[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THE EMP THREAT: EXAMINING THE CONSEQUENCES
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY,
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 12, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-115
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
80-856 WASHINGTON : 2013
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Ron Barber, Arizona
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND SECURITY
TECHNOLOGIES
Daniel E. Lungren, California, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Tim Walberg, Michigan, Vice Chair Laura Richardson, California
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Billy Long, Missouri William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Coley C. O'Brien, Staff Director
Zachary D. Harris, Subcommittee Clerk
Chris Schepis, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
WITNESSES
Panel I
Hon. Trent Franks, a Representative in Congress From the State of
Arizona:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Panel II
Mr. Joseph McClelland, Director, Office of Electric Reliability,
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Mr. Brandon Wales, Director, Homeland Infrastructure Threat and
Risk Analysis Conter, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 31
Prepared Statement............................................. 33
Mr. Michael A. Aimone, Director, Business Enterprise Integration
Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Installations and Environment, Office of Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Department
of Defense:
Oral Statement................................................. 36
Prepared Statement............................................. 38
Panel III
Dr. Chris Beck, President, Electric Infrastructure Security
Council:
Oral Statement................................................. 46
Prepared Statement............................................. 47
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies:
Statement of the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation.................................................. 6
Statement of Nickolaus E. Leggett, N3NL, Analyst, Amateur Radio
Operator, Inventor, U.S. Citizen............................. 10
APPENDIX
Questions From Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke for Joseph
McClellan...................................................... 53
Questions From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren for Brandon Wales...... 54
Questions From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren for Michael A. Aimone.. 57
Questions From Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke for Chris Beck.... 59
THE EMP THREAT: EXAMINING THE CONSEQUENCES
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Wednesday, September 12, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection,
and Security Technologies,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Daniel E. Lungren
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Lungren, Long, Clarke, Richardson,
and Richmond.
Mr. Lungren. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and
Security Technologies will come to order. This subcommittee is
meeting today to examine the electromagnetic pulse threat.
I will now recognize myself for an opening statement.
The Washington, DC area was recently impacted by a deadly,
fast-moving storm, called a derecho--a word I had never heard
of before until I found myself in the midst of it--which is one
of the most destructive and deadly thunderstorm systems in
North American history. It resulted in 22 deaths, widespread
damage, and millions of power outages from the Midwest to the
Middle Atlantic States.
This derecho provided a glimpse of the kind of
destruction--just a glimpse of the kind of destruction that
would result from an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack.
Falling trees and the loss of electric power caused death and
destruction from Chicago to Virginia. Fortunately, this power
outage was short-term, which limited the human and economic
consequences.
An EMP is a burst of electromagnetic radiation typically
generated by a high-altitude nuclear explosion or a non-nuclear
device. Nuclear weapon EMPs are most effective when detonated
high in the altitude above the intended target. Depending on
the yield of the weapon and the height of the explosion,
nuclear EMPs can destroy large portions of the U.S. power and
communications infrastructure, we are informed.
Geomagnetic radiation generated by a naturally occurring
solar storm can also damage the same infrastructure. An EMP
attack would destroy the electronics and digital circuitry in
the area of impact, thereby denying electric power to our
homes, businesses, and military.
Our country is dependent on electricity to power our
health, financial, transportation, and business systems. If our
power system was ever lost for an extended period, according to
Dr. William Graham, the chairman of the EMP Commission, it
would have catastrophic and lethal consequences for our
citizens and the economy. It would also potentially degrade our
military defenses.
America's digital dependence grows every year and we
rejoice in that. But the fact of the matter is that along with
that dependence comes our EMP vulnerability. What I mean by
that is America has gotten used to the digital world. It powers
and is implicated in so much of our everyday life, that if it
were in fact attacked in a serious way, it would result in some
cases, unforeseen circumstances. What I mean by that is most
people don't think about them.
Computer simulations carried out in March 2010 by Oak Ridge
National Laboratory demonstrated that an electromagnetic pulse
from a nuclear device detonated at high altitude or a powerful
solar storm could destroy or permanently damage major sections
of our National power grid. According to this Oak Ridge study,
the collapse of our power system could impact 130 million
Americans, could require 4 to 10 years to fully recover, and
could impose economic costs between $1 trillion and $2
trillion.
The National electric grid has almost no backup capability
in the event of a power collapse from electromagnetic pulses.
According to FERC testimony presented this morning, existing
bulk power reliability standards don't even address EMP
vulnerabilities. In addition, with most of the Nation's power
system under private ownership, who view an EMP event as
unlikely or so we are told, there is been little preparation
for a long-term power collapse.
Although the impact of an EMP event has been examined,
studied, and debated, I am fearful that little progress seems
to have been made in mitigating the EMP threat. Although the
United States has conducted numerous exercises to test our
readiness against natural events such as hurricanes, we have
never conducted an exercise to help us prepare for the severe
consequences of a National power outage from an EMP event.
I am informed that the Defense Department takes this
seriously and, therefore, has taken steps to protect many of
their critical infrastructure from an EMP event. Either they
are wasting a lot of money because it is not a serious event--
we should stop them from doing it and save us billions of
dollars--or it is a serious threat to our National defense
capabilities, and we ought to look in the same way in terms of
our domestic capabilities. That is, what sustains our standard
of living, but in some ways, a way of life for the American
public.
I don't want to be an alarmist on this. I want to be a
realist on this. That is why we have asked a number of people
to testify here today, so that we can get our hands around
this, at least a little better than we have to this point.
In today's hearing, we will examine the consequences of an
EMP attack, and examine whether we are adequately protecting
our power system and other critical infrastructure from this
growing vulnerability. My thought is that the more information,
the greater awareness the American people have and that we as
leaders have, the better we will be prepared to deal with this,
as long as we understand what the true consequences are.
Okay, and so at this point in time, I would recognize my
colleague from California for a statement representing her side
of the aisle.
[The statement of Chairman Lungren follows:]
Statement of Chairman Daniel E. Lungren
September 12, 2012
The Washington DC area was recently impacted by a deadly fast-
moving storm called a derecho which was one of the most destructive and
deadly thunderstorm systems in North American history. It resulted in
22 deaths, widespread damage and millions of power outages from the
Midwest to the Middle Atlantic States. This derecho provided a glimpse
of the kind of destruction that would result from an electromagnetic
pulse (EMP) attack. Falling trees and the loss of electric power caused
death and destruction from Chicago to Virginia. Fortunately, this power
outage was short-term, which limited the human and economic
consequences.
An EMP is a burst of electromagnetic radiation typically generated
by a high-altitude nuclear explosion or a non-nuclear device. Nuclear
weapon EMPs are most effective when detonated high in the altitude
above the intended target. Depending on the yield of the weapon and the
height of the explosion, nuclear EMPs can destroy large portions of the
U.S. power and communications infrastructure. Geomagnetic radiation
generated by a naturally occurring solar storm can also damage this
same infrastructure.
An EMP attack would destroy the electronics and digital circuitry
in the area of impact, denying electric power to our homes, businesses,
and military. Our country is dependent on electricity to power our
health, financial, transportation, and business systems. If our power
system was ever lost for an extended period, according to Dr. William
Graham the chairman of the EMP Commission, it would have catastrophic
and lethal consequences for our citizens and the economy. It would also
degrade our military defenses. America's digital dependence grows every
year and along with that dependence, our EMP vulnerability.
Computer simulations carried out in March 2010 by Oak Ridge
National Laboratories demonstrated that an electromagnetic pulse from a
nuclear device detonated at high attitude or a powerful solar storm
could destroy or permanently damage major sections of our National
power grid. According to this Oak Ridge Study, the collapse of our
power system could impact 130 million Americans, require 4 to 10 years
to fully recover and impose economic costs of $1 to $2 trillion.
The National electric grid has almost no backup capability in the
event of a power collapse from electromagnetic pulses. According to
FERC testimony presented this morning, existing bulk power reliability
standards don't even address EMP vulnerabilities. In addition, with
most of the Nation's power system under private ownership, who view an
EMP event as unlikely, there has been little preparation for a long-
term power collapse. Although the impact of an EMP event has been
examined, studied, and debated, little progress seems to have been made
in mitigating the EMP threat. Although the United States has conducted
numerous exercises to test our readiness against natural events such as
hurricanes, we have never conducted an exercise to help us prepare for
the severe consequences of a National power outage from an EMP event.
Today's hearing will examine the consequences of an EMP attack and
whether we're adequately protecting our power system and other critical
infrastructure from this growing vulnerability.
I now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentle lady from New York,
Ms. Clarke, for her opening statement.
Ms. Richardson. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and those
before us.
Before I start my prepared comments, I would like to
acknowledge the unfortunate passing of Ambassador Stevens of
Libya and also the several other Foreign Service personnel
members who we lost. It is times like these on both sides of
the aisle where it really doesn't matter that there is an
aisle. We are all here to serve this country and we are very
grateful for our Foreign Service personnel who advocate and, in
many instances, implement the policies that we have brought
forward. So I first would like to do that on behalf of all of
us.
Mr. Chairman Lungren and Ranking Member Clarke, it is very
good and I concur with the Chairman of convening this hearing
today on the threat of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that the
potential impacts that it could have on our critical
infrastructure, which we witnessed, unfortunately, several
months ago.
I look forward to this hearing from our esteemed panel of
witnesses, including our colleague Congressman Trent Franks.
I also welcome back Chris Beck to this hearing before our
subcommittee. It has been a pleasure working with you on this
subcommittee, and I look forward to your testimony.
An electronic magnetic pulse can be caused by solar
activity, nuclear explosions, lightning, or other sources. The
energy from any electromagnetic pulse can damage or destroy
electronics, such as cell phones, car computers, and computer
networks. We have found that we depend upon cell phones in
times of emergencies. It was quite alarming that through this
latest storm that we had, the tremendous impact that it had on
cell phones. We found them not to be immune and to be the sole
source of our means of communication.
Our electric grid is also vulnerable to electromagnetic
pulse. The EMP that knocks out our electric grid would have a
catastrophic consequence that could result in lives lost, as
well as having a devastating impact on our economy.
While an EMP attack on our electric grid is a high-impact,
low-frequency event, we need to be cognizant of its
consequences. We can and should take precautions to make our
electronics and our grid more resilient to an EMP incident.
The Department of Homeland Security has not identified EMP
as a high-risk threat, and thus has not included it in its 15
all-hazards National planning scenarios. I am interested to
hear from all of our witnesses today whether planning and
preparing for an EMP attack is appropriate.
I thank the Chairman and Representative Clarke for holding
this hearing today. I hope that we can learn forward how we
might best protect our critical infrastructure against natural
and terrorist threats.
Finally, I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, I would like to
ask unanimous consent that the opening statement of the full
committee Ranking Member Mr. Thompson be submitted for the
record.
Mr. Lungren. Without objection.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
September 12, 2012
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing on electromagnetic
pulse threats. I want to welcome our colleague, Mr. Franks, who will
testify about his bill, H.R. 668, the SHIELD Act, which has been
referred to the Energy and Commerce Committee, and the Budget
Committee.
I also want to welcome all of our witnesses, but especially Dr.
Chris Beck, a former staffer of this committee.
Scientists tell us that a geomagnetic solar storm capable of
affecting parts of the U.S. electrical grid is an event with a low
probability of occurrence. However, if such a thing were to occur, it
could have a serious impact on our electrical transmission system.
Our witnesses today will be able to shed some light on the
probability of such an event, and the likelihood and severity of the
effects on the electric grid and other critical infrastructure.
But in this time of increasingly tight budgets, we must depend on
risk analysis to guide us in making the tough decisions about our
priorities.
We know the electric grid is vulnerable to disruption. I am very
interested in the testimony today, to hear about how the Department of
Homeland Security assesses the risk of geomagnetic storms and other EMP
threats.
I am pleased that the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation has submitted a statement for the record. They are the
folks on the ground dealing with how the electric industry prepares for
grid vulnerabilities, and it is important that we listen carefully to
their findings.
Thank you again Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you. The next one, I will hold. Thank
you, sir. I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentlelady.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Clarke follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke
September 12, 2012
Good morning and thank you Mr. Chairman for holding this hearing on
our efforts to assess the EMP threat.
I too, also want to welcome our colleague, Mr. Franks, to the
subcommittee. He has helped write the road map for addressing the EMP
threat, and I am glad he is here to discuss his bill.
I also want to welcome our other witnesses today, and especially
Dr. Beck, who formerly was the staff director for this subcommittee and
is an expert on this matter. Welcome back Chris. I look forward to all
the testimony.
I believe it is important that we find the building blocks for a
partnership that will bring improvements to the security and
reliability of one of our most important critical infrastructures, the
electric grid.
This hearing will help give this topic the visibility it deserves.
We all know the grid plays a fundamental role in our lives, our
economy, and way of life. We simply cannot afford to lose broad
sections of the grid for days, or weeks.
It is our very reliance on this infrastructure that makes it
important to anticipate the worst, and there are many scenarios that we
should concerned about.
We are still learning about the significant threat that could come
in the form of a natural or manmade Electromagnetic Pulse, and we have
more to learn about the effects of an EMP and geomagnetic disturbances
to the grid as well.
Over the past few years, I have followed with interest Secure Grid
exercises that The National Defense University has held at Fort McNair.
These series of tabletop exercises on U.S. electrical grid security
have focused on the effects of a major geomagnetic storm on the
Nation's electrical infrastructure.
With the 12-year peak in solar activity approaching in 2012-2013,
there is considerable upturn in interest from Government agencies,
including the White House and Congress, in understanding the potential
impacts if a severe geomagnetic disturbance event should occur.
Although this is a low-probability event, the consequences of an
extended and widespread power loss across portions of the country would
constitute a serious National emergency.
To me, one of the largest barriers to Government agency disaster
response is cross-agency coordination and roles of authority--crucial
elements made more difficult when discussing the privately-owned
National electrical grid.
Ultimately, the Secure Grid exercises and other policy discussions
work to identify preparedness gaps in plans to manage the challenges
associated with extended power outages, and add urgency to existing
efforts to identify technology solutions to protect the U.S. grid.
Hearings such as this serve to highlight areas where the United
States and its Allies are analyzing the risks that a severe geomagnetic
disturbance would present, and help us look for international
approaches to effectively react to these risks.
While severe solar storms that create geomagnetic disturbances
cannot be prevented, there are tools and opportunities to mitigate and
protect the grid from the risks of such an event.
My colleagues on the Homeland Security Committee and I have spent
nearly 3 years identifying and reviewing the security protections that
are in place to mitigate the effects of any intentional or
unintentional attack on the electric system. Our goal is to determine
whether appropriate protections are in place that would mitigate
catastrophic incidents on the grid.
Our review has required extensive discussions and review with the
private sector, which owns, operates, and secures the grid. The private
sector develops its own security standards and also oversees compliance
with these standards. In short, the private sector has the
responsibility for securing the grid from electromagnetic events and
cyber attacks.
I am very pleased to see the statement for the record submitted by
the North American Electric Reliability Corporation. These are the
folks who are closest to the electric grid, and they manage an almost
impossibly complex flow of energy, not to just our 330-plus million
people, but also the flow of energy across our borders . . . every day.
Finally, the U.S. Congress has also acted. In June 2010, the GRID
Act passed the House of Representatives unanimously. Unfortunately, it
stalled in the Senate and did not become law.
The bill would have granted the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission expanded authorities to oversee electromagnetic and cyber
protections.
This Congress, Mr. Franks has introduced a version of the bill, now
called the SHIELD Act, which is similar to the GRID Act but focuses
only on the electromagnetic threat component without the cybersecurity
component.
I am a co-sponsor of that bill, and it is our hope that during the
next Congress we will get the bill through both Houses and to the
President's desk.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. Before I introduce our first witness, I have
written statements from the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation and private citizen, Mr. Nicholas Leggett. I ask
unanimous consent that these two statements may be made a part
of the record.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
September 12, 2012
The mission of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC) is to ensure the reliability of the bulk power system of North
America and promote reliability, excellence, and accountability in the
electric utility industry. In 2007, NERC was designated the Electric
Reliability Organization (ERO) by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) in accordance with Section 215 of the Federal Power
Act (FPA), enacted by the Energy Policy Act of 2005. To ensure the
reliability of the bulk power system, NERC relies on the combined
expertise of the North American electric power industry. NERC works
collaboratively with industry and Government experts to address issues
impacting the bulk power system, including the effects of geomagnetic
disturbances. NERC is pleased to provide written comments as requested
by the committee to discuss the differences between electromagnetic
pulses and geomagnetic disturbances, and provide an update on current
activities underway to address geomagnetic disturbances.
electromagnetic pulses vs. geomagnetic disturbances
Geomagnetic disturbances (GMDs) are part of a class of risks called
High-Impact, Low-Frequency (HILF) events. These events are
characterized by their potential to impose very large adverse impacts
on the electric power system (and other infrastructures in some cases),
their infrequent nature, and hence, the industry's limited experience
mitigating them. This group of risks includes major disasters such as
earthquakes, tsunamis, and pandemics. The group also includes man-made
phenomena such as electromagnetic pulses (EMPs) caused by high-altitude
nuclear blasts.
EMP attacks are often studied alongside, and confused with, GMDs.
One reason is that a component of an EMP, the E3 wave, is similar to a
GMD in its effects; however, the E3 wave has a larger magnitude and
shorter duration than a GMD, and it occurs after the grid has already
been exposed to the other more intense components of an EMP, the E1 and
E2 waves.\1\ As with GMD, the E3 component can induce currents that
couple to transmission lines and drive high-voltage transformers to
saturation, potentially disrupting or damaging equipment of the
electric power delivery system. There are significant differences
between EMP and GMD in both the nature of the threat, the science
behind their impacts, and the scale and form of potential solutions.
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\1\ Radasky, W. A., ``High-altitude EMP (HEMP) Environments and
Effects,'' NBC Report, Spring/Summer 2002, pp. 24-29.
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EMPs result from nuclear blasts that represent intentional acts of
war, something first and foremost in the domain of National defense and
security. For that reason, the Electricity Subsector Coordinating
Council (ESCC) concluded that NERC should focus its efforts on the risk
and underlying science behind the naturally-occurring phenomenon of
GMD.
overview--geomagnetic disturbances
Solar magnetic pulses emanate from the sun, causing GMDs on Earth.
According to space scientists, solar coronal holes and coronal mass
ejections are the two main categories of solar activity that drive
solar magnetic disturbances on Earth. Coronal mass ejections create a
large mass of charged solar energetic particles that escape from the
sun's halo (corona), traveling to Earth in 14 to 96 hours. These high-
energy particles consist of charged electrons, along with coronal and
solar wind ions.
GMDs are produced when a large coronal mass ejection occurs and is
directed at Earth. The interaction between the particle cloud and the
earth's magnetic field can cause geomagnetically-induced currents to
arise on the power system. The intensity of the effects on the power
system depends on a number of factors such as the polarity of the
magnetic structures created by the charged particle cloud, geomagnetic
latitude of the impacted system, directionality of the disturbance, and
geology (electrical conductivity of the ground), as well as power
system characteristics such as system configuration and power system
impedances.
Geomagnetically-induced currents can be measured directly using
monitors attached to the neutral connections of power transformers. The
measurements from these monitors, along with alerts and warnings issued
by the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
Space Weather Prediction Center or the Canadian Space Weather Forecast
Centre, can provide the key information that a GMD event is imminent or
in progress, and can support or trigger pre-planned operational
decisions and actions.
nerc and gmd
In November 2009, NERC and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) held
a 2-day workshop on HILF event risk to the North American Bulk Power
System. The proceedings of this workshop and recommendations were
documented in a jointly released report in 2010,\2\ which outlined a
plan to address these risks to the bulk power system, including
proposals for action and options to respond to GMDs.
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\2\ http://www.nerc.com/files/HILF.pdf.
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Following the release of the NERC and DOE June 2010 assessment, the
ESCC, chaired by NERC President and CEO Gerry Cauley, developed the
Strategic Roadmap to address HILF events through an organized
combination of industry-led task forces and initiatives, including the
formation of a NERC GMD Task Force. FERC held a technical conference on
GMD in February 2011, and NERC held a workshop in April 2011 to develop
strategies and plans to address this risk. NERC released a NERC Alert
\3\ to the industry on GMDs in May 2011, providing bulk power system
owners and operators with immediate operating and planning actions that
could be taken to mitigate the impact of a large geomagnetic storm.
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\3\ http://www.nerc.com/fileUploads/File/Events%20Analysis/A-2011-
05-10-01_GMD- _FINAL.pdf.
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NERC issued a Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report on GMDs
(Interim Report)\4\ in February 2012. The report highlights the
potential for voltage collapse and the damage or loss of a limited
number of vulnerable transformers across the North American bulk power
system. Previous examples of the impact of GMDs, such as a 1989 event
which led to the fast collapse of the Hydro Quebec system, showed these
effects. The 1989 event left more than 6 million people without power
for 9 hours, demonstrating that severe solar storms represent a serious
risk that can challenge the reliability of the bulk power system.
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\4\ http://www.nerc.com/files/2012GMD.pdf.
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implementing the task force recommendations and next steps
In May of 2012, NERC filed comments \5\ with the FERC addressing
the recommendations outlined in the Interim Report. NERC is currently
implementing a Phase 2 workplan \6\ for the reconvened NERC GMD Task
Force that outlines the specific tasks necessary to support these
recommendations.
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\5\ http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/common/
OpenNat.asp?fileID=12989318.
\6\ http://www.nerc.com/docs/pc/gmdtf/
GMD_Phase_2_Project_Plan_APPROVED.pdf.
