[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM: DOES DHS HAVE AN EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT
NUCLEAR DETECTION STRATEGY?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY,
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 26, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-110
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Ron Barber, Arizona
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND SECURITY
TECHNOLOGIES
Daniel E. Lungren, California, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Tim Walberg, Michigan, Vice Chair Laura Richardson, California
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Billy Long, Missouri William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Coley C. O'Brien, Staff Director
Zachary D. Harris, Subcommittee Clerk
Chris Schepis, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Dr. Huban A. Gowadia, Acting Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Joint Prepared Statement with Gene Aloise...................... 16
Mr. Vayl S. Oxford, National Security Executive Policy Advisor,
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren for Huban A. Gowadia... 37
Questions From Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke for Huban A.
Gowadia........................................................ 40
Question From Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke for Vayl S. Oxford. 43
PREVENTING NUCLEAR TERRORISM: DOES DHS HAVE AN EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT
NUCLEAR DETECTION STRATEGY?
----------
Thursday, July 26, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection,
and Security Technologies,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:59 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Daniel E. Lungren
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Lungren, Walberg, Marino, and
Clarke.
Mr. Lungren. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and
Security Technologies will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine the nuclear
detection capabilities and strategy of the Department of
Homeland Security. We have been advised that we are going to
have votes starting at 10:30 or 10:45. It will go for 2 hours,
so we are going to try and--we are going to have to get this
in, in a very short period of time. So we will move as quickly
as possible and hopefully get to questions.
I will recognize myself for an abbreviated opening
statement.
First of all, let me thank those of you who are here and
others who helped give us a very, very good classified briefing
the other day. I think that was very helpful. I understand
there were a lot of questions and answers that we got in the
classified briefing that we couldn't have here, and I
appreciate it. Just for the record, I think the attendance of
the membership was an indication of how important this issue is
and how well received the briefing was.
Nuclear and radiological terrorism is my greatest fear for
various reasons, which I articulate in my written statement,
which will be made a part of the record. I would mention that
it was a year ago in this hearing room that the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office informed us that it was canceling the
costly Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Monitoring Program, known
as ASP. Obviously that was a disappointment. The disappointment
was expressed by the Department. It was shared, at least
shared, by those of us on this subcommittee.
A few months ago the Department provided its proposed path
forward with the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture--GNDA--
implementation plan. We thank you for responding to our
questions on that in the classified briefing that we had. I
believe that this is a major accomplishment of your office by
facilitating the interagency cooperation that is essential to
the development of such a comprehensive architecture.
In 2005 the President called for the establishment of the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO, in the Department of
Homeland Security. I responded by codifying it in our Safe Port
Act of 2006, which we introduced to address the terrorist
threats at our ports of entry. I believe the Safe Ports Act has
served the Nation very well. The Department acknowledged at
least the Department has met its goal of scanning 100 percent
of the containerized cargo entering our country's highest-risk
ports.
Now that we have made progress in securing these ports it
is important to expand our look into all potential pathways for
nuclear smuggling whether by land, sea, or air. The Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture is a response to that. We
appreciate the work that you are doing on that.
Unfortunately for the subcommittee, we have seen a
recurring theme--and perhaps you can address that--that DHS is
struggling to manage its technology acquisition processes. We
hope that the situation will be quickly corrected, since it is
a vital part of our global architecture strategy.
I would like to commend DNDO on its Securing the Cities
Program, which has successfully put radiation detector
technology in the hands of first responders throughout the New
York City area. It is, I believe, a model for Federal-State
nuclear defense cooperation.
I would leave the rest of my statement to be entered into
the record so that we can proceed as quickly as possible to our
panel.
[The statement of Chairman Lungren follows:]
Statement of Chairman Daniel E. Lungren
July 26, 2012
Nuclear and radiological terrorism is my greatest fear. It would
represent an unprecedented catastrophic event, causing enormous death,
destruction, as well as long-term economic disruption. So it is
critical that we continue our vigilance and oversight efforts in order
to address this continuing threat. Our subcommittee hearing today will
examine the current nuclear detection strategy of the Department of
Homeland Security and assess whether that strategy is both effective
and efficient in countering this threat.
It was exactly 1 year ago today, in this very hearing room, that
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office informed me that it was
cancelling its costly Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Monitoring Program,
known as ``A-S-P''. After much promise, testing, and evaluation, the
Department cancelled ASP without identifying a new technology
replacement.
Three months ago, the Department provided its proposed path forward
with its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) ``Implementation
Plan''. This was a major accomplishment of DNDO by facilitating the
interagency cooperation that is essential to the development of such a
comprehensive architecture. The plan provides for the first time, a 5-
year look-ahead of the needed capabilities for countering our nuclear
and radiological threats. While the GNDA plan contains excellent
procedures and policies to coordinate our Nation's nuclear defense
efforts, it fails to identify the Department's priorities for acquiring
its next generation of detection equipment.
In 2005, the President called for the establishment of the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) in the Department of Homeland Security.
I responded by codifying DNDO in the SAFE Port Act of 2006 which I
introduced to address terrorist threats at our ports of entry. I
believe that the SAFE Port Act has served this Nation very well. We are
proud to acknowledge that the Department has met its goal of scanning
100% of containerized cargo entering our country's highest-risk ports.
Now that we have made progress in securing these ports, it is important
that we expand our look into all potential pathways for nuclear
smuggling, whether by land, sea, or air. In response, DNDO is
developing, in coordination with the Departments of Defense, Energy,
and State, the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. DNDO is
responsible for implementing the domestic portion of this architecture
which focuses on the U.S. border as well as Federal, State, and local
governments. It's also responsible for developing and acquiring
radiation detection equipment to support the domestic efforts of DHS
and other Federal agencies. A key partner in this domestic nuclear
security effort is U.S. Customs and Border Protection, or ``C-B-P''. We
are disappointed that CBP was unable to testify at today's hearing but
we look forward to hearing from them on this topic at a later date.
Today we will examine how the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
will detect and prevent a catastrophic nuclear terrorism event.
Reliable and effective detection technology is critical to that effort.
Unfortunately, in hearings before this subcommittee, we have seen a
recurring theme: DHS struggling to manage its technology acquisition
processes. We are hopeful that this situation will be quickly corrected
since it is a vital part of our global architecture strategy.
I would like to compliment DNDO on its Securing the Cities Program
which has successfully put radiation detector technology in the hands
of first responders throughout the New York City metropolitan area.
Securing the Cities is a model for Federal-State nuclear defense
cooperation. We are hopeful that DNDO can apply these positive lessons
learned to its next generation of radiation portal monitors (RPM's) and
other technologies.
Dr. Gowadi, I welcome and congratulate you on your new Director
position. It is a critical role and the centerpiece of our defense to
the Nation's nuclear terrorist threat.
I also look forward to hearing from GAO on the effectiveness and
efficiency of DNDO's plans as well as one of our National laboratories
on new and innovative ways to improve our radiation detection
capability.
I now recognize the gentle lady from New York, Ms. Clarke for her
opening statement.
Mr. Lungren. I would now recognize my Ranking Member, the
gentle lady from New York, Ms. Clarke, for her opening
statement.
Ms. Clark. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this hearing today to discuss developments in the Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office strategy and the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture.
It has been said before, the enormous devastation that
would result if terrorists used a nuclear weapon or nuclear
material successfully requires us to do all we can do to
prevent them from entering or moving through the United States.
This subcommittee in its oversight capacity has held hearings
starting in 2005 and continuing through 2012 regarding the
development and implementation of the GNDA and in the decision-
making process that involves costly investments in it.
The overarching issues include the balance between
investment in near-term and long-term solutions for
architecture gaps, the degree and efficiency of Federal agency
coordination, the mechanism for studying agency investment
priorities in the architecture, and efforts DNDO has undertaken
to retain institutional knowledge regarding this sustained
effort.
In the policy and strategy documents of the GNDA the DNDO
is responsible for developing the global strategy for nuclear
detection, and each Federal agency that has a role in combating
nuclear smuggling is responsible for implementing its own
program. DNDO identified 73 Federal programs, which are
primarily funded by DOD, DOE, and DHS that engage in
radiological and nuclear detection activities.
With the publication of an overall DNDO strategy
development document and the release of the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture and the implementation plan, Congress
will have a better idea of how to judge DNDO's policy,
strategy, operations, tactics, and implementation.
But we need to know about their R&D activities, their
resource requests and their asset allegations. I know that I
might sound like a broken record before the day is through, but
from the very start of the ASP program, which was officially
cancelled just 10 days ago, July 16. DNDO seemed to push
acquisition decisions well before the technology had
demonstrated that it could live up to its promise.
On July 14, 2006, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael
Chertoff, and then-director of DNDO, Mr. Oxford, one of our
witnesses today, announced contract awards to three companies
worth an estimated $1.2 billion to develop ASP, including the
Raytheon Company from Massachusetts, the Thermal Electron
Company from Santa Fe, New Mexico, and Canberra Industries from
Connecticut.
Both Secretary Chertoff and Oxford held a press conference
to announce the billion-dollar contract awards just a few
months after highly critical reviews of the ASP's ability by
the GAO and the National Institute of Standards and Technology.
I hope we don't see that kind of decision making again in DNDO.
Within DNDO, policy and strategy have historically not been
adequately translated into operations, tactics, and
implementation. Overlapping missions, especially in the field
of nuclear detection, worsened this. Since 2009, DNDO has made
important changes under Secretary Napolitano, and made
especially good progress in nuclear forensics. I hope that our
Congressional oversight has had an effect, a positive one, in
bringing to light decisions that cost the taxpayers a lot of
money with little to show.
In 2010, the Science and Technology Directorate requested
$109 million for the transformational research and development,
radiological and nuclear division. This research was to be
transferred from DNDO to the Science and Technology
Directorate, and the Democratic committee Members supported the
transition of radiological and nuclear research away from DNDO
into S&T.
The committee, under then-Chairman Thompson, worked to make
this transition happen and we believed that research and
development and operations and procurement are best left to
separate organizations in order to avoid obvious conflicts of
interest.
What I hope we are going to hear today is how DNDO's
mission can be better defined. Some claim there is still
confusion as to whether it is an end-to-end RDT&E and
procurement entity for all things nuclear and radiological, a
development entity or an operational entity, and the question
whether there is an inherent conflict of interest when an
agency is both an R&D workshop and a procurement platform.
Let me finish with this thought, completely out of the
policy arena. On the ground and every day our nuclear deterrent
effort requires motivated and vigilant officers supplied with
the best equipment and intelligence we can give them.
Customs and Border Patrol officers working at our Nation's
ports of entry have an extremely complex and difficult job.
Thousands of decisions are made every day to clear a container
or personal vehicle for transit into the United States, require
further inspection, and even deny entry or interdict such a
vehicle or person. That is the hard, cold, every-day reality of
our mission to prevent this kind of violent nuclear attack. We
must do our best.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Clarke follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke
July 26, 2012
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing to discuss
developments in the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Strategy, and the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.
It has been said before, the enormous devastation that would result
if terrorists use a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials successfully,
requires us to do all we can to prevent them from entering or moving
through the United States.
This subcommittee, in its oversight capacity, has held hearings
starting in 2005, and continuing through 2012, regarding the
development and implementation of the GNDA and in the decision-making
process that involves costly investments in it.
The overarching issues include the balance between investment in
near-term and long-term solutions for architecture gaps, the degree and
efficiency of Federal agency coordination, the mechanism for setting
agency investment priorities in the architecture, and the efforts DNDO
has undertaken to retain institutional knowledge regarding this
sustained effort.
In the policy and strategy documents of the GNDA, DNDO is
responsible for developing the global strategy for nuclear detection,
and each Federal agency that has a role in combating nuclear smuggling
is responsible for implementing its own programs. DNDO identified 73
Federal programs, which are primarily funded by DOD, DOE, and DHS that
engage in radiological and nuclear detection activities.
With the publication of an overall DNDO strategy document and the
release of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and implementation
plan, Congress will have a better idea of how to judge the DNDO's
policy, strategy operations, tactics and implementation.
But we need to know more about their R&D activities, their resource
requests, and their asset allocations. And I know that I might sound
like a broken record before the day is through, but from the very start
of the ASP program which was officially cancelled just 10 days ago,
July 16, DNDO seemed to push for acquisition decisions well before the
technology had demonstrated that it could live up to its promise.
On July 14, 2006, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff
and the then-Director of DNDO, Mr. Oxford, one of our witnesses today,
announced contract awards to three companies worth an estimated $1.2
billion to develop ASPs, including the Raytheon Company, from
Massachusetts, the Thermo Electron Company from Santa Fe, New Mexico
and Canberra Industries from Connecticut. Both Secretary Chertoff and
Oxford held a press conference to announce the billion-dollar contract
awards just a few months after highly critical reviews of the ASPs'
abilities by the GAO and the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST).
I hope we don't see that kind of decision making again in DNDO.
Within DNDO, policy and strategy have, historically, not been
adequately translated into operations, tactics, and implementation.
Overlapping missions, especially in the field of nuclear detection,
worsen this.
Since 2009, DNDO has made important changes under Secretary
Napolitano, and made especially good progress in nuclear forensics. And
I hope that our Congressional oversight has had an effect, a positive
one, in bringing to light decisions that cost the taxpayers a lot of
money, with little to show.
In 2010, the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate requested
$109.000 million for the Transformational Research and Development
Radiological and Nuclear Division. This research was to be transferred
from DNDO to the S&T Directorate,\1\ and the Democratic Committee
Members supported the transition of radiological and nuclear research
away from DNDO into S&T. The committee, under then-Chairman Thompson,
worked to make this transition happen, and we believe that research and
development, and operations and procurement, are best left to separate
organizations in order to avoid the obvious conflict of interest.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ DHS fiscal year 2011 Budget in Brief, ICE 10-2647.000474 p.
139.
------------
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
What I hope we are going to hear today is how DNDO's mission can be
better defined. Some claim there is still confusion as to whether it is
an end-to-end RDT&E and procurement entity for all things nuclear/
radiological, a development entity, or an operational entity, and
question whether there is an inherent conflict of interest when an
agency is both an R&D workshop and a procurement platform.
Let me finish with this thought, completely out of the policy
arena. On the ground, and every day, our nuclear deterrence effort
requires motivated and vigilant officers supplied with the best
equipment and intelligence we can give them. Customs and Border Patrol
officers working at our Nation's ports of entry have an extremely
complex and difficult job.
Thousands of decisions are made every day to clear a container or
personal vehicle for transit into the United States, require further
inspection, or even deny entry or interdict such a vehicle or person,
and that is the hard, cold, everyday reality of our mission to prevent
this kind of violent nuclear attack.
We must do our best.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and with that,
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. The gentle lady yields back.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
July 26, 2012
Good morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing.
I also want to thank the witnesses for their testimony today.
Exactly 1 year ago, we had a similar hearing on our nuclear
detection capabilities.
As we continue to seek ways to resolve known vulnerabilities, the
work of DNDO can play an important role in the security of our borders
and ports of entry by assuring that radiological and nuclear materials
are detected before they enter this country.
Many DHS components contribute to meeting the Department's
strategic goal of preventing unauthorized acquisition or use of
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials and
capabilities, but only DNDO has detection as a core mission.
Since its creation, the Department has maintained existing
programs, and established new programs dedicated to the detection of
radiological and nuclear materials.
These programs initially lacked a unified strategy that integrated
their activities with the programs of other Federal departments.
