[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
TERRORIST EXPLOITATION OF REFUGEE PROGRAMS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 4, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-124
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
81-133 WASHINGTON : 2013
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Ron Barber, Arizona
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia, Vice Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Loretta Sanchez, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Ben Quayle, Arizona Janice Hahn, California
Scott Rigell, Virginia Ron Barber, Arizona
Billy Long, Missouri Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Kevin Gundersen, Staff Director
Zachary Harris, Subcommittee Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Patrick Meehan, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Janice Hahn, a Representative in Congress From the
State of California............................................ 4
Witnesses
Mr. Lawrence F. Bartlett, Director, Office of Refugee Admissions,
Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, U.S. Department
of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Ms. Barbara L. Strack, Chief, Refugee Affairs Division, United
States Citizenship and Immigration Services, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security; Accompanied by Dawn Scalici, Deputy Under
Secretary, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department
of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement of Barbara L. Strack............................ 8
Prepared Statement of Barbara L. Strack........................ 10
Prepared Statement of Dawn Scalici............................. 13
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Patrick Meehan for Lawrence F. Bartlett.. 33
Questions From Chairman Patrick Meehan for Barbara L. Strack..... 33
Questions From Chairman Patrick Meehan for Dawn Scalici.......... 35
TERRORIST EXPLOITATION OF REFUGEE PROGRAMS
----------
Tuesday, December 4, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Patrick Meehan
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Meehan, Hahn, and Hochul.
Mr. Meehan. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee
on Counterterrorism and Intelligence will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony
regarding the exploitation of refugee programs by terrorists. I
would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing. I look
forward to hearing from today's witnesses from the Department
of Homeland Security and the State Department. I would also
like to take this opportunity to thank them for taking the time
to be with us here today. You are all dedicated public servants
and we thank you for the hard work you do on a day-to-day
basis, and I know you have provided extensive briefings to my
staff over the last year on the various security concerns
related to the various visa refugee programs and I greatly
appreciate your assistance on this important issue.
From 2004 to 2007, the bloody sectarian insurgency in Iraq
produced substantial civilian displacement and emigration from
the country. In response to this growing humanitarian crisis,
Congress passed legislation which gave Iraqis who helped the
U.S. Government or military the opportunity to receive special
refugee status and resettlement in the United States.
While the motivation behind creating these special
immigrant categories were well-intentioned, the fact remains
that in May 2011 two Iraqi nationals who were given refugee
status and resettled in the United States were arrested and
accused by the FBI of plotting to send weapons and money to al-
Qaeda in Iraq. One of the men arrested had openly discussed his
prior experience as an insurgent until Iraq and the IED attacks
he participated in against U.S. troops. The fingerprints of the
other Iraqi refugee who was charged were traced by the FBI to a
component of an unexploded IED that was recovered by U.S.
forces in northern Iraq.
In the wake of these arrests, DHS Secretary Janet
Napolitano and others have publicly acknowledged security
screenings have been expanded to more than 58,000 Iraqi
refugees who have already been settled in the United States,
and according to press reports this February, intelligence
indicates that the threat posed by refugees with ties to al-
Qaeda is much broader than previously believed.
FBI Director Robert Mueller stated last year during
Congressional testimony before the House Intelligence Committee
that he continues to be concerned with ``individuals who have
been resettled here in the United States that have some
association with al-Qaeda in Iraq.''
There are also reports that immigration authorities have
given the FBI roughly 300 names of Iraqi refugees for further
investigation. With the emergence of al-Qaeda affiliates across
North Africa and the Middle East, the influx of AQI fighters
into Jordan where Jordanian intelligence officials foiled a
large-scale terror plot in October, and into Syria where there
were reports just yesterday of chemical weapons being moved, I
am increasingly worried that the terrorists may try to exploit
various refugee resettlement programs via Turkey, Jordan, or
other countries where persons may flee to escape the bloodshed.
It is imperative that the interagency security screening
process for all refugees be formidable and credible. The
purpose of this hearing is to identify any remaining gaps in
the security screening process that need to be remedied and to
ensure that DHS and the State Department have the necessary
tools and resources at their disposal to be able to carry out
the necessary security checks.
It is concerning to me that neither of the Iraqi refugees
arrested last year had worked for any U.S. military,
diplomatic, or nongovernmental organization in Iraq, yet both
received refugee status based on humanitarian reasons.
All this being said, I am glad to hear that the interagency
security screening and adjudication process for refugees has
undergone and continues to undergo a number of enhancements
since it was initiated. In particular I would like to call
attention to the enhanced intelligence- and information-sharing
relationships that have been developed as well as the
biographic checks done in collaboration with the National
Counterterrorism Center, and these are known as interagency
checks, and I am encouraged by the security measures now
required for all refugee applicants ages 14 to 65 regardless of
nationality.
Now, as we all know, the United States welcomes more
refugees than any other country in the world and I think the
U.S. Government policy of resettling refugees, especially those
who risked their lives helping our soldiers and diplomats, is
important. My goal today is to highlight these issues to ensure
that the security gaps are closed to prevent terrorists from
infiltrating our refugee programs. Moreover, I want to ensure
that the lessons learned from the breakdown are applied to
future adjudication of refugees from other high-risk nations.
Again I want to thank our witnesses for their hard work on
this important issue and for your being here today.
[The statement of Mr. Meehan follows:]
Statement of Chairman Patrick Meehan
December 4, 2012
I would like to welcome everyone to today's hearing.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses from the
Department of Homeland Security and the State Department. I would also
like to take this opportunity to thank them for taking the time to be
here with us today. You are all dedicated public servants and we thank
you for the hard work you do on a day-to-day basis.
I know you have provided extensive briefings to my staff over the
last year on this issue and I greatly appreciate your assistance on
this important issue.
the aqi arrests of 2011
From 2004 to 2007, the insurgency in Iraq produced substantial
civilian displacement and emigration from the country. In response to
the growing humanitarian crisis, Congress passed legislation, which
gave Iraqis who helped the U.S. Government or military the opportunity
to receive special refugee status and resettlement in the United
States.
While the motivation behind creating these special immigrant
categories were well-intentioned, the fact remains that in May 2011,
two Iraqi nationals who were given refugee status and resettled in the
United States were arrested and accused by the FBI of plotting to send
weapons and money to al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).
One of the men arrested had openly discussed his prior experience
as an insurgent in Iraq and the IED attacks he participated against
U.S. troops. The fingerprints of the other Iraqi refugee charged were
traced by the FBI to a component of an unexploded IED that was
recovered by U.S. forces in northern Iraq.
the threat
In the wake of these arrests, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano and
others have publicly acknowledged that security checks have been
expanded to the more than 58,000 Iraqi refugees who had already been
settled in the United States.
According to press reports this past February, intelligence
indicates that the threat posed by refugees with ties to al-Qaeda is
much broader than was previously believed.
FBI Director Robert Mueller stated last year during Congressional
testimony before the House Intelligence Committee that he continues to
be concerned with ``individuals who may have been resettled here in the
United States that have some association with al-Qaeda in Iraq.'' There
are also reports that that immigration authorities have given the FBI
roughly 300 names of Iraqi refugees for further investigation.
With the recent movement of AQI fighters into Syria and reports
just yesterday of chemical weapons being moved, I am increasingly
worried that terrorists may try to exploit various refugee resettlement
programs via Turkey, Jordan, or other countries where many refugees
have fled to escape the bloodshed.
It is imperative that the interagency security screening process
for refugees be formidable and credible.
today's hearing
The purpose of this hearing is to identify any remaining gaps in
the security screening process that need to be remedied, and to ensure
DHS and the State Department have the necessary tools and resources to
ensure security.
It is concerning that neither Hammadi nor Alwan had worked for any
U.S. organization in Iraq, yet both received refugee status for
humanitarian reasons.
interagency security screening and adjudications work
All this being said, I am glad to hear that the interagency
security screening and adjudication processing for refugees has
undergone a number of enhancements since it was initiated, particularly
regarding intelligence and information sharing with the intelligence
community.
In particular, I would like to call attention to the biographic
check done in collaboration with the National Counterterrorism Center,
known as Interagency Checks. I am encouraged that this security check
is now required for all refugee applicants ages 14 to 65, regardless of
nationality.
conclusion
As we all know, the United States welcomes more refugees than any
other country in the world. I think the U.S. Government policy of
resettling refugees, especially those who risked their lives helping
our soldiers and diplomats, is important.
My goal today is to highlight these issues to ensure that security
gaps are closed to prevent terrorists from infiltrating our refugee
programs. Moreover, I want to ensure that the lessons learned from this
breakdown are applied to the future adjudication of refugees from other
high-risk nations.
Again, I thank the witnesses for their hard work on this important
issue and for being here today.
Mr. Meehan. The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking
Minority Member of the subcommittee, the gentle lady from
California, Ms. Hahn, for any statement that she may have.
Ms. Hahn. Good morning. Thank you, Chairman Meehan, for
holding this very important hearing today as well as the
committee for allowing me to serve today in this capacity. I
also want to thank the panel for appearing before us and
providing valuable expert testimony on these critical issues.
Every year the United States admits thousands of refugees
through its United States Refugee Admissions Program, a program
authorized by Congress to support and provide opportunity to
those who live in fear of persecution. Since 1975, the United
States Refugee Admissions Program has admitted over 3 million
refugees. The United States resettles more refugees than all
other countries combined. Resettlement in the United States
gives refugees the opportunity to share in America's promise
and the ability to have life, liberty, and the pursuit of their
happiness.
Many refugee entrepreneurs have received help from the
United States and the community organizations that assist in
refugee resettlement. Because of this support, there have been
countless success stories of refugees that have come to America
and have given remarkable contributions to this country and
their communities. Hence, we can agree that the Refugee
Admissions Program is beneficial and that it should be
continued.
However, vulnerabilities in the program have been exposed.
In 2011, the Department of Justice issued indictments to Waad
Ramadan Alwan and Mohanad Shareef Hammadi, two Iraqi refugees
living in Kentucky, for plotting to provide material support to
al-Qaeda in Iraq. Since the indictment was issued both Alwan
and Hammadi pleaded guilty to all counts.
The Department of Justice, specifically the investigations
of the Joint Terrorism Task Force, should be applauded for
their efforts in thwarting this potential terrorist activity.
Unfortunately, the Joint Terrorism Task Force was not the first
entity that had information on one of these convicted
terrorists. In 2005, Alwan's fingerprint was found on a
roadside bomb in Iraq. This information was in a Department of
Defense database that was not checked during his background
investigation when he applied to the Refugee Admissions
Program. This illustrates that we still have failed to close
the remaining information-sharing gaps that continue to persist
since the September 11 terrorist attacks.
I look forward to hearing today from the witnesses on how
measures to close gaps in the refugee admission process are
being put in place.
In addition, separate and apart from the Refugee
Resettlement Program, I would like to hear what measures are
being put in place to ensure that the Special Immigrant Visa
Program, a program for Iraqis and Afghans, is free from
vulnerability. We want to keep the United States as a safe
haven for both those in need and those that are here by birth
or through the naturalization process. One way to do that is to
ensure that our Government agencies are working together
collectively to obtain this goal.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Meehan. Let me thank Ranking Member Hahn for her
opening statement, and other Members of the committee are
reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
We are please to have three distinguished witnesses before
us on this important topic. Let me introduce them from left to
right, from my left to right.
