[Senate Hearing 112-559]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-559
SECRET SERVICE ON THE LINE: RESTORING TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 23, 2012
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JON TESTER, Montana RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MARK BEGICH, Alaska JERRY MORAN, Kansas
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Holly A. Idelson, Senior Counsel
Jason M. Yanussi, Senior Professional Staff Member
Nicholas A. Rossi, Minority Staff Director
Richard H. Houghton, Minority Deputy General Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Patricia R. Hogan, Publications Clerk
Laura W. Kilbride, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1
Senator Collins.............................................. 4
Senator Brown................................................ 14
Senator Johnson.............................................. 18
Senator Portman.............................................. 20
Senator Carper............................................... 22
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 35
Senator Collins.............................................. 38
Senator Carper............................................... 40
Senator Landrieu............................................. 41
WITNESSES
Wednesday, May 23, 2012
Mark J. Sullivan, Director, U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security........................................... 6
Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 8
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Edwards, Charles K.:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 50
Sullivan, Mark J.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 42
APPENDIX
Letter of Support from the Federal Law Enforcement Officers
Association.................................................... 53
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
Mr. Sullivan with attachments................................ 55
Mr. Edwards.................................................. 113
SECRET SERVICE ON THE LINE: RESTORING TRUST AND CONFIDENCE
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 23, 2012
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:31 a.m., in
room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Carper, Landrieu, Collins,
Brown, Johnson, Portman, and Moran.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order.
Good morning, and thanks to those who are here,
particularly Director Mark Sullivan of the U.S. Secret Service
agency, and Charles Edwards, the Acting Inspector General of
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Over its nearly 150-year history, the Secret Service has
built an extraordinary reputation for selfless and skilled
devotion to the important and dangerous work its agents do:
Protecting the President of the United States and other high
officials of our government, as well as foreign leaders who
visit the United States.
That great reputation, was, sadly, stained last month when
11 Secret Service employees engaged in a night of heavy
drinking in Cartagena, Colombia, which ended with them taking
foreign national women back to their hotel rooms.
We have called this hearing as part of our Committee's
responsibility to oversee the functions of the Federal
Government, particularly those within the Department of
Homeland Security, including the U.S. Secret Service.
There are three things we hope to accomplish today and in
our Committee's ongoing investigation.
First, we want to get the facts about what precisely
happened in Cartagena and where the Secret Service's own
investigation of Cartagena stands today.
As has widely been reported, the misconduct involved 11
agents and officers who arrived in Cartagena the morning of
Wednesday, April 11, and were off duty the rest of the day.
The men went out--in groups of two, three, and four--to
four different nightclubs that evening. After considerable
drinking, they returned to their rooms at the El Caribe Hotel
with women they had met at the clubs--some of whom were
prostitutes--and registered the women as overnight guests
according to hotel rules. The Secret Service subsequently
learned that another individual engaged in similar conduct in
Cartagena, the night of Monday, April 9. All of the agents and
officers held security clearances, and two were in supervisory
positions.
If one of the agents had not argued with one of the women
about how much he owed her, the world would never have known
this sordid story.
But the world does know this sordid story, and that is why
the Secret Service, the Inspector General (IG), and we must do
everything we can to learn the truth, as best we can. Our
purpose is not to diminish the U.S. Secret Service but, quite
the contrary, to help restore its credibility which our Nation,
indeed the continuity of our government, so clearly depends
upon.
Second, as part of that search for truth and lessons to be
learned, we need to know if there were warning signs that
misconduct had become a pattern among traveling Secret Service
agents, in the years before Cartagena, that should have been
seen and stopped. It is hard for many people, including me, I
will admit, to believe that on one night in April 2012, in
Cartagena, Colombia, 12 Secret Service agents--there to protect
the President--suddenly and spontaneously did something they or
other agents had never done before, that is, go out in groups
of two, three, or four to four different nightclubs or strip
clubs, drink to excess, and then bring foreign national women
back to their hotel rooms.
That lingering disbelief led our Committee to send a series
of questions to the Secret Service to determine if there was
any evidence in their records of patterns of previous
misconduct. We have begun to review the agency's answers and
have found individual cases of misconduct over the last 5 years
that I would say are troubling, but do not yet find evidence at
all sufficient to justify a conclusion of a pattern or culture
of misconduct.
But the Secret Service disciplinary records, of course,
only take us so far. They only include cases where misconduct
was observed, charged, and/or adjudicated.
We can only know what the records of the Secret Service
reveal and what others, including whistleblowers, come forward
to tell us. Thus far, the Committee has received a relatively
small number of calls from people outside; whistleblowers. But
thus far they, too, have not provided evidence of a pattern of
misconduct by Secret Service agents similar to what happened in
Cartagena.
However, we have not concluded our oversight of this
matter, nor has the Department of Homeland Security Inspector
General. And, therefore, in this public forum, I would ask
anyone who has information about the conduct of the Secret
Service employees over the years that they believe is relevant
to our investigation to contact our staff at the Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs Committee here at the U.S.
Capitol.
Today's Washington Post reports, based on multiple
anonymous sources that, ``sexual encounters during official
travel had been condoned under an unwritten code that allows
what happens on the road to stay on the road.'' The article
also contends that this tolerance was part of what was called
the ``Secret Circus''--a mocking nickname the employees
apparently use when large numbers of agents and officers arrive
in a city.
One of the men implicated in Cartagena has told associates
that a senior security supervisor had advised agents to follow
loose guidelines when spending time with women they met on the
road: One-night stands were permitted as long as the
relationship ended when the agent left the country. This
Washington Post article, which, again, I say was based on
anonymous sources--though the article contends there were
multiple sources--obviously encourages people's worse
suspicions about a pattern of conduct existing within the
Secret Service and needs a response from Director Sullivan,
hopefully this morning.
In addition, as I mentioned, our initial review of the
Secret Service agency's disciplinary records for the last 5
years, which is what we requested, shows some individual cases
of misconduct which are troubling but are not evidence yet of a
pattern of misconduct. These records do reveal 64 instances--
again, over 5 years--in which allegations or complaints
concerning sexual misconduct were made against employees of the
Secret Service. Most of these complaints involved sending
sexually explicit emails or sexually explicit material on a
government computer, although three of the complaints involved
charges of an inappropriate relationship with a foreign
national woman, and one was a complaint of nonconsensual sexual
intercourse. And, of course, either this morning or in our
investigation, we would like the Secret Service response to
those as we need to know more about them.
Thirty other cases over 5 years involved alcohol, almost
all relating to driving while under the influence. I hasten to
say that these complaints involve a very small percentage of
the thousands of people who have worked at the U.S. Secret
Service during the last 5 years. And I also want to say that
discipline was imposed in most of the cases. Nonetheless, it is
important for us to know how those complaints were handled and
whether, looking back, they should have been warnings of worse
to come.
We want to know what reforms the Secret Service is
implementing to make sure that what happened in Cartagena never
happens again.
I know Secret Service Director Sullivan has already made
some changes, such as increasing the no alcohol before
reporting for duty rule from 6 to 10 hours and banning foreign
national women explicitly from hotel rooms.
But I also want to hear what the Secret Service is doing to
encourage people to report egregious behavior when they see
it--to ensure that no code of silence exists among agents and
officers.
Finally, let me put this in a larger context. In the last
several days, the Secret Service has been called on to provide
protection for a large number of world leaders who were
attending both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and the G-8 summits in the United States. The presidential
campaigns of 2012 are ongoing, and the Secret Service needs to
protect the candidates and secure two large national
conventions. And, of course, ultimately, and most importantly,
the President and Vice President of the United States and their
families need protection every day.
That is why the Cartagena scandal has to be dealt with head
on and quickly. The credibility of the Secret Service is too
important and its mission too critical to our country to leave
any questions about Cartagena and what preceded it unanswered.
I want to personally thank Secret Service Director Sullivan
for his cooperation with our investigation and also to thank
him because he has worked very hard and fast since he learned
of the crisis to investigate it and try to restore the
credibility of the Secret Service.
Director Sullivan, I look forward to your testimony, as I
do to yours, Inspector General Charles Edwards.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin my
remarks today by stating my strong belief that the vast
majority of the men and women of the U.S. Secret Service are
professional, disciplined, dedicated, and courageous. They do a
difficult job extraordinarily well.
The honorable conduct of the many true professionals of the
Secret Service stands in stark contrast to the misconduct that
occurred in Colombia last month on the eve of the President's
visit there. The timing makes the appalling behavior all that
much more troubling not only to me but also to the majority of
Secret Service personnel both past and present.
I will not dwell on the details of the incident since they
have already been so widely reported and I am sure will be
discussed by Director Sullivan today. The behavior is morally
repugnant, and I certainly do not want to downplay that fact.
My concerns, however, go far beyond the morality of the agents'
actions.
First of all, this reckless behavior could easily have
compromised the individuals charged with the security of the
President of the United States. And, second, the facts so far
lead me to conclude that, while not at all representative of
the majority of Secret Service personnel, this misconduct was
almost certainly not an isolated incident. Let me discuss both
of these concerns in a bit more detail.
It is basic ``Counterintelligence 101'' that Secret Service
personnel and others holding sensitive positions of trust in
the U.S. Government should avoid any situation that could
provide a foreign intelligence, security service, or criminal
gangs with the means of exerting coercion or blackmail. Yet two
of the primary means of entrapment--sexual lures and alcohol--
were both present here in abundance.
While the preliminary investigation has shown that none of
these men had weapons or classified material in their hotel
rooms, they still could easily have been drugged or kidnapped
or had their liaisons with these foreign national women used to
blackmail them, thereby compromising their effectiveness and
potentially jeopardizing the President's security. They
willingly made themselves potential targets not only for
intelligence or security services, but also for groups like the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) or drug cartels.
