[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
ELEVEN YEARS LATER: PREVENTING TERRORISTS FROM COMING TO AMERICA
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 11, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-113
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Ron Barber, Arizona
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Chairwoman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Henry Cuellar, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Ben Quayle, Arizona, Vice Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Paul Anstine, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security.......................................... 4
Witnesses
Ms. Kelli Ann Walther, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of
Policy, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Kevin McAleenan, Acting Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Field Operations, Customs and Border Protection, Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. John P. Woods, Assistant Director, National Security
Investigations, Homeland Security Investigations, Immigrations
and Customs Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
Mr. Edward J. Ramotowski, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 29
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
Mr. Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General, Office of the
Inspector General, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 36
Prepared Statement............................................. 37
Appendix
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Kelli Ann
Walther........................................................ 45
ELEVEN YEARS LATER: PREVENTING TERRORISTS FROM COMING TO AMERICA
----------
Tuesday, September 11, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Miller, Duncan, Cuellar, Jackson
Lee, Higgins, and Clarke.
Mrs. Miller. Good morning, everyone. The Committee on
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security
will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to
examine the Department of Homeland Security's ability to
prevent terrorists from traveling to the United States.
We have an excellent panel of witnesses. I would just
remind the committee, though, and the witnesses as well,
obviously in remembrance of this day, 9/11, 11 years ago, we
have some pictures on the back of this committee room which
remind us all, each and every day, of why this committee was
even formed, the main committee and certainly our subcommittees
as well.
There will be a commemorative ceremony at 11:00 o'clock
today. All the Members of Congress will be gathering, the House
and the Senate, at the East Center Staircase for the
Congressional Remembrance Ceremony marking the observance of
September 11, 2001.
So this committee will be certainly joining our other
colleagues. We will have opening statements from myself and our
Ranking Member and the statements of our witnesses. We will see
where we are on time, because we will have a hard break
probably at about 10 to 11:00 for folks.
Our witnesses today are Kelli Ann Walther, who is the
deputy assistant secretary for policy at the Department, Kevin
McAleenan, acting assistant commissioner in the Office of Field
Operations at Customs and Border Protection, John Woods,
assistant director for national security investigation at ICE,
Ed Ramotowski, deputy assistant secretary for visa services at
the Department of State, and Charles Edwards, the acting
inspector general at the Department of Homeland Security.
Eleven years ago today, 19 terrorist cowards successfully
penetrated our border and visa security defenses and hijacked
four planes to conduct a terrible, terrible attack against
nearly 3,000 innocent people. That act of violence, as I said,
is the very reason the Department of Homeland Security exists,
and why this committee was created to prevent another terrorist
attack on our homeland.
We should never forget, of course, what happened on that
Tuesday in September when so many of our fellow Americans died
tragically, or fail to remember the first responders as well,
all of the victims of that tragedy. One of the ways I think
that we can honor those who lost their lives that terrible day
is to make sure an attack like that never happens again, to
harden our defenses and to take into account the hard lessons
that we learned that day.
Among the most important weaknesses the attackers exploited
was the porous outer ring of border security. The hijackers
actually passed through United States Border Security a
combined total of 68 times. The relative ease with which the
terrorists evaded detection by presenting fraudulent
documentation, passports, and made detectable false statements
on visa applications, gave false statements to border
officials, and certainly the failure to watch lists with known
al-Qaeda operatives became missed opportunities to stop those
attacks.
It has highlighted certainly the need to close the holes
exploited by the 9/11 terrorists by strengthening our border
security and visa issuance policy. Curtailing the ability of
terrorists to travel to the United States can be one of the
most effective counter-terrorism tools, because denying
terrorists the freedom to travel essentially eliminates their
ability to plan or to exercise or to carry out attacks on our
homeland.
As the 9/11 Commission Report noted, said in the report,
for terrorists, travel documents are as important as weapons,
which is a very interesting statement I think. Building on that
key insight, we strengthen our outer ring of border security to
conduct more rigorous checks, collect biometric data and
continuously check visa holders against the terrorist watch
list.
We have pushed our border out by conducting more checks
overseas before passengers even board an airplane or present
themselves to a CBP officer at any of our ports of entry, a
layered approach that increases our chances of preventing
terrorists from ever coming to America.
Today, we collect more information on foreign travelers
that allows CBP, through the National Targeting Center, to use
complex targeting rules which examine travel patterns, allowing
agents to find any problems with travel documents that might
raise a red flag.
Programs such as CBP's Immigration Advisory Program and
ICE's Visa Security Unit, that stations officers and agents
overseas, are critical components of our success at keeping
those with terrorism links and other high-risk passengers off
planes that are bound into the United States.
Without question, we have made enormous progress, limiting
the ability of terrorists to travel to the United States since
9/11. But certainly the incident of the Christmas day bomber,
that demonstrated that we still have some significant gaps in
our visa vetting system.
Continually vetting visa and electronic systems for travel
authorization holders against our watch list is a welcome
improvement, but we are going to be interested from hearing
from our witnesses today how we can further leverage the power
of targeting systems to vet visa applicants before a visa is
ever issued.
Improvements to watch listing processes have increased the
ability of consular officers and other border security
officials to keep those individuals that concern us out of the
country. But we still need to do better.
So we will be interested again to hear from the witnesses
on how we vet visa applicants that are known to the
intelligence community, and how we resolve visa issuance
through the Security Advisory Opinion Process.
Unlike several of this subcommittee's previous hearings
where we discussed the challenges of tracking down visa over-
stays and the delay in rolling out a reliable exit system that
allows Department of Homeland Security to determine if a visa
holder has departed in accordance with the terms of their visa,
this hearing is really focused on the front end of the visa
process.
We certainly believe that a viable exit system, of course,
is vital to our National security efforts. But it is incumbent
on the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
State to also focus their efforts on preventing terrorists from
coming into the country in the first place.
Also look forward to hearing from the inspector general in
regards to their recent work which identified challenges with
US-VISIT and the multiple names associated with the same set of
fingerprints, a gap certainly that needs to be swiftly
corrected to prevent fraud and exploitation by any terrorist.
Certainly contrary to what some have suggested, al-Qaeda,
although diminished in capability thanks to the wonderful work,
heroism, and professionalism and bravery of our men and women
in uniform and our allies, still, they are a lethal enemy
intent on attacking the homeland.
Vigilance is certainly one of the best tools at our
disposal to prevent terror travel. So that is why we are here
today, to examine those gaps, vulnerability in the visa
immigration system, and how they have been addressed in the
period since 9/11.
[The statement of Chairwoman Miller follows:]
Statement of Chairwoman Candice S. Miller
Eleven years ago today, 19 men successfully penetrated our border
and visa security defenses and hijacked four planes to conduct a
heinous attack against nearly 3,000 innocent people.
That act of violence is the very reason the Department of the
Homeland Security exists, and why this committee was created--to
prevent another terrorist attack on the homeland.
Along the walls, we have photographs of the aftermath of those
attacks to remind us why we're here--and most importantly the cost of
failure.
We should never forget what happened on that Tuesday in September
to so many of our fellow Americans, or fail to remember the first
responders and victims of that tragedy.
I would like to ask you to join me in a moment of silence in honor
of those who died in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
One of the ways we can honor those who lost their lives is to make
sure an attack like that never happens again--to harden our defenses
and take into account the hard lessons learned from that horrible day.
Among the most important weaknesses the attackers exploited was the
weakness of our ``outer ring of border security.'' The hijackers passed
through U.S. border security a combined total of 68 times.
The relative ease with which the terrorists evaded detection by
presenting fraudulent documents and passports with suspicious
indicators, made detectable false statements on visa applications, gave
false statements to border officials, and the failure to watchlist
known al-Qaeda operatives became missed opportunities to stop the
attacks.
It highlighted the need to close the holes exploited by the 9/11
terrorists by strengthening our border security and visa issuance
policy because curtailing the ability of terrorists to travel to the
United States can be one of the most effective counterterrorism tools.
Denying terrorists the freedom to travel essentially eliminates
their ability to plan, exercise, and carry out attacks on the homeland.
As the 9/11 Commission Report noted, ``For terrorists, travel
documents are as important as weapons.'' Building on that key insight,
we have strengthened our ``outer ring of border security'' to conduct
more rigorous checks, collect biometric data, and continuously check
visa holders against the terror watch lists.
We have pushed our border out by conducting more checks overseas
before passengers board a plane, or present themselves to a CBP officer
at the port of entry--a layered approach that increases our chances of
preventing terrorists from ever coming to America.
Today, we collect more information on foreign travelers that allows
CBP, through the National Targeting Center, to use complex targeting
rules, which examine travel patterns--allowing agents to discern
problems with travel documents that might raise red flags.
And programs, such as CBP's Immigration Advisory Program and ICE's
Visa Security Units, that station officers and agents overseas are
critical components of our successes in keeping those with terrorism
links and other high-risk passengers off planes bound for the United
States.
Without question, we have made progress limiting the ability of
terrorists to travel to the United States since 9/11, but the Christmas
day bombing attempt demonstrated there are still significant gaps in
our visa vetting system.
Continually vetting visa and Electronic System for Travel
Authorization (ESTA) holders against our watch lists is a welcome
improvement, but I will be interested in hearing from our witnesses on
how we can further leverage the power of targeting systems to vet visa
applicants before a visa is ever issued.
Improvements to watch-listing processes have increased the ability
of consular officers and other border security officials to keep those
individuals that concern us out of the country, but I am still
concerned that being on a watch list is not an automatic bar to getting
a visa.
I will be interested to hear from the witnesses on how we vet visa
applicants that are known to the intelligence community, and how we
resolve visa issuance through the Security Advisory Opinion process.
Unlike several of this subcommittee's previous hearings, where we
have discussed the challenges of tracking down visa overstays, and the
delay in rolling out a reliable exit system that allows DHS to
determine if a visa holder has departed in accordance with the terms of
their visa, this hearing is focused on the front end of the visa
process.
I continue to believe that a viable exit system is vital to our
National security efforts, but it is incumbent on DHS and the
Department of State to also focus their efforts on preventing
terrorists from coming to the country in the first place because it is
much easier to detect them on the front end of the process.
I also look forward to hearing from the DHS Inspector General in
regards to their recent work which identified challenges with US-VISIT,
and the multiple names associated with the same set of fingerprints--a
gap that needs to be swiftly corrected to prevent fraud and the
exploitation by terrorists.
Contrary to what some have suggested, al-Qaeda, although diminished
in capability, is still a lethal enemy, intent on attacking the
homeland. Vigilance is one of the best tools at our disposal to prevent
terror travel.
That is why we are here today--to examine how gaps and
vulnerabilities in the visa and immigration system have been addressed
in the period since 9/11.
I look forward to hearing from the distinguished panel of witnesses
and with that I'll yield to the Ranking Member.
Mrs. Miller. The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking
Member for his opening statement.
Mr. Cueller. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I join Chairwoman
Miller and my colleagues in remembering those who lost their
lives in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Our
thoughts and our prayers are with them and their families
today, the 11th anniversary of this tragedy. Of course, every
day our prayers are with them.
One way we can honor those who died is to do our utmost to
prevent terrorists from traveling to countries to do us harm.
The 9/11 hijackers did not sneak into the country across our
land borders, but rather entered the United States via an
airplane and carrying visas.
The attempted bomber of an airline on Christmas day, 2009,
was a stark reminder of the vulnerabilities in the visa
process. The Department of Homeland Security and the Department
of State, with the direction of Congress, have taken important
steps to strengthen visa security and to pre-screen air
passengers traveling to the United States.
With DHS, the U.S. Immigration, Customs Enforcement--ICE--
has expanded its Visa Security Program at our overseas
embassies, providing an important additional layer of security
in visa securities and security matters.
Similarly, the U.S. Customs Border Protection has deployed
Immigration Advisory Program officers at foreign airports and
strengthened its ability to identify travelers of concern bound
for the United States. CBPS also enhances efforts at the
National Targeting Center to combat terrorist travel.
These programs require investments in personnel,
technology, and resources. So it is imperative that Congress
continues providing DHS the funding it needs to carry out its
mission.
Today, I look forward to hearing about what security
enhancements have been made since the subcommittee met last
year on this important issue, as well as what remains to be
done.
A related issue that I continue to find troubling is that
of recalcitrant countries. It is my understanding that certain
individuals subject to orders of removal from the United States
are often delayed due to their respective Government's refusal
to accept the return of their nationals or use lengthy delay
tactics.
I have raised this issue in previous hearings. I appreciate
the difficult and delicate nature of this issue. But we must
address this issue. We, the Chairwoman and I and the committee,
look forward to working with you on this issue.
However, I look forward to hearing more from the Department
and ICE about recommended steps for improvements. So any steps
you all might have, any ideas that you might have, please work
with our committee.
I certainly thank Chairwoman Miller for having this
particular hearing, her leadership. I appreciate all the
witnesses for joining us here. I look forward to your
testimony.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentlemen. The other committee
Members are reminded that any opening statements they may have
can be entered into the record.
What I will do is introduce each one of the witnesses. Then
we will start over here. Give a short bio here.
First of all, as I mentioned, we are joined by Ms. Kelli
Ann Walther, who currently serves as the senior director for
the Department of Homeland Security Screening Coordination
Office. Ms. Walther began working in the SCO in 2007, where she
is currently responsible for setting policy and direction that
harmonizes a variety of Department of Homeland Security
screening programs and investments.
Mr. Kevin McAleenan is the acting assistant commissioner at
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, where he is responsible
for overseeing CBP's anti-terrorism, immigration, anti-
smuggling, trade compliance, and agricultural protection
operations at 20 major field offices, 331 ports of entry, and
70 locations in over 40 countries internationally.
Mr. John Woods is the assistant director at U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, where he oversees National
Security Investigations Division within Homeland Security
Investigations. As chief of this 450-person headquarters
division, he manages a $160 million operational budget and
overseas HSI's investigative, regulatory, and technological
programs, targeting transnational National security threats
arising from illicit travel, trade, and financial enterprises.
Mr. Ed Ramotowski is a deputy assistant secretary for visa
services at the United States Department of State. In this
position, he oversees the visa office in Washington, DC, two
domestic processing centers, as well as visa operations at over
200 U.S. embassies--excuse me--and consulates abroad. He has
previously worked as a special assistant to the assistant
secretary of state for consular affairs, chief of the consular
section at the U.S. Embassy in Nassau, Bahamas, as the U.S.
consul in Warsaw, Poland, as well.
Mr. Charles Edwards is the acting inspector general of the
Department of Homeland Security. He has over 20 years of
experience in the Federal Government and has held leadership
positions at several Federal agencies, including the
Transportation and Security Administration, the U.S. Postal
Service's Office of Inspector General, and the United States
Postal Service.
The Chairwoman would now recognize Ms. Walther for her
opening testimony.
STATEMENT OF KELLI ANN WALTHER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
OFFICE OF POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Walther. Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to highlight our work on preventing terrorist
travel. I head the Screening Coordination Office, where we
facilitate policy decisions for people screening programs, from
planning through implementation.
We are the DHS coordination point for inter-agency
screening initiatives as well. As the 9/11 Commission pointed
out, targeting terrorist travel is one of the most powerful
weapons we have to counter terrorist operations. Today's threat
environment is complex and multifaceted. So it is imperative we
employ layers of security throughout the travel continuum, to
identify individuals that may pose a risk before they reach the
United States.
We recognize there is no one-size-fits-all approach to
security. Our approach includes close coordination with
counter-terrorism, law enforcement and public security
authorities, the private sector and our State, local, Tribal,
territorial, and foreign partners.
To support these efforts, DHS collects biographic and
biometric data for screening against various databases to track
known threats. We utilize intelligence-based targeting rules
and risk-based screening to better identify unknown threats.
A risk-based approach is the foundation of the DHS model
today, and in a more comprehensive and sophisticated form than
ever before.
With the advent of better information technology, DHS has
been able to apply this approach across the life cycle of a
traveler's journey, including first when a traveler seeks an
authorization to travel, either a visa or ESTA; second just
prior to travel, when DHS conducts passenger manifest and
reservation screening; third, when a person seeks to board a
commercial aircraft or vessel, passengers must undergo physical
screening; and finally upon arrival at a port of entry, when a
traveler seeks admission to the United States, DHS conducts
verification of a traveler's identity and identity documents.
Today, the visa waiver program is more robust than ever
before, with strengthened international partnerships and
enhanced information-sharing arrangements. Today, we receive
data we never had access to before. We now conduct ESTA checks
on every VWP traveler.
In the last 3 years, DHS has also achieved a major aviation
security milestone by assuming responsibility for terrorist
watch list screening for all aircraft operators covered by the
Secure Flight final rule. Today, Secure Flight vets 100 percent
of all commercial airline passengers flying into, out of, and
within the United States--approximately 2 million passengers
every day.
We know that implementing such secure measures must be done
while ensuring the facilitation of legitimate trade and travel.
Trusted traveler programs such as Global Entry include over 1.4
million pre-approved low-risk travelers who may undergo
expedited inspection.
These individuals are our most frequent border-crossing
travelers. Because they are known, they usually enter the
United States in a fraction of the time of other individuals.