In 2010, the Department, in coordination with other Federal
agencies, released a strategic plan for the global nuclear detection
architecture that provided this unified strategy.
It is my understanding that the strategy does not provide guidance
to participating entities; leaves program level budgeting to the
discretion of the component, and does not establish performance
measures and benchmarks.
It seems that without these elements, the strategy is not a road
map to success and may well be a path to nowhere.
I raise the need for these elements because I do not want DNDO to
repeat the ASP fiasco. After several years, a few GAO reports, and $393
million,\1\ DNDO has come to the conclusion that ASP is not a workable
product.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Government Accountability Office, Combating Nuclear Smuggling:
DHS Has Developed a Strategic Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture, but Gaps Remain, GAO-11-869T, July 26, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And while I commend you for accepting the truth, it is my
understanding that this conclusion could have been reached much sooner
and without the expenditure of millions of dollars if DNDO had talked
to CBP and understood the needs of the product's end-user.
I hope that the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and strategy
is an effort to revamp the process that allowed the ASP fiasco to
occur.
However, I cannot be assured that DNDO has learned from this
experience without knowing that routine management tools like
performance measures and benchmarks are in place.
Hopefully, our witnesses today will tell us that DNDO has turned a
corner and is not likely to repeat its unfortunate past.
Mr. Lungren. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel
of witnesses today for us on this important topic. Dr. Huban
Gowadia is the acting director of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office at the Department of Homeland Security. In
this capacity, she oversees integration of the interagency
efforts for technical nuclear detection and forensics, and
directs research, development, evaluation, acquisition
activities for the Department's radiological and nuclear
detection technologies.
Served most recently at DNDO as the deputy director.
Previously served as the assistant director of DNDO's mission
management directorate, where she was responsible for ensuring
an effective link between user requirements, operational
support, and technology development across the nuclear
detection architecture.
Mr. David Maurer is the director in the U.S. Government
Accountability Offices, Homeland Security and Justice team,
where he heads GAO's work reviewing DHS and DOJ management
issues. His recent work in these areas include DHS management
integration, the Quadrennial Homeland Security review, Secret
Service financial management, DOJ grant management for the
present system, and assessment of the technology for detecting
explosives in the passenger rail environment.
Mr. Vayl Oxford is the national security policy advisor at
the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. In this role he is
responsible for working with the laboratory's leadership to
guide the strategic direction and vision for National security
issues.
Prior to joining the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory,
Mr. Oxford spent a short time in private industry after 35
years of public service, combining time in the military and as
a government civilian employee. He served at the Department of
Homeland Security from October 2003 to January 2009, where he
held positions of policy advisor to the under secretary of
science and technology, acting director of Homeland Security
Advanced Research Projects Agency, and as the first director of
the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office.
I am sorry we are under the time constraints that we have,
but we are going to have a voting session of about 2 hours on
the floor. So again, your written statements will be made a
part of the record and we would ask you for a summarization of
5 minutes of each of your points and then we will try and get
as many questions possible.
If you will please testify in the order in which I
introduced you.
STATEMENT OF HUBAN A. GOWADIA, ACTING DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC
NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Gowadia. Good morning, Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member
Clarke, and Mr. Walberg.
Thank you so much for having us here today to discuss
DNDO's progress in coordinating the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture, or GNDA, and implementing its domestic component.
DNDO is a unique interagency organization with a singular
focus on making nuclear terrorism a prohibitively difficult
undertaking for our adversaries. On DO oversight, DNDO
continues to build upon the concept of an interagency GNDA.
As we strive to build an effective and efficient nuclear
detection strategy, we acknowledge that ability to counter the
nuclear threat is fundamentally based on the critical triad of
intelligence, law enforcement, and technology.
To maximize our ability to detect and interdict a nuclear
threat, it is imperative that we apply these technologies in
operations that are driven by intelligence indicators, and
place them in the hands of the well-trained law enforcement and
public safety personnel.
To this end, we have steadily increased our collaboration
with the intelligence community, and we continue to set the
training standards and build curricula necessary to train
front-line operators. We are now focusing on an architecture
that is capable of surging in response to credible information
that indicates an imminent threat to our National security.
This means that nuclear detection capabilities must be robust,
flexible, agile, and well-coordinated. Our multi-layered
architecture will indicate partner assets and capabilities into
a unified response.
Following completion of the first-ever interagency GNDA
strategic plan in December 2010, we worked with our DHS partner
components to develop the DHS-GNDA implementation plan. This
plan represents the next step in the development of an
operational and coordinated capability to search for, detect,
and interdict nuclear threats. As this plan illustrates, we are
committed to balancing capabilities across the architecture,
not just in any one pathway.
Over the past decade DHS has made considerable progress in
deploying systems at our land borders and seaports to scan
cargo and vehicles for nuclear threats. Our on-going work with
the U.S. Customs and Border Protection has resulted in the
scanning of over 99 percent of all containerized cargo that
enters our Nation at our seaports and via trucks at our land
borders.
DHS began deploying the current generation systems in 2003
and many of these are now approaching 10 years of service in
the field. While recent studies have shown that the service
life of these systems may be significantly longer than
originally anticipated, at DNDO we are proactively examining
technical methods to improve their operation and capabilities
and extend their service life. This includes efforts to ensure
that alternative neutron detection technologies are now
commercially available and large quantities of helium-3 will no
longer be necessary for these systems.
As we look beyond our land and seaports to implement a more
balanced National architecture, we will need cost-effective
detectors that can be widely deployed and detection systems
that can search wide areas, even in the most challenging
environments. Such challenges require new materials, such as
lanthanum bromide, that can be applied in novel concepts of
operation. Recently, we developed the next-generation
radioisotope identification device which has improved
algorithms and is based on this material, resulting in
significantly superior performance.
We worked closely with our partners to identify key
operational requirements that drove the new system design, and
now we have an easy to use light-based system that is more
reliable and has lower maintenance costs due to its built-in
calibration and diagnostics feature.
To address the challenge of wide-area search, our long-
range radiation detection project seeks to advance technologies
that detect, identify, and precisely locate radiation sources
at stand-off distances. To allow for nuclear detection along
our borders, DNDO is working on network detectors that
integrate data from across multiple portable monitors with the
goal overall system performance compared to a non-network
system.
DNDO is able to strengthen the security triad of
intelligence, law enforcement, and technology because of our
integrated and holistic approach to preventing nuclear threats
through our detection and forensics efforts. Our disciplined
and singular focus on nuclear counterterrorism is reinforced by
our rigorous systems development process and anchored by the
skills and knowledge of our interagency staff, scientists,
engineers, current and former law enforcement and military
personnel, intelligence professionals, and policy experts.
Thank you again for this opportunity to discuss DNDO's
efforts to protect our Nation from a nuclear threat. I would be
happy to take your questions.
[The statement of Ms. Gowadia follows:]
Prepared Statement of Huban A. Gowadia
July 26, 2012
Good morning Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. As acting director of the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO), I am pleased to testify today with my distinguished
colleagues to discuss nuclear detection. My testimony today will focus
on the DNDO's progress in coordinating the global nuclear detection
architecture (GNDA) and implementing the domestic portion.
DNDO is a unique interagency organization, with staff expertise in
technical, law enforcement, military, and interagency issues, focused
exclusively on preventing nuclear terrorism. Countering nuclear
terrorism is a whole-of-Government challenge, and DNDO works with
Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, international, and private-
sector partners to fulfill this mission. Working in coordination with
partners from across the U.S. Government (USG), including DHS
components, the Departments of Energy (DOE), State, Defense (DOD),
Justice, the intelligence community, and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, DNDO develops the global nuclear detection architecture
(GNDA) and implements the domestic component of the architecture. DNDO
also works with its partners to coordinate interagency efforts to
develop technical nuclear detection capabilities, measure detector
system performance, ensure effective response to detection alarms,
integrate USG nuclear forensics efforts, and conduct transformational
research and development for advanced detection and forensics
technologies.
DNDO continues to build upon the concept of an interagency GNDA. We
are working with partners to build a flexible, multi-layered
architecture that will strategically integrate Federal, State, local,
territorial, and Tribal assets and capabilities into a unified response
when intelligence or information indicates there may be a credible
nuclear threat. The USG must be able to respond effectively to credible
information that indicates an imminent threat to our National security,
and, if necessary, surge all available resources in a coordinated
manner. Since a surge relies on detection resources that are in place
at the time, this places a premium on identifying what is needed to
respond to threats and ensuring it will be available if needed. The USG
strategy leverages the integrated efforts of Federal, State, local,
territorial, and Tribal responders to perform nuclear detection in
concentrated regions or areas when information indicates there may be a
need for responsive search operations for preventive detection or
interdiction. DNDO continues to develop new equipment and technology
that is flexible and mobile, enhancing the ability of the USG to
respond to radiological and nuclear threats.
dhs gnda implementation plan
Building upon the interagency GNDA Strategic Plan, which we
submitted to Congress in December of 2010, DNDO led the Department's
development of the DHS GNDA Implementation Plan. This plan represents
the next step in the development of the Department's operational and
coordinated capability to respond to radiological and nuclear threats
against the homeland. The planning team was made up of representatives
from across DHS operational components and headquarters offices, as
well as interagency representatives.
The DHS GNDA Implementation Plan identifies specific DHS-led
programs and activities that will support the mission, goals, and
responsibilities detailed in the GNDA Strategic Plan.
As requested by Congress, the plan also includes current resource
planning information based on the Future Years Homeland Security
Program.
The GNDA will require constant review to account for changing
threats, missions, and technology. Through this implementation planning
process, DHS has developed metrics associated with GNDA Strategic Plan
performance goals. These metrics define achievement and time lines for
each performance goal.
maintaining and enhancing capabilities at ports of entry
Over the past decade, DHS has made considerable progress in
deploying systems at our borders and seaports to scan cargo and
vehicles for radiological and nuclear threats. Through the Radiation
Portal Monitor (RPM) program, detection equipment is procured and
installed at domestic ports of entry to scan containerized cargo for
radiological and nuclear threats, addressing the requirements of the
Security and Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 (Pub. L.
No. 109-347). Our on-going work with U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) to facilitate container security has resulted in the scanning of
over 99 percent of all incoming containerized cargo for radiological
and nuclear threats entering via truck at our land borders and at our
seaports, utilizing RPMs. RPMs, coupled with handheld radioisotope
identification devices (RIIDs), are the workhorses of our on-going
deployments.
Scanning of containerized cargo at seaports of entry will continue,
in accordance with SAFE Port Act requirements. However, given the
current fiscal environment, DNDO and CBP, working together, will
continue to work to balance risk reduction, effectiveness of
radiological and nuclear scanning, flow and volume of commerce, and
life-cycle costs when determining RPM deployment priorities.
Improvements to Current Generation RPMs
We are looking ahead in anticipation of a future need for enhanced
capabilities or new systems for scanning cargo at ports of entry. The
RPM program began deployment of the current generation poly-vinyl
toluene (PVT) RPMs in 2003 and many of these are approaching the 10-
year service life mark. While recent DNDO-funded studies have shown
that the service life of PVT RPMs may be significantly longer than was
previously anticipated, the oldest RPMs will eventually need to be
replaced or refurbished. Given the very significant DHS investment in
the RPM program, DNDO has been studying the issue of how to extend the
usefulness of this investment and develop the system to its full
potential. DNDO's PVT Improvement Program examines technical methods to
improve the operations and capabilities of currently deployed PVT RPMs.
DNDO plans to complete developmental testing and field validation
testing of selected PVT improvement solutions in fiscal year 2013.
Next Generation Handheld Detectors
Radioisotope Identification Devices (RIIDs) are used by law
enforcement officers and technical experts during routine operations.
To further improve operational nuclear detection capability, DNDO has
led the development of a next-generation RIID. We worked closely with
CBP, USCG, the TSA, and State and local operators, to identify key
operational requirements that drove the design of the new system. Based
on an enhanced detection material, lanthanum bromide, and improved
algorithms, this new handheld technology is easy-to-use, lightweight,
and more reliable, and because it has built in calibration and
diagnostics, has a much lower annual maintenance cost. We are currently
in the process of deploying these with CBP at POEs.
Advanced Spectroscopic Portals (ASP)
Last year, my predecessor announced the Department's decision to
cancel full-scale deployment of the ASP system for either primary or
secondary scanning. At the recommendation of the Department's
Acquisition Review Board, Secretary Napolitano directed DNDO and CBP to
end the ASP program as originally conceived and to instead use hardware
left over from the ASP program to collect spectroscopic data from
operational environments that can be used to characterize future models
and refine operational requirements. Based upon a careful review of
needs and resources, DNDO is working with CBP, as well as State
authorities, to determine locations for data collection purposes. The
data gathered will be used for modeling and to refine requirements,
especially in the areas of detecting special nuclear materials in the
presence of masking, and for characterizing the effect of conveyance
speed control on isotope identification.
dndo acquisition and commercial engagement strategy
Recognizing the important contributions and innovations of private
industry, National laboratories, and academia, DNDO has evolved its
acquisition focus from one that is predominantly fueled by a
Government-funded, Government-managed development process to one that
relies upon industry-led development. As such, all DNDO technology
development programs now proceed with a ``commercial first'' approach--
engaging first with the private sector for solutions and only moving to
a Government-sponsored and -managed development effort if necessary.
This approach takes advantage of industry's innate flexibility and
ability to rapidly improve technologies, leveraging industry-led
innovation.
This transition will also include a new approach at the systems
level, in which strategic interfaces will be clearly defined in the
detector/system architecture, allowing system upgrades without
wholesale changes. We have shared the DNDO Acquisition and Commercial
Engagement Strategy with industry through DHS's Private Sector Office
to ensure the commercial sector remains aligned with DNDO's current
development and acquisition approach. In some cases, shifting to
commercial-based acquisitions will reduce the total time to test,
acquire, and field technology.
research and development to support and enhance the architecture
Along with intelligence and law enforcement, technology is
fundamental in our ability to detect nuclear threats. In recent years,
there have been dramatic advancements in nuclear detection technology.
Thirty years ago, identification of detected nuclear material required
laboratory specialists and large, complicated equipment. Now, newer
detection materials that can be integrated into mobile and human-
portable devices, coupled with advanced algorithms, allow for
significantly improved operations. As a result, front-line responders
and law enforcement officials now regularly use detection equipment to
search for, find, and identify nuclear materials in the field.
Technological advances in computing, communications, software, and
hardware have also contributed to this revolution in nuclear detection
technology.
Despite these advancements, however, developing nuclear detection
technology for homeland security applications is an inherently
difficult technical task. The fundamental technical challenge for
nuclear detection is one of distinguishing signal from noise. Sensors
can detect radiation, but detection is limited by several factors,
including speed, distance, shielding, and source strength. Compounding
these challenges is the difficulty in distinguishing ever-present
background radiation from radiation that poses a threat. Additionally,
to mitigate risk across all pathways in the GNDA, detection
technologies must be capable of operations in challenging environments,
such as on the water and in rugged terrain between ports of entry.
While DNDO's work to develop, evaluate, and deploy systems supports
the on-going enhancement of the GNDA, significant technical challenges
remain. These challenges include:
Cost-effective equipment with sufficient technical
performance to ensure widespread deployment;
Enhanced wide-area search capabilities in a variety of
scenarios to include urban and highly-cluttered environments;
Monitoring along challenging GNDA pathways, to include
scanning of general aviation and small maritime vessels, and
searching for nuclear threats between ports of entry; and
Detection of nuclear threats even when heavily shielded.