There is absolutely no excuse for, or factor that can
mitigate, such recklessness. The Secret Service, to its credit,
has tightened up its regulations and oversight to try to ensure
that this never happens again.
Second, the facts suggest to me that this likely was not
just a one-time incident.
If only one or two individuals out of the 160 male Secret
Service personnel assigned to this mission had engaged in this
type of serious misconduct, then I would think it was an
aberration. But that was not the case; there were 12
individuals involved--12. That is 8 percent of the male Secret
Service personnel in-country and 9 percent of those staying at
a particular hotel.
Moreover, contrary to the conventional story line, this was
not simply a single, organized group that went out for a night
on the town together. Rather, these were individuals and small
groups of two and three agents who went out at different times
to different clubs, bars, and brothels, but who all ended up in
compromising circumstances.
In addition, and perhaps most troubling, two of the
participants were supervisors--one with 22 years of service and
the other with 21 years. That surely sends a message to the
rank-and-file that this kind of activity is somehow tolerated
on the road.
The numbers involved, as well as the participation of two
senior supervisors, lead me to believe that this was not a one-
time event. Rather, the circumstances unfortunately suggest
that different rules apply on the road, and they suggest an
issue of culture.
And it may well be a culture that spans agencies. The
Secret Service and the Department of Justice Inspector General
are continuing to investigate yet another Secret Service agent
and at least two Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) personnel who
entertained female foreign nationals in the Cartagena apartment
of one of the DEA agents.
Moreover, the evidence thus far in that investigation
suggests that was not a one-time incident.
And, of course, the original reports out of Colombia also
alleged misconduct by about a dozen members of our Armed
Forces.
Again, I want to emphasize that the vast majority of our
law enforcement and military personnel are real heroes, and I
deeply appreciate the dangers that those deployed overseas face
every day. Given this apparent question of culture, however, I
am pleased that the Department of Homeland Security Inspector
General will be examining the culture of the Secret Service to
see if there is something systemic that led to these incidents.
And the Director himself has convened a task force. I will
follow these developments closely.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I do want to join you in recognizing
that Director Sullivan and the Acting IG have acted in a
forthright and open manner with this Committee over the past 6
weeks as we have attempted to better understand the
ramifications and causes of this scandal.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important
hearing.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Collins,
for your opening statement.
Director Sullivan, we thank you for being here, and we
would welcome your testimony at this time.
TESTIMONY OF MARK J. SULLIVAN,\1\ DIRECTOR, U.S. SECRET
SERVICE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman,
Senator Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the
facts surrounding the misconduct of U.S. Secret Service
employees in Cartagena, Colombia, the immediate actions taken
by the agency to ensure the protective mission was not
compromised, the results to date of the agency's internal
investigation into this matter, and the actions that have been
put into place thus far.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Sullivan appears in the Appendix
on page 42.
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The last several weeks have been a difficult time for the
U.S. Secret Service, and I would like to begin by talking about
the outstanding men and women who serve in our organization.
The overwhelming majority of the men and women who serve in
this agency exemplify our five core values of justice, duty,
courage, honesty, and loyalty. On a daily basis, they are
prepared to lay down their lives to protect others in service
to their country. And it is precisely because of these
longstanding values that the men and women of this agency are
held to a higher standard.
Clearly, the misconduct that took place in Cartagena,
Colombia, is not representative of these values or of the high
ethical standards we demand from our nearly 7,000 employees. I
am deeply disappointed and I apologize for the misconduct of
these employees and the distraction that it has caused.
The men and women of the U.S. Secret Service are committed
to continuing to live up to the standards that the President,
the Congress, and the American people expect and deserve. From
the beginning of this incident, we have strived to keep Members
of Congress and our committees of jurisdiction up to date as
information became available. While my written testimony
provides an overview of our findings to date, I am committed to
keeping you informed as our review continues.
Immediately upon learning of the allegations of misconduct,
I directed Secret Service supervisory personnel in Cartagena to
initiate an investigation and conduct preliminary interviews of
any Secret Service employee alleged to be involved in this
incident. Once the preliminary interviews had taken place, I
ordered all 11 people alleged to be involved in misconduct to
immediately return to the United States.
The prompt removal of these individuals enabled us to make
necessary replacements and adjustments to the staffing plan in
advance of the President's arrival in Cartagena. On Saturday,
April 14, the morning after their return to the United States,
these 11 individuals were interviewed by our Office of
Professional Responsibility (RES), which acts as our agency's
internal affairs component. At the conclusion of these
interviews, all 11 individuals were placed on administrative
leave, their security clearances were suspended, and all of
their equipment was surrendered pending the outcome of this
investigation. As the investigation progressed, a 12th person
was implicated. At this point, administrative action has been
taken relative to all 12 individuals.
In addition, during the course of our internal
investigation, we had one individual self-report an incident
unrelated to the misconduct that occurred at the El Caribe
Hotel. This individual, too, has been placed on administrative
leave pending the investigation and their clearance has been
suspended.
During the course of the investigation, we confirmed that
none of the 12 individuals had received a briefing regarding
their protective assignment prior to the misconduct taking
place. We also confirmed that none of the 12 individuals had
any sensitive security documents, firearms, radios, or other
security-related equipment in their hotel room.
Since the beginning of this investigation, we have been
transparent and forthcoming with the Department of Homeland
Security's Office of Inspector General (OIG). I have instructed
our Office of Professional Responsibility to cooperate fully
with DHS Acting Inspector General Edwards as his office
conducts its own comprehensive review of the matter.
As I mentioned at the beginning of my statement, while the
overwhelming majority of the men and women who serve in our
agency exemplify the highest standards of professionalism and
integrity, I want to ensure that this type of misconduct that
occurred in Cartagena, is not repeated. As a result, a number
of enhancements to existing codes of conduct, in addition to
some new policies, have been put in place as detailed in my
written statement.
I have also established a Professionalism Reinforcement
Working Group to look at the efficacy of our employment
standards, background investigations, disciplinary actions,
ethics training, and all related policies and procedures.
Director John Berry from the Office of Personnel Management
(OPM) and Director Connie Patrick from the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center are co-chairs of this group.
I am confident that this review will provide us with an
objective perspective on our organizational practices,
highlighting both areas where we excel and identifying areas
where we may improve.
The U.S. Secret Service is an organization that maintains
deep pride in the work it does on behalf of our Nation.
Throughout our 147-year history, the agency has demanded
service with honor and distinction by its agents, officers, and
administrative professional and technical staff. All employees
are expected to adhere to the highest standards of personal and
professional integrity and recognize that the success of our
agency's mission depends on the strong character and sound
judgment of our people.
One of the greatest privileges I have is swearing in new
agents and officers. It gives all of us a tremendous sense of
pride to witness a new generation take that same oath we took
many years ago. That pride comes for all of us from being part
of a special organization with a history of dedicated people
who serve our country honorably.
Over the past several weeks, we have been under intense
scrutiny as a result of this incident. To see the agency's
integrity called into question has not been easy. Through it
all, the men and women of the U.S. Secret Service have
demonstrated professionalism and integrity in their daily work.
Just this past weekend, the agency successfully completed
security operations for the G-8 in Maryland and the NATO
summit, which included the gathering of more than 40 world
leaders from four continents, in the city of Chicago.
Concurrent with these events, we continue the planning for
similar large-scale security operations for the Republican
National Convention in Tampa, Florida, and the Democratic
National Convention in Charlotte, North Carolina, later this
summer. All of this comes on top of exceptional work carried
out every day in field offices around the country and
throughout the world.
Today, as I testify before you, the men and women of this
organization are protecting world leaders, presidential
candidates, former presidents, numerous embassies in
Washington, DC, conducting criminal investigations, keeping
American citizens and financial institutions safe from
financial fraud, and preparing for the Presidential
Inauguration. They are overall making a positive impact on
their community.
I am grateful to them for what they do every single day,
and my sincere hope is that they are not defined by the
misconduct of a few but, rather, by the good work that they
perform with character and integrity.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here today. I
will be more than happy to answer any questions you may have.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Director Sullivan.
And now the Acting Inspector General of the Department of
Homeland Security, Charles Edwards.
TESTIMONY OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS,\1\ ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Edwards. Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, Senator
Collins, and distinguished Members of the Committee. I
appreciate this opportunity to update you on the Inspector
General's actions to review and monitor the U.S. Secret
Service's investigation of the incident in Cartagena, Colombia,
involving Secret Service employees' interactions with Colombian
nationals on April 11 and 12. Our role began almost immediately
after the incident when, on April 13, Director Sullivan and I
discussed the events. We have since remained in regular
contact. Director Sullivan has repeatedly stated to me his
commitment to conduct a thorough investigation. His actions so
far have demonstrated that commitment, and the Secret Service
has been completely transparent and cooperative with OIG
inspectors and investigators since our team started its work.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Edwards appears in the Appendix
on page 50.
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On April 26, I instructed our Assistant IG for Inspections
and the Acting Assistant IG for Investigations to review the
Secret Service's handling of its internal investigation
regarding the incident in Cartagena. The next day, our
Assistant IG for Inspections and the Acting Deputy Assistant IG
for Investigations met with officials from Secret Service's
Office of Professional Responsibility (RES), which is
conducting the internal investigation, and briefed them on the
objectives of our review.
Our Assistant IG for Inspections has assembled a nine-
person review team, led by a veteran chief inspector and
augmented by three OIG criminal investigators.