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NERC is coordinating its efforts on GMD with agencies and other
stakeholder groups in the United States and Canada such as DOE, NOAA,
SpaceWeather Canada, the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Natural
Resources Canada (NRCan), the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), the Canadian Space Agency, the Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI), the Institute for Electrical and Electronic
Engineers (IEEE), the North American Transmission Forum, and other
industry and scientific organizations. These efforts are focused on two
key areas: (1) Assessing the vulnerability of the North American
transformer fleet, using power system modeling with space weather
simulation and transformer thermal characteristics; and (2) surveying
the industry for best practices in operations to respond to GMDs and
updating the NERC Industry Alert. In tandem with these efforts, and in
support of other HILF events, NERC has released a revamped Spare
Equipment Database to support the sharing of equipment amongst entities
in the face of a catastrophic event.
The potential for voltage collapse and the loss of even a limited
number of transformers as a result of a GMD is a serious issue that
should be addressed to minimize the effects on bulk power system
reliability. NERC, through industry groups and the membership of the
NERC GMD Task Force, is working to provide power system planners and
operators with the necessary information to develop better design
criteria to withstand GMDs, the tools to identify problems that may
result from GMDs, improved operating procedures to protect reliability
in response to GMDs event, and mitigating approaches to address impacts
of GMDs. The approaches and need for action may differ depending on the
geomagnetic latitude, geology, as well as transformer design and
health.
To supplement the work of the NERC GMD Task Force, NERC, EPRI, DOE,
and 12 industry organizations have funded a collaborative research and
development project focused on developing and enhancing tools to better
prepare and manage effects from strong GMDs. Open-source software to
calculate geomagnetically-induced current has been developed, and
several commercial software vendors are incorporating GMD studies into
their power flow packages, so that commonly-used off-the-shelf tools
will soon be available for industry planners to study the impact of GMD
on their systems. Additionally, the recent release of publically
available ``1-in-100-year'' wave-forms by NASA will facilitate industry
benchmarking and establish common frames of reference for comparative
analysis.
The primary goals of the NERC GMD Task Force in its continuing work
are to:
Provide industry subject-matter expertise and volunteer
industry participation as appropriate in the development of
tools and practices to study and mitigate the effects of GMDs;
Motivate, review, and verify (where applicable) the work
products of NERC and other industry and scientific
organizations in support of power system and transformer
vulnerability assessment, improved operational practices, and
information exchange;
Augment and finalize the Interim Report on GMD; and
Set an industry path forward towards addressing identified
vulnerabilities.
The four key activities to support these goals are:
1. Vulnerability assessment through system analysis, to enhance
system design, operating procedures, and mitigation techniques;
2. Training of planners and operators;
3. Spare equipment inventory management; and
4. Development of improved transformer specifications to withstand
geomagnetically-induced current (GIC).
1. vulnerability assessment through system analysis, to enhance system
design, operating procedures, and mitigation techniques
The conclusions of the 2012 Interim Report on GMDs will be
validated through detailed vulnerability assessment of the North
American grid, undertaken by industry experts with the support of NERC
GMD Task Force members, with final results being published in 2013.
This joint effort will specifically examine transformer vulnerability
and will take into consideration the two primary risks to reliability
from GMDs: Reactive power loss and transformer hot spot heating. These
two phenomena involve two very different time constants: Seconds for
reactive power loss and potential voltage collapse, compared to several
minutes for transformer heating.
NERC has supported the development of publicly-available simulation
software to support this vulnerability assessment. Commercial software
vendors are now leveraging this work to incorporate GMD studies into
off-the-shelf tools. Transformer reactive power and thermal models are
being validated to focus attention on the appropriate characteristics
of the system. This information will be used to complete the high-level
vulnerability assessment which can be used to further industry
discussion on mitigation strategies. To complete the vulnerability
assessment, NERC is working with the private sector and with
Governmental agencies. For example, the NERC GMD Task Force is working
with:
Transformer vendors, to determine the thermal
characteristics of hot spot heating due to geomagnetic-induced
currents to identify the risk associated with specific
transformer types;
U.S. Geological Survey and Natural Resources Canada, to
improve the ground impedance maps of North America, which will
improve modeling of the electric fields that cause
geomagnetically-induced currents;
Interconnection modeling groups, to improve power system
models so the effects of GMDs on and across grids can be
simulated;
NASA and the Canadian Space Agency, to develop a credible
basis for GMD scenario development, which can differ based on
geology and geomagnetic latitude, as well as develop the
theoretical maximum GMD; and
The North American Transmission Forum, to support review of
confidential information on bulk power system and equipment
performance, as well as, to support the vulnerability
assessment.
To support these activities, over the next few months NERC will
pursue an industry voluntary data request on the existing transformer
fleet to gather the important transformer characteristics with respect
to the risks to reliability. The data collected through this request
would remain confidential and would be subject to NERC's Rules of
Procedures regarding data confidentiality. If necessary, NERC can make
a mandatory request for information under Section 1600 of its Rules of
Procedure.
Further, in the next few months, the NERC GMD Task Force will
review and update the existing NERC Alert on GMDs, to ensure that the
guidance given reflects the most recent information.
2. Training of planners and operators
NERC will continue to educate industry on GMDs, work with industry
to refine operator tools and procedures, and have industry consider
actions such as preemptively increasing reserves, enabling forced
cooling, or taking equipment out of service in advance of a GMD. As
part of this transfer of knowledge, it will be vital that open-source
models are developed to facilitate industry learning, study, and
action. Further, NERC will also add GMD training as part of its
existing Operator Certification program.
3. Spare equipment inventory management
The industry continues to demonstrate its commitment to reliability
in the response to HILF events. One example is the development of
programs to share spare equipment in the event of a severe event.
NERC's Spare Equipment Database has been upgraded with specific focus
on spare transformers. The Spare Equipment Database is a voluntary
program whereby owners of long lead-time transformers would share
information about their spare equipment to facilitate potential
equipment sharing.
4. Development of improved transformer specifications to withstand GIC
As a result of NERC GMD Task Force activities, the IEEE
Transformers committee has begun development on a guide on transformer
and step response specifications to meet the service conditions related
to a GMD, as well as, the magnitude and stress cycle due to
geomagnetically-induced current that transformers should be designed to
withstand. This project was initiated at the spring 2012 meeting of the
IEEE Transformers Committee, and NERC will continue to collaborate with
the IEEE on the progress of this effort and provide technical expertise
as warranted to its conclusion.
Over the next 12 months, the NERC GMD Task Force will continue
working with experts from across the science and engineering spectrum
to develop the tools and training necessary for the industry to
incorporate GMD study and mitigation as regular planning and operating
practice. Just as they prepare for earthquakes, hurricanes, and
snowstorms, preparations for GMDs should be a part of the electric
industry's on-going efforts in the future.
important role for the government
From an operational perspective, more useful GMD forecasting is
needed to support operator action. NOAA and SpaceWeather Canada need to
enhance warning time frames and granularity of forecasts so industry
can take the right action, in the most affected parts of North America.
To ensure that the agencies can provide timely and detailed forecasts,
it will be crucial that their efforts in satellite development and
replacement, event simulation and prediction, and communications
methods to the industry be maintained and enhanced.
conclusion
Work is underway to address the recommendations for industry in the
NERC Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report on GMDs. NERC and
its stakeholders have made measureable progress toward mitigating the
potential reliability impacts of GMDs, by characterizing the
reliability issues and risk, gathering industry experts to focus on
short- and long-term solutions, identifying spare equipment data for
collection, assessing bulk power system resiliency through improved
modeling, and alerting industry to potential actions they can take to
fortify their systems from the risks posed.
NERC is addressing GMD in an open forum with a transparent process,
leveraging the expertise of utility members, the scientific community,
and equipment manufacturers, to guide the development of the necessary
tools and training that will enable the industry to determine
appropriate responses for its unique but interconnected systems.
Substantial work remains to further the understanding of the impacts
from GMDs, to continue improving the scientific methods used in its
study, to demonstrate solutions, and to support the development as well
as implementation of mitigation measures in a cost-effective manner.
______
Statement of Nickolaus E. Leggett, N3NL, Analyst, Amateur Radio
Operator, Inventor, U.S. Citizen
September 12, 2012
My name is Nickolaus E. Leggett. I am an analyst, amateur radio
operator, commercial radio operator, and an inventor who is resident in
Reston, Virginia. I have been a Federally-licensed amateur radio
operator since the 1960s. My amateur radio call sign is N3NL. I am a
credentialed electronics technician (ISCET and iNARTE) and I am an
inventor with three United States Patents--U.S. Patents 3,280,929,
3,280,930, and 6,771,935.
executive summary
My testimony discusses the need to develop protections from the
effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and solar geomagnetic storms.
The first step is to get Governmental agencies to hold public hearings
on EMP and suitable protections.
the nature of electromagnetic pulse (emp)
Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) is a serious threat to the continued
existence of the United States as a major military, economic, and
social power. Indeed, EMP is a major threat to the continued existence
of the United States in any form.
High-altitude Electromagnetic Pulse (HEMP) is the generation of a
very intense pulse of radio waves using a nuclear weapon or device
exploded in space near the Earth. The radiation from the nuclear bomb
excites and agitates the Earth's ionosphere which generates a large
zone of intense radio waves that can disable electronic equipment and
communications equipment throughout the Nation. Several years ago, the
Congress commissioned a detailed study of EMP that can be accessed on-
line. Refer to Note 1 at the end of this document.
consequences of electromagnetic pulse attacks
A HEMP attack consisting of a single high-yield nuclear weapon
exploded a couple of hundred miles above the United States would
disable electronics and communications through most of the Nation. Most
of our Nation's electronic infrastructure uses solid-state electronics
and microprocessors that are quite vulnerable to electromagnetic pulse.
The failure of much of our electronics infrastructure would cause
serious problems in supplying food, water, electric power, and
communications to our population. In addition, the functions of
business, government, and law enforcement would be greatly impaired.
Panic, rioting, and the failure of law and order would probably occur.
lack of action by the federal communications commission
I have devoted many years of my life to bringing the EMP threat to
the attention of the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Donald J.
Schellhardt and I have submitted two formal petitions to the FCC
calling for a Notice of Inquiry (NOI) and a Notice of Proposed Rule
Making (NPRM) on EMP. Refer to Note 4. In addition, we have filed other
formal comments with the Commission on this subject. The FCC has
declined to take any positive action on EMP.
I am rather puzzled that the FCC refuses to act to protect our
communications infrastructure from EMP. The subject is certainly
interesting and it would be desirable to avoid the great damage that
would result from any EMP attack. There is ample evidence that EMP is a
real and serious threat to the Nation. Certainly, if an EMP attack did
occur, the Nation would not be friendly towards the decision makers who
refused to protect against EMP attacks and their consequences.
hostile nations
We can all easily imagine several nations that would be quite happy
if the United States were to collapse in response to an EMP attack. In
their view, EMP would be a rather convenient method for deleting a
major competitor. While launching a missile with a warhead from a ship
is not an easy task, it is certainly easier than other methods of
eliminating the United States. Also, the structure of the United States
may become so shattered by an attack that other nations could actually
colonize parts of the former United States.
proposed congressional actions
The Congress should request or require the FCC to hold rulemaking
hearings on electromagnetic pulse and effective methods to protect
communications equipment from it. Probably some form of shielding
should be required to protect critical communications equipment.
Similarly, Congress could require the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) to hold hearings on protecting the electric power
industry and other energy industries from EMP effects. Similarly, the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) should have hearings on EMP
impacts on air navigation technology and on the operation of aircraft
engines.
Also, the Congress can consider legislation that would require that
critical infrastructure be shielded against EMP. In developing this
legislation, the Congress can consult with the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) that has developed detailed standards
on protection of infrastructure from EMP.
solar geomagnetic storms
Congress also needs to examine the related natural phenomenon of
solar geomagnetic storms. This natural phenomenon has a different
physics from EMP but it is related. An intense solar storm can have a
similar comprehensive effect that would result in the failure of the
electric energy grid and other aspects of the infrastructure. Refer to
Note 2. Federal agencies should be required to have hearings on solar
geomagnetic storms.
amateur radio
Amateur radio can perform local and long-distance communications
during and after these chaotic events. Congress should establish
legislation that would allow amateur radio operators to establish
minimum-sized amateur radio antennas despite opposition of homeowner
associations, condominium managements, and rental landlords.
our duty
It is in the Nation's interest that we all work to develop and
apply effective protections against EMP attacks. Mr. Schellhardt and I
have spent many years on this subject. Now Congress needs to move ahead
constructively and deal with EMP threats.
Appendix A--References on Solar Geomagnetic Storms and Electromagnetic
Pulse
Note 1
The text of the Congressional Commission to Assess the Threat to
the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack is available
at the web site: www.empcommission.org.
This document confirms the serious impact of an EMP attack on the
infrastructure of the United States.
Note 2
Severe Space Weather Events--Understanding Societal and Economic
Impacts--A Workshop Report, National Academy of Sciences, National
Academies Press, Publication Year 2008, PAPERBACK, ISBN-10:0-309-12769-
6, ISBN-13:978-0-309-12769-1.
This document can be accessed on-line at the URL: http://
www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=12507.
Note 3
H. Robert Schroeder, ``Electromagnetic Pulse and Its Implications
for EmComm'', QST magazine, November 2009, pages 38 through 41. [The
term EmComm refers to emergency communication.]
Note 4
Petitions to the Federal Communications Commission by Donald J.
Schellhardt and Nickolaus E. Leggett:
Docket RM-5528, Request to Consider Requirements for Shielding and
Bypassing Civilian Communications Systems from Electromagnetic
Pulse (EMP) Effects.
Docket RM-10330, Amendment of the Commission's Rules to Shield
Electronics Equipment Against Acts of War or Terrorism
Involving Hostile Use of Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP).
Note 5
Daniel N. Baker and James L. Green, ``The Perfect Solar
Superstorm'', Sky & Telescope, February 2011, Vol. 121 No. 2, Pages 28-
34.
Note 6
Publications Dealing with the Protection of Civil Equipment and
Systems from the Effects of HEMP and HPEM--Issued by the International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) SC 77C.
Note 7
Mark Clayton, ``Is US Ready for a `Solar Tsunami'? ``The Christian
Science Monitor, June 27, 2011, Page 20.
Note 8
H.R. 668, Secure High-voltage Infrastructure for Electricity from
Lethal Damage Act (SHIELD Act). This bill was introduced on February
11, 2011. This bill addresses the subjects of solar geomagnetic storms
and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) impacting the electric power industry.
Mr. Lungren. We are pleased to have several panels of
distinguished witnesses before us today. The sole witness of
our first panel is Congressman Trent Franks. He represents
Arizona's second Congressional district, serves on the Armed
Services Committee and the Judiciary Committee, where he
currently chairs the Constitutional Law Subcommittee. In
addition, Congressman Franks serves as the co-chair of the
Congressional EMP Caucus, and has studied this issue for
several years.
The Chairman now recognizes Congressman Franks for his
statement. As a witness, you know our routine here--5 minutes
and your full written statement will be included in the record.
STATEMENT OF HON. TRENT FRANKS, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS
FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning to
you, sir. Good morning to Representative Clarke and the other
Members of the committee. I am especially grateful to be here
before you all.
Mr. Chairman, I would suggest to you that I am critically
grateful to you for your knowledge and for your commitment to
this issue. Your opening statement leaves little to add, but I
will do my best.
The reality of the potential devastating effects of
sufficiently intense electromagnetic pulse on the electronic
systems and sources of many of our critical defense and
National security components is well-established, Mr. Chairman.
As a Nation, we have spent billions of dollars over the
years hardening our nuclear triad, our missile defense
capabilities, and numerous other critical elements of our
National security apparatus against the effects of
electromagnetic pulse, particularly the type that might be
generated by a high-altitude nuclear warhead detonation over
our country by one of America's enemies.
However, our civilian grid, which the Defense Department
relies upon for nearly 99 percent of its electricity needs, is
completely vulnerable to the same kind of danger. This
constitutes an invitation, in my opinion, on the part of
certain enemies of the United States to use the asymmetric
capability of EMP against us. There is now evidence that such
strategies are being considered by certain of those enemies.
We recently witnessed, as you said, Mr. Chairman, the chaos
that attends a prolonged power outage when the derecho storm
impacted the District of Columbia and the surrounding area. Our
sick and elderly suffered without air conditioning. Grocery
stores were unable to keep food fresh. Gas lines grew.
Thankfully, the derecho had only a regional and limited impact.
In 2004 and 2008, the EMP Commission testified before the
Armed Services Committee, of which I am a member, that the U.S.
society and economy are so critically dependent upon the
availability of electricity that a significant collapse of our
grid precipitated by a major natural or manmade EMP event could
result in catastrophic civilian casualties. This conclusion is
echoed by separate reports recently compiled by the DOD, DHS,
DOE, NAS, along with various other agencies and independent
researchers.
Now I am heartened, Mr. Chairman, by the efforts of DHS to
address the vulnerabilities EMP poses to our grid, including
the recovery transformer and resilient electric grid projects.
However, while these projects are well-intentioned and a major
positive step in the right direction, they do not go far enough
to adequately protect our grid and our Nation against a
catastrophic, continental-wide EMP event.
Our first priority should always be National security. To
that end, I have introduced H.R. 668, the Shield Act, which
among other things, requires automated hardware-based
solutions, rather than relying upon procedural safety measures
alone to protect our Nation's major transformers from a
cascading, destructive effect catalyzed by a major EMP event.
According to solar weather experts, there is only a 20- to
30-minute warning from the time we can actually predict a solar
storm may affect us significantly to the time that it actually
does. This is not enough time to implement procedures that will
adequately protect the grid. Furthermore, these predictions are
only accurate one out of three times. This places a crushing
dilemma on industry who must decide whether or not to heed the
warning with the knowledge that a wrong decision, either way,
could result in the loss of thousands or even perhaps millions
of lives and massive legal ramifications beyond expression.
Additionally, while there are those certainly who believe
that the likelihood of terrorists or rogue nations obtaining
nuclear weapons and using them in an EMP attack is remote, the
recent events of the Arab Spring, which our intelligence
apparatus did not foresee, show us that regimes can change very
quickly. Iran's increasingly obvious efforts to gain nuclear
weapons should serve as a grave and urgent warning to all of
us.
Thankfully, Mr. Chairman and Members, there is a moment in
the life of every problem, when it is big enough to be seen by
reasonable people and still small enough to be solved or
addressed. You and I live in that moment when there still may
be time for the free world to address and mitigate the
vulnerability that naturally occurring or weaponized EMP
represents to the mechanisms of our civilization.
Your actions today to protect America may gain you no fame
or fanfare in the annals of history. However, it may happen in
your lifetime that natural, manmade, or other types of EMP may
have an event so large and have an effect so small that no one
but a few will recognize that was averted. For the sake of our
children and future generations, I pray it happens exactly that
way.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. God bless you all for hearing
this. I welcome Ms. Clarke. Thank you, sir.
[The statement of Mr. Franks follows:]
Prepared Statement of Honorable Trent Franks
Good morning Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and the rest
of my fellow Members on the committee. I believe the subject of this
hearing is one of profound implication and importance to Western
civilization, and consequently I hope the Members will feel inclined to
read my written testimony--and I thank you for allowing me to testify
here today.
In our technological advancement, we have now captured the electron
and transported its utility into nearly every business, home, and
industrial endeavor throughout the civilized world. In so doing, we
have advanced our standard of living and productivity beyond dreams.
But we have also grown profoundly dependent upon electricity and its
many accoutrements. In keeping with one of humanity's most reliable
hallmarks, we now find among our greatest strengths an unsettling
vulnerability . . . EMP . . . Electromagnetic Pulse.
Catalyzed by a major solar storm, a high-altitude nuclear blast, or
a non-nuclear, device-induced Intentional Electromagnetic Interference,
this invisible force of ionized particles has the capability to
overwhelm and destroy our present electrical power grids and electrical
equipment, including electronic communication networks, radio
equipment, integrated circuits, and computers.
The reality of the potentially devastating effects of sufficiently
intense electromagnetic pulse on the electronic systems/sources of many
of our critical defense and National security components is well-
established, and beyond dispute. We as a Nation have spent billions of
dollars over the years hardening our nuclear triad, our missile-defense
capabilities, and numerous other critical elements of our National
security apparatus against the effects of electromagnetic pulse,
particularly the type of electromagnetic pulse that might be generated
against us by an enemy. However, our civilian grid, which the Defense
Department relies upon for nearly 99% of its electricity needs, is
completely vulnerable to the same kind of danger. This constitutes an
invitation on the part of certain enemies of the United States to use
the asymmetric capability of an EMP weapon against us, and there is now
evidence that such strategy is being considered by certain of those
enemies.
The effects of geomagnetic storms and electromagnetic pulses on
electric infrastructure are well-documented, with nearly every space
weather and EMP expert recognizing the dramatic disruptions and
cataclysmic collapses these pulses can bring to electric grids. We all
recently witnessed the chaos that ensues a prolonged power outage when
the derecho storm impacted the District of Columbia. Sick and elderly
suffered without air conditioning, grocery stores labored to keep food
fresh, and gas lines grew. Thankfully, the derecho was only regional in
its impact and limited in its effects.
In 2004 and 2008 the EMP Commission testified before The Armed
Services Committee, of which I am a member, that the U.S. society and
economy are so critically dependent upon the availability of
electricity that a significant collapse of the grid, precipitated by a
major natural or man-made EMP event, could result in catastrophic
civilian casualties. This conclusion is echoed by separate reports
recently compiled by the DOD, DHS, DOE, NAS, along with various other
Government agencies and independent researchers. All came to very
similar conclusions. The sobering reality is that this vulnerability,
if left unaddressed, could have grave, societal-altering consequences.
I am heartened by the efforts of DHS to address the vulnerabilities
EMP poses to our grid, including the Recovery Transformer and Resilient
Electric Grid Projects. However, while these projects are well-
intentioned and a positive step forward, they do not go far enough to
adequately protect our grid and our Nation against a catastrophic,
continental-wide EMP event.
Like many of you, I believe Federal regulation should be very
limited. Our first National security priority in this instance is to
protect our major transformers from cascading destruction. To that end,
I have introduced the SHIELD Act which, among other things, requires
automated hardware-based solutions rather than procedural safety
measures alone. And the SHIELD Act does not contain cybersecurity
provisions, leaving the conflicting approaches to that extremely
important issue, among members of the Senate in particular, to be
debated in a separate bill.
