[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
UNDERSTANDING THE HOMELAND
THREAT LANDSCAPE
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 25, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-109
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Ron Barber, Arizona
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Hon. Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Matthew G. Olsen, Director, National Counterterrorism Center:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
For the Record
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Image.......................................................... 41
The Honorable Loretta Sanchez, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Letter......................................................... 57
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Peter T. King for Hon. Janet Napolitano.. 71
UNDERSTANDING THE HOMELAND
THREAT LANDSCAPE
----------
Wednesday, July 25, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King [Chairman
of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Lungren, Rogers, McCaul,
Broun, Miller, Walberg, Cravaack, Walsh, Meehan, Quayle, Long,
Duncan, Marino, Turner, Thompson, Sanchez, Jackson Lee,
Cuellar, Clarke of New York, Richardson, Clarke of Michigan,
Hahn, and Barber.
Also present: Representative Crawford.
Chairman King. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order.
Before we begin the actual proceedings, I would like to
acknowledge the appearance of a new Member to the Congress,
Member of the committee, Congressman Ron Barber from Arizona.
He succeeds our former colleague, Gabby Giffords, for whom he
served as district director, I believe. He has a long,
distinguished record in Arizona. I am sure Secretary Napolitano
is familiar with him. I'm getting ganged up on by people from
Arizona here.
But, anyway, Ron, it is good to have you on the committee.
Look forward to working with you. You know, we appreciate the
interest and concern you have already shown. So, thank you.
Mr. Thompson. [Off mike.]
Chairman King. The gentleman from Mississippi.
Mr. Thompson. I would also like to welcome Mr. Barber to
the Democratic side. Your reputation for being a hard worker
precedes you. We look forward to it. The work is in the rear,
as soon as the meeting is over. We look forward to you picking
it up. But thank you very much for being here.
Chairman King. I will start with the formal notice. The
Committee on Homeland Security is meeting today to hear
testimony from Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano and
National Counterterrorism Director Matthew Olsen on the
homeland threat landscape. I will recognize myself for an
opening statement.
But before I begin the opening statement--and I will defer
to Secretary Napolitano if she wants to add to the comments--I
want to acknowledge that we just learned--Secretary Napolitano
learned yesterday that former Homeland Security employees were
killed in Afghanistan this week. Our thoughts and prayers, as
the Secretary said, are with the families of former U.S. Border
Patrol agent and retired ICE agent Benjamin Monsivais and
retired CBP Port Director Joseph Perez.
They were in Afghanistan working with contractors,
supporting the Afghan border police in their training efforts,
and also two other individuals wounded in this senseless
attack. So obviously, our thoughts and prayers go out to them
and their families.
Chairman King. If the Secretary wants to comment on that
now, I will defer to you.
Secretary Napolitano. [Off mike.]
Chairman King. All right. Thank him for his service.
I will now recognize myself for an opening statement.
This is Secretary Napolitano's fourth appearance before our
committee in the past 18 months. She has also held a number of
unofficial meetings and briefings with Members of the
committee. I know this occurs on both sides of the aisle, and I
want to thank her for her cooperation on that.
Matt Olsen is, I guess, just finishing his first year as
director of the National Counterterrorism Center. He has a long
distinguished record in Government prior to that. I would just
say, in a personal capacity, I have had several meetings with
him, received several briefings from him. Whenever there has
been an incident and we had to reach him by phone, if I was
back in the District, he was there. He provided the essential
information, and has, again, been more than willing to
cooperate with us in any way, and I thank you for your service
and look forward to continued working with you.
When Secretary Napolitano testified before our committee in
January 2012, she stated that the radicalization of U.S.
citizens to al-Qaeda's violent and extremist ideology was a
``game-changer.'' To examine that threat, I convened a series
of hearings to examine the scope and the severity of that
threat. That is really what we are faced with today, is what is
the scope and severity of the threat, both from homegrown
terrorists, from splinter terrorist groups around the world,
and from core al-Qaeda?
In the past year, past 15 months, there have been a number
of outstanding achievements. There was the killing of bin
Laden. There was the killing of Awlaki. There was the killing
of Samir Khan, and other top al-Qaeda leaders.
Yet there are still real threats. In this 112th Congress
alone, there have been 10 al-Qaeda plots that we know of
against the United States. In addition to that now, we have
plots from Iran, as the attempted assassinations here in
Washington demonstrated last December. Also with the intensity
in the Middle East, with Iran and Israel, with the United
States and Iran, with Iran and her neighbors, we have to be
concerned about threats to the homeland from Hezbollah. We also
have hearings on that, but I look forward to any testimony you
have on that, especially seeing what happened to Bulgaria, to
the extent that Hezbollah was involved in the killing of the
Israeli children in Bulgaria.
Also, there has been an emergence of Boko Haram.
Congressman Meehan has done an outstanding job in that with his
subcommittee. We have asked to have Boko Haram designated as a
foreign terrorist organization. I believe, Congressman Meehan
and others in the committee believe that is essential, if the
Justice Department is going to have the powers of enforcement
that it needs. Again, this is a growing threat, and I look
forward to any testimony you have on the whole issue of Boko
Haram.
There has been another issue, and that is the question of
leaks, which I believe have a direct impact on the security of
our homeland. It began last year after the killing of bin
Laden, which was--the President deserves tremendous credit for
that, but the leaks that poured out of the administration in
the days and weeks following that. Then the agreement with Sony
Pictures to do a film on it.
Then, after that, we had the--just 2 months ago, the al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula plot, which was details that
were leaked to the media, to the Associated Press, before the
work was completed on that, I believe compromising the effort
that was in there, not just with the United States, but also
with several of our very key allies overseas.
Then we saw the series of leaks in late May or early June,
involving drones, Stuxnet . . . and, again, these are most
sensitive information which was being given out--it appears to
me--it appears to Senator Feinstein and others--from people
high up in the administration, people within the White House.
Senator Feinstein said several months ago, these are
unprecedented leaks.
I have demanded investigations of all these. I know on the
arrangements between the administration and Sony Pictures, the
CIA did an investigation. As a result of that, they have made
several very significant structural changes in the CIA, and the
Department of Defense inspector general is still carrying out
an investigation as to all the details of the arrangements
between the military and Sony Pictures in the preparation of
this film. The inspector general only began this investigation
after a 4-month preliminary investigation as to whether or not
a full investigation was warranted.
The FBI is carrying out right now investigations of the
leaks--well, without going into details--carrying out two very
significant investigations regarding aspects of the leaks.
Also, a recent matter was Hani Nour Eldin, who belongs to
the Islamic group, which is a designated foreign terrorist
organization, was allowed into the United States, had access to
the White House and to the United States Congress. I will be
discussing this with the Secretary. I don't believe the letter
or the spirit of the law was complied involving visa waivers
and what procedures have to be followed when we are dealing
with a designated foreign terrorist organization.
On a very positive note, I want to commend the Secretary
for the work that is being done as far as the grant system,
which are becoming more and more risk-based. I particularly
support the continuation of the Securing the Cities program,
which I believe is focused and is very effective at preventing
attacks against urban areas from areas that are out in the
suburbs, similar to what happened in Madrid and London, where
we can foresee terrorists actually planning the attack outside
the cities and bringing the devices--in this case nuclear
devices, into large urban areas.
That program has been going ahead. I want to thank the
Secretary for the continued support that we have gotten on
that.
Again, I look forward to the hearing today. I think the
issue--while we--obviously, there are philosophical differences
on the committee, and to some extent perhaps between and among
us, the fact is, all of us share a common desire to defeat
terrorism, to win this war, and to do all we can to make sure
that the counterterror forces have all of the weapons and
powers that they need and the support of the Congress.
So, with that, I yield to the distinguished Ranking Member,
the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding today's hearing on understanding the homeland threat
landscape. I want to thank Secretary Napolitano, Director Olsen
for appearing here this morning.
As we meet today to consider the homeland threat landscape,
we must be mindful that yesterday the leader of al-Qaeda in
Iraq issued a videotaped message indicating his intentions to
carry out attacks within the United States. Those new threats
require an assessment of our ability to meet our known
challenges and address our known vulnerabilities.
According to recent reports, this Nation has spent about
$360 billion on homeland security since September 1, 2001. But
despite this amount of spending, we have not filled all the
gaps.
I think most people would agree that we have made some
gains. Aviation security, border security, disaster response,
and information-sharing activities have been improved. For the
most part, these improvements in security have not required us
to surrender the Constitutional rights and protections that are
the cornerstone of this Nation's freedom.
This Nation cannot sacrifice security or freedom in the
face of any threat, foreign or domestic. As we look back at the
last 11 years, we have greatly decreased the Nation's
vulnerability to attack. I would be remiss if I did not mention
that this administration's actions abroad, from eliminating a
threat posed by bin Laden to stiffening our military presence,
has also contributed to decreasing our vulnerability at home.
However, we must be candid. Some vulnerabilities remain,
and the nature of the threat continues to evolve. As we
continue this evolution process, we must focus on the nature of
the terrorist actor. The most recent incidents in this country
have involved lone-wolf actors who are ideologically motivated
to commit violent acts. We must accept that we will not be able
to find every lone wolf on terror. But we cannot accept that we
are powerless to close opportunities and remove the
instrumentalities of destruction.
As I stated at a hearing last week, we should not forget
that the United States--the last person to crash a plane into a
Federal building, fueled by an anti-Government ideology, was a
pilot, U.S. citizen, in Texas. GAO has reported that the
Department has testified that we do not check Americans seeking
flight training against the terrorist watch list until they
apply for a pilot's license. The lesson of 9/11 is that we need
to keep people who seek to do us harm from being trained as
pilots. We must remove the opportunities and instrumentalities
of destruction.
I have introduced a bill that would require everyone who is
seeking to be trained as a pilot, make sure that they are
vetted against a terrorist watch list. I hope my colleagues
will join me in that effort.
As we consider the vulnerabilities that remain, I am
disappointed that we have not yet managed to achieve the
screening of 100 percent of maritime cargo before it reaches
our shores.
Madam Secretary, it is my understanding that you have
recently signed a blanket 2-year waiver of the 100 percent
screening requirement. I do not understand how the Department
can ignore a statutory mandate designed to close a known
vulnerability. Searching the cargo before it reaches this
country provides us with the best opportunity to remove
instrumentalities of destruction before they reach this
country.
Finally, as we consider threats and vulnerabilities, we
must also think about likely targets. GAO has introduced
several reports highlighting the poor state of Federal building
security. While promises have been made, little changes have
been.
I hope we have not forgotten that a lone-wolf terrorist
blew up a Federal building in Oklahoma several years before the
events of September 11. Timothy McVeigh used this opportunity
and created destruction. We did not need to see this happen
again before we take action.
In closing, as we began today's discussion about the
homeland threat landscape, I look forward to hearing about how
we can move away from merely identifying the problem and move
toward finding and implementing solutions.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
July 25, 2012
As we meet today to consider the homeland threat landscape, we must
be mindful that yesterday, the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq issued a
videotaped message indicating his intention to carry out attacks within
the United States. These new threats require an assessment of our
ability to meet our known challenges and address our known
vulnerabilities.
According to The New York Times, this Nation has spent about $360
billion on homeland security since September 1, 2001. But despite this
amount of spending we have not filled all the gaps. I think most people
would agree that we have made some gains. Aviation security, border
security, disaster response, and information-sharing activities have
been improved. For the most part, these improvements in security have
not required us to surrender the Constitutional rights and protections
that are the cornerstone of this Nation's freedom. This Nation cannot
sacrifice security or freedom in the face of any threat--foreign or
domestic.
As we look back at the last 11 years, we have greatly decreased
this Nation's vulnerability to attack. I would be remiss if I did not
mention that this administration's actions abroad, from eliminating the
threat posed by bin Laden to shifting our military presence, have also
contributed to decreasing our vulnerability at home.
However, we must be candid. Some vulnerabilities remain and the
nature of the threat continues to evolve. As we consider this evolution
process, we must first focus on the nature of the terrorist actor. The
most recent incidents in this country have involved the lone-wolf actor
who is ideologically motivated to commit violent acts. We must accept
that we will not be able to find every lone wolf bent on terror. But we
cannot accept that we are powerless to close opportunities and remove
the instrumentalities of destruction.
As I stated at a hearing last week, we should not forget that in
the United States the last person to crash a plane into a Federal
building, fueled by an anti-Government ideology, was a pilot in Texas.
GAO has reported and the Department has testified that we do not check
Americans seeking flight training against the terrorist watch list
until they apply for a pilot's license. The lesson of 9/11 is that we
need to keep people who seek to do us harm from being trained as
pilots. We must remove the opportunities and the instrumentalities of
destruction. I have introduced a bill that would require everyone who
is seeking to be trained as pilot is vetted against a terrorist watch
list. I hope my colleagues will join me in that effort.
As we consider the vulnerabilities that remain, I am disappointed
that we have not yet managed to achieve the screening of 100% of
maritime cargo that reaches our shores. Madame Secretary, it is my
understanding that you have recently signed a blanket 2-year waiver of
the 100% screening requirement. I do not understand how the Department
can ignore a statutory mandate designed to close a known vulnerability.
Searching the cargo before it reaches this country provides us with the
best opportunity to remove instrumentalities of destruction before they
reach this country.
Finally, as we consider threats and vulnerabilities, we must also
think about likely targets. GAO has produced several reports
highlighting the poor state of Federal building security. While
promises have been made, little has changed. I hope we have not
forgotten that a lone-wolf terrorist blew up a Federal building in
Oklahoma several years before the events of September 11. Timothy
McVeigh used his opportunity and created destruction. We do not need to
see this happen again before we take action.
In closing, as we begin today's discussion about the homeland
threat landscape, I look forward to hearing about how we can move away
from merely identifying the problems and move toward finding and
implementing solutions.
Chairman King. I thank the Ranking Member. I am going to
ask if we can recess for a few moments. Apparently, there is a
problem with the microphones, which should be corrected in the
next several moments. So the committee stands in recess for
hopefully just a few minutes.
[Recess.]
Chairman King. The hearing will resume, and--Madam
Secretary, Mr. Director, we regret the inconvenience and the
delay.
Mr. Olsen, I was hoping that perhaps, considering your past
experience with the NSA, you could have had somebody come in
and, you know, rewire it for us very quickly, but--anyway, I
would thank the Ranking Member for his opening statement. Other
Members of the committee are reminded that opening statements
may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have two very distinguished witnesses
before us today on this topic, obviously, of homeland security
and the threats to the homeland.
Secretary Napolitano was sworn in as the third Secretary of
Homeland Security in January 2009, previously served as the
Governor of Arizona and that State's attorney general. As I
said, just in the past 18 months alone, she has testified
before this committee four times. I am sure she has loved every
minute of it.
With that, we would recognize the Secretary and look
forward to her testimony.
Secretary Napolitano.
STATEMENT OF HON. JANET NAPOLITANO, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you Chairman King, Ranking
Member Thompson, and Members of the committee. I thank Director
Olsen and NCTC for their close partnership and collaboration
across many areas.
I am pleased to join you today, and I thank the committee
for your strong support for the Department of Homeland
Security, not only over the past 3\1/2\ years, but indeed,
since the Department's founding. I look forward to continuing
our work together to protect the American people as we advance
our many shared goals.
[Off mike.]
Chairman King. Excuse me, Secretary. Is the system working?
It seems to be going in and out.
Secretary Napolitano. I can speak very loudly. Let me try
again.
Today, nearly 11 years after the 9/11 attacks, America is
stronger and more secure, thanks to the work of the men and
women of DHS and our Federal, State, local, Tribal,
territorial, and international partners across the homeland
security enterprise.
Yet while the United States has made significant progress,
threats from terrorists persist and continually evolve:
We face direct threats from al-Qaeda.
We face growing threats from other foreign-based terrorist
groups which are inspired by al-Qaeda ideology but appear to
have few operational connections to the core al-Qaeda group,
such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al Shabaab.
Perhaps most crucially, we face a threat environment where
violent extremism is not defined or contained by international
borders. Today we must address threats that are home-grown as
well as those that originate abroad.
These threats are not limited to any one individual, group,
or ideology, and as we have seen, the tactics employed by
terrorists can be as simple as a homemade bomb or as
sophisticated as a biological threat or a coordinated cyber
attack.
While we deal with a number of threats and threat actors at
any given time, three areas merit special, sustained attention:
The first is aviation. With respect to our aviation sector,
the Christmas day 2009 plot, the October 2010 air cargo threat,
and the more recent AQAP plot that would have targeted a U.S.-
bound airliner with explosives make clear that commercial
aviation remains a target. Terrorists, especially AQAP,
continue to seek ways to circumvent existing security measures;
their methods and tactics are sometimes ingenious and
increasingly sophisticated.
A second area is cyber. Cyber threats and incidents have
increased significantly over the past decade. Our Nation
continues to confront a dangerous combination of known and
unknown vulnerabilities in cyberspace, strong and rapidly
expanding adversary capabilities, and limited threat and
vulnerability awareness. We remain hopeful that Congress can
pass strong cybersecurity legislation this year.
The third area of growing concern is home-grown violent
extremism. Within the context of U.S.-based violent extremism,
we know that foreign terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda,
and individual extremists, are actively seeking to recruit or
inspire Westerners to carry out attacks against Western and
U.S. targets.
Recruitment within the United States spans a variety of
activities, using social media, personal interaction, and
publication of magazines, among other things.