On May 2, this team met with RES officials and began part
one of our three-part review. In part one, we are evaluating
the adequacy of Secret Service's response to the incident in
Cartagena; the adequacy of the scope, methodology, and
conclusions of its internal investigation; and the sufficiency
of the corrective actions already implemented or planned.
We are in the process of interviewing Secret Service
personnel responsible for coordinating the agency's response to
the incident and conducting its investigation as well as
personnel within the Office of the Director, the RES, those in
charge of field operations, and the office responsible for
security clearances.
We will review all records, documents, and other materials
related to the Secret Service's internal investigation,
including RES's standards for inspection and investigation. We
will review protocols for advance teams, the Secret Service
Code of Conduct, and disciplinary processes and records.
Our field work for part one of our review is currently
taking place in Washington, DC. We have started meeting with
RES staff members who interviewed the Secret Service employees
who were in Cartagena at the time of the incident. We have also
started reviewing the records that resulted from RES interviews
of nearly 200 Secret Service employees who were associated with
the President's visit, as well as 25 employees of the Hilton
and El Caribe hotels in Cartagena.
Besides, we plan to interview Special Agent-in-Charge Paula
Reid, who had on-site responsibility for the Secret Service's
Cartagena detail. We also plan to interview Director Sullivan.
We will review the Secret Service's report on its internal
investigation as soon as it becomes available. Contingent upon
our receipt of that report, our goal is to complete the first
phase of our review and report our findings by July 2.
Immediately thereafter, we will begin part two of our
review, during which we will determine whether certain
workplace conditions and issues have promoted a culture within
the Secret Service that could have contributed to the Cartagena
incident. We will examine the Secret Service's recruiting,
vetting, and hiring practices. We will also examine the Secret
Service's Equal Employment Opportunity and Merit System
Protection Board cases, communications within the agency, its
administration of awards and discipline, training, and any
other programs that might cast light on the organizational
culture of the Secret Service. This portion of our work will
include site visits to the Miami and other field offices.
The third phase of our review will examine the Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU) between the Secret Service and our
office. We will evaluate changes in both Secret Service and
Office of Inspector General investigative capabilities since
the MOU was created in 2003 and determine whether changes are
necessary. It is likely that we will conduct this phase
concurrently with phase two. We will report our findings on
both phases two and three later this year.
Finally, I would like to stress that the value of the
Secret Service's efforts to date in investigating its own
employees should not be discounted. It has done a credible job
of uncovering the facts and has taken swift and decisive
action.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement, and I
would be happy to answer any questions that you or the
Committee Members may have. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Mr. Edwards, for your
testimony and for what you have been doing.
We will start with 7-minute rounds of questions for each of
the Senators here.
Director Sullivan, you have told us that you were shocked
by the behavior of the 12 agents in Cartagena, and I believe
you were. And you have felt confident that their behavior was
not a common occurrence within the ranks of the Secret Service.
I wanted to ask you, after reading the Washington Post
story today, whether you have that same confidence. In other
words, can you give us your first reaction to what is contained
in that story? And, obviously, most damningly, ``Current and
former agency employees say that sexual encounters during
official travel had been condoned under an unwritten code that
allows what happens on the road to stay there.''
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Senator. I absolutely feel the
same way about the men and women of the U.S. Secret Service and
the culture after reading that article. When I read that
article, it cited numerous anonymous sources. I guess what I
would ask is that if people do have information, I want them to
come forward with that information, either to our Office of
Professional Responsibility or to the DHS IG. But the thought
or the notion that this type of behavior is condoned or
authorized is just absurd, in my opinion. I have been an agent
for 29 years now. I began my career for 7 years in Detroit. I
was on the White House detail twice. I have worked for a lot of
men and women in this organization. I never one time had any
supervisor or any other agent tell me that this type of
behavior is condoned. I know I have never told any of our
employees that it is condoned.
So I feel as strongly now as I did before I read that
article.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Edwards, let me ask you, because at
least some significant part of the conclusions drawn--again,
generally without attribution--in the Washington Post article
today are based on conversations with some of the 12, perhaps
all of the 12 agents involved in the Cartagena scandal. Are you
intending to interview any or all of them about what happened?
Mr. Edwards. Thank you, sir. Yes, we are going to be
interviewing all 12. In fact, this afternoon, we are going to
be interviewing two of those individuals.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, that is very important and very
encouraging news because obviously you are conducting a formal
Inspector General investigation, and, therefore, if they repeat
the allegations they have made to the newspaper, presumably you
will find out whether they are credible or not and report to us
and to the public as your investigation goes on.
Director Sullivan, let me ask you, with respect to your own
investigation thus far and the individuals alleged to have
behaved improperly, were they asked whether they had engaged in
similar conduct on other occasions?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir, they were.
Chairman Lieberman. And what was their answer?
Mr. Sullivan. Their answer was they had not.
Chairman Lieberman. They had not. And just for the record,
were they under oath when they were interrogated?
Mr. Sullivan. I believe they all gave a signed oath to
that, but I will have to get back to you on that, Senator. I am
not sure if they were under oath.
Chairman Lieberman. I would appreciate that.
I know they all were offered the opportunity to take a
polygraph test, and it would be of interest to me whether
during that test they were also asked whether they had ever
been involved in similar behavior.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir, and there are some--we did use
every investigative tool we had, including polygraph
interviews, talking to other people, looking at records, and
thus far, we have not found that this type of behavior was
exhibited by any of these individuals before.
Chairman Lieberman. Were the Secret Service personnel
questioned during your own investigation asked whether they
considered their conduct acceptable for some reason?
Mr. Sullivan. Sir, this was a question an awful lot of us
have asked ourselves over the last month and a half, and I
believe when many of these people were interviewed, I do not
think they could explain why they exhibited the behavior that
they did.
Chairman Lieberman. For instance, some people have tried to
explain and understand why such risky, really irresponsible
behavior would be carried out by Secret Service agents on
assignment and have said perhaps they were influenced by the
fact that prostitution was legal in Colombia. I take it that
would not matter so far as the Secret Service is concerned
because whether prostitution was legal or not--they, by their
behavior, would run the risk of compromising the security of
the President of the United States because who knows who they
are with on those occasions.
Mr. Sullivan. Senator Lieberman, absolutely. You know,
there is no excuse for that type of behavior from both a
conduct perspective and from a national security perspective.
That type of behavior was just reckless.
Chairman Lieberman. Understood. Over the past 5 years,
based on our review of the disciplinary records that we have so
far gone over, which you provided to the Committee in response
to our question, there appear to have been five cases that are
directly relevant to what happened in Cartagena and, therefore,
potentially noteworthy: Three allegations involving
inappropriate or undocumented contact with a foreign national
woman, one allegation of contact with a prostitute, and one
allegation of nonconsensual sex.
Director Sullivan, are you aware of these cases? And if so,
can you tell us what was involved and how the agency handled
them?
Mr. Sullivan. I believe so, sir. First of all, any type of
misconduct we take extremely seriously and we investigate it to
the end limit. The one I believe you are talking about with the
nonconsensual sex was investigated by law enforcement, and
after doing an intense investigation on that, decided not to go
forward with any charges on that one.
Chairman Lieberman. And may I ask, if it is appropriate,
whether the complainant was somebody within the Secret Service,
in other words, a fellow employee, or someone outside, a
citizen?
Mr. Sullivan. Somebody who was outside the organization,
Senator. The other three with the foreign national contact,
again, all of those were investigated and the appropriate
administrative action was taken on those three.
Chairman Lieberman. Did any of those have characteristics
similar to what happened in Cartagena, that they were women or
prostitutes that they picked up.
Mr. Sullivan. No, nothing to do with prostitution. I
believe these were women that they had contact with, but
nothing like this situation we are referring to now.
Chairman Lieberman. Were these long-term relationships, to
the best of your understanding, or just people they met when
they were on assignment in a foreign location?
Mr. Sullivan. At least one of them, I believe, Senator, was
somebody who they had met and they continued with the contact
via email.
Chairman Lieberman. And, finally, what about the one case
that we have seen in the record of contact with a prostitute,
which I gather occurred right here in Washington?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir. Back in 2008, an individual was
involved with prostitution and was separated from our agency a
month later.
Chairman Lieberman. Was that individual on duty at that
time?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. And I take it this was not somebody he
met during the course of his work, but he was caught in a
sting. Is that correct?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir. As I understand it, he solicited an
undercover police officer.
Chairman Lieberman. We will continue to talk about those
cases. Thanks for being so responsive. My time is up.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Sullivan, it is my understanding that all of the
Secret Service personnel involved, with the possible exception
of one agent who may have used another agent's name, registered
the women at the hotel's front desk using their real names and
using the women's real names. Is that accurate?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, it is, Senator.
Senator Collins. That fact made your investigation easier
in terms of tracking down the women, but it also seems to
reinforce the claim that this kind of conduct has been
tolerated in the past. In other words, it suggests to me that
the agents were so unconcerned about being caught or about the
impropriety of their actions that they did not even seek to
conceal it.
What is your reaction? Do you think that the fact that they
followed the rules of the hotel in registering the women, they
used their real names, they used the women's real names,
suggests that they were not really worried about being caught?
Mr. Sullivan. Senator, I have tried to figure this out for
a month and a half what would ever possess people to exhibit
this type of behavior. Again, I will tell you that I do not
think this is indicative of the overwhelming majority of our
men and women, as you mentioned before, Senator. But I just
think that between the alcohol--and, I do not know, the
environment--these individuals did some really dumb things. And
I just cannot explain why they would have done what they would
do, but I will tell you that I do not believe they did it
because they believed that this type of behavior would be
tolerated. We have a zero tolerance for this type of behavior.
