[Senate Hearing 112-639]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-639
HOMELAND THREATS AND AGENCY RESPONSES
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 19, 2012
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
76-070 WASHINGTON : 2012
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the
GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office.
Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JON TESTER, Montana RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MARK BEGICH, Alaska JERRY MORAN, Kansas
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Christian J. Beckner, Associate Staff Director for Homeland Security
Prevention and Protection
Nicole M. Martinez, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas A. Rossi, Minority Staff Director
Ryan M. Kaldahl, Minority Director of Homeland Security Policy
Marshall C. Erwin, Minority Professional Staff Member
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Patricia R. Hogan, Publications Clerk
Laura W. Kilbride, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1
Senator Collins.............................................. 4
Senator Moran................................................ 19
Senator Akaka................................................ 21
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 31
Senator Collins.............................................. 34
Senator Akaka................................................ 36
Senator Carper............................................... 37
Senator Moran................................................ 38
WITNESSES
Wednesday, September 19, 2012
Hon. Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 6
Hon. Matthew G. Olsen, Director, National Counterterrorism
Center, Office of the Director of National Intelligence........ 9
Kevin L. Perkins, Associate Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, on behalf of the
Hon. Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice...................... 12
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Napolitano, Hon. Janet:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 40
Olsen, Hon. Matthew G.:
Testimony.................................................... 9
Prepared statement........................................... 61
Perkins, Kevin L.:
Testimony.................................................... 12
Prepared statement........................................... 73
APPENDIX
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record:
Secretary Napolitano......................................... 82
Mr. Olsen.................................................... 104
HOMELAND THREATS AND AGENCY RESPONSES
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, Pryor, Collins,
and Moran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order. Good
morning to all. This is our Committee's annual homeland threat
assessment hearing. I want to welcome back Janet Napolitano,
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and
Matt Olsen, the Director of the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC); and welcome the Associate Deputy Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Kevin Perkins, who is
standing in for Director Robert Mueller today. The Director had
to undergo an unexpected surgical procedure resulting from
complications associated with a recent dental treatment so he
is unable to join us today. But we welcome Mr. Perkins in his
stead with confidence, and we extend best regards to the
Director for a speedy recovery.
This will be the final time that I have the privilege of
chairing this annual hearing, so I want to use this opportunity
to thank each of you for your leadership in our Nation's
homeland security and counterterrorism efforts; to thank those
who work with you in each of your departments or agencies; and
more narrowly to thank you for the productive relationship that
each of you and your predecessors have had with this Committee.
The obvious fact, as I look at the three of you, and then
look back, is that on September 11, 2001 (9/11), two of the
three organizations testifying today did not exist, and the
third, the FBI, was a very different organization than it is
today, focused on domestic crime as it had been for quite a
while.
Obviously, in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on
America of September 11, 2001, Congress and the Executive
Branch created the Department of Homeland Security and then,
pursuant to the 9/11 Commission recommendations, created the
National Counterterrorism Center. The FBI essentially re-
created itself into a first-rate domestic counterterrorism
intelligence agency, in addition to carrying out all of its
other responsibilities. And in his absence, we should thank
Director Mueller for what I think is the extraordinary job he
has done in overseeing this historic transformation and thank
the two of you, Secretary Napolitano and Director Olsen, for
what you have done.
Together these changes represent the most significant
reforms of America's national security organization since the
1940s at the beginning of the Cold War. And it is not
coincidental since after 9/11 we understood that we were
facing a very different threat to our national security and
with an intensity that we had not experienced through most of
American history, a very real threat to our homeland security.
So as I look back, I really want to again thank you and
your predecessors in each of these roles--although in the FBI,
Director Mueller has pretty much been there the whole time--and
the thousands of Federal employees who work under you, because
I think without question, because of all that the three
organizations represented here before us have done, the
American people have been much safer here at home than we
otherwise would have been if your agency had not existed. So
with a lot of gratitude, I thank you for that remarkable
transformation. We have made a lot of progress; we have kept
the enemy away for most of the last 11 years.
The most lethal threats or attacks on our homeland have
actually been carried out, as we know, by homegrown terrorists:
Nidal Malik Hasan at Fort Hood and Carlos Bledsoe at the Army
recruiting station in Little Rock. But the battle goes on, and
it is hard to reach a conclusion other than it will go on for a
long time.
Obviously, we hold this hearing today still mourning the
deaths of the American Ambassador to Libya, Chris Stevens, and
three other State Department personnel, still, speaking
personally, infuriated by those attacks that resulted from a
movement against--which I believe to be a terrorist act--our
consulate in Benghazi on the 11th anniversary of the attacks of
September 11, 2001.
These attacks do many things, but they remind us, I think,
first of the bravery and commitment of government officials who
serve in countries around the world, supporting the struggles
of people in those countries to live free and, by doing so,
work to improve our own national security.
The attack in Libya also reminds us that even though the
core of al-Qaeda has been seriously weakened, we still face
threats from an evolving and fractious set of terrorist groups
and individuals, united by a common ideology, which is that of
violent Islamist extremism. And I will have some questions to
ask the three of you about the nature of the terrorist threat
today and specifically with regard to the reaction to this
film, whether you think it has raised the threat level against
any places, institutions, or individuals here in the United
States.
In reporting to us on the terrorist threat to the homeland
today, I also hope you will address other concerns, such as the
effort to counter homegrown violent Islamist groups; the threat
to our homeland and people in a different way over the last
couple of years posed by Islamic Republic of Iran, its Iranian
Guard corps, and the Quds force, part of it, and its proxy
groups such as Hezbollah, which certainly seem to be reaching
outside of their normal areas of operation in the Middle East
and conducting attacks elsewhere. These include an attempted
assassination, which was thwarted, of the Saudi ambassador here
in Washington, and apparently the attack on a tourist bus in
Bulgaria just a short while ago.
I would like to just say a few words about cybersecurity,
which has been a significant focus of this Committee this year.
We know how serious the problem is. Enormous amounts of cyber
espionage and cyber theft are going on, and there is increasing
danger of a cyber attack. As you know, the Cybersecurity Act of
2012, which was the compromise bipartisan legislation that made
it to the Senate floor, has had problems getting enough votes
to get taken up on the Senate floor. We worked for years with
partners on both sides of the aisle. We had extensive
consultations with private industry, and, of course, we went to
substantial lengths to find common ground, including by making
the standards voluntary and not mandatory for the private
sector owners of cyber infrastructure.
But despite the magnitude of the threat as recognized by
national security leaders and experts from the last two
Administrations, regardless of party, and the many compromises
that were made, the bill was filibustered on the Senate floor
last month so it could not come up. Thus was lost the best
opportunity we have had to pass comprehensive cybersecurity
legislation. And, of course, all of you have said, Director
Mueller perhaps most memorably, that, in his opinion, the
threat of cyber attack will soon replace the threat of terror
attack as a danger for our homeland security.
I believe that it is obvious that we are not going to pass
the cybersecurity legislation before the election, and because
we are probably leaving here in the next couple of days to
return after the election, but I think it is still possible
and, I would add, critical for Congress to pass a cybersecurity
bill this session. And I certainly will continue to try to do
everything in my power to do so. But I must say if the gridlock
continues, as I fear it will, then the President and others in
the Executive Branch should really do everything within their
power, as I know they are considering actively now, to raise
our defenses against cyber attack and cyber theft.
The fact is that today, because of the inadequate defenses
of America's privately owned critical cyber infrastructure, we
are very vulnerable to a major cyber attack, perhaps a
catastrophic cyber attack, well beyond in its impact what we
suffered on September 11, 2001.
I understand that Executive action cannot do everything
legislation can to protect us from cyber attack, but it can do
a lot. And as this session of Congress concludes at the end of
this year, we have still failed to fix this problem and close
some of our vulnerabilities to cyber attack. And I certainly
hope the President will step in, along with you, Secretary
Napolitano, and act as strongly as you can to protect our
country. And I will be asking some questions of you when we get
to that point in the testimony.
So I thank you again for being here. I look forward to this
hearing every year. It is sometimes unsettling, but it is
really important as a report to both Congress and the American
people about the status of the current threat to our homeland.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Last week, we observed the 11th anniversary of the horrific
attacks of September 11, 2001. We again remembered the victims
and the heroes of that day. And we acknowledged the dedicated
military, intelligence, law enforcement, and homeland security
professionals who have worked together to bring terrorists to
justice and to prevent another large-scale attack within the
United States. And I want to join the Chairman in thanking each
of you for your hard work in that endeavor.
Tragically, however, we have also witnessed violent attacks
on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, that resulted in the
killings of our Ambassador and three other brave Americans.
While these attacks remain under investigation, it is difficult
not to see shades of the 1998 attacks on our embassies in Kenya
and Tanzania, which were among the many precursors to the
attacks of September 11, 2001. This tragedy once again
underscores the ongoing threat we face, both abroad and at
home, from violent Islamist extremists.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, we took significant
actions to address this threat. When Senator Lieberman and I
authored the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act
of 2004 (IRTPA), our aim was to improve coordination within the
intelligence community and among the key stakeholders at all
levels of government. Achieving the goals of this landmark law
remains a work in progress.