Today, the Department operates with the understanding that
a significant terrorist risk to the homeland is posed by
violent extremists inspired by al-Qaeda and its affiliates.
This threat is real, as evidenced by the multiple recent
thwarted attacks of domestic violent extremists inspired by al-
Qaeda, including the arrest of Naser Jason Abdo in Fort Hood in
July 2011 and the arrest of Amine el-Khalifi in February 2012
in Washington, DC. Importantly, however, we also know that
violent extremism can be inspired by various religious,
political, or other ideological beliefs.
The recent terrorist attack overseas in Bulgaria, as well
as the shooting last week in Aurora, Colorado, further
demonstrate that we must remain vigilant and prepared.
We mitigate these threats in several ways. First and
foremost, we have worked to build a homeland security
enterprise that allows DHS and our many partners to detect
threats earlier, share information, minimize risks, and
maximize our ability to respond and recover from attacks and
disasters of all kinds.
With respect to the aviation sector, we have implemented a
layered detection system focusing on risk-based screening,
enhanced targeting, and information-sharing, while
simultaneously facilitating travel for nearly 2 million
domestic air travelers every day.
Following the December 2009 threat, we launched a historic
global initiative to strengthen international aviation, which
has improved cooperation on passenger and air cargo screening,
technology development and deployment, information collection
and sharing, and the development of security standards.
We have strengthened information sharing with our
international partners. For example, our new and historic PNR
agreement with the European Union allows us to continue sharing
passenger information so that we can better identify travelers
who merit our attention before they depart for the United
States.
Our Pre-Departure Targeting Program, Immigration Advisory
Program and enhanced in-bound targeting operations also allow
us to more effectively identify high-risk travelers who are
likely to be inadmissible to the United States, and make
recommendations to commercial carriers to deny boarding before
a plane departs.
At home, we have continued the deployment of advanced
technology at airports, including AIT machines, while at the
same time implementing new programs to make the screening
process more efficient for trusted travelers through programs
such as TSA PreCheck and Global Entry.
Across the cyber domain, we have continued to partner with
sector-specific agencies and the private sector to help secure
cyberspace and critical infrastructure such as the financial
sector, the power grid, water systems, and transportation
networks.
We have taken significant action to protect Federal
civilian government systems through the deployment of intrusion
detection systems like EINSTEIN, greater monitoring and sharing
of threat information, National exercises and incident response
planning, public awareness and outreach programs, and a cyber
workforce initiative to recruit the next generation of cyber
professionals.
Internationally, we have worked with our partners to share
expertise, combat cybercrime, and strengthen shared systems and
networks.
Finally, we have improved our domestic capabilities to
detect and prevent terrorist attacks against our citizens, our
communities, and our critical infrastructure.
We have increased our ability to analyze and distribute
threat information at all levels. Specifically, we have worked
to build greater analytic capability through 77 designated
fusion centers, resulting in unprecedented levels of
information sharing at the State and local level.
We have invested in training for local law enforcement and
first responders of all types, to increase expertise and
capacity at the local level.
For example, we have transformed how we train front-line
officers regarding suspicious activities, through the
Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, in
partnership with the Department of Justice.
We are also in the final stages of implementing a
Countering Violent Extremism curriculum for Federal, State,
local, and correctional facility law enforcement officers that
is focused on community-oriented policing, which will help
front-line personnel identify activities that are potential
indicators of potential terrorist activity and violence.
Through the Nation-wide expansion of the ``If You See
Something, Say Something,'' campaign, we are encouraging all
Americans to alert local law enforcement if they see something
that is potentially dangerous.
DHS has come a long way in the nearly 11 years since 9/11
to enhance the protection of the United States and engage our
partners in this shared responsibility.
Together, we have made significant progress to strengthen
the homeland security enterprise. But many challenges still
remain.
Threats against our Nation, whether by terrorism or
otherwise, continue to exist and evolve. DHS must continue to
evolve as well. We continue to be ever-vigilant to protect
against threats, while promoting travel, trade, and
safeguarding our essential rights and liberties.
I thank the committee for your attention as we work
together to keep our Nation safe.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Napolitano follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Janet Napolitano
July 25, 2012
Thank you Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of
the committee, I am pleased to join you today, and I thank the
committee for your strong support for the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), not only over the past 3\1/2\ years, but indeed, since
the Department's founding. I look forward to continuing our work
together to protect the American people as we advance our many shared
goals.
Almost 11 years after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
America is stronger and more secure, thanks to the support of the
Congress, the work of the men and women of DHS, and our Federal, State,
local, Tribal, and territorial partners across the homeland security
enterprise. I thank them all for their service.
Created with the founding principle of protecting the American
people from terrorist and other threats, DHS and its many partners
across the Federal Government, public and private sectors, and
communities throughout the country have strengthened homeland security
to better mitigate and defend against evolving threats.
Additionally, within the Federal Government, many departments and
agencies contribute to the homeland security mission. The Nation's
armed forces serve on the front lines of homeland security by degrading
al-Qaeda's capabilities to attack the United States and targets
throughout the world. The Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the entire
intelligence community, of which DHS is a member, are producing better
streams of intelligence than at any time in history.
The Federal homeland security enterprise also includes the strong
presence of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), whose role in leading terrorism investigations has
led to the arrest of numerous individuals on terrorism-related charges.
But despite considerable progress, the horrific attack last week in
Aurora, Colorado--and the terrorist attack in Bulgaria--serve as a
reminder that our work to detect and prevent attacks against Americans
is never done.
As I have said many times, homeland security begins with hometown
security. As part of our commitment to strengthening hometown security,
we have worked to get information, tools, and resources out of
Washington, DC, and into the hands of State, local, Tribal, and
territorial officials and first responders.
This has led to significant advances. We have made great progress
in improving our domestic capabilities to detect and prevent terrorist
attacks against our citizens, our communities, and our critical
infrastructure. We have increased our ability to analyze and distribute
threat information at all levels. We have invested in training for
local law enforcement and first responders of all types in order to
increase expertise and capacity at the local level. We have also
supported and sustained preparedness and response capabilities across
the country through more than $36 billion in homeland security grants
since 2002.
As we look ahead, and in order to address evolving threats and make
the most of limited resources, the administration proposed a new vision
for homeland security grants in the fiscal year 2013 President's
budget. The administration's proposal focuses on building and
sustaining core capabilities associated with the five mission areas
within the National Preparedness Goal (NPG), helping to elevate Nation-
wide preparedness.
This proposal reflects the many lessons we have learned in grants
management and execution over the past 10 years. Using a competitive,
risk-based model, the proposal envisions a comprehensive process to
assess gaps, identify and prioritize deployable capabilities, limit
periods of performance to put funding to work quickly, and require
grantees to regularly report progress in the acquisition and
development of these capabilities. The administration looks forward to
working with Congress and stakeholders on this proposal to enable all
levels of government to build and sustain, in a collaborative way, the
core capabilities necessary to prepare for incidents that pose the
greatest risk to the security of the Nation.
Our experience over the past several years has also made us smarter
about the terrorist threats we face and how best to deal with them. We
continue to expand our risk-based, intelligence-driven security
efforts. By sharing and leveraging information, we can make informed
decisions about how to best mitigate risk, and provide security that is
seamless and efficient.
We also free up more time and resources, giving us the ability to
focus those resources on those threats or individuals we know the least
about. This approach not only makes us safer, it also creates
efficiencies within the system for travelers and for businesses. In
other words, our homeland security and our economic security go hand-
in-hand.
Strengthening homeland security includes a significant
international dimension. To most effectively carry out our core
missions--including preventing terrorism, securing our borders,
enforcing immigration laws, and protecting cyberspace--we partner with
countries around the world. This work ranges from strengthening cargo,
aviation, and supply chain security to joint investigations,
information sharing, and science and technology cooperation.
Through collaborations with other Federal agencies and our foreign
counterparts, we not only enhance our ability to prevent terrorism and
transnational crime; we also leverage the resources of our
international partners to more efficiently and cost-effectively secure
global trade and travel, to help ensure that dangerous people and goods
do not enter our country.
In my time today, I would like to provide an update on the key
areas of the DHS mission that fall within the committee's jurisdiction,
our priorities, and our vision for working with the Congress to build
on the substantial progress we have achieved to date and must continue
to sustain in the months and years ahead.
PREVENTING TERRORISM AND ENHANCING SECURITY
While the United States has made significant progress, threats from
terrorists--including, but not limited to al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda-
affiliated groups--persist and continually evolve, and the demands on
DHS continue to grow. Today's threats are not limited to any one
individual, group, or ideology and are not defined or contained by
international borders. Terrorist tactics can be as simple as a homemade
bomb and as sophisticated as a biological threat or a coordinated cyber
attack.
DHS and our partners at the Federal, State, Tribal, and local
levels have had success in thwarting numerous terrorist plots,
including the attempted bombings of the New York City subway, foiled
attacks against air cargo, and other attempts across the country.
Nonetheless, recent attacks overseas, and the continued threat of home-
grown terrorism in the United States, demonstrate how we must remain
vigilant and prepared.
To address these evolving threats, DHS employs risk-based,
intelligence-driven operations to prevent terrorist attacks. Through a
multi-layered detection system focusing on enhanced targeting and
information sharing, we work to interdict threats and dangerous people
at the earliest point possible. We also work closely with Federal,
State, and local law enforcement partners on a wide range of critical
homeland security issues in order to provide those on the frontlines
with the information and tools they need to address threats in their
communities.
Likewise, countering biological, nuclear, and radiological threats
requires a coordinated, whole-of-Government approach. DHS, through the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, works in partnership with agencies
across Federal, State, and local governments to prevent and deter
attacks using nuclear and radiological weapons through nuclear
detection and forensics programs. The Office of Health Affairs (OHA),
the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), and the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) also provide medical, scientific, and other
technical expertise to support chemical, biological, nuclear, and
radiological preparedness and response efforts.
Sharing Information, Expanding Training, and Raising Public Awareness
The effective sharing of information in a way that is timely,
actionable whenever possible, and that adds value to the homeland
security enterprise is essential to protecting the United States. As
part of our approach, we have changed the way DHS provides information
to our partners by replacing the outdated color-coded alert system with
the National Terrorism Advisory System, or NTAS, which provides timely,
detailed information about credible terrorist threats and recommended
security measures.
We also have continued to enhance our analytic capability through
the 77 designated fusion centers, resulting in unprecedented
information-sharing capabilities at the State and local levels. DHS has
supported the development of fusion centers through deployed personnel,
training, technical assistance, exercise support, security clearances,
connectivity to Federal systems, technology, and grant funding. We
currently have more than 90 DHS intelligence officers deployed to
fusion centers, working side by side with their Federal, State, and
local counterparts.
We are working to ensure that every fusion center supported by DHS
maintains a set of core capabilities that includes the ability to
assess local implications of National intelligence, share information
with Federal authorities so we can identify emerging National threats,
and ensure the protection of civil rights, civil liberties, and
privacy.
Specifically, we are encouraging fusion centers to develop and
strengthen their grassroots analytic capabilities so that National
intelligence can be placed into local context, and the domestic threat
picture can be enhanced based on an understanding of the threats in
local communities. We are partnering with fusion centers to establish
more rigorous analytic processes and analytic production plans,
increase opportunities for training and professional development for
State and local analysts, and encourage the development of joint
products between fusion centers and Federal partners.
Over the past 3 years, we have transformed how we train our
Nation's front-line officers regarding suspicious activities, through
the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI). This
initiative, which we conduct in partnership with the Department of
Justice, is an administration effort to train State and local law
enforcement to recognize behaviors and indicators potentially related
to terrorism and terrorism-related crime; standardize how those
observations are documented and analyzed; and ensure the sharing of
those reports with the Federal Bureau of Investigation-led Joint
Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) for further investigation.
More than 229,000 law enforcement officers have now received
training under this initiative, and more are getting trained every
week. The training was created in collaboration with numerous law
enforcement agencies, and with privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties officials. DHS also has expanded the Nationwide Suspicious
Activity Reporting Initiative to include our Nation's 18 critical
infrastructure sectors. Infrastructure owners and operators from the 18
sectors are now contributing information, vetted by law enforcement
through the same screening process otherwise used to provide
information to the JTTFs.
Because an engaged and vigilant public is vital to our efforts to
protect our communities, we have also continued our Nation-wide
expansion of the ``If You See Something, Say SomethingTM''
public awareness campaign. This campaign encourages Americans to
contact law enforcement if they see something suspicious or potentially
dangerous. To date, we have expanded the campaign to Federal buildings,
transportation systems, universities, professional and amateur sports
leagues and teams, entertainment venues, some of our Nation's largest
retailers, as well as local law enforcement. Most recently DHS has
partnered with sports leagues such as the National Football League,
Major League Baseball, the National Basketball Association, National
Collegiate Athletic Association, National Hockey League, U.S. Golf, and
the U.S. Tennis Association, to promote public awareness of potential
indicators of terrorism at sporting events.
Countering Violent Extremism
At DHS, we believe that local authorities and community members are
often best able to identify individuals or groups residing within their
communities exhibiting dangerous behaviors--and intervene--before they
commit an act of violence. Countering violent extremism (CVE) is a
shared responsibility, and DHS continues to work with a broad range of
partners to gain a better understanding of the behaviors, tactics, and
other indicators that could point to terrorist activity, and the best
ways to mitigate or prevent that activity.
The Department's efforts to counter violent extremism are three-
fold. We are working to better understand the phenomenon of violent
extremism, and assess the threat it poses to the Nation as a whole, and
within specific communities. We are bolstering efforts to address the
dynamics of violent extremism and strengthen relationships with those
communities targeted for recruitment by violent extremists. We are also
expanding support for information-driven, community-oriented policing
efforts that have long proven effective in preventing violent crime.
All of this is consistent with the administration strategy released in
August 2011 and the related Strategic Implementation Plan released in
December 2011.
DHS has conducted extensive analysis and research to better
understand the threat of violent extremism in order to support State
and Local law enforcement, fusion centers, and community partners with
the knowledge needed to identify behaviors and indicators of violent
extremism, and prevent violent crime. This includes over 75 case
studies and assessments produced by the DHS Office for Intelligence and
Analysis (I&A) since 2009 on home-grown violent extremist activities,
including an in-depth study that examined the common behaviors
associated with 62 cases of al-Qaeda-inspired violent extremists.
Finally, DHS is in the last stages of implementing a CVE curriculum
for Federal, State, local, and correctional facility law enforcement
officers that is focused on community-oriented policing, which will
help front-line personnel identify activities that are potential
indicators of potential terrorist activity and violence. The training's
key goal is to help law enforcement recognize the indicators of violent
extremist activity and distinguish between those behaviors that are
potentially related to crime and those that are Constitutionally
protected or part of a religious or cultural practice. We piloted the
24-hour State and local training curriculum in San Diego in January
2012, and we are aiming to finalize the curriculum by the end of 2012.
DHS is working with the International Association of Chiefs of Police
to develop shorter CVE training modules for the recruit and field
training officer level, which will be introduced into Police Academies
and posted on an internet-based platform before the end of 2012. We are
also developing a similar curriculum with the Federal Law Enforcement
Training Center for Federal law enforcement officers, and finalizing a
CVE awareness training for Correctional Facility, Probation, and Parole
Officers in collaboration with the Interagency Threat Assessment
Coordination Group, the Bureau of Prisons, and the National Joint
Terrorism Task Force.
Ensuring that State and Local law enforcement have access to
operationally accurate and appropriate training is a top priority. With
local communities and the Department of Justice, we have published
guidance on best practices for community partnerships to prevent and
mitigate home-grown threats. DHS publicly released the CVE Training
Guidance and Best Practices, which was sent to all State and local
partner grantors and grantees thereby tying to grant guidance policy on
October 7, 2011. DHS also incorporated language into fiscal year 2012
grant guidance that prioritizes CVE and allows funds to be used in
support of State and local CVE efforts.
Protecting Our Aviation System
Threats to our aviation system remain active and continue to
evolve. Consequently, TSA is working internationally and with the
private sector to continue to improve security screening, while
simultaneously facilitating lawful travel and trade. We are continuing
to strengthen protection of our aviation sector through a layered
detection system focusing on risk-based screening, enhanced targeting,
and information-sharing efforts to interdict threats and dangerous
people at the earliest point possible.
The Department is focused on measures to shift aviation security
from a ``one-size-fits-all'' approach for passenger screening to a
risk-based approach. In doing so, TSA utilizes a range of measures,
both seen and unseen, as part of its layered security system--from
state-of-the-art explosives detection, to using Advanced Imaging
Technology (AIT) units and canine teams to screen passengers and cargo,
to expediting screening for known travelers. Through Secure Flight, TSA
is now pre-screening 100 percent of all travelers flying within, to, or
from the United States against terrorist watch lists before passengers
receive their boarding passes.
In our increasingly interconnected world, we also work beyond our
own airports, partnering with our Federal agencies and countries to
protect both National and economic security.
For example, through the Pre-Departure Targeting Program,
Immigration Advisory Program, and enhanced in-bound targeting
operations, Customs and Border Protection (CBP) has improved its
ability to identify high-risk travelers who are likely to be
inadmissible into the United States and make recommendations to
commercial carriers to deny boarding before a plane departs.
Through the Visa Security Program, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) has deployed trained special agents overseas to high-
risk visa activity posts to identify potential terrorist and criminal
threats before they reach the United States.
