[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
A LINE IN THE SAND: ASSESSING DANGEROUS
THREATS TO OUR NATION'S BORDERS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 16, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-123
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Ron Barber, Arizona
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Billy Long, Missouri, Vice Chair Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Dr. R. Nick Palarino, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Tamla Scott, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management...... 7
Witnesses
Mr. Roger F. Noriega, Visiting Fellow, American Enterprise
Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Frank J. Cilluffo, Director, Homeland Security Policy
Institute, The George Washington University:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Mr. Douglas Farah, Senior Fellow, International Assessment and
Strategy Center:
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
Mr. Marc R. Rosenblum, Ph.D., Specialist in Immigration Policy,
Congressional Research Service:
Oral Statement................................................. 38
Prepared Statement............................................. 40
For the Record
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management:
Letter From Chairman Michael T. McCaul to Thomas Donilon....... 54
A LINE IN THE SAND: ASSESSING DANGEROUS THREATS TO OUR NATION'S BORDERS
----------
Friday, November 16, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and
Management,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:00 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul, Long, Duncan, Marino,
Keating, and Davis.
Mr. McCaul. The committee will come to order.
The first order of business, I would like to say what a
pleasure it has been working with my Ranking Member, Mr.
Keating, over this Congress.
I believe this will be our last official hearing of this
Congress, and I just want to say thank you for that.
The committee will come to order. The purpose of this
hearing is to discuss the findings from the subcommittee's
Majority investigative report, entitled ``A Line in the Sand:
Confronting Crime Violence and Terror At the Southwest
Border,'' and having issues identified in the report may impact
American National security.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
International terrorist networks are expanding their ties
to ruthless Mexican drug-trafficking organizations and creating
risks to our Nation's borders and a possible attack on our
homeland. These are findings from our subcommittee's
investigative report released yesterday: The Majority report,
entitled ``A Line in the Sand: Confronting Crime Violence and
Terror At the Southwest Border,'' describes the growing concern
that terrorist organizations will exploit burgeoning
relationships with Latin American drug traffickers to
infiltrate the Southwest Border undetected.
Specifically Iran is attempting to cement relations with
certain Latin American countries to expand its influence and
challenge the United States. Iran has cultivated stronger
relationships with Venezuela. Examining travel between the two
countries, according to Ambassador Roger Noriega, former
Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs,
direct commercial flights from Caracas to Tehran continue
despite claims to the contrary.
Iran also tries to flout international economic sanctions
by using Venezuela as a major destination to ship its exports.
Far more alarming than increasing political and economic ties,
Iran is also attempting to lay the foundation for military and
covert operations within the United States by partnering with
Mexican drug cartels.
No better example illustrates this danger than the Iranian
Qods Force's attempts to work with the Los Zetas drug cartels
to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in the United States on
American soil.
Some estimate that Hezbollah sympathizers operating in the
United States could number in the hundreds.
Iran's strategic migration and its relationship in Latin
America are a clear and present danger to American National
security. Should tensions mount over Iran's nuclear program,
these relationships could possibly result in strategic
platforms for Iran to unleash terror operations on the U.S.
homeland.
In addition, concerns increasingly exist that terrorist
organizations are attempting to corrupt drug traffickers and
other aliens entering the United States. For example, according
to news reports from earlier this year, Osama bin Laden sought
operatives with valid Mexican passports to enter the United
States to conduct terror attacks. Bin Laden believed these
operatives could more easily blend into American society and
unleash terror attacks without warning. Threats at our Southern
Border also persist from the increasing sophistication of drug
cartels. From elaborate underground tunnels costing over $1
million to constructing submarines used to circumvent our
maritime security, these cartels will stop at nothing to ensure
their products enter our homeland.
U.S. Border Patrol faces an ever-persistent challenge of
identifying and apprehending special-interest aliens, those
aliens from countries designated by intelligence agencies as
potential threats to our security. For fiscal years 2006 to
2011, Border Patrol officers apprehended nearly 2,000 special-
interest aliens. With the Calderon government's tough stand
against organized crime in Mexico, we have also witnessed the
increasingly ruthless violence that the cartels employ to
strike fear into those attempting to stop them.
For example, in May 2012, 23 residents of Nuevo Laredo,
Mexico, were brazenly executed, nine of the bodies hung from a
bridge at a busy intersection only a 10-minute drive from
Texas.
Unfortunately, some of this violence has even spilled into
American soil. Since 2009, Mexican drug traffickers have fired
upon nearly 60 Texas law enforcement officers. Kidnappings in
2009 also spiked in McAllen, Texas, and all these threats were
making the Southwest Border increasingly dangerous.
Despite these growing threats, efforts to secure the
Southern Border have been mixed. Border Enforcement Security
Teams, or BEST teams, have combined Federal, State, and local
resources and have had a significant positive impact since
their creation in 2005, such as seizing over 13,500 weapons and
investigations, resulting in over 4,500 convictions. The Texas
Department of Public Safety initiatives have also had an effect
in reducing border crime, apprehending illegal drugs and
fostering improved law enforcement relationships resulting in
improved information sharing.
However, with these successes, our efforts to secure the
border have experienced challenges, the most high-profile of
which, the Secure Border Initiative Network, or SBInet, failed
to meet expectations and resulted in little return to its $1
billion investment. Due to the challenges with SBInet, the
administration abandoned the goal of securing the Southern
Border to instead focus first on the Arizona border. But we
still may be years away from effectively securing Arizona, and
no definite time frame for securing the rest of the Southern
Border exists. DHS reported in late 2011 that it could respond
to illegal activity along 44 percent of the Southwest Border,
leaving 7,500 border miles inadequately protected.
Given all the threats outlined in the subcommittee's
report, this approach is unacceptable. The 9/11 Commission
wisely cautioned us about a failure of imagination, and this
criticism should be considered when securing our border. The
next Congress and administration need to develop an achievable
plan to comprehensively secure our Southern Border.
By identifying the threats to our border and developing a
plan to better secure them, this hearing can be a first step
towards a significant issue that we will need to address in the
next Congress, reforming our immigration system. I hope our
witnesses today can share specific ideas on how we can better
secure our borders and mitigate the grave threats that we see
from Iran and Latin American drug cartels.
With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating.
[The statement of Mr. McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
November 16, 2012
International terrorist networks are expanding their ties to
ruthless Mexican drug trafficking organizations and creating risks to
our Nation's borders and possible attack on our homeland. These are
findings from our subcommittee's investigative report released earlier
this week. The Majority report, entitled A Line in the Sand:
Confronting Crime, Violence, and Terror at the Southwest Border
describes the growing concern that terrorist organizations will exploit
burgeoning relationships with Latin American drug traffickers to
infiltrate the Southwest Border undetected.
Specifically, Iran is attempting to cement relations with certain
Latin American countries to expand its influence and challenge the
United States. Iran has cultivated stronger relationships with
Venezuela. Examining travel between the two countries, according to
Ambassador Roger Noriega--former Assistant Secretary of State for
Western Hemisphere Affairs, direct commercial flights from Caracas to
Tehran continue despite claims to the contrary. Iran also tries to
flout international economic sanctions by using Venezuela as a major
destination to ship its exports.
Far more alarming than increasing political and economic ties, Iran
is also attempting to lay the foundation for military and covert
operations within the United States by partnering with Mexican drug
cartels. No better example illustrates this danger than the Iranian
Qods Force's attempt to work with the Los Zetas drug cartel to
assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States on
American soil. Some estimate that Hezbollah sympathizers operating in
the United States could number in the hundreds.
Iran's strategic migration and its relationships in Latin America
are a clear and present danger to American National security. Should
tensions mount over Iran's nuclear program, these relationships could
possibly result in strategic platforms for Iran to unleash terror
operations on the U.S. homeland.
In addition, concerns increasingly exist that terrorist
organizations are attempting to corrupt drug traffickers and other
aliens entering the United States. For example, according to news
reports from earlier this year, Osama bin Laden sought operatives with
valid Mexican passports to enter the United States to conduct terror
attacks. Bin Laden believed these operatives could more easily blend
into American society and unleash terror attacks without warning.
Threats at our Southern Border also persist from the increasing
sophistication of drug cartels. From elaborate underground tunnels
costing over $1 million to construct to mini-submarines used to
circumvent our maritime security, these cartels will stop at nothing to
ensure their ``products'' enter our homeland.
U.S. Border Patrol faces an ever-persistent challenge of
identifying and apprehending ``special-interest aliens''--those aliens
from countries designated by intelligence agencies as potential threats
to our security. From fiscal years 2006 to 2011, Border Patrol officers
apprehended nearly 2,000 special-interest aliens.
With the Calderon government's tough stand against organized crime
in Mexico, we have also witnessed the increasingly ruthless violence
that the cartels employ to strike fear into those attempting to stop
them. For example, in May 2012, 23 residents of Nuevo Laredo, Mexico
were brazenly executed; 9 of the bodies hung from a bridge at a busy
intersection only a 10-minute drive from Texas.
Unfortunately, some of this violence has even spilled onto American
soil. Since 2009, Mexican drug traffickers have fired upon nearly 60
Texas law enforcement officers. Kidnappings in 2009 also spiked in
McAllen, Texas. All of these threats are making the Southwest Border
increasingly dangerous.
Despite these growing threats, efforts to secure the Southern
Border have been mixed. Border Enforcement Security Task Forces--or
BEST teams--have combined Federal, State, and local resources and had a
significant positive impact since their creation in 2005, such as
seizing over 13,500 weapons and investigations resulting in over 4,500
convictions. Texas Department of Public Safety initiatives have also
had an effect in reducing border crime, apprehending illegal drugs, and
fostering improved law enforcement relationships resulting in improved
information sharing.
However, with these successes, our efforts to secure the border
have experienced challenges. The most high-profile of which, the Secure
Border Initiative Network or SBINet, failed to meet expectations and
resulted in little return on its $1 billion dollar investment. Due to
the challenges with SBINet, the administration abandoned the goal of
securing the Southern Border to instead focus first on the Arizona
Border. But we still may be years away from effectively securing
Arizona and no definite time frame for securing the rest of the
Southern Border exists. DHS reported in late 2011 that it could respond
to illegal activity along 44 percent of the Southwest Border, leaving
7,500 border miles inadequately protected.
Given all of the threats outlined in the subcommittee's report,
this approach is unacceptable. The 9/11 Commission wisely cautioned us
about a failure of imagination and this criticism should be considered
when securing our border. The next Congress and administration need to
develop an achievable plan to comprehensively secure our Southern
Border. By identifying the threats to our border and developing a plan
to better secure our borders, this hearing can be a first step towards
a significant issue that we will need to address in the next Congress:
Reforming our immigration system. I hope our witnesses today can share
specific ideas on how we can better secure our borders and mitigate the
grave threats from Iran and Latin American drug cartels.
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Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your kind remarks, and it has been a pleasure
this Congress. I think we have set some record for the number
of hearings, and I think we have had some fruitful results.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the multitude
of threats that must be considered when securing our Nation's
borders. From keeping illegal goods and contraband out of our
country to ensuring that our border communities are shielded
from the violence spurred by drug-trafficking organizations
occurring in Mexico and serving as the last line of defense
between our country and its neighbors, the work that occurs at
our borders on a daily basis is nothing short of phenomenal.
Putting things in perspective, by all accounts, our borders
are safer now than they have been. In the past 3 years, the
U.S. Customs and Border Protection has increased the number of
Border Patrol agents from approximately 9,100 in 2001 to more
than 18,500 today, and border apprehensions have decreased by
53 percent.
The brave men and women who work tirelessly to ensure our
border security are indeed to be commended.
I would like to especially thank and honor those who have
paid the ultimate sacrifice while working to keep our borders
safe and secure.
Two threats that our witnesses will discuss in particular
are whether spillover violence from Mexico has impacted the
United States and whether Iranian-sponsored terrorism has found
roots in Latin America. Statistics and evidence show that in
many respects progress has been encouraging. According to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation's and anecdotal evidence from
communities across the border States, U.S. border communities
are safer places than they were a short time ago. The crime
rates that are there are less than some of our own cities here
in the country, particularly even here in the District of
Columbia.
Furthermore, the U.S. Department of State in its 2009 and
its 2011 country reports on terrorism has maintained that,
``there are no known operational cells of Hezbollah or al-Qaeda
in the Western Hemisphere.'' Activities of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard, however, worldwide and including possible
Latin American activities bear continued scrutiny. We must not
divert our attention overall from the threat of homegrown
terrorist threats, and we should be mindful of General Barry
McCaffrey's testimony in front of this committee on the
importance of comprehensive immigration reform and its
relationship to border security.
Therefore, the likelihood that terrorists will seek to
enter the country via the Southwest Border cannot be ruled out,
but it is lower on the probability scale. In fiscal year 2006
through fiscal year 2011, only .5 percent of aliens apprehended
at the Southwest Border were from special-interest countries.
While progress has been made, we must remain vigilant and
never rest on our laurels. That is why I would like to thank
our witnesses for appearing today.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. McCaul. I thank the Ranking Member.
Other Members are reminded opening statements may be
submitted for the record. We have a very distinguished panel of
witnesses here today. I would like to go ahead and introduce
them.
Mr. McCaul. First, we have Ambassador Roger Noriega, former
assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs and
a former U.S. Ambassador to the Organization of American
States. He coordinates the American Enterprise Institute's
program on Latin America and writes for the institute's Latin
American Outlook Series.
Next, we have Mr. Frank Cilluffo, who is an associate vice
president at the George Washington University, where he directs
the Homeland Security Policy Institute. Shortly after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, he was appointed by the
President to the Office of Homeland Security and served as a
principal adviser to Secretary Tom Ridge.
Next, we have Mr. Douglas Farah, who is the International
Assessment and Strategy Center senior fellow of financial
investigations and transparency. He specializes on
transnational criminal organizations and armed groups in their
efforts on states and corruption, terrorism, terror finance and
proliferation, illicit financial flows in the Western
Hemisphere.
Last, we have Dr. Marc Rosenblum. He is a specialist in
immigration policy at the Congressional Research Service and
associate professor of political science at the University of
New Orleans. At CRS, Dr. Rosenblum focuses on policies related
to immigration enforcement at the border and within the United
States.
I would like to thank all of you for being here today.
The Chairman now recognizes Ambassador Noriega for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF ROGER F. NORIEGA, VISITING FELLOW, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE
Mr. Noriega. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a
full statement, and I will summarize briefly. I applaud the
subcommittee for its continued efforts to study and expose the
menacing cooperation between narco traffickers and Islamic
terrorist group Hezbollah.
Focus on the border is essential, of course, but we need to
look down-range to find the roots of some of these problems.
There is a growing body of evidence, for example, that this
narco-terrorist collaboration in this hemisphere is aided and
abetted by the hostile governments of Venezuela and Iran.
To put it bluntly, this is not just criminal activity, Mr.
Chairman; it is asymmetrical warfare being supported by two
very determined foes of the United States.
So how is it being waged? Hezbollah conspires with drug-
trafficking networks in Mexico, Central America, and South
America and really around the world, as a means of raising
funds, sharing tactics, and reaching out and touching U.S.
soil. One instructive example of the complexity and scale of
these operations is the pending criminal case again Lebanese
drug lord Ayman Jouma. Jouma was indicted in November 2011 for
managing a sophisticated cocaine-smuggling and money-laundering
scheme that channeled millions of dollars per month to
Hezbollah as well as back to the cartels. His network involved
Colombian narco-traffickers, the deadly Mexico gang Los Zetas,
and other criminal associates, businesses, or banks in the
United States, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, Africa, Europe, and
Lebanon.
But traditional threats persist as well as. In recent
years, Mexico has arrested numerous individuals associated with
Hezbollah engaging in criminal activities, including smuggling
of persons across the Southwest Border of the United States.
Just in September, Mexicans intercepted a Lebanese-born U.S.
citizen who was convicted in 2010 of channeling $100,000 to
Hezbollah. That same man is suspected of working with Hezbollah
operatives in Central America.
Far from our border, Venezuela serves as a significant role
as a nexus for narco and terrorist collaboration. On
Venezuela's Margarita Island, for example, Hezbollah agents
operate numerous businesses and safe houses. In addition to
fundraising activities, Hezbollah provides terror training on
the island for recruits from Venezuela and other Latin American
countries. It is not well-known that the world's most powerful
cocaine smuggler and head of Mexico's Sinaloa cartel, Joaquin
Archivaldo ``El Chappo'' Guzman, conducted his business from
Venezuela for much of the year 2010, living in a suburb of
Caracas and on Margarita Island until early last year under the
protection of security officials of the Venezuelan government.
Margarita Island is not an isolated example of how
Venezuela serves as a platform for this cooperation.
Using that country as a safe haven, two parallel terrorist
networks proselytize, fundraise, recruit, and train operatives
on behalf of Hezbollah in many countries in the Americas.
Hezbollah operatives and their co-conspirators hold senior
positions in the Venezuela government from which they launder
millions of dollars using regional banks and state-run
enterprises in Venezuela to provide--as well as providing
travel documents--weapons and logistical support to terrorist
operatives and cocaine smugglers throughout the hemisphere and
right up to our border. The Venezuelan state-owned airline
Conviasa helps move personnel, weapons, and contraband in and
out of our hemisphere from Damascus and Tehran.
Mr. Chairman, Hugo Chavez is an able broker between
Hezbollah and the narco-traffickers because I believe his
regime is a narco-state. To be precise, U.S. officials have
fresh compelling information implicating Chavez himself, his
National Assembly president, his former minister of defense,
his army chief, his newly-appointed deputy minister of interior
and dozens of other senior military officials in cocaine-
smuggling and money-laundering activities. These cartels engage
routinely in lucrative schemes involving Hezbollah front
companies that operate in Venezuela.
Chavez is also a strategic ally, as you mentioned, with
Iran, and he carries out, helps them carry out their
asymmetrical battle to our doorstep through its proxy
Hezbollah. They have laundered about $30 billion to the
Venezuelan economy to evade international sanctions and 70
companies, some of which have been sanctioned by Western
authorities for their involvement in supporting Iran's illicit
program, operate suspicious industrial facilities in various
locations throughout Venezuela. That is the tip of the iceberg,
Mr. Chairman.
So what are some of the recommendations for addressing this
problem? Very, very briefly, I think we need a strategy, we
need the adequate resources, and we need action.
This summer, the House passed Representative Jeff Duncan's
bill to require the Executive branch to provide Congress with a
strategy for countering this threat. The Senate is expected to
make small changes and return that measure within days to the
House for final approval. I hope it passes. Once the Executive
branch produces the required strategy, I hope Congress will
appropriate law enforcement and intelligence agencies the
resources they need to respond urgently and effectively.
As an immediate measure, further administrative action can
be taken now to sanction banks for on-going money-laundering
schemes. Also, the involvement of Venezuelan officials and
state-run entities in drug trafficking and terrorism must be
publicized and punished in the form of Federal indictments.
After years of work on the subject, I think it is fair to ask
the Justice Department who or what is holding up these
indictments. Congress is right to demand answers, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Noriega follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roger F. Noriega
November 16, 2012
Mr. Chairman, I applaud you and other Members of the subcommittee
for your continued efforts to study and expose the evolving threats to
the U.S. homeland that are developing beyond our borders. The
subcommittee's published reports on this subject contain a sobering and
insightful appraisal of the menacing cooperation between
narcotraffickers and the Islamic terrorist group Hezbollah in our
hemisphere.
As a visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute for
Public Policy Research, I head a project to examine and expose the
dangerous alliance between the Venezuelan regime of Hugo Chavez and
Iran. To date, we have conducted dozens of interviews with experts from
throughout the world and with eyewitnesses on the ground in the region
regarding Hezbollah's offensive in the Americas. We also have obtained
reams of official Venezuelan and Iranian documents, only a few of which
we have published to support our conclusions. In addition, I have
worked for most of my professional life to understand and obstruct the
illicit production and distribution of illegal narcotics and associated
crimes of deadly drug syndicates.
While much attention has been paid to the bloody confrontation
between authorities in Mexico and several Central American countries
with the transnational narcotrafficking organizations, there is
virtually no recognition of the simple fact that, for the last 6-7
years, much of the cocaine from South America makes its way northward
with the material support of the government of Venezuela.
Also, although some have taken note of anecdotal evidence about the
troubling links between narco-traffickers and global terrorist group
Hezbollah, most observers have failed to follow that evidence to
Iranian-backed Hezbollah elements that operate throughout Latin
America, right up to our Southwest Border, from a safe haven in
Venezuela.
Some may assess this narco-terrorist phenomenon as a marriage of
convenience between different criminal elements or just another modus
operandi of powerful international drug syndicates. In my view, such
interpretations overlook a growing body of evidence that this narco-
terrorist alliance in our neighborhood is aided and abetted by
Venezuela and Iran--two regimes bound together by a relentless
hostility against U.S. security and interests. In other words, it is
not just criminal activity--it is asymmetrical warfare.
Focusing on improving security at our borders is important, but far
from sufficient. This narco-terrorism will exact an increasingly
terrible price from our neighbors and our Nation until our National
security establishment recognizes that the mayhem on our border is
being sponsored by hostile states. Once our policymakers face this
fact, they can begin to fashion a more effective response.
key observations
Allow me to describe some of the elements of this narcoterrorist
network, followed by a fuller discussion to provide the necessary
context to understand why this threat is extraordinarily dangerous.
Hezbollah conspires with drug-trafficking networks in Mexico
and Central and South America as a means of raising funds,
sharing tactics and ``reaching out and touching'' U.S.
territory.
The criminal case against Lebanese drug lord Ayman Jouma
is very instructive. Jouma was indicted in November 2011
for a sophisticated cocaine-smuggling and money-laundering
scheme benefiting Hezbollah.\1\ His network involves
criminal associates and corrupt businesses in Colombia, the
United States, Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, and Lebanon. In
June 2012, Venezuelan-Lebanese dual citizens Abbas Hussein
Harb, Ali Houssein Harb (sic), and Kassem Mohamad Saleh and
several Venezuelan and Colombian companies were sanctioned
by the U.S. Treasury Department for their role in Jouma's
narco-terrorist operation.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Ties Between Hezbollah and Mexican Drug Cartels Revealed,''
by Rebecca Anna Stoil, The Jerusalem Post, December 15, 2011 http://
www.jpost.com/International/Article.aspx?id=249684.
\2\ ``Treasury Targets Major Money Laundering Network Linked to
Drug Trafficker Ayman Joumaa and a Key Hizballah Supporter in South
America,'' U.S. Department of the Treasury press release, June 27, 2012
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1624.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In recent years, Mexico has arrested numerous individuals
associated with Hezbollah engaging in criminal activities--
including smuggling of persons across the U.S. Southwest
Border.\3\ For example, in September, a Lebanese-born U.S.
citizen, convicted in 2010 for a credit card scheme that
raised $100,000 for Hezbollah, was arrested in Merida by
Mexican authorities. Rafic Mohammad Labboun Allaboun, an
imam from a mosque in San Jose, California, was traveling
with a falsified passport issued by Belize. He was
extradited to the United States.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Exclusive: Hezbollah Uses Mexican Drug Routes into the
U.S.,'' Washington Times, March 27, 2009.
\4\ ``Mexico Extradites Suspected Hezbollah Member,'' September 11,
2012 http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/09/11/mexico-
extradites-suspected-hezbollah-member/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In Venezuela, our sources report that Hezbollah cells and
representatives of the Mexican Sinaloa cartel operate in
key cocaine transit corridors in that South American
country. Margarita Island, best known as a Caribbean
tourist destination, is a safe haven for terrorists and
drug smugglers. We believe that it is here that Mexican
kingpins and Hezbollah chiefs have planned their
collaboration.
It is a little-known fact is that the world's most
powerful cocaine smuggler and head of the Sinaloa cartel,
Joaquin Archivaldo ``El Chapo'' Guzman conducted his
business from Venezuela for much of 2010, living in a
suburb of Caracas and on Margarita Island until early last
year under the protection of Venezuelan security officials
working for Chavez.
Not coincidentally, Hezbollah agents operate numerous
businesses and safe houses on Margarita Island. In addition
to fund-raising activities, Hezbollah provides terror
training on the island for recruits from Venezuela and
other Latin American countries.
Margarita Island is not an isolated example of this
cooperation. Two Hezbollah networks proselytize, fund-raise,
recruit, and train operatives on behalf of Iran and Hezbollah
in many countries in the Americas.
One of these parallel networks is operated by a Lebanese-
Venezuelan clan, and another is managed by Mohsen Rabbani,
a notorious agent of the Qods Force of the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps who is wanted for his role in the
1992 and 1994 Buenos Aires bombings against the Israeli
Embassy and Jewish community center, respectively.
Hezbollah operatives and their radical anti-Semitic allies
hold important senior positions in the Venezuelan
government and run a network that provides logistical and
material support to terrorist operatives.
In recent years, the Chavez regime has sent weapons to
Hezbollah (ammunition, grenades, rockets, etc., intercepted
in 2009 by Israeli commandos) \5\ and shipped refined fuel
to Iran and Syria.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ http://articles.latimes.com/2009/nov/05/world/fg-israel-arms-
boat5.
\6\ http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/world/americas/chavez-
appears-to-use-venezuelan-fuel-to-help-syrias-assad.html.
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Thousands of authentic Venezuelan travel documents have
been provided to persons of Middle Eastern descent in the
last decade, and numerous Latin American governments have
detained many Iranian and Lebanese persons carrying
Venezuelan passports.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ One of the 9/11 attackers had ties to a man traveling on an
authentic Venezuelan passport bearing the name ``Hakim Mohamed Ali Diab
Fattah.'' Diab Fattah was detained by the FBI and deported to
Venezuela; when the FBI asked the Venezuelan government for access to
this man, authorities there claimed that he never entered the country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Venezuelan state-owned airline, Conviasa, operates
regular service from Caracas to Damascus and Tehran--
providing Iran, Hezbollah, and associated narco-traffickers
a surreptitious means to move personnel, weapons,
contraband, and other materiel.
Hugo Chavez is able to broker ties between Hezbollah and
narco-traffickers, because his regime has become a narco-state.