We know we face a determined enemy. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) has tried repeatedly to exploit holes in our
security. The failed 2009 Christmas Day bomber used a device
specifically designed to avoid detection. The 2010 cargo plot
sought to circumvent improvements in passenger screening by
targeting cargo. In May of this year, al-Qaeda tried again. The
bomb maker apparently sought to avoid the failures of the
earlier Christmas Day attack. Through the aggressive efforts of
our intelligence community, fortunately this plot was disrupted
before it could threaten American lives. Nevertheless, that
operation was also plagued by leaks--apparently from within the
Executive Branch--that may have undermined future efforts and
compromised sources.
Not every threat that we face has been met with sufficient
resolve and action. Perhaps the best example, which the
Chairman has mentioned, is the ever-increasing cyber threat.
Experts have repeatedly warned that the computer systems that
run our electric grids, our water plants, financial networks,
and transportation systems are vulnerable to a cyber attack
that could harm millions of Americans. In fact, rarely has
there been such a bipartisan consensus among experts that this
threat must be addressed.
Just last week, former Deputy Secretary of Defense John
Hamre said that the threats in cyberspace ``took a darker
turn'' this summer, as three very large corporations
experienced cyber attacks ``designed to damage operations.''
Citing government sources, he said that at least two of the
attacks may have come from Iran. China and Russia we know have
also launched cyber attacks.
To respond to this escalating threat, the Chairman and I
have worked during the past 2 years to craft a bipartisan bill
that relies on the expertise of government and the innovation
of the private sector. Despite our hard work to find common
ground, the Senate has failed to pass cybersecurity
legislation. Given the significant damage already done to our
economy and our security, as well as our clear vulnerability to
even worse attacks, this failure to act is inexcusable.
Former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff, and former National
Security Agency (NSA) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
chief Michael Hayden describe the urgency this way: ``We carry
the burden of knowing that 9/11 might have been averted with
the intelligence that existed at the time. We do not want to be
in the same position again when `cyber 9/11' hits. It is not a
question of `whether' this will happen; it is a question of
`when.' ''
This time all the dots have been connected. This time the
warnings are loud and clear, and this time we must heed them.
In contrast to the known threat of cyber attacks, another
persistent challenge we face comes from those threats that we
fail to even anticipate--what the 9/11 Commission memorably
referred to as ``a failure of imagination,'' the so-called
black swan events that test our assumptions. These are our most
vexing problems because we cannot simply build walls around
every potential target. Nevertheless, if we strengthen
information sharing and analytic capabilities, our law
enforcement and intelligence officers can disrupt even more
plots, whether they are ones that we know well are coming or
those that we have never before seen.
In my judgment, which is informed by numerous briefings and
discussions with experts, the attack in Benghazi was not a
``black swan'' but, rather, an attack that should have been
anticipated based on the previous attacks against western
targets, the proliferation of dangerous weapons in Libya, the
presence of al-Qaeda in that country, and the overall threat
environment.
Whatever the plots hatched by our enemies, I am also
concerned about vulnerabilities that stem from our own
government's actions or failure to act.
I have already noted what I believe to be the inexplicable
lack of security in Benghazi, the grave, self-inflicted wounds
from intelligence leaks, and the failure to enact a
cybersecurity bill. There is also a genuine danger posed by the
automatic, mindless cuts known as sequestration. Absent a
commitment by the President and Congress to avoid this
disastrous policy, the budget of every Federal agency
represented here today--the Department of Homeland Security,
the National Counterterrorism Center, and the FBI--the very
agencies charged with protecting our Nation from terrorism and
other disasters--will be slashed in an indiscriminate way, by 8
percent or more, potentially harming such vital programs as
border security, intelligence analysis, and the FBI's work.
At a time when budget constraints require everyone to
sacrifice and priorities to be set and waste to be eliminated,
we should ask where resources can be spent more effectively and
what tradeoffs should be made to balance the risk we face with
the security we can afford. What we cannot afford, however, is
to weaken a homeland security structure that is helping to
protect the citizens of this country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
Secretary Napolitano, thank you for being here, and we
would welcome your testimony at this time.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JANET NAPOLITANO,\1\ SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman,
Senator Collins, and Members of the Committee. And I would also
like to thank Associate Deputy Director Perkins and Director
Olsen for their partnership.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Secretary Napolitano appears in the
Appendix on page 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Chairman, this is my 17th appearance before you. It is
my 44th hearing overall since becoming Secretary of the
Department. I am grateful personally for this Committee's
tireless advocacy on behalf of DHS, not only during its initial
creation but in the time since. Senator, you have been one of
our strongest supporters, and our Nation's security has
benefited as a direct result. Thank you for all you have done
to make the country more secure.
Eleven years after the 9/11 attacks, America is stronger
and more secure, thanks to the work of the men and women of
DHS; our many Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, and
international partners; and Members of this Committee. And
while the United States has made significant progress since the
9/11 attacks, we know that threats from terrorists persist and
continually evolve. We face direct threats from al-Qaeda. We
face growing threats from other foreign-based terrorist groups
which are inspired by al-Qaeda ideology, such as AQAP and al-
Shabaab. And we must address threats that are homegrown as well
as those that originate abroad.
These threats are not limited to any one individual, group,
or ideology. And as we have seen, the tactics employed by
terrorists can be as simple as a homemade bomb or as
sophisticated as a biological threat or a coordinated cyber
attack.
While we deal with a number of threats and threat actors at
any given time, three areas merit special sustained attention.
The first is aviation. The Christmas Day 2009 plot, the October
2010 air cargo threat, and the AQAP plot earlier this year that
would have targeted a U.S.-bound airliner with explosives make
clear that commercial aviation remains a target. Terrorists,
especially AQAP, continue to seek ways to circumvent existing
security measures. Their methods and tactics are sometimes
ingenious and increasingly sophisticated.
A second threat area is cybersecurity, as both of you have
mentioned. Cyber threats and incidents have increased
significantly over the past decade. Our Nation confronts a
dangerous combination of known and unknown vulnerabilities in
cyberspace: Strong and rapidly expanding adversary
capabilities, and limited threat and vulnerability analysis and
awareness.
We are committed to working with the Congress to make sure
the Department and our Nation have the tools and authorities we
need to effectively confront threats to cyberspace, and that
includes minimum standards for our Nation's critical
infrastructure.
We remain hopeful that the Congress can pass strong
cybersecurity legislation, and I thank you, Chairman Lieberman
and Ranking Member Collins, for your leadership in this area.
The third area of growing concern is homegrown violent
extremism. Within the context of U.S.-based violent extremism,
we know that foreign terrorists groups affiliate with al-Qaeda
and individual extremists are actively seeking to recruit or
inspire westerners to carry out attacks against western and
United States targets. Importantly, however, as recent events
have demonstrated, we also know that violent extremism can be
inspired by various religious, political, or other ideological
beliefs. Moreover, the attack last week against the U.S.
consulate in Libya that took the life of Ambassador Stevens and
three other Americans, the terrorist attack in Bulgaria in
July, as well as this summer's shootings in Aurora, Colorado,
and Oak Creek, Wisconsin, demonstrate that we must remain
vigilant and prepared. And certainly our thoughts are with
those impacted by these senseless attacks.
How do we mitigate the threat? We mitigate these threats in
several ways. First and foremost, we have worked to build a
homeland security enterprise that allows DHS and our many
partners to detect threats earlier, to share information, to
minimize risks, and to maximize our ability to respond and
recover from attacks and disasters of all kinds.
With respect to the aviation sector, we have implemented a
layered detection system focused on risk-based screening,
enhanced targeting, and information sharing, while
simultaneously facilitating travel for nearly 2 million
domestic air travelers every day.
Following the December 2009 threat, we launched a historic
global initiative to strengthen international aviation, which
has improved cooperation on passenger and air cargo screening,
technology development and deployment, and information
collection and sharing, as well as the development of
internationally accepted security standards.
As part of this effort, last week, in Montreal, 13 member
states of the International Civil Aviation Organization met to
reaffirm our commitment to these principles and to continue our
progress, including through the development of global air cargo
security standards. We have strengthened information sharing
with our international partners.
For example, our new and historic passenger name record
agreement with the European Union allows us to continue sharing
passenger information so that we can better identify travelers
who merit our attention before they depart for the United
States.
And in addition to our Pre-Departure Targeting Program,
Immigration Advisory Program, and enhanced in-bound targeting
operations, all of these allow us to more effectively identify
high-risk travelers who are likely to be inadmissible to the
United States and to make recommendations to commercial air
carriers to deny boarding before a plane departs.
And at home, we have continued the deployment of advanced
technology at airports, including advanced imaging technology
machines, while implementing new programs to make the screening
process more efficient for trusted travelers through programs
such as the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Pre-
Check and Global Entry.