Additionally, TSA has implemented its Pre-Check Expedited
Screening Program. TSA Pre-Check uses intelligence-driven
information and a risk-based approach to provide more effective
screening, focusing resources on those travelers we know the
least about, while providing expedited screening and a better
experience for travelers we know the most about.
In the past 10 years, we have made great strides to
facilitate the known traveler, leaving us more time to identify
the unknown threat. But let me be clear, no visa, ESTA, trusted
traveler program provides carte blanche to enter the United
States. Throughout all the phases of travel, DHS is constantly
monitoring changes to the watch list that could lead to
recommendations against boarding or revocation of a visa,
refusal of admission, or even removal of an individual.
DHS mitigates risks in a way that effectively establishes
and uses security measures to promote the safe movement of
people and commerce, while respecting privacy, civil rights and
civil liberties. With this in mind, DHS is also deliberate in
its efforts to provide travelers an opportunity to be heard.
The DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program, or DHS TRIP, is a
single point of contact for individuals, regardless of
citizenship, who have inquiries or seek resolution of
difficulties they experience during travel.
Today, in response to 9/11 and evolving threats, we have
significantly adapted and enhanced our ability to detect travel
threats at the earliest opportunity. DHS does not work alone in
this mission.
Terror screening is a multi-agency and collaborative
effort. More work remains to be done.
But Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, I can assure
you that the men and women of the Department of Homeland
Security never forget. Our goal is to keep the country safe.
For us, it is not a job. It is a mission.
Thank you for this opportunity to update the committee on
the progress the Department has made in recent years. Thank you
for holding this hearing.
I have submitted written testimony and respectfully request
it be made part of the hearing record. I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Walther follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kelli Ann Walther
September 11, 2012
introduction
Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to highlight the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) work in preventing terrorist
travel.
Eleven years ago, screening of passengers coming to the United
States was limited to the Department of State (DOS) visa process, if
applicable, the inspection of a person by an immigration officer at the
port of entry, and processes applied at foreign airports by foreign
governments. Provision of advance passenger information was voluntary
and, even when provided by air carriers, frequently contained
inaccurate or inconsistent data. There was no biometric collection for
visa applicants beyond photographs, or from aliens seeking admission to
the United States. There was limited pre-departure screening of
passengers seeking to fly to the United States, virtually no screening
of any kind for domestic flights beyond the security checkpoint, and no
advance vetting of passengers seeking admission under the Visa Waiver
Program (VWP). Interagency sharing of information on terrorist threats
was minimal.
Today, in response to both 9/11 and evolving threats, and with the
help and support of Congress, we have significantly adapted and
enhanced our ability to detect and interdict threats at the earliest
opportunity. As the 9/11 Commission pointed out, targeting terrorist
travel is one of the most powerful weapons we have to counter terrorist
operations. One of the key aspects of the DHS approach is to identify
persons that may pose a risk to U.S. citizens or whose entry may
violate U.S. law, before they reach the United States.
DHS works to track known threats, while utilizing intelligence-
based advanced targeting techniques to help mitigate and identify
unknown threats. For example, DHS uses the U.S. Government's
consolidated terrorist watch list and other information derived from
investigations and intelligence assets to identify individuals with
known or suspected ties to terrorism and other potential threats to the
United States. In addition, DHS relies on domestic and international
criminal records (e.g., investigative case files domestically and
INTERPOL notices internationally) to identify potential criminal
movements. Travel data is also compared against passport, visa, and
immigration data to determine if travelers are admissible or can enter
the United States. Moreover, DHS implements rigorous physical security
requirements both in the form of airport checkpoint and airline
security standards, as well as physical detection methodologies (e.g.,
drug-sniffing canines) at ports of entry.
Identifying travelers through a risk-based approach remains the
foundation of the DHS model today, and in a more comprehensive and
sophisticated form than ever before. With the advent of better
information technology within Government and the transportation
industry, DHS has been able to apply this methodology across the life
cycle of a traveler's journey.
dhs's multi-layered approach to security
Since 9/11, the travel threat has evolved to include not only
large-scale attacks, but also smaller operations with potentially
catastrophic effects. Our approach employs multiple layers of security
measures throughout the travel continuum that are closely coordinated
with other U.S. Government counterterrorism, law enforcement, and
public security authorities and with State, local, Tribal, territorial,
and foreign partners and the transportation industry. To support these
efforts, DHS collects biographic and biometric data for vetting and
screening against various databases to track known threats and better
identify and mitigate unknown threats.
This multi-layered approach allows DHS to improve security and to
minimize the likelihood that any single measure becomes a single point
of failure.
Enhancements Since December 25, 2009
Since the attempted bombing of a commercial aircraft on December
25, 2009, DHS, in coordination with other departments and agencies, has
worked to address issues and potential gaps to ensure that we have a
comprehensive and multi-layered approach that focuses on stopping
terrorists at the earliest possible opportunity. As represented by the
other officials who have been asked to testify today, we can see that
addressing this issue requires significant collaboration and
coordination among Federal agencies.
Our efforts are not all directed at one area of the travel
continuum--but rather are part of our layered approach to strengthen
security. Working in concert with other U.S. agencies, DHS has
strengthened security, law enforcement, and screening at several points
in the travel process:
During the travel planning phase, when a traveler seeks a
visa or authorization to travel;
Just prior to travel, when a person seeks to board a
commercial carrier or vessel;
Upon arrival at a port of entry, when a traveler seeks
admission into the United States;
During the period of stay in the United States, when a non-
U.S. person travels by air within the United States; and
Upon departure, when a traveler leaves the United States.
DHS, in cooperation with commercial carriers and vessels, reviews
information about travelers, including their identity and travel
documents, prior to arrival at a U.S. port of entry. The traveler
establishes his or her identity through the provision of biographic and
biometric data, which is confirmed at various points in the travel
continuum.
screening in the travel planning phase
This layer of defense consists of deploying safeguards to prevent
dangerous individuals from obtaining visas and travel authorizations.
To enter the United States, most foreign nationals are required to
either obtain a visa issued by a U.S. embassy or consulate or, for
citizens or nationals of a Visa Waiver Program (VWP) country,\1\ obtain
a travel authorization via the Electronic System for Travel
Authorization (ESTA). Visa applicants are required to provide biometric
(fingerprint and digital photo) and biographic data. The applicant's
information is checked against the biometric and biographic databases
of DHS, DOS, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In most
instances, individuals must also appear in-person for an interview with
a consular official.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 36 countries currently designated for participation in the
Visa Waiver Program include: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brunei, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS is continually working with interagency stakeholders to improve
procedures for vetting immigrant and nonimmigrant visa applicants,
asylum applicants, and refugees. The interagency vetting process in
place today is more robust and considers a far broader range of
information than it did in past years. Visa applicants, asylum
applicants, refugees, and those seeking to enter the United States at a
port of entry, are subject to rigorous background vetting, biographic,
and biometric checks. The security procedures for all of these
categories have been enhanced over the past several years as vetting
capabilities have evolved and interagency partnerships with the law
enforcement and intelligence communities have been strengthened.
By continuously vetting all issued U.S. non-immigrant visas against
law enforcement data, changes in a traveler's eligibility are
identified by DHS in near real-time, allowing DHS to submit timely
``no-board'' recommendations to carriers, visa revocation requests to
DOS, or notifications to other law enforcement agencies in situations
where the individual is physically present in the United States.
In an effort to identify potential terrorists and criminals before
they obtain a visa to travel to the United States, DHS has implemented
the Visa Security Program (VSP) through which U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (ICE) deploys trained special agents overseas to
high-risk visa activity posts. The VSP is currently deployed to 19
posts in 15 countries. As part of this program, ICE special agents
conduct targeted, in-depth reviews of individual visa applications and
applicants prior to the issuance of a visa and recommend to consular
officers refusal or revocation of applications, when warranted. As of
July 31, 2012, the VSP has screened over 1.1 million visa applicants
against information held by DHS.
In support of ICE VSP efforts to enhance visa security measures,
representatives from DHS, ICE, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
and DOS have agreed to develop an automated visa screening process that
will enable DHS entities to identify derogatory information relating to
applicants prior to the visa application being submitted to a Consular
Officer. This process will inform and be used in conjunction with the
current DOS Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) and Advisory Opinion (AO)
programs. Additionally, DHS, DOS, and the intelligence community are
working to establish a process to screen all visa applications against
intelligence information provided by the interagency prior to visa
issuance.
Visa Waiver Program
The VWP encourages high security standards and helps facilitate
cooperation on security-related issues, including sharing security and
law enforcement information, cooperating on repatriation matters,
adhering to higher standards for aviation security, and strengthening
document security standards. At the same time, the VWP facilitates
exchanges--commercial, tourist, and others--that are essential to our
economy. According to the Commerce Department, international tourism
supported 1.2 million U.S. jobs last year, and tourism revenue in early
2012 was up 14% from the previous year. The VWP is an essential driver
of international tourism because it allows eligible nationals of 36
countries to travel to the United States without a visa and remain in
our country for up to 90 days. Over 60% of overseas travelers that come
to the United States are from VWP countries.
DHS has focused on bringing VWP countries into compliance with the
information sharing agreement requirements of The Implementing
Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act), Pub. L. No. 110-53. As of
January 2012, all VWP countries have completed an exchange of
diplomatic notes or an equivalent mechanism for the requirement to
enter into an agreement to share information on lost and stolen
passports with the United States through INTERPOL or other designated
means. DHS, in collaboration with the Department of Justice (DOJ), has
also concluded Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC)
agreements, or their equivalent, with 35 VWP countries and two VWP
aspirants. DHS, along with DOJ and DOS, continues to work closely with
the remaining country to sign a PCSC agreement. These agreements enable
each side to query the fingerprint databases of the other side for law
enforcement purposes and enable the sharing of data about criminals and
terrorists. Also, the U.S. Government has concluded negotiations on
arrangements with all VWP countries for the exchange of terrorism
screening information.
In addition, nationals from all VWP countries, regardless of their
port of embarkation, are required to obtain an approved travel
authorization via ESTA prior to boarding a carrier to travel by air or
sea to the United States. ESTA vets prospective VWP travelers against
several databases, including the terrorist watch list, lost and stolen
passports (including INTERPOL Stolen and Lost Travel Documents), visa
revocations, and previous VWP refusals.
DHS supports the carefully managed expansion of the VWP to
countries that meet the statutory requirements, and are willing and
able to enter into a close security relationship with the United
States. To this end, we support current bi-partisan efforts by the
Congress to expand VWP participation and to promote international
travel and tourism to the United States while maintaining our strong
commitment to security. Additionally, as part of the President's recent
Executive Order (13597), we are working with partner countries to meet
existing requirements and prepare for further expansion of the VWP.
Refugee Vetting
DHS is committed to conducting rigorous checks in order to ensure
that individuals admitted to the United States, including those through
the refugee program, do not threaten our security. Refugees often lack,
for legitimate reasons, valid documents that establish their identity.
The Department has instituted rigorous methods to mitigate this
vulnerability. In May 2007, DHS announced and implemented an
administration-coordinated, enhanced background and security check
process for Iraqi refugees applying for resettlement in the United
States.
DHS has enhanced this security check regime, including both
biographic and biometric checks, over the last several years as new
opportunities and interagency partnerships with the law enforcement and
intelligence communities have been identified. The latest enhancement
to the refugee security check regime involves a new ``pre-departure''
check shortly before refugees are scheduled to travel to the United
States. It is intended to identify whether any new derogatory
information exists since the initial checks were conducted. No case is
approved until results from all security checks have been received and
analyzed.
screening prior to boarding/departure
The next layer of defense for air travel includes information-based
and physical screening prior to a traveler boarding an aircraft. In
partnership with the airline industry and foreign governments, the U.S.
Government conducts passenger manifest screening and vetting prior to
air travel to identify known threats. Passenger and crew manifest
screening and vetting are also conducted for commercial vessels in the
maritime environment. In addition, physical screening of all air
passengers and their baggage is conducted at airport checkpoints.
The actions resulting from inclusion on the No-Fly, Selectee, or
Expanded Selectee list are generally as follows:
No-Fly matches are prohibited from boarding an aircraft;
Selectee matches undergo enhanced screening prior to
boarding an aircraft; and
Expanded Selectee matches undergo enhanced screening prior
to boarding an aircraft.
Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) and Passenger Name Record
(PNR) Data
DHS use of APIS and PNR data has assisted CBP in the positive
identification of over 4,000 persons with ties to terrorism in fiscal
year 2011.
DHS analysis of PNR information--the information provided to the
air carrier when booking international travel--is an indispensable tool
for the prevention of terrorist travel. PNR analysis assists in the
identification of watch-listed and other high-risk individuals up to 96
hours in the maritime environment and 72 hours in the air environment
prior to departure.
DHS also uses PNR data to link previously unknown terrorists and
criminals to known terrorists or criminals, and identify high-risk
travelers by matching them against travel patterns known to have been
used by terrorists or other intelligence-based scenarios.
DHS identifies travel patterns and other information to develop
targeting rules from intelligence information. These rules are reviewed
quarterly by CBP, the DHS Privacy Office, the DHS Office of Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL), and the Office of the General
Counsel. Additionally, the DHS Chief Privacy Officer conducts privacy
compliance reviews of the DHS use of PNR and reports the findings to
Congress.
APIS data--essentially the flight or ship passenger and crew
manifest for a given flight or voyage--contains information such as a
traveler's date of birth, citizenship, and travel document number,
which is typically collected as passengers check in for their flight or
voyage.
Pre-departure Screening
DHS utilizes the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), at 11 airports
in nine countries, to conduct additional screening for high-risk and
improperly documented travelers, by using targeting and passenger
analysis information. At the invitation of foreign partners, IAP
officers can make ``no-board'' recommendations to airlines for
travelers who may present security risks or lack necessary travel
documents. This partnership has also benefited air carriers, as it
saves them time and the cost of transporting individuals denied entry
to the United States back to their port of embarkation. Through direct
networks with commercial airlines and connections to CBP officers
overseas as part of the IAP, National Targeting Center (NTC) officials
are able to issue no-board recommendations to the airline to keep
suspected high-risk passengers from traveling to the United States. In
fiscal year 2012, to date, there have been more than 3,663 ``no-board''
recommendations.
Maritime Environment
As the lead DHS agency for maritime homeland security, the U.S.
Coast Guard screens all commercial vessel passenger and crew manifests
against intelligence holdings and law enforcement data sets. This
screening is conducted through the vessel's submission of an Advanced
Notice of Arrival (ANOA) up to 96 hours (but no less than 24 hours)
prior to arrival at a U.S. port. In 2011, 28.5 million people and over
121,000 ship arrivals were screened, and 120 advance warning reports
were generated regarding arriving ships, people, or cargo posing a
potential threat.
Checkpoint Screening
DHS employs measures both seen and unseen by travelers, including
walk-through metal detectors, explosive trace detection equipment,
trained canines, vapor trace machines that detect liquid explosives,
full-body pat-downs, and behavior detection officers--both at and
beyond the checkpoint. Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT) machines are
also employed to screen passengers for metallic and non-metallic
threats that cannot be detected by walk-through metal detectors. DHS
has also strengthened the presence and capacity of law enforcement to
prevent terrorist attacks on commercial aviation.
DHS has increased Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) coverage of
U.S.-flag carriers' international flights. The expanded FAMS program
builds upon additional programs created since 9/11 that further
increase the safety of aircraft, including the hardening of cockpit
doors.
inspection at a port of entry
All travelers to the United States, regardless of the means by
which they arrive (land, sea, or air), must present valid travel and
identity documents in order to obtain admission. Upon arrival at a port
of entry, a traveler presents his or her secure travel document (i.e.,
passport) and visa (if required) or other appropriate travel
authorization. The CBP officer will conduct information-based checks
against Federal databases, and, when applicable, will collect
biometrics (including fingerprints) to vet them against the DHS
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT). IDENT will match
biometric data previously collected from the traveler, such as during
the visa application or a past visit to the United States, to verify
the person's identity. Travelers may also undergo a secondary
inspection prior to an admissibility determination.
IDENT enables DHS to store and analyze biometric data--digital
fingerprints and photographs--and then link that data with biographic
information to establish and verify identities; IDENT contains
biometric data on known and suspected terrorists, criminals, and
immigration violators, and aids in distinguishing potential threats
from bona fide travelers. ``Anchoring'' an identity on the first
encounter--usually with the collection of biometrics through the visa
and entry processes--helps prevent misidentifications and dramatically
reduces the ability of individuals to use fraudulent identities on
subsequent encounters.
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative
DHS continues to balance the need to prevent terrorist travel with
the need to facilitate the legitimate travel of known individuals. The
Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative (WHTI), implemented for air travel
in 2007 and travel by land and sea in 2009, requires all travelers--
U.S. citizens and aliens alike--to present a passport or another
acceptable secure document denoting identity and citizenship for entry
into the United States. WHTI also expanded the use of radio frequency
identification (RFID) technology to efficiently balance security needs
and facilitation of legitimate trade and travel, resulting in an almost
five-fold increase in RFID-enabled documents in 2 years. In addition to
a decrease in counterfeit documents, and altered documents, WHTI has
contributed to reduced wait times at ports of entry through Ready
Lanes, which expedite the travel of individuals possessing WHTI-
compliant and RFID-enabled documents.