But I cannot figure out why they did what they did.
Senator Collins. What troubles me about this is, again, I
will go back to the fact that this was not a case where these
12 men together were out on the town in the same club bringing
back women from that one source. They went out on the town in
small groups, in some cases two or three or individually; yet
each one of them comes back to the hotel, makes no attempt to
conceal the fact that they are bringing foreign national women
into the hotel, actually register them at the front desk, they
do not try to conceal their actions in any way. That suggests
to me that they were not worried about being caught, that they
did not think there would be consequences if they were caught.
Otherwise, wouldn't you expect that they would try to conceal
their actions?
Mr. Sullivan. Senator, when I was first apprised of this
situation, I was dumbfounded--that people on an assignment
protecting the President in a foreign country could have acted
in this manner, it was a very easy decision for me to say we
need to bring them back here. And, again, Senator, I have no
excuse for those actions. All I can tell you is that we acted
quickly and brought them back here and initiated our
investigation.
Senator Collins. Let me turn to another but related issue.
When you discovered what had happened, you updated some of the
training manuals. In late April, you issued a directive that
clearly says that the laws of this country apply to Secret
Service personnel while abroad. And I give you credit for
issuing that to make it crystal clear. But wasn't your
guidance, as I look through your adjudication guidelines and
the eligibility for access to classified information, isn't it
already pretty clear in those guidelines that this kind of
behavior would not be acceptable?
Mr. Sullivan. Senator, absolutely. We put these new
enhanced guidelines out. I have been accused of being draconian
for putting them out, and maybe they are. I think, again, I go
back to the overwhelming majority of our men and women. I do
not think that our men and women need these guidelines because
we have men and women of character and integrity. But what I
wanted to make sure is even if there is one individual out
there who just did not understand it, we wanted to make sure we
reached these individuals.
But you are absolutely right. There are adjudicative
guidelines out there. People are aware of what those
adjudicative guidelines are. We are a professional
organization. We travel around the world. Over the last 6
years, we have done 37,000 trips around the world, and we have
had no situation like this one before. And, again, I am
confident this is not a cultural issue, this is not a systemic
issue with us. We make decisions every single day. Our
employees make some really critical decisions that, again, the
overwhelming majority of the time they make good decisions. On
this particular trip, we had some individuals who made very bad
decisions. That is why it is very important for us to have a
strong Office of Professional Responsibility and to have a good
relationship with the Inspector General, because when those
individuals, which are in the minority, make bad decisions,
when they make bad choices, when there is misconduct or
misbehavior, we are going to act appropriately.
Senator Collins. I guess the point I was trying to make is,
as I read these guidelines, it specifically refers to engaging
in any activity that is illegal in that country or that is
legal in that country but illegal in the United States. So
there is no doubt that officially this kind of behavior was
already prohibited prior to your issuing the directive on April
27, correct?
Mr. Sullivan. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Collins. Mr. Edwards, in just the few seconds I
have left, are you conducting an independent investigation of
what occurred in Colombia? Or are you simply reviewing the
investigation that Director Sullivan and his staff are
conducting?
Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Senator. I am deeply troubled, just
as you are, and we are doing a comprehensive review. In that
what I mean is we are reviewing the investigation that is done
by Secret Service. At the same time, we are also doing some
independent interviews ourselves. We also want to talk to the
people who are interviewing the personnel. We have done 23. We
have also sat in on about six of the interviews that were
conducted.
In order for us to get a comprehensive report--I do not
have the personnel to go interview all 200 of them, but we are
doing a random sampling of them to make sure that our review
and investigation is independent and transparent.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Let me just say, Mr. Chairman, that I think it is critical
that the IG do a completely independent investigation, not just
a review of the agency's investigation. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins. I agree with
you. I know this will require a commitment of personnel by you,
Mr. Edwards, but I think it is so important to get to the
bottom of this event, to get to the truth of it so that we can
find out exactly what happened. And the aim here is, of course,
to restore confidence to the Secret Service, which most of
whose members obviously deserve it by their work. So I agree
with that.
The Members of the Committee, as is our custom, will be
called in order of appearance, and in that regard, Senator
Brown is next.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Sullivan, thank you. Mr. Edwards, thank you for
attending.
Mr. Sullivan, listening to your testimony, you said you
were not aware that this has happened before, and that is
evidenced by some of the investigations you have done in your
long history in the Secret Service. Is that correct?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, Senator.
Senator Brown. And you are still trying to figure it out,
is something you also said. Is that correct?
Mr. Sullivan. As far as figuring this type of behavior----
Senator Brown. Yes, the most recent event.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir.
Senator Brown. And you are making changes, doing ethics
training, changing policy. Is that also correct?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir.
Senator Brown. And you have said many times a majority of
the folks serving in the agency--and I would agree--do
wonderful work. They have many missions. They have served with
great pride and resourcefulness over, I believe, 147 years of
service. Is that also a fair statement?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, Senator.
Senator Brown. I know you have set out new guidelines, and
you indicated on your own, you just said that they were
draconian, as a matter of fact, and you hate to do them, but
you feel it is necessary. And I would ask, do you also trust
the men and women now that are serving, notwithstanding this
individual incident? Do you trust them in their sacrifice and
service in the job that they are doing right now?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir.
Senator Brown. The reason I am asking these questions is
because I know there is potentially a new policy to send a GS-
15 supervisor from the Office of Professional Responsibility,
which you indicated also that is a member of the internal
affairs division of the agency, to go and basically baby-sit
these agents when they are going overseas and doing their duty.
So I am a little bit confused as to why we would be sending a
$155,000 additional person to basically baby-sit people that--
you say this has not happened before, you have changed policy,
you have made draconian changes, and you trust the men and
women, yet we are going to be sending somebody to oversee that
they are, in fact, following your policies. I am not quite sure
how that makes financial sense, and re-establishes the so-
called trust that you have in the agency. Could you answer
that, please?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir. And, again, I was accused of being
draconian for putting these out, but we did feel that it was
important to get these out.
As far as the GS-15 from the Office of Professional
Responsibility going out, he or she will have an assignment. I
have heard them referred to as a ``baby-sitter.'' They are not.
They are there to be a working agent. However, one of the
things we did find on this particular trip was that when we did
have this situation we had to look at, the person we needed to
rely on was the special agent in charge of the Miami Field
Office, who did an outstanding job. And my preference would
have been for her to continue to work on the upcoming visit. We
do need to have supervision on these type of----
Senator Brown. Yes, but you already have supervision. You
have agents, you have agents in charge of agents, and you have
other agents in charge of those. You already have a chain of
command, and it seems like you are now going to insert an
internal affairs person to basically--you can call it a ``baby-
sitter,'' or you can call it somebody just overseeing what is
happening. I am just going on your testimony where you said you
have made changes, you trust these people, this is an
aberration, it is not something that habitually happened, you
had no knowledge, and yet we are going to spend the time and
effort and are going to take somebody away from doing another
job to be there just in case something like this happens. I am
wondering if you think it is a little bit overkill.
Mr. Sullivan. No, Senator, and maybe I am doing a bad job
of explaining this. We have a group of agents who go out, and
they are called a jump team. On this particular jump team, we
had 53 agents. This jump team was led by two GS-14s who were
two of the individuals who were involved in this incident.
What we have done now is we have replaced those two GS-14
supervisors with two GS-15 supervisors. One GS-15 is going to
come from the field, more than likely will be a GS-15 special
agent in charge of a field office, and then the other one will
be a GS-15 from our Office of Professional Responsibility. They
are not there to be a baby-sitter. They are going to have an
assignment. But if a situation does come up, they will be there
to resolve that situation.
Senator Brown. Is this on every mission that we do now?
Mr. Sullivan. This will be for every foreign trip.
Senator Brown. For every foreign trip. And how many foreign
trips do we actually conduct per year?
Mr. Sullivan. Sir, I would have to give you the numbers for
that.
Senator Brown. Around, approximately? Is it 10? Is it 100?
Is it 200 or 500? Give me just an approximation.
Mr. Sullivan. So far this year we have done about 200 trips
or so, but this is only for a presidential or a vice
presidential visit.
Senator Brown. And how many of those?
Mr. Sullivan. Sir, I would have to get you the number.
Senator Brown. If you could because, once again, you are
restructuring--you are changing the entire structure, putting
higher paid people, GS-15s in position. They should be doing
the job regardless of the GS level that they are at. And then,
changing and having someone there to oversee and be there, an
agency that you trust, I am still not quite----
Mr. Sullivan. Senator, I do trust our people, but we are
talking about protecting the President here, and I believe
supervision is very important. And, clearly, on this particular
trip, supervision was lacking. And if we have to put GS-15s on
a particular trip, then that is what we are going to do.
Senator Brown. OK.
Mr. Sullivan. We are going to see how it goes, and if we
believe we can go back to the way we had it before, we will do
that. But the one thing I want to make clear, these people are
not there to baby-sit, and these GS-15s from our Office of
Professional Responsibility are going to be the individuals who
are going to be giving an ethics briefing at the beginning of a
trip and a Code of Conduct briefing on a trip.
Senator Brown. How often do they get the ethics briefings?
Mr. Sullivan. They get those throughout their career during
training, and there is an annual requirement----
Senator Brown. So an annual ethics briefing, and how about
polygraphs every 10 years, I understand?
Mr. Sullivan. No. They get a polygraph at the beginning of
their career when they come on, and then after that we do 5-
year background updates. Some of our individuals, depending on
what type of position they hold, either internal or external to
the organization, they get polygraphs throughout their career
as well.