To be precise, U.S. officials have fresh, compelling
information implicating Chavez, his head of the National
Assembly (Diosdado Cabello Rondon), his former Minister of
Defense (Henry de Jesus Rangel Silva), his army chief
(Cliver Alcala Cordones), and his newly-appointed deputy
Minister of Interior (Hugo Carvajal), and dozens of other
senior military officials in trafficking in cocaine.
These elected officials and active-duty and retired
military officers are responsible for transporting tons of
cocaine to Central America, Mexico, the Caribbean, the
United States, west Africa, and Europe.
It is no surprise that corrupt Chavista officials,
including Chavez's closest advisors, engage routinely in
lucrative schemes involving Hezbollah front companies,
Colombian guerrillas, narco-traffickers, Venezuelan
financial institutions and even powerful state-run
entities.
Chavez also is a key ally of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
which is carrying its asymmetrical battle to our doorstep.
Since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad paid his first visit to Caracas in
September 2006, Venezuela has become one of Iran's most
important allies in the world--certainly Tehran's closest
partner in our neighborhood.
Venezuela has helped Iran launder at least $30 billion to
evade international sanctions. Seventy Iranian companies--
many of them fronts for the IRGC that have been sanctioned
by Western governments for their support for Iran's illicit
nuclear program--operate suspicious industrial facilities
in Venezuela co-located with military and petrochemical
installations.
The two governments also cooperate in nuclear technology
and the exploration for uranium, notwithstanding U.N.
sanctions.
discussion and background
venezuela's pivotal role
In light of the pivotal role being played by the Venezuelan regime
in sustaining this narcoterrorist threat, it is important to bear in
mind that this is not just another developing country that is unable to
control its territory. Venezuela is an oil-rich state that has
collected about $1.1 trillion in oil revenue in the last decade. It
also is not just an isolated hostile state led by a bombastic populist:
Venezuela has collected more than $25 billion in loans from China in
the last 18 months, and has purchased at least $9 billion in arms from
the Russians in the last decade.
Chavez's diplomats have systematically undermined the region's
oldest political forum while creating others that consciously exclude
the United States. He also has used ``checkbook diplomacy'' to create a
loose alliance of nearly two dozen states in the region that either
share his radical views, are dependent on his largesse, or both.
With the success of the U.S.-backed Plan Colombia, about 6 or 7
years ago, South American narco-traffickers had to adjust their
smuggling routes. They had to look no farther than Caracas. Chavez
doled out lucrative drug-trafficking deals as a means to secure the
loyalty of military subordinates and to generate billions in revenue
and make them complicit in his corrupt regime. As described above,
dozens of senior military officials closely associated with Chavez have
been implicated in narco-trafficking crimes. The Venezuelan Cartel del
Sol is headed by Diosdado Cabello, National Assembly president and
ruling party vice chairman, and other active-duty and retired military
officers who are among Chavez's closest collaborators.
That military syndicate operates parallel to a civilian network
known as the Cartel Libanes, which was formed by Walid Makled Garcia.
According to journalist and narco-terror expert, Douglas Farah, ``The
supplier of the cocaine [to the Makled cartel] was the FARC in Colombia
. . . Venezuelan sources say Makled was also the a key tie in the
corruption and drugs world to the Shiite Muslim communities in Isla
Margarita and the Guajira, groups that have a strong financial
relationship with Hezbollah.''\8\ Makled is wanted in the United States
for cocaine smuggling; after being detained in Colombia, he gave a
series of media interviews implicating dozens of Venezuela officials in
cocaine smuggling. Colombia surprised many observers by extraditing
Makled to Venezuela, where his closed-door trial began in April
2012.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ ``The Further Narco-Terrorist Ties of the Chavez Government,''
by Douglas Farah, November 12, 2010 http://www.douglasfarah.com/
article/543/the-further-narco-terrorist-ties-of-the-chavez-government.
\9\ ``5 Things to Watch for in Venezuelan Kingpin Walid Makled's
Trial,'' by Elyssa Pachico, Latin America Monitor, July 31, 2012 http:/
/www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2012/0731/5-
things-to-watch-for-in-Venezuelan-kingpin-Walid-Makled-s-trial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even before Chavez won power in 1998, he established intimate links
to the Colombian guerrilla group FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
Colombianas)--which wages a terrorist war against a democratic
government and ally of the United States. For many years, FARC
commanders and troops have operated in and out of Venezuela with the
complicity of the Chavez regime. A principal activity of the FARC today
is the transportation of cocaine to safe havens operated by the
Venezuelan military for transport to the United States and other
countries.
In September, pursuant to section 706(2)(A) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act of 2003, President Obama determined that
Venezuela was one of three countries in the world (along with Bolivia
and Burma) that ``failed demonstrably during the previous 12 months to
adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics
agreements . . . ''\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ See the September 14, 2012, Presidential Memorandum at this
site: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/09/14/
presidential-memorandum-presidential-determination-annual-presidential-
d.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the last 4 years, the Russians have sold at least $9 billion in
arms to Venezuela and will complete construction of a factory in
Maracay that can produce about 25,000 assault rifles per year. The
latest $4 billion Russian line of credit announced in June will go
toward arming Chavista militias--shock troops loyal only to him and
meant to intimidate the opposition.
Venezuela's internal security apparatus has been organized and
directed by Cuba, a country designated by the U.S. State Department as
a state sponsor of terrorism. That same report cited Venezuela's
``economic, financial and diplomatic cooperation with Iran . . . ''\11\
Chavez's aides make no secret of on-going oil shipments to a third
terrorist state, Syria. A regime with intimate ties to three of the
world's four terror states would have to try quite hard not to be a
threat. Just as Hezbollah, Cuba, Syria, and Iran are considered
terrorist threats to U.S. National security interests, Venezuela's
crucial support for each of them should be, too. Although this support
may not pose a classical conventional threat, it is precisely the kind
of asymmetrical tactics that our enemies favor today.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195546.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chavez also has served as the principal interlocutor on Iran's
behalf with other like-minded heads of state in the region, primarily
Rafael Correa (of Ecuador) and Evo Morales (of Bolivia), both members
of the Chavez-sponsored Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our
America (ALBA) and both of whom have established dubious networks with
criminal transnational groups.\12\ According to recent Congressional
testimony by investigative journalist Doug Farah, this has led to ``the
merging of the Bolivarian Revolution's criminal-terrorist pipeline
activities and those of the criminal-terrorist pipeline of radical
extremist groups (Hezbollah in particular) supported by the Iranian
regime.''\13\ Such ties are invaluable to groups like Hezbollah, as
they afford them protection, safe havens in which to operate, and even
diplomatic status and immunity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Jose R. Cardenas, ``The Chavez Model Threatens Ecuador,'' AEI
Latin American Outlook (March 2011), www.aei.org/outlook/101037;
Douglas Farah, Into the Abyss: Bolivia under Evo Morales and the MAS
(Alexandria, VA: International Assessment and Strategy Center, 2009),
www.strategycenter.net/files/2011/10/06/
20090618_IASCIntoTheAbyss061709.pdf (accessed September 27, 2011).
\13\ Douglas Farah, ``Hezbollah in Latin America: Implications for
U.S. Security,'' Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland
Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, July 7,
2011, www.homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/files/
Testimony%20Farah.pdf (accessed September 27, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iran's dangerous gambit near our borders
To comprehend what Iran is up to, we must set aside conventional
wisdom about its ambitions, strategies, and tactics and follow the
evidence where it leads. For example, in the aftermath of a bizarre
plot discovered in October 2011 in which Iranian agents conspired with
supposed Mexican drug cartel leaders to commit a terrorist bombing in
the heart of our Nation's capital,\14\ Director of National
Intelligence, James R. Clapper, revealed that ``Iranian officials'' at
the highest levels ``are now more willing to conduct an attack in the
United States . . . '' General Clapper also reported that Iran's so-
called ``supreme leader'' Ali Khamenei was probably aware of this
planning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ ``Notorious Iranian Militant has a Connection to Alleged
Assassination Plot Against Saudi Envoy,'' by Peter Finn, The Washington
Post, October 14, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iranian officials have made no secret of the regime's intention to
carry its asymmetrical struggle to the streets of the United States.
For example, in a May 2011 speech in Bolivia, Iran's Defense Minister
Ahmad Vahidi promised a ``tough and crushing response'' to any U.S.
offensive against Iran.\15\ At the same time that Iran caught the
world's attention by threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad announced a five-nation swing through Latin America aimed
at advancing its influence and operational capabilities on the U.S.
doorstep.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ ``Sanction shows U.S. weakness, says Iran minister,'' Iranian
Students' News Agency, June 1, 2011; ``Iran Warns of Street War in Tel
Aviv If Attacked,'' Fars News Agency, November 8, 2011.
\16\ ``Iran Seeking to Expand Influence in Latin America,'' by Joby
Warrick, The Washington Post, January 1, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The intelligence community's fresh assessment of Iran's willingness
to wage an attack on our soil leads to the inescapable conclusion that
Tehran's activities near our homeland constitute a very real threat
that can no longer be ignored.
Bracing for a potential showdown over its illicit nuclear program
and emboldened by inattention from Washington in Latin America, Iran
has sought strategic advantage in our neighborhood. It also is
preparing to play the narco-terrorism card--exploiting its partnership
with Venezuelan operatives, reaching into Mexico, and activating a
decades-old network in Argentina, Brazil, and elsewhere in the region.
Today, a shadowy network of embassies, Islamic centers, financial
institutions, and commercial and industrial enterprises in several
countries affords Iran a physical presence in relatively close
proximity to the United States. Iran is well-positioned to use its
relationships with these countries to pose a direct threat to U.S.
territory, strategic waterways, and American allies. Iran also has
provided the Venezuelan military with weapon systems that give Chavez
unprecedented capabilities to threaten its neighbors and the United
States.
Notably, a half-dozen Iranian companies sanctioned by the United
Nations, U.S. or European authorities have built suspicious industrial
installations at various sites in Venezuela.\17\ These facilities were
important enough to attract secret visits by Iranian Major General Amir
Ali Hajizadeh, the Revolutionary Guard Corps aerospace commander who
previously headed Iran's missile program, in July 2009 and November
2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Iranian companies sanctioned on repeated occasions by the U.S.
Treasury, the Office of Foreign Assets Control, the U.N. Security
Council (United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1747, 1803, 1929),
the European Union (2008, 2010, 2011), the United Kingdom (2007, 2008),
Germany (2005), and Japan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
venezuela's hezbollah-narco nexus
It is said that wherever Iran goes, Hezbollah is not far behind. In
the case of Venezuela, Hezbollah blazed the trail in Venezuela,
establishing a network of commercial enterprises meant to raise and
channel funds and hide its financial tracks. These activities have
exploded in the last 6-7 years, as Hezbollah's activities in the region
gained the active complicity of the Venezuelan government, the backing
of Iranian security forces and notorious Muslim radicals, and the
cooperation of powerful Mexican and narco-trafficking syndicates that
reach onto U.S. soil.
Research from open sources, subject-matter experts, and sensitive
sources within various governments has identified at least two
parallel, collaborative terrorist networks growing at an alarming rate
in Latin America. One of these networks is operated by Venezuelan
collaborators, and the other is managed by the Qods Force of the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. These networks encompass more than
80 operatives in at least 12 countries throughout the region (with
their greatest areas of focus being Brazil, Venezuela, Argentina, and
Chile).
The Nassereddine Network.--Ghazi Atef Nassereddine Abu Ali, a
native of Lebanon who became a Venezuelan citizen about 12 years ago,
is Venezuela's second-ranking diplomat in Syria. Nassereddine is a key
Hezbollah asset because of his close personal relationship to Chavez's
Justice and Interior Minister, Tarik El Aissami, and because of his
diplomatic assignment in Damascus. Along with at least two of his
brothers, Nassereddine manages a network to expand Hezbollah's
influence in Venezuela and throughout Latin America.
Nassereddine's brother Abdallah, a former member of the Venezuelan
congress, uses his position as the former vice president of the
Federation of Arab and American Entities in Latin America and the
president of its local chapter in Venezuela to maintain ties with
Islamic communities throughout the region.\18\ He currently resides on
Margarita Island, where he runs various money-laundering operations and
manages commercial enterprises associated with Hezbollah in Latin
America. Younger brother Oday is responsible for establishing
paramilitary training centers on Margarita Island. He is actively
recruiting Venezuelans through local circulos bolivarianos
(neighborhood watch committees made up of the most radical Chavez
followers) and sending them to Iran for follow-on training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ This organization was founded in Argentina in 1972 to unite
Muslims, namely the Syrian and Lebanese communities, in Latin America
and has spread rapidly throughout Latin America, with offices in
Argentina, Chile, Brazil, Cuba, Venezuela, Guadalupe Island, Antigua,
and Uruguay. It is overtly anti-Israel; supportive of anti-American
regimes in the Middle East and Latin America; and used as a platform
for Hezbollah to raise money, recruit supporters, and solicit illegal
visas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Rabbani Network.--Hojjat al-Eslam Mohsen Rabbani, who was the
cultural attache at the Embassy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in
Buenos Aires, Argentina, oversees a parallel Hezbollah recruitment
network.\19\ Rabbani is currently the international affairs advisor to
the Al-Mostafa Al-Alam Cultural Institute in Qom, which is tasked with
propagation of Shia Islam outside Iran.\20\ Rabbani, referred to by the
important Brazilian magazine Veja as ``the Terrorist Professor,''\21\
is a die-hard defender of the Iranian revolution and the mastermind
behind the two notorious terrorist attacks against Jewish targets in
Buenos Aires in 1992 and 1994 that killed 144 people.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ ``Reis-Jomhour-e Arzhantin Dar Sazeman-e Melal: Tehran Ba
Mohakemeh-ye Maqamatash Dar Keshvar-e Sales Movafeqat Konad'' [The
President of Argentina: Tehran Should Accept Trial of Its Authorities
in a Third Country], Asr-e Iran (Tehran), September 25, 2010,
www.asriran.com (available in Persian, accessed September 29, 2011).
\20\ ``Din va Siasat Dar Amrika-ye Latin Dar Goftegou Ba Ostad
Mohsen Rabbani'' [Religion and Politics in Latin America in
Conversation with Professor Mohsen Rabbani], Book Room (Tehran), May 3,
2010.
\21\ ``The Terrorist `Professor,' '' Veja (Brazil), April 20, 2011.
\22\ Marcelo Martinez Burgos and Alberto Nissman, Office of
Criminal Investigations: AMIA Case (Buenos Aires, Argentina:
Investigations Unit of the Office of the Attorney General, 2006),
www.peaceandtolerance.org/docs/nismanindict.pdf (accessed September 27,
2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the time, Rabbani was credentialed as Iran's cultural attache in
the Argentine capital, which he used as a platform for extremist
propaganda, recruitment, and training that culminated in the attacks in
the 1990s. In fact, he continues to exploit that network of Argentine
converts today to expand Iran's and Hezbollah's reach--identifying and
recruiting operatives throughout the region for radicalization and
terrorist training in Venezuela and Iran (specifically, the city of
Qom).
At least two mosques in Buenos Aires--Al Imam and At-Tauhid--are
operated by Rabbani disciples. Sheik Abdallah Madani leads the Al Imam
mosque, which also serves as the headquarters for the Islamic-Argentine
Association, one of the most prominent Islamic cultural centers in
Latin America.
Some of Rabbani's disciples have taken what they have learned from
their mentor in Argentina and replicated it elsewhere in the region.
Sheik Karim Abdul Paz, an Argentine convert to Shiite Islam, studied
under Rabbani in Qom for 5 years and succeeded him at the At-Tauhid
mosque in Buenos Aires in 1993.\23\ Abdul Paz is now the imam of a
cultural center in Santiago, Chile, the Centro Chileno Islamico de
Cultura de Puerto Montt. Another Argentine convert to radical Islam and
Rabbani disciple is Sheik Suhail Assad, who lectures at universities
throughout the region and recruits young followers to the cause.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ ``Goftegou Ba Sarkar-e Khanom-e Ma'soumeh As'ad Paz Az
Keshvar-e Arzhantin'' [Conversation with Lade Ma'soumeh As'ad Paz From
Argentina], Ahlulbayt (Tehran), June 13, 2011.
\24\ Marielos Marquez, `` `El Islam es una forma de vida': Sheij
Suhail Assad,'' DiarioCoLatino, August 27, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A key target of the Rabbani network--and Hezbollah in general--is
Brazil, home to some 1 million Muslims. Rabbani travels to Brazil
regularly to visit his brother, Mohammad Baquer Rabbani Razavi, founder
of the Iranian Association in Brazil.\25\ Another of his principal
collaborators is Sheik Khaled Taki Eldyn, a Sunni radical from the Sao
Paulo Guarulhos mosque. Taki Eldyn, who is active in ecumenical
activities with the Shia mosques, also serves as the secretary general
of the Council of the Leaders of the Societies and Islamic Affairs of
Brazil.\26\ A sensitive source linked that mosque to a TBA network
cited by the U.S. Treasury Department as providing major financial and
logistical support to Hezbollah.\27\ As far back as 1995, Taki Eldyn
hosted al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden and 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheik
Mohammed in the TBA region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ ``Sourat-e Jalaseh'' [Agenda], Iranianbrazil (Brazil), March
17, 2010.
\26\ ``Aein-ha-ye Ramezani Dar Berezil'' [Ramadan Traditions in
Brazil], Taghrib News (Qom), September 5, 2010.
\27\ U.S. Department of the Treasury, ``Treasury Designates Islamic
Extremist, Two Companies Supporting Hizballah in Tri-Border Area,''
news release, June 10, 2004.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to Brazilian intelligence sources cited by the magazine
Veja, at least 20 operatives from Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic
Jihad are using Brazil as a hub for terrorist activity.\28\ The fact
that Brazil is set to host the FIFA World Cup tournament in 2014 and
the Summer Olympics in 2016 makes it an inviting target for
international terrorism. U.S. officials should be approaching Brazilian
officials to discuss the potential threat of Venezuelan-Iranian support
for narcoterrorism. Unfortunately, most U.S. diplomats are as
indifferent to this reality as their Brazilian counterparts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ ``The Terrorist `Professor' '' Veja (Brazil), April 20, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
continued congressional leadership required
Mr. Chairman, our project has shared substantial information about
these aforementioned threats with U.S. Government officials--either
directly or through Members of Congress. Too often the attitude we have
encountered in the Executive branch has been one of skepticism or
indifference.
Apparently, this indifference has left senior U.S. officials
uninformed on the subject. For example, President Obama told a Miami
journalist in July 11, ``[M]y sense is that what Mr. Chavez has done
over the last several years has not had a serious National security
impact on us.'' U.S. General Douglas Fraser (USAF), regional commander
of U.S. Southern Command, subsequently supported the appraisal that
Venezuela does not represent a threat to U.S. National security.\29\
``As I look at Iran and their connection with Venezuela,'' said Fraser,
``I see that still primarily as a diplomatic and economic
relationship.'' Mr. Chairman, I believe the foregoing discussion of the
facts on the ground will lead most reasonable observers to a very
different conclusion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ ``Top U.S. General: Venezuela not a Threat,'' by Frank Bajak,
The Associated Press, July 31, 2012 http://bigstory.ap.org/article/top-
us-general-venezuela-not-threat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Important exceptions to Executive branch neglect is the work of the
Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the Office of Foreign Assets
Control (OFAC) of the Department of the Treasury to sanction numerous
Venezuelan officials and entities for their complicity with and support
for Iran and international terrorism; in addition, U.S. Attorney for
the Southern District of New York, Preet Bharara, has investigated and
prosecuted key cases to attack this international conspiracy.
Inexplicably, according to law enforcement sources, State Department
officers systematically resist the application of sanctions against
Venezuelan officials and entities, despite the fact that these suspects
are playing an increasingly important role in Iran's operational
capabilities near U.S. territory.
Mr. Chairman, I am convinced that Congressional attention, such as
this hearing, is essential to encourage Executive branch agencies to
act. For example, sanctions against Venezuela's state-owned petroleum
company for transactions with Iran were the direct result of pressure
by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, acting in part on
information uncovered by AEI's project.
This summer, the House passed H.R. 3783, ``Countering Iran in the
Western Hemisphere Act of 2012,'' legislation authored by
Representative Jeff Duncan (R-SC), to require the Executive branch to
report to Congress on Iran's activities in a host of areas and to
provide a strategy for countering this threat. I understand that this
bill enjoys bipartisan support in the U.S. Senate--where Senator Robert
Menendez (D-NJ) is a leader on this issue--and the bill may be approved
with several amendments before Congress recesses.
I believe that such a thorough, Congressionally-mandated review
will require the Executive branch to apply additional needed
intelligence resources to collect on subject matters in Venezuela,
Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, Central America, and beyond. Once National
security officials study the scope and depth of the problem, I hope for
a whole-of-Government response to protect our security, our interests,
and our allies against the threat posed a narco-terrorist network in
the Americas. Once Congress receives this report, perhaps this
challenge will be treated as a budgetary priority so that law
enforcement and intelligence agencies have the resources required to
respond urgently and effectively.
Of course, our project at AEI is prepared to cooperate with this
policy review by providing the subcommittee documents and analysis
regarding suspicious transactions and installations operated by Iran in
Venezuela, Mexico, Ecuador, Bolivia, and elsewhere in the region.
recommendations
The involvement of Venezuelan officials and state-run
entitites in drug trafficking and terrorism must be publicized
and punished in the form of federal indictments. Sanctions by
the Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets
Control are good interim measures. However, in the case of
Venezuelan officials and state-run entities, indictments are
much more meaningful. The Department of Justice headquarters
should be asked to explain why such prosecutorial actions have
failed to meet this extraordinary lawlessness by the Venezuelan
narcostate.
Congress should demand U.S. diplomats be more cooperative
with law enforcement and intelligence efforts aimed at exposing
and punishing criminal behavior and terrorist activities in the
region. Specifically, the Department of State must be more
cooperative in raising this phenomenon with our neighbors. We
also must find a way to talk about this problem with our
friends in a way that it is not misunderstood as an accusation
against those governments that are trying to confront the
problem.
Congress should give U.S. intelligence and security agencies
the resources required to expand their capabilities to confront
extra-regional threats and cross-border criminality.
U.S. National security agencies, led by the Department of
State, should increase the dialogue and cooperation with
regional and European military, intelligence, and security
agencies on the common threat posed by the Venezuelan-Iranian
alliance.
Congress should use its oversight functions to determine if
U.S. Northern and Southern Commands, the U.S. Coast Guard, and
the Drug Enforcement Administration have adequate programs and
funding to support U.S. anti-drug cooperation with Mexico and
Central America.
conclusion
As I stated before another panel of this committee 16 months ago,
the ``Hezbollah/Iranian presence in Latin America constitutes a clear
threat to the security of the U.S. homeland . . . In addition to
operational terrorist activity, Hezbollah also is immersed in criminal
activity throughout the region--from trafficking in weapons, drugs, and
persons . . . If our Government and responsible partners in Latin
America fail to act, I believe there will be an attack on U.S.
personnel, installations, or interests in the Americas . . . '' as a
result of this dangerous conspiracy.
The narco-terrorism on our doorstep, backed by Venezuela and Iran,
demands a response from those whose job it is to keep us safe. Our
Government must take effective measures--unilaterally and with willing
partners--to disrupt and dismantle illicit operations and neutralize
unacceptable threats.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. It is certainly a
real honor to have such a man of distinction as yourself at
this hearing.
Next, the Chairman calls on Mr. Cilluffo for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF FRANK J. CILLUFFO, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY
POLICY INSTITUTE, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
Mr. Cilluffo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Keating, Mr.
Davis, Mr. Long, Mr. Marino, I appreciate the opportunity to
appear before you today.
The topic of the hearing and what I consider your excellent
report, ``A Line In the Sand,'' are unquestionably issues of
National importance, and they do indeed have significant
implications for U.S. National security.
I am often amazed by the way how little attention the
Americas seems to get, whether good news, bad news, but
especially the troubling situation in the region seems to get
inside the Beltway, and to me, I hope this helps ring a bit of
a bell that we need to focus more of our time and effort on
some of these challenges.
I have got an awful lot of territory to cover in a very
short period of time, 5 minutes. As you probably noted, I just
came under the wire on the maximum length on my prepared
remarks; that rule is probably created for me or people like me
since I have never had an unspoken thought. But I will try to
be very brief and pick up on a couple of points because
everybody here brings an awful lot to the table.
First, my views are highly consistent with the findings and
recommendations of your report, but I want to elaborate on a
couple of very brief points. The fact that terrorists
exploiting our borders, whether by air, land, or sea, has long
been a profound concern of our National security community. If
we just look back to the 1999 plot, Ressam's plot, the
Millennium plot; obviously, after 9/11, you saw how hijackers
were able to exploit our aviation systems. One of the things
that is interesting is after these attacks, and by no means
perfect, but we have put a lot of effort into enhancing our
aviation security and improving our intelligence, terror travel
data, and the like. But I think we need to think about borders
a little differently today.
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned lack of imagination. When you
deal with cyberspace, for example, traditional concepts of
border are irrelevant; they are moot in many cases where
someone can anonymously cloak and step foot and come to this
country without ever stepping foot into this country.
Mr. Keating, you mentioned I think a very important point;
we have to remember that there been over 50 plots of homegrown
Jihadi-based terrorism in the United States that didn't
necessarily--some were foreign fighters, they traveled overseas
to receive training--but many of whom reside in the United
States. I might note CRS did an excellent report and some of
the colleagues are here to discuss that further.
But the bottom line is drug-trafficking organizations,
there is an old joke. The old joke was if you want to smuggle
in a tactical nuclear weapon, just wrap it in a bale of
marijuana. The reality is, is our ability to seize drugs is not
as robust as we would like it to be. We are seeing what I
consider, and conventional wisdom went along the following when
you are dealing with drug-trafficking organizations and foreign
terrorist organizations, drug-trafficking organizations would
not bring about more heat because they are financially
motivated by working with foreign terrorist organizations, who
are obviously ideologically motivated. I would argue in most
cases that is still the reality. But not in all.