Global Entry
In an effort to ensure security while facilitating legitimate trade
and travel, DHS has also expanded Global Entry, which allows pre-
approved, low-risk travelers expedited inspection at select airports.
More than 1 million trusted traveler program members are able to use
the Global Entry kiosks, and we are expanding the program both
domestically and internationally as part of the administration's
efforts to foster increased travel and tourism.
In addition to U.S. citizens and Lawful Permanent Residents,
Mexican nationals can now enroll in Global Entry, and Global Entry's
benefits are also available to Dutch citizens enrolled in the Privium
program; South Korean citizens enrolled in the Smart Entry Service
program; Canadian citizens and residents through the NEXUS program; and
citizens of the United Kingdom, Germany, and Qatar through limited
pilot programs. In addition, we have signed agreements with Australia,
New Zealand, Panama, and Israel to allow their qualifying citizens and
permanent residents to participate in Global Entry. Global Entry
applicants, like applicants for DHS's other Trusted Traveler programs
(i.e., NEXUS, SENTRI, and FAST) are vetted against criminal and
terrorist databases, and provide biometrics prior to acceptance into
the program.
screening within the united states
Foreign visitors to the United States may undergo additional
screening while in the United States for a variety of reasons,
including if the visitor chooses additional domestic travel.
Secure Flight
In November 2010, DHS achieved a major aviation security milestone
by assuming responsibility from the airlines for terrorist watch list
screening for 100 percent of aircraft operators covered by the Secure
Flight Final Rule for flights into, out of, and within the United
States. This year, DHS expanded the program to include overflights
(i.e., flights that pass over but do not land in the United States) by
requiring all Foreign Air Carriers to report Secure Flight passenger
data for covered flights. Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
continues to work with foreign air carriers to ensure compliance of
this requirement. In addition to facilitating secure travel for all
passengers, Secure Flight helps prevent the misidentification of
passengers who have names similar to individuals on Government data
sets.
DHS revised the Secure Flight program to screen passengers against
all records on the Terrorist Screening Database (TSDB) that contain a
full name and a full date of birth (not just the No-Fly and Selectee
lists); travelers identified under this new initiative are designated
for enhanced physical screening prior to boarding an aircraft.
DHS uses a passenger's name, date of birth, and gender to vet
airline passengers against terrorist information up to 72 hours before
those passengers are permitted to board planes. Passengers who are
potential matches are immediately identified by DHS for appropriate
notifications and coordination with our Federal partners.
Secure Flight screens more than 14 million passenger reservations
against terrorist information each week. Approximately 25 individuals
per month are denied boarding under the Secure Flight program.
TSA PreCheckTM
DHS has worked to develop a strategy for enhanced use of
intelligence and other information to support a more risk-based
approach in all facets of transportation security. TSA
PreCheckTM is part of the Department's on-going effort to
implement risk-based security concepts that enhance security by
focusing on travelers DHS knows least about. More than 2 million
passengers have received expedited screening through TSA
PreCheckTM security lanes since the initiative began last
fall. TSA PreCheckTM is now available in 22 airports for
select U.S. citizens traveling domestically on Alaska Airlines,
American Airlines, Delta Air Lines, United Airlines, and US Airways,
and members of CBP's Trusted Traveler programs. TSA expanded TSA
PreCheckTM benefits to U.S. military active-duty members
traveling through Ronald Reagan Washington National and Seattle-Tacoma
International airports. In addition to TSA PreCheckTM, TSA
has implemented other risk-based security measures including modified
screening procedures for passengers 12 and younger and 75 and older.
As always, DHS will continue to incorporate random and
unpredictable security measures throughout the security process, and at
no point are TSA PreCheckTM travelers guaranteed expedited
screening.
screening upon departure
Over the past year, we have worked to better detect and deter those
who overstay their lawful period of admission. These efforts, and DHS's
overall approach is documented extensively in the comprehensive
biometric air exit plan submitted to Congress this past spring. The
ability to identify and sanction overstays is linked to our ability to
determine who has arrived and departed from the United States. By
matching arrival and departure records, and analyzing entry and exit
records stored in our systems and using additional data collected by
DHS, we can better determine who has overstayed their lawful period of
admission.
In May 2011, DHS began a coordinated effort to vet all potential
overstay records against intelligence community and DHS holdings for
National security and public safety concerns. Using those parameters,
we reviewed the backlog of 1.6 million overstay leads in the U.S.
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program
and referred leads based on National security and public safety
priorities to ICE for further investigation.
Through limited automated means, DHS cross-referenced additional
overstay leads with DHS location and immigration holdings, closing
additional records by confirming changes in immigration information or
travel history that had not yet been recorded. Previously, these
records would not have been examined, except in instances when
resources allowed. Now, we are vetting all overstays for public safety
and National security concerns, and DHS is also conducting automated
reviews for changes in immigration status or travel history. This is
performed on a recurrent basis.
In July, following the submission of the comprehensive air exit
plan, Congress approved DHS to continue improvements related to
identifying individuals who may have overstayed their lawful period of
admission. DHS is implementing elements, and expects to have these
enhancements in place by early 2013. Once completed, this initiative
will significantly strengthen our existing capability to identify and
target for enforcement action those who have overstayed their
authorized period of admission, and who represent a public safety and/
or National security threat by incorporating data contained within law
enforcement, military, and intelligence repositories.
This strategy also will also enhance our ability to identify
individual overstays; provide DOS with information to support visa
revocation; prohibit future VWP travel for those who overstay; execute
``lookouts'' for individuals who overstay, in accordance with existing
Federal laws; establish greater efficiencies to the VWP; and enhance
the core components of an entry-exit and overstay program.
Concurrently, the Department's Science and Technology Directorate
(S&T) is working to establish criteria and promote research for
emerging technologies that would provide the ability to capture
biometrics and develop a biometric exit capability at a significantly
lower operational cost than is currently available. S&T is
collaborating with the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) on this initiative.
Last, as part of the Beyond the Border Action Plan signed by
President Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Harper in December 2011, we
are creating an exit program on the United States Northern Border. In
accordance with the Action Plan, the United States and Canada will
exchange entry records so that an entry to one country essentially
becomes an exit record from the other country.
Overall, these elements constitute DHS's comprehensive approach to
biometric exit implementation.
building bridges: international partnerships and information sharing
DHS works closely with international partners, including foreign
governments, major multilateral organizations, and global businesses,
to strengthen the security of the networks of global trade and travel,
upon which our Nation's economy and communities rely. Today, DHS is in
just about every corner of the world, with 11 components and over 1,400
personnel stationed in more than 75 countries.
Perimeter Security
DHS is working to implement the President's February 2011 Beyond
the Border declaration with Canadian Prime Minister Harper, which will
strengthen North American security and make both Canada and the United
States safer through a series of mutually beneficial initiatives.
Specifically, we have jointly committed to taking a ``perimeter''
approach to security and economic competitiveness in North America, and
thus to collaborating to address threats well before they reach our
shores. To address threats early, the United States and Canada are
improving our intelligence and information sharing, and developing
joint and parallel threat assessments in order to support informed
risk-management decisions. We also are enhancing our efforts to
identify and screen travelers at the earliest point possible, with a
common approach, including biometrics. Specifically, we are working
toward common technical standards for the collection, transmission, and
matching of biometrics that enable the sharing of traveler information.
DHS and DOS have worked with our closest allies to develop routine
sharing of biometric information collected for immigration purposes.
Last year, DHS chaired an initiative with Australia, Canada, New
Zealand, and the United Kingdom to build on these efforts and expand
security and information-sharing cooperation to mutually enhance travel
security among these five countries. A program that began in 2010,
which shares biometric information with Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom, has identified cases of routine immigration
fraud, as well as dangerous people traveling under false identities.
Intelligence and Information Sharing
A critical step to thwarting terrorist operations along travel
pathways is to identify those associated with, suspected of being
engaged in, or supporting terrorist or other illicit activities, as
well as the techniques they use to avoid detection. This is done by
collecting, maintaining, and updating data and integrating knowledge of
terrorist travel patterns into our immigration and border inspection
systems and operations. DHS has created a standing intra-departmental
working group to facilitate the sharing of DHS travel data with the
intelligence community. The DHS Privacy Office and CRCL are key
participants in the working group.
Since 9/11, the Federal Government has improved the sharing of
information and intelligence among stakeholders. Several organizations
within DHS provide critical resources to the Department's ability to
understand, anticipate, and thwart terrorist travel.
CBP's National Targeting Center (NTC) provides tactical targeting
information aimed at interdicting terrorists, criminal actors, and
implements of terror or prohibited items. Crucial to the operation of
the NTC is CBP's Automated Targeting System, a platform used by CBP to
match travelers and goods against information and known patterns of
illicit activity often generated from successful case work and
intelligence. Since its inception after 9/11, the NTC has evolved into
two Centers: The National Targeting Center Passenger (NTC-P) and the
National Targeting Center Cargo (NTC-C).
DHS implements programs around the world to provide training and
technical assistance to build the capacity of foreign governments to
counter terrorism activity, prevent terrorist movement, and strengthen
the security of the United States. It is imperative that officials have
the proper training and access to intelligence to detect fraudulent
travel documents so that such documents cannot be used by terrorists
seeking to subvert the screening process. The ICE Forensic Document
Laboratory (FDL) is the U.S. Government's only forensic crime
laboratory dedicated exclusively to fraudulent document detection and
deterrence. The FDL also provides training to international and
domestic partners on identifying fraudulent documents.
redress
With all of these efforts, DHS is deliberate in its effort to give
travelers an opportunity to be heard when an issue arises. The
Department has established the DHS Traveler Redress Inquiry Program
(DHS TRIP), a single point of contact for individuals, regardless of
citizenship, who have inquiries or seek resolution of difficulties they
experience during travel, including: Denied or delayed airline
boarding; denied or delayed entry into and/or exit from the United
States; or frequent referral for additional screening. Individuals who
complete the redress process are issued a redress number that can be
used to book travel to prevent misidentifications.
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties
Protecting privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties is a core
mission of DHS. DHS has the first statutorily-required privacy office
of any Federal agency, as well as a senior official responsible for
civil rights and civil liberties. DHS builds privacy and civil rights
and civil liberties protections into its operations, policies,
programs, and technology deployments from the outset of their
development.
Both the DHS Privacy Office and CRCL partner with every DHS
component to assess policies, programs, systems, technologies, and
rule-makings for privacy and civil liberties risks, and recommends
appropriate protections and methods for handling personally
identifiable information in accordance with the Constitution, the
Privacy Act, and the Fair Information Practice Principles. At DHS we
work hard to create an environment where privacy, civil rights, and
civil liberties and security go hand-in-hand, helping to secure our
Nation while honoring the principles on which the country was founded.
conclusion
Since 9/11, we have learned that preventing terrorist travel
through immigration and border security is more than drawing a line in
the sand where we can deny entry into our country. We must utilize a
multi-layered, many-faceted, and multi-national effort that weaves
together intelligence, information-sharing, security and law
enforcement programs from DHS, the interagency, and across a multitude
of partnerships with our international and domestic partners.
Together they reflect one of our Nation's most pressing priorities:
The facilitation of legitimate travel and commerce while thwarting
threats, and simultaneously protecting privacy and civil liberties.
Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I look forward to
answering any questions you may have.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. McAleenan. I hope I am
pronouncing that correct.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN MC ALEENAN, ACTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF FIELD OPERATIONS, CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. McAleenan. Very close, ma'am. McAleenan. Good morning.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify here this morning about U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's efforts to disrupt terrorist travel.
On the 11th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, CBP
remains vigilant and focused. As the Nation's unified border
security agency, CBP is responsible for securing our Nation's
borders while facilitating legitimate trade and travel that is
so vital to our economic health.
Within this broad responsibility, our priority mission is
to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from entering the
country. As a result of this committee's support, our strong
Government and private-sector partnerships, advances in
technologies and applications of intelligence, CBP and DHS are
more capable than ever before in our efforts to identify and
mitigate terrorist threats before they reach the United States.
A traveler's risk is now assessed from the moment he or she
applies for a visa through the Department of State or for
travel authorization through CBP's ESTA Program. To address the
higher risk in the international air environment, which remains
a primary target for terrorist organizations seeking to move
operatives or attempt attacks, CBP leverages advanced travel
information from air carrier reservation and check-in systems.
CBP's National Targeting Center, or NTC, analyzes this data
through the automated targeting system, and uses advanced
software to apply intelligence-driven targeting rules to
conduct risk assessments. If information indicating a potential
risk is discovered, NTC will issue a no-board recommendation to
air carriers, preventing travel of a suspect individual.
Internationally, the NTC supports the work of CBP's
Immigration Advisory Program to extend the Nation's zone of
security beyond our physical borders to 11 airports in nine
foreign countries, where we work with carriers and foreign
authorities to identify and address potential threats prior to
boarding.
To put our pre-departure efforts in context, in fiscal year
2009, before the Christmas day attempt, the NTC and IAP teams
made fewer than 500 no-board recommendations to carriers for
security purposes. This fiscal year, in contrast, the NTC and
IAP teams have made almost 4,000 no-board recommendations, a
dramatic increase that has have enhanced the security of our
borders and international air travel.
While the focus of our pre-departure work is the air
environment, we also maintain robust protocols upon arrival at
U.S. ports of entry. Prior to admission at any U.S. port of
entry, whether by air, land, or sea, CBP officers further
assess traveler risk by scanning entry and identity documents,
conducting personal interviews, and running appropriate
biometric and biographic queries against law enforcement
databases.
If there are any matches to suspected terrorist records,
CBP activates its counter-terrorism response protocols. These
protocols are aided by the fact that the National Targeting
Center has become a critical interagency counter-terrorism
resource, with representatives from over a dozen departments
and agencies, including full units from ICE, TSA, the U.S.
Coast Guard, and soon to be the Department of State.
Together we are assessing risk at each stage in the travel
cycle and working together to enhance our collective response.
As this committee is well aware, we continue to live in a
world of ever-changing threats. We must adapt and evolve to
identify and address security gaps and anticipate
vulnerabilities. CBP will continue to be at the forefront of
the global effort against terrorism. We will work with our
colleagues within DHS, Department of State, and the
intelligence and law enforcement communities to meet these
challenges.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify about our
work at CBP on this solemn anniversary. I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. McAleenan follows:]
Prepared Stateent of Kevin McAleenan
September 11, 2012
Good morning Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you to represent U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) and, on this solemn anniversary, to discuss our
efforts to disrupt terrorist travel and promote travel security. I
appreciate the committee's leadership and your continued efforts to
ensure the security of the American people.
cbp's actions to prevent terrorist travel
As the unified border security agency of the United States, CBP is
responsible for securing our Nation's borders while facilitating the
flow of legitimate international travel and trade that is so vital to
our Nation's economy. Within this broad responsibility, our priority
mission remains to prevent terrorists and terrorist weapons from
entering the United States.
To do this, CBP works in close partnership with the Federal
counterterrorism community, including law enforcement agencies, the
intelligence community, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Department of
State, State and local law enforcement, the private sector, and our
foreign counterparts to improve our ability to identify risks as early
as possible in the travel continuum, and to implement security
protocols for addressing potential threats. CBP works with its
counterparts to apply its capabilities at multiple points in the travel
cycle to increase security by receiving advance information, employing
sophisticated targeting systems to detect risk, and acting through a
global network to address risks or prevent the movement of identified
threats toward the United States at the earliest possible point in
their travel.
In concert with its partners, CBP strives to ensure that travelers
who present a risk are appropriately interviewed or vetted before
boarding a flight bound for the United States, and that any document
deficiencies are addressed before traveling to the United States. CBP
has placed officers in strategic airports overseas to work with
carriers and host nation authorities, and has built strong liaisons
with airline representatives to improve our ability to address threats
as early as possible and effectively expand our security efforts beyond
the physical borders of the United States.
These efforts seek to keep our transportation sectors safe and
prevent threats from ever reaching the United States. These efforts
also enhance efficiency and create savings for the U.S. Government and
the private sector by preventing inadmissible travelers from traveling
to the United States.
travel to the united states
Given that commercial air transportation remains the primary target
of terrorist organizations seeking to attack the homeland or move
operatives into the United States, my testimony will focus on
international air travel. CBP inspects nearly 1 million travelers each
day as they enter the United States, and about 30 percent--almost 100
million a year--of these travelers arrive via commercial aviation. CBP
has developed and strategically deployed resources to detect, assess
and, if necessary, mitigate the risk posed by travelers throughout the
international travel continuum. CBP and its partners work to address
risk at each stage in the process: (1) The time of application to
travel; (2) ticket purchase or reservation; (3) check-in at a foreign
airport; and (4) arrival in the United States. Aspects of this strategy
are highlighted below.
Application to Travel
In general, most non-U.S. citizens wishing to travel to the United
States need to either apply for a visa from the Department of State
(DOS) at a U.S. Embassy or Consulate, or a travel authorization from
CBP via the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA). CBP
plays an important role in each of these processes.