Around the cyber domain, we have partnered with sector-
specific agencies and the private sector to help secure
cyberspace, such as the financial sector, the power grid, water
systems, and transportation networks.
We have taken significant action to protect Federal
civilian government systems through the deployment of intrusion
detection systems like EINSTEIN, greater diagnostic and sharing
of threat information, national exercises and incident response
planning, public awareness and outreach programs, and a cyber
workforce initiative to recruit the next generation of cyber
professionals.
And, internationally, we are working with our partners to
share expertise, combat cyber crime, and strengthen shared
systems and networks.
Finally, we have improved our domestic capabilities to
detect and prevent terrorist attacks against our citizens, our
communities, and our critical infrastructure. We have increased
our ability to analyze and distribute threat information at all
levels. Specifically, we have worked to build greater analytic
capabilities through 77 designated fusion centers, resulting in
unprecedented levels of information sharing and analysis at the
State and local level. We have invested in training for local
law enforcement and first responders of all types to increase
expertise and capacity at the local level.
In partnership with the Department of Justice, we have
transformed how we train front-line officers regarding
suspicious activities through a nationwide Suspicious Activity
Reporting Initiative. And as part of that initiative, we have
helped to train over 234,000 law enforcement officials.
We are in the final stages of implementing a Countering
Violent Extremism curriculum for Federal, State, local, and
correctional law enforcement officers that is focused on
community-oriented policing, which will help front-line
personnel identify activities that are potential indicators of
terrorist activity and violence.
We have also expanded training with respect to active
shooter threats, providing a range of information, tools, case
studies, and resources to Federal, State, and local partners to
help them prepare for and, if necessary, respond to attacks
involving active shooters.
And through the nationwide expansion of the ``If You See
Something, Say Something'' campaign, we continue to encourage
all Americans to alert local law enforcement if they see
something that is potentially dangerous.
In conclusion, DHS has come a long way in the 11 years
since September 11, 2001, to enhance protection of the United
States and engage our partners in this shared responsibility.
Together, we have made significant progress to strengthen the
homeland security enterprise, but significant challenges
remain. Threats against our Nation, whether by terrorism or
otherwise, continue to exist and to evolve, and we must
continue to evolve as well. We continue to be ever vigilant to
protect against threats while promoting travel and trade and
safeguarding our essential rights and liberties.
I thank the Committee for your support in these endeavors
and for your attention as we work together to keep the country
safe.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Secretary Napolitano,
for that opening statement, which was a good beginning for us.
Probably most Americans, certainly a large number, know
about the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of
Homeland Security. Probably very few know about the National
Counterterrorism Center, which was created by what I call the
9/11 Commission legislation. But it is really one of the most
significant steps forward we have taken in our government. It
is the place at which, to go back to language we all used after
September 11, 2001, we make sure that the dots are on the same
board and can be connected. As a matter of fact, as we have
discussed, we have now figured out how to put so many dots on
that same board, the challenge now is to see them all and see
the patterns and the connections. But I think the folks at NCTC
have really taken us a long way, working with the Department of
Homeland Security and the FBI. And, Mr. Olsen, I thank you for
your leadership and look forward to your testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. MATTHEW G. OLSEN,\1\ DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL
INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Olsen. Thank you, Chairman Lieberman, Senator Collins,
and Members of the Committee. I really do appreciate this
opportunity to be here this morning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Olsen appears in the Appendix on
page 61.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I also want to express my appreciation to your Committee
for its leadership on national security matters and certainly
your support of NCTC from its inception. And I thank you for
your kind comments this morning about our work, and I accept
those on behalf of the men and women at NCTC. And I am also
very pleased to be here with Secretary Napolitano and Associate
Deputy Director Perkins. We are close partners in the fight
against terrorism.
In my brief remarks this morning, I will focus on recent
events and highlight a few areas of real key concerns for us,
and then I will take a moment to highlight our efforts at NCTC
to analyze and share critical threat information.
Certainly the attack on our diplomatic post in Benghazi
last week that took the lives of four Americans, including
Ambassador Stevens, is proof that acts of terror and violence
continue to threaten our citizens and our interests around the
world. As the President said of these Americans just this past
Friday, they did not simply embrace the American ideal, they
lived it.
It is now our responsibility to honor them by fulfilling
our mission to combat terrorism and to combat violent
extremism. The intelligence community, I can tell you, is
working as one to determine what exactly happened in Benghazi,
to uncover new threats in the region, and then to identify and
bring to justice those who are responsible for this attack.
Last week's attacks I think should be viewed in the context
of the evolving threat landscape we face that you have spoken
about as well as the ongoing unrest and political transition in
the region. More than a decade after the September 11th
attacks, we face a dynamic threat from al-Qaeda, from its
affiliates, as well as those who follow al-Qaeda's ideology.
There is no doubt that over the past few years our government,
working with our allies, has placed relentless pressure on al-
Qaeda's core leadership. We have denied the group safe haven.
We have denied the group resources and the ability to plan and
train. In short, the intelligence picture shows that al-Qaeda's
core in Pakistan is a shadow of its former self.
But even as al-Qaeda's leadership in Pakistan struggles to
remain relevant, the terrorist threats we face have become more
diverse. Al-Qaeda has turned to other groups to carry out
attacks and to advance its ideology. These groups are based in
an array of countries, including Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria, and
Iraq.
In particular, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is the
group that is most likely, we think, to attempt attacks against
the United States. We saw this in May with the disruption of an
AQAP plot to take down an airliner. Other affiliates and
related groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-
Qaeda in Iraq, Boko Haram in Nigeria, as well as militants
based in Pakistan, all pose threats to our citizens and
interests in those regions of the world.
We are also focused on threats posed by Iran and by
Hezbollah. Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism
in the world, and over the past year, the threat from Iranian-
sponsored terrorism has increased.
Inside the United States, we remain vigilant to prevent
violent extremists from carrying out attacks in the name of al-
Qaeda. This past week, the FBI arrested a Chicago man after he
allegedly tried to blow up a crowded bar in the city. Also last
week, a Federal judge sentenced a Virginia man to 30 years in
prison for plotting to bomb the U.S. Capitol. These plots
highlight the danger that al-Qaeda inspired extremists pose
to our country.
And beyond these threats, we face a period of unrest and a
period of transition in the Middle East and in North Africa.
The Arab spring or awakening, now in progress for well over a
year, has led to fundamental reforms in the region. Al-Qaeda
was not part of this change, but the group is seeking to take
advantage of the unrest in some areas, seeking to establish
safe havens and to recruit extremists where security is
diminished.
Now, if I may, turning to the role of the National
Counterterrorism Center, Congress and this Committee created
NCTC to help lead this effort to combat these threats. Our
founding principle is the imperative to integrate all terrorism
information and to share that knowledge with those on the front
lines of this fight. I will take a few moments to describe the
ways in which we are seeking to achieve this goal every day at
NCTC.
First, intelligence information and state-of-the-art
analysis. NCTC serves as the primary organization in the
government for integrating and assessing all intelligence
relating to international terrorism. We have a unique
responsibility to examine all terrorism issues, spanning
geographical boundaries to identify and analyze threat
information, regardless of whether that information is
collected inside or outside the United States.
At NCTC, our culture is defined by collaboration. Nearly
every NCTC analytic product is coordinated throughout the
intelligence community. It therefore reflects multiple
perspectives for policymaker and operators alike.
Second, access to data and technological innovation. We are
promoting information integration and sharing with the
development of a Counterterrorism Data Layer. This approach to
data allows our analysts to access terrorist information that
we have collected from across the government in a single place,
and it allows us to do that without having to manually search
multiple networks.
Here, if I may, I would like to make a point about the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Amendments Act, a
law that is set to expire at the end of this year. As this
Committee knows, this law authorizes the government to collect
valuable intelligence involving international terrorists and
other enemies by targeting non-Americans who are overseas.
These provisions were carefully crafted and carefully
implemented to protect the privacy and civil liberties of
Americans and should remain law.
Third, NCTC has enhanced its focus on tactical intelligence
and developing leads involving threats to the United States. We
established a Pursuit Group--analysts from across the
counterterrorism community who have unparalleled data access
and expertise. Their mission is to focus on information that
could lead to the discovery of threats, to connect those dots,
and to identify actionable leads for agencies such as the FBI,
the Department of Homeland Security, and the CIA.
Finally, NCTC provides situational awareness and
intelligence support to the broad counterterrorism community.
Our Operations Center, which is collocated with the FBI's
Watch, provides around-the-clock support to counterterrorism
agencies. We also maintain the government's central repository
for terrorist identities. This enables us to provide near-real-
time watchlisting data to support screening and law enforcement
activities across the government.