Additionally, our programs must be able to reach out to operators
for user requirements and to balance both ``technology push'' and
``technology pull'' efforts, as appropriate. For the former, the
technology developer is pushing a new concept out for examination by
the operator. These systems may be otherwise unknown to operators, and
are often state-of-the-art with enhanced or improved threat detection
capabilities and may further allow for simplified operational use.
Technology pull refers to equipment and programs where operators have
identified new concepts of operation and/or features that they need in
order to achieve their missions. The operators are constantly pulling
the technologies in directions that guide our development of detection
systems.
DNDO works to address these challenges through a robust, long term,
multi-faceted transformational and applied research and development
(R&D) program. I would like to highlight a few of the projects in our
transformational R&D portfolio that are showing significant progress
and promise.
Helium-3 Alternatives
Helium-3 has been widely used as a neutron detection component for
radiation detection devices, such as RPMs. However, in recent years,
our country has faced a helium-3 shortage. Years before the recent
helium-3 shortage, DNDO was already exploring options for better, more
cost-effective, alternatives for neutron detection. DNDO's
transformational and applied research efforts included 14 different
technologies that could be used instead of helium-3 tubes, including
those based on boron or lithium.
Once the shortage was identified, DNDO accelerated this progress
and led an interagency working group to address the use of alternate
neutron detection technologies. DNDO also queried the commercial
marketplace for available systems. At a recently-completed test,
present and next generation alternatives from DNDO's research and
development and the private sector were evaluated and multiple systems
proved to have sufficient performance to replace helium-3 in RPMs. As a
result of DNDO's efforts, alternative neutron detection technologies
are now commercially available and large quantities of helium-3 will no
longer be necessary for use in RPMs. Importantly, due to a
collaborative, USG-wide effort to address the shortfall, our U.S.
strategic reserve of helium-3 has increased by 40 percent since 2009.
Advanced Radiation Monitoring Device (ARMD)
Our Advanced Radiation Monitoring Device (ARMD) project focuses on
enhancing our ability to distinguish benign radiological and nuclear
materials, from those that potentially pose a threat. The ARMD project
capitalizes on the efficiency and energy resolution of emerging
detector crystals, such as strontium iodide (SrI2) and
cesium lithium yttrium chloride, or ``CLYC'', to develop smaller, more
capable detection systems. Through DNDO's efforts, the detector
materials have sufficiently matured to the point where they are now
commercially available. New handheld detector systems using these
crystals are being designed, built, and will soon be ready for formal
evaluation by DNDO.
Long Range Radiation Detection (LRRD) Project
Our Long Range Radiation Detection (LRRD) project has the potential
to have broad operational impact by significantly improving the range
of detectors. Through the LRRD project, DNDO has been developing
advanced technologies to detect, identify, and precisely locate
radiation sources at stand-off distances, through passive gamma-ray
imaging technology. We have focused on two systems: Stand-Off Radiation
Detection Systems, which uses a mobile system to locate stationary
sources; and the Road Side Tracker, which is a rapidly re-locatable
monitoring system capable of identifying and tracking threats in moving
vehicles across multiple lanes of traffic. Recent LRRD demonstrations
included interagency partners from the technical and law enforcement
communities, utilizing a ``technology push'' to allow operators to use
the prototype systems in simulated and operational environments. DNDO
is assessing the potential for further development based upon operator
feedback and evaluations obtained during the demonstrations.
Networked Detectors
To address nuclear detection in challenging operational
environments, DNDO is working on networked detectors. These detectors,
being developed in the Intelligent Radiation Sensor System (IRSS)
project, are intended to facilitate situational awareness and improve
capabilities to detect, identify, locate, and track threats across
distributed sensors. The IRSS integrates data from across multiple
portable detectors with the goal of improving overall system
performance compared to a non-networked system. This technology will
support operations where scanning for nuclear threats by routing
traffic through checkpoints is not tenable. These operations are
conducted at some special security events, between ports of entry along
the land border, and include scanning general aviation or small
maritime vessels for illicit radiological or nuclear materials.
Detecting Shielded Nuclear Threats
Nuclear threats may be shielded or masked, increasing the challenge
for passive detection techniques. To address shielded nuclear threats,
DNDO has several important projects. The Shielded Nuclear Alarm
Resolution project seeks to develop and characterize advanced active
interrogation systems with improved ability to uniquely detect special
nuclear material and to resolve alarms with confidence, even in the
presence of significant countermeasures (such as shielding). This
technology may substantially reduce the number of manual inspections
required to resolve alarms, while increasing the probability of nuclear
threat detection even when heavily shielded. Technologies of interest
include induced fission, high energy backscatter, and nuclear resonance
fluorescence.
Recent advancements in the commercial sector have also resulted in
technologies that combine the merits of passive and active technologies
into a single system through either muon tomography or by integrating
radiation detectors into X-ray radiography systems. In theory, these
systems should be able to automatically detect nuclear threats,
regardless of the shielding level, while providing an image for
detecting other anomalies. In order to characterize the full
performance capability of these technologies, DNDO recently solicited
proposals for our Nuclear and Radiological Imaging Platform Advanced
Technology Demonstration. This project will characterize imaging
systems for scanning conveyances and identifying possible shielded
threats. Results from this demonstration will be available in 2014.
testing, evaluation, and standards for nuclear detection technologies
Over the years, DNDO's test program has grown and matured. To date,
DNDO has conducted more than 70 test and evaluation campaigns at over
20 experimental and operational venues. These test campaigns were
planned and executed with interagency partners using rigorous,
reproducible, peer-reviewed processes. Tested nuclear detection systems
include pagers, handhelds, portals, backpacks, and vehicle-, boat- and
spreader bar-mounted detectors, as well as next-generation radiography
technologies. The results from DNDO's test campaigns have informed
Federal, State, local, and Tribal operational users on the technical
and operational performance of nuclear detection systems, allowing them
to select the most suitable equipment and implement effective concepts
of operations to detect nuclear threats.
DNDO has also supported the development, publication, and adoption
of National consensus standards for radiation detection equipment.
Several such standards now exist for use in homeland security. DNDO
collaborated with the National Institute of Standards and Technology to
conduct a review of all National and international consensus standards
for nuclear detection systems, and formed an interagency working group
to draft Government-unique technical capability standards (TCS).
Earlier this year, we finalized the first TCS for hand-held systems.
The success of the nuclear detection mission is contingent on
timely information exchanges. To this end, DNDO successfully
collaborated with the National Institute of Standards and Technology to
create a major update of the Data Format Standard for Radiation
Detectors used for Homeland Security. This standard facilitates the
exchange of detection information by ensuring that the systems create
and distribute data in a specified format to enable interoperability.
Through the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and the
American National Standard Institute, this significantly improved
standard (IEC 62755) is now internationally accepted. IEC 62755 was
approved in late February 2012.
The DNDO Graduated Radiological/Nuclear Detector Evaluation and
Reporting (GRaDERSM) Program builds upon these standards to
determine if commercially-available nuclear detection equipment
complies with established standards. DNDO created the infrastructure
for voluntary, vendor testing of commercial nuclear detection
technologies by independent, accredited laboratories against National
consensus standards and Government-unique TCS. This program encourages
vendors to develop better nuclear detection and identification systems
that meet evolving homeland security requirements.
With the maturation of our test and evaluation program, DNDO's
collaboration with interagency partners, such as DOE and DOD, and
international partners, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Israel, the
European Union, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), has
increased significantly. For example, our close partnership with the
DOE Second Line of Defense program, European Commission, and the IAEA
for the Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program+10 (ITRAP+10)
will result in a comprehensive evaluation of the performance of nearly
100 commercially-available radiation detection systems against National
and international standards. ITRAP+10 will allow for the refinement of
nuclear detection standards and promote greater homogeneity in United
States and international detection standards. The test program will
conclude in the spring of 2013.
increased collaboration with federal, state, and local partners
Our ability to counter the nuclear threat is fundamentally based on
the critical triad of intelligence, law enforcement, and technology. To
maximize our ability to detect and interdict nuclear threats, it is
imperative that we apply detection technologies in operations that are
driven by intelligence indicators and place them in the hands of well-
trained law enforcement and public safety personnel.
We have increased our collaboration with the intelligence
community. By sharing information, personnel, and requirements, we
continue to improve our ability to successfully bring technologies to
bear on the nuclear detection mission. Additionally, we have made
significant progress in ensuring that law enforcement officers are
appropriately trained and equipped for the nuclear detection mission.
DNDO has facilitated the delivery of radiation and nuclear
detection training to thousands of Federal, State, and local officers
and first responders Nation-wide. Our work with DHS partners has
developed cross-sector capabilities for radiation and nuclear
detection: All U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) boarding teams and
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response teams are equipped with detection capabilities.
DNDO has also made considerable progress in deploying detection
equipment. For example, DNDO has made available radiological and
nuclear detection training to over 23,000 State and local law
enforcement officers and first responders. In the New York City region,
the Securing the Cities (STC) program has funded the deployment of
nearly 8,500 pieces of detection equipment and provided the requisite
training to over 13,000 personnel. This year, DNDO will also select a
second region to implement a phased STC program, tailored to build a
regional nuclear detection architecture and integrate State and local
capabilities into the Federal response framework. DNDO will assist
regional partners in implementing self-supported sustainment of
capabilities and sharing of data from fixed, mobile, maritime, and
human-portable radiation detection systems.
DNDO also supports five Mobile Detection Deployment Units that are
operated by our State and local law enforcement partners to provide
enhanced detection capability at large public gatherings and special
events. With regular use, these units, which are available upon
request, are being integrated into exercises, operations, and planning
for nuclear search operations in response to threats.
conclusion
DNDO has come a long way since its creation in 2005. With our
integrated approach to GNDA planning, testing and assessments, research
and development, acquisition, and operational support, we continue to
strengthen the Nation's capabilities to detect and interdict nuclear
threats. We appreciate your continued support as we work with our
partners to develop, evaluate, deploy, and support the necessary
systems to implement a nuclear detection architecture that can
effectively respond to credible intelligence and threat information.
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, I thank you for this
opportunity to discuss the nuclear detection architecture and the
progress of DNDO. I am happy to answer any questions the subcommittee
may have.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Mr. Maurer.
STATEMENT OF DAVID C. MAURER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Maurer. Good morning, Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member
Clarke, and other Members and staff. I am pleased to be here
today to discuss DHS's efforts to combat nuclear terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, as you know well, GAO has been following and
reporting on this topic for the past several years. In the
interests of time, I would like to call your attention to some
key themes from my statement at today's hearing.
First and foremost, DHS is learning from its past mistakes.
The best evidence of this is the Department's announcement last
week that it was canceling the ASP program. Let us be clear,
the ASP program was a failure for the Department.
DHS prematurely pushed for full-scale production and
deployment before it was clear the system would work in the
real world, before unbiased testing demonstrated whether it
worked better than existing systems, before completing a
rigorous cost-benefit analysis, and without the benefit of a
documented strategic approach to explain how the program fit
into the broader effort to combat nuclear smuggling.
But that was the past. Today, DHS has an overall strategy
and implementation plan. These documents, in tandem, address
our prior recommendations that, among other things, DHS define
objectives, identify needed funding, and monitor progress.
These documents are not perfect. We would like to see clearer
articulation of priorities and a more robust discussion of
anticipated resource needs. But they do demonstrate that DHS
has changed for the better.
The Department has also modified its overall approach.
Today, DHS is less focused on deploying static radiation portal
monitors and is placing greater emphasis on flexible
approaches, deployable technology, and more attention to other
aspects of the detection architecture.
Looking ahead, DHS and Congress face some tough decisions.
We have already invested billions of dollars in the currently
deployed radiation detection technology. Some of these systems
are starting to reach the end of their expected service life.
DHS is currently studying whether to refurbish or replace its
current system.
Regardless of what path DHS takes, it will likely cost
billions of dollars and take several years. With that in mind,
it is important for DHS to position itself for the future.
However DHS decides to modernize its existing capabilities, it
should, No. 1, test before it buys. Any investment in new
systems should include sufficient and rigorous testing to
ensure they meet mission needs.
No. 2, make sure new technologies meet the operational
needs of the people who will be using them every day. No. 3,
conduct a cost-benefit analysis to ensure the benefits from new
systems are worth the costs in taxpayer dollars. Finally,
ensure that decisions on what to buy are driven by the
Department's strategies and plans, and not the other way
around.
Now, keep in mind, detection technology is an important
part of the overall effort to keep a nuclear device out of the
United States, but it is not the only one. Consider this, if
the United States ever has to rely on a radiation portal
monitor to stop a smuggled nuclear device, a lot of other
things have already gone wrong.
It means law enforcement missed it, the intelligence
community missed it, our allies missed it, risk-based screening
missed it, treaty regimes didn't work, and non-proliferation
programs failed. All of these--play a key role long before
detection technology at ports of entry come into play, and they
should not be overlooked. That is why it is so important for
the United States to have a clear and coherent strategy to tie
all these various pieces together.
The bottom line, keep your eyes on the billions that DHS
will be investing in the future, hold DHS accountable for its
strategies, and GAO will be there to help with that oversight,
and remember that technology is one part of a much larger
effort.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify this
morning and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Maurer follows:]
Prepared Statement of David C. Maurer and Gene Aloise
July 26, 2012
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the efforts of
the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) to develop and deploy a global nuclear detection
architecture (GNDA)--an integrated system of radiation detection
equipment and interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in
foreign countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States--
and to provide an update on the deployment of radiation detection
equipment at U.S. borders. Preventing terrorists from using nuclear or
radiological material to carry out an attack in the United States is a
top National priority. DNDO is charged with, among other things,
enhancing and coordinating the nuclear detection efforts of Federal,
State, local, and Tribal governments and the private sector to ensure a
managed, coordinated response.\1\ Among other things, DNDO is required
to coordinate with other Federal agencies to develop an enhanced GNDA.
It is also responsible for developing, acquiring, and deploying
radiation detection equipment to support the efforts of DHS and other
Federal agencies. While Federal efforts to combat nuclear smuggling
have largely focused on established ports of entry, such as seaports
and land border crossings, DNDO has also been examining nuclear
detection strategies along other potential pathways in the
architecture, including: (1) Land border areas between ports of entry
into the United States, (2) international general aviation, and (3)
small maritime craft, such as recreational boats and commercial fishing
vessels.
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\1\ National Security Presidential Directive 43/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 14, Domestic Nuclear Detection, April 15, 2005.
DNDO was established in statute by the Security and Accountability for
Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port) Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347, 501, 120
Stat. 1884, 1932 (codified as amended at 6 U.S.C. 591).
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Even before DNDO's inception in 2005, we were highlighting the need
for a more comprehensive strategy for nuclear detection. In 2002, we
reported on the need for a comprehensive plan for installing radiation
detection equipment, such as radiation portal monitors, at all U.S.
border crossings and ports of entry.\2\ In July 2008, we testified that
DNDO had not developed an overarching strategic plan to guide the
development of a more comprehensive GNDA, and we recommended that DHS
coordinate with the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State to
develop one.\3\ DHS agreed with our recommendation. In January 2009, we
recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a strategic
plan for the domestic part of the global nuclear detection strategy to
help ensure the success of initiatives aimed at closing vulnerabilities
in the United States.\4\ We stated that this plan should focus on,
among other things, establishing time frames and costs for the areas
DNDO had identified--land border areas between ports of entry,
aviation, and small maritime craft. DHS did not comment on this
recommendation but noted that it aligned with DNDO's past, present, and
future actions. The status of these recommendations is discussed later
in this testimony.