Senator Brown. And what is the average, about every 5 or 10
years.
Mr. Sullivan. Well, not all of our employees get polygraphs
every 5 years.
Senator Brown. How about these particular individuals that
would have been doing the job that they were doing? How often
would they get a polygraph?
Mr. Sullivan. Unless they are in a specialized position
where that was required, they would not have taken another
polygraph once they got their initial polygraph.
Senator Brown. So it could have been 10 or 20 years for
some of these people.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir.
Senator Brown. Do you think maybe we should review that
policy and have folks----
Mr. Sullivan. That is part of what we are looking at now.
Senator Brown. Do you think we would have actually found
out about this if we did not have an argument regarding price?
Mr. Sullivan. I do think we would have, Senator.
Senator Brown. How do you think we would have found out?
Mr. Sullivan. I think that somebody on this jump team would
have reported that.
Senator Brown. Well, if, in fact, you believe the
Washington Post article, this is something that has been
happening for quite a while, and yet you have never heard of
it. We are getting two different stories. So I would hope that,
Mr. Edwards, in your investigation we can find out what the
truth is and deal with the people that are not adhering to the
policy and deal with it accordingly. I agree with you, Mr.
Sullivan. I think there are some amazing men and women serving
in our Secret Service. You know, taking a bullet for the
President is the ultimate form of sacrifice that an agent could
make, and protecting our President and Vice President is the
most important thing that any individual in our government can
do, quite honestly. And I know there are some fine ones out
there, and, unfortunately, I agree with the Chairman, the image
is stained. And that is why I also appreciate your appearances
before us and your efforts to be open and forthright. I thank
you for holding this hearing, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sullivan. Senator, if I may, I would just like to
respond back to the Washington Post article. Again, that
referenced numerous anonymous sources there, and you had talked
about waste and mismanagement earlier. You know, there was an
allegation at the beginning of this about misconduct in El
Salvador, and a lot of people took that and ran with it because
it was reported on the news. I took that allegation very
seriously, and I sent our Office of Professional Responsibility
down to El Salvador for almost a week.
We spent thousands of dollars to send those people down
there. We interviewed 28 to 30 people. We went to four hotels
where our agents stayed. We talked to every hotel manager. We
talked to every security director for those hotels. We talked
to seven or eight of the contract drivers who our agents used.
We talked to the police chief. We talked to the owner of a
nightclub where this incident was alleged to have occurred. We
were unable to prove any of these allegations. We spoke to the
Regional Security Officer (RSO) who conducted his own
investigation down there.
So all I would say is that when you read about it in the
paper from an anonymous source, it is very difficult for us to
investigate that type of an allegation. I would say, again, we
would like to know who, when, where, and why, and the names of
people, as well as who these people are who are condoning it.
And I will just tell you, sir, that is not the organization I
know that we would condone such behavior.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Director. Thank you, Senator
Brown. Senator Johnson, you are next.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHNSON
Senator Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Director Sullivan
and Inspector General Edwards, thanks for testifying today.
First of all, I have great respect for the Secret Service,
and this is an incredibly sad episode, and this hearing is all
about how do you restore credibility. I am also sad to say--I
agree with Senator Collins--based on the facts of this case, it
is hard to believe that this is just a one-time occurrence. I
wish I could believe that, but it is just hard to believe.
I have a couple of questions. Let us go back to the
polygraphs that Senator Brown was asking about.
I think I heard you earlier say that the polygraphs were
offered to these agents. Was that not a requirement?
Mr. Sullivan. Sir, I believe we ended up doing about 14 or
15 polygraphs.
Senator Johnson. But, again, was it not a requirement?
Mr. Sullivan. Sir, they have the option to refuse a
polygraph.
Senator Johnson. What kind of constraints did you find in
your investigation? What constraints are there in trying to get
to the facts of this based on just worker protections?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, sir, going back to the polygraph, in
some cases, the polygraphs helped a couple of people keep their
job, and those particular individuals who refused to take the
polygraph, we were able to come up with other information that
refuted what they were saying. So for us not giving a polygraph
did not really impact the way this investigation was conducted
because we were able to prove the allegation without using the
polygraph.
Senator Johnson. Again, as we talked in our closed-door
briefing, my concern is that additional information starts
coming out, other stories come out month after month after
month, and we need to get this behind us. I would imagine you
have the exact same concern.
In your investigation, what are you doing to make sure that
we do not hear of another instance 2 or 3 months out?
Specifically, what are you doing to ensure that does not occur
other than just your belief that you have faith in your agents?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, sir, we put together this
Professionalism Reinforcement Working Group with Director Berry
and Director Patrick. The Inspector General is going to be
taking a look at our investigation. Last June, a governmentwide
Viewpoint survey, when asked if they would report an incident
of unethical behavior, I believe nearly 60 percent of our
employees responded that they would report it. We want to
improve that number until it is 100 percent. We want to
encourage our employees that if they see unethical behavior or
misconduct, we want that to be reported to us.
Senator Johnson. Forty percent is a very high percentage
that would not report. I guess that is my concern when you hear
the story of ``what is done on the road stays on the road.'' My
guess is that within the Secret Service there is a pretty high
level of esprit de corps, possibly even a code of silence. And
so barring utilization of polygraphs that are required, how do
you really get to the bottom of this?
Mr. Sullivan. Sir, I go back to leadership, that the
leadership that we have on these trips, the leadership that we
have in our organization, that they encourage our people and
make sure that people know that there is not going to be
retribution or that there is not going to be any negative
impact for them to report this type of behavior.
Senator Johnson. But you had leadership on these trips, and
these things occurred. So, again, how do we get to the bottom
of it? Is there some mechanism where we can require polygraphs,
I hate to say it, of the 7,000 members of the Secret Service to
actually get this episode behind us.
Mr. Sullivan. Sir, one of the things that we have looked at
is, do we need to increase the use of polygraph. We have a very
aggressive and a very good polygraph program. All of our agents
are polygraphed when they first come on the job. We do 5-year
updates for every single employee that we have. Every employee
we have maintains a top security clearance. But we are taking a
look at further use of polygraph.
Senator Johnson. What questions specifically in these types
of episodes would be asked in a polygraph test?
Mr. Sullivan. I think that is something we would have to
take a look at. There would be two different polygraphs we are
talking about here. There would be the national security
polygraph and then there would be the character issue
polygraph. And for each one there would be two or three
relevant questions that would be looking for our polygraphers
to ask the employees.
Senator Johnson. So in the polygraphs that were
administered voluntarily, was a more general question asked or
were only questions asked related to this specific episode? In
other words, did you ask those individuals that were
polygraphed, ``Have you ever participated in this type of
behavior in the past?''
Mr. Sullivan. That type of question I believe was asked in
the pre-test, but, again, sir, I would be more than happy to
get you answers to the exact questions that were asked.
Senator Johnson. I would like to know whether that question
was asked and whether the question was also asked, not only
under oath but also in the polygraph, ``Are you aware of any
other type of behavior by somebody else within the service?''
Mr. Sullivan. We will be happy to get that for you.
Senator Johnson. To me, those are the types of questions
that really do need to be asked almost universally if we are
going to get to the bottom of this.
Mr. Sullivan. OK.
Senator Johnson. In terms of taking disciplinary action, up
to and including discharge, do you feel constrained in your
employment policies of actually being able to take the
necessary steps?
Mr. Sullivan. No, sir. I believe we did a very swift and
comprehensive investigation, and we took the appropriate action
when we felt that we had enough information to take that
action.
Also, not only in this type of an investigation but any
investigation we do, when it comes to an employee, we want to
make sure that we protect the rights that they have. But,
again, we want to make sure that whatever decision we make is
going to be the right one and it is one that cannot be refuted.
Senator Johnson. We have had a number of agents retire but
now are trying to get back in the Secret Service or they are
challenging the dismissal. What are the numbers and what is the
status on that?
Mr. Sullivan. Right now, our numbers contradict what was in
the Washington Post article. We have two employees who had
originally said that they were going to resign that have now
come back and said that they are going to challenge their
resignations. And so now we will look to revoke their security
clearance.
Senator Johnson. Well, I am basically out of time. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Johnson. Senator
Portman.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PORTMAN
Senator Portman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Senator Collins, for holding the hearing and, more importantly,
for being on top of this situation from the start. I know that
you share the concern of our colleagues to be sure this is
fully investigated and the necessary reforms are put into
place. Thank you, Mr. Director, and the Acting IG for being
here and for your testimony. And, Director Sullivan, thanks for
your 29 years of service and for your willingness to take some
swift actions and also to be transparent, as the Acting IG
said, with him and to be honest with us up on the Hill as we
have asked questions over these past few weeks.
As is the case with the Chairman, I am a former protectee,
and I was in a Cabinet level role as U.S. Trade Representative
on a number of foreign trips where I had Secret Service
protection. And earlier, Director Sullivan, you talked about
the five core values of the service: Justice, duty, courage,
loyalty, and honesty. And I will say that my experience is that
the men and women who protected me exemplified those values.
And it is precisely because of my high regard for the character
and professionalism of those men and women and for the
importance of the Secret Service--and really its central role
in the continuity of our very governmental system--that I am so
concerned about what happened and so deeply troubled by the
incident that is the subject of this hearing today.
We all have a role to fully investigate this as a result,
and we all have a role to be sure that this kind of risky and
unprofessional behavior does not occur again by putting in
place new protocols to try to restore the trust and confidence
of the American people.