In addition, the Interagency Threat Assessment and
Coordination Group (ITACG), which is located at NCTC and is led
by senior DHS and FBI officers, brings Federal and State and
local officers together in one place at NCTC. This group is
dedicated to providing relevant intelligence on terrorism
issues to State, local, tribal, and private sector partners,
helping to ensure that information is shared with public safety
officials, including police officers and firefighters. Faced
with the possible loss of funding, we are working closely with
DHS and FBI to retain this capability. Mr. Chairman, you have
been a strong supporter of ITACG and have noted its successes,
and I am personally committed to working with DHS and FBI to
sustain this initiative, to find ways to do so in a cost-
effective way, and we are working closely together to chart a
way ahead.
I just want to close by identifying our most important
assets, and that is our people. NCTC is working to meet the
many challenges ahead, but that effort is really dependent on
our diverse and dedicated workforce. Maintaining this
workforce--through the continued commitment and support of
agencies like DHS, the FBI, and other organizations--is a
priority for me at the center.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Collins, Members of the Committee,
thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you this
morning, and thank you for your continued support of NCTC. I
look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Director Olsen.
Associate Deputy Director Perkins, thanks again for being
here, and we welcome your testimony now.
TESTIMONY OF KEVIN L. PERKINS,\1\ ASSOCIATE DEPUTY DIRECTOR,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON
BEHALF OF HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER III, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Perkins. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, Senator
Collins, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before the Committee today and for your
continued support of the men and women of the FBI. I also want
to thank Secretary Napolitano and Director Olsen and the men
and women they lead in our joint fight against those seeking to
do harm against U.S. citizens here and around the world.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Perkins appears in the Appendix
on page 73.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As you know, the Bureau has undergone unprecedented
transformation in recent years. Since the attacks of September
11, 2001, we have refocused our efforts to address and prevent
emerging terrorist threats. The terrorist threat is more
diverse than it was 11 years ago, but today, we in the FBI are
in a better place to meet that threat.
We also face increasingly complex threats to our Nation's
cybersecurity. Nation-state actors, sophisticated organized
crime groups, and hackers for hire are stealing trade secrets
and valuable research from America's companies, universities,
and government agencies. Cyber threats also pose a significant
risk to our Nation's critical infrastructure.
As these threats continue to evolve, the FBI must continue
to adapt to counter those threats. We must continue to build
partnerships with our law enforcement and private sector
partners, as well as the communities we serve. Above all, we
must remain firmly committed to carrying out our mission while
protecting the civil rights and civil liberties of the people
we serve.
Counterterrorism remains our number one priority. We face a
fluid, dynamic, and complex terrorist threat. We have seen an
increase in the sources of terrorism, a wider array of
terrorism targets, a greater cooperation among terrorist
groups, and an evolution in terrorist tactics and
communications methodologies.
In the past decade, al-Qaeda has become decentralized, but
the group remains committed to high-profile attacks against the
West. Al-Qaeda affiliates and surrogates, especially al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula, now represent the top
counterterrorism threat to the Nation. These groups have
attempted several attacks on the United States, including the
failed Christmas Day airline bombing in 2009 and the attempted
bombing of U.S.-bound cargo planes in October 2010.
We also remain concerned about the threat from homegrown
violent extremists. Over the past years, we have seen increased
activity among extremist individuals. These individuals have no
typical profile; their experiences and motives are often
distinct. Lone offenders, some of whom may have some
affiliation with known domestic terrorist organizations,
present a special challenge. They may be self-trained, self-
financed, and self-executing. They are sometimes motivated to
take action in furtherance of their ideological beliefs, but
they stand on the periphery and are hard and difficult to
identify.
Unfortunately, we have recently seen a number of lone
offender incidents, as we have recently witnessed the shooting
at the Sikh Temple in Wisconsin.
Now, as this Committee knows, the cyber threat has evolved
and grown significantly over the past decade. Foreign cyber
spies have become increasingly adept at exploiting weaknesses
in our computer networks. Once inside, they can exfiltrate
government and military secrets, as well as valuable
intellectual property--information that can improve the
competitive advantage of state-owned companies.
Unlike state-sponsored intruders, hackers for profit do not
seek information for political power; rather, they seek
information for sale and trade to the highest bidder. In some
cases, these once isolated hackers have joined forces to create
criminal syndicates. Organized crime in cyberspace offers a
higher profit with a lower probability of being identified and
prosecuted. And hackers and hactivist groups such as Anonymous
and Lulz-Sec are pioneering their own forms of digital anarchy.
With these diverse threats, we anticipate that
cybersecurity may well become our highest priority in the years
to come. That is why we are strengthening our cyber
capabilities in the same way we enhanced our intelligence and
national security capabilities in the wake of the September 11
attacks.
We are focusing our Cyber Division on computer intrusions
and network attacks. We are also hiring additional computer
scientists to provide expert technical support to critical
investigations ongoing in the field.
As part of these efforts, we are expanding our cyber squads
in each field office to become Cyber Task Forces that will be
focused on intrusions and network attacks.
We are also working with our partners to improve on the
National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force (NCIJTF)--the
FBI-led multi-agency focal point for coordinating and sharing
of cyber threat information. The NCIJTF brings together 18 law
enforcement, military, and intelligence agencies to stop
current and predict future attacks.
As we have in the past, we will be inviting the
participation of our Federal, State, and local partners as we
move forward with these initiatives. As we evolve and change to
keep pace with today's complex threat environment, we must
always act within the confines of the rule of law and the
safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution. Following the rule
of law and upholding civil liberties--these are not burdens.
These are what make all of us safer and stronger.
Chairman Lieberman and Senator Collins, I thank you for
this opportunity to discuss the FBI's priorities and the state
of the Bureau as it stands today. Mr. Chairman, let me again
acknowledge the leadership that you and this Committee have
provided to the FBI. The transformation of the FBI over the
past 11 years would not have been possible without the support
of Congress and the American people. I would be happy to answer
any questions you may have at this time, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Associate Deputy
Director Perkins. It has been a privilege to work with the FBI
and the other agencies here.
We will do a 7-minute first round of questions. Let me
focus in on the recent wave of protests throughout large parts
of the Muslim world, but also the attacks in Benghazi. Director
Olsen, let me begin with you and see if you can help us
separate this out. It certainly seems to me that there were a
series of protests that were set off as a result of this film,
and I will get back to that, but what happened in Benghazi
looked like a terrorist attack. The NCTC uses the definition of
terrorism, which I think is a good one, as ``politically
motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by
subnational groups or clandestine agents.''
So let me begin by asking you whether you would say that
Ambassador Stevens and the three other Americans died as a
result of a terrorist attack.
Mr. Olsen. Certainly, on that particular question, I would
say yes, they were killed in the course of a terrorist attack
on our embassy.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. And do we have reason to believe
at this point that the terrorist attack was sort of pre-planned
for September 11, or did the terrorists who were obviously
planning it--because it certainly seemed to be a coordinated
terrorist attack--just seized the moment of the demonstrations
or protests against the film to carry out a terrorist attack?
Mr. Olsen. A more complicated question and one, Mr.
Chairman, that we are spending a great deal of time looking at
even as we speak, and obviously the investigation here is
ongoing and facts are being developed continually.
The facts that we have now indicate that this was an
opportunistic attack on our embassy. The attack began and
evolved and escalated over several hours. I said ``our
embassy.'' It was our diplomatic post in Benghazi. It appears
that individuals who were certainly well armed seized on the
opportunity presented as the events unfolded that evening and
into the morning hours of September 12.
We do know that a number of militants in the area, as I
mentioned, are well armed and maintain those arms. What we do
not have at this point is specific intelligence that there was
a significant advanced planning or coordination for this
attack. Again, we are still developing facts and still looking
for any indications of substantial advanced planning. We just
have not seen that at this point.
So I think that is the most I would say at this point. I do
want to emphasize that there is a classified briefing for all
of Congress that will take place tomorrow.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. We will be there. Let me come
back to what you said, that there was intelligence, as you
indicated broadly a moment ago, that in eastern Libya, in the
Benghazi area, there were a number of militant or violent
Islamist extremist groups. Do we have any idea at this point
who was responsible among those groups for the attack on the
consulate?
Mr. Olsen. This is the most important question that we are
considering.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Olsen. We are focused on who was responsible for this
attack. At this point, what I would say is that a number of
different elements appear to have been involved in the attack,
including individuals connected to militant groups that are
prevalent in eastern Libya, particularly in the Benghazi area.
As well, we are looking at indications that individuals
involved in the attack may have had connections to al-Qaeda or
al-Qaeda's affiliates, in particular al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. So that question has not been
determined yet whether it was a militant Libyan group or a
group associated with al-Qaeda and influence from abroad.
Mr. Olsen. That is right, and I would add that the picture
that is emerging is one where a number of different individuals
were involved, so it is not necessarily an either/or
proposition.
Chairman Lieberman. OK, good.
Mr. Olsen. Again, as you know, the FBI is leading the
investigation, and that is ongoing.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. I wanted to go to you now,
Associate Deputy Director Perkins, and ask you about that. What
is the status of the FBI investigation into the attack on our
consulate in Benghazi, Libya?