You mentioned the assassination plot on Ambassador al-
Jubeir. The reality is you are seeing a fractioning to one
extent or another of both drug-trafficking organizations and
foreign terrorist organizations. It is this divergence that I
think we need to really keep our eyes on and the convergence.
You increasingly see foreign terrorist organizations
turning to criminal activity, kidnapping and ransom, drug
trafficking, organized crime activity, probably best
exemplified by al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb, the broader
Sahel in Africa. I mean, it is a whole swoop from east to west
where you have a hybrid of criminal enterprises, drug-
trafficking organizations and Jihadi-based foreign terrorist
organizations. Look at the Haqqani network in the FATA. Right
here, is that a state? Is it a state within a state? In
essence, they have usurped authorities of a state. Basically,
you have got a narco-state. Guinea-Bissau, same thing in the
Sahel, Mauritania, Mali, these are all countries that are
falling under the power and sway of criminal enterprises.
But you are also seeing drug cartels turning to terrorist
tactics to achieve their objectives. If you see the beheadings,
if you see the violence, if you see the TTPs, terrorist
tactics, techniques and procedures, they are increasingly
learning, increasingly engaging in terrorist activities. This
is a big concern.
So you have both of those trends occurring while at the
same time, you have the potential for convergence and hybrid
threats. If you just think about the reach that these drug-
trafficking organizations have in the United States, remember
smuggling is smuggling is smuggling is smuggling whether you
are smuggling drugs, weapons, people; those same routes can be
exploited by the same individuals.
The question is, is: How do we keep the heat? How do we
keep disrupting? How do we ensure that we don't see that
marriage--that ugly marriage--that is, in fact, occurring
between these organizations?
I am already over my time. I promised I never had an
unspoken thought, but Lebanese Hezbollah, big issue, we have
done a lot of work on the government of Iran, and I am happy to
get into that during Q and A.
The one other point I would like to make is the Caribbean.
It is not only the Southwest Border. The Caribbean gateway is a
big concern. If you look back to the Dudus Coke case, he had
distribution routes from Miami through New York. He had
protection inside Jamaica. It was very difficult to be able to
seize him and arrest him.
Then you have got Abdullah el-Faisal. Abdullah el-Faisal is
one of these so-called Jihadi rock stars, a bridge figure. His
fingerprints can be found on multiple foreign terrorist cases
aimed at the United States.
So I just put a little caution there; it is not just the
Americas, it is also the Caribbean gateway, and we have got to
think about these issues differently.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cilluffo follows:]
Prepared Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo
November 16, 2012
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before
you today. The subject matter of this hearing and of the subcommittee's
report titled, ``A Line in the Sand: Confronting Crime, Violence, and
Terror at the Southwest Border,'' are unquestionably issues of National
importance. Your sustained focus on these challenges, especially at a
time when the U.S. and global economies dominate the headlines, is to
be appreciated. My own written remarks address the hemispheric threat
and its implications for the U.S. homeland; and include proposed
recommendations for action to meet the threat, moving forward. I think
you will find that our respective conceptualizations of the threat and
the means and methods of combating it, as reflected in your Report (``A
Line in the Sand'') and in my statement below, are in sync and
complement one another. Indeed, we are clearly jointly concerned about
Iran/Hezbollah's presence in the Americas, the relationship of same
with Mexican drug cartels, the potential for future and more nefarious
such cooperation and collaboration, and the significant sources of
threat and already-existing challenges in this country that emanate
from the U.S.-Mexico border--just to name a few points of agreement and
intersection. Likewise, a mix of both strategic and tactical steps are
needed in order to address the threat ecosystem more effectively,
including an approach that encourages and leverages enhanced
interagency cooperation.
defending u.s. borders: evolution of thought and threat
The exploitation of American borders--by land, sea, and air--has
long been of profound concern to U.S. authorities and the general
public alike. Consider the Millennium plot of December 1999 in which
Ahmed Ressam sought to enter the United States from Canada by car in a
plot to blow up Los Angeles International Airport. Thanks to the
vigilance of an astute U.S. border official at the tip of the spear,
the attack did not materialize. Such a mixture of luck and skill saved
the day in that case; but what is needed is a system that offers
defense-in-depth and that keeps the threat as far away as possible from
the Continental United States in the first place. This is all the more
challenging an end-state to achieve at a time in history when the
nature of borders has changed, due in part to technological advances.
Indeed, to the extent that our borders ever created watertight
compartments, they are now more porous in character than ever. Consider
cyberspace, where traditional conceptions of border security simply do
not translate. In a domain without traditional physical checkpoints,
our adversaries can cloak themselves in anonymity and seek to do us
harm, often without tipping off the target or stepping foot into that
country. Though the United States has begun to direct substantial
resources toward redressing its vulnerabilities in this area, much
remains to be done. Correspondingly, we have invested much in aviation
security and in supporting measures and tools such as travel data and
intelligence. While an imperfect situation, we have made substantial
strides over time in terms of shoring up our posture in these areas.
However, the task at hand must not be underestimated, especially
because the threat also emanates from within. Over 50 ``homegrown''
jihadist plots have been discovered since 9/11.
In addition to an evolution in the manner in which to think about
borders, a separate but related phenomenon, not new but intensified,
has occurred--a convergence of the forces of crime and terror.
According to conventional thinking and analysis, terrorists (motivated
by ideology) and criminals (motivated by money/profit) would not
cooperate and collaborate. Why? Because criminals such as drug
traffickers seek to do business, and associating with terrorists could
jeopardize that goal by drawing the full attention of U.S. (and other)
law enforcement authorities dedicated to counterterrorism. While
terrorists and criminals may have undertaken their operations
separately in past and often continue to do so at present, there are
today significant and concerning counter-examples. Consider the
thwarted 2011 plot, sponsored by Iran, to assassinate the Saudi Arabian
Ambassador to the United States, with Mexican drug cartel hit-men
serving as the hired killers. This case is in fact indicative of a
broader trend in which terrorists are turning increasingly to crime/
criminals and criminals such as drug cartels are increasingly turning
to terrorist tactics. Grisly news reports from Mexico in recent months,
that highlight beheadings and other brutal violence perpetrated by the
cartels, have offered ample evidence of the latter proposition. As to
the former, we have seen foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) turn
more and more to drug trafficking, kidnapping, and organized crime in
order to support terrorist activities. This phenomenon is best
exemplified by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and the larger
Sahel region of Africa, as well as the Haqqani Network (HQN) operating
in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). For its part,
HQN has effectively become a state within a state, usurping the
traditional prerogatives of government. One of the upshots of the power
that HQN, AQIM, and other terrorist groups have accumulated (at the
expense of government authorities) is that the lucrative Golden
Crescent--the drug routes from Asia/Africa into Europe--is firmly under
their control.
For the U.S. homeland, this convergence of the forces of crime and
terror is particularly concerning because the pipelines and pathways
used to smuggle drugs into this country can also be used to smuggle in
people (including terrorists) and weapons. Put another way, smuggling
is smuggling is smuggling. Terrorists can tap the distribution networks
and routes that drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have established.
The reach of DTOs is expansive and stretches throughout the Continental
United States. An old joke, which still serves as a stark reminder of
the dangers that we face today, is that the easiest way to smuggle a
tactical nuclear weapon into the United States is to wrap it in a bale
of marijuana. The threat picture grows yet more complex and vivid when
we contemplate further just which terrorist organizations are now
heavily involved in the drug trade. Consider Lebanese Hezbollah (Iran's
chief proxy) which has expanded its illegal narcotics activities from
its original foothold in the Bekaa Valley to the Tri-Border Area of
South America, west Africa, and Europe. With this kind of reach,
Hezbollah is well-poised to do Iran's dirty work (or its own)--
including in the Americas.
Relationships between and among terrorist groups are also becoming
more overt and strategic in nature. There exists substantial evidence
of cooperation and collaboration between and among groups with U.S. and
Western targets ever more in their sights and aspirations. These
terrorist groups include al-Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, the Sahel, and
Somalia, as well as jihadist forces based elsewhere in Africa,
Pakistan, and beyond. Despite U.S. and allied counterterrorism efforts
that have yielded a good measure of success, these terror affiliates
remain committed to carrying forward the mantle of bin Laden, and to
exploiting both ungoverned and under-governed spaces. The latter tactic
pre-dated the Arab Spring, but evidenced reinforcement and
magnification thereafter. The tragic violence in Benghazi, directed
against U.S. personnel and interests (and those of allies) further
proves this point. As the Commander of U.S. Africa Command, General
Carter Ham, stated earlier this week, `` . . . it appears to me very
likely that some of the terrorists who participated in the attack in
Benghazi have at least some linkages to AQIM.''\1\
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\1\ ``US Commander: Libya attack linked to Qaeda in Maghreb,''
Reuters (November 14, 2012) http://www.trust.org/alertnet/news/us-
commander-libya-attack-linked-to-qaeda-in-maghreb.
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spotlight: hezbollah, iran, and the americas
There is thus little cause for complacency as toxic forces converge
and cooperate in multiple spots across the globe, more than ever
before. As the former head of operations for the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) testified earlier this year, both Iran's Quds
Force and Hezbollah ``are now heavily involved in the global drug trade
. . . Their participation in that effort presents them with myriad
opportunities with which to build their terrorist and criminal capacity
in the Western Hemisphere and elsewhere.''\2\ Likewise, the Commander
of U.S. Southern Command, General Douglas M. Fraser, has observed
convergence--based on convenience--between terrorist and criminal
organizations in the Tri-Border Area of Argentina, Brazil, and
Paraguay.\3\ Unfortunately, these developments are matched by a
disturbing (even if understandable) shortcoming on the U.S. side. For
the past decade, U.S. Government analysts have focused on al-Qaeda,
resulting in a lesser reservoir of U.S. intelligence on, and perhaps
even a blind spot, regarding Hezbollah and their networks and
activities.\4\
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\2\ Joby Warrick, ``In Iran, drug trafficking soars as sanctions
take bigger bite,'' The Washington Post (November 1, 2012) citing
Michael Braun http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-
iran-drug-trafficking-soars-as-sanctions-take-bigger-bite/2012/10/31/
12ff0930-1d81-11e2-b647-bb1668e64058_story.html.
\3\ Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee (March 6,
2012) http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2012/03%20March/
Fraser%2003-13-12.pdf.
\4\ Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon Cardash, and Michael Downing, ``Is
America's view of Iran and Hezbollah dangerously out of date?''
FoxNews.com (March 20, 2012) http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2012/03/20/
is-americas-view-iran-and-hezbollah-dangerously-out-date/.
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As an astute analyst of these issues, Matthew Levitt, has observed,
Hezbollah's ``expansion into the South American narcotics industry
began in the early-1980s but grew significantly in the following
decades.'' Hezbollah now derives ``major funding'' from these
activities and ``facilitates drug trafficking for other smuggling
networks, including those of the Colombian terrorist group FARC.''
Former assistant administrator for intelligence in the DEA, Anthony
Placido, reinforced the point in 2010 testimony noting, ``Drug
trafficking organizations based in the tri-border area have ties to
radical Islamic organizations such as Hizbullah.'' And as Levitt writes
further, ``Over time, Hizbullah leveraged its criminal ties to support
operational objectives, including trading drugs for intelligence from
Arab-Israeli (and sometimes Jewish-Israeli) criminals and, . . . moving
weapons or explosives through drug smuggling networks.'' Cross-
fertilization of forces is also noted in the 2011 State Department
Country Reports on Terrorism, which underscored that ``ideological
sympathizers in South America and the Caribbean continued to provide
financial and ideological support to . . . terrorist groups in the
Middle East and South Asia.''\5\
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\5\ Matthew Levitt, ``Hizbullah narco-terrorism: A growing cross-
border threat'' IHS Defense, Risk and Security Consulting (September
2012) citing Placido, and State Department http://
www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Levitt20120900_1.pdf.
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These developments draw warranted attention to the risk posed by
hybrid threats, where an adversary acquires from a third party the
necessary access, resources, or know-how needed to attack or threaten a
target--all of which could be used strategically against the United
States. Against this background, the New York City Police Department
has expanded its decade-plus focus on core al-Qaeda (AQ), affiliates,
and the homegrown threat (inspired by AQ), to include Iran and
Hezbollah.\6\ In doing so, NYPD continues its efforts to build a robust
and independent counterterror posture for the City of New York. In
turn, the Los Angeles Police Department recently elevated the
Government of Iran and its proxies, notably Hezbollah, to a Tier I
threat.\7\
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\6\ Testimony of Mitchell D. Silber before the U.S. House of
Representatives Committee on Homeland Security, Iran, Hezbollah, and
the Threat to the Homeland (March 21, 2012) http://homeland.house.gov/
sites/homeland.house.gov/files/Testimony-Silber.pdf.
\7\ Cilluffo, Cardash, and Downing. ``Is America's view of Iran and
Hezbollah dangerously out of date?''
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Clearly, much as we might wish state-sponsored terrorism to have
fallen off the map, it has not. Indeed, both the Director of the
National Counterterrorism Center and the Director of National
Intelligence have underscored concern about Iran and their proxies,
suggesting respectively in recent testimony that ``Iran remains the
foremost state sponsor of terrorism'';\8\ and that Iran is ``now more
willing to conduct an attack in the United States.''\9\ Concern about
Iran and its proxies, as reflected above, is all the more disturbing
given Iran's on-going drive to achieve nuclear weapons capability, and
the recent statement of Lebanese Hezbollah leader Sayyed Hassan
Nasrallah to the effect that there will be no distinction drawn between
Israel and the United States in terms of retaliation, should Israel
attack Iran to halt its progress toward the nuclear goal: ``If Israel
targets Iran, America bears responsibility.''\10\
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\8\ Matthew G. Olsen, ``Understanding the Homeland Threat
Landscape'' Hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security
(July 25, 2012) http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/
files/Testimony-Olsen.pdf.
\9\ James R. Clapper, ``Unclassified Statement for the Record on
the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence Community for
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence'' (January 31, 2012) http:/
/intelligence.senate.gov/120131/clapper.pdf.
\10\ Reuters, ``Nasrallah: Iran could strike U.S. bases if
attacked'' The Jerusalem Post (September 3, 2012) http://www.jpost.com/
IranianThreat/News/Article.aspx?id=283706.
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Note that Hezbollah's nexus with criminal activity is greater than
that of any other terrorist group. In the United States, there were 16
arrests of Hezbollah activists in 2010 based on Joint Terrorism Task
Force investigations in Philadelphia, New York, and Detroit. And the
organization has attempted to obtain equipment in the United States
including Stinger missiles, M-4 rifles and night vision equipment.\11\
These links, including with drugs and cartels, generate new
possibilities for outsourcing, and new networks that can facilitate
terrorist travel, logistics, recruitment, and operations. After all,
the distribution routes are the same regardless of what is being moved
illicitly. Authorities have noted significant terrorist interest in
tactics, techniques, and procedures used to smuggle people and drugs
into the United States from Mexico. According to Texas State Homeland
Security Director, Steve McCraw, Hezbollah operatives were captured
trying to cross the border in September 2007.\12\ Thus, the old
assumption that Hezbollah and others would avoid linking up with drug
traffickers, in order to avoid drawing attention (and potentially heat)
from law enforcement officials, no longer applies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland
Security, ``Indictment charges 4 with conspiracy to support Hezbollah 6
others charged with related crimes,'' Press Release (November 24, 2009)
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/0911/091124philadelphia.htm.
\12\ ``Terrorists have been arrested on the border, security chief
says,'' Associated Press (September 13, 2007).
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Instead we have seen a troubling hybridization and convergence of
such forces, pursuant to which ``terrorists look to criminals'' and
vice versa, while ``criminals emulate businesses.'' Regrettably, as
noted more than a decade ago, ``The linkage between terrorists and
narcotics is strong, and getting stronger . . . Suffice it to say
narcotics provide a substantial source of funding and have deepened the
connection between terrorists and organized crime. Kidnapping is also
nothing new to terrorists. They have been taking hostages since day one
to gain media attention and ransom money. But there is a new twist--
more and more terrorists take hostages for money--not for publicity.
Kidnapping has become big business. The $64,000 question is how much
money is going into their coffers to further their terrorist campaigns
and how many of these organizations are transforming into outright
criminal enterprises.''\13\ The cross-walk between terror and crime may
therefore be murky. By way of example, ``Abu Sayyaf is a good example
of an ideologically-driven group that have transformed into a criminal
enterprise.''\14\
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\13\ Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo before the U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Oversight and Government Reform,
Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans Affairs, and International
Relations (April 3, 2001) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/
testimony4.3.01_cilluffo.pdf.
\14\ Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo before the U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime
(December 13, 2000) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/testimony-
12.13.00_cilluffo.pdf.
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Also noteworthy, particularly with an eye to the future, is the
growing activity among the Bolivarian axis states of Ecuador, Bolivia,
Nicaragua, and Venezuela--and between them and external actors,
including Iran and Russian organized crime.\15\ Such is another
dangerous variation on the theme of convergence and cooperation between
state and non-state actors with postures that are hostile to the West
generally and to the United States in particular. For example,
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad established the IRISL (Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Lines) Group to facilitate and obscure activity between the two
countries and third-party criminal enterprises--including drug
trafficking organizations. Although the IRISL Group and its offshoots
are on the radar of the United States and its allies (having already
been blacklisted by the Treasury Department), this is a threat that
bears careful and active watching, in order to remain ahead of the
curve and on proactive rather than reactive footing.\16\
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\15\ Douglas Farah, ``Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism, and
Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National
Security Priority'' U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute
Monograph (August 2012).
\16\ Douglas Farah, ``Hezbollah in Latin America: Implications for
U.S. Security'' Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland
Security (July 2011) http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.249/
pub_detail.asp. Sandra Warmoth, ``Iran's Expanding Footprint in Latin
America.'' Small Wars Journal (May 2012) http://smallwarsjournal.com/
jrnl/art/irans-expanding-footprint-in-latin-america.
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Spillover effects from Mexico are also in evidence in the United
States, up to and including the northeast and northwest regions of this
country, where Mexican drug trafficking organizations have established
a presence. As noted in the subcommittee's Report, ``A Line in the
Sand,'' Mexican cartels now have an established presence in more than
1,000 U.S. cities. If not challenged by action on our part, there is no
logical reason why we should expect that number to decrease. In fact,
it will grow. Narco-trafficking in Mexico is big business, and the
Mexican drug cartels have become so powerful that they threaten, if not
effectively supplant, the state in certain parts of the country. If we
continue to observe an increase in the strength and position of the
cartels in Mexico, we should expect to observe an increase in their
reach into the United States. Alone, the drug threat poses a serious
threat to the United States. That threat becomes truly grave, however,
when you consider its potential to move beyond narcotics. Mexico now
grapples with a triple threat--a mixture of crime, terrorist tactics,
and insurgency--that is at once adaptive, lethal, and determined.\17\
Cartels and other criminals there have adopted the violent tactics,
techniques, and procedures of terrorists. Meanwhile terrorist groups
have undertaken a range of illicit activities. This convergence of
forces with differing motivations (profit, ideology, etc.) has already
yielded a case in which a ``controversial imam'' was smuggled across
America's Southwestern Border by smugglers based in Mexico.\18\ And as
the subcommittee's Report (``A Line in the Sand'') notes, intelligence
from the 2011 raid on bin Laden's compound found evidence that bin
Laden wanted to exploit Mexican smuggling routes into the United
States. The concern among U.S. security and intelligence officials is
that this type of activity could become more institutionalized, for
instance if major Mexican drug cartels were to ally and partner with
terrorists. Recall the plot targeting Ambassador Al-Jubeir.
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\17\ Sharon L. Cardash, Frank J. Cilluffo, and Bert B. Tussing,
Mexico and the Triple Threat (October 20, 2011) http://www.gwumc.edu/
hspi/policy/issuebrief_MexicoTripleThreat.pdf.
\18\ Richard Marosi, ``Controversial Muslim cleric is arrested
while sneaking into the U.S.'' Los Angeles Times (January 27, 2011)
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jan/27/local/la-me-border-cleric-
20110127.
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Mexico, however, is not the only avenue of approach. If you were to
take a map of the Americas and trace the points of origin, transit
routes, and destinations of drug trafficking and other illicit
smuggling operations, you would see a spider-web of conduits--including
some that pass through U.S. territory. The DEA has noted that Puerto
Rico is becoming a principal entry point for drug trafficking into the
United States. From the perspective of the cartels and terrorists,
Puerto Rico is a perfect target and opportunity. As a U.S. border, the
island is under-protected, receiving too little resources and
attention--a fact evidenced by a growing drug-related murder rate (more
than five times the National average); and the fact that for the second
time in 3 years, major smuggling rings were recently uncovered at San
Juan's Luis Munoz Marin International Airport. These rings were
responsible for shipments to New York, New Jersey, Florida,
Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Massachusetts; and highlight the fact that
once drugs, weapons, individuals, or materials make it to the island,
they are within the United States--just hours from the major population
centers of the East Coast.\19\
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\19\ CNN Wire Staff, ``Drug raid targets baggage handlers, airline
workers in Puerto Rico'' CNN (June 7, 2012) http://www.cnn.com/2012/06/
06/us/puerto-rico-airport-arrests/index.html.
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In addition, we are also witnessing growing hybrid threats in the
Caribbean. At times, the hybrid threats emanate from a blending of
criminal activity and community resources. Witness the case of the
Jamaican drug lord Christopher ``Dudus'' Coke. Coke rose to his
position after the death of his father, a gang leader with considerable
influence in the Jamaican Labour Party. In Jamaica, ``Dudus'' Coke
controlled the Tivoli Gardens neighborhood of Kingston and exercised
considerable influence within Jamaican populations both on and off the
island. Eventually Coke leveraged this community of influence to
establish a global trafficking ring that connected Kingston, Miami, and
New York. Before being convicted earlier this year in New York, he
pleaded guilty to charges that included the trafficking of more than 3
tons of marijuana and 30 pounds of cocaine; Coke effectively ran a
state within a state--a fact that landed him on the Department of
Justice's list of most dangerous drug traffickers.\20\
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\20\ ``Manhattan U.S. Attorney Charges Jamaican-Based Drug Kingpin
with Narcotics and Firearms Trafficking Crimes.'' Press Release. U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York (2009) http://
www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/August09/cokechristophermichael-
idictmentpr.pdf. United States of America v. Christopher Michael Coke.
Sealed Indictment S15 07 Cr. 971 (RPP) (2009) http://
www.americanthinker.com/Christopher%20Coke- %20Indictment.pdf. Kareem
Fahim, ``Jamaica Strains to Fill Void Left by Gang Bosses'' The New
York Times (2010) http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/01/world/americas/
01jamaica.html?_r=1&ref=christopher_coke. Carlin DeGuerin Miller,
``Christopher ``Dudus'' Coke Extradited, Pleads Not Guilty in U.S.
Court'' CBS News (2010) http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-
20008897-504083.html. Richard Esposito, Mark Schone, & Luis Martinez.
``U.S. Report: Jamaican Prime Minister Is `Known Criminal Affiliate' of
Hunted Drug Lord.'' ABC News (2010) http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/
jamaica-christopher-dudus-coke-escaped-security-forces-assault/
story?id=10737428. Jason Horowitz, ``Renewed Questions about Firm's
Involvement in Jamaican Extradition Case'' The Washington Post (2010)
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/05/26/
AR2010052604233.html. Ed Pilkington, ``Christopher `Dudus' Coke handed
23-year U.S. jail term for drug trafficking'' The Guardian (2012)
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jun/08/christopher-dudus-coke-
jail-term.
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At other times, the hybrid threat represents a blending of criminal
activity with terrorist narrative and incitement. For example, Jamaica
is also home to Abdullah al-Faisal, a prominent jihadist imam who
preaches violence and calls for the murder of Americans, Jews, and
Hindus. A jihadi ``rock star'' on YouTube and other internet sites, al-
Faisal inspired Zacarias Moussaoui, Richard Reid (the failed shoe
bomber), Jermaine Lindsay (one of the 7/7 bombers that struck London),
and Faisal Shahzad (who sought to detonate a car bomb in Times Square);
and likely others too.\21\ It is also worth noting the Caribbean ties
present in the 2007 plot to bomb the jet fuel artery at New York's JFK
airport. Two of the perpetrators were from Trinidad and Tobago, but
more importantly, the plotters repeatedly travelled to Trinidad for
moral and financial support from the extremist Muslim group Jamaat al-
Muslimeen.\22\
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\21\ ``Profile: Sheikh Abdullah al-Faisal'' BBC News (2007) http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6692243.stm. Madeleine Gruen, ``Abdullah
al-Faisal: Extremist Ideologue with Influence in the West.'' NEFA
Backgrounder. New York, NY; The NEFA Foundation (2009) http://
www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/
nefa_alfaisal1009.pdf.
\22\ Cara Buckley and William K. Rashbaum, ``4 Men Accused of Plot
to Blow Up Kennedy Airport Terminals and Fuel Lines'' The New York
Times (2007) http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/03/nyregion/03plot.html.
Jerome P. Bjelopera, ``American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex
Threat.'' Washington, DC; Congressional Research Service (2011) http://
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf.
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This last point brings variants of the threat back to and within
the United States, where bin Laden's ideology and narrative continues
to inspire a small but dangerous constituency. As indicated above, well
over 50 home-grown U.S. jihadi terrorism plots have been discovered
since 9/11. In addition, as foreign fighters return to their respective
homelands (U.S. included) battle-hardened and armed with Western
passports--10 feet tall in the eyes of those who admire their
exploits--these returned fighters pose a direct threat to Western
security given their familiarity with potential targets they may select
to attack. Where foreign fighters are concerned, so-called ``bridge
figures'' are of special importance, as they ensure that the fighter
pool is replenished, by helping to inspire, radicalize, and motivate.
These figures exude charisma, and exhibit cultural and linguistic
fluency as well as other skills that propel them to positions of
leadership, guidance, and prominence. This was the role Abdullah al-
Faisal played.\23\ He and others like him, illustrate both the
actuality and potential for the Caribbean to serve as a threat gateway
to the United States. A concerted and comprehensive U.S. effort to
counter our adversaries' narrative is the largest missing dimension of
our counterterrorism statecraft.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Frank J. Cilluffo, Jeffrey B. Cozzens, and Magnus Ranstorp,
Foreign Fighters: Trends, Trajectories & Conflict Zones (October 1,
2010) http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/report_foreignfighters501.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
the cyber threat--which knows no borders
The threat has also taken hold in the cyber domain, where our
adversaries may be surfing in the wake of ``Anonymous'' and other such
groups in order to learn from and perhaps also exploit their actions.
