[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
ELEVEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 CAN TSA EVOLVE TO MEET THE NEXT TERRORIST
THREAT?
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 11, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-114
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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Washington, DC 20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Ron Barber, Arizona
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Chairman
Daniel E. Lungren, California Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tim Walberg, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois, Vice Chair Ron Barber, Arizona
Robert L. Turner, New York Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Amanda Parikh, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Vacant, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security........................................ 2
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Geoff Freeman, Chief Operating Officer, U.S. Travel
Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Mr. James J. Carafano, Ph.D., Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies, Deputy Director, Kathryn and
Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, The
Heritage Foundation:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Mr. Sam Gilliland, Chief Executive Officer, Sabre Holdings:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Panel II
Mr. John W. Halinski, Deputy Administrator, Transportation
Security Administration, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 39
Prepared Statement............................................. 41
Mr. Stephen M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 45
Prepared Statement............................................. 46
ELEVEN YEARS AFTER 9/11 CAN TSA EVOLVE TO MEET THE NEXT TERRORIST
THREAT?
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Tuesday, September 11, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:00 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Rogers, Lungren, Turner, Jackson
Lee, Richmond, and Barber.
Mr. Rogers. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security will come to order. The
committee is meeting today to discuss what steps TSA can take
in order to meet the evolving terrorist threat.
I want to let you all know if you hear the buzzer, we are
going to be called for votes in a few minutes. So what I want
to do is go ahead and hopefully try to get all of our opening
statements in before we have to recess for the votes then we
will be over about 30 minutes then I will come back and we will
kick right back up.
I want to thank all the witnesses for being here, the time
it took to prepare for this is very valuable to us but also I
recognize that it takes a lot time and energy on your part, so
thank you very much.
Today marks the 11th anniversary of the September 11
terrorist attacks that took nearly 3,000 innocent lives.
Before I begin my opening remarks, I would like to ask
everyone to join me in a moment of silence to honor the lives
of those that were lost on that tragic day.
Thank you. I know anybody that has watched TV this morning
shares my sentiments. It is a tough day when you think about
all those lives and those families who are remembering their
loved ones today that they lost on that tragic day.
Since TSA's creation after 9/11, the agency has gone down
to a troubling path of overspending, limiting private sector
engagement, and failing to sufficiently protect passenger
privacy.
Based on vigorous oversight by the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security, the Majority staff issued a report
this week that we believe shines a bright light on TSA and lays
the groundwork for meaningful reform.
Without objection I would like to insert a copy of that
report into the hearing record at this time; hearing none, so
ordered.*
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* The information has been retained in committee files.
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Our report highlights key findings from the subcommittee's
oversight and makes several recommendations to TSA.
Based on our findings, I believe we can advance risk-based
security by prioritizing the harmonization of aviation security
standards worldwide, adopting a comprehensive plan to mitigate
evolving threats, and expanding the use of canine explosive
detection assets.
I believe we can strengthen privacy protections by
enlisting the private sector to modernize and automate the path
of your screening process to reduce pat-downs, implementing
privacy software on all AIT machines and sponsoring an
independent analysis of the potential health impact of AIT
machines.
I believe we can limit spending by reducing the size of
TSA's workforce, conducting cost-benefit analyses for all major
programs and purchases and communicating with industry to avoid
setting technology requirements that are just not attainable.
I believe we can create jobs by contracting with the
private sector to perform screening and establishing a 5-year
procurement plan to guide future investments in aviation
security technology, research, and development and I believe we
can cut red tape by working with stakeholders to streamline
existing security regulations, issuing final rules for long
overdue security programs and reforming the prohibited items
list to better reflect evolving threats.
Here is the bottom line--it takes time to reform TSA. In
fact, it has been a long time coming. I am eager to hear the
inside perspective from our witnesses today as this
subcommittee continues to examine ways in which TSA can become
a leaner, smarter organization.
With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, my friend, the gentle lady from Texas, for 5
minutes for her opening statement.
Welcome.
Ms. Jackson Lee. For most of America, this is a very solemn
day and certainly a day of remembrances. I think it is
appropriate, as the Chairman has already done to acknowledge
this--for this room for a moment of silence which has occurred.
But I also think it is important to acknowledge the families
that still mourn, communities that are still traumatized by the
loss of so many of their neighbors.
I believe that all of us can remember where we were and I
know that for most of the committee Members, if they were not
here in the United States Capitol, they were somewhere in
America.
So I believe it is important to hold a hearing that
reflects upon the concerted and unified effort of Members of
Congress to respond to the horrific attack on the United States
of America.
Over the course of the years, we have lost soldiers on
battlefields in faraway places where there have been who have
been willing to sacrifice for this country.
I do want to acknowledge families--in particular,
children--for many of us remember the term ``latchkey
children'' when many in the New York and surrounding areas went
home to empty places; for their family members, mothers and
fathers, had been lost already earlier that day and the tragedy
of 9/11.
Remember the brave and heroic members who detoured a plane
that landed in a field in Pennsylvania.
For those of us who were here who were evacuated from the
United States Capitol, remember running without information,
remember looking to the sky and the building smoke of the
Pentagon and wondering what was next--The White House, The
State Department, or the United States Capitol?
So this hearing is important for hopefully its unity as
well, for we can say that with the creation of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, although we did not have years
and months and weeks to deliberate, we created a buffer, a
barrier, of security for the United States.
With that in mind, although there have been attempts, we
have not had a tragic event on this soil.
So although it is sadness, I have a sense of
accomplishment--not for any personal accomplishment--but what
we have been able to do together. In the midst of tragedy and
trauma, America has come together. American public demonstrated
a resilient character filled with valor and dedication to
reveal our strength and ensure that aviation security will
become a priority for the Federal Government.
Let me thank the families who pushed for the establishment
of the 9/11 Commission to conduct a thoughtful evaluation and
identify vulnerabilities across our security policies.
I don't know if they can hear my voice, but it was my honor
to get to know so many of them as they walk the hallways in the
midst of their tragedy. They were willing to put their burdens
down and fight to make America better, and I think we have done
so.
This is the Transportation Security Committee and we have
not had a tragic catastrophic incident through the Nation's
airlines, though we know that it is still the most attractive
target for a franchise terrorist or organized terrorism.
So, we thank the American public for willingness to have
its cargo and baggage screened, individual screening. We thank
the former men and women of the United States military and law
enforcement who have joined the transportation security
administration, making up the TSA as TSO officers.
I look forward to the oversight that is important to be
able to address questions that have been raised. But again,
with all the loss and all that has gone before us, we recognize
that TSA has been in the front lines, not perfect, but ready
for work because they show up every day.
I look forward, Mr. Chairman, that we can again look to a
markup of the TSA Authorization bill at the full committee
level. This will continue to ensure that we integrate key
findings and lessons learned from various audits.
But 11 years later, the American public has not forgotten
why we are here today and neither have I. I urge my colleagues
on both sides of the aisles and on the other side of the aisles
to recognize that the 9/11 hijackers of that day have not shown
up at our doorsteps again. We must give tribute and recognition
to those who died, those who mourn, those who yet live in pain;
for those serve every single day trying to do better on behalf
of the United States of America.
I am grateful for that. For that I say God bless this
Nation.
I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady for that very thoughtful
illustration of how important this day of remembrance is. I
would also point out to the members of the audience that, when
you look around the room at the photos we have, it is
specifically to be a reminder to everybody in this chamber that
this committee exists solely for the purpose of preventing that
from ever happening again.
We are pleased to have several distinguished witnesses
before us today on this important topic. Let me remind the
witnesses, their entire statements will appear in the record.
Also, remind Members of the committee that if they have opening
statements they can submit those for the record.
Our first witness is Mr. Geoff Freeman--currently serves as
chief operating officer of the U.S. Travel Association.
Thank you for being here, Mr. Freeman. You are recognized
for 5 minutes to summarize your statement.
STATEMENT OF GEOFF FREEMAN, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, U.S.
TRAVEL ASSOCIATION
Mr. Freeman. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Lee, and
Members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the invitation to
testify today. I am pleased to offer my viewpoints on behalf of
the U.S. Travel Association, which represents the entirety of
the travel industry, with the goal of increasing travel to and
within the United States.
The most critical elements to increasing travel are safety
and efficiency in the travel experience. Since the tragic
events of 9/11, TSA has stood as the gateway to air travel. To
TSA's immense credit, no further acts of terrorism have taken
place.
My testimony today challenges Congress and TSA to match its
immense security successes with equal improvements in the
facilitation of travel. Improvements in facilitation will lead
to dramatic increases in travel. Dramatic increases in travel
mean more jobs, stronger local communities, and a more vibrant
American economy. Anyone who claims that world-class security
prevents efficient and friendly processing of travelers is
creating a Hobson's Choice that you must reject.
TSA faces three significant challenges today. The first is
embracing risk management. The threats we face are infinite.
Demanding perfection, rather than encouraging risk management,
will cause TSA to be inefficient, wasteful, and ultimately less
effective.
The second challenge TSA faces is growing inefficiency
within security screening that is frustrating millions of
travelers. A 2010 survey found that travelers would take two to
three more flights per year if the hassles in security
screening were reduced. These increased flights would lead to
$85 billion in more spending and help to create nearly 1
million American jobs.
The third challenge that TSA faces is sharp budgetary
growth. In fact, the cost of screening per passenger rose by
over 400 percent since 2001. Over the past 7 years, TSA's
budget increased by 68 percent while the number of travelers
essentially stayed flat.
In 2010, U.S. Travel commissioned a bipartisan panel of
aviation security experts to propose innovative solutions to
these challenges. I am pleased that Sam Gilliland of Sabre is
here today to discuss these recommendations.
One of the panel's most important recommendations was
creating a Trusted Traveler program that enabled TSA to manage
risk, rather than embrace the one-size-fits-all approach of the
past.
To its credit, TSA has taken several steps to become a more
risk-based organization, most notably with the launch of
PreCheck. Unfortunately, there are several fundamental flaws to
PreCheck that will prevent the program from having a meaningful
impact on sufficiency and security.
The foundation of PreCheck is based on airline frequent-
flier data, or a Customs and Border Protection program, Global
Entry, designed for frequent international travelers. Global
Entry is an excellent program, and has many traits that should
be included in PreCheck, but it is also known for a cumbersome
process.
After navigating a poor enrollment website, a person living
in Montgomery, Alabama would have to travel more than 300 miles
to Atlanta, Georgia in order to conduct their interview. If the
traveler wishes to join through an airline, U.S. Travel
estimates that it would cost roughly $10,000 in airfare paid to
a single carrier in order to qualify for PreCheck. Even at
that, they are only eligible for a single airline.
The other shortcomings of PreCheck include low rates of
utilization and high rates of unpredictability and randomized
screening. For PreCheck to benefit travelers, there must be
some element of predictability. Although I am a member of the
Global Entry program, have passed the background check and paid
$100, I have been rejected for PreCheck on five out of seven
occasions.
There are several solutions to these problems. The first is
that TSA can leverage private-sector innovation and technology
to expand PreCheck to the average traveler. For example, the
company Clear currently has the technology and capability to
provide passengers with secure biometric identification and
robust background checks. Clear is already at four airports
across the country.
Second, any PreCheck passengers should be able to use the
program, no matter which airline they are flying or how they
enrolled. The system should be based on risk and efficiency,
not customer loyalty.
Last, TSA can increase predictability by using in-depth
background checks and secure identification, which will allow
TSA to lower its rates of randomized screening.
Congress must also embrace that it has an important role
here in helping TSA solve its long-term problems. There are at
least three things that you can do to help TSA speed up their
efforts.
The first is to continue to take an aggressive line on
hearings and oversight, and the reports like that which you
issued this week. TSA often changes its behavior or makes
better decisions based on the questions and guidance that you
provide.
Second, we need to see a TSA reauthorization bill. Finally,
in everything that you do, remember that security and
efficiency are equal and obtainable goals. Continue to
challenge TSA to achieve both.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Freeman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Geoff Freeman
September 11, 2012
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to offer testimony on behalf of the U.S.
Travel Association (U.S. Travel), the National, non-profit organization
representing all sectors of America's travel industry. U.S. Travel's
mission is to increase travel to and within the United States.
The travel industry provides good, domestic jobs that cannot be
outsourced. In 2011, travel spending in the United States totaled $813
billion, which generated a total of $1.9 trillion in total economic
output. The travel industry also supported 14.4 million jobs and was
among the top 10 employers in 48 U.S. States and the District of
Columbia. For example, travel directly employs more than 10,000
Alabamans in the 3rd Congressional District and contributes over $1
billion annually to the local economy. Similarly, travel directly
employs more than 16,000 Texans in the 18th Congressional District and
contributes more than $1.4 billion to the local economy.
Travel is not only a vital economic engine--it is a hallmark of our
free, open, and democratic society, and its various components are
essential to our daily lives. Unfortunately, these same attributes make
travel an attractive target for acts of terrorism. From the tragic
attacks of September 11, to the hotel bombings in Jakarta, to train
bombings in London and Madrid, the global travel industry has suffered
heavily from these senseless acts of violence.
After each tragedy, our industry has emerged stronger and more
secure. Hotels around the globe have increased on-site security and
strengthened cooperation with emergency responders and law enforcement.
Canine and explosive detection teams are now common sights on metro
cars and trains. After September 11, Congress created the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) and the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) to protect America's aviation system and all other modes of
transportation.
Thanks to the hardworking and dedicated men and women of TSA, and
so many others from our defense and homeland security agencies, there
is no doubt that the United States--and travel itself--is safer today
than it was before 9/11. Although there has not been a successful
terrorist attack on American soil since 9/11, terrorism remains a
serious and ever-changing threat.
I applaud the subcommittee for holding this important hearing on
how the TSA can evolve to meet the next terrorist threat. My testimony
today will focus in three areas. First, I will provide an overview of
what I believe to be the long-term challenges facing TSA and their
implications for the travel industry. Second, I will discuss TSA's
successes and shortcomings in addressing these challenges. Last, I will
provide U.S. Travel's recommendations for how TSA, Congress, and the
private sector can expand and improve upon TSA's current efforts.
long-term challenges in aviation security
Commercial aviation is the gateway to travel and tourism. Since 9/
11, TSA has stood as the gateway to commercial aviation. The safety of
travelers, the strength of our homeland security, and the economic
success of the travel industry are all dependent on TSA's ability to
complete its mission. But if TSA is to be successful, it must resolve
three major challenges.
The first challenge--and a top priority for the travel industry--is
achieving the highest level of security in the face of numerous and
shifting threats. I am confident that Administrator Pistole, Members of
this committee, and almost all Americans are in agreement on this
point. However, the paramount importance of security must be coupled
with a realization that TSA will never achieve 100 percent security.
Therefore, the real challenge for TSA lies in achieving the highest
level of security by devoting scarce resource to the most pressing and
dangerous threats.
The second major challenge facing TSA is the growing inefficiency
of the passenger screening process. Repeated studies show that TSA's
security checkpoints are time-consuming, frustrating, and deterring
millions of people from traveling each year. A 2010 survey conducted by
Consensus Research found that travelers would take two to three more
flights per year if the hassles in security screening were reduced.
These additional flights would add nearly $85 billion in consumer
spending back into local hotels, restaurants, convention centers and
other travel business, and help support 900,000 jobs. A similar survey
conducted in 2011 found that four of the top five passenger
frustrations relate directly to the TSA checkpoint.
The third challenge facing TSA is the rapid cost increase of
screening per passenger. In its fiscal year 2012 budget request, DHS
acknowledged that the cost of screening per passenger rose by over 400
percent between 2001 and 2011. From 2004 to 2011, the TSA's budget
increased by 68 percent, while the number of passengers screened
remained almost flat.\1\ After just 11 years, TSA's budget is now
roughly equal to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).
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\1\ U.S. Travel Association, ``A Better Way: Building a World-Class
System for Aviation Security.'' http://www.ustravel.org/sites/default/
files/page/2011/03/A_Better_Way_032011.pdf
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Unfortunately, without major and forward-thinking changes, all
three of the major challenges facing TSA are likely to get worse over
time.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) forecasts that, over the
next 20 years, passenger levels will almost double to 1.2 billion
passengers per year. At the same time, Congress and Federal agencies
are entering a new period of flat budgets and fiscal austerity, and the
amount of airport space that can be devoted to passenger screening is
already nearing capacity. Such rapid passenger growth will likely lead
to longer lines and wait-times at security checkpoints, sharper
increases in the cost of security screening per passenger, and dampened
demand for travel in the United States.
These problems, therefore, are not TSA's alone. In fact, the real
threat of terrorism, the economic consequences of inefficient
screening, and increase in screening costs, add up to create one of the
biggest problems facing the travel industry today. Therefore, U.S.
Travel and the entire travel industry is fully committed to assisting
TSA in finding workable and lasting solutions to the problems in
aviation security.
That is why, in 2010, U.S. Travel commissioned a bipartisan panel
of aviation security experts to propose innovative solutions could
increase both security and efficiency. The panel, title the Blue-Ribbon
Panel for Aviation Security (BRP), was chaired by former Secretary of
Homeland Security Tom Ridge, former Ranking Member of the House
Homeland Security Committee Jim Turner, and President and CEO of Sabre
Holdings Sam Gilliland.
I am pleased that Sam Gilliland is here today to discuss the
recommendations of the BRP and provide an update on TSA's progress in
implementing some of their proposals.
However, I want to briefly highlight what I believe are the two
most important findings of the BRP. First and foremost, the BRP
challenged TSA, Congress and all aviation security stakeholders to set
aside the notion that security and efficiency are mutually exclusive
goals. Specifically, the final BRP report states:
``Some in Congress appear to have calculated that there are no
political consequences to an inefficient and costly system, but great
political consequences to a successful terrorist attack. This is a
classic Hobson's Choice that the American traveling public repudiates.
The debate Congress must engage in is not strong security versus weak
security, but rather how to create a world-class aviation security
system that effectively manages risk, increases efficiency, and
embraces the freedom to travel.''
This same notion is also strongly held by the American traveling
public. A 2010 Consensus Research survey found that nearly 9 in 10
travelers believe it is possible to achieve an air travel screening
system that is both secure and efficient. The same number of travelers
believe that if we can put a man on the moon, we can create a passenger
security system that doesn't frighten or inconvenience travelers.\2\
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\2\ http://www.ustravel.org/news/press-releases/american-traveling-
public-says-there-has-be-better-way-conduct-air-travel-secu.[sic]
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The second major finding of the BRP was that TSA could build a more
efficient and secure screening process, and address its three long-term
challenges, by implementing a true, risk-based trusted traveler
program. The BRP recommended that a true trusted traveler program
should include four major elements:
1. A voluntary and accessible enrollment process;
2. Background checks and security threat assessments to determine
risk;
3. Biometric credentialing to increase identity verification; and
4. A separate and expedited screening process for passengers
enrolled in the program.
successes and shortcoming in addressing tsa's long-term challenges
To TSA's credit, it is taking several steps to reform the agency
into a more risk-based and intelligence-driven organization.
Last year, TSA restarted the Aviation Security Advisory Committee
and increased its interaction with the private sector. I am honored
that TSA and the ASAC selected me to co-chair the Passenger Advocacy
Subcommittee--and I look forward to working with TSA on that important
group.
In 2011, TSA launched PreCheck, a trusted traveler pilot program
that provides expedited screening for passengers willing to volunteer
more personal information. PreCheck is an essential first step in
creating a more efficient and secure screening process, and I applaud
Administrator Pistole for his leadership in creating this program.
Today, over 500,000 Americans are enrolled in PreCheck and the
program has screened over 2.5 million passengers. PreCheck lanes are
currently available at 23 airports and, by the end of 2012, TSA expects
PreCheck to be operational at an additional 12 airports across the
country.
Although PreCheck is a positive first step, the current program has
several shortcomings that will prevent TSA from ultimately addressing
its long-term challenges. The shortcomings include limited and
cumbersome enrollment opportunities, low utilization rates, and high
levels of unpredictability for PreCheck passengers hoping to receive
expedited screening.
There are several barriers preventing a large number of ordinary
travelers from joining and using PreCheck. One way to join the program
is to be a member of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP's)
Global Entry program. Unfortunately, Global Entry's on-line enrollment
process is cumbersome and confusing, and is a prime example of the
difficulty a Government agency can have in creating streamlined and
customer-friendly services.
Moreover, to be a part of Global Entry, CBP requires an in-person
interview but only offers these interviews at 25 permanent locations.
If a person living in Montgomery, Alabama, wishes to join Global Entry,
the closest CBP interview location is in Atlanta, Georgia, and requires
a 5-hour, 300-mile round-trip drive.
There are also many difficulties associated with the airline
PreCheck enrollment process. Perhaps the most significant shortfall is
the cost of joining PreCheck through an airline frequent flier program.
If the same person wishes to qualify for PreCheck through a sponsoring
carrier, U.S. Travel estimates that it would cost roughly $10,000 in
airfare paid to a single airline in order to accrue enough frequent
flier miles to qualify for PreCheck.\3\
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\3\ TSA considers enrollment criteria for PreCheck to be Security
Sensitive Information. The U.S. Travel Association calculated an
estimate of the cost to join PreCheck by multiplying the average 2010
passenger yield (the average fare paid by domestic passengers per mile
flown) of 13.49 cents by 75,000 (the number of miles needed to become
Platinum customer on Delta airlines).
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The exclusive and inaccessible PreCheck enrollment options
contribute to the second shortcoming--low utilization rates. After
almost 1 year of operation, TSA has screened 2.5 million passengers
through PreCheck. But this number is miniscule when compared with the
roughly 2 million people who fly each day in the United States and the
roughly 700 million passengers who fly each year.
Additionally, low PreCheck utilization rates also stem from the
structure of the airline enrollment process. Once a traveler is
enrolled in PreCheck through a frequent flier program, they can only
use the expedited screening lanes when flying with that particular
airline. For example, an American Airlines PreCheck customer who buys
an American Airlines ticket for travel from JFK airport to Miami
International would have access to the PreCheck lane. If that same
customer decides to fly Delta Airlines on the return flight home, he or
she would not have access to the PreCheck lane, simply because they are
not flying with American Airlines. In our opinion, risk should not be
determined by your loyalty to any one airline.
The true value of PreCheck lies in the potential for TSA to devote
less resources and time to screening passengers they already know more
about. The more passengers TSA can screen through PreCheck, the shorter
lines and wait times for regular passengers undergoing the normal TSA
screening process. This will help TSA become more efficient and lower
the cost of screening per passenger.
The final shortcoming of PreCheck is that the overall level of
randomized screening could be lowered if passengers could offer more
personal information for a security threat assessment and used
biometric credentialing to verify their identity. TSA acknowledges that
there is a direct relationship between the amount of background data
shared by a PreCheck passenger and the level of randomized screening
that passenger is subjected to. In other words, the more background
information available, the more predictable the expedited screening
process will be.
But the airline PreCheck enrollment process uses flying history as
the only element of additional background data. This leads to higher
randomization rates for the airline PreCheck passengers and contributes
to the overall inefficiency of the current PreCheck system.
recommendations to improve aviation security and efficiency
Fortunately, there are many innovative ways to bolster the PreCheck
program and address its initial shortcomings.
First, TSA and DHS can increase participation in PreCheck by
expanding CBP's trusted traveler programs and allowing travelers to
qualify by aggregating their frequent flier miles across multiple
airlines. Additionally, once a passenger is enrolled in the program--
through either CBP, an airline, or any future enrollment platform--
those passengers should be immediately granted access to any PreCheck
lane.
But TSA must also offer enrollment opportunities beyond CBP trusted
travelers and elite frequent fliers if the program is going to succeed.