So my questions are really about, going forward, what do we
do. Again, I think you took some appropriate, swift actions. I
think it was appropriate to remove the Secret Service personnel
from Colombia, as you did immediately. I think that some of the
immediate actions you have taken with regard to this incident
are appropriate. I have to agree with my colleagues that it may
not be an isolated incident given the fact that there were
supervisors involved among other aspects of this, and so I
would like to talk about what should be done in the future.
I have been interested in the discussion today about the
guidelines that are currently in place, and it is my view that
either because they are specifically written or because they
are understood, it is not as if there were not adequate
guidelines. I will read you from a couple of your guidelines.
One is the Code of Conduct, which says that the Secret Service
employees shall not engage in amoral, notoriously disgraceful
conduct, or other conduct prejudicial to the government.
Standards of conduct also specify that the absence of a
specific published standard of conduct covering an act tending
to discredit an employee or department does not mean such an
act is condoned. So even if it is not specifically identified
in terms of what happened in Cartagena, certainly it would fall
into this general category.
Also, under your rules of conduct with regard to security
clearances, it says that ``Contact with a foreign national, if
that contact creates a heightened risk of foreign exploitation,
inducement, manipulation, pressure, or coercion, is
inappropriate.'' The guidelines also warn ``against conduct,
especially while traveling outside the United States, which may
make an individual vulnerable to exploitation, pressure, or
coercion by a foreign person, group, or country.''
So it seems to me, you can write all the guidelines you
want, but if the culture does not reinforce, again, the five
core values we talked about and the integrity and
professionalism that I certainly saw in my experience with the
Secret Service, it will not be successful.
So we have talked a little bit about the Professional
Reinforcement Working Group. It seems like that is a good step
forward. What else would you recommend, Director Sullivan and
IG Edwards, in terms of looking from to ensure that this kind
of an incident never happens again?
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Senator. One of the things we did
was to look backwards. We looked at our discipline over the
last 5\1/2\ years, and when I look at that, it is under 1
percent of our population is involved in some type of
disciplinary action, and that just gives me reason to believe
that this is not part of the culture, and being part of this
organization for 29 years and never seeing anything like this
before in my life, I just believe very strongly that this just
is not part of our culture.
Senator Portman. Director, how many personnel do you have?
Mr. Sullivan. Close to 7,000.
Senator Portman. And on this jump team, there were 53
individuals, but how many U.S. Secret Service personnel were on
the Cartagena trip in total?
Mr. Sullivan. We had about 200 people on the trip. At the
time of this situation we had about 175 people who were in
Cartagena.
Senator Portman. And how many foreign trips had the Secret
Service been involved with? You talked about over 200 this year
alone.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir, and over the past 7 years, we have
done about 2,700 since----
Senator Portman. Two thousand, seven hundred foreign trips?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir.
Senator Portman. And this kind of an incident has not been
reported before?
Mr. Sullivan. No, sir. But, again, moving forward, I think
that with the Professionalism Reinforcement Working Group, we
are going to look at various areas. We have broken it up into
three different areas. There is going to be a Subcommittee on
Workforce Management, and we are going to take a look at how we
hire, our performance management, accountability, discipline,
and the security clearance process. We are also going to take a
look at our operational environment and have the subcommittee
look at our traditions, look at our operations, compare
ourselves to other law enforcement and military organizations,
take a look at the role of our high standards--that there is no
margin of error within our culture--and look at our workforce
programs, ombudsman programs, employee assistance program, and
diversity program. And we are also going to take a look at our
ethics communication training and professional development.
We do want to ensure that the men and women of this
organization are not just better but the best, and that is the
goal of that subcommittee.
Senator Portman. Well, thank you, Director Sullivan. My
time has now expired. Again, I appreciate your 29 years of
distinguished service, and, Mr. Edwards, I appreciate the way
you have worked seamlessly with the Secret Service. I know you
have a lot of other responsibilities at the Department of
Homeland Security, including other law enforcement
responsibilities. I am sure some of the best practices there
are also helpful, as the Director has said in part of this
review. Thank you for your testimony today.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Lieberman. Senator Portman, thank you. Senator
Carper.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARPER
Senator Carper. Thank you very much.
Those of us who serve in the Senate are privileged to serve
with a retired Navy admiral. His name is Barry Black. He is
Chief of Chaplains, formerly from the Navy Marine Corps, and
now the chaplain for the U.S. Senate. He oftentimes encourages
those of us who are privileged to serve here to ask for wisdom,
whatever our faith might be. And so we try to do that in
different ways.
As I was thinking about this hearing and preparing for this
hearing, I actually took a few minutes to go back and read one
of the most famous passages in the New Testament, from the Book
of John, and the setting is one that I think most people will
recall, where a woman had been accused of adultery, and she was
being surrounded by a group of men. The man involved in the
adultery was nowhere to be seen, but she was surrounded by a
group of men who held stones in their hands. And Jesus was
close by, and the Pharisee said to Jesus, Look, what do you
think should happen to this woman? And He was bending down,
writing stuff in the dirt, and He just kind of ignored them.
And after a while they said, Jesus, we are talking to you. What
do you think should happen to this woman? The laws of Moses say
that she should be stoned and her life taken from her as a
result of her sins.
Jesus kept writing in the dirt, and all He said was, ``Let
those of you who are without sin cast the first stone.'' That
is all He said. And one by one, the men holding the stones from
oldest to youngest dropped their stones and walked away. And
the woman was left there standing in the middle of this circle,
and the only person still there was Jesus. And He said to her,
``Woman, where are your accusers?'' And she said, ``They have
gone away.'' And He said to her, ``Your accusers have gone, and
I am not going to accuse you either.'' But then He added, ``Go
and sin no more.''
Nobody here is going to lose their life because of what
they did down in Colombia. They have lost their jobs. They have
lost their reputation. They have harmed the reputation of a
wonderful agency.
How many men and women serve in the Secret Service today?
Roughly how many?
Mr. Sullivan. Senator, just under 7,000.
Senator Carper. And if you go back in time, any idea how
many tens of thousands might have served in the Secret Service?
Mr. Sullivan. Tens of thousands. I do not have the exact
number, but a lot of people have come before us who we have
built this organization upon.
Senator Carper. One indiscretion of the nature that has
been reported in Colombia, one indiscretion is one too many.
Eleven or 12 are 11 or 12 too many. And the folks who have done
these things have not just ruined their careers, they helped
spoil the reputation of the tens of thousands of people who
have served and continue to serve in the Secret Service.
Having said that, none of us is without sin, and the key
here for us is to figure out what went wrong, to make sure that
those who have misbehaved are punished, and then make sure that
we have put in place the kind of policies and safeguards to
ensure that this kind of thing does not happen again.
Are you convinced, Mr. Edwards, that is what we have done?
Mr. Edwards. Can you repeat your question again, sir?
Senator Carper. The role here for us, and I think for you,
and certainly for Mr. Sullivan, is to ensure that we have found
out the facts, provided appropriate punishment for those who
have misbehaved, and to put in place the policies and the
safeguards to ensure that this kind of thing does not happen
again. Are you satisfied with the steps that have been taken
meet that test?
Mr. Edwards. Absolutely, sir. I will make sure that we do a
complete review and provide recommendations to Director
Sullivan to implement and make sure that this never happens
again.
Senator Carper. What further needs to be done, and what is
the appropriate role for the Congress?
Mr. Edwards. I owe it to the Secretary and to Congress for
me to do an independent review and be transparent and
accountable with the recommendations and report to you what
else can be done. I am still in the process of doing my review,
so I do not have any findings yet.
Senator Carper. Mr. Sullivan, could you just respond to
those questions as well, please?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir. We cannot ignore what happened in
Cartagena, but, again, I go back to the overwhelming men and
women in this organization doing an outstanding job every
single day. And my goal right now is to make sure that they
know that we have confidence in them and that we believe in
them and that we know that this is not indicative of their
character.
What I would ask is that we continue to get your support,
and I appreciate the complimentary things that you have said
about our men and women today. We have a very challenging year
that we are in the middle of right now. As I mentioned to you,
we just finished up the NATO summit and the G-8. But I would
ask for your continued support. I would ask for you to continue
to believe in what this organization is all about. And I would
ask that you just continue to believe in us and know that we
are going to do everything we can do to make sure that we
rebuild our reputation and do the right thing for the people
that we protect and serve.
Senator Carper. I will just close with this. You just
mentioned ``do the right thing,'' and some of the best guidance
I ever received in my life is ``to figure out the right thing
to do and just do it.'' Just do it consistently, not the easy
thing, not the expedient thing, but to do the right thing. And
I would just say to you and Mr. Edwards in your capacity to
ensure that you do the right thing.
The other thing I would say, all of us make mistakes. God
knows I have. I am sure my colleagues have as well and will
make others in the future. Having said that, some of the best
advice I ever got was actually from my father who essentially
said, talking about my work in life, he said, ``If it is not
perfect, just make it better.'' And everything I do I know I
can do better, and I think that is true of the behavior of all
of us and it is certainly with the behavior of folks who work
and have worked and will work in the future at the Secret
Service. If it is not perfect, make it better. That should be
our goal.
Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Senator.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Carper.
We will do a second round insofar as Members have
additional questions.
Would either or both of you like to take a 5-minute break,
or are you OK to go forward?
Mr. Sullivan. I am fine, Senator.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks.
Inspector General, let me just ask you, if you have not
said it already--maybe I missed it--generally speaking, what
kind of time schedule are you putting yourself on? I know it is
hard to do deadlines here, but you have three parts. Am I
correct to say that your first focus is going to be the review
and insofar as possible independent investigation of what
happened in Cartagena?
Mr. Edwards. Yes, sir. The first part, I need to look at is
the investigation, how it was done, the scope and methodology,
the questions asked, whether it is closed-ended or open
questions, and look at it; and now, after listening to you and
Senator Collins, for me to go back and redo all of the 200.