Non-Immigrant Visa Process
Travelers that require Non-Immigrant Visas (NIVs) to travel to the
United States must apply to DOS to be a temporary visitor under
specific visa categories, including those for business, pleasure,
study, and employment-based purposes.
DOS manages the process of initially vetting visa applicants
including biometric and biographic checks. DOS Consular Officers then
adjudicate the visa application, which may include an interview of the
applicant, to determine eligibility. Applicants suspected of committing
fraud or suspected of other criminal or terrorist links are referred to
DOS, or the appropriate agency, for additional investigation.
CBP operates and monitors the Visa Hot List, a tool to re-vet
previously-issued visas against lookout records, to identify persons
whose eligibility for a visa or entry to the United States has changed
since the issuance of that visa. Relevant information that is uncovered
is passed to DOS, ICE, or other agencies as appropriate. This
continuous re-vetting by CBP has resulted in the revocation of over
more than 3,000 visas by DOS since its inception in March 2010.
To further enhance visa screening efforts, ICE, CBP, and DOS are
collaborating on the development of an automated visa application
screening process that will broaden the scope to identify potential
derogatory information prior to visa adjudication and issuance, and
synchronize reviews of the information across these agencies. This
process may be used as a precursor to and in conjunction with the
current DOS Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) and Advisory Opinion (AO)
programs. The joint program will leverage the three agencies'
expertise, authorities, and technologies, such as CBP's Automated
Targeting System (ATS), to screen pre-adjudicated visa applications. It
will significantly enhance the U.S. Government's anti-terrorism
efforts, improving the existing process by extending our borders
outward and denying high-risk applicants the ability to travel to the
United States.
Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA)
Since 2009, travelers traveling to the United States by air or sea
and intending to apply for admission under the Visa Waiver Program
(VWP),\1\ must first apply for travel authorization through CBP's on-
line application system, the Electronic System for Travel Authorization
(ESTA). Through this process, CBP incorporates targeting and database
checks to identify those who are statutorily ineligible to enter the
United States under the VWP and those who may pose a National security
or criminal threat if allowed to travel. The majority of ESTA
applications are approved; however, if derogatory information is
revealed during the vetting process, the application is denied and the
applicant is directed to DOS to initiate a formal visa application
process. In fiscal year 2012 (through August 2012), CBP has vetted over
10.7 million ESTA applications and denied more than 21,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The 36 countries currently designated for participation in the
Visa Waiver Program include: Andorra, Australia, Austria, Belgium,
Brunei, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Latvia,
Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ticket Purchase/Reservation
Passenger Name Record
As part of CBP's layered enforcement and risk segmentation
approach, the next opportunity to review a traveler's information
occurs upon the purchase of a ticket, when the carrier creates a
Passenger Name Record (PNR). All commercial airlines are required to
make their PNR systems and data available to CBP. The PNR is provided
to CBP up to 72 hours in advance of travel, which permits CBP to
conduct research and risk segmentation on all travelers including U.S.
citizens and non-U.S. citizens. At this point, CBP, in cooperation with
other Government agencies, begins a more comprehensive assessment of
each traveler's risk by reviewing his/her travel documents, responses
to questions on the ESTA or visa application, travel companions, and
patterns of travel to identify those who may be ineligible to travel or
who may warrant additional vetting.
Check-in
Advance Passenger Information System
Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) regulations require
that carriers transmit all passenger and crew manifest information
before departure, prior to securing the aircraft doors. APIS data
includes the biographic traveler information that is found in a
passport, such as a name and date of birth. APIS data also includes
itinerary information, such as the date of travel and flight
information. This information is used by CBP, in conjunction with the
PNR data, to identify known or suspected threats before they depart the
foreign location.
In 2007, CBP published the APIS Pre-Departure Final Rule, enabling
CBP systems to conduct vetting prior to passengers gaining access to
the aircraft or departing on-board a vessel. This regulation added an
essential layer to our anti-terrorism security measures. As part of the
implementation of the regulation, CBP developed an interactive
communications functionality where carriers can transmit single-
passenger APIS messages as passengers check-in and receive an automated
response message.
As part of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) commitment to
establish a common reporting process for carriers submitting traveler
information to DHS components, CBP and TSA aligned the CBP APIS Pre-
Departure requirements with those of the TSA Secure Flight program, so
that air carriers transmit data once and receive a combined DHS
response message that includes both the TSA Secure Flight screening
results and the traveler's ESTA status. This consolidated information
helps carriers make informed boarding decisions. CBP is currently
expanding this capability to include a document validation check, to
provide confirmation to the airlines that the individual's visa is
valid as well.
National Targeting Center
CBP leverages all available advance passenger data including the
PNR and APIS data, previous crossing information, intelligence, and law
enforcement information, as well as open-source information in its
anti-terrorism efforts at the National Targeting Center (NTC). The NTC
is a 24/7 operation that makes extensive use of intelligence materials
and law enforcement data, allowing analysts and targeting officers to
make tactical decisions at all points along the travel continuum.
Starting with the earliest indications of potential travel, including
United States-bound travel reservations, ESTA applications, visa
applications, and passenger manifests, and continuing through the
inspection or arrivals process, the NTC is continually analyzing
information gleaned from these sources using CBP's Automated Targeting
System (ATS). ATS is a decision-support tool for CBP officers which
compares information on travelers arriving in, transiting through, and
exiting the country against law enforcement and intelligence databases
to identify individuals requiring additional scrutiny. This information
is also matched against targeting rules developed by subject matter
experts. Targeting rules are based on actionable intelligence derived
from current intelligence community reporting or other law enforcement
information available to CBP.
NTC analyzes each traveler's risk before departure to identify
possible matches to the U.S. Government's consolidated terrorist watch
list, Interpol lost and stolen passports, criminal activity, fraud, and
other mala fide travelers, including U.S. citizens. Through direct
networks with commercial airlines and connections to CBP officers
overseas as part of the Immigration Advisory Program (IAP), NTC
officials are able to issue no-board recommendations to the airline to
keep suspected high-risk passengers from traveling to the United
States. In fiscal year 2011, NTC made 3,181 no-board recommendations to
carriers. In fiscal year 2012 (through August 2012), there have been
more than 3,600 no-board recommendations. The NTC vetting process for
international passengers continues while the flight is en route to the
United States in order to identify any travelers who, although they may
not be National security risks, may need to be referred for a more
thorough inspection at the first port of entry upon arrival in the
United States for other potential violations.
In addition to expanding the Nation's zone of security beyond the
United States and improving operational efficiency, NTC pre-departure
programs result in significant monetary savings by preventing
inadmissible passengers from boarding flights destined to the United
States, where upon arrival most of them likely would have to be
processed by CBP for refusal or removal, generating detention costs for
the U.S. Government and additional repatriation expenses for commercial
carriers.
In a recent effort to make CBP passenger and cargo targeting more
effective, the NTC was established as a stand-alone entity in the
Office of Field Operations with greater responsibility for CBP
passenger and cargo targeting operations at the port of entry. The NTC
continues to improve its operations as DHS and CBP anti-terrorism
targeting requirements expand by exploring new and innovative ways to
identify, interdict, or deter terrorists, their weapons, and their
supporters.
Immigration Advisory Program
IAP is another integral component of CBP's layered security
approach. With advance targeting support from the NTC, IAP officers
work in partnership with foreign law enforcement officials, to identify
and prevent terrorists and other high-risk passengers, and then work in
coordination with commercial air carriers to prevent these individuals
from boarding flights destined to the United States. Maximizing the use
of new mobile technology to enhance on-site targeting, IAP officers
conduct passenger interviews and assessments to evaluate the potential
risks presented by non-watchlisted travelers. The IAP is currently
operational at 11 airports in 9 countries including Amsterdam, Doha,
Frankfurt, London Heathrow and Gatwick, Madrid, Manchester, Mexico
City, Panama City, Tokyo, and Paris.
Since the inception of the program in 2004, IAP officers have been
successful in preventing the boarding of more than 15,700 high-risk and
improperly documented passengers, to include matches to the TSDB.
Arrival at a U.S. Port of Entry
Arrival Processing
Upon arrival in the United States, all persons are subject to
inspection by CBP officers. Upon application for admission to the
United States, this inspection begins with CBP officers scanning the
traveler's entry document and performing a query of various CBP
databases for exact or possible matches to existing lookouts, including
those of other law enforcement agencies. The system queries the
document information against the APIS manifest information previously
received from the carrier and provides any enforcement information
about the traveler to the officer for appropriate action. APIS data is
verified for completeness and accuracy through this process.
For most foreign nationals arriving at U.S. airports, fingerprint
biometrics and photographs are captured by CBP officers. If the
traveler has been previously fingerprinted, either at time of visa
application or during a previous trip to the United States, the newly
captured fingerprints will be compared to the originals to ensure the
fingerprints match. Once a verified identity is established, the system
will identify any watch list information and return the results to the
officer for appropriate processing. If the traveler has not been
previously fingerprinted, the officer will collect all ten fingerprints
and a biometric watch list search will be conducted, returning the
search results to the officer. In addition to the biographic and
biometric system queries performed, each traveler is interviewed by a
CBP officer to determine the purpose and intent of their travel, and
whether any further inspection is necessary based on concerns for
National security, identity or admissibility, customs, or agriculture.
If upon review of the system queries there are any exact or
possible matches to the TSDB, including potential matches to the ``No-
Fly'' List, or other law enforcement lookouts, the NTC will be notified
and coordinate with the port of entry for appropriate disposition or
action. Additionally, CBP has established a Counter-Terrorism Response
(CTR) protocol at ports of entry for passengers arriving with possible
links to terrorism. CTR protocol mandates immediate NTC notification,
initiating coordination with the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), the
National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), ICE, and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI) Terrorist Screening Operations Unit (TSOU), and
National Joint Terrorism Task Force (NJTTF).
For CBP's Preclearance locations in Aruba, Bermuda, the Bahamas,
Canada, and Ireland, customs, agriculture, and immigration inspection
and examination typically occurs at the Preclearance location instead
of upon arrival in the United States. Therefore, this process allows
the aircraft to arrive at a domestic airport gate in the United States
and travelers may proceed to their final destination without further
CBP processing; however, CBP may conduct further inspection or engage
in enforcement action after a pre-cleared flight departing from a
preclearance location arrives in the United States.
For CBP land border locations, the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative (WHTI) implemented the first 9/11 Commission border security
recommendation and legislative mandate by reducing the number of
acceptable travel documents from more than 8,000 to a core set of six
secure documents types which can be automatically queried via law
enforcement databases as the vehicle approaches the CBP officer. Today,
more than 16 million individuals have obtained Radio Frequency
Identification (RFID) technology-enabled secure travel documents, which
can be verified electronically in real-time back to the issuing
authority, to establish identity and citizenship. The implementation of
WHTI in the land border environment, and the increased use of RFID-
enabled secure travel documents, have allowed CBP to increase the
National law enforcement query rate, including the terrorist watch
list, to over 98 percent. By comparison, in 2005, CBP performed law
enforcement queries in the land border environment for only 5 percent
of travelers.
As of June 2009, all major land border ports, representing 95
percent of all inbound vehicle traffic, have been upgraded to include
improved license plate readers, RFID readers, and improved processing
applications to facilitate the inspection of travelers and vehicles
using the new RFID-enabled travel documents. Since June 2009, the
average number of imposter apprehensions, counterfeit and altered
documents seized has declined to 42 per day from 84 per day (a 50
percent decrease).
Outbound: Air, Land, and Sea
In addition to vetting inbound flights for high-risk travelers, CBP
also developed protocols to enhance outbound targeting efforts within
ATS, with the goal of identifying travelers who warrant outbound
inspection or apprehension. Outbound targeting programs identify
potential matches to the TSDB, including potential matches to the ``No-
Fly'' List, as well as National Criminal Information Center fugitives,
and subjects of active currency, narcotics, and weapons investigations.
Additionally, outbound operations are enhanced by the implementation of
targeting rules designed to identify and interdict subjects with a
possible nexus to terrorism or links to previously identified terrorist
suspects. As with inbound targeting rules, outbound targeting rules are
continually adjusted to identify and interdict subjects of interest
based on current threat streams and intelligence. Advance outbound
manifest information is also obtained through the APIS system from
carriers for all passengers 30 minutes prior to departure or if using
the APIS Quick Query mode, then carriers can transmit in real time as
each passenger checks in for the flight prior to boarding.
As soon as APIS information becomes available, prior to the
departure of a commercial conveyance, CBP and the TSA immediately begin
the screening and vetting processes of the outbound flight for possible
inclusion in the TSDB, including potential matches to the ``No-Fly''
and Selectee List, as well as other law enforcement lookouts, using any
and all available biographic information of the traveler. CBP's law
enforcement capability and commitment to National security, through the
monitoring and vetting of outbound flights, were highlighted on May 1,
2010 when CBP officers arrested Faisal Shazad as the man suspected in
the Times Square car bomb plot as he attempted to flee the country on a
flight destined to Dubai. Shazad had, hours before, come to the
attention of Federal law enforcement authorities in part because of
data collected by CBP. Later, when Shazad tried to flee the country by
purchasing a ticket on his way to the airport, it was CBP's collection
of API data that alerted us to his presence on the flight for Dubai,
enabling us to take him into custody before the plane departed. CBP's
capabilities were also evident in September 2009 when Najibullah Zazi
plotted an attack against the New York City subway system; in this
case, CBP's databases led to the identification of two of Zazi's
previously unknown co-conspirators. One pled guilty in April 2010 and
the other was found guilty on May 21, 2012. Also, in October 2009,
David Coleman Headley was arrested and pled guilty to plotting attacks
in Copenhagen and conducting surveillance in support of the November
2008 attacks in Mumbai, India; CBP identified Headley using partial
name and travel routing provided by FBI.
conclusion
CBP is committed to protecting our country from terrorists and
terrorist weapons while ensuring safe international travel and
facilitating legitimate trade. CBP is continually updating and
adjusting our programs to enhance the overall efficiency of how we
operate in this ever-changing global environment. As part of our
mission, CBP fosters partnerships and encourages cooperation with the
law enforcement community, industry, and foreign governments. CBP has
built a multi-layered approach for screening and identifying potential
travelers to the United States who may pose a threat to the homeland
and will continue to use all means within our authority to protect the
Nation and its citizens. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to
testify before you today, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Woods for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WOODS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS,
IMMIGRATIONS AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Woods. Thank you, Chairwoman Miller. Chairwoman Miller,
Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss ICE's
efforts to prevent terrorist travel and the exploitation of our
immigration system.
Visa overstays and other forms of status violation bring
together two critical areas of ICE's mission, both National
security and immigration enforcement. The importance of
determining who to allow to enter the United States and
ensuring compliance with conditions of such entry cannot be
overstated.
As you know, ICE's Visa Security Program, or VSP,
interdicts criminals, terrorists, and others who would exploit
our legal visa process to enter the United States and serves as
the agency's front line in protecting the United States against
terrorist and criminal organizations.
The VSP integrates DHS, law enforcement equities into the
visa process to advance our Nation's border security
initiatives. Under the VSP, ICE special agents are assigned to
visa security units at high-priority diplomatic posts world-
wide to conduct visa security activities and help identify
potential criminal and terrorist threats before they would have
the opportunity to reach our ports of entry.
The VSP currently screens and vets selected non-immigrant
and immigrant visa applications prior to visa issuance. In
support of our efforts to enhance visa security measures,
representatives on the panel here today from ICE, CBP,
Department of State, including the U.S. intelligence community,
are developing an automated visa screening process that will
enable ICE to identify derogatory information related to all
non-immigrant visa applicants prior to their adjudication by
consular offices.
This process may be used as a precursor to or in
conjunction with our current Department of State Security
Advisory Opinion and Advisory Opinion Programs. When an alien
files for non-immigrant visa application electronically, it
goes to the Department of State's Consular Electronic
Application Center, or the CEAC.
ICE's information technology modernization efforts will
allow ICE to obtain the non-immigrant visa application
information directly from CEAC, screen it against DHS and
intelligence community data before it goes to consular offices
for adjudication. This automated screening process will
significantly enhance the U.S. Government's anti-terrorism
efforts by aiding another layer of security to our border
protection efforts.
In addition to VSP, ICE's Counter-Terrorism and Criminal
Exploitation Unit, or the CTCEU, is dedicated to the
enforcement of non-immigrant visa violation. Today through the
CTCEU, ICE proactively develops cases for investigation through
the Student Exchange Visitor Program and the US-VISIT Program.
These programs enable ICE to access information about
millions of students, tourists, and temporary workers present
in the United States at any given time, and identify those who
have overstayed or otherwise violated the terms of their
condition of admission.
Special agents and analysts at ICE monitor the latest
threat reports and proactively address emergent issues. This
practice has contributed to ICE's counter-terrorism mission by
supporting high-priority National security initiatives based on
specific intelligence.
The practice is designed to identify individuals exhibiting
specific respecters risk factors on intelligence reporting,
including international travel from specific geographic
locations and in-depth research of dynamic social networks.