One way TSA can expand PreCheck is by leveraging the technological
capabilities and innovation of the private sector. For example, the
company CLEAR heightens security through its verified identity
platform, while also expediting travel document checker throughput
using advanced automated biometric scanners. It's the equivalent of
replacing the bank teller with an ATM. Each of the 200,000-plus CLEAR
members has a secure biometric identification card and has opted in to
sharing personal information for a security threat assessment. Through
an innovative public/private partnership with TSA, companies such as
CLEAR could quickly help the agency boast enrollment and utilization
rates for PreCheck, increase security through the use of biometric
identity verification and robust background checks, and reduce TSA's
budget by shifting operational costs from TSA to the private sector.
These types of partnerships also provide new, important revenue streams
to local airport authorities, an added benefit in tight budgetary
times.
In short, CLEAR is just one example of how TSA can alleviate all
three long-term challenges--security, efficiency, and cost-
effectiveness--by partnering with the private sector and addressing the
shortcoming of the current PreCheck program. As TSA expands PreCheck
enrollment opportunities, it must also make interoperability a central
pillar of the program. PreCheck passenger should be able to use the
program no matter which airline they're flying or how they enrolled.
The system should be based on risk and efficiency--not customer
loyalty.
Last, TSA can increase predictability through better line
management, the use of biometric credentialing, and more in-depth
background checks. In-depth background checks and secure forms of
identification enable TSA to know more about a passenger and lower
rates of random screening. TSA can also increase efficiency by allowing
PreCheck passengers selected for randomize screening to move
immediately to the standard screening lane, rather than the back of the
waiting line before the travel document checker.
other areas for improvement
PreCheck is not the only and final solution to the challenges
facing TSA. The New York Times recently reported that TSA screened an
estimated 59 million more carry-on bags in 2010 than in 2009.\4\ TSA
also estimates that carry-on bags processed at the checkpoints will
have increased by about 87 million from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal
year 2011 and continue to increase by about 29 million more in fiscal
year 2012. This is an issue that should be examined and addressed.
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\4\ http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/29/business/29bags.html.
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TSA must also improve its communication and interaction with the
passenger. This includes tracking and distributing wait-time
information and using customer feedback to inform its standard
operating procedures.
the important role of congress
Finally, Congress must take the lead in helping TSA solve its long-
term problems. I strongly urge this committee to relentlessly engage in
three areas.
First, Congress must continue to conduct aggressive hearings and
oversight. TSA often changes its behavior or makes better decisions
based on the questions and guidance they receive through committee
hearings.
Second, Congress must improve TSA through legislation. A TSA
reauthorization bill has not been enacted in over a decade--while
similar agencies, like the FAA, are reauthorized on a multi-year and
reoccurring basis.
Third--and perhaps most importantly--Congress must keep in mind
that security and efficiency are equal and obtainable goals. TSA is
vital to security but the agency also impacts travel businesses, jobs,
and our quality-of-life.
The country that put a man on the moon, and has led the world for
centuries in innovation and technology, can have a world-class,
efficient, and secure aviation system.
Again, thank you Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
all Members of the subcommittee for inviting me to testify today. I
look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you for that statement. Right on
time, 5 minutes. Good job.
We are going to recess now for approximately 30 minutes. We
should be back at about 2:45 and reconvene the hearing.
Dr. Carafano will be waiting with anxious anticipation for
your comments.
[Recess.]
Mr. Rogers. All right. Thank you all very much for your
patience and we look forward to getting back to it.
Dr. Carafano, now that we have built up the anticipation,
don't let us down. You are recognized for 5 minutes. Thanks for
being here.
STATEMENT OF JAMES J. CARAFANO, PH.D., DIRECTOR, DOUGLAS AND
SARAH ALLISON CENTER FOR FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES, DEPUTY
DIRECTOR, KATHRYN AND SHELBY CULLOM DAVIS INSTITUTE FOR
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION
Mr. Carafano. Thank you, sir.
I would like to thank the committee for this opportunity
and begin by saying it is not difficult to exercise leadership
in the wake of a crisis.
Real leadership is demonstrating courage and caring on very
unremarkable days and there has actually been nothing more
unremarkable than the year of transportation security we have
had last year.
So I really do want to commend the committee for focusing
on this issue when it is not a crisis. In that spirit, I
particularly want to commend what I think is very thoughtful.
An interesting report, done by the committee staff, which I
think is exactly what we need not in the spirit of attacking
the agency itself and being very respectful of the men and
women in the agency and the work they are trying to do, but
pointing out, I think, some legitimate areas of concern and
creating some interesting questions about our local frameworks
that I think are very worthwhile.
So I do think it is an excellent report and a great
starting point for going forward. I must say it is in that
spirit that the Heritage Foundation, in our research, has
looked at the issue of homeland security.
Particularly, what we have really focused and emphasized is
really lessons learned. We have over a decade of experience at
dealing with the issue of transnational terrorism. We have
learned a lot. By our count and our records, we have thwarted
at least 51 Islamist-inspired terrorism plots aimed at the
United States since 9/11.
The vast majority of those thwarted attempts weren't
stopped by accident. There is a lot that we can learn from that
and surveying what we have done.
I think that we are in the place in history where we can do
an awful lot to distinguish between what really represents
sensible security and what represents checkbook security or
feel-good security and make that distinction between them.
It is in that spirit that I offer my testimony today where
I focused on what I think and believe are really the three
critical areas where the difference can be made in really
making TSA make the most valuable contributions not to just
safety and security, but also ensuring the freedoms and
prosperity of the American people.
The first of those is remaining mission-focused. By that I
mean remaining on the focus on thwarting attacks against
critical transportation U.S. infrastructure or its
exploitation.
There, I think, the real key is those TSA programs that are
the most valuable are the ones that really integrate and
leverage off our most effective counterterrorism programs.
Practically going out there and stopping the plots long
before they get to the airport or long before they get on an
airplane and so I would highlight, for example, Secure Flight,
which I think is probably the best example of what TSA should
be doing; integrating the knowledge and capability and
information from the larger CT effort and using that in an
operational role to try to keep bad people and bad things away
from the transportation aviation system.
So, in that context, if that is the strategy, then the
second area, which becomes equally vital, is getting the most
efficiency from the operations that we are conducting.
When we think of efficiencies of operations, it is very,
very important that we think in the context of not only, ``What
are all the government programs that we are doing to protect
critical transportation infrastructure?'' and how TSA fits in
that, but also how TSA fits in the efforts of the industry and
the airports and their efforts so we are getting the best
balance or the best combination between efforts that ensure
security, prosperity, and individual freedoms.
I think efficiency is clearly an issue where we can have a
lot of I think fruitful discussion. I will just offer, as an
example of something I highlighted on my testimony, is the
distinction between the Federal Flight Deck Officer program and
the Surface Transportation Inspector program.
On the one hand, with the Federal Flight Deck Officer
program, you have a very low-cost capability to bring real
operational capability to protect the airplane in a proven way,
in a way that has been proven very, very cost-effective and
provides a real operational capability. Yes, we saw the
administration this year wanted to cut that modest program by
50 percent.
On the other hand, we see in the Surface Transportation
Inspector program really kind of a reliance on the regulatory
model, which is, again, the least effective way to be proactive
and a very high cost, twice the cost of the FFDO program, and
really delivering no operational capability.
So when I see things like that in the same department, it
really questions me whether we really are operating off a true
risk-based framework in terms of implementing a strategy which
focuses on getting the terrorists before they get to the plane.
The third area I would definitely focus on is managing
TSA's workforce. We often forget in Washington, you know,
whether we all often give it platitudes, the most single
valuable thing the U.S. Government has is its human capital--
not only its citizens and its people, but the people working
for the U.S. Government and getting the most out of the talent
and skills of those people, I think, is absolutely vital.
I don't think it is a debatable question that the Screening
Partnership program is a valuable component and that balancing
what we do with privatization and what we do with the TSA
workforce is going to be greatly beneficial.
I mean if we look at the work that was done in analyzing,
for example, what was going on at the San Francisco airport and
L.A. airport as we saw in the last year report from the
Transportation Committee, we clearly see that there are ways of
privatization to both gain efficiencies, in some respects, and
not sacrifice on security whatsoever.
You look at the European experience where we know at least
half of the European airports used privatized screening, and
yet their security and safety record is comparable to the
United States.
So, there is no question that this can be done, the problem
is with the implementation of the program itself. I think
getting that program where it is workable, but better for the
airports and the industry and for TSA, I think is key to really
getting the right balance in the work force that we need.
So, with that, I greatly look forward to this hearing and
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carafano follows:]
Prepared Statement of James J. Carafano
September 11, 2012
My name is James Jay Carafano. I am deputy director of the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and
director of the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy
Studies at The Heritage Foundation. The views I express in this
testimony are my own, and should not be construed as representing any
official position of The Heritage Foundation.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the committee today
to address this vital subject. It is certainly fitting that we pause to
reflect on the state of transportation security on the anniversary of
the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, DC, but it is even
more appropriate that this hearing is taking place during what has been
a fairly unremarkable year in terms of transportation security. For it
was on a quiet, unremarkable autumn morning that America was attacked.
The best way to prevent more days like 9/11 is to spend our
unremarkable days preparing--doing what we can to continue to keep this
Nation safe, free, and prosperous.
In my testimony today, I would like to focus on what I believe are
the key challenges ahead for transportation security, including: (1)
Remaining mission-focused; (2) gaining greater efficiency in
operations; and (3) managing the Transportation Security Administration
workforce.
My responsibilities at The Heritage Foundation comprise supervising
all of the foundation's research on public policy concerning foreign
policy and National security. Homeland security has been a particular
Heritage research priority as we produced the first major assessment of
domestic security after 9/11.\1\ Over the past decade, we have
assembled a robust, talented, and dedicated research team and I have
the honor and privilege of leading that team.
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\1\ L. Paul Bremer III and Edwin Meese III, Defending the American
Homeland: A Report of the Heritage Foundation Homeland Security Task
Force (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 2002).
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Heritage analysts have studied and written authoritatively on
virtually every aspect of homeland security and homeland defense. The
results of all our research are publicly available on the Heritage
website at www.heritage.org. We collaborate frequently with the
homeland security research community, including the Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), the Aspen Institute, the
Center for National Policy, the Hudson Institute, the George Washington
University Homeland Security Policy Institute, and the Strategic
Studies Institute and Center for Strategic Leadership at the Army War
College. Heritage analysts also serve on a variety of Government
advisory efforts, including the Homeland Security Advisory Council and
the Advisory Panel on Department of Defense Capabilities for Support of
Civil Authorities. Our research programs are nonpartisan, dedicated to
developing policy proposals that will keep the Nation safe, free, and
prosperous.
I am particularly proud of The Heritage Foundation's long and
substantive record of research on transportation security. This effort
reflects the foundation's commitment to advancing public policies that
enhance our security by thwarting terrorist travel; encouraging
economic growth by promoting the legitimate exchange of goods, peoples,
services, and ideas among free nations; and fostering a free and open
civil society--all at the same time.
mission focus
In my mind, the 9/11 Commission's staff study on terrorist travel
was in many ways more vital to understanding the transnational threat
and how to impact its operational capabilities than the commission's
best best-selling report. The August 2004 staff study documented the
poor state of our preparedness to prevent exploitation of U.S.
transportation systems. The study pointed out that the 9/11 hijackers
had known affiliation to extremist groups, broke the law, committed
fraud, lied on visa applications, had at least 68 contacts with State
Department and Immigration and Customs officials, and yet managed to
pass through aviation and border checkpoints here and abroad. According
to the study, together the group ``successfully entered the United
States 33 times over 21 months, through nine airports of entry.''\2\
Without that ease of movement, the 9/11 attacks would not have been
possible.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Thomas R. Eldridge et al., ``9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff
Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States,'' National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United
States, August 21, 2004, preface, at http://www.9-11commission.gov/
staff_statements/911_TerrTrav_Monograph.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are few capabilities more essential to terrorist operations
than the ability to freely move and communicate. Restricting either of
these ``centers of gravity'' is key to containing the transnational
operational threats.
After 9/11 America became a much harder target. The United States
has thwarted at least 51 Islamist-inspired terror plots since the
attacks on New York and Washington, DC.\3\ Increasingly, we find that
these plots are ``homegrown,'' in part because it has been more
difficult for transnational terrorist groups to organize operations
overseas and dispatch operatives to the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Steven Bucci and Jessica Zuckerman, ``51st Terrorist Plot
Against the United States: Continued Threat of al-Qaeda and
Affiliates,'' Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No. 3598, May 8, 2012, at
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/05/51st-bomb-terror-plot-
proves-continued-threat-of-al-qaeda. See also James Jay Carafano, et
al., ``Fifty Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11: The Homegrown Threat and
the Long War on Terrorism,'' Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 2682,
April 25, 2012, at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/04/
fifty-terror-plots-foiled-since-9-11-the-homegrown-threat-and-the-long-
war-on-terrorism. This report provides a summary of each thwarted
attack and subsequent investigation and prosecution.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The post-9/11 efforts at thwarting terrorist travel and access to
transportation systems, however, offer no cause for complacency.
Transportation systems continue to rank high on the list of potential
targets. For example, to the end Osama bin Laden continued to extol the
virtue of aiming attacks on cities and transportation
infrastructure.\4\ Further, in recent years in two plots, preemptive
efforts failed to thwart attacks. In 2009, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab
attempted to donate explosives on a Detroit-bound international flight.
In 2010, Faisal Shahzad attempted to detonate explosives in an SUV that
he drove into and left parked in Times Square.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Peter L. Bergen, Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden
from 9/11 to Abbottabad (New York: Crown, 2012), pp. 140-141.
\5\ Carafano, ``Fifty Terror Plots Foiled Since 9/11.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our successes and shortfalls since 9/11 are instructive. The best
way to prevent terrorists from exploiting or threatening our
infrastructure is to disrupt their networks and operations before they
are implemented. In this respect, effective U.S. counterterrorism
programs are the first and most critical component of our defenses.
Without question, overseas operations to identify and dismantle the
leadership of al-Qaeda and its affiliates have degraded their
operational capabilities.
Yet, the current U.S. strategy is inadequate to prevent a
resurgence of al-Qaeda.\6\ Indeed, there are already signs that al-
Qaeda and its affiliates are attempting to improve their operational
security so that their operatives are less vulnerable to direct
attack.\7\ Therefore, the United States must remain vigilant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The administration's strategy is primarily limited to attacking
the leadership of al-Qaeda and its affiliates. It does not pay
sufficient attention to global insurgency threat presented by the
group, which makes the terrorist network more resilient than the U.S.
Strategy appreciates. See, The Heritage Foundation Counterterrorism
Task Force, ``A Counterterrorism Strategy for the `Next Wave,' ''
Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 98, August 24, 2011, at http://
www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/08/a-counterterrorism-strategy-
for-the-next-wave.
\7\ Aaron Y. Zelin, ``Dodging the Drones: How Militants Have
Responded to the Covert U.S. Campaign,'' Foreign Policy, August 31,
2012 at http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/08/31/
dodging_the_drones_how_militants_have_responded_to_the_covert_us_campaig
n.
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The most indispensible role for transportation security is to
remain integrated with U.S. counterterrorism operations so that their
security measures, oversight responsibilities, and capacity to act
against active threats are synchronized in the most effective manner.
No example of what must be done is more illustrative than the
apprehension of Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, who was placed
on a terrorist watch list, identified, and arrested attempting to flee
the country on an international flight less than 2 days after the
aborted attack. Programs that link directly to the larger
counterterrorism effort, such as the Secure Flight initiative, must be
the TSA's top priority.\8\ I would be greatly skeptical of any
allocation of resources that did not fully fund these priorities first
to the exclusion of anti-terrorism measures or other agency
responsibilities.
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\8\ The Transportation Security Administration website describes
Secure Flight as a ``behind-the-scenes program that enhances the
security of domestic and international commercial air travel through
the use of improved watch list matching. By collecting additional
passenger data, it improves the travel experience for all airline
passengers, including those who have been misidentified in the past.
The airline submits this information to Secure Flight, which uses it to
perform watch list matching. This serves to prevent individuals on the
No Fly List from boarding an aircraft and to identify individuals on
the Selectee List for enhanced screening.'' See, http://www.tsa.gov/
what_we_do/layers/secureflight.
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making efficiency a priority
One of the key findings of the 9/11 Commission emphasized a risk-
based approach to managing transportation security. The commission
concluded, ``[h]ard choices must be made in allocating limited
resources. The U.S. Government should identify and evaluate the
transportation assets that need to be protected, set risk-based
priorities for defending them, select the most practical and cost-
effective ways of doing so, and then develop a plan, budget, and
funding to implement the effort. The plan should assign roles and
missions to the relevant authorities (Federal, State, regional, and
local) and to private stakeholders.''\9\ The commission recommendation
offered the best strategy--appropriate for the threat and the vast,
complex, and interrelated transportation infrastructure that TSA must
oversee.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ ``What to Do? A Global Strategy,'' Chapter 12 in National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11
Commission Report, at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/
911Report_Ch12.htm.
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A risk-based approach requires evaluating risk, threat, and
criticality and adopting the most judicious means to reduce risk to an
acceptable level at an acceptable cost.\10\ It is not clear that the
agency consistently applies that approach in managing its programs and
initiatives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ For discussion of the role of risk management in homeland
security, see James Jay Carafano, Testimony before the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection, Committee on
Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives, June 25,
2008, at http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/risk-and-
resiliency-developing-the-right-homeland-security-public-policies-for-
the-post-bush-era.
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From the onset, TSA has had difficulty truly adopting a risk-based
approach. ``TSA's original strategies were largely grafted from the
Federal Aviation Administration's pre-9/11 aviation security
measures,'' noted the former administrator of TSA, Kip Hawley. ``Since
the FAA's primary role is ensuring aviation safety, which has unbending
parameters based on the laws of physics, its regulatory nature makes
sense. But using regulation as the primary tool to stop adaptive
terrorists does not.''\11\ TSA still struggles with finding the right
balance of regulation, but it has struggled even more implementing the
right balance of operational capabilities to put real obstacles rather
than just rules in the path of terrorist travel and exploitation of
transportation infrastructure. Two examples--the Federal Flight Deck
Officer (FFDO) and the Surface Transportation Inspector Program--are
illustrative.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Kip Hawley and Nathan Means, Permanent Emergency: Inside the
TSA and the Fight for the Future of American Security (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 228.
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The Federal Flight Deck Officer Program.\12\ In his fiscal year
fiscal year 2013 budget proposal for the Department of Homeland
Security, President Obama called for a 50 percent cut in funding for
the FFDO program. This decision made no sense. The FFDO program costs
very little (fiscal year 2012 enacted: $25.5 million). To put total
program costs in perspective: The FDDO costs approximately $15 per
officer per flight; the Federal Air Marshal program, although also an
important added layer of security, in comparison costs an estimated
$3,300 per air marshal per flight. Further, at present, FFDOs are
estimated to be able to cover five times as many flights as Federal Air
Marshals, providing a strong added layer of defense and deterrence
against the threat of terrorism and air piracy. Since the FFDO
program's inception in 2003, its budget has not changed, despite an
estimated 100-fold increase in members.\13\
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\12\ The Transportation Security Administration website describes
the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program where ``eligible flight
crewmembers are authorized by the Transportation Security
Administration Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air Marshal Service to
use firearms to defend against an act of criminal violence or air
piracy attempting to gain control of an aircraft. A flight crew member
may be a pilot, flight engineer, or navigator assigned to the flight.''
See, http://www.tsa.gov/lawenforcement/programs/ffdo.shtm.
\13\ See, Jessica Zuckerman, ``Federal Flight Deck Officer Program:
First Line of Deterrence, Last Line of Defense,'' Heritage Foundation
Issue Brief No. 3544, March 20, 2012, at http://www.heritage.org/
research/reports/2012/03/impact-of-cutting-the-budget-of-the-federal-
flight-deck-officer-program.
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Surface Transportation Inspector Program.\14\ In contrast to the
FFDO initiative, the Surface Transportation Inspector program costs
nearly four times as much (fiscal year 2012 enacted: $96.2 million) but
appears to lack significant utility. The program has been criticized
for lacking clear and consistent standards and focusing on regulatory
requirements that are only marginally relevant to diminishing terrorist
threats.\15\ Given the massive size, scope, and diversity of surface
transportation within the United States, in contrast to aviation
security it is difficult to see how any Federal program of this scope
could have significant impact on reducing National vulnerabilities.
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\14\ Surface Transportation Security Inspectors ``assist surface
transportation carriers, operators, owners, entities, and facilities to
enhance their security against terrorist attack and other security
threats and to assist the Secretary in enforcing applicable surface
transportation security regulations and directives.'' See, 6 USC 1113.
\15\ See, for example, Howard R. Elliot, Testimony before the
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection,
Committee on Homeland Security, United States House of Representatives,
May 31, 2012, at http://homeland.house.gov/sites/homeland.house.gov/
files/Testimony%20Elliott.pdf.
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Attention should also be given to the programs that provide the
context for transportation security, particularly as it affects
international travel. Contrasting examples are the Federal requirement
for biometric exit and the Visa Waiver Program (VWP).
Biometric Exit.--The directive for implementing biometric exit--
recording of a uniquely identifiable intrinsic physical characteristic
(most often fingerprints) at the point of departure from the United
States at land, sea, or airport point of entry--predates 9/11. After
almost two decades, the Federal Government has failed to implement this
Congressional mandate. Regardless of what benefits the framers of the
requirement believed biometric exit would bring, either as an
immigration management tool, a criminal enforcement measure, or a
counterterrorism initiative, the need for this program needs to be
reassessed in light of current requirements. From a counterterrorism
perspective, it is difficult to justify the expense of biometric exit.
When this program was originally conceived, there were few effective
tools for tracking terrorist travel. Even where we have seen the
requirement for tracking suspects trying to exit the United States in
``real time,'' we have seen where these tasks can be conducted
effectively using existing enforcement tools.
From the enforcement perspective, biometric exit would be a very
limited tool. Federal authorities lack the resources to investigate
every lead such a system might produce. Furthermore, by itself, a
report that an individual had failed to register an exit and
potentially was unlawfully present in the United States would have
scant utility in prioritizing law enforcement resources. Such a report
might simply be a false positive--the individual's status might have
changed. The report alone would provide no assessment of risk.
Biographical data (name, date of birth, and country of origin)
provide suitable data for most enforcement activities. Given the costs
of implementing comprehensive biometric exit, the fiscal constraints
that will likely be imposed on the Department of Homeland Security in
the years ahead, and the Department's many priorities, the biometric
exit mandate can no longer be justified. It is past time to repeal the
requirement.\16\
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\16\ James Jay Carafano, Testimony before Subcommittee on
Immigration Policy and Enforcement, Committee on the Judiciary United
States House of Representatives, December 7, 2011, at http://
judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Carafano%2012072011.pdf.
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Visa Waiver Program.--In contrast to biometric exit, the Visa
Waiver Program provides a cost-effective and efficient means to capture
more useful data on travelers in real time.\17\ Thirty-six countries
participate in VWP (in contrast, U.S. citizens can travel to over eight
times as many countries visa-free or obtain a visa on arrival). Only
one country has been added to the VWP under the current administration.
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\17\ The Visa Waiver Program allows for visa-free travel--for
leisure or business--for up to 90 days among member states. See,
Department of State, at http://travel.state.gov/visa/temp/without/
without_1990.html.
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The principal obstacles to adding more countries are the
unrealistic legislative requirement to implement biometric exit and the
manner in which current legislation requires calculating visa overstay
rates. Revising the legislative limitations and pressing the
administration to add more qualifying countries would be a very cost-
effective means to both facilitate international travel and strengthen
the U.S. capacity to identify terrorist travel and high-risk
passengers.\18\
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\18\ Carafano, Testimony before Subcommittee on Immigration Policy
and Enforcement.
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managing the workforce
The administration's decision to engage in limited collective
bargaining with airline security screeners could well reduce the
agency's effectiveness over time. Collective bargaining impairs the
agency's ability to reward merit and raises the likelihood of illegal
labor disputes, finds The Heritage Foundation's labor expert, James
Sherk, who has followed closely the shift in administration policy.\19\
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\19\ James Sherk, ``Unionizing Airline Screeners Endangers National
Security,'' Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 3142, February 9, 2011 at
http://thf_media.s3.amazonaws.com/2011/pdf/wm3142.pdf.