Through preclearance agreements, CBP Officers deployed overseas
inspect passengers abroad through the same process a traveler would
undergo upon arrival at a U.S. port of entry, allowing us to extend our
borders outward while facilitating a more efficient passenger
experience.
Finally, our continued use, analysis, and sharing of Passenger Name
Record (PNR) data has allowed us to better identify passengers who
merit our attention before they depart for the United States. On July
1, 2012, a new agreement with the European Union on the transfer of PNR
data entered into force, marking an important milestone in our
collective efforts to protect the international aviation system from
terrorism and other threats.
As we have taken these actions to strengthen security, we also have
focused on expediting trade and travel for the millions of people who
rely on our aviation system every day. One key way we have done this is
through expansion of trusted traveler programs.
For instance, the Global Entry program, which is managed by CBP, is
allowing us to expedite entry into the United States for pre-approved,
low-risk air travelers. More than 1 million trusted traveler program
members are able to use the Global Entry kiosks, and we are expanding
the program both domestically and internationally as part of the
administration's efforts to foster increased travel and tourism.
In addition to U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents,
Mexican nationals can now enroll in Global Entry, and Global Entry's
benefits are also available to Dutch citizens enrolled in the Privium
program; South Korean citizens enrolled in the Smart Entry Service
program; Canadian citizens and residents through the NEXUS program; and
citizens of the United Kingdom, Germany, and Qatar through limited
pilot programs. In addition, we have signed agreements with Australia,
New Zealand, Panama, and Israel to allow their qualifying citizens and
permanent residents to participate in Global Entry. We are continuing
to expand the program both domestically and internationally as part of
the administration's efforts to foster travel and tourism, which
supports the President's Executive Order 13597 on Travel and Tourism.
U.S. citizen participants in Global Entry are also eligible for TSA
PreCheckTM--a passenger prescreening initiative. TSA
PreCheckTM is part of the agency's on-going effort to
implement risk-based security concepts that enhance security by
focusing on travelers the agency knows least about. More than 1.7
million passengers have received expedited screening through TSA
PreCheckTM security lanes since the initiative began last
fall. TSA PreCheckTM is now available in 18 airports for
select U.S. citizens traveling on Alaska Airlines, American Airlines,
Delta Air Lines, United Airlines and US Airways and members of CBP
Trusted Traveler programs. TSA has expanded TSA PreCheckTM
benefits to U.S. military active-duty members traveling through Ronald
Reagan Washington National and Seattle-Tacoma International airports.
In addition to TSA PreCheckTM, TSA has implemented other
risk-based security measures including modified screening procedures
for passengers 12 and younger and 75 and older.
Visa Waiver Program
With our partners overseas, we have acted to strengthen the Visa
Waiver Program (VWP), a program that boosts our economy by facilitating
legitimate travel for individuals traveling to the United States for
tourism or business. According to the Commerce Department, tourism
alone supported 7.6 million U.S. jobs last year, and tourism revenue in
early 2012 was up 14% from the previous year.
The VWP is an essential driver of international tourism because it
allows eligible nationals of 36 countries to travel to the United
States without a visa and remain in our country for up to 90 days.
Almost two-thirds of international travelers come to the U.S. from VWP
countries. Additionally, since its inception in the mid-1980s, VWP has
also become an essential tool for increasing security standards,
advancing information sharing, strengthening international
relationships, and promoting legitimate travel to the United States.
Over the last several years, DHS has focused on bringing VWP
countries into compliance with information-sharing agreement
requirements of The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007 (9/11 Act), Pub. L. No. 110-53. As of January 2012, all VWP
countries have completed an exchange of diplomatic notes or an
equivalent mechanism for the requirement to enter into an agreement to
share information on lost and stolen passports with the United States
through INTERPOL or other designated means.
DHS, in collaboration with the Department of Justice, has concluded
Preventing and Combating Serious Crime (PCSC) agreements, or their
equivalent, with 35 VWP countries and two VWP aspirants. DHS, along
with the Departments of Justice and State, continues to work closely
with the remaining country to sign a PCSC agreement. These agreements
facilitate the sharing of information about terrorists and serious
criminals.
The U.S. Government has also concluded negotiations on arrangements
with all VWP countries for the exchange of terrorism screening
information.
Additionally, DHS developed the Electronic System for Travel
Authorization (ESTA) as a proactive on-line system to determine whether
an individual is eligible to travel to the United States under the VWP,
and whether such travel poses any law enforcement or National security
risks.
We support carefully managed expansion of the VWP to countries that
meet the statutory requirements, and are willing and able to enter into
a close security relationship with the United States. To this end, we
support current bi-partisan efforts by the Congress, such as the
proposed JOLT Act of 2012, to expand VWP participation and to promote
international travel and tourism to the United States while maintaining
our strong commitment to security. Additionally, as part of the
President's recent Executive Order, we are working with partner
countries to meet existing requirements and prepare for further
expansion of the VWP.
Overstays and Exit Capabilities
Over the past year, we have worked to better detect and deter those
who overstay their lawful period of admission through the enhanced
biographic program. The ability to identify and sanction overstays is
linked to our ability to determine who has arrived and departed from
the United States. By matching arrival and departure records, and using
additional data collected by DHS, we can better determine who has
overstayed their lawful period of admission.
In May 2011, as part of Phase 1 of the enhanced biographic effort,
DHS began a coordinated effort to vet all potential overstay records
against intelligence community and DHS holdings for National security
and public safety concerns. Using those parameters, we reviewed the
backlog of 1.6 million overstay leads within the U.S. Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) program and referred
leads based on National security and public safety priorities to ICE
for further investigation.
Through limited automated means, DHS cross-referenced additional
overstay leads with DHS location and immigration holdings, closing
additional records by confirming changes in immigration information or
travel history that had not yet been recorded. Previously, these
records would not have been examined, except in instances when
resources allowed it. Now, we are vetting all overstays for public
safety and National security concerns, and DHS is also conducting
automated reviews for changes in immigration status or travel history.
This is performed on a recurrent basis.
In July, Congress approved DHS's plan to continue building its
enhanced biographic capability. DHS is implementing Phase 2 of this
effort, and expects to have these enhancements in place by early 2013.
Once completed, this initiative will significantly strengthen our
existing capability to identify and target for enforcement action those
who have overstayed their authorized period of admission, and who
represent a public safety and/or National security threat by
incorporating data contained within law enforcement, military, and
intelligence repositories.
This strategy also will also enhance our ability to identify
individual overstays; provide the State Department with information to
support visa revocation, prohibit future VWP travel for those who
overstay, and place ``lookouts'' for individuals, in accordance with
existing Federal laws; establish greater efficiencies to our Visa
Security Program; and enhance the core components of an entry-exit and
overstay program.
Concurrently, the Department's Science and Technology Directorate
(S&T) is working to establish criteria and promote research for
emerging technologies that would provide the ability to capture
biometrics and develop a biometric exit capability at a significantly
lower operational cost than is currently available. S&T is working
closely with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)
on this initiative.
Last, as part of the Beyond the Border Action plan signed by
President Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Harper in December 2011, we
are creating an exit program on the United States Northern Border.
Under the plan, the United States and Canada will exchange entry
records, so that an entry to one country essentially becomes an exit
record from the other.
Protecting Surface Transportation
Beyond aviation, we have worked with Federal agencies and other
Government partners, transportation sector entities, and companies
across the United States to enhance security of surface transportation
infrastructure through risk-based security assessments, critical
infrastructure hardening, and close partnerships with State and local
law enforcement partners.
Because of its open access architecture, surface transportation has
a fundamentally different operational environment than aviation. As a
result, our approach must be different. To protect surface
transportation, we have conducted compliance inspections throughout the
freight rail and mass transit domains; critical facility security
reviews for pipeline facilities; comprehensive mass transit assessments
that focus on high-risk transit agencies; and corporate security
reviews conducted in multiple modes of transportation on a continuous
basis to elevate standards and identify security gaps.
We also have continued to support Visible Intermodal Prevention and
Response (VIPR) teams, including 12 multi-modal teams. VIPR teams are
composed of personnel with expertise in inspection, behavior detection,
security screening, and law enforcement for random, unpredictable
deployments throughout the transportation sector to prevent potential
terrorist and criminal acts.
These efforts have been supported by more than $1.9 billion in DHS
grant funding awarded through the Transit Security Grant Program to
harden assets, improve situational awareness, and build National
capabilities to prevent and respond to threats and incidents across the
transportation sector.
GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN SECURITY
Securing the global supply chain system is integral to securing
both the lives of people around the world, and maintaining the
stability of the global economy. We must work to strengthen the
security, efficiency, and resilience of this critical system. Supply
chains must be able to operate effectively, in a secure and efficient
fashion, in a time of crisis, recover quickly from disruptions, and
continue to facilitate international trade and travel.
We know that a crisis or vulnerability in any part of the world has
the ability to impact the flow of goods and people thousands of miles
away. Beyond loss of life and physical damage, these events can cause
large economic consequences. Therefore, our economy is dependent on our
ability to secure and facilitate the flow of people and goods to and
from our shores.
Within the American economy, trade with our international partners
accounts for roughly one-quarter of our GDP. This year alone, DHS will
help facilitate about $2 trillion in legitimate trade, while enforcing
U.S. trade laws that protect the economy, the health, and the safety of
the American people.
Earlier this year, the administration announced the U.S. National
Strategy for Global Supply Chain Security to set a Government-wide
vision of our goals, approach, and priorities to strengthen the global
supply chain system. The National Strategy establishes two explicit
goals: Promoting the efficient and secure movement of goods and
fostering resilient supply chain systems. As we work to achieve these
goals, we will be guided by the overarching principles of risk
management and collaborative engagement with key stakeholders who also
have key supply chain roles and responsibilities.
DHS is now working in close partnership with other Federal
departments and agencies to translate the high-level guidance contained
in the Strategy into concrete actions. We are focusing our immediate
efforts on the priority action areas identified in the Strategy.
In addition to the National Strategy for Global Supply Chain
Security, DHS continues to advance a range of other measures and
programs to strengthen different components of this vital system in
partnership with multilateral organizations such as the International
Maritime Organization (IMO), the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), the World Customs Organization (WCO), and the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) as well as bilaterally with
trading partners.
We are also working closely with industry and foreign government
partners to identify and address high-risk shipments as early in the
shipping process as possible by collecting and analyzing advance
electronic commercial data. This allows DHS to make risk-informed
decisions about what cargo is safe to be loaded onto vessels and
aircraft prior to their departure from a foreign port and facilitates
the clearance of those shipments upon their arrival in the United
States.
Through the Container Security Initiative (CSI), CBP works with
host government customs services to examine high-risk maritime
containerized cargo at foreign seaports, before they are loaded on-
board vessels destined for the United States. CSI teams currently
operate at a total of 58 ports in North America, Europe, Asia, Africa,
the Middle East, and Latin and Central America--covering approximately
80 percent of all maritime containerized cargo imported into the United
States.
In the aviation environment, we are working with leaders from
global shipping companies and the International Air Transport
Association (IATA) to develop preventive measures, including terrorism
awareness training for employees and vetting personnel with access to
cargo. We are reviewing our foreign partners' cargo screening to
determine whether their programs provide a level of security
commensurate with U.S. air cargo security standards. Those who meet
these requirements are officially recognized to conduct screening for
cargo traveling to the United States. We are also building
partnerships, through mutual recognition arrangements, with foreign
governments maintaining industry partnership programs comparable to the
Customs-Trade Partnership against Terrorism. We concluded such an
agreement with the European Union in May which will give us better
visibility into the security applied early in the supply chain for
shipments from all 27 Member States of the European Union.
DHS is also focused on preventing the exploitation of the global
supply chain by those seeking to use the system to transport dangerous,
illicit, contraband, contaminated, and counterfeit products. For
example, under Program Global Shield, we are working with more than 90
countries to prevent the illegal theft or diversion of precursor
chemicals that can be used to make Improvised Explosive Devices, or
IEDs. Through these efforts, we have already seized more than 62 metric
tons of these deadly materials.
DHS, through ICE and CBP, also continues to investigate U.S. export
control law violations, including those related to military items,
controlled ``dual-use'' commodities, and sanctioned or embargoed
countries. We are committed to ensuring that foreign adversaries do not
illegally obtain U.S. military products and sensitive technology,
including weapons of mass destruction and their components, or attempt
to move these items through the global supply chain. In fiscal year
2011, ICE initiated 1,780 new investigations into illicit procurement
activities, made 583 criminal arrests, and accounted for 2,332 seizures
valued at $18.9 million. ICE also manages and operates the Export
Enforcement Coordination Center (E2C2), an interagency hub for
streamlining and coordinating export enforcement activities and
exchanging information and intelligence.
SECURING AND MANAGING OUR BORDERS
DHS secures the Nation's air, land, and sea borders to prevent
illegal activity while facilitating lawful travel and trade. The
Department's border security and management efforts focus on three
interrelated goals: Effectively securing U.S. air, land, and sea
borders; safeguarding and streamlining lawful trade and travel; and
disrupting and, in coordination with other Federal agencies,
dismantling transnational criminal and terrorist organizations.
Southwest Border
To secure our Nation's Southwest Border, we have continued to
deploy unprecedented amounts of manpower, resources, and technology,
while expanding partnerships with Federal, State, Tribal, territorial,
and local partners, as well as the government of Mexico.
We have increased the number of Border Patrol agents Nation-wide
from approximately 10,000 in 2004 to more than 21,000 today with nearly
18,500 ``boots on the ground'' along the Southwest Border. Working in
coordination with State and other Federal agencies, we have deployed a
quarter of all ICE operational personnel to the Southwest Border
region--the most ever--to dismantle criminal organizations along the
border.
We have doubled the number of ICE personnel assigned to Border
Enforcement Security Task Forces, which work to dismantle criminal
organizations along the border. We have tripled deployments of Border
Liaison Officers, who facilitate cooperation between U.S. and Mexican
law enforcement authorities on investigations and enforcement
operations, including drug trafficking, in coordination with the Drug
Enforcement Administration. We also have increased the number of
intelligence analysts working along the U.S.-Mexico border.
In addition, we have deployed dual detection canine teams as well
as non-intrusive inspection systems, Mobile Surveillance Systems,
Remote Video Surveillance Systems, thermal imaging systems, radiation
portal monitors, and license plate readers to the Southwest Border.
These technologies, combined with increased manpower and
infrastructure, give our personnel better awareness of the border
environment so they can more quickly act to resolve potential threats
or illegal activity. We also are screening southbound rail and vehicle
traffic, looking for the illegal weapons and cash that are helping fuel
the cartel violence in Mexico.
We also have completed 651 miles of fencing out of nearly 652 miles
mandated by Congress as identified by Border Patrol field commanders,
including 299 miles of vehicle barriers and 352 miles of pedestrian
fence.
To enhance cooperation among local, Tribal, territorial, State, and
Federal law enforcement agencies, we have provided more than $203
million in Operation Stonegarden funding to Southwest Border law
enforcement agencies over the past 4 years.
Our work along the border has included effective support from our
partners at the Department of Defense (DOD). In addition to continuing
support from DOD's Joint Task Force--North, in 2010, President Obama
authorized the temporary deployment of up to 1,200 National Guard
troops to the Southwest Border to contribute additional capabilities
and capacity to assist law enforcement agencies as a bridge to longer-
term deployment of border surveillance technology and equipment that
will strengthen our ability to identify and interdict the smuggling of
people, drugs, illegal weapons, and money.
Beginning in March 2012, DOD's National Guard support to CBP began
to transition from ground support to air support, essentially moving
from boots on the ground to boots in the air with state-of-the-art
aerial assets equipped with the latest detection and monitoring
capabilities.
These aerial assets, which include both rotary and fixed-wing
aircraft, supplement the CBP Office of Air and Marine aerial assets and
support the Border Patrol's ability to operate in diverse environments,
expand our field of vision in places with challenging terrain, and help
us establish a greater visible presence from a distance, which
increases deterrence. And this year, CBP introduced an extremely
effective new aviation surveillance technology to monitor the border.
The U.S. Army has loaned CBP a new electronic sensor system. CBP flies
Predator B unmanned aircraft systems (UASs) with this new system on the
Southwest Border. This system provides DHS with the first broad-area,
electronic sensor system, with capabilities that far exceed those of
the ground-based fixed or mobile systems.
The results of these comprehensive and coordinated efforts have
been significant. Border Patrol apprehensions--a key indicator of
illegal immigration--have decreased 53 percent in the last 3 years and
have decreased 80 percent from what they were at their peak. Indeed,
illegal immigration attempts have not been this low since 1971. Violent
crime in U.S. border communities has also remained flat or fallen over
the past decade, and statistics have shown that some of the safest
communities in America are along the border. From fiscal years 2009 to
2011, DHS seized 74 percent more currency, 41 percent more drugs, and
159 percent more weapons along the Southwest Border as compared to
fiscal years 2006 to 2008.
To further deter individuals from illegally crossing our Southwest
Border, we also directed ICE to prioritize the apprehension of recent
border crossers and repeat immigration violators, and to support and
supplement Border Patrol operations. Between fiscal years 2009 and
2011, ICE made over 30,936 criminal arrests along the Southwest Border,
including 19,563 arrests of drug smugglers and 4,151 arrests of human
smugglers.