Automated hardware is particularly important when one considers the
shortcomings of procedural safety measures alone in response to an EMP
event. According to solar weather experts, there is only 20-30 minutes'
warning from the time we predict a solar storm may affect us to the
time it actually does. This is simply not enough time to implement
procedures that will adequately protect the grid. Furthermore, these
predictions are only accurate one out of three times. This places a
crushing dilemma on industry, who must decide whether or not to heed
the warning with the knowledge that a wrong decision either way could
result in the loss of thousands or even millions of lives and massive
legal ramifications beyond expression.
Mr. Chairman, the phenomenon of natural and man-made
electromagnetic pulse is not a new one.
In 1859, English Astronomer Richard Carrington discovered the cause
of natural EMP when he identified and chronicled a major geomagnetic
solar storm which brilliantly intensified the Northern lights and
caused the telegraph system, the only major electrical system that
existed on earth at that time, to go down across the planet. The
National Academy of Sciences predicts this effect, to a lesser or
greater degree, will recur globally approximately once every 100 years.
In 1962, the United States discovered that a high-altitude nuclear
blast could generate a more localized electromagnetic pulse of the same
intensity as the Carrington effect. In an upper atmospheric nuclear
test called Starfish Prime, an EMP occurred and electric lines were
fused and radios and street lights stopped working in Hawaii nearly 900
miles away. The residual effects also disabled nearly all major
satellites systems.
Because of new understandings of how EMP interacts with the Earth's
electromagnetic field, and that it is intensified over large land mass,
we now believe that if a warhead with a nuclear yield of just 100
kilotons detonated at an altitude of 400 kilometers over America's
heartland, the resulting damage to our electric grid and infrastructure
would be catastrophic across most of the continental United States.
Such a result would be devastating to our electricity, transportation,
water and food supply, medical care, financial networks,
telecommunication and broadcasting systems and our infrastructure in
general. Under such a scenario, both military and productive capability
would be devastated. The immediate and eventual impact, directly and
indirectly, on the human population, especially in major cities, is
unthinkable.
It should be remembered that EMP was first considered as a military
weapon during the ``Cold War'' as a means of paralyzing U.S.
retaliatory forces.
America's EMP commission began their 70-page executive summary
describing a one- or two-missile EMP attack as one of the few threats
which look as if it could defeat the U.S. military.
Dr. William Graham, the chairman of the EMP Commission, testified
before the U.S. House Armed Services Committee, and stated:
``EMP is one of a small number of threats that can hold our society at
risk of catastrophic consequences.
`` . . . A determined adversary can achieve an EMP attack capability
without having a high level of sophistication. For example, an
adversary would not have to have long-range ballistic missiles to
conduct an EMP attack against the United States. Such an attack could
be launched from a freighter off the U.S. coast using a short- or
medium-range missile to loft a nuclear warhead to high altitude.
Terrorists sponsored by a rogue state could potentially execute such an
attack without revealing their identity.''
Dr. Graham has said that a major catastrophic EMP attack on the
United States could cause an estimated 70-90 percent of the our
Nation's population to become unsustainable.
It is impossible for me to even wrap my mind around that figure.
But for terrorists, this is their ultimate goal, and I believe EMP
is their ultimate asymmetric weapon. In 1988, Osama bin Laden called it
a religious duty for al-Qaeda to acquire nuclear weapons. U.S. Admiral
Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has stated:
``My worst nightmare is terrorists with nuclear weapons. Not only do I
know they are trying to get them, but I know they will use them.''
This is indeed the greatest danger of all. If a rogue state like
Iran steps over the nuclear threshold, rogue regimes and terrorists the
world over will have access to these monstrous weapons.
We do well to remember that Iran, the world's leading sponsor of
international terrorism, has practiced launching a mobile ballistic
missile from a vessel in the Caspian Sea. Iran has also tested high-
altitude explosions of the Shahab-III, a test mode consistent with an
EMP attack, and described the tests as successful. We have also
discovered an Iranian military journal that included an article
recommending such a strategy. The article noted that if major Western
nations do not learn to defend themselves against EMP attacks, they
will be destroyed.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad again made it clear where he stands on Israel
when he declared, ``[Israel] is about to die and will soon be erased
from the geographical scene.''
Jewish author, Primo Levi, was once asked what he had learned from
the Holocaust. He replied, ``When a man with a gun says he's going to
kill you--believe him.''
At this moment, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a man who,
in the same breath, both denies the Holocaust ever occurred, and then
threatens to make it happen again, is arrogantly seeking a gun with
which he vows to wipe the state of Israel off the map.
He has also said: ``The time for the fall of the satanic power of
the United States has come and the countdown to the annihilation of the
emperor of power and wealth has started.'' He has said point-blank,
``The wave of the Islamist revolution will soon reach the entire
world.''
What a happy cheerful, fellow . . .
Unfortunately, he talks like a man who knows something the rest of
us don't.
It is not enough, to casually dismiss his fanatical rhetoric. When
analyzing the nature of any threat, we must always seriously assess two
things: A potential enemy's intent and his corresponding capacity to
carry out any such intent.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his regime have stated very clearly their
intent to see Israel wiped off the face of the earth and America and
the West brought to their knees. Nuclear warheads could give them the
capacity to effectively proceed in that endeavor; and to ignore the
incontrovertible fact that Iran is rapidly progressing toward a nuclear
weapons capability, is to resign ourselves and our children to live and
walk in the shadow of nuclear terrorism.
Mr. Chairman and Members, these things should not surprise us. We
are now 65 years into the nuclear age, and the ominous intersection of
jihadist terrorism and nuclear proliferation has been inexorably and
relentlessly rolling toward America and the free world for decades.
But, when we add the dimension of asymmetric electromagnetic pulse
attacks to that equation, we face a menace that may represent the
gravest short-term threat to the peace and security of the human family
in the world today.
Certainly there are those who believe that the likelihood of
terrorists or rogue states obtaining nuclear weapons and using them in
an EMP attack is remote. It may be a reasonable conclusion for the
moment. But the recent events of the Arab Spring, which our
intelligence apparatus did not foresee, show us that regimes can change
very quickly. Is a regime change in Pakistan possible? Will there be
blowback from our involvement in Libya? What about the current crisis
in Syria? Will North Korea ever supply or sell it nuclear technology or
warheads to terrorists? Will Iran develop or obtain nuclear weapons?
Iran's increasingly obvious efforts to gain nuclear weapons should
serve as a grave and urgent warning to all of us.
If terrorists or rogue states do acquire nuclear weapons, hardening
our electric grid would become a desperate priority for our Nation.
However, that process will take several years, while a regime change
takes only weeks and a missile launch only minutes. The fact that we
are now 100% vulnerable means we should start securing our electric
infrastructure now. Indeed, by reducing our vulnerability we may reduce
the likelihood that terrorists or rogue states would attempt such an
attack.
We should always remember that 7 decades ago, another murderous
ideology arose in the world. The dark shadow of the Nazi swastika fell
first upon the Jewish people of Germany. And because the world did not
heed the warnings of men like Winston Churchill and respond to that
evil in time, it began to spread across Europe until it lit the fires
of World War II's hell on earth which saw atomic bombs fall upon cities
and over 50 million people dead worldwide.
History has repeatedly shown humanity to be susceptible to
malignant dangers that approach inaudibly and nestle among us with
innocuous countenance until a day of sudden calamity finds us empty-
handed, broken-hearted, and without excuse.
Thankfully, Mr. Chairman and Members, there is a moment in the life
of nearly every problem when it is big enough to be seen by reasonable
people and still small enough to be solved. You and I live in that
moment when there still may be time for the free world to address and
mitigate the vulnerability that naturally occurring or weaponized EMP
represents to the mechanisms of our civilization.
The challenge to ultimately and fully protect our peoples and
nations from all of the various perils of natural or man-made
electromagnetic pulse will be long and lingering. But the time to
protect our Nation from the most devastating scenario is now; the
threat is real, and the implications are sobering.
America's Brink Lindsey said it it this way: ``Here is the grim
truth: We are only one act of madness away from a social cataclysm
unlike anything our country has ever known. After a handful of such
acts, who knows what kind of civilizational breakdown might be in
store?''
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, the first purpose of any
government or its leaders is to protect the lives and security of its
innocent citizens. The failure of this responsibility renders all
others meaningless.
Your actions today to protect America may gain you no fame or
fanfare in the annals of history. However, it may happen in your
lifetime that a natural or man-made EMP event so big has an effect so
small that no one but a few will recognize the disaster that was
averted. For the sake of our children and future generations, I pray it
happens exactly that way.
Thank you and God bless all of you.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Congressman Franks. I
appreciate the leadership that you have shown in this
particular area.
There are some that have suggested that EMP attack or an
EMP event, if naturally caused, is not that serious--that there
is sort of an alarmist tone to statements to the public that
this is an issue about which they should be concerned. How do
you respond to that?
Mr. Franks. Well, first, in the sincerest way that I can
express to you, I pray they are correct. I hope that there is
just some overreaction on the part of all of us. But I will say
to you, if that is true, then your seminal point made earlier
that the military is spending a great deal of unnecessary money
hardening our military apparatus should be considered
carefully.
There is no question about the reality of the effects of
EMP if there is a sufficient surge. We have got a great deal of
research in that regard and to ignore that would be to ignore
some of the major reports not only by the EMP Commission, but
the Department of Defense. There are somewhere between six and
nine major reports now in Government--and I will certainly
refer you to the experts that will follow me that testify
clearly to the danger.
The challenge before us is to ascertain exactly what that
danger is. We suggest to you that we don't know fully what it
is. But something that has the potential to have this kind of
catastrophic effect should be considered carefully.
Mr. Lungren. Where is the failure? Is the failure with the
Congress? Is the failure with the Executive branch? Is the
failure with critical infrastructure owners? If this is as
serious as you suggest, as some of these reports suggest, the
lack of attention to it is something that bewilders me.
I mean you have been involved in a lot of issues on the
Armed Services Committee and so forth, and I am trying to
figure out what is it that is lacking on this issue that does
not garner the attention of the American people? In other
words, is there a lack of consensus about the threat? I mean is
there a serious question that--from your standpoint--is there a
serious question about whether this is a serious issue?
Mr. Franks. No, I think, Mr. Chairman, that is probably the
most important question that we have to ask. I would only
suggest to you that when the EMP Commission came to the Armed
Services Committee in 2004, I had been aware of EMP. My
background is engineering. I had been aware of it, but I
thought it was like something that could be catastrophic, but
the chances of it happening were so remote. I just didn't see
that happening.
The testimony was that other nations--there were five
nations at the time that were developing this as an offensive
capability. Certainly, the Soviet Union had a major EMP
component in their nuclear strategy.
So there is a dichotomy here that I don't exactly
understand in the military, among our National security
experts, there is clear consensus of the danger this
represents. However, when you go over into the civilian areas,
it seemed like there is a general, sort of a lackadaisical,
kind of a----
Mr. Lungren. Let me ask you about that, because I have
found most people who are involved in critical infrastructure
in the private sector are serious-minded folks. They do
recognize the value of their assets. In most cases, when I am
dealing with them on issues, I find them to be forward-thinking
and to actually try and protect those assets. They articulate
that in a way so that they can justify certain capital
investments to their shareholders or their ratepayers.
Well, let me ask you this: Do you find the attention to the
protection of their assets that you believe to be necessary,
and if not, why as the owners and protectors of those assets,
is this not taken more seriously?
Mr. Franks. I think that is a good question. It has been
something that has bewildered me to a degree. It seemed just a
few years ago, as this became more well known that there was a
more serious--or at least a more recognizable response. It
seemed like in the recent just past last year, there has been
sort of a pushback in parts of industry.
My concern is if they have credible, scientific bases for
being unconcerned or not addressing it as vigorously as some of
us think that it should be, then I would adjure them to bring
that testimony and that evidence to the rest of us. Because I
can suggest to you that I haven't seen it.
It may be that there is some concern on the part of major
manufacturers of these large components, transformers and
others, that are somewhat out of professional pride. That they
either don't want to recognize the danger or somehow they feel
like that there would be some requirement of reengineering of
some of these major components if they did.
But I would suggest that the potential liability here is
off the charts. The fix here--and this would probably be one of
the more important points to point out--the fix here is fairly
simple, at least in terms of protecting our electric-producing
grid--not all the elements that are connected to it. That is a
huge issue. But at least to be able to keep the lights on--
electricity coming--that is a fairly easy fix. I think this
country needs to look at it.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
I recognize the Ranking Member Ms. Clarke for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Let me thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Mr. Franks, for your testimony before our
subcommittee today. I know how passionate you are about this.
We share that passion. You are helping to write the road map
for addressing the EMP threat speaks to your commitment.
I wanted to also welcome Dr. Beck, who as a former staffer,
a staff director for this subcommittee and has also developed
an expertise on this matter. So I want to welcome you back, Dr.
Beck.
I believe it is important that we find the building blocks
for the partnership of which Councilman, excuse me, Congressman
Franks has articulated this morning. We must bring improvements
to the security and reliability of one of our most important
critical infrastructures, our electric grid.
I understand that our very reliance on the infrastructure
that makes it important to anticipate the worst. There are many
scenarios that we should be concerned about. We are still
learning about the significant threat that could come in the
form of a natural or manmade electromagnetic pulse and have
more to learn about the effects of the EMP and geomagnetic
disturbances to the grid as well.
Over the past few years, I have followed with interest, Mr.
Chairman, the secure grid exercises that the National Defense
University has held at Fort McNair. These series of tabletop
exercises in the U.S. electric grid security have focused on
the effects of a major geomagnetic storm on the Nation's
electrical infrastructure. With the 12-year peak in solar
activity approaching in 2012-2013, there is considerable upturn
in interest from Government agencies, including the White House
and Congress in understanding the potential impacts if a
geomagnetic disturbance event should occur.
Although this is a low-probability event, the consequences
of an extended and widespread power loss across portions of the
country would constitute a serious National emergency. To me,
one of the largest barriers to Government agency disaster
response is cross-agency coordination, the role of authority--
crucial elements made more difficult when discussing privately-
owned National electric grid. Ultimately, the secure grid
exercises and other policy discussions work to identify
preparedness gaps in plans to manage the challenges associated
with extended power outages and add urgency to existing efforts
to identify technology solutions to protect the U.S. grid.
This hearing serves to highlight areas where the United
States and its allies are analyzing the risk that a severe
geomagnetic disturbance would present, and help us look for
international approaches to effectively react to those risks.
While severe solar storms that create geomagnetic disturbances
cannot be prevented, there are tools and opportunities to
mitigate and protect the grid from such risks of such an event.
My colleagues on the Homeland Security Committee and I have
spent nearly 3 years identifying and reviewing security
protections that are in place to mitigate the effects of any
intentional or unintentional attack on the electric system. Our
goal is to determine whether appropriate protections are in
place that would mitigate catastrophic incidents on the grid.
Our review has required extensive discussions and review
with the private sector, which owns, operates, and secures the
grid. The private sector develops its own security standards
and also oversees compliance with these standards. In short,
the private sector has the responsibility, as has been stated
by Congressman Franks, for securing the grid from
electromagnetic events and cyber attacks.
I am very pleased to see the statement for the record
submitted by the North American Reliability Corporation. These
are the folks who are the closest to the electric grid and they
manage an almost impossibly complex flow of energy, not just
our 330-plus million people, but also the flow of energy across
our borders every day.
Finally, the U.S. Congress has acted. In June 2010, the
Grid Act passed the House of Representatives unanimously.
Unfortunately, it stalled in the Senate and did not become law.
The bill would have granted the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission expanded authorities to oversee electromagnetic and
cyber protections.
This Congress, Congressman Franks, has introduced the
version of the bill now called the Shield Act, which is similar
to the Grid Act, but focuses only on the electromagnetic threat
component, without the cybersecurity component. I am a
cosponsor of the bill. It is our hope that during the next
Congress, we will get this bill through both houses and to the
President's desk.
So I just wanted to put that on the record. Thank you,
again, Congressman Franks, for your vigilance. I think this is
a very crucial concern. As we look at the modernity of our
civil society, we must be concerned about unintended
consequences from what may be solar, geomagnetic, or
intentional threat to our electric grid.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Franks. Mr. Chairman, if I could just respond to--Ms.
Clarke has demonstrated tremendous commitment in this area and
has done some amazing things. I appreciate her work so much.
I would just leave the committee with this thought. As we
have challenged those who don't think or are not significantly
convinced that this is a threat, weigh on one hand the money
that we spend in the military to defend against this threat and
all of the reports that are ubiquitous throughout our
Government. On the other hand, let us ask the industry to show
us why this is not a threat.
We, as a human family, have been historically, you know,
clear back in the days of London, when 90 percent of London
burned, we knew about fire then, but somehow we just kind of
didn't respond to it until something critically significant
happened.
So I would encourage the committee, just get the facts.
Because if it is not a problem, then we can all go home. It
is----
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Long, do you have any questions for our
witness?
Mr. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congressman Franks, the solar flare you spoke about
earlier--you said solar flares--if I remember what you said
right--sometimes you will have 20-30 minutes' notice before
solar flare with an accuracy rating of one out of three times,
I think you said.
Mr. Franks. Go ahead, please.
Mr. Long. Go ahead.
Mr. Franks. Uh, let me try to expand that a little bit. We
have satellites that give us some indication much sooner than
that, about 24 hours in advance sometimes that there is a major
geo--like a CME, which is a chrome mass ejection or it is an
effective solar flare--that creates a geomagnetic disturbance,
which is inevitable. It happens about every 100-105 years,
sometimes even more frequently. But the major ones are called
the Carrington Effect, which was named after a gentleman that
discovered or essentially documented the first major clear
demonstration of that type of solar storm.
We have in this society about 24 hours to say, okay, we
have one coming. But we don't know if it is going to be severe
enough to do any damage until about 30 minutes out. Now the
problem is, even then, when we say, okay, we have 30 minutes
and this looks like one that could really be serious. It looks
like our earth polarity--is just right. All of that, as it
were, the stars are lining up and this could be really bad. But
even then, only one out of three times is that correct.
So as an operator, do you shut down the grid to protect it
and take a chance on risking human life, or do you leave it up
and take a chance on it being damaged and risk even more human
life?
Mr. Long. My question was the 20- to 30-minute warning,
what could be done in that 20-30 minutes. You say shutting it
down, I suppose. But what if we had 20-30 days or 20-30 months
for that warning? Let us pretend we had 20-30 months. What
steps can be taken to mitigate this? Are there things that can
be done?
You gotta keep in mind that most of these--a lot of the
infrastructure is privately held, so has there been studies to
show what will mitigate this? Are there things--back on the
farm, every house had a lightning rod on it to mitigate the
lightning to keep it from burning the house down. Are there
things to mitigate this if we had the sufficient amount of
time?
Mr. Franks. You know, you point out probably the perfect
example and that is lightning--that lightning is a type of
EMP--it is E2. The lightning rods redirected the force or the
rush of electric energy into the ground, where it wouldn't
damage anything. There are what we call nuclear phase blockers
that can go before these major transformers that would
interrupt the electric flow. If there was a surge, that it
would happen instantaneously. If there was a surge, it would
keep these transformers from burning themselves up. That is one
way to mitigate it.
Mr. Long. When you say can go before it, what do you mean?
Mr. Franks. These neutral face blockers are, prior to any
charge going into the transformer, coming out of it----
Mr. Long. So this is hardware that is actually hard laid.
Mr. Franks. That is correct.
Mr. Long. Okay, that is what I----
Mr. Franks. That means if there is no electromagnetic
pulse, then no one has to shut something down just in case. But
if there is, then it automatically says no, we are going to
interrupt the flow to that transformer so that it won't add to
its load that would ultimately cause it to burn up. If it does,
those transformers are difficult to replace.
The challenge, of course, as far as having sufficient
warning, is that we would have to be able to predict when there
is a major solar flare--major coronal mass ejection. We haven't
really found the science to do that yet. So even----
Mr. Long. Well, if you had it installed ahead of time, you
wouldn't need to predict, right?
Mr. Franks. Correct. Correct. But I am saying right now, if
you base it on procedures alone, where you tell the operators
there is a big one coming. Shut down manually. At best, they
are going to have 24 hours general warning. Again, more often,
a 30-minute warning is just not enough time.
Mr. Long. Is the effect the same whether it is an act of
God, whether it is a solar flare or solar storm that you called
the other one.
Mr. Franks. Well, the act of God as it were----
Mr. Long. Well, yes, but my question is, is it the act of
God, solar storm, solar flare--is the ramification the same as
a man-made act, such as the high-altitude electromagnetic pulse
that a nuclear device set off at 100 kilometers above the earth
would?
Mr. Franks. It is a little bit technical, but I will answer
your question. The solar storm or the geomagnetic disturbance
is primarily E3. It is a slower and it is more damaging to
transformers and the heavy equipment and things of that nature.
Whereas, it doesn't have the E1 and E2.
Whereas, the lightning--I mean, excuse me--the nuclear-
generated electromagnetic pulse, where a nuclear warhead
creates a gamma ray emission which interacts with the
atmosphere and creates a rush of ionized particles toward the
earth, it happens to create all three--E1, E2, and E3. So it
can damage electrical components of, you know, small
transistors, scatter control systems--these very delicate
systems that are sort of the hallmark of our, you know, our
electronic advancement in this society.
So the answer--the effect is, with a nuclear generated EMP,
the effect is--covers a lot more electronic components. But
with the geomagnetic----
Mr. Long. Is the fix the same?
Mr. Franks. What is that?
Mr. Long. Is the fix the same? You said earlier that the
fix is simple. Is the fix the same on either----
Mr. Franks. Yes, if the components that are destroyed--the
fix is the same, but the GMD affects mostly----
Mr. Long. I am talking about the prevention fix, I guess,
not--maybe I misunderstood what you meant by fix.