Mr. Lawrence Bartlett is the director of the Office of
Refugee Admissions at the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration. He leads the State
Department program abroad and in the United States that
identifies, processes, places, and has received more than
260,000 refugees in the United States over the last 4 years
alone. Previously Mr. Bartlett held the State Department
leadership positions for refugees from Afghanistan, Iraq,
Kosovo, and Lebanon. Mr. Bartlett served as the Peace Corps'
Country Director in Bulgaria and Jordan was a Peace Corps
volunteer in the Yemen Arab Republic.
Ms. Barbara Strack is the chief of the Refugee Affairs
Division of the Department of Homeland Security's Citizenship
and Immigration Services. Ms. Strack's responsibilities include
managing the refugee corps' and headquarters' staff to support
the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program by conducting overseas
adjudications and through related policy training, quality
assurance, anti-fraud, and National security efforts. Ms.
Strack came to DHS with both public- and private-sector
experience, serving in the Policy Office of the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service and as a Senate
committee counsel, among other positions.
Ms. Dawn Scalici is the deputy under secretary for analysis
in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of
Homeland Security. In this capacity she leads the office's
analytic efforts with a special focus on advancing analysis and
developing intelligence products to support the DHS leadership
and State, local, Tribal, and private-sector partners. Prior to
joining DHS, Ms. Scalici served as the director for production
and strategic program at the CIA'S Office of Iraq Analysis
where she oversaw current and strategic analysis in Iraq and
led efforts to advance planning, analytic tradecraft, and
community collaboration. She earlier served as the deputy
director for mission management at the National
Counterterrorism Center, helping oversee National intelligence
related to the counterterrorism mission. Ms. Scalici is a 29-
year veteran of the CIA.
For all witnesses, it would be greatly appreciated if you
would be aware that your testimony is important to us, but we
try to work within time parameters, so I know you will be
guided, otherwise having submitted written testimony as well.
So I now recognize Mr. Bartlett for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE F. BARTLETT, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF REFUGEE
ADMISSIONS, BUREAU OF POPULATION, REFUGEES, AND MIGRATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. Chairman Meehan and other
distinguished Members, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before your subcommittee and to update you on the steps we have
taken to increase the security of the U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program.
Every year the United States admits tens of thousands of
refugees as part of a humanitarian effort that reflects the
highest values and aspirations of the American people in a
program that is authorized by Congress and historically has
enjoyed broad bipartisan Congressional support.
Since 1975, the United States Refugee Admissions Program
has welcomed over 3 million refugees to the United States. That
is over 3 million people with a new chance at life, dignity,
self-sufficiency, at raising a family and being part of our
community. With the admission of each new refugee we celebrate
the rebirth of America's promise.
For decades American communities have opened their hearts,
homes, and neighborhoods to refugees from around the world. Our
responsibility is to ensure that they do so with continued
confidence in the security of the U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program, a responsibility that the State Department shares with
the Department of Homeland Security.
Specifically, the State Department's Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration, through our resettlement support
centers, conducts preliminary overseas prescreening of refugee
applicants for U.S. admissions, collecting pertinent biographic
information necessary for numerous counselor, law enforcement,
and intelligence reviews. The State Department is responsible
for checking all refugee applicants against the Consular
Lookout and Support System, known as CLASS, which comprises
security information from the FBI Terrorist Screening Center
and DHS as well as certain intelligence agencies.
Certain refugee applications are also submitted by the
State Department for a Security Advisory Opinion. This check
requests that certain law enforcement and intelligence agencies
share with the State Department any information they have on
refugee applicants with possible terrorism linkages. Our
partners at DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services as
well as DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis will discuss
in their testimony the additional security and other
counterterrorism checks that they undertake in partnership with
the National Counterterrorism Center, the Defense Department,
and others in the intelligence community and law enforcement
before DHS grants refugee status and admission to a refugee
applicant and his or her qualifying members. The State
Department strongly supports these efforts by DHS.
This subcommittee's request for testimony included
questions pertaining to the Congressionally-mandated Special
Immigrant Visa Program which facilitates the admissions of U.S.
Government-affiliated foreign nationals, including Iraqis and
Afghans to the United States. The SIV program, which is
distinct from the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, is managed
by the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs. While I
am not in a position to address SIV processing issues, I can
tell you SIV applicants also undergo multiple extensive layers
of security and counterterrorism review.
Whether through the admission of the U.S. Refugee Admission
Program or the Special Immigrant Visa Program, the State
Department makes its first priority the safety of the American
people, who have a right to expect that their Government will
undertake all available efforts to safeguard their security. We
at the Department of State are proud of the measures we have
taken in recent years to strengthen the security of these
programs, including through expanded intelligence community
participation, measures which have made the country safer. In
partnership with DHS we will continue to look for additional
ways to enforce the safety and security of these important
humanitarian programs. This is our obligation to the American
people.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Bartlett follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lawrence F. Bartlett
December 4, 2012
Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Higgins and other distinguished
Members, thank you for the opportunity to appear before your
subcommittee and to update you on the steps we have taken to increase
the security of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program.
Every year the United States admits tens of thousands of refugees
as part of a humanitarian effort that reflects the highest values and
aspirations of the American people, in a program that is authorized by
Congress and historically has enjoyed broad bipartisan Congressional
support.
Since 1975, the United States Refugee Admissions Program has
welcomed over 3 million refugees to the United States. That is over 3
million people with a new chance at life, dignity, self-sufficiency, at
raising a family and being part of our community. With the admission of
each new refugee, we celebrate the rebirth of America's promise.
For decades, American communities have opened their hearts, homes,
and neighborhoods to refugees from around the world. Our responsibility
is to ensure that they do so with continued confidence in the security
of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program, a responsibility the State
Department shares with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Specifically, the State Department's Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration, through our Resettlement Support Centers,
conducts preliminary overseas pre-screening of refugee applicants for
U.S. admissions, collecting pertinent biographic information necessary
for numerous consular, law enforcement, and intelligence reviews.
The State Department is responsible for checking all refugee
applicants against the Consular Lookout and Support System known as
``CLASS'', which comprises security information from the FBI Terrorist
Screening Center and DHS as well as certain intelligence agencies.
Certain refugee applications (based upon classified parameters) are
also submitted by the State Department for a Security Advisory Opinion.
This check requests that certain law enforcement and intelligence
agencies share with the State Department any information they have on
refugee applicants with possible terrorism linkages.
Our partners at DHS' U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services as
well as DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, will discuss in
their testimony the additional security and other counterterrorism
checks that they undertake in partnership with the National
Counterterrorism Center, DOD, and others in the intelligence community
and law enforcement, before DHS grants refugee status and admission to
a refugee applicant and his or her qualifying family members. The State
Department strongly supports these efforts by DHS/USCIS.
This subcommittee's request for testimony included questions
pertaining to the Congressionally-mandated Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
Program, which facilitates the admission of U.S. Government-affiliated
foreign nationals, including Iraqis and Afghans, to the United States.
The SIV Program, which is distinct from the U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program, is managed by the State Department's Bureau of Consular
Affairs. While I am not in a position to address SIV processing issues,
I can tell you that SIV applicants also undergo multiple, extensive
layers of security and counterterrorism review.
Whether through the administration of the U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program or the Special Immigrant Visa Program, the State Department
makes its first priority the safety of the American people, who have a
right to expect that their Government will undertake all available
efforts to safeguard their security.
We at the Department of State are proud of the measures we have
taken in recent years to strengthen the security of these programs,
including through expanded intelligence community participation--
measures which have made the country safer. In partnership with DHS, we
will continue to look for additional ways to enhance the safety and
security of these important humanitarian programs. This is our
obligation to the American people.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I look forward to
answering your questions.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Bartlett.
Ms. Strack, the committee now recognizes you for your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF BARBARA L. STRACK, CHIEF, REFUGEE AFFAIRS
DIVISION, UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY; ACCOMPANIED BY DAWN
SCALICI, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND
ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Strack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of this
subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today
about the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program and the Department of
Homeland Security's efforts to deter exploitation of that
program by terrorist groups.
As the Chief of the Refugee Affairs Division at U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services, I work in close
partnership with other components within DHS and with
colleagues at the Department of State's Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration. We strive to meet the program's dual
mission of offering resettlement opportunities to eligible
refugees while safeguarding the integrity of the program and
our National security.
USCIS is proud to play a part in the United States' long-
standing tradition of offering protection, freedom, and
opportunity to refugees from around the world. An integral part
of this mission is to ensure that refugee resettlement
opportunities go to those who are truly eligible and who do not
present a risk to the safety or security of the United States.
Accordingly, we are committed to deterring and detecting fraud
among those seeking to resettle in the United States and we
worked hard to develop and implement the best security
screening measurements for refugee applicants in close
collaboration with the law enforcement, National security, and
intelligence communities.
I will focus this morning on the enhancements that were
first adopted by the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program in
connection with large-scale processing of Iraqi applicants
beginning in 2007 and the lessons we have learned since and
applied more broadly to other populations.
USCIS's first tool to assure the integrity of the Refugee
Resettlement Program is its dedicated and well-trained officer
corps. This special cadre of USCIS officers travels around the
world to conduct detailed in-person interviews with refugee
applicants. They adjudicate these cases based on U.S. law,
taking into account their knowledge of country conditions and
their assessment of the applicant's credibility, and, when
necessary, certain categories of cases, including certain
National security-related cases, are referred back to
headquarters. This provides another opportunity to conduct
additional research and to liase with law enforcement or
intelligence agencies before finalizing our decisions.
In addition to in-person interviews, security checks are an
integral part of the U.S. resettlement program. All available
biographic and biometric information is vetted against a broad
array of law enforcement, intelligence community, and other
relevant databases to help confirm an applicant's identity, to
check for any criminal or other derogatory information, and to
identify information that could inform lines of questioning at
the interview itself.
While the State Department takes the lead for certain
biographic checks, biometric checks are coordinated by USCIS
using mobile fingerprint equipment. These fingerprints are
screened against the FBI's vast biometric holdings and also
screened and enrolled in DHS's biometric system, which is known
as IDENT. Through IDENT, applicant fingerprints are screened
not only against watch list information, but also for previous
immigration encounters that may be relevant to their
eligibility.
What I have just described is the baseline of security
checks that were conducted for all refugee applicants before
the launch of large-scale processing of Iraqi applicants in
2007. In order to mitigate the risk of exploitation while
offering resettlement opportunities to thousands of Iraqi
refugees in need of protection, many of whom had worked closely
with the U.S. military or coalition forces, USCIS developed two
key partnerships.
First, we established a relationship with the Department of
Defense to augment our biometric screening by checking against
a DOD database known as IAFIS. IAFIS includes fingerprint
records captured in theater in Iraq and elsewhere, so it is a
valuable resource for us to identify a wide array of relevant
information. For example, it includes data ranging from
individuals who had been detained by U.S. forces to those who
had been employed by U.S. forces, and much more.
In addition, we reached out to DHS's Office of Intelligence
and Analysis, which we call I&A for short, to take advantage of
their expertise and their knowledge of the broader intelligence
community. Working with I&A has enabled us to identify
potential screening capabilities, to obtain critical
intelligence information, and to enlist their services in our
enhanced officer training. As a result, we have been able to
enhance our refugee vetting protocols over time for both Iraqi
applicants and for other nationalities. For example, in the
fall of 2008 we launched a new biographic check for Iraqi
applicants with the National Counterterrorism Center and we
added further intelligence community support in July 2010 for
what we now refer to as interagency checks, or IACs. We have
expanded this vetting to other nationalities over time, and the
IAC is now required for all refugee applicants ages 14 to 65.