In addition to our efforts to strengthen border security, we made
great strides in expediting legal trade and travel, working with local
leaders to update infrastructure and reduce wait times at our Southwest
Border ports of entry. Along the Southwest Border, new initiatives have
included outbound infrastructure improvements and port hardening, which
when completed, will expand our outbound inspection capabilities,
enhance port security, and increase officer safety. We also have
implemented Active Lane Management, which leverages Ready Lanes,
Dedicated Commuter Lanes, and LED signage to dynamically monitor
primary vehicle lanes and re-designate lanes as traffic conditions and
infrastructure limitations warrant.
These efforts are not only expediting legitimate trade, they are
also stopping contraband from entering and leaving the country. In
fiscal year 2011, DHS interdicted goods representing more than $1.1
billion in Manufacturer's Suggested Retail Price. Further, the value of
consumer safety seizures including pharmaceuticals totaled more than
$60 million, representing a 41 percent increase over fiscal year 2010.
Northern Border
To protect the Northern Border, we have continued to deploy
technology and resources, invest in port of entry improvements to
enhance security, and deepen our strong partnership with Canada.
For instance, CBP expanded unmanned aerial surveillance coverage
along the Northern Border into eastern Washington, now covering 950
miles of the Northern Border. In 2011, CBP Office of Air and Marine
provided nearly 1,500 hours of unmanned aerial surveillance along the
Northern Border.
In 2011, CBP opened the Operations Integration Center in Detroit--a
multi-agency communications center for DHS, and other Federal, State,
local, and Canadian law enforcement agencies. The Operations
Integration Center increases information-sharing capabilities leading
to seizures of drugs, money, and illegal contraband along the Northern
Border within the Detroit Sector.
ICE has four Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) units
along the Northern Border. These units, including representatives from
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Canadian Border Services Agency, and
numerous other provincial Canadian police departments, enhance
coordination of U.S.-Canada joint interdictions and investigations,
resulting in increased security for both countries.
To support the Beyond the Border Action Plan, in June we released
the DHS Northern Border Strategy, the first unified strategy to guide
the Department's policies and operations along the U.S.-Canada border.
Through this strategy, we will continue to work to improve information
sharing and analysis within DHS, as well as with our partners. We will
enhance coordination of U.S.-Canada joint interdictions and
investigations, deploy technologies to aid joint security efforts along
the border, and continue to update infrastructure to facilitate travel
and trade. We also look forward to continuing to deepen partnerships
with Federal, State, local, Tribal, private sector, and Canadian
partners that are so critical to the security, resiliency, and
management of our Northern Border.
Maritime
With more than 350 ports and 95,000 miles of coastline, the U.S.
maritime domain is unique in its scope and diversity.
The Coast Guard provides maritime security using a major cutter and
patrol boat fleet to respond to threats, and launch boats and aircraft
to maintain a vigilant presence over the seas. Closer to shore, Coast
Guard helicopters small cutters and boats monitor, track, interdict,
and board vessels. In the Nation's ports, the Coast Guard and CBP,
along with our Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners, working in
concert with other port stakeholders, monitor critical infrastructure,
conduct vessel escorts and patrols, and inspects vessels and
facilities.
The U.S. Coast Guard plays an integral role in DHS' border
enforcement strategy through its maritime operations as part of Joint
Interagency Task Force (JIATF)--South, the U.S. Southern Command entity
that coordinates integrated interagency counter drug operations in the
Caribbean Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and the eastern Pacific. In fiscal year
2011, Coast Guard major cutters and other assets removed over 75 metric
tons of cocaine, more than 17 metric tons of marijuana, detained 191
suspected smugglers, and seized 40 vessels. Additionally, Coast Guard
Law Enforcement Detachments are deployed aboard U.S. Navy and Allied
assets to support detection, monitoring, interdiction and apprehension
operations. CBP Office of Air and Marine P-3 and Coast Guard fixed-wing
aircraft have also been an integral part of successful counter-narcotic
missions operating in the Source and Transit Zones in coordination with
JIATF-South. Collectively the efforts to interdict drugs in the Source
and Transit Zones helped to control the flow of drugs to the Southwest
Border.
Robust interagency cooperation and strong international
partnerships also helped the Coast Guard interdict 2,474 migrants at
sea in fiscal year 2011.
SAFEGUARDING AND SECURING CYBERSPACE
Our daily life, economic vitality, and National security depend on
a safe, secure, and resilient cyberspace. A vast array of
interdependent IT networks, systems, services, and resources are
critical to communication, travel, powering our homes, running our
economy, and obtaining Government services. While we are more network-
dependent than ever before, increased interconnectivity increases the
risk of theft, fraud, and abuse.
Cyber incidents have increased significantly over the last decade
and the United States continues to confront a dangerous combination of
known and unknown vulnerabilities in cyberspace, strong and rapidly
expanding adversary capabilities, and limited threat and vulnerability
awareness. There have been instances of theft and compromise of
sensitive information from both Government and private-sector networks.
Last year, the DHS U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT)
received more than 100,000 incident reports, and released more than
5,000 actionable cybersecurity alerts and information products.
DHS is the Federal Government's lead agency for securing civilian
government computer systems and works with our industry and Federal,
State, local, Tribal, and territorial government partners to secure
critical infrastructure and information systems. DHS analyzes and
mitigates cyber threats and vulnerabilities; distributes threat
warnings; provides solutions to critical research and development
needs; and coordinates the vulnerability, mitigation, and consequence
management response to cyber incidents to ensure that our computers,
networks, and information systems remain safe. DHS also works with
Federal agencies to secure unclassified Federal civilian government
networks and works with owners and operators of critical infrastructure
to secure their networks through risk assessment, mitigation, and
incident response capabilities.
With respect to critical infrastructure, DHS and the sector-
specific agencies work together with the private sector to help secure
the key systems upon which Americans rely, such as the financial
sector, the power grid, water systems, and transportation networks.
Protecting critical infrastructure requires taking an integrated
approach toward physical and cybersecurity and ensuring that we can
utilize our established partnerships with the private sector to address
cybersecurity concerns. We do this by sharing actionable cyber threat
information with the private sector, helping companies to identify
vulnerabilities before a cyber incident occurs, and providing forensic
and remediation assistance to help response and recovery after we learn
of a cyber incident.
In addition, DHS S&T works collaboratively across Federal agencies,
private industry, academic networks and institutions, and global
information technology owners and operators to research, develop, test,
and transition deployable solutions to secure the Nation's current and
future cyber and critical infrastructures.
To combat cyber crime, DHS leverages the skills and resources of
the U.S. Secret Service and ICE, who investigate cyber criminals and
work with the Department of Justice, which prosecutes them. Cyber crime
investigations are directly led by the USSS and involve numerous
partners at the Federal, State, and local level as well as the private
sector. In fiscal year 2011 alone, USSS prevented $1.6 billion in
potential losses through cyber crime investigations. Additionally, ICE
HSI cyber crime investigations relating to child exploitation in fiscal
year 2011 resulted in 1,460 criminal arrests, 1,104 indictments and 928
convictions. One significant child exploitation investigation conducted
by ICE HSI was Operation Delego, which resulted in prosecutors bringing
charges against 72 individuals for their alleged participation in an
international criminal network that sought the sexual abuse of children
and the creation and dissemination of child pornography.
DHS recognizes that partnership and collaboration are crucial to
ensuring that all Americans take responsibility for their actions on-
line. To that end, we are continuing to grow the Department's
Stop.Think.Connect.TM Campaign, which is a year-round
National public awareness effort designed to engage and challenge
Americans to join the effort to practice and promote safe on-line
practices.
The Department of Defense is a key partner in our cybersecurity
mission. In 2010, I signed a Memorandum of Understanding with then-
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to formalize the interaction between
DHS and DOD, and to protect against threats to our critical civilian
and military computer systems and networks. Congress mirrored this
division of responsibilities in the National Defense Authorization Act
for fiscal year 2012. We are currently working with the Defense
Industrial Base to exchange actionable information about malicious
activity.
As much as we are doing, we must do even more. To this end,
Congress has before it several pieces of proposed legislation designed
to address emerging cyber threats. The proposal the administration has
supported is a bipartisan bill sponsored by Senators Lieberman,
Collins, Rockefeller, and Feinstein, and is known as the Cyber Security
Act of 2012.
Under current law, Congress gave DHS significant cyber authorities,
and we inherited a patchwork of others. But we have reached a point
where the current threat outpaces our existing amalgam of laws, and so
we are working with Congress to make some changes to the law.
Specifically, the Cyber Security Act of 2012 would require the
establishment of baseline cybersecurity practices for the Nation's
critical core infrastructure.
It removes barriers to information sharing between the Federal
Government, industry, and State, local, Tribal, and territorial
governments so that we may more quickly respond to and mitigate any
cyber threat or intrusion. And, importantly, the legislation would help
us attract and retain cybersecurity professionals to execute this
complex and challenging mission by adding flexibility to the current
personnel laws. I understand that Senator Lieberman has recently
introduced a new version of this legislation. The administration is
currently reviewing this version of the bill and looks forward to
working with the Congress as the bill moves through the legislative
process.
ENSURING ROBUST PRIVACY AND CIVIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES SAFEGUARDS
The Department builds privacy, confidentiality, and civil rights
and civil liberties protections into its operations, policies,
programs, and technology deployments from the outset of their
development.
The DHS Privacy Office--the first statutorily-required privacy
office of any Federal agency--partners with every DHS component to
assess policies, programs, systems, technologies, and rulemakings for
privacy risks, and recommends privacy and confidentiality protections
and methods for handling personally identifiable information.
DHS's Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) plays a
key role in the Department's mission to secure the Nation while
preserving individual freedoms and represents the Department's
commitment to the idea that core civil rights values--liberty,
fairness, and equality under the law--are a vital part of America, and
that these values provide a bulwark against those who threaten our
safety and security.
Since its inception, CRCL has expanded its participation in
programs and activities throughout the Department and continued its
efforts to promote civil rights and civil liberties. For example, CRCL
collaborates with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement on detention
reform and other immigration-related efforts, and works with TSA to
ensure that evolving aviation security measures are respectful of civil
rights and civil liberties.
CRCL's community engagement efforts include a wide variety of
stakeholders and organizations through regular roundtables across the
country. CRCL has also expanded its training capacity and worked
closely with the DHS Privacy Office and the Office of Intelligence and
Analysis to offer civil rights and civil liberties training for fusion
centers, as well as training to a number of the Department's Federal,
State, and local partners.
CONCLUSION
While America is stronger and more resilient as a result of these
efforts, threats from terrorism persist and continue to evolve. Today's
threats do not come from any one individual or group. They may
originate in distant lands or local neighborhoods. They may be as
simple as a homemade bomb or as sophisticated as a biological threat or
coordinated cyber attack.
As threats to our Nation evolve, DHS must also evolve. Thus, we
continue to remain vigilant, protecting our communities from terrorist
threats, while promoting the movement of goods and people and
maintaining our commitment to civil rights and civil liberties.
I thank the committee for your continued partnership and guidance
as together we work to keep our Nation safe. I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman King. Thank you, Secretary Napolitano. Thanks for
working through the technical problem with us.
I will ask the staff--okay. It is--okay.
Our next witness is Matthew Olsen, who served as the
director of the National Counterterrorism Center, the NCTC,
since August of last year. Prior to joining NCTC, Mr. Olsen
served as the general counsel for the National Security Agency,
where he served as the chief legal officer for NSA. He also has
served in Government with the FBI and the Department of
Justice, and it is a pleasure to have him testify here before
this committee for the first time.
Director Olsen.
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW G. OLSEN, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER
Mr. Olsen. Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, Members
of the committee, thank you very much.
I appreciate this opportunity to be here with the committee
today to discuss the terrorist threat facing our country and
our efforts to combat it. I am particularly pleased to be here
with Secretary Napolitano. The Department of Homeland Security
and NCTC are strong partners in the fight against terrorism.
As you mentioned, Chairman, I have now served as the
director of NCTC for almost a year. During that year, we have
continued to make steady progress in the fight against
terrorism. At the same time, acts of terror and acts of
violence still threaten us here at home and abroad.
As you know, just last week in Bulgaria, seven people were
killed in a brazen terrorist attack on a bus filled with
Israeli tourists. While there is no suggestion that the
shooting last week in Colorado was connected to international
terrorism, the attack is a tragic reminder that a lone,
calculating shooter can inflict devastating damage.
Over the past year, with the guidance and support of
Congress and of this committee, we have placed relentless
pressure on the core of al-Qaeda. We have denied that group
safe haven and the ability to plan and to train. Following the
death of Osama bin Laden last year, several of his top
lieutenants have been eliminated.
The leaders that remain lack experience, and they are under
siege. They have a very limited ability to recruit and to
communicate with other operatives. In short, the intelligence
picture shows that al-Qaeda core is a shadow of its former
self. The overall threat from al-Qaeda in Pakistan is degraded.
While these gains are significant and enduring, al-Qaeda
and its affiliates and its adherents around the world, as well
as other terrorist organizations, continue to pose a
significant threat to our country. As al-Qaeda's core
leadership struggles to remain relevant, it has turned to other
groups to carry out attacks and to advance its ideology.
These groups are from an array of countries. They include
Yemen, Somalia, Iraq, and Iran. The men and women at the
National Counterterrorism Center are confronting this threat
and working with resolve to prevent a terrorist attack.
In the balance of my remarks, I would like to further
describe briefly the threat landscape and then discuss the role
of NCTC and some of the ways that we are responding to this
threat.
First, beginning with al-Qaeda in Pakistan, as I mentioned
over the past year, sustained pressure has degraded Pakistan-
based al-Qaeda's leadership and its operational capabilities,
leaving the core of al-Qaeda at its weakest point in over a
decade.
The death of bin Laden, the subsequent losses of other top
lieutenants and senior planners, have eroded the group's bench
of potential leaders and have shaken the group's sense of
security in Pakistan's tribal areas. Al-Qaeda is placing a
greater emphasis on smaller, simpler plots that are easier to
carry out and more difficult to detect.
We remain concerned that individuals like the alleged Fort
Hood shooter, Nidal Hasan, and the Toulouse shooter, Mohamed
Merah, may inspire other like-minded individuals to conduct
attacks in the name of al-Qaeda.
Beyond the core of al-Qaeda, we face a diverse set of
affiliated groups, enabled in part by political instability and
unrest in areas such as Yemen and Somalia. To varying degrees,
these groups coordinate their activities and follow the
direction of al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan.
The single most capable affiliate today is al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula, AQAP, based in Yemen. This group remains the
affiliate most likely to attempt and to carry out a
transnational attack, including against the United States. The
death of Anwar al-Awlaki last September temporarily slowed
AQAP's external plotting efforts, but the group maintains the
intent and the capability to conduct U.S. attacks with little
or no warning. AQAP demonstrated this intent last May, when it
plotted to bring down an airliner bound for the United States.
We monitor other key al-Qaeda affiliates and related groups
in the Middle East, in South Asia, and in Africa. These groups
remain primarily focused on local and regional plotting. Al-
Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM, and Boko
Haram are active in countries like Mali and Nigeria, and are
focused on targeting Western and U.S. interests in that region.
Al-Shabaab, which formally merged with al-Qaeda just this
past February, is principally concerned with combating Kenyan
and Ethiopian incursions into Somalia, which are eroding the
group's safe haven in Somalia. It also remains intent on
conducting attacks against regional and Western targets in East
Africa, having carried out a number of recent low-level attacks
in Kenya.
Pakistani and Afghan militant groups, including the
Pakistani Taliban, or TTP, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-
Taiba, or L.T., continue to pose a direct threat to U.S.
interests and our allies in South Asia. We continue to watch
for signs that any of these groups or networks or individuals
is pursuing operations outside of that region as a strategy to
achieve their objectives.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq continues to carry out high-profile,
coordinated attacks against government and civilian targets in
Iraq. Just this past weekend, more than 100 people were killed
in terrorist attacks across Iraq. In a video a couple days ago,
AQI, al-Qaeda in Iraq's leader, forecast a new offensive
against individuals in Iraq and threatened to carry out attacks
in the United States.
In the past 2 years, American and Canadian law enforcement
authorities have arrested North American-based AQI operatives,
highlighting the potential threat posed by U.S.-based AQI
associates.
I would like to take a moment to discuss the terrorist
threat from Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran. Lebanese Hezbollah has
intensified its terrorist activities around the world. Since
2008, it has engaged in an increasingly aggressive terrorist
campaign, seeking to carry out attacks in places like Egypt,
Israel, and Thailand. Israel has blamed Hezbollah for the
attack last week on an Israeli tourist bus in Bulgaria, taking
the lives of seven people.
Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Since
9/11, the regime has expanded its involvement with terrorists
and insurgent groups, primarily in Iraq and in Afghanistan,
that target U.S. and Israeli interests. Iran has been linked to
plots elsewhere, as well. As the committee is aware, the
disrupted Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to
the United States last fall demonstrated that Iran is willing
to conduct terrorist attacks inside the United States.
Then finally, Mr. Chairman, with regard to HVEs, the
homegrown violent extremists who are inspired by al-Qaeda's
ideology continue to pose a threat to the United States, as
Secretary Napolitano discussed. AQAP members Anwar al-Awlaki
and Samir Khan created propaganda specifically for an American
audience. Even after their deaths, that propaganda remains
accessible on-line.