Mr. Franks. Yes, the only thing that the Shield Act--well,
I won't say the only thing--but the primary thing that the
Shield Act addresses is to make sure that our major
transformers are 750 KV corridor are not destroyed, which means
that we would be in a catastrophic civilizational challenge
where we wouldn't have electricity and wouldn't be able to
perhaps restore it for months or even years. That is the worst-
case scenario. The Shield is designed to prevent that.
Some of these ancillary damages on cell phones, radios,
things like that, it is difficult to mitigate against that in a
short-term fix. We have to harden as we go. But my contention
is if we take those components as we rebuild them and replace
them and harden them against EMP, which we can do that. It adds
about 10 percent to the cost of doing that. Then we can
eventually get past this vulnerability. But the main big
vulnerability that we have right now is the potential damage to
our major transformers that could be caused by either a high-
altitude electromagnetic pulse or GMD.
Mr. Lungren. Time.
Mr. Long. But that is preventable. I am way past my time. I
yield back.
Mr. Lungren. Well, if you are way past your time, how can
you yield back?
[Laughter.]
Mr. Lungren. The gentlelady from California is recognized
for approximately 5 minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no
questions for the Congressman. Thank you for your testimony.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Richmond.
Mr. Richmond. I don't have many, but the thing that I guess
just draws my attention is the Congressman's conversation about
the solar storm. I know that it is termed a 1-in-100-year
event. But I am from New Orleans, where we get 1-in-100-year
events. So I would like to be----
Just your feeling in your opinion, as someone who has
really taken the lead on this--I mean, how prepared are we for
that 1-in-100-year event right now? What things can we do
quickly or what do we need to put in place so that we start
developing either criteria, building codes, or codes for or
standards for the utility companies to make sure that we don't
have the potential to have people out of power for years?
Mr. Franks. Well, let me try if I could to address the
worst-case scenario, which I consider openly to be remote. But
it is possible. It is that 100-year event you talk about.
On the military side, in terms of our National security,
being able to fight back, as it were, our major military
apparatus is hardened effectively and we are prepared. The
problem is on the civilian side, we are almost completely
unprepared. It is just an incredible antithesis here. Our
military is critically dependent upon the civilian grid for its
electricity needs--about 99 percent--and is, according to
military sources, their own military mission becomes
compromised without that source of electricity.
So our focus needs to--you know, our missile defense
systems are able actually to fight through a major EMP
environment. It can have major electromagnetic pulse energy
everywhere and they are able to fight through it, because they
understand that that is exactly the type of environment they
would be in, in terms of a nuclear war.
But the civilian grid right now remains unprotected. In the
conferences that Ms. Yvette Clarke and I have attended on
occasion, the Defense Department has testified that they are in
a sort of a no-win situation, because they depend on the
electric grid, but they have no control over how it should be
protected. I am fine with that.
The Shield Act allows the private sector to come up with
the best solution; and if that is good enough, great. I am the
last one that wants to regulate any industry, but I am the
first one that wants to pay attention to our National security.
If we have standards that says we must mitigate or protect
against this, which we can do at minimal costs--the neutral
face blockers that I had mentioned to the other gentlemen
actually allow the grid to be run at a higher capacity, which
more than pays for what is a relatively minimal cost. I mean,
it is in the noise of the cost of our daily generation costs.
So the bottom line is, we are not prepared in our civilian
grid. We are very prepared to be able to continue to fight a
war. But I wonder at some point if we have a significant enough
impact, how much, you know, are we really protecting the
country.
Finally, I would just say that, you know, the worst-case
scenario is so bad that rather than preparing for it, we must
prevent it from ever occurring.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. The gentleman yields back. Thank you,
Congressman Franks, for your testimony and for your leadership
on this issue. We appreciate it very much.
Mr. Franks. Thank you. Thank all of you.
Mr. Lungren. They have it written for me to say, Panel 1 is
dismissed. You are Panel 1.
Mr. Franks. All right. Thank you, sir. Thank you all very
much.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you. Now, I would ask the clerks to
prepare for our second panel.
We have a very distinguished second panel. I thank you all
for being here.
Mr. Joseph McClelland is the director of the Office of
Electric Reliability at the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission, a position to which he was first appointed in
September 2007. Mr. McClelland came to the Commission with more
than 20 years of experience in the electric utility industry,
holds a Bachelor of Science degree in electrical engineering
from Penn State.
Mr. Brandon Wales is the director of the Homeland
Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center at the
Department of Homeland Security. In this role, he leads a
robust all-hazards analytic resource for public and private-
sector partners, covering the full array of risks and
challenges facing the infrastructure community. Prior to
joining the Department, Mr. Wales served as the principle
National security advisor to the United States Senator Jon Kyl
and was a senior associate at the Washington-based foreign
policy and National security think tank.
Mr. Michael Aimone is director of Business Enterprise
Integration on Intergovernmental Personnel Assignment--Personal
Assignment in the Office of the Secretary of Defense's
Installations and Environment Directorate. That is a long term.
We will just say you are an expert. How is that?
Mr. Aimone oversees the efforts by the deputy under
secretary to modernize and integrate real property, energy, and
environmental business information technology systems for the
Department of Defense. Mr. Aimone serves as the U.S. Air Force
and in the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Air Force Reserves for
nearly 30 years, and is widely known as one of the country's
industry leaders on energy, security, and sustainable
operations.
We thank you for all being here. Your written submissions
are made a part of the record. We would ask you to attempt to
summarize your testimony within 5 minutes after which time we
will have the panel subjected to questions by our Members of
the subcommittee. So if you would go in the order in which I
have introduced you.
STATEMENT OF JOSEPH MC CLELLAND, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF ELECTRIC
RELIABILITY, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION
Mr. McClelland. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member,
and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the privilege to
appear before you today to discuss the security of the power
grid. My name is Joe McClelland. I am the director of the
Office of Electric Reliability at the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission. I am here today as a Commission staff witness. My
remarks do not necessarily represent the views of the
Commission or any individual commissioner.
In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress entrusted the
Commission with a major new responsibility to oversee mandatory
enforceable reliability standards for the Nation's bulk power
system. This authority is in section 215 of the Federal Power
Act. It is important to note that FERC's jurisdiction and
reliability authority under section 15 is limited to, ``the
bulk power system,'' as defined in the FPA, which excludes
Alaska and Hawaii, as well as the local distribution systems.
Under this section 215 authority, FERC cannot author or modify
reliability standards. We must depend upon an electrical
reliability organization or ERO to perform this task. The
Commission selected the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation, or NERC, as the ERO. The ERO develops and proposes
reliability standards or modifications for the Commission's
review, which it can then either remand or approve.
If the commissioner approves the proposed reliability
standard, it becomes mandatory enforceable in the United
States, applying to the users, owners, and operators of the
bulk power system. If the Commission remands a proposed
standard, it is sent back to the ERO for further consideration.
In my view, section 215 of the Federal Power Act provides
an adequate statutory foundation for the ERO to develop most
reliability standards for the bulk power system. However, the
nature of a National security threat by entities intent on
attacking the United States through vulnerabilities in its
electric grids stands in stark contrast to other major
reliability vulnerabilities that have caused regional blackouts
and reliability failures in the past, such as tree trimming and
equipment maintenance practices. Widespread disruption of
electric service can quickly undermine the United States
Government, its military, and the economy, as well as endanger
the health and safety of millions of its citizens.
Given the National security dimension to this threat, there
may be a need to act quickly to protect the grid, to act in a
manner where action is mandatory rather than voluntary, and to
protect certain information from public disclosure.
While the Commission is considering actions that it can
take under its current authority, this authority may not be
sufficient in cases where mandatory action is needed to protect
the United States from physical threats that endanger our
Nation's security.
One example of a physical threat is an electromagnetic
pulse, or EMP, event. EMP events can be generated from either a
naturally occurring or manmade causes. In 2001, Congress
established a commission to assess the threat from EMP. In
2004, and again in 2008, the Commission issued its reports.
Among the findings in the reports, was that a single EMP attack
could seriously degrade or shut down a large part of the
electric power grid. Depending upon the attack, significant
parts of the electric infrastructure could be, ``out of service
for periods measured in months to a year or more.''
In order to better understand and quantify the effect of
EMP on the power grid, FERC staff, the Department of Energy,
and the Department of Homeland Security sponsored a study by
the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and their subcontractor
Metatech in 2010. The results of this study support the general
conclusion of prior studies that EMP events pose substantial
risk to equipment and operation of the Nation's power grid, and
under extreme conditions, could result in major long-term
electrical outages.
In fact, solar magnetic disturbances are inevitable, with
only the timing and magnitude subject to variability. The study
assessed the 1921 solar storm, which has been termed a 1-in-
100-year event and applied it to today's power grid. The study
concluded that such a storm could damage or destroy in excess
of 300 bulk power system transformers, interrupting service to
130 million people, with some outages lasting for a period of
years.
In February 2012, the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation released its interim report, ``Effects of
Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk Power System.'' In it,
they concluded that the most likely worst-case scenario system
impact from a severe geomagnetic disturbance is voltage
instability and voltage collapse, with limited equipment damage
and recovery times measured in hours or days.
On April 30, 2012, the Commission held a technical
conference to discuss issues related to the reliability of the
bulk power system, as affected by geomagnetic disturbances. The
conference explored the risks and impacts from geomagnetically-
induced currents to transformers and other equipment on the
bulk power system, as well as options for addressing or
mitigating risks and impacts.
The Commission is considering the comments filed after the
conference and what actions it can take under its current
authority to address National security threats to the
reliability of our power system from EMP. Although the
Commission's current authority allows it to require submission
to the ERO of proposed standards to address the EMP threat to
the United States, it does not allow the Commission the ability
to author the standards, thereby limiting its effectiveness.
These types of threats pose an increasing risk to the power
grid that serves our Nation. The Commission is therefore
considering actions that it can take under its current
authority.
Any new legislation should address several key concerns,
including allowing the Federal Government to take action before
a cyber or physical National security incident has occurred,
ensuring appropriate confidentiality of sensitive information
developed under new authority, and allowing cost recovery for
entities that mitigate vulnerabilities and threats.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify today. I
would be happy to answer any questions that you might have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McClelland follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph McClelland
September 12, 2012
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Members of the committee: Thank
you for this opportunity to appear before you to discuss the security
of the electric grid. My name is Joseph McClelland. I am the director
of the Office of Electric Reliability (OER) of the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC or Commission). The Commission's role with
respect to reliability is to help protect and improve the reliability
of the Nation's bulk power system through effective regulatory
oversight as established in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. I am here
today as a Commission staff witness and my remarks do not necessarily
represent the views of the Commission or any individual Commissioner.
The Commission is committed to protecting the reliability of the
Nation's bulk electric system. The Commission is considering actions
that it can take under its current authority to address National
security threats to the reliability of our transmission and power
system from electromagnetic pulses. These types of threats pose an
increasing risk to our Nation's electric grid, which undergirds our
Government and economy and helps ensure the health and welfare of our
citizens. I will describe how limitations in Federal authority may not
fully protect the grid against security threats due to electromagnetic
pulse and summarize the Commission's oversight of the electric grid
under section 215 of the Federal Power Act.
background
In the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct 2005), Congress entrusted
the Commission with a major new responsibility to oversee mandatory,
enforceable reliability standards for the Nation's bulk power system
(excluding Alaska and Hawaii). This authority is in section 215 of the
Federal Power Act. Section 215 requires the Commission to select an
Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) that is responsible for
proposing, for Commission review and approval, reliability standards or
modifications to existing reliability standards to help protect and
improve the reliability of the Nation's bulk power system. The
Commission has certified the North American Electric Reliability
Corporation (NERC) as the ERO. The reliability standards apply to the
users, owners, and operators of the bulk power system and become
mandatory in the United States only after Commission approval. The ERO
also is authorized to impose, after notice and opportunity for a
hearing, penalties for violations of the reliability standards, subject
to Commission review and approval. The ERO may delegate certain
responsibilities to ``Regional Entities,'' subject to Commission
approval.
The Commission may approve proposed reliability standards or
modifications to previously approved standards if it finds them ``just,
reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the
public interest.'' The Commission itself does not have authority to
author or modify proposed standards. Rather, if the Commission
disapproves a proposed standard or modification, section 215 requires
the Commission to remand it to the ERO for further consideration. The
Commission, upon its own motion or upon complaint, may direct the ERO
to submit a proposed standard or modification on a specific matter but
it does not have the authority to modify or author a standard and must
depend upon the ERO to do so.
Limitations of Section 215 and the Term ``Bulk Power System''
Currently, the Commission's jurisdiction under section 215 is
limited to the ``bulk power system,'' as defined in the FPA, and
therefore excludes Alaska and Hawaii, including any Federal
installations located therein. It also excludes all local distribution
facilities, including those facilities connected to defense
infrastructure. The current interpretation of ``bulk power system''
also excludes some transmission, including virtually all of the grid
facilities in certain large cities such as New York, thus precluding
Commission action to mitigate cyber or other National security threats
to reliability that involve such facilities and major population areas.
The Commission directed NERC to revise its interpretation of the bulk
power system to eliminate inconsistencies across regions, eliminate the
ambiguity created by the current discretion in NERC's definition of
bulk electric system, provide a backstop review to ensure that any
variations do not compromise reliability, and ensure that facilities
that could significantly affect reliability are subject to mandatory
rules. NERC has recently filed a revised definition of the term bulk
power system, and the Commission has solicited comments on its proposal
to accept NERC's revised definition. However, it is important to note
that section 215 of the FPA excludes local distribution facilities from
the Commission's reliability jurisdiction, so any revised bulk electric
system definition developed by NERC will still not apply to local
distribution facilities, including those connected to defense
infrastructure.
the nerc process
As an initial matter, it is important to recognize how mandatory
reliability standards are established. Under section 215, reliability
standards must be developed by the ERO through an open, inclusive, and
public process. The Commission can direct NERC to develop a reliability
standard to address a particular reliability matter. However, the NERC
process typically requires years to develop standards for the
Commission's review.
NERC's procedures for developing standards allow extensive
opportunity for stakeholder comment, are open, and are generally based
on the procedures of the American National Standards Institute. The
NERC process is intended to develop consensus on both the need for, and
the substance of, the proposed standard. Although inclusive, the
process is relatively slow, open, and unpredictable in its
responsiveness to the Commission's directives. This process requires
public disclosure regarding the reason for the proposed standard, the
manner in which the standard will address the issues, and any
subsequent comments and resulting modifications in the standards as the
affected stakeholders review the material and provide comments. NERC-
approved standards are then submitted to the Commission for its review.
The procedures used by NERC are appropriate for developing and
approving routine reliability standards. The process allows extensive
opportunities for industry and public comment. The public nature of the
reliability standards development process can be a strength of the
process. However, it can be an impediment when measures or actions need
to be taken to address threats to National security quickly,
effectively, and in a manner that protects against the disclosure of
security-sensitive information. The current procedures used under
section 215 for the development and approval of reliability standards
do not provide an effective and timely means of addressing urgent
National security risks to the bulk power system, particularly in
emergency situations. Certain circumstances, such as those involving
National security, may require immediate action, while the reliability
standard procedures take too long to implement efficient and timely
corrective steps.
FERC rules governing review and establishment of reliability
standards allow the agency to direct the ERO to develop and propose
reliability standards under an expedited schedule. For example, FERC
could order the ERO to submit a reliability standard to address a
reliability vulnerability within 60 days. Also, NERC's rules of
procedure include a provision to develop a new or modified Reliability
Standard using an expedited reliability standard development process
that can be completed within 60 days and which may be further expedited
by a written finding by the NERC board of trustees that an
extraordinary and immediate threat exists to bulk power system
reliability or National security. However, it is not clear NERC could
meet this schedule in practice. Moreover, faced with a National
security threat to reliability, there may be a need to act decisively
in hours or days, rather than weeks, months, or years. That would not
be feasible even under the expedited process. In the mean time, the
bulk power system would be left vulnerable to a known National security
threat. Moreover, existing procedures, including the expedited action
procedure, could widely publicize both the vulnerability and the
proposed solution, thus increasing the risk of hostile actions before
the appropriate solutions are implemented.
In addition, a reliability standard submitted to the Commission by
NERC may not be sufficient to address the identified vulnerability or
threat. Since FERC may not directly modify a proposed reliability
standard under section 215 and must either approve or remand it, FERC
would have the choice of approving an inadequate standard and directing
changes, which reinitiates a process that can take years, or rejecting
the standard altogether. Under either approach, the bulk power system
would remain vulnerable for a prolonged period.
Finally, the open and inclusive process required for standards
development is not consistent with the need to protect security-
sensitive information. For instance, a formal request for a new
standard would normally detail the need for the standard as well as the
proposed mitigation to address the issue, and the NERC-approved version
of the standard would be filed with the Commission for review. This
public information could help potential adversaries in planning
attacks.
physical security and other threats to reliability
The existing reliability standards do not extend to physical
threats to the grid, but physical threats can cause equal or greater
destruction than cyber attacks. While the Commission is considering
actions that it can take under its current authority, this authority
may not be sufficient in cases where quick mandatory action is needed
to protect the United States from the EMP threat or other National
security threats to the reliability of our transmission and power
system. The Federal Government should have no less ability to act to
protect against potential damage from physical threats to the grid than
from cyber attacks.
One example of a physical threat is an electromagnetic pulse (EMP)
event. EMP events can be generated from either naturally-occurring or
man-made causes. In the case of the former, solar magnetic disturbances
periodically disrupt the earth's magnetic field which in turn, can
generate large induced ground currents on the electric grid. This
effect, also termed the ``E3'' component of an EMP, can simultaneously
damage or destroy bulk power system transformers over a large
geographic area. Regarding man-made events, EMP can also be generated
by weapons. Equipment and plans are readily available that have the
capability to generate high-energy bursts, termed ``E1'', that can
damage or destroy electronics such as those found in control and
communication systems on the power grid. These devices can be portable
and effective, facilitating simultaneous coordinated attacks, and can
be reused, allowing use against multiple targets. The most
comprehensive man-made EMP threat is from a high-altitude nuclear
explosion. It would affect an area defined by the ``line-of-sight''
from the point of detonation. The higher the detonation the larger the
area affected, and the more powerful the explosion the stronger the EMP
emitted. The first component of the resulting pulse E1 occurs within a
fraction of a second and can destroy control and communication
electronics. The second component is termed ``E2'' and is similar to
lightning, which is well-known and mitigated by industry. Toward the
end of an EMP event, the third element, E3, occurs. This causes the
same effect as solar magnetic disturbances. It can damage or destroy
power transformers connected to long transmission lines and cause
voltage problems and instability on the electric grid, which can lead
to wide-area blackouts. It is important to note that effective
mitigation against solar magnetic disturbances and non-nuclear EMP
weaponry provides effective mitigation against a high-altitude nuclear
explosion.
In 2001, Congress established a commission to assess the threat
from EMP, with particular attention to be paid to the nature and
magnitude of high-altitude EMP threats to the United States;
vulnerabilities of U.S. military and civilian infrastructure to such
attack; capabilities to recover from an attack; and the feasibility and
cost of protecting military and civilian infrastructure, including
energy infrastructure. In 2004, the EMP commission issued a report
describing the nature of EMP attacks, vulnerabilities to EMP attacks,
and strategies to respond to an attack.\1\ A second report was produced
in 2008 that further investigated vulnerabilities of the Nation's
infrastructure to EMP.\2\ The reports concluded that both electrical
equipment and control systems can be damaged by EMP. The reports also
pointed out how the interdependencies among the various infrastructures
could become vulnerabilities after an EMP. In particular, they point to
the electrical infrastructure's need of the communication and natural
gas infrastructures.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Graham, Dr. William R. et al., Report of the Commission to
Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
Attack (2004).
\2\ Dr. John S. Foster, Jr. et al., Report of the Commission to
Assess the Threat to the United States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP)
Attack (2008).
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An EMP may also be a naturally-occurring event caused by solar
flares and storms disrupting the Earth's magnetic field. In 1859, a
major solar storm occurred, causing auroral displays and significant
shifts of the Earth's magnetic fields. As a result, telegraphs were
rendered useless and several telegraph stations burned down. The
impacts of that storm were muted because semiconductor technology did
not exist at the time. Were the storm to happen today, according to an
article in Scientific American, it could ``severely damage satellites,
disable radio communications, and cause continent-wide electrical
black-outs that would require weeks or longer to recover from.''\3\
Although storms of this magnitude occur rarely, storms and flares of
lesser intensity occur more frequently. Storms of about half the
intensity of the 1859 storm occur every 50 years or so according to the
authors of the Scientific American article, and the last such storm
occurred in November 1960, leading to world-wide geomagnetic
disturbances and radio outages. The power grid is particularly
vulnerable to solar storms, as transformers are electrically grounded
to the Earth and susceptible to damage from geomagnetically-induced
currents. The damage or destruction of numerous transformers across the
country would result in reduced grid functionality and even prolonged
power outages.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Odenwald, Sten F. and Green, James L., Bracing the Satellite
Infrastructure for a Solar Superstorm, Scientific American Magazine
(Jul. 28, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In March 2010, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (Oak Ridge) and its
subcontractor Metatech released a study that explored the vulnerability
of the electric grid to EMP-related events. This study was a joint
effort contracted by FERC staff, the Department of Energy, and the
Department of Homeland Security and expanded on the information
developed in other initiatives, including the EMP commission reports.
The series of reports provided detailed technical background and
outlined which sections of the power grid are most vulnerable, what
equipment would be affected, and what damage could result. Protection
concepts for each threat and additional methods for remediation were
also included along with suggestions for mitigation. The results of the
study support the general conclusion that EMP events pose substantial
risk to equipment and operation of the Nation's power grid and under
extreme conditions could result in major long-term electrical outages.
In fact, solar magnetic disturbances are inevitable with only the
timing and magnitude subject to variability. The study assessed the
1921 solar storm, which has been termed a 1-in-100-year event, and
applied it to today's power grid. The study concluded that such a storm
could damage or destroy up to 300 bulk power system transformers,
interrupting service to 130 million people for a period of years.