Here, foreign states--China, Russia, North Korea, Iran--are our primary
concern. What Iran may lack in cyber capability (notwithstanding heavy
investment in that area) it makes up for in intent. Together with cash,
Iran and others who wish to do us harm can go far, simply by buying or
renting the cyber weapons and tools they need or seek. Bear in mind
that cyber threats manifest in nanoseconds. Protecting critical
infrastructure and building resilience in relation to it, should
therefore be at the top of our priority list. Consider, for example,
``reports that Iranian and Venezuelan diplomats in Mexico were involved
in planned cyber-attacks against U.S. targets, including nuclear power
plants.''\24\ The scenario is especially concerning, keeping in in mind
that Hurricane Sandy and other recent storms have highlighted this
country's shortcomings in terms of resilience. Mother Nature may be a
formidable adversary, but just imagine the level of damage and
destruction that a determined and creative enemy could wreak.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Shaun Waterman, ``U.S. authorities probing alleged cyberattack
plot by Venezuela, Iran'' The Washington Times (December 13, 2011)
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/dec/13/us-probing-alleged-
cyberattack-plot-iran-venezuela/?page=all.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
recommendations and potential solutions
To fight back effectively against the complex multi-dimensional
threat outlined above, a multi-dimensional response that incorporates
law enforcement, intelligence, diplomatic, and other measures, is
needed.
Mexico's Triple Threat and U.S. Spillover.--There is more
that the United States could do in terms of border security and
enforcement, with the aim of tackling spillover effects of
Mexico's triple threat of crime, terrorist tactics, and
insurgency. Whether it is drugs or weapons being trafficked,
the illicit enterprise operates like a business. This presents
opportunities for U.S. and counterpart authorities to exploit
for the purpose of counter-attack. For example, careful and
comprehensive mapping of the movement of weapons and funds by
Mexican drug-trafficking organizations operating with the
United States would generate additional opportunities to
disrupt and seize flows of arms and money. As a prerequisite to
capitalizing on these potential opportunities, we would need to
develop the intelligence needed to better track, locate, and
seize cash and weapons before they reach the border--at which
point the task of intercepting them is much harder since
efforts to conceal are then at their peak.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Cardash, Cilluffo, and Tussing, Mexico and the Triple Threat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to this type of painstaking and patient work that
supports operations, we must also do the hard strategic
thinking required to further develop a comprehensive--meaning
multi-dimensional and multi-instrument--plan to work with
Mexico to help create and reinforce the institutional and
social foundations and developments needed to achieve strategic
success in the long run. On this there is, perhaps, a window of
opportunity. On December 1, President-elect Enrique Pena Nieto
of Mexico will be sworn in. Although Nieto's campaign promises
to lower the level of drug-related violence gave rise to
concerns about his willingness to tackle the threat posed by
the cartels, his appointment of retired Colombian police chief
General Oscar Naranjo as a security advisor suggests that Nieto
is committed to a broad strategic fight against the cartels.
Naranjo is a veteran of Colombia's drug war and led that
country's intelligence efforts against the cartels. President-
elect Nieto seems intent on bringing the lessons learned from
success in Colombia (efforts this country supported) to
Mexico.\26\ As we did in Colombia, we must work with our
Mexican allies, as well as allies across Central and South
America, and the Caribbean, to combat this threat and
strengthen regional security writ large.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Steven Dudley, ``Can Colombian expert reform Mexico's troubled
police force?'' The Christian Science Monitor (July 13, 2012) http://
www.csmonitor.com/World/Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2012/0713/Can-
Colombian-expert-reform-Mexico-s-troubled-police-force.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This undertaking will be especially challenging at a time of
domestic and international economic turbulence and restraint.
Although policy without resources is rhetoric, we must try to
work smarter and better. Strategy and doctrine in Mexico, in
the United States, and in the region, must evolve and keep pace
with the triple threat that is lethal and determined. Until our
thinking ripens across the board, so as to lay the groundwork
for a posture that is powerfully suited to the threat climate
the United States, Mexico, and our regional allies will
continue to play catch-up to the mix of forces at play. The
challenge is further magnified because facts on the ground will
continue to change and there will no doubt be other important
developments that shake up the equation moving forward. Against
this background, the best and most effective thing that we can
do at this point is increase our awareness through better
region-wide intelligence and analysis. We must have a rich
picture of what is happening in the Americas and the Caribbean.
We must be able to look beyond our own borders.
Iran/Hezbollah.--Disruption should be our goal here, though
Iran and its proxies are no doubt expecting as much. Keeping
eyes and ears open at home and abroad to glean indications and
warnings (I&W) of attack will be fundamental, as will outreach
to and partnership with State and local authorities and
communities, where the rubber meets the road. Searching for I&W
will require fresh thinking that identifies and pursues links
and patterns not previously established by U.S. officials. In
part, this entails hitting the beat hard, with local police
tapping informants and known criminals for leads--bearing in
mind the interconnections between Iran/Hezbollah and gangs/
cartels. As criminal and terrorist networks increasingly
support and reinforce one another, the post-9/11 shift of U.S.
law enforcement resources away from drugs and thugs toward
counterterrorism may be in need of some recalibration, to
better serve both counterterrorist and counter-narcotics aims.
At minimum, red-teaming and the production of additional threat
assessments should be pursued, to include modalities of attack
(such as cyber, see more below) and potential consequences. The
upside of today's grim operating presumptions, including the
perception that the United States is fair game as subject of
attack, is that the intersection of threat vectors (terrorists,
drug traffickers, etc.) provides additional opportunities to
U.S. intelligence and law enforcement authorities to exploit
for collection and other purposes.\27\
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\27\ Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo before the U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence; and Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies (April 26, 2012)
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/
Iran%20Cyber%20Testimony%204.26.12%20Frank%20Cilluffo.pdf.
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Counter-Radicalization in a Borderless World.--Addressing
specific outbreaks of violent Islamist extremism will not
prevent its virulent spread--including to and among Americans
(``home-grown'' terrorist cases)--unless the underlying
extremist ideology is exposed, unpacked, dissected, and
combated. Government agencies currently involved in various
aspects of the mission of combating violent Islamist extremism
(CVIE) do not represent systemic failures so much as the
complete lack of a system at all. Without clear interagency
directives instructing how to distribute resources and
coordinate aspects of the mission, individual, and broader
agency efforts are improvised. As a result, an inconsistent and
haphazard approach to dealing with the force underlying today's
terrorist threat is all but guaranteed.
Counter-radicalization is an essential complement to
counterterrorism. Elements of a cohesive National strategy
could incorporate a range of approaches that have proven
effective in other contexts. The power of negative imagery, as
in a political campaign, could be harnessed to hurt our
adversaries and further chip away at their appeal and
credibility in the eyes of their peers, followers, and
sympathizers. A sustained and systemic strategic communications
effort aimed at exposing the hypocrisy of Islamists' words
versus their deeds could knock them off balance, as could
embarrassing their leadership by bringing to light their seamy
connections to criminal enterprises and drug trafficking
organizations. Imagine the groundswell that could be achieved
if the tragic attack on Pakistani teenager Malala Yousufzai,
and the many others who have been similarly targeted by al-
Qaeda and the Taliban, were similarly recognized world-wide--
and the impact of these incidents thus multiplied thousands-
fold.
Brokering infighting within and between al-Qaeda, its affiliates,
and the broader jihadi orbit in which they reside, will damage
violent Islamists' capability to propagate their message and
organize operations both at home and abroad. Locally-
administered programs are especially significant, as many of
the solutions reside outside the U.S. Government and will
require communities policing themselves. In the last year or 2,
the United States has made some headway on these fronts,
including through the efforts of the Department of State's
Office of Strategic Counterterrorism Communications--but we
could do more and we could (and should) hit harder, especially
when our adversaries are back on their heels. Indeed, now is
the time to double down rather than ease up on the pressure. In
short, we must encourage defectors, delegitimize and
disaggregate our adversaries' narrative, and above all,
remember the victims.\28\
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\28\ Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo before the U.S. Senate
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs (July 11, 2012)
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/Testimony%20-%20SHSGAC%20Hearing%20-
%2011%20July%202012.pdf.
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Securing Cyberspace, the Borderless Domain.--Cyber threats
manifest in nanoseconds. Our response measures must be almost
as quick. This means developing and implementing an ``active
defense'' capability to immediately attribute and counter
attacks and future threats in real-time. Despite multiple
incidents that could have served as galvanizing events to shore
up U.S. resolve to formulate and implement the changes that are
needed, and not just within Government, we have yet to take
those necessary steps. Officials in the homeland security
community should therefore undertake contingency planning that
incorporates attacks on U.S. infrastructure. At minimum, ``red-
teaming'' and additional threat assessments are needed. The
latter should include modalities of attack and potential
consequences. Working together with DHS Intelligence and
Analysis colleagues, the Department's National Protection and
Programs Directorate (NPPD) could and should do more in terms
of threat and intelligence reporting, especially in relation to
critical infrastructure, where DHS is well-positioned to add
real and unique value given the Department's relationship with
and responsibilities towards the private sector.
The United States should also develop and clearly articulate a
cyber-deterrence strategy. Such a deterrence policy should
apply generally, and also in a tailored manner that is actor/
adversary-specific. A solid general posture could serve as an
80 percent solution, neutralizing the majority of threats
before they manifest fully. This, in turn, would free up
resources (human, capital, technological, etc.) to focus our
limited resources and bandwidth on the high-end of the threat
spectrum and on those which are most sophisticated and
persistent. To operationalize these recommendations, we must
draw lines in the sand. Preserving flexibility of U.S. response
by maintaining some measure of ambiguity is useful, so long as
we make parameters clear by laying down certain markers or
selected redlines whose breach will not be tolerated. More
investment needs to be made in our offensive capability as
well, in order to support the foregoing proposals in terms of
practice and at the level of principle (to signal a credible
commitment). Cybersecurity by definition is transnational in
nature and will require some level of transnational solutions,
yet it must not be approached like an arms control treaty
(i.e., attribution and verification are still a ways away).\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Statement of Frank J. Cilluffo before the U.S. House of
Representatives, Committee on Homeland Security (September 20, 2012)
http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/policy/testimony9.20.12_Cilluffo.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is my privilege to have been afforded the opportunity to tender
the above thoughts for consideration by Congress and the next
administration. Thank you to both the subcommittee and its staff for
your leadership and hard work on the pressing issues before us today
and covered in your Report, ``A Line in the Sand.'' I would be pleased
to try to answer any questions that you may have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, sir.
I just want to agree with you, state for the record we
actually had a hearing on the Caribbean, calling it the third
border and the threat from that region. They are not just going
across land borders. They are going by sea as well.
With that, the Chairman now recognizes Mr. Farah for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS FARAH, SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL
ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY CENTER
Mr. Farah. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, and Ranking Member
Keating, for the opportunity to participate in this. I have
spent a lot of time on the ground in Latin America,
particularly Central America and northern South America, and
what I am seeing closely tracks with what your excellent report
came up with.
I would like to step back a little bit from what Ambassador
Noriega said to perhaps a little larger lens view. I believe
what we are seeing today is something that is fundamentally
reordering the threat to the U.S. homeland, and that is the
emergence of multiple, criminal state actors in Latin America,
primarily grouped into the self-identified Bolivarian alliance
led by Venezuela, now operating in conjunction with
transnational organized crime groups, extraregional actors,
such as Iran and terrorist groups. States such as Iran, that
traditionally have had little interest or influence in Latin
America, have become important players, as you have noted, led
by Hugo Chavez and including Rafael Correa of Ecuador, Evo
Morales of Bolivia, and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua.
The intentions of Iran in the region have long been subject
of debate, but today, it is clear the goal of Iran's presence
is at least at a minimum two-fold, to develop the capacity and
capability to wreak havoc in Latin America and possibly the
U.S. homeland if the Iranian leadership views this as necessary
to the survival of its nuclear program and to develop and
expand ways to avoid international sanctions that are
increasing crippling their economic life.
With the emergence of criminalized states, we face the
prospect of transnational organized crime networks facilitating
weapons of mass destruction for terrorists under the protection
of one or more states, thus greatly increasing their chances of
success.
Chavez and his allies have allowed Iran to open financial
facilities, front companies and dedicated shipping lines to
evade sanctions on its nuclear program. At the same time, Iran
is carrying out multiple mining activities that directly
benefit its missile and nuclear programs in Latin America while
moving aggressively to expand intelligence-gathering
capabilities and military access. Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia,
and Nicaragua have all granted hundreds of Iranian citizens
passports from their respective countries, freeing these
individuals to travel in almost untraceable ways as agents of
the Iranian region.
While Iran's revolutionary rulers view the 1979 revolution
in theological terms, as a miracle of divine intervention in
which the United States as the Great Satan was defeated by the
Allah, the Bolivarians view it from a secular point of view, as
a road map to defeat the United States, the evil empire,
through asymmetrical warfare.
Iran's revolution serves as a model for how asymmetrical
leverage, when applied by Allah or humans, can bring the
equivalent of David defeating Goliath on the world stage. I go
into some detail on the relationship of this in my full
testimony in the role that Carlos the Jackal, one of the most
wanted terrorists in the world until his arrest in 1994, has
played since his conversion to Islam in prison, where he is
serving a life sentence, infusing the concept of radical Shi'a
Islam and Marxist revolutionary dialectic together into
something that President Hugo Chavez has picked up on and gone
forward with.
The emerging military doctrine of the Bolivarian
revolution, officially adopted in Venezuela and now spreading
to Bolivia and Ecuador, explicitly embraces the use of weapons
of mass destruction and nuclear weapons against the United
States. This is occurring at a time when Hezbollah's presence
in Latin America is growing and when Chavez announced his
successful completion of a project to build drones in Venezuela
with Iranian help.
Chavez has adopted as his military doctrine the concepts
and strategies articulated in this book, ``Peripheral Warfare
and Revolutionary Islam: Origins, Rules, and Ethics of
Asymmetrical Warfare,'' by the Spanish politician and ideologue
Jorge Verstrynge. The tract is an explicit endorsement of the
use of WMD for the destruction of the United States. Chavez
liked the Verstrynge book so well that he had a special pocket-
sized edition printed and distributed to his Armed Forces as
part of their official military doctrine. You can see here the
Venezuelan flag and officer corps in there, and it is pocket-
sized, so they can carry it with them and study.
The road ahead will require enhanced resources in this time
of scarcity and a much better understanding of the ground game
of those who wish us harm. They have the clearly-stated
intention of carrying out asymmetrical attacks against us. It
would be foolish to assume that the capacity lags far behind.
In addition to the vulnerabilities presented by having
states granting legitimate travel documents to hostile state
and nonstate actors, the Southwest Border in the Caribbean, as
noted, remained relatively easy points of entry. The almost
unlimited pool of violent, well-armed, and increasingly well-
traced members of gangs both in Central America and Mexico,
which are truly now by bidirectional and binational, present an
almost unlimited labor supply for those who wish to do us harm
as well.
I think one of the things that you mentioned, Mr. Chairman,
in the opening was the submersibles, which also present now the
ability to carry 10 tons of cargo, any cargo, any place, all
the way from Ecuador to northern--past California into northern
United States, presents an extraordinary challenge because we
simply cannot find the submersibles.
Expanded human intelligence and advanced field research by
experts in the region are, I think, fundamental. Given the
hundreds of billions of dollars in legitimate commerce and the
legal flows of millions of people across our border, the task
of finding and interdicting illicit products, weapons, or
individuals at the border itself is more daunting than finding
a needle in a haystack. Intelligence generated before they
arrive at the border area is vital. This intelligence-driven
effort must combine law enforcement, the intelligence
community, and the capacities of the Special Operations Command
and other DOD entities with the international cooperation
channeled through the State Department.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:]
Prepared Statement of Douglas Farah
November 16, 2012
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, thank you for the
opportunity to participate in this important hearing on the threats to
our Nation's borders. It is a matter of utmost importance to the
security of the United States, and something that has long been the
subject of my on-going field research in Central and South America. My
own investigations in recent months have led me to many of the same
concerns your report raises, particularly relating to the activities of
Iran and Hezbollah in the region.
I believe that what we are seeing today is the emergence of
multiple criminalized state actors in Latin America, primarily grouped
into the self-identified Bolivarian Alliance led by Venezuela, now
operating in conjunction with Transnational Organized Crime groups
(TOCs), extra regional actors such as Iran, and terrorist groups.
In recent months there has been increased awareness of the flow of
South American cocaine through Venezuela to West Africa, particularly
through Mali, Guinea Bissau, and other fragile states--possibly
benefitting not only the traditional regional TOC structures and their
Colombian and Mexican allies, but several terrorist entities including
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Hezbollah,\1\ and the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
de Colombia-FARC).\2\
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\1\ For a detailed look at this development see: Antonio L.
Mazzitelli, ``The New Transatlantic Bonanza: Cocaine on Highway 10,''
Western Hemisphere Security Analysis Center, Florida International
University, March 2011.
\2\ The FARC is the oldest insurgency in the Western hemisphere,
launched in 1964 out of Colombia's Liberal Party militias, and enduring
to the present as a self-described Marxist revolutionary movement. For
a more detailed look at the history of the FARC see: Douglas Farah,
``The FARC in Transition: The Fatal Weakening of the Western
Hemisphere's Oldest Guerrilla Movement,'' NEFA Foundation, July 2,
2008, accessible at: http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/
nefafarc0708.pdf.
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As the subcommittee's report notes, the case of Ayman Joumaa, the
Lebanese national and Hezbollah supporter, provides clear evidence of
new types of overlap among criminal and terrorist groups which, in
years past, did not easily mix. Yet, Joumaa was able to work on behalf
of Latin America TOCs, including Los Zetas, and Hezbollah, dealing in
both cocaine and weapons. These ``alliances of convenience'' among
highly-trained groups with complementary skill sets, with the new
levels of State protection being offered, presents a much more
dangerous and volatile panorama in the hemisphere, and specifically for
our borders, than we have traditionally confronted.
Just as telling, as the committee's report notes, is the
willingness of at least some senior members of the Iranian government
to engage the services of a person they thought belonged to Los Zetas,
Mexican drug trafficking organization in order to kill the Saudi
ambassador to the United States on U.S. territory; an act of war. This
is something that should give us pause. It speaks to willingness of the
Iranian regime to cross U.S. borders, and the sense that it can do so
with impunity. It also shows their awareness of the abilities of
Mexican organizations to carry out operations inside the United States,
and the willingness of some in the Iranian regime to make a significant
leap to work through a criminal organization with which it has no
religious or political affinity at all. This shows that many of the
``lines in the sand'' that we thought existed (the U.S. border;
terrorist and TOC group divisions) have been largely erased.
As I recently wrote in a monograph published by the U.S. Army War
College, which addresses some of the same issues this subcommittee's
report does:
``This (emerging Latin American) threat includes not only traditional
TOC activities such as drug trafficking and human trafficking, but
others, including the potential for WMD-related trafficking. These
activities are carried out with the participation of regional and
extra-regional state actors whose leaders are deeply enmeshed in
criminal activities. These same leaders have a publicly-articulated
doctrine of asymmetrical warfare against the United States and its
allies that explicitly endorses as legitimate the use of weapons of
mass destruction.
``This emerging combination of threats comprises a hybrid of criminal-
terrorist, and state- and non-state franchises, combining multiple
nations acting in concert, and traditional TOCs and terrorist groups
acting as proxies for the nation-states that sponsor them. These hybrid
franchises should now be viewed as a tier-one security threat for the
United States. Understanding and mitigating the threat requires a
whole-of-Government approach, including collection, analysis, law
enforcement, policy, and programming. No longer is the state/non-state
dichotomy viable in tackling these problems, just as the TOC/terrorism
divide is increasingly disappearing.
``These franchises operate in, and control, specific geographic
territories, which allow them to function in a relatively safe
environment. These pipelines, or recombinant chains of networks, are
highly adaptive and able to move a multiplicity of illicit products
(cocaine, weapons, humans, bulk cash) that ultimately cross U.S.
borders undetected thousands of times each day. The actors along the
pipeline form and dissolve alliances quickly, occupy both physical and
cyber space, and use both highly-developed and modern institutions,
including the global financial system, as well as ancient smuggling
routes and methods.
``Most of the goods and services that generate this wealth pass through
geographic regions that are often described as `stateless' or
`lawless.' However, these regions are far from ungoverned. In fact,
they represent a powerful component of the threat from TOCs and other
non-state actors which control them, either at the expense of weak host
states and their neighbors, or in alliance with stronger ones which
host them, tolerate them, or use them as instruments of
statecraft.''\3\
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\3\ Douglas Farah, ``Transnational Organized Crime, Terrorism and
Criminalized States in Latin America: An Emerging Tier-One National
Security Priority,'' Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War
College, Carlisle Barracks, PA, pp. 1-2.
States that traditionally have had little interest or influence in
Latin America have emerged as important players over the past decade,
primarily at the invitation of the self-described Bolivarian states
seeking to establish ``21st Century Socialism.'' This bloc of nations--
led by Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, includes Rafael Correa of Ecuador, Evo
Morales of Bolivia, and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua--seeks to break the
traditional ties of the region to the United States. To this end, the
Bolivarian alliance has formed numerous organizations and military
alliances--including a military academy in Bolivia to erase the
vestiges of U.S. military training--which explicitly exclude the United
States.\4\
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\4\ These include recently founded Community of Latin American and
Caribbean States (Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribenos--
CELAC), and the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America
(Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra America--ALBA), as
well as the ALBA Defense School, inaugurated in 2011 in Warnes,
Bolivia, to develop a joint military doctrine and training.
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Iran, identified by successive U.S. administrations as a state
sponsor of terrorism, has expanded its regional political alliances,
diplomatic presence, trade initiatives, and military, intelligence, and
informational programs via the Bolivarian axis.
The intentions of Iran in the region have long been a subject of
debate; but today there is a much clearer indication available, to both
the intelligence community and investigators on the ground, that the
goal of Iran's presence in the region is two-fold: To develop the
capacity and capability to wreak havoc in Latin America--and possibly
the U.S. homeland--if the Iranian leadership views this as necessary to
the survival of its nuclear program; and, to develop and expand the
ability to avoid international sanctions that are increasingly
crippling the regime's economic life.
As DNI James Clapper recently stated, ``some Iranian officials--
probably including Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei--have changed their
calculus and are now more willing to conduct an attack in the United
States in response to real or perceived U.S. actions that threaten the
regime. We are also concerned about Iranian plotting against U.S. or
allied interests overseas.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ James R. Clapper, Director of National Intelligence,
``Unclassified Statement for the Record: Worldwide Threat Assessment of
the U.S. Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, January 31, 2012, p. 6.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A recent Univision documentary La Amenaza Irani (The Iranian
Threat) showed Iranian diplomats in Mexico, working with their
Venezuelan and Cuban counterparts, to try to develop the capacity to
carry out a sophisticated cyber attack against U.S. military, nuclear,
and economic targets. The documentary shows military training provided
by Hezbollah to Venezuelan militias directly under the control of
Chavez, with weapons and ammunition provided by the Venezuelan
military. It also identifies by name the leaders of Hezbollah in
Venezuela.\6\
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\6\ Univision, La Amenaza Irani, aired December 8, 2011.
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This press for expanded ties comes despite the almost complete lack
of cultural or religious ties to the region, linguistic affinity, or
traditional economic logic and rationale in the relationships.
While it is true that TOC penetration of the state threatens the
rule of law, as the administration's TOC strategy released in July 2011
notes,\7\ it also poses significant new threats to the homeland.
Criminalized states frequently use TOCs as a form of statecraft,
bringing new elements to the ``dangerous spaces'' where non-state
actors intersect with regions of weak sovereignty and alternative
governance systems.\8\ This fundamentally alters the structure of
global order.
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\7\ National Security Council, ``Strategy to Combat Transnational
Organized Crime: Addressing Converging Threats to National Security,''
Office of the President, July 2011. The Strategy grew out of a National
Intelligence Estimate initiated by the Bush administration and
completed in Dec. 2008, and is a comprehensive Government review of
transnational organized crime, the first since 1995.
\8\ The phrase ``dangerous spaces'' was used by Phil Williams to
describe 21st Century security challenges in terms of spaces and gaps,
including geographical, functional, social, economic, legal, and
regulatory holes. See: Phil Williams, ``Here be Dragons: Dangerous
Spaces and International Security,'' Ungoverned Spaces: Alternatives to
State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty, Anne L. Clunan and
Harold A. Trinkunas editors, Stanford University Press, 2010, pp. 34-
37.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The possibility of TOC networks facilitating the transfer of
weapons of mass destruction for terrorists, as described in the NSC
strategy document, is very troubling, but assumes that the TOC groups
and terrorists are in confrontation with states and their multiple law
enforcement and intelligence tools. With the emergence of criminalized
states, we face the prospect of TOC networks facilitating such
transfers under the explicit or implicit protection of one or more
states, thus greatly increasing the chances of success. Parts of this
pipeline are already being developed in Latin America.
As the state relationships consolidate, the recombinant criminal-
terrorist pipelines become more rooted, and more dangerous. Rather than
being pursued by state law enforcement and intelligence services in an
effort to impede their activities, TOC groups (and perhaps terrorist
groups) are able to operate in a more stable and secure environment,
something that most businesses, both licit and illicit, crave.
Rather than operating on the margins of the state, or seeking to
co-opt small pieces of the state machinery, the TOC groups in this
construct operate in concert with the state on multiple levels. Within
that stable environment a host of new options open up. These range from
the sale of weapons, to the use of national aircraft and shipping
registries, easy use of banking structures, the use of national
airlines and shipping lines to move large quantities of unregistered
goods, the acquisition of diplomatic passports and other identification
forms; and, access to sensitive law enforcement, military, and
intelligence information and capabilities, to include those shared with
the United States, Interpol and, other international entities.