Lone actors or small insular groups posed the most serious
HVE threat to the homeland. They are difficult to detect. They
may carry out their attacks without travel and without
consulting others.
Now, briefly, if I could turn to the role that the National
Counterterrorism Center is playing. Our analysts review all
terrorism intelligence, collected both inside and outside of
the United States. We have access to the full catalogue of
reporting, both foreign and domestic, on terrorism issues, and
our workforce includes representatives from across the
government, including from the Department of Homeland Security.
They reflect a wide range of viewpoints and perspectives.
Today, we are facing a dynamic and complex threat
environment, and we are seeking to adapt to that threat. I
would like to focus on a couple of key initiatives that we have
adopted to, in particular, focus on the threat to the U.S.
homeland.
In 2010, NCTC created the Pursuit Group. This group is
designed to develop tactical leads and to pursue terrorist
threats. The Pursuit Group analysts at NCTC help ensure that
terrorism cases are examined thoroughly, focusing on the
details and connections that could yield relevant information.
These analysts provide leads to operational organizations, like
DHS and the FBI and the CIA.
Second, we continue to implement important reforms in the
watch listing process. We have improved our processing and
information-sharing in support of that mission. As the threat
continues to evolve, our experts on watch listing work closely
with the rest of the CT community to expedite the sharing of
information and to build more complete terrorist identities.
Additionally, we have implemented several improvements to
our information technology. Our counterterrorism data layer is
being developed to process relevant information and to allow
analysts to search and correlate terrorism information in a
single environment.
Later this week, Mr. Chairman, the London Olympics begin.
For the past 2 years, NCTC, in coordination with our
intelligence community and British partners, has been leading
the U.S. effort to make sure that we are collecting and
analyzing and sharing all potential threat information relating
to the Olympics and that we are in a position to respond
quickly to prevent any possible plotting tied to the games.
Finally, if I may say, that all of these activities must be
consistent with the protection of privacy and civil liberties
of the American people. As NCTC's director, I am committed to
making sure that we retain the trust and the confidence of our
citizens.
I would like to close these opening remarks by identifying
our single most important resource, and that is our people. As
we bolster our efforts to meet the challenges posed by the
threat I have described, our progress is dependent on
maintaining and developing a diverse workforce, much of which
comes from other agencies like the Department of Homeland
Security. I am proud to lead such a committed group of
professionals.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Thompson and Members of the
committee, thank you for this opportunity. Thank you for your
continued support of our mission and the men and women of the
National Counterterrorism Center. I am happy to answer your
questions.
[The statement of Mr. Olsen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Matthew G. Olsen
July 25, 2012
Thank you Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, Members of the
committee. I appreciate this opportunity to be here today to discuss
the terrorist threat against the United States and our efforts to
counter it.
I also want to express my appreciation to the committee for your
steadfast leadership and your support of the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC). I am particularly pleased to be here today with
Secretary Napolitano. The Department of Homeland Security and NCTC are
strong and vital partners in the fight against terrorism.
I have now served as Director of NCTC for close to 1 year. During
this year, with the support and guidance of Congress, we have made
significant progress in the fight against terrorism. Our Nation has
placed relentless pressure on al-Qaeda's leadership. We have denied the
group safe havens, resources, and the ability to plan and train.
Following the death last year of Usama bin Ladin, several of his top
lieutenants have been eliminated. The leaders that remain lack
experience and are under siege. They have limited ability to recruit
and communicate with other operatives. In short, the intelligence
picture shows that al-Qaeda core is a shadow of its former self, and
the overall threat from al-Qaeda in Pakistan is diminished.
Further, the Government has disrupted terrorist attacks in the
United States and abroad. Our intelligence officers have worked to
identify and stop terrorist plots before they are executed. And we have
investigated and prosecuting individuals who have sought to carry out
and supported terrorist operations.
In addition, we have continued to build an enduring
counterterrorism framework--including institutions like NCTC and DHS--
dedicated to analyzing and sharing terrorism information across the
Government and to the mission of detecting and preventing terrorist
attacks against our citizens and interests around the world.
The credit for these successes belongs to the men and women in our
military, law enforcement, and intelligence communities.
While these gains are real and enduring, al-Qaeda, its affiliates
and adherents around the world--as well as other terrorist
organizations--continue to pose a significant threat to our country.
This threat is resilient, adaptive, and persistent.
More than a decade after the September 11 attacks, we remain at war
with al-Qaeda, and we face an evolving threat from its affiliates and
adherents. America's campaign against terrorism did not end with the
mission at bin Ladin's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. Indeed, the
threats we face have become more diverse. As al-Qaeda's core leadership
struggles to remain relevant, the group has turned to its affiliates
and adherents to carry out attacks and to advance its ideology. These
groups are from an array of countries, including Yemen, Somalia,
Nigeria, Iraq, and Iran. To varying degrees, these groups coordinate
their activities and follow the direction of al-Qaeda leaders in
Pakistan. Many of the extremist groups themselves are multi-
dimensional, blurring the lines between terrorist group, insurgency,
and criminal gang.
Confronting this threat and working with resolve to prevent another
terrorist attack is NCTC's overriding mission. We continue to monitor
threat information, develop leads, work closely with domestic and
international partners, and develop strategic plans to combat our
terrorist adversaries. Today I can report that, while we have taken
important steps against al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups, much work
remains. And the dedicated professionals at NCTC, along with our
partners across the Government and overseas, remain steadfast, and
committed to sustaining and enhancing the effort to protect the Nation.
In my statement, I will begin by examining the terrorist threats to
the homeland and to U.S. interests. I will then describe NCTC's role in
addressing these threats and some of the key reforms and initiatives we
have adopted.
THE TERRORIST THREAT IN TRANSITION
Pakistan-based al-Qaeda Core
Over the past year, sustained CT pressure has systematically
degraded Pakistan-based al-Qaeda's leadership and operational
capabilities. These efforts have left the group at its weakest point in
the last 10 years. Although core al-Qaeda remains committed to its
overarching goals, it is clearly a group in decline.
The death of Usama bin Ladin on May 2, 2011 removed al-Qaeda's
founder and leader and its staunchest proponent of spectacular attacks
against the U.S. homeland. The subsequent losses of several of bin
Ladin's top lieutenants and senior operational planners--including
general manager Atiyah Abd al-Rahman last August and his replacement
Abu Yahya al-Libi this June--have eroded the group's bench of potential
leaders and have shaken al-Qaeda's sense of security in Pakistan's
tribal areas. Remaining leaders have been driven underground to varying
degrees and the group has shifted a substantial portion of its
attention from terrorist plotting to security and survival.
Operationally, core al-Qaeda has not conducted a successful
operation in the West since the 2005 London bombings. The group,
however, remains committed to striking Western targets, including the
United States. Its degraded capabilities almost certainly will compel
operational planners to place a greater emphasis on smaller, simpler
plots that are easier to carry out.
Since bin Ladin's death, multiple al-Qaeda leaders have publicly
endorsed the concept of individual acts of violence. We remain
concerned that individuals like alleged Fort Hood shooter Nidal Hassan
and Toulouse shooter Mohammed Merah may inspire other like-minded
individuals to conduct attacks in al-Qaeda's name.
Despite its shrinking leadership cadre, al-Qaeda continues to issue
propaganda and media statements specifically focused on the Arab
unrest. Persistent conflict in places such as Yemen, Libya, and Syria,
and the impending withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, may
provide core al-Qaeda a propaganda opportunity to claim victories over
the United States and reinvigorate its image as the leader of the
global movement. Senior leaders almost certainly recognize that the
Coalition drawdown in Afghanistan presents an opportunity for the group
to reconstitute in parts of the country and in propaganda declare a
major victory.
Al-Qaeda's Affiliates: A Persistent and Diversifying Threat to the U.S.
and Overseas Interests
AQAP.--Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains the
affiliate most likely to attempt and carry out transnational attacks,
including against the United States. Despite Anwar al-Aulaqi's death,
the group maintains the intent and capability to conduct anti-U.S.
attacks with little to no warning.
In its three attempted attacks against the U.S. homeland--the
airliner plot of December 2009, an attempted attack against U.S.-bound
cargo planes in October 2010, and an airliner plot this May--AQAP has
shown an awareness of Western security procedures and demonstrated its
efforts to adapt. The death of al-Aulaqi probably temporarily slowed
AQAP's external plotting efforts but did not deter the group from
attempting another aviation attack in May. We are also concerned by
AQAP's efforts to exploit the security vacuum associated with the Arab
Spring, although the group has suffered recent setbacks in these
efforts.
AQAP also remains intent on publishing the English-language Inspire
magazine--previously spearheaded by al-Aulaqi and now-deceased Samir
Khan--in order to mobilize Western-based individuals for violent
action. While the deaths of al-Aulaqi and Khan have affected the
quality of the magazine, the publication endures and continues to reach
a global audience of violent extremists.
AQIM and Boko Haram.--Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and Boko Haram remain focused on local and regional attack
plotting, including targeting Western interests in Nigeria. The groups
have shown minimal interest in targeting the U.S. homeland.
AQIM is actively working with local violent extremists in northern
Mali to establish a safe haven from which to advance future operational
activities. While Boko Haram is primarily focused on plotting against
targets in Nigeria, in April a spokesman for the group publicly
threatened to find a way to attack a U.S.-based news outlet if its
coverage of Islam did not change.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq.--Since the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq
late last year, al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has conducted numerous high-
profile attacks there and this year has carried out coordinated
country-wide attacks against government, security, and Shia civilian
targets. During the past 2 years AQI has continued to release media
statements supporting global extremism.
AQI's propaganda statements have cited its support for uprisings
against secular governments in the Middle East and North Africa and, in
a June statement, the group expressed solidarity with the Syrian Sunni
population. In January 2011 it published an explosives training video
that called for lone-wolf attacks in the West and against so-called
apostate regimes in the Middle East.
During the past 2 years, American and Canadian authorities have
arrested several North America-based AQI associates, highlighting the
potential threat posed by to the United States. The FBI in May 2011
arrested Kentucky-based Iraqi nationals Waad Alwan and Shareef Hamadi
for attempting to send weapons and explosives from Kentucky to Iraq and
conspiring to commit terrorism while in Iraq. Alwan pled guilty to
supporting terrorism in December. In January 2010, Canadian authorities
arrested dual Iraqi-Canadian citizen Faruq Isa who is accused of
vetting individuals on the internet for suicide operations in Iraq.
Al-Shabaab.--We continue to monitor al-Shabaab and its foreign
fighter cadre as a potential threat to the United States, although the
group is mainly focused on combating the on-going Kenyan and Ethiopian
incursions into Somalia which have eroded its territorial safe haven
since late last year.
The group, which formally merged with al-Qaeda in February, also
remains intent on conducting attacks against regional and Western
targets in East Africa, especially in countries supporting Transitional
Federal Government (TFG) and allied forces in Somalia. Probable al-
Shabaab sympathizers recently conducted several low-level attacks in
Kenya. Al-Shabaab leaders publicly have called for transnational
attacks, including threatening to avenge the January death of British
national and al-Shabaab senior foreign fighter Bilal Berjawi.
OTHER TERRORIST THREATS
Lebanese Hizballah.--Lebanese Hizballah has intensified its
terrorist activities around the world and we remain concerned that the
group's activities endanger U.S. interests and citizens, as well as our
allies.
Since May 2008, Hizballah plots against Israeli targets in
Azerbaijan, Egypt, and Israel have been disrupted, and additional
operational activity in Turkey has reportedly been uncovered. The
Government of Israel has cited possible Hizballah involvement in the
July 18 terrorist attack in Burgas, Bulgaria. Hizballah has engaged in
an increasingly aggressive terrorist campaign since the end of its 2006
war with Israel and probably accelerated by the death of its operations
chief Imad Mughniyah in Syria in 2008.
In Thailand this past January, a dual Lebanese-Swedish citizen and
suspected Hizballah facilitator was arrested by the Royal Thai police
at the Bangkok airport as he prepared to leave the country. Following
his arrest, the individual gave the location of two buildings where
Thai authorities found a large supply of explosive precursors. The
disrupted attack may have targeted Israelis in an area popular with
tourists from many countries, including the United States.
Iranian Threat.--Iran remains the foremost state sponsor of
terrorism. Since 9/11 the regime has expanded its involvement with
terrorist and insurgent groups--primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan--that
target U.S. and Israeli interests.
Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force and Ministry of
Intelligence and Security have been involved in the planning and
execution of terrorist acts and the provision of lethal aid--such as
weapons, money, and training--to these groups, particularly Lebanese
Hizballah. Iran's relationship with Hizballah since 9/11 has evolved
from a traditional state sponsor-proxy relationship to a strategic
partnership that provides a unified front against Israel and the United
States.
The disrupted Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to
the United States last fall demonstrates that Iran is more willing to
conduct terrorist operations inside the United States than was
previously assessed. As part of the plot, the Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps-Qods Force attempted to use a dual Iranian-U.S. national to
recruit Mexican criminal organizations to conduct the assassination,
raising our concerns that Iran may seek to leverage other Mexican
contacts for activities in the United States.
South Asia-Based Militants.--Pakistani and Afghan militant groups--
including Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Haqqani Network, and
Lashkar-e Tayyiba (LT)--continue to pose a direct threat to U.S.
interests and our allies in the region, where these groups probably
will remain primarily focused. We continue to watch for signs that any
of these groups, networks, or individuals are actively pursuing or have
decided to incorporate operations outside of South Asia as a strategy
to achieve their objectives.
TTP's recent claim of responsibility for the beheading of 17
Pakistani soldiers and its threat to attack Coalition supply lines
through Pakistan underscore the threat the group poses in the region.
TTP leaders have repeatedly threatened attacks against the United
States, including after the death of bin Ladin in May 2011. TTP's claim
of responsibility for the failed Times Square bombing in May 2010
demonstrates its willingness to act on this intent.
The Haqqani Network has orchestrated and carried out multiple
attacks against NATO and Afghan Government targets in Afghanistan,
notably the 18-hour multi-pronged assault against military, security,
and government facilities in Kabul and three other cities in April.
LT leaders have maintained a regional focus. LT leaders almost
certainly recognize that an attack in the United States would bring
intense international backlash upon Pakistan and endanger the group's
safe haven there. LT provides training to a wide range of Pakistani and
Western militants, some of whom could plot terrorist attacks in the
West without direction from LT leaders. LT members frustrated with the
group's focus on South Asia likewise could leave LT to join a more
globally focused group like al-Qaeda.
LT has demonstrated a willingness to attack Western interests in
South Asia in pursuit of its regional objectives, as it did through a
high-profile operation targeting hotels frequented by Westerners during
the Mumbai attacks in 2008.
Homegrown Violent Extremists
Homegrown violent extremists (HVEs), including those who are
inspired by al-Qaeda's ideology, continue to pose a threat to the
United States. HVEs inspired by al-Qaeda are almost certainly entering
a period of transition as U.S.-based violent extremists adjust to the
deaths and disruption of influential English-language figures who
helped al-Qaeda's ideas resonate with some in the United States.
Now-deceased AQAP members Anwar al-Aulaqi and Samir Khan were
probably best positioned to create propaganda specifically for an
American audience and mobilize HVEs. Their propaganda remains easily
accessible on-line and will likely continue to inspire HVE violence.
The growth of on-line English-language extremist content during the
past 3 years has fostered a shared identity--but not necessarily
operational collaboration--among HVEs. Plots disrupted during the past
year were unrelated operationally, but may demonstrate a common cause
rallying independent violent extremists to plot against the United
States.
Lone actors or insular groups pose the most serious HVE threat to
the homeland. HVEs could view lone-offender attacks as a model for
future plots in the United States and overseas. The perceived success
of previous lone-offender attacks combined with al-Qaeda and AQAP's
propaganda promoting individual acts of terrorism is raising the
profile of this tactic.
The arrests last year of Texas-based Saudi Khalid Aldawsari and
U.S. Army Private First Class Naser Abdo, as well as the successful
attack in France, underscore the threat from lone offenders who are
able to adapt their plans quickly by rapidly changing time lines,
methods, and targets to meet existing circumstances--all without
consulting others.
THE ROLE OF NCTC
NCTC's Core Missions
The overarching mission of the NCTC is to lead the effort to combat
international terrorism. In 2004 the 9/11 Commission observed that,
``the United States confronts a number of less visible challenges that
surpass the boundaries of traditional nation-states and call for quick,
imaginative, and agile responses.'' That observation--as true today as
it was in 2001--led the Commission to recommend the creation of a
National Counterterrorism Center: ``Breaking the mold of national
government organization, this NCTC should be a center for joint
operational planning and joint intelligence.''
In 2004 Congress established NCTC. The Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act set forth NCTC's key responsibilities as
detailed below. These responsibilities are captured in NCTC's mission
statement: ``Lead our Nation's effort to combat terrorism at home and
abroad by analyzing the threat, sharing that information with our
partners, and integrating all instruments of National power to ensure
unity of effort.''
Intelligence Integration and Analysis.--NCTC serves as the primary
organization in the U.S. Government for analyzing and integrating all
intelligence possessed or acquired by the Government pertaining to
international terrorism and counterterrorism. NCTC has a unique
responsibility to examine all international terrorism issues, spanning
geographic boundaries, and allowing for intelligence to be analyzed
regardless of whether it is collected inside or outside the United
States.
