks,
everyone, for making this transition in light of the power
outage. We're grateful for the work that was done by Bertie and
your team to get this done. We're grateful for that. I'll have
an opening statement and then we'll go right to our witnesses.
Today the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee
on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs meets to
examine the efforts to combat the proliferation of improvised
explosive devices, IED as we know them by the acronym, and the
role of terrorist organizations in Pakistan. We are now meeting
in open session, which will be followed by a closed session
where we can explore these issues more deeply in a classified
setting.
This subcommittee met more than 2 years ago to examine the
scourge of IEDs in Afghanistan and the flow of precursor
materials from Pakistan. Today we hope to review the status of
those efforts since November 2010.
It's instructive to start with two stories about two of my
constituents whose lives were forever changed by IEDs, and I'm
sure there are Members of the House and the Senate that could
provide stories from their own States. On my left there is a
photograph of Adam Keys. Adam moved from Canada to the Lehigh
Valley of Pennsylvania, on the eastern side of our State. He
moved there as a teenager and joined the U.S. Army after he got
his green card.
In July 2010, Adam's vehicle hit an IED in Zabul province.
The 14-ton mine-resistant armored vehicle was thrown into the
air by the blast. Four soldiers in the truck were killed,
including Adam's best friend from Whitehall High School in
Pennsylvania, Jesse Reed.
Adam lost both legs and his left arm. He has had more than
100 surgeries to repair the damage to his body. There was a
news account that said he had 120 surgeries. I just saw him
last week at Walter Reed and he said the number is actually 130
surgeries.
I first met Adam back in March 2011 and had the great
opportunity to see him in Bethesda just recently. Now an
American citizen and promoted to sergeant, Adam's road to
recovery has been incredibly long. He's a true inspiration to
all of us and he and his family are in our prayers.
I want to add a footnote here. I've probably never met
anyone who's been through so much horror and still has a sense
of optimism. The day I saw him he was about to move from one
area
of Walter Reed to the next. He was anticipating that move in a
matter of hours or minutes when I saw him, and he was in great
spirits.
On my right is a photograph of Nick Staback. Nick is an
Army specialist from the county in Pennsylvania that I live in,
Lackawanna County, and I knew his grandfather, who served in
the Pennsylvania General Assembly. In October 2011 Nick was on
a foot patrol in the Arghandab Valley in Afghanistan when an
IED exploded in his path. He lost both legs and spent the past
year recovering at Walter Reed National Military Medical Center
in Bethesda. Nick's mother Maria took a leave of absence from
her job to move to Bethesda to be with Nick as he learned how
to walk on prosthetic legs.
I met Nick and his family shortly after his return from
Afghanistan and I was awed and inspired by his positive
attitude and his determination not to let his injuries slow him
down or stop him from doing the things that he loves. In fact,
I understand from his mother that Nick is in Texas on a hunting
trip as we speak. The day that I first met him, that was one of
the objectives that he had upon leaving Walter Reed, to figure
out a way to keep hunting in the future. Again, a tremendous
sense of optimism and positive thinking that characterize both
these patriots.
Nick is now 21 years old and he's moved into an apartment
near the hospital, and we're all optimistic that he has a
bright future ahead of him. We have no doubt about that.
As public officials, we owe nothing less than our greatest
efforts and then some to confront this terrible weapon of war.
On behalf of Nick, Adam, and the thousands of other U.S. forces
still out there today on patrol, we need to redouble our
efforts and our focus on stopping the illicit flow of these
deadly IED precursor chemicals. As I think through how to
attack this issue diplomatically and otherwise, every step is
taken with Nick and Adam and thousands of others in mind.
Over the past 2\1/2\ years I have sought to raise the
profile of the threat of IEDs in Afghanistan. In 2010 I
introduced a resolution, which passed unanimously, calling for
increased efforts by Pakistan, Afghanistan, and their neighbors
to prevent ammonium nitrate fertilizer from entering
Afghanistan. As mentioned, I chaired a hearing in this
subcommittee to hear testimony on the steps the United States
could take to minimize the threat of IEDs. Soon thereafter, I
commissioned a report from the General Accountability Office to
examine this issue, particularly United States cooperation with
Pakistan.
I have also pushed for conditioning aid to Pakistan based
on its progress on this issue. At the end of last year, I
introduced an amendment to the National Defense Authorization
Act which would prohibit some security assistance--the
operative word there being ``some''--some security assistance
from going to Pakistan until the government demonstrates
commitment to stopping the flow of IED components.
I am glad to say that our own interagency structure has
elevated this issue and that it has raised it at the most
senior levels in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and other international
forums. In fact, I have had excellent communication with our
Ambassador in Islamabad, Richard Olson. Yesterday, Ambassador
Olson sent me a letter with an update on efforts to restrict
the availability of IED components, improve the counter-IED
abilities of Pakistani law enforcement and security forces, and
raise public awareness about the groups that wield these deadly
weapons. I'm glad that Ambassador Olson is making this such a
priority in his work as Ambassador and I look forward to
working with him closely to ensure that Pakistan follows
through on its commitments.
Despite this interagency focus, much work remains to be
done. The Department of Defense's section 1230 report on
progress toward security and stability in Afghanistan, released
this month, acknowledged that relations with Pakistan have
improved, but says, ``Pakistan's continued acceptance of
sanctuaries for Afghan-focused insurgents and failure to
interdict IED materials and components continue to undermine
the security of Afghanistan and pose an enduring threat to
U.S., coalition, and Afghan forces.''
Pakistan has also acutely felt the terrible impact of these
weapons. I get reports from the Pakistani Embassy on the
casualty counts of these Pakistani civilian and security forces
killed in terrorist attacks. According to the latest Embassy
reports, 37,990 Pakistani civilians have been killed in
terrorist attacks since 2001. So just a little shy of 38,000
people killed in that time period. In addition, 6,416 security
forces have perished. The U.S. Embassy tells me that Pakistan
has lost 2,395 people, including civilians, to IEDs over the
past 12 months.
Each one of these deaths is a tragedy and it's important
that we honor and acknowledge the enormous sacrifices that
Pakistanis have made in the struggle against violent extremism
in their own country.
Pakistan is key to preventing bomb components from making
their way into Afghanistan. That's why we're here today. When I
traveled to Pakistan in the summer of 2011 with Senators
Whitehouse, Blumenthal, and Bennet, we raised this issue
repeatedly with Pakistani officials. Whether it was the
President, the Prime Minister, General Kayani, anyone we talked
to, we raised this issue over and over and over again.
Based on these exchanges and others over the years, I
believe that Pakistan's leaders understand the problem and
share our interest in preventing more American, Pakistani, and
Afghan casualties due to IEDs. In 2011, Pakistan drafted a
strategic plan to combat IEDs. We were presented with that plan
on our visit and they made commitments to implement it. On
October 5 of this year, Interior Minister Malik visited the
United States to participate in a bilateral working group on
the issue. These are promising steps and I commend the
Pakistani Government for this commitment. In recent months
there appears to have been significant activity and Pakistan
has worked closely with the United States on moving this
forward.
While I am pleased that Pakistan has developed a very
detailed and comprehensive set of plans to counter IEDs, let me
be clear, it's time to finally and fully implement these plans.
IED incidents have risen in Afghanistan. The flow of chemicals
coming from across the border has not diminished. We continue
to see far too many IED casualties at Walter Reed and in
Bethesda. Thousands of Pakistanis died in the past year, as I
have mentioned. We need to see execution of these plans. We
need to see, in a word, action.
Given the gravity of this threat and the mounting casualty
toll, the current pace of activity by the Pakistani Government
is not acceptable. At the November 2010 hearing that we had, I
laid out the following benchmarks for Pakistan: First, I said
they needed to do more to strengthen the legislative framework
to restrict the sale and transport of ammonium nitrate and
other IED precursor materials like potassium chlorate. Second,
I called for a better tracking and accountability system for
these chemicals inside the country from producer to distributor
to final purchase. Finally, at that hearing I urged that the
United States and Pakistan work together to employ better
controls along the border with Afghanistan.
In addition to the important responsibilities borne by
governments to tackle this problem, the private sector can also
play a constructive role. Members of the fertilizer industry in
Pakistan have the opportunity to be good corporate citizens.
They should also understand that they are part of a broader
global corporate community, where reputations matter, just like
they do here in Washington. The failure to take action could
have an adverse impact on their ability to do business in the
future. We met with some of those folks in August 2011 in our
visit to Islamabad.
I look forward to a readout from our witnesses on where we
stand and what we as a country are doing to accelerate our
efforts to finally turn back this tide.