In light of the time, I will conclude my testimony, and I
look forward to answering any questions you may have. Thanks
for the opportunity to testify this morning.
[The prepared statements of Ms. Strack and Ms. Scalici
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Barbara L. Strack
December 4, 2012
Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Higgins, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify at
today's hearing on the refugee program and the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) efforts to deter exploitation by terrorist groups of
the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP). As the chief of the
Refugee Affairs Division of the Refugee, Asylum, and International
Operations (RAIO) Directorate within U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), I work in close partnership with other components
within DHS and with colleagues at the Department of State's Bureau of
Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) to meet the USRAP's dual
mission to offer resettlement opportunities to eligible refugees while
safeguarding the integrity of the program and our National security.
As you know, the United States has a proud and long-standing
tradition of offering protection, freedom, and opportunity to refugees
from around the world who live in fear of persecution and are often
left to languish in deplorable conditions of temporary asylum. USCIS
remains dedicated to fulfilling this mission, in partnership with PRM,
and continuing the United States' leadership role in humanitarian
protection. An integral part of this mission is to ensure that refugee
resettlement opportunities go to those who are eligible for such
protection and do not present a risk to the safety and security of our
country. Accordingly, we are committed to deterring and detecting fraud
among those seeking to resettle in the United States, and continue to
employ the highest security measures to protect against risks to our
National security.
As a representative of USCIS, I can assure you that this commitment
to our humanitarian and National security mandates is shared inside and
outside of DHS. The refugee resettlement program has forged strong and
deep relationships with colleagues in the law enforcement, National
security, and intelligence communities and we continue to benefit
enormously from their expertise, analysis, and collaboration. It simply
would not be possible for us to support a resettlement program of the
size and scope that the United States maintains without this critical
interagency infrastructure.
My testimony today will be focused on the safeguards and measures
taken by the USRAP in connection with the Iraqi refugee resettlement
program and lessons that we have learned since large-scale processing
of Iraqi applicants began in 2007. In particular, I will focus on
security-vetting protocols and information sharing. In addition, I will
address the current refugee environment as it pertains to applicants
from Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, and other countries in the Middle East
and Africa. Finally, I will provide an update on the Special Immigrant
Visa (SIV) program, which is distinct from the refugee program, but
operates in parallel for certain Iraqi nationals.
DHS and other interagency partners have conducted a number of
classified briefings for committee staff on each of these topics, and I
would be happy to follow up with a classified briefing after today's
hearing if needed.
refugee resettlement case processing
As I mentioned above, the USRAP is a shared responsibility of the
State Department and USCIS. The State Department is responsible for the
overarching coordination and management of the USRAP, including the
decision on which refugees around the world are granted access to the
USRAP for resettlement consideration, after formal consultations with
Congress as set forth in section 207 of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. USCIS is responsible for conducting individual, in-person
interviews with applicants to determine their eligibility for refugee
status, including whether they meet the refugee definition and are
otherwise admissible to the United States under U.S. law.
In order to fulfill its responsibilities under the USRAP, USCIS
created the Refugee Corps in 2005, which is a cadre of specially-
trained USCIS officers who are dedicated to adjudicating applications
for refugee status overseas. These officers are based in Washington,
DC, but they travel around the world to the locations where refugees
reside. In addition, USCIS has a small number of officers posted at
embassies overseas and assigns well-trained officers from other
programs--such as the Asylum Corps and Office of the Chief Counsel--to
supplement the Refugee Corps. Using this model, USCIS has been able to
respond to an increasingly diverse refugee admissions program, working
in 66 countries in fiscal year 2012.
Recognizing that a well-trained cadre of officers is critical to
protecting the integrity of the refugee process, we have focused our
efforts on providing the highest-quality training to refugee
adjudicators. In addition to the basic training required of all USCIS
officers, refugee officers receive 5 weeks of specialized training that
includes comprehensive instruction on all aspects of the job, including
refugee law, grounds of inadmissibility, fraud detection and
prevention, security protocols, interviewing techniques, credibility
analysis, and country conditions research. Before deploying overseas
officers also receive pre-departure training which focuses on the
specific population that they will be interviewing. This includes
information on the types of refugee claims that they are likely to
encounter, detailed country of origin information, and updates on any
fraud trends or security issues that have been identified. Since the
advent of large-scale processing of Iraqi applicants in 2007, USCIS
officers who adjudicate Iraqi refugee applications also receive
additional 2-day training on country-specific issues, including
briefings from outside experts from the intelligence, policy, and
academic communities. This specialized training was one of the
requirements instituted under former DHS Secretary Chertoff, as part of
the enhanced security screening procedures he announced in May 2007.
In order to fully explore refugee claims and to identify any
possible grounds of ineligibility, specially-trained USCIS officers
conduct an in-person, in-depth interview of every principal refugee
applicant. The officer assesses the credibility of the applicant and
evaluates whether the applicant's testimony is consistent with known
country conditions. In addition, all refugee status determinations made
by interviewing officers undergo supervisory review before a final
decision is made. Refugee Affairs Division policy requires officers to
submit certain categories of sensitive cases--including certain
National security-related cases--to Refugee Affairs Division
Headquarters to obtain concurrence prior to the issuance of a decision.
This allows for Headquarters staff to conduct additional research,
liaise with law enforcement or intelligence agencies, or consult with
an outside expert before finalizing the decision.
security checks
Security checks are an integral part of the USRAP for applicants of
all nationalities, and coordinating these checks is a shared
responsibility between the State Department and DHS. Prior to launching
our large-scale Iraqi refugee processing in spring 2007, we worked from
a standard suite of required security. For example, all available
biographic and biometric information is vetted against a broad array of
law enforcement, intelligence community, and other relevant databases
to help confirm a refugee applicant's identity, check for any criminal
or other derogatory information, and identify information that could
inform lines of questioning during the interview. Biographic checks
against the State Department's Consular Lookout and Support System
(CLASS)--which includes watch list information--are initiated at the
time of prescreening by the State Department's contractors. In
addition, State requests Security Advisory Opinions (SAOs) from the law
enforcement and intelligence communities for those cases meeting
certain criteria. Biometric checks are coordinated by USCIS, using
mobile fingerprint equipment and photographs at the time of the
interview. These fingerprints are screened against the vast biometric
holdings of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) and screened and
enrolled in DHS's Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT).
Through IDENT, applicant fingerprints are screened not only against
watch list information, but also for previous immigration encounters in
the United States and overseas--including cases in which the applicant
previously applied for a visa at a U.S. embassy.
In order to mitigate the risk of exploitation while offering
resettlement opportunities to thousands of Iraqi refugees in need of
protection, USCIS has developed two key partnerships. First, we work
with the Department of Defense (DOD) to augment our biometric screening
by checking against the DOD Automated Biometric Identification System
(ABIS), which contains fingerprint records captured in theatre in Iraq
and is a valuable resource for us to identify a wide array of relevant
information. This includes data ranging from individuals who had been
detained by U.S. forces to those who had been employed by U.S. forces.
In addition, we work with DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis
(I&A) to identify potential screening capabilities and obtain critical
intelligence information, as well as to enlist its services in our
enhanced officer training.
These two partnerships were firmly in place in January 2008 when
Congress passed the Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act, which directed the
State Department and DHS to establish refugee processing mechanisms
inside Iraq, supplementing the on-going processing of Iraqi refugee
applicants who had sought refuge in neighboring countries. Furthermore,
with I&A's assistance, we have enhanced our refugee vetting protocols
over time, for both Iraqi applicants and for applicants of other
nationalities, including Afghans and Somalis. For example, in the fall
of 2008, we launched a new biographic check with the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) for Iraqi applicants and added
intelligence community support in July 2010 for what we now refer to as
Interagency Checks (IAC). We have expanded this vetting protocol to
other nationalities over time, and the IAC is now required for all
refugee applicants ages 14-65, regardless of nationality.
Finally, in addition to the checks that I have described, our
vetting regime now includes pre-departure checks that are conducted
before a refugee applicant is scheduled to travel to the United States.
Because there can be a considerable lapse of time between the initial
vetting and the time of travel, these checks are important to identify
any new derogatory information that may not have been available when
the initial security checks were conducted. The suite of pre-departure
checks currently includes a second IAC as well as additional screening
conducted by our DHS colleagues at U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
National Targeting Center-Passenger, and Secure Flight screening
conducted by the Transportation Security Administration. A refugee
applicant cannot be approved for travel until all required security
checks have been completed and cleared.
the refugee admissions pipeline
DHS's commitment to a rigorous vetting regime for refugee
applicants and the challenges of implementing enhancements to guard
against National security risks had a significant impact on refugee
admissions levels in fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012. In both
years, we fell short of the admissions ceiling authorized by the
President, and we recognize that many eligible refugee applicants have
considerable wait times before receiving a final decision on their
case.
DHS has been working closely with interagency partners to improve,
refine, and streamline the security vetting regime for refugee
applicants and for other immigration categories. I am pleased to report
that refugee admission levels began to rebound in the second half of
fiscal year 2012 as a result of these efforts. In fiscal year 2012, the
USRAP admitted a total of 58,238 refugees. This compares favorably to
fiscal year 2011's admission total of 56,424. We achieved this progress
through a series of policy and operational decisions based on extensive
interagency consultations. For example, the USRAP received critical
policy guidance in February 2012 from the Deputies' Committee
establishing an analytic framework for administering the IAC. In
addition, DHS, the State Department, and other entities have cooperated
to examine and harmonize the validity periods for various checks and to
streamline certain steps without compromising the overall integrity of
the program.
We will continue these interagency efforts to improve the efficacy
of the USRAP security screening regime, including progress toward more
automated processes and bolstering capacity to conduct recurrent and
continuous vetting for the refugee applicants.
current refugee environment in the middle east and africa
USCIS officers conduct refugee status interviews for applicants
from more than 60 countries each year, though the vast majority of
these applicants are currently Iraqi, Bhutanese, and Burmese nationals.
Refugee processing operations in the Middle East are primarily focused
on Iraqi nationals with interviews taking place in Lebanon, Turkey,
Jordan, and Egypt as well as in-country processing of Iraqi nationals
in Baghdad. Operations in Damascus, Syria, previously a large refugee
processing site, have been suspended since March 2011.
In fiscal year 2012, over 12,000 Iraqi refugees were admitted to
the United States, and since 2007, over 71,000 Iraqi nationals have
been resettled, many of whom have ties to the United States through
work or family. Small numbers of Iranian and Afghani refugee applicants
are also resettled through the USRAP--1,758 and 481 respectively for
fiscal year 2012. In Africa, the vast majority of refugee applicants
are Somali, Congolese, Eritrean, Sudanese, and Ethiopian nationals
processed in Egypt, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Uganda. Applicants from Africa
accounted for 10,608 of the refugees admitted in fiscal year 2012. In
fiscal year 2013, we expect similar refugee processing demographics for
these two regions with increased processing of Congolese refugee
applicants in Rwanda.
special immigrant visas (sivs)
The SIV program is separate and distinct from the refugee
resettlement program, though certain individuals may be eligible to
apply for both the SIV and the USRAP at the same time. Afghan and Iraqi
SIV applicants are also subject to the same enhanced security vetting
protocols as refugee applicants. There are three programs under which
an individual may apply for an SIV:
(1) The Iraqi and Afghan Translators/Interpreters Program under
section 1059 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
fiscal year 2006, which allows up to 50 principal SIVs each
fiscal year for Iraqi and Afghan translators or interpreters
who worked for the U.S. military or under Chief of Mission
(COM) authority;
(2) The Iraqi Affiliates Program under section 1244 of the Refugee
Crisis in Iraq Act, which authorizes up to 5,000 principal SIVs
per year from fiscal year 2008 through fiscal year 2012 \1\ for
Iraqis who worked for or on behalf of the U.S. Government; and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ With unused numbers available in fiscal year 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
(3) The Afghan Allies Program under section 602(b) of the Afghan
Allies Protection Act of 2009, which authorizes up to 1,500
SIVs annually from fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2013
\2\ for Afghans who worked for or on behalf of the U.S.