NCTC has access to the catalogue of reporting--both foreign and
domestic--on terrorism issues. NCTC's strategic analyses are vetted and
coordinated throughout the intelligence community, which adds multiple
analytic perspectives. NCTC produces coordinated assessments on such
critical terrorism issues as terrorist safe havens, state sponsors of
terrorism, counterterrorism cooperation worldwide, and regional
terrorism issues and groups. NCTC also regularly prepares intelligence
assessments that are integrated into NCTC's Directorate of Strategic
Operational Planning to inform policymakers on the progress of U.S.
counterterrorism efforts.
NCTC's analytic cadre includes detailees and assignees from across
the intelligence community and Government, ensuring NCTC products
reflect the diversity of the entire intelligence community and not the
analytic view of one group or agency.
Watchlisting.--NCTC hosts and maintains the central and shared
knowledge bank on known and suspected terrorists and international
terror groups, as well as their goals, strategies, capabilities, and
networks of contacts and support. NCTC has developed and maintains the
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment (TIDE) on known and suspected
terrorists and terrorist groups. In this role, NCTC advances the most
complete and accurate information picture to our partners to support
terrorism analysts. We also support screening activities that
ultimately help prevent terrorist plans and operations against U.S.
interests.
Situational Awareness and Support to Counterterrorism Partners.--
NCTC provides direct support to counterterrorism partners at both the
Federal and State and local levels.
In particular, our unique, centralized access to intelligence
information on terrorist activity enables our analysts to integrate
information from foreign and domestic sources and to pass that
information in a timely manner to domestic agencies. Below are several
examples:
NCTC provides around-the-clock support to domestic
counterterrorism activities through the NCTC Operations Center,
which is collocated with FBI Counterterrorism Division Watch.
NCTC produces and disseminates daily situational awareness
products and chairs thrice-daily secure video teleconferences
to facilitate timely information exchanges between all
counterterrorism partners.
The Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group
(ITACG), located at NCTC and led by DHS and FBI, brings
together Federal and non-Federal intelligence, law enforcement,
and first responder detailees, who are dedicated to bridging
the intelligence information gap between traditional
intelligence agencies and State, local, Tribal, and private-
sector partners. ITACG ensures that shared information is both
timely, relevant, and transformed into situational awareness
products for public safety officials--including police officers
and firefighters--enhancing their capabilities to quickly
assess and effectively respond to suspected terrorist
activities.
NCTC expedites the dissemination of information at
unclassified levels to support DHS and FBI efforts to inform
law enforcement and local officials of potential dangers to
include near-real-time export of watch-list data to the FBI's
Terrorist Screening Center.
NCTC provides threat information to DHS regarding
individuals who have been identified as overstaying their visas
in the United States, and we work regularly with DHS and FBI to
provide briefs to Federal, State, and local officials at Fusion
Centers regarding counterterrorism matters.
NCTC ensures the timely dissemination of finished
intelligence and situational reporting via the NCTC Online
CURRENT--the premier classified website and repository for
counterterrorism reporting and analysis. The site is available
on JWICS with more than 10,000 monthly users from 45 different
organizations and on DHS's Homeland Secure Data Network to
certain State and local officials in the Fusion Centers and at
FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs).
Strategic Operational Planning.--NCTC is charged with conducting
strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities,
integrating all instruments of National power, including diplomatic,
financial, military, intelligence, homeland security, and law
enforcement activities. In this role, NCTC looks beyond individual
department and agency missions toward the development of a single,
unified counterterrorism effort across the Federal Government. NCTC
develops interagency counterterrorism plans to help translate high-
level strategies and policy direction into coordinated department and
agency activities to advance the President's objectives.
These plans address a variety of counterterrorism goals, including
regional issues, weapons of mass destruction-terrorism, and countering
violent extremism. The strategic operational planning process
integrates all phases of the planning cycle--developing a plan,
monitoring its implementation, and assessing its effectiveness and
resource allocations--and creates communities of interest to coordinate
and integrate implementation.
For example, NCTC is joining with the Department of Homeland
Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to conduct workshops
across the United States that enable cities to better develop and
refine their response plans to evolving terrorist threats. These
``Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshops'' increase the ability of
Federal, State, local, and private-sector partners to respond to a
threat by discovering gaps in capabilities, planning, training, and
resources; and identify existing programs or resources that can close
those gaps. The workshops also provide a venue to share best practices
at the State and local levels and serve as a basis for identifying
issues and gaps that may subsequently be addressed Nation-wide.
KEY NCTC INITIATIVES
Facing a dynamic and complex terrorist environment, NCTC is
changing and adapting to build on the past several years of experience
to meet these threats and the challenges they present. With lessons
learned from AQAP's December 2009 failed airline bombing and other
plots, NCTC has implemented several key initiatives to advance our
ability to identify and prevent terrorist attacks.
Pursuit Group.--NCTC created the Pursuit Group to develop tactical
leads and pursue terrorism threats. The formation of the Pursuit Group
has provided the counterterrorism community with a group of co-located
analysts that have unparalleled data access and expertise, enabling the
Pursuit Group to focus exclusively on information that could lead to
the discovery of threats aimed against the homeland or U.S. interests
abroad.
With teams comprised of personnel from across the intelligence
community, with access to the broadest range of terrorism information
available, Pursuit Group analysts are able to identify actionable leads
that could otherwise remain disconnected or unknown. Pursuit Group
analysts can ensure that terrorism cases are examined as thoroughly as
possible by pursuing non-obvious and unresolved connections,
identifying unknown, known, or suspected terrorists, and focusing on
seemingly unimportant details that could yield relevant information.
The Pursuit Group provides investigative leads, collection
requirements, and potential source candidates to operational elements
like the FBI, CIA, or DHS for intelligence purposes or action.
Watch-listing and TIDE Enhancements.--NCTC has adopted important
reforms in the watch-listing process and has improved NCTC's receipt,
processing, and quality of information sharing in support of the
Center's watch-listing and screening responsibilities. One of the key
gaps we identified in the watch-listing process was the need to enhance
existing TIDE records with additional information. NCTC is now taking a
more aggressive and innovative approach to seek methodologies and data
repositories to ingest biographic, biometric, and derogatory
information. As the threat continues to evolve, our watch-listing
experts are proactively working with NCTC's Pursuit Group and the
counterterrorism community to expedite the sharing of information to
build more complete terrorist identities. We have also enhanced our
ability to store, compare, match, and export biometrics such as
fingerprint, facial images, and iris scans.
The community watch-listing guidance was revised in 2010 to provide
flexibility to push forward information that previously had not met the
requirements. Nevertheless, nominations of U.S. persons to a watch list
must still be supported by ``reasonable suspicion'' that the person is
a ``known or suspected terrorist,'' and a person cannot be watch listed
based solely upon a First Amendment-protected activity, or based solely
upon race, ethnicity, or religious affiliation.
Information Sharing.--NCTC is promoting information integration and
sharing across the counterterrorism community with the development of
the Counterterrorism Data Layer (CTDL). The CTDL provides users a
single access point to millions of pieces of Government
counterterrorism-related data gathered from multiple data sets. Prior
to December 2009 analysts were required to manually search multiple
networks and integrate information. Now, NCTC's CTDL is being developed
to ingest relevant data and to allow NCTC analysts to identify, search,
exploit, and correlate terrorism information in a single environment.
Thanks to the support of our key counterterrorism partners,
including DHS and the FBI, NCTC is acquiring priority data sets for
ingestion. For the first time, NCTC analysts can search across key
homeland security and intelligence information and get back a single
list of relevant results. Moreover, sophisticated analytical tools are
in place to permit analysts to conduct analytic searches, conduct link
analysis and data visualization, and triage information.
Finally, we are committed to handling data in a manner that retains
the trust of the American people and remains true to the oaths we have
taken to support and defend the Constitution. Specifically, we protect
information relating to United States persons through procedures
approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order 12333, and we
adhere to the requirements of the Privacy Act. Compliance with these
protections is reviewed at several levels--including NCTC's Civil
Liberties and Privacy Officer, ODNI's Office of General Counsel, ODNI's
Civil Liberties and Privacy Office, and the Intelligence Community
Office of Inspector General.
NCTC Domestic Representatives.--NCTC has developed a domestic
representative cadre, deploying officers to serve as counterterrorism
liaison representatives in seven cities around the country. These
officers are embedded with FBI joint terrorism task forces and with
fusion centers where they bring the National counterterrorism
intelligence picture to regional Federal, State, and local officials.
The NCTC representatives engage with counterterrorism partners, at all
levels, and provide analytic insights drawn from the full catalogue of
counterterrorism intelligence collection. Based on the positive
feedback we have received about this program, we are sending
representatives to two additional cities and will be aligned with the
DNI domestic representative program to provide Nation-wide coverage.
Countering Violent Extremism.--As our understanding of the threat
evolves, so too must our approach to defeating it. Over the past 10
years, the Government has expanded its counterterrorism efforts to
include a focus on preventing al-Qaeda and its adherents from
recruiting and radicalizing to violence the next generation of
terrorists. We recognize that al-Qaeda's recruitment is not constrained
by geographical boundaries, which is why we are working closely with
U.S. Government partners both overseas and at home. We also recognize
that communities are best placed to identify and prevent recruitment
efforts.
Therefore, working side by side with FBI, DHS, DOJ, State, and DoD,
we are building whole-of-Government approaches focusing on expanding
Government and community understanding of all forms of violent
extremism, including al-Qaeda-inspired radicalization to violence.
Domestically, in partnership with DHS and FBI, NCTC developed a
``Community Awareness Briefing'' to inform members of American
communities about the threat of terrorist recruitment and to facilitate
discussions with those communities about their role in to catalyzing
efforts to counter the al-Qaeda narrative. NCTC is working with
Federal, State, and local partners to broadly disseminate the briefing
to communities around the country. Internationally, NCTC works with our
colleagues at the State Department to support CVE work in embassies
across Europe, North Africa, and South Asia.
NCTC continually examines al-Qaeda-inspired violent radicalization
in order to understand and track this dynamic threat. NCTC's
Directorate of Intelligence published the Radicalization Dynamics
Primer, which includes a new framework that conceptualizes the process
of radicalization, mobilization, and engagement in violent action for
al-Qaeda-inspired individuals. The Primer was coordinated throughout
the intelligence community, and is intended as a reference guide for
U.S. policymakers, law enforcement officers, and analysts--including
civilian and military personnel--who assess or take action on
radicalization to violence trends in their areas of responsibility.
NCTC, in collaboration with FBI and DHS, also developed a training
curriculum to enable law enforcement and Government agencies to more
effectively identify, counter, and report on violent extremists in the
homeland. Several hundred Federal, State, local government, and law
enforcement representatives across the country have received the
training and given it positive reviews.
Support to the London Olympics.--NCTC, in coordination with the
U.S. intelligence community, is leading the effort to coordinate U.S.
intelligence integration as we approach 2012 Olympic Games in London.
The Olympics present a potential target for terrorists and other
disruptive groups. We are working closely with our British counterparts
to ensure that we are collecting, analyzing, and sharing all potential
threat information relating to the Olympics and that we are in a
position to respond quickly to prevent any possible plotting tied to
the Games. In particular, NCTC, with our intelligence community
partners, established a Threat Integration Center, designed to operate
around the clock providing real-time situational awareness and threat
analysis.
Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify before you this
morning.
The talented men and women who work at NCTC perform a unique and
vital service to the Nation, and we benefit from the integration of
analysts and planners from across the intelligence community, the U.S.
military, and other Federal, State, and local partners. As NCTC
bolsters its efforts to meet the challenges ahead, our progress is
dependent on our diverse and dedicated workforce. Maintaining this
diversity through continued commitment from intelligence agencies and
other organizations is a priority for the Center.
The men and women I am privileged to represent appreciate the
intelligence committee's bipartisan interest and support as they work
around the clock to identify and disrupt potential terrorist threats.
And while perfection is no more possible in counterterrorism than it is
in any other endeavor, NCTC, in partnership with DHS and the rest of
the counterterrorism community, continues to work day and night to
reduce the likelihood of a successful attack.
Thank you for your continued support of our mission, and I would be
happy to answer any questions the Members of the committee may have.
Chairman King. Thank you, Director Olsen. I understand you
are accompanied today by one of your main advisers, Nate Olsen,
who is sitting here in the front row. I want to welcome him,
your son, to the hearing.
Mr. Olsen. That is right. Thank you very much.
Chairman King. Thank you.
Secretary Napolitano, I would like to discuss the whole
issue of Hani Nour Eldin, who is the Egyptian member of the
Islamic Group who was here in the country, and what this
portends for the future, as we go forward, with representatives
coming from the Middle East.
My understanding of the Immigration and Nationality Act is
anyone who belongs to a designated foreign terrorist
organization, before receiving a visa, must apply and receive a
waiver from the Secretary of State and the Secretary of
Homeland Security. I know we have seen a number of them--for
instance, you and Secretary Clinton signed one for a member of
the Iraqi National Congress, and this has been the procedure, I
guess, since 1996, 1997. If you are designated FTO--if you
belong to it, you cannot come into the country without getting
a waiver.
Now, my understanding is that Eldin, who is an elected
official in Egypt, was a part of a delegation that came to
Washington, went to the White House, went to the National
Security Council, and also met with Members of Congress. He is
a member--according to his own Facebook page--of the Islamic
Group, which is a designated foreign terrorist organization.
Yet he was given a visa, never applied for a waiver. No waiver
was given. When he arrived at Kennedy airport, he did not go
through any secondary inspection.
He was at the White House, he asked for the release of the
Blind Sheikh, I understand; met with Members of Congress, who
were never told he is a member of a designated foreign
terrorist organization.
Now, the reason I ask this question, it appears as if the
law was not complied with, in that he did not apply for a
waiver. Congress was not notified, which was also required,
that whenever a waiver is given, Congress has to be notified
that one of these individuals is in the country.
My understanding, also--and I take only information that
was provided by your Department in a letter to me--but the
reason that said that no waiver was required is because there
was no derogatory information found. Yet his own Facebook page
says he belonged to a terrorist organization.
The concern I have is, this individual case is one thing.
But as we see the results of the Arab Spring, whether it is
Egypt, whether it is Libya, hopefully Syria, and other
countries in the Middle East, we are going to have people
coming to this country or attempting to come to this country
who may have had involvement in the past, peripheral or real,
with various terrorist organizations.
The administration, whether it is this administration or
another administration, may feel that some of these people can
be dealt with, can be worked with, but if that is to be done,
to me, it would seem to me, it would have to be an open
process--a transparent process where Congress and the people
would know who was being let into this country, what were the
factors that went in to giving this person a waiver, and also
at what level that decision is made.
I mean, we went through the situation in the 1940s where
people in the State Department said that Mao was an agrarian
reformer; or the 1950s, that Castro was a Jeffersonian
Democrat. So you can have people making bad decisions.
My question to you is: Who in the State Department, who in
the Department of Homeland Security would initiate allowing
someone from one of these organizations into the country? For
instance--and even if they are not designated as an FTO, as a
foreign terrorist organization, you could have the Muslim
Brotherhood, without going into details, which may be
considered one way in Egypt but another way in Syria, and
members of it may have different types of relationships with
the organization.
Who is going to be making those decisions? Who is going to
give the waiver? Is Congress going to be informed so we will
know who is being allowed into the country and who is not and
why a waiver is being issued?
Again, I say in this case, with all respect, it does not
appear that either letter or the spirit of the law was complied
with, with Eldin, who was a self-proclaimed member of a
designated foreign terrorist organization.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think a
couple of things. One is, I think you are right in pointing out
that, as we move forward, we are going to continue to have
visitors to this country that the State Department and others
feel are useful to bring to the country, to have discussions
moving forward, who in the past--or who say they are members of
a political party that in the past has been so designated.
In the particular case you refer to, this was a State
Department-selected group. It originated there. He was vetted
before he got a visa against all known terrorists and other
databases for derogatory information. None was found.
As he entered the United States, we, too, vetted him
against all of our holdings, including terrorists and
information from a variety of sources. No derogatory was found.
Before he entered the White House, he was vetted a third
time by the Secret Service. No derogatory information was
found. So then we can have some confidence that this was not a
security breach in that sense.
With respect to notification to Congress about this, that
is something I will have to look into. I don't know what the
status of that was.
Within our organization, when we get a visitor like that--
and we have had some in the past--it is usually a combination
of our counterterrorism group and CIS that reviews the
information, and then oftentimes--not oftentimes, but
occasionally, it will actually come up to the Secretary.
Chairman King. But with all this vetting, the fact is, on
his own Facebook page, he said was a member of the Islamic
Group, which is a designated foreign terrorist organization.
Now, how did that escape the entire vetting process?
Secretary Napolitano. Again, Mr. Chairman, I think we have
to add more nuance to that. We have to know, you know, what the
group was. Is it now a political party that is running the
government of a country that has strong ties with the United
States? If that is so, what is the actual derog information?
What was the content of the relationship, the substance of the
relationship?
In the particular instance you raise, I think everyone who
looked at this individual felt confident that he was not a
security risk to the White House or to the United States.
Chairman King. But I think you are proving my point. That
was a policy decision. It may or may not have been right. I am
not even quibbling with the policy decision. I am saying, under
the law, if he belonged to a foreign terrorist organization, a
formal process had to be gone through, reasons given why the
waiver was going to be granted, and then Congress notified of
it. That is the concern I have.