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There have already been other instances within the Department of
Homeland Security of union interference with operational activities.
For example, the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) brought the
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) before an arbitrator after the CBP
changed policies. The arbitrator found that the CBP should have
provided the NTEU with notice and the opportunity to bargain before the
CBP made its changes, such as the Port of Houston reassigning officers
to Bush International Airport and the Port of New Orleans. In short,
CBP was cited for making decisions necessary to ensure the effective
continuity of its operations.\20\
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\20\ Decision of M. David Vaughn in Federal arbitration between the
Bureau of Customs and Border Protection and National Treasury Employees
Union, November 15, 2006.
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The United States should have also learned a lesson from Canada. In
2006, union baggage screeners undertook an intentional work slowdown
during the Thanksgiving day travel rush. In response, managers allowed
250,000 passengers to board without screening. In the words of one
Canadian security expert, ``If terrorists had known that in those 3
days that their baggage wasn't going to be searched, that would have
been bad.''\21\
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\21\ CBC News, ``Luggage Security Lax During Pearson Labour
Dispute: Report,'' December 20, 2006.
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Screening Partnership Program\22\.--Privatization of screening
makes sense from both an economic and security perspective. As
transportation security expert Robert Poole notes, ``in nearly all of
Europe, screening is the responsibility of the airport, under national
government oversight and regulation, and in most cases airports can
either provide the screening themselves or outsource it to approved
security firms.''\23\ The benefits of privatization also go beyond
issues of security and cost-effectiveness--including providing a
workforce that not only meets appropriate standards but can respond to
the needs of the airport's customers, improving the travel experience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ According to the Transportation Security Administration
website ``[i]n accordance with the Aviation Transportation Security Act
(ATSA) of 2001, TSA conducted a pilot program to evaluate the
performance of a private contract screening workforce under Federal
oversight. The pilot was conducted from 2002 to 2004 with five
airports. ATSA required contract screeners to meet all the requirements
applicable to Federally employed screeners. At the conclusion of the
pilot, TSA created the Screening Partnership Program (SPP). The five
pilot airports transitioned to SPP. Currently, 11 additional airports
are participating in the program, for a total of 16.'' See, http://
www.tsa.gov/what_we_do/optout/index.shtm.
\23\ Robert Poole, Testimony to the House Committee on Homeland
Security, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, July 10, 2012,
http://reason.org/news/show/improving-airport-security-testimon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Moving toward a mixed, non-union Federal workforce and greater
reliance on private-sector screening companies would likely provide the
United States in the near term with a balanced and responsive workforce
at a responsible cost. Despite the utility of this approach, in January
2011, the administration announced that it would no longer allow
airports that wanted to privatize their TSA screening workforce to do
so, claiming that privatization was not cost-effective.\24\ This was
contradictory to statutory law, specifically the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act of 2001, which grants airports the ability
to ``opt out'' of having Federal TSA screeners as long as their private
workforce submits to TSA oversight. In March, the Government
Accountability Office noted that the TSA method of determining that
privatization of screening was not cost-effective was flawed.\25\ In
recent months, however, additional airports have applied and been given
tentative approval to join the SPP.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Mark Rockwell, ``TSA Halts Secure Partnership Program for
Airports,'' Government Security News, January 31, 2011, at http://
www.gsnmagazine.com/node/22349?c=airport- _aviation_security; Jena
Baker McNeil, ``Aviation Security: Policy Responses to Address
Terrorism Threats,'' testimony before the Pennsylvania House of
Representatives Committee on State Government, March 30, 2011, at
http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/2011/03/aviation-security-
policy-responses-to-address-terrorism-threats.
\25\ Government Accountability Office, letter, Subject: Aviation
Security: TSA's Revised Cost Comparison Provides a More Reasonable
Basis for Comparing the Costs of Private-Sector and TSA Screeners,
dated March 4, 2011 at http://republicans.transportation.house.gov/
Media/file/112th/Aviation/2011-03-04-GAO_Letter_Screening_Costs.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The administration's whipsaw and over-centralized approach to SPP
serves neither the agency's workforce, nor the airports, nor their
customers well. Clear, consistent, and dependable processes should be
established to govern SPP so airports and the agency can undertake
thoughtful human capital strategies. In particular, airports should be
given the authority to select their own contractors based on best value
from a list of TSA-certified screeners and the airport should have full
authority to manage the contract within the guidelines established by
TSA regulatory policies.
next steps
Thank you for the opportunity to speak today on this important
issue. I urge this committee and the Congress to: Press TSA to sharpen
its mission focus on fully integrating with other National
counterterrorism efforts to thwart terrorist travel and exploitation of
transportation infrastructure; concentrate its resources more on the
most cost-effective operational initiatives; and rethink the management
of its workforce, establishing a more judicious mix of Federal and
private-sector screeners. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Rogers. Great, thank you--very good job.
I am glad you mentioned the report. I do want to thank our
Majority staff, Amanda Parikh, Nicole Smith, Krista Powers, and
April Corbett. All of them have been very dedicated--put a lot
of time and energy--as well as Chris Brinson on my staff, in
putting that report together--and they are the reason why this
committee has had success this cycle in providing some pretty
aggressive oversight.
Also I want to say that Nicole Smith is getting married
this Friday. We will miss her while she is on her honeymoon--
but she will be back pretty soon.
All right; our third witness is Mr. Sam Gilliland. Mr.
Gilliland was co-chair of U.S. Travel Association's Blue-Ribbon
Panel on Aviation Security 2 years ago. He serves as a chief
executive officer of Sabre Holdings.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Gilliland for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF SAM GILLILAND, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, SABRE
HOLDINGS
Mr. Gilliland. All right, thank you, Chairman Rogers,
Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the subcommittee.
Thanks very much for the opportunity to appear before you
today.
First and foremost, on the 11th anniversary of the horrible
tragedy of September 11, we must pay tribute to all the
families who lost loved ones, friends, and relatives. We must
also honor those who assisted in the immediate aftermath as
well as all who helped get our country back on its feet
economically.
This afternoon, I am pleased to provide an update on the
recommendations released last year by the U.S. Travel
Association's Blue-Ribbon Panel on Aviation Security. Our panel
set out to develop recommendations that would improve the TSA
checkpoint, generate greater Governmental efficiency and
cooperation, and encourage broader use of risk management.
Overall, TSA has made significant progress. TSA's risk-
based management screening initiative implements one of the
major goals of our panel and demonstrates a new willingness by
the Government to provide low-risk travelers with an improved
screening experience.
At the same time, there are millions of low-risk travelers
who could and should be enjoying expedited access through our
Nation's airports, PreCheck must be expanded in several ways,
including facilitating interoperability among carriers,
increasing enrollment opportunities, and offering PreCheck
eligibility to international members of global entry.
Travel industry stakeholders and TSA must also collaborate
so that travelers know what to expect at airport security.
While the role out of both TSA PreCheck and the TSA smartphone
app demonstrate progress in this area, travelers continue to be
frustrated by the lack of clear instructions on screening
protocols.
Improving Government efficiency and cooperation is also
critical. While the Aviation Security Advisory Committee was
implemented last November, TSA needs to recognize the valuable
perspective of passenger advocacy groups and include them in
full ASAC membership.
TSA must develop a comprehensive multi-year plan for
acquiring and implementing checkpoint technology, and Congress
must provide multi-year funding authorization for the agency.
Unfortunately, TSA has yet to issue a legislatively
required long-term acquisition plan. Also collaboration with
the technology development community remains uneven.
Regarding streamlining international arrivals, DHS has
taken no action on duplicative TSA's screening. Fortunately,
the fiscal year 2012, DHS appropriations bill established a
pilot program to look at this issue.
Other legislative alternatives being considered including
the No Hassle Flying Act are also consistent with the panel's
recommendations. In terms of facilitating international travel,
while CVP has expanded access to global entry and Congress has
authorized the APEC business travel card, more must be done.
CVP should aggressively expand global entry, an excellent
example of risk management in practice. Issue APEC business
travel cards and offer foreign members of global entry access
to TSA PreCheck.
Also, in the international arena, DHS has worked to build
security-screening capacity abroad. Last November concluded
negotiations with the European Union on a revised passenger
name record treaty. Recently, the United States and the
European Union agreed to work together to harmonize the
checkpoint screening of liquids, aerosols, and gels.
Going forward, DHS should continue expanding global entry,
and Congress should pass legislation to add more countries to
the visa waiver program related to liquids, aerosols, and gels.
The United States and European Union should make public their
time lines and multi-year budgets for technology deployment.
In conclusion, since the issuance of the Blue-Ribbon Panel
report, and clearly since September 11, much has been done to
improve aviation security. At the same time, we are just
beginning, as a Nation, to look at the other side of TSA's
mission, travel facilitation. Many Members of this committee
are leading that effort, and we thank you for that commitment.
In honor of those who lost their lives, and for the sake of
the continued well-being of our Nation, we must do all we can
to protect ourselves from future attacks, while not deterring
law abiding, freedom-loving citizens from traveling.
Thanks for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gilliland follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sam Gilliland
September 11, 2012
a. introduction
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, Members of the
subcommittee, thank you very much for this opportunity to appear before
you on this solemn anniversary day. My name is Sam Gilliland, and I
serve as chairman and chief executive officer of Sabre Holdings, one of
the Nation's and the world's leading travel technology companies. First
and foremost, on the 11th anniversary of the horrible tragedy of
September 11, we must pay tribute to all families who lost loved ones,
friends, and relatives. We must also honor the first responders, good
Samaritans, and others who helped in the immediate aftermath of the
attacks on the United States, as well as those who helped get our
country back on its feet economically. In their honor and for the sake
of the continued well-being of our Nation, we must do all we reasonably
can to protect ourselves from future attacks, while not deterring law-
abiding, freedom-loving citizens from traveling.
Our country is becoming stronger, more secure, and more resilient
through our dedication to creating the best aviation security system in
the world. And it's frankly most encouraging that the TSA and private-
sector leaders are striving and increasingly working together to create
a system that strikes the right balance between security and
facilitation. So in that spirit, I'm pleased to provide an update on
the recommendations of the U.S. Travel Association's blue-ribbon panel
on aviation security released last year. I had the honor of co-chairing
this panel with former Department of Homeland Security Secretary Tom
Ridge and the former Ranking Member of this Committee, Representative
Jim Turner. The panel included over a dozen experts with significant
expertise in aviation, security, economics, and privacy.
Our report, entitled ``A Better Way: Building a World-Class System
for Aviation Security,'' was released on March 16, 2011. The goals of
our panel were simple--we set out to develop recommendations that
would:
1. Improve the TSA checkpoint by increasing efficiency, decreasing
passenger wait times, and screening passengers based on risk;
2. Generate greater Governmental efficiency and cooperation in
executing its security responsibilities; and
3. Restructure America's National approach to aviation security by
developing and using risk management methods and tools.
With these three goals in mind, the panel set forth a series of
detailed recommendations. Today, I will provide an overview of those
recommendations, an assessment of progress made on the key
recommendations, and thoughts on the path forward for those that remain
works in progress.
Overall, TSA has made good progress on a number of the
recommendations by the blue-ribbon panel. TSA's risk-based security
initiative, for example, implements one of the major goals of our panel
and demonstrates a new willingness by the Government to identify low-
risk populations and provide them with an improved screening
experience. The re-establishment of the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee is also a positive step toward engaging a broader community
of experts to advise TSA on issues critical to the traveling public. At
the same time, there is much work to be done in areas like long-term
budgeting and planning, utilization of secure identity documents, and
elimination of redundancy with other Government agencies.
b. review of tsa progress against blue-ribbon panel recommendations
Recommendation 1: Improve the TSA Checkpoint by Increasing Efficiency,
Decreasing Passenger Wait Times, and Screening Passengers Based
on Risk
Implement a risk-based Trusted Traveler program. Congress
should authorize TSA to implement a new, voluntary,
Trusted Traveler program that utilizes a risk-based
approach to checkpoint screening, with the goal of
refocusing resources on the highest-risk
passengers.
Progress.--On this first recommendation, TSA has made its most
visible progress through implementation of a trusted traveler program.
Six months after the publication of our report, TSA launched the TSA
PreCheckTM program on a pilot basis on October 4, 2011. The
pilot has expanded from an initial limited partnership with two
carriers within specific terminals in four airports to a full network
of specific terminals at 22 airports and five airlines partners.\1\
Dulles Airport here in the Washington area is scheduled to
significantly expand PreCheckTM on September 25; I am
hopeful that many of the Members of this committee will have the
opportunity to visit the airport and see how travelers move through the
security checkpoint with laptops and liquids in their bags; shoes,
belts, and jackets on; and hands by their sides instead of over their
heads. Customers are extremely supportive of the program, as they have
used PreCheckTM over 2 million times to date, according to
data from TSA. The pilot program now underway includes many elements of
the blue-ribbon panel proposal, including the offering of
PreCheckTM benefits to U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
Global Entry international trusted traveler program \2\ members,
airline frequent flyer program members, and other vetted populations
such as active-duty military.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ According to TSA's website, PreCheckTM exists at
specific terminals in the following airports: Charlotte Douglas,
Chicago O'Hare, Cincinnati/Northern Kentucky, Dallas/Ft. Worth,
Detroit, Dulles, George Bush Intercontinental, Hartsfield Jackson
Atlanta, Indianapolis, John F. Kennedy, LaGuardia, Lambert-St. Louis,
Las Vegas McCarran, Logan, Los Angeles, Miami, Minneapolis-St. Paul,
Newark, Orlando, Philadelphia, Phoenix, Portland, Ronald Reagan, Salt
Lake, Seattle-Tacoma, and Tampa. The 5 airlines participating in
PreCheckTM at these locations are: Alaska, American, Delta,
United, and U.S. Airways.
\2\ Global Entry is a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
program that allows expedited clearance for pre-approved, low-risk
travelers upon arrival in the United States.
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Next Steps.--While clearly PreCheckTM is a major step
forward, and one that deserves high praise from all industry
stakeholders, we believe there are millions more low-risk travelers who
could and should be enjoying expedited access through our Nation's
aviation security system if TSA and the broader travel and tourism
community purposefully worked together to expand it.
To achieve this, we believe that TSA and the travel community must
work together to improve and expand PreCheckTM in a number
of ways, including:
1. Facilitating interoperability among carriers so that a traveler
identified as ``low-risk'' by one airline can also be
recognized as a low-risk traveler on all other airlines.
Interoperability was a key requirement of the private-sector-
run registered traveler program that existed at 19 airports
until July of 2009 and should be a core part of an expanded
PreCheckTM effort.
2. Increasing enrollment opportunities through partnerships with a
range of organizations that can bring massive numbers of low-
risk travelers into the program. Today, TSA follows two paths
to enroll members in PreCheckTM. The most well-known
approach is one where TSA teams with specific airlines to
enroll their most frequent travelers. TSA is also continuing to
identify communities of other low-risk individuals--most
recently Federal judges and members of the intelligence
community with security clearances--to enroll in
PreCheckTM. However, enrolling these limited
populations will not rapidly grow this program to the size it
should be. The number of low-risk travelers who would be
willing to voluntarily provide additional information for a
better aviation security experience, is, we believe, quite
large. Opening up alternative enrollment mechanisms through new
TSA agreements with hotel loyalty programs, frequent car rental
programs, travel agencies, and companies like the reorganized
Clear (which offers private-sector run biometric enrollment for
travelers who seek an expedited security checkpoint
experience), are all examples of how we might enroll low-risk
travelers in PreCheckTM. These are also all ideas
that would significantly increase the size of this program
within TSA's risk-based screening framework.
3. Improving PreCheckTM promotional materials by
bringing private-sector marketing and communications expertise
to bear. Today's PreCheckTM materials are sufficient
for the limited populations now being offered access to this
program. However, if TSA opens up the program along the lines
we have outlined above, then it should engage marketing and
communications experts at some of our Nation's leading travel
and tourism companies to improve the materials in existence
today. As a member of the President's Management Advisory
Board, I have been part of numerous discussions on how the
public and private sectors can join forces to achieve shared
goals. This effort is a prime example of an area where the
private-sector's marketing skills could be used for the
Government's benefit.
4. Improving communication with the traveling public to provide
clear PreCheckTM usage requirements. TSA and the
travel community would both benefit from stronger partnerships
to make sure travelers understand how to use
PreCheckTM. Again, assuming that the growth
recommendations outlined above would be adopted, communication
with travelers would need to be substantially improved so that
individuals understand what to expect when entering a
PreCheckTM lane at a PreCheckTM airport
terminal. Clearly communicating all of the requirements
beforehand would also prevent confusion and frustration when a
traveler is denied PreCheckTM benefits.
5. Working with airlines to standardize PreCheckTM
verbiage. Today's airline-centric PreCheckTM model
does not provide that all participating airlines communicate
with customers on program benefits or eligibility in a
standardized manner. As a result, there is significant
potential for traveler confusion when traveling on different
airlines. Providing consistent and predictable communication
among all airlines would help eliminate any potential confusion
within the traveling public.
6. Working with airlines to create a consistent level of
PreCheckTM training. Given that so much of the
current PreCheckTM program is in the hands of the
airlines, it would be useful for TSA to expect that all
participating airlines provide appropriate employees with a
standard level of training on the program so that they
consistently communicate the program's attributes, offer
enrollment to the eligible population of travelers, and can
adequately address PreCheckTM related questions from
the traveling public.
7. Working with Online Travel Agents (OTAs) to accept Global Entry
PASS ID numbers during the booking process. Currently, Global
Entry members who use OTA's to book flights may not have their
CBP-issued PASS ID included in their reservation that is
forwarded to the carrier, and thus may not be able to utilize
PreCheckTM for flights booked in this manner.
8. Expanding PreCheckTM usage beyond domestic flights
and allowing international participation in the program. Today,
PreCheckTM is only offered to individuals travelling
purely domestically, not to those on outbound international
flights or taking a domestic connection after an international
flight. A low-risk traveler should have the opportunity to
utilize PreCheckTM for flights originating in the
United States.
9. Offering PreCheckTM eligibility to international
members of Global Entry. Through the CBP Global Entry program,
the United States has identified low-risk travelers from other
countries. Because these individuals are low-risk from a CBP
perspective, they should also be eligible to benefit from
PreCheckTM when travelling within the United States.
10. Ensuring efficient use of dedicated lines and lanes as traffic
increases. While no one would say that today's
PreCheckTM lanes are overcrowded, implementation of
any of the program growth initiatives outlined above would
change that significantly. Therefore, planning should begin now
so that as the PreCheckTM population grows, it grows
along with TSA's capability of handling a larger number of
participants in the program.
Improve preparation of travelers. Industry stakeholders,
including airlines, hotels, resort owners and
operators, cruise lines, rental car agencies,
travel agents and the like should work with TSA to
improve their education and communication on
security rules and regulations, targeting locations
and sources that travelers are likely to review as
they book or prepare for a trip.
Progress.--TSA has improved communications with industry sources to
provide them with more information on programs such as TSA
PreCheckTM. Of note, TSA has developed promotional materials
and worked with Government partners, notably CBP and the Department of
State, to disseminate information to the traveling public.
Additionally, their roll-out of a TSA-dedicated smartphone app allows
travelers find answers to TSA-related questions during the travel
process.
Next Steps.--Despite this progress, more improvement is necessary,
as travelers continue to be frustrated by:
1. The lack of clear instructions on the regular (as opposed to
PreCheckTM) screening protocols (e.g., sometimes
consumers are asked to put their shoes on the conveyor belt,
other times in a bin; sometimes tablet computers are treated
like laptops, other times like mobile phones; sometimes laptops
are put in a bin alone, other times it is all right to include
other items in that bin; occasionally consumers are asked to
have a boarding pass in hand, other times they are not; and the
on-going confusion over whether or not duty-free liquids of
more than 3 ounces acquired abroad when connecting to a
domestic flight are permitted in a carry-on); and
2. The lack of easy-to-find and -use contacts that consumers can
reach for immediate answers to their travel security questions,
including airport-specific information, airport-specific phone
lines or customer service agents at an airport.
TSA, airports and the airlines must continually collaborate to
provide travelers with clear, concise, and consistent guidance on
aviation security, including processes and procedures at the airport
from curbside to boarding. A November 2011 survey by the U.S. Travel
Association found that four out of five travelers are frustrated with
the checkpoint process. While there are clearly a range of reasons for
the frustration--long lines, travelers unsure of how to use the
advanced imaging technology, families with lots of unwieldy gear--not
understanding the aviation security process should not be one of the
reasons once all parties in the security process are communicating
effectively.
Additionally, commercial aviation stakeholders--hoteliers, cruise
lines, and rental car agencies, for example--should look for
opportunities to provide their customers, members, and affiliates with
information on enrollment for programs like PreCheckTM and
Customs and Border Protection's international travel facilitation
program called Global Entry in order to add more low-risk travelers to
the programs, and allow TSA to focus its resources on higher-risk
travelers. In addition, as new programs or screening protocols are
unveiled, organizations that can reach out to significant numbers of
travelers should work with the appropriate Government agency to
communicate the new processes to the traveling public.
Recommendation 2: Improve Governmental Efficiency and Cooperation in
the Execution of its Security Responsibilities
Reinstitute the Aviation Security Advisory Committee. DHS
should immediately reinstate and appoint the
Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC) to
provide effective private-sector input to DHS on
aviation security within 180 days. DHS should also
convene airport-specific working groups to identify
and resolve problems affecting travelers at
particular locations.
Progress.--On November 7, 2011, TSA officially reconstituted the
ASAC and named 24 members to the committee. Since that time, the ASAC
has held several full committee meetings, formed five subcommittees to
examine specific issues, and will consider subcommittee recommendations
in the near future. I am especially pleased that TSA named my friend
and fellow panelist Geoff Freeman, executive vice president and chief
operating officer of the U.S. Travel Association, as chair of the ASAC
Subcommittee on Passenger Advocacy.
Next Steps.--Now that passenger advocacy groups, including the U.S.
Travel Association, have been brought into the ASAC process at the
working group level, it is time to recognize the importance of such
organizations and add them to the full membership of this Federal
Advisory Committee. Adding U.S. Travel and others, such as the Consumer
Travel Alliance, for example, would give the travel community a greater
voice in the advisory committee. CBP and TSA also need to create a
broader group of local airport-specific stakeholder groups, including
relevant destination marketing organizations, to develop innovative
solutions that can improve passenger processing and customer service at
their airports.
Facilitate non-partisan leadership of TSA. The TSA
Administrator should be converted to a 5-year
position extending across Presidential
administrations to be filled by a non-partisan
official with expertise in both security and
facilitation.
Progress.--While the underlying statute creating the TSA envisions
the administrator position holding a 5-year term, there has not yet
been effective implementation of this term appointment during a
transition of Presidential leadership: at the end of the Bush
administration, former administrator Kip Hawley resigned rather than
continue into the Obama administration. We understand that this issue
has arisen recently before this committee, and that there has been
discussion between the Chairman and the Ranking Member on the subject.
We hope that bipartisan support for the TSA Administrator fulfilling a
5-year term appointment will remain strong so that this critical
organization can transition from administration to administration
without the disruption of a confirmation process.
Next Steps.--Aviation security and travel facilitation should not
be partisan issues, and TSA can ill afford not having a confirmed head
following a Presidential election as happened in 2009. Thus, aviation
stakeholders should encourage the incumbent or new administration to
commit to having TSA Administrator Pistole fulfill his 5-year term.
Additionally, Congressional leaders should, on a bipartisan basis,
consider whether a longer term, such as that held by the FBI Director,
would provide necessary continuity at TSA.
Develop a comprehensive technology procurement strategy.