Mr. Perkins. Yes, Mr. Chairman, as Director Olsen noted, we
have an open investigation at this time. We have a significant
number of FBI agents, analysts, and various support employees
assigned to this matter. We are conducting interviews,
gathering evidence, and trying to sort out the facts. We are
working with our partners, both from a criminal standpoint as
well as in the intelligence community, to try to determine
exactly what took place on the ground that evening.
Chairman Lieberman. Secretary Napolitano, let me go to you,
I know that last Thursday the Department of Homeland Security
and the FBI released a bulletin indicating that this film was
the apparent catalyst for these protests and that the fact
could increase the risk of violence here in the United States
and could motivate homegrown violent extremists, certainly with
their recruitment efforts and perhaps with actions.
I wonder if in this setting you could comment on the state
of your concern about that and what steps DHS and the FBI are
taking, along with other government agencies, to proactively
address the potentially higher risk of homegrown terrorist acts
as a result of the film?
Secretary Napolitano. Right now, Mr. Chairman, we have no
intelligence of impending violent attacks within the United
States. There is open source information on some planned
demonstrations in, I believe, Los Angeles and Houston, among
other places. Those are posted on the Web. But we have no
indication of anything that is violent in nature.
Nonetheless, immediately after the attack in Benghazi, we
began outreach to a number of groups within the country, faith-
based groups and others, who could be the target of a violent
attack and provided them with guidance on things they can do to
make sure they are as safe as possible. So we continue that
outreach. We continue working with our local partners in terms
of what they are seeing on the ground and then monitoring the
open-source media.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. Let me ask you finally what
we as a government can do to counteract the impact of this
film. You know, we are a country of almost 310 million people
now. This film, hateful really, was done by a handful of
people. And yet American embassies and consulates not only are
the subject of protests, which is very much in the American
spirit of civil protest and right of free speech, but going
beyond that to destruction of property and, at its worse, a
terrorist attack in Benghazi that kills four people. In one
other case, I believe in Yemen, the demonstrators were armed.
And, of course, in some cases, including Tunisia, the local
police or security forces actually ended up having to fire at
crowds to stop them from doing further damage.
I know this is very sensitive, but we have to ask our
friends in the Muslim world and ourselves to be willing to say
this film does not represent us and, therefore, it is simply
unacceptable, even if you are offended by the film, which we
understand, to do more than protest, to begin to act violently.
It is no more acceptable than it would be in this country if
some group seized on the statements of a fringe religious
leader or a political leader in some foreign country that
attacked Americans, Christians and Jews, and as a result some
group in America started to not just protest but to attack the
embassy of the country in which that happened. In other words,
we have to blow the whistle on this behavior. Fortunately, we
have had some help from our allies in countries like in the
governments of Libya and Tunisia, and I think we have to be
forthright in doing that ourselves. So with apologies for the
length of the question and the opportunity I took to get a
little bit off my chest, I wonder if any of you could tell us
what our government is trying to do now to challenge people in
the Muslim world to confront the reality that this film is not
representative of America or the American Government?
Secretary Napolitano. Mr. Chairman, the film is absolutely
not representative of America or the American Government. It is
deplorable. The issue you raise is a difficult one. We are a
country where people have rights, and one of the rights they
have is to have free speech, and that can include things we
find deplorable as well as other things.
So we also recognize that there is a right to assembly, a
right to petition the government, so we recognize the right to
have a peaceful demonstration against deplorable speech.
What we need to keep communicating is, as deplorable as we
find that film to be, it is not, and never will be an excuse
for violence and for the senseless killing we saw in Benghazi
and other places. And we need that voice to come loud and
clear, not just from Washington but from the country as a whole
and internationally, and it needs to come from people of all
faiths.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much. My time is up.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Olsen, I want
to follow up on the series of questions that the Chairman
raised with you about the attack in Benghazi that cost the
lives of four Americans.
First, I will tell you that, based on the briefings I have
had, I have come to the opposite conclusion and agree with the
President of Libya that this was a premeditated, planned attack
that was associated with the anniversary of September 11, 2001.
I just do not think that people come to protests equipped with
rocket-propelled grenades and other heavy weapons. And the
reports of complicity--and they are many--with the Libyan
guards who were assigned to guard the consulate also suggest to
me that this was premeditated.
Nevertheless, I realize that is something you are still
looking at, the FBI is still looking at, but I for one believe
that the very forthright conclusion by the President of Libya
is more likely the correct one.
But putting aside the issue of whether this was an
opportunistic attack or a premeditated one, the issue of the
security of the consulate in what by any measure has to be
considered a dangerous threat environment continues to trouble
me. It is clear that the security situation in Benghazi was
deteriorating given that there were at least four attacks that
I am told about, beginning in June, on diplomatic and western
targets. We are also all aware that Libya is awash in heavy
weapons. I think there are something like 10,000 man-portable
air-defense systems, maybe 20,000, that are still missing.
We also know that it is a bastion for extremist groups,
including offshoots of al-Qaeda. We know that the No. 2 person
in al-Qaeda was a Libyan who was killed. The Libyan government
is having a hard time controlling its borders, getting the
militias under control. And even this week, the FBI team
investigating the attack had difficulties getting to Libya
safely because of the security situation.
So given these facts, how would you personally have
assessed the general threat environment prior to the attacks on
our diplomats in Benghazi and the former Navy SEALs?
Mr. Olsen. Well, Senator Collins, I would agree with your
characterization of the threat pretty much as you laid it out.
So the threat in Libya from armed militant groups, from al-
Qaeda-affiliated individuals was high, and that made Libya in
some ways very similar to other countries in the region, and
certainly similar to parts of Egypt and to northern Mali. We
are concerned about Nigeria.
So the region, particularly those countries following the
Arab spring, are faced with real challenges from a security
perspective. So we are, again, working with our partners, both
in the Federal Government here but also with the governments in
the region, seeking to increase the security capabilities of
those as well as, of course, cooperating with them to look at
specific threats or attacks, such as the investigation that is
on going in Libya.
Senator Collins. Was there any communication between NCTC
and the State Department alerting them to the high-threat
environment in which Benghazi was located and suggesting that
be considered as the State Department evaluated its security?
Mr. Olsen. So over the course of the last several months,
again, you highlighted particularly events in June of this
year, we know that there was a small-scale attack on our
mission, our post in Benghazi in June. We also know that there
was a more sophisticated attack involving the convoy with the
British ambassador in Benghazi. So there were reports detailing
those attacks and detailing generally the threat that was faced
to U.S. and Western individuals and interests in eastern Libya
from, again, armed militants as well as elements connected to
al-Qaeda.
There was no specific intelligence regarding an imminent
attack prior to September 11 on our post in Benghazi.
Senator Collins. Were there any indications that there were
communications between extremist elements and the guards, the
Libyan guards that were assigned to the consulate?
Mr. Olsen. In the immediate aftermath--or prior to the----
Senator Collins. Prior to the attack.
Mr. Olsen. That question I think would be better addressed
in the session that we are going to have tomorrow.
Senator Collins. It just concerns me so gravely that there
were not marines present in Benghazi to defend the consulate,
and as I have been looking further into this issue, I am
learning that the situation is far more common than I would
have thought. We are relying on foreign nationals, perhaps on a
British security firm that has been told to be unarmed, and
other more questionable and less secure means of protecting our
American personnel in extremely dangerous parts of the world.
And I am just stunned and appalled that there was not better
security for all of the American personnel at that consulate
given the high-threat environment.
I know you are not in charge of assigning security. You do
communicate information to the State Department about the
threat. Can you enlighten me at all on why decisions were made
to have virtually no security?
Mr. Olsen. I would say that we do as a community provide as
much information as we possibly can in as timely a way as
possible with the State Department as well as the rest of the
Federal Government. I would say this: We do rely on host
countries to help protect our diplomatic personnel in those
countries. But I think that the ultimate question that you have
asked of the decisions about the security at our post in
Benghazi would be better addressed to the Diplomatic Security
Service within the State Department.
Senator Collins. Mr. Perkins, is your FBI team looking at
security as well as trying to better understand how the attack
came about and whether or not it was premeditated?
Mr. Perkins. Yes, Senator. Let me start by saying I share
your specific concerns regarding the security. In Libya, as
well as on a larger scale, we have FBI employees posted around
the world and in many places that have higher-than-usual
security concerns. We need to do that to carry out our mission
every day in the counterterrorism environment.
But with regard to the specifics within Benghazi, within
Libya itself, we are counting on our investigators on the
ground to be able to sort that out, obviously, to gather the
facts, go where the facts take us, and then on the back end to
be able to work with the State Department, with Diplomatic
Security's Regional Security Office, and others to share
whatever it is we have found that may be of benefit to
providing better security for the people on the ground.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
I do want to say for the record that last Friday, Senator
Collins and I addressed a request to the Inspector General at
the Department of State to do an investigation of what happened
with regard to security at our consulate in Benghazi prior to
these deadly attacks, and then to draw conclusions or lessons
learned that might relate to provision of security generally,
particularly at non-embassy locations throughout the world.