If he was able--even though he had it on his own Facebook
page, that he belonged to a foreign terrorist organization, we
could have hundreds of people in the situation over the next
several years coming in who may not all brag on their Facebook
page that they are a member of a foreign terrorist
organization.
So it raises serious questions to me, really, as to then
how effective the vetting process is. Or if a policy decision
was made, and it was made without Congress intending to be
notified, because under--again, if he had applied for a waiver,
and it had been granted, you would have had to notify Congress.
So Congress was left out of it. He was allowed in without a
waiver. I have a real concern.
Director Olsen, do you want to--
Secretary Napolitano. Well, if I might, Mr. Chairman, if I
might give you--separate it into substance and process. On the
substance, there was no derogatory information. He was vetted
multiple times by multiple departments. But on the process,
that is a fair point to make.
Chairman King. Okay. I would say that it is a significant
point here, because I made it, but a significant point because,
again, if a person belongs to an organization and he is allowed
in without applying for the waiver, it is bad enough it
happened in this instance, but we could be faced with this
situation many times over the next several years, especially
involving, for instance, Libya, Syria, hopefully sometime,
Egypt is going to be a work in progress.
So I would really ask that that be looked into. I hope the
decision is not being made at a policy level with the intention
of keeping Congress excluded, which, again, on the face of it,
appears to have happened here.
Also, in closing, in the letter I sent to the Department, I
understand that Eldin at the White House asked if the Blind
Sheikh could be released. He was told the answer is no. But
when I asked, what is the position of the Department of
Homeland Security regarding any potential transfer or release
of Omar Abdel-Rahman, the Blind Sheikh who was the architect of
the first World Trade Center attack, quite frankly, your
Department didn't answer it. They said he is in the custody of
the Justice Department.
Well, the fact is, if he is going to be released, Homeland
Security has a real role to play in that. I mean, the Justice
Department and the Department of Homeland Security--and, again,
it appears as you are not answering--the Department is not
answering the question about whether or not there is any
intention at any time to release the Blind Sheikh.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, let me just say this. I know of
no such intention.
Chairman King. Okay.
The gentleman from Mississippi.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Madam
Secretary, in a hearing in one of our subcommittees last week,
we were told that American citizens can be trained to fly
planes and not be vetted against a no-fly list. We were told
that foreigners are vetted through a robust process that would
only start once they are cleared.
The question was whether or not a process could be put
where anyone before they are admitted to a flight school would
be vetted. Testimony from the Department at that time was it
couldn't be done. Have you looked at that since that testimony
was presented to this committee?
Secretary Napolitano. I have.
Mr. Thompson. What is your position on it?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, the answer is, yes, there is a
distinction between U.S. citizens and foreign persons who are
seeking to get flight training. With respect to U.S. citizens
who may be on one of our watch lists, there are a variety of
ways that we can and do keep abreast of their activities. I
don't want to go into those in an open setting.
But the law is somewhat unclear as to whether we can vet a
U.S. citizen prior to their application for certification from
the FAA. So the Department historically is taking the position
that we cannot formally vet them--any U.S. citizen before that
application.
Mr. Thompson. Well, then I will say that we introduced a
bill last week to close that gap. Do you support such
legislation?
Secretary Napolitano. Absent an opportunity to see the
exact language, I don't want to say support, but I would say
the idea behind the bill is something we support, yes.
Mr. Thompson. But right now, you also admit that that is a
problem?
Secretary Napolitano. It can be a gap, but, again, let me
just say, it is a gap that would be easily filled a number of
ways. Those for whom we actually have watch list information,
there is a variety of ways we receive information about
possible flight school training. But it would be nice to tidy
up the law a little bit.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Taking on the Chairman's questions
about intent of Congress, Congress passed a law mandating 100
percent cargo screening for inbound containers. You indicated
that it can't be done, but that some other things are being
done to do that. I think the question for some of us is that
this was an act Congress said the Department should do.
I would like to hear where we are on a percentage of
screening of containers based on whatever system you are using
at this point. Are we 20 percent, 30 percent? Where are we
along the goal toward 100 percent?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, we have looked at containers
from different angles, as you know, and as we have discussed
before--high-risk versus low-risk. We have actually done quite
a bit to form and strengthen the international partnerships and
the industry partnerships necessary to know and to secure
containers and freight as it leaves foreign ports, to the
extent we can. There are a lot of foreign ports, it is just
physically not available to us to do that.
With respect to inbound, we have an algorithm and other
algorithms we use to evaluate high-risk cargo. We do a random
selection of a small percentage of other containers.
I would say, Representative Thompson, this is an area that
I know that the Department and some in the Congress are at odds
about, but there are a lot of ways to protect the ports of the
United States and the interior of the United States from
dangerous cargo. As we keep in mind the 100 percent law, which
we understand is the law, sometimes those laws are very
difficult standards to attain, and we have had to move in other
directions in the near term to make sure that we are doing
everything we can with respect to cargo.
Mr. Thompson. So what percentage screening are you at right
now?
Secretary Napolitano. I will get you the exact numbers, but
I would differentiate between high-risk and low-risk cargo, and
we are very high percentage on the high-risk cargo. Low-risk,
as I said, is very small.
Mr. Thompson. So you can't give us a number?
Secretary Napolitano. No, I can. I can't give you it at
this precise hearing. That number is available.
Mr. Thompson. But, Madam Secretary, you know, Congress said
you shall do it. They didn't say look at it and come back to
us. What I am saying to you is, if the Department differs, you
instituted the waiver, but I think you should come back to us
and say, you asked for 100 percent, we are at 20 percent. But I
think it is not a good omen that we can't get the numbers.
Can you provide us with any task orders that have been
issued by the Department, looking for new technology to get us
to 100 percent, or anything like that?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative Thompson, we are happy
to brief you and your staff again on where exactly we are. All
that has been done. The numbers are available. I just don't
have them at my fingertips at this hearing.
Let me also say, however, that as we move forward--we have
to recognize Congress also gave the Secretary the power to
waive that requirement. I think implicit in that is if it is
not feasible, practicable, affordable; whether it would have
undue interference with all of the cargo that needs to transit
into American ports for real-time inventories by the American
manufacturers of our country. Those are all things taken into
account. Whether that interference with lawful and legal trade,
we get enough of a benefit that it makes it worth it. We
believe that there are other ways currently available to get
there.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I am aware of information that you have
shared from time to time. What I would ask, that if you have
the current rationale for not doing it, and whatever data
supporting it, I think some on the committee would be
interested in seeing it.
The last question--Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your
indulgence. Also, can you tell us how much of this cargo that
Congress said should be screened before it comes to this
country is actually screened when it gets here?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, I can give you those numbers. I
will be happy to provide those numbers to you.
Mr. Thompson. So your testimony is that some of this cargo
is already here before we look at it?
Secretary Napolitano. It may be. It depends on the source,
but, again, there are multiple layers that go into examining
and knowing what is in the containers that are on ships bound
for the United States. Some of those layers begin before it
gets to the point of exit. It has to do with trusted shippers.
It has to do with other initiatives we have, particularly in
some of the large ports of the world.
Others have to do with what in particular the Coast Guard
does before cargo is allowed to enter a port of the United
States. In between, there is the exchange of a lot of the
manifest and other information necessary to evaluate whether
cargo is high- or low-risk.
So there is a whole system set up--I don't want to leave
the public or the committee with the idea that not only we are
not doing 100 percent, we are not doing anything. We are doing
quite a bit. But the 100 percent as the standard is not yet
attainable.
Mr. Thompson. Yield back.
Chairman King. I recognize the gentleman from California,
the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Protection, Security Technologies, Mr. Lungren--
5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the Chairman. I thank both of our
witnesses.
I might just say at the beginning that some discussion
about application of lone wolf. While it would not have
assisted in the terrible case in Colorado, we did have a debate
on the floor of the House about whether we should have the
lone-wolf provisions allowed for the Patriot Act, and we won
that on the floor. It was consistent with what the
administration was supporting. So I appreciate the fact that it
is now recognized as a current and continuing threat to us,
that is, the operation of a lone wolf.
Madam Secretary, I want to thank your Department for the
excellent classified briefing we received on the subcommittee
yesterday on Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. I think some of
the questions asked with respect to the last issue were
addressed there, and I appreciate that. I appreciate the work
that is being done there. We are going to have a subcommittee
open hearing on that and other issues with DNDO tomorrow.
I was very interested in your prepared testimony with
respect to DHS implementing a curriculum for Federal, State,
local, and correctional facility law enforcement officers with
respect to community-oriented policing. In California, for
instance, we have the post officer standards and training
commission that establishes the curriculum for all law
enforcement officers who are allowed to carry weapons, and
community-oriented policing is a part of that. So I look
forward to see exactly what your Department has.
I would be most interested in an elaboration on exactly
what the indicators of violent extremist activity are that you
mention or reference in your prepared testimony. The reason I
ask that is this: In the aftermath of the Fort Hood situation,
it was very difficult to get some to admit that we had missed a
whole lot of red flags with respect to Major Hasan. When we had
a joint hearing asking a representative of the administration
with DOD about what those indicators or red flags would be and
how they would have actually been implemented with respect to
Nidal Hasan, it was difficult to get a response.
What I am trying to figure out is, if you are preparing a
curriculum that is to assist local and State law enforcement
officials as to those signs that hopefully will help us
identify before violent behavior takes place, what are those
signs?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, a couple of things. One is the
curriculum is based on the community policing idea, with the
idea that police officers, deputy sheriffs, whatever, are
normally in the best position to witness something, tactics,
techniques, other indicators. Without spelling in an
unclassified setting what all those indicators are, let me just
say that we have involved local law enforcement, including
California, in the development of this curriculum.
Part of it includes taking 62 cases of home-grown terrorism
or purported terrorism from a variety of ideologies and mapping
them out as to what happened so we can precisely look at, well,
what were some of the things that--early warning signs, early
tripwires, things that should have alerted law enforcement. It
can be as simple as communication with known terrorists that
becomes available, all the way to unusual purchases of guns and
unusual purchases of explosives, explosive materiel.
Mr. Lungren. How do you distinguish between the area of
protected Constitutional speech versus that which is an
indicator of potential violent acts? What I mean is, in Major
Hasan's case, we have evidence of the fact that at a setting in
which he was supposed to lecture on a medical issue; instead,
he went into a rant about the justification for radical
Islamists attacking those in the West. Yet that was not
reported. That was not acted upon. I would consider that an
indicator.
Is that such an indicator in the curriculum that you are
presenting to law enforcement, including my State of
California?
Secretary Napolitano. Perhaps. I don't want to get into
Hasan, the FBI, DOD issues there. I think Judge Webster has
issued a report on that now.
But all of these things taken together--so when you
actually look at the Department's efforts on CVE, countering
violent extremism, they actually are a number of things. No. 1
is, we need to get a better understanding of the roots of
violent extremism. What is it that is going on in society that
leads to the creation of a violent extremist? Can we get at
some of those root causes?
No. 2, how do we partner with nongovernmental agencies,
NGOs, other groups that may come into contact with someone who
is moving from your espousal of beliefs to actually becoming
pre-operational and operational?
Then No. 3 is, how do we better train our local law
enforcement to be aware of tactics and indicators? I think one
of the best ways we can do that is to provide case studies and
analysis either from events that happened within the United
States or like Merah that happen in other countries.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman is--Director
Olsen, you want to----
Mr. Olsen. Yes, if I could just add a couple of points.
DHS, under Secretary Napolitano's leadership, is taking the
lead on this, along with FBI and Department of Justice and us
at NCTC.
One way that we contribute to this effort is analytically.
We have a group of analysts that look at the question of
radicalization. We have generated a number of analytic products
to help understand exactly what you are talking about,
Congressman, in terms of the pathway from radicalization to
mobilization to violence, helping to explain what those
identifiers are so that we can then use that in training to
sensitize local law enforcement and first responders to
recognize those signs, and then to take action when somebody is
on that path. We can stop that person before they do take
action.
Mr. Lungren. I appreciate that. I am just very concerned
about this. I mean, Tony Blair said just 2 days ago that the
West is asleep on this issue--that even he underestimated the
power of the narrative of the violent Islamists.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman is expired.
Mr. Lungren. It is a powerful statement, and I just hope
that we have learned from our----
Chairman King. The gentle lady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee,
is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman and the Ranking
Member for this hearing and acknowledge the witnesses and thank
them for their presence this morning. Good morning.
First, let me acknowledge the passing and funeral of
Inspector Phillip Prater, who was assigned to the Houston
division of the Federal Protective Service. His on-going
service indicated the stellar record of service, and I am
grateful that Director Patterson was able to attend, Madam
Secretary. I hope we will have a dialogue over the next couple
of days.
Let me thank you for your letter of sympathy to the family.
I would just like to put on the record, there is a need for a
more responsive H.R., human resources. If you could look into
that, I would appreciate it, in terms of working with the
family.
Let me ask a question that--if the Homeland Security
Department was operable in 1993--I think it was--1993, 1994--in
the action of the Oklahoma bombing----
Secretary Napolitano. Nineteen ninety-five.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. Nineteen ninety-five. Thank
you. Would that have been considered domestic terrorism and
under the Homeland Security Department?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, I actually worked on that case.
I would say, Representative, that, yes, that had all the
hallmarks of domestic terrorism.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do we as a Department--your Department,
our opportunity in review--concern ourselves with domestic
terrorism, meaning actions that may be driven by American
citizens?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, Representative. As I testified,
I think Matt testified, we look at terrorism from abroad and
from within. It can be Islamist. It can be motivated by other
ideologies, but yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So would a situation that would have wired
and set booby traps and others in a residential dwelling, that
has now left dwellers outside of their home for a period of
time, and if it had been triggered, could have caused massive
loss of life, would that warrant homeland security involvement?
Does a local jurisdiction have to call you for that?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, the Aurora tragedy--and a true
tragedy--is under investigation. I don't want to get too much
into the comment on that, because there is a lot we still don't
know. But I would say that, with respect to the response--and
the local police, by the way, if I might make this point--one
of the things we have been doing is doing a lot of training
around the country on how to respond to different types of
terrorist potential attacks.
One of the scenarios we have been training across the
country for is something along the lines of a Mumbai-style
attack, where you have multiple shooters, organized. We had
actually coincidentally----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right. I have another----
Secretary Napolitano [continuing]. Just done that training
in Colorado.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I have another question, so if you can--go
ahead. Finish.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes. The Aurora police were there,
and their response last week is to be commended. But with
respect to, is there a Federal process and so forth in an
investigation of an incident of that type? Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me express my sympathy to those and
applaud for those law enforcement first responders. Of course,
this was a very difficult time. I would encourage that Homeland
Security be present, because I do believe there are issues of
domestic terrorism.
Let me move quickly to another issue on--five Members of
Congress attacked a staff person in the State Department on the
grounds of being associated with the Muslim Brotherhood--the
mother, father, and brother. I do not want to call that staff
person's name. I know that staff person as an outstanding
American. But they sent a letter to the State Department
inspector general.
My question is, broadly, their letter suggests that there
are Muslim Brotherhood operatives in the United States
Government. To me, that is a Homeland Security issue. My
question to you, barring classified information, and if we have
to have a classified response at a later time, are you engaged,
or have you been notified, or are you investigating the idea of
present staff being associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in
the United States of America?
They cited the Tariq Ramadan decision, where there was
civilization jihad. They cited de facto U.S. recognition of
some entities. Where is Homeland Security in this? This is our
jurisdiction, if that is a truthful accusation.
Secretary Napolitano. We have looked into this. The FBI has
looked into this. We have found no credible evidence that such
activity is going on.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Could you repeat that again, Madam
Secretary? Maybe we have not heard you clearly.
Secretary Napolitano. We have looked into it. The FBI
looked into it. We have found no credible evidence that such
infiltration is going on.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The FBI, being the component that would
have an intelligent component, would it be necessary for the
CIA, which we look internationally with their work, but the FBI
would have used their intelligence resources? Is that what you
are suggesting in their investigation?
Secretary Napolitano. I would assume so, yes. I don't know
precisely who they use, but that is what would be my
assumption.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Both the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security and the FBI have found no evidence of this?
Secretary Napolitano. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman.
Chairman King. The time of the gentle lady is expired.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to thank the witnesses. First, Madam Secretary, let
me compliment you on your recent attention to the Caribbean. We
chaired an oversight hearing on the Caribbean being the third
border. I know that I got reports back from Governor Fortuno
and Representative Pierluisi that you did a great job going
over there. I certainly appreciate that.
I also chaired a hearing just recently on the use of
drones. Now, as you know, Congressman Cuellar and I have been
strong advocates for the use of DHS drones down on the border.
There is another issue with respect to drones being used
throughout the United States in the interior.
I bring this up because the GAO 4 years ago said that the
TSA, under DHS, had a role to play with respect to security
assessments and a National policy. Then less than a year ago,
we had a man who attempted to use this drone, but was thwarted
by the FBI, in an attempt to blow up the Pentagon and the
United States Capitol.
I have to tell you, I was surprised at the response from
your Department was that you had no role with respect to these
drones and that you were not going to send witnesses to testify
at that hearing. So I just want to register my disappointment.
I personally think that DHS does have a role. In fact,
every Member sitting on the subcommittee, both Republican and
Democrat, agreed with that assessment. In fact, the witnesses--
I mean, it is rare that you have a privacy expert and a law
enforcement expert agreeing on the same issue, and that was
that DHS has a role through the Office of Privacy and also
through Science and Technology and other departments within DHS
to deal with this issue.