I want to thank both JIEDDO and the Department of State for
working closely with me on this critical issue over the past 2
years. General Barbero, you have been not only a close ally but
also a bright light on this issue. I know it has been very
difficult to make progress and sometimes even to measure that
progress, but I commend your work and appreciate you being here
today. I commend you not just because of your work and not only
because that you grew up in Philadelphia, but that certainly
helps.
We are also fortunate to be joined by SRAP Economic Adviser
Jonathan Carpenter. Jonathan, we appreciate you being here.
Jonathan's the lead State Department staff member on this issue
as well as others related to the border between Afghanistan and
Pakistan. We benefited from Jonathan's expertise when he
recently served as a fellow on the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. We're glad that he could join us on the other side
of the table. So Jonathan, welcome back.
General, let's start with you, then we'll move to Jonathan,
and then we'll get to some questions, and then we'll have to
move once again to a closed setting. I want both of you to know
that your full statements will be made part of the record, so
if you could provide as good as a 5-to-7-minute summary as you
can.
Thank you.
STATEMENT OF GEN. MICHAEL BARBERO, U.S. ARMY, DIRECTOR, JOINT
IMPROVISED EXPLOSIVE DEVICE DEFEAT ORGANIZATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, WASHINGTON, DC
General Barbero. Chairman Casey, thank you for the
opportunity this morning to appear before you and share my
views on this very critical subject. Up front, if I could
digress for a minute and talk about your opening comments and
the cost of this issue in personal and human terms. I could sit
here and tell you that in my mission and our organization we
are making progress, but to Adam Keys and Nick Staback and
their families that is not progress and that is not good
enough.
The same message we hear from families across this country:
That is not good enough. And I get it, and every day we are
focused to prevent this and to help our troopers execute their
missions safely and securely. I just want to comment on that.
Up front, I understand the importance of our relationship
with Pakistan and to address the IED networks that threaten our
strategic interests in the region requires a cooperative
relationship and engagements with Pakistan. The United States,
led by the State Department, continues to seek a relationship
with Pakistan that
is constructive and advances both United States and Pakistani
interests.
Secretary Clinton has kept this topic at the forefront of
all her discussions and we have a strong relationship with the
Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, represented today by my friend, Jonathan Carpenter.
Their support and actions have significantly contributed to the
increased interagency cooperation we are seeing on this IED
challenge.
I would like to thank you for being the driving force in
Congress and a steadfast advocate on this difficult Pakistan
IED issue, and also for your leadership in shepherding through
the fiscal year 2013 counter-HME legislative proposal, which
will give us another tool to use in this fight. So thank you
for your leadership and focus on this IED problem.
As you have commented, the importance of countering this
threat posed by IEDs and attacking these threat networks cannot
be overstated. Counter-IED is an area ripe for cooperation
between the United States and Pakistan. I am also encouraged by
the recent positive tone in our discussions with the Government
of Pakistan and the assurances from our Pakistani counterparts.
But, like you, I believe our Pakistani partners can and must do
more.
You have highlighted the numbers of IEDs and the cost to
our troops in Afghanistan. More than 60 percent of United
States combat casualties in Afghanistan, both killed and
wounded in action, are the result of IEDs. This year nearly
1,900 U.S. casualties have been caused by IEDs.
As you stated and we acknowledge, Pakistan has suffered
greatly from these networks and these devices, and they have a
significant, and face a significant and growing IED challenge.
So it is in their interest to increase counter-IED cooperation
with us and take effective actions against these networks.
As you know, despite a countrywide ban on the importation
of ammonium-nitrate-based fertilizers by the Government of
Afghanistan, fertilizer-based explosives still remain our
greatest counter-IED challenge in Afghanistan. Today more than
85 percent of the IEDs employed against coalition forces are
homemade explosives, and of those about 70 percent are made
with ammonium nitrate derived from the fertilizer calcium
ammonium nitrate, referred to as CAN, a common agricultural
fertilizer produced in and transited through Pakistan.
CAN is produced by two factories in Pakistan owned and
operated by the Fatima Group. While CAN is produced in other
regional countries, I have seen no evidence to indicate that
CAN used for IEDs in Afghanistan comes from any other country
in any significant amounts.
While ammonium nitrate continues to be the most prominent
main charge in HME-based IEDs in Afghanistan, the use of
potassium chlorate by insurgents has increased for 12 straight
months. Potassium chlorate, which is also banned for
importation by the Government of Afghanistan, is legally
imported into Pakistan
for use by the textile and matchstick industries. It is then
transferred to, or stolen by, insurgents for use as IED
materials in Afghanistan.
In concert with our Pakistani partners, we must address the
continued flow of ammonium-nitrate-based fertilizers and other
IED materials into Afghanistan. Since then I would point out,
as far as seizures of amounts in Afghanistan, since 2009 we
have seen a significant increase in the amounts we have seized
in Afghanistan, from 30 tons in 2009 to 440 tons so far in
2012.
So the high number of IED incidents and the growing seizure
rates highlight the continued lack of effective measures to
impede the supply of IED materials into Afghanistan from
Pakistan. In Afghanistan we are playing defense.
In 2011 I engaged the top leadership of Fatima Group, the
producers of CAN in Pakistan, to urge their action in
countering the illicit use of their fertilizer as an explosive
through the implementation of several steps--a dye program,
better tracking, and such. I also engaged to International
Fertilizer Association and global fertilizer community to
encourage development of a whole-of-industry approach
addressing the illicit use of their products.
While the international and United States professional
fertilizer associations are receptive and actively addressing
these issues, the producers within Pakistan have been less than
cooperative. Despite making minor packaging, tracking, and
marketing changes, they have not implemented any effective
product security or stewardship efforts. I believe Pakistani-
based CAN producers can and must do more.
While the Government of Pakistan has taken military actions
to address the IED threat and go after these networks, these
efforts remain focused on Pakistan's domestic threat and have
had no measurable effect on the number of IED events in
Afghanistan, on the flow of HME precursor materials smuggled
across the border, or on the threat networks operating in
Pakistan who attack our troops in Afghanistan.
While the dialogue between the U.S. Government and the
Government of Pakistan on IED-related issues has been
improving, I believe there is still much work to be done. We
must move from discussing cooperation to actual cooperation.
You cited some of the examples of some of the legislation.
I will just highlight a couple. For example, in June 2011 the
Government of Pakistan adopted a national counter-IED strategy
to prevent the smuggling of these materials. While this sounds
substantial, it has neither been fully implemented nor
resourced and therefore will have minimal impact on this issue.
Another example: The Government of Pakistan's National
Counter-IED Act of 2012, which in their words, ``will provide
the legal framework to the counter-IED strategy,'' has not been
passed by Parliament into law and therefore remains unenforced.
A final example: In July the Government of Pakistan
committed to a military-to-military counter-IED cooperation
framework. To date, despite our input, this document remains in
its original draft form, with no progress. This is an area, the
military cooperation; where we must move beyond talking about
cooperation to developing a comprehensive framework and then
work together to address the shared problems.
As far as intelligence, countering the IED threat and
networks operating at both sides of the border requires strong
partnership between the United States and Pakistan. The U.S.
Government needs to, and we are working to, share with our
Government of Pakistan partners' actual information on threat
networks of mutual interest, and in turn the Government of
Pakistan must act on the information and likewise share the
critical intelligence with us which is needed to counter these
threat networks. So there's much work to be done, as you
stated.
If I could just briefly talk about what the whole of the
U.S. Government is doing to address these threat networks and
the IED challenge. We focus on the military solution and
military capabilities, but we have increasingly recognized the
requirement for interagency cooperation and cooperation with
foreign governments. Today we are working with an expanded
counter-IED community of action that did not exist previously.
We have established an interagency forum that SRAP cochairs,
consisting of United States intelligence and interagency
partners, Federal law enforcement, key allies, and our commands
in Afghanistan, to achieve a more effective effort to disrupt
threat networks employing IEDs against U.S., ISAF, and Afghan
forces.
And we are having some results. For example, the U.S.
Department of Commerce has added 152 persons to the entity list
because of IED-related matters. Now, this designation stops
U.S. companies from trading with these entities, companies,
individuals, or organizations which we can prove violate U.S.
export laws. U.S. Department of Treasury has imposed economic
sanctions on 38 Afghan Pakistan-based facilitators, three
specifically for IED-related matters.
Through coordinated efforts and strong partnership across
the U.S. Government and with our international partners, the
counter-IED community is going after these threat networks
wherever they are, their leaders, their funds, and their
facilitators, employing all the tools at our disposal to
counter the networks that employ IEDs.
Now, going forward we cannot step back from this linked
interagency process and the intelligence community needs to
continue to focus on these networks. We cannot go back to the
stovepipe approach that will fail to address the complex
present-day threats.