In February 2012, NERC released its Interim Report: Effects of
Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk Power System. In it, NERC
concluded that the most likely worst-case system impact from a severe
geomagnetic disturbance is voltage instability and voltage collapse
with limited equipment damage.
On April 30, 2012, the Commission held a technical conference to
discuss issues related to reliability of the bulk power system as
affected by geomagnetic disturbances. The conference explored the risks
and impacts from geomagnetically-induced currents to transformers and
other equipment on the bulk power system, as well as options for
addressing or mitigating the risks and impacts. The Commission is
considering the comments filed after that conference and what actions
it can take under its current authority to address National security
threats to the reliability of our transmission and power system from
electromagnetic pulses.
The existing reliability standards do not address EMP
vulnerabilities. Protecting the electric generation, transmission, and
distribution systems from severe damage due to an EMP-related event
would involve vulnerability assessments at every level of electric
infrastructure.
conclusion
Although the Commission's current authority allows it to require
the submission by the ERO of proposed standards to address the EMP
threat to the United States, it does not allow the Commission the
ability to author the standard, thereby limiting its effectiveness. The
Commission is considering actions that it can take under its current
authority. This authority, however, does not allow it to author
standards or to require quick action to protect the United States from
the EMP threat or other National security threats to the reliability of
our transmission and power system. Any new legislation should address
several key concerns, including allowing the Federal Government to take
action before a cyber or physical National security incident has
occurred, ensuring appropriate confidentiality of sensitive information
submitted, developed, or issued under new authority, and allowing cost
recovery for costs entities incur to mitigate vulnerabilities and
threats.
These types of threats pose an increasing risk to the power grid
that serves our Nation, which undergirds our Government and economy and
helps ensure the health and welfare of our citizens. Thank you again
for the opportunity to testify today. I would be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Mr. Wales.
STATEMENT OF BRANDON WALES, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND INFRASTRUCTURE
THREAT AND RISK ANALYSIS CONTER, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Wales. Thank you, Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member
Clarke, and distinguished Members of the committee for inviting
me to address the threat posed by electromagnetic pulse, or
EMP, to our Nation's critical infrastructure, and the
Department of Homeland Security's preparations to respond to
and recover from EMP attacks.
As you mentioned, I am the director of the DHS Homeland
Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center, known as
HITRAC, which is charged with analyzing risks to the Nation's
critical infrastructure from threats and hazards, both natural
and man-made, recognizing EMP as a growing threat to the
Nation's digital and physical infrastructures and the growing
vulnerability of today's microelectronics to that threat. I
appreciate the opportunity to discuss this issue.
As you know, an EMP is the burst of electromagnetic
radiation created when a nuclear weapon is detonated or when a
non-nuclear EMP weapon is used. Naturally-occurring solar
weather can generate an effect similar to one component of EMP.
The consequences of an EMP range from temporary system
disruptions to permanent physical damage and critical service
outages.
Overall, EMP in its various forms can cause widespread
disruption and serious damage to electronic devices and
networks, including those upon which many critical
infrastructures rely, such as communication systems,
information technology equipment, and supervisory control and
data acquisition, commonly known as SCADA modules. SCADA
modules are used in infrastructure, such as electric grids,
water supplies, and pipelines. The disruption to SCADA systems
that could result from EMP range from SCADA control errors to
actual equipment destruction. Secondary effects of EMP may harm
people through induced fires, electric shocks, and disruption
of the transportation and critical support systems, such as
those at hospitals or sites like nuclear power plants and
chemical facilities.
EMP places all critical infrastructure sectors at risk.
Those sectors that rely heavily on communications technology,
information technology, the electric grid, or that uses SCADA
system, are particularly vulnerable. The complex
interconnectivity among critical infrastructure sectors means
that an EMP incident that affects a single sector will likely
affect other sectors, potentially resulting in cascading
failures. The interdependent nature of all 18 critical
infrastructure sectors complicates the impact of the event and
recovery from it.
The Department is working collaboratively, both internally
and with external stakeholders, to reduce the risk from EMP and
solar weather. For example, the Federal Emergency Management
Agency have exercised scenarios involving EMP and solar weather
and are developing plans to help address these evolving
threats. FEMA is also working with States and industry to
reduce the risk from EMP, notably by deploying new capabilities
as part of the integrated public alert and warning system to
help keep the public informed and alerted during a major EMP
event.
The National Protection and Program Directorate's Office of
Cybersecurity and Communications has also worked to model and
assess EMP effects, and to conduct research and propose
solutions to understand and mitigate EMP risks. NPPD's Office
of Infrastructure Protection also plays a role in the
Department's work on EMP. For example, our office conducted a
study in 2010 on EMP's potential impact on extra-high voltage
transformers and recommended options for hardening these
systems from EMP attacks.
The Science and Technology Directorate has led much of the
Department's research in the EMP area. Its recovery transformer
project is intended to increase the resilience of the power
grid through the development of a prototype extra-high voltage
transformer that, unlike traditional transformers, will be able
to be quickly delivered to a site, reducing potential recovery
time by 75 percent.
S&T is also working to increase the resilience of the power
grid through their resilient electric grid project. This
project is designed to develop an inherently fault-current-
limiting high temperature super-conducting cable, which can
help the electric utilities manage fault currents that can
cause cascading blackouts and permanent damage to electrical
equipment.
The Commission to assess the threat to the United States
from EMP attack recommended in its final report that DHS play a
leading role in spreading knowledge of the nature of prudent
mitigation preparations for EMP attack to mitigate its
consequences. The Department takes that recommendation
seriously. We have pursued a deeper understanding of the threat
and its potential impacts and effective mitigation strategies,
and a greater level of public awareness and readiness through
various communication channels. But as we all know, there is
more work to be done.
Thank you for holding this important hearing. I would be
happy to respond to any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wales follows:]
Prepared Statement of Brandon Wales
September 12, 2012
Thank you, Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and
distinguished Members of the committee. It is a pleasure to appear
before you today to discuss the nature of the threat posed by
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to our Nation and its critical
infrastructure, including its cyber, communications, and electric-grid
assets, as well as to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's
(DHS) preparations to respond to and recover from potential EMP
attacks.
Over the past several decades, the threat to digital and physical
infrastructures has grown. For example, today's power grid and
information networks are much more vulnerable to EMP than those of a
few decades ago.\1\ The Commission to Assess the Threat to the United
States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack recommended in its final
report that DHS ``play a leading role in spreading knowledge of the
nature of prudent mitigation preparations for EMP attack to mitigate
its consequences.''\2\ The Department takes that recommendation
seriously and welcomes in cooperation with other Government agencies
increasing understanding of this critical topic.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Since the 1980s, our power grid control systems and information
infrastructures have been growing in their reliance on the Ethernet and
computers, which are much more vulnerable to E1 EMP than previous
control and communications systems designs. Likewise, the power grid
today is much more vulnerable to (E3 EMP) and solar storms than the
grid of the 1970s and 80s due to the increasing network size and
evolution to higher operating voltages.
\2\ ``Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United
States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: Critical National
Infrastructures,'' April 2008, page 181. This report presents the
results of the Commission's assessment of the effects of a high-
altitude EMP attack on our critical National infrastructures and
provides recommendations for their mitigation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
background
An EMP is the burst of electromagnetic radiation created when a
nuclear weapon is detonated or when a non-nuclear EMP weapon is used.
Naturally-occurring solar weather can generate effects similar to one
component of an EMP. EMPs can be high-frequency, similar to a flash of
lightning or a spark of static electricity, or low-frequency, similar
to an aurora-induced phenomenon.\3\ An EMP can spike in less than a
nanosecond or can continue longer than 24 hours, depending on its
source. The consequences of an EMP range from permanent physical damage
to temporary system disruptions and can result in fires, electric
shocks to people and equipment, and critical service outages. There are
four general classes of EMP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Aurora-induced phenomena refer to effects like geomagnetically-
induced currents in the power grid that are caused by solar storms
which are associated with increased aurora activity. Although there are
many different phenomena associated with solar storms, one of the most
important is the geomagnetically-induced quasi-dc current flow that can
damage our power transmission networks.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
High-altitude EMP (HEMP) results from a nuclear detonation
typically occurring 15 or more miles above the Earth's surface. The
extent of HEMP effects depends on several factors, including the
altitude of the detonation, the weapon yield and design, and the
electromagnetic shielding, or ``hardening,'' of assets. One high-
altitude burst could blanket the entire continental United States and
could cause widespread power outages and communications disruptions and
possible damage to the electricity grid for weeks or longer.\4\ HEMP
threat vectors can originate from a missile, such as a sea-launched
ballistic missile; a satellite asset; or a relatively low-cost balloon-
borne vehicle. A concern is the growing number of nation-states that in
the past have sponsored terrorism and are now developing capabilities
that could be used in a HEMP attack.
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\4\ ``Report of the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United
States from Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Attack: Critical National
Infrastructures,'' April 2008, page vi, ``When a nuclear explosion
occurs at high altitude, the EMP signal it produces will cover the wide
geographic region within the line of sight of the detonation. This
broad-band, high-amplitude EMP, when coupled into sensitive
electronics, has the capability to produce widespread and long-lasting
disruption and damage to the critical infrastructures that underpin the
fabric of U.S. society.'' See also: Glasstone, S., P.J. Dolan, ``The
Effects of Nuclear Weapons,'' Chapter XI on EMP, U.S. Dept. of Energy,
1977.
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Source Region EMP (SREMP) is a burst of energy similar to HEMP but
differs in that it is created when a nuclear weapon detonates at lower
altitudes within the atmosphere. SREMP can occur when a detonation
occurs on or near the ground, as would likely be the case of a
terrorist nuclear device attack. A SREMP's electromagnetic field is
much more limited in range than that from HEMP; it would only affect a
delimited geographic area. SREMP can induce very high currents on power
cables or metallic communications lines near the fireball, and it can
send extreme spikes of energy great distances from the blast zone along
these metal lines, potentially causing fires where these lines meet
other infrastructures. In addition, the SREMP travels through the air
and can damage or disrupt equipment connected to Ethernet cables,
telephone lines, and power cords out to 70 miles or more. Electronic
systems not connected to power cords or communications lines, such as a
cell phone, are generally resistant to SREMP but become useless if the
infrastructure that supports them is non-functional. While SREMP is not
the primary reason a terrorist would detonate a nuclear weapon, it is
important to note that all ground-based detonations create SREMP of
sufficient magnitude to cause infrastructure disruptions, including an
improvised nuclear device, a crude nuclear device that could be built
from the components of a stolen weapon or from using nuclear materials.
Given the possible impacts of SREMP, such as secondary fires and the
disruptions of power, communications, and other critical
infrastructures, it is an important consideration in our Department's
planning to mitigate and respond to this type of attack.
Unlike HEMP and SREMP, which primarily disrupt Earth-based
infrastructures, System Generated EMP (SGEMP) is a threat to space-
based assets, such as satellites or a space station. SGEMPs originate
from a nuclear weapon detonation above the atmosphere that sends out
damaging X-rays that strike space systems. Both SGEMP and HEMP are
similar, in that they both originate from a high-altitude burst. The
Department's chief concern with SGEMP and other related high-altitude
nuclear effects is that satellite or other space systems that support
critical communications and navigation services, as well as essential
intelligence functions, can be immediately disrupted. SGEMP and other
related effects could also harm systems supporting any astronaut in
space.
The fourth type of EMP is Non-Nuclear EMP, or NNEP. This type of
EMP can be created by Radio Frequency Weapons (RFWs), devices designed
to produce sufficient electromagnetic energy to burn out or disrupt
electronic components, systems, and networks. RFWs can either be
electrically-driven, where they create narrowband or wideband
microwaves, or they can be explosively driven, where an explosive is
used to compress a magnetic field to generate the pulse. Multiple
nations have used RFWs since the 1960s to disable or jam security,
communications, and navigation systems; induce fires; and disrupt
financial infrastructures. Devices that can be used as RFWs have
unintentionally caused aircraft crashes and near crashes, pipeline
explosions, gas spills, computer damage, vehicle malfunctions, weapons
explosions, and public water system malfunctions.\5\ The Department
believes that much of the mitigation and planning we are doing for
other types of EMP will help reduce our threat to NNEP.
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\5\ Robert L. Schweitzer, LTG (ret) USA, ``Radio Frequency Weapons:
The Emerging Threat and Policy Implications,'' Eagan, McAllister
Associates, October 1998; see also: Overview of Evolving and Enduring
Threats to Information Systems, National Communications System, August
2012.
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solar weather
Solar Weather is created as a result of massive explosions on the
sun that may shoot radiation towards the Earth. These effects can reach
the Earth in as little as 8 minutes with Solar Flare X-rays or over 14
hours later with a Coronal Mass Ejection (CME) plasma hurricane. An
extreme CME is the Department's biggest Solar Weather concern. It could
create low-frequency EMP similar to a megaton-class nuclear HEMP
detonation over the United States, which could disrupt or damage the
power grid, undersea cables, and other critical infrastructures. The
United States experiences many solar weather events each year, but
major storms that could significantly impact today's infrastructures
are not common but have previously occurred in 1921 and 1859 and
possibly in several other years prior to the establishment of the
modern power grid. The U.S. Department of Energy and utility owners and
operators have been focusing on potential threats and steps that
utilities can take to reduce possible impacts.\6\ Work is underway in
cooperation with a number of Federal agencies including the: National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Nation Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), United States Geological Survey,
Department of Energy, Department of Defense, and DHS with industry
support and participation to ensure this threat is understood.
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\6\ In the last 200 years, only the 1859 and 1921 solar superstorms
are believed by experts to have exceeded the 4,000 nanoTesla/minute
level over the United States. If one of these storms were to occur
today, many experts believe they would likely damage key elements of
the power grid and could cause very long-term power outages over much
of the United States.
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potential impacts to critical infrastructure
Overall, EMP in its various forms can cause widespread disruption
and serious damage to electronic devices and networks, including those
upon which many critical infrastructures rely, such as communication
systems, information technology equipment, and supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) modules. SCADA modules are used in
infrastructure such as electric grids, water supplies, and pipelines.
The disruptions to SCADA systems that could result from EMP range from
SCADA control errors to actual SCADA equipment destruction. Secondary
effects of EMP may harm people through induced fires, electric shocks,
and disruptions of transportation and critical support systems, such as
those at hospitals or sites like nuclear power plants and chemical
facilities.
EMP places all critical infrastructure sectors at risk. Those
sectors that rely heavily on communications technology, information
technology, the electric grid, or that use a SCADA system are
particularly vulnerable. The complex interconnectivity among critical
infrastructure sectors means that EMP incidents that affect a single
sector will likely affect other sectors--potentially resulting in
cascading failures. The interdependent nature of all 18 critical
infrastructure sectors complicates the impact of the event and recovery
from it.
dhs's efforts to study, mitigate, and respond to emp attacks
The Department, acting through the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD)
and the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), has worked
extensively to help recognize EMP as a threat to the Nation.
Specifically, the Department is working collaboratively, both
internally and with external stakeholders, in various arenas to reduce
risk. For example, DHS has exercised scenarios involving both EMP and
solar weather and is developing plans to help address these evolving
threats. Likewise, FEMA and other Government agencies are working with
States and industry. For example, FEMA is deploying new capabilities as
part of the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System, such as the
protected Emergency Alert System Primary Entry Point AM and FM radio
stations that would be used by the President and key leadership to help
keep the public informed and alerted during a major EMP event.\7\ Both
NASA and NOAA are improving and testing their Space Weather warning
systems. Many of the Federal Government's missions rely on satellite
imagery, communications satellites, and GPS for their execution. The
potential impact of solar storms on satellites led Secretary Napolitano
to issue the DHS Space Policy on February 3, 2011, which committed the
Department to working with both private and public-sector partners on
increasing the resilience of mission essential functions.
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\7\ To date, 17 National-level Emergency Alert System radio
stations have been protected against EMP. Within the next year, another
20 National-level EAS radio stations are planned to have EMP protection
installed.
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Two offices within NPPD are at the forefront of understanding and
working to identify how EMP can impact the homeland security
enterprise. First, the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications
(CS&C) has worked extensively to model and assess EMP effects and
conduct research and propose solutions to understand and mitigate EMP
risks. As a result, CS&C has produced many assessments of the risks and
mitigation options related to EMP. In particular, significant progress
has been made in the last few years in modeling and understanding the
risks of SREMP associated with an improvised nuclear device.
NPPD's Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) also plays a
significant role in the Department's work on EMP. IP conducted a study
in 2010 on EMP's potential impact on extra high-voltage (EHV)
transformers for the Western United States' electrical grid. The study
included findings about EMP from both artificial and naturally-
occurring incidents and recommended options for hardening EHV
transformers from EMP.
S&T has led much of the Department's research in the EMP area and
is conducting important work through the Recovery Transformer (RecX)
Project to increase the resiliency of the EHV transmission power grid,
through the use of more mobile and modular transformers. EHV
transformers are very large, extremely difficult to transport, and
until 2009 primarily manufactured overseas, complicating rapid recovery
and restoration efforts. This effort has developed a prototype EHV
transformer that can quickly be deployed to a site, via a series of
trailers and semi-trucks, and then installed, assembled, and energized
rapidly. The prototype RecX was demonstrated and installed in the grid
at a host utility and is currently undergoing a 1-year observational
period to verify its performance.
Another Departmental effort to increase the resiliency of the power
grid is the S&T Resilient Electric Grid Project. S&T has developed a
power-surge limiting, high-temperature, superconducting cable for
electric grid resiliency that enables distribution-level substations to
interconnect and share power and assets, while helping electric
utilities manage power surges arising from a variety of causes that can
cause cascading blackouts and permanent damage to electrical equipment.
The interconnection of substations increases the resiliency of the grid
by creating multiple paths for power flow. Superconducting cables also
provide additional benefits such as allowing more power to flow through
a smaller cable with lower transmission losses. The cable will be
installed for testing and evaluation in Yonkers, NY, in 2014. Several
approaches to improving the resiliency of the electrical grid are
underway both in the United States and abroad that hold promise to
reduce the vulnerability of extra large transformers and reduce the
threat to the electricity grid.
conclusion
DHS has pursued a deeper understanding of the EMP threat as well as
its potential impacts, effective mitigation strategies, and a greater
level of public awareness and readiness in cooperation with other
Federal agencies and private equipment and system owners and operators
through various communications channels. However, more work is needed
to understand the risk posed by EMP and solar weather to all sectors,
through direct and cascading impacts. I commend the committee for its
interest in this key issue and look forward to your questions.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Wales.
Mr. Aimone.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL A. AIMONE, DIRECTOR, BUSINESS ENTERPRISE
INTEGRATION OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR
INSTALLATIONS AND ENVIRONMENT, OFFICE OF UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS, DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
Mr. Aimone. Thank you, Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member
Clarke, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
I was asked specifically to address the question of how the
Department of Defense would operate during a significant outage
of the commercial electrical grid. Although today's hearing is
focused on the prospect of the EMP event, such an event is only
just one scenario of a grid outage. DOD, as it has been stated
before me, is in fact heavily dependent upon the electrical
commercial grid.
The Department has two closely-coordinated sets of
activities that focus on the need to maintain critical mission
activities in the event of a commercial outage. One set of
these activities, led by our Department's Office of Homeland
Defense, is part of the Department's explicit Mission Assurance
Strategy. The other set of activities focused in the Office of
the Under Secretary for Installations and Environment falls
underneath the Facilities Energy Strategy. These two strategies
are tied together.
With regards to the Mission Assurance Strategy, the
Department has long had a major focus on mitigating risks to
high-priority DOD facilities and infrastructure and the
critical global missions they support. To that end, DOD
recently adopted the Mission Assurance Strategy to focus on
enduring operational continuity in an all-hazards threats
environment.
This strategy entails a two-track approach. Track I
includes in-house mitigation activities, those efforts that the
Department can execute largely in-house. Track II of our
Mission Assurance Strategy tackles the many challenges to DOD
mission execution and requires external collaboration with our
partners in the Department of Energy, Homeland Security, and
industry.
With regards to the facility's energy strategy, the
Department's fixed installations are traditionally served by--
as largely as platforms for training and deployment of forces.
But in recent years, they have begun to provide direct support
to combat operations, such as unmanned aerial vehicles flown in
Afghanistan from fixed installations here in the United States.
Our fixed installations also serve as staging platforms for
humanitarian and Homeland Defense missions. These installations
are largely dependent on the commercial power grid that is
vulnerable to disruptions due to aging infrastructure, weather-
related events, and potential kinetic and cyber attack.
Currently, the Department ensures that it can continue its
mission-critical activities on base, in the event of a grid
outage through its fleet of on-site power generation equipment.
This equipment is connected to essential mission systems. In
addition, each installation has standby generators in storage
for repositioning as required.
As further backup to these on-site generation equipment,
DOD maintains a strategic stockpile of electrical power
generators and support equipment that is kept in operational
readiness. For example, during Hurricane Katrina, the Air Force
transported more than 2 megawatts of specialized diesel
generators from Florida, where they were stored, to the Keesler
Air Force base in Mississippi to support base recovery.
Although the Department will continue to maintain its fleet
of on-site and mobile backup generators, we are also moving
aggressively to adopt the next generation micro-grids. Advanced
micro-grids combined with on-site energy generation and energy
storage offer a more robust and cost-effective approach to
ensuring installation energy security than the current solution
of just maintaining a fleet of backup generators.
Advanced micro-grids are a triple play. First, they will
facilitate and incorporate renewable and other on-site energy
generation. Second, they will reduce installation energy costs
on a day-to-day basis by allowing for load balancing and demand
response. Third, and more importantly, the combination of on-
site energy and storage, together with the micro-grid's ability
to manage local energy supply and demand will allow an
installation to shed the non-essential loads and maintain
critical mission loads if the grid should go down.