We are already seeing multiple other types of transfers that
greatly benefit terrorist organizations and their state sponsors.
Each leader in the Bolivarian bloc of nations has publicly and
privately supported the FARC rebels in Colombia--a prototypical hybrid
organization that is both a designated terrorist organization and TOC
group that produces some 90 percent of the cocaine consumed in the
United States. This support, in the form of money, weapons, sanctuary,
and joint business enterprises helps FARC-produced cocaine flow to the
outside world, and helps the FARC to survive the military battering it
has undergone at the hands of the Colombian military and police.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ For a look at the weapons transfers see: ``Los `rockets'
Venezolanos,'' Semana (Colombia), July 28, 2009. For a look at
documented financial and logistical support of Chavez and Correa for
the FARC see: ``The FARC Files: Venezuela, Ecuador, and the Secret
Archives of `Raul Reyes,' '' An IISS Strategic Dossier, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, May 2011. To see FARC connections to
Evo Morales see: Douglas Farah, ``Into the Abyss: Bolivia Under Evo
Morales and the MAS,'' International Assessment and Strategy Center,
2009: http://www.strategycenter.net/docLib/
20090618_IASCIntoTheAbyss061709.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chavez and his allies have allowed Iran, a state sponsor of terror,
to open financial facilities, front companies, and dedicated shipping
lines to evade sanctions on its nuclear program. At the same time, Iran
is carrying out multiple mining activities that directly benefit its
missile and nuclear programs in Latin America, without normal
transparency, and with no public scrutiny, while moving aggressively to
expand intelligence-gathering capacities and military access.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Douglas Farah, ``Iran in Latin America: Strategic Security
Issues,'' International Assessment and Strategy Center, Defense Threat
Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, May 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Several hundred Iranian citizens have been given Ecuadoran cedulas
or national identity cards, which allow them to travel to many places
in Latin America as Ecuadoran rather than Iranian nationals. Ecuador,
Venezuela, Bolivia, and Nicaragua have all granted hundreds of Iranian
citizens passports from their respective countries, freeing those
individuals to travel in almost untraceable ways. It also gives the
individuals access to the Colon Free Trade Zone (CFTZ) in Panama, and
to other relatively unmonitored FTZs in the region, which has greatly
enhanced Iran's ability to circumvent international sanctions aimed at
crippling the Iranian nuclear program.
The most common assumption among those who view the Iran-Bolivarian
alliance as troublesome (and many still do not see it as a significant
threat at all), is that points of convergence of the radical and
reactionary theocratic Iranian government and the self-proclaimed
socialist and progressive Bolivarian revolution are: (1) An overt and
often stated hatred for the United States and a shared belief in the
need and methods to destroy this common enemy; and (2) a shared
acceptance of authoritarian state structures that tolerate little
dissent and encroach on all aspects of a citizen's life.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ For a more detailed look at this debate see: Iran in Latin
America: Threat or Axis of Annoyance?, op cit., in which the author has
a chapter arguing for the view that Iran is a significant threat:
http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.204/pub_detail.asp.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These assumptions are true, but do not necessarily recognize the
broader underpinnings of the relationship. While Iran's revolutionary
rulers view the 1979 revolution in theological terms as a miracle of
divine intervention in which the United States, the ``Great Satan,''
was defeated, the Bolivarians view it from a secular point of view as a
roadmap to defeat the United States as the Evil Empire. To both, Iran's
revolution has strong political connotations, serving as a model for
how asymmetrical leverage, when applied by Allah or humans, can bring
the equivalent of David defeating Goliath on the world stage.
I want to go into some detail on this issue because I believe it is
fundamental to understanding why this threat we face must be taken
seriously, and to underscore that this threat has direct bearing on our
border security.
Among the first to articulate the possible merging of radical Shite
Islamic thought with Marxist aspirations of destroying capitalism and
U.S. hegemony was Illich Sanchez Ramirez, better known as the terrorist
leader `Carlos the Jackal', a Venezuelan citizen who was, until his
arrest in 1994, one of the world's most wanted terrorists. He converted
to Shite Islam in prison.
In his seminal 2003 book Revolutionary Islam, written from prison
where he is serving a life sentence for killing two French policemen,
Sanchez Ramirez praises Osama bin Laden and the 9/11 attacks on the
United States as a ``lofty feat of arms'' and part of a justified
``armed struggle'' of Islam against the West. ``From now on terrorism
is going to be more or less a daily part of the landscape of your
rotting democracies,'' he writes.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ `` `Jackal' book praises bin Laden,'' BBC News, June 26, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In this context, the repeated, public praise of Chavez for Sanchez
Ramirez can be seen as a crucial element of the Bolivarian ideology and
an acceptance of his underlying premise as important to Chavez's
ideological framework. Acolytes of Sanchez Ramirez continued to develop
his ideology of Marxism and radical Islamism rooted in the Iranian
revolution.
The emerging military doctrine of the ``Bolivarian Revolution''--
officially adopted in Venezuela and rapidly spreading to Bolivia,
Nicaragua, and Ecuador--explicitly embraces the radical Islamist model
of asymmetrical or ``fourth-generation warfare,'' with its heavy
reliance on suicide bombings and different types of terrorism,
including the use of nuclear weapons and other WMD. This is occurring
at a time when Hezbollah's presence in Latin America is growing and
becoming more identifiable,\13\ and when Chavez has announced the
successful completion of a project to build drones in Venezuela with
Iranian help.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ In addition to Operation Titan there have been numerous
incidents in the past 18 months of operatives being directly linked to
Hezbollah who have been identified or arrested in Venezuela, Colombia,
Guatemala, Aruba, and elsewhere in Latin America and the Caribbean.
\14\ Brian Ellsworth, ``Venezuela Says Building Drones with Iran's
Help,'' Reuters News Agency, June 14, 2012, accessed at: http://
www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/14/us-venezuela-iran-drone-
idUSBRE85D14N20120614.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chavez has adopted as his military doctrine the concepts and
strategies articulated in Peripheral Warfare and Revolutionary Islam:
Origins, Rules and Ethics of Asymmetrical Warfare (Guerra Periferica y
el Islam Revolucionario: Origenes, Reglas y Etica de la Guerra
Asimetrica), by the Spanish politician and ideologue Jorge
Verstrynge.\15\ The tract is a continuation of and exploration of
Sanchez Ramirez's thoughts, incorporating an explicit endorsement of
the use of weapons of mass destruction to destroy the United States.
Verstrynge argues for the destruction of United States through series
of asymmetrical attacks, like those of 9/11, in the belief that the
United States will simply crumble when its vast military strength
cannot be used to combat its enemies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Verstrynge, born in Morocco to Belgian and Spanish parents,
began his political career on the far right of the Spanish political
spectrum as a disciple of Manuel Fraga, and served as a national and
several senior party posts with the Alianza Popular. By his own
admission he then migrated to the Socialist Party, but never rose
through the ranks. He is widely associated with radical anti-
globalization views and anti-U.S. rhetoric, repeatedly stating that the
United States is creating a new global empire and must be defeated.
Although he has no military training or experience, he has written
extensively on asymmetrical warfare.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although he is not a Muslim, and the book was not written directly
in relation to the Venezuelan experience, Verstrynge moves beyond
Sanchez Ramirez to embrace all strands of radical Islam for helping to
expand the parameters of what irregular warfare should encompass,
including the use of biological and nuclear weapons, along with the
correlated civilian casualties among the enemy.
Central to Verstrynge's idealized view of terrorists is the belief
in the sacredness of the willingness of the fighters to sacrifice their
lives in pursuit of their goals. Before writing extensively on how to
make chemical weapons and listing helpful places to find information on
the manufacture of rudimentary nuclear bombs that ``someone with a high
school education could make,'' Verstrynge writes:
``We already know it is incorrect to limit asymmetrical warfare to
guerrilla warfare, although it is important. However, it is not a
mistake to also use things that are classified as terrorism and use
them in asymmetrical warfare. And we have super terrorism, divided into
chemical terrorism, bioterrorism (which uses biological and
bacteriological methods), and nuclear terrorism, which means `the type
of terrorism uses the threat of nuclear attack to achieve its goals.'
''\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Verstrynge, op cit., pp. 56-57.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
In a December 12, 2008 interview with Venezuelan state television,
Verstrynge lauded Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda for creating a new type
of warfare that is ``de-territorialized, de-stateized, and de-
nationalized,'' a war where suicide bombers act as ``atomic bombs for
the poor.''\17\ In his interview with Univision, Verstrynge said his
model was specifically drawn from Hezbollah's experience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Bartolome, op cit. See also: John Sweeny, ``Jorge Verstrynge:
The Guru of Bolivarian Asymmetric Warfare,'' www.vcrisis.com, Sept. 9,
2005; and ``Troops Get Provocative Book,'' Miami Herald, Nov. 11, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chavez liked the Verstrynge book so well that he had a special
pocket-sized edition printed and distributed to the armed forces
officer corps with express orders that it be read cover to cover. It
has since been adopted as official Venezuelan military doctrine. Even
more worrisome, copies of the book have been found over the past year,
for the first time, in FARC camps in Colombia, indicating the doctrine
is being passed on to Venezuela's non-state proxy.
To further ingrain this teaching, and explicitly to eradicate any
vestiges of U.S. military doctrine in the region, Chavez and other
Bolivarian leaders, in conjunction with Iran, have recently opened a
new military academy to teach Bolivarian military doctrine, operating
in Santa Cruz, Bolivia. The ALBA Defense School is going to teach the
``beautiful projects and experiences that unite our military,'' said
Nicolas Maduro, Venezuela's foreign minister. This includes, he said,
the doctrines of Jose Marti, the hero of Cuban independence; Simon
Bolivar, the hero of South American independence; Eloy Alfaro, an
Ecuadoran revolutionary; and, Augusto Casar Sandino, a Nicaraguan
revolutionary.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Juan Pauliler, ``Que busca la academia military del ALBA?''
BBC Spanish Service, June 15, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bolivian President Morales, speaking at the inauguration of the
facility, said the School would prepare the peoples of the region to
defend against ``imperialist threats, which seek to divide us.'' He
said that the ``Peoples of the ALBA are being besieged, sanctioned, and
punished by the imperial arrogance just because we are exerting the
right of being decent and sovereign.'' He added that, ``We must not
allow that the history of colonization repeats and that our resources
are the loot of the empire.''
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Iran's interest in the project, which it supports financially, was
made clear when Iranian defense minister Ahmad Vahidi arrived in
Bolivia for the school's inauguration, despite having an Interpol Red
Notice issued for his arrest as a result of his alleged participation
in the 1994 AMIA bombing in Buenos Aires. His public appearance at a
military ceremony the day before the school's inauguration set off an
international scandal and sharp protests from Argentina, which had
asked Interpol to emit the Red Notice. Vahidi quietly slipped out of
Bolivia.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Robin Yapp, ``Iran defense minister forced to leave Bolivia
over 1994 Argentina bombing,'' The Telegraph (London), June 1, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is not an encouraging panorama and it has many direct
implications for U.S. National security. Where, in the not distant
past, drug traffickers, coyotes, and bulk-cash smugglers routinely
crossed our Southwest Border, today a much larger group of illicit
actors are opening up multiple new ways to cross our border undetected.
The traditional human smuggling routes continue to function
efficiently under the control of Los Zetas, the Mara Salvatrucha (MS-
13) gang, and other increasingly violent actors whose primary, if not
sole, motivation is economic. The budding alliances among Mexican gangs
such as the Barrio Azteca and the Central American gangs such as the
MS-13 along with the expanding reach of Los Zetas in the human
smuggling business all auger ill for border security.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The traditional border vulnerabilities remain while new ones
continue to arise. The willingness of multiple criminalized and corrupt
states in the region to issue legitimate passports (including
diplomatic passports) to officials and agents of a state sponsor of
terrorism such as Iran makes securing the U.S. border ever more
complex. As the relationships among traditional TOC's and terrorist
groups mature in places like Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, and
relationships are built and knowledge exchanged, it will become a
significantly more complex challenge to detect and deter those seeking
to cross our borders to do us harm.
The road ahead will require enhanced resources in a time of
scarcity, and a much better understanding of the ``ground game'' of
those who wish to hurt us. They have a clearly stated intention to
carry out asymmetrical attacks against us; it would be foolish to
assume the capacity lags far behind.
The demonstrated willingness of the Iranian government to reach out
to Mexican TOCs in order to perpetrate attacks inside the United States
shows just how blurry many of the TOC-Terrorist lines have become, and
they are likely to get blurrier. The implications of this new paradigm
are often still not clearly understood by policy makers and often are
dismissed by some who do not understand the pace at which the world is
changing. Hearings like this one are a necessary first step in
advancing a debate that is very late in getting started.
In addition to the vulnerabilities presented by having states
granting legitimate travel documents to state and non-state actors who
are plotting attacks against the United States, the Southwest Border
remains a relatively easy point of entry. The almost unlimited pool of
violent, well-armed, and increasingly well-trained gang members who
operate daily from our border, south to the Northern Triangle of
Central America (Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala), is truly bi-
directional and bi-national. Not only do members cross the border
regularly, as the report notes, but they also maintain structures in
hundreds of U.S. cities (as well as in Canada), giving them broad reach
to carry out harmful activities on behalf of whomever will meet their
price.
Expanded human intelligence and advanced field-based research by
experts in the region's cultural and political history are necessary to
further understand the challenges, predict their evolution, and suggest
countermeasures. Many of the TOCs and terrorist groups use low-tech
methods to plan, communicate, and move their resources. Given the
hundreds of billions of dollars in legitimate commerce, and the legal
flow of millions of people across the border, the task of finding and
interdicting illicit products, weapons, or individuals at the border
itself is more daunting than finding a needle in the haystack.
Intelligence generated before they arrive at the border area is vital
to successful interdiction (and to minimizing the disruption and
negative economic consequences on legitimate movements). Such
intelligence will not always be electronic, nor will it likely derive
from a single agency, source, or data stream. Timely warning and
interdiction will increasingly require a more whole-of-Government
coordinated approach, as opposed to a lane or command-centric one.
This intelligence-driven effort must combine law enforcement, the
intelligence community, capacities of the Department of Defense, and
international cooperation through the Department of State. The Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), which has been a leader in this
field, was able to detect the attempted attack on the Saudi ambassador
before it happened through an informant on the ground. Other parts of
the law enforcement and intelligence communities were then able to
broaden out the information and take action. Iran's broader actions in
the hemisphere can only be curtailed by working with partner nations
such as Colombia, Brazil, Peru, and Mexico to scale back Iran's illicit
activities, limit their sanctions-busting efforts, and create an
environment in which they do not have unfettered access.
Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Farah.
The Chairman now recognizes Dr. Rosenblum for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF MARC R. ROSENBLUM, PH.D., SPECIALIST IN
IMMIGRATION POLICY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Rosenblum. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Keating, Members of the subcommittee. It is an honor to be here
today to testify on behalf of the Congressional Research
Service.
I also have a full statement that I would like to submit
for the record, and it includes a couple of figures that I hope
you have in front of you because I will refer to them in my
spoken remarks.
My statement draws on a new report that I am co-authoring
with my colleagues, Jerome Bjelopera and Kristin Finklea.
I want to also thank them for their help.
My statement will discuss key threats to U.S. borders,
including terrorists, transnational criminals, and unauthorized
migrants. I will describe a model to evaluate threats, and I
will discuss some policy options Congress may consider.
While certain border threats are overlapping, Congress and
DHS face trade-offs in how they allocate enforcement resources.
How members understand and evaluate border risks may shape
their policy preferences for enforcement at versus away from
the border, between versus at ports of entry, at the Southwest
versus other borders and related questions.
With respect to border threats, unauthorized migration
mainly from Mexico and illegal drug flows, mainly from Latin
America, emerged as major policy concerns in the late 1960s.
The 1993 World Trade Center bombing made counterterrorism a
third focus, and it became the top concern after 9/11. The 2002
Homeland Security Act charged DHS with preventing the entry of
terrorists, enforcing immigration laws, preventing illegal drug
flows and criminal activity and securing U.S. borders, among
other responsibilities.
As Figure No. 1 in my statement illustrates, these elements
in DHS's mission are distinct but partially overlapping. At the
core of the diagram, all three circles overlap, describing
convergent threats, such as drug traffickers, unauthorized
migrants, and terrorists who use the same smuggling routes or
techniques. Yet the peripheral areas of the figure are
important because particular policy responses may be more
appropriate to combat unique threats.
For example, most unauthorized migrants do not fall into
the other categories. None of the 9/11 hijackers or known post-
9/11 interests entered the United States illegally. While most
migrants enter between ports of entry or by overstaying non-
immigrant visas, illicit drugs are often smuggled into the
United States hidden within cargo containers or in private
vehicles. As a result, enforcement tools targeting illegal
migration likely do not reduce drug smuggling and vice versa.
Another set of enforcement measures may be ideally designed
to combat terrorism. Analysts rely on risk models to evaluate
different threats. A basic model describes risk as the function
of the likelihood of an event and its potential consequences.
Figure No. 2 in my statement illustrates unlikely events
that would have modest consequences are especially low-risk
threats. A likely event with severe consequences is a high-risk
threat. The model doesn't provide unambiguous risk assessments,
however, because our estimates of likelihood are highly
uncertain and because consequences are complex, uncertain, and
often subjective.
In addition, because all of these threat actors are
strategic and may adapt their behavior in response to
enforcement, any particular risk assessment only represents a
snapshot at a point in time.
Despite these challenges, many would agree that the threat
of terrorists bringing a weapon of mass destruction into the
United States is a relatively low likelihood risk but could
have catastrophic consequences. Conversely, many would describe
unauthorized migration as a higher probability but lower
consequence threat.
Immediately after 9/11, the convergence of immigration
control, the war on drugs and the urgency attached to the war
on terror meant that DHS could take an all-of-the-above
approach to border security. But questions about how to
allocate scarce resources are more pressing in the current
fiscal climate. Members of Congress may ask whether policies
should aim to prevent unauthorized migration in general or
whether policies should target terrorists and criminal
organizations?
Certain border security policies appear designed with the
more generalized set of goals in mind. Indeed, the Secure Fence
Act defines zero illegal inflows as part of DHS's statutory
mission. Some analysts doubt that goal can ever be achieved.
Where can DHS reap the greatest return on enforcement
investments? Lawmakers concerned about illicit drugs may favor
increased spending for more CDP officers, scanners, and drug-
sniffing dogs at ports of entry and for efforts to disrupt
money laundering and to detect and prevent southbound flows of
money and guns. For counterterrorism, priorities might include
intelligence collection, as everybody here as discussed, and
investments in DHS information systems, such CDP's automated
targeting system and US-VISIT. Some Members may emphasize
resiliency to an attack. Counterterrorism and counternarcotics
work may involve partnerships with allies abroad.
With respect to migration, some have argued for years that
the greatest deficiency in America's immigration control system
involves employment verification and work-site enforcement
rather than border security. With net unauthorized migration
flows now around zero, two key questions are how recent
enforcement policies have contributed to this recent trend and
how unauthorized flows will respond as the U.S. economy
recovers.
These are the types of policy choices that may be informed
by an assessment of border threats.
I thank the subcommittee again for this opportunity and
look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Rosenblum follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marc R. Rosenblum
November 16, 2012
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, Members of the committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the
Congressional Research Service. My statement draws on a new report that
I am co-authoring with my CRS colleagues Jerome Bjelopera and Kristin
Finklea; and I want to thank them and acknowledge their role, along
with several other colleagues at CRS, in preparing this statement.
Pursuant to the committee's request, my statement today will
consist of three parts. First, I will discuss key threats to U.S.
borders. Second, I will describe selected threat scenarios. Third, I
will discuss some policy options Members of Congress may consider with
respect to border security in the next 4 years and beyond.
the complexity of the border security mission
America's National security concerns at the border long predate the
post-9/11 focus on ``homeland security,'' though the nature of border
threats has changed over time. The first Federal immigration laws,
passed in 1798, authorized the President to arrest or deport any alien
deemed dangerous to the United States, and any adult male alien from a
country at war with the United States.\1\ Over the course of the 20th
Century, laws expanded to exclude anarchists (in 1903), aliens
considered a threat to public safety during times of war (1918),
communists (1950), and terrorists (1990).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The Aliens Act of June 25, 1798 (1 Statutes-at-Large 570), and
the Alien Enemy Act of July 6, 1798 (1 Statutes-at-Large 577),
respectively. Three laws passed prior to June 1798 concerned Federal
naturalization provisions.
\2\ Respectively, the Immigration Act of March 3, 1903 (32
Statutes-at-Large 1213); the Act of May 22, 1918 (40 Statutes-at-Large
559); the Internal Security Act of 1950 (64 Statutes-at-Large 987);
Immigration Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-649).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The mission and focus of U.S. border enforcement has also changed
over time. The Border Patrol was established in 1924 and focused
initially on preventing the entry of Chinese migrants and on preventing
alcohol inflows during prohibition, with the majority of agents
stationed on the Northern Border.\3\ Unauthorized migration, mainly
from Mexico, emerged as a major policy concern beginning in the late
1960s.\4\ The year 1970 also marked the beginning of America's ``war on
drugs.''\5\ Border Patrol staffing climbed eleven-fold between 1975 and
2011,\6\ and the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) budget
expanded about five-fold (in constant dollars) during the same
period.\7\ Despite these increases, however, the estimated unauthorized
population in the United States grew from about 1.7 million in 1979 to
about 12.1 million in 2007, before declining to about 11.5 million in
2011.\8\ About 22.5 million individuals were current (past month)
illegal drug users in 2011, representing a slight per capita increase
since 2002, but a decline of about one-third since the 1970s.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ See U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), ``Border Patrol
History,'' http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/border_security/border_patrol/
border_patrol_ohs/history.xml. Also see Tony Payan, The Three U.S.-
Mexico Border Wars: Drugs, Immigration, and Homeland Security
(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006).
\4\ See CRS Report R42560, Mexican Migration to the United States:
Policy and Trends, coordinated by Marc R. Rosenblum.
\5\ See CRS Report R41535, Reauthorizing the Office of National
Drug Control Policy: Issues for Consideration, by Lisa N. Sacco and
Kristin M. Finklea.
\6\ Calculations from data available at CRS Report R42138, Border
Security: Immigration Control Between Ports of Entry, by Marc R.
Rosenblum; and Syracuse University Transactional Records Access
Clearinghouse, ``National Trends in Apprehensions and Staffing,''
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/141/include/rep141table2.html.
\7\ Calculations from data available at Department of Justice,
``Drug Enforcement Administration,'' http://www.justice.gov/archive/
jmd/1975_2002/2002/html/page100-103.htm; and CRS Report R42440,
Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies: FY2013
Appropriations, by Nathan James, Jennifer D. Williams, and John F.
Sargent, Jr., Coordinators.
\8\ See CRS Report R42560, Mexican Migration to the United States:
Policy and Trends; CRS Report RL33874, Unauthorized Aliens Residing in
the United States: Estimates Since 1986, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
\9\ Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration,
Results from the 2011 National Survey on Drug Use and Health: Summary
of National Findings, September 2012, http://www.samhsa.gov/data/NSDUH/
2k11Results/NSDUHresults2011.pdf; The White House, Office of National
Drug Control Policy, ``Remarks by Director Kerlikowske before the
Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission,'' http://
www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/news-releases-remarks/remarks-by-director-
kerlikowske-before-the-inter-american-drug-abuse-control-commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, the Oklahoma
City bombing in 1995, and the interception of the millennium bomber in
1999, counterterrorism became a third important focus of U.S. border
security during the 1990s--and the top concern after September 11,
2001. Thus, the Homeland Security Act of 2002 created the Department of
Homeland Security and charged the new agency with, among other
responsibilities, preventing the entry of terrorists and terrorist
weapons, securing U.S. borders, immigration enforcement, and customs
enforcement (including preventing illegal drug flows).\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Pub. L. 107-296, 402.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As Figure 1 illustrates, these elements in DHS' border security
mission are distinct but partially overlapping. The ``criminal
networks'' circle in Figure 1 includes characteristics that are unique
to that threat, including trafficking organizations that specialize in
drug smuggling. The circle intersects with ``unauthorized migrants''
where these threats relate, as in the case of drug trafficking
organizations (DTO) that expand into migrant smuggling. At the core of
the diagram all three circles overlap, describing convergent threats--
DTOs, unauthorized migrants, and terrorists who use the same smuggling
routes or techniques, for example.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
While one may be drawn to the core of Figure 1, the peripheral
areas of each circle are also important because threats encompass
distinct features, and certain policy responses may be more appropriate
to combat particular threats. For example, while there is some degree
of overlap among unauthorized migrants, drug smugglers, and potential
terrorists, the great majority of unauthorized migrants do not fall
into the other categories. None of the 9/11 hijackers or known post-9/
11 terrorist threats (e.g., Richard Reid, the ``shoe bomber''; Umar
Farouk Abdulmutallab, the ``underwear bomber''; and Faisal Shahzad, the
``Times Square bomber'') entered the United States illegally. And while
most unauthorized migrants enter the country between ports of entry or
by overstaying nonimmigrant visas,\11\ many illicit drugs are smuggled
into the United States hidden within cargo containers, private
vehicles, or in other non-commercial vehicles.\12\ As a result, the
enforcement tools targeting unauthorized migration--personnel and
infrastructure between ports of entry, worksite enforcement, Secure
Communities--likely do little to reduce narcotics smuggling, and vice
versa. Another set of enforcement measures may be ideally designed to
combat terrorism, and yet another to prevent other border threats, such
as fraudulent goods.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ CRS Report RL33874, Unauthorized Aliens Residing in the United
States: Estimates Since 1986, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
\12\ U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug Intelligence Center,
National Drug Threat Assessment 2011, pp. 13-16, www.justice.gov/
archive/ndic/pubs44/44849/44849p.pdf.
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types of threats at u.s. borders
Border threats may be divided into actors and goods.
Threat Actors
Any person who intends to harm the United States, or whose presence
may lead to harmful consequences, may be a threat and a potential
target for border enforcement policies. Three general types of threat
actors are terrorists, transnational criminals, and unauthorized
migrants,\13\ although certain actors may fall into more than one
category.\14\ These actors may be broadly distinguished and categorized
by their motives and their behavior.