This person-centric approach of non-immigrant prioritization
moves away from our traditional methods of identification and
thereby enhances the way threats are identified and resolved.
As we move forward, it is imperative that we continue to
expand the Nation's enforcement efforts concerning overstays
and other status violations, with special emphasis on those who
threaten our National security and public safety. Accordingly,
ICE is analyzing various approaches to this issue, including
sharpening the focus of programs that address vulnerabilities
that are exploited by visa violators, such as the DHS Overstay
Initiative and CTCEU's School Fraud Targeting Program.
Effective border security measures require broad
information sharing and cooperation among U.S. agencies. On
January 11, 2011, ICE signed a memorandum of understanding
outlining the roles and responsibilities and collaboration
between ICE and the Department of State's Consular Affairs and
Diplomatic Security.
This MOU governs the day-to-day operations of ICE agents
conducting visa security operations at U.S. embassies and
consulates abroad. To facilitate this information sharing, it
reduces duplication of efforts by both ICE and the Department
of State by supporting collaborative training and orientation
prior to overseas assignments.
The VSP at high-priority U.S. embassies and consulates
brings an important law enforcement element to the visa review
process. This relationship serves as an avenue for VSP
personnel to alert consular offices and other U.S. Government
personnel to potential security risks.
More than a decade after the 9/11 attacks, ICE has made
significant progress in preventing terrorists from exploiting
our visa process. We look forward to working closely with the
subcommittee in the future to enhance those efforts.
I want to thank you again for the opportunity to appear
today. I would be pleased to answer any questions you have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Woods follows:]
Prepared Statement of John P. Woods
September 11, 2012
introduction
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss
the efforts of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to
prevent terrorist travel and the exploitation of our immigration
system. Visa overstays and other forms of status violation bring
together two critical areas of ICE's mission--National security and
immigration enforcement--and the importance of determining whom to
allow to enter the United States and ensuring compliance with the
conditions of such entry cannot be overstated.
the visa security program (vsp)
The Visa Security Program (VSP) interdicts criminals, terrorists,
and others who would exploit the legal visa process to enter the United
States and serves as ICE's front line in protecting the United States
against terrorist and criminal organizations. The VSP integrates DHS
law enforcement equities into the visa process to advance the Nation's
border security initiatives. Under VSP, ICE agents are assigned to Visa
Security Units (VSU) at high-priority diplomatic posts worldwide to
conduct visa security activities and help identify potential criminal
and/or terrorist threats before they reach a United States port of
entry.
The ICE VSP currently screens and vets selected non-immigrant and
immigrant visa applications prior to visa issuance. In support of ICE
VSP efforts to enhance visa security measures, representatives from
DHS, ICE, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), the U.S. Department
of State (DOS), and the U.S. intelligence community are developing an
automated visa screening process that will enable DHS entities to
identify derogatory information relating to all non-immigrant visa
applicants prior to adjudication of their visa application by DOS
consular officers. This process may be used as a precursor to, and in
conjunction with, the current DOS Security Advisory Opinion and
Advisory Opinion programs.
When an alien files a non-immigrant visa application
electronically, it goes to the DOS Consular Electronic Application
Center (CEAC) and is transmitted to DHS for screening against CBP and
other DHS and intelligence community data. Through the automated visa
screening process, currently under development, the information
identified through this process will provide DOS consular officers
information they can use in their interviews to address concerns raised
by the VSP findings, adding another layer of security to our border
protection efforts, in turn denying mala fide travelers access to the
United States.
For the automated visa screening process under development, a
proposed coordinated review process will be conducted by ICE and CBP.
This process will include the capability to utilize CBP vetting
methodologies, to address specific threats identified by the
intelligence community, to provide detailed case notes and
justifications for any recommendations for consular officers related to
visa issuance, and to recommend applicants for targeted interviews, and
incorporate feedback from DOS consular officers. DHS will work
cooperatively with DOS to refine the review process to ensure the
information provided is relevant, supported by immigration law, and
efficient. A future expansion of this system will incorporate pre-
adjudicative screening and vetting of immigrant visa applications.
Additionally, ICE has deployed Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI) special agents assigned to the VSP to the National Targeting
Center (NTC) and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to augment
and expand current operations. The NTC provides tactical targeting and
analytical research in support of preventing terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States. The co-location of HSI special
agents at the NTC and NCTC have helped to increase both communication
and information sharing.
the student and exchange visitor program (sevp)
The Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP) is a part of the
National Security Investigations Division and facilitates information
sharing among relevant Government partners on nonimmigrants whose
primary reason for coming to the United States is to be students. On
behalf of DHS, SEVP covers schools, nonimmigrant students in the F and
M visa classifications and their dependents. The Student Exchange
Visitor Information System (SEVIS) is the database that SEVP manages
that monitors schools that have been certified by DHS to enroll foreign
students, and the exchange visitor programs designated by the DOS to
sponsor exchange visitors. SEVIS contains the records of more than 1.1
million active nonimmigrant students, exchange visitors, and their
dependents, as well as nearly 10,000 SEVP-certified institutions.
SEVP regulates schools' eligibility to enroll foreign individuals
for academic and vocational training purposes and manages the
participation of SEVP-certified schools in the student and exchange
visitor program, and nonimmigrant students in the F (academic) and M
(vocational) visa classifications and their dependents. DOS manages the
Exchange Visitor Program for nonimmigrants in the J (exchange visitor)
visa classification.
SEVP is responsible both for certifying schools and for withdrawing
certification from non-compliant schools. The certification process
assists in the important functions of furthering National security and
the integrity of our Nation's borders, by providing consistent,
comprehensive oversight while preserving the rich tradition of
welcoming nonimmigrant students and exchange visitors.
SEVP collects, maintains, and provides information to interagency
partners so that only legitimate foreign students and exchange visitors
gain entry to, and remain in, the United States. The result is an
easily accessible system that provides timely information to support
ICE's law enforcement mission, as well as to our DHS partner agencies,
CBP and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and other Federal
agencies. Additionally, the data maintained by SEVP in SEVIS support
the DOS's Bureau of Consular Affairs visa process by providing advanced
electronic data on nonimmigrant visa applicants prior to visa issuance.
The student and exchange visitor programs that bring F, J, and M
visa holders to the United States are of immense value to all countries
involved, as they serve to strengthen international relations and
foster intercultural understanding. These programs produce economic
benefits as well; the U.S. Department of Commerce estimates that
foreign students and exchange visitors contributed more than $21
billion to the U.S. economy through their expenditures on tuition and
living expenses during the 2010-2011 academic year.
the counterterrorism and criminal exploitation unit (ctceu)
Created in 2003, the Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation
Unit is ICE's National program dedicated to the enforcement of
nonimmigrant visa violations. Today, through the CTCEU, ICE proactively
develops cases for investigation in cooperation with the SEVP and the
United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-
VISIT) Program. These programs enable ICE to access information about
the millions of students, tourists, and temporary workers present in
the United States at any given time, and identify those who have
overstayed or otherwise violated the terms and conditions of their
admission.
Each year, the CTCEU analyzes records on hundreds of thousands of
potential status violators from SEVIS and US-VISIT, along with other
information. These records are reviewed for potential violations that
would warrant field investigations, such as establishing compliance or
confirming departure from the United States, or determining if
additional derogatory information is available for analysis. Between
15,000 and 20,000 of these records are resolved by in-house analysts
each month. Since its creation, analysts have resolved more than 2
million such records using automated and manual review techniques. On
average, ICE opens approximately 6,000 investigative cases annually,
and assigns them to our special agents in the field for further
investigation.
Agents and analysts in ICE monitor the latest threat reports and
proactively address emergent issues. This practice has contributed to
ICE's counterterrorism mission by supporting high-priority National
security initiatives based upon specific intelligence. The practice is
designed to identify individuals exhibiting specific risk factors based
on intelligence reporting, including international travel from specific
geographic locations to the United States, and in-depth criminal
research and analysis of dynamic social networks. This person-centric
approach to nonimmigrant prioritization moves away from the traditional
methods of identification, thereby enhancing the way threats are
identified and resolved.
In order to ensure that the potential violators who pose the
greatest threats to National security are given priority attention, ICE
uses intelligence-based criteria, developed in close consultation with
the intelligence and law enforcement communities. ICE assembles the
Compliance Enforcement Advisory Panel (CEAP) on a tri-annual basis to
ensure that it uses the latest threat intelligence to target
nonimmigrant overstays and status violators who pose the greatest
threats to National security and to discuss possible changes based on
current threat trends. The CEAP is composed of members from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the NCTC, DHS Office of Intelligence and
Analysis, and other intelligence community members.
An ICE investigation in Los Angeles, California exemplifies how the
CTCEU operates. In March 2011, the CTCEU received an INTERPOL blue
notice concerning a person who traveled to the United States as a
tourist. A blue notice seeks information (e.g., identity, criminal
record) on subjects who have committed criminal offenses, and is used
to trace and locate a subject where extradition may be sought (i.e.,
offenders, witnesses). The individual at issue in the Los Angeles
investigation had an arrest warrant in connection with child
pornography charges in Colombia. A week later, ICE special agents
arrested the person who was admitted as a visitor and violated the
terms of admission by working in the adult film industry.
Likewise, in March 2010, ICE's Counterterrorism and Criminal
Exploitation Group in Miami, Florida, initiated ``Operation Class
Dismissed,'' a criminal investigation that led to the indictment of the
owner/operator of a Miami-based foreign language school and one of its
employees on four counts of conspiring to commit a criminal offense
against the United States. The owner and employee were suspected of
fraudulently sponsoring foreign students by certifying students as
nonimmigrants, without requiring them to maintain full courses of study
to comply with the terms of their admission. ICE's primary focus in
these types of investigations is the criminal violations of the
business owner/operators and administrative violations of the students.
This ICE investigation revealed that only approximately 5 percent of
the school's students attended class on any given day. In addition to
the indictment, follow-up investigation resulted in the administrative
arrests of 116 student visa violators purported to be attending the
school from multiple countries.
The CTCEU tracks 75 active criminal investigations each year. Since
June 2010, HSI special agents have criminally arrested 39 school owners
or officials related to fraud or and misuse of student visas.
Additionally, 10 foreign nationals residing outside of the United
States have been arrested for various student visa fraud schemes.
During fiscal year 2012, HSI special agents have conducted 760 school
outreaches Nation-wide, which represents a 400 percent increase over
the previous fiscal year. CTCEU has reviewed 476 schools for fraud or
National security anomalies that have resulted in 11 criminal
investigations. All of this is being completed in concert with SEVP's
on-going efforts to effectively build our Nation's population of well-
qualified international students to a number that is as robust as that
of pre-9/11. SEVP continues to work to close vulnerabilities within the
program.
As we move forward, it is imperative that we continue to expand the
Nation's enforcement efforts concerning overstays and other status
violations with special emphasis on those who threaten National
security or public safety. Accordingly, ICE is analyzing various
approaches to this issue, including sharpening the focus of programs
that address vulnerabilities exploited by visa violators, such as the
DHS Overstay Initiative and school fraud targeting by CTCEU.
coordination with us-visit and other dhs components
CTCEU also works in close collaboration with US-VISIT, part of the
DHS's National Protection and Programs Directorate. US-VISIT supports
DHS's mission to protect our Nation by providing biometric
identification services to Federal, State, and local Government
decision makers to help them accurately identify the people they
encounter, and determine whether those people pose risks to the United
States. DHS's use of biometrics under the US-VISIT program is a
powerful tool in preventing identity fraud and ensuring that DHS is
able to rapidly identify criminals and immigration violators who try to
cross our borders or apply for immigration benefits under an assumed
name. Interoperability between the FBI Criminal Justice Information
Service's IAFIS and US-VISIT's Automated Biometric Identification
System (IDENT), which includes the sharing of biometric information, is
the foundation of ICE's Secure Communities program.
US-VISIT also analyzes biographical entry and exit records stored
in its Arrival and Departure Information System to further support
DHS's ability to identify international travelers who have remained in
the United States beyond their periods of admission by analyzing
related biographical information.
ICE receives or coordinates nonimmigrant overstay and status
violation referrals from US-VISIT's Data Integrity Group from several
unique sources: Overstay violations; biometric watch list
notifications; CTCEU Visa Waiver Enforcement Program nominations; and
enhanced biometric exit. The first type, nonimmigrant overstay leads,
is used by the CTCEU to generate field investigations by identifying
foreign visitors who violate the terms of their admission by remaining
in the United States past the date of their required departure.
HSI generates a second type of lead from biometric data collected
by US-VISIT. US-VISIT routinely receives fingerprint records from a
variety of Government sources and adds them to a biometric watch list,
including individuals of National security concern. These new watch
list records are checked against all fingerprints in IDENT to determine
if DHS has previously encountered the individual. If US-VISIT
identifies a prior encounter, such as admission to the United States,
the information is forwarded to ICE for review and possible field
assignment. Similarly, US-VISIT monitors records for individuals who,
at the time of admission to the United States, were the subject of
watch list records that did not render the individuals inadmissible to
the United States. Therefore, if such individuals overstay their terms
of admission, information on the subjects is forwarded to ICE for
review and possible referral to investigative field offices for follow-
up.
The third type of lead pertains to the CTCEU's Visa Waiver
Enforcement Program (VWEP). The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) is the
primary source of nonimmigrant visitors from countries other than
Canada and Mexico. Although the overstay rate from this population is
less than 1 percent, ICE created a program dedicated to addressing
overstays from VWP. Prior to the implementation of the VWEP in 2008,
there was no National program dedicated to addressing VWP. CTCEU
provides US-VISIT a list of potential VWP overstays for additional
scrutiny. In accord with its intelligence-based criteria, the relevant
portion of this list is given to CTCEU's lead tracking system for
review and possible field assignment.
Additionally, the CTCEU develops potential overstay and status
violation leads from SEVIS and other sources, and applies intelligence-
based criteria to determine whether an investigative referral is
appropriate. Throughout its history, the integrity of SEVIS data and
its applicability have been valued throughout the law enforcement
community.
In May 2011, at the direction of Secretary Napolitano, DHS's
Counterterrorism Coordinator organized an effort to ensure that all
overstays, regardless of priority, receive enhanced National security
and public safety vetting by the NCTC and CBP. As part of Phase 1 of
this effort, DHS components reviewed a backlog of 1.6 million un-vetted
potential overstay records based on National security and public safety
priorities.
As of 2010, DHS had a backlog of ``un-reviewed overstays,''
comprised of system-identified overstay leads, which did not meet
criteria set by ICE for expedited high-priority review. Before the
summer of 2011, these records would not have been examined, except in
instances when resources allowed it. The DHS ``overstay initiative,''
begun in the summer of 2011 at the direction of the Secretary, reformed
this effort.
By leveraging capabilities within CBP's Automated Targeting System,
as well as DHS's relationship with NCTC, DHS was able to conduct
richer, more thorough vetting for National security and public safety
concerns. This generated new leads for ICE, which previously would not
have been uncovered.
coordination with dos
Effective border security requires broad information sharing and
cooperation among U.S. agencies. On January 11, 2011, ICE signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) outlining roles, responsibilities,
and collaboration between ICE and the DOS Bureaus of Consular Affairs
and Diplomatic Security. The MOU governs the day-to-day operations of
ICE agents conducting visa security operations at U.S. embassies and
consulates abroad. To facilitate information sharing and reduce
duplication of efforts, ICE and DOS support collaborative training and
orientation prior to overseas deployments. Once they are deployed to
overseas posts, ICE and DOS personnel work closely together in:
Participating in working groups; coordinating meetings, training, and
briefings; and engaging in regular and timely information sharing.
The VSP's presence at high-priority U.S. embassies and consulates
brings an important law enforcement element to the visa review process.
Additionally, this relationship serves as an avenue for VSP personnel
to alert Consular Officers and other U.S. Government personnel to
potential security threats in the visa process.
ICE continues to evaluate the need to screen and investigate
additional visa applicants at high-risk visa issuing posts other than
the 19 posts at which the agency currently operates, which were
determined in collaboration between ICE and DOS. ICE will continue to
conduct joint site visits with DOS to identify locations for deployment
based on emerging threats. We are engaged with our counterparts at DOS
in determining a common strategic approach to the broader question of
how best to collectively secure the visa issuance process. We look
forward to continuing to report back to you with updates on this
process.
recent successes with our partners
Working in tandem with other DHS personnel, as well as our
international, Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners, we have
enjoyed significant successes preventing visa fraud. I would like to
elaborate briefly on two of these cases.
In December 2010, ICE special agents were involved in the
identification and investigation of a transnational alien smuggling
organization that facilitated the illegal travel of Somali nationals
into Yemen and on to western locations, including the United States.
ICE special agents received information from the ICE Attache office in
Amman, Jordan that two Somali nationals had been intercepted in Amman
attempting to travel to Chicago using counterfeit travel documents, and
contacted local officials in Yemen and Somalia to investigate how the
counterfeit documents had been obtained and how the subjects had
transited Yemen. The information developed was shared with other U.S.
agencies at post in Sana'a via the Law Enforcement Working Group, as
well as ICE domestic offices and the appropriate FBI Joint Terrorism
Task Force. While the joint investigation is on-going, efforts to date
have eliminated this scheme as a method of entry to the United States.