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\2\ GAO, Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation
Detection Equipment, GAO-03-235T (Washington, DC: Oct. 17, 2002).
\3\ GAO, Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture, GAO-08-999T (Washington, DC: July 16, 2008).
\4\ GAO, Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities,
GAO-09-257 (Washington, DC: Jan. 29, 2009).
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As we will discuss today, DHS has made meaningful progress in
deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. border crossings and
seaports; however, as deployed portal monitors begin to reach the end
of their expected service lives, DHS will soon need to make decisions
about whether to refurbish or replace them. DHS has also made progress
in developing key planning documents to guide the GNDA. This testimony
discusses: (1) DHS's efforts to complete the deployment of radiation
detection equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the
United States at ports of entry, (2) observations from our past work
that may help DHS as it considers options for deploying new
technologies to refurbish or replace existing portal monitors when they
reach the end of their expected service lives, and (3) our assessment
of the extent to which DHS has addressed our prior recommendations.
This testimony is primarily based on our prior work on Federal
efforts to detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological
materials, issued from October 2002 through July 2011. We have updated
our prior work in this testimony to reflect DHS's continuing efforts to
deploy radiation detection equipment. To do so, we met with DHS, DNDO,
and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officials and reviewed DHS
documents including the GNDA strategic plan, the 2011 GNDA Joint Annual
Interagency Review, and the GNDA implementation plan issued in April
2012. As part of our update, we asked for, and DHS provided, a
classified briefing that compared the GNDA capabilities with the
expected capabilities of adversaries who may wish to smuggle nuclear
material into the United States. Details on the scope and methodology
for our prior reviews are available in our published reports. We
conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted Government
auditing standards.
In summary, over the past 10 years, DHS has made significant
progress in deploying radiation detection equipment to scan for nuclear
or radiological materials in nearly all trucks and containerized cargo
coming into the United Stated through seaports and border crossings.
However, challenges remain for the agency in developing a similar
scanning capability for railcars entering this country from Canada and
Mexico, as well as for international air cargo and international
commercial aviation. As portal monitors approach the end of their
expected service lives, observations from our past work may help DHS as
it considers options to refurbish or replace such monitors. Among other
things, we have previously reported that DHS should: (1) Test new
equipment rigorously prior to acquisition and deployment, (2) obtain
the full concurrence of the end-user to ensure that new equipment meets
operational needs, and (3) conduct a cost-benefit analysis to inform
any acquisition decisions. In our past work on the GNDA, we recommended
that DHS develop an overarching strategic plan to guide the development
of the GDNA, as well as a strategic plan for the domestic part of the
global nuclear detection strategy. DHS took action on these
recommendations and, in December 2010, it issued the interagency GNDA
strategic plan.\5\ We reported, in July 2011, that the GNDA strategic
plan addressed several of the aspects of our prior recommendations but
did not: (1) Identify funding necessary to achieve plan objectives or
(2) employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and identify
needed improvements. In April 2012, DHS issued its GNDA implementation
plan, which addresses the remaining aspects of our recommendations by
identifying funding dedicated to plan objectives and employing
monitoring mechanisms to assess progress in meeting those objectives.
However, in both the GNDA strategic plan and the implementation plan,
it remains difficult to identify priorities from among various
components of the domestic part of the GNDA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ The GNDA strategic plan was an interagency effort jointly
developed by the Departments of Homeland Security, Energy, Defense,
Justice, and State; the intelligence community; and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
dhs has made progress deploying radiation detection equipment at land
borders and major seaports, but challenges remain
Over the past decade, DHS has made significant progress in
deploying radiation detection equipment and developing procedures to
scan cargo and conveyances entering the United States through land and
sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials, but it has
made less progress with other pathways. In 2010, we reported that DHS
initially planned to deploy more than 2,100 portal monitors to U.S.
ports of entry. Due to funding constraints and challenges in developing
new technologies, DHS is updating its portal monitor deployment plan by
reducing the number of portal monitors it planned to deploy and
increasing its reliance on portable systems. Specifically, according to
DHS officials, DHS has deployed about 1,465 of the approximately 1,537,
or 95 percent, of radiation portal monitors that it now plans to
deploy; the agency expects to complete this deployment by December
2014.\6\ As we reported in 2011, since 2009, DHS has scanned nearly all
of the containerized cargo and conveyances entering the United States
through land borders and major seaports for nuclear and radiological
materials.\7\ However, as we reported in 2010 and 2011, DHS has made
less progress scanning: (1) Railcars entering the United States from
Canada and Mexico and (2) international air cargo and commercial
aviation aircraft, passengers, and baggage.\8\
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\6\ Radiation portal monitors are large stationary detectors
through which cargo containers and vehicles pass as they enter the
United States.
\7\ GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed a Strategic
Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain,
GAO-11-869T (Washington, DC: July 26, 2011).
\8\ GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Some Progress
but Not Yet Completed a Strategic Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection
Efforts or Closed Identified Gaps, GAO-10-883T (Washington, DC: June
30, 2010) and GAO-11-869T.
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Land Ports of Entry
As we reported in 2011, according to DHS officials, since November
2009, almost all nonrail land ports of entry have been equipped with
one or more radiation portal monitors. Of the about 1,465 portal
monitors deployed, as of July 2012, 917, or about 63 percent, have been
deployed along the Northern and Southern Borders of the lower 48 States
to all but a few nonrail ports of entry. According to DHS officials,
100 percent of all containerized cargo, conveyances, drivers, and
passengers entering the United States through commercial lanes at land
borders are scanned for radiation, as are more than 99 percent of all
personally-operated vehicles (noncommercial passenger cars and light
trucks), drivers, and passengers.
Seaports
According to DHS officials, the Department scans nearly all
containerized cargo entering U.S. seaports for nuclear and radiological
materials. Specifically, of the about 1,465 portal monitors, DHS has
deployed 453, or about 31 percent, of radiation portal monitors to
major American seaports--including the largest seaports accounting for
the majority of cargo. However, some smaller seaports that receive
cargo may not be equipped with portal monitors. DHS officials told us
they will know how many more portal monitors will be deployed to these
smaller seaports when the agency completes its updated deployment plan
in September 2012. Furthermore, in July 2012, these officials told us
that, due to increased cargo volume at some major seaports, additional
portal monitors may be needed to avoid delays in moving cargo through
larger ports. In such cases, DHS officials told us that they are
considering cost-sharing arrangements with seaport operators, whereby
DHS and seaport operators would share the cost of additional portal
monitor deployments. Under such arrangements, DHS would continue to
purchase, maintain, and operate these additional portal monitors, but
the seaport operators would share in the cost of deploying them.
International Rail
As we reported over the last 2 years, DHS has made limited progress
with regard to radiation scanning of the roughly 4,800 loaded railcars
in approximately 120 trains entering the United States each day from
Canada and Mexico through 31 rail ports of entry.\9\ Although, most
international rail crossings have radiography systems to scan the
majority of cargo, much of the scanning for nuclear and radiological
materials that takes place at these ports of entry is conducted with
portable, handheld radioactive isotope identification devices. This
scanning is triggered when, for example, anomalous readings are
detected from imaging scans of railcar contents. According to DHS
officials, international rail traffic represents one of the most
difficult challenges for radiation detection systems. Specifically, in
June 2010, they told us that rail traffic poses unique operational
challenges due to the length of the trains (up to 2 miles), the
distance required to stop moving trains, and the difficulties in
separating individual cars for further examination. Furthermore, DHS
officials told us that rail companies typically own the land where DHS
would need to establish stations for screening, and these companies
often resist doing things that might slow down rail traffic. Moreover,
DHS officials told us that an effective solution would require scanning
of at least some rail traffic on Mexican or Canadian soil, and they
said that it will take time to develop the close cooperation with
officials in Mexico and Canada necessary to do so. Accordingly, in
2010, DHS undertook an International Rail Threat and Gap Study to
determine the most promising radiation detection approach. In July
2012, DHS officials said that the agency is presently in the final
stages of completing a second study analyzing technological and
operational options. DHS officials told us that decisions about
additional enhancement of radiation detection capabilities at
international rail ports of entry are pending the results of this
analysis and the Department's broader consideration of the needs and
priorities of the GNDA. The second study is due to be completed in
September 2012, according to DHS officials.
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\9\ GAO-10-883T and GAO-11-869T.
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International Air Cargo and Commercial Aviation
DHS has made less progress scanning air cargo and commercial
aviation for nuclear and radiological materials. As of July 2012, DHS
was scanning for nuclear and radiological materials at certain major
international airports in the United States using some portal monitors.
CBP also utilizes radioactive isotope identification devices and
personal radiation detectors to alert the agency to the presence of
such materials.
DHS officials told us in June 2010 that they were studying options
for effectively deploying portal monitors to increase their capacity to
scan for nuclear and radiological materials in international air cargo
conveyed on commercial airlines. According to these DHS officials,
their experience scanning air cargo at a few major international
airports in the United States has led them to conclude that the
deployment of radiation portal monitors is not feasible at many
locations due to the lack of natural choke points, where scanning would
take place. Furthermore, these officials stated that scanning 100
percent of air cargo would be technically and logistically challenging
and would require significant investment in equipment, staffing, and
maintenance resources. Moreover, further DHS analysis since June 2010
has shown that there are no procedural or operational changes that can
easily overcome the logistical and resource challenges associated with
airports. Until solutions to these challenges can be found, DHS
officials told us that the scanning for radioactive materials that
occurs at airports will continue to be conducted primarily with
handheld detectors where portal monitors are not deployed.
Similarly, DHS does not scan all commercial aviation aircraft,
passengers, or baggage for radioactive materials with portal monitors.
However, passengers are scanned for radioactive materials with
radioactive isotope identification devices when DHS is alerted to the
presence of radiation by CBP officers' personal radiation detectors,
and some baggage is scanned by radiation portal monitors at selected
overseas airports.
observations from our past work for dhs to consider when replacing
portal monitors
As deployed portal monitors reach the end of their expected service
lives, observations from our past work may help DHS as it considers
options for deploying new technologies as to whether to refurbish or
replace them. DHS has been procuring portal monitors for about 10
years, and DHS officials estimate that the expected service life of
many of these portal monitors is about 10 to 20 years. Their service
lives can be extended by refurbishing their key components but doing so
also requires some additional investment. In July 2012, DNDO and CBP
officials told us they are working on a portal monitor replacement
strategy that is due to be completed in 2013. As DHS considers options
to refurbish existing systems, or replace them with new systems,
observations from our past work may help the agency make the most
informed decisions, mitigate risks, and produce expected outcomes.
Specifically, we believe it is important that DHS consider the
following:
Taking into account the overall priorities of the domestic
side of the GNDA before making investments or reinvestments in
ports and border crossings.--Ports and border crossings have
received most of the investment of radiation detection
technologies because these are the areas through which a
significant amount of cargo must pass, and Federal law requires
certain scanning at seaports.\10\ However, as discussed
earlier, other pathways also pose risks. As we reported in
2011, any additional investment in radiation detection
equipment needs to be consistent with the highest priority
needs of the domestic side of the GNDA, including examining and
balancing the needs and risks of all smuggling pathways into
the United States.\11\ In July 2012, DHS officials told us they
agreed that further investment in detecting radiation in ports
and border crossings needs to be consistent with the overall
needs of the GNDA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ 6 U.S.C. 921 (2006).
\11\ GAO-11-869T.
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Testing new equipment rigorously prior to acquisition and
deployment.--One of the principal findings of our past work
reviewing DNDO's efforts to develop and procure the advanced
spectroscopic portal--a more advanced radiation portal
monitor--was that initial testing was not rigorous enough.\12\
Once the testing became more rigorous, these portals did not
perform well enough to warrant deployment, and the program was
subsequently cancelled, after DNDO had spent more than $280
million on development and testing costs. Consistent with our
past recommendations, any investment in new equipment should
include sufficient and rigorous testing to ensure that any new
selected equipment performs well enough to meet mission needs.
DNDO officials told us that DNDO is currently working on a
collaborative effort with the radiation detection agencies of
the European Union to test the capabilities of currently
available radiation detection equipment, including portal
monitors, from multiple vendors. This testing is part of the
Illicit Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program and is not
connected to any planned acquisition; instead, it will provide
performance information on a variety of radiation detection
equipment. According to DHS officials, the final report from
this testing is expected in 2013, and DNDO could use the
results as part of its basis for considering whether to replace
currently deployed portal monitors with other devices.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ For further information regarding our work on the advanced
spectroscopic portal, see GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional
Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation
Detection Equipment, GAO-07-1247T (Washington, DC: Sept. 18, 2007); and
GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Improved Testing of Advanced
Radiation Detection Portal Monitors, but Preliminary Results Show
Limits of the New Technology, GAO-09-655 (Washington, DC: May 29,
2009).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Obtaining full concurrence of the end user--CBP--to ensure
that any new equipment meets CBP's operational needs.--Our past
work on the advanced spectroscopic portal and DNDO efforts to
develop a system to use radiography to scan cargo for nuclear
materials found that DNDO did not fully understand: (1) How CBP
used existing radiation detection equipment in a port
environment or (2) the extent of the space limitations in port
environments.\13\ Consistent with our past findings, decisions
to rehabilitate or replace currently deployed portal monitors
need to be made with the full buy-in of CBP--particularly if
the decision involves new equipment or technologies. Obtaining
early buy-in from CBP will help ensure any new equipment is
consistent with CBP's operational needs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Recent Testing Raises Issues
About the Potential Effectiveness of Advanced Radiation Detection
Portal Monitors, GAO-10-252T (Washington, DC: Nov. 17, 2010) and GAO,
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate Communication and Oversight
Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced Radiography System to
Detect Nuclear Materials, GAO-10-1041T (Washington, DC: Sept. 15,
2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conducting a cost-benefit analysis to inform acquisition
decisions.--A key part of deciding whether to refurbish or
replace currently deployed portal monitors is conducting a
comprehensive cost-benefit analysis that can be used to compare
the relative costs and expected benefits of existing versus new
equipment. Consistent with our past recommendations in 2006 on
portal monitors, such an analysis should articulate what
enhanced performance could be expected of new equipment and
whether this benefit is worth its cost.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress
Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but
Concerns Remain, GAO-06-389 (Washington DC: Mar. 22, 2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
dhs's gnda strategic and implementation plans address our past
recommendations but do not yet clearly define priorities
In our past work on the GNDA, we made recommendations about the
need for a strategic plan to guide the development of the GDNA. Among
other things, in July 2008, we recommended that DHS develop an
overarching strategic plan for the GNDA that: (1) Clearly defines the
objectives to be accomplished, (2) identifies the roles and
responsibilities for meeting each objective, (3) identifies the funding
necessary to achieve those objectives, and (4) employs monitoring
mechanisms to determine programmatic progress and identify needed
improvements.\15\ DHS agreed with our recommendation. In January 2009,
we recommended that DHS develop a strategic plan for the domestic part
of the global nuclear detection strategy and that this plan focus on
establishing time frames and costs for addressing previously identified
pathways within the architecture--land border areas between ports of
entry, aviation, and small maritime vessels.\16\ DHS did not comment on
this recommendation but noted that it aligned with DNDO's past,
present, and future actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ GAO-08-999T.