Government.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ With unused numbers available in fiscal year 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Like the refugee program, all three SIV programs are a shared
responsibility of the State Department and USCIS. Individuals who wish
to apply for an SIV must first obtain COM approval from the State
Department, or in the case of the Iraqi and Afghan Translators/
Interpreters Program, the approval can come from an appropriate U.S.
military general or flag officer. These letters certify that the
individual has the requisite service and otherwise meets the general
qualifications of the SIV program under which he or she is applying.
When a COM letter is issued, the applicant may then submit it along
with Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special
Immigrant and any additional supporting evidence to the USCIS Nebraska
Service Center (NSC), which has sole jurisdiction over the processing
and adjudication of SIV petitions. Average processing time at NSC for
an I-360 SIV petition is between 3 and 10 business days. During this
time, USCIS conducts a biographic security check through DHS's TECS
(formerly known as the Treasury Enforcement Communications System). The
vast majority of SIV petitions are filed by individuals living outside
the United States at the time of filing. If USCIS approves a SIV
petition for an alien living outside the United States, USCIS forwards
the case to the State Department's National Visa Center, which routes
the case to the appropriate consulate overseas for interview of the
petitioner and visa issuance. Prior to issuing the SIV, the State
Department conducts additional biographic and biometric security
checks--the same security vetting regime employed by the USRAP. To
further streamline processing of SIVs, DHS and the State Department
signed a Memorandum of Understanding in fiscal year 2012 to establish a
process in which individuals filing an I-360 under the Iraqi Affiliates
Program or Afghan Allies Program may submit their petitions
electronically with USCIS. Since fiscal year 2006, USCIS has processed
12,899 I-360 petitions filed by Iraqis and Afghans who have assisted
the United States, and has approved 10,739 of them as of September
2012.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy to
answer your questions.
______
Prepared Statement of Dawn Scalici
Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Higgins, distinguished Members of
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today about
the role of the intelligence community in the screening of Iraqi
refugee applicants overseas seeking resettlement to the United States.
As the deputy under secretary for intelligence and analysis/analysis,
my office provides intelligence support to USCIS to help them leverage
the full capabilities of the intelligence community (IC). We have
worked closely with the Refugee Affairs Division to ensure all relevant
intelligence is available and considered when screening applicants for
refugee resettlement to the United States.
The integrity and security of the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program
(USRAP), as well as other available immigration avenues, is of
paramount importance to the Department of Homeland Security. We
recognize that terrorists or other illicit actors could seek to use the
refugee program to gain admission to the United States. To address this
threat, the Department has taken significant steps to enhance the
security checks conducted on refugee applicants. DHS and other
interagency partners have conducted a number of classified briefings
for committee staff on each of these topics and I would be happy to
follow up with a classified briefing after today's hearing if needed.
When large-scale processing of Iraqi refugee applicants was
launched in 2007, DHS recognized the potential risks involved with
administering such a program. To that end, at USCIS's request, my
office has worked closely with key IC partners to develop more robust
security screening processes--first for Iraqi refugee applicants and
then expanding these security checks to all refugee applicants age 14
to 65. Each agency involved in this process is committed to minimizing
the burden to the thousands of refugees who seek our protection and
assistance while still conducting the most thorough security checks.
As a result of our interagency efforts, the vetting regime in place
for Iraqi refugee resettlement applicants in 2007 was strong, but not
impervious. We have worked to strengthen existing protocols over the
last 5 years, including facilitating collaboration among IC partners
and USCIS to identify where additional intelligence-based screening may
be possible and effective. The mechanisms we have designed seek to
ensure relevant intelligence is reviewed by analysts before an
applicant is approved for resettlement. Today, this process is a robust
mechanism that enhances our ability to deter and detect individuals
seeking to exploit the refugee program.
Over the past 5 years, DHS has prevented the travel to the United
States of a number of individuals who would have posed a threat as a
result of the security regime we have in place. For example, we have
identified and denied refugee resettlement to the United States to
applicants who were:
Detained for several years by the U.S. military on
terrorism-related grounds in Iraq;
Involved in terrorist or insurgent attacks against U.S.,
Iraqi, or Coalition forces;
Linked to fingerprints found on unexploded improvised
explosive devices; and
Fired from employment with the U.S. Government in Iraq on
the grounds that they were linked to terrorism.
I&A has worked with the FBI, NCTC, and other agencies to identify
areas where intelligence information can be used to further strengthen
existing security vetting procedures, and worked with partner agencies
to develop solutions. Since instituting the additional checks in the
summer of 2010, there has been an appreciable increase in our ability
to identify derogatory information on Iraqi refugee applicants. Indeed,
the robust security screening employed in the refugee context--and in
the SIV screening mechanisms, which are modeled on it--has allowed the
Department to leverage lessons learned to strengthen our collaboration
with law enforcement, National security, and intelligence communities.
When we instituted the new security checks we ensured that high-
risk refugee applicants were screened, and we now require these
additional checks of all refugee and SIV applicants aged 14-65. In
addition, we took steps to re-examine individuals that were already
admitted to the United States. We are providing the results of the re-
screening to the appropriate law enforcement and intelligence parties
and while I cannot go into details in an open setting due to the
sensitive nature of this effort, I can tell you that these
``retroactive'' checks continue.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I would be happy to
answer your questions.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Ms. Strack.
I note for the record as well that you and Ms. Scalici
joined together in preparing the written testimony and so your
testimony reflects the opening statements for both of you. So I
am grateful for your preparation for this and for your
appearance here today, and I now will recognize myself for
opening questions.
Let me begin first with the recognition that we have had
some 68,000 Iraqi refugees resettled in the country since 2007.
What comfort can we have that there has been adequate
screening, recognizing that many of those refugees were allowed
into the country during a period of time where there was a
response to matters in Iraq and less scrutiny that was given on
the front end than may exist today?
So what comfort, I am not in the business of asking for
guarantees, but I would like to have you explain how it is that
we can feel confident that we don't have a situation with
68,000 refugees who were allowed in the country in the last 6
years?
Mr. Bartlett.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. If I could start and
then I will defer to my colleagues at the Department of
Homeland Security, but I think I would like to start by saying
that obviously the administration's commitment to resettling
Iraqi refugees is steadfast and conducting this program in a
way that is responsible, responsible in a humanitarian way as
well as in a security effort, are really our two main issues
and our two main responsibilities.
The refugee program and the refugee screening for Iraqis is
no different than it is for any other nationality. We conduct a
full battery of tests and we have since the beginning of the
Iraqi resettlement program. Those tests have evolved over time
as vulnerabilities I think have been discovered and as new
intelligence has been put into databases. So we continue to
look at that population. But, frankly, as with any population,
we want to make sure that this is a population that is safe to
resettle.
Mr. Meehan. But when you say it is no different than any
other, wouldn't there be a higher level of scrutiny of those
that are coming from a country in which we know that there is a
high degree of terrorist activity and al-Qaeda activity?
Mr. Bartlett. The screening level is calibrated to some
extent by the country of origin, but we also resettle refugees
from Afghanistan, we resettle refugees from parts of Africa
where there is also turmoil. So in fact what is incumbent upon
all of us to do in the interagency and with the intelligence
community is to look at, as you said, the specific intelligence
that derives from those situations.
I would defer to my colleagues.
Mr. Meehan. Let me ask, let me just pursue this. I am going
to ask you to go into these questions. But you are telling me
that there is sort of a generalized approach to this, to the
humanitarian immigration, and I can see somebody from Gambia or
some other country, Ethiopia, where we don't--or maybe Ethiopia
could be questionable, but we don't have the same degree of
inherent, you know, issues. But with those in Iraq,
Afghanistan, Jordan, Syria, Egypt, do we have some kind of a
method in which there is a specific heightened level of
scrutiny for those who are seeking to come into this country?
My opening question I note related to asking for your
response with regard to the 58,000 Iraqi refugees who are
already here. So I am sort of giving you two questions, but I
want you to answer about these other countries now and then get
back to what I asked about the 58,000 Iraqi refugees.
Mr. Bartlett. Sure. Let me do my best, but I think I am
again going to have to defer for specificity to my Department
of Homeland Security colleagues.
The types of checks that are implemented for refugees are
largely similar. I think the difference, but again my
colleagues will expand upon this, is the types of information
that is available to us from those very checks. So when my
colleagues talked about using databases, fingerprint databases
from Iraq, those definitely are just used for Iraqi refugees.
So I think that is the discriminating factor. It is the types
of intelligence holdings that we have and our ability to ping
against those holdings.
I think on the second question about what is being done for
those people who have already arrived, again I would defer to
my DHS colleagues, who have been much more involved in that
issue.
Mr. Meehan. Well, Ms. Strack and Ms. Scalici, either of you
who wants to answer this, I guess the implication on that is
somehow there is a level of basic intelligence that exists
which is higher in those countries that we have concerns about
the terrorist activity than in others, is that accurate? Be
responsive to my questions, please.
Ms. Strack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to start
briefly with a kind of operational response and then invite my
colleague to speak more in depth on the intelligence front.
I would say operationally what you are suggesting, that the
program ought to have heightened scrutiny on Iraqis, is in fact
what happened. This was a chronology, and when the United
States Government announced large-scale resettlement of Iraqis
in 2007, we immediately looked at what should we be doing in
light of this particular population, which was different. It
was a nationality we had not been resettling a great deal. We
looked at what enhancements we could bring on board that would
address this new population. That is when we created the
partnership with DOD. Initially that was Iraqi-focused. Later
when we worked with the National----
Mr. Meehan. Was in this 2007, Ms. Strack?
Ms. Strack. That was in 2007. Later when we identified
additional capacity and a new partnership with the National
Counterterrorism Center, that initially was focused on Iraqi
applicants. But we learned by doing, and we learned that that
heightened level of checks which was initially oriented towards
Iraqi applicants, we expanded to applicants of all
nationalities. So really we used the Iraqi program to raise the
bar across the board for other nationalities.
Mr. Meehan. There was some 20-25,000 a year for a few years
that were coming out of Iraq, is that not right, for at least a
2- or 3-year period? Twenty thousand a year?
Ms. Strack. I believe the high point was 18,000.
Mr. Meehan. Okay, that is still 18,000 a year. Did you have
the resources and capacity to do some kind of a fairly thorough
assessment of each of those 18,000 before they were able to be
granted entrance?
Ms. Strack. Yes, sir, we did. That is where I would like to
defer to my colleague who can explain in further detail.
Ms. Scalici. Thank you. I think it is fair to say that in
2007 when the large-scale processing of Iraqi refugees began,
certainly the security and vetting programs that we had in
place at the time were strong, but they were not impervious. We
have learned a lot since then and we have worked with
interagency partners to strengthen the security and the vetting
programs that we have in place.