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\13\ Some people may object to describing unauthorized migrants as
``threats to border security.'' Nonetheless, illegal migration flows
threaten certain U.S. interests, even if people disagree about the
scope or gravity of the threat. In addition, given that DHS' mission
includes preventing the entry of terrorists, illegal drugs and
contraband, and unauthorized migrants, a common framework for
understanding these inflows may be helpful for making border policy and
allocating DHS resources.
\14\ In addition, some people may threaten U.S. interests without
falling into any of these categories, including for example a legal
migrant who (knowingly or unknowingly) carries a virus that threatens
U.S. public health.
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Terrorists.--A defining feature of terrorists is that they
are motivated by particular grievances about aspects of the
societies that surround them,\15\ and they articulate their
views ``on moral grounds.''\16\ Based on their grievances and
ideologies, terrorists generally have goals other than personal
monetary gain.\17\ Terrorists often seek to instill fear among
a targeted population to ``destroy the collective confidence
individuals invest in social institutions and . . . national
leadership.''\18\ Terrorists use violent tactics to direct
public attention toward their grievances, gain recruits, or
coerce people.\19\ Terrorists also promote their causes by
fashioning propaganda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Anthony F. Lemieux and Victor H. Asal, ``Grievance, Social
Dominance Orientation, and Authoritarianism in the Choice and
Justification of Terror Versus Protest,'' Dynamics of Asymmetric
Conflict, vol. 3, no. 3, (November 2010), p. 196. See also: Ryan Hunter
and Danielle Heinke, ``Radicalization of Islamist Terrorists in the
Western World,'' FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, (September 2011), pp.
27-29, http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/law-enforcement-
bulletin/september-2011.
\16\ Louise Richardson, What Terrorists Want: Understanding the
Enemy, Containing the Threat (New York: Random House, 2007), p. 16.
Also see Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-
First Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008),
pp. 72-75.
\17\ Richardson, What Terrorists Want, p. 13.
\18\ Thomas F. Ditzler, ``Malevolent Minds: The Teleology of
Terrorism,'' in Understanding Terrorism: Psychosocial Roots,
Consequences, and Interventions, ed. Fathali M. Moghaddam and Anthony
J. Marsella (Washington, DC: American Psychological Association, 2004),
p 197.
\19\ Robert A. Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide
Terrorism (New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 9-10.
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Transnational criminals.--In contrast with terrorists,
criminals generally are non-ideological, and fundamentally
motivated by the pursuit of profit.\20\ People also participate
in criminal organizations for reasons that involve other sorts
of personal gain, such as ``belonging to a powerful and even
prestigious entity,''\21\ or because of kinship, ethnic ties,
or friendship.\22\ Profit incentives drive criminals to
``provide goods and services that are illegal, regulated, or in
short supply.''\23\ They devote resources to enhancing their
market-related activities, which can involve carving out and
defending turf, devising novel smuggling techniques, managing
and protecting supply chains, eliminating rivals, laundering
money, and shielding their secrets from ``competitors'' (such
as rival gangs and law enforcement).\24\ Violence plays a key
role in criminal behavior, but it is rarely ideologically-
driven.\25\ In addition, criminals may secure access to markets
by corrupting or intimidating public officials or gaining
influence over state activity.\26\
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\20\ Frank E. Hagan, `` `Organized Crime' and `organized crime'
Indeterminate Problems of Definition,'' Trends in Organized Crime, vol.
9, no. 4 (Summer 2006), p. 135. See also James O. Finkenauer,
``Problems of Definition: What Is Organized Crime?'' Trends in
Organized Crime, vol. 8, no. 3 (Spring 2005), pp. 65.
\21\ Diego d'Andria, ``Investment Strategies of Criminal
Organisations,'' Policy Studies, vol. 32, no. 1 (January 2011), p. 3.
\22\ Klaus von Lampe, ``Re-Conceptualizing Transnational Organized
Crime: Offenders as Problem Solvers,'' International Journal of
Security and Terrorism, vol. 2, no. 1 (2011), p. 11.
\23\ Finkenauer, ``Problems of Definition,'' p. 67.
\24\ Toine Spapens, ``Macro Networks, Collectives, and Business
Processes: An Integrated Approach to Organized Crime,'' European
Journal of Crime, Criminal Law, and Criminal Justice, vol. 18 (2010),
pp. 210-212.
\25\ See for example, Phil Williams, ``The Terrorism Debate Over
Mexican Drug Trafficking Violence,'' Terrorism and Political Violence,
vol. 24, no. 1 (April 2012).
\26\ See: Moises Naim, ``Mafia States: Organized Crime Takes
Office,'' Foreign Affairs, vol. 91, no. 3, (May/Jun 2012), pp. 100-111.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unauthorized migrants.--In addition to terrorists and
certain criminals, the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
defines as inadmissible, among others, any alien present in the
United States without being admitted or paroled, arriving at an
illegal time or place, or not in possession of a valid
unexpired visa or other entry document.\27\ Unauthorized
migrants--like legal migrants--may be motivated by some
combination of employment opportunities, a general desire to
improve their economic circumstances, family connections, and
dangerous or difficult conditions in their home countries,
among other factors.\28\ Apart from immigration-related
offenses such as illegal entry or the use of fraudulent
documents to obtain employment, some unauthorized aliens never
commit a criminal offense.\29\
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\27\ INA 212(a)(6)-(7); 8 U.S.C. 1227 (a)(6)-(7). Also see
CRS Report R41104, Immigration Visa Issuances and Grounds for
Exclusion: Policy and Trends, by Ruth Ellen Wasem.
\28\ See for example, Elizabeth Fussell, ``Space, Time, and
Volition: Dimensions of Migration Theory,'' in Oxford Handbook of
International Migration, ed. Marc R. Rosenblum and Daniel J. Tichenor
(New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 25-52.
\29\ See CRS Report R42057, Interior Immigration Enforcement:
Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens, by Marc R. Rosenblum and William
Kandel. Also see for example, Lesley Williams Reid, Harald E. Weiss,
and Robert M. Adelman, et al., ``The Immigration-Crime Relationship:
Evidence Across U.S. Metropolitan Areas,'' Social Science Research,
Vol. 34, no. 4 (December 2005: pp. 757-780.
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The differences among terrorists, transnational criminals, and
``regular'' unauthorized migrants are summarized in Table 1.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Illegal Goods
Any good that is smuggled in or out of the country is illegal and
may pose security risks. Illegal goods fall into two categories
distinguished by their inherent illegitimacy: Goods that are always
illegal and categorically prohibited, and those that are potentially
legal but illegitimate because they are smuggled to avoid enforcement
of specific laws, taxes, or regulations.
Categorically prohibited goods include certain weapons,
illegal drugs, and counterfeit goods.--Among illegal weapons,
``high-consequence weapons of mass destruction (WMD)'' are
considered one of the primary threats to homeland security.\30\
Concerns over WMDs entering the United States generally involve
worries over terrorists' use of these weapons, yet some have
raised concerns that criminal networks may--for the right
price--attempt to smuggle WMDs or related materials. Illegal
drugs comprise another set of illicit goods that challenges
U.S. border security, as many drugs consumed in the United
States are produced abroad and smuggled into the country.\31\
The smuggling of counterfeit and pirated goods into the United
States has also been identified as a threat to border
security.\32\ This smuggling violates intellectual property
rights (IPR) and ``threaten[s] America's economic vitality and
National security, and the American people's health and
safety.''\33\
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\30\ Department of Homeland Security, Quadrennial Homeland Security
Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland, February
2010, p. 6, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf.
\31\ CBP seized an average of 13,717 pounds of drugs each day in
fiscal year 2011; see Customs and Border Protection, On a Typical Day
in Fiscal Year 2011, March 7, 2012, http://cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/
about/accomplish/typical_day_fy11.ctt/typical_day_fy11.pdf.
\32\ See CRS Report RL34292, Intellectual Property Rights and
International Trade, by Shayerah Ilias and Ian F. Fergusson.
\33\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Intellectual Property
Rights Fact Sheet, http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/newsroom/
fact_sheets/trade/ipr_fact_sheet.ctt/ipr_fact_- sheet.pdf. In fiscal
year 2011, ICE and CBP had 24,792 seizures of counterfeit goods--25%
more than in fiscal year 2010; see U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
IPR Seizure Statistics, http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/trade/
priority_trade/ipr/ipr_communications/seizure/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Illegal via Smuggling.--Goods that are not categorically
prohibited are still illegal if they are smuggled into or out
of the United States. For instance, alcohol and cigarettes,
while generally legal and regulated in the United States, are
sometimes smuggled to circumvent taxes or to evade other laws.
Proceeds from the smuggling of cigarettes have been linked to
the financing of terrorist operations abroad.\34\ Other legal
products, such as textiles or agricultural products, may be
mislabeled to avoid tariffs or circumvent quotas. Illegal
outflows are also a concern, particularly as they relate to
transnational criminal organizations. Bulk cash smuggling\35\
is one of the primary means by which criminals move their
illicit proceeds out of the United States.\36\ Between $20
billion and $25 billion in bank notes may be smuggled across
the Southwest Border into Mexico each year.\37\ Analysts also
believe that Mexican DTOs purchase firearms in the United
States and smuggle these weapons to Mexico, where they may
contribute to trafficking-related violence.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ International Tax and Investment Center, The Illicit Trade in
Tobacco Products and How to Tackle It, http://www.kangaroogroup.eu/
DB_beelden/booklet_illicit_trade_tobacco_- products.pdf. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, Cigarette Smuggling Linked
to Terrorism, June 18, 2004, http://www.atf.gov/pub/gen_pub/
cigarettesmuggling.pdf.
\35\ Cross-border movement of money is not inherently illegal, but
certain practices are. In general, the movement of $10,000 or more out
of the United States is illegal unless it is declared and reported; see
31 U.S.C. 5332, 31 C.F.R. 103.23(a).
\36\ Office of National Drug Control Strategy, National Southwest
Border Counternarcotics Strategy, June 2009, p. 25, http://
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/swb_counter-
narcotics_strategy09/swb_counternarcotics_strategy09.pdf.
\37\ William Booth and Nick Miroff, ``Stepped-Up Efforts by U.S.,
Mexico Fail to Stem Flow of Drug Money South,'' Washington Post, August
25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/
25/AR2010082506161.html. In fiscal year 2011, CBP seized an average of
$345,687 in undeclared or illicit currency each day--over $126 million
total; Customs and Border Protection, On a Typical Day in Fiscal Year
2011, March 7, 2012, http://cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/about/accomplish/
typical_day_fy11.ctt/typical_day_fy11.pdf.
\38\ See CRS Report R40733, Gun Trafficking and the Southwest
Border, by Vivian S. Chu and William J. Krouse; and CRS Report RL32842,
Gun Control Legislation, by William J. Krouse.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
understanding border threats and risk
A fundamental challenge for border security policymaking is the
uncertainty and fear surrounding border threats: Many different threats
exist, threat actors do not announce their intentions or capabilities,
and our understanding of the underlying issues is imperfect. Thus,
rather than attempting specific predictions about where, when, and how
border threats will be realized, analysts often rely on probabilistic
risk models as a framework for analyzing different types of potential
threats.\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ See for example, DHS, Risk Management Fundamentals: Homeland
Security Risk Management Doctrine, Washington, DC, April 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The standard components of many risk models include estimates of
the likelihood of a threat (or adverse event) and the potential
consequence of the event. Risk is modeled as a positive function of
these two components, so that risk increases with the likelihood and
potential consequences associated with a particular threat (see Figure
2). Put another way, this model of risk may be understood as ``as the
statistical expect[ed] value of an unwanted event that may or may not
occur.''\40\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ Sven Ove Hansson, ``From the Casino to the Jungle: Dealing
with Uncertainty in Technological Risk Management,'' Synthese, no. 168
(2009), p. 424.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Thus, as Figure 2 illustrates, events that are unlikely to occur,
and that would have low consequences if they did occur, are especially
low-risk threats. Conversely, an event that is likely to occur, and
that would have severe consequences, is an especially high-risk threat.
Threats exist between these two extremes, including high-likelihood,
low-consequence threats and low-likelihood, high-consequence threats.
DHS employs this general framework for many of its risk management
programs, including for example the Homeland Security Grant Program and
the Strategic National Risk Assessment. Some experts have raised
questions about whether this type of risk model is the right approach
to understanding border threats.\41\ An alternative approach, based on
game theory, places more emphasis on strategic planning by terrorists
and other threat actors, who may attempt to exploit weakness in U.S.
defenses.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\41\ See for example, National Research Council, Committee on
Methodological Improvements to the Department of Homeland Security's
Biological Agent Risk Analysis, Department of Homeland Security
Bioterrorism Risk Assessment: A Call for Change (Washington, DC:
National Academies Press, 2008). Also see Barry Charles Ezell, Steven
P. Bennett, and Detloff von Winterfeldt, et al., ``Probabilistic Risk
Analysis and Terrorism Risk,'' Risk Analysis, vol. 30, no. 4 (2010).
\42\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Likelihood of Border Threats
Historical data may allow analysts to calculate past frequencies
and use them to estimate probabilities. In the case of unauthorized
migration, for example, CBP and the legacy INS have used apprehensions
of unauthorized migrants by the Border Patrol as a proxy to estimate
unauthorized inflows.\43\ Apprehensions and survey data also may offer
insight into illegal drug flows, in this case by analyzing drug
seizures and data on the availability of illegal drugs within the
United States.\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ See CRS Report 42138, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement
Between Ports of Entry, by Marc. R. Rosenblum.
\44\ See for example, the White House, ``Drug Availability
Estimates in the United States, 2012,'' http://www.whitehouse.gov/
sites/default/files/page/files/daeus_report_final_1.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Yet deriving probabilities from historical observations is
problematic because measures of past frequencies are only of known
frequencies and not actual flows. For instance, while data from the
National Seizure System indicate that over 1.7 million kilograms of
illegal drugs were seized along the Southwest Border in 2010,\45\ this
is not indicative of the total amount of illicit drugs smuggled across
the Southwest Border and into the United States for that time period.
Any estimates of illegal inflows--whether of drugs, unauthorized
migrants, or some other illicit flow--are just that: Estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ Data provided to CRS by the National Drug Intelligence Center.
Data cover seizures of cocaine, heroin, marijuana, MDMA, and
methamphetamine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Learning from past history is even more problematic when it comes
to extremely rare events like attempted terrorist attacks. Probability
models based on historical frequencies are poorly equipped to describe
one-in-a-million chances, or to distinguish among, say, probabilities
of one-in-a-million versus one-in-a-billion or one-in-one-hundred-
thousand.\46\ Especially when the stakes are high, as with terrorism,
rare event probability models may not generate precise predictions
about future likelihood.\47\ Partly for this reason, the intelligence
community often describes likelihood in terms of qualitative ranges,
such as ``remote,'' ``unlikely,'' ``probable,'' etc.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ Mark Jablonowski, Precautionary Risk Management: Dealing with
Catastrophic Loss Potentials in Business, the Community, and Society
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006).
\47\ Ibid.
\48\ See for example DHS Risk Steering Committee, DHS Risk Lexicon,
p. 20, http://www.dhs.gov/dhs-risk-lexicon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More generally, historical analysis is limited because ``past
performance is no guarantee of future results.'' Changes to the
underlying model may invalidate long-term probabilities. Scientists use
long-term frequencies to calculate the probability of severe weather,
for example; but some people believe that rising temperatures and sea
level may have altered climate dynamics so that probability models
describing ``500-year'' floods and ``100-year'' storms may no longer be
accurate. Similarly, some social scientists believe changes in U.S. and
Mexican labor markets and demographics, along with the decades-long
escalation in U.S. enforcement, may have fundamentally altered regional
immigration dynamics.
Analysts may improve upon historical frequencies by relying on
subject field experts to make more informed predictions about the
expected frequency of future events. With respect to the threat of
terrorism, for example, Federal law enforcement, security agencies, and
elements within the intelligence community use intelligence analysis to
estimate the likelihood of a terrorist attack. This involves many
factors aside from historical frequency, such as probing and evaluating
the motives of threat actors, their organizational structures, and
their capabilities, as well as estimating the impact of broad social,
political, or economic forces on these actors. Analysts may look at
similar data along with U.S. market forces to estimate the future
likelihood of illegal drug flows and other contraband; and they may
examine market and social forces to model future migration flows.
The Strategic Adversary Problem
Regardless of the methodology, a fundamental challenge to
estimating the likelihood of border threats is that threat actors like
unauthorized migrants, transnational criminal organizations, and
potential terrorists are strategic adversaries who may adapt their
behavior in response to U.S. border enforcement efforts.\49\ In this
regard, risk models for border security differ in important ways from
risk models for natural disasters, industrial failures, or financial
markets, for example. The strategic adversary problem means that any
effort to describe the likelihood of a given threat must account for
given security conditions. And any particular risk assessment can only
represent a ``snapshot'' at a single point in time within a constantly
evolving dynamic system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ NRC, DHS Risk Assessment; Ezell et al., ``Probabilistic Risk
Analysis.''
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Potential Consequences of Border Threats
Border threats may result in a range of potential consequences, and
policymakers may disagree about how to evaluate them. The process of
evaluating consequences includes at least three discrete tasks:
Defining the scope of a threat (i.e., the types of consequences),
measuring the potential impact, and attaching value to the impact.
Defining consequences.--The first step in evaluating the
potential consequences of a given threat is to define its
scope: What type of impact may occur? Many traditional risk
assessment methodologies limit their analysis to concrete
criteria, including in particular direct economic costs and
loss of life.\50\ An advantage to defining consequences
narrowly in this way is that both of these criteria are easy to
quantify (i.e., in dollars and in the absolute number of lost
lives). An alternative approach considers a wider scope of
consequences. In its Strategic National Risk Assessment, for
example, DHS has conceptualized six broad categories of
potential consequences: Loss of life, injuries and illness,
direct economic costs, social displacement, psychological
distress, and environmental impact.\51\ An advantage to
adopting this more expansive definition is that, for certain
types of threats, these additional consequences may be at least
as important as economic and mortality effects. On the other
hand, psychological and sociological effects may be far more
difficult to define and quantify.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\50\ See for example, Charles Meade and Roger C. Molader,
Considering the Effects of a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack, RAND Center
for Terrorism Risk Management Policy, Santa Monica, CA, 2006, http://
www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR391.pdf; also see Sara
Clucking, ``DHS S&T Bioterrorism Risk Assessment (BTRA),''
International Symposium on Bioterrorism Risk, October 6, 2009, http://
www.biosecurity.sandia.gov/ibtr/subpages/pastConf/20082009/albuquerque/
6dhs3.pdf.
\51\ Department of Homeland Security, The Strategic National Risk
Assessment in Support of PPD 8: A Comprehensive Risk-Based Approach
Toward a Secure and Resilient Nation, December 2011, p. 5, http://
www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/rma-strategic-national-risk-assessment-
ppd8.- pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Measuring consequences.--Within any given category of
consequences, a second challenge is how to measure the impact
of a given threat. How close in time and space must a given
consequence be to attribute it to a particular security
incident? For example, what are the economic consequences of a
transnational retail crime network?\52\ Retailers incur direct
economic costs from the loss of the pilfered goods, and also
may incur second-degree costs from security spending to prevent
merchandise loss. There may be third-degree costs if the
criminal network sells the stolen products and use the proceeds
to further additional criminal operations.\53\ Are economic
costs limited to the duped retailer, or do they also include
the costs to public and private security agencies charged with
investigating the crimes and related criminal activities?
Partly for these reasons, analysts disagree--often by wide
margins--about the potential consequences of different types of
threats. In the case of unauthorized migration, for example,
even when the analysis is limited to the narrowest economic
question of fiscal impact,\54\ estimates of net effects vary by
wide margins.\55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ For more information on organized retail crime, see CRS Report
R41118, Organized Retail Crime, by Kristin M. Finklea.
\53\ For instance, Federal law enforcement has reputedly traced the
illicit proceeds from the theft and resale of infant formula to
terrorist organizations and insurgent groups, including Hezbollah; see
testimony by David Johnson, Section Chief, Criminal Investigative
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, before the U.S. Congress,
House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security, Combating Organized Retail Crime: The Role of
Federal Law Enforcement, 111th Cong., 1st sess., November 5, 2009.
\54\ Fiscal impacts are just one of three main types of economic
effects, along with the effect of migration on native-born wages and
its effect on economic growth.
\55\ See CRS Report R42053, Fiscal Impacts of the Foreign-Born
Population, by William A. Kandel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Valuing Consequences.--How one evaluates consequences
depends on who is making the judgment. For example, the
smuggling of counterfeit medication impacts a range of
individuals from law enforcement officers, to individuals
consuming the counterfeit drugs, to the legitimate
manufacturer. Consumers may place the greatest value on the
potential health consequences of consuming the counterfeit
product, while manufacturers may perceive the issue primarily
in economic terms based on lost sales revenues and reputational
costs. A distinction also may be drawn in terms of the motives
of threat actors.\56\ What is more threatening: Terrorists who
intend to harm U.S. interests, drug traffickers who intend to
earn illicit profits but cause mayhem in the process, or an
infectious disease outbreak that is not motivated by malicious
intent? Ultimately, how one defines the scope of a threat
(i.e., what categories of consequences are considered) and how
one weighs each category are inherently subjective
considerations. There is no ``correct'' way to value the loss
of a human life, for example, or the destruction of a
particular ecological habitat, or disregard for the rule of
law.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\56\ For a discussion of motive or purpose, see: Gregory F.
Treverton, Intelligence for an Age of Terror (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), pp. 22-23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
discussion of selected threat scenarios
Lawmakers may use information about estimated likelihood and
potential consequences of threat scenarios to develop their own
``maps'' of border risks in order to set enforcement priorities. At a
general level, for example, many people would agree that certain threat
scenarios involving terrorist attacks against the United States are low
likelihood risks but could have very high consequences, while the
threat of unauthorized migration flows is more likely, but has lower
consequences.\57\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ See for example, testimony by Michael Fisher, Chief, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection Office of Border Patrol, before the House
Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime
Security, Measuring Border Security: U.S. Border Patrol's New Strategic
Plan and the Path Forward, 112th Congress, 2nd sess., May 8, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With respect to the likelihood of terrorist threats at the
Southwest Border, the State Department reports no known operational
cells of Hezbollah or al-Qaeda in the Western Hemisphere;\58\ and CRS
is not aware of any publically available evidence of ties between
Mexican DTOs and homegrown terrorists. Terrorists may see crossing the
Southwest Border between ports of entry as a high-risk strategy,
because 30-50% of unauthorized Mexican border crossers are apprehended
at least once while attempting to enter the United States.\59\ The
apprehension rate is about twice as high for aliens crossing between
ports of entry as for those who attempt to enter through a port without
inspection or using a fraudulent document.\60\ And anecdotal evidence
suggests that apprehension rates are probably lower still at the
Northern Border and coastal borders. Thus, some analysts consider other
modes of entry to be at greater risk of terrorist incursion.\61\ This
intuition is backed up by data on apprehensions of unauthorized aliens
from special interest countries: 2.3% of aliens apprehended at the
Northern Border in fiscal year 2006-fiscal year 2011 were from special
interest countries, compared to 0.05% of aliens apprehended at the
Southwest Border.\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\58\ U.S. Department of State, ``Country Reports on Terrorism
2011,'' July 31, 2012, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/
index.htm. On terrorism in Latin America, see CRS Report RS21049, Latin
America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan and June S. Beittel. In
addition, out of 40 post-9/11 terrorist plots identified in one recent
study, none had a nexus with the Southwest Border; see James Jay
Carafano and Jessica Zuckerman, ``40 Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11:
Combating Complacency in the Long War on Terror,'' The Heritage
Foundation, backgrounder No. 2604, September 7, 2011 http://
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/09/40-terror-plots-foiled-since-
9-11-combating-complacency-in-the-long-war-on-terror.
\59\ Over 90% of Mexicans attempting to cross the border eventually
succeed after a first apprehension; see David Fitzgerald and Rafael
Alarcon, ``Migration: Policies and Politics'' in Mexico and the United
States: Strengthening the Partnership, edited by Andrew Selee and Peter
H. Smith. New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming.
\60\ Ibid.
\61\ See for example testimony by Alan Bersin, Commissioner, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection, before the Senate Judiciary Committee,
Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and Border Security, Improving
Security and Facilitating Commerce at America's Northern Border and
Ports of Entry, 112th Congress., 1st sess., May 17, 2011. Also see
Stewart M. Powell, ``Are Potential Terrorists Crossing into Texas from
Mexico?'' Houston Chronicle, December 2, 2011 http://www.chron.com/
news/houston-texas/article/Are-potential-terrorists-crossing-into-
Texas-from-2341185.php.
\62\ CRS analysis of data provided by U.S. Border Patrol Office of
Legislative Affairs. Special-interest countries are defined based on a
list of 35 special interest countries identified by CBP in 2004. These
numbers should be interpreted with caution because the vast majority of
aliens from special-interest countries have no ties to terrorist
groups, and because these data do not reflect aliens from special-
interest countries who evade detection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A terrorist attack involving WMD may be particularly unlikely
because of the technical and practical challenges to obtaining WMD
materials and designing a delivery system.\63\ Yet the potential
consequences of a successful WMD attack on U.S. soil are sufficiently
catastrophic that lawmakers may take such a threat very seriously. One
estimate suggests that a 10 kiloton nuclear detonation at the Port of
Long Beach, CA would kill 60,000 people in its immediate aftermath and
cost more than $1 trillion dollars.\64\ The release of a lethal
biological agent in an unprotected population could cause untold number
of deaths and economic costs exceeding $1 trillion dollars.\65\ Even
without WMD, the 9/11 attack claimed 2,753 lives in New York City
alone, and has been estimated to have caused $55 billion in destroyed
and damaged property. The broader economic impacts likely ranged
between $40 billion and $122 billion.\66\
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\63\ See CRS Report RL33787, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist
Attacks and Protection Priorities, by Paul W. Parfomak and John
Frittelli.