In May 2011, ICE special agents within the VSP Security Advisory
Opinion Unit (SAOU) investigated a Middle Eastern national who obtained
a nonimmigrant visa to enter the United States by concealing his true
identity from DOS by using a variation of his true name. Through
vetting efforts, the SAOU identified this individual's true identity
and revealed that he was a known terrorist with significant ties to
other known terrorists, and who was likely involved in the planning of
a terrorist attack in 2003. Based on this investigation and at the
request of the VSP and SAOU, DOS revoked the individual's visa on
National security-related grounds and prevented him from traveling to
the United States.
conclusion
More than a decade after the attacks of 9/11, ICE has made
significant progress in preventing terrorists from exploiting the visa
process. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and for
your continued support of ICE and its law enforcement mission.
I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentlemen.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Ramotowski.
STATEMENT OF EDWARD J. RAMOTOWSKI, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Ramotowski. Thank you, Madame Chairwoman, Ranking
Member Cuellar, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
As a consular officer with 26 years of experience in the
U.S. Foreign Service, it is a solemn occasion for me to testify
here today on the 11th anniversary of the September 11 attacks.
I thank you for the opportunity to update you on how we
continue to improve visa security to prevent such an attack
from ever taking place again.
Our highest priority is the safety of American citizens at
home and abroad. Together with our partner agencies, we build a
layered visa and border security screening system, resting on
technological advances, biometric innovations, consular
interviews, expanded data sharing, and improved consular
training.
The Department of State is constantly developing,
implementing, and refining an intensive visa application and
screening process. This process incorporates personal
interviews in most cases and multiple biographic and biometric
checks, supported by a sophisticated global information
technology network.
We share this data among the Department and Federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies. Security remains our
primary mission.
For us, every visa decision is a National security
decision. Our electronic visa applications provide consular and
fraud prevention officers, as well as our intelligence and law
enforcement partners, the opportunity to analyze an applicant's
data in advance of the visa interview, so that these partners
may detect potential non-biographic links to derogatory
information.
We are currently working with our partners on two major
initiatives to screen more of this data with the law
enforcement and intelligence communities, and make the visa
system even more secure.
In addition to these biographic checks, the Department
screens the fingerprints of visa applicants against DHS and FBI
databases, and uses facial recognition technology to check
applicants against a watch list of photos obtained from the
Terrorist Screening Center, as well as visa applicant photos
contained in our Consular Consolidated Database.
Other agencies access our large database of visa
information for security screening, law enforcement, and
counter-terrorism purposes. We specifically designed our
systems to facilitate comprehensive sharing.
We cooperate with law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, and benefit from their capabilities and resources.
This is most dramatically evident in the continuous vetting of
visa holders, so that derogatory information that surfaces
after a visa is issued is promptly reviewed, and the visa
revoked, if warranted, by a dedicated revocation unit on 24/7
basis.
More than 8,000 visas have been revoked under the
Continuous Vetting Program since 2010.
Consular officers are also thoroughly trained prior to
making visa decisions. Each officer completes our consular
course, which has a strong emphasis on border security and
fraud prevention, and includes in-depth training on
interviewing and name-checking techniques.
Officers also receive continuing education in all of these
disciplines throughout their careers. On your next trip abroad,
I would encourage you and all Members of the committee to visit
the consular sections of the U.S. embassy or consulate to see
these procedures first-hand and to observe how our dedicated
consular personnel are carrying out their border security
responsibilities.
Distinguished Members of the committee, our unique layered
approach to border security screening, in which each agency
applies its particular strengths and expertise, best serves our
border security agenda, while furthering compelling U.S.
interests in legitimate travel, trade promotion, and the
exchange of ideas.
The United States must protect and advance all of these
interests to guarantee our long-term security.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear today. I am
ready to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ramotowski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Edward J. Ramotowski
September 11, 2012
Good morning Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is a solemn occasion for
me to testify here today on the 11th anniversary of September 11. I
thank you for calling this hearing today, and for your unwavering
commitment to visa security and prevention of terrorist travel.
The Department of State (the ``Department'') remains dedicated to
the protection of our borders, and has no higher priority than the
safety of our fellow citizens at home and abroad. We are the first line
of defense in border security, because the Department is often the
first U.S. Government agency to have contact with foreign nationals
wishing to visit the United States. Since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, we and our partner agencies have built a multi-
faceted security screening process that extends our ability to review
traveler information well before any potential threat reaches our
borders. The lessons learned from that tragic day and subsequent
terrorist attempts have not been ignored.
One of the most important improvements since 2001 is the enormous
expansion of interagency cooperation, information sharing, and
teamwork. Multiple Federal agencies responsible for border security,
including the Department, share increasing amounts of data and
coordinate lookout and screening activities. Likewise, we see today an
unprecedented level of information sharing with like-minded foreign
governments. We and our partner agencies are committed to a layered
approach to border security. This approach enables the U.S. Government
to track and review the visa eligibility and status of foreign visitors
from their visa applications throughout their travel to, sojourn in,
and departure from, the United States.
security improvements in the visa application process
Often, a foreign visitor's first step in traveling to the United
States is applying for a visa at a U.S. embassy or consulate abroad.
The Department has built a visa system that leverages state-of-the-art
technology, extensive information sharing, highly skilled and trained
consular officers, and interagency cooperation to facilitate legitimate
travel and trade without compromising our Nation's security.
The Department constantly refines and updates the technology that
supports the adjudication and production of U.S. visas. Under the
Biometric Visa Program, before a visa is issued, the visa applicant's
fingerprints are screened against two key databases. The first database
is the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Automated Biometric
Identification System (IDENT), which has a watch list containing
available fingerprints of terrorists, wanted persons, and immigration
law violators, as well as the entire gallery of more than 100 million
individuals who have applied for visas, immigration benefits, and
admission to the United States under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP), to
combat identify fraud. The second database is the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification
System (IAFIS), which contains more than 50 million criminal history
records. More than 10,000 matches of visa applicants with records on
the IDENT watch list are returned to posts every month, normally
resulting in visa refusals. In 2011, IAFIS returned more than 66,000
criminal arrest records to posts.
The Biometric Visa Program partners with DHS' US-VISIT Program to
enable Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers at ports of entry
to match the fingerprints of persons entering the United States with
the fingerprints that were taken during the visa application process at
overseas posts and transmitted electronically to DHS IDENT. This
biometric identity verification at ports of entry has essentially
eliminated the previous problems of counterfeit and photo-substituted
visas, as well as the use of valid visas by imposters.
The Department was a pioneer in the use of facial recognition
techniques and remains a leader in operational use of this technology.
Consular officers use facial recognition technology to screen all visa
applicants against a watch list of photos of known and suspected
terrorists obtained from the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center (TSC), as
well as the entire gallery of visa applicant photos contained in the
Department's Consular Consolidated Database (CCD). Currently, more than
109 million visa applicant photos are enrolled in our facial
recognition database. Facial recognition screening has proven to be
effective in combating identity fraud.
The on-line DS-160 non-immigrant visa application form is used
worldwide, and we currently are piloting the on-line DS-260 immigrant
visa application form. These new on-line forms provide consular and
fraud prevention officers the opportunity to analyze data in advance of
the visa interview, enhancing their ability to make decisions. The on-
line forms offer foreign language support but applicants must respond
in English, to facilitate information sharing between the Department
and other Government agencies, who are able to view visa application
data in foreign and domestic locations.
All visa applicants are checked against our automated Consular
Lookout and Support System (CLASS), which contains 27 million records
of persons found ineligible for visas, or against whom potentially
derogatory information exists. CLASS employs strong, sophisticated
name-searching algorithms to ensure matches between names of visa
applicants and any derogatory information contained in CLASS. This
robust searching capability has been central to our procedures since
automated lookout system checks were mandated following the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing. We use our significant and evolving experience
with searching mechanisms for derogatory information to improve the
systems for checking our visa issuance records constantly.
The amount of information contained in CLASS has grown more than
400 percent since 2001--largely the result of improved sharing of data
among the Department, Federal law enforcement agencies, and the
intelligence community. Almost 70 percent of CLASS records come from
other agencies, including information from the FBI, DHS, DEA, and
intelligence from other agencies. CLASS contains unclassified records
on known or suspected terrorists (KSTs) from the Terrorist Screening
Database, which is maintained by the TSC, and holds unclassified data
on KSTs nominated by all U.S. Government sources. We also run all visa
applicants' names against the CCD in order to detect and respond to
derogatory information regarding visa applicants and visa holders. The
CCD contains more than 143 million immigrant and nonimmigrant visa
records going back to 1998. A system-specific version of the automated
CLASS search algorithm runs the names of all visa applicants against
the CCD to check for any prior visa applications, refusals, or
issuances.
In 2011, we deployed the Enterprise Case Assessment Service, a visa
fraud tracking tool that provides a platform to store fraud-related
research that used to be stored outside of consular systems. Should
fraud be confirmed during the course of a visa interview, consular
officers can record that data in this tool, and it will be permanently
available to consular officers worldwide should the referenced
individual re-apply for a visa. Future iterations of this tool will
track fraud in other consular services, such as U.S. passport
applications, and will enable us to track the activities of third-party
document vendors and visa fixers.
innovations in the security advisory opinion process
The Department's Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) mechanism provides
consular officers with the necessary advice and background information
to adjudicate cases of visa applicants with possible terrorism or other
security-related ineligibilities. Consular officers receive extensive
training on the SAO process, including modules on cultural and
religious naming conventions, which assist them in identifying
applicants who require additional interagency vetting. The SAO process
requires the consular officer to suspend visa processing pending
interagency review of the case. Most SAOs are triggered by clear and
objective circumstances, such as CLASS name check results, nationality,
place of birth, or residence.
In addition, in cases where reasonable grounds exist regardless of
name check results, consular officers may suspend visa processing and
institute SAO procedures if they suspect that an applicant may be
inadmissible under the security provisions of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA).
In the last quarter of 2012, in conjunction with our interagency
partners, we will pilot major improvements to the way we process SAO
requests. These changes will not only broaden our applicant screening
for possible terrorist connections, but will also greatly enhance our
ability to weed out false matches and more effectively focus vetting
resources.
changes to the visas viper program
Our overseas posts provide information on foreign nationals with
possible terrorist connections through the Visas Viper reporting
program. Following the December 25, 2009 attempted terrorist attack on
Northwest flight 253, we strengthened the procedures and content
requirements for Visas Viper reporting. Chiefs of Mission are
responsible for ensuring that all appropriate agencies and offices at
post contribute relevant information for Viper nominations. These
enhanced Visas Viper directives also included guidance on advanced name
searches to identify information regarding previous or current U.S.
visas, which must be included in Visas Viper cables; instructions
regarding procedures and criteria used to revoke visas; and reiterated
guidance on consular officers' use of the discretionary authority to
deny visas under section 214(b) of the INA, with specific reference to
cases that raise security and other concerns. Instruction in
appropriate use of this authority has been a fundamental part of
consular officer training for several years.
continuous vetting
The Department has been continuously matching new threat
information with our records of existing visas since 2002. We have long
recognized this function as critical to the way we manage our records
and processes. This system of continual vetting evolved as post-9/11
reforms were instituted, and is now performed in cooperation with the
TSC. All records added to the Terrorist Screening Database are checked
against the CCD to determine if there are matching visa records.
Matches are sent electronically from the Department to TSC, where
analysts review the hits and flag cases for possible visa revocation.
In addition, we have widely disseminated our data to other agencies
that may wish to learn whether a subject of interest possesses a U.S.
visa.
Cases under consideration for revocation are forwarded to the
Department by our consular offices overseas, CBP's National Targeting
Center (NTC), and other U.S. Government entities. As soon as
information is established to support a revocation (i.e., information
that could lead to an inadmissibility determination), a ``VRVK'' entry
code showing the visa revocation is added to CLASS, and to biometric
identity systems. This information is shared immediately with the DHS
lookout systems used for border inspection and vetting. As part of its
Pre-Departure and Immigration Advisory Programs, CBP uses these VRVK
records, among others, to recommend that airlines not board certain
passengers on flights bound for the United States.
The Department receives daily requests to review and, if warranted,
revoke visas from aliens for whom new derogatory information has been
discovered since the visa was issued. Our Operations Center is staffed
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to address urgent requests, such as when
a potentially dangerous person is about to board a plane. In those
circumstances, the State Department can and does use its authority to
revoke the visa prudentially, and thus prevent the individual from
boarding.
The Department has broad and flexible authority to revoke visas and
we use that authority widely to protect our borders. Since 2001, the
Department has revoked approximately 62,000 visas for a variety of
reasons, including nearly 6,000 for suspected links to terrorism. Most
revocations are based on new information that has come to light after
visa issuance. Because individuals' circumstances change over time, and
people who once posed no threat to the United States can become
threats, revocation is an important tool. We use our authority to
revoke a visa immediately in circumstances where we believe there is an
immediate threat. At the same time, we believe it is important not to
act unilaterally, but to coordinate expeditiously with our National
security partners in order to avoid possibly disrupting important
investigations. Individuals whose visas are revoked may reapply at a
U.S. embassy or consulate abroad; their reapplication would be subject
to complete interagency security vetting to determine their eligibility
for a visa.
the assistant regional security officer, investigator program
The Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS) Assistant Regional Security
Officer, Investigator (ARSO-I) Program adds an important law
enforcement element to the Department's visa security capabilities.
There are currently 105 ARSO-I positions approved for 93 consular
sections overseas, specifically devoted to working with our foreign law
enforcement partners to combat travel document fraud and other law
enforcement issues. These highly trained law enforcement professionals
add another important dimension to our border security efforts, and we
are working with DS to identify additional locations for ARSO-I
placement.
ARSO-Is train our foreign partners in the recognition of fraudulent
travel documents and work closely with immigration and airline security
officials assigned at foreign airports. They teach courses at our
International Law Enforcement Academies, networking with foreign law
enforcement partners and learning about vulnerabilities in foreign visa
and passport systems. DS agents share this information with each other,
resulting in additional investigations and opportunities to shut down
human smuggling and trafficking networks that could potentially be
exploited by terrorists. ARSO-Is have trained over 50,000 foreign law
enforcement personnel, resulting in stronger global enforcement efforts
targeting illicit methods of travel.
ARSO-Is work very closely with consular fraud prevention managers,
sharing information and participating in joint training sessions to
ensure that adjudicating consular officers possess up-to-date
information on fraud trends in their country. They are complemented by
DS agents working domestically on visa and passport fraud criminal
investigations and analysis. Investigations that originate overseas
often have a U.S. nexus, and close collaboration between overseas and
domestic DS agents has resulted in many U.S.-based prosecutions.
cooperation with the visa security program
The Department of State believes that the Visa Security Program
(VSP), under which DHS establishes Visa Security Units (VSU) staffed
with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) special agents at
certain overseas consular posts, is another valuable component of the
U.S. Government's overall border security program. We have a close and
productive partnership with DHS, which has authority for visa policy
under section 428 of the Homeland Security Act, and are fully
supportive of the mission and future of the VSP.
The VSP increases the utility of the visa application and interview
processes to detect and combat terrorism, criminality, and other
threats to the United States and the traveling public. ICE special
agents assigned to VSUs provide on-site vetting of visa applications
and other law enforcement support to our consular officers. When
warranted, DHS officers assigned to VSUs will conduct targeted, in-
depth reviews of individual visa applications and applicants prior to
issuance, and recommend refusal or revocation of applications to
consular officers. We work very closely with DHS to ensure to the
maximum possible extent that no terrorist receives a visa or is
admitted into our country.
As the VSP has matured over the past few years, VSU personnel have
moved beyond a singular focus on visa application review. Working with
their law enforcement colleagues assigned to our various missions, they
have contributed their expertise and resources to enhance our response
to all kinds of threats to the visa and immigration processes including
human smuggling and trafficking.
In Washington, we work very closely with our VSP colleagues on day-
to-day issues affecting the operations of the program, as well as
longer-term issues related to the expansion of the program to select
overseas posts. VSP officers in Washington review our visa databases
and advise posts of emerging information about visa holders. Another
important aspect of our Washington partnership is coordinating VSP
expansion to more posts. The Department's Bureaus of Consular Affairs
(CA) and Diplomatic Security (DS) have a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) with ICE governing VSU-Department of State interactions with visa
sections. This MOU outlines procedures for resolving the very few
disputed visa cases that emerge from the VSU review process, and
collaboration between ICE/VSU agents and their DS law enforcement
colleagues assigned as Regional Security Officers (RSOs) or ARSO-Is.
Currently, 19 VSUs are active at posts in 15 countries. In
administering and expanding the VSP, the Department works
collaboratively with DHS, pursuant to an October 2004 MOU between the
Department and the VSP on the ``Administrative Aspects of Assigning
Personnel Overseas,'' and National Security Decision Directive 38
(NSDD-38). This directive outlines factors to be considered by Chiefs
of Mission when considering requests by a U.S. Government agency to
create a new position at a post abroad. NSDD-38 gives Chiefs of Mission
responsibility for the size, composition, and mandate of U.S.