In closing, I would like to just, instead of quoting, also
echo your comments about the DOD report on progress toward
security and stability in Afghanistan. I believe the comments
there and its description are accurate. While we have seen and
welcome recent indications of increased Pakistani cooperation
and gestures on their part, Secretary Panetta this week
recently said it best, ``Actions have to speak louder than
words.''
The U.S. Government is unified in taking action, but we
cannot solve this IED challenge without the significant
commitment of our Pakistani partners; government, military, and
industry alike.
So, Chairman, again thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today. I look forward to answering your questions,
and again thank you for your leadership on this issue.
[The prepared statement of General Barbero follows:]
Prepared Statement of LTG Michael D. Barbero
Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, and distinguished members of
the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to appear before you today
to share my views on the improvised explosive device (IED) challenge in
the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
In February 2006, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) officially
established the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) to focus on the IED threat in Iraq and Afghanistan. JIEDDO's
mission, as defined by DOD Directive 2000.19E, ``is to focus (lead,
advocate, coordinate) all DOD actions in support of the Combatant
Commanders' and their respective Joint Task Forces' efforts to defeat
IEDs as weapons of strategic influence.'' \1\ JIEDDO is singularly
focused on the IED threat and exists to rapidly field capabilities to
reduce the effectiveness of this asymmetric weapon.
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\1\ Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization,
Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 2000.19E (14 Feb. 2006), para 4.
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IED CHALLENGE
The importance of countering the threat posed by IEDs and attacking
these threat networks cannot be overstated. During the past 2 years in
Afghanistan, IED events increased 80 percent, from 9,300 in 2009 to
16,800 in 2011. Even though IED events are down 8 percent this year,
there have been nearly 14,500 IED events in 2012.
IEDs remain the leading cause of civilian, military, and law
enforcement casualties in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. More than 60
percent of U.S. combat casualties in Afghanistan, both killed and
wounded in action, are a result of IEDs. This year, 1,874 U.S.
casualties have been caused by IEDs. It is important to note, this
threat is not exclusive to Afghanistan. Pakistan has a significant and
growing IED challenge that threatens its own soldiers and populace. As
of November 2012, there have been more than 926 IED attacks inside
Pakistan, resulting in an excess of 3,700 casualties.\2\ Recently, on
November 21 in Quetta, a Pakistani military vehicle was targeted by a
vehicle-borne IED, resulting in the deaths of three Pakistani soldiers
and one civilian. The deadliest attack in Pakistan in nearly 5 months
occurred in Rawalpindi on November 22, where a person-borne IED killed
23 and wounded more than 62 people participating in a Shiite Muslim
procession. The threats posed by IEDs and the threat networks are areas
of joint concern for both the U.S. and Pakistan and with the
improvement in bilateral relations since July, there has been increased
cooperation.
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\2\ Worldwide IED Database, Institute for Defense Analysis,1 Jan.
2012 through 13 Nov 2012.
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Fertilizer-based explosives still remain our greatest challenge in
Afghanistan. Today, more than 85 percent of IEDs employed against
coalition forces are homemade explosives (HME), and of those, about 70
percent are made with ammonium nitrate derived from calcium ammonium
nitrate (CAN)--a common agricultural fertilizer produced in, and/or
transited through, Pakistan. CAN is produced by two factories in
Pakistan, with a total production capacity of 870,000 metric tons
annually, but did not reach production capacity in 2011. An estimated
200 tons of CAN was used to make IEDs in Afghanistan this year. Despite
a countrywide ban on the importation of ammonium nitrate-based
fertilizers by the Government of Afghanistan, this HME precursor
continues to be the main charge in the majority of IEDs in that
country.
While ammonium nitrate continues to be the most prominent main
charge in HME-based IEDs in Afghanistan, the use of potassium chlorate
by insurgents has increased for 12 straight months. Potassium chlorate
is now the main charge in 23 percent of exploited IEDs, up from 13
percent a year ago. Insurgents perceive potassium chlorate as being a
more effective explosive. Potassium chlorate, which is also banned for
importation by the government of Afghanistan, is legally imported by
Pakistan for legitimate use in the textile and matchstick industries.
It is illegally sold to or stolen by insurgents for use as HME
material.
A critical piece to any IED is the initiator, a small, sensitive
primary explosive device generally used to detonate a larger, more
powerful and less sensitive secondary explosive. One type of initiator
commonly used is the blasting cap. Pakistani law requires companies who
produce blasting caps to sell their products only to entities holding
an explosives permit, such as construction or mining companies. Despite
this fact, military forces are recovering these products on the
battlefield in Afghanistan. Curbing the supply of blasting caps to
insurgents in Afghanistan can help reduce the number of IED events in
Afghanistan, and I believe this is an important area of future
engagement with the Government of Pakistan.
The continued flow of ammonium nitrate-based fertilizers and other
IED materials from Pakistan and smuggled into Afghanistan is a crucial
area we continue to address in concert with our Pakistani partners.
This is evident by the growing record seizures by coalition forces in
Afghanistan. During the past year, coalition forces have seized more
than 444 tons of HME precursor materials, an increase of 16 percent
since last year. This includes more than 341 tons of ammonium nitrate-
based fertilizer and 37 tons of potassium chlorate. The high number of
IED incidents and seizure rates highlights the continued lack of
effective measures to impede the supply of IED materials into
Afghanistan from Pakistan. In Afghanistan, we are playing defense.
INDUSTRY
In 2011, I engaged the producers of CAN in Pakistan to request
their commitment in countering the illicit use of fertilizer as an
explosive through the implementation of a dye program and instituting
effective control and tracking measures. Additionally, I also engaged
the International Fertilizer Association and the global fertilizer
community to urge their commitment in developing a whole-of-industry
approach to: implement a universal dye program; explore nondetonable
substitutes for ammonium nitrate; institute effective industrywide
standards, regulations and safeguards regarding the production and
distribution of nitrogen-based fertilizer; and produce a global
education and awareness campaign.
Professional fertilizer associations are receptive and actively
addressing these issues. The International Fertilizer Association has
engaged its global membership with the establishment of a new product
security task force to create momentum within the industry on the
important issue of fertilizer misuse. Efforts continue to establish
effective and adequate measures to secure CAN. The producers of CAN in
Pakistan made minor packaging and marketing changes, but has yet to
establish an effective tracking process to monitor and account for the
distribution of the product. To date, measures taken by industry or
government have minimal impact on the HME flow into Afghanistan.
GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN
During the past few years, our cooperation on the IED challenge
with Pakistan has had mixed results. While much work remains, Pakistani
authorities now acknowledge their slow start in the counter-IED fight
and have realized IEDs are not just a threat to ISAF but to Pakistan as
well. The Government of Pakistan has taken some actions to address IED
threat, mostly focused on Pakistan's domestic challenge, thus having
limited effect on the number of IED events in Afghanistan or on the
flow of HME precursor materials smuggled across the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border. However, dialogue between the United States and the
Government of Pakistan on IED-related issues has been improving, as
evident by recent engagements such as the Law Enforcement and
Counterterrorism Working Group in October 2012 and the Defense
Consultative Group meeting in December 2012. It is essential we
continue to increase cooperation to address the illicit use and
trafficking of HME and dual-use materials and the threat networks
trafficking and employing IEDs on both sides of the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border.
In June 2011, the Government of Pakistan adopted a national
counter-IED strategy to prevent the smuggling of CAN and other
precursors out of the country; build Pakistan's counter-IED capacity
through equipping and training; launch a vigorous counter-IED public
awareness campaign; and modify and strengthen existing legislative
framework on terrorism and explosives. This is a very positive step.
The implementation plan, developed by Pakistan's Directorate General
for Civil Defense, has designated the Pakistani Army the lead for
counter-IED efforts. While these steps sound substantial, Pakistan has
not resourced this strategy to the level we see as necessary.
Effective and enforceable regulations and border controls are
necessary and essential to mitigating this shared threat and these
measures can be effective. This has proven effective in other countries
that have recently implemented regulations on ammonium nitrate and are
seeing results. We recognize and appreciate the actions of the
Government of Pakistan to ban the exportation of products such as CAN;
however, the porous borders, lack of enforcement in border regions and
the high economic incentive to smuggle HME precursors will continue to
render these efforts ineffective. The improved border coordination
enabled by the tripartite border control standard operating procedure
agreement, signed by the U.S., Pakistan, and Afghanistan in November,
and the ongoing discussion on the development of a comprehensive border
security strategy are steps in the right direction.