TSA, in collaboration with technology vendors and
the travel community, should develop a
comprehensive strategy for implementing necessary
checkpoint technology capabilities. Congress should
provide multi-year funding plans for TSA to execute
this strategy.
Progress.--As this committee and others have noted in oversight
hearings over the last several years, TSA has a checkered history in
terms of deploying security technology. TSA priorities change with
little notice, leaving frustrated vendors on the hook for time and
resources spent in technology development. For example, deploying
biometric card readers for the TSA Transportation Worker Identity
Credential (TWIC) program, which provides biometrically-enabled cards
to qualified individuals who need unescorted access to the secure areas
of ports, vessels, and facilities, has been unresolved for years, with
vendors having technology approved but left waiting for the formal
rulemaking process to conclude. At the request of TSA, vendors
prioritized the development of bottled liquid scanners in response to a
specific threat only to see the organization pull back from the broad
deployment originally envisioned. The current Credential Authentication
Technology-Boarding Pass Scanning System (CATBPSS) has been through
multiple procurements over several years, and support for this program
is still questioned by some. Meanwhile, travelers are left with little
understanding of what technologies do, what the future looks like, and
how security will be enhanced over time. Knowing all of this, in the
fiscal year 2012 DHS appropriations bill, Congress has established a
requirement that all DHS components, including TSA, issue a Five-Year
Homeland Security Acquisition Plan. Unfortunately, TSA has yet to do
so, and there are some indications are that the agency does not plan to
comply with the mandate, citing ever-changing threat circumstances as
factor that limits the organization's ability to plan for the long-
term.
Next Steps.--As any business leader knows, budgeting and planning
are a necessary disciplines to set priorities and establish resource
requirements. Uncertainty about the future is a given and changing
priorities--and budget allocations--is in fact part of every manager's
responsibility. Government budget experts also know this, and have, in
departments including the Department of Defense, issued 5-year plans
that signal what the agency believes the future holds so that others,
including partners in the private sector, can plan accordingly. The
homeland security apparatus of the Government should similarly have the
capability to issue 5-year plans. Indeed, I would argue that, given
this tight budget environment, TSA's planning capabilities must
improve, and the organization must more routinely and deeply engage
technology vendors and travel community representatives. Engaging
vendors before issuance of a request for proposals to discuss a
security requirement, and possible solutions, should be the norm, not
the exception. An open and transparent process to establish
requirements and specifications should also be standard operating
procedure--as opposed to the erratic, often opaque, process in place
today. Through better planning and more thorough engagement, TSA can
better ensure that the industry develops and deploys more effective and
traveler-accepted technology that addresses well-articulated
requirements. Stronger collaboration between the Government and private
sector on acquisition-related issues will drastically improve traveler
facilitation and security, while providing significant cost savings.
Encourage wider use of secure identification documents.
Federal and State governments should embrace
programs that build and deploy secure
identification documents in order to provide
higher-quality identity documents to the traveling
public that meet Government security requirements.
Progress.--A critical step in securing our country's commercial
aviation system is ensuring the identity of individuals who travel on
it. Today, the percentage of Americans holding a passport has reached
an all-time high of 35%, according to the State Department. In
addition, nearly all States have made significant improvements to the
security of their identity documents in recent years, enhancing
confidence that individuals holding an identity document are who they
purport to be. Furthermore, U.S. Travel and several other stakeholders
have submitted a proposal to TSA to leverage private-sector investment
in secure identification as an alternative enrollment mechanism for TSA
PreCheckTM.
Next Steps.--Expanding the existence of secure identity documents
should be a TSA priority. To that end, TSA should approve the use of
secure private-sector enrollment technologies for TSA
PreCheckTM to leverage the biometric identity management
systems in use today within the private sector. The new Clear company,
with its biometric identity card, is one good example, particularly
given that a security threat assessment is conducted in conjunction
with card issuance.
Reduce duplicative TSA screening for international
arrivals. DHS should enable certain low-risk
passengers who are traveling through a U.S. gateway
to another domestic airport to forego checked
baggage and passenger screening upon landing in the
United States.
Progress.--The fiscal year 2012 DHS appropriations bill directed
DHS to establish a pilot program to allow connecting passengers and
their baggage to bypass baggage screening. In addition, the U.S.-Canada
bilateral ``Beyond the Border'' action plan outlined a series of travel
facilitation steps, including the end of rescreening of baggage from
Canada under most circumstances by 2015 as Canada deploys baggage
explosive detection systems.
Next Steps.--CBP and TSA should complete the pilot described above
and look to expand it to additional locations and populations.
Furthermore, commercial aviation and travel interests should work with
U.S. and Canadian authorities to move the ``Beyond the Border'' agenda
forward, including the goal of baggage screening harmonization.
Finally, legislative alternatives, including the No Hassle Flying Act,
H.R. 6028, which streamlines baggage security processing measures for
international flights, should also be viewed as options to achieve this
same goal. This bill is on the House suspension calendar this week.
Expand trusted traveler programs to qualified international
passengers. DHS should expand access to trusted
traveler programs for international passengers
entering the United States, as well as lead efforts
to establish a multinational network of streamlined
entry procedures for low-risk travelers.
Progress.--CBP has made some progress in expanding access to Global
Entry by launching pilot programs with the United Kingdom and Germany,
and announcing agreements with South Korea and Singapore. Congress has
supported Global Entry with funding and authorizing language, including
requests to broaden enrollment to members of international
organizations. In addition, Congress enacted legislation to allow the
United States to participate in the APEC Business Travel Card (ABTC)
program, which facilitates travel for business leaders in the 21
economies that make up the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum.
Next Steps.--CBP should accelerate negotiations with foreign
governments to expand access to Global Entry, work to reduce interview
delays in enrollment locations, and implement the ABTC legislation by
beginning to issue APEC Business Travel Cards to qualified business
travelers. In addition, foreign members of Global Entry--such as those
in the U.S.-Canada NEXUS program--should be offered access to TSA
PreCheckTM.
Eliminate duplication between TSA and Customs and Border
Protection (CBP). DHS should streamline its
operations at U.S. international airports to reduce
unnecessary duplication and leverage CBP and TSA
resources, authorities, and capabilities.
Progress.--Unfortunately, there has been no progress on this
recommendation, despite the potential cost savings that could be
realized from elimination of duplication between TSA and CBP.
Next Steps.--Reducing unnecessary duplication and cutting
Government spending are two goals that every department and agency
should be pursing with all due haste in this time of fiscal discipline.
However, as TSA and CBP have not yet tackled this recommendation, we
would hope that perhaps this committee could review programs in CBP and
TSA that are duplicative, or might benefit from consolidation. This
should start with both agencies jointly reviewing their staffing levels
and schedules at international arrival airports. Unifying schedules so
that there is optimal staffing based on flight arrivals should be the
first priority, followed by an assessment of where cross-training of
TSA and CBP officers might benefit the travelling public. Of course, in
cases where programs seem duplicative but in fact a legitimate law
enforcement or National security purpose is served through separation,
we would not object. However, in this case, we believe a fresh set of
eyes on the roles and responsibilities of CBP and TSA personnel at
airports is merited, and we hope this committee would conduct such
oversight.
Push for international cooperation with U.S. security
standards. The Federal Government must continue to
push for international cooperation in the
development of international aviation security,
including both bilateral and multilateral
approaches, as well as with organizations such as
the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), to strengthen aviation security efforts
while promoting travel and protecting travelers'
rights.
Progress.--Following a 2010 agreement by the International Civil
Aviation Organization to strengthen aviation security, DHS has
continued to work on a bilateral basis with countries such as Panama,
El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Qatar to build capacity in the
international aviation system for more consistent levels of screening
and more standardized deployment of technology. In addition, in
November 2011, DHS and the European Union concluded negotiations on a
revised Passenger Name Record treaty to allow for continued vetting of
in-bound passengers from the European Union. And recently, the United
States and the European Union agreed to work together to harmonize the
currently disparate approaches to the checkpoint screening of screening
of liquids, aerosols, and gels.
Next Steps.--Two DHS programs that are global in nature--the Global
Entry program and the Visa Waiver Program--merit expansion immediately,
assuming the foreign partners commit to implementing the required
improvements in security and law enforcement information sharing. In
the House, the expansion of VWP is codified in the Jobs Originated
through Launching Travel Act (JOLT Act), H.R. 5741 (S. 3199 in the
Senate). We hope that Members of this subcommittee, and the full
committee, will take a look at this legislation and consider signing on
as co-sponsors, and also encourage subcommittee Chair Miller to hold a
hearing. In the liquids, aerosols, and gels area inspection area, the
United States and European Union should make public their time lines
and multi-year budgets for harmonizing the deployment of technology
that will meet the new U.S.-E.U. requirements so that technology
vendors are ready with equipment once the governments harmonize policy.
Recommendation 3: Restructure Our National Approach to Aviation
Security by Developing and Utilizing Real Risk Management
Methods and Tools
Implement well-defined risk management processes. The
administration should convene an external panel of
experts with appropriate security clearances to
review TSA aviation security programs, assess the
risk each is designed to mitigate and develop
metrics for measuring progress to lessen that risk.
Progress.--While an external panel of risk management experts has
not been convened by TSA, we do believe that the Risk-Based Screening
Initiative, which includes PreCheckTM, is consistent with
the spirit of this recommendation, which encouraged broader use risk
management processes.
Next Steps.--TSA's Risk-Based Screening Initiative and the
revitalization of the Aviation Security Advisory Committee are hopeful
signs that TSA is not only expanding its use of risk management, but
also is more thoroughly engaging external travel and aviation experts
from the private sector. We will watch the evolution of the various
streams of on-going aviation security and facilitation work to insure
they stay grounded in solid risk management principles, and that
external experts remain actively involved. Assuming that is the case,
we will withhold seeking the explicit creation of a risk management
experts group.
c. conclusion
Since the issuance of the blue-ribbon panel report--and clearly,
since September 11, 2001--much has been done to improve aviation
security. A new Government agency, new technologies, and new approaches
to security have all been brought to bear to employ all reasonable
steps to insure that such a tragedy never strikes our country again. At
the same time, we are just beginning, as a Nation, to look at the other
side of TSA's mission--travel facilitation. Many Members of this
committee are leading that effort, and we thank you for your
commitment. The twin goals of security and facilitation must be
effectively balanced to ensure that our country is both safe and
prosperous.
In our estimation, TSA has made tremendous progress since its
establishment, and recent efforts--including TSA's Risk-Based Screening
Initiative--hold much promise for the country and for the traveling
public. We look forward to continuing our long-standing bipartisan work
with this subcommittee to ensure we highlight opportunities for TSA to
do more to facilitate commercial air travel, while maintaining security
for all Americans.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify today, and I look forward
to answering your questions.
Mr. Rogers. Great, Mr. Gilliland.
I appreciate you mentioning the No Hassle Flying Act. That
will be on the floor this afternoon and the suspension
calendar. So we are excited about that.
The Chairman now recognizes himself for 5 minutes for
questions. Each witness, I am a recovering attorney, as you all
probably know, so I am going ask a leading question. I want you
to answer with the one letter.
What grade would you give TSA on efficiency, efficiency
after 11 years?
Mr. Freeman.
Mr. Freeman. TSA has made progress, but the grade is
clearly incomplete as you look at what the opportunities are
with PreCheck.
Mr. Rogers. You have been watching the convention, haven't
you?
Mr. Freeman. It works well.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Freeman. There is progress that has been made. It is a
step in the right direction, but as for all the reasons we
outlined earlier today with PreCheck, we have got to work on
that model; we have got to work on our inter-operability, and
we have got to find better ways to get people enrolled and
provide more predictability to those that are enrolled.
Mr. Rogers. Doctor Carafano.
Mr. Carafano. With all due respect sir, it is the wrong
question. Your grades are subjective, particularly looking
across the complexity of the TSA mission. To give them a grade
in this sense would be to do what they are doing wrong now,
which is we are don't have the strong quantitative and
qualitative analytical basis for decision making.
Rather than give them a grade, I would say we have got--the
structural inability to do the kind of tradeoffs that need to
be done, and that is something that needs to be fixed.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Gilliland.
Mr. Gilliland. Well, are we grading at a curve?
Mr. Rogers. No.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Gilliland. No.
I guess I would say, specific to efficiency, there are
clearly frustrations, particularly during peak travel times
when somebody shows up at an airport.
So if I think about it, specifically from a checkpoint
perspective, you could say there are improvements to be made.
There is a lot of work being done to move those trusted or
known travelers out of those lines, so that they can process
the other travelers more quickly.
I will say from experience, I was in Frankfurt,
transmitting through Frankfurt here just in the last couple of
days, and certainly noted that the checkpoint process there is
much slower than our own.
So, if you are grading on a curve, they are certainly doing
better than certainly some international checkpoint processes
that I have seen; but lots of opportunity here ahead with TSA
PreCheck, with global entry too, to reduce the size of a
haystack. You know, we are looking for a needle in the
haystack.
Reduce the size of the haystack--get those known travelers,
trusted travelers out of those lines and push people through
much more efficiently.
Mr. Rogers. As a follow-up to that, let me ask, do you
believe that TSA has implemented security measures in a
proactive or reactive way?
We will start with Mr. Gilliland.
Mr. Gilliland. Well, I think certainly there has been
reaction to numerous incidents that have occurred in the last
11 years. So you see them being reactive in a number of
situations. I suppose there is no other way to manage through
that.
On the proactive front, and I mention this in my testimony,
I think we really need to have a multi-year plan. I think TSA
needs to have a multi-year plan, and you need to provide--this
committee needs to provide them with multi-year funding
authorization so that they can look forward.
To your points, Chairman Rogers, you know the threats are
evolving. They are looking forward; they are looking at those
threats. They need to build a proactive plan, technology and
otherwise, to address that. I think that is what gets them
fully forward from a proactive perspective.
Mr. Rogers. Doctor Carafano.
Mr. Carafano. I think the simple answer is we have seen
both. We have seen them do both.
You know, I look back at the reaction to the liquid bomb
plot, which in many ways, seems like a reaction, but was
actually very proactive, because the agency had actually done a
lot to think through that threat and when they had to respond
to it, they actually did so, I thought, in a fairly thoughtful
way.
We don't always see that. So it is this lack of consistent
pattern of behavior throughout all the programs that I think is
the greatest cause for concern.
Mr. Rogers. How about you, Mr. Freeman?
Mr. Freeman. I would add two things.
I think the point Jim made earlier is that we have all been
a bit too reactive with things from Congress, to the public, to
TSA looking in bad times to see what needs to be done, as
opposed to doing what you are doing today, which is when times
are--when there isn't a crisis situation, ``How do we make some
improvements here?'' So, I think we are all guilty of being a
bit reactive, in that sense.
I think where we suffer the most though from a travel
perspective is we continue to look at this too much only from
the security lens, rather from that balance of security and
facilitation.
If we bring that model to it of ``How do we get as many
people through America's airports as we possibly can?'' as a
means of promoting commerce, it is going to give us a different
perspective, it is going to lead us to some different ideas as
to policies that will increase travel and, in so doing, create
new jobs.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Gilliland, given your role in the private
sector, can you discuss what challenges you have encountered
with TSA's procurement process?
Mr. Gilliland. I think the challenges that I have
observed--and they aren't necessarily specific to our company--
but I think from private-sector perspective--I think that there
are numerous starts and stops.
So some of that can come from either a policy change--but
technology companies can get started on a project-based on a
view of where we are going to be a couple years from now, only
to have policy stop that. So we saw that, in some respects,
with liquids, aerosols, and gels and the technology that was
going to be deployed in that regard.
I think it is really important--and my prior point that we
understand that technology companies are included early in the
process understanding what problem we are trying to solve. They
will then forecast forward and plan along with TSA to get at
the solution.
Mr. Rogers. I completely agree. That is across DHS. That is
not unique to TSA.
I thank you very much.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member for any
questions she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for,
again, this hearing.
I guess I am a little taken aback on the criticism on a day
that we are mourning those who are lost, that we haven't had
one tragic incident since 9/11.
So let me try to understand--I think it is Mr. Freeman?
Where did you get this data that you are talking about that
people are not traveling? Is this your own research?
Mr. Freeman. Yes, Ranking Member Jackson Lee. There have
been several studies done. We funded one study through
Consensus Research. There have been other studies which speak
to travelers' frustration with the air-travel process.
In fact, four out of five of the top frustrations deal with
the security-screening process. It does discourage travel. It
does discourage people from going to various destinations
around the country.
As I said earlier, our challenge is to match our immense
success on the security side with similar successes in
facilitating travel.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay. But you indicate in your statement
that the research you are indicating your statement said
travelers would take two or three more flights if the hassles
in security screening were reduced.
What are you suggesting? Reduced in what?
Mr. Freeman. Well, when it comes to the hassle factor, as
you talk to travelers there are various things, from the length
of lines to the unpredictability of what you are going to face
one day versus the next, to removing shoes.
What travelers are most frustrated with is the one-size-
fits-all approach. Many travelers, particularly those that are
business travelers----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you want us to hire more TSO officers,
because you say there are lines?
Mr. Freeman. Yes.
What travelers would like to do is provide more information
about themselves. Provide that background information about
themselves--prove with whatever measure Congress would like to
set--that they are not a threat, so that they can face a
different experience----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you see anything positive about what
has occurred since 9/11?
Mr. Freeman. As I said in my statement, TSA has done a
fabulous job of protecting America, of assuring that we haven't
had any future or any additional terrorism acts. Our challenge
is to match that success with similar successes on
facilitation.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think part of what we have to do is to
listen to you. You obviously have expertise. But I think the
other part of what we have to do is to explain to America that
they have safe travel partly because of some of the technology
and techniques that have been utilized. Maybe a little bit of
explanation might aid in the understanding.
I am looking at the language that says nearly two in every
three travelers, 54 percent, said they would fly more if the
procedures remain as effective. So they believe that the
procedures are effective. I guess that the issue of being
intrusive and time-consuming, don't you think that in addition
to maybe looking at ways of expediting, that a greater
explanation and information to travelers might also be helpful?
Mr. Freeman. I think travelers are the customers. Travelers
have the right to demand speedy process while also being
secure. We can find a way to do that. We are the country that
put a man on the moon, we can figure out how to----
Ms. Jackson Lee. One of the things that I am certainly
interested in is that--or that I might join with you on--is
that we want to ensure that the civil liberties of all
passengers are certainly protected; that there is no racial
profiling, that there is no discrimination on the basis of
one's religious attire. I think that we can come together on
that.
But I also believe that we have seen over the last 2 weeks
two very conspicuous large conventions. As I have had reports
provided for me on both of those in Tampa and Charlotte, and
having seen the one in Charlotte, and even stopped at the
airport and watched the screening process--large population of
individuals, large numbers of individuals--and it looks as they
went through without a hitch.
I also think we can focus on information. I am not sure
whether we can focus on reduction, and I think that if you are
aware that TSA continuously looks at ways to eliminate some of
the--let me not use the terminology--procedures that they use,
including taking off shoes.
So would that please you if TSA would move more
expeditiously on some aspects of the screening process?
Mr. Freeman. I think if we can move expeditiously to look
at the reforms, it would be an excellent step in the right
direction. You know, we have that here in the Cannon House
Office Building. We have it across Capitol Hill right now,
where Members of Congress go through a different screening
procedure than I go through when coming into this building.
That is because they have more information about Members of
Congress. They are trusted. It is using risk-based screening.
We need to bring that same effort to America's airports.
Ms. Jackson Lee. With all due respect, I am not going to
adhere to the screening here to protect Members of Congress. I
think protecting the various visitors that we have might be a
little bit more important. But it certainly doesn't equate to
someone getting on an airplane and being airborne and that
particular, if you will, aircraft becoming a flying missile, as
it did on 9/11.
I just want to say that I think we live in a completely
different world, and it is not all about vacationers and
others. I do want grandma and grandchild to be able to get to
their destination to visit each other without having an
intrusive and frightening process.
But I believe that one of the responsibilities we have as a
Member of Congress is to ensure that we educate not only you
and the traveling public, because I think we have done a lot
for the travel industry and I want to do more. I like to do
more for however I can create processes to help you.
But I do not want us to be lax--and I am ending, Mr.
Chairman, thank you for the gavel--I do not want to be lax, if
you will, on procedures that have provided a safe passage for a
Nation's millions of travelers since 9/11.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from California,
Mr. Lungren, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
At the outset I want to say that I do think we are safer as
a result of the actions that have been taken. I do think there
has been some improvement in terms of the rapidity with which
we can go through.
At least, I have seen that. I have only traveled 2.5
million miles on commercial air, and unfortunately I did two
different airlines, and so you don't get the same benefits at 1
million as you do with 2, but what the heck?
But I have noticed an improvement. I happen to think the
full-body scanners have helped, particularly since I have been
one of those who have the opportunity to have a hip
replacement, a knee replacement. I would much rather go through
that way than have their hands put on me.
But there is a lot of improvement that needs to be done. I
don't think there is any doubt about that.
Dr. Carafano, I would like to ask you this: Do we run into
the problem of sort of two different impulses--egalitarianism,
meaning that everyone is treated the same, versus risk-based
activity? It just strikes me that we have had the reluctance on
the part of TSA in both administrations to go to pre-screened
lines, because it is going to treat people differently.
We had a reluctance by prior operations for the flight-deck
operation. I mean, that was imposed by Congress. It was because
they would be treated differently than everybody else. It just
seems to me that smacks of frankly silliness in not getting us
to a risk-based scenario.
Mr. Carafano. Well, Congressman, I think you ask a really
great question. I have real problems with the risk-based
initiative, because it implies something is exactly wrong. Most
people that travel are low-risk. So the notion that we have
distinguish a few low-risk categories, that is really much of
an achievement. That just means that we have singled out a few
out of all of us who are very, very low-risk.
So I really don't applaud the department for these
initiatives, because we have got the real challenge is to
distinguish the vast majority of travelers that are low-risk
from the very few that we know are a real problem. Which is,
again, my emphasis on linking TSA on the operational
capabilities, the things that are proactive, the things that
link with CT, the things that stop people before they get near
our critical infrastructure, that are really the most cost-
effective.
Mr. Lungren. Let us presume that--because in tough budget
times that TSA is going to continue with the current budget or
maybe even slightly less. How would you make changes with the
same budget and why?
Mr. Freemen, do you have any suggestions?
Mr. Freeman. Well, I think one of the great opportunities
here is the many travelers who are willing to pay for a better
experience. Quite frankly, when you look at it, upwards of 80
percent of travelers would be willing to pay to be part of a
trusted-traveler program, where in exchange for providing
information about themselves and paying a modest fee to cover
TSA's cost for the FBI background check or whatever else they
may have----
Mr. Lungren. Have you ever heard anybody argue that having
more information that would go to the question of whether they
are a risk or not risk does not give you a better benefit than
idly looking at everybody that goes through?
Mr. Freeman. No. No one has made that argument. In fact,
the model for the Global Entry program that Customs and Border
Protection is already using is based on getting information
about people in advance. As the 9/11 Commission says, it is all
about intelligence gathering. Gathering that information in
advance is the best that we can do, and processing people
through there.
I think when you look at tight budgetary time, that is one
approach; working with private vendors who can also cooperate
here. I mentioned Clear earlier as one example of an entity
that can help on background checks and in other areas that are
opportunities here to achieve the security that Ranking Member
Jackson Lee rightfully demands will also streamline the
process.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Gilliland, do you have any suggestions how
they can improve without having an increased budget if they
have to deal with that situation, as most Government agencies
are going to have to?
Mr. Gilliland. Well, I think the very programs that have
been mentioned here are opportunities to use the same number of
people to screen more. What I mean by that is that you see
PreCheck, you see Global Entry--it allows people to move
through the process more quickly. It allows TSA to focus on
people they don't know.
However, we do need to--as Dr. Carafano pointed out, we
need to get more people into the program. So it can't simply be
about frequent travelers, although they are the highest volume
of entry and exit into and out of airports. It can't just be
about frequent fliers.