\16\ GAO-09-257.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS has taken action on these recommendations. In December 2010,
DHS issued the interagency GNDA strategic plan and in April 2012, it
issued its GNDA implementation plan for domestic aspects of the GNDA.
As we reported in July 2011, the 2010 GNDA strategic plan addresses
several aspects of our prior recommendations--including defining
program objectives and assigning roles and responsibilities.\17\
However, it did not: (1) Identify funding necessary to achieve plan
objectives or (2) establish monitoring mechanisms to determine progress
and identify needed improvements. DHS officials stated at that time
that they intended to include these aspects of our recommendations in
an upcoming implementation plan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ GAO-11-869T.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our review of the April 2012 GNDA implementation plan found that
DHS had made progress in both identifying funding dedicated to plan
objectives and in employing monitoring mechanisms to assess progress in
meeting plan objectives. Furthermore, the plan has established specific
milestones for completing many of DHS's activities--allowing a further
assessment of whether progress is being made according to plan time
frames. In our view, these actions address the intent of our 2008
recommendations to identify necessary funding and employ monitoring
mechanisms. The plan also discusses strategies for addressing
previously identified pathways in the domestic portion of the GNDA,
including time frames and costs for key elements of DHS' approach.
While these pathways remain an area of concern, the strategies
discussed in the plan address our 2009 recommendations and lay out an
approach to making nuclear smuggling through these pathways more
difficult and thus less likely to succeed. As DHS updates the
implementation plan in the future, providing additional details and
discussion about how the strategy will address the pathways in the
domestic GNDA could better position DHS to make decisions regarding
resource allocations.
However, in both the GNDA strategic plan and the implementation
plan, it remains difficult to identify priorities from among various
components of the domestic part of the GNDA. As we reported in July
2011, one of the key benefits of a strategic plan is that it is a
comprehensive means of establishing priorities and using these
priorities to allocate resources so that the greatest needs are being
addressed.\18\ In times of tight budgets, allocating resources to
address the highest priorities becomes even more important. Identifying
priorities would help inform DHS's decisions to refurbish or replace
portal monitors or invest in radiation detection equipment for other
potential pathways. DHS has done a comprehensive analysis of GNDA
capabilities and compared its capabilities with the expected
capabilities of adversaries who may wish to smuggle nuclear material
into the United States. This classified analysis provides data that DHS
could use as a basis to set priorities within the GNDA. DHS officials
told us they agreed that the implementation plan did not yet articulate
specific priorities for GNDA program areas with the greatest need for
development and resources and that the DHS classified analysis of GNDA
capabilities could help inform those priorities. These officials told
us the implementation plan was an iterative document that was designed
to be periodically updated and that future versions of the plan would
provide a greater discussion of priorities.
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\18\ GAO-11-869T.
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Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer
any questions that you may have at this time.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Mr. Oxford.
STATEMENT OF VAYL S. OXFORD, NATIONAL SECURITY EXECUTIVE POLICY
ADVISOR, PACIFIC NORTHWEST NATIONAL LABORATORY
Mr. Oxford. Good morning, Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member
Clarke, and other distinguished Members of the committee, it is
a pleasure to be here to discuss PNNL's support to DHS in
formulating and executing an effective and efficient nuclear
detection strategy.
At PNNL we have a long legacy of supporting Federal, State,
local, private, and international users to protect them from
and help them recover from WMD attacks. We find solutions for
DHS, NNSA, DOE, DOD, DIC, and other Federal agencies.
Today, about half of what PNNL spends of its $1.1 billion
budget is devoted to National security missions. Our mission-
focused approach always considers the operational environment
and the operators executing this mission, including the CVP
officers at the ports of entry, the Border Patrol agents
between ports of entry, the Coast Guard personnel protecting
the maritime environment, the TSA officers protecting the
transportation venues, and State and local and Tribal first
responders.
PNNL has also been deeply involved in many aspects of the
nuclear detection strategy to include a decade of support of
DHS and NNSA deploying radiation detection portal monitors to
U.S. land and seaports of entry, and ports of departure around
the world.
We provide expertise and support to DHS to formulate
strategies that balance risk reduction and total program costs,
including long-term O&M costs associated with various
technologies. We evaluate emerging technologies and concepts of
operation for application in non-PON, like Ondoc and
international rail, to include analysis of alternatives,
technologies assessments, life-cycle cost estimates and threat
definitions.
We identify new detection materials to include the
resolution and processing time in detecting rad/nuc threats. We
provide strategic planning, program support, training and
overseas installation in material, control and accountability
and second line of defense of radical new detection systems.
Last year PNNL supported efforts in over 100 foreign
countries. Since 2002, PNNL has been an integral part of the
DHS radiation portal monitor program, deploying rad/nuc
detection technologies at approximately 530 U.S. ports of
entry. This support extended to working with DHS, NNSA, and
other National laboratories to identify alternatives to the
helium-3 shortage for neutron detection.
Finally, we perform preliminary analysis for the
anticipated life cycle for the currently deployed RPMs, and
propose sustainment strategies to extend their life cycle while
assessing associated costs. Significant progress has been made
in the last 10 years to protect the Nation from the threat of
nuclear terrorism, but there is still much work to be done.
That work involves developing and executing risk-based
strategies associated with all vectors into the country that
are integrated with other security programs in DHS and across
the U.S. Government.
We must consider the current status of our deployed
systems. The second line of defense and mega ports programs are
currently transitioning to sustainment in current capabilities
and coverage overseas. Domestic coverage includes scanning over
99 percent of all incoming containerized cargo at land and sea
ports of entry.
We are conducting preliminary pre-clearance of passenger
and baggage at some foreign airports. We are sustaining a
maritime security program in the Puget Sound to protect against
the small vessel maritime threat. We continue the Securing the
Cities Program in New York, and expansion to a second city is
expected in 2013. DHS is now requiring and deploying the next
generation handheld radiation detection systems to enhance GDP
to field operations.
Finally, we have equipped the U.S. Coast Guard boarding and
TSA Viper teams with radiation detection capabilities. Despite
these successes, there are areas that we are involved,
including addressing threats in general aviation and commercial
air cargo, expanding the small maritime vessel programs,
looking at areas between ports of entry, and finally, an
expanded major urban area concentration.
In closing, PNNL has provided critical support to the
formulation and implementation of nuclear counterterrorism
efforts around the globe and is ready to continue that support,
especially in light of the threat of nuclear terrorism has not
diminished.
I thank you for the chance to appear before you today and
welcome any questions you might have.
[The statement of Mr. Oxford follows:]
Prepared Statement of Vayl S. Oxford
July 26, 2012
introduction
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and other distinguished
Members of the committee, it is a pleasure to be here and discuss
PNNL's support to DHS in formulating and executing an effective and
efficient nuclear detection strategy. This is a very important issue;
one that I personally consider critical and worthy of great attention,
and resources that demands the collective efforts of the USG and the
international community. I have devoted much of my career to combating
the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) with the focus ranging
from developing offensive capabilities to locate, exploit, and defeat
WMD-related facilities to developing policies and approaches to
interdict illicit transfers of WMD-related materials and technologies
to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism.
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) has a long history of
providing valuable support to numerous Federal, State, local, private,
and international users to protect them from and help them recover from
WMD attacks. PNNL is one of ten U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
National Laboratories managed by DOE's Office of Science (SC). Our
support strengthens the Nation's foundation for innovation, and we find
solutions for not only DOE, but for DHS, the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), the Department of Defense (DoD), the
intelligence community, other Government agencies, universities, and
industry. Our multidisciplinary technical teams are brought together to
address the Nation's most pressing issues in energy, environment, and
National security through advances in basic and applied science.
role of doe laboratories
The DOE and NNSA complex of National Laboratories, which are and
have been a vital centerpiece of the Nation's research and development
capabilities for over 60 years, continue to play a prominent role in
developing and deploying technologies to protect America against
evolving threats, most especially, the rad/nuc threat.
Important objectives of DOE's multi-program science laboratories
are to accelerate the rate of innovation, steward unique National
capabilities, and leverage the National science base for the benefit of
diverse applied missions. The rad/nuc detection research programs at
PNNL successfully illustrate how these objectives come together. We
have scientific and engineering strengths and historic capabilities
with roots dating back to the Manhattan project of the 1940s at the
Hanford Site. Today, approximately half of PNNL's $1.1 billion business
is centered on National security missions. Threat detection technology
development and deployment is a central part of these programs and one
in which science plays a particularly critical role.
front-line operators
It is important to note that the most critical element of the
nuclear detection strategy is the brave men and women who execute this
important mission day in and day out--the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection officers at our ports of entry (POE), the Border Patrol (BP)
agents between our POEs, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) personnel
monitoring our waterways, the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) officers defending transportation venues, and the State, local,
and Tribal first responders, and international partners. Nuclear
detection is just a single aspect of one of many missions they execute
each and every day, and the role of technology is to enable these
tremendously capable men and women, to make the mission of interdiction
of nuclear threats more efficient, more effective, and less onerous.
PNNL takes great pride in the opportunities afforded it to work
alongside and partner with mission personnel to understand their
requirements and operational environments. We are committed and work
hard to support them in the execution of all aspects of their mission
and to provide them with operationally and technically effective and
efficient solutions to their requirements.
To successfully detect and interdict nuclear materials requires an
informed encounter. There are three elements in an informed encounter:
(1) Know the signature or indications of illicit nuclear trafficking,
(2) place your personnel or assets in a position where they have the
opportunity to sense or observe the signature of indication, and (3)
accurately interpret the indications when presented. Clearly technology
can play a role in this process, but there is no substitute for well-
trained law enforcement personnel.
It is also important to consider all of the actions we can take to
detect illicit nuclear trafficking activities. Nuclear detection
technology has and will continue to play a critical role. However, this
is only one source of relevant data. There are other physical sensors
that could play an important role. Imagine if operators were able to
determine if someone has been in the presence of nuclear materials
though a simple hair sample. Additionally, operators clearly need more
capable information sensors. The number and diversity of data sources
continues to increase and provides a key opportunity to identify
illicit trafficking activities. However, the ability to ingest and
analyze the sheer quantity of data requires new solutions that will
only be realized through additional research and development that is
currently being undertaken at PNNL and other National Laboratories.
In the end, all of these tools are either collecting data for or
actually performing the analysis to find signatures of illicit nuclear
trafficking. Signatures are not new in this business, but it is
important that we continue to systematically look for new signatures.
The new signatures are likely to combine disparate data or approaches
to increase sensitivity and specificity. However, new signatures must
be evaluated for accuracy, the cost and risk to collect them, and
whether they change or evolve over time. Finally, it is crucial that we
provide an integrated framework that allows the analysis and decision-
making--by analysts, front-line operators, and senior officials.
pnnl's role in the evolution of the nuclear detection strategy
Initial response to the terrorist events of 9/11 included far-
reaching and comprehensive strategies for technology deployment across
various points or layers for possible interdiction including: The place
of origin for nuclear materials or weapons, foreign border crossings
and airports, ports of departure, ports of entry, between the ports of
entry, and the target. In particular, PNNL has supported the deployment
of radiation detection equipment for over a decade in partnership with
DHS and NNSA to achieve initial post-9/11 and SAFE Ports Act scanning
goals at domestic POEs and ports of departure (POD) around the world.
Since 9/11, DHS has a more mature assessment of the nuclear threat
and a deeper understanding of how to evaluate the risks through various
technology insertion strategies. Coupled with the current budget
realities, new strategies are emerging that balance risk reduction and
total program costs, including the long-term operations and maintenance
(O&M) costs associated with various technologies. As an example of how
the risk analyses have matured, the new analyses more accurately
recognize the fact that the presence of uniformed CBP officers and BP
agents at POEs and BP checkpoints, along with the extensive range of
regulatory and security functions performed by officers/agents provides
for a substantial deterrent and makes the POEs a significantly less
desirable entry path into the country. Hence, new, risk-based
strategies for radiation detection equipment at the POEs are currently
being generated.
The risk-based analyses highlight key gaps and vulnerabilities.
These gaps need to be solved through a combination of material and non-
material solutions. Over the last few years, DHS has implemented
rigorous systematic approaches to define and address these gaps. In
support of these systematic approaches, PNNL has been providing
expertise and support to DHS in formulating and executing these new
strategies. This support includes risk analyses, evaluation and
deployment of technologies, technology pilots, O&M strategies, and
impact analyses, etc.
pnnl strategic support to the development and implementation of a dhs
strategy
PNNL has been a strategic partner with DHS and its interagency
partners and supported the development and implementation of the
nuclear detection strategy. Those partners include CBP and BP, USCG,
and TSA within DHS; NNSA; and DoD. Specific support to DNDO,
responsible within DHS for the development of the GNDA, has included
assisting with the development of the first GNDA Strategic Plan that
was delivered to Congress in December 2010, conducting numerous
architectural studies of potential threat pathways, collaborating on
the development of a risk analysis model, and determining potential
efforts to strengthen relationships between the GNDA and the
interagency. PNNL has provided this strategic support since its
initiation in 2005 and continues to this day.
One example worth noting that illustrates the unique role PNNL
plays in supporting DHS architecture advancement is the development of
the Rad/Nuc Risk Analysis Model (RNRAM) in collaboration with Battelle
Memorial Institute. This improved RNRAM, compared to previously-
employed risk analysis tools, will allow DNDO to more easily and
quickly determine risks associated with the GNDA and incorporate the
most recent information for more timely results.
PNNL participated in several characterization surveys of the major
and minor airports in metropolitan areas. These survey teams were led
by CBP with representatives from DNDO and PNNL. The fact gathering at
the airports, including the obtaining of extensive information on
stakeholders, cargo handling procedures, and CBP's inspection and cargo
release process, supported the development of an approach to study the
scanning opportunities for international air cargo. PNNL conceptualized
cargo movement, captured it as stylized diagrams, and developed a
matrix of conceptual rad/nuc scanning systems versus cargo encounter
locations. PNNL also developed a potential volume model that makes use
of commercial flight data and other open source data to quantify
international air cargo movement around the airport. The model
estimates the percentage of cargo volume passing various encounter
locations at an airport.
PNNL managed the Puget Sound portion of DNDO's West Coast Maritime
Pilot project. Activities included pilot exercise series, which began
with the Concept Development Conference and ended with a full-scale
exercise. The pilot agencies were eager to sustain the capability
developed in the Puget Sound. Sustainment was coordinated for the
region through the Puget Sound Area Maritime Security Committee, and
they secured a Port Security Grant, the first of its kind for rad/nuc
detection. The grant will fund the continued maintenance of detection
equipment in the region, new equipment for new agency participation,
and additional training.
PNNL is currently doing work for DNDO in the international rail
environment by using modeling and testing to support the analysis-of-
alternatives work that includes technology assessments, concept of
operation development, life-cycle cost estimates, deployment task
definitions, port of entry site surveys, and threat definition.
However, the fact remains that the operational constraints in the rail
environment are quite daunting to perform rad/nuc detection efforts.
CBP does utilize imaging systems along the Mexican and Canadian
border to inspect international rail traffic. PNNL has been involved in
efforts to both evaluate and optimize system performance.
In the area of new detection materials, PNNL has been using its
expertise in materials discovery to identify, select, and develop new
materials that will improve the resolution and processing time in
detecting radiological and nuclear devices. Experts now have a greater
understanding of the potential materials covering the four conventional
semiconductor material classes. They were able to narrow over 2,000
material compositions to a list of 245 that may have comparable
performance characteristics to cadmium zinc telluride, a well-known
radiation detection material. This work has drawn collaborative
interests from multiple industrial and academic partners with plans to
develop new detection instruments, increasing effectiveness in the
field.