The Government of Pakistan recently approved the antiterrorism
(amendment) bill 2012, amending the 1997 Anti-terrorism Act. This new
legislation strengthens the provisions of the 1997 act by covering all
aspects of financing terrorism including provisions on freezing,
seizing and forfeiture of assets and properties of those involved in
financing terrorism. This is a very positive step and an area of
critical importance. I would like to commend the Government of Pakistan
for taking action against several individuals involved in IED
facilitation networks and urge their commitment to take action against
others. Now, in accordance with this law, the Government of Pakistan
should take action to fully enforce United National Security Council
sanctions against designated personnel.
Countering the IED threat and the networks operating on both sides
of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border requires a strong partnership
between the United States and Pakistan. The U.S. Government needs to
provide the Government of Pakistan with actionable information on
targets of mutual interest, and in turn, the Government of Pakistan
must act on the information.
To be a partner in the fight against IEDs and threat networks, the
Government of Pakistan must continue to expand cooperation with
international partners to detain these individuals and share the
critical intelligence needed to address these threat networks who
endanger both their country and NATO forces and civilians in
Afghanistan. We stand ready to partner with Pakistan to tackle this
mutual threat.
PAKISTAN MILITARY
Last year, the Government of Pakistan committed to a military-to-
military cooperation framework regarding the IED issue. This is an area
where we must move beyond talking about cooperation to developing a
comprehensive cooperation framework and take action to address this
shared problem.
The DOD, through the Office of Defense Representative-Pakistan, the
United Kingdom and Pakistan have partnered to train and equip
Pakistan's law enforcement and security forces in counter-IED and
attack-the-network tactics and techniques to build Pakistan's capacity
to find, disrupt, and exploit IEDs, components and threat networks
through advanced search, IED disruption and explosive scene
investigation. The international community has provided specialized
equipment and training in all of these areas. We can and must work
together to dissect the IED supply chain to go after the nefarious
actors and threat networks operating on both sides of the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border. This is the decisive course of action and a critical
area for cooperation between the United States, Pakistan, and
international community.
U.S. GOVERNMENT EFFORTS
JIEDDO and DOD respond to the IED problem from the military
perspective, but we have increasingly recognized the requirement for
interagency cooperation and cooperation with foreign governments is as
essential in addressing this complex issue.
Today, JIEDDO is working with an expanded community of action that
did not exist previously to put pressure on these IED networks. We have
established an interagency forum, cochaired by JIEDDO, Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy and the Department of State Special
Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, consisting of U.S.
intelligence and interagency partners, federal law enforcement, key
allies (United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia) and our commanders in
Afghanistan to achieve a more effective effort to disrupt threat
networks employing IEDs against U.S. and coalition forces.
We recognize no single government department or international
partner has the ability to fully limit access to IED precursors, so we
are integrating our efforts to go after the threat networks
distributing these materials. Our U.S. Government partners bring
expertise in defeating and prosecuting criminal networks; applying
financial pressures by going after the assets of IED network members,
financers and distributors; enacting export controls and treaty
compliance efforts that lead to the interdiction of IED components;
advancing counter-IED objectives through public diplomacy and
regulatory changes; advising on legitimate agricultural requirements;
and coordinating and executing national counter-IED policy efforts
outside of declared combat zones through the interagency Joint Program
Office for Countering IEDs. This is by no means a comprehensive list of
the actions our interagency partners are applying to the counter-IED
fight, but it should give an idea of the collaboration occurring on all
levels.
For example, the U.S. Department of Commerce added 152 persons to
the Entity List because of IED-related matters. This designation stops
U.S. companies from trading with these entities--companies,
organizations, persons--who violated U.S. export laws. The U.S.
Department of Treasury has imposed economic sanctions on 51
Afghanistan-Pakistan-based terrorist and their supporters since October
2010, two specifically for IED-related matters. One of Treasury's
designees, Taliban financier Haji Mohammed Qasim, was arrested by
Afghan and coalition security forces in Logar province on November 30,
2012. As of December 2012, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security
Investigations' Global Shield Program, operating under the auspice of
the World Custom's Organization, has produced 42 enforcement actions
and 49 seizures totaling 140.67 metric tons of explosive precursor
chemicals. Through coordinated efforts and strong partnership across
the U.S. Government and with our international partners, the counter-
IED community is going after these nefarious actors and effectively
countering the networks that use IEDs. Maintaining this momentum
against an adaptive threat requires the continued focus of the
intelligence community to build a common intelligence picture. The
increasingly interlinked challenges we face demands integrated and
synchronized efforts. We cannot go back to a stove-piped approach to
address present day threats.
CLOSING
The challenge of interdicting this HME threat is considerable and
must be addressed using a comprehensive approach, applying a range of
assets in close partnership with our allies and other countries in the
region to include Pakistan. This is a common threat and an area where
the United States and Pakistan can continue to grow our cooperation.
Just as the IED supply chain is not limited by national borders,
the counter-IED response cannot be limited to the interdiction of HME
precursor materials in Afghanistan. Success against the supply of HME
precursor materials is essential to reduce the effect of IEDs on our
forces, as well as on government personnel and civilians in Afghanistan
and Pakistan. While the U.S. Government is unified and is taking
action, we cannot solve this HME challenge without our regional
partners like Pakistan--government, military, and industry alike.
Chairman Casey, Ranking Member Risch, members of the subcommittee,
again, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look
forward to your questions.
Senator Casey. General, thank you.
Mr. Carpenter.
STATEMENT OF JONATHAN CARPENTER, SENIOR ECONOMIC ADVISER,
OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND
PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Carpenter. Thank you, Senator Casey, for the invitation
to appear before the subcommittee and for the welcome back to
the committee. If I told you it felt different on this side,
you would believe me.
On behalf of Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Grossman, the
Department of State appreciates the leadership role that you
and the subcommittee are playing in seeking solutions to the
lethal problem of improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, and
the threat they pose to our military forces and civilians
deployed in Afghanistan. I join the General in thanking you for
what is a very poignant reminder here of why we do this and
what is important and how we should measure our progress.
As you know, IEDs are responsible for the majority of
coalition fatalities in Afghanistan. Your leadership and
continuing congressional attention to this matter directly
supports our efforts with the Pakistani Government to make
progress against these networks that supply these weapons.
Secretary Clinton has emphasized the importance of decisive
action against the IED threat in nearly every conversation she
has had with senior Pakistani officials over the past few
years, as she did again last week in Brussels with Foreign
Minister Khar. As you noted, Ambassador Olson has also made
counter-IED efforts a priority in his initial calls with
Pakistani officials in Islamabad and has noted the deep concern
expressed by this committee and the need for impactful action.
Over the past 2 years, we have worked aggressively to
deepen our interagency cooperation to combat the IED assembly
line. So I am honored to be sitting alongside Lieutenant
General Barbero of the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat
Organization, JIEDDO. As we have better understood how we might
disrupt the material and financial flows that go into the
making of these bombs, we have increasingly focused on how to
degrade the complex global network of both legal and illegal
activities that supply these weapons.
It is not enough to single out a lone precursor chemical or
a single individual. These transnational networks are too
resilient and diverse for that approach. In addition to the
threat to coalition personnel, IEDs cause significant death and
injury among Afghan civilians, government, and security
officials. As the transition to full Afghan security
responsibility progresses, this threat will continue, and we
have a clear interest in ensuring that Afghan Government and
security personnel are able to protect themselves and their
people from these devices.
Afghanistan is taking steps to address the threat of IEDs.
In June of this year President Karzai signed a national CID
strategy. U.S. mission personnel in Kabul are working closely
to support border capacity, rule of law, and other essential
components of a comprehensive national effort to address this
threat.
The IED is also an increasing threat to Pakistani law
enforcement, security, and civilian personnel, as you have
noted. We have an interest in helping the Government of
Pakistan meet these challenges, and it is on this basis of a
common understanding of a shared threat that we believe the
best prospects for cooperative meaningful action exist.
As we have worked to address the supply chains that bring
lethal aid into Afghanistan, we were constrained by the overall
United States-Pakistan relationship in 2011. While we asserted
the need for aggressive action against the IED supply chain
during that time, it was difficult to make progress on this
front absent progress on the broader bilateral relationship.
Following the opening of the ground lines of communication,
or GLOCs, into Afghanistan in July of this year, the United
States and Pakistan agreed to restart a limited number of
suspended working groups. Again, sir, as you noted in your
opening statement, the first working group to meet following
the opening of the GLOCs was a meeting of the Law Enforcement
and Counterterrorism Working Group here in Washington on
October 5, solely focused on the threat of IEDs. Pakistan's
Interior Minister, Rehman Malik, cochaired the meeting with
Assistant Secretary of State William Brownfield. The working
group focused on identifying near-term specific actions for
each side to take, on which we could measure progress in a
limited window of time.