We have got to get the programs like Clear, other programs
that can get more and more people into that process. If you do
that, you can process more people with fewer TSA agents or----
Mr. Lungren. Dr. Carafano, any other suggestions?
Mr. Carafano. Well, you know, I think that they are both
correct. If you reduce your screener requirement you are going
to save a ton of money. The question is--even if you vastly
spend, the number of people that are low-risk, and the getting
people into--wind up into the low-risk category, is just like
getting people to use Twitter.
I mean, the rules are exactly the same. It has to be
simple. It has to be vigorous, and the traveler has to see
value in that. So unless you create a system that has those
three attributes, you are not going to get the numbers of
people into the system at the level you do to significantly
reduce costs.
I don't see how you get to that kind of system with just a
Government-run program. I do think you are going to have to
have a program which has greater input from industry and
travelers and stakeholders to shape the kind of programs that
are suitable and flexible to their needs.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Davis is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank the witnesses for being here.
Mr. Freeman, in your testimony, you discuss the economic
impact travel has on our Nation's economic health and the many
jobs that are dependent upon the travel industry.
Is it accurate to say that when TSA does its job
effectively and prevents terrorist attacks from occurring, it
is helping to ensure the health of a critical part of our
economy?
Mr. Freeman. The most important things to increase travel
are safety and efficiency, so both of those things have to work
hand-in-hand.
Unfortunately, we have the same number of air travelers
today that we had in 2000. So I think we have to ask ourselves,
``What is it going to take to get more people traveling?'' What
is it going to take to get more people in the air so that we
can go into these local communities and not just stay in hotels
and rent cars, but go to the local drugstores, go to the dry
cleaners, spend that money throughout those local communities
to strengthen them?
Right now, we are static.
Mr. Davis. You also cite in your testimony studies that
suggest individuals do not fly oftentimes due to hassles
related to the checkpoint screening.
What would you suggest TSA and the travel industry do
collaboratively to ensure that individuals are not deterred
from flying because of security hassles?
Mr. Freeman. Yes, the travelers that most often avoid trips
are those travelers who travel most, the frequent business
travelers. The single biggest thing those travelers want is
predictability. They want a sense of, if it is an hour wait 1
day and 1 minute or 5 minutes the next day, why is that? Why
are things changing constantly?
If we can work together to provide that predictability, we
will be much better off. One thing we have been discussing with
TSA is the ability of travelers if TSA would be willing to
provide the information to check from an offsite location as to
the length of wait times at various airports so they can know
before they depart for the airport.
That is one example, I think, would help business travelers
in particular.
Mr. Davis. Thank you.
Also in your testimony, you referenced that TSA restarted
the Aviation Security Advisory Committee and has increased its
interaction with the private sector.
I know that Mr. Thompson, our Ranking Member Thompson, has
legislation H.R. 1447 which would codify the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee. Do you support that kind of approach or Mr.
Thompson's legislation?
Mr. Freeman. The Aviation Security Advisory Council is
critical. Sam's Blue-Ribbon Panel recommended putting that into
full gear. I need to look at Mr. Thompson's bill. I am not
familiar with it, but we absolutely support councils like that
to ensure that TSA can get the outside council that it needs.
Mr. Davis. In your testimony, you also state that TSA's
PreCheck program is an essential first step to creating a more
efficient and secure screening process.
What would you recommend that the next step be in an effort
to expand that activity?
Mr. Freeman. Well, I think two important next steps.
One is working with outside entities who can help direct
more travelers to that so that Global Entry is not the only
model for coming into the program, as well as working to create
some interoperability with the airlines.
One of the biggest shortcomings today is that if you have
100,000 miles with one airline and you fly on that airline, you
may be in PreCheck. The next day you fly with a different
airline, you are the same person, you are the same security
threat, and yet you have a different experience.
We have got to address that issue.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Gilliland, let me ask you, the Blue-Ribbon Panel's
report states that TSA should develop a comprehensive
technology procurement strategy.
How many years would you suggest the strategy cover, and do
we ensure TSA retains the flexibility to adapt to new threats
that may have not been envisioned at the time the strategy was
developed?
Mr. Gilliland. Well, first of all, if I were to apply
private-sector approaches to a forward-looking view on
technology planning, I would say 3 to 5 years would be a good
time horizon to think about in terms of a technology plan.
I think, though, going along with that, it is going to be
really important for this subcommittee to provide a multi-year
authorization for that type of plan.
Sir, I am sorry, the second part of your question?
Mr. Davis. The second part would be--let us see, what did I
ask here? The second part was what kind of flexibilities, I
guess, would one project the need for over that period of time?
Mr. Gilliland. Well I think, and again, this comes back to
the challenge of the budget process around here. But often you
can plan in the private sector to purchase something a year out
and your plan won't change.
In the budgetary process here, you are often forecasting
out several years. By the time you get there to implement the
technology has passed you by and you need to procure new--so I
think the flexibility that is needed is both an ability to
purchase soon after the decisions are made and also than to
have a budgeting process that allows you think forward a couple
of years and purchase at the time of need as opposed to having
to forecast so far out that the technology has become obsolete
by that time.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from New York,
Mr. Turner, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A question for Dr. Carafano--you mentioned the
international studies and comparisons with some of the European
operations in airports. Could you elaborate a little bit on
what has been learned that is positive that could translate
here?
Mr. Carafano. Well, I think if you look at the European
experience--with the last data I looked at from the Reason
Institute was about--I think they said 48 percent of European
countries either use contractor airport security--Government
security--their compliance with ICAO--their safety records have
been comparable with the United States.
That raises----
Mr. Turner. Cost?
Mr. Carafano. I am not sure on the European costs. The most
interesting data I have seen on cost comparisons was the work
that the House Transportation Committee did in 2011 where they
looked at LAX, which is a completely TSA airport, vis-a-vis San
Francisco, which was in the screening partnership program--San
Francisco had lower costs and equal efficiency; and actually
some cases better efficiency, but equal levels of security.
The question of Government versus private screeners in
terms of the level of security they provide--I think the answer
is, with the appropriate oversight and requirements on them,
they can provide equal security. Then the question of cost
efficiency gets a little more complicated as to the size of the
airport, how it is structured and everything.
But clearly we have seen there is potential for airports
with private security screening to deliver equal services at
lower cost.
Mr. Turner. Sure, all right, thank you.
Mr. Freeman, I can only agree with you, as a frequent flyer
and roughly 2.5 million miles as well over many years. If I can
avoid flying, I do.
Just the operations at the airport are--it is off-putting
and some days it is belts-on. Some days it is belts-off, shoes-
off, don't quite know why. Just the last time I flew, I had my
Congressional identity challenged--``No, we can't use that. We
can only use State driver's license.'' I said, ``Really?''
But, I let that one go because by the time you get a
supervisor over, just--I can drive in 5 hours down here as
opposed to getting to the airport an hour early and going
through that hassle and waiting on the tarmac another 40
minutes on. What you say is very true.
I have a dozen friends who now drive from New York to
Myrtle Beach. They have had it with the airport process. They
will take a day-and-a-half drive rather than two airline trips.
So I am sure it is affecting the commerce and the business
of airline travel, and it is not positive.
Now I don't think this is that difficult to find who the
frequent travelers are, identify them and move them through. I
think that can be a very big and broad list. But if you have
anything to add, I would like to hear it.
Mr. Freeman. I am sorry your experience mimics that of so
many others. We can do better. I think that is the essence of
what the Blue-Ribbon Panel chaired by Sam, Tom Ridge, former
Congressman Jim Turner, everyone looking at this issue is
saying we can do better.
Security is absolutely job No. 1. As Americans, let us find
a way to achieve that security with world-class efficiency,
with a world-class customer service and letting people know
that we want to help you move around this country. That is the
challenge we face, and we can do it.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
You all are probably aware that this committee has held a
series of hearings on procurement and acquisition and the
problems that alluded to Dr. Carafano's opening statement as
being accurate, but it is accurate across the whole Department.
This has been real frustrating to me.
Mr. Gilliland, has TSA requested the assistance of the
private sector, to your knowledge, to help in establishing a
truly risk-based screening process at checkpoints?
Mr. Gilliland. Well, I think the ASAC is an example of the
type of collaboration that can occur if we bring public and
private sector together. So I think there is certainly that
collaboration.
I think the other collaboration that has occurred here more
recently is less related to technology and more related to
communications and process.
Certainly, there has been a lot of collaboration around:
How do we get the word out about Global Entry? How do we get
more people signed up? How do we get more people into TSA
PreCheck and help them understand? Can you be helpful if it
relates--can private sector be helpful as it relates to
technology on our website--and the clarity of that information,
the flow of the website so that we can be a lot more helpful to
travelers with the information they would really like to get
out to them?
Mr. Rogers. You heard Mr. Freeman talk about being
qualified for Global Entry and being denied for PreCheck and
made the reference to the fact that, just like I am, I am
PreCheck for Delta, but US Air, I am not, which is----
Mr. Gilliland. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not the
technology exists and whether it would be prohibitively
difficult or expensive to put in a central database of people
who are qualified for PreCheck or Global Entry or whatever so
that each airline would be able to ping off that database
somebody that has bought a ticket?
Mr. Gilliland. Certainly, from a technology perspective, it
is doable. I think, from a policy perspective and just as you
think about the passengers themselves and their willingness to
opt in, which I think many would be happy to opt in, to provide
their information and data more freely.
I think it is clearly possible, from a tech perspective.
There are probably some processes and maybe even some policy
that you need to apply to it though as well.
Mr. Rogers. I am interested--do you all have any thoughts
on that point? Since you brought it up, Mr. Freeman, the Global
Entry thing I think, is just amazing--that after having that
done you can't qualify for PreCheck.
Tell me more about the general--I don't know your
particulars, but why you think that happens?
Mr. Freeman. My understanding is, in talking with TSA, that
it deals with different entry codes in the various airline
systems as well as TSA's systems whether your middle initial is
entered in one system and your full middle name in another.
These systems are having difficulty talking to one another.
That certainly needs to get addressed. It can be done, as Sam
said, from a technology standpoint. We just have to place
greater emphasis on it.
Mr. Rogers. Dr. Carafano, what would you suggest we do to
try to enhance or facilitate more public-private conversation
between the Department and the private sector?
Mr. Carafano. That is a great question. I think it is all
an interesting kind of academic debate. We don't get to the
fundamental problem, which is the Department, overall, lacks an
organized, coherent acquisition process and we need that.
Without that everything else around is just kind of window
dressing.
There are some great initiatives. For example, the Homeland
Security Policy Institute runs a program for DHS on technology
review where they bring in stakeholders and they say, ``Hey,
here is the technology, what do you guys think?''
They get a variety of stakeholders from industry and
private sector and they comment on it. The idea is to
understand how the public and how customers would react to this
technology if the Department rolled it out or if they tried to,
you know, hand it over to industry.
It is a great initiative, but it is a great initiative
absent the context of a structured acquisition program for the
Department.
Mr. Rogers. Frustrating. Thank you very much.
The Chairman recognizes the Ranking Member for any
additional questions she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much.
I want to make sure that the panelists know how much I
appreciate the insight is crucial. It is good for us to have a
give-and-take. I want Mr. Turner to be able to not have to
drive 5 hours and do other things.
I, most of all, want to make sure that TSO officers
understand what a Government ID is and that a Congressional ID
is a Government-issued ID and it should not be question not
because we are Members of Congress, but because it is a
Government ID.
So I hope that those who are in the sound of my voice can
hear that, Mr. Chairman, because that is an embarrassment.
But I do want Mr. Freeman, who I want to welcome in
particular, to at least give me the moment that a lot of other
things impact traveling such as--a $150 travel fee, baggage
fees, waiting on tarmacs, canceled flights are part of it. But
I think we can come together and I want to just raise this
question with you which I think is important.
The U.S. Travel Association's Blue-Ribbon Panel Report
recommends that Congress act immediately to clear up confusion
over ownership of commercial aviation security and authorize
TSA to control the entire security checkpoint starting at the
beginning of the security lines and ending as the traveler
exits the screening area.
I would almost make the argument about the area right
outside the airplane and the place of entry onto the plane.
But, in any event, would implementation of this recommendation
enhance both efficiency and security and, also, do what I think
you said is the integration of the PreCheck and the Global
Entry and to expedite that processing even if we have moved to
the point where we have it integrated? I think it would be
important to integrate that system to make it one so that you
could do that in a more expeditious way.
Let me just finish by saying you also recommend the
Department of Transportation issue regulations requiring
airlines to allow passengers one checked bag as part of their
base airfare.
So why don't I let you answer that with the focus being how
TSA, by getting more control over areas, put on the onus and
burden of them being efficient.
I do want to acknowledge Mr. Richmond and Mr. Davis'
presence here for the record, even though Mr. Davis has already
spoken.
I yield to you.
Mr. Freeman. I appreciate that. Let me take those questions
in reverse order. The panel did look at the issue of increased
bags coming through the security checkpoint.
According to Secretary Napolitano, they have picked up--DHS
has--in excess of $300 million in new costs since the
implementation of baggage fees and the increased bags coming
through the security checkpoint.
Administrator Pistole has told folks in the industry, they
have seen a 50 percent increase in bags coming through the TSA
checkpoint. We think that is an issue that needs to be
investigated, that, absolutely, it would play a significant
role in the inefficiency of that process and it is something
that needs to be explored, No. 1.
With regard to Global Entry integration, we completely
agree. Global Entry is a good model for what PreCheck can look
like. It includes a background check. It includes a personal
interview. It includes a lot of the things that speak to risk
management. So we agree on the integration.
On your last point regarding the whole checkpoint, I think
one thing that many people are unfamiliar with is that the
airlines control the security checkpoint up until you reach the
Travel Document Checker.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right.
Mr. Freeman. So that whole line process is controlled by
the airlines, and we understand why they see value in that.
Certain travelers get a different, perhaps better experience,
than other travelers.
It would be our opinion that the security checkpoint is
about security and the way to get a better security experience
is to provide more information about yourself. The more
information you provide, the more information that speaks to
security--the better experience you get based less on your
frequency of flying or how much money you have paid someone and
much more on the security information you have provided.
Having control of that entire checkpoint will increase
efficiency and will get us to a system that is more risk-based
than dollar-based.
Ms. Jackson Lee. There lies a very conspicuous place of
agreement and a place where we can include and engage the U.S.
Travel Association and airlines, which, Mr. Chairman, I think
are very important to come into this discussion because Mr.
Freeman is right.
If you look at the lines, you will see a slow process, long
lines based upon ticket structure. But, more importantly, you
will see, as a frequent traveler--and you are I know--the huge
numbers of bags that individuals--I am amazed at how many bags
they can pack under their arm or on their backpack or in
between their shoulders, et cetera, in order to avoid what is
expensive baggage fees.
I am not criticizing travelers at all, but we have got to
find a common ground because I believe that America has been
made secure because we have had a process in place. Now, we
have to refine and define and make better the process.
So let me thank you. That is the only question I wanted to
follow-up with is about the control of the security area and
how we can expedite and make better security and expedite
travelers. Thank you very much for our testimony.
Mr. Freeman. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady.
That concludes our question period. We do have one brief
statement that the gentleman from California wanted to make.
Mr. Lungren. I just wanted to say, Mr. Chairman, I join my
colleagues in wondering why the identification card for Members
of Congress, which is a Government-issued document, which has a
picture on it, is not accepted.
It certainly seems to me that has a higher level of
security than a driver's license. Twice at Los Angeles Airport,
I have been told by the person ``Well, I don't recognize that.
That is not one of the usual ones and if you wait here for 5 or
10 minutes, we can get the supervisor to come.''
If the purpose is security, the manner in which it is used
just goes upside-down. So maybe they will hear today from this
hearing.
Mr. Rogers. Yes, that is demonstrative of a larger problem.
Thank all of you all for your very thoughtful comments and
answers to our questions. It has been very helpful and I
appreciate it.
With that, this panel is dismissed, and we will call up the
second panel.
The Chairman now recognizes the second panel.
We are pleased to have two additional witnesses for us
today on this important topic--both of them very familiar
figures when it comes to this subcommittee.
Let me remind the witnesses their entire written statements
will appear in the record.
Our first witness, Mr. John Halinski, currently serves as
deputy administrator for TSA.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Halinski for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOHN W. HALINSKI, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Halinski. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee,
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today.
None of us needs to be reminded of the significance of this
day. Few dates in our history carry the weight associated with
the numbers 9/11. Like today, September 11, 2001 was a Tuesday.
The attacks occurred from 8:46 to 10:03. When it was over,
2,977 people had been killed, and more than 3,000 children lost
a parent.
As the wreckage of the World Trade Center smoldered, the
United States Congress passed ATSA, the Aviation and
Transportation Security Act, authorizing the creation of the
Transportation Security Administration.
We were built to strengthen the security of the Nation's
transportation systems while ensuring the freedom of movement
for people in commerce. We were built to coordinate and
collaborate security efforts with the public and private-sector
stakeholders across all modes of transportation. We were built
to ensure that no other date is ever as deeply and permanently
scarred as this one.
Everywhere we work, our actions are guided by the promise
that we will never forget. Every year, more than 9 billion
passengers use mass transit, while another 750 million people
travel on over-the-road buses. Additionally, nearly 800,000
shipments of hazardous material are transported every day, 95
percent of them by truck. Transportation security officers
perform security screening for approximately 640 million
passengers each year.
Our commitment to never forget the significance of this day
includes an understanding that commercial aviation continues to
be a priority target for terrorists who continue developing and
adapting threats against the global aviation system. This is
why intelligence is a key driver for all we do.
Continuing our efforts to strengthen global aviation this
week, TSA administrator John Pistole will meet with leaders
from around the world. This high-level conference, which is a
culmination of 2 years' worth of work on aviation security, is
sponsored by the international civil aviation organization and
will address key aviation security principles. Agenda items
vary from risk-based security, to cargo, to combating the
insider threat.
As you know, we are taking a number of steps to achieve our
primary goal of providing the most effective security in the
most efficient way for passengers as well. These include
modified screening procedures for passengers 12 and younger and
75 and older, the launch of TSA PreCheck, the Known Crewmember
program, and the expedited screening for members of the U.S.
armed forces.
The success of these risk-based security initiatives depend
upon our most valuable resource, our people. Maintaining and
enhancing the capabilities of our employees through training is
a priority. The nature of our work and advances in technology
require our work force to adapt and develop new specialized
skills as threats evolve.
It is not enough to train and engage our work force. We
must hold everyone accountable in the success for our mission,
and remove people who do not meet the high standards of
integrity that our mission requires.
To honor our commitment to never forget, we must also
engage our work force, shaping them for success and driving
efficiencies across the organization, so that all who travel
can do so securely, as exemplified by recent TSA support to the
Olympics and the conventions in Tampa and Charlotte.
Eleven years ago, we--all Americans--stood united to defeat
a diabolical threat that attacked our Nation. TSA was born from
this tragedy, and lives this event every day. We do this with
honor, integrity, and professionalism. Our mission appears
simple to many, but its complexity and variety makes it a
difficult task for anyone to accomplish.
As the memories of 9/11 slip by for many, we at TSA cannot
afford to forget what our job is. We cannot be distracted by
critics and others who forget we face a threat, that just this
spring rose again and attempted to attack our transportation
system.
We will never forget and not let it happen on our watch. I
am proud of our employees who come to work each day and every
day to serve and protect the traveling public.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here with you on this
important anniversary. I look forward to answering your
questions. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Halinski follows:]
Prepared Statement of John W. Halinski
September 11, 2012
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today on the anniversary of the September 11 terrorist
attacks against our Nation.
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was created in the
wake of
9/11 to strengthen the security of the Nation's transportation systems
while ensuring the freedom of movement for people and commerce. TSA
functions as a critical component of our Nation's counterterrorism
efforts with a highly dedicated workforce working around the clock and
across the globe to execute our transportation security
responsibilities. Every day we work closely with public and private-
sector stakeholders in the aviation, rail, mass transit, highway, and
pipeline sectors to employ an intelligence-driven, risk-based security
approach across all modes of transportation.
The vast nature of the Nation's transportation systems as well as
its impact on our Nation's economy requires that our personnel
continually adjust and adapt security practices and procedures to best
address evolving threats and vulnerabilities. Every year, passengers
make more than 9 billion mass transit trips while over 750 million
over-the-road bus trips are completed. Additionally, nearly 800,000
shipments of hazardous materials are transported every day, of which 95
percent are shipped by truck. Within the commercial aviation
environment, Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) perform security
approximately 640 million passenger screenings each year. This volume
is roughly equivalent to screening every person residing in the United
States, Mexico, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, and Italy.
TSA's security measures create a multi-layered system of
transportation security that mitigates risk. We continue to evolve our
security approach by examining the procedures and technologies we use,
how specific security procedures are carried out, and how screening is
conducted. As we carry out our mission, TSA is focused on providing the
most effective transportation security in the most efficient way
possible.
maintain focus on global strategy
We are committed to maintaining our focus on global strategies in
order to mitigate the likelihood of a successful attack that originates
from beyond our borders. To accomplish our mission, TSA has a globally-
deployed outreach and engagement workforce comprising TSA
representatives (TSAR) who coordinate closely with foreign government
counterparts and international industry representatives who serve as
the direct liaison to regulated foreign airlines. Also, TSA has a cadre
of aviation security instructors who focus on capacity development and
provide formal training to international counterparts when capacity
development and training are deemed a viable solution for
vulnerabilities. Through these interactions, TSA is able to synchronize
our approach with the entities affected by our security decisions while
promoting both international security and commerce.
We believe that good, thoughtful, sensible security by its very
nature facilitates lawful travel and legitimate commerce. Tomorrow, DHS
Secretary Janet Napolitano and TSA Administrator John Pistole will meet
with leaders from around the world at a High-Level Conference on
Aviation Security of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO) to address, among other things, key principles of air cargo and
mail security developed by an ICAO working group in May of this year.
These principles recognize that strong, sustainable, and resilient air
cargo security is essential and recommend the adoption of the total
supply chain approach to security that has already been incorporated by
the United States to secure domestic cargo. The principles also
emphasize the importance of oversight, quality control, and
international cooperation and coordination of security measures for the
global air cargo supply chain.
TSA has worked closely with its international and private-sector
partners to increase the security of air cargo without restricting the
movement of goods and products. By December 3, 2012, TSA will require
100 percent physical screening of all air cargo transported on
passenger aircraft bound for the United States. This important step not
only builds on the current practice of 100 percent screening of
identified high-risk international cargo, but also adds TSA's risk-
based, intelligence-driven procedures into the prescreening process by
determining appropriate screening protocols on a per-shipment basis.
This process requires enhanced screening for any shipment designated as
higher-risk based on a review of information about the shipper and the
shipment itself, which must undergo the most stringent screening
protocols prior to transport on both passenger and all-cargo aircraft
bound for the United States. In addition, TSA continues to pursue
bilateral efforts with appropriate foreign government partners through
its National Cargo Security Program (NCSP) recognition program. Under
this program, an air carrier can choose to implement the security
program of the country from which it is operating once TSA has
determined that such programs provide a level of security commensurate
with current U.S. air cargo security requirements.
risk-based security improves mission effectiveness
Risk-based screening strengthens security while significantly
enhancing the travel experience for passengers whenever possible. By
learning more about travelers through information they voluntarily
provide, and combining that information with our other layers of
security, DHS can focus more resources on higher-risk and unknown
passengers. DHS will continue to incorporate random security steps as
well as other measures both seen and unseen in order to maintain the
safest and most efficient system possible for the traveling public.
Since the fall of 2011, TSA has offered modified screening procedures
to a variety of low-risk populations including passengers 12 and
younger and 75 and older.