As DHS, the interagency, industry, and academia advance the
technology and materials used in the detection of rad/nuc materials
there needs to be a commensurate testing and evaluation program to
ensure those systems and materials detect the types of threats we are
concerned with. In addition, they should be tested in an environment
that closely approximates the operational environment to ensure the
systems or materials can withstand the rigors of front-line operators
like CBP, USCG, or TSA.
deployment support to dhs and nnsa
PNNL's strategic support to the nuclear detection strategy stems
from our unique understanding of the operational environment, both
domestically and internationally. Over the past 2 decades PNNL has been
a part of or managed for the U.S. Government large-scale deployment
programs of rad/nuc detection systems that are an essential component
of a layered defense strategy. Part of that strategy involves securing
rad/nuc materials at its source overseas. Locking down proliferation
concern materials where they legally reside is critically important and
much progress has been made by the various Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) programs involved with this work. Over the years PNNL has
provided strong leadership, sound programmatic recommendations, and
high-value technical contributions supporting the management of
projects, strategic planning, training, infrastructure development, and
the overseas installation of Material Protection Control and Accounting
(MPC&A) and Second Line of Defense (SLD) rad/nuc detection systems in
support of the Office of International Materials Protection and
Cooperation (NA-25) in NNSA. Last year alone, PNNL provided its
capabilities in over 100 foreign countries through staff travel or
relocation as part of these programs and NNSA's Global Threat Reduction
Initiative (GTRI) which seeks to secure radiological sources in foreign
countries that might be used for a radiological dispersal device (RDD),
also known as a ``dirty bomb.''
PNNL subject matter experts in the fields of system engineering,
protective forces, physical protection, material control and
accounting, radiation detection, physics, materials science, training,
procurement, and technically-related project management helped NNSA
execute large, highly-visible nuclear nonproliferation/National
security projects around the globe. These same experts have been
utilized by the DoD as part of its Guardian Program that seeks to
deploy rad/nuc detection systems at U.S. military bases domestically
and overseas.
Since 2002, PNNL has been an integral part of DHS' Radiation Portal
Monitor Program (RPMP) which deploys rad/nuc detection technology to
scan incoming international traffic and cargo for illicit radioactive
materials at approximately 530 ports of entry into the United States
while maintaining the uninterrupted flow of legitimate trade and
travel.
PNNL support to RPMP also includes tapping into our scientific
expertise to tackle such technical issues as supporting efforts to
transition the Nation's portal monitoring activities away from the
current neutron detection standard, which is based on the now highly-
constrained helium-3 (He-3) commodity, toward more sustainable
solutions. Several DOE labs, in conjunction with industry, the DNDO,
and NNSA, played critical roles in driving innovation and evaluating
technology so that today's detection system needs are met with
commercial instrumentation that does not consume precious He-3. In the
longer run, improved detection systems will require more rapid
discovery of new materials with advanced capabilities. To this end,
laboratories such as PNNL have focused on the fundamental science
necessary to understand how and why radiation detection materials
function as they do.
Another example of PNNL work involves improving the capability of
currently deployed RPMs via advanced algorithms. RPMs operate via
algorithms that allow the technology to detect radiation from
threatening materials, but these algorithms sometimes result in a large
number of alarms from naturally-occurring radioactive materials (NORM)
as well. The current data provided by the RPMs make it difficult to
directly distinguish between the two, thus requiring a referral to
secondary inspection. PNNL is adapting its anomaly detection algorithms
to improve the detection of illicit rad/nuc materials. In addition,
PNNL also continues to make significant progress on the DNDO-sponsored
Energy Window Optimization Initiative. The initial results indicate a
potential for modest reduction of alarms due to NORM on deployed RPMs
while holding the threat detection probability constant through
optimization of existing system settings.
sustainment of current domestic architecture
When deployment started in 2002 as part of RPMP, the RPMs were
estimated to have a 10-year life cycle. However, the deployment of RPMs
across U.S. POEs is the first of its kind on this scale. While regular
maintenance is part of RPM sustainment, the goals of upgrading for
improved performance, controlling costs, eventual replacement of aged
systems, and maintaining configuration commonality are fundamentally in
conflict. Thus, the best approach to sustaining and replacing these
systems is still being developed. PNNL is analyzing the anticipated
life cycle for an RPM and proposing sustainment strategies to extend
their life cycle and understand the associated costs.
PNNL has also used its expertise in RPM technology to support CBP
operations across a full range of engineering work including
maintaining and upgrading individual pieces of hardware and software to
managing the service of entire systems. Two of PNNL's key support
functions are trouble call handling and calibration. For example, PNNL
provided subject matter expertise via phone support to CBP's
Enforcement Technology Program as needed regarding preventive
maintenance, repairs, and improvements to ensure installed systems
remain fully operational. PNNL staff also calibrate systems annually to
prevent long-term drift or degradation, minimizing the effects of the
recalibration process on port operations. PNNL is also assisting CBP's
Enforcement Technology Program in sustaining fully-transitioned RPM
equipment and related systems within CBP so that all systems continue
to operate as planned in detecting threats.
PNNL also plays a key role in the management and execution of the
sustainability strategy under NNSA's SLD program. Maintaining the
operational effectiveness of foreign deployed rad/nuc detection systems
is critically important and PNNL operates a help desk that provides as-
needed troubleshooting assistance to foreign partners. Implementing
robust preventative maintenance programs, tracking system performance,
developing partner-country training capabilities and providing
assistance in the creation of National alarm response plans are all
activities that PNNL leads on behalf of NNSA to help ensure long-term
risk reduction is achieved.
considerations for next steps
Although significant progress has been made across the last decade
to protect the United States from the threat of nuclear terrorism,
there is still work to be done. Much of that work involves developing
and executing strategies associated with all pathways into the country
that are risk-based and highly integrated with all security programs in
DHS and throughout the USG.
In order to discuss next steps associated with an effective
strategy to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism, it is important to
summarize some high-level views of the significant progress that has
been made to date that PNNL has directly supported:
On the international front, the SLD program is increasing
its focus on both the sustainment of deployed radiation
detection systems and expanding the provision of mobile
``surge'' radiation detection technologies to special law
enforcement agencies.
Implementation at the POEs, in the maritime vector, for
general aviation, and within cities:
Scanning over 99% of all incoming cargo at land and sea
ports of entry;
Preliminary pre-clearance of international general
aviation aircraft at foreign airports;
Successful maritime pilot demonstration and sustained
program in the Puget Sound to protect against the small
maritime vessel threat;
On-going Securing the Cities program in the New York City
region and an expansion to a second city expected in 2013;
Acquisition and deployment of the next generation handheld
radiation detection system to enhance CBP's field
operations;
Successful equipping of the USCG boarding teams and TSA
Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams
with radiation detection capabilities.
Despite these successes there are still areas of the DHS detection
strategy that will continue to evolve including:
General aviation and commercial air cargo;
Small maritime vessels;
Areas between POEs;
Protection of major urban areas;
Next-generation detection and imaging technology.
PNNL stands poised to continue to support DHS in further developing
and executing these evolving strategies.
closing
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, protecting the Nation
from a nuclear attack has been at the top of U.S. Government priorities
for at least the last 11 years and PNNL has been honored to provide
essential support to U.S.G. strategy formulation and implementation of
nuclear counterterrorism efforts around the globe and stands ready and
prepared to continue its support. There is still much work left to be
done. Advanced risk analyses and highly-integrated strategies need to
emerge to ensure capabilities are not eroded but actually improve,
despite current fiscal realities since, unfortunately, the threat of
nuclear terrorism has not diminished. I thank you for the chance to
appear before you today and welcome any questions you might have.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, all the panelists, and I
thank you for staying within the time of 5 minutes each.
We will start our round of questioning.
First of all, Mr. Maurer, thank you for the work that you
have done and GAO has done on this and helping us for a
vigorous oversight. I was interested to see someone who
attended Michigan State and the University of Michigan. You
don't show any of the schizophrenic attitude I would expect
from somebody like that.
Mr. Walberg. It doesn't happen in Michigan.
Mr. Lungren. It doesn't? Oh, it doesn't happen in Michigan?
Yes.
I would say this. We will continue in our efforts to assist
DNDO in becoming better. There are very good people that have
been there. Very good people that are there now. Obviously,
some mistakes were made in the past. You have pointed out,
given us some avenues of inquiry to continue with. We thank you
for that.
Dr. Gowadia, you told us a year ago the ASP program was not
successful, official cancellation of it. We spent a lot of
money on it. GAO representative has given us reasons where
there is valid criticisms of it.
My concern is: Do you have a suitable follow-up program?
How far along are we on that? How are we going to avoid making
the same mistakes we made with the ASP program?
Ms. Gowadia. Thank you, Chairman Lungren.
I want to assure you that despite the fact we cancelled the
ASP program, current port security has not been adversely
affected. We continue to seek to improve the portal monitoring
systems we already have in the field, and extend their service
life. We are also deploying much more depth capability for
hand-held detection systems with our CVP partners for field
operations.
When it comes to lessons learned, we have definitely
stepped up, based on your oversight and GAO's recommendations,
process within not just the Department, but within DNDO itself.
We have a far more rigorous solution development process. We
have evolved our strategies to looking at surge concepts in
global architectures. All around, the rigor in our program
management and execution has certainly turned up----
Mr. Lungren. I was saying the follow-on program to ASP is
not necessarily the single technological fix that ASP would,
but a panoply of approaches using current technology and some
tweaks to current technology?
Ms. Gowadia. Exactly, sir. We are not looking at the
architecture anymore at a single----
Mr. Lungren. Okay.
Ms. Gowadia. So we will use this generation and next
generation for software.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. Let me ask you about the GNDA, the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. The plan that we
received from their office calls for the Department to spend
nearly a billion dollars in the next 5 years on radiation
detection imaging equipment fixed sites. Per your figures, only
10 percent of the planned funding will go to acquiring
equipment for scanning international rail and air cargo. Are
you satisfied this is the right risk balance?
Ms. Gowadia. Sir, the imaging systems that are fairly
expensive actually apply to far more than just the nuclear
detection mission. International rails and in air cargo we are
making significant progress, not just from the technical
perspective, but looking at both modes holistically.
For example, in air cargo, 70 percent of incoming air cargo
is express mail or consignment cargo. One hundred percent of
that is scanned before it comes into the country. So again, we
are looking across the board at all parts of the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture to implement a balanced approach.
Mr. Lungren. In response to a letter from Chairman King of
this committee, both DNDO and CVP indicated, ``there is no
National plan'' for recapitalizing radiation portal monitors. I
am trying to figure out what that answer means, consistent with
what you have just told us here?
Ms. Gowadia. We are looking very carefully with CVP on the
life extension programs and improving the detection systems
that are presently in the field. Future strategies will not be
a one-for-one portal exchange. It may even come to using a mix
of mobile and agile technologies in conjunction with the
systems that are out there.
So we are in the process of doing those studies, sir. I
think we will have some answers for you--better answers for
you--as we go through our planning this year.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
The Ranking Member is recognized.
Ms. Clark. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To Dr. Gowadia, the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
Implementation Plan contains details on what we just have spent
on various activities within the domestic of GNDA. So rather
than focus on past expenditures, do you plan to have more
information about future programmatic budgetary needs as you
update the plan? Wouldn't it be one way to better articulate
priorities within DNDA?
Ms. Gowadia. Certainly, ma'am. Actually, the plan is
forward-looking and it does describe what we will be doing
across our presently-planned 5-year budget. Now, this was a
static snapshot. I will give you that. This was our first go-
around. With every year we look through our gap vulnerabilities
and address and adapt those adversaries. Those mixes will
change, but we do intend to keep up, keep looking at that plan
on a regular basis.
Ms. Clark. You plan to make it much more dynamic going
forward?
Ms. Gowadia. Absolutely.
Ms. Clark. Okay. The GNDA strategic plan was released in
2010, and DHS-GNDA implementation plan was released in 2012.
Between these dates, the DHS, through its component agencies,
continued work on the GNDA by funding and operating those
programs contributing to the GNDA. How did the release of the
GNDA strategic plan change the day-to-day operation of
programs, like the use of RPMs at the U.S. border by CVP?
Ms. Gowadia. It would be hard for us to make a direct link
from a high-level USG-wide strategic plan down to the tactical
operations of, say, a port. However, the roles and
responsibilities that we signed up to win that strategic plan,
all of us coming together to agree upon those objectives and
goals is beginning to drive our planning process moving
forward. We see that reflected to a certain extent in the
implementation plan for the first generation. I sincerely hope
you will we see more of it as we go along.
Ms. Clark. Then just finally, what do you plan on doing
with the 13 ASP units? What is the disposition of that?
Ms. Gowadia. Actually, thank you for giving me the
opportunity to speak about the ASP. Just to give you a couple
of things. Last year at this time, Warren--Mr. Stern--was here
and told you about the cancellation of the ASP program. I want
to assure you that in July of last year when the last contract
expired we did not spend any further money with contracts for
ASP.
The Secretary did cancel the program and sent a letter to
Congress in October of last year. What you received last week
was just the next step in the process where the Acquisition
Review Board closed out the action item.
Ms. Clark. Okay.
Ms. Gowadia. The 13 portals that we have, some of them will
go to State agencies who are interested in deploying some of
these along their borders. In fact, I believe New Mexico is
getting one this month. So we continue to try to learn and
expand the knowledge we have, data that we can collect.
Ms. Clark. So then, in transferring the unit it then
becomes the responsibility of the State for any further
development with it, any maintenance of it? What is the
relationship?
Ms. Gowadia. I do not have all of the details on the MOU. I
know that they wouldn't develop it further, but I know that we
will be partnering with them to get a lot of the data and the
knowledge moving forward.
Ms. Clark. Thank you very much.
Mr. Maurer, how did PNNL in its role as a testing site,
coordinate between CVP and DNDO of these systems?
Mr. Maurer. Are you talking about during the testing
process for the original development of ASP?
Ms. Clark. Correct, sir.
Mr. Maurer. Correct? The PNNL played a coordination role.
The specifics varied depending on what level of testing and
what stage in the testing process you were talking about. I can
provide additional details for the record, if you would like.
Ms. Clark. That would be helpful, sir.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
The gentleman from Michigan is recognized for his time.
Then, we have heard from the floor that things are going a
little more slowly there, so we might have a little more time
here. But that doesn't mean you should use any more time than
you need.
Mr. Walberg. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not
schizophrenic about Michigan State or Michigan U either.
Representing both institutions in my district, Mr. Maurer,
I would concur that there is no schizophrenia, that is just
quality experience.
Thanks for being here.
Thanks to the rest of the panel as well.
Mr. Maurer, the recent GNDA implementation plan states
performance measures of achieving 100 percent radiation
scanning of sea cargo, and over 80 percent of rail and air
cargo within the next 3 years.
In your opinion, are these appropriate performance goals?
In your opinion, does the Department have a credible technology
acquisition plan and cost estimate for achieving these
performance goals?
Mr. Maurer. I think those are reasonable performance goals
the Department has set for itself as the targets for
accomplishing what they need to do in the future. Particularly
in the rail environment, that has been one of the more critical
vulnerabilities, or potential vulnerabilities.