Can you explain to me why this is not given any attention?
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I think--and I can't speak to
exactly how the role was expressed last week, but here is what
is going on. Yes, you are right. Yes, you are right. We use the
drones on the border extensively. With respect to the
regulation of drone use in the interior of the United States,
which is a relatively new phenomenon--and I think this was the
focus of the committee--the regulatory authority is with the
FAA, in part because it is an air traffic control issue. But we
are working and will be working with the FAA to make sure that
Homeland Security equities are protected.
With respect to science and technology, that directorate,
we do have a funded project--I think it is in California--
looking at drones that could be utilized to give us situational
awareness in a large public safety or disaster such as a forest
fire and how they could give us better information----
Mr. McCaul. Excuse me. My time is limited, but I appreciate
that comment. I hope that you--you know, the Ranking Member is
prepared to offer legislation with me. I would prefer to see
this happen administratively by either Executive Order or
within your Department, to coordinate with the Justice
Department and the FAA. I do think FAA controls the safety of
the airwaves, but doesn't really focus on security, per se. I
think that is an appropriate role for the Department.
Director Olsen, Fort Hood occurred not too far from my
district. I went to the memorial service. The Webster report
just recently came out. Well, since the tragic incident, it has
been downplayed. First, it was a workplace violence incident.
Senior intelligence officials, including your predecessor,
downplayed the e-mail exchanges between Mr. Hasan and Awlaki,
which always concerned me.
Since then, we have found out that the San Diego Joint
Terrorism Task Force pleaded with the Washington field office
to respond to this, as they saw it--threat. The WFO responded
that he is doing research; we can't investigate everybody
looking at websites; and in one documentation, that this was a
politically sensitive issue. I think that failure to contact
the DOD resulted in the deaths of 13 soldiers, and next to 9/
11, the biggest terrorist attack on American soil.
Real briefly, one of these e-mails particularly, literally
outlines exactly what Major Hasan did. It is the one on May 27,
2009. At the end of it, he says, ``So I would assume that
suicide bombers whose aim is to kill enemy soldiers or their
helpers, but also kill innocents in the process, is
acceptable.''
I mean, there is a huge red flag in this e-mail. You know,
as a former DOJ prosecutor, working with JTTFs, I can't
imagine--I can see San Diego's concern, and I can't imagine why
WFO did not give that greater attention. Do you have any
response?
Mr. Olsen. I can say, Congressman, you know, obviously, the
Webster report, an extensive study of exactly how--focused on
the FBI, how the FBI responded. I know that the director of the
FBI has indicated that a number of the recommendations from the
Webster report are being implemented, in terms of changes to
information sharing, technology, and policies.
I mean, I can say, at a personal level, also as a former
prosecutor, at NCTC, the Fort Hood shooting, along with the
2009 Abdulmutallab attempted attack, are sort of seminal events
for us, as far as trying to learn what we can from those
lessons. I mean, those are hard-learned lessons. But we need to
continue to be vigilant to do better at spotting those types of
indicators and sharing that information appropriately.
Mr. McCaul. Oh, I would sure hope so, when you get a major
on a major base in the United States talking to a No. 2
terrorist in the world, and that is not transmitted to the
general and the commanding officer in charge of Fort Hood? I
think that is absolutely unacceptable.
In particular, after reading these e-mails, I feel misled
that senior intelligence officials misled the Congress by
downplaying the extent and the importance and significance of
these e-mails. I see my time has expired.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentlelady from--Mr. Cuellar is not here--the
gentlelady from California, Ms. Richardson, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Richardson. [Off mike.]
Chairman King. Ms. Richardson, it is not working. It is
probably not being picked up. Maybe Ms. Clarke can let you----
Ms. Richardson. Will you give me a little more time?
Chairman King. You have got it. Start over. Oh, that is a
new one.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Try this.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. All right.
Chairman King. You can start the clock over.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, sir.
Madam Secretary, as I was explaining, my role here on the
committee and also having where I live--Congressman Rohrabacher
actually represents the port of both Los Angeles and Long
Beach. However, throughout my whole district is all the traffic
and the impacts of the port and that part that we both benefit
and we also have challenges.
My question to you is as follows, and I want to build upon
the questions of Ranking Member Thompson: When you submit the
information that you promised for the record, would you also be
willing to include in that--and it may require a briefing or a
classified briefing to this committee--what do you view as the
continuing vulnerabilities within our Nation's ports? What
resources might you need to be able to address these gaps in
the security of our ports? Because we would like to assist you
with that.
No. 3, what is being done to look at specifically the small
vessel threats that are now becoming of great concern to us, as
well?
I should let you know that, for the record, I did submit a
letter to the GAO, and I believe it was provided to you, as
well, at the time back on May 7, 2012. So I just wanted to,
one, give you an opportunity to respond to your willingness to
provide us that information.
Secretary Napolitano. We are always willing,
Representative, to work with you on issues of the ports. They
are obviously a critical infrastructure for the country. We
work with a variety of partners on them. They are complicated
entities, particularly large ports like Los Angeles, but, yes,
we would be happy to work with you.
Ms. Richardson. And supply the information, too?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes. It may have to be--some of it
will undoubtedly be classified, but yes.
Ms. Richardson. Yes, madam. Thank you.
Also, being a part of the Emergency Communications and
Preparedness Committee, we recently had an update regarding the
reforms that have been done due to the grant program. I want to
commend you and your staff for establishing transparency with
those who utilize those programs within State and local
government and getting their thoughts.
I would like to, though, ask you, what do you expect to do
in terms of continuing to address how we can make sure that
those funds are, in fact, risk-based, versus by traditional
formula? Specifically, I am referencing the minimum requirement
amount that I believe is in statute that allows, for example,
well over $2 million, I think, to various cities that certainly
don't rise to the risk that we see in others.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I think as the Chairman noted
in his opening remarks, we have moved more and more to a risk-
based approach to a lot of things, I mean, from how TSA looks
at the traveling public to how we deal with containers, to how
we award grant monies. There is a little bit of a policy issue,
I think, for the Congress to consider; which is to say, at a
certain amount, you know, risk evaluation is not perfect. It is
somewhat of an art, not a science, and spreading some of the
monies around might make sense.
But on the other hand, where we have high-risk areas and
known risk areas, we need to be sure to address those.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Would you be willing, though, to
consider working with this committee to establish those policy
changes that would give you the ability to ensure that more of
those funds are, in fact, risk-based, especially given the
tremendous reduction that your Department has, unfortunately,
suffered?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, absolutely. In our fiscal year
2013 budget request, we proposed that the Congress take up all
of our grants and look at merging them, reconfiguring them in
such a way as to maximize our ability to use risk-based
criteria. So we have that proposal before the Congress, and we
will be happy to provide you with a copy.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. My other question is, in your
response regarding the ports, one of the things that you
mentioned of the difficulties of implementing 100 percent cargo
inspection is potentially the cost and the international
relationships.
Could you describe to the committee what you are doing in
conjunction with the trade ambassador to establish these
agreements so that we could go forward and have a more
stringent system, similar to what we have internationally with
passengers?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I have not personally dealt
with the trade ambassador, the trade representative on this. I
know our staffs have had discussions. We also have had
discussions simply port to port, not with respect to the trade
representative, but with respect to the actual shippers,
consigners, and forwarders, and the like. So there has been a
broad variety of approaches to this issue.
Ms. Richardson. Would you consider meeting with the trade
ambassador? Because when we had the trade agreements that came
before this Congress, four of them, I asked the trade
ambassador specifically, had he worked with you to establish
these agreements, so at least for those going forward, we could
eliminate this problem? The answer was no.
Secretary Napolitano. Always happy to work with the trade
rep.
Ms. Richardson. Okay, thank you.
Mr. Chairman, would you allow me to ask one question to Mr.
Olsen?
Chairman King. Yes, if we can just try to keep it within
30--because Director Olsen has to leave about 12:30, so, yes,
go ahead and ask him.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Olsen, I am sure that you are aware that in this
committee, there are many discussions about terrorism
intelligence. Could you share with this committee what you
would view would be the percentage of intelligence that you
receive that implies that the terrorism that this country is
facing is based upon those being directed by their Islamic
faith?
Mr. Olsen. A percentage that is directed by--you know----
Ms. Richardson [continuing]. That is motivated by----
Mr. Olsen [continuing]. I think the way to answer that
question is, in terms of our work, certainly a substantial
majority of our work focuses on al-Qaeda and its affiliates. So
certainly, a substantial majority of NCTC's focus, which is
international terrorism, focuses on al-Qaeda and the al-Qaeda
ideology.
Chairman King. The time of the gentlelady is----
Ms. Richardson. But do you--could I just ask a follow-up
question, sir? You are very kind.
Chairman King. Oh, I know that. It is part of my
personality.
[Laughter.]
Also, you do bring out the best in me.
Ms. Richardson. Oh, you just might get a hug, sir.
Just a follow-up question. But would you view that that al-
Qaeda direction is directed and motivated strictly by the
Islamic faith? Or is it based upon the perspectives of the work
that they do?
For the record, I will submit other questions specifically
to this for the record, if you could----
Mr. Olsen. It is certainly much broader than just faith, so
it is a particular brand of ideology that is associated
specifically with al-Qaeda and its ideology.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman King. Okay. The time of the gentle lady has
expired.
The gentleman from Georgia, Dr. Broun, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, right after the Fort Hood massacre,
members of your Department came here and talked about an
alleged attack after 13 soldiers were killed and many were
injured. I stated at that time that political correctness was
going to kill people. I think it did in that case. The more we
have learned about that particular incident, the more there
were gaps in communications between your Department and the FBI
and other entities, as Mr. McCaul has brought up, and my friend
from California, Mr. Lungren has brought up.
It is certainly something that just really concerns me. I
think the blood of those dead soldiers falls on the head of
members of this Executive branch because they did not do their
work and because political correctness prevented Major Hasan
from carrying out the attack that was blatantly obvious to many
people.
I hope we change all that, because I think political
correctness is going to kill more people if we don't stop it.
But had it existed at the time of the Fort Hood incident, how
would this new curriculum that you have proposed or described
in your written testimony have prevented the tragedy from
happening at Fort Hood?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, first the Webster
report goes into the FBI-DOD issues. To my knowledge, and I
haven't read the full report, but DHS was not there. But I must
take exception to the way the question was worded, because the
men and women I work with, the men and women at the FBI, the
men and women at NCTC----
Mr. Broun. Madam, I am asking you about how your
curriculum----
Secretary Napolitano [continuing]. They spend 100 percent
of their time trying to protect the American people----
Mr. Broun. Madam Secretary, I apologize I just have a short
time and I have got----
Secretary Napolitano. Well, you asked a long question with
a lot of insinuation in it, and I--I don't think it is fair to
the men and women who work in this area all the time every day.
Mr. Broun. Well, I asked a question about the new
curriculum that you have described. Would it have prevented--if
it had been in place at the time prior to the Fort Hood
massacre, would it have prevented Major Hasan of carrying out
that terrorist attack?
Secretary Napolitano. It is difficult to give you a firm
yes or no, but I can tell you the curriculum does go into the
indicators of someone who is moving from extreme ideology to
operational. We would be happy to provide you a briefing on it.
Mr. Broun. I would like that. Mr. Lungren, I think, also
asked for the similar kind of briefing. I would be very
interested in hearing that.
Also, how would the curriculum that you have described in
your testimony prevent home-grown terrorist attacks without
singling individuals or groups due to their religious or
political beliefs?
With that question, I want to remind you that your
Department--some individuals in your Department have described
anybody who is military--or a military veteran, a gun owner, a
Christian conservative, pro-life individual--that is me--as a
terrorist. How would you prevent me being singled out as a
terrorist, but then find out people like Major Hasan not being
a terrorist?
I don't think I am a terrorist, frankly.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I think, Representative, as you
know, the--the report to which you refer was prepared under the
prior administration and issued under ours very early on. We
have since taken corrective measures to make sure these things
are precisely identified.
It is something that requires all of us to continue to look
at what are the root causes of terrorism, what are groups that
can help us that are outside the Government? As I said before,
the public at large can have a role under kind of a ``see
something-say something'' aspect of things.
So this is a very difficult area. We have to be very
cognizant of civil rights and civil liberties and privacy
interests. We are very cognizant of those. But on the other
hand, we are trying to learn lessons after every incident as to
what could have been done better. We are not static.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, madam. My time is about expired and I
have got a previous engagement. But I just want to say in
closing that we have got to get past this political
correctness. We have got to start focusing on those who want to
harm us. I think it is going to take intelligence gathering,
boots on the ground to do so, within the Department, as well as
within the CIA, FBI, as well as the military, to try to prevent
these kind of attacks.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Clarke, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Clarke.
Excuse me, Hansen. I don't think your microphone is working
either, so maybe----
Secretary Napolitano. I can hear you, but----
Chairman King. I don't think it is being picked up, though,
that is what I am saying.
Secretary Napolitano. Oh, I am sorry.
Chairman King. You might want to try the other mike.
[Laughter.]
Chairman King. Actually, Hansen, you could use over here--
the one that was just used by Ms. Richardson. I guess that was
yours. Yes--Ms. Clarke's microphone. We will go from Clarke and
Clarke.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Napolitano, thank you again for recognizing and
protecting our aviation system as being a key priority in your
administration. As you are well aware, metro Detroit is a known
high-risk area. If the underwear bomber had been successful, a
huge commercial aircraft could have blown up right over
metropolitan Detroit.
My concern is this: How to best warn the public about an
imminent danger like this so they can take cover immediately. I
feel that one of the most reliable ways to do so would be to
alert the public through the free local broadcasting media such
as local TV and radio.
While many people in Detroit rely on local television, such
as seniors and also just to mention some economic issues facing
the region, a lot of people are struggling financially. I mean,
just this week I have been working with Fannie Mae to help stop
some evictions of homeowners that are currently in foreclosure.
Many households, they can't afford cable, but they have
free local commercial TV broadcasting accessible to them. Many
folks do have cell phones. The unfortunate issue is that when
we had our power grid shutdown and we had a blackout in metro
Detroit, the wireless networks got overloaded and we could not
communicate with our cell phones.
That is why I think it is important at least to have access
to radio broadcasting through cell phones. I will be soon
asking the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications
Preparedness and Response to hold a hearing to examine these
issues on how we can best alert the public by continuing free
local TV broadcasting and enhance the public's access to radio
broadcasting.
If you have any thoughts on how we can best alert the
public so they can take cover in the event of an attack or
other emergency by continuing to offer free local TV
broadcasting and enhance free radio broadcasting, I welcome
your comments.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, and we have done quite a bit of
work in this area. The plain fact of the matter is you have to
use multiple media to get your message out quickly. FEMA has
actually done the most work here. But as you note, cell phones
go out, but texting may work. Radio, TV, other ways that people
receive information through. So there has been quite a
developed project, and quite a lot of work done here.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Well, thank you. I look forward to
working with FEMA to make sure that our public has access free
local broadcasting through TV and radio. I will address this
before the FEMA subcommittee as well.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Olsen. Chairman, if I could add one more point in
response to the Congressman's question----
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Sure.
Mr. Olsen [continuing]. About media. Secretary Napolitano
referred to training that is being done--DHS, FEMA in the
lead--in local communities and how to respond to a shooter or
Mumbai-style attack.
Part of that training does involve not only the law
enforcement response to a shooter-type incident, but also is
there public messaging that must go on in the event of an
attack, and how that would play out. The actual workshops run
through an exercise, so that exercise helps build capability in
those communities. That is something we are working together
on.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Okay, thank you Mr. Olsen.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Chairman King. The gentleman yields back.
The gentlelady from Michigan, the Chairwoman of the Border
Maritime Security Committee, Mrs. Miller. Mrs. Miller is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Hopefully, this
microphone is working.
Secretary, you have been asked a number of excellent
questions today about the cargo screening. I would just mention
that the subcommittee that I am chairing, Border and Maritime,
have had a number of hearings about this. I think you will find
at least the testimony that we had from your agency was that
the percentage of screening right now is in about the 5
percentile.
So it is in the one-digit numerals and it has also been
explained to our subcommittee that the estimated cost of
compliance of 100 percent would be $15 billion to $20 billion--
rough guesstimate. So actually, the House recently passed a
piece of legislation I sponsored, the Smart Port Act, which
really talks about the risk-based assessment, et cetera. But
that is not my question.
My question is--I want to talk a little bit--or ask you a
question about visa overstays. Again, in the subcommittee, some
of the things that have been rather startling as we think about
the amount of illegal aliens that are in the country. Everybody
always thinks that somehow that all of them came across the
desert.
You know, the truth is in the 40 percentile of all of the
illegals that are in the country currently came literally
through the front door, through visa overstays. We saw that
with the recent Capitol suicide bomber who had been here on a
visa overstay for over a decade. Certainly in the case of 9/11,
at least four of the terrorists and murderers were here on visa
overstays.
In regards to the secure communities now, which I am a huge
supporter of, I am just wondering if you could talk a little
bit about the criteria for your department for when you
apprehend, or when you--when you pull over, for instance, a
visa overstay, that may not be here--somebody that you think is
a high-level risk, and so we don't deport them because of some
of the criteria.
That could have happened even in the case of the 9/11
hijackers that might have been pulled over for routine traffic
stop