The other thing I would say, although I understand you have
a respectful disagreement on the question of whether the attack
that resulted in the four American deaths in Benghazi was pre-
planned for that day or a spontaneous taking advantage of the
protests that were going on, I do appreciate the fact, Director
Olsen, that you as the head of the National Counterterrorism
Center have told the Committee this morning without hesitation
that you believe what happened in Benghazi was a terrorist
attack. There seemed to be a little confusion about that over
the last few days. And, of course, I could not agree with you
more and will await your conclusion of the investigation as to
whether you think it was pre-planned for that day or just
spontaneous.
My own inclination is to agree with Senator Collins, as I
usually do, but I will await the investigation.
In order of importance, we have Senators Moran, Akaka--did
I say ``importance''? [Laughter.]
I take that back because Senator Akaka is the most
important Senator. But in order of appearance, Senators Moran,
Akaka, Pryor, and Carper.
Senator Moran. I very much appreciated your original
comment, Mr. Chairman, but have great deference and respect for
the Senator from Hawaii and recognize his importance.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR MORAN
Senator Moran. What a difficult hearing with so many topics
and how the world changes so often and so rapidly. So I thank
the Chairman and the Ranking Member for hosting this hearing,
and I appreciate our three witnesses and express my gratitude
for the efforts that are being made to make certain that
Americans remain safe and secure around the world.
I need to focus my attention, Madam Secretary, as you would
expect, on a conversation that we constantly have, and it deals
with the threat of biological weapons, either intentional or
inadvertent. For a long time, the Department of Homeland
Security has been the lead department in developing a
bioscience and agroscience facility, and I think all the
hurdles that have been placed in making progress in the
completion of this facility have now been completed with the
National Academy of Sciences report that was released in July.
You and I had a conversation in early August about the
Office of Management and Budget. I would like to thank you
personally for the graciousness and kindness that you have
always demonstrated toward me in our conversations and your
interest in this topic and in seeing a good conclusion to this
facility being built. Every time you have testified, and every
time I have asked you questions, you have expressed your
support not only for the facility but for the location and the
process by which that site location was made.
I think we are at the point now, Madam Secretary, at which
there is no reason for you, your Department, not to allow the
facility to proceed. There is a lot of uncertainty now with the
contractors that are on site and when their contracts expire,
and all money that has been spent on this facility to date has
been from the State of Kansas, and the Congress has
appropriated $40 million for use in the utility plant and
another $50 million to begin construction. It seems clear to me
that whether or not those dollars are available for those
purposes rests in your hands. It would require also in addition
to the money that the land be transferred. I think that also
rests at your desk. And my question, I guess, is to be broadly
asked: Now what, Madam Secretary? As we know, the construction
timetable only becomes more expensive. We know the need for the
facility, and I am not certain how long the contractors have a
purpose for being on site if you do not release the funds. And
I think Kansas has indicated its strong commitment to this
process, is willing to continue to provide resources, work with
you to accomplish that. But in the absence of a land transfer,
I think our confidence that something is going to happen here,
that our money is being well spent is greatly diminished.
And so my question is, Madam Secretary, now what?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, you are right, Senator Moran.
We have had a number of things to accomplish as predicates to
being able to move forward with the National Bio and Agro-
Defense Facility (NBAF), the most recent being the National
Academy of Sciences' analysis. I think from all the studies,
all the analyses, I think they confirm a couple of basic facts.
One is we need a Bio Level 4 laboratory for this there. It
is an essential part of our security apparatus, as it were.
Two, the current facility at Plum Island is inadequate as a
substitute, although it will have to serve as a bridge and some
monies will have to be invested there to allow it to do so
while we move forward with the NBAF.
Three, as you say, I think it is time that we begin moving
forward with the land exchange and the Central Utility Plant
(CUP). Before we do so, I hope to host a meeting with the
Kansas delegation and perhaps the governor to talk about out-
year funding, cost shares, and some of the things that Kansas
has mentioned they are willing to contemplate. But the $40
million for the CUP has been held in our fiscal year 2012
budget. We have a fiscal year 2012 budget, so we can move
ahead. So we will be in touch with your office about when we
want to have such a meeting.
But I think it is necessary for the country, and I think it
is time to fish or cut bait.
Senator Moran. Madam Secretary, I always appreciate what
you say, and you expressed sentiments that I was pleased to
hear. What I would follow up with is you indicate now is the
time. What is the definition of ``now is the time''? From many
of our perspectives, now is the time has been true for a long
time. And, again, let me see what your understanding is of what
happens on some date, September 30 or October 30, when the
contracts have expired and the contractors leave. We would hate
to have to rebid this, so I think when you say the time is now,
it is not a matter of many months. It is a matter of a few
weeks before this needs to happen.
Secretary Napolitano. That is right.
Senator Moran. Is that true?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, that is my understanding as
well. I know some of you will be back in your home States, but
it could be done by conference call or people can come back
here. But I would hope to pull together something in the next
couple of weeks.
Senator Moran. Madam Secretary, I spoke with Governor
Brownback last evening and I spoke again with him on the phone
this morning during this hearing. His request of me is to tell
you that he will be on a plane today or tomorrow, at your
earliest convenience, to reach an agreement in which you will
sign the transfer----
Secretary Napolitano. Exchange, yes.
Senator Moran [continuing]. And release the $40 million.
Secretary Napolitano. We will be in touch with your office
over the next few days to schedule such a meeting.
Senator Moran. I appreciate that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Moran.
And now, Senator Akaka. If I may on a point of personal
privilege before I call on Senator Akaka, this happens to be
the day on which Senator Akaka will chair the last hearing of
his Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia this afternoon.
Senator Akaka has really given extraordinary leadership to this
Committee and worked particularly in a way that really is
unsung but very important on human capital management in the
Federal workforce.
Senator Akaka will be concluding 36 years of service to the
people of Hawaii, 22 in the Senate, 13 in the House, and
retiring at the end of this year to spend more time with what I
take to be the three great loves of his life: His beloved wife,
Millie, his family, and the island paradise of Hawaii. Senator
Akaka and his wife, Millie, have four sons, one daughter, 15
grandchildren, and 16 great-grandchildren. Not bad. He is much
loved here in the Senate and in Hawaii. He has accomplished an
enormous amount in his time here. I want to just express to him
not only my gratitude for his friendship and what an honor it
has been to serve with him, but as the Chairman of the
Committee to thank him for his steadfast and principled work on
this Committee year in and year out.
And since we are going out together, so to speak, at the
end of this term, one of the benefits I hope, Senator Akaka, is
that I will have time to visit you in Hawaii more often, and
expecting that, I will, just as I turn it over to you, say,
``Aloha pumehana.'' Not bad for a Yankee from New England.
[Laughter.]
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. That is terrific. Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman, and thank you for your words. I am glad that we are
stepping out of the Senate together, and I have enjoyed working
with you very much throughout the years. I want to thank you
and Senator Collins for your leadership on this Committee and
in the Senate. You continue to do great work, so thank you very
much, Mr. Chairman, for your words. And thank you so much for
holding this timely hearing.
I want to join all Americans in mourning the loss of the
four brave and dedicated American public servants who died as a
result of what we consider senseless attacks in Libya last
week. I honor them and the thousands of civilian Federal
employees overseas who risk their lives every day in service to
this country. We all owe a debt of gratitude to those that have
made essential contributions to fighting terrorism. In the face
of domestic and international threats, we really rely on these
workers to keep us safe, and we will continue to try to help
these workers.
Also, I want to commend the Departments of our witnesses
for your increased efforts for protecting our Nation against
terrorist attacks and for your partnerships that you have been
bringing about so that we can have the best kind of efforts
made for our country, and also for the training of 230,000 law
enforcement officials to help in this effort. And I want to
commend you for all of that.
At my request, I want to tell the panel, the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report last week that
highlighted troubling vulnerabilities in the security of
radiological materials used at medical facilities across the
country. Terrorists could steal these materials to build a
dirty bomb that would have devastating social and economic
consequences.
What is your reaction to this report of GAO? And what are
the current threats regarding terrorists' acquisition of
radiological materials?
Secretary Napolitano. Senator, I will start and, again,
thank you for your years of service to the country.
With respect to that report, it is primarily medical
radiological material. The Department of Energy has the
responsibility for the security of that material and how it is
handled, so we are reaching out to them to see what steps they
intend to take with respect to those medical materials. And we
will be happy to report back to you.
Senator Akaka. Any further comments? Mr. Olsen.
Mr. Olsen. Senator, as well I would like to thank you for
your years of service.