Government agency staff under his or her authority.
Before submitting an NSDD-38 request, ICE officials, with the
support of senior Department officers from CA and DS, conduct a post-
specific, on-site assessment. The visit provides an opportunity for the
team to consult with officials at post to validate the interagency
assessment of the risk environment, determine the feasibility and
timing of establishing an office, and brief the Chief of Mission on the
role of the VSU. In 2012, joint Department/DHS teams conducted
assessment visits to two potential VSU sites, and follow-on NSDD-38
requests currently are under consideration by the Department of State.
layered security and data sharing
As I have previously stated in my testimony, the Department
embraces a layered approach to security screening. In addition to our
support of the VSP, the Department and DHS have increased resources
significantly, improved procedures, and upgraded systems devoted to
supporting the visa function over the past 7 years. DHS receives all of
the information collected by the Department during the visa process.
DHS's US-VISIT is often cited as a model in data sharing because the
applicant information we provide, including fingerprint data, is
checked at ports of entry to confirm the identity of travelers. DHS has
access to our entire CCD. A menu of reports tailored to the specific
needs of each particular unit is supplied to elements within DHS, such
as ICE's agents assigned to VSUs.
All of our visa information is available to other U.S. Government
agencies for law enforcement and counterterrorism purposes, and our
systems are specifically designed to facilitate tailored and
comprehensive data sharing with our partners. We give other agencies
immediate access to more than 14 years of visa data for these purposes,
and they use this access extensively in the course of conducting law
enforcement and/or counterterrorism investigations.
Working in concert with DHS, we proactively expanded biometric
screening programs and integrated this expansion into existing overseas
facilities. In partnership with DHS and the FBI, we established the
largest fingerprint screening program on the globe. These efforts
require intense on-going cooperation from other agencies. We
successfully forged and continue to foster partnerships that recognize
the need to supply accurate and speedy screening in a 24/7 global
environment. As we implement process and policy changes, we are always
striving to add value in both border security and in operational
results. Both dimensions are important in supporting the visa process.
In addition, every post that issues visas has at least one fraud
prevention officer and locally-employed staff devoted specifically to
fraud prevention and document security. We have a large Fraud
Prevention Programs office in Washington, which works closely with DS.
We have fraud screening operations which use sophisticated database
checks at the Kentucky Consular Center in Williamsburg, Kentucky, and
the National Visa Center in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. Their role in
flagging questionable applications and applicants who lack credibility,
present fraudulent documents, or give us false information adds a
valuable dimension to our visa process.
facing the terrorist threat
We face an evolving threat of terrorism against the United States,
but the multi-agency team effort, based upon broadly-shared
information, provides a solid foundation for securing U.S. borders. The
people and tools we use to address this threat are sophisticated and
flexible. The interagency community continues to automate processes to
reduce the possibility of human error, and enhance our border security
screening capabilities.
Our response to these threats accounts for the cultural and
political environment in which they arise. Our officers are well-
trained, motivated, and knowledgeable. Our information is comprehensive
and accurate. Our criteria for taking action are clear and coordinated.
The Department remains fully committed to fulfill our essential role on
the border security team.
enhanced cooperation with foreign partners
The U.S. Government's information-sharing initiatives ensure that
we and our international partners are in constant contact regarding the
threat of terrorist travel. The Department plays a key role in all of
these international initiatives.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6), among other
things, called for enhancing information sharing with our foreign
partners, starting with those countries participating in the Visa
Waiver Program. Through July of this year, the Department, in
collaboration with the TSC, has negotiated more than 40 agreements or
arrangements facilitating the bilateral exchange of terrorism screening
information. These agreements enhance the data in our U.S. Government's
known or suspected terrorist watch list and strengthen our
counterterrorism cooperation.
We also have entered into arrangements for the sharing of visa
information with foreign governments, consistent with the requirements
of section 222(f) of the INA. Since 2003, there have been arrangements
in place with Canada for such sharing under certain circumstances. With
DHS, the Department is participating in a pilot program, through the
Five Country Conference (United States, Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom) for identification of some travelers based on
biometric matching. We are in negotiation with the governments of
Canada and the United Kingdom for agreements that would provide a legal
basis for us to implement arrangements for the automated sharing of
visa refusal data and for systematic confirmation of an applicant's
identity through biometric matching. We expect both agreements to be
completed this year, and similar agreements with Australia and New
Zealand in 2013.
We have been and remain a close partner of DHS in API and PNR
discussions overseas, in particular with respect to the talks with the
European Union leading to the PNR Agreement that entered into force on
July 1, 2012. Together, all of these programs are helping achieve the
goal of constraining terrorist mobility and ensuring the security of
travelers. This is our obligation to the American people.
conclusion
The Department's border security agenda does not conflict with our
support for legitimate trade and travel. In my testimony for your
subcommittee and for the subcommittee on Travel and Tourism of the
Senate Committee on Commerce, our message is the same: The United
States' long-term interests and security are served by continuing the
flow of commerce and ideas that are the foundations of prosperity and
security. Exposing international visitors to American culture and
ideals is the best way to decrease misperceptions about the United
States. Fostering academic and professional exchanges keeps our
universities and research institutions at the forefront of science and
technology.
The Department continues to refine its intensive visa application
and screening process requiring personal interviews, employing analytic
interview techniques, incorporating multiple biographic and biometric
checks, all supported by a sophisticated global information technology
network. We have visa offices in virtually every country of the world,
staffed by consular officers drawn from the Department's professional,
mobile, and multilingual cadre of Foreign Service Officers. These
officials are dedicated to a career of worldwide service, and provide
the cultural awareness, knowledge, and objectivity to ensure that the
visa function remains the front line of border security. Each officer's
experiences and individual skill set are enhanced by an overall
understanding of the political, legal, economic, and cultural
development of foreign countries in a way that gives the Department of
State a special expertise over matters directly relevant to the full
range of visa ineligibilities.
The Department's global presence, foreign policy mission, and
personnel structure give us singular advantages in executing the visa
function throughout the world. Our authorities and responsibilities
enable us to provide a global perspective to the visa process and its
impact on U.S. National interests. The issuance and refusal of visas
has a direct impact on our foreign relations. Visa policy quickly can
become a significant bilateral problem that harms broader U.S.
interests if handled without consideration for foreign policy equities.
The conduct of U.S. visa policy has a direct and significant impact on
the treatment of U.S. citizens abroad. We are in a position to
anticipate and weigh all those factors, while always keeping border
security as our first priority.
This concludes my testimony today. I will be pleased to take your
questions.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentlemen.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Edwards for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL,
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Edwards. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking
Member Cuellar, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for inviting me to testify today regarding border
security to detect and deter terrorist travel.
I will present the results of three reports that we issued
in the past year on this topic. Specifically, we looked at
resources and coordination among DHS agencies to screen foreign
nationals and protect the border, controls that US-VISIT to
identify potentially fraudulent attempt to enter the United
States and TSA's implementation of the Secure Flight Program.
The infrastructure for securing our borders is layered.
Federal entities such as the Department of State and DHS
components like CBP, TSA, US-VISIT and ICE make vital
contributions to border security. In addition, other Federal,
State, and local entities play critical roles in this layered
strategy.
However, technological issues, resource deficiencies and
interagency coordination present significant challenges. For
example, DHS officers at any of the 327 air, sea, and land
border ports of entry have to access as many as 17 different
DHS systems to verify the identity of foreign nationals and
make admission decisions.
Some components have made progress in streamlining their
systems. However, mobile devices used by some SBP officers and
border patrol agents continue to lack adequate bandwidth and
technology. This can hinder officers in the field attempting to
fingerprint aliens or accessing law enforcement and immigrant
databases.
In addition, long-standing mission overlap and inadequate
information sharing between CBP and ICE agents at the Northern
Border have sometimes led to duplication of efforts and
concerns over officer safety. The Department concurred with
five of the eight recommendations, and has implemented actions
to address our findings.
DHS has even taken actions to close two of the three
recommendations with which it did not concur. We expect the
final recommendation to be closed next month. US-VISIT is
designed to collect and analyze foreign nationals' biographic
and biometric data and provide timely, accurate information to
border enforcement officials to prevent entries of potentially
fraudulent and dangerous individuals.
However, we found hundreds of thousands of instances where
the same fingerprint was recorded in US-VISIT's database with
sometimes as many as 14 different names and dates of birth. The
vast majority of this faulty data is attributable to data entry
errors in the name and date fields.
However, US-VISIT officials were unable to quantify how
many of those inconsistencies came from individuals
purposefully presenting fraudulent information at the border.
Our report identified a number of instances where individuals
with derogatory information, such as criminal aliens, supplied
different biographic information to CBP officers in an attempt
to enter the United States.
These individuals were not flagged in the IDENT Database.
US-VISIT concurred with our recommendations to improve
procedures to target, identify fraud.
Another pillar in the fight against terrorism is TSA's
Secure Flight Program. Through this program, TSA assumed from
commercial operators the matching of passenger names against
the terrorist watch list. If passenger information matches
closely enough against the watch list record, a TSA analyst
must complete a manual review of that passenger's record.
Unless the match is resolved, the boarding pass cannot be
printed until the passenger provides identification to the
aircraft operator and TSA. TSA may also may require a passenger
to undergo additional screening at a secure checkpoint or deny
that person access beyond the security area altogether.
The standardization affected by Secure Flight has resulted
in more consistent watch list matching process. However, Secure
Flight's watch list matching results are sometimes disrupted by
DHS and aircraft operator system outages. In some instances,
aircraft operators have overridden TSA controls and allowed
inhibited individuals to board the aircraft.
In response to our recommendations, TSA has taken steps to
address these issues.
Madam Chairwoman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I
thank you again for the opportunity to testify before this
committee. I would be happy to answer any questions you or
other Members might have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Edwards follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles K. Edwards
September 11, 2012
Good morning Chairwoman Miller, Vice Chairman Quayle, Ranking
Member Cuellar, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am
Charles K. Edwards, acting inspector general of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS). Thank you for inviting me to testify about the
results of our work on border security. I will present the results of
three recent reports on DHS' implementation--along with other
departments and agencies--of various programs aimed at securing our
border and preventing terrorist travel.\1\ Specifically, I will
address: (1) DHS screening of foreign nationals, as well as the
cooperation, resources, and technology necessary to share information
and safeguard our borders; (2) the United States Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology Office's (US-VISIT's) oversight of
biographic and biometric data for foreign nationals entering the United
States; and (3) the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA's)
implementation of the Secure Flight program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The information provided in this testimony is contained in the
following reports: Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border
Security (OIG-12-39); US-VISIT Faces Challenges in Identifying and
Reporting Multiple Biographic Identities (OIG-12-111); and
Implementation and Coordination of TSA's Secure Flight Program (OIG-12-
94).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
multiple departments and agencies play crucial roles in border security
The security infrastructure at U.S. borders is layered and the
Department of State (State), DHS components, and other Federal, State,
local, Tribal, and private entities play critical roles in securing our
border. For example, State Department consular personnel review the
visa applications of all individuals traveling to the United States
from countries where visas are required. State approves visas only
after checking the individual's fingerprints against previous
biographic records associated with those fingerprints to ensure that
the individual has not previously used different biographic information
to enter the United States. TSA performs passenger watch list matching
for all covered flights into, out of, within, and over the United
States. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) analyzes cargo and
passenger manifests to identify higher risk matters for subsequent
examination, and CBP immigration Advisors provide real-time assistance
to foreign authorities at some foreign airports.
In addition to control procedures that occur prior to foreign
nationals entering the United States, other Federal entities have
control procedures designed to identify potential criminal behavior at
entry to the United States or subsequently, in order to flag
individuals for future apprehension. CBP officers at ports of entry
check travel documents to identify potential fraudulent or stolen
passports, visas, or other travel documents before admitting an
individual to enter the United States. Even after entry, US-VISIT and
other DHS data systems play a crucial role in processing data captured
by numerous agencies to identify and flag potential identity fraud or
individuals who have overstayed their visas. Multiple layers of
effective security programs and coordination among agencies are crucial
to protecting our Nation.
screening of foreign nationals and information sharing \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Information Sharing on Foreign Nationals: Border Security (OIG-
12-39).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We identified resource and technological difficulties facing DHS'
border security programs in screening foreign nationals, as well as
challenges in coordinating among DHS components.
Resource and technological difficulties.--DHS officers at any of
the 327 air, sea, or land border ports of entry have to access as many
as 17 different DHS systems to verify the identity and evaluate the
admissibility of foreign nationals seeking to enter the United States.
This process is labor-intensive, and the inefficiency of using multiple
data systems hinders border security officers in their efforts to
verify or eliminate links to possible terrorism or other derogatory
information. While CBP and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) have developed more streamlined software to conduct immigration
inspections, apprehension, and enforcement, DHS officers with more
complex border security caseloads still face challenges in data
systems. In addition, some ports of entry, land, and maritime border
operations had unmet infrastructure needs. For example, at some land
border ports of entry, limited direct access to law enforcement,
intelligence, and immigration databases and high-speed internet
connections had a negative effect on the operations of these locations.
Some CBP Officers who conduct outbound screening--and most Border
Patrol Agents in the field--use only mobile devices that lack the
bandwidth and access to multiple databases that desktop terminals
provide.
Information Sharing and Coordination.--Our Inspection Report 12-39
describes challenges presented by the long-standing mission overlap
between CBP and ICE agents at the Northern Border. The intersection of
their responsibilities, along with inadequate information sharing, has
sometimes led to duplication of missions and concerns over officer
safety. These problems also hindered the effectiveness and efficiency
of operations to screen and process foreign nationals. We determined
that CBP and ICE do not always share all information and intelligence
related to open investigations, even when the origin of the
investigation comes from both agencies. Further, the data systems used
by CBP and ICE are not designed for information sharing on
investigations, or to identify operations that may overlap between the
two agencies. DHS-level guidance is necessary to provide clarity on
missions and priorities for law enforcement agencies that share
overlapping mandates, such as ICE and CBP.
us-visit's oversight of traveler data \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ US-VISIT Faces Challenges in Identifying and Reporting Multiple
Biographic Identities (OIG-12-111).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Automated Biometrics Identification System (IDENT) maintained
by US-VISIT contains hundreds of thousands of discrepant records. We
also determined that the identity resolution processes at US-VISIT are
manual and not specifically targeted to identifying individuals who may
have presented fraudulent identities to attempt to enter the United
States.
IDENT contains biographic and biometrics information collected by
various agencies including State, ICE, CBP, U.S. Customs and
Immigration Services (USCIS), and the Federal Bureau of Investigations
(FBI). Each time an international traveler passes through a United
States port of entry, US-VISIT checks the person's biometrics, i.e.,
fingerprint and/or picture, against a biometric watch list of more than
6.4 million known or suspected terrorists, criminals, and immigration
violators. In addition, US-VISIT checks the foreign visitor's
fingerprint along with their permit and/or other documents against a
number of systems to verify an individual's identity and authenticate
travel document. These efforts at US-VISIT assist CBP officers make a
final determination as to whether the individual should be admitted.
Oversight of Overstays and Identity Resolution.--According to US-
VISIT officials, they have identified individuals who have overstayed
visas by comparing visa information against entry and departure data,
and established overstay lookouts so CBP officers and Department of
State personnel can be warned of potential overstays seeking reentry to
the United States. In fiscal year 2011, US-VISIT referred more than 900
visa overstay leads per week to ICE. US-VISIT also provides other
Federal law enforcement and intelligence community with historical
biographic and biometric information in the course of their
investigations.
With respect to identity resolution, US-VISIT reviews records of
foreign nationals entering and exiting the United States where
different biographic data were associated with the same biometrics.
This process involves US-VISIT analysts manually reviewing entry
records to determine whether biographic information was input
incorrectly at the point of collection, or whether fraud may have
occurred. For example, analysis of discrepant data may reveal that a
husband and wife had their passports switched during entry, a
traveler's first and last name was switched at entry, or a traveler's
birth date was recorded using different day and month format.
Procedures Targeting Potential Identity Fraud Needs Improvements.--
The manual review process presents challenges considering the large
volume of data that exist on travelers who sought entries into the
United States. Specifically, our analysis of data from IDENT identified
more than 800,000 instances affecting 375,000 individuals where the
name and/or date of birth did not match other records with the same
fingerprint identification number. These hundreds of thousands of
records with inconsistent biographic data limit the effectiveness and
efficiency of using biometrics to identify and prevent the use of
fraudulent identities at U.S. ports of entry. According to US-VISIT
officials, US-VISIT manually reviews IDENT encounters with multiple
biographic records to identify potential identity fraud. However, US-
VISIT's current identity resolution effort is not designed to
specifically target individuals who are using multiple identities to
enter the United States. Since 2005, US-VISIT analysts have referred
only two instances of biographic fraud to ICE.
Data Inconsistencies Hinder Oversight Effectiveness.--Most of the
multiple identities appear to be data integrity errors. For example:
Test data existed in the alien encounter information that
US-VISIT provided to us. In a number of instances, we reviewed
records with the same fingerprint number but with fictitious
names such as ``Mickey Mouse'' and ``Jarvis Sample.''