The Department's Installation Energy Test bid is funding 10
demonstrations of micro-grids and storage technologies to
evaluate benefits and risks of alternative approaches and
configurations. The test bid is working with multiple vendors
so that to allow that DOD captures the benefits of competition.
That ends my prepared remarks. Thank you for holding this
important hearing.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Aimone follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael A. Aimone
September 12, 2012
Chairman Lungren and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify. I was asked to address the
question of how the Department of Defense (DoD) would operate during a
significant outage of the commercial electric power grid.
Although today's hearing is focused on the prospect of an
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) event, such an event is only one scenario
for a grid outage. DoD is heavily dependent on the commercial electric
power grid. The Department has two closely coordinated sets of
activities that focus on the need to maintain critical mission
activities in the event of a commercial grid outage. One set of
activities, led by DoD's office of homeland defense, is part of the
Department's explicit ``mission assurance strategy.'' The other set of
activities, focused on the Department's fixed installations and led by
its Installations and Environment office, falls under DoD's ``facility
energy strategy.''
mission assurance strategy
The Department has long had a major focus on mitigating risks to
high-priority DoD facilities and infrastructure and the critical global
missions they support. Toward that end, DoD recently adopted an
explicit Mission Assurance Strategy, which is focused on ensuring
operational continuity in an all-hazard threat environment.
This strategy entails a two-track approach. Track I includes ``in-
house'' mitigation efforts--activities that the Department can execute
largely on its own. A key element is DoD's Defense Critical Industry
Program (DCIP)--an integrated risk management program designed to
secure critical assets, infrastructure, and key resources for our
Nation. DoD and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) work closely
together as part of DCIP. Under Track I of the Mission Assurance
Strategy, DCIP will continue to update the list of DoD's most critical
assets and target them for special mitigation efforts through DoD's
budget and other internal processes.
Track II of our Mission Assurance Strategy tackles the many
challenges to DoD mission execution that require external collaboration
with partners such as the Department of Energy (DOE), DHS, and
industry. Given that DoD mission execution relies heavily upon the
energy surety of the communities surrounding our installations, Defense
Industrial Base facilities spread across entire regions, and on private
sector infrastructure that will collapse without electricity, this two-
track approach can help meet the challenges to DoD mission assurance
that lie far beyond our military bases.
dod's facility energy strategy
DoD's facility energy strategy is also focused heavily on grid
security in the name of mission assurance. Although the Department's
fixed installations traditionally served largely as a platform for
training and deployment of forces, in recent years they have begun to
provide direct support for combat operations, such as unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs) flown in Afghanistan from fixed installations here in
the United States. Our fixed installations also serve as staging
platforms for humanitarian and homeland defense missions. These
installations are largely dependent on a commercial power grid that is
vulnerable to disruption due to aging infrastructure, weather-related
events, and potential kinetic, cyber attack. In 2008, the Defense
Science Board warned that DoD's reliance on a fragile power grid to
deliver electricity to its bases places critical missions at risk.\1\
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\1\ ``More Fight--Less Fuel,'' Report of the Defense Science Board
Task Force on DoD Energy Strategy, February 2008. Facility energy is
also important because of its high cost. With more than 300,000
buildings and 2.2 billion square feet of building space, DoD has a
footprint three times that of Walmart and six times that of the General
Services Administration. Our corresponding energy bill is $4 billion
annually--roughly 10 percent of what DoD spends to operate and maintain
its installation infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
standby power generation
Currently, DoD ensures that it can continue mission-critical
activities on base largely through its fleet of on-site power
generation equipment. This equipment is connected to essential mission
systems and automatically operates in the event of a commercial grid
outage. In addition, each installation has standby generators in
storage for repositioning as required. Facility power production
specialists ensure that the generators are primed and ready to work,
and that they are maintained and fueled during an emergency. With
careful maintenance these generators can bridge the gap for even a
lengthy outage. As further back up to this installed equipment, DoD
maintains a strategic stockpile of electrical power generators and
support equipment that is kept in operational readiness. For example,
during Hurricane Katrina, the Air Force transported more than 2
megawatts of specialized diesel generators from Florida, where they
were stored, to Keesler Air Force Base in Mississippi, to support base
recovery.
next generation microgrids
Although the Department will continue to maintain its fleet of on-
site and mobile backup generators, we are moving aggressively to adopt
next-generation microgrids. Advanced microgrids, combined with on-site
energy generation (e.g., solar or geothermal) and energy storage, offer
a more robust and cost-effective approach to ensuring installation
energy security than the current solution (backup generators). Although
microgrid systems are in use today, they are relatively
unsophisticated, with limited ability to integrate renewable and other
distributed energy sources, little or no energy storage capability,
uncontrolled load demands, and ``dumb'' distribution that is subject to
excessive energy losses. By contrast, we envision advanced (or
``smart'') microgrids as local power networks that can utilize
distributed energy, manage local energy supply and demand, and operate
seamlessly both in parallel to the grid and in ``island'' mode.
Advanced microgrids are a ``triple play'' for DoD's installations:
First, they will facilitate the incorporation of renewable and other
on-site energy generation. Second, they will reduce installation energy
costs on a day-to-day basis by allowing for load balancing and demand
response--i.e., the ability to curtail load or increase on-site
generation in response to a request from the grid operator. Third, and
most importantly, the combination of on-site energy and storage,
together with the microgrid's ability to manage local energy supply and
demand, will allow an installation to shed non-essential loads and
maintain mission-critical loads if and when the grid goes down.
DoD's Installation Energy Test Bed, run out of the Department's
Installations and Environment office, is funding ten demonstrations of
microgrid and storage technologies to evaluate the benefits and risks
of alternative approaches and configurations. The Test Bed is working
with multiple vendors so as to allow DoD to capture the benefits of
competition. Demonstrations are underway at Twentynine Palms, CA
(General Electric's advanced microgrid system); Fort Bliss, TX
(Lockheed Martin); Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst, NJ (United
Technologies); Fort Sill, OK (Eaton); and several other installations.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much. I appreciate the
testimony of all our panelists. You have added to our record in
very substantial ways and we appreciate that.
I will recognize myself to begin with the questioning now.
Mr. McClelland and Mr. Wales, in the area of dam safety and
in the area of protection against flooding, we have means by
which we assess whether a dam is at protection level of 1-in-
100-year flood, 1-in-200-year flood. My area, the Folsom Dam
was 1-in-90-year flood. We are doing modifications to bring it
up to 1-in-200-year flood, which is an improvement, but would
still leave us behind where New Orleans was before Katrina hit.
But there is an assessment by which you can make those
determinations. Do we have a way of determining, with critical
infrastructure of the electric grid, whether they are protected
against the 1-in-100 possibility, the 1-in-200 possibility? Is
there a way of gauging that sort of thing? If there is, is
there a general assessment of where our electric grid is in
terms of protecting against this 1-in-100 possibility of
electromagnetic pulse?
Mr. McClelland. I can start with that. There are
operational procedures in specific parts of the country and
monitors in place. For instance, in PJM, in the eastern
interconnection, if ground current levels reach 10 amps, they
start to mitigate. They start to re-dispatch the units and move
power around, so they reduce load on some of the transformers.
But as far as automatic mitigation efforts, there are very few.
If an entity puts in a series capacitor, it will block a
ground-induced current, so it will mitigate any effects from a
solar magnetic disturbance. It is not done particularly for
GMD. It is done for economic reasons to reduce the losses on
the transmission line and increase the throughput, particularly
in the western interconnection. The far and away, both the
electronics aspects and the large power equipment, is largely
unmitigated from a hardware standpoint.
I think that is particularly important when you consider
some of the past events. In 1989, there was a geomagnetic
disturbance, a solar flare. The whole province of Quebec, 5
million people, was out of power in 90 seconds. There was
little any operator could have done. In fact, there was nothing
practically an operator could have done to prevent that grid
from collapsing.
The information we have from Zurich is that--and we are
trying to confirm this with our friends in Quebec--is that that
outage alone cost $2 billion.
Mr. Lungren. You say there is nothing that could be done.
Do you mean with current equipment as it was displayed at that
time? Or are there that could have been done in retrospect?
Mr. McClelland. Oh, yes. There are things that could have
been done. But from an operational standpoint, it happened too
fast for an operator sitting at a terminal to really realize
what was occurring. After that event, though, Quebec did
protect themselves from geomagnetic disturbance and
electromagnetic pulse. They did put series capacitors in to
protect their system. So they have mitigated themselves against
this issue.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Wales, Congressman Franks suggested that
the costs associated with taking some of these measures to
protect our electric grid in the light of the potential damage
would be reasonable. Does that make sense to you?
Mr. Wales. I would actually defer some of this question to
my colleague from FERC. But I would say two things. One is,
working with the private sector, they are going to look at both
cost; they are also going to look at the potential impact on
operations. I think the electric sector is a fairly
conservative industry. They have a responsibility for ensuring
a very high degree of reliability in electric power grids. So
anytime we turn on the lights, it is 99-plus times, it is
working. In order to maintain that, they are fairly
conservative about new advances in new technology, what gets
inserted in the grid without sufficient testing and other
procedures.
Over time, I think we are definitely seeing improvements,
more series capacitors inside of networks to mitigate the risk
of geomagnetic disturbances, exploring new technologies that
could be brought to bear to allow a more resilient grid.
There is certainly more that the industry can do. I think
one last point on the cost is, this is an industry that when
they want to raise costs, have to get permission from numerous
utility commissions--utility boards around the country. So when
they have to pass on potential costs, even ones that may seem
minor, they have to go request permission from individual
utility commissions, one at a time. That does have a potential
impact on their ability to move quickly, raise rates, in order
to deploy new and advanced technologies.
Mr. Lungren. I would say that costs are difficult to pass
on if, in fact, the information is not there for people to
understand the worthiness of the cost commitment. Let me just
ask you Mr.--and by the way, when you use the word
conservative, I am not offended.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Lungren. Mr. McClelland, in terms of the costs,
Congressman Franks suggested that the costs are not out of
proportion to the damage to be prevented. Is that, in your
mind, accurate?
Mr. McClelland. Yes. Just to give you a quick example, if
we go to the Quebec outage again, the cost to society for a
relatively short outage to 5 million people--I believe the
outage was about 9 hours long--was about $2 billion, estimated
by Zurich. Mitigation devices that would absolutely block the
geomagnetic disturbance effects, so you wouldn't have to worry
if it is a 1-in-100-year event or a 1-in-60,000-year event, the
Fukushima-Daiichi, the conservative cost is about $500,000 per
transformer. If you extrapolate that into $2 billion cost for
relatively modest losses, I mean, you could mitigate 4,000
transformers, which is far and away in excess of anything that
would need to be done in Quebec.
The Oak Ridge report, on the other extreme, when it
estimated severe effect, was $1 trillion to $2 trillion. That
is with equipment damage. So that one event, even if there is
no loss of equipment whatsoever, one even could more than pay
for the cost of mitigation.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
The Ranking Member is recognized.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Conservatism does has
its place.
My first question is to Mr. Wales. I wanted to just get
from you what your best risk analysis is telling us about the
probability of a severe geomagnetic disturbance or an EMP that
would cause widespread damage to the electric grid.
Mr. Wales. You know, I think the Department would classify
both of those events as ones that are low likelihood. In the
case of a solar storm, we are sure that there are solar storms
that will hit the United States again in the future. Whether
that is in 1 year or in 10,000 years, we don't know.
The potential when you are evaluating the potential impacts
of those types of events, in particular the challenge of
addressing what Chairman Lungren mentioned earlier in terms of
against the 1-in-100-year flood, looking at geomagnetic storms
is not just a 1-in-100-year event, it is what direction is that
solar storm--north, south, east, west? What is the intensity of
that storm, duration, et cetera? So all of those factors will
come into play when evaluating the potential impacts. So in
some cases, if it goes in one direction, the western
interconnect doesn't have severe outages. If it goes in another
direction, it may have a severe outage.
I would also say that some of the information associated
with the likelihood of an EMP being used would have to be done
in a closed hearing. But on the whole, we would continue to
assess these as low-likelihood events. That is not to say that
the nature of the impacts associated with them don't require
action, which is why the Department is taking those measures
where it can. But again, trying to balance those against all
the risks that critical infrastructure, including the power
grid face every day, requires both interaction with the private
sector to build their capacity and ensure that they have the
right information available to them as they are deciding on
their own, how to use their scarce resources for security
enhancements and to build resilience into these systems.
Ms. Clarke. So would you say low likelihood is the
equivalent of a once-in-10-year event, once-in-100-year event,
once-in-500-year event? You know, how do we kind of gauge that
categorization of it?
Mr. Wales. I think, in general, in the solar storm context,
it is a little bit easier to determine since there is more
frequency in which to do analysis on. Those severe solar storms
have historically been termed a 1-in-100-year event. That is
generally considered to be a low-likelihood scenario,
particularly when that 1-in-100-year event may only hit a one
piece of the country, may hit--or a larger one--we don't really
know.
I think there is need to do more study for exactly how a
solar event could impact the infrastructure. While it is likely
that there will be significant disruption, the key variable is
whether there will be severe equipment damage that will require
long lead times to replace. Without that kind of information,
it is unclear what type of mitigation may be best and be able
to assess in more detail what the likely consequences and how
quickly we can recover.
Ms. Clarke. Mr. McClelland, as I understand, there are two
risks that result from the introduction of a ground-induced
current from a geomagnetic disturbance to the bulk power
system. No. 1, damage to the bulk power system assets, like
transformers. No. 2, loss of reactive power support, which
could lead to voltage instability. How does the Commission
oversee that operators of the grid address these risks in a
responsible and comprehensive way?
Mr. McClelland. I think you have hit on, sort of, the key
differentiation between all the prior bodies of study and the
NERC report. The prior bodies of study have said that there
would be a significant opportunity for widespread destruction
of transformers. The NERC report, however, took exception and
said that the reactive power requirements of the transformers
under these conditions would increase significantly, causing
the grid to collapse before there was any significant damage.
The two are very related.
So the Commission called a technical conference to sort out
the details. What we did find was an absolute certainty was
that no one really knows. There was no correlation studies done
on the reactive power supply or on the relays and controls
themselves, so with absolute certainty, no one can say that the
grid would collapse.
In fact, there have been events in 2003 in South Africa,
there was a low-level GIC current. It was too small to cause
reactive power requirements to increase on the transformers and
yet it destroyed 12 large bulk power system transformers. It
took years for the South Africans to recover.
So we know with certainty that is not going to be the case.
We know in Quebec, although the grid collapsed very quickly,
there were still transformers lost at St. John's Bay. So I
think that the issue, the consensus we did achieve was that
grid collapse is absolutely unacceptable in any event, whether
it causes a lot of transformers to be damaged or whether it
just causes a few transformers. The protection scenario,
fortunately, is the same.
So if the GIC is mitigated, either dampened or blocked--if
you dampen, you have to pick to what level. If you block, it
costs the same and you have got certainty associated with it.
You won't have to worry about either the reactive power
consumption or the destruction of the transformers. It is
mitigated.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
Mr. Long.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Wales, you talked about a study, I think, in an
accompanying report earlier. Was that a HITRAC study? Or----
Mr. Wales. Yes.
Mr. Long. Okay. What would the cost be to implement that
proposal that came out of the HITRAC study and accompanying
report?
Mr. Wales. We did not work with industry to assess the
explicit costs. Some of those recommendations, however, were
similar to those that were found in the EMP Commission's
report. I will refer you to that, but in the EMP Commission and
most of the recommendations in the electric power grid section
came to a couple of billion dollars for a Nation-wide
implementation.
Mr. Long. It would be what?
Mr. Wales. A couple of billion dollars for Nation-wide
implementation of all of their recommendations related to the
electric power system.
Mr. Long. A couple of billion dollars Nation-wide?
Mr. Wales. Yes.
Mr. Long. Mr. McClelland, didn't you say that the one event
up in Canada cost how much?
Mr. McClelland. Two billion dollars. Estimated at $2
billion by Zurich.
Mr. Long. So you are telling me, Mr. Wales, that for $2
billion we could implement what we need to do to mitigate this.
Mr. Wales. It may be higher than $2 billion. It may be
closer to $4 billion or $5 billion. Some of their costs were
per unit, so figuring out exactly how many of those units you
would employ, where you want to have that level of EMP
protection. But based upon, again, the EMP Commission's report
contained these cost estimates.
Mr. Long. The what now?
Mr. Wales. The Commission to assess the threat to EMP to
the United States--that Commission--that is where those cost
estimates came from.
Mr. Long. It still doesn't jive to me. So, I mean, if we
are asked to do something as a Congress in these austere times,
it would sure be handy if we had some kind of a--and, I mean,
just on the surface, thinking that an event in Canada cost $2
billion in Quebec. Was that where it was?
Mr. Wales. Yes.
Mr. Long. To think we could go and do everything--put in
all the safeguards we need to for $2 billion or $4 billion or
$6 billion, that doesn't jive with me. So if we are trying to
make decisions here and serious discussion, I think that if you
all could come back with some figures of some type that had a
little justification to them, it would help us try and help
you.
Mr. Wales, by virtue of how our economy is structured, most
electric and other critical infrastructure is privately owned.
So No. 1, I think we would have to get the figure first, but
how do you overcome the challenge of convincing private
industry to make that type of capital investment. Again, we
don't know what the capital investment is yet, but to protect
the electric grid.
Mr. Wales. Historically, DHS has--given the fact that it
does not have regulatory authority to compel action within the
private sector for most critical infrastructure sectors--has
determined that the best way for us to advance the overall
mission is to work collaboratively with the industry, provide
them with the information that they need to better assess how
they can increase their protection and enhance their
resilience. Using that type of information, hopefully, and
owners and operators will make the capital investments that are
best situated given the potential risk that they may face.
For example, power operators in the southern part of the
country are less at risk than the northern part of the country
to geomagnetic storms. They may take a somewhat different
perspective when it comes to investments to harden their
systems against solar or events. But forming--partnerships,
working with the industry and relevant other Government
agencies, like Department of Energy, Department of Defense,
FERC, to ensure that all available information is on the table.
Any knowledge gained through the studies that we do, the
research and development that is done in places like S&T and in
the private sector are shared and the knowledge base is
expanded.
Mr. Long. Okay. Again, I would like to--you know, with all
the reporting and the study and everything, if we had some
numbers that we could--you know, they say, figures lie and
liars figure, so if we had some decent figures to work with, it
would sure help. Thanks for being here.
I am proud to report that I have 30 seconds to yield back.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentleman. So I will use those 30
seconds.
Mr. Aimone, I feel sorry for you not having any questions
directed to you, so I feel compelled to ask you about the
micro-grids that you were talking about. You referred to that
as one of the Defense Department's approaches to dealing with
the potential of a loss of energy supply to fix facilities. How
do you define micro-grids and how far along are you in the
development of them?
Mr. Aimone. Thank you very much for the question.
What we are hoping to do with our micro-grid
demonstrations--and we have one going on today at Twentynine
Palms, a U.S. Marine Corps installation in California, as well
as an installation in Texas at Fort Bliss, and several other of
these micro-grid demonstrations--are bringing together, if you
will, the ability to take the renewable energy resources that
are variable in nature--the sun is out. These renewable energy
sources can provide energy, tie these to the electrical loads
on the base and operate, if you will, the power system of the
base as a small electrical grid, separate from the Nation's
grid, should that happen to be.
In fact, what we really want to do is be able to use the
best of the economics of the National grid when it is available
and the micro-grid can take a look at economics associated with
power production on base and purchasing electrical power off
base with regards to the demands that are available that are
occurring on the installation moment-by-moment and balance
those electrically, such that demand and supply are achieved as
a local grid.
Mr. Lungren. I am not an expert on this, so forgive me. But
in speaking with some of the operators of electrical systems in
California, they have told me how renewable energy sources are
the most difficult to balance because of the variability--sun,
wind, et cetera. So maybe I just don't understand the
technology there, but it seemed to me if you are creating a
micro-grid that is reliant on the variabilities of the
renewable resources--wind, solar--that is a difficult technical
challenge and how long a fix is that?
Mr. Aimone. Combine our renewable sources that would bring
energy onto the installation from on-base sources with our
demands would be the appropriate energy storage devices. We
have demonstrations of battery technology that would, if you
will, gap the difference between what is available from
renewable energy and the demands required. Also would allow for
the on-base generation that exists to be able to be ramped up
to meet the needs if the storage system is being exhausted, yet
the renewable sources aren't available.
So this is a combination of demand on-base generation and
storage.
Mr. Lungren. I appreciate all that, and I appreciate what
you are doing on that. But does the fact still remain that our
fixed installations within the continental United States still
rely primarily on energy produced from our regular electric
grid?
Mr. Aimone. That is a true statement. With one caveat, if I
may, and that caveat is those critical mission loads have those
standby generators that I was speaking to that have the
capability of operating in times of grid outage, such that they
could make sure that those important mission loads can be
achieved. For example----
Mr. Lungren. So long as the grid outage isn't beyond the
capability of your on-installation energy production.
Mr. Aimone. That is a true statement. So testing these
generators to make sure that they can meet the needs of the
loads during a simulated outage, the understanding of how much
fuel is required, and when the fuel needs to be provided to
those particular generators so that you always have a constant
supply of fuel. The inherent generator itself, if it is well-
maintained and operated correctly within the parameters of that
generator, will meet that load for as long as you have fuel to
it.
So we practice how do we get fuel to those generators in
the time of an emergency, even if we have to go off-base and
find appropriate fuel from other locations.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Mr. Long, do you have any more questions?
All right, I want to thank this panel. You have been very,
very helpful. This is an issue that is timely and timeless and
we appreciate your assistance. Thank you very much.
The sole witness of our final panel today is Dr. Chris
Beck, the president of the Electric Infrastructure Security
Council. Dr. Beck is a policy expert in several homeland
security-related areas, including critical infrastructure
protection, cybersecurity, science and technology development,
WMD prevention and protection, and emerging threat,
identification, and mitigation. Dr. Beck holds a Ph.D. in
physics from Tufts University, a B.S. in physics from Montana
State University. Immediately prior to his service at EIS, Dr.