In answer to your question, what I would say as a general
matter is that we do have at NCTC a significant element within
our organization of analysts who are focused solely on
radiological, chemical, and biological weapons, and the
possibility of terrorists obtaining and using those. And we
work closely with the National Counterproliferation Center in
that regard, as well as with our domestic partners represented
here, and the CIA and other agencies that focus overseas. It is
obviously a significant concern for us, and so I will look
forward to working, again, with Secretary Napolitano and the
FBI on this issue.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Director. Mr. Perkins.
Mr. Perkins. Yes, Senator, and I, too, congratulate you on
your years of service to the country.
I reflect what Madam Secretary and Director Olsen both
stated. We have a Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate that
works closely with the Department of Energy, with components of
DHS, as well as NCTC, in tracking, following, and in trying to
be in a mode where we are able to detect any thefts along those
lines. We will have to have some time to review the actual
aspects of the GAO report and could get back to you on that.
But we work closely with our counterparts in these agencies as
well as the Department of Energy to mitigate those threats.
Senator Akaka. Well, thank you again for your partnerships.
It really shows. As you know, Secretary Napolitano, the Senate
failed to pass comprehensive cybersecurity legislation prior to
the August recess. Because the prospects of enacting
legislation this year are dim, I support the President's use of
his authorities to improve cybersecurity of the Nation's
critical infrastructure such as the power grid.
What are the contours of the Executive Order currently
under consideration? And when do you expect it to be issued?
Secretary Napolitano. Senator Akaka, there is an Executive
Order that is being considered. It is still being drafted in
the interagency process, but I would say that it is close to
completion pending a few issues that need to be resolved at the
highest levels. And, of course, the President will need to be
involved. It is perhaps easier to say what cannot be in an
Executive Order as opposed to what can be in an Executive
Order.
We still need cyber legislation. We still need the
congressional action and appreciate the efforts everyone has
made in this regard. This is something that the Congress should
enact in a comprehensive fashion. We have come close, but we
have not been able to get across the goal line here. But it
remains an urgent need.
There are at least three things I can think of just off the
top of my head that an Executive Order cannot solve. One is it
cannot solve some of the limitations we have on personnel,
personnel hiring and salaries, and how that works. It cannot
solve issues about liability protections, which are often
viewed as a mechanism to foster timely and effective
information sharing. And we cannot without legislation increase
criminal penalties for the bad actors that we find or the FBI
finds. So those are at least three important areas that even a
robust Executive Order would not be able to cover.
Senator Akaka. Well, thank you very much. My time has
expired, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Akaka.
Let me pick up on the last round of questioning by Senator
Akaka. I appreciate that report, Secretary Napolitano, and I am
glad that the Administration is going forward with a sense of
urgency about this because it is possible that we will be able
for a variety of reasons to adopt cybersecurity legislation in
the lame-duck session. But I agree with Senator Akaka. Based on
what we have been through up until now, I would not count on
it. I will be, obviously, quite pleasantly surprised if we are
able to find common ground. And we are still working on it. We
still have bipartisan discussions going on.
But with that probability of the failure of Congress to
adopt the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 or something like it, I
think the sooner the Executive Branch is ready to try to fill
whatever gaps it can, the safer the country will be. So I
appreciate that, and I certainly take this to be what the pace
of work in the Administration is, so I am not saying anything
that is at odds with it. But I certainly would not wait to see
how the lame-duck session works out. In other words, if we get
something passed, then it will presumably overcome the
Executive Order. And as you said, there are at least those
three matters that are in legislation that the President cannot
adopt by Executive Order.
I assume, but I look for reassurance now, that you and the
Department of Homeland Security are quite actively involved
since you are charged with the unique responsibility for
cybersecurity in the construction of a possible Executive Order
or orders regarding cybersecurity.
Secretary Napolitano. Mr. Chairman, yes, we have been very
actively involved, as have some of the other agencies who have
primary responsibility in this area. One of the benefits of the
legislation, even though it did not pass, is it helped to begin
educating people as to the really considerable civilian cyber
responsibilities and capabilities that are already being
exercised by the Department of Homeland Security. And I think
that any Executive Order will reflect that as well.
Chairman Lieberman. That is good. Even though we ended up
with a proposal that would have made compliance with the
standards voluntary--and I understand the President by
Executive Order cannot make them mandatory--but we looked at
the possibility that under existing statutory authority,
various regulatory agencies might have the existing authority
to make whatever standards emerged mandatory on the sector of
the economy that they oversee. Do you know whether the
Executive Order is considering that possibility?
Secretary Napolitano. Mr. Chairman, without talking in
detail because things are still in draft.
Chairman Lieberman. Sure.
Secretary Napolitano. But I can tell you that there has
been a deep diver into sector-specific analysis as to where
there may already exist some powers.
Chairman Lieberman. That is good to hear. I am encouraged
by that.
Let me give you an opportunity one more time to rebut what
seems to be driving a lot of the opposition to the bill, which
is that this would be the heavy hand of government over the
private sector that controls critical cyber infrastructure.
Even though in the non-cyber infrastructure or primarily non-
cyber, the 18 areas that are designated now which DHS has
authority over, you are working really quite constructively and
collaboratively, I gather, with the private sector in each of
those areas. So what more do you think you and we can do to
reassure the private sector that this is intended to be
collaborative, not coercive.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I think, Mr. Chairman, we need
to continue to remind them that past is prologue to the future;
that we have worked collaboratively on a number of areas
outside of cyber affecting critical infrastructure; and that
they themselves benefit if there are shared standards. And,
quite frankly, with respect to core critical infrastructure,
many businesses, communities, and families rely on that core
infrastructure to be safe and secure. So that in and of itself
I think elevates this to a different plane.
We want to be collaborative. We think that is the way to
go. It is truly public-private in contemplation and in current
activity. But, again, a significant gap anywhere respecting
core critical infrastructure can have ripple effects far beyond
the individual entity that is the controller.
Chairman Lieberman. Agreed. Associate Deputy Director
Perkins, do you want to add anything? The FBI has developed
really impressive cybersecurity capacities, obviously
particularly with regard to domestic law enforcement. I take it
you two are involved in the construction of a possible
Executive Order?
Mr. Perkins. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is correct. We are
working with our partners at DHS to effect that end, and I echo
to some degree what Secretary Napolitano was talking about as
far as the efficiency. We have to have the partnerships to make
things work. In many of the things the FBI does, partnerships
make our work efficient. In the world of cyber crime and cyber
threat, partnerships are essential, more than efficient. They
have to be there in order for us to carry out our mission.
So looking at the past, looking at the success we have had
with the partnerships with the private sector, we hope to play
on that going forward to win the confidence and to get this
type of partnerships, whether it be through legislation or
Executive Order, in place that could benefit our ability to
carry out our mission.
Chairman Lieberman. My staff just handed me a note that
said that Reuters news service is just reporting that the Bank
of America's Web site has suffered intermittent problems amid
threats on the Internet that a group was planning to launch
cyber attacks on the bank and the New York Stock Exchange,
again, in retaliation for this film. Do any of you know
anything about that at this point?
Secretary Napolitano. Mr. Chairman, there has been some
ongoing activity, and whether it is retaliatory I do not think
has been determined. Without going into more, I will just
simply say that this is an example of where working public to
private and private to public benefits everybody.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Director Olsen or Associate Deputy
Director Perkins, do you want to add anything?
Mr. Olsen. I would just add, we were familiar with these
reports as of last night, and so there have been ongoing
efforts in this regard.
Mr. Perkins. Yes, sir, that is accurate. We are working
with DHS on that matter, but beyond that point right now I
really cannot share a great deal of detail on it as we look
into it.
Chairman Lieberman. Good enough. It does make the point.
Again, this is a news story that I am going from, but you have
given some legitimacy to parts of it, although not clearly to
whether it is related to the film. But it does make the point
that we have been trying to make in the cybersecurity
legislation that we are in an unusual circumstance now where
the target of an attack by an enemy, whether a nation-state or
a terrorist group, would just as likely, in some senses more
likely, be privately owned cyber infrastructure that controls
some significant part of life in America as opposed to
attacking a military target or a government Web site or
something of that kind.
I want to move to another area, and that is, the extent to
which over the last year or so the Iranian Revoluionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) and Quds Force from Iran and its clients,
including particularly Hezbollah, have attempted to perpetrate
a number of terrorist attacks in countries around the world,
again, most recently the successful terrorist attack on a
tourist bus in Bulgaria. But, obviously, again, we know that
last year the government of Iran apparently attempted to carry
out an attack here in Washington against the Saudi ambassador
to the United States using someone they believed to be a member
of a Mexican drug cartel.
I wanted to ask the three of you--first, to put this into
context--my impression is that the Iranian Revolutionary Guard
Corps and the Quds Force have made a strategic decision to move
out of their immediate neighborhood and to begin to operate
internationally. Am I correct on that, Director Olsen?