In October 2011, TSA launched the TSA PreCheckTM program
to build on our intelligence-driven, risk-based initiatives helping TSA
move away from a one-size-fits-all model and closer to its goal of
providing the most effective security in the most efficient way. To
date, more than 2 million passengers have experienced TSA
PreCheckTM. TSA PreCheckTM is now available in 23
airports for Alaska Airlines, American Airlines, Delta Air Lines,
United Airlines, and US Airways frequent flyers. A total of 35 airports
are scheduled to be on-line by the end of this year. As participating
airlines and airports become operationally ready, TSA will announce the
implementation of TSA PreCheckTM at additional locations.
TSA PreCheckTM enables TSA to focus our efforts on the
passengers we know little about and high-risk passengers, while
providing expedited screening and a better experience for those
travelers TSA knows the most about. Airports with TSA
PreCheckTM provide expedited screening to U.S. citizens
flying domestically, who are members of existing U.S. Custom and Border
Protection (CBP) Trusted Traveler programs (Global Entry, NEXUS, and
SENTRI), or eligible airline frequent flyers who have opted in.
TSA continues to take steps to further enhance our layered approach
to security through state-of-the-art technologies, better passenger
identification techniques, and other developments that strengthen our
capabilities to keep terrorists off commercial aircraft. However, TSA
will always incorporate random and unpredictable security measures
throughout the airport and no individual will be guaranteed expedited
or modified screening. Airport security checkpoints are only one part
of a multi-layered system for aviation security. Other parts, both seen
and unseen by the public, include analysis of intelligence, explosives
detection, canine teams, Federal Air Marshals, and closed-circuit
television monitoring. With the tools that exist today, if we can
confirm a person's identity and learn more about them through
information they voluntarily provide, and combine that information with
our other layers of security, we can expedite the physical screening
for many people.
As part of the continued expansion of RBS initiatives, TSA will
include flight attendants from U.S.-based airlines and traveling from
U.S. airports into the Known Crew Member (KCM) program that already
includes pilots. KCM provides positive identity verification of the
airline crewmember, enabling expedited screening. TSA anticipates that
it may take 6 to 12 months for the air carriers and their service
providers to make the necessary system modifications to incorporate
flight attendants into the expedited screening process already in place
for U.S. airline pilots and fully develop, test, and implement the
program. As of August 2012, KCM has been deployed at 18 airports, with
13 additional sites scheduled to come on-line by the end of the
calendar year.
TSA also recognizes that members of the U.S. Armed Forces, who are
trusted to protect the security and values of America with their lives,
pose a lower risk to aviation security. In fact, TSA is proud to count
many uniformed service members among our employees. At airport
checkpoints Nation-wide, U.S. service personnel in uniform with proper
identification, whether traveling on official orders or not, are not
required to remove their shoes or boots unless they alarm our
technology. Other screening courtesies that we extend to U.S. military
personnel traveling in uniform significantly reduce the likelihood that
they will receive a pat-down or other additional screening. In
addition, family members may obtain gate passes to accompany departing
troops or meet their loved ones when they come home. TSA also expedites
screening for honor flight veterans, and partners with the Department
of Defense to expedite screening of wounded warriors. Additionally, as
part of our intelligence-driven, risk-based approach to security, TSA
now offers TSA PreCheckTM expedited screening benefits to
active-duty service members at Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport and Seattle-Tacoma International Airport as part of an initial
proof of concept.
workforce engagement initiatives
The success of RBS and initiatives like TSA PreCheckTM
depend upon people. A dedicated TSA workforce assures the traveling
public that they are protected by a multi-layered system of
transportation security that mitigates risk. An effective workforce
must be properly trained. We are currently engaged in a transformation
of TSA that is designed to increase efficiencies and more prudently
allocate resources. An important part of this effort is the creation of
the Office of Training and Workforce Engagement (OTWE), which
centralizes technical and leadership training, as well as workforce
engagement programs that were previously dispersed throughout TSA.
Maintaining and enhancing the capabilities of our employees, and
particularly our TSOs, is a priority. Both the nature of our work and
advances in technology have required our workforce to adapt and develop
new, specialized skills as threats continue to evolve. As part of this
strategic alignment, OTWE developed and implemented a new TSA training
program at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC) in
Glynco, GA in April 2012.
In addition to technical training, on-going programs support the
professional development of TSOs to continually improve their overall
effectiveness and efficiency. For example, since last summer TSA has
been delivering a tactical communications course for all managers,
supervisors, and TSOs. The course, which expands upon the concepts and
principles introduced during earlier engagement training, teaches
officers how to effectively interact with passengers and co-workers.
The course is designed to prepare TSOs for all types of human
interactions by giving them tools and techniques to de-escalate
difficult situations. At the checkpoint, these skills enable TSOs to
more effectively complete the screening process.
We are also expanding supervisory training as we implement the
Department of Homeland Security Cornerstone program, a unified approach
to the development of essential skills for new and seasoned TSA
supervisors. This program includes instructor-led classroom training,
mentoring, and on-going development opportunities. Over the next 18
months all of our Supervisory Transportation Security Officers (STSO)
will complete a course on the essentials of supervising screening
operations. This training will build upon the basic leadership and
technical skills of front-line supervisors, including effective
communications, coaching, mentoring, and problem solving, and will
enhance technical skills needed for effectively implementing security
procedures. One of the key course objectives is to encourage STSOs to
take ownership of their role in facilitating and contributing to the
development of a responsible and professional workforce by establishing
a high standard for performance, accountability, and integrity that
their team members will strive to emulate.
Workforce development is further enhanced by the TSA Associates
Program, which continues to provide TSA's front-line workforce the
opportunity to receive a TSA Certificate of Achievement in Homeland
Security upon the completion of three core courses offered at community
colleges across the country. More than 2,500 officers have enrolled
since the program's inception. Today, the program is represented by
employees in all 50 States with more than 70 airports and 60 community
colleges participating in the program. TSA has also implemented
employee development initiatives like the Leaders at Every Level (LEL),
through which TSA identifies high-performing employees and fosters
commitments to excellence and teamwork. The implementation of a new
four-tier performance management program for non-TSOs enables the
workforce to actively engage in developing their annual performance
goals in collaboration with their supervisors, while promoting two-way
communication between employees and their supervisors throughout the
performance year. Providing a mechanism to proactively identify
opportunities to improve their performance has increased employee
morale.
It is not enough to train and engage our workforce--we must hold
everyone accountable in the success of our mission. Administrator
Pistole, shortly after coming to TSA, established the Office of
Professional Responsibility (OPR) to ensure that allegations of
misconduct are thoroughly investigated and that discipline is
appropriate and fair across the agency. OPR ensures that our workforce
is treated fairly by removing people that do not meet the high
standards of integrity that our mission requires.
efficiencies improve organization, management
Over the past year, TSA has announced several enhancements to its
headquarters functions to improve the agency's overall security
posture. For example, to support a more effective means of vetting
functions with the operational use of intelligence information, we
merged the Office of Intelligence with Secure Flight and the Office of
Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing. This change allows
TSA to more effectively identify potential threats posed by airline
passengers and transportation workers across all vetted populations.
Restructuring efforts have allowed TSA to gain efficiencies with
many support functions including training and information technology
(IT) management. For example, as discussed above, we have placed all
security training programs under a single Assistant Administrator,
which eliminated multiple levels of supervision in several offices and
reduced processing times and redundant review functions. In addition,
by combining IT management activities under a single functional area,
TSA has ensured IT strategies are in accordance with the consolidated
DHS IT architecture.
In addition, combining the technology deployment and integration
groups under the Office of Security Capabilities has improved
coordination and deployment of new equipment while eliminating
redundant management structures. These changes have enabled TSA to
better address recommendations for improvements provided by Congress,
the Government Accountability Office, the DHS Inspector General, and
our own workforce.
Finally, to improve field coordination, TSA has reduced the number
of field regions within the Office of Security Operations (OSO) from 12
to 6 and has developed a scorecard to evaluate operational
effectiveness and efficiency at the National, regional, and local
levels. OSO has further enhanced its ability to measure effectiveness
by formalizing its Presence, Advisements, Communication, and Execution
(PACE) program, which tracks performance metrics. The PACE program
establishes and measures the level of standardization that exists
across airports in areas not traditionally set or measured by other
programs. This includes such things as evaluating to what extent TSOs
exhibit command presence and how effective their interaction is with
passengers, as well as adherence to other Management Directives and
Standard Operating Procedures.
conclusion
Our Nation's transportation systems continue to face evolving
threats. To achieve its mission, TSA will continue to effectively
implement an intelligence-driven and risk-based security system across
all transportation modes while increasing the level of engagement with
our workforce to shape them for success and drive operational and
management efficiencies across the organization. TSA strives to achieve
these goals as it continues to protect the Nation's transportation
systems to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. We
appreciate your continued support as we strive to ensure that our
workforce is well-prepared and given the proper tools to meet the
challenges of securing our aviation transportation system. Thank you,
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee, for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look
forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Halinski, for your testimony. We
appreciate your many years of service, in the military and now
with the Department.
Our second witness is Mr. Steve Lord--currently serves as
director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues for Government
Accountability Office.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Lord.
Welcome back.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Lord. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Jackson Lee, other Members of the committee. I am truly honored
to be here today to testify on the anniversary of the 9/11
attacks.
These attacks underscore the importance of implementing
effective screening systems, not only for airline passengers,
but air cargo, and checked baggage, as well as preventing
foreign nationals coming to this country to take flight school
training.
I would first like to note that DHS and TSA have made some
notable achievements and deserve to be commended for enhancing
security since these attacks. At the same time, as our reports
have demonstrated, they faced a number of challenges along the
way.
Today, just to give you a flavor for some of the progress
and challenges, I would like to briefly highlight three key TSA
programs of which we have reported on.
The first is its behavior detection program called SPOT,
its program for screening air cargo, and its program for
screening foreign nationals coming to this country to take
flight school training.
First, regarding TSA's behavior-detection program--we have
done a lot of work in this area, and we have highlighted the
fact that DHS and TSA need to take additional actions to ensure
the science underpinning this program has been validated by
outside experts.
The good news is DHS did complete a validation study in
April 2011, but the report itself raised a number of issues
that remain to be addressed and our view is this additional
research could take several more years to complete.
Our 2010 report on the program also recommended that TSA
standardize the process by which the behavior-detection
officers deployed to across the Nation, standardize the process
by which they collect and share information internally to help
TSA connect the dots on potential terrorist activity. As you
know, connecting the dots was one of the major failures of 9/
11.
The good news, also, is we are conducting a follow-on
review of this program. We have made several recommendations to
strengthen the program, which TSA has agreed with, and we will
be giving you a status update in the spring of next year.
Regarding air cargo, again, the good news is TSA has taken
some important actions to enhance the security of air cargo.
Again, that is cargo that goes in the belly of the aircraft.
They have tightened existing screening requirements. They
have entered in a security regime, so--with other countries
such as the European Union, Switzerland, and Canada. This
alleviates air carriers of having to respond to different sets
of security requirements.
However, again, they face some challenges in this area that
could hinder their efforts to fully meet the Congressional
mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft.
These challenges include logistical issues, as well as
verifying the accuracy of screening data submitted by the
carriers.
It is important to note contextually, there is no
equivalent reporting requirement for all cargo carriers that
ship air cargo. This is important because they actually ship
the highest percentage of the cargo coming into this country.
Thus, TSA does not really know the extent to which these off-
cargo carriers are compliant with the new screening
requirements implemented after the 2010 Yemen incident.
Finally, regarding TSA's Alien Flight School program--I
testified before this committee in July, highlighted a number
of weaknesses in their vetting process. TSA and ICE agreed to
move out smartly to implement our recommendations. Yet as of
today, these recommendations are still open, these weaknesses
still exist. I know there was some confusion at the last time I
testified on this point.
In closing, over a decade after the 9/11 attacks, DHS has
implemented a broad range of programs in concert with TSA to
help secure, not only the homeland, but the U.S. aviation
system. However, as highlighted in our extensive reporting,
more work needs to be done to strengthen these systems.
I look forward to helping this committee do future
oversight on these issues. I think we all share the common goal
of ensuring these programs are risk-based, cost-effective, and
best serve the traveling public.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my testimony. I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen M. Lord
September 11, 2012
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-12-1024T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
Securing commercial aviation operations remains a daunting task,
with hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands of
flights daily carrying millions of passengers and pieces of carry-on
and checked baggage. The attempted terrorist bombing of Northwest
flight 253 on December 25, 2009, and the October 2010 discovery of
explosive devices in air cargo packages on an all-cargo aircraft bound
for the United States from Yemen highlight the continuing need for
effective passenger, cargo, and baggage screening. This statement
discusses actions TSA has taken to: (1) Validate the scientific basis
of its behavior-based passenger screening program (the Screening of
Passengers by Observation Techniques, or SPOT); (2) strengthen the
security of inbound air cargo (3) acquire checked baggage screening
technology in accordance with established guidance; and (4) vet foreign
nationals training at U.S. flight schools. This statement is based on
GAO's work issued from September 2009 through July 2012, and includes
selected updates on air cargo screening conducted from July through
September 2012. For the selected updates, GAO interviewed TSA
officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations. GAO has previously
recommended that TSA take actions to improve aviation security. In
general, TSA concurred with the recommendations, and is taking actions
to address them.
aviation security.--9/11 anniversary observations on tsa's progress and
challenges in strengthening aviation security
What GAO Found
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has taken actions
to validate the science underlying its behavior-based passenger
screening program, the Screening of Passengers by Observation
Techniques, or SPOT, program, but more work remains. GAO reported in
May 2010 that: (1) TSA deployed SPOT before first determining whether
there was a scientifically valid basis for using behavior and
appearance indicators to reliably identify passengers who may pose a
risk; and (2) it is unknown if the SPOT program has ever resulted in
the arrest of anyone who is a terrorist, or who was planning to engage
in terrorist-related activity, although there is other evidence that
terrorists have transited through SPOT airports. GAO recommended in May
2010 that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) convene an
independent panel of experts to review the methodology of the on-going
validation study on the SPOT program to determine whether it is
sufficiently comprehensive to validate the program. DHS concurred and
subsequently revised its validation study to include an independent
expert review. DHS's study, completed in April 2011, found that SPOT
was more effective than random screening to varying degrees; however,
DHS noted limitations to the study, such as that it was not designed to
comprehensively validate whether SPOT can be used to reliably identify
individuals who pose a security risk. GAO is currently reviewing the
program and will issue our report next year.
TSA has taken actions to enhance the security of cargo on in-bound
aircraft, but challenges remain. For example, TSA issued new screening
requirements aimed at enhancing the security of cargo on aircraft, such
as prohibiting the transport of air cargo on passenger aircraft from
Yemen. In June 2010, GAO recommended that TSA develop a mechanism to
verify the accuracy of all screening data. TSA concurred in part and
required air carriers to report inbound cargo screening data, but has
not yet fully addressed the recommendation. In June 2012, TSA required
air carriers to screen 100 percent of inbound air cargo transported on
passenger aircraft by December 3, 2012. However, air carriers and TSA
face challenges in implementing this requirement and in providing
reasonable assurance that screening is being conducted at reported
levels.
DHS and TSA have experienced difficulties establishing acquisition
program baselines, schedules, and cost estimates for the Electronic
Baggage Screening Program (EBSP). For example, GAO reported in July
2011 that TSA had established a schedule for the acquisition of the
explosives detection systems (EDS) TSA deploys to screen checked
baggage, but it did not fully comply with leading practices. GAO
recommended that DHS develop and maintain a schedule for the EBSP in
accordance with leading practices. DHS concurred.
GAO reported in July 2012 that TSA has worked to enhance general
aviation security, such as through issuing regulations, but there are
weaknesses in its process for vetting foreign flight school student
applicants, and in DHS's process for identifying flight school students
who may be in the country illegally. For example, TSA's program to help
determine whether flight school students pose a security threat does
not determine whether they entered the country legally. GAO recommended
actions that DHS and TSA could take to address these concerns, with
which DHS and TSA have concurred, and are starting to take actions.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today's
hearing on the anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks
to discuss our work examining key layers of aviation security: (1) The
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) behavior-based passenger
screening program; (2) the security of air cargo on flights bound for
the United States from foreign countries (known as inbound air cargo);
(3) the deployment of checked baggage screening technology; and (4) the
Federal Government's vetting process for individuals training at U.S.
flight schools. This work may help inform future deliberations about
any potential challenges and corrective actions regarding U.S. aviation
security.
In the years that have passed since TSA assumed responsibility for
aviation security, TSA has spent billions of dollars and implemented a
wide range of initiatives to strengthen aviation security. Our work has
shown that TSA has enhanced aviation security with respect to
passenger, checked baggage, and air cargo screening, among other areas.
Securing commercial aviation operations, however, remains a daunting
task--with hundreds of airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands
of flights daily carrying millions of passengers and their property, as
well as cargo. The attempted terrorist bombing of Northwest flight 253
on December 25, 2009, and the October 2010 discovery of explosive
devices in air cargo packages on an all-cargo aircraft bound for the
United States from Yemen provides a vivid reminder that civil aviation
remains an attractive terrorist target and highlights the continuing
need for effective passenger, cargo, and baggage screening. According
to the President's National Counterterrorism Strategy, released in June
2011, aviation security and screening is an essential tool in our
ability to detect, disrupt, and defeat plots to attack the homeland.\1\
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\1\ National Strategy for Counterterrorism, (Washington, DC: June
28, 2011).
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My statement today discusses actions TSA has taken to: (1) Validate
the scientific basis of its behavior-based passenger screening program
(known as the Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques, or
SPOT program), (2) strengthen the security and screening of inbound air
cargo, (3) acquire checked baggage screening technology in accordance
with established guidance, and (4) vet foreign nationals seeking to
undertake flight training at U.S. flight schools,\2\ as well as the
challenges associated with implementing these actions.
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\2\ Flight schools fall within the general aviation community,
which also includes non-scheduled aircraft operations such as air
medical-ambulance, corporate aviation, and privately-owned aircraft--
generally, aircraft not available to the general public for transport.
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This statement is based on our prior work issued from May 2010
through July 2012, and includes selected updates conducted from July
2012 through September 2012 on TSA's efforts to improve security of in-
bound air cargo.\3\ Our previously published products contain
additional details on the scope and methodology, including data
reliability, for these reviews. For the updated information on air
cargo screening, we obtained TSA views on our findings and incorporated
technical comments where appropriate. We conducted our work in
accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards.
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\3\ See GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Validate TSA's Passenger
Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist
to Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges, GAO-10-763
(Washington, DC: May 20, 2010); Aviation Security: TSA Has Deployed
Optimal Systems at the Majority of TSA-Regulated Airports, but Could
Strengthen Cost Estimates, GAO-12-266 (Washington, DC: Apr. 27, 2012);
Aviation Security: Actions Needed to Address Challenges and Potential
Vulnerabilities Related to Securing Inbound Air Cargo, GAO-12-632
(Washington, DC: May 10, 2012); and General Aviation Security:
Weaknesses Exist in TSA's Process for Ensuring Foreign Flight Students
Do Not Pose a Security Threat, GAO-12-875 (Washington, DC: July 18,
2012).
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background
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act established TSA as the
Federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the Nation's
civil aviation system, which includes the screening of all passenger
and property transported by commercial passenger aircraft.\4\ At the
more than 450 TSA-regulated airports in the United States, prior to
boarding an aircraft, all passengers, their accessible property, and
their checked baggage are screened pursuant to TSA-established
procedures. TSA relies upon multiple layers of security to deter,
detect, and disrupt persons posing a potential risk to aviation
security. These layers include behavior detection officers (BDOs), who
examine passenger behaviors and appearances to identify passengers who
might pose a potential security risk at TSA-regulated airports;\5\
travel document checkers, who examine tickets, passports, and other
forms of identification; transportation security officers (TSO), who
are responsible for screening passengers and their carry-on baggage at
passenger checkpoints using X-ray equipment, magnetometers, Advanced
Imaging Technology, and other devices, as well as for screening checked
baggage; random employee screening; and checked baggage screening
systems.\6\ The Implementing Recommendations of 9/11 Commission Act of
2007 further mandates that the Secretary of Homeland Security establish
a system to screen 100 percent of cargo transported on passenger
aircraft, and defines screening for purposes of meeting this mandate,
in general, as a physical examination or the use of nonintrusive
methods to assess whether cargo poses a threat to transportation
security.\7\ Such cargo ranges in size from 1 pound to several tons and
ranges in type from perishable commodities to machinery. In 2011, all-
cargo carriers transported approximately 66 percent (6.9 billion
pounds) of the total cargo (10.4 billion pounds) transported to the
United States.\8\ Additionally, TSA has responsibilities for general
aviation security, and developed the Alien Flight Student Program
(AFSP) to help determine whether foreign students enrolling at flight
schools pose a security threat.\9\ U.S. Government threat assessments
have discussed plans by terrorists to use general aviation aircraft to
conduct attacks. Further, analysis conducted on behalf of TSA has
indicated that larger general aviation aircraft may be able to cause
significant damage to buildings and other structures.
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\4\ See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). For purposes of
this testimony, ``commercial passenger aircraft'' refers to U.S. or
foreign-flagged air carriers operating under TSA-approved security
programs with regularly scheduled passenger operations to or from a
U.S. airport.
\5\ TSA designed SPOT to provide BDOs with a means of identifying
persons who may pose a potential security risk at TSA-regulated
airports by focusing on behaviors and appearances that deviate from an
established baseline and that may be indicative of stress, fear, or
deception.
\6\ Advanced Imaging Technology screens passengers for metallic and
non-metallic threats including weapons, explosives, and other objects
concealed under layers of clothing. At airports participating in TSA's
Screening Partnership Program, screeners employed by private-sector
entities under contract to and overseen by TSA, and not TSOs, perform
the passenger and checked baggage screening function in accordance with
TSA requirements. See 49 U.S.C. 44920.
\7\ See 49 U.S.C. 44901(g).
\8\ Based on 2011 TSA data.
\9\ See 49 C.F.R. pt. 1552, subpt. A.
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tsa has taken actions to validate the science underlying its behavior
detection program, but more work remains
We reported in May 2010 that TSA deployed SPOT Nation-wide before
first determining whether there was a scientifically valid basis for
using behavior and appearance indicators as a means for reliably
identifying passengers who may pose a risk to the U.S. aviation
system.\10\
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\10\ See GAO-10-763.
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According to TSA, SPOT was deployed before a scientific validation
of the program was completed to help address potential threats to the
aviation system, such as those posed by suicide bombers. TSA also
stated that the program was based upon scientific research available at
the time regarding human behaviors. We reported in May 2010 that
approximately 14,000 passengers were referred to law enforcement
officers under SPOT from May 2004 through August 2008.\11\ Of these
passengers, 1,083 were arrested for various reasons, including being
illegal aliens (39 percent), having outstanding warrants (19 percent),
and possessing fraudulent documents (15 percent). The remaining 27
percent were arrested for other reasons such as intoxication, unruly
behavior, theft, domestic violence, and possession of prohibited items.
As noted in our May 2010 report, SPOT officials told us that it is not
known if the SPOT program has ever resulted in the arrest of anyone who
is a terrorist, or who was planning to engage in terrorist-related
activity. More recent TSA data covering the period from November 1,
2010, to April 18, 2012, indicates that SPOT referred 60,717 passengers
for additional screening, which resulted in 3,803 referrals to law
enforcement officers and 353 arrests. Of these 353 arrests, 23 percent
were related to immigration status, 23 percent were drug-related, 9
percent were related to fraudulent documents, 22 percent were related
to outstanding warrants, and 28 percent were for other offenses.\12\
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\11\ See GAO-10-763.
\12\ These percents add to more than 100 percent (specifically, 105
percent) because some of the passengers were arrested for multiple
offenses.