Overall, there is considerably more that the Government of
Pakistan must do to counter the threat from IEDs that our
troops face in Afghanistan. However, we believe there has been
a substantive change in the tone and content of the discussion
with Pakistan as we have worked together to put our
relationship on a surer footing.
The Pakistanis have taken several important steps. The
Government of Pakistan has assisted, through the U.N. Security
Council, in the designation of key IED facilitators. Over the
past year the Pakistani military has conducted eight operations
against suspected IED manufacturing facilities along the
border. There have been notable seizures of IED precursors in
Pakistan by Pakistani forces in at least January, May, and
December 2012. Embassy Islamabad reports greater cooperation
with Pakistani law enforcement counterparts in the field and
increased information-sharing.
We strongly support these and other steps by the Government
of Pakistan and will evaluate their effectiveness based on
whether they contribute to diminishing the threat in the field.
As the General noted, the United States has taken a number
of steps to advance our CIED objectives. We have completed a
public awareness campaign inside Pakistan designed to heighten
public knowledge of the threat posed by IEDs and the terrorists
who deploy them. Through close interagency cooperation, again
focused in this community of action that the General referred
to, we have pursued designation of key individuals in the
network under U.S. law as well as through the U.N. Security
Council. In 2012, Treasury has designed, pursuant to Executive
Order 13224 on terrorism, two individuals for their role in
facilitating Taliban IEDs.
One of these individuals was also designated by the U.N.
Security Council's 1988 Committee, and it is important to note
that in 2012 and 2013 Pakistan serves as an elected member of
the Security Council and therefore is part of the designation
process.
We have also increased our coordination with our closest
allies and continue to support international efforts to address
the threat, including through the World Customs Organization's
program, Global Shield. Ninety-three of the WCOs 178 Member
States are now participating in Global Shield.
We are prepared to use the resources made available by
Congress to help the Pakistanis address the IED problem. In
response to the challenges of the last year, we recalibrated
our security assistance, slowing execution. In the wake of the
Defense Consultative Group, or DCG, meeting last week in
Islamabad, we anticipate that the time required for delivery of
security assistance, including CIED equipment for Pakistan,
will improve. The Pakistanis emphasized at the DCG their
priority for CIED force protection equipment.
Subject to congressional notification, we anticipate using
approximately $135 million from the fiscal year 2012 PCCF
appropriation to support CIED efforts in Pakistan. Such an
outlay would represent a significant portion of the overall
PCCF budget.
The consensus of key stakeholders that look at this very
difficult challenge is that we must continue to assertively
press the Pakistani Government to translate commitments into
actions on the basis of an increasing understanding of a common
threat. It is our belief that sustained administration and
congressional attention on this matter has made a difference in
the Pakistanis' approach and we will continue to press for
specific and continuing progress in a few key areas.
First, we will support joint Afghan and Pakistani
initiatives, particularly at the border and with an emphasis on
interdiction.
Second, we believe it is important that the Pakistanis
continue to advance implementation of their own CIED strategy,
as referenced here, including the necessary legislation
required to prosecute individuals for IED-related activities.
Third, we expect continued cooperation from Pakistan for
UNSC designations and the implementation of sanctions against
those already so designated.
Fourth, we will continue our conversations with the
Government of Pakistan on how to further strengthen Pakistani
banking supervision and regulation, particularly in the border
areas.
Fifth, in addition to the greater cooperation between
Afghanistan and Pakistan noted above, we will support efforts
at regional cooperation, including through the Istanbul
process, where the governments of the region are looking at
potential cooperation in a broad range of areas.
Sixth, we will continue to focus on what Pakistani
industry, including fertilizer and commercial explosive
manufacturers, are doing to protect against diversion. JIEDDO
has made its significant expertise available to increase the
fertilizer industry's awareness of the misuse and to encourage
greater end use controls and other measures to diminish the
utility of their product for illicit purposes.
Despite increased cooperation and emphasis by both the
Governments of Pakistan and Afghanistan and our own sustained,
concerted efforts, IEDs remain a principal threat to the
security forces and civilian populations of both countries.
This is not likely to diminish in 2013 and will require the
continuation of robust counter-IED programs and adroit
diplomacy.
Mr. Chairman, we look forward to continuing to work with
you, your office, and this committee on this important issue in
the months ahead and I look forward to taking your questions
today.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carpenter follows:]
Prepared Statement Senior Economic Adviser Jonathan Carpenter
Thank you, Senator Casey, for the invitation to appear before the
subcommittee.
On behalf of Secretary Clinton and Ambassador Grossman, the
Department appreciates the helpful role that the subcommittee has
played in drawing attention to important issues in South and Central
Asia, and particularly your leadership in seeking solutions to the
lethal problem of improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. Your previous
travel to the region and your continuing conversations with Pakistani
officials are important signals of congressional attention to this
matter.
Secretary Clinton has consistently emphasized the importance of
decisive action against the IED threat in her conversations with senior
Pakistani officials the past few years, as she did again last week in
Brussels with Foreign Minister Khar. Ambassador Olson has also
emphasized counter-IED efforts in his initial calls with Pakistani
officials in Islamabad, noting the deep concern expressed by this
committee and the need for impactful action.
Over the past 2 years, we have worked aggressively to deepen our
interagency cooperation to combat the IED assembly line, and so I am
honored to be sitting alongside LTG Barbero of the Joint Improvised
Explosive Device Defeat Organization, or JIEDDO, with whom the Office
of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan has had the
pleasure to work closely on behalf of our forces in the field.
This hearing, and its focus on the role that terrorist networks
play in the proliferation of these weapons, is critically important.
These devices are supplied through a complex, global network of both
legal and illegal activities into Afghanistan from neighboring
countries, including Pakistan.
As we have better understood how we might disrupt the flow of the
material and financial resources that go into the making of these
bombs, we have increasingly focused on how to disrupt and degrade the
network at multiple nodes. It is not enough to single out a lone
precursor chemical or a single individual. These transnational networks
are too resilient and diverse for that approach. We must use all the
tools available to us and partner with those who share our interest in
stopping these supply chains, and build capacity for further action.
As you know, IEDs are responsible for the majority of coalition
fatalities in Afghanistan. IEDs are also responsible for significant
death and injury among Afghan civilians, government, and security
officials. The police chief for Nimroz province was killed by a
roadside bomb on Monday morning of this week. I would emphasize that as
the transition to full Afghan security responsibility continues, this
threat will continue, and we have a clear interest in ensuring that the
Afghan Government and security personnel are able to protect themselves
and their people from these devices.
It is important to recognize the work being done by Afghanistan,
with our support, to address the threat of IEDs and prepare for the
full transition of security responsibilities by the end of 2014. In
June of this year, President Karzai signed a National CIED strategy.
Since then, the working groups for the five pillars of that strategy
(Security, Rule of Law, Diplomatic Engagement, Governance & Engagement,
and Public Awareness) have met and are developing engagement plans.
Alongside the training and equipping of the Afghan National Security
Forces, U.S. mission personnel in Kabul are working closely to support
border capacity, rule of law, and other essential components of a
comprehensive national effort. Afghan officials deserve credit for
increasing numbers of seizures of IED making material.
What is also clear is that the IED is an increasing threat to
Pakistani law enforcement, security, and civilian personnel. Suicide
bombers killed six people at a police station in North Waziristan on
Monday of this week. IEDs are a threat to the stability of Pakistan,
and we have an interest in helping the Government of Pakistan meet this
challenge. It is on this basis, of a common understanding of a shared
threat, that we believe the best prospects for cooperative, meaningful
action exist.
ENGAGING THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN
As we have worked to address the supply chains that bring lethal
aid into Afghanistan, we were constrained by the overall U.S.-Pakistan
relationship in 2011. It is well documented that 2011 was a difficult
year in the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. While we continued to assert
the need for aggressive action against the IED supply chain in
conversations with Pakistani officials during that time, it was
difficult to make progress on this front absent progress on the broader
bilateral relationship.
Following the opening of the Ground Lines of Communication (GLOCs)
into Afghanistan in July of this year, the United States and Pakistan
agreed to restart a limited number of suspended working groups. We
prioritized groups where our core interests were at stake, and where we
saw potential shared interests with the Government of Pakistan.
Counter-IED efforts were identified as a top priority, and the
first working group to meet following the opening of the GLOCs was a
Law Enforcement and Counter Terrorism Working Group, on October 5 in
Washington, focused on IEDs. We appreciate that Pakistan's Interior
Minister, Rehman Malik, made the trip to cochair the meeting with
Assistant Secretary of State William Brownfield. The working group
identified near-term, specific actions for each side, on which we could
measure progress in a limited window of time. One recommendation called
for closer Afghan-Pakistani cooperation on the CIED issue; and I am
pleased that a tripartite meeting of U.S., Pakistani, and Afghan
officials, met just over a month later.