I know that DHS has taken a number of efforts to try to
address the rail environment. That one is particularly
challenging. Some of it gets down to the fact that you just
can't stop a large freight rail train in its tracks if you get
a hit, so there is some challenges around that.
But I think it is important for DHS to have that as a goal
going forward. In terms of the technology, one of the things
that we are going to be watching carefully over the next couple
of years is the results of DHS's on-going work to develop new
technologies to supplement what it currently has in place. The
current systems have been the backbone of radiation detection
capabilities at DHS for a number of years and it has
significantly enhanced their capabilities.
However, they really need to take advantage of new
technologies, particularly to address some of the challenges,
be detecting shielded radioactive sources as well in the rail
environment. So we will be watching that carefully and seeing
what develops over the course of the next year.
Mr. Walberg. But you are positive in your sense of the
movement forward, that is it is not simply adequate, but it is
staying with the curve, ahead of the curve?
Mr. Maurer. Yes, absolutely. We think that DNDO is on the
right path. We are encouraged by the recent changes in its
overall approach. We are encouraged by the fact that they now
have a strategy and implementation plan in response to our
recommendations. The key for us, from an oversight perspective,
is seeing what they do to execute on those plans and
strategies.
Mr. Walberg. Okay. Expanding on that, the Department of
Homeland Security continues to experience difficulty in
acquiring new technology. We have seen, as you have indicated,
millions of dollars wasted on failed efforts to develop
security technologies. The ASP plan already being a prime
example of that.
In your opinion, could you expand on I guess some of the
root problems with the Department's approach to technology
acquisition?
Mr. Maurer. Absolutely. Some of its members sort of
diverted in the past, and DHS is taking measures to address
some of these problems. But generally speaking, there was a
tendency a few years ago to push the deployment of new
technology before it was really ready. In other words, trying
to make decisions about deployment before it had been
adequately tested to show that it actually worked in a real-
world environment. That was one significant challenge that DHS
faced.
Another challenge that it faced was the Department
traditionally has had some pretty robust guidance for its
overall acquisition programs, its policies. When you read them
on a piece of paper it looks quite sound. They weren't always
complying and following with those policies. That is something
that we have some on-going on. We will be issuing a report on
that relatively soon and talking about where they are now. They
are making progress, but there is still some ways to go on
that.
Then finally, another key challenge they face is that
oftentimes the portions of DHS that were developing the new
technologies weren't talking to the actual end-users, the
eventual end-users, of those systems. So sometimes there were
some pretty significant disconnects between the folks
developing the technologies and the people who actual had to
use them on a day-to-day basis. Once again, DHS has a number of
plans in place right now to address that problem, and we will
be watching them carefully to make sure that they carry them
out.
Mr. Walberg. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, unless you would give me the opportunity to
ask another question, knowing that it is getting close to the
time ending.
Mr. Lungren. Well, let me ask Mr. Marino if he has some
questions. Then if you have some more I think we might have
some time.
Mr. Marino from Pennsylvania.
Mr. Marino. Nothing, sir.
Mr. Lungren. Well, then I would ask the gentlelady if she
has further questions?
Ms. Clark. Sure.
Just quickly to Dr. Gowadia. The Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office develops and coordinates, as time would have it, Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture. Many Federal departments
participate in implementing it even within DHS, and many DHS
components participate.
Given the involvement of the multiple agencies, how does
DNDO achieve its statutory mission of implementing the domestic
portion of GNDA?
Ms. Gowadia. Thank you, Congresswoman Clarke. We actually
have multiple ways in which we do that. First and foremost, we
do work closely with our DHS operational components, CDC, Coast
Guard, TSA, working with them closely to get their images or
requirements, make sure that those are coupled with our
rigorous analysis of the architecture and where weaknesses and
vulnerabilities exist.
So that is how we start programs. Now, sometimes that is a
technical program, sometimes it could be a training program, it
could be a policy issue. That is the Federal end of things. We
also work with our State and local partners very closely. They
have been tremendous supporters of this mission and I believe
all of you commented on their law enforcement skills.
So I go back to the notion of, again, that security triad.
How do we bring to bear the technologies that are available
from our end with law enforcement skills and intelligence
skills to make sure that as a Federal, State, and local
enterprise we are doing our best to counter nuclear terrorism?
Ms. Clark. Just quickly to follow that, is there a metric
involved?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, some metrics are reflecting an annual
review, their first--the one from last year I believe got us
some initial metrics. This year's, you will see a little bit.
We will continue to build on those initial metrics. Also, our
implementation plan allows us to track progress.
Ms. Clark. Very well.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. I know Mr. Walberg
has a question.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Walberg.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Oxford, at the National Laboratory, you need to have
forward-looking plan to support technology development and
sustain a world-class technical workforce.
In your opinion, has the Department shared with you a
sufficiently detailed plan for its upcoming technology
acquisition programs?
Mr. Oxford. Congressman, what we do is work closely with
places like DNDO. We actually advise them in many cases of
where some of the gaps and some of the issues are surrounding
either emerging technologies, or the existing technology.
We will provide information that contributes now to what
Dr. Gowadia mentioned as their solution development process,
informing analysis of alternatives so they can make cost-
effective decisions as new technology comes about. We also get
directly involved in tests and evaluation of existing or
emerging technologies.
For example, we supported an initiative to look at Ondoc
rail straddle carrier detection systems to find out whether
that is a feasible solution in the Ondoc rail or the seaport
environments. So it was a good collaborative effort, allowing
us not only to support their on-going efforts, but to look into
the future to look at changes.
For example, we were directly involved in the helium-3
alternative discussion based on our background. So there is a
very robust discussion allowing us to look forward.
Mr. Walberg. So it is a working relationship where I am to
understand that it is certainly is them coming and saying,
``Here is a challenge that we have. These are some things that
we need developed, processes?'' But also could I conclude that
you would be suggesting to them concerns, options, and
capabilities?
Mr. Oxford. Absolutely. We advise them on components of the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. I would also work
directly with them on looking, for example, as I mentioned in
my opening statement, the sustainment of the current RPM
program. It is not just an operational and maintenance issue.
There are technical aspects of that that allow us to continue
that program while DNDO determines what the future life cycle
of a deployed system might look like.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. Dr. Gowadia, about the ASP. That was at least
presented to us as a program intended to improve performance
for equipment for things such as false positives in sensitivity
to shielded nuclear materials. But you folks have presented to
us that it just didn't work based on the way that we thought it
did and it was not worth continuing.
My question is: Why would States want something that is not
working? Somehow it is going to work better because the State
is operating it? Or I am really kind of confused on this.
Ms. Gowadia. Chairman Lungren, as we were going through our
field validation, we discovered that the jointly-developed
specifications for the ASP system--I believe CDTMS developed
this jointly in 2007--no longer reflected accurately the
operational concerns that CVP faces. So specifically, truck
speed in secondary inspection exceeds 2 miles an hour, and the
design specification called for 2 miles an hour.
In the State and local weigh station environment, for
example, they are able to control truck speed up to 2 miles an
hour. So it is a--operational environment and the technology is
suited for being used there. Again, what we will learn from
these deployments is the impact of the speeds on the
performance of the system. That was one of the things we intend
to gain from our partnership with the States.
Mr. Lungren. I appreciate that very much.
I think we only have a few minutes to go to vote, so
anybody else have a question?
We want to thank you for making a presentation before us.
We appreciate very much the work that you are doing and the
spirit of cooperation with which you have worked with this
subcommittee.
Once again, I would like to say that I very much appreciate
the participation that we had at the classified briefing and
the number of people that were available to us for answering
our questions. I hope that both in classified briefings and in
open hearings we can continue with this dialogue.
I think it is very important. What you do at DNDO is as
important as anything that is being done at DHS, and in my
opinion as important as anything that is being done in the
Federal Government.
We want to make sure that we get it right. We will work
with you to make sure that we get it right to the extent that
we can participate and that means active oversight. I assure
you it is not partisan.
It is a bipartisan commitment and the concerns expressed by
the Ranking Member are concerns I believe shared by all members
about some of the past performance, with the recognition that,
again, good people are working over there attempting to try and
solve some very, very difficult problems.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony, and
Members for their questions. Members of the committee may have
some additional questions for the witnesses that they would
submit to you in writing. We would ask that you would respond
to them in writing.
We thank you for your service. We thank you for your
participation.
The hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
The subcommittee's hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:47 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren for Huban A. Gowadia
Question 1. We have learned that the Department of Energy (DOE) is
phasing out its Megaports Program, which was deploying new radiation
detection equipment at foreign ports.
Does that mean that DHS will have to do even more scanning at our
domestic ports to make up the difference?
Question 2. In the fiscal year 2013 Presidential budget request,
neither DHS nor DOE requested any funds for the deployment of radiation
portal monitors (RPM's) at domestic and foreign ports.
Based on this fact, please explain why RPM's are being de-
emphasized in the overall Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA)
strategy.
Answer. In keeping with the U.S. National Strategy for Global
Supply Chain Security, DHS uses a layered, risk-based approach to cargo
security that includes a variety of risk mitigation measures, including
(among others) advance information, automated targeting, and inspection
and scanning of cargo by personnel or technological means, both at
domestic ports and in foreign trading partner ports. Radiation Portal
Monitors (RPMs), whether provided via Megaports at foreign ports or
deployed domestically, are but one example of this broader security
system.
In the layered defense provided by the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture (GNDA), there are detection capabilities at various points
along the pathways that nuclear and radiological materials might follow
to get to the United States. Cargo scanning is but one part of that
defensive posture. At this stage in the development and implementation
of the GNDA, cargo scanning with RPMs is seen as one of a number of
priorities that, in total, will result in a comprehensive, layered
defense. This layered defense also includes sustainment of existing
Megaports sites and equipment abroad, as well as expanding use of
mobile detection methodologies like Human Portable Radiation Detection
Systems.
It should also be noted that the Megaports Program is not being
phased out. The Megaports Program continues to provide technical
support to terminal operators and foreign counterparts who undertake
this work, and is considering potential cost-sharing deployments in the
out-years. Furthermore, the planned reduction in funding would not
impact the equipment that has already been deployed in countries around
the world.
Question 3a. Figures provided by DNDO indicate that less than 1% of
the planned acquisition funding for new radiation detection equipment
over the next 5 years will be dedicated to international rail port of
entries.
Why is DNDO not putting more resources on this important aspect of
the GNDA?
Question 3b. In testimony, it appears that it is technically
feasible to monitor rail cargo as it enters the United States, but that
there are logistical and operational barriers. Can you please describe
these barriers and what actions need to be taken in order to remove
these barriers?
Answer. Radiological and nuclear detection for freight rail cargo
is technically challenging due to several factors, including those that
impact logistics and operations for scanning freight trains. These
include the length of railcars, the required stand-off distances from
rail tracks for installation of detection equipment to scan trains,
limited space, attenuation of any radiation through rail cargo and rail
car structures, the speed of the train passing a detector, and
legitimate commerce such as fertilizer and ceramics that can set off
false alarms.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) currently has 26 rail
imaging systems deployed Nation-wide--18 rail imaging systems are
deployed on the Northern Border and 8 systems are deployed on the
Southern Border. These 26 systems provide CBP with the capability to
examine up to 99% of all arriving rail traffic for the presence of
contraband. Suspect containers can be further examined using hand-held
radiation detectors for the presence of radiological and nuclear
materials. Thus, the current funding profile for international rail
cargo scanning was determined through a systematic process that
considered budget levels; maturity and challenges faced by current
technologies; and the ranking of other priorities within the global
nuclear detection architecture. Consistent with this approach, DNDO is
conducting an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for International Rail
that is considering technical, operational, and logistical issues as
part of the evaluation process. Based on the AoA findings and the DNDO
Transformational and Applied Research Directorate (TARD) proof of
concept evaluation, the funding profile for international rail cargo
will be re-examined in comparison to other priority efforts as the
results of these studies are reviewed.
In the technology development area, TARD is planning to explore
technology concepts to address the rail cargo scanning challenges. TARD
is participating in the AoA effort and will leverage data gathered
during this study to assist in the evaluation of technologies. During
fiscal year 2013, DNDO will conduct a freight rail scanning-related
proof of concept evaluation for new and developing technologies. Based
on the AoA findings and relevant technology evaluation, the funding
profile for international rail cargo scanning can be re-examined.
Question 4. The Securing the Cities Program (STC) has successfully
put radiation detector technology in the hands of first responders
throughout the New York metropolitan area.
What made the STC acquisition so successful, and how can we apply
or expand that model to other Departmental acquisitions?
Answer. The Securing the Cities (STC) program's success stems from
effective management techniques applied to a focused capability
development process. STC is not a standard acquisition program, but a
financial assistance instrument allowing the grant awardee to procure
the necessary commercial off-the-shelf radiation detection equipment
and associated support. The program emphasizes a cooperative regional
structure for radiation detection, unified under one grant recipient
who enters into sub-awards with other principal area partners. This
structure allows procurement of standardized equipment and brings all
regional players together under a common concept of operations. DNDO
maintains substantial involvement throughout the grant's period of
performance and all phases of the STC program to ensure State and local
acquisitions satisfy local requirements, as well as Federal program
requirements. DNDO's technical assistance supports planning, strategy
development, equipment acquisition, concepts of operation development,
standard operating procedures development, training, exercises, and
assessment activities, as well as sustainment and maintenance analysis.
The STC methodology has been standardized for replication to other
high-threat, high-density urban areas to provide for radiation/nuclear
detection capability. A replication of this program within other
Department components would require an assessment of program
fundamentals, such as outcomes (end-state), expectations, and
cooperative agreements that partner State, local, and Federal resources
into a coherent effort. A best practice for integrated programs
leverages existing infrastructure and capabilities while taking
advantage of current technology and partnerships. Additionally, a
costs-versus-benefits assessment of the program will be needed to
understand the overall value of an implemented program.
Question 5. The Department's nuclear detection strategy cross-cuts
many U.S. Government and foreign agencies.
Is there specific coordination aspects that you believe need to be
improved and are there legislative solutions that may help?
Answer. The coordination of the development of the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture (GNDA) is of great importance. DNDO has seen
great success in working with our Federal, State, and local partners to
implement the domestic portion of the GNDA. DNDO's authorities provided
by the Security and Accountability for Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006
(Pub. L. 109-347) and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 110-53), have underscored the need for
a cooperative working relationship with interagency and intra-DHS
partners. Through continued productive engagement with our DHS and
interagency partners, we are able to frequently discuss our collective
efforts to build effective nuclear detection architecture to detect and
report on the illicit trafficking of radiological and nuclear materials
across our borders.
DNDO also coordinates with the Departments of Defense, Energy, and
State, which have primary responsibility for overseas implementation of
the GNDA, including with foreign countries and on U.S. Government
international activities.
Question 6a. The technology providers for DNDO (e.g. industry and
the National Laboratories) have stated that it is very difficult to
plan their technology development efforts due to insufficient
information regarding the Department's acquisition plans.
Has DNDO shared the GNDA Implementation Plan with its technology
providers?
Question 6b. Are there specific actions that DNDO can take in order
to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of its technology supply
chain?
Answer. Consistent with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) uses a variety of mechanisms
to exchange information with industry to improve the understanding of
Government requirements, including Broad Agency Announcement, Requests
for Information, Industry Days, Pre-solicitation Notices, Draft Request
for Proposals/Quotations, and one-on-one meetings with potential
vendors. DNDO works with its partners to coordinate interagency efforts
to develop technical nuclear detection capabilities, measure detector
system performance, ensure effective response to detection alarms,
integrate USG nuclear forensics efforts, and conduct transformational
research and development for advanced detection and forensics
technologies. We collaborate and coordinate efforts through shared
review of Broad Area Announcements, Requests for Proposals, and through
interagency portfolio reviews. Additionally, we interact and exchange
technical information for research and development efforts under a
Memorandum of Understanding with relevant parties.