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A 2008 report issued by the National Research Council of the
National Academy of Sciences stated that the scientific evidence for
behavioral monitoring is preliminary in nature.\13\ The report also
noted that an information-based program, such as a behavior detection
program, should first determine if a scientific foundation exists and
use scientifically valid criteria to evaluate its effectiveness before
deployment. The report added that such programs should have a sound
experimental basis and that the documentation on the program's
effectiveness should be reviewed by an independent entity capable of
evaluating the supporting scientific evidence.\14\
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\13\ National Research Council, Protecting Individual Privacy in
the Struggle Against Terrorists: A Framework for Assessment
(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2008). We reviewed the
approach used and the information provided in this study and found the
study and its results to be reliable for the purposes for which we used
it in this report.
\14\ A study performed by the JASON Program Office raised similar
concerns. The JASON Program Office is an independent scientific
advisory group that provides consulting services to the U.S. Government
on matters of defense science and technology.
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As we reported in May 2010, an independent panel of experts could
help DHS determine if the SPOT program is based on valid scientific
principles that can be effectively applied in an airport environment
for counterterrorism purposes. Thus, we recommended that the Secretary
of Homeland Security convene an independent panel of experts to review
the methodology of DHS's Science and Technology Directorate's on-going
validation study on the SPOT program being conducted to determine
whether the study's methodology is sufficiently comprehensive to
validate the SPOT program. We also recommended that this assessment
include appropriate input from other Federal agencies with expertise in
behavior detection and relevant subject matter experts.\15\ DHS
concurred and stated that its validation study, completed in April
2011, included input from a broad range of Federal agencies and
relevant experts, including those from academia.\16\ DHS's validation
study found that SPOT was more effective than random screening to
varying degrees. For example, the study found that SPOT was more
effective than random screening at identifying individuals who
possessed fraudulent documents and identifying individuals who law
enforcement officers ultimately arrested.\17\
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\15\ See GAO-10-763.
\16\ See DHS, SPOT Referral Report Validation Study Final Report
Volume I: Technical Report, (Washington, DC: Apr. 5, 2011). DHS's study
was conducted to determine the extent to which SPOT was more effective
than random screening at identifying security threats and how the
program's behaviors correlate to identifying high-risk travelers. The
study defines high-risk passengers as travelers that knowingly and
intentionally try to defeat the security process including those
carrying serious prohibited or illegal items, such as weapons, drugs,
or fraudulent documents; or those that were ultimately arrested by law
enforcement.
\17\ The extent to which SPOT is more effective than random
screening at identifying fraudulent documents and individuals
ultimately arrested by law enforcement officers is deemed sensitive
security information by TSA.
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According to DHS's study, no other counterterrorism or screening
program incorporating behavior and appearance-based indicators is known
to have been subjected to such a rigorous, systematic evaluation of its
screening accuracy. However, DHS noted that the identification of high-
risk passengers was rare in both the SPOT and random tests. DHS's study
also noted that the assessment was an initial validation step, and was
not designed to fully validate whether behavior detection can be used
to reliably identify individuals in an airport environment who pose a
security risk. According to DHS, further research will be needed to
comprehensively validate the program.
In addition, DHS determined that the base rate, or frequency, of
SPOT behavioral indicators observed by TSA to detect suspicious
passengers was very low and that these observed indicators were highly
varied across the traveling public. Although details about DHS's
findings related to these indicators are sensitive security
information, the low base rate and high variability of traveler
behaviors highlights the challenge that TSA faces in effectively
implementing a standardized list of SPOT behavioral indicators. In
addition, DHS outlined several limitations to the study. For example,
the study noted that BDOs were aware of whether individuals they were
screening were selected as the result of identified SPOT indicators or
random selection. DHS stated that this had the potential to introduce
bias into the assessment. DHS also noted that SPOT data from January
2006 through October 2010 were used in its analysis of behavioral
indicators even though questions about the reliability of the data
exist.\18\
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\18\ DHS officials stated that this historical SPOT data was not
used in their analysis to determine whether SPOT was more effective
than random screening.
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The study also noted that it was not designed to comprehensively
validate whether SPOT can be used to reliably identify individuals in
an airport environment who pose a security risk. The DHS study also
made several additional recommendations related to strengthening the
program and conducting a more comprehensive validation of whether the
science can be used for counterterrorism purposes in the aviation
environment.\19\ Some of these recommendations, such as the need for a
comprehensive program evaluation including a cost-benefit analysis,
reiterate recommendations made in our prior work. In March 2011, we
reported that Congress may wish to consider the study's results in
making future funding decisions regarding the program.\20\ TSA is
reviewing the study's findings and assessing the steps needed to
address DHS's recommendations. If TSA decides to implement the
recommendations in the April 2011 DHS validation study, it may be years
away from knowing whether there is a scientifically valid basis for
using behavior detection techniques to help secure the aviation system
against terrorist threats given that the initial study took about 4
years to complete. We are conducting a follow-on review of TSA's
behavior detection program, and its related variant, the so-called
``Assessor Program,'' which incorporates more extensive verbal
interactions (``chat downs'') with the traveling public. The Assessor
program is currently being test piloted in Boston and Detroit. Our
follow-on report on this program will be issued early next year.
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\19\ The study made recommendations related to SPOT in three areas:
(1) Future validation efforts, (2) comparing SPOT with other screening
programs, and (3) broader program evaluation issues. TSA designated the
specific details of these recommendations sensitive security
information.
\20\ See GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in
Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-
318SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 1, 2011).
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dhs and tsa have taken actions to enhance the security of cargo on
inbound aircraft, but challenges remain
DHS and TSA have taken four primary actions to enhance the security
of in-bound cargo on passenger and all-cargo aircraft following the
October 2010 bomb attempt originating in Yemen.
TSA issued new screening requirements aimed at enhancing the
security of cargo on passenger and all-cargo aircraft.--Beginning in
October 2010, TSA imposed new risk-based security procedures on
passenger and all-cargo aircraft aimed at focusing more detailed
screening measures on high-risk shipments and, among other things,
prohibited the transport of cargo on passenger aircraft from Yemen and
Somalia due to threats stemming from those areas.\21\
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\21\ TSA imposed requirements on both U.S. and foreign-flagged
passenger and all-cargo carriers. All-cargo carriers are generally
aircraft configured solely for the transport of cargo (e.g., FedEx and
United Parcel Service).
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DHS instituted working groups with air cargo industry stakeholders
to identify ways to enhance air cargo security.--In January 2011, the
Secretary of Homeland Security established an Air Cargo Security
Working Group to obtain advice and consultations from air cargo
security stakeholders on ways to enhance the security of the air cargo
system.\22\ The Air Cargo Security Working Group briefed the Secretary
of Homeland Security, the Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), and the TSA Administrator in April 2011 on proposed
solutions, and recommended that TSA reevaluate the agency's
implementation plan, time line, and resources related to TSA's program
to recognize the security programs of foreign countries, known as the
National Cargo Security Program (NCSP). According to TSA officials,
participants of this working group have reconvened as part of the
Aviation Security Advisory Committee, which held its first meeting in
May 2012, and the committee will meet again in mid-September 2012 to
discuss the implementation of the recommendations.
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\22\ DHS's Air Cargo Security Working Group consists of four
subgroups: (1) Information subgroup, whose objective is to, among other
things, enhance intelligence and information sharing among Federal
stakeholders and between the U.S. Government and private-sector
entities; (2) technology- and capacity-building subgroup, whose
objective is to review technology standards and develop suggestions for
addressing technology limitations; (3) global cargo programs subgroup,
whose objective is to review and explore opportunities for enhanced
public-private coordination as DHS works to address statutory
requirements for screening 100 percent of inbound air cargo; and (4)
global mail subgroup, whose objective is to, among other things,
identify potential vulnerabilities for global mail and propose
alternative processes and procedures to ensure the safety of mail
transported by air.
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DHS initiated an Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) pilot to
identify high-risk cargo for screening prior to transport to the United
States.--The aim of the pilot, which is on-going, is to determine
whether it is feasible for air carriers to submit air cargo manifest
data to CBP prior to departure from all foreign last point of departure
airports to allow CBP to analyze, target, and, if needed, issue
instructions to air carriers to provide additional cargo information or
take additional security measures before such cargo is loaded onto
aircraft. DHS initially focused on all-cargo express carriers and
companies due to the elevated risk highlighted by the October 2010
incident.\23\ As of August 2012, the ACAS pilot included 3 passenger
air carriers and 4 all-cargo carriers that service the United States
and is focused on about 189 geographic locations. Under existing CBP
requirements, CBP must receive manifest data for air cargo shipments
from air carriers no later than 4 hours prior to the flight's arrival
in the United States or no later than the time of departure (that is,
``wheels up'' and en route directly to the United States) from
locations in North America.\24\ Under the pilot program, however,
participants provide manifest data prior to loading cargo aboard
aircraft.
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\23\ All-cargo express carriers and companies focus on transporting
cargo under quick time frames.
\24\ See 19 C.F.R. 122.48a(b).
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TSA developed a program to recognize foreign air cargo security
programs.--TSA has developed the NCSP recognition program to review and
recognize the air cargo security programs of foreign countries if TSA
deems those programs as providing a level of security commensurate with
TSA's air cargo security standards. In May 2012, TSA recognized Canada
as providing a level of security commensurate with U.S. air cargo
security standards, and in June 2012, the agency recognized the
European Union and Switzerland as also providing this same level of
security based on the principle of ``mutual recognition.''\25\ TSA
officials stated that the NCSP recognition program is a key effort in
meeting the 100 percent screening mandate because it will eliminate the
need for air carriers to comply with two countries' security programs.
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\25\ TSA had previously recognized France and the United Kingdom as
providing a level of security commensurate with U.S. air cargo security
standards.
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Despite these actions, air carriers and TSA face three key
challenges that, among other things, could limit TSA's ability to meet
the 9/11 Commission Act mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo
transported on passenger aircraft as it applies to inbound air cargo
and to provide reasonable assurance that screening is being conducted
at reported levels.\26\ All-cargo carriers subject to TSA regulation
also reported facing challenges in implementing new TSA screening
requirements established after the October 2010 Yemen incident.
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\26\ See 49 U.S.C. 44901(g).
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Passenger air carriers reported logistical challenges implementing
proposed screening requirements.--In January 2011, TSA proposed changes
to passenger aircraft security requirements outlined in the Aircraft
Operator Standard Security Program and the Model Security Program to
further enhance the security of air cargo departing foreign locations
by requiring 100 percent screening of inbound cargo previously exempt
from screening. TSA requirements currently call for air carriers to
screen a certain percentage of all cargo.\27\ TSA proposed changes that
would require passenger air carriers to screen 100 percent of cargo as
part of its efforts to meet the 9/11 Commission Act mandate. Passenger
air carriers expressed concerns about being able to meet the 100
percent screening mandate as it applies to inbound cargo stating that
it would cause significant disruptions in the air cargo supply chain,
among other issues. In response to these concerns, TSA officials stated
that they revised the proposed requirements and issued new passenger
security requirements in June 2012. Agency officials said they plan to
require air carriers to screen 100 percent of inbound air cargo
transported on passenger aircraft by December 3, 2012.
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\27\ Details on TSA's screening requirements are deemed sensitive
security information and not included in this statement.
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TSA faces challenges verifying screening data on inbound passenger
cargo.--TSA relies on data submitted to the agency by air carriers to
determine the amount of inbound air cargo screened in accordance with
TSA screening requirements. As of September 2011, TSA officials stated
that air carrier-reported screening percentages--which they estimate to
be about 80 percent--are based on actual data reported by air carriers,
but agreed that it is difficult to verify the accuracy of the screening
data reported by air carriers with reasonable assurance. According to
TSA, as of August 2012, the air carrier data have not been
independently verified for accuracy since TSA has not developed a
mechanism to cross-reference local screening logs with screening
reports submitted by air carriers to TSA that do not contain such
information. To more accurately identify the level of screening being
conducted on inbound air cargo, we recommended in June 2010 that TSA
develop a mechanism to verify the accuracy of all screening data
through random checks or other practical means.\28\ TSA concurred in
part and stated that as of May 1, 2010, they had issued changes to air
carriers' standard security programs that require air carriers to
report inbound cargo screening data to TSA. Specifically, TSA officials
told us that in May 2010 the agency created a reporting requirement for
air carriers to provide screening data on a monthly basis. TSA also
stated that inspectors review screening data, among other things, when
inspecting air carriers as part of the agency's air carrier compliance
inspections. However, since TSA still has not developed a mechanism to
verify the accuracy of the data reported by air carriers, the agency
has not yet fully met the intent of the recommendation. It will be
important for TSA to continue to work towards ensuring verification of
inbound air cargo screening data submitted by air carriers and that
inbound air cargo is screened in accordance with the mandate.
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\28\ GAO-10-446.
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Reporting screening data could facilitate oversight of all-cargo
carrier compliance requirements.--TSA relies on data submitted by
passenger carriers to determine the amount of air cargo screened on
inbound passenger aircraft but there is no requirement for all-cargo
carriers to report comparable screening data to TSA, even though most
of the cargo shipped from abroad into the United States is shipped on
all-cargo carriers. Thus, TSA does not know the extent to which all-
cargo carriers are screening cargo or meeting the enhanced screening
requirements introduced after the October 2010 incident in Yemen.
Officials from two global all-cargo carriers said that submitting such
information to TSA would be feasible because they are already
collecting this data internally, but officials from two other all-cargo
carriers stated that reporting screening data to TSA would be
challenging because of staffing limitations or because such data may
not be available. TSA officials said that TSA does not require that
all-cargo carriers submit screening data because it has focused its
efforts on collecting data from passenger air carriers in support of
meeting the 100 percent mandate. TSA officials stated that TSA may
consider opportunities to capture additional inbound air cargo
information, but has not yet weighed the costs and benefits of doing so
because it has focused its efforts on establishing the ACAS pilot
program, which DHS established to more readily indentify high-risk
cargo. The pilot program is a key effort to identify high-risk cargo
prior to aircraft departing from foreign airports, but is not intended
to provide TSA with screening data, which if collected and verified,
could provide additional assurance that all-cargo carriers are
complying with TSA's enhanced screening requirements. To help TSA
better determine what actions are needed, if any, to ensure that all-
cargo carriers are complying with the agency's enhanced screening
requirements, we recommended in May 2012 that DHS assess the costs and
benefits of requiring all-cargo carriers to report data on screening
conducted.\29\ DHS concurred with the recommendation and is taking
actions to address it.
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\29\ See GAO-12-632.
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dhs and tsa have experienced difficulties establishing acquisition
program baselines, schedules, and cost estimates for checked baggage
screening systems
TSA's Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) reports that 76
percent of the airports (337 of 446) the agency regulates for security
have a mix of in-line and stand-alone baggage screening configurations
that best meet airport needs (i.e., optimal systems). Our prior work on
TSA's checked baggage screening program--EBSP--identified a number of
shortcomings in DHS and TSA's process for establishing program
baselines, program schedules, and cost estimates.
Acquisition program baselines.--We found that realistic acquisition
program baselines with stable requirements for cost, schedule, and
performance are among the factors that are important to successful
acquisitions delivering capabilities within cost and schedule.\30\
Further, we reported in April 2009 that program performance metrics for
cost and schedule can provide useful indicators of the health of
acquisition programs and, when assessed regularly for changes and the
reasons that cause changes, such indicators can be valuable tools for
improving insight and oversight of individual programs as well as the
total portfolio of major acquisitions.\31\ According to DHS's
acquisition guidance, the program baseline is the contract between the
program and departmental oversight officials and must be established at
program start to document the program's expected cost, deployment
schedule, and technical performance. By tracking and measuring actual
program performance against this baseline, management can be alerted to
potential problems, such as cost growth or changing requirements, and
has the ability to take corrective action.
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\30\ GAO-10-588SP.
\31\ Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD's Weapon
Programs Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines, GAO-09-543T
(Washington, DC: April 1, 2009).
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We reported in April 2012 that TSA has not had a DHS-approved
acquisition program baseline for EBSP since the program's inception
more than 8 years ago.\32\ Further, DHS did not require TSA to complete
an acquisition program baseline until November 2008. TSA officials said
they have twice submitted an acquisition program baseline to DHS for
approval--first in November 2009 and again February 2011. However,
according to DHS officials TSA did not have a fully developed life-
cycle cost estimate. In November 2011, DHS told TSA that it needed to
revise the life-cycle cost estimates as well as its procurement and
deployment schedules to reflect budget constraints. DHS officials told
us that they could not approve the acquisition program baseline as
written because TSA's estimates were significantly over budget. An
approved baseline will provide DHS with additional assurances that
TSA's approach is appropriate and that the capabilities being pursued
are worth the expected costs. TSA officials stated that TSA is working
with DHS to amend the draft program baseline and plans to resubmit a
revised life-cycle cost estimates with a revised acquisition program
baseline by December 31, 2012. As we reported, establishing and
approving a program baseline, as DHS and TSA plan to do for the EBSP,
could help DHS assess the program's progress in meeting its goals and
achieve better program outcomes.
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\32\ GAO-12-266.
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Schedules.--In July 2011, we reported that TSA had established a
schedule for the acquisition of the explosives detection systems (EDS)
TSA deploys to screen checked baggage, but it did not fully comply with
leading practices, and TSA had not developed a plan to upgrade its EDS
fleet to meet the 2010 explosives detection requirements.\33\ We noted
that some of TSA's approximately 2,200 deployed systems met 2005
explosive requirements while the remainder met 1998 explosive detection
requirements.\34\ Leading practices state that the success of a large-
scale system acquisition, such as TSA's EDS acquisition, depends in
part on having a reliable schedule that identifies when the program's
set of work activities and milestone events will occur, amongst other
things. We reported that the schedule for the EDS acquisition is not
reliable because it does not include a timeline to deploy EDS or plans
to procure EDS to meet subsequent phases of explosive detection
requirements. We stated that developing a reliable schedule would help
TSA better monitor and oversee the progress of the EDS acquisition. DHS
concurred with the recommendation to develop and maintain a schedule
for the entire EBSP in accordance with the leading practices we
identified for preparing a schedule. DHS commented that TSA had already
begun working with key stakeholders to develop and define requirements
for a schedule and to ensure that the schedule aligns with the leading
practices. In April 2012, TSA stated that it had secured contractor
resources to support development of an integrated master schedule in
accordance with our and industry best practices, and that it
anticipated completion of this schedule by September 2013.
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\33\ GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives
Detection Requirements for Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening
Actions Are Needed, GAO-11-740, (Washington, DC: July 11, 2011).
\34\ The specific number of EDS operating at particular detection
levels is considered sensitive security information.
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Cost estimates.--In April 2012, we reported that TSA's methods for
developing life-cycle cost estimates for the EBSP did not fully adhere
to best practices for developing these estimates.\35\ We reported in
March 2009 that a high-quality, reliable cost estimation process
provides a sound basis for making accurate and well-informed decisions
about resource investments, budgets, assessments of progress, and
accountability for results and thus is critical to the success of a
program.\36\ We reported that TSA's estimates partially met three
characteristics and minimally met one characteristic of a reliable cost
estimate.\37\ DHS concurred with the recommendation that TSA ensure
that its life-cycle cost estimates conform to cost estimating best
practices, and identified efforts underway to address it.
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\35\ See GAO-12-266.
\36\ GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs. (Supersedes GAO-07-
1134SP). GAO-09-3SP, (Washington, DC: Mar. 2, 2009).
\37\ Specifically, we found their life-cycle cost estimate to be
partially comprehensive, partially documented, partially accurate, and
minimally credible: (1) Partially comprehensive because the cost
estimate does not incorporate costs associated with all security
threats, lacks a detailed scope of work, and lacks a single technical
baseline; (2) partially documented because TSA did not adequately
document many assumptions or methodologies underlying its cost model,
and provided little or no evidence that the assumptions and
methodologies underlying the cost estimate were approved by management;
(3) partially accurate because differences between planned and actual
costs are not fully documented, explained, or reviewed; and (4)
minimally credible because TSA did not complete relevant activities,
such as an independent cost estimate--to ensure that the estimate
accounts for bias and uncertainty. See GAO-12-875.
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tsa established a process for vetting foreign flight students but
weaknesses remain
As we reported in July 2012, TSA has worked with industry and other
stakeholders to enhance general aviation security, such as issuing
regulations and enhancing outreach and awareness, but there are
weaknesses in the agency's process for vetting foreign flight student
applicants and in DHS's process for identifying flight students who may
be in the country illegally. We recommended two actions that DHS and
TSA could take to address these concerns, with which DHS concurred.
Vetting foreign flight student applicants.--Under AFSP, foreign
nationals seeking flight training in the United States undergo a TSA
security threat assessment before receiving flight training to
determine whether each applicant is a security threat to the United
States. According to TSA officials, when a foreign national applies to
AFSP to obtain flight training, TSA uses information submitted by the
foreign national--such as name, date of birth, and passport
information--to conduct a criminal history records check, a review of
the Terrorist Screening Database, and a review of the Department of
Homeland Security's TECS system.\38\ According to TSA officials, most
foreign nationals taking training from a U.S. flight training provider
will apply for a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) airman
certificate (pilot's license) once their flight training is completed.
Information obtained by FAA as part of this application for
certification is placed in the airmen registry. From January 2006
through September 2011, 25,599 foreign nationals had applied for FAA
airman certificates, indicating they had completed flight training.
However, TSA computerized matching of FAA data determined that some
known number of foreign nationals did not match with those in TSA's
database, raising questions as to whether they had been vetted.\39\
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\38\ Information in the Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated
database of known or suspected terrorists--the Terrorist Screening
Database--is used for security-related screening of foreign nationals
applying to AFSP, among other purposes. TECS, an updated and modified
version of the former Treasury Enforcement Communications System, is an
information-sharing platform that allows users to access different
databases relevant to the antiterrorism and law enforcement mission of
numerous other Federal agencies.
\39\ The exact number is considered to be sensitive security
information.
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Since 2009, TSA has vetted all new and existing FAA airman
certificate holders against the Terrorist Screening Database on an on-
going basis, which would include the foreign nationals identified
through TSA's analysis. However, this vetting does not occur until
after the foreign national has obtained flight training. Thus, foreign
nationals obtaining flight training with the intent to do harm--such as
three of the pilots and leaders of the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks--could have already obtained the training needed to operate an
aircraft before they received any type of vetting.\40\ We recommended
that TSA take steps to identify any instances where foreign nationals
receive FAA airman certificates without first undergoing a TSA security
threat assessment and examine those instances so that TSA can identify
the reasons for these occurrences and strengthen controls to prevent
future occurrences. DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated
that TSA signed a memorandum of understanding with FAA in February 2012
to help address this issue. The memorandum outlines a process for FAA
to provide certain data from its airmen registry on a monthly basis and
authorizes TSA to use the data to ensure flight training providers are
providing TSA with information to conduct background checks prior to
flight instruction. This is an important step toward addressing the
first part of our recommendation, provided that TSA uses the data to
identify instances where foreign nationals receive FAA airman
certificates without first undergoing a TSA security threat assessment,
identifies reasons for these occurrences, and strengthens controls to
prevent future occurrences, as we recommended.
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\40\ TSA likewise does not vet flight student applicants claiming
U.S. citizenship. H.R. 6159--the Flight School Security Act of 2012,
introduced in July 2012--would require, among other things, a
determination by TSA that the individual seeking training is a non-
threat to aviation prior to beginning flight training. See H.R. 6159,
112th Cong. (2d Sess. 2012). The bill, sponsored by Representative
Bennie G. Thompson, was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security.