Beck served as the minority staff director of this very
subcommittee. We appreciate your return.
As you know the rules as well as anybody, your written
testimony will be entered into the record and we would ask you
to try and summarize your testimony in 5 minutes and then we
will ask questions.
STATEMENT OF CHRIS BECK, PRESIDENT, ELECTRIC INFRASTRUCTURE
SECURITY COUNCIL
Mr. Beck. Well, thank you, Chairman Lungren. Thank you,
Ranking Member Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Long. It is good to be
back before the committee. It is a little disorienting to be on
this side of the witness table, but I will do the best I can.
As you mentioned, I started looking at these issues while a
member of this committee, and it was because of the seriousness
of this issue that I moved to the Electric Infrastructure
Security Council to focus on this issue full-time. So I very
much appreciate this committee holding this hearing and giving
this issue your attention.
The Electric Infrastructure Security Council's mission is
to work in partnership with Government and corporate
stakeholders to host National and international education,
planning, and communication initiatives to help coordinate
infrastructure protection against electromagnetic threats.
We are happy and proud to co-host the Electric
Infrastructure Security Summit series, the annual international
government NGO summits on infrastructure security. The third
annual summit took place on May 14 and 15 this year in the
United Kingdom's houses of parliament in London. Ranking Member
Clarke was one of the U.S. bipartisan co-chairs of this event,
along with Representative Trent Franks, who you heard from
earlier.
The summit was a gathering of senior government
representatives, scientists, and industry executives from 21
countries. The conclusions and recommendations that we
discussed should be of great interest to this committee. I have
provided the full summary report and my testimony is a quick
summary of that.
We have covered a lot of the ground, so I don't think I
need to describe the problem, the severity, or the lack of
specificity of the timing of these events. The key questions we
asked at the Electric--at the summit were, ``Should we respond
to these threats?'' ``If so, what is the path forward?'' ``Who
should be involved?'' ``And how broad should our response be?''
``Should we respond'' was a resounding, ``yes.'' There is
certainly enough evidence known and enough identified
vulnerability that the delegates felt it is time to move
forward.
``What is the path to move forward?'' A much more difficult
question. We arrived at a couple of things. One is to define
and apply interconnect-wide standards and protection plans and
to pursue two paths to implementation. One, is validate and
implement specific cost-effective protection measures. Two, is
to prioritize scope and timing of protective measures by
expanded hardware and interconnect-wide modeling prioritization
and data collection.
``Who should be involved?'' The sense of the summit
participants is the broader the community, the better the
result that we are going to get. So while this issue initially
was, as Mr. Wales said, identified by the EMP Commission and it
was initially looked at as a government question, we need
participation from government, from commercial power suppliers,
insurance companies, other stakeholders that can each
contribute in their own area of expertise.
``How broad should our scope be?'' We have discussed both
naturally-occurring instances of geomagnetic disturbances and
malicious EMP, and the consensus again was that both need to be
addressed.
I am happy to go into any of these points in greater detail
as we move forward. I would like to note that there appear to
be no significant technical or financial barriers to mitigating
this threat. The technologies needed are well understood and
the cost based on both government estimates and recent
corporate experience is quite low. Going back to questions
raised by Mr. Long. So I think that cost-effective measures are
available.
This concludes my prepared testimony. I look forward to
answering any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Beck follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chris Beck
September 12, 2012
Good morning Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members
of the subcommittee. Thank you for holding this hearing on what I
consider to be one of the greatest threats to our National and homeland
security. As many of you know, before I became EIS Council's President,
I worked for this committee, focusing on Critical Infrastructure
Protection and Science and Technology issues. It was through that work
that I first became aware of the threats facing our critical electric
infrastructures, and I found the issue to be so important that I felt
compelled to focus on it exclusively.
The Electric Infrastructure Security Council's mission is to work
in partnership with Government and corporate stakeholders to host
National and international education, planning, and communication
initiatives to help coordinate infrastructure protection against
electromagnetic threats (e-threats). E-threats include naturally-
occurring geomagnetic disturbances (GMD), high-altitude electromagnetic
pulses (HEMP) from nuclear weapons, and non-nuclear EMP from
intentional electromagnetic interference (IEMI) devices.
EIS Council is also proud to co-host the Electric Infrastructure
Security Summit Series, the annual international government/NGO summits
on infrastructure security. The third annual summit took place on May
14 and 15 this year, in the United Kingdom's Houses of Parliament in
London. Ranking Member Clarke was one of the U.S. bipartisan co-chairs
of that event, along with Rep. Trent Franks. This summit was a
gathering of senior government representatives, scientists, and
industry executives from 21 countries. The conclusions and
recommendations that we discussed should be of great interest to this
committee. The full report has been provided to the committee as an
addendum to my testimony, and I include the summary here.
summary of major themes and recommendations
Defining the Issue
The Problem.--Developed nations are vulnerable to serious National
power grid damage from e-threats, both natural and malicious.
The Severity.--The impact will range from, at minimum, a serious
financial and economic crisis to, at maximum, a catastrophe that would
threaten societal continuity.
The Timing.--For severe space weather, the most recent events
occurred 90 and 150 years ago, but the precise timing of the next such
occurrence, as with all extreme natural disasters, is unknown. For
malicious EMP, either local (non-nuclear) or sub-continental (nuclear),
a strike could be induced by on-going vulnerability coupled with
rapidly changing geopolitical realities.
The Key Questions
1. Should we respond to e-threats? Should we accept the status quo,
and minimize near-term costs by accepting growing vulnerability, or
begin reducing vulnerability?
2. If we respond, what is the path? How should we address
interconnect-wide interdependence, and how should we proceed with
implementation?
3. If we respond, who should be involved? Who should take
responsibility to define the path, and implement it?
4. How broad should our response be? Should both GMD and EMP be
included?
The Response: Consensus Recommendations
1. Should we respond? A common theme of the summit deliberations,
broadly accepted in all presentations and discussions, was that the
risks associated with severe e-threats are serious, and it is time to
begin taking positive actions to protect critical infrastructures.
2. What is the path? The broad consensus of summit presenters and
other delegates was that we need to establish interconnect-wide
standards and plans. For implementation, we should begin working
aggressively to validate and implement specific protection measures,
while also pursuing expanded modeling, priority assessment, and
planning. More specifically:
a. Define and apply interconnect-wide standards and protection
plans.--We should define and apply applicable interconnect-wide
e-threat protection standards, through regulatory or other
means, and develop implementation plans that include
prioritized protection for critical assets.
b. Pursue two paths to implementation.--
1. Validate and implement specific, cost effective protection
measures.
We should thoroughly evaluate protective measures to validate
that they support the e-threat standards, including both
procedural and hardware-based measures (e.g., transformer
or other hardware design upgrades, current blockers, series
capacitance and power substation IEMI protection).
If expectations for high effectiveness and low-cost hardware-
based protection can be tested and demonstrated, this will
become a core approach to mitigation, beginning with
development of interconnect-wide protection planning.
2. Prioritize scope and timing of protective measures by
expanded hardware and interconnect-wide modeling,
prioritization, and data collection.
We should also pursue a path of data collection, hardware
vulnerability modeling and grid impact modeling, and define
critical, high-value asset protection priorities. This
process will guide and prioritize cost-effective
implementation measures. It will be even more vital in
those cases where more expensive measures are needed.
3. Who should be involved? The sense of summit presenters and
delegates was that assembling and implementing a plan for e-threat
protection will require the broadest possible participation among
government agencies, commercial power suppliers, insurance companies
and other stakeholders, each contributing in its own domain of
authority and expertise. A common theme of all the discussions: The
need to work toward international partnerships in developing these
plans.
4. Addressing EMP and IEMI: How broad should our scope be? These
recommendations, it became clear, will be essential for both aspects of
e-threats, both natural--Severe Space Weather, and malicious--IEMI and
EMP. In fact, another common theme at the summit was that, in focusing
on space weather, there has been insufficient attention given to the
needs for protection against malicious EMP and IEMI threats. In this
regard, all the security-related speakers were quite clear: Security
forces cannot perform their National security and protection mission
without the partnership of commercial power suppliers, who will need to
``expand their resilience into a new hazard environment.'' The hope
that the government could handle either the natural or malicious threat
domain on its own was rejected, with the clearest articulation of this
reality coming from speakers who represented the responsible government
departments and agencies.
This summary of summit consensus-based themes and recommendations
reflects many detailed comments made in the presentations and
discussions during summit events. I would welcome the opportunity to
discuss any of these points in greater detail.
I should note that there appear to be no significant technical or
financial barriers to mitigating this threat--the technologies needed
are well understood, and the cost--based on both government estimates
and recent corporate experience--is quite low, even in comparison with
just existing logistics and maintenance budgets for affected equipment.
Rather, the primary needs seem to be for education to increase
awareness and willingness to address the problem, and for coordination
to address the complex government and corporate administrative
structures of even the most critical infrastructures.
This concludes my prepared testimony, and I'd be happy to answer
any questions.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Dr. Beck. Again, good to
have you back here.
Mr. Beck. Thank you.
Mr. Lungren. Maybe I will follow along on Congressman
Long's earlier statements. There have been some generalized
statements about how there is no significant financial
barrier--so I guess the question I would ask is this, if there
is no significant technical or financial barriers to mitigating
this threat, what is the difficulty?
I am not trying to cast aspersions on the industry at all.
I think the industry is, by and large, is one of the primary
providers of the standard of living we have today and the way
of life we have today. The consistency and reliability of the
systems is actually remarkable when you think about it. It goes
to the question--you turn the light switch on. It only comes to
your attention if it doesn't go on when you turn that light
switch.
We take it for granted. That is the way we live. That is
what we rely on. That is our expectation. Something so
essential to our needs would seem to require heightened
attention. If it is as apparent as many have suggested and the
studies have concluded that we have significant
vulnerabilities, either natural or man-made, the question would
be, why aren't we taking these steps?
My partial is--and I would ask yours--that we haven't
raised the awareness to the level that the public would accept
rate increases that would allow for the capitalization of the
technical fixes that are necessary. So that is one of the
obligations that I think we have.
But we have talked in general terms about how we have got
technical fixes and how we have technical fixes within our
fiscal grasp, I guess I would say. Can you put some meat on the
bones on that? Can you give us some idea from the work that was
done at these conferences to suggest the ballpark that Mr. Long
asked about? Or is there some other gauge that you can give us
that would show the appropriateness of applying these fixes to
the current system?
Mr. Beck. Yes, I think I can do that. Going back to the
original question is: What is the disconnect or why don't we
know about this? I think part of it is just a question of human
nature. It is that there are--when you have certain events that
don't happen very often and they are things that we don't see,
then we fail to plan for those.
When we designed the grid and built it over the last 100
years, there wasn't the consistent level of disruption from
solar storms. In other words, lower-level solar storms do
happen all the time. Any time the aurora borealis that you see
it--that is, in effect, a geomagnetic disturbance. So there are
low-level events all the time. So the grid was able to deal
with those. We haven't see the very high-level events and when
the grid wasn't designed for that purpose, there is a certain
inertia both mental and physical that comes in with saying we
designed the grid. I know how this works. We have optimized it.
We are happy with its performance. Trying to move beyond that
sometimes is difficult.
Going to the question of costs--and you mentioned
capitalization, which I think is important. So taking the EMP
Commission report estimate of about a billion dollars for
mitigation for transformers that both Mr. Wales and Mr.
McClelland talked about. You take that the step further and
say, well, the transformer is a 30- to 50-year asset. They have
a long lifetime, as opposed to other components on the grid,
electronics and stuff that are replaced much more frequently.
So if you have a 30-year asset and a billion dollars, you
are talking about $33 million or so a year. That breaks down
to, you know, a few cents per citizen that we would have to
pay. So your job and your two concerns, especially on this
panel, are providing for security and protection of the public;
but also you have a fiscal responsibility that you don't want
to stick the citizens with an enormous bill that doesn't make
sense. But when you run some of those numbers, especially when
you are talking about the transformers and the fact that those
assets last for a long time, you can spread those costs out and
make them nearly insignificant to the ratepayer or the
taxpayer.
Mr. Lungren. Those are your words. I can never say that
there is an insignificant cost to taxpayers, but I understand
the point that you make.
The gentlelady from New York is recognized.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me first
say, Mr. Chairman, or ask if we could ask for unanimous consent
that the EIS summit three London report, a summary of the third
Electric Infrastructure Security summit held this summer in
London be placed in the record.
Mr. Lungren. Without objection.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information has been retained in committee files and is
available at http://www.eissummit.com/images/upload/conf/media/
EISS%20III%20London%20Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ms. Clarke. I think its findings and conclusions will
benefit the record of this hearing.
Dr. Beck, in your recent London conference, there were
representatives from business and industry, in addition to
governments. Can you describe the conversations and discussions
about how the insurance industry is viewing EMP--excuse me--and
the geomagnetic disturbances in the electric industry?
Mr. Beck. Yes. This was one of the significant new or
differences--thankful one--between the prior conferences that
we have had. So this was our third summit. The first summit in
London was pretty much a government-only event and the second
one--and you know this very well, Ms. Clarke--we had some
expanded participation. We had a half-day where we had industry
roundtables and we talked to the electric grid operators.
But Lloyd's of London, for example, 2010, did a report on
space weather. So they had been reading the same reports, and
so we had a panel at the summit and you can see a lot of the
highlights of that in the report that you just referenced. So
the interest is there that Lloyd's insures not just the assets
directly, but we talked about earlier, the economic disruption
overall of a power outage.
Joe McClelland talked about the $2 billion estimate for the
Quebec outage. In the 2003 northeast blackout, not a GMD event,
but still instructive because it was a power outage of 1-3
days, depending on where you were in that blackout zone. The
after-action report was about $14 billion in societal costs.
So when an insurance company, whether they are insuring an
electric grid operator and his assets or a major power consumer
that is manufacturing or any other major player that has
insurance, when effects like geomagnetic disturbance impact
electric grid and the continuous supply of electricity,
especially for high-precision manufacturing that really rely on
that, there are insurance effects. So the insurance companies
looked at this. They said, we think that we need to take a
deeper dive.
You know, they didn't come back with any conclusions. We
know what GMD costs. We are ready to have a GMD insurance
package. They are not there yet, but I would recommend to the
members and staff that the Lloyd's report would help to give
some of those--put the meat on the bones, as Mr. Lungren put
it.
Ms. Clarke. Is the council proposing international
standards for EMP and the geomagnetic disturbance mitigation?
Who would oversee such an effort?
Mr. Beck. The council acts as a host to the discussion, so
we are summarizing the discussions and recommendations. So I
wouldn't say that we are proposing international standards, but
those were called for by many of the members there.
So a lot of the, you know, the sophisticated electric grids
are located in North America and Europe, northern Europe. So
that was the bulk of the participants there and so the grids
there have some interconnection. I mean, the grid doesn't just
end, you know, at the border of France, and a brand new grid in
Spain. There is some crosstalk there, like we have across State
lines here. So there is interest there to say, well, we are
all, you know, we all have a connection, just like we all have
a connection here in the United States to each other.
So a standard or goal to be set for reliability and
operation under a geomagnetic disturbance or protection
modalities for EMP--the individual operators recognize that a
standard that they could look to would be very helpful. Because
otherwise, they, you know, look at, well, what does the threat
mean and I will do my best. I will give my best engineering
judgment to apply that to my section of the grid. But in an
interconnected system, you know, you always have the question
of, well, what if I do something and the guy next to me does
nothing? Is that worth the investment? Because I am still
vulnerable and I don't have any control over that grid next to
me.
So that was the point where international standards--or in
the United States, National standards, or I guess it is a bit
broader, because we include Canada and parts of Mexico here--
but those types of standards so that everyone has some common
goal and common understanding of the issue. Everyone suggested
that that was very important.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much. I guess Mr. Long has
gone.
So I thank you for your testimony, Mr. Beck. Once again,
thank you for your participation on this committee in your
major staff positions. Congratulations on the Council's work.
I thank you and all the other witnesses for the valuable
testimony and the Members for their questions. The Members of
the committee may have some additional questions, as you know,
for you and the other witnesses. We will ask you to respond to
these in writing. The hearing record will be held open for 10
days. The subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke for Joseph McClelland
Question 1. Are there any areas--in infrastructure, programs, or
research--that seem urgently in need of attention regarding a
Geomagnetic Disturbance threat?
If you could affect one change in current arrangements for managing
the risks of severe space weather and geomagnetic disturbance events,
what would that be?
In other words, what development in the current system of space
weather risk management would yield the greatest benefit with the least
cost?
Answer. Yesterday, the Commission issued a proposal to address the
impacts of GMD on the electric grid. This proposal stems from the
technical conference held by the Commission on April 30 of this year,
which explored the risks and impacts from geomagnetically-induced
currents to transformers and other equipment on the bulk power system,
as well as options for addressing or mitigating the risks and impacts.
In the proposed rule discussed above, the Commission proposes to
direct the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) to
submit for approval Reliability Standards that address the impact of
geomagnetic disturbances (GMD) on the reliable operation of the Bulk-
Power System. The Commission proposes to do this in two stages. In the
first stage, the Commission proposes to direct NERC to file, within 90
days of the effective date of a final rule in this proceeding, one or
more Reliability Standards that require owners and operators of the
Bulk-Power System to develop and implement operational procedures to
mitigate the effects of GMDs consistent with the reliable operation of
the Bulk-Power System. In the second stage, the Commission proposes to
direct NERC to file, within 6 months of the effective date of a final
rule in this proceeding, one or more Reliability Standards that require
owners and operators of the Bulk-Power System to conduct initial and
on-going assessments of the potential impact of GMDs on Bulk-Power
System equipment and the Bulk-Power System as a whole. Based on those
assessments, the Reliability Standards would require owners and
operators to develop and implement a plan so that instability,
uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of the Bulk-Power
System, caused by damage to critical or vulnerable Bulk-Power System
equipment, or otherwise, will not occur as a result of a GMD. This plan
cannot be limited to operational procedures or enhanced training alone,
but should, subject to the needs indentified in the assessments,
contain strategies for protecting against the potential impact of GMDs
based on factors such as the age, condition, technical specifications,
or location of specific equipment. These strategies could include
automatically blocking geomagnetically-induced currents from entering
the Bulk-Power System, instituting specification requirements for new
equipment, inventory management, and isolating certain equipment that
is not cost-effective to retrofit. This second stage would be
implemented in phases, focusing first on the most critical Bulk-Power
System assets.
Current GMD forecasting methods provide limited time for operators
to react once a GMD warning is issued. I am concerned with the short
period of time to react to a GMD event and the potential consequences
of not reacting fast enough. The Commission's proposed rule would first
ensure that appropriate operational procedures to mitigate GMD are in
place in a relatively short time frame, then turn to implementation of
a plan so that instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading
failures of the Bulk-Power System, caused by damage to critical or
vulnerable Bulk-Power System equipment, or otherwise, will not occur as
a result of a GMD.
Question 2. What is FERC currently doing to address EMP and
Geomagnetic Disturbance threats?
Answer. See question 1.
Question 3. As I understand, there are two risks that result from
the introduction of ground-induced currents from a geomagnetic
disturbance to the bulk power system: (1) Damage to the bulk power
system assets, like transformers, and (2) Loss of reactive power
support, which could lead to voltage instability.
How does the Commission oversee that operators of the grid address
these risks in a responsible and comprehensive way?
Answer. The proposed rule issued yesterday would take short-term
and long-term steps to protect the electric grid from a geomagnetic
disturbance. The Commission's proposed two-phase approach recognizes
this difference by focusing first on the development of Reliability
Standards requiring operational procedures in a relatively short time
frame. The Commission proposes to give NERC and owners and operators of
the Bulk-Power System more time to perform, in the second phase,
initial and on-going assessments and, based on those assessments, to
develop and implement a plan so that instability, uncontrolled
separation, or cascading failures of the Bulk-Power System, caused by
damage to critical or vulnerable Bulk-Power System equipment, or
otherwise, will not occur as a result of a GMD.
Question 4. NERC has outlined several recommendations in their GMD
report--what is the Commission's process or approach to implement or
facilitate their recommendations?
Answer. In addition to proposing that NERC develop Reliability
Standards that require operational procedures during the first phase,
the Commission's proposal also would accept aspects of the ``Initial
Actions'' proposal set forth in NERC's post-Technical Conference
comments.
Question 5. Do you think each utility should have spare
transformers to be prepared in case of a solar Geomagnetic Disturbance
event? Who should pay for these spare transformers and what is the
cost?
Answer. There should be some spare transformers for the Bulk-Power
System to recover from geomagnetic disturbances as well as from many
other risks (e.g., lightning, voltage surges, and fault conditions).
However, spare transformers alone are not sufficient to address GMDs.
During a GMD, geomagnetically-induced currents flowing through
transformers cause those transformers to operate in a manner for which
they are not designed (typically described as half-cycle saturation).
As question 3 above notes, two results of this abnormal operation are
equipment damage and loss of reactive power support. In addition, the
affected transformers introduce disruptive harmonics into the power
grid. The harmonics can be thought of as ``noise'' on the power grid.
This ``noise'' can cause switching equipment to misoperate (opening or
closing when they should not) and other equipment damage, most notably
damage to generators. The risks from loss of reactive power support and
from harmonics would not be mitigated by spare transformers. Steps such
as preventing half-cycle saturation from occurring would be necessary
in order to avoid these risks.
Maintaining spare equipment is a time-tested method of improving
electric reliability, and typically is a legitimate cost of providing
service. The cost of a spare extra-high voltage (EHV, typically over
300kV) transformer varies depending on many design features, including
the operating voltages and the power rating of the transformer.
However, a ball-park range would be $10 million to $15 million for a
typical three-phase EHV transformer.
Questions From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren for Brandon Wales
Question 1. What is DHS' 90-day, 1-year, and 5-year plan to address
the threat posed by EMP?