Now, as Ms. Strack indicated, enhanced security vetting
procedures were initially applied to Iraqi refugees applicants,
expanded over time to other high-risk populations, to now at
this point as we have all acknowledged to include all refugee
applicants regardless of their country of origin within the age
ranges of 14 to 65.
So we believe that the greatly enhanced security vetting,
which allows us to draw upon all relevant intelligence and
other data on the applicants, has greatly enhanced our ability
to identify derogatory information on applicants for the
refugee program.
At the same time, we recognize the fact that a number of
Iraqi refugees entered the country before the enhanced security
vetting procedures were put into place by the interagency, so
what we have done as an interagency process is to go back and
do retroactive checks on those individuals that were earlier
admitted to the United States and any relevant information that
comes to light is then shared with relevant intelligence
community or law enforcement agencies as appropriate.
One other thing I think I would mention is while not only
do we have analysts who are looking at all the relevant
intelligence and data at the time that an applicant originally
puts forward their application, we review it again before that
applicant actually enters the United States in case any
derogatory information has arisen in the intervening time.
So we do believe again this interagency process, drawing on
more intelligence and data than we ever did before, as well as
the recurring and the retroactive checks, has greatly enhanced
our ability to identify individuals of concern.
Mr. Meehan. Ms. Scalici, thank you. My time has expired. I
will follow up with some questions. But now I recognize the
Ranking Member for whatever questions she may have. Ms. Hahn.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you. I think for me just real simply, in my
opening testimony I talked about the arrests of the Iraqi
refugees and how there was information available earlier that
might have led us to believe that they could cause some trouble
in our country. How did we miss that initial information and
could you speak to what are we doing? I hear vague comments
about information sharing, but we know that is key as we move
forward. That was one of the one lessons we learned from 9/11.
So without divulging any classified information, how did we
miss that information the first time around and what can you
tell us that will give us some confidence that we really are
able to look at all the data available out there to make
responsible decisions as we move forward in this refugee
program?
Ms. Scalici. Well, for those two individuals of concern
that we have been talking about, at the time they made their
original application to enter the refugee program in the United
States, both their biographic and the biometric information
that we had available on them at the time and that were used in
the screening processes came in clean. So we did not have any
derogatory information on those two individuals that we used as
part of the screening effort when they entered the United
States. In fact, the fingerprint clearance came through as well
from DOD, FBI, as well as DHS.
Ms. Hahn. Even though their fingerprints were found to have
been on a roadside bomb?
Ms. Scalici. That is what we have learned in the aftermath.
I would have to defer to DOD and FBI for any specific
information on that. But, again, all of the biographic as well
as the biometric checks that were performed at the time did
come back clean. But since that time, as I think we have noted,
we have actually enhanced the program and the security checks
and we now draw upon a greater wealth of intelligence and data
holdings on individuals seeking application to the refugee
program, which greatly enhances our ability to identify
derogatory compared to earlier.
Ms. Hahn. Anyone else want to comment on that?
So other than the recent Iraqi refugee case, have there
been many open-source cases of foreigners admitted through the
refugee or immigration programs who have been associated with
terrorism and is there any public evidence that terrorist
groups are successfully exploiting this U.S. Refugee Admissions
Program or any other refugee program for the specific purpose
of gaining entry into the United States and committing an act
of terrorism?
Ms. Scalici. In that regard, certainly we are concerned
about the potential for terrorist groups to exploit the refugee
program. We certainly saw that in the case of the two
individuals arrested in Kentucky. Although a point of
clarification in that case, we don't actually believe that
those two individuals deliberately sought entry to the United
States through the refugee program with a specific intent on
carrying out an attack here. But certainly in the aftermath of
their entry to the United States, given their continuing desire
to support terrorist groups overseas and in particular AQI, as
well as obviously the previous terrorist involvement that had
come to light, they were security risks.
When we look at on the potential in the future for
terrorist groups to exploit the refugee program, we do have
concerns. Hence, we have the enhanced security and vetting
procedures that we have in place. I will tell you that we have
intelligence-driven processes regardless of the immigration
program that a terrorist actor may seek to use or just travel
to the United States. We are reviewing intelligence on a
regular basis, sharing that with interagency partners and
developing the procedures by which we can help to identify and
further screening individuals of concern, again regardless of
the way in which they plan to enter the United States.
Ms. Strack. If I may follow up with respect to your
question about information sharing, I did want to note that we
in many ways at USCIS, we are customers of the agencies that
hold security and National intelligence information and it is a
tremendously cooperative relationship. We have relationships,
the information flows. It not only comes to us in order to help
us make better decisions in individual refugee cases, there are
instances where we are also able to share information back. So,
for example, if there is a latent fingerprint that has been
identified from an IED or some other terrorist-related purpose,
if that applicant, if that individual appears as an applicant
in the refugee program, we are able to associate biographic
information with that person, a photograph with that person, a
location with that person, and so we are able to enrich the
watch list information in that regard.
Also my colleagues at another division of USCIS, our fraud
detection and National security unit, have quite an elaborate
program with liaison with other agencies. So they have officers
embedded at the National Counterterrorism Center, the Terrorist
Screening Center, with Interpol, with joint terrorism task
forces at both the National level, State, and local. So that is
a very important program for us, to make sure that those
agencies have the benefit of the immigration expertise embedded
in their unit, and then they are also eyes and ears for USCIS
to make sure that we are getting information from those kinds
of organizations that are important to us, not just for the
refugee program but across the whole range of immigration
benefits that we are responsible for.
Ms. Hahn. Are you working with our fusion centers?
Ms. Strack. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Hahn. Because I know we have conflicting reports
sometimes on the success of those, but I know the ones where I
come from in Los Angeles have been very valuable in helping to
provide extremely important information that I believe has
thwarted some potential attacks in this country.
Ms. Strack. We agree.
Ms. Hahn. I know I am over time, but since it is just you
and me, I was just thinking, I am a strong supporter of a
quick, immediate, and responsible drawdown of our forces in
Afghanistan. I am one of those that really would like to speed
up that time line, but I think part of the responsible drawdown
includes providing opportunities for the Afghan people.
Are we prepared, what is your projection as we wind that
war down to the number of Afghan refugees that may be seeking
to come to this country? Let us know how your resources are and
if you feel like that is going to be a major surge. Because the
Afghan refugees have been smaller in comparison to the Iraqi
refugees, and I just wanted to hear your projection as we go
forward how you think that is all going to play out.
Mr. Bartlett. Thank you. An interesting question. So on the
Afghan front, the program that we have that parallels the Iraq
program is the Special Immigrant Visa Program. Again, that was
legislated by Congress for those people who have worked closely
with our forces and with our embassy and other U.S.
contractors. So that program is still on-going. It has frankly
been a bit slow getting off the mark, but frankly is now
working. Over the last year, had I think 235 visas were issued,
a total over the time of the program, 2,117. So it is still
fairly small but it continues.
On the refugee side, the refugee situation in Afghanistan
is quite a bit different than the Iraqi refugee situation. Most
Afghan refugees for over 20 years have found shelter and
protection in either Pakistan or Iran. In the case of Pakistan
we have supported the international efforts to help those
refugees that are finding asylum in Pakistan.
Most of those refugees are not seeking resettlement. UNHCR
has looked over the last few years to see if there are pockets
of refugees, especially, actually both in Pakistan and Iran
that are in need of resettlement, and we have started in fact
to resettle some refugees from both countries. We have a very
small program out of Iran. We are obviously not operating
inside Iran, but are taking those people to either Romania or
Slovakia where we can process vulnerable women and families.
So we don't I think project a large increase in the
resettlement program for Afghanistan, but we continue to help
UNHCR and I think the neighboring countries that are providing
asylum and see where individuals might need protection as
opposed to large waves of refugees.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Bartlett, you identified that you have a
two-step process. First, you want to identify those who are
eligible for this consideration and then to assure that they
don't present a risk. Explain to me how you identify when and
how somebody is eligible for this process in the first place?
Mr. Bartlett. Sure, and that is more than a one-step
process, trying to identify people for resettlement. Frankly,
our largest partner is U.N. High Commission for Refugees and
they work throughout the world----
Mr. Meehan. Is that an American-run organization or an
international organization?
Mr. Bartlett. This is an international organization. They
operate in countries of refugee outflows as well as countries
where refugees are received.
Mr. Meehan. Am I correct to say then we have an
international organization that is determining who should be
emigrating to the United States of America?
Mr. Bartlett. It would not be exactly correct. What we do
is we work closely with UNHCR in this regard to look at
populations that are in need of resettlement. They are located
in camps. They are basically at the ground level. There are
hundreds and hundreds of thousands of refugees around the world
who don't have a hope to go home any time soon.
Mr. Meehan. How do you distinguish between, because it is
interesting and I noticed you identified that Afghans would
have a place of refuge in Pakistan, so-to-speak. But we are now
looking at Jordanians, Syrians, not as likely Egyptians at this
point, although nobody knows what is going to happen there. How
do you determine who may be able to find refuge within their
region as opposed to the United States being the only source of
refuge?
Mr. Bartlett. Sure. I mean, this is certainly both a
diplomatic as well as humanitarian effort. So what we expect is
that countries will provide asylum for refugees as they seek
it. Not all countries are able to provide long-term support. So
that is something we will engage bilaterally with in terms of
governments, but we will also work multilaterally through the
United Nations and other partners to see. So, for example,
Syria, you bring up Syrian refugees.
Mr. Meehan. Right.
Mr. Bartlett. Syrian refugees right now have moved into
principally Turkey and Lebanon, but some numbers also into
Jordan. Those countries are hosting those refugees and we are
supporting that effort.
Any refugee, I will say 99 percent of the refugees in this
world, would like to go home. As great a place as the United
States or Australia or Canada are for resettlement, their first
preference is to go home to their families and their own
country. So what we try to do is support the effort to help
people, right now again in Turkey and Lebanon and Jordan, to
remain in those places, to have protection, to have services,
so that as the situation changes and hopefully the violence
subsides they can return home.
So we are not looking at resettling large numbers of Syrian
refugees at this moment, but, again, we are looking out to see
if there are individuals who, for example, may have protection
concerns in Turkey or Lebanon and cannot stay there safely.
So it is really a kind of a two-step process. In an
emergency situation it is really about providing assistance. We
have provided about $200 million worth of assistance to Syrian
refugees, and allowing them an opportunity to go home as the
situation changes. If the situation becomes protracted as it is
did with Iraqis, countries are sometimes unable to host people
for extended periods of time. So after 5 years, after 6 years,
then we begin to look at who within that population might be in
need of resettlement.
Mr. Meehan. I interrupted you with regard to the criteria
and eligibility. So is there specific criteria that you look at
in making those determination as to who is eligible?
Mr. Bartlett. There are. I mean, our program prides itself
on the fact that we look largely at vulnerability. So we look
at really protecting people who are vulnerable in a country of
asylum. You know, our program provides a fairly broad range of
services once people arrive so we are working with them to help
anchor them in the United States and help them gain self-
sufficiency.
But in terms of looking at criteria, again, we look at the
vulnerability, their inability to stay in this situation of
temporary asylum and, frankly, their inability to go home. So
as the situation becomes protracted, and Somalia is a good
example, we know that there will be--and the Democratic
Republic of Congo is another, frankly--these are two
populations that won't have an opportunity to go home soon. So
then we will look at discrete populations within that large
community to see who is the most vulnerable. Often women at
risk, without a husband, a husband is missing but with
children, have protection concerns in a camp environment or in
an urban environment. So we will look at that population and
work to identify those people. Sometimes people with medical
conditions that can't be treated in a camp and makes them again
more vulnerable, we will look at those populations. So it is
kind of a broad array of vulnerabilities that we try to assess.