In a number of instances, the same set of fingerprints was
used to record the names of as many as seven different
individuals.
Nearly 400,000 records for women have different last names
for the same first name, date of birth, and fingerprint.
According to US-VISIT officials, these instances are likely
women who changed their names after a marriage.
However, US-VISIT was unable to quantify how much of the biometric/
biographic inconsistencies can be attributed to data entry and other
identifiable errors, and how much occurred because of intentional fraud
by individuals who used different biographical data to attempt illegal
entry.
Examples of potential fraud.--Our analysis of IDENT identified that
individuals used different biographic information at ports of entry
after they had applied for a visa under a different name or been
identified as a recidivist alien. These multiple biographic identities
were not flagged in IDENT. For example:
A male who used two different names and dates of birth to
attempt to enter the United States in 2008 and 2011 was
identified as a repeated criminal (recidivist) alien.
A female who was identified as a recidivist alien in 2008
used different biographic data to attempt to enter the United
States, once in 2009 and twice in 2011.
A female who was identified as a recidivist alien in 2006
attempted to enter the country on three visits in 2009, 2010,
and 2011 under variations of the same name.
Although the more than 800,000 instances represented less than 1
percent of overall IDENT encounter data we received from US-VISIT, the
potential risk can be significant. Critical work performed by CBP and
State mitigates some of the security risks. However, without a process
to distinguish between errors and potential fraud quickly, US-VISIT is
limited in its ability to flag identity fraud, and therefore help
border enforcement agencies prevent improper entries into the United
States.
tsa's implementation of the secure flight program \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Implementation and Coordination of TSA's Secure Flight Program
(OIG-12-94).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Through the Secure Flight program, TSA assumed from commercial
operators the performance of passenger watch list matching for all
covered flights into, out of, within, and over the United States.
Aircraft operators are required to submit passenger data to Secure
Flight prior to flight departure for advanced passenger prescreening.
Secure Flight implementation has resulted in a more consistent watch
list matching process. However, DHS and aircraft operator system
outages sometimes disrupt the process.
More Consistent Watch List Matching.--TSA requires aircraft
operators to transmit airline passenger information including name,
gender, passport number (if applicable) and date of birth to Secure
Flight. Passenger information is submitted 72 hours prior to flight
departure, and a high-priority queue has been established for
reservations created subsequently. TSA matches the passengers'
biographic information against the Terrorist Screening Database and the
No-Fly and Selectee subsets. If the information matches closely enough
against a watch list record, the Secure Flight system flags the record
for manual review by a TSA analyst. If the analyst needs more
information, the boarding pass is ``inhibited''--it cannot be printed
until the passenger provides identification to the aircraft operator
and TSA. Based on the review, TSA may clear the individual.
Alternatively, TSA may provide for additional screening at a security
checkpoint, or deny boarding or authorization to enter a U.S. airport's
sterile area.
Because all airlines are required to use the same process, Secure
Flight has provided a more consistent watch list matching process for
both TSA and passengers. However, aircraft operators have the ability
to override inhibited boarding passes. When this occurs, inhibited
individuals who have not yet been cleared by Secure Flight may not be
handled appropriately before entering an airport's sterile area or
boarding an aircraft. In its response to our report, TSA said that they
have taken steps to identify how and when aircraft operators
inappropriately engaged in overrides, ensure screening is performed
when overrides are identified, and launch compliance investigations.
Secure Flight Sometimes Disrupted by System Failures.--Secure
Flight's watch list matching results are sometimes disrupted by DHS and
aircraft operator system outages. Outages may require aircraft
operators to revert to alternative procedures that may include pre-
Secure Flight watch list matching procedures and protocols. TSA has
established procedures to identify and resolve outages. Secure Flight
has also taken steps to address these disruptions through operation
center and system redundancy.
Our reports have described the work and coordination of agencies
within and outside the Department of Homeland Security that play an
important role in deterring terrorist travel. Because of the hard work
of these entities, we have identified and stopped terrorist acts before
they have occurred. However, our reports have also identified a number
of areas, including identification of fraudulent identities, system
interfaces, and increased coordination, where agencies can make further
improvements to help ensure the efficiency, accuracy, and effectiveness
of our complex border security system.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks. I welcome any
questions that you or the Members of the subcommittee may have.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you all very much. I certainly
appreciate your service to the country, first of all. One of
the things that I think we all learned from the 9/11 Commission
recommendation--well, there were a number of excellent
recommendations in this document. I tell you, in our office, we
don't regard this as shelfware. We use it all the time. We are
constantly referencing it on various points.
But certainly one of the things that has always stuck in my
mind is that we need to move from the need-to-know to the need-
to-share information. When we talk about visa overstays or
problems with the visa application process that we have had in
our Nation, first of all, let us all recognize that we have
made unbelievable positive strides forward since 9/11 in our
processes.
But the largest room is always a room for improvement, I
suppose. I think it is particularly so when--I mentioned about
the Christmas day bomber in my opening remarks. But, you know,
with the kind of threat that we face, these enemies of freedom
are looking at a battlefield in different optics, I suppose you
could say, than we ever have before. They see the battlefield
in a very asymmetrical way.
Certainly on that particular day, the Christmas day bomber
saw the battlefield as seat 19A on that Northwest flight. That
was the battlefield for him.
I know that we had a problem in the visa application
process with that particular individual because of a spelling
error. That was brought to everybody's attention, et cetera.
Subsequently, since that time, we have had, again, tremendous
strides forward, I think, in our visa processes.
We are doing the vetting against the watch listing. You are
doing your initial application checks, et cetera. So I guess my
question is--and I know the revocation process has
significantly increased since that time as well, all to the
good.
I guess my question would be, if you could flesh out a bit
how something like that had happened, how it hopefully would
not happen in the future, as you think about, again, the need-
to-know to the need-to-share information on how cooperation is
happening in a better way with the various agencies, the
Department of State, CBP, your overseas consular applications,
et cetera.
I am not sure who I am addressing this to.
Ms. Walther. I am happy to kick it off.
Mrs. Miller. Okay.
Ms. Walther. The interagency conducted a complete review
following the events 12/25 in 2009, and took several
significant steps following that event. One of our largest was
the robust interagency process to revise the criteria for
nominations to the watch list to close gaps.
We also have 100 percent vetting of all commercial airline
passengers today through Secure Flight. CBP also vets on a
recurrent basis all visa holders. CBP's pre-departure program
pushed back the vetting of passengers before they board a
plane.
As an international effort, working with our international
partners, DHS worked with the International Civil Aviation
Organization, looking at a global framework for how we look at
aviation security. That framework was supported by nearly 190
countries.
So you can see that in the interagency, as well as with our
international partners, we continue to be aggressive. We will
not stop until we prevent terrorist attacks to the United
States.
Mrs. Miller. Very good.
Does anyone else have any follow-on to that?
Mr. Ramotowski. Yes, I would just like to add that from the
perspective of the State Department, we have significantly
strengthened our Visas Viper procedures, which is the State
Department's method of reporting individuals for watch listing.
At the time of the 12/25/09 incident, as my colleague has
stated, the interagency watch-listing guidance did not permit
for Mr. Abdulmutallab to be watch listed. We have changed that.
The Department also acts immediately whenever a Visas Viper
message arrives with an individual who currently possess a
valid visa. That visa will be revoked unless a law enforcement
or intelligence agency asks us not to.
Mrs. Miller. I appreciate that.
The Chairwoman now recognizes our Ranking Member.
Mr. Cueller. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Just a quick
statement, because as you know, we will be cutting the
committee down because we have the 9/11 remembrance there at
the Capitol steps. We certainly don't want to be late for that.
Let me just say this: I think we are all on the same page.
So we have got to do everything possible to make sure we don't
let another group or individual attack the United States as we
saw back in 9/11/2001. But at the same time as we do that, we
have to make sure that we don't let the pendulum swing over so
much to the other side where we restrict our own freedoms and
our own economic freedoms also, in the sense that we got to
find that balance between security and making sure that the
legitimate trade, tourism, people coming into the United States
are coming in.
I would ask you all that as you look at that, you look at a
couple of things. One is the efficiencies that you all are
looking at and finding ways to get more efficient. You know,
still providing security but the efficiencies, so we minimize
the impacts to the legitimate trade and tourism, people coming
in.
The other thing is, keep in mind that a couple of years
ago, just 2 years ago, we passed the modernization of the
performance based act that we have here in the Congress. I
would ask you--if you are not familiar with that, I would ask
you to look at that, because as time goes on, we are going to
be looking at more the performance, not measuring activity, but
performance, measuring the results.
We give you $1; what do we get for $1? What does the
taxpayer get back? So I would ask you, as you are looking at
your great job that you are doing, and we appreciate what you
all are doing, is to look at the efficiencies, trying to find
the balance in the work that you are doing.
I know some of you all are law enforcement. I have three
brothers that are law enforcement. I got a brother who is a
border sheriff down there on the border. I understand law
enforcement is so important to us. But at the same time, just
keeping in mind that you still have an impact on business, on
tourism and on the people that are trying to do the legitimate
trade and tourism over here.
So I would ask you--and again, I guess I would turn from a
question a statement. I would only ask you to please keep that
in mind as you do your job. You do it in a good way. I salute
all the men and women that are doing your job for the State
Department, CBP, and the inspector general, and the other folks
working together.
But just don't lose sight of the efficiencies, maximizing
the taxpayers' dollars, finding the balance in security and
trade and tourism. If we do that, I think our country will
remain secure, but still remain prosperous and free.
Thank you so much. Again, to all of you, I thank you for
what you and your men and women do. Thank you so much.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the Ranking Member. I thank all the
committee individuals for being here today, my colleagues. As
was said, we have a remembrance ceremony on the steps of the
Capitol in a very few short minutes. I think that will serve to
focus all of our attention on what happened that terrible day
11 years ago when the enemies of freedom attacked our Nation,
and they really tried to get us to retreat from freedom.
In that, they failed miserably. We have seen in the last 11
years, the sons and daughters of America rise up and defend our
freedoms, our liberty, our democracy. What is happening even
here today with this hearing is a very vivid demonstration I
think of the unity of purpose of every American to make sure
that we always advance the cause of freedom, not only here in
the United States domestically, but certainly we are a society
that takes that message across the globe. We intend to continue
to do so.
As I say, they failed very miserably. Today is a way for us
certainly to commemorate those innocent Americans that were
murdered by these cowardly terrorists. We all have a unity of
purpose to make sure that we do protect our homeland, harden
our defenses.
Again, I appreciate all of the witnesses being here today.
With that, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:43 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Kelli Ann Walther
Question 1a. The DHS Inspector General's August 2012 report
regarding US-VISIT found instances where intersecting responsibilities
and inadequate information sharing between CBP and ICE had hindered
operations to screen and process foreign nationals as well as concerns
over officer safety. The OIG asserts that these issues cannot be
corrected without DHS-level guidance in order to provide clarity on
missions and priorities.
As a result of the OIG August report, how does DHS plan to
implement changes in order to alleviate on-going overlapping
responsibilities between CBP and ICE related to preventing terrorist
travel?
Answer. The OIG determined that DHS has invested considerable
resources to improve staffing and infrastructure to facilitate
information sharing. DHS continues to take steps to further strengthen
information sharing, communication, and coordination in this area, and
address the OIG recommendations.
A key layer in the DHS multi-layer approach to preventing terrorist
travel is to identify persons that may pose a risk to U.S. citizens or
whose entry may violate U.S. law, before they reach the United States.
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) have complementary, coordinated roles in the
prevention of terrorist travel; both CBP and ICE share information with
partners regarding foreign nationals who seek to enter the United
States.
An example of a joint effort between ICE and CBP is the coordinated
screening of visa applications. The ICE Visa Security Program (VSP)
currently screens and vets select non-immigrant visa applications prior
to visa adjudication and issuance and CBP conducts recurrent vetting of
all valid visas against newly identified derogatory information. To
enhance visa security, DHS, ICE, CBP, and the Department of State (DOS)
are collaboratively developing an automated visa screening process that
will enable DHS entities to identify derogatory information relating to
all visa applicants prior to their application being adjudicated by a
consular officer. This process will inform and be used in conjunction
with the current DOS Security Advisory Opinion (SAO) and Advisory
Opinion (AO). DHS internal cooperation and efficiency with respect to
issued visas and revocation recommendations is also expected to
continue to improve and be expanded in conjunction with the new
process. Additionally, DHS, DOS, and the intelligence community are
working to establish a process to screen all visa applications against
intelligence information provided by the interagency prior to visa
issuance. This proposed coordinated review process includes the
capability to utilize rule-based vetting methodologies, to provide
detailed case notes and justification for any recommendations related
to visa issuance, and to recommend applicants for targeted interviews.
Employing ICE VSP authorities, leveraging CBP expertise and
authorities, and utilizing current information technology platforms to
screen pre-adjudicated visa applications and expand the scope of
recurrent visa vetting significantly enhances the U.S. Government's
anti-terrorism efforts by adding another layer of security to the
process while further extending our borders outward.
Question 1b. Has DHS established a time line to implement these
changes? Please explain.
Answer. As explained in the prior response, the multi-layer
approach utilized by DHS ensures that the missions and operations of
the Department complement, rather than overlap each other. In an effort
to enhance visa security measures, representatives from ICE, CBP, and
DOS are developing PATRIOT (Pre Adjudicated Threat Recognition
Intelligence Operations Team), a joint project that will revolutionize
the visa process by both automating the screening of pre-adjudicated
visa applicants against DHS holdings and collectively leveraging the
respective ICE and CBP authorities relating to visas.
When fully operational PATRIOT will have the capability to screen
and vet all non-immigrant visa's worldwide daily (pre-adjudicative) and
provide derogatory findings to all 73 HSI attache offices in addition
to all U.S. Embassies/Consulates without an HSI presence. Complete
operational capabilities are anticipated to be completed within 2 years
from version 2.0 release in early January 2013.
The release of version 2.0 in January 2013 will provide 100 percent
pre adjudicative screening and vetting capabilities to the 19 existing
HSI attache offices with visa security operations.
Question 2a. The DHS Inspector General's August 2012 report
regarding US-VISIT raises serious questions regarding the integrity of
the data used by the US-VISIT system. While some of the discrepancies
may be due to data entry errors, it seems that some travelers may be
exploiting the overburdened manual entry system.
What process is in place to target individuals who are using
multiple identities to enter the United States?
Answer. The U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(US-VISIT) Program received the OIG's full 825,000 instances where the
OIG determined that the same fingerprints were associated with
different biographic data and will review the full data set for
potential fraud. Fraud, in this context, addresses attempts by
individuals to enter the country rather than successful admissions.
US-VISIT proactively reviews IDENT records to identify potential
fraud by individuals attempting to enter the United States or obtain
immigration benefits. If an individual is suspected of fraud, he or she
is referred to the appropriate law enforcement agency and placed on the
watch list for appropriate action. Additionally, a TECS record is
created so that the agency/stakeholders encountering the subject can
review the information and make a determination on a course of action.
Case information may also be forwarded to other agencies for possible
fraud notification.
In addition, US-VISIT searches for discrepant biographical
information corresponding to a single Fingerprint Identification
Number, or FIN, based on certain other system identifiers. US-VISIT
reviews encounters with biographical discrepancies to determine if
there was a typographical error, an error in enrollment where the
fingerprints were entered under another person's biographical
information, the date of birth was transposed, or a possible legitimate
name change on the subject, such as females that have since married.
The Department is also working to enhance biographic systems, such
as the Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS), and related
interfaces across DHS components to increase interoperability, reduce
processing errors, and improve data quality. A recent upgrade to the
ADIS has improved the integration of US-VISIT biometric and biographic
systems, and US-VISIT will continue to develop plans to improve
identity resolution as funding permits.
Question 2b. What happens if an individual is found to have
committed fraud by changing biographic information in order to enter
into the United States? Are these individuals ``flagged'' in case of
future travel?
Answer. If an individual is suspected of committing identity fraud,
the subject is promoted to the IDENT watch list and a TECS lookout is
created. Upon any future biometric and/or biographic screening,
decision makers such as State Department Consular Officers, U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for benefits, and CBP
Officers for admissibility will be notified of this suspected fraud.
US-VISIT coordinates with the appropriate stakeholder for further
action. If an individual who committed fraud was able to enter the
United States, US-VISIT contacts ICE's National Security Investigations
Division (NSID), Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit or
USCIS directly.
Question 2c. Does US-VISIT have plans to change its current
identity resolution procedure in order to target individuals who may be
attempting to defraud our travel system by entering the United States
under multiple identities?
Answer. US-VISIT is reviewing the complete set of 825,000 records
provided by the Inspector General to identify potential vulnerabilities
and will coordinate with its partner agencies to improve the quality
and accuracy of submitted data. A recent upgrade to the Arrival and
Departure Information System has improved the integration of US-VISIT
biometric and biographic systems, and US-VISIT will continue to develop
plans to improve identity resolution in the event funding becomes
available.
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