The Pakistani Government repeatedly emphasizes the threat IEDs pose
inside Pakistan, and there is increasing public acknowledgement of the
threat posed by shipments that are smuggled across the too-porous
Afghanistan-Pakistan border. In the recently concluded Defense
Consultative Group meeting, in Islamabad earlier this month, the
Pakistanis produced a comprehensive review of the threat IEDs pose to
their interests, as well as actions that they have taken to attack
networks that supply these devices. We believe it is imperative to
build on this shared understanding to overcome differences and
mistrust, and find meaningful ways to lower the risk to our personnel
in Afghanistan.
IED PRECURSORS
To attack these networks, we believe it is important that we look
at the entire supply chain, including the full range of precursor
chemicals and other required IED components. There has, and must
continue to be, a great deal of attention paid to Calcium Ammonium
Nitrate, or CAN, a fertilizer produced in Pakistan and used legally for
agricultural purposes in Pakistan. Afghanistan, as this committee
knows, outlawed CAN in January 2010. However, CAN continues to be
smuggled into Afghanistan across the border in large quantities, and
homemade explosives based on CAN remain the most frequently deployed
charge in Afghanistan.
We now also have better understanding of the role played by
potassium chlorate, which is not produced in but is transshipped
through Pakistan and possibly Afghanistan's other neighbors, and is
increasingly found as the main charge in IEDs in Afghanistan's Eastern
provinces. Potassium chlorate is a legal product in Pakistan, and has
numerous valuable commercial uses. We begun discussions with suppliers
and the Government of Pakistan to address vulnerabilities in the supply
chain and ensure appropriate end-user verification for shipments of
potassium chlorate.
Similarly, conventional explosives and certain electronic
components are critical to the construction and deployment of IEDs. We
must continue to identify how and where these materials are diverted
out of legal supply chains and into illicit networks.
U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIONS
The United States has taken a number of steps to advance our CIED
objectives. We have completed a public awareness campaign inside
Pakistan, designed to heighten public knowledge of the threat posed by
IEDs and the terrorists who deploy them, and we are working with the
Government of Pakistan on the next stage of that campaign. One of the
issues discussed at the recent Law Enforcement Working Group was
support for Pakistan launching a national CIED tip line, as a tangible
recognition of the national threat these devices pose, and we look
forward to helping the Government of Pakistan implement that effort.
Through close interagency cooperation, we have pursued designation
of key individuals in the network, under U.S. law as well as through
the U.N. Security Council. In 2012, Treasury has designated pursuant to
Executive Order 13224 on terrorism two individuals, Abdul Samad
Achekzai and Maulawi Adam Khan Achekzai, for their role in facilitating
Taliban IEDs. Samad was also designated by the U.N. Security Council's
1988 Committee. It is important to note that in 2012 and 2013 Pakistan
serves as an elected member of the Security Council, and therefore
agreed to these designations. In all, Treasury has designated 15
individuals and three hawalas associated with the Taliban and six
Haqqani Network (HQN) officials pursuant to E.O. 13224; and one Taliban
Commander pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act.
We have coordinated closely with our international partners in
Afghanistan, including the U.K. and Australia, who are also engaging
the Pakistani Government on these issues and are providing critical
capacity building support. Our partnership with allies emphasizes
complementarities and seeks to leverage different relationships.
We have also continued to support international efforts to address
the threat in the region. The State Department has worked cooperatively
with the Department of Homeland Security to support and fund the World
Customs Organization's Project Global Shield. This program brings
together the expertise of the World Customs Organization, Interpol, and
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime to monitor the trade flows
of 14 precursor chemicals, including ammonium nitrate.
Project Global Shield is in an international effort to raise
awareness of the lethal effects of diverted trade flows and improve the
ability of customs and border officials in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
the Central Asian states to identify and seize the precursor chemicals
smuggled across the borders and used in the manufacture of IEDs. As a
measure of international attention on this growing threat, 93 of the
WCO's 178 member states are now participating in Project Global Shield.
This collaborative effort has resulted in 49 seizures of IED
precursors, including more than 140 metric tons of seized CAN, and 42
law enforcement actions.
TRANSLATING COMMITMENTS INTO ACTION
Overall, it must be said that Pakistan's efforts to combat IEDs,
while now going in a constructive direction, remain incomplete. The
strategy that was discussed here in this committee more than 2 years
ago has not been fully implemented, nor incorporated into legislation.
In some cases, there have been notable regulatory changes, though
enforcement remains inconsistent, at best. There are, as the Pakistanis
point out, good reasons for this--particularly a lack of capacity,
equipment, and training. We continue to work with the Government of
Pakistan on ways in which we can remove obstacles to implementation.
In recent months, we believe there has been a substantive change in
the tone and content of the discussion with Pakistan as we work to put
our relationship on surer footing. There have been noticeable and
tangible steps forward. There is now a readiness to engage at many
different levels, both in military and civilian channels, and the
Pakistanis have taken several important steps over the last year,
including:
--The Government of Pakistan has assisted, through the U.N. Security
Council, in the designation of key IED facilitators.
--Over the past year, the Pakistani military has conducted eight
operations against suspected IED manufacturing facilities along the
border. There have been notable seizures of IED precursors in at
least January, May, and December of this year.
--Embassy Islamabad reports greater cooperation with Pakistani law
enforcement counterparts in the field and increased information
sharing, including regular meetings of action officers to
coordinate CIED efforts.
We strongly support these and other steps and will evaluate their
effectiveness based on whether they contribute to diminishing the
threat in the field.
CIED SUPPORT
We are prepared to use the resources made available by Congress to
help the Pakistanis address the IED problem. In response to challenges
of the last year, we calibrated our security assistance, slowing
execution. Since 2009, State and DOD provided approximately $113
million in Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund (PCCF) and
Pakistan Counterinsurgency Funds (PCF) to support Pakistan's CIED
efforts, including for forensic and detection kits, jammers, and mine
resistant vehicles. Some of these items are pending delivery, as we
work with Pakistan to identify appropriate units, consistent with our
assistance requirements.
In the wake of the Defense Consultative Group (DCG) meeting last
week, we anticipate that the time required for delivery of security
assistance, including CIED equipment, for Pakistan will improve. The
Pakistanis emphasized at the DCG their priority for CIED force
protection equipment. Subject to congressional notification, we
anticipate using approximately $135 million from the fiscal year 2012
PCCF appropriation to support CIED efforts in Pakistan. Such an outlay
would represent a significant portion of the overall PCCF budget.
Consistent with the legislative language included in the Fiscal
Year 2012 State Appropriations, the Department has also worked closely
with the Department of Agriculture to expand certain Agriculture
Extension programs related to soil fertility in Pakistan. These
programs are run extensively here in the United States, and elsewhere
around the world, to teach farmers proper soil management, improve crop
yield, and decrease reliance on fertilizers.
We are using all of our available and significant resources to
address the IED problem, but appreciate Congress' support to provide
flexibility in all assistance flows in support of this effort.
PRIORITY ACTIONS
The consensus of key stakeholders that look at this very difficult
challenge is that we must continue to assertively press the Pakistani
Government to act, on the basis of an increasing understanding of a
common threat. We must test the positive change to the relationship in
recent months, as we press for action to defeat the network. It is also
our belief that sustained administration and congressional attention on
this matter has made a difference in the Pakistanis' approach. We will
continue to press for specific and continuing progress in a few key
areas.
--First, we will support joint Afghan-Pakistani initiatives,
particularly at the border and with an emphasis on interdiction. As
demonstrated by the recent tripartite meeting, the United States
has the ability to facilitate information-sharing between the
parties. At the same time, we believe it is important that these
meetings include civilian personnel from all sides, to ensure
whole-of-government efforts.
--We believe it is important that the Pakistanis prosecute individuals
for IED related activities. We note that there have been a number
of important arrests in recent months, but we support Pakistan's
efforts to seek prosecutions in these cases.
--We expect continued cooperation from Pakistan for UNSC designations
against those involved in supporting the insurgency in Afghanistan,
and we would expect a full conversation with the Government of
Pakistan regarding implementation of U.N. sanctions against those
already designated.
--We will continue our conversations on how to further strengthen
Pakistani banking supervision and regulation, particularly in the
border areas.