Mr. Meehan. Ms. Strack and Ms. Scalici, could you identify
then, we are talking about those who are eligible for
consideration, there has been an identification of an emphasis
on those who have participated in assisting United States
efforts, either in the military, intelligence or otherwise
nongovernmental organizations, and put themselves into some
peril. What is the distinction between those who are
humanitarian versus those who have performed to the benefit of
our interests and are therefore being given some consideration
because of the exposure that may result from that service?
Ms. Strack. I would say the programs work in several ways
to address both humanitarian concerns and those who have worked
side-by-side, employed directly by the United States or with
U.S.-affiliated organizations, NGOs, or media organizations.
The SIV program that we have talked about is often conflated
with the refugee program but is actually distinct.
Mr. Meehan. Could you explain that for me, what SIV stands
for? Because we have seen this before and I want to see how
that is different from the other program.
Ms. Strack. Yes, sir. It stands for Special Immigrant Visa
Program. So unlike the refugee program, the fundamental focus
of the refugee program is on whether someone has been
persecuted, have they been persecuted in the past or they have
a well-founded fear of persecution in the future based on a
protected category, race, religion, nationality, political
opinion, or membership in a particular social group.
The SIV program traditionally, the Special Immigrant Visa,
is really based on service with the United States, and this is
something Mr. Bartlett is a little bit more of an expert on,
but Congress legislated a program, special immigrant visas, to
say that those who worked for the United States Government, and
there are actually three subcategories within the Special
Immigrant Visa program. Initially it was small, if you were a
translator with the military, but it expanded beyond that to
include embassy employees. Really for them it is the fact of
their service with the United States that makes them eligible.
When they come to the United States, both our agencies have
handled it through an entirely different bureaucratic stream,
they don't come as a refugee, they come as a lawful permanent
resident, so when they arrive they get a green card based on
their service.
Now, there are some individuals who may be eligible to
apply for both programs. They may have worked with the U.S.
embassy or the U.S. military so they are eligible to apply for
an SIV, but they may very well be able to articulate a refugee
claim because of that service they have also faced persecution.
So we work on the refugee side of the program, but
individuals may choose which of those two avenues is better for
them, which they think operates more quickly, depending on
whether they are in Iraq or somewhere else.
Mr. Meehan. That is an interesting question. Do they
operate on a parallel track or is there some preference given
to somebody who has served as an interpreter for our troops
that are, you know, out in the midst of the mountains in
Afghanistan? Do they get a preference, or is there not any
difference?
Ms. Strack. I can tell you that they do operate on a
parallel track. So an individual who is eligible has the
opportunity to file for an SIV, and, again, that would be filed
the State Department. In the refugee program, having worked
with the United States or a U.S.-affiliated organization is one
of the criteria that can help you get access to the program,
but it is not the sole criteria.
Mr. Meehan. Okay.
Ms. Hahn. The only thing I would like to follow up, this
has been such a good hearing and such a serious issue, but an
important one certainly, and again we want to make sure that we
continue this program, these programs, ensuring the safety of
the refugees and the safety of the Americans.
Have you been briefed on any possible effect that
sequestration might have on the departments and these programs?
Mr. Bartlett. I know at the State Department we have
certainly looked at overall sequestration effects. I note also
that our program--our program has been adequately funded in the
past, so I guess our expectation is that in the coming year
that the program should be able to continue at similar levels.
I think it would be hard to say that it would be at the same
level. But, again, a lot of the infrastructure we have in place
overseas as well as domestically I think will remain. So I
think the question will be probably what happens in the longer
term and I am not able to answer that at this point.
Ms. Strack. USCIS is in an unusual position in that most of
our programs, including the refugee program, are funded through
fees, so the fees that are paid by applicants for other
immigration benefits is what supports the refugee settlement
program for USCIS. That being said, my understanding is that
the interpretation of sequestration is that it most likely will
affect not just appropriated funds but our fee funding as well,
but because that is a complicated issue, our Budget Office at
USCIS is in discussions with DHS headquarters on how
sequestration will affect USCIS.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you. We know our Republican colleagues are
going to do the right thing and make sure that we don't go over
the cliff. I have complete confidence.
Mr. Meehan. As do I. I appreciate as well, there are so
many aspects to this hearing, and I do want to follow up on a
couple of lines of questioning.
I opened by identifying this look into the past while at
the same time we appreciate the continuing instability
throughout the region as we go to the future, and both create
challenges to our immigration process, those who have already
gained entrance to the United States, those who we may be
looking at in the future.
I identified testimony from Robert Mueller which was
publicly reported, and if it is in fact accurate it was before
the House Intelligence Committee. He said ``Individuals who may
have resettled here in the United States that have some
association with al-Qaeda in Iraq.'' Then he further, the
report indicated that there were some 300 names of Iraqi
refugees for further investigation.
So, Mr. Bartlett and then either of the other panelists,
can you update this committee on the status of the rescreening
process and explain exactly what steps were taken in the event
that a person with a refugee status is found to have even a
suspicion or a relationship of some sort to al-Qaeda?
Mr. Bartlett. I can start briefly and then I will have to
turn it over to my colleagues. But I can assure you that there
is very close cooperation with all law enforcement agencies, in
particular the FBI, and that the data that we hold in our
systems is shared with them on these types of cases, and
certainly our cooperation with Department of Homeland Security
to further these kinds of information sharing. But I would
really need to defer to DHS to answer that with more
specificity.
Ms. Scalici. Yes. In that regard, I think I mentioned a
little bit about the retroactive checks that we have under way
drawing upon a host of intelligence and other interagency data
and intelligence that we have available on those individuals
who entered the country before the enhanced security checks
were in place. Certainly if any derogatory information comes to
light as a result of those rechecks, that information is
immediately shared with law enforcement agencies for
consideration and for action as appropriate.
I do know that there have been several cases that FBI has
opened as a result of new information that has come to light
for individuals already settled here in the United States. That
said, though, I would have to defer really to DOJ for any
specifics on the number of cases that are still open or the
status of those cases.
Mr. Meehan. Ms. Scalici had said that there were 58,000
people who had come into the country during that period of
time. Do we know where they are in the United States?
Mr. Bartlett. I will start with that. We know where they
arrived. So, certainly, when people enter the United States, we
have arranged with, in fact we contract with local agencies
around the country to receive the refugees and provide initial
support. Largely, refugees stay in those initial places, but,
of course, one of the great things about coming to the United
States is that they are free to move, and some refugees do
move.
So I am not sure, again, what DHS has in terms of onward
movement, but it is one of the issues in terms of trying to
provide on-going support to people, is that they actually end
up moving, but in small numbers.
Mr. Meehan. I am sort-of curious about what we know about
those 58,000 who are already here and the extent to which we
are going back, and do we engage them or do we go back
historically and just look at other information that we have
from, you know, other databases about what we knew about them
prior to their time coming here?
Because I am struck by the fact that it was other
intelligence sources--and maybe that is the way. That is the
way we found the two individuals who had the past association
who had actually been opposed to our military who gained
entrance to the country. But we got that from intelligence.
Otherwise, what are we doing to look at the 58,000 who are here
to determine if there was anything in their background that
would raise suspicion?
Ms. Strack. If I may, I would like to note that of the
58,000 that you reference, from the very outset of large-scale
Iraqi processing in 2007, there was very vigorous vetting.
Mr. Meehan. Okay.
Ms. Strack. They were being fully vetted through biographic
and biometric checks. The DOD fingerprint checks were part of
the process, really from day one in 2007, as were other quite
rigorous biographic and biometric checks. So although some of
those individuals, a subset of that 58,000, was not subject to
the very latest enhancement, that is what Ms. Scalici is
talking about in terms of looking at that portion of them for
the retroactive checks. So I do want to be clear that the
serious, rigorous, robust vetting was in place from the very
beginning in 2007.
But that being said, inevitably there are going to be
instances where information comes to light after a refugee has
been admitted to the United States. We work very closely,
whether it is intelligence community, whether it is law
enforcement, or whether it is our colleagues in immigration
enforcement, civil immigration enforcement, depending on the
information and the circumstance, whether it is an
investigation, whether it is criminal proceedings, as in the
Kentucky cases, or another alternative in some instances is
that an individual can be placed in immigration removal
proceedings and removed from the United States. So the
solutions will be different, I think, under different fact
patterns.
The other thing that I would mention is that refugees are
obliged to come forward after 1 year and apply to adjust their
status; that is, to apply for their green card to become a
lawful permanent resident. Later in their immigration life
cycle, they may apply for naturalization.
So at those junctures, when an individual comes back to
USCIS, those other application benefits will also trigger
additional vetting of the applicant. So there is some
continuous vetting built in.
Ms. Hahn. May I follow up on what you just said?
Mr. Meehan. Please. Absolutely. Jump in wherever----
Ms. Hahn. Yeah. You know, this is an interesting issue, is
tracking these refugees when they come here. I mean, you said
they are obligated to, in a year, show up somewhere and
reapply. Do we know if that happens? What about the ones that
don't? Do we, you know, try to reach out to them?
If information does come to light after they are already
here, let's say maybe even a couple years, what is our
mechanism to know where these refugees actually have located?
As you said, some do move. That is the beauty of this country.
How are we sort of keeping track of these many thousands of
refugees that are here if they don't automatically come back
and reapply for their green card? What do we have in place?
For instance, what if some information does come to light
on a particular person? How do we know where that person has
located in this country?
Ms. Strack. My understanding is that there is not
systematic tracking of refugees who come into the United States
because they have gone through vigorous vetting before they
arrive. We do not treat them as a suspect class. However, the
resettlement agencies that Larry mentioned, when refugees come
into the United States there is an agency that is invited to
welcome them and often keeps in touch with them and encourages
them at the 1-year mark to go ahead and apply for adjustment of
status. But we do not routinely track people.
Of course, if someone comes to our attention through law
enforcement or intelligence reasons after someone has been
admitted, very often that information itself may include
information pertaining to location.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you. I appreciate that. You are right, we
shouldn't be treating these people as suspects or criminals.
But I think the issue is the information that comes to light
after the rigorous vetting. At that point, there is a little
bit of a vulnerability, I think, in this program. I don't know
if there is any talk going forward of a better way to keep
track of refugees.
Mr. Meehan. Do we have a record of individuals who have
been denied access? I mean, who have sought status and then by
virtue of something in their past denied?
Ms. Strack. We do maintain records on denied refugee
applicants. Those records are included in DHS' biometric
database, the IDENT system. So if that individual is
encountered again, whether they are using the same identity or
a different identity, because of the biometric there would be a
link to identify----
Mr. Meehan. ``Biometric'': Is that more than a fingerprint?
Ms. Strack. Fingerprint and photograph. So they would be
identified. To the other, a subsequent encounter would be
identified that they had previously been denied as a refugee
applicant.
Mr. Meehan. Okay.
Mr. Bartlett, can you explain the criteria for determining
who gets this Security Advisory Opinion? What individuals in
the, as you are doing the prescreening, seem to bring a higher
level of scrutiny? Can you explain what a Security Advisory
Opinion is or if it is not, whichever panelist, but----
Mr. Bartlett. Allow me one conversation, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Meehan. Absolutely.
Mr. Bartlett. Take a moment.