Originally, I was planning on getting this done by July 2, but
I am going to go back and revisit that because I truly want to
try to come up with an independent investigation on the first
part.
The second part is looking at the culture. This misbehavior
or this risky behavior, what is the cause for that? What is the
type of corrective action that was taken? What kind of vetting
process and ethics training was offered? So, to get an idea of
that, I need to do a comprehensive inspection on that, and I
plan to have that done by fall.
Chairman Lieberman. So at this point, it is fair to say
that if you do the kind of independent investigation of
Cartagena that we are talking about, you are probably not going
to be able to do it by early July, but hopefully you will have
it by the end of the summer? We are not holding you to that,
but is that a reasonable goal?
Mr. Edwards. I am going to put all my additional resources
and make sure that this is a top priority and get this done.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you.
Mr. Edwards, in response to the questions that our
Committee sent you, you indicated that you found in the IG case
files some record of an incident, 10 years ago actually, where
approximately five Secret Service agents were disciplined for
partying, and here I am quoting, ``partying with alcohol with
underage females in their hotel rooms'' while on assignment at
the 2002 Olympics. And, of course, this is of significance as
we try to determine whether there was further evidence of the
kind of misconduct that occurred at Cartagena.
Do you know at this point whether this is a credible
report?
Mr. Edwards. Thank you, sir. We received a hotline
complaint on April 20. This was referring to the February 2002
Winter Olympics in Salt Lake City. There were five Secret
Service agents that were sent home after police responded and
found them partying with alcohol with underage females in their
hotel rooms while on assignment. This was investigated by the
Secret Service at that time, and I think the outcome of that
was many of them have left the agency now, but since we
received a hotline complaint, I have an obligation to look into
it. So we are looking into it.
Chairman Lieberman. This is important. This actually came
in relatively recently over the hotline that you maintain,
which is an Internet hotline?
Mr. Edwards. Yes, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. You might want to mention what the
address is. Do you know it offhand?
Mr. Edwards. It is oig.dhs.gov.
Chairman Lieberman. So you are beginning to investigate
that.
Director Sullivan, do you have awareness of that incident?
I know you were not Director of the agency at that point.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir, as far as I know, there were three
individuals who were involved in that particular incident. I
believe that those individuals were gone within a very short
period of time after that incident. Again, I go back to the
fact that it does not represent the overwhelming majority of
our people, but like any allegation that comes to our
attention, we are going to investigate it, and we are going to
take the appropriate disciplinary action.
Chairman Lieberman. That leads me to ask this question. I
assume from everything you have said that the seriousness of
that behavior is not affected by the fact that it occurred
within the United States as opposed to outside in Colombia, and
it occurred presumably with young women who were not
prostitutes, that the behavior was unacceptable for Secret
Service personnel.
Mr. Sullivan. Well, again, as I understand the allegation,
it was underage individuals, and that would bring into account
the seriousness of the allegation.
Chairman Lieberman. In fact, probably in Utah it was a
crime. I am not asking you to opine on that, but----
Mr. Sullivan. Right. Senator, I have not looked at that
case, and I would be more than happy to. And, again, we will
cooperate fully with the IG.
Chairman Lieberman. So leave this case during the 2002
Olympics aside. Just to clarify, we are focused on these
matters, unfortunately, because of what happened in Cartagena,
Colombia, outside of the United States.
Mr. Sullivan. Right.
Chairman Lieberman. Am I correct in presuming that the
Secret Service would be just as concerned if you found that
agents on assignment somewhere here in the United States were
bringing back women who were not foreign nationals but who they
had just met somewhere to their rooms while on assignment
protecting somebody?
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, sir. I think anything that is going to
compromise our mission we are going to be concerned. And,
again, if we receive an allegation of that, we are going to
investigate. We want our people to live up to the standards of
our organization. And this was just handed to me by staff. I
guess these women in the Utah case were under the age of 21,
not under the age of 18. I am not sure what, if any, State-
specific legislation was there, but, again, I will be more than
happy to get the particulars for you. But what I do know is
that those employees were gone pretty quickly.
Chairman Lieberman. But just to make the point, the concern
that we have expressed, Senator Collins quite explicitly, and
what we are worried about is that an agent with the
responsibility to protect the President and Vice President
could be compromised by being involved in a casual sexual
relationship while on assignment on the road. So, ultimately,
it does not matter whether it happens in Cartagena, Colombia,
or Chicago, Illinois. True?
Mr. Sullivan. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. Let me come to just a final question
quickly. Senator Portman read from some of the Code of Conduct
for the Secret Service, and then the general rules more
governmentwide, if you will, for anybody seeking a security
clearance, and they are really quite explicit about what is
expected. The security clearance rules caution against contact
with a foreign national ``if that contact create a heightened
risk of foreign exploitation, inducement, manipulation,
pressure, or coercion.'' The guidelines also warn ``against
conduct, especially while traveling outside the United States,
which may make an individual vulnerable to exploitation,
pressure, or coercion by a foreign person, group, government,
or country,'' and that is a really pretty high standard.
What becomes of these guidelines, the Secret Service's own
Code of Conduct and the general governmentwide rules for people
who have security clearances? In other words, were the agents,
including those involved in this misconduct in Cartagena, were
they required to study these guidelines? Were they given
training sessions in them? In other words, anybody in their
right mind as a Secret Service agent, if they faced reality,
would have known that what they were doing in Cartagena that
night was just outrageously unacceptable and irresponsible. But
assuming for a moment they weren't in their right mind, do you
think they were adequately on notice of these rules of conduct
that this behavior was unacceptable?
Mr. Sullivan. Senator, I do. We are talking about two
different issues here. You have Codes of Conduct, and then you
have the security clearance issue. I will talk about Code of
Conduct first.
Code of Conduct with us starts from the recruitment
process. From the very beginning when we hire somebody to come
work for us, the first thing we talk to them about is character
and integrity. That is part of our background investigation.
That is part of the conversation that we have with the
employee. That is part of our polygraph. That goes right
through their initial training. From their first day on the job
and through their orientation, we talk about our Codes of
Conduct. That is also reinforced when they go through the
Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. It is reinforced again
when they go to our training facility in Beltsville, Maryland.
About a week or two before the agent or officer graduation, I
myself and the Deputy Director meet with each class for about
an hour and a half. The first thing we talk about is character,
and we tell these individuals that the thing that separated
them from the others was their character and their integrity.
When they go back into their field office, they have to
annually certify that they have read our Code of Conduct, that
they understand our Code of Conduct, and that is done with
their supervisor. And in between, as they go through the
organization, they attend our various training classes, whether
it is a supervisory training class or an in-service training
class, or when they get into upper management, we continue to
talk about our Code of Conduct.
As far as the security clearance issues, as you know,
Senator, we have adjudicative guidelines where this is all
spelled out. As a matter of fact, on the passport that we
travel on, it is indicated on the passport that you will abide
by the rules and regulations of the organization and of the
United States.
So, Senator, I do believe that it is pretty clear, I think,
to anybody in our organization. It is a common-sense thing to
me and a moral thing to me that people understand what the
expectation is.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you for that answer. I hope you
will take a fresh look at it, notwithstanding everything you
have said, to make sure that you are drilling all these values
that are important to the Secret Service, that are on paper,
that you have updated since Cartagena in a constructive way, so
that the next time a Secret Service agent or group of them
think about doing something like they did in Cartagena that
night, that a light will go off in their heads and they will
conclude the risk is too high. Probably in the short run, the
memory of Cartagena and the dishonor brought on the agents
there will be so fresh that this will not happen. But human
nature being what it is, over a period of time--we need to have
rules and procedures for drilling those rules into personnel
that go on for a much longer period of time, to a time when
what happened in Cartagena may not be as fresh in the minds of
future Secret Service agents.
My time is well up. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Sullivan, initially, you did not have information
about these women. Initially, you did not know whether they
were prostitutes or foreign agents or members of a terrorist
group or working for a drug cartel. Is that correct?
Mr. Sullivan. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Collins. So was there a sweep done of the hotel
rooms to see whether the women involved had planted any
electronic surveillance equipment?
Mr. Sullivan. Senator, one of the things we tell all of our
people on a foreign trip is never trust that your room is safe.
We did not do any type of a sweep on any of these rooms that
were used by these agents and officers.
Senator Collins. I would understand that there was no sweep
before the incident, but when you first learned of the
incident, was there any order given to do a sweep of the rooms
that the women had been in?
Mr. Sullivan. Other than a visual sweep, there was no type
of electronic sweep that was made. There was a visual sweep.
People went through the rooms. But as far as any type of
electronic sweep, Senator, there was not.
Senator Collins. Have you now been able to definitively
conclude that the women were not associated with foreign
agents, that they did not work for drug cartels, that they were
not involved in human trafficking, that they were not working
for FARC, for example, or other terrorist groups?
Mr. Sullivan. One of the first things we did, Senator, was
to get the names of all the women. We had their country
identification number. We provided those names and identifiers
to some of our various partners out there who could verify for
us if there was any connection with any type of criminal
activity or criminal organization as well as any type of
intelligence concerns that we may have. All of the information
that we have received back has concluded that there was no
connection either from an intelligence perspective or a
criminal perspective.
We have also been able to interview, I believe, all but two
women. I think we have interviewed nine or ten of the women,
working with the local police in Colombia and, again, that,
from all appearances in those interviews, has backed up the
information that we have been able to derive from these checks
we have done.