--In addition to the greater Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation noted
above, we have supported efforts at regional cooperation, including
the Istanbul Process, where the governments of the region are
looking at potential cooperation in a broad range of areas. This
regionally led initiative provides a vehicle for a truly regional
conversation, something for which the Government of Pakistan has
called.
--And we will continue to broaden the dialogue beyond governments. We
applaud Pakistani private sector interest in engagement with
industry organizations and international associations for the
purpose of learning and implementing best practices, including in
supply-chain management. As global awareness of the IED threat
deepens, there will be focus on what Pakistani industry, including
fertilizer and commercial explosives manufacturers, are doing to
protect against diversion. JIEDDO has made its significant
expertise available to increase the fertilizer industry's awareness
of the misuse and to encourage greater end-use controls and other
measures to diminish the utility of their product for illicit
purposes.
Despite increased cooperation and emphasis by both the Governments
of Pakistan and Afghanistan, and our own sustained, concerted efforts,
IEDs remain a principle threat to the security forces and the civilian
populations of both countries. This is not likely to diminish in 2013
and will require the continuation of robust counter-IED programs and
adroit diplomacy.
Mr. Chairman, we look forward to continuing to work with you, your
office and this committee on the important issue in the months ahead.
And I look forward to taking your questions today. Thank you.
Senator Casey. Thank you very much, Mr. Carpenter. I
appreciate that.
Just for the record, I know that I was in my opening using
acronyms without spelling them out. That's probably not a good
idea. For those who are listening and may not know these
acronyms, when we refer to ``JIEDDO'' we're of course referring
to the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, a
long-winded terminology, but that's why we need the acronym.
Of course, when we talk about Mr. Carpenter's duties, when
we say ``SRAP'' we mean Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan.
General, I'm going to start with you with regard to the
private sector part of this in Pakistan. You highlighted this.
We all have in one way or another, but the fact that you've got
a small number of producers, in essence producers of
fertilizer, in Pakistan, a small portion of their production is
enough to make thousands and thousands of IEDs. I know you've
engaged with the leadership of these organizations and we
appreciate that because that's critically important.
To be honest about it, it's an uneven record of cooperation
in terms of these companies' efforts to engage with the
international community in terms of stemming the flow of
calcium ammonium nitrate into Afghanistan. I wanted to see if
you could provide--
I know you referred to it earlier, but maybe a couple of
minutes and just kind of a report on where things stand as you
see it as it relates to the engagement between the Pakistani
Government and these private sector entities, and of course our
engagement and your engagement, with these companies?
General Barbero. Yes, Senator. I met with the leader of the
Fatima Group last year in my office. Since that time, all
direct contact with them we've been informed must go through
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Pakistan. So I've not had
direct contact with them for over a year since last September.
But at that time we requested the actions that I indicated,
specifically find a way to dye this material so border guards
on both sides or soldiers can look at something and determine
that it is either the residue or the ammonium nitrate. Right
now it is a nondescript, milky white substance, which is often
repackaged as detergent, so how can you tell the difference in
what it is? So we requested that.
We requested some sort of education plan with their over
1,500 distributors about what to look for as far as misuse of
this product. The third step we asked was: let's study how to
reformulate this. This is difficult, but to be an industry
leader, and specifically with this problem, can we put the
scientists, see how we can reformulate so it's either harder or
impossible to turn into a detonable material?
Then the last step is let us put some effective tracking
and control measures on the flow of this material from the
factories. Two factories in Pakistan each produce about 400,000
metric tons of this a year. But as I said, it's illegal in
Afghanistan, but it still makes its way there.
So I have not had direct engagement. We have asked this. We
have been told ``no'' on the dye unless there is an
industrywide solution to this. On the positive side, the
international fertilizer
associations and organizations are very supportive.
They have organized a product security work group. They
have had one meeting. They are having another meeting in
January in Washington to come up with an action plan to see how
they can execute these four measures. So they are moving out.
Unfortunately, I have heard of no progress or minimal
progress from the leaders of Fatima Group.
Senator Casey. Look. To be skeptical--it is part of my job
to be skeptical. It is part of your job as well. But I am
assuming that--and I will ask you to confirm this--when you got
word that all of your communications had to be routed through
and handled by their foreign ministry, I am assuming that you
did not take that as a good sign?
General Barbero. I do not, and we have requested subsequent
meetings and they have not occurred.
Senator Casey. So not even meetings?
General Barbero. I have had one meeting with a member of
the Fatima Group. He came here in September after an article
appeared in the Washington Post asking. We had a good exchange
of ideas. But that's been the only one in 14 months.
Senator Casey. I want to give even for a couple of minutes
the benefit of the doubt to the Pakistani Government.
It often happens in Washington where you're trying to
communicate with an agency and they say, you can't communicate
this way, you have to go through some other office. We get
skeptical when that happens in our domestic policy.
To give you a sense of why I'm skeptical, in light of the
track record here of not implementing a strategy that they
developed, not having the kind of cooperation that we would
expect. When that is the predicate to an action where they have
you communicating more indirectly and then, to add insult to
injury, having difficulty holding even a meeting or meetings,
I'm a little more than skeptical. So we will just put that on
the record.
General, I know you had testimony in the House Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee on September 20. You discussed
efforts to urge the--and you referred to this here--the
International Fertilizer Association to commit to countering
the illicit use of fertilizer. Can you give us a little better
sense of that in terms of where that stands and how the Senate
could encourage a constructive approach to the industry
globally?
General Barbero. Well, I believe calcium ammonium nitrate
is a global issue. We have tragic experience with it here--
Oklahoma City, the first World Trade Tower attack, on and on,
the failed attack in Time Square 2 years ago by the Pathfinder
that was
loaded with ammonium nitrate. It continues to be used
worldwide--Oslo last summer, Mumbai. It is a ubiquitous
fertilizer around the world and easily, readily available, very
cheap. A bag of it for about $50 you can turn into $6 to $8
very effective IEDs.
So we have met with the leadership from the major
fertilizer organizations and explained this issue to them and,
to their credit, they have been very receptive and have taken
this on and, as I said, formed a product security work group to
develop a plan of action on the four initiatives that we have
asked. They have been very receptive. They have had meetings
and we expect out of this next meeting in January here they
will develop an action plan with a time line to pursue these.
So I am very encouraged by the positive response from these
organizations. I think as we engage with them, just to
encourage continued development, especially tracking and
securing of their products, that is the first step that they
can put in, which I think many of them are doing voluntarily.
That is the most immediate effect that they can have.
Senator Casey. I want to ask you about the transition,
which we are concerned about more broadly, but especially the
impact of the transition on this issue. But a couple of points
I want to make sure I put on the record. I know in your
testimony there is some of this already.
Is it accurate to say that over the last several years, say
the last three, that the number of what are described as
events, where there is an IED that detonates--let me just get
that right. You would consider that an event?
General Barbero. Senator, that is an event when we find an
IED----
Senator Casey. Or find one.
General Barbero [continuing]. Or it is detonated safely, we
find and clear it or it detonates without injuries. Those are
all IED events, so we can understand the scale of the problem.
Senator Casey. So the number of events has increased, which
would lead you to believe logically there is more of a flow, to
use my words. But at the same time, the number of events is
growing, which is bad news. The good news is we are doing a
much better job of finding, detecting, and also protecting our
soldiers when there is an explosion.
Can you walk through some of those numbers just so people
have a broad sense of the figures here?
General Barbero. I can. First of all, to the metric that is
our golden metric, what we call an effective attack, that
produces a wounded-in-action or a killed-in-action. That has
been cut in half and has been steadily dropping the last 29
months. I attribute that to a couple of factors: better
training back here by our troopers; obviously equipping, the
surge of equipment from handheld devices to undergarments to
sensors to dogs has had an impact. Also, Senator, I would say
the improved performance of the Afghan forces. We find when we
are partnered with Afghan forces our find-and-cleared rates go
up and the effective attacks go down. They are better,
obviously, at interacting with the population.
So the most important metric is a reduction in casualties.
I would tell you the number of IED events from last year, 2011,
was an all-time high. June 2012, this past summer, was the
highest monthly total. But 2012 compared to 2011, the number of
IED events is down 12 to 15 percent. Casualties are down 40
percent. So those are I think the important measures.
The problem is still here with numbers of IEDs. However,
our troopers have been more effective in dealing with them and
reducing the casualties.
Senator Casey. Obviously, when we say casualties--killed or
injured.
General Barbero. Killed or wounded in action; yes.
Senator Casey. Killed or wounded in action. And that number
in 2011 was a little more than 1,900, 1,938, or something like
that?
General Barbero. I can give you the specific numbers here.
Senator Casey. And this year, 2012, we are on track to
matching that or coming close. We are above 1,800?