Sorry. We did talk earlier about which information is
classified and which is suitable for an open hearing. For the
Security Advisory Opinion check----
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Bartlett, please, feel comfortable, if you
are uncomfortable with talking about any kind of an issue. You
have been conversant with us, and I am not against the
possibility of entertaining that kind of a question in a
different environment. But I just believe that we at the same
time want to create a level of comfort that we are doing things
on both ends. If you feel comfortable about it, I would like
you to discuss it.
Mr. Bartlett. I appreciate that. I will start with a small
discussion and then I will move to the comfort level of going
perhaps to offering to brief in a classified setting.
But at the outset, every refugee is subject to the Consular
Lookout check, the CLASS check, and the information that might
be in that CLASS check could point to the need to do a Security
Advisory Opinion. So that, again, that has holdings from
various intelligence agencies, and that would indicate a need
to do a more rigorous examination of their background through
the Security Advisory Opinion check.
Security Advisory Opinion checks are also run on other
applicants. That is what we would need to talk about, I think,
in a classified setting. But it is one that is run on many
refugees, but not all, and it does give us additional
information about if there is derogatory information that would
disallow their entry to the United States.
Mr. Meehan. What do we know about an applicant when they
make this? This is one of the things that I struggle with, is
understanding where the, you know, the predicate knowledge
about someone may come from.
Now, I distinguish, again, when I go back from those who
have worked with our Government in some particular capacity
over a period of time and there is already a relationship, and
I know the DOD will come in and talk about individuals, they
will affirm that they had participated with this person.
But I look towards others who come, quite appropriately,
seeking refugee status. But how we do we determine that they
actually have the beliefs or relationship with some particular
group or others that qualifies them on the first place. What
predicate level of information is pursued about someone? Do we
have adequate resources to do it to the extent to which it is
probably necessary?
Mr. Bartlett. Sir, let me start and then refer to my DHS
colleague.
The process by which refugees are both identified and
processed is, I think I said earlier, methodical and sometimes
long.
We don't really apologize, I think, for the length of the
process because it does allow us to be, I think, more thorough.
Again, we work very closely with partners on the ground. The
United Nations is one, but certainly sometimes with local
embassies, U.S. Embassies, sometimes with NGOs, to identify the
refugees who are really in need of resettlement.
Then we have nine contractors overseas that are located in
regions throughout the world who are responsible, and are our
contractors, who are responsible for collecting different
information on each refugee family. So be it an individual or
be it a family, information is collected. That is when really
we begin, I think, a lot of the screening processes so that
information----
Mr. Meehan. How proactive is that, Mr. Bartlett? I mean,
when I was appointed the United States Attorney, the FBI sent
people back, they talked to my 8th-grade classmates, they
talked to people that I went to high school with, neighbors
that lived on my block when I was 10.
Now, of course, that is for a secure position of
responsibility here in the United States Government. I don't
expect to have the same degree. I am just sort of curious the
extent to which, so there is a sort of a vetting, so to speak,
and there would be the kind of inquiry that would go back to
try the understand who this person was in their previous
community and what we know about them?
Mr. Bartlett. If I could say one additional point, and then
I think I will refer to my DHS colleague.
I mean, at the beginning of this process there is a
collection of information on each refugee or the refugee family
in trying to develop both the individual information about that
family, but also we look at family tree information, who are
they related to, collection, obviously, of fingerprints at some
point down the road. So at the individual level it is
collected, and then that is when the process starts.
At the next point in the process, Department of Homeland
Security comes in and conducts additional interviews face-to-
face with a U.S. officer, usually located in Ms. Strack's
office. But I think I will refer to Ms. Strack to talk a little
more about how that vetting process then unfolds.
Mr. Meehan. Ms. Strack, would you also, as you discuss that
process, to the extent you can share it, identify how it is
that that interview is designed to elicit the kind of
information that would allow us to ask the next logical
question about somebody's background?
Ms. Strack. Yes, sir. The information that we have on
refugee applicants does vary in certain regards. One is that
there are basically three different ways that individuals can
access the U.S. refugee resettlement program. Larry, I think,
has talked about two of those three to this point. One is the
U.N. Refugee Agency, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
can refer cases to us. In some cases, that may be an individual
that the UNHCR knows has been in a camp for 20 or 30 years.
They have very good registration records and they can reverify
those records.
So that individual has come forward, has shared a story of
persecution, a story of flight. They have been in the camp,
they have had a ration for 20 years, they have talked about who
their children are, who their family members are. So there is
quite a long record on who that person is before resettlement
to the United States has ever even been talked about. So when
we do the interview with that kind of a family, we will have
that record in front of us and we can elicit testimony and see
if the things that they are telling us are consistent with the
records and the story that they have been telling to the U.N.
Refugee Agency over a period of time, and that can give us
greater confidence that the information that we are eliciting
is true and accurate.
In other cases, we may encounter, say, an Iraqi applicant
who has fled much more recently. Iraqis tend to have a very
great deal of documentation. So when we see an Iraqi refugee we
often have a passport, we have a national ID, we may have a
military booklet, in addition to possibly a record with UNHCR.
They may tell us they worked for an American company, and if
that is the case--or with the embassy--we have the ability to
go back and to confirm their claimed employment history.
So it really runs the gamut in terms of the tools that we
have, depending on the----
Mr. Meehan. May I interrupt to ask whether, in fact, in
light of the engagement that we have with the governments of
both Iraq and Afghanistan, do we have any access to the legacy
records that that government now--that the Iraqi government or
the Afghan government possess with respect to the, you know,
the Iraqis and Afghans within their country? Do we have access
to those databases?
Ms. Strack. We do have access to some information, former
Iraqi government information. I can't speak to Afghanistan. As
Mr. Bartlett mentioned, we have just seen many fewer of those
cases. I am not familiar with that off the top of my head. But
we can in some instances access that information.
Then we spend really a very great deal of time with our
staff training them to be rigorous in terms of eliciting
testimony.
Another point that I would like to mention, for those who
claim--who have previously been affiliated with the United
States, we have found instances where that claim is true, they
did have a previous affiliation with the U.S. Government or the
U.S. military. We vet those individuals, nonetheless, just the
way we would vet another applicant, because we have found in
some instances that individuals may have been fired for cause
or there may have been subsequent derogatory information that
their former employer had no idea about.
So even in a case where someone has documented prior
employment directly or indirectly with the U.S. Government or a
U.S.-affiliated entity, we still go through the full suite of
security checks because we think that is important.
Mr. Meehan. As we move forward in anticipation of the--
maybe I shouldn't say anticipation--the recognition of the
continuing unrest in the countries like Syria and Jordan, if we
anticipate that there may be more demands for the opportunity
to be considered as refugees for either purpose, to come into
our country, are we in possession of the capability right now,
in light of the fact that we have got resources that are
screening those in Iraq, we have got resources looking at
Afghanistan, do you have the resources on the ground to be able
to sufficiently identify and do the kinds of background work
that need to be done, anticipating that you may get people from
a broad variety of countries now who are seeking asylum under--
not asylum, but refugee status in this, you know, in light of
the destabilization?
Mr. Bartlett. Perhaps I could start just on the pure
processing front. I think my colleagues at DHS can talk more
about the security screening effort.
But certainly in the Middle East we have very strong
partners. We have a major partner that is located in Jordan. We
have a major partner that is located in Istanbul, Turkey.
So from those two, I think, main points, and with
suboffices both in Baghdad and Egypt and Lebanon, we do
actually have the capability to receive refugees and to take
initial screening information and to move them through the
processing system.
I think on the security side I would defer to my DHS
colleagues to talk about, kind-of, our ability to vet and be
ready for that potential.
Ms. Strack. As you know, every year the size of the refugee
program is determined through a Presidential determination
after consultations with Congress. So we know for this year the
ceiling is 70,000. There will be an interagency conversation,
then a conversation with the Congress about the size for next
year.
So we do feel at USCIS that we have the resources that we
need to support a program of 70,000 admissions this year. Next
year's ceiling will be set I think keeping the resources of all
of the program partners into account.
I can't speak directly to the capacity of the vetting
agencies. That really is for them to say. But I can tell you
that we know that a number of our vetting partners have
increased their staffing over the last year, year-and-a-half or
2, and in connection with this workload and being sure that
they are staffed to be partners with us in this effort.
Ms. Scalici. I could add, if you will, that to complement a
little bit of what Ms. Strack said, this is a resource-
intensive effort that we have in place to do the enhanced
security checks on all of the refugee applicants. We have
worked across the interagency to include with the intelligence
community. We believe we have the resources in place right now
to support the refugee program as it is currently configured
and at the current size that it currently exists. But I would
have to defer to them if the program were to grow much larger
over time.
That said, though, I mean, we continue to learn and
collaborate well with our interagency partners. We are working
hard to try to find ways in which we can automate the processes
to a greater extent than currently exist and to streamline
those processes so that over time the amount of manpower
specifically devoted to the effort could perhaps go down with
any loss in the efficacy of the program itself.
Mr. Meehan. I think it is important to note for the record,
because we have been asking some probing questions and asking
you to more or less present your confidence that something in
the future might not happen by virtue of allowing the refugees
here, but I think it is important to identify the 3 million or
so, Mr. Bartlett, that you said have been resettled since the
late '70s? Is that accurate? And of course the 58,000 since the
Iraqi bulge, so to speak.
So the fact that we have identified a small number who have
actually come to the United States and been investigated and
concluded to have participated in a potential terrorist
activity is noteworthy, that it is quite small.
But my closing question for you is, we on this committee
have never ceased to be, I shouldn't say appreciative, I
shouldn't say awed, but I would say cognizant of the extent to
which al-Qaeda and others constantly probe and look for
opportunities to exploit our system and to introduce acts of
terror, not just against our interests in other parts of the
country, but principally within the United States of America.
To what extent can we feel comfort that al-Qaeda is not
looking at this program as a back-door way to work with
somebody to get them in here, into our country, to plant them
for ultimate--you know, is this a way around the traditional
way of getting into the United States of America, as one would
with a visa or otherwise?
Ms. Scalici. I would note and agree with you, sir, that
certainly al-Qaeda and its affiliates have been very innovative
over the years in terms of trying to identify potential what
they consider to be vulnerabilities or gaps in our screening
procedures to try to get individuals into the United States to
do harm here.
That is why we definitely have an intelligence-driven
process. We review intelligence on a daily, 24-by-7 basis in
conjunction with interagency partners to actively try to
identify means by which al-Qaeda or its affiliates may try to
penetrate our defenses and to identify individuals or groups of
concern that really require increased screening and detention.
So that is on-going.
Certainly, we have comfort in terms of the increased
security vetting that we have in place through the refugee
program. But I will emphasize, it is not a static program. We
will continue to learn lessons, we will continue to try to
identify new sources of data and intelligence that would be
relevant to these screening processes and to better secure our
defenses and our program, such as the refugee program.
Mr. Meehan. Do the other two panelists have any closing
comments or observations you would like to share for us before
we conclude the hearing?
Ms. Strack. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to say, very
briefly, when we launched large-scale processing of the Iraqi
program in 2007, we recognized the compelling humanitarian
need, but at the same time we recognized, in anticipation, that
bad actors will try to take advantage of any immigration
program to the United States, whether it is visa programs or
refugee programs or student visitor programs.
So we have really striven over the years to be in the
forefront of cooperation and collaboration with the law
enforcement and National intelligence communities. We know no
program is impervious, but we have tried our best to be
forward-leaning and in the forefront and ready to innovate and
learn, as Ms. Scalici has said, from our experience in order to
adopt the very best protocols that we can.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you.