Mr. Olsen. What I would say, Mr. Chairman, is that we have
seen an uptick in operational activity by the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards Force and the Quds Force over the last
year or so. And certainly to your point, the plot against the
Saudi ambassador here in Washington last fall highlighted a
willingness of Iran and its terrorist elements to actually
carry out or seek to carry out an attack inside the United
States.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. And what I am wondering is am I
right--my impression certainly is that whereas traditionally
the IRGC and the Quds Force have operated within the Middle
East through Hezbollah--perhaps sometimes Hamas, certainly
Hezbollah--and Iraqi Shia militias in, obviously, Iraq, that
now they seem to be spreading out more broadly. The two cases
we know are the United States and Bulgaria.
Mr. Olsen. I would say that your impression is consistent
with my own insofar as certainly we have seen Iranian influence
in Iraq and in Afghanistan. But we have also seen links between
Iran and terrorist operations in India, Thailand, and Georgia.
So it is a threat that is posed beyond the immediate region of
Iran.
Chairman Lieberman. So let me ask any of you to what extent
now this expansion of terrorist activity sponsored by the
Iranian government rises as a threat to our homeland among the
other terrorist threats to our homeland?
Mr. Olsen. I will take that, at first at least. Again, you
mentioned and I discussed briefly the planned attack last fall.
I would consider it to be a significant source of concern for
us, both Iran and, again, its terrorist element, the Quds
Force, as well as the group that it coordinates with, Lebanese
Hezbollah.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. Associate Deputy Director
Perkins.
Mr. Perkins. Yes, I agree with Director Olsen in that Quds
Force, Hezbollah, and others have shown they both have the
capability and the willingness to extend beyond that region of
the world and likely here into the homeland itself. We look at
it as a very serious problem. We look at it as a serious threat
and that we are focusing intelligence analysts and other
resources on that on a daily basis to monitor that threat, to
make determinations, is it increasing, is it dropping off, and
the like. But I agree with Director Olsen that they have the
capability and they have the willingness to do that, which are
two very important steps.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. And obviously you are coordinating
with other parts of our intelligence community that have unique
responsibility for intelligence outside of the United States.
Mr. Perkins. That is correct, Senator, and that is a key
point there, that this is a whole-of-government approach to
dealing with this. This is very key across the entire
intelligence community, both outside of the United States, as
well as here in the homeland.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me go to aviation security which,
overall post-September 11, 2001, has been an area where we have
put tremendous resources into the battle, and overall we have
successfully defended our country and the enormous number of
people, Americans and non-Americans, who travel by air. You
offered testimony that al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
nonetheless continues to show an intention to attack American
and international aviation systems.
I wonder, and I will begin, Secretary Napolitano, with you,
apart from your statement in your prepared remarks, are there
additional steps that you would like to highlight at this point
which you think we can or should take to deter or detect future
attacks via our aviation systems?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I think the whole aviation
sector demonstrates the necessity to have a layered approach so
that if someone or some group is able to evade one layer,
another layer can pick them up. And it begins fundamentally
with good intelligence, good intelligence sharing with our
international partners, good intelligence sharing within the
aviation sector, and good intelligence sharing among the
Federal family. It goes to the standards that we require for
planes bound for the United States, both for passengers and for
cargo, and how we inspect those standards.
It goes to what we ourselves require of airports and
airport authorities that control, say, the perimeter of the
airport. We have had one or two instances of breaches this last
year. We have jumped on both of those to see why and what
corrective measures needed to be taken.
It goes to when you get into the airport, what you see in
the area before you get to the gate, what you may not see in
the area before you get to the gate, and the construction of
the gate itself with the new technology. Then there are things
that we are doing in the so-called sterile area where, even
though we call it a sterile area, there is still a lot of work
underway and different things that TSA does on different days
at different times and different places to increase security.
So it is an entire layered approach.
One of the things I think has really helped and I think
American passengers will begin seeing the benefits, if they
have not already, is moving to a risk-based approach where, if
we have pre-knowledge of a traveler and we have their
biometrics, they are able to go through the airport and go
through customs or whatever more quickly. So we are really
encouraging that. That takes pressure off of the lines.
The second thing that is going on is a lot of technology
research to see if in this country, where we have the world's
best scientists and engineers, we can devise a system that is
even more efficient for travelers and yet deals with the
evolving threat. Research cycles take time, but there is some
very interesting work underway in that regard.
Chairman Lieberman. Director Olsen, Associate Deputy
Director Perkins, do you want to add to that?
Mr. Olsen. Just a couple of quick points.
First, in terms of the threat, and I know we have touched
on this briefly, but we do see from al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula that it has demonstrated its desire to carry out an
attack involving the aviation sector, really three failed
attempts since December 2009, including one just this past May.
I concur completely with Secretary Napolitano in terms of
developing a layered approach, in terms of NCTC's contribution
to that effort. We maintain the identities database of known
and suspected terrorists, which becomes the basis for
watchlisting and screening, at least in part the types of
screening that can take place at airports. And then, finally, I
would highlight again the point that Secretary Napolitano made
about the value of intelligence and developing at the earliest
possible stages the signs, indications, and information about
individuals who may be seeking to carry out such an attack so
that we can disrupt that type of plot before that person ever
seeks to board an airplane or go to an airport.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Perkins.
Mr. Perkins. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I echo their comments. I
agree that AQAP is one of the top if not the top threat we face
right now simply because of their active willingness to
continue coming at us in that way.
I echo Director Olsen's comments as far as intelligence
goes. One of the things we have done recently to enhance and
build our intelligence capabilities, especially within our
Counterterrorism Division, is a better integration of our
intelligence analysts into operations. Recently, we have named
three deputy assistant directors who are all non-agent
personnel, intelligence analysts, to lead those efforts within
the Counterterrorism and Criminal Investigative Divisions. So
the focus on intelligence ahead of time as well as the layered
approach to thwart these attempts is vital.
Chairman Lieberman. So you said something just now that
anticipated the following question I was going to ask, which we
are in a context, as we have said, where core al-Qaeda, which
was responsible for the September 11, 2001, attacks on America,
has been greatly weakened. Bin Laden is dead. A series of
people who have worked their way up to replace others are gone.
Abu Laith al-Libi, the Libyan who was close to the top, is now
gone. Ayman al-Zawahiri unfortunately remains at liberty, but I
am sure that he is in our sights nonetheless.
So if I asked you to give me what you would rank as the top
two or three Islamist terrorist threats to the homeland, what
would you say? Associate Deputy Director Perkins, you said you
might even put AQAP now at the top. What else? Other groups?
Iran, Quds Force? Which?
Mr. Perkins. Obviously, Quds Force, Hezbollah. A lot
depends on future world events as to where exactly that goes.
But as we echoed, they have the capability and the willingness
so that puts them near the top of that list as well. Other
emerging threats in other parts of the world that we look at in
addition to AQAP, are some of the West Africa, East Africa
threats in those regions, as far as their actual extent and
threat to the homeland, there is debate in those areas. But,
nonetheless, those are things that are near the top of our list
to follow as they emerge.
Chairman Lieberman. Director Olsen, how about you? What are
your major concerns about sources of threats to our homeland?
Mr. Olsen. In terms of the threat to the U.S. homeland, I
would put AQAP at the top of the list. But I would
also put, again, al-Qaeda core. Notwithstanding its greatly
diminished capability, it does retain the intent--and we have
seen this--to carry out an attack, even if it is a smaller-
scale, less sophisticated attack than we have seen in the past,
against the U.S. homeland. And then, third--and, again, these
are not in any particular order--but I would also include on
that list Iran and Hezbollah, echoing the comment that the
likelihood of an attack inside the United States depends
largely on events in the Middle East and what we see.
Chairman Lieberman. Understood. Secretary Napolitano.
Secretary Napolitano. I would add to what was said the
nature of homegrown Islamist terrorists or terrorism, what we
saw, for example, the arrest in Chicago last Saturday of an
individual. We have seen a pattern of this or several of these
instances over the last year. I think the Internet serves as a
facilitator for that, and I think the so-called lone wolf can
also be a lone Islamist in that regard, driven by motivations
that may be behind, for example, what occurred in Benghazi.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, I thank you, the three of you,
very much. Again, we have made great progress. I think the
American people have reason not only to be grateful to you and
all the work with you for our increased security in the face of
a really unusual, unprecedented threat to our homeland
security, unique really in American history--and we are not
only improving our defenses, we are on the offense in a very
real way. But the threat goes on, and so will the work that you
and this Committee will continue to do, so I thank you very
much.
The record of the hearing will stay open for 15 days for
any additional statements or questions that you or Members of
the Committee have. Associate Deputy Director Perkins, you can
tell Director Mueller that he does not have to appear anymore,
that you have done very well. [Laughter.]
With that, thank you. The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:55 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.038
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.039
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.040
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.041
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.042
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.044
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.046
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.047
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.048
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.049
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.050
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.051
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.052
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.053
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.054
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.055
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.056
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.057
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.058
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.059
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.060
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.061
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.062
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.063
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.064
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.065
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.066
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.067
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.068
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.069
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.070
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.071
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.072
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.073
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.074
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.075
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T6070.076
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