General Barbero. We are, and we will be a little below. I
think we are about 12 to 18 percent below numbers of IEDs, raw
numbers of IED events, compared to last year, which was the
highest year ever.
Senator Casey. Before I go to Mr. Carpenter--I know we are
short on time because we have a closed session, and I am
probably asking too many questions. You can tell I have got a
couple here.
With regard to the strategy we are trying to employ during
the transition, and to achieve some success in bringing those
numbers down that you just cited, what is your greatest concern
about the transition, the drawdown of our forces?
General Barbero. My greatest concern is I believe our
troops could be more vulnerable to these IEDs. Right now and in
the past, when you have a large number of troops and boots on
the ground, you are out there operating among the population,
your situational awareness, your intelligence, your
understanding of what is happening, who is who, what is the
threat, is very high.
As we reduce numbers and transition to the Afghan forces in
the lead, the fidelity that we have of these incidents, what
type of weapons is dropping, their reporting is not as rigorous
as ours. So I am concerned that--and we saw this in Iraq. As we
drew down numbers of forces, your situational awareness drops
and, frankly, your movements on the roads become more
predictable. You are not operating within this large bubble or
large presence.
So to sum up, I believe the IED will continue to be the
weapon of choice against our forces and we must remain vigilant
for future capabilities and emerging tactics, techniques, or
procedures that could be used against our troops.
Senator Casey. When I was last in Afghanistan, in August
2011, the four of us--Senator Whitehouse, Senator Blumenthal,
and Senator Bennet--had a great briefing. This briefing was
really an on-the-ground briefing of all the ways that our Armed
Forces and the scientists and the technology research that
backs it up, are detecting and dealing with this problem.
I was struck by the great old American ingenuity, the
remarkable technology. But it ran the gamut from the most
rudimentary kind where they would have--if there was a fuse
hidden in the dirt, they would use like a long extension pole
with a little hook on it and they would just drag it along, and
when they would hit the wire, so to speak, it would tell them
where they were. That was rudimentary. Then all the way to the
more sophisticated technology that we have.
The undergarments for the soldiers that are now being
produced, thank goodness. I was struck by all the ways and all
the research and effort that it is taken to protect our troops.
I juxtapose that effort by our government, our military, our
scientists here, with what I hope the Pakistanis put a better
effort forth on. They just do not seem to be as committed.
The other thing which struck me was the power of these
explosions. They told us at one point at the very end of our
briefing--we were about 100 yards or more, maybe 150 yards away
from a demonstration. They warned us, they said: We are going
to have an explosion. They told us the explosion was about, if
my memory serves me, about one-third or one-fifth of the
typical explosion that a soldier would feel. Again, we were
really far away. When they detonated the device, it was
stunning. That was a small explosion, a really low-intensity
explosion, and it was horrific to hear the sound of that and
feel the shock of it even that far away.
So I just cannot imagine what these two soldiers and
thousands like them have been through when they get exposed to
that kind of explosion.
Mr. Carpenter, I wanted to ask you--I know we are really
short on time; in fact, I am over time, but that happens--about
the border. The Pentagon section 1230 report cites an early
August 2012 interdiction of 46,200 pounds of ammonium nitrate
concealed in a truck at the Torkham Gate, the border crossing.
Afghan customs police, who are provided a scanner by the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, were responsible for this
interdiction, thank goodness.
This kind of success should be replicated on the Pakistani
side of the border. Going back many, many months now, I
discussed this with Ambassador Rehman, who was open to more
cooperation on border security.
Do you know, if you can answer this, what we are doing to
improve the capacity of Pakistani border personnel to identify
and interdict illicit material passing through border
crossings, whether it is at the Torkham Gate or others? And
what are the obstacles to more cooperation? Because this border
question is at the heart of the problem. In fact, when Foreign
Minister Khar, who is a very impressive, brilliant individual,
came to the Foreign Relations Committee to have a kind of a
conversation with members of the committee, I was pressing her
on this border question. I just want to give you an
opportunity, if you can, to kind of walk through what, if any,
progress we have made on the border and the cooperation between
us and the Pakistanis?
Mr. Carpenter. Thank you, Senator, yes. First, I would
reference in my testimony the defense consultative group that
met recently and really restarted the conversation on security
assistance that, as I said, during this period of constrained
relations in 2011 we had sort of slowed the execution on the
disbursement of that. As such, part of their specific request
to us was for both force protection and some CIED detection
capabilities. Now we are working through that request.
As I said to you, we believe that we will have significant
funds available out of fiscal year 2012 appropriations to put
toward this request.
I would note that the border was a clear focus of the law
enforcement working group that we had here with Minister Malik.
One of the things that he stressed and that we have seized upon
is a desire for closer cooperation with the Afghans. We think
that this is a very important vehicle to pursue moving forward.
So shortly after that, that working group meeting, there was a
tripartite meeting. This is members of ISAF, the coalition, the
military coalition in Afghanistan, Afghan military, and
Pakistan military, joined, importantly, by Pakistan interior
ministry representatives. They met as a tripartite and had a
productive, by their own accounts, a productive discussion
about how to move these issues forward.
We think pushing down this line of attack is a very
important one to close that gap. So to your point, we think
there is more that we can do in terms of building capacity at
these borders. We work closely with partners on this--the
United Kingdom, some of the U.N. agencies, have training
programs that we engage with on the ground in Islamabad in
support, and we look to do more on that. So I hope that begins
to address your question, sir.
Senator Casey. Maybe when we have a bit more time we can
pursue it further. I would hope that, in light of all the great
work that our government has done, whether it is the Department
of Defense, the State Department, the administration, the work
that the Congress is doing on this, I would hope, though, that
in light of the exasperation we feel, the frustration we feel,
and in light of the horror this is causing to our troops, I
would hope that coming out of that October engagement that we
have benchmarks or measuring tools to assess what they have
done since that.
I was encouraged by the October meeting and that
engagement. However, it is month after month now, year after
year, of leaders in Pakistan promising, shaking their head when
I raise it, shaking their head when others raise it, saying: We
understand, we understand; we are going to do something. And
then the results aren not nearly what we would expect.
So I would hope that you have a way of measuring and
assessing this in a matter of weeks and months instead of
waiting a long time to assess what they are doing. I do not
know if you want to comment on that.
Mr. Carpenter. If I might, sir, I think that is exactly at
the heart of the problem here. Foreign Minister Carr when she
was here, I believe in September, made reference to something
like 53,000 people crossing that border on a daily basis. So
this is exactly the problem. And when you hear in our testimony
a description of the flow across the border, what you do not
hear is specific statistics of that flow. We have indications
on either side of the movement of these materials, so we have
evidence and can come to conclusions about the flow, but we do
not actually have great fidelity on exactly how much. This is
on a given day and what route is taken.
I think that is one of the really important things that
General Barbero and this sort of greater interagency
cooperation that we have talked about, particularly the
intelligence community, has been focused upon: How do we have
better fidelity on these networks; how do we understand them;
how do we understand the transition from legal commerce--which
is what you were discussing when you talk about the Fatima
Group and others, which are legal businesses--to this illicit
trade that ends up doing so much damage on the other side of
the border?
So you are exactly right, that is the task that we put to
Minister Malik, and there are significant indications, again
particularly in this discussion and this willingness to do
information-sharing both with us as well as between the Afghans
and the Pakistanis, to see some demonstrable progress on this
in terms of interdictions, in addition to the interdictions
that you referenced and I referenced in my testimony, sir.
Senator Casey. I know we are pretty much out of time, but I
know that Members of Congress have an obligation to be
constructive, have an obligation to try to undertake efforts
that will lead to a better relationship between our two
countries, our two governments, and our sharing of information
and cooperation.
We also have an obligation to these troops and their
families and taxpayers to make sure that we have measures in
place to hold the Pakistanis accountable for their promises. So
I am going to do my best to try to continue to be constructive,
but I am also going to be, as we all must be, vigilant and
determined to get results, not just promises.
I know we are out of time, but I am grateful that both of
you are here. I appreciate your testimony. But more important,
we appreciate the work you are doing on this important issue.
We had to move locations, but now we will go to a closed
setting. Let me say something before we conclude. I do not get
a chance to do this nearly enough. In addition to thanking the
Foreign Relations staff for moving us here and helping us, I
want to commend my staff: Damian Murphy, who has done great
work on this for years now, work helping us to track this issue
and to be as constructive and helpful as we can be. Next to
him, Chloe Bowser, who is leaving our staff, but has done great
work on this and many other issues as a member of our Foreign
Relations staff. She will be leaving, but we are grateful for
her good work and for the work that she did in particular on
these issues.
So I think we will adjourn for now and go to closed
session.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:29 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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