DNDO is currently planning an Industry Day for the first quarter of
fiscal year 2013, where information about the Government's upcoming
programs and anticipated programs and acquisitions will be discussed
and an overview of the GNDA Implementation Plan will be provided. In
addition to these mechanisms, technology providers may access a wealth
of publicly available budget and planning information through the
Office of Management and Budget's website.
Additionally, in August 2012, DNDO hosted National Laboratory
Information Day to promote an understanding of the current activities
and future plans for GNDA program development and analysis and to
provide an opportunity for APD staff to learn about National Laboratory
programs and specialized areas of expertise that can support current
and future GNDA activities. Staff members from seven National
Laboratories attended the event.
DNDO has also implemented a Commercial First Initiative to improve
the effectiveness and efficiency of its technology supply chain. The
goal of DNDO Commercial First Initiative is to leverage the commercial
marketplace to maximize the use of commercially available products, to
engage commercial vendors to focus their internal product development
efforts to meet the validated needs of DNDO and its stakeholders, and
to invest in solutions to meet these needs. There are several
``commercial first'' pathways that a program can follow (as shown in
the below graphic) depending on the defined gap and the technical
maturity and commercial availability of potential material solutions
that may be able to address that gap. These pathways include:
Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS)
Customized COTS
Commercial Development
Government Sponsored Development
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Question 7. Given that it has been 1 year since the cancelation of
the ASP program, and DNDO has still not deployed any first-production
ASP units in the field, we are now requesting that DNDO please provide
a monthly report that includes the following information:
Number of ASP units in storage;
Number of ASP units deployed, their location, and the
operating agencies;
A full accounting of the $16.1 million that was dedicated
for ASP deployments, including amount expended, and amount
remaining;
Monthly reports shall continue until all ASP units have been
deployed or until all remaining funds have been expended,
whichever occurs first.
Answer. DNDO will provide a monthly report that contains the
following information:
Number of Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) units in
storage (For Official Use Only/Law Enforcement Sensitive
Information Attachment)*
Number of ASP units deployed including the location and
operating agency of each system (For Official Use Only/Law
Enforcement Sensitive Information Attachment)*
An accounting of the $16,072,560 that was dedicated for ASP
deployments, including amount expended and amount remaining.
The data will be updated and provided on a monthly basis, as
requested; however, given that the location and operating agency of
each system constitutes Law Enforcement Sensitive information, this
data will be appropriately marked and provided separately.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Information is retained in committee files.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Please note that the $16,072,560 in Systems Acquisition funds also
included funds for the Radiation Portal Monitor Program (RPMP). Thus,
the amount originally dedicated for ASP deployments was $13,251,591
instead of $16,072,560 (QFR referred to this as $16.1 million). As of
27 July 2012, there is $6,495,591 available for the deployment of ASPs
to support data collection. The balance of remaining funds is reflected
in the table below.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount in
Description Dollars
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASP LRIP Deployment Support............................. $13,251,591
RPMP Deployment Support................................. 2,570,969
Additional RPMP Deployment Support...................... 250,000
TOTAL for RPMP and ASP Deployment................. 16,072,560
------------------------------------------------------------------------
ASP LRIP Deployment Support............................. 3,251,591
Deobligation 1QFY12..................................... (600,000)
ASP LRIP Deployment Support............................. 12,651,591
Transferred to RPMP support 4QFY12...................... (7,500,000)
Available for ASP LRIP Deployment Support............... 5,151,591
Expended through 27 July 2012........................... (656,000)
Remaining as of 27 July 2012............................ 4,495,591
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Questions From Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke for Huban A. Gowadia
Question 1. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) develops
and coordinates the global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA). Many
Federal departments participate in implementing it. Even within DHS,
many DHS components participate,
Given the involvement of multiple agencies, how does DNDO achieve
its statutory mission of implementing the domestic portion of the GNDA?
Question 2. What authorities does DNDO have to ensure participation
by other DHS components?
Are these sufficient? If not, how are DHS components held
accountable to the deadlines presented in the DHS GNDA implementation
plan?
Question 3. Who leads GNDA strategy development and implementation
for the Federal Government?
How is the performance of programs, agencies, and departments
participating in the GNDA assessed, and what mechanisms are in place to
identify duplication, overlap, or synergy among the GNDA programs and
activities?
Answer. DNDO achieves its statutory mission of implementing the
domestic component of the GNDA through its procurement of equipment on
behalf of its DHS partners, fostering the nuclear and radiological
detection capabilities of State and local law enforcement, and close
collaboration with interagency partners.
DNDO's authorities provided by the Security and Accountability for
Every (SAFE) Port Act of 2006 (Pub. L. 109-347) and the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 110-53)
have led to a cooperative working relationship with interagency and
intra-DHS partners. DNDO has led the development of an interagency GNDA
Strategic Plan, a DHS GNDA Implementation Plan, and the joint annual
review of the GNDA. The joint annual review enables a careful
comparison of the respective roles that individual constituents play. A
recommendations section is intended in part to correct any duplication,
overlap, or lack of synergy that is identified. Improved mechanisms for
assessment are being explored as part of the annual reporting process.
These accomplishments and activities have served to advance the
implementation of the domestic portion of the GNDA, and further
cooperative work within DHS is being undertaken to track the activities
and performance measures found in the DHS GNDA Implementation Plan.
While DNDO has led the GNDA strategy development for the Federal
Government, we are cognizant of the extensive expertise and efforts on
behalf of the GNDA by its interagency partners. For this reason,
products such as the GNDA Strategic Plan and GNDA Joint Annual
Interagency Review were developed collaboratively and work continues to
further empower interagency partners in shaping strategy.
In addition, coordination mechanisms such as the GNDA Sub-
Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) process run by the National Security
Staff within the White House and the Nuclear Terrorism Working Group
(NTWG) within DHS enable identification of potential duplication and
overlap, as well as synergy among programs.
Question 4a. There have been many Congressionally-requested GAO and
National Academy of Sciences reports that have identified the failures
in the use, testing, evaluation, procurement, and deployment of the
ASP, and finally the Department has terminated the program. How do you
intend to move forward with the remaining ASP's and how much money do
you anticipate spending on the existing devices that are not certified
by the Secretary?
What steps has DHS undertaken to implement the lessons learned from
the failed ASP procurement?
Question 4b. How have the procurement, testing, and evaluation of
nuclear detection systems changed in response to Congressional
oversight and GAO reports?
Answer. The remaining $6,495,591 will be used for ASP deployments,
decommissioning (field validation and test sites), and stream-of-
commerce spectroscopic data collection in support of requirements
development for future systems. DNDO has already deployed two systems
at State sites, and is planning to deploy another three systems at
State sites, as well as one system to CBP at a port of entry (POE) for
non-operational data collection, for a total of six systems. The
remaining systems will be given to National Labs, academia, etc, or
will be disposed of.
DHS has implemented numerous steps to improve its acquisition
processes, including but not limited to the implementation of DHS
Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 (MD 102-01). In support of MD
102-01, DNDO has implemented a Solution Development Process, including
a Governance Review Board, which ensures guidance in MD 102-01 is
properly met. In addition, DNDO captured and documented lessons learned
from the ASP program in a Lessons Learned database that is available to
program managers in DNDO and is discussed during program quarterly
reviews. The aforementioned documents and several other processes have
directly improved DHS procurement, testing, and evaluation of nuclear
detection systems. The challenges faced by the ASP program also
underscore the need for close coordination with operational partners to
determine technical requirements and operational requirements in the
field. MD 102-01 and DNDO's internal implementation of improved
acquisition and program management facilitate close coordination
between technology developers and end-users.
In response to the National Academy of Sciences Report, DNDO is
expanding our developmental approach to include a more robust modeling
and simulation of the environment where that equipment will be deployed
for radiation detection in support of the global nuclear detection
architecture. The set of possible combinations of threats, cargo, and
environments (i.e., nuisance radiation signatures, shielding
attenuations, and background variation) is so large and diverse that
DNDO is incorporating a more thorough analytical basis for
understanding the performance of its detectors systems against
different configurations and in different operational environments.
In response to Congressional oversight and Government
Accountability Office reports for test and evaluation of nuclear
detection systems, DNDO has modified DNDO Operating Instruction 1 to
increase the formality of test event planning by defining roles and
responsibilities and implementing a structured Milestone Review Process
with entrance and exit criteria that is reviewed by the senior
management of DNDO. DNDO has also increased its use of independent
verification and validation, and has developed a Test Observation
Reporting System to capture any deviations from the Test Plan.
Finally, DNDO has improved its test capabilities through the
manufacture and acquisition of specially-designed sources and ancillary
test support equipment to ensure accurate and reproducible test
conditions.
Question 5a. In 2009, Secretary Napolitano testified that ``in
order to implement the 100% scanning requirement of foreign ship cargo
entering the United States by the 2012 deadline, DHS would need
significant resources for greater manpower and technology, technologies
that do not currently exist, and the redesign of many ports. These are
all prohibitive challenges that will require the Department to seek the
time extensions authorized by law.''
What efforts has DHS undertaken since that time to overcome these
challenges? How successful have those efforts been?
Answer. U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has focused
substantial attention and resources over the last several years on
securing goods being transported within maritime containers. As a
result, we have strengthened our multi-layered security measures, more
effectively securing and facilitating the large volume of goods
arriving in the United States each year. By leveraging programs such as
the Container Security Initiative (CSI) for the integrated scanning of
high-risk containers, the Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism
(C-TPAT), and the Importer Security Filing (often called ``10+2'') for
the advance collection of manifest and import data to enhance
targeting, we are more secure than ever before. Our layered and risk-
based approach provides that, at a minimum, 100 percent of high-risk
containers are examined through a number of measures, including
screening, scanning, physical inspection, or resolution by foreign
authorities. In addition, we have strengthened our automated targeting
systems and enhanced the quality and timeliness of the commercial data
upon which those systems rely. CBP continues to work collaboratively
with industry, our Federal partners, and the international community to
expand these programs and our capability to detect, analyze, and report
on nuclear and radiological materials that are outside of regulatory
control.
Question 5b. Clearly DHS has planned for some time to extend the
July 2012 deadline. The law permits additional extensions in 2-year
increments.
Question 5c. Does DHS expect to extend the deadline again in 2014?
If so, when does DHS expect to be able to meet the 100% scanning
requirement?
Answer. DHS has not made any decision at this time regarding a
decision to extend the deadline in 2014. DHS will continue to work with
Congress to refine its approach and ensure that scanning remains a key
layer of the suite of security systems.
Question 5d. In allowing for extensions of the 100% scanning
deadline, the law requires the Secretary to certify that at least two
of six specified conditions exist. A lack of resources for implementing
the requirement is not one of the six specified conditions.
Which of the six conditions currently exist?
Answer. On May 2, 2012 DHS Secretary Napolitano certified that the
following conditions existed to allow for the extension:
Use of systems that are available to scan containers will
have a significant and negative impact on trade capacity and
the flow of cargo.
Systems to scan containers cannot be purchased, deployed, or
operated at ports overseas because ports do not have the
physical characteristics to install such a system.
Question 5e. Which of the six conditions does DHS expect to resolve
within the next 2 years?
Answer. It is unclear which conditions can be resolved in the next
2 years due to a variety of challenges and the uniqueness of each
foreign port and the cooperation with foreign governments. However, DHS
recognizes the need to proceed with container security programs in a
responsible, practical manner that maximizes the security of maritime
cargo, facilitates trade, and enhances global supply chain resilience.
DHS plans to work within and across the U.S. Government to effectively
develop technology, enhance risk management processes, and implement a
robust layered enforcement strategy for screening cargo. Through the
Department's Science and Technology Directorate and Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, DHS continues to monitor technology advancement in
the private sector, academia, and the interagency to address the
challenges of scanning maritime cargo. Through existing and new efforts
on domestic and international fronts, DHS--along with the World Customs
Organization, the International Maritime Organization, the
International Civil Aviation Organization, and other partners--is
striving to improve the security of operations, raise international
standards, and foster systems that secure the global supply chain.
Question 5f. Considering that resource availability is not an
allowable reason for extending the deadline, how does DHS prioritize
funding for this effort relative to other programs?
Answer. To date, CBP and the Department of Energy have spent
approximately $120 million on efforts to implement the 100 percent
scanning mandate. The Government Accountability Office has testified
that the total cost to fully implement the 100 percent scanning mandate
in all ports that ship maritime cargo to the United States would be
approximately $20 billion.
The International Cargo Screening (ICS) PPA prioritizes funding for
CBP to continue operations for the Container Security Initiative (CSI)
in keeping with DHS policy of a robust risk-based approach to cargo
security. CSI is a key component to DHS's layered security approach to
cargo security. The ICS PPA also allows for sufficient funding for the
Secure Freight Initiative (SFI) to continue 100 percent scanning
operations in Qasim, Pakistan.
Funding continues to be a priority for other key components of
DHS's layered security strategy such as Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism, the Importer Security Filing, and enhancements to
the Automated Targeting System. These programs, in conjunction with CSI
and SFI, comprise DHS's layered security strategy.
Question From Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke for Vayl S. Oxford
Question. What work is PNNL currently doing that might improve the
performance of existing RPMs? How would you characterize the importance
and potential of that work?
Answer. PNNL is engaged in several programs that are focused on
improving the performance of radiation portal monitors (RPMs) as well
as extending RPM life in the field.
The performance of an RPM is dictated by its ability to
simultaneously detect the threat (probability of detection) and to be
insensitive to nuisance and false alarms. These sensor attributes are
measured as the probability of detection (PD) and the nuisance and
false alarm probability (NFAP). PNNL is currently funded to develop and
evaluate a number of new algorithmic approaches that have the potential
to improve both of these parameters of performance for current
generation RPMs. This research is focused on making full use of all the
information generated by current generation RPM technology and applying
our experience and knowledge from 10 years of deployment support and
approximately 750 million screening events. These projects specifically
address optimization of the currently deployed commercial algorithm to
make best use of fielded capabilities, the evaluation of a novel
algorithmic approach that categorizes screening events (radiation
spectra) as ``threats'' or ``benign,'' and an algorithm that accounts
for the changing radiation environments in real-world operations.
Combined, these efforts will likely make modest improvements in the
probability of threat detection, but offer the potential to have
significant operational impact through the reduction of nuisance and
false alarms, which drive the operational cost for these systems.
In addition to improving the detection performance of the systems,
PNNL has focused on addressing the system life-cycle issues that reduce
performance of RPM systems over time and require the ultimate
replacement of components and whole systems. Specifically, the
radiation-sensitive detector material poly-vinyl toluene (PVT), which
is the backbone of almost all deployed RPM systems worldwide, has a
limited life that is not well understood. This research has focused on
understanding the reasons for the degradation of PVT over time and to
get at root cause so that mitigation strategies can be put in place. As
the Nation's deployed systems age, this will become a critical issue.
There are other limited-lifetime components of the deployed systems,
and PNNL has been asked to evaluate the issue to inform a United States
Government strategy to sustain the existing deployed system network to
the degree that it continues to meet the operational needs of the
nuclear threat detection community.
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