\64\ Charles Meade and Roger C. Molader, Considering the Effects of
a Catastrophic Terrorist Attack, RAND Center for Terrorism Risk
Management Policy, Santa Monica, CA, 2006, http://www.rand.org/pubs/
technical_reports/2006/RAND_TR391.pdf.
\65\ The White House, National Strategy for Countering Biological
Threats, November 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
National_Strategy_for_Countering_-
BioThreats.pdf.
\66\ ``The Reckoning: America and the World a Decade After 9/11.''
New York Times, September 8, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
us/sept-11-reckoning/viewer.html.
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On the other hand, with respect to the likelihood of unauthorized
migration, even in a year in which apprehensions of unauthorized
migrants fell to a 4-decade low, the U.S. Border Patrol apprehended
340,252 unauthorized migrants in fiscal year 2011.\67\ This number
overstates the number of unique individuals apprehended, since it
includes an unknown number of repeat apprehensions; but it may
understate unauthorized inflows because it excludes people who
successfully enter the United States (by crossing the border between
ports of entry, being smuggled without inspection through a port, using
fraudulent documents to enter through a port, or entering legally and
then overstaying or otherwise violating the terms of a visa).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ U.S. Border Patrol, ``Apprehensions/Seizure Statistics--Fiscal
Year 2011,'' http://www.cbp.gov/linkhandler/cgov/border_security/
border_patrol/usbp_statistics/fy_profile_- 2011.ctt/
fy_profile_2011.pdf. This number includes an unknown number of repeat
apprehensions, so the number of unique individuals apprehended likely
was substantially less than 340,000.
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Yet the consequences of unauthorized migration may be considered
less severe that those associated with terrorist threats and some other
illegal flows.\68\ From an economic perspective, for example, while
research on fiscal effects reaches conflicting findings,\69\ the weight
of economic research suggests that the overall impact of unauthorized
migration is not highly significant.\70\ Likewise, from a public safety
perspective, while a large proportion of Federal inmates are foreign-
born, research by CRS and others suggests that the overall criminality
rate among the foreign-born (i.e., including legal and unauthorized
migrants, at the Federal, State, and local level) likely is no more
than--and possibly is below--the native-born rate.\71\ Even within the
border region, while violence has increased on the Mexican side of the
border, violent crime rates have not significantly increased in U.S.
border cities or in other metropolitan areas where there has been an
identified presence of Mexican DTOs. And there was no significant
difference between average violent crime rates in border and non-border
metropolitan areas in fiscal year 2000-fiscal year 2010.\72\
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\68\ This discussion does not include an analysis of the social,
psychological, and cultural effects of a terrorist attack or of
unauthorized migration. These effects are subjective and difficult to
quantify, but some people may view them as important.
\69\ See CRS Report R42053, Fiscal Impacts of the Foreign-Born
Population, by William A. Kandel.
\70\ One recent study concludes that the overall economic impact of
unauthorized migration is ``close enough to zero to be essentially a
wash''; see Gordon Hanson, ``The Economics and Policy of Illegal
Immigration in the United States,'' Migration Policy Institute,
Washington, DC, December 2009, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/
Hanson-Dec09.pdf.
\71\ See CRS Report R42057, Interior Immigration Enforcement:
Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens, by Marc R. Rosenblum and William
Kandel. Also see for example, Lesley Williams Reid, Harald E. Weiss,
and Robert M. Adelman, et al., ``The Immigration-Crime Relationship:
Evidence Across U.S. Metropolitan Areas,'' Social Science Research,
Vol. 34, no. 4 (December 2005): pp. 757-780. Available data make it
difficult to estimate the criminality rate exclusively among
unauthorized migrants.
\72\ CRS analysis of Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) data;
also see CRS Report R41075, Southwest Border Violence: Issues in
Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence, by Kristin M. Finklea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
policy options
Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the convergence of immigration
control, the war on drugs, and the urgency attached to the war on
terror meant that DHS took an all-of-the-above approach to border
security. But even when budgets are expanding, Congress and DHS face
trade-offs among the different elements of DHS' mission. As budgeting
has grown tighter in the current fiscal climate, policymakers face
increasingly hard questions about how to set priorities and where to
allocate scarce resources.
Members of Congress may ask whether border security and other DHS
policies should be designed to prevent unauthorized migration in
general, or whether policies should be tailored to target terrorists,
transnational gang, or illegal drugs.\73\ While DHS prioritizes
counterterrorism, certain border security and immigration control
policies may have been designed with a more generalized set of goals.
Indeed, the Secure Fence Act defines zero illegal inflows as part of
DHS' statutory mission.\74\ Many analysts doubt that an open country in
a globalized economy can ever achieve a 100% interdiction rate--and
some question whether such a standard is even worth aspiring to.\75\
Moreover, even at current interdiction levels, the population of
unauthorized migrants in the United States has declined by about a
million people since 2007, and net inflows apparently have declined to
about zero or become somewhat negative.\76\ In contrast, illegal drug
flows do not appear to have declined over this period.\77\ It is
difficult to estimate changes in the likelihood that terrorists will
cross the Southwest Border.
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\73\ As noted above, uncertainty about the likelihood of different
illegal flows and inherent subjectivity about their consequences mean
there is no ``right'' answer to this question.
\74\ See Pub. L. 109-367, (2)(b).
\75\ See for example, testimony by Doris Meissner, Director, U.S.
Immigration Policy Program, Migration Policy Institute, before the U.S.
Congress, Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs, Securing the Border: Building on the Progress Made, 112th
Cong., 1st sess., March 30, 2011.
\76\ See Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan Baker, ``Estimates
of the Unauthorized Immigrant Population Residing in the United States:
January 2011,'' DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, March 2012,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/
ois_ill_pe_2011.pdf; Jeffrey Passel, D'Vera Cohn and Ana Gonzalez-
Barrera, ``Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero--and Perhaps Less,''
Pew Hispanic Center, May 3, 2012, http://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/
23/net-migration-from-mexico-falls-to-zero-and-perhaps-less/; Scott
Borger, Gordon Hanson, and Bryan Roberts ``The Decision to Emigrate
From Mexico,'' presentation at the Society of Government Economists
annual conference, November 6, 2012.
\77\ Total illegal drug seizures along the Southwest Border
increased from 1.1 to 1.7 kilograms in 2005-2010; see CRS Report 41075,
Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring
Spillover Violence, coordinated by Kristin M. Finklea. According to the
National Institute on Drug Abuse (NIDA), 8.9% of Americans aged 12 or
older used an illicit drug in 2010, the latest year for which data are
available, up from 8.3% in 2002; see NIDA, ``Drug Facts: Nationwide
Trends,'' http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/nationwide-
trends.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to setting overall priorities, Members of Congress may
consider where DHS may get the most effective return on future
enforcement investments. Lawmakers concerned about illegal drug flows,
for example, may favor increased investments at ports of entry, such as
more CBP officers, non-intrusive inspection scanners, and drug-sniffing
dogs. In addition, DHS and other law enforcement agencies may combat
traffickers' business models by taking additional action to disrupt DTO
money-laundering schemes and to detect and prevent southbound flows of
money and guns.
For Members focused on counterterrorism, priorities might include
continued investments in DHS information systems, such as the CBP
Automated Targeting System, US-VISIT, and the Automated Commercial
Environment, along with investments in intelligence collection programs
to ensure that the right data are being analyzed. In addition to
terrorism prevention, some Members may also emphasize investments in
resiliency, or the ability to survive and manage a terrorist attack.
With respect to both counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts,
some of the most important work may involve bilateral and multilateral
partnerships with allies abroad.
With net unauthorized migration flows at around zero, two key
questions for Members concerned about unauthorized migration are how
recent DHS policies like increased border personnel, CBP's consequence
delivery system, and ICE's Secure Communities program have contributed
to these recent trends; and the degree to which unauthorized flows will
increase as the U.S. economy recovers and new hiring resumes.\78\ For
many years, some have argued that the greatest deficiency in America's
immigration control system involves employment eligibility verification
and worksite enforcement, rather than border control.\79\ And some
believe that it will be impossible to achieve further reductions in
unauthorized migration without revisions of existing visa categories
and avenues for certain unauthorized migrants to qualify for legal
status--though others believe that enforcement should be further
strengthened before Congress considers broader immigration reforms.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ One recent study found that illegal inflows fell about 60
percent between 2004 and 2010, with 40% of the reduction due to a
stronger Mexican economy, 30% of the reduction due to increased U.S.
border enforcement, and 30% of the reduction due to the weaker U.S.
economy; see Scott Borger, Gordon Hanson, and Bryan Roberts ``The
Decision to Emigrate From Mexico,'' presentation at the Society of
Government Economists annual conference, November 6, 2012.
\79\ See for example, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform (Jordan
Commission), U.S. Immigration Policy: Restoring Credibility
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
concluding comment
In sum, DHS' border security mission is broader than any single
type of border threat. And policies to combat terrorism, criminal
networks, unauthorized migration, and other illegal flows likewise are
broader than border security per se, as they include enforcement within
the United States and abroad. Understanding the differences among these
threats, their relative risks, and how policies may be designed to
respond to them is a logical starting point for a conversation about
how to allocate scarce enforcement resources.
I thank the committee again for this opportunity to testify and
look forward to your questions.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you Dr. Rosenblum.
The Ranking Member has to leave here shortly so he will be
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for just
allowing me to do that.
I had two areas I just wanted to focus on, it is very
hard--you covered so much ground--to focus in on areas. But one
of them that I think you will have some concern with is the
issue the challenges we face with different Federal agencies
and how they coordinate and don't coordinate with each other as
well, how some have greater abilities to deal with these issues
and others don't. For instance, DEA has some I think some
statutory abilities that other agencies don't have, to follow
some of these things.
I just want to ask the panelists, whoever wants to step up,
how best can we coordinate these different agencies so that we
are working together on this issue? I think it is an important
issue. That is why I want that to be the really one of my two
questions.
Mr. Noriega. Sir, if I could take the first stab at that.
Well, you are exactly right. The DEA does have authorities that
Congress wisely provided to them to treat the terrorism issue
as it runs parallel with drug trafficking. They have a task
force that brings all of the various agencies, intelligence,
law enforcement, and others together to coordinate some of
their work.
It has to be treated, though, as a higher priority.
I think Representative Duncan's legislation, which passed
unanimously in the House and enjoys bipartisan support in the
Senate, would be an important part of getting all of the
agencies to do a whole-of-Government assessment and produce a
strategy and hopefully elevate this as a priority. You see some
U.S. Attorneys putting in vast hours on these things, and
unless Justice treats it as a priority, you are not going to
see indictments coming forward. So I would just suggest that
that is extraordinarily important.
Then the State Department, really, I worked there for 10
years, some of these people are long-time friends, at least
acquaintances, and if they, if you did a report on the State
Department, you would title it ``head in the sand'' because
they completely--they drag their feet. They prevent law
enforcement from doing its work, and I have specific examples
of all that. If they said there aren't operational cells, it
isn't lack of imagination; it is lack of vision that is being
on display there. I have seen that statement before, and I just
have to disagree with it.
Mr. Cilluffo. Mr. Keating, if I can also expand on that
really quickly.
In addition to looking at the alphabet soup in the various
agencies and departments at the Federal level, obviously, State
and local play a significant role here. When you look at LAPD,
they would probably have a better position on some of the
government of Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah activities in the
United States. So we have got to continue to the support and
look to ways that we can improve our fusion centers between
Federal, State, local.
But let me also add one other set of issues. In addition to
the agencies, you have got doctrinal challenges. Is this a
counterterrorism issue? Is it a counterinsurgency issue? Is it
a counter-crime issue? The reality is, it is all of the above.
What you want to be able to do is bring out the best of all of
those entities. So, however we structure it, we have got to
start thinking doctrinally how do we address these issues as
well.
I would just add, the Drug Enforcement Administration, DEA,
I would argue is, if not the top, is one of the top agencies in
the world when it comes to human intelligence. I will tell you
all the technology in the world we need to bring to bear, it is
going to take multiple intelligence disciplines and sources.
But at the end of the day this is still a humint business. It
is about human intelligence. I would like to see that tapped in
a greater way to get at the priority that Ambassador Noriega
discussed.
Mr. Keating. I know we did grant them greater authority,
and they do have ability to talk about and to investigate some
of the issues we have talked about in terms of laundering and
other issues, and that information could be valuable if it is
transferred successfully among agencies.
I do want to just touch base on the second thrust I have.
As a committee, we have to have a way of measuring resources in
how we go forward. I am worried about when you have so many
diverse issues all coming together, I am worried that the
metrics that are involved may not be such that we can look at
things. Are we always going to be looking at apples and
oranges? Could you comment on how effective the metrics are--
how effective that is now in being able for us to utilize that
to see if resources are being effective or not, or how they
could be changed to make us, put us in a better position so we
can evaluate where our resources go?
Maybe, Dr. Rosenblum, I can start with you.
Mr. Rosenblum. Thank you. I know this is a question that
many Members of Congress have been focused on, and I think it
is an important and good question. I can speak most directly to
immigration control metrics and that component of border
security. DHS for almost 10 years now has been building its
biometric database, US-VISIT, that tracks people who are
apprehended anywhere along the border, and they have developed
much better capacity to measure, for example, how people who
come through different enforcement pipelines, what their
recidivism rate, what their re-apprehension rate is, although
those data aren't public, but it is something that Congress has
expressed an interest in, and I hope that we will have a chance
to look at those data and to be able to evaluate programs
through those data.
I think as you get into these more complex threats and
certainly with terrorism and the nexus in Latin America, again,
it comes down to intelligence because on those kinds of issues,
what we have to measure--with migration we have got people to
count, we can count apprehensions. So the measurement is less
of a problem, and it is the analysis. With some of these more
uncertain things, we need the intelligence so that we know we
are looking at the right things.
Mr. Keating. I would just, a final comment. I am glad that
I don't know which one of our witnesses just a moment ago had
said that local law enforcement has to be a part of this. I
agree that it does.
We were in the port of Houston with one of our field visits
that came back to us very strongly that COPS programs, other
ways to make sure there are resources at the local level, make
sure they are available, are important front-line issues for
intelligence and enforcement, but particularly for intelligence
purposes. So I am glad you brought that point up.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for taking me out of
turn, and I yield back my time.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you as well.
Let me first commend the committee staff for putting
together this report, which we had written this 5 years ago.
This is the second volume, if you will, of ``A Line in the
Sand.''
I would like to submit it, without objection, into the
record,* as well as a letter that we sent to the
administration, to the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, after we took a delegation, led a delegation
down to Latin America to look at the very issues that we are
discussing here today. I would like to enter that into the
record as well. Also state that this letter was sent on October
5, and we have yet to receive any sort of response from the
administration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information has been retained in committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
[The information follows:]
Letter From Chairman Michael T. McCaul to Thomas Donilon
October 5, 2012.
Mr. Thomas Donilon,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Eisenhower
Executive Office Building, Washington, DC 20501-0005.
Dear Mr. Donilon: We recently returned from a bipartisan
Congressional Delegation (Codel)\1\ overseas, which included stops in
Mexico, Colombia, Paraguay, and Argentina. Based on this trip the
Delegation developed several observations and recommendations listed
below for your consideration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Congressmen Michael T. McCaul (TX-10) Henry Cuellar (TX-28),
Tom Graves (GA-09), Jeff Duncan (SC-03), and Robert Turner (NY-09).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The purpose of the trip was to examine the Iranian and Hezbollah
presence in South America, the threat to the Southwest Border from
terrorists and drug cartels, and to acquire information about the
terrorist pipeline from the Middle East into South America. In each
country we met with the U.S. country team, foreign leaders, and other
key officials to gain more insight on this evolving threat, which
ultimately affects the security of our homeland.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Mexico.--(Mexico City) U.S. Ambassador to Mexico Anthony Wayne
and Country Team; National Security and Investigations Center (CISEN)
Director Jaime Domingo Lopez Buitron and staff; and Secretary of Public
Security, Genaro Garcia Luna and staff. Colombia.--(Bogota) U.S.
Ambassador to Colombia Peter Michael McKinley and Country Team;
Narcotics Affairs Eradication Chief Alexandra Z. Tenny; Narcotics
Affairs Aviation Chief Ted Harkin; Major General Jose Perez Mejia,
Chief of Defense; Melgar Base Commander Col Losada; Pijaos Base
Commander Col Ramirez; Narcotics Affairs Interdiction Chief Michael
Schreuder; Narcotics Affairs Jungla Advisor William Worley; and
Narcotics Affairs Rural Police Advisor Roberto Valles. Paraguay.--
(Ciudad Del Este) U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay James Thessin and Country
Team; and Chief of Paraguayan National Police--Counter Terrorism Unit
Carlos Humberto Benitez Gonzalez. Argentina.--(Buenos Aires) Charge
d'Affaires Alexis Ludwig and Country Team; Argentine Israelite Mutual
Association (AMIA); and Minister for Foreign Affairs Hector Marcos
Timerman.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
mexico
OBSERVATION.--The Government Accountability Office concludes only
873 miles of our 1,969-mile border with Mexico is under operational
control and only 129 miles are under full control. This problem is
compounded by the fact that the Mexican government does not have the
capacity to effectively control much of their side of the border.
Recognizing this concern, the Mexican government passed a law to build
its border patrol capacity. However there is no funding available for
this initiative.
RECOMMENDATION.--The U.S. Government should redirect some of the
Merida initiative funds to help Mexico build its capacity to control
their side of the border.
RECOMMENDATION.--The U.S. Government should pursue with Mexico a
bilateral strategy deploying unused U.S. Department of Defense assets
returned from Iraq and Afghanistan such as unmanned aerial vehicles,
tethered aerostats, and integrated fixed towers along each side of the
border. The information gathered by these shared technologies should be
symmetrical, managed respectfully, and have clear protocols concerning
how it will be used.
RECOMMENDATION.--Continue to foster cooperation between the
Governments of Colombia and Mexico so that Mexico has the benefit of
Colombia's experience dealing with drug cartels. The U.S. Government
should help facilitate regular meetings between the two countries.
RECOMMENDATION.--Continue pursuing with Mexico a shared biometric
system that could be used to track human smuggling of Special Interest
Aliens (SIAs).
OBSERVATION.--Qods Force and Hezbollah are in Mexico and fully
aware of the porous border between the United States and Mexico. The
Mexican government shares our concerns. Mexico considers the Arbabsiar
case a success story because it highlighted the close information-
sharing relationship between the United States and Mexico. The Mexican
government stated the case was an ``eye opener;'' the threat is still
here, but it's not known how large.
Qods Force and Hezbollah are actively researching human smuggling
routes and establishing relationships with drug cartels who have
knowledge of known routes into the United States. These relationships
between Iran, Hezbollah, and organized criminal organizations could
potentially assist in strikes against the homeland.
RECOMMENDATION.--U.S. intelligence agencies, in conjunction with
CISEN, should develop as a priority mission with additional resources
and authorities targeting Iran and Hezbollah operatives in Mexico and
throughout the region. This priority targeting should help provide U.S.
operational entities some advance notice of possible terrorist attacks
against the homeland.
colombia
OBSERVATION.--Although Plan Colombia has had considerable success
in combating the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a
narco-terrorist organization, the war has yet to be won, and challenges
remain. The FARC continues to adapt and rebuild itself along the
borders with Venezuela, Brazil, and Ecuador. There does not appear to
be a strategy to combat the emerging threat of FARC operations in other
countries such as Ecuador and Bolivia. Additionally, activity by
smaller drug and criminal organizations has increased in the region.
RECOMMENDATION.--The United States should increase efforts to
assist Colombia interdict and eradicate cocaine, enhance information
sharing, provide continued resources for Colombia's special operation
forces, and send advisors to assist Colombian officials reform their
judicial system.
OBSERVATION.--Cocaine is the ``Center of Gravity'' in Colombia's
fight against the FARC. Cocaine funds terrorist organizations. South
America is considered a ``cash cow'' for terrorist operations. 92% of
FARC activity occurs where cocaine is grown. The FARC is the first leg
in the supply chain for cocaine bound for the United States and
operates and owns complete supply lines into the United States.
An example of the nexus between the FARC and the Mexican drug
cartels is the November 2011 indictment of the Ayman Joumaa network.
Joumaa is the alleged leader of an international drug-trafficking and
money-laundering network that coordinated multi-ton shipments of
cocaine from Colombia to the Los Zetas Mexican drug cartel. He also
laundered hundreds of millions of dollars in drug proceeds back to the
Colombian suppliers and Hezbollah. These actions underscore major links
between terrorist organizations and major South American narcotics
money-laundering organizations.
RECOMMENDATION.--As cocaine use in the United States is a large
funding source for terrorist organizations, the administration should
expand telegraphing this fact to the American public, and make the
point that those who use cocaine fund terrorists.
OBSERVATION.--Venezuela is a safe haven for not only Iran and
Hezbollah, but also the FARC. The Colombian government has evidence of
a Venezuelan Army helicopter providing operational support to the FARC.
The Colombian government also has evidence of Venezuelan government
officials working for the FARC narco-terrorist organization.
Additionally, Hezbollah is connected to communities in Colombia where
the FARC is operating, which provides support back to the terrorist
organization. Hezbollah is also purchasing cocaine from the FARC. FARC
weapons were found to be from Russia and Venezuela.
From these observations, we conclude the FARC is operating with
Iran and Hezbollah in Venezuela, and the Venezuelan government is
complicit in these operations.
RECOMMENDATION.--The U.S. Government should consider designating
Venezuela a state sponsor of terrorism.
paraguay
OBSERVATION.--The Tri-Border region is identified as a center that
finances Islamic terrorism. Hezbollah has a well-known and established
presence in the Tri-Border region. Additionally, Iranian government
officials have been found entering Paraguay with Venezuelan passports
and meeting with Hezbollah operatives. Shops are owned and operated by
Hezbollah and in one particular mall you must be a Hezbollah
sympathizer in order to rent space in that location. A sizable amount
of profits from these shops go to the Middle East to fund terrorists.
While the region is mainly known for illicit financing and money-
laundering activities, it was reported in December 2006 that Ali
Muhammad Kazan, a leader in Hezbollah's political structure and who
served as a commanding member of counterintelligence for Hezbollah was
present in the Tri-Border region. According to the 2011 State
Department Country Reports on Terrorism, the Barakat Network in the
Tri-Border area is another example of drug money being funneled to
Hezbollah. Although the total amount of money being sent to Hezbollah
is difficult to determine, the Brakat network provided, and perhaps
still provides, a large part of the $20 million sent annually from the
Tri-Border Area to finance Hezbollah and its operations around the
world.
Unfortunately, high levels of corruption within law enforcement and
the judicial system, along with weak terrorism-related laws, continue
to exacerbate and allow these terrorist organizations to operate in the
region.
RECOMMENDATION.--The U.S. Government should increase resources and
work more closely with the Paraguayan government to aid in building a
more trusted and capable law enforcement and legal system and establish
more effective terrorism-related laws related to financing of terrorist
organizations.
RECOMMENDATION.--While the Codel was in Paraguay, the Brazilian
government recently announced they plan to send 10,000 troops to the
lawless Tri-Border region in part to address these transnational
criminal and terrorism-related security threats. The U.S. Government
should support these efforts and work with the Brazilian government in
sharing information that could target and dismantle these Hezbollah
financing operations.
argentina
OBSERVATION.--Hezbollah and Iran launched two terrorist attacks
from the Tri-Border region in 1992 and 1994, which destroyed the
Israeli embassy and the Jewish Cultural Center in Buenos Aires. These
terrorist attacks were against soft targets. The planners of the
attacks have not been brought to justice. Of the six Iranian citizens
accused of plotting these attacks, one suspect in particular, the
Minister of Defense of Iran, was recently in Bolivia to open up a
military school. The Bolivian government apologized and claimed to not
have known about the connections between the Iranian Minister of
Defense and the terrorist attacks.
RECOMMENDATION.--The U.S. Government should work with Argentina to
bring to justice the individuals alleged to have carried out the
terrorist attacks against the Israeli Embassy and Jewish Cultural
Center.
RECOMMENDATION.--With these terrorist bombings serving as an
example, the U.S. Government should recognize the reality of Hezbollah
and Iran's capability to leverage sympathizers in Latin America to
become operational and attack soft targets without difficulty.
OBSERVATION.--There are indications that bimonthly flights are
still occurring between Iran and Venezuela. Interpol has not been able
to learn what cargo is on these flights. Clearly these flights are a
direct pipeline between the two countries that could be used to
transfer weapons, nuclear material, and terrorists.
RECOMMENDATION.--The U.S. Government should regularly monitor these
continuing claims of flights between Iran and Venezuela, and arbitrate
its frequency, potential cargo, and other suspicious activities.
Additionally, the United States should demarche the Venezuela
government and request they abide by transparent flight requirements.
OBSERVATION.--There have been indications that Iran is proactively
reaching out to many countries in Latin America, including Argentina,
to establish relationships, increase trade, fund infrastructure
projects, spread its ideology, and build stronger cultural ties in the
region. Although publicly denouncing Iran, there is increased concern
Argentina will be more open in its relationship and establish larger
trade with the Iranian regime. In addition, Iran has stated its
intention of opening up companies in Argentina.
RECOMMENDATION.--The U.S. Government should closely monitor Iran's
activity throughout Latin America and work with our allies in the
region.
We are deeply concerned Iran and its surrogates are conducting
operations in the Western Hemisphere. The alarming connections between
Iran, Venezuela, Hezbollah, the FARC, drug cartels, criminal
organizations, and Iranian sympathizers throughout Latin America could
be leveraged by Iran to carry out terrorist attacks in the United
States and against our allies in the region. Given Iran's recent
efforts to intervene in Latin American affairs, the U.S. Government
should not downplay the implications of the recent decision on June 5,
2012 by Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela to be removed from
the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, also known as the
Rio Treaty of 1947. This Western Hemispheric defense doctrine
recognizes that an attack on a Western Hemispheric nation is an attack
against us all, and any unraveling of a Western Hemispheric defensive
treaty threatens the sovereignty of the United States and our allies
throughout the Western Hemisphere. In accordance with the Monroe
Doctrine, the United States should send a strong signal to the world
that any effort by Iran and its surrogates to enroot operations in the
Western Hemisphere is dangerous and a threat to our peace, safety, and
prosperity.