Mr. Bartlett, any closing comment?
Mr. Bartlett. Just a brief one, Mr. Chairman.
I would just like to thank you for your interest, I think,
in the security screening process that we have put in place and
for the recognition that, in fact, improvements have been made.
Also just like to say that the security screening process not
only protects the United States, but also protects the program
and really allows this country to provide on-going protection
to refugees who are in need of this. So we thank you for your
interest.
Mr. Meehan. Well, let me conclude the hearing with the same
observation I made at the outset, which is to thank you for the
work that you do on a very, very challenging issue in which we
balance the interests we have in continuing to be a Nation of
refuge for those who we can include while at the same time
appreciating the need to fulfill our first responsibility,
which is to protect the citizens of the United States against
future harm.
So you are on the tip of the spear. I thank you for the
diligent work that you are doing and the improvements that
continue to be putting in to enhancing our ability to do so.
So I just want to conclude the hearing by asking the
panelists, if there should be further questioning from your
panel here today or others who were unable to participate, that
they may have written questions. We will keep the record open
for 10 days in the event that there may be further questions,
and I ask that you be responsive.
I am very grateful, again, for your participation today.
So, without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Patrick Meehan for Lawrence F. Bartlett
Question 1a. In May 2010, the FBI announced the arrest of Mohanad
Hammadi and Waad Ramadan Alwan, two Iraqi nationals who were charged
with participating in a plot to send cash, explosives, and Stinger
missiles to al-Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq. The two made it through
security screenings by both DHS and the Department of State and
exploited special Iraqi refugee programs to come to the United States.
Most disturbing perhaps is that Alwan was admitted into the United
States in 2009 even though his fingerprints were found in 2005 on an
unexploded roadside bomb that was set to blow up a U.S. convoy in Iraq.
How is it that these two men were able to get through security
background checks through the Iraqi refugee programs and what
modifications in the security screening process have both DHS and the
Department of State made since 2009 in order to make sure this never
happens again?
Question 1b. How confident are you all that this could not happen
again? Please explain how the enhanced security screening processes now
in place ensures that this will never happen again.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Are there legal authorities that this subcommittee or
Congress could provide to assist your Department in putting into place
an effective, efficient security check process for refugees from all
threat countries?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. If a special category of refugee were created in the
future, similar to what was established for Iraqis, do you feel
confident the measures established to screen the current Iraqi refugees
would be enough to prevent an incident resembling the Alwan and Hammadi
case?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. How many names of Iraqi refugees have been provided to
the FBI for further investigation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. Do you have concerns that refugees with terrorist ties
from Iraq or other high-risk countries could be resettled in countries
that participate in the Visa Waiver Program and then could enter the
United States with a lower level of scrutiny?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. How does the enhanced screening protocols used for
refugees compare with the checks conducted through the Electronic
System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) program under the Visa Waiver
Program?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman Patrick Meehan for Barbara L. Strack
Question 1a. In May 2010, the FBI announced the arrest of Mohanad
Hammadi and Waad Ramadan Alwan, two Iraqi nationals who were charged
with participating in a plot to send cash, explosives, and Stinger
missiles to al-Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq. The two made it through
security screenings by both DHS and the Department of State and
exploited special Iraqi refugee programs to come to the United States.
Most disturbing perhaps is that Alwan was admitted into the United
States in 2009 even though his fingerprints were found in 2005 on an
unexploded roadside bomb that was set to blow up a U.S. convoy in Iraq.
How is it that these two men were able to get through security
background checks through the Iraqi refugee programs and what
modifications in the security screening process have both DHS and the
Department of State made since 2009 in order to make sure this never
happens again?
Question 1b. How confident are you all that this could not happen
again? Please explain how the enhanced security screening processes now
in place ensures that this will never happen again.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. In testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and
Government Affairs Committee last year, DHS Under Secretary Rand Beers
said that the rescreening of Iraqi refugees would not be ``a one-time
only screening process'' because new intelligence and information is
constantly becoming available.
We know that DHS is rescreening tens of thousands of Iraqi refugees
who have been resettled in the United States for ties to terrorism. Can
you update the committee as to the status of the rescreening process,
how many refugees already in the country have been rescreened and how
many remain?
Question 2b. Please explain step-by-step the exact process DHS
undertakes if a refugee admitted into the country has been found to
have ties to al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Question 2c. Does any agency within DHS have access to Iraqi
National Police and/or Iraqi Interior Ministry criminal records to
assist in the adjudication process of Iraqi refugee and Special
Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants?
Question 2d. How many USCIS officers are assigned to adjudicating
and interviewing Iraqi refugee applicants at Refugee Support Centers
abroad? How does the training USCIS officers receive compare to the
training the Department of State provides to its Consular Officers?
What security-related questions are included in the interview?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. The Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007 requires
refugees undergo and pass a background check as determined by the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
What effect did the requirement for expediting Iraqi refugee
resettlements have on DHS's ability to conduct thorough security
screening of refugee applicants?
Question 3b. What staffing resources were in place in 2007 to vet
the thousands of Iraqis applying for resettlement in the United States?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. How many Iraqi refugee applicants have been flagged by
USCIS in the adjudication process and refused resettlement status by
the U.S. Government?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. How many Iraqi Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants
have been identified by USCIS in the adjudication process and refused
resettlement status by the U.S. Government?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. Ms. Strack, can you explain the criteria for
determining who should receive a Security Advisory Opinion and can you
explain this process from beginning to end?
Answer. The Foreign Affairs Manual contains State Department
administrative organization policies and procedures and is written
based on requirements contained in the Foreign Service Act. Security
Advisory Opinions (SAOs) for refugees are called Merlins, and the
requirements for requesting a Merlin SAO are found in 9 FAM Appendix G.
In general, SAOs must be requested for refugee applicants 16 years of
age or older, who can be described in one of the categories listed
below:
(1) An applicant with a non-excludable security-related hit in the
Department of State's Consular Lookout and Support System
(CLASS) database;
(2) Nationals, or specified categories of nationals, of designated
countries which are not recognized by the United States, with
which the United States has no diplomatic relations, or on
which the Department has imposed an SAO requirement for
political, security, or foreign policy reasons.
(3) Third-country nationals working for the government of Iraq or
government of Libya.
(4) An applicant on whom the adjudicating officer has any reason to
believe an SAO should be performed prior to final adjudication,
including any applicant who may be inadmissible under I&A
terrorism-related grounds.
Refugee applicants are subject to additional SAO requirements
regardless of the CLASS name-check response. These requirements are
classified.
The Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM)'s overseas
Resettlement Support Centers request SAOs through PRM's Worldwide
Refugee Admissions Processing System which is managed by the Refugee
Processing Center (RPC), located in Rosslyn. The Center's staff runs a
CLASS check and creates the SAO. Our interagency partners respond via a
Consular Affairs application known as Visa Opinion Information Service
(VOIS), which is used by the Department of State's Bureau of Consular
Affairs for all other types of SAOs. PRM and RPC staffs vet the
responses to finalize the SAO decision.
Question 7. Is there a uniform process for receiving Security
Advisory Opinion of refugees from countries which may be of heightening
security concern before undergoing an interview with USCIS?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8. Are you satisfied with the support DHS has received
from all applicable partners in the U.S. intelligence community (USIC)
on the refugee security check regime? Are you aware of any data sources
that DHS does not currently have access to, but could be helpful to the
security check process?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 9. Are there legal authorities that this subcommittee or
Congress could provide to assist your Department in putting into place
an effective, efficient security check process for refugees from all
threat countries?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 10. If a special category of refugee were created in the
future, similar to what was established for Iraqis, do you feel
confident the measures established to screen the current Iraqi refugees
would be enough to prevent an incident resembling the Alwan and Hammadi
case?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 11. How many names of Iraqi refugees have been provided to
the FBI for further investigation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12. How long will DHS maintain data on refugees obtained
as part of the application and security screening process? Does DHS
also retain data on applicants who are rejected for resettlement?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 13. Do you have concerns that refugees with terrorist ties
from Iraq or other high-risk countries could be resettled in countries
that participate in the Visa Waiver Program and then could enter the
United States with a lower level of scrutiny?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 14. How does the enhanced screening protocols used for
refugees compare with the checks conducted through the Electronic
System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) program under the Visa Waiver
Program?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Chairman Patrick Meehan for Dawn Scalici
Question 1a. In May 2010, the FBI announced the arrest of Mohanad
Hammadi and Waad Ramadan Alwan, two Iraqi nationals who were charged
with participating in a plot to send cash, explosives, and Stinger
missiles to al-Qaeda's affiliate in Iraq. The two made it through
security screenings by both DHS and the Department of State and
exploited special Iraqi refugee programs to come to the United States.
Most disturbing perhaps is that Alwan was admitted into the United
States in 2009 even though his fingerprints were found in 2005 on an
unexploded roadside bomb that was set to blow up a U.S. convoy in Iraq.
How is it that these two men were able to get through security
background checks through the Iraqi refugee programs and what
modifications in the security screening process have both DHS and the
Department of State made since 2009 in order to make sure this never
happens again?
Question 1b. How confident are you all that this could not happen
again? Please explain how the enhanced security screening processes now
in place ensures that this will never happen again.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. In testimony before the Senate Homeland Security and
Government Affairs Committee last year, DHS Under Secretary Rand Beers
said that the rescreening of Iraqi refugees would not be ``a one-time
only screening process'' because new intelligence and information is
constantly becoming available.
We know that DHS is rescreening tens of thousands of Iraqi refugees
who have been resettled in the United States for ties to terrorism. Can
you update the committee as to the status of the rescreening process,
how many refugees already in the country have been rescreened and how
many remain?
Question 2b. Please explain step-by-step the exact process DHS
undertakes if a refugee admitted into the country has been found to
have ties to al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups.
Question 2c. Does any agency within DHS have access to Iraqi
National Police and/or Iraqi Interior Ministry criminal records to
assist in the adjudication process of Iraqi refugee and Special
Immigrant Visa (SIV) applicants?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. The Refugee Crisis in Iraq Act of 2007 requires
refugees undergo and pass a background check as determined by the
Secretary of Homeland Security.
What effect did the requirement for expediting Iraqi refugee
resettlements have on DHS's ability to conduct thorough security
screening of refugee applicants?
Question 3b. What staffing resources were in place in 2007 to vet
the thousands of Iraqis applying for resettlement in the United States?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Are you satisfied with the support DHS has received
from all applicable partners in the U.S. intelligence community (USIC)
on the refugee security check regime? Are you aware of any data sources
that DHS does not currently have access to, but could be helpful to the
security check process?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. Are there legal authorities that this subcommittee or
Congress could provide to assist your Department in putting into place
an effective, efficient security check process for refugees from all
threat countries?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. If a special category of refugee were created in the
future, similar to what was established for Iraqis, do you feel
confident the measures established to screen the current Iraqi refugees
would be enough to prevent an incident resembling the Alwan and Hammadi
case?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7. How many names of Iraqi refugees have been provided to
the FBI for further investigation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8. How long will DHS maintain data on refugees obtained as
part of the application and security screening process? Does DHS also
retain data on applicants who are rejected for resettlement?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 9. Do you have concerns that refugees with terrorist ties
from Iraq or other high-risk countries could be resettled in countries
that participate in the Visa Waiver Program and then could enter the
United States with a lower level of scrutiny?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 10. How does the enhanced screening protocols used for
refugees compare with the checks conducted through the Electronic
System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) program under the Visa Waiver
Program?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