Answer. Signed March 30, 2011, Presidential Policy Directive-8
(PPD-8) seeks to strengthen security and resilience through systematic
preparation for threats that pose the greatest risk to the Nation. As a
part of PPD-8 implementation and from a Whole Community approach, the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is leading the development
of a National Planning System (NPS) that integrates planning across all
levels of Government and with the private and non-profit sectors around
key capabilities to address all-hazard threats. This work will result
in a set of focused planning documents that support the effective
delivery of core capabilities across the Whole Community to address
all-hazards, including those posed by Electromagnetic Pulses (EMP) due
to space weather or nuclear incidents.
As a component of PPD-8, the Federal Interagency Operational Plan
(FIOP)-Response is an all-hazards plan that describes how the Federal
Government supports State, local, Tribal, territorial, and insular area
efforts to save lives, protect property and the environment, and meet
basic human needs following an emergency or disaster, such as EMP
impacts. The FIOP-Response delineates Federal response roles and
responsibilities; identifies critical tasks, resources, and sourcing
requirements necessary to deliver the Response Core Capabilities; and
coordinates statutory authorities across governments.
While this plan is based on a no-notice catastrophic incident that
spans multiple regions and States, it will also contain incident-
specific annexes as required. For example, FEMA has scheduled
development of a ``Long-Term Power Outage Annex'' for fiscal year 2014.
The FIOP-Response will also be updated 18 months after initial
signature with quadrennial re-writes thereafter.
Question 2. The Department of Homeland Security does not include
the threat of EMP attack in its 15 National Disaster scenarios. Why
not?
How is DHS protecting the homeland against EMP? Is it enough?
Answer. Under Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8), the 15
National Planning Scenarios were replaced by a new National
Preparedness System based on the Strategic National Risk Assessment
which identified incidents that posed the greatest threat to the
Nation. Electromagnetic radiation from space weather was included as a
National-level event that could test the Nation's preparednesss. PPD-8
includes five integrated National planning frameworks and interagency
operational plans. As stated under the response to Question No. 1, the
Federal Interagency Operational Plan (FIOP)-Response is a component of
PPD-8. The FIOP-Response is an all-hazards plan that describes how the
Federal Government supports State, local, Tribal, territorial, and
insular area efforts to save lives, protect property and the
environment, and meet basic human needs following an emergency or
disaster, such as those with EMP threats. While this plan is based on a
no-notice catastrophic incident that spans multiple regions and States,
it will also contain incident-specific annexes as required. For
example, FEMA has scheduled development of a ``Long-Term Power Outage
Annex'' for fiscal year 2014. The FIOP-Response will also be updated 18
months after initial signature with quadrennial re-writes thereafter.
Question 3. By virtue of how our economy is structured, most
electric and other critical infrastructure is privately owned. How do
you overcome the challenge of convincing private industry to make the
capital investments required to secure the electric grid?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) works with
industry in a number of ways to promote appropriate security
investments. The National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center
(NISAC) prepares and shares analyses of critical infrastructure,
including their interdependencies, vulnerabilities, consequences, and
other complexities, under the direction of the Office of Infrastructure
Protection's Infrastructure Analysis and Strategy Division.
Additionally, DHS coordinates unclassified and classified briefings
and workshops for industry and works to analyze their vulnerabilities
and demonstrate potential impacts and costs if those vulnerabilities
are left unaddressed. To facilitate discussions of this type, DHS
administers the Critical Infrastructure Private Sector Clearance
Program (PSCP). The PSCP sponsors clearances for private-sector
partners that are responsible for critical infrastructure protection
but would not otherwise be eligible for a clearance. Through these
activities, private-sector partners become better positioned to make
more informed security investments.
Question 4. How much do you or does your agency rely upon data from
NOAA's ACE satellite for warnings about naturally-occurring EMPs?
Question 5. Are you aware that this satellite is well past its
expected lifetime, and already operating at a severely diminished
capacity?
Answer. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) relies on
space weather information and warnings from NOAA's Space Weather
Prediction Center (SWPC), which uses data from the ACE satellite. FEMA
benefits from the SWPC's real-time monitoring and forecasting of solar
and geophysical events, which could impact satellites, power grids,
communications, navigations, and other systems. FEMA is aware of the
ACE satellite's current state and the fiscal year 2014 mission planned
to replace it.
Question 6. Are you aware of NOAA's plans and time line to replace
the failing ACE spacecraft with the refurbished DSCOVR spacecraft?
And, the naturally-occurring EMP warning needs of your agency?
Answer. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is aware of
NOAA's plans and time line to replace the ACE spacecraft with DSCOVR.
FEMA liaisons regularly communicate with the National Weather Service
and, more specifically, the Space Weather Prediction Center (SWPC).
FEMA relies on SWPC's real-time monitoring and forecasting of solar and
geophysical events, which could impact satellites, power grids,
communications, navigations, and other systems. NOAA and the SWPC have
communicated to FEMA the ACE satellite's vulnerabilities and their
plans to address it.
Question 7. How would your agency's ability to meet its mission
requirements be effected if ACE were to completely fail before DSCOVR
is operationally on-orbit?
Answer. Failure of the ACE satellite would only impact the Federal
Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) actual operations if such failure
led to delays in critical information or warnings. To respond to a
space weather event, FEMA would implement its response plans in
accordance with the Stafford Act and the National Response Framework.
Delays in space weather-related information or warnings could
theoretically delay implementation of preventative or early response
actions.
Questions From Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke for Brandon Wales
Question 1a. I understand that your office includes analysts from
the Office of Infrastructure Protection and the Office of Intelligence
and Analysis.
Could you outline for us how HITRAC creates actionable risk-
informed analysis for EMP or geomagnetic disturbance threats?
Question 1b. In other words, what kind of input information, in
generally do you use in the risk analysis of geomagnetic disturbances
or EMP threats?
Question 1c. To whom would you report this analysis for action on
EMP-specific threats?
Answer. There are several reports that analyze the threat posed by
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and geomagnetic disturbances. The 2011 and
2012 National Risk Profiles identify what sectors are most at-risk from
geomagnetic disturbances and what systems are in place to warn of an
impending space weather event. A 2010 HITRAC study performed by the
National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center analyzed the
impact of EMP on extra high-voltage power transformers. Additionally, a
2010 National-Level Exercise looking at the effects of an improvised
nuclear device touched upon the impacts of an EMP from a nuclear
attack. At this time, the Department of Homeland Security has not
performed a comprehensive study analyzing how different inputs would
change how critical infrastructure is affected.
Question 2. I see that within Infrastructure Protection, risk
analysis, modeling, simulation/analysis and incident planning and
response are bundled together as part of an overall package for
Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources protection.
Are EMP and geomagnetic disturbance considered a discreet separate
threat or are they combined in an all-hazards analysis approach?
Answer. Electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and geomagnetic disturbance are
considered discreet and separate threats. The 2011 and 2012 National
Risk Profiles have separate Space Weather sections. A National
Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center report highlighted
threats from EMP and geomagnetic disturbance and considered them to be
separate from other hazards. Also, studies analyzing the impacts from
the detonation of a nuclear device include analysis on the effects from
the resulting EMP.
Question 3. I understand that within DHS, under the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, the Office of Infrastructure Protection
oversees three key elements of the Risk Management Frameworks:
i. Identification of critical infrastructure assets and systems;
ii. Risk assessment based on event consequences, facility or system
vulnerabilities, and known or probable threats; and
iii. Prioritization of CIKR protection activities based on risk.
How is the U.S. grid identified or described in this framework (or
is it identified), what are the risk assessment levels, and what
prioritization is listed for EMPs and geomagnetic disturbances threats
to the grid?
Answer. Electric power is identified as a subsector of the energy
sector and includes power plants and the electric grid. Infrastructure,
including the electric grid, is not prioritized based on
electromagnetic pulse or geomagnetic disturbances, but rather is based
on the National Critical Infrastructure Prioritization Program (NCIPP)
outlined in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan. NCIPP
identifies Nationally significant critical assets and systems to
enhance decision making related to critical infrastructure protection.
Critical infrastructure identified includes those that, if destroyed or
disrupted, could cause some combination of significant casualties,
major economic losses, or widespread and long-term disruptions to
National well-being and governance capacity.
Question 4. Do you think each utility should have spare
transformers to be prepared in case of a solar geomagnetic disturbance
event? Who should pay for these spare transformers and what is the
cost?
Answer. The Department has not taken a position on whether
utilities should have spare transformers and if so who should bear the
cost. The Department recognizes that redundancy can add resilience to
infrastructure systems. In the event of a major electromagnetic pulse
or geomagnetic disturbance, the current quantity of spare transformers
could be insufficient if enough transformers were physically damaged.
There is no regulatory requirement that utility companies maintain
spare transformers, though some currently do at their own expense.
More needs to be learned about the effects of large GMD on major
transformers. Stockpiling spares would be costly and not easy to do
generically since transformer needs vary and their massive weight make
them difficult to move.
The DHS Science & Technology Directorate has worked with industry
to jointly develop a prototype extra high-voltage (EHV) transformer
that is easier to transport and quicker to energize than conventional
EHV transformers to enable rapid recovery from such events. Known as
the Recovery Transformer (RecX), a pilot demonstration was successfully
conducted in March 2012 in which the RecX was transported, installed,
and energized in less than 1 week. The RecX is currently operational in
the grid for a 1-year monitoring period. DHS S&T and RecX project
partners are working on transition plans for RecX with various
stakeholders, including Federal partners & private industry.
Questions From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren for Michael A. Aimone
Question 1. How has the U.S. military sought to protect its
satellites, weapons, and other equipment against an EMP attack?
Since many U.S. military facilities are dependent on the U.S.
electric grid, what steps has the U.S. military taken to protect its
capabilities in the event of an EMP attack? Are these steps relevant to
the protection of the U.S. electric grid?
Answer. Since the 1960s the Department of Defense (DoD) has been
conducting on-going research focused on defining the nature of the
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) threat, its effect on systems, and ways to
protect both military assets and infrastructure against EMP threats.
Mission-critical military systems are required to be hardened against
the High-Altitude EMP (HEMP) threat specified in MIL-STD-2169, the HEMP
threat environment, in accordance with DoDI 3150.09, CBRN Survivability
Policy. Although there are several types of EMPs, HEMP is considered to
be the primary threat to military assets. Military standards for
protecting strategic C4I ground-mobile systems, fixed facilities, and
aircraft have been enacted and standards for protecting maritime assets
against nuclear HEMP and satellites against other nuclear weapon
effects environments are currently being developed. Transportable and
mobile military systems are powered by mobile generators which are
hardened against the HEMP threat. Similarly, military ground (fixed)
facilities performing mission-critical functions use EMP-hardened
commercial power. If the commercial power source is unavailable (e.g.
due to power grid outages), these facilities rely on HEMP-hardened
backup generators.
Many EMP hardness protection methods and commercially available
protection devices are generally applicable for use in protecting
elements of the U.S. electric grid such as the universal Supervisory
Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) equipment which may be susceptible
to and should be hardened against early-time HEMP. SCADA is a type of
industrial control system (ICS). Industrial control systems are
computer controlled systems that monitor and control industrial
processes that exist in the physical world. SCADA is critical to normal
functioning of the grid. In addition, due to the unique nature of the
grid, such as transmission of electric power over very long
transmission lines containing numerous transformers and other high-
voltage devices, the grid may be vulnerable to late-time effects of
HEMP. The DoD's DTRA recently have been conducted two experimental
research efforts at the Department of Energy's Idaho National
Laboratory to define the nature and extent of late-time EMP effects on
typical elements of the power grid and on protecting the grid against
late-time HEMP.
DoD does not harden all military systems, but just those systems
deemed to be mission-critical that are expected to operate in a nuclear
environment. DoDI 3150.09, CBRN Survivability Policy, is the tool used
to identify those systems.
Question 2. Have the effects of an EMP attack, solar storm, or
other long-term disruption (such as the derecho) on the civilian
recovery sectors (i.e., hospitals, police, fire departments) been
adequately investigated and planned for? What about similar impacts on
DoD assets and missions?
Answer. Lessons-learned from DoD hardening is applicable to
civilian infrastructure, but the civilian infrastructure is not in
DoD's mission space. DoD plans to operate mission-critical systems as
necessary without civilian infrastructure. It is probably cost-
prohibitive to harden all civilian infrastructure but it might be cost-
effective to harden critical nodes such as SCADA. Overall, DoD has no
responsibility to harden civilian infrastructure.
Based on results of past studies and limited HEMP testing, the
effects of an EMP attack on the civilian recovery sectors (emergency
services) may not, in some areas, be adequately planned for. The
Congressional Commission on EMP Attack on the U.S. conducted a HEMP
effects study on the emergency services sector in 2002-2003. The study,
based on site visits, analyses, and limited testing, illustrated the
effects of plausible HEMP threats and scenarios on typical components
of the sector including a preliminary vulnerability assessment of HEMP
events on Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPS). While the PSAP
facilities visited had lightning protection, they were not directly
protected against the effects of HEMP. Limited HEMP testing was
performed on actual (or similar) components in PSAP facilities and
equipment used by the emergency services sector such as computers,
hand-held radios, and a police vehicle.
In general, unhardened DoD assets and computer networks are
vulnerable to high-level HEMP (e.g. <10kV/m). To the extent that DoD
relies on unhardened assets to perform specific missions, these
missions are at risk. Strategic missions, in general, rely on HEMP-
protected assets. Non-strategic missions may rely on unhardened assets.
Question 3a. While the term ``energy security'' has been in vogue
amongst policymakers, it is mainly used in terms of sustainability and
alternative energy sources (i.e. freedom from foreign oil) rather than
resiliency and counter-terrorism applications. Have the Departments of
Defense and Homeland Security been directing their regulatory attention
more towards these issues rather than securing its energy sources,
particularly electricity, against the effects of a long-term
disruption?
Answer. The Department of Defense defers to the Department of
Homeland Security to provide the subcommittee with a description of the
status of the U.S. Government's efforts to plan for EMP, solar storm,
or long-term disruption effects on the civilian recovery sectors. The
Department is largely in a supporting role to the lead civilian
authorities in any event to mitigate the consequences of or remediate
after an EMP attack, solar storm, or long-term disruption event in the
homeland. DHS is the lead agency for National Critical Infrastructure
Protection and leads the U.S. Government's contingency response plan
efforts to mitigate the consequences of or remediate after an EMP
attack, solar storm, or long-term disruption event. However, the
Department of Defense is a significant stakeholder, and the
Department's ability to perform its National security functions is
largely dependent upon the reliability and resilience of the commercial
electric power grid.
Question 3b. If so, are there plans to broaden your interpretation
of energy security?
Answer. The Department is pursuing comprehensive energy security
strategies through the Energy Grid Security Executive Council (EGSEC)
co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense
and Americas' Security Affairs and the Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Installations and Enviromnent. The council is working to
improve the security, adequacy, and reliability of electricity supplies
and related infrastructure key to the continuity of critical defense
missions. The EGSEC works closely with the Departments of Energy and
Homeland Security, along with private-sector partners.
Congress has issued a broader interpretation of energy security in
Title 10, Section 2924, which the Department of Defense believes is a
good start in defining energy security. This definition includes,
``having assured access to reliable supplies of energy and the ability
to protect and deliver sufficient energy to meet mission-essential
requirements.''
The Department's current facility energy strategy includes
enhancing the energy security of DoD installations. The DoD Annual
Energy Management Report (AEMR) for fiscal year 2011 describes the
facility energy strategy and includes a chapter describing energy
security activities for DoD installations (see Chapter 5 in the fiscal
year 2011 AEMR).
The Department's Installation Energy Management policy in DoDI
4170.11 includes a broader interpretation of energy security (see
Enclosure 3, Section 3c. in DoDI 4170.11). The Department is in the
process of updating this policy to further broaden the interpretation
of energy security for fixed installations.
Question 4. How is DoD using the inter-agency system to share its
intelligence gathering and modeling capability with DHS and its
partners to better understand potential EMP threats? Is DoD taking
advantage of FERC, DoE, and DHS' planning and response capabilities?
Answer. DoD is using established intelligence community (IC)
processes and mechanisms to share the results of its intelligence
gathering on EMP threats with DoE, DHS, and other partners.
DoD components who are also elements within the IC, such as DIA and
(by extension) the Service Intelligence Centers (NASIC, NGIC, aNI)
produce assessments on different aspects of EMP threats. Completed
intelligence analysis on EMP threats is shared directly in
collaborative efforts and made broadly available through Intelink and
other collaboration tools.
As a part of a 65-year partnership on nuclear weapons, DoD
collaborates closely with DoE and its key laboratories to engage in
research of common interest on EMP and other nuclear-related effects.
DoD relies on the deep technical expertise resident at DoE labs to
supplement DoD's weapon-specific expertise. Each DoE National lab also
has a field intelligence element that is responsible for coordinating
IC-related activities at the lab and assisting with sharing of
intelligence products.
DoD collaborates with DHS on EMP threats as just one of many areas
of cooperation on homeland security. DHS has an extensive liaison
relationship with NSA and an operational coordination relationship with
USNORTHCOM.
Those organizations across DoD, DoE, and DHS that deal with EMP
threats are well-connected at both the leadership and rank-and-file
level, ensuring robust intelligence sharing.
Question 5. There is a DHS, DoD, and Department of Energy
initiative to address EMP preparedness and grid reliability issues with
private owners and operators. When was this partnership developed and
what is its current status?
Answer. The Energy Sector Public-Private Partnership (ES3P)
initiative was established in March 2012 by the Department of Energy,
the Department of Homeland Security, and the Department of Defense to
engage sector stakeholders to understand, and where necessary, improve
the energy surety (reliability, security, and resiliency) of
infrastructure which supports National security missions. ES3P does not
specifically focus on EMP-related events.
The goal for the ES3P Joint Working Group (ES3PJWG) is to pull
together the existing roles, responsibilities, and activities which
currently support the Nation's public and privately-owned energy
systems. Increasing efficiency through integrated activities across
larger, interconnected systems should improve energy surety. This
public-private partnership is intended to be a multi-stage initiative.
Specifically, this initiative is designed to take a regional approach
to the energy surety of critical infrastructure and installations.
Currently, ES3P is engaged in ``The National Capital Region
Initiative,'' which focuses on DoD mission assurance in the National
Capital Region (NCR). Specifically, this initiative addresses the
energy surety of DoD installations, critical infrastructure, and
Defense Industrial Base (DIE) facilities that perform or support DoD
critical missions in the NCR. Best practices established in the first
stage will be applied in other National security mission areas in
follow on stages.
Questions From Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke for Chris Beck
Question 1. In your recent London Conference, there were
representatives from business and industry, in addition to governments.
Could you describe the conversations and discussions about how the
insurance industry is viewing EMP and geomagnetic disturbances in the
electric industry?
Answer. The insurance industry is now becoming very active in this
area. While high-impact, low-frequency (HILF) risks are difficult to
handle with traditional, actuarial-style risk analysis, the industry
recognizes that the serious consequences resulting from a large EMP/GMD
event means that mitigation actions must be taken. Insurance companies
are very exposed to space weather costs, with the primary expense
likely to be contingent business interruption costs, in addition to the
need to cover direct costs of insured equipment that would be damaged.
The EIS Summit III report, which I supplied to the committee as an
addendum to my testimony summarizes the insurance industry discussions
(see pages 30-35). In addition, Lloyd's of London issued a report on
Space Weather in 2010, which I am also attaching for your convenience.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* The information has been retained in committee files and is
available at http://www.lloyds.com/lloyds/press-centre/press-releases/
2010/11//media/lloyds/reports/360/360%20space%20weather/
7311_lloyds_360_space%20weather_03.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2. Is the council proposing international standards for
EMP and geomagnetic disturbance mitigation? Who would oversee such an
effort?
Answer. One of the broad, consensus recommendations that emerged
during several of the discussions at our third Electric Infrastructure
Security Summit on May 14-15, 2012, was the need for standards for
electrical transformers and other electrical devices on electric grids
throughout the world. Standards, whether National or international, are
necessary to ensure some basic level of protection. Sweden, for
example, has set a standard for the amount of geomagnetically-induced
current (GIC) that all transformers on their grid must meet. Such
standards allow electric grid owners and operators to procure equipment
designed with GMD hazards taken into account. Without a standard,
individual companies are doing the best they can, but this approach
yields highly varied levels of protection. Because grids are all
interconnected, ``weak links'' are present that put the entire system
at risk. There are a number of approaches to begin developing such
standards, including both relevant Government agency efforts and input
from industry on best practices and experiences. Whatever the choice,
it will be important to have it clearly defined, and designed to accept
input from all relevant stakeholders and experts.
Question 3. Electrical systems for countries are structured in
different ways, for example we know that the system in S. Africa will
need GMD protection that may vary from another country, and mitigation
for GMD will have to be tailored to their needs.
How do you plan to propose international standards if there are so
many discreet and individual systems that will need specialized
mitigation?
Answer. The most fundamental standards required will refer to
maximum tolerable off-nominal grid conditions. In the case of GMD, this
would mean a standard that would limit maximum GIC flows in extra-high-
voltage (EHV) transformers or provide corresponding GIC withstand
ratings in EHV transformers. Since these are transformer-specific
approaches, they would be country- and system-independent. The country-
unique effort would take place in implementing the GMD standard, just
as it does for implementing other standards, as each country, or
coordinated group of system operators, works to evaluate--for their
system--which approaches to assuring those standards/limits are met are
best-suited to different elements of their power grid.
Question 4. If commercial suppliers can produce mitigation devices
that address protective strategies for expensive electrical equipment,
then, what, in your opinion, is preventing them from marketing their
products if their customers express a need for them?
Answer. There are now three companies in the process of starting to
market devices such as GIC current-blockers to customers, along with an
increasing and impressive body of test data, which is a critical need
to build confidence in their use by the energy sector. This marketing
process has been slow to start due to the lack of any widely applicable
standard, either voluntarily self-imposed, or else externally mandated.
Once such a standard becomes available, and is broadly accepted,
marketing of such devices will rapidly accelerate.
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