We welcome the opportunity to discuss these matters with you more
fully. If you have any questions or would like additional information
on these observations and recommendations, please contact Dr. R.
Nicholas Palarino, Staff Director or Mr. Brett DeWitt, Professional
Staff Member for the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations and
Management, House Homeland Security Committee, who accompanied us on
the Codel.
Sincerely,
Michael T. McCaul,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and
Management.
Mr. McCaul. This is an area that I know Mr. Duncan shares
my concerns. I believe, Mr. Cilluffo, as you stated, this is an
area that has gone largely ignored, overlooked, and yet it is
right in our backyard, and we talk about the Middle East a lot.
We talk about North Africa and Egypt and Libya. Yet some things
are happening not too far from here that I think the American
people just have no idea the threat level that it presents to
us. As you look at the tension between Israel and Iran right
now and how that has heightened to a flash point that I don't
think I have seen as great in my lifetime. As that tension
heightens, so does the tension across the world and in this
hemisphere. If, God forbid, there is a strike from Israel into
Iran, the retaliation will be certain, and it will be swift,
not just against Israel but in the entire Middle East, and it
will also expand into this hemisphere. It will light up
Hezbollah operatives I think in Latin America. It will also
light up Hezbollah cells in the United States. Many people
don't even realize that there are Hezbollah cells in the United
States.
When I was a former AUSA chief of counterterrorism that was
our job to find out where they are. You don't know what you
don't know. Where are these cells? What we found was Hezbollah
is actually pretty sophisticated and, in some ways, more so
than al-Qaeda.
They are certainly probably better-financed. So when we
went down to Latin America, Mr. Duncan and I, we went to the
Tri-Border Area, Paraguay, Brazil, Argentina, and we saw a huge
Hezbollah presence, billions of dollars being sent from that
area, that region, to Hezbollah to Iran.
We also saw that there are satellite nations of Iran in
Latin America, certainly Venezuela being one of the biggest,
and then Bolivia and Ecuador and Cuba. They are even talking
about disavowing a treaty from 1947 that deals with the Monroe
Doctrine where an attack on one is an attack against all. Why
would these states want to violate that treaty or get out of
that treaty? It is because of the influence of Iran in the
region?
So I guess my question is that we were always told, and
Ambassador Noriega, I think you put it, you hit the nail on the
head by saying, when it comes to the State Department, it is
the head in the sand. Because when we were down there, we got
briefings from the chief of station, which were pretty good,
but the local security guys, better, and then we went to the
Jewish community center that was blown up by Hezbollah, and
these guys probably gave us the best briefing that we got down
there, most likely wired into Israeli intelligence, which is
probably the best when it comes to Iran.
But then when we talked to our own State Department,
amazing how the threat is downplayed, how the terrorism word is
not even used. I think it has been taken out of their
vernacular, and even though you have this large Hezbollah
presence down there, they don't seem to care. It is like
diplomacy outweighs threat; diplomacy outweighs looking at this
as a counterterrorism issue. So I think that was to me the line
in the hearing, the head in the sand. They need to get their
head out of the sand and look at this problem.
So my question to the panel is: We were always told, you
know, yeah, Hezbollah is down there, but they are just finance
support cells; it is nothing to get too worried about, so don't
overblow this problem. It is not really a problem.
Well, then we saw the Qods Force operative in Mexico, the
aligning with what he thought was a Los Zetas cartel member to
assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington and to hit the
embassies in Argentina, both the Israeli and Saudi embassies.
The first time we are seeing this theory that there couldn't
possibly be a threat to suddenly seeing an operative, an
operation.
So I guess, again, my final question is: Can you discuss
the sort-of unholy alliance that we are seeing now and marriage
between these Hezbollah Qods Force, more radical Islamic
groups, and the drug cartels, that are largely finance and I
understand that, but discuss that and then also is it possible
that they could become operational in the future, particularly
in light of the situation between Israel and Iran currently?
Mr. Cilluffo. If I could jump in, well, Mr. Chairman you
are exactly right, Ahmad Vahidi is the minister of defense of
Iran. He said, if Iran were attacked by anyone, that there
would be a tough and crushing response. He said that on May
2011, in Bolivia, where he was inaugurating an academy on
asymmetrical warfare that is being funded by Iran. Just one
example, Mohsen Rabbani is a cleric who is wanted for his role
in the 1992 and 1994 bombings in Buenos Aires. He travels on
documents provided him by Venezuela. He is not supposed to be
able to travel at all because there is a red notice, an
Interpol red notice, but he travels in this hemisphere on a
regular basis, and we have been able to place him through our
sources at least a couple times in the last 18 months. So that
exists.
The Jouma case that I referred to involves all of these
different criminal elements and really a global enterprise,
where Jouma played a role bringing Colombian cocaine to the Los
Zetas through Central America, taking the money there,
commingling it with a used car enterprise, those cars, that
value was then exported to Africa, converted to cash, so you
launder the resources, and then flown back to the Western
Hemisphere. This is a terrifically sophisticated mechanism that
is going to reach out and touch us in a serious way if we don't
get ahead of the curve and start to block some of these moves
on their part.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Mr. Cilluffo.
Mr. Cilluffo. Mr. Chairman, to build on one of the previous
questions as well regarding metrics, I think before jumping in
the specifics, it is worth remembering the terrorism, what gets
measured gets done, but are we measuring what matters? But more
importantly, terrorism is a small numbers business. If you look
back to 9/11, we weren't talking about hundreds of thousands of
people, so it is worth factoring in the vulnerabilities that
can be exploited. You don't need big numbers to cause
catastrophic effect.
So in terms of the Lebanese Hezbollah marriage in the Tri-
Border Area, I think General Fraser, head of Southern Command
put it best, they are working together mostly alliances of
convenience, but it is those alliances of convenience that can
cause real significant damage to our U.S. National interest,
our National security.
I might note that LAPD recently elevated the government of
Iran and its proxies to a Tier I threat, at par and even to al-
Qaeda, its affiliates, and those inspired by al-Qaeda. That is
a significant development.
NYPD has done much the same.
In addition to the points that Ambassador Noriega brought
up, Nasrallah, the head of Lebanese Hezbollah has stated
himself and his quote was, if Israel targets Iran, America
bears responsibility. So clearly, they are going to light up
and tap some of those networks.
I might also note there have been a number of arrests, JTTF
arrests in the United States. In 2010, there were 16
significant arrests of Hezbollah sympathizers trying to access
stinger missiles, night vision equipment. So this isn't
something that we need to be worrying about. This has occurred.
So the question is, if you see these pieces come together
and should a triggering event cause, yes, I think that is a
significant issue the United States needs to be concerned
about.
I might also note that they are pretty sophisticated in
terms of trade craft, so that is just something to bear in
mind.
Mr. McCaul. Mr. Farah.
Mr. Farah. I would echo what Ambassador Noriega said. I
think that but if you look at Iran's history in the region, we
tend to look at the attack on, the attempted attack on, the
Saudi Ambassador as sort of a crossing or a sea change in how
they behave. But it is not really. If you look at the 2007
attempted attack on the JFK fuel facilities, that was also an
Iranian plot. It didn't get a lot of publicity, but the Irani
connection, but Mr. Kadir who was running, involved in the plot
out of Guyana was sent to the western hemisphere at the same
time Mohsen Rabbani was and he was working the northern tier as
Mohsen Rabbani was working Argentine sphere, and part of the
money for that, and it is documented in our core documents, for
that attack were put into the mosque that Mr. Kadir was running
in Guyana.
So I think they have been waging an asymmetrical campaign
against us for a long time, and we are not taking it seriously.
The other thing that one has to pay attention to is simply
the breadth of their activities. Many of them are small, but
taken together, they are quite significant. The number of
businesses that are opening in Panama in the Colon Free Trade
Zone is astounding. They are buying Panamanian citizenship for
$10,000; as Panamanian citizens, then opening businesses in the
Colon Free Trade Zone, with extremely broad capabilities for
acquiring dual-user, moving whatever they want through that
particular area.
If you look at the Univision report from last year on ``La
Amenaza Irani,'' they documented and filmed Iran's attempts to
hack our major National security networks from a Mexican
university in conjunction and with Venezuela asking for
anything that was taken to be shared back with them.
So I think that we at least--our assumption is that this is
all starting now, when in reality, there was a meeting in
Tehran in 1983, where they made the decision to expand into
Latin America using guns, automatic weapons, grenades, fusiles,
y grenadas, you know, weapons and grenades to take over the
region. So I think that the idea that they are somehow
unprepared or that this is a new thing for them and they are
suddenly scrambling to position themselves is nonsense. They
have been doing this for 20 years. They are in places where we
are only beginning to look to see where they are. I think the
potential to light us up if they felt necessary is huge.
Mr. McCaul. Let me follow up. This isn't about cyber, but
there was an attack recently by Iran, a cyber attack on Aramco
in the Saudi peninsula, 30,000 computers compromised, and at
the same time, an attack against our financial institutions in
the United States. So it really is astounding, and you are
correct; it is not some science fiction thing. It is happening
right now.
Then these flights going back between Caracas to Tehran.
What is on those planes? We can't monitor those planes.
Speculation uranium is on these flights. What if it came back
weapons grade into this hemisphere and smuggled across the
border? That is a nightmare scenario for a lot of us.
Mr. Farah. I would say perhaps even more dangerous than
those flights are the unregulated shipping, which have much
more significant capacity and are even less monitored than the
flights are, in their ability because of state-to-state
transaction, there is no way of knowing what is on those planes
as they leave.
Mr. McCaul. Just one last question, Ambassador, you said
you have a lot of friends in the State Department. So given all
this mounting evidence, why do they continue to have their head
in the sand on this?
Mr. Noriega. Well, I should add I had a lot of friends in
the State Department about 20 minutes ago, but maybe fewer.
Mr. McCaul. Sorry, they are not still there.
Mr. Noriega. Well, they conflate this, Mr. Chairman, with
other issues that we have with these countries.
For example, Venezuela, they don't want to mud wrestle with
Hugo Chavez, and they think that if we do, it elevates him. It
is a wonderful theory. Seven years ago it might have had some
validity, but it has been disproven, as we see that we try to
studiously ignore him, that he is galloping forward at this
staggering alliance with Iran, for that matter with PRC, buying
$9 billion of weapons from the Russians. The Cubans essentially
run the internal security apparatus. I don't know what else he
could do if we were to try to provoke him.
The other thing is there are countries like Mexico and
Brazil that are just so sensitive about talking about this
issue, and part of it is every time we raise it, they read it,
misread it, as an accusation. The fact is we can all up and
down this table give examples of the things the Mexicans have
done right in fighting this issue. But for some reason, we
can't, they are not doing their job at the State Department to
find a way to have a serious dialogue about this, so but the
Mexicans are more open and the Brazilians are more open.
The Brazilians are going to host the Olympics and the World
Cup in the next 3 or 4 years, both events. If you ask a lot of
these foreign ministry types in Brazil, they will tell you the
terrorism is an invention of the United States Government to
intervene in our internal affairs. Well, it is going to come
unfortunately in the manifestation, it will manifest itself in
another way if they don't do something serious to address this
issue.
Mr. McCaul. The Brazilians, when we were down there,
absolutely right, did not want to acknowledge any of this, but
at the same time, while we were there, sent 10,000 troops to
the Tri-Border Area. So it is not a threat, but we are going to
send 10,000 troops to the Tri-Border Area, while you are there.
Mr. Noriega. Mr. Chairman, some of the best work being done
on this is by the Brazilian police, by the Brazilian security
agencies. But at the political level, it is completely Sergeant
Schultz; they know nothing about anything.
One other example, Argentina, a country where 144 people
were the victims of Hezbollah violence not so far in the
distant past, is engaging in talks right now with the Iranians.
What are they up to? Well, there have been vast transfers of
cash, at least a quarter of a billion dollars from Venezuela to
Argentina. We know that Ahmadinejad asked Chavez to intervene
with Nestor Kirchner, the former president of Argentina, to
turn back on the sort of a nuclear cooperation that he had they
had back in the 1990s before those bombings.
Now these talks are, I believe, to launder the reputations
of two potential candidates for president of Iran to succeed
Ahmadinejad, who are indicted by Argentina.
So mark my words, this will involve some sort of
transaction, very high-priced soybean exports from Argentina to
Iran, and you are going to see Argentina find a way to lift
those indictments so they don't have a black mark against the
next president of Iran. This is the sort of stuff the State
Department needs to know about and engage on.
Mr. McCaul. Everybody needs to know about it. I can tell
you, meeting with the ambassador from Argentina was hardly a
friendly experience as well. Very anti-American, was my sense.
So I have gone way past my time.
I would like to now recognize the gentleman from Illinois,
Mr. Davis.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Cilluffo, you indicated, I believe, that our efforts to
seize drugs is not as robust as perhaps they could and should
be.
How intertwined is drug trafficking with the whole threat
and engagement of terrorism in the areas?
Mr. Cilluffo. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
Looking at the Americas specifically or--I mean, if you
look globally, you are starting to see more and more foreign
terrorist organizations engaging in criminal activity, from
drug trafficking all the way through to organized crime
activity, kidnapping and ransom. I mean, if you look at the
Sahel and the Maghreb, a lot of examples there. If you look at
FATA, if you look at all these un- and under-governed spaces.
In the Americas, in particular, I wouldn't say it is--they
have different aims and objectives, for the most parts. But
that is almost missing the real question.
The real question is, is: Will they exploit some of those
networks, distribution networks and opportunities? I think the
answer is yes. Because you do see a Lebanese Hezbollah presence
in the Tri-Border Area, and even in Colombia, and in other
places. You do have drug trafficking organizations who can
smuggle, you name the good; if there is the demand, they will
find the way to get it through.
I actually think back to Kosovo, during the campaign there.
I wrote a long piece that was politically incorrect, I guess.
It was titled ``And the Winner is . . . the Albanian Mafia.''
Here you had criminal entities smuggling both Serbs and Croats
for the same amount of money. They put a tax, another 10
percent on when the tides turned and others were--asked to be
smuggled out.
So at the end of the day, the way I think you look at it,
look at it as a business enterprise, look at it as a P&L, and
in this case, very specifically, movement of product. If you
add those together, and if you have flare points that can
trigger that, that is a pretty toxic and dangerous blend.
Mr. Davis. So let me ask the panel, given the fact that
there is such a serious opportunity and relationship between
the two, is there any way that we can attack the issue from
another vantage point of looking at the drug problem as much as
we look at the threat of terrorism and how we can impact one by
perhaps impacting the other?
Mr. Farah. If I might, I would say, in relation to your
previous question, I would say that the other--you now have
clear--for the first time it has been--we have had anecdotal
evidence for a long time, but I think now in judicial cases
that Hezbollah is directly engaging with the FARC, which is
another designated terrorist organization, to move cocaine for
the Mexican cartels. So it is much more than a passing
relationship. They are now integrally involved in the movement
and transshipment.
If you look at the Lebanese Canadian Bank case, which is
the outgrowth of the Joumaa case that you mentioned in your--
you look at in your paper, that is a multibillion-dollar
enterprise that was collapsed by taking the cocaine trade out
of it. So I think that multimillion enterprise for Hezbollah
collapsed when you took the cocaine out of it. So I think that
the relationship there is profound and deep.
I think if you want to get at that, I think the best model
you have is the Special Operations Division of the Drug
Enforcement Administration. They are able to use specific
authorities, unique authorities to go after, in a judicial
manner also--and judicialize what they find and what they are
able to collect from some of their foreign colleagues on the
same targets and use that in judicial court systems to bring
about indictments and in many cases convictions.
So I think that that, coupled with some of the special
authorities that the Special Operations Command has in the
region, the ability, the resources they provide on the
intelligence-gathering front, particularly, have to be melded
and expanded. I think right now we have sort of little
stovepipes of excellence that need to be broadened out and can
be broadened out considerably to make that joint fight. I don't
think you have to choose either/or. I think if you--because you
see them so often together that if you use the hybrid model the
DEA has done so well, you can actually do both at the same
time.
Mr. Cilluffo. Mr. Davis, I mean, a hybrid threat does
require a hybrid response. It is all of the above. We have to
attack it from all fronts. There is a CT component, a
counternarcotics component, a counterinsurgency component, and
we have to address the demand issues as well. So we need to
look at it holistically.
The problem is, is we are not moving quickly enough or
treating it with the urgency I believe it deserves.
Mr. Davis. I guess one of the reasons that I asked the
question is that I believe that sometimes money is just as
potent a rationale as ideology; that there are some individuals
who become a part of the action based upon ideology in terms of
what they believe and there are others who are recruited
because there is the resource. I mean, there is the lure of
money which attracts them just as easily as an ideological
bent.
So thank you very much. I yield back.
Mr. McCaul. Just to make a brief clarification.
We met with the Argentinean Minister of Affairs--of Foreign
Affairs, not the Ambassador. So just to make that clarification
for the record.
Mr. Cilluffo. Did you get a phone call?
Mr. McCaul. Yes. It was still--still was not a very
friendly meeting, though.
With that, now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania,
Mr. Marino.
Mr. Marino. Mr. Chairman, I have no questions.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. I know Mr. Duncan was here. I know he
certainly would have many questions for you. If we could just
wait just a minute.
Okay, great.
Mr. Farah. Sir, if I could just add, Mr. Davis, to your
comment on the money.
I think the money over time has become the defining
motivator for the vast bulk of these transactions. If you look
at how groups evolve, particularly the FARC in Colombia, it
went from being a very ideological organization until it got
into the drug trade and it is now essentially a major drug
cartel with very little ideological content left in them. The
reason for joining the Zetas or any number of the organizations
in Mexico is entirely devoid of ideology. If you look at how
these groups operate, I would argue that, although Hezbollah, I
think, was quite successful for many years in not becoming de-
ideologicized through the drug trade, it now has as well.
Mr. Cilluffo. If I could just say, there are actual foreign
terrorist organizations--Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines went
from a very ideological organization to a huge criminal
enterprise. Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, you have got camps,
some of whom are criminally motivated, financially motivated.
But Willie Sutton said: Why rob banks? That is where the money
is. So, yeah.
Mr. McCaul. See Mr. Duncan has arrived. The Chairman now
recognizes him for questions.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just say again how much your leadership on this
issue has meant. It is an issue I have been following, as the
panel knows, for a very long time. We will talk in a minute
about the threat assessment bill I have residing over in the
Senate.
But it was a very informative trip when we went down to
investigate this issue. You are spot on when the Chairman says,
you know, we hear one thing from the Department of State, but
when we talk with the boots on the ground, so to speak, whether
it is the Paraguayan police force or the folks in Argentina,
the Israelis and the Jewish community, it is a different story.
I walked away from that CODEL wondering why it is a different
story. Why we are hearing the ``head in the sand''-type analogy
from State and why we are hearing something different from the
folks who are actually impacted.
I raise awareness to what I believe, if I remember
correctly, we just discovered a Hezbollah training camp in
Nicaragua. What we were told in South America, that most of the
Hezbollah activity was financial transactions. But we saw
tremendous money, financial transactions happening in the tri-
border region and Cuidad del Este.
My thought is, I don't believe that training camp in
Nicaragua was training bank tellers or folks on financial
transactions.
So it is--there is more going on in South America and Latin
America and in this Western Hemisphere than just financial
transactions that are going to assist Hezbollah's activities,
terrorist activities around the world.
The Iranians and their proxies are here in this hemisphere
for a reason. It is time for America to truly get their head
out of the sand and raise awareness to the issue and start
understanding the issue and come up with a counterterrorism
strategy to address that real threat.
I think the Chairman was right, if Israel does take some
action to assess or address their existential threat in that
region, I believe we will see some activity here and we better
be aware of it and better know how to deal with it.
So I went down after that hearing, after that trip to Latin
America to assess this, I went down to the border, because I
wanted to understand the United States-Mexican border. From
South Carolina, you are a long ways removed from that. So I
went to Arizona and tried to understand the threats, the
challenges that CBP has down there. I walked away with a
tremendous respect for what they are trying to do.
Because when we think of the Southern Border in South
Carolina, we think of flat desert terrain, easy to put fences
up. What I saw was a different topography with the mountains
and the corridors. The fencing comes up to the foots of the
mountain and we have basically corridored the bad guys coming
into this country to have to come through the mountains. But
when we helo'd over those same mountains, I looked down and I
saw what looked like cow paths through the mountains. I asked,
``Well, what kind of animals, what kind of cattle ranches are
in this area?'' They said, ``No, Congressman, the trails you
see are the bad guys. These are the smugglers and the folks
coming into this country.''
The challenges are real. We have got to figure out a way to
address those challenges. I think the first step in really
addressing the threat of terrorism would be countering the
Iranian threat in the Western Hemisphere bill. Appreciate the
ambassador mentioning that. I would encourage anyone that can
contact the Senate and see if we can get this thing hotlined
over there to pass.
So on to my question.
Do you have--and I guess this is for Ambassador Noriega--do
you have any recommendations for ways we can go about
strengthening our relationships with our fellow stakeholders in
Latin America? See, I met with the Honduran government
officials here in Washington last spring and that was the
conversation I had.
I think that the Chairman mentioned the distrust--or maybe
it was Mr. Farah mentioned, if we bring this subject up with
Mexico or with some of the Latin America countries, they think
we are questioning their integrity or questioning something
else.
So how do we strengthen that? How do we get them to be
willing allies with us and show that this is a neighborhood, we
are all residents in this neighborhood and we have got to work
together to address that threat? So how do we go about doing
that?
Mr. Noriega. Well, Congressman Duncan, you were out of the
room when I addressed that same point and made the point that
you just made, which was that when we raise these issues with
Mexico or Brazil, they see it as an attack on their integrity.
We can all cite examples where the Mexicans have done precisely
the right things to fight terrorism and want to be on the same
side with us.
The Brazilians, the best informed on these issues are
Brazilian security folks. But if you talk to the political
folks and certainly the people in the Foreign Ministry, the
problem doesn't exist.
This is what diplomacy is all about, quite frankly, and we
have to communicate what we know about this threat and why it
is important to them.
Another thing, just vis-a-vis Mexico, lot of people talk
about Mexico's drug war. It is not Mexico's drug war, it is our
drug war. Mexico is fighting it. If we had the kind of
political leadership across the political spectrum talking in
those terms, the Mexicans, frankly, their confidence in us as
an ally--they would be treated as a wartime ally, quite
frankly--would go up exceedingly. It would open this kind of
serious dialogue about the dimensions of this threat. So that
certainly has to happen.
In the cases of other countries, they think we have
everything wired. If you go talk to security officials in Peru
or Chile or Colombia, they think the United States knows
everything and that it must not be a problem, particularly when
our ambassadors don't raise it. So we have to change that.
I think, quite frankly, bipartisan Congressional
leadership, like we have seen behind the legislation that you
are moving, will make a difference. It has to be bipartisan
leadership to say: Look, we are not making accusations against
the State Department. What do you need to do a better job in
engaging these countries on this threat?
Because Hezbollah is here for--in the Western Hemisphere--
for one reason: Because we are here. We are the target.
Menacing Nicaragua is not their objective. It is to threaten
us.
So we have to--I think the appraisal is part of that. The
only thing--only concern I have about your bill is it gives
them 6 months to come up with a strategy. I know they will need
it. It is going to be an eye-opening experience for a lot of
these folks.
But we need a strategy today. There are some--some action-
oriented things that we can do right now. We can bring
indictments, we can expose the Venezuelan state as a narco-
state. The U.S. attorneys have, you know, hundreds of man-hours
in on this.
You have an oil company in Venezuela that has taken in a
trillion dollars over the last dozen years. That can be used to
hide--that entity in itself can be used to hide vast
transactions.
If we can put those indictments forward, it will signal not
only to the bad guys, but to the good guys that we are serious
about this problem.
It may have serious consequences, which is important. The
administrative actions are not sufficient because, let's note,
Chavez has promoted people who the Treasury Department has on
their list of supporters of terrorism and narco-trafficking. He
promoted his Minister of Defense, head of his army after they
were designated by the U.S. Treasury Department. So those are
not enough, we need to get serious with indictments.
Mr. Farah. Could I just add, sir? I think that Ambassador
Noriega is right. But I think that you see a sea change in
Brazil relating to Bolivia particularly. They have a strong
alliance. Why? Because they now recognize 90 percent of the
cocaine they are receiving, and they are the second-largest
consumer nation in the world, is coming from Bolivia. So
suddenly the ideological affinity is diminishing and they are
suddenly saying: Holy cow, we now know where this is coming
from. They are taking much stronger actions against Bolivia.
So to go to the point of Ambassador Noriega, I think when
it is in their self--when they understand yourself what is in
their self-interest, they will take on these issues. We have
been very unwilling or unable to communicate what their self-
interest--why it is not just our problem, but their problem. I
can't tell you how many times, even with the Colombians, with
whom we have a very good relationship, when I was talking about
the Iranian issue, I said: What does the U.S. Embassy say about
them? They say: Nothing. I say: Why not? They say: Well, we
never gave it to them. I said: Why not? They said: Because they
never asked for it. It wasn't that they were trying to hide it,
it was just there was no interest so it doesn't go anyplace.
I think that that is--that lack of curiosity on our part
diminishes greatly our ability to understand the regional
context.
Mr. Duncan. That is right.
Well, my time has expired. I just would say for the record,
Mr. Chairman, I believe the Brazilians sent 10,000 troops up to
the Tri-Border region when they heard you were there.
Mr. McCaul. Thanks for that confidence in my strength.
You know, it was also interesting to see the FARC given
safe haven in Venezuela. When we were in Colombia, they would
go across the border, not unlike in Pakistan, and they would
protect them. The Iranian influence between Venezuela and the
FARC is very real, and it is clear.
I think these training camps that you mentioned, that is
not for financial purposes. They are here for a reason, and I
don't think it is to be in Nicaragua or Bolivia or Ecuador, it
is because we are here. We have to be aware of this threat.
So I want to thank my colleagues for being here.
Mr. Duncan, your intense interest in this issue, and the
bill that I co-sponsored, I sure hope we can get that passed
through the Congress and signed by the President.
So I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. The
committee now stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:24 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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