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Identifying flight students entering the country illegally.--We
also reported that AFSP is not designed to determine whether a foreign
flight student entered the country legally; thus, a foreign national
can be approved for training through AFSP after entering the country
illegally. A March 2010 U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
investigation of a flight school led to the arrest of six such foreign
nationals, including one who had a commercial pilot's license. As a
result, TSA and ICE jointly worked on vetting names of foreign students
against immigration databases, but had not specified desired outcomes
and time frames, or assigned individuals with responsibility for fully
instituting the program as of July 2012. Thus, this weakness still
exists today. Having a road map, with steps and time frames, and
assigning individuals the responsibility for fully instituting a pilot
program could help TSA and ICE better identify and prevent potential
risk. We recommended that TSA and ICE develop a plan, with time frames,
and assign individuals with responsibility and accountability for
assessing the results of their pilot program to check TSA AFSP data
against information DHS has on applicants' admissibility status to help
detect and identify violations by foreign flight students, and
institute that pilot program if it is found to be effective. DHS
concurred and stated that TSA will prepare a plan by December 2012 to
assess the results of the pilot program with ICE to determine the
lawful status of the active AFSP population. We believe that these are
positive actions that could help TSA address the weaknesses identified
in our report. We will continue to monitor TSA's progress on the
proposed solutions as the agency proceeds.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I look forward to
responding to any questions that you may have.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes himself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Halinski, you have had a chance to review the report of
this committee as Majority staff has issued yesterday?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I received this yesterday afternoon--our
headquarters received the report. I have people looking at the
report. I personally have not had a chance to review the
report. I plan to do that over the next couple of days, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. I would very much like to have you share
your thoughts with me on what you agree with and disagree with
in our findings and put those back to me in writing.
Mr. Halinski. Yes sir.
Mr. Rogers. I look forward to receiving that.
I want to ask, Mr. Halinski, do you know--and you know I
have been hot on this procurement and acquisition concern
within the Department of Homeland Security, but also within
TSA. Do you know if TSA has recently requested the private
sector to help them in developing a more risk-based screening
process at its checkpoints?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. We have, sir, quite frankly. One of
the issues that we want to do with risk-based security, as we
have done with liquids, aerosols, and gels, is we understand
that this has got to be a joint effort. It is not just the
Government, quite frankly. It has to be the private industry.
I would point to the recreation of the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee, which is a regular committee that meets.
Within that committee, we have created a Risk-Based Security
subcommittee. Since May, it has met three times. This is both
private industry and stakeholders and TSA.
Mr. Rogers. It is comprised of----
Mr. Halinski. Stakeholders, sir? Industry----
Mr. Rogers. What industry? I mean, what groups did you
reach out to?
Mr. Halinski. I will have to get you the names of the board
members, but typically who we deal with is the stakeholders at
the airport, stakeholders for the air carrier, A4A, IATA. They
are all represented on the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
Mr. Halinski. This is a subcommittee of that.
As I said, it meets three times. It actually will meet
tomorrow. The goal of this is--and we have pushed this with
RBS. Now, we recognize that for risk-based security to be
successful we have to have buy-in from everybody. They know the
industry. We want to work with them on how to make this
successful, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Are you working with them or even discussing
with them improvements that you can make on the regulatory
processes that they have to adhere to?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I would tell you we are.
You know, one of the things--as I am with you always, sir,
I am going to be right up front. We can't look through the
world with just one lens.
I believe that what we have to do with risk-based security,
because it is, I think, the way to go in the future, is to be
able to take advice--take advice from industry, take advice
from here, take advice from Mr. Lord.
Quite frankly, I have had two meetings with Mr. Lord since
July when I came in as the deputy, because we need that and we
use that as a tool. We don't have all answers--readily admit
that. We are willing to take advice and look at it, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Well, I hope you will be aggressive,
particularly on the regulatory front, because I get a lot of
feedback about how burdensome and cumbersome--and some of it is
antiquated. So we need to stay on top of that.
Mr. Lord, do you think TSA has sufficiently addressed
privacy concerns of its passengers, yes or no?
Mr. Lord. I believe that they have made a concerted effort
in the last year or two to address privacy concerns, most
notably in the privacy software incorporated in their whole-
body imaging equipment--advance imaging technology.
Obviously, they can continue to work on that, but that was,
I believe, a major step in the right direction. They also have
a privacy officer employed full-time at the agency, and they
have done some outreach with industry to see how they could
better address these issues.
Obviously, it is a delicate balancing act. They are
concerned with security. At the same time, you want to respect
passengers' privacy and not impede commerce. So I always
present this policy triangle. Where do you draw the line within
the triangle in making policy?
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Halinski, what is the status of the Foreign
Airport Repair Station Security rule and the Large Aircraft
Security Program rule?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. Sir, we are following the
rulemaking process. I will say right off the bat I understand
your frustration with that process.
The process as we work through it is guided by OMB, and
they fall under the statutes from Congress. We are working
toward getting the rule finalized. The rule is in review right
now. I know, sir, it has been a long process, one that has
frustrated many on this committee.
Mr. Rogers. Many years.
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir--absolutely understand that, sir. We
are pushing that forward.
I will tell you, though, just because the rule isn't
complete doesn't mean we are not taking action. We have looked
at the most critical foreign repair stations and conducted
surveys and visits to those to ensure that they do not pose a
security threat.
We have found that of those 170--what we consider critical
airports--all of them have security plans. All of them will
meet, when the rule is final, the regulatory responsibility.
Mr. Rogers. So it is going to have to wait for
certification? Those repair stations can't be certified until
the rule is complete, is that correct?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, under the rulemaking process, I don't
believe we can do that.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Last question I have got is--Mr. Halinski, the Alien Flight
Student program--you know, we talked about the No-Fly list at
least being adhered to. Can you talk to me about what has
happened since then?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir.
After the testimony of our TSA representative here, and
working with the recommendations from Mr. Lord, we have pursued
trying to close the vulnerabilities in the system and we are
working at them very aggressively.
We appreciate that there is legislation--it appears
forthcoming--which will help clarify the Congressional intent,
particularly when it comes to U.S. persons that are flying.
If you were to ask me, ``Do we have the authority to do
that?'' Sir, yes, we do. But if we do it, we know that it will
end up in a rulemaking process, sir.
We estimate there is about 350,000 people a year who
start--U.S. citizens who start the flight process. We are
trying to work with FAA.
On the alien side sir, we are trying to clean up the
recommendations that we got from GAO with ICE and also with
FAA.
We are pursuing it, sir. We welcome the support of your
committee on this. I will tell you, we are pushing it, sir. I
hope we can close the gap here quickly, sir.
Mr. Rogers. I hope so too. That is one of the more ugly
shortcomings that we have discovered, so I really hope you
could fix that.
With that I want to ask for unanimous consent to submit a
letter by GAMA, General Aviation Manufacturers, to Secretary
Napolitano on these issues.
Without objection, so ordered.**
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** The information has been retained in committee files.
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The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member for any
questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman very much.
I thank the witnesses who have come, both Mr. Halinski and,
of course, Mr. Lord who has been diligent in his review.
Just a quick question to you, Mr. Lord--and I think you
said in your testimony you have seen cooperation and
improvement in the assessments that GAO has made and how TSA
has responded?
Mr. Lord. Yes, ma'am, we have. We meet at the very high
level on a regular basis to go over our open recommendations,
and I think that is really facilitated a process, ensure we are
not talking past each other and leads to an expedited closeout
process.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you for that.
Mr. Halinski, I have a series of questions, and you can be
pointed and brief.
We have had 11 years--and Homeland Security was created in
the shadow and the tragedy of 9/11, and therefore
Transportation Security Administration.
What would you view as the agency's greatest
accomplishment?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am.
I would tell you that I think the greatest accomplishment
that we have is being able to take a very simple mission, which
is to protect the traveling public, and try to make that work,
because it is a very complex mission. It ranges from screening
in the airports to protection of our surface systems, mass
transit systems, our pipeline systems, and then the myriad of
other things that we have talked about here--general aviation,
insider threat, cargo.
We are addressing them. We are trying to work towards them
and accomplish them because we understand the vulnerability and
risk.
I believe to be able to do that as an organization in 10
years is an accomplishment, but it is due mainly to the people
that we have in the organization.
I know sometimes people think that we are a very large
organization. But we screen 1.7 million people a day. We look
at 2.2 million checked bags and over 2 million hand-carry bags
a day in the airports in the 450 airports that we are in.
I think that is a major accomplishment when you look at the
people that are there, most of them earning about $34,000 a
year. They are doing this service for the American public. It
is not because they are doing it for the money. They are not
doing it for the glory. But, quite frankly, they are doing it
because they believe in this mission.
Anytime you have a team that can believe in a mission like
that, I want to be on that team.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, I want to thank them. But I also
want to acknowledge that as public servants and workers of the
Federal Government, we all want to do our very best. We want to
do it, as you have indicated, not matter what our salary range
is. Because we have Americans who are waitresses and nurses'
aides and bus drivers and others whose salaries don't equate,
and we want them to do their very best.
So I am glad that you are saying that without regard to
salary you feel that the TSO officers, the Transportation
Security Administration--that the TSOs are doing their very
best. Is that what you are telling me?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am, I am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you. Americans had an episode
of democracy over the last 2 weeks--one in Tampa, one on
Charlotte.
How do you think that went? They were, I understand,
thousands going through different airports, Tampa and then
Charlotte. How did you see that with respect to TSA's
responsibility?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. I think that from a TSA
perspective, it went very well. But it was also a very
collegial effort among all of the Department of Homeland
Security, Secret Service, Customs and Border Protection.
All the folks that were there, quite frankly, did a good
job, as well as local law enforcement and State law
enforcement, primarily because of planning. The planning
process for an event like that takes almost a year or more, and
it takes a lot of communication and collaboration. I think that
is why it was successful.
Ms. Jackson Lee. When I was able to view in Charlotte, I
did not see long lines. I did not see stalled lines. I think
that was very good.
Let me just raise these two questions, and I will--let me
raise the questions of SPOT. There are several investigations
going on, and there is representation that SPOT has been
discriminatory and has done racial profiling.
How do you respond to that?
Mr. Halinski. Ma'am, we train our officers that if racial
profiling is conducted you are failing the program. We don't
believe it. We train our officers not to do that.
We want to ensure that our officers don't do that, so we
try to ensure quality control. I believe that the SPOT program
is a program that is essential to a layered effect.
I think when you look at security from an airport--and we
look at the layered effect because I don't believe there is one
single piece of technology or process--human process or other
process--that can stand alone and by itself. It has to be
interwoven; it has to be redundant and not duplicative. I
believe that the SPOT program is successful.
Quite frankly, I had very good conversations with Mr. Lord.
We have talked to our DHS I.G. about this program. There is
always a way to improve programs, and we are looking at that. I
think that is what is important--is to continually improve the
program based on threat, based on perceived vulnerabilities,
and based on recommendations from our partners in GAO, at DHS,
and in other agencies.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask these series of questions.
I would like to ask unanimous consent to put into the
record a letter to Ranking Member Thompson from Mr. Pistole
dated January 30, 2012, that says TSA uses a standardized
interview process for promotions in the SPOT program as well as
new management positions, the SPOT referral interview rate is
not factored into these decisions.
I would like unanimous consent to put this into the record.
Mr. Chairman, I would like unanimous consent to put this
into the record.
Mr. Walberg [presiding]. No objection.***
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*** The information has been retained in committee files.
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Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. I am just finishing my
questions.
Can you answer these rather quickly, please?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. One, there are several individuals who are
involved in investigations regarding the SPOT program. Can you
give me assurance that those individuals--let me just ask my
questions and then if you can answer them--can you give me your
assurance that those individuals who have spoken with
investigators will not be subjected to any punishment or other
adverse personnel actions because of their participation in
these investigations?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. They will not be.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Will you issue a public statement to the
TSA workforce pledging that those who come forward with
information about racial or ethnic profiling will not be
subject to punishments or adverse personnel actions because of
their participation in these investigations?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. In fact, we put that in our
training for all of our personnel.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That you will announce it.
Then, there was a report in Houston indicating that you had
wasted $800 million in the SPOT program. Can you respond to
that?
Let me just finish with this final question. I have long
been concerned--and you mentioned in your testimony, Mr.
Halinski--and I think also Mr. Lord--about surface
transportations. While our focus has been on aviation security,
it is certainly warranted, it is critical that we not take our
eye off the ball when it comes to the security of our rail,
subway, and bus systems.
That is why I introduced a bill, H.R. 1900, the Surface
Transportation and Mass Transit Security Act of 2011, earlier
this Congress, to enhance surface transportation.
What steps are being taken by TSA to ensure sufficient
resources are being allocated to surface transportation and
mass transportation?
Will you answer the SPOT question about $800 million in
expenditures versus what you may have expended, and whether or
not you are vetting SPOT to ensure the validity of the science?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. The----
Ms. Jackson Lee. SPOT is BDO, right?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. It is one of the subsets of BDO?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am, it is.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right.
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you please?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am--$800 million, ma'am.
The program was started. I have an accounting of all the
money that was spent for that particular program. The majority
of that money was spent on pay and benefits for the identified
behavior detection officers that are in the program.
We have approximately 3,000 personnel in that program. The
program has been in existence since, I believe, about 2005. The
money that has been allocated is--the recording is through
2007, I am sorry. That money was spent on pay and benefits for
those particular officers--payroll, ma'am. There is some money
that has been spent--approximately $5 million on training for
these officers, and some on travel--for instructors and
participants, roughly about the same on that, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you will be able to submit that to the
record for this committee?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am, I should be able to.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay. So the question of the $800
million--you believe you spent $800 million or you believe you
spent less than that?
Mr. Halinski. No, we spent $800 million, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You can document what you spent it on?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am, I can.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay--and the transportation for transit?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. As far as transit goes, we have
an entire division in TSA that is oriented toward surface
security.
Part of our program is to recognize the fact that in the
surface security world, we deal both with private industry,
with local authorities and State authorities. I believe we have
allocated the right amount of assets at this time to that, with
the idea that we have to work in unison and collaboratively
with our local and State authorities, as well as private
industry.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you. You didn't answer, but let me
just make sure you put it in the record. You are going to
continue to validate the SPOT technology?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, yes, ma'am. I will give you my word on
that, ma'am--that we will continue to validate that program and
ensure that it is meeting our expectations and has a solid
quality-assurance-and-metrics program.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very
much. I yield back.
Mr. Walberg. Thank the gentlelady.
I will recognize myself for a round of questioning, and
apologize for being delayed in getting over here.
But you may have answered the question, Mr. Halinski,
already, about the time line for the foreign repair stations
being up and running, the decision being made. I just met with
a major foreign repair station entity in my district, with
concerns around the world, and great concern that that is still
so delayed.
Is there any time, a date certain, where we will have this
in place?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I am going to be frank with you. I would
love to give you a date when this is going to be done. I can't
give you a date, sir, because I don't know.
I will tell you that we are aggressively pursuing this. We
understand the frustration on the----
Mr. Walberg. Aggressive for me--versus what I am hearing
here seems awful slow to be aggressive.
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. I fully recognize this one has been
a long time in coming. We are trying to work through the
process. We are moving it forward. We are pushing it as fast as
we can, sir. We will push it as fast as we can.
I don't have a date, sir. I would hope by the end of the
year, but I can't guarantee that, sir, and I don't want to give
you a guarantee I can't give.
Mr. Walberg. Do we have a set of factors that are causing
this restriction, this delay to take place? I don't know
whether it was shared with the committee before I got here, but
I guess my concern is, while we talk about being aggressive,
what at this point in time, after this length of time,
continues to hold us up and short-circuit the process?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. I would tell you, sir, that this
particular issue has gone back and forth, back and forth. It is
in the process. It has left TSA. It is moving through the
process. We believe that it should work its way through
shortly. If you ask me what shortly is, sir, I am going to be
honest with you again. I can't give you what that is.
We are pushing it, sir. We understand it. As I said before
you came here, though, we are not holding up the security
vulnerability piece. Realizing that the rule isn't in place, we
have actively gone out to outside of the United States, to
foreign repair stations, to look at what we consider to be the
most critical 170 of those foreign repair stations, to ensure
that they have security plans, to ensure they meet the intent
of the future rule.
We have done that, sir, and we will continue to push it as
hard as we can. I understand your frustration. I also
understand the fact that I would love to have that rule done as
well, sir.
Mr. Walberg. Well, we will continue to wait.
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir.
Mr. Walberg. Mr. Lord, what do you make of the fact that
TSA doesn't do any cost-benefit analysis?
Mr. Lord. Well, that has been a consistent theme of some of
our reporting. In some cases, we urge them to conduct a cost-
benefit analysis before deciding to go forward with a program.
A related issue is their life-cycle cost estimates. When senior
managers are making a decision about a program, we think it is
important to know, ``How much is this program going to cost
over the life of the program?''
So we have made----
Mr. Walberg. It seems logical, doesn't it?
Mr. Lord. Yes, now, so we have--I mean, it is not that they
don't have any, but they can obviously be refined and improved,
giving better granularity on--you know, these are big programs,
technology programs we are referring to.
But the good news is TSA has agreed. I think in some cases
they didn't have the in-house expertise to really develop a
good one, but they have recently taken some steps to address
that. So hopefully, over the future, we will be seeing better
cost estimates, better cost-benefit analysis, et cetera.
Mr. Walberg. Mr. Halinski, what is the process, if you
could describe it for us, for coordinating with other agencies
such as the DOD on evaluating and incorporating new
technologies for use in security screening?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir.
I would say that one of the things we are trying to do with
technology--and we have taken on-board recommendations from
GAO. We have taken on-board recommendations from DHS and other
entities--is to look at the way we approach technology. We have
done this in the last, I would say, year.
What we are trying to do is approach it from the
perspective that instead of you have technology drive
operations, requirements and threat drives technology. That is
what we are looking for.
What we want to try to do is work with industry. We have
industry days. We work with the Washington Homeland Security
group that deals with technology. We are looking at putting
together a strategic plan--a 5-year plan, which at times can be
a little bit difficult because the budget cycles go in 1 and 2
years, particularly 2 years for acquisition of technology.
But we believe that a 5-year plan, listening to our
counterparts in GAO, would be very productive to us. That is
one of the things that DOD does.
Having come from DOD--spent 25 years there--I know the way
their process works, and the way their process works with
technology. I think it is a good model.
We have done outreach to DOD on a consistent basis when it
comes to technology. We have talked to other departments when
it comes to technology. We have an entire division--our Office
of Security Capabilities--that deals with that kind of outreach
to other departments, as well as to private industry.
We recognize the fact that we could probably take a
different approach, be a little bit more strategic in our
planning as far as technology goes, and ensure that
requirements and ensure that threat is driving technology and
not a single piece of technology is driving operations.
Mr. Walberg. Okay. Thank you.
My time is expired.
I recognize Mr. Richmond.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you.
We touched for a second on PreCheck. It appears from
testimony and my experience that airlines, they run PreCheck on
the outside of the security gate.
Mr. Halinski. Sir----
Mr. Richmond. Here is my question.
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richmond. If I am PreChecked with US Air----
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir.
Mr. Richmond But I am not PreChecked with Delta--so that
means in the D.C. airport I am PreChecked, but in the Atlanta
airport I am not. Why does that happen?
Mr. Halinski. Okay, sir. Under the PreCheck concept--and we
are still piloting PreCheck, sir, right now. We are in 23
airports in the United States. We will be in 35 by the end of
this year.
We are continuing to grow PreCheck. Some of it has to do,
quite frankly, with the physical setups of the PreCheck areas
vice the screening area.
Some of it is logistics. We have to work with an airport.
We have to ensure that it is going to meet the right
requirements and the right configuration. That is one way.
The other area that I heard earlier, sir, has to deal with,
``If I am a frequent-flyer program in one airline, why can't I
go to another one?'' It is not as easy as having computers talk
to each other. Quite frankly, we do that with Secure Flight
every day. So that is not the issue.
I would say it is a proprietary issue among air carriers. I
am giving out your best customer list and there are some
concerns on how that will be protected.
We are working with industry to try to say that we will
protect and we will ensure that there is cross-pollination
there. We would like nothing more than to increase the amount
of people that are going through PreCheck. We have 12 and
under, 75 and older, armed forces of the military, we are
looking at new populations every single day.
One of the reasons we have asked industry to help us is to
drive towards these new populations because we understand very
clearly now, we have evolved. I will tell you we have evolved
from one-size-fits-all to, ``Let us look at the traveling
public and see who poses the highest threat and the rest we
screen, but we screen to a standard that is acceptable to the
level of risk.''
Mr. Richmond. Has anyone come up with a formula for what
they believe passenger traffic through a security point to the
proportionate number of TSA agents? Do we have a ratio on that?
Mr. Halinski. Well, yes sir, and that is one of the models
we are looking at. To make PreCheck successful, we need to
ensure that the amount of people that are using the PreCheck
lanes are substantial enough and right now. That is why we are
in the pilot stage.
We don't----
Mr. Richmond. Well actually I am talking about just the
regular checkpoints, not PreCheck, just your regular
checkpoints, do you have best practices on how many agents
per----
Mr. Halinski. Yes sir, we do. We have an entire model. It
is not only based on the number of flights during a specific
time, down periods--the airline industry uses banks when there
are higher numbers of flights coming in and out of that
airport.
So we have a very good model, we think, optimizing and
effectively using the number of TSOs at the checkpoint based on
configuration, based on operations, and based on the type of
technology that is there.
Mr. Richmond. I will just add, the last meeting we had or
committee hearing that we had on TSA and basically that was a
meeting on your approval rating. But when I left that meeting
and they talked about the number of TSO officers in airports, I
noticed that in the District of Columbia, the line now was
substantially larger. In the conversation with the airport
people, they said that they added flights and they said, ``We
added a good number of flights at the D.C. airport.'' I said,
``Did you get anymore TSA agents?'' They said ``No,'' hence the
long line.
So that is why I am asking if there is a formula you use,
if you use it, and how long after they add flights or make
adjustments do you adjust to make sure you don't have those
long waiting periods at the airport?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. The key to success in security
operations, we believe is not just the security screening
process itself. It is the communication that exists between the
airport authority, the law enforcement, and all the other
vendors that are in the airport.
Let me use the example of DCA, was there a blockage there
for probably about a week or 2--yes, there was. When we went
back and looked at that process, what we found is that two
different air carriers had moved into one of the terminals.
They had changed the type of aircraft. They had gone from a
smaller aircraft to 757s, which means that you are going to
have more people going through.
What was needed was more communication from everybody
involved--TSA, Airport Authority. I think that communication
hit them real hard and real fast and I believe that when you go
there now, you will see that they are at the right level.
``Communication, collaboration, cooperation''--that is a
motto that we have that we think works if we follow it.
Mr. Richmond. My time has expired.
If the Chairman will, I just have one last question.
My experience with Government entities, especially the
Corps of Engineers, which did all the levee protection around
New Orleans--and one thing we advocated for was third-party
independent review of their engineering plans and practices to
give the general public more confidence.
I guess my question is, do you all do an individual--I mean
and independent of technology and evaluations of some of your
security either technology or procedures or things of that
nature?
Mr. Halinski. Yes sir, in fact I am sitting next to Mr.
Lord who probably is our greatest quality control person that
we have right now.
We also use the Department's inspector general and we have
in the past used outside contractors to validate some of our
processes. It is a great tool to have, sir, and I think it is
important to conduct the analysis and look inward at your
processes.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you.
Mr. Walberg. I thank the gentleman.
You could have more time to ask questions if you would
commit to not pitching the first four innings of the
Congressional ballgame next year that--we will let that go.
Just to make one final comment, my experience with PreCheck
in Detroit, where I go through coming here, has just been
excellent--works so well. It is not crowded, and I think it is
doing what it was intended to do.
At DCA, it is still pretty crowded at this point where it
probably encourages some of us not to go through PreCheck, it
is faster to go through the regular line. I know that is
something that has to be worked out over time.
But I do want to say that where it is working, it is
working and we appreciate that and trust that as the days go on
and you work out the arrangements with the airlines itself. I
appreciate that testimony, because that is not something that I
thought about. It is proprietary in getting lists of people
understanding the process or the numbers that are coming
through, that is just an added point of your consideration. So
I appreciate that.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony, the
Members for their questions. The Members of the committee may
have some additional questions for the witnesses that we will
ask you to respond to in writing.
The hearing record will be held open for 10 days. So
without objection the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:29 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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