Senator Collins. It is somewhat ironic that we can be
relieved that the women for the most part were simply
prostitutes. That is a rather strange thing for us to take
comfort in in this case, but obviously, it would have been more
troubling if they were foreign agents or associated with drug
cartels or other criminal gangs.
Mr. Sullivan. Yes, Senator. Again, our investigation has
pretty much confirmed that these women did not know who these
individuals were, and were not aware that they worked for the
Secret Service.
Senator Collins. I want to return to an exchange that you
had with Senator Johnson. I believe during that exchange you
referred to a governmentwide survey that asked certain Federal
employees whether they would report ethical misconduct. Did I
understand correctly that you said that 60 percent of the
Secret Service personnel who were interviewed for this survey
said that they would report ethical misconduct and 40 percent,
approximately, said they would not?
Mr. Sullivan. No, Senator, I think it was something like 58
or 60 percent said they would. I think there was about 18 or 19
percent who said they would not. And then I think there might
have been the remaining percentage who just were indifferent
towards it.
Senator Collins. Doesn't that suggest a broader problem?
Mr. Sullivan. Senator, I think that is a number that we
need to raise up. I think that is something that we need to
work on. I do not know if that presents a problem. I want to
look at that. That is part of the theme that I have talked to
Director Berry from OPM about because I would like to see that
number increase.
Senator Collins. From my perspective, when you combine the
facts of this case, the fact that the agents made no attempt to
conceal their identities or the fact that they were bringing
these women back to their hotel rooms, a survey in which fewer
than 60 percent of the Secret Service personnel said that they
would report ethical misconduct, the fact that this was not, as
I said in my opening statement, a group of individuals who just
got swept up into a situation but, rather, smaller groups who
engaged in the same kinds of misconduct, to me that just spells
a broader problem with culture in the agency. And I say that
with the greatest respect for the vast majority of people
working for the Secret Service who do extraordinary work and so
courageously. But that does not mean that there is not a
problem.
So my final question to you today is: If I finally become
successful in convincing you that there is a broader problem
here with culture or with unacceptable behavior being condoned
when agents are on the road, what actions would you take to
address this problem that you are not taking now? How would you
change the culture of an agency?
Mr. Sullivan. Senator, I am hoping that I can convince you
that it is not a cultural issue.
Senator Collins. I know, but----
Mr. Sullivan. Again, Senator I look at the number of
cases--one of the things I know as the Director is that on any
given day, I potentially am going to have an employee who is
going to get into some type of an incident. It might be a
serious one. It might not be a big one at all. But, again, I
just keep going back to under 1 percent of our investigations
have some type of misconduct. But that is why I do feel very
optimistic about this Professionalism Reinforcement Working
Group. We have over 45 senior executives throughout the Federal
Government, from the military, from other law enforcement, and
from non-law enforcement--I do want to be very open with them,
I want to be transparent, and I want them to take a hard look
at us. But, again, it is my opinion that the overwhelming
majority of the men and women of this organization are part of
a great culture.
I think the thing that makes our organization what it is is
our culture. I think that we have a culture of hard-working
people that are committed, that work hard every single day.
And, when I was out at the NATO summit in Chicago, Senator, I
walked around and I must have talked to a couple hundred agents
out there. And I can tell you that there is nobody who is more
disappointed by this behavior, who is more upset with this
behavior, than our men and women. But I have 100 percent
confidence in our men and women, and I just do not think that
this is something that is systemic within this organization.
Senator Collins. Are there any additional actions that you
would be taking if you felt that there was a systemic problem?
Mr. Sullivan. Well, again, I think that we would have more
training. I think training is a big thing, and I think you can
never do enough training, and training is something that we try
to be very proactive with. But I think we just need to
continually drill into our people what the result is going to
be of a bad decision. And, quite frankly, Senator, I do think
that the action we have taken for these bad decisions, I think
that sends a pretty strong message to the men and women of this
organization that this will not be tolerated.
Senator Collins. I know I promised you that was my last
question, but I do have just one final question. You stated
earlier that you feel that this incident in Colombia would have
become public even if there had not been the dispute over
money. What is your basis for feeling that the incident would
have become public, particularly in light of this survey?
Mr. Sullivan. We had almost 200 people there, and, again,
it just goes back to how confident I am in the men and women of
our organization. And we are talking about a pretty significant
event here. We are talking about 11 individuals, now 12
individuals, who took part in this misconduct. And I just
believe--and I have a lot of faith in our men and women--that
somebody would have reported this misconduct because this just
goes beyond the pale. And I truly do believe that they would
have made a complaint either to our Office of Professional
Responsibility or to the DHS IG.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Collins.
So I understand, if I can put it this way, that both your
own faith in the Secret Service, which is a result of your own
experience--I know you have been an extraordinary Secret
Service agent and leader yourself. What happened in Cartagena
happened. You do not have to have the suspicions that most
others have that it is hard to believe that this was the only
case. But to some extent, I think while you maintain your faith
in the Secret Service, going forward I think you have to assume
that it was not the only case. What I believe you are trying to
do is to put in place rules and procedures to make sure to the
best of your human ability that it never happens again. And I
was thinking about a slogan that we talk about a lot in the
field of domestic counterterrorism, which started in New York,
``See Something, Say Something.''
This is not easy. Those numbers that you mentioned, Senator
Collins, point to about a little less than 60 percent saying
they would definitely report misconduct by a fellow Secret
Service employee, there is a natural tendency in organizations
either not to want to get your colleagues in trouble or in a
sense to not want to get yourself involved in a controversy.
But in the end, as we saw here, what suffers is a great
organization. And I just hope all the personnel of the Secret
Service have learned that and that you will try to put in place
rules and procedures that will continue to telegraph that
message for years and years after you and others leave the
agency.
As Senator Portman mentioned, I was a protectee during the
2000 presidential campaign. I had nothing but the highest
regard and really gratitude for the Secret Service details that
were with me and my family. They were people of honor, of great
discipline. They were so obviously committed to protecting our
safety and security.
And so like you, I think, when this story came out, I was
just heartbroken. And then I was angry at the people who did
this. And I think we have to preserve those feelings and not be
at all defensive here, because this is like a wound to a body
and we have to get in it, find out what happened, clean it out,
let it heal, and then make sure that you particularly put in
place rules and procedures that will make sure that this great
body, if I can continue the metaphor, will never be subject to
being wounded again in this way.
I appreciate very much the presence and the testimony of
both of you. I appreciate what you have done, both of you,
since this incident became public. The Committee is going to
continue to conduct its own investigation and work with both of
you to make sure that we achieve the objectives that I know we
all have, which is to restore total public trust and confidence
in the Secret Service agency so that it can fulfill its
critical missions at the highest levels of honor and
excellence, which has been the norm over its history. We want
it to be the norm in the years ahead.
Senator Collins, would you like to add anything?
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Director Sullivan, in reflecting on the many conversations
that we have had and listening to you today, I cannot help but
think that because you personally are such an outstanding
individual, completely ethical, dedicated, courageous,
everything we would want the head of the Secret Service to be,
and because in your career you did not happen to see this kind
of behavior, that it is very difficult for you to accept that
this happened. And I urge you to try to put that aside because
if there is a problem, if the Washington Post story today is
correct, you cannot be confident that this has not happened
before and that it will not happen again, unless a very clear
message is sent that the rules are not different when agents
are on the road. They are exactly the same rules that apply in
their home towns. And I think that is a very important message
for you to send regardless of your sense of disbelief that this
could have happened.
And I just want to close my remarks today by thanking the
brave men and women of the Secret Service, of law enforcement,
and of the military who do put their lives on the line for us
and who do perform such dangerous jobs so extraordinarily well
in the vast majority of cases. But if we ignore or downplay
what happened here, it can be like a cancer. It can spread and
cause the entire agency to be tarnished, if you will.
So I hope that you will continue not only your no-holds-
barred investigation and the disciplinary actions which are so
clearly warranted in this case, but that you will also take a
really hard look at what procedural changes and training
changes need to be made, because I continue to believe that the
problem is broader than you believe it to be. But I thank you
for your leadership and your cooperation.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
Director, did you want to add something?
Mr. Sullivan. Chairman, Senator, again thank you very much
for your time, and I just want to make sure that--I hope I have
not given you the impression that this is something that we
have not taken seriously or that I am going to ignore. This
cannot be ignored. And hopefully everyone has seen with the
action that we have taken that we will not tolerate this type
of behavior. And as I said, moving forward, I do want to take a
hard look at our organization, and that is why I have been so
aggressive with bringing in these outsiders. I know this is
something that internally, we may not be the best individuals
to do it and that we do need to bring outside people in to take
a look at our organization. And as I said before, we are not
looking to just be better; we are looking to be the best. But I
do believe in the men and women of this organization. I do
believe that they, too, want to make us not only better but the
best. I appreciate your support, and I look forward to
continuing to work with you on this, and I value the
relationship. Also, I value the opportunity that we have had to
be able to talk to you about this both here and offline.
But I will tell you that this is a great organization with
great people, and if there are any issues we need to resolve,
we are going to resolve them.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks. Mr. Edwards, do you want to add
anything?
Mr. Edwards. Chairman, I want to give you my commitment
that we are going to do a comprehensive review and an
independent investigation and report back to you on the
findings and recommendations as soon as possible.
I just want to repeat the Web site for our hotline. It is
oig.dhs.gov, and we also have an 800 number. It is 800-323-
8603, both anonymous and people with their names can submit
their allegations or any issues, and we will respond
accordingly.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. Excellent. Thank you. The record of
this hearing will remain open for 15 days for any additional
questions and statements.
With that, again I thank you. The hearing is adjourned.
Mr. Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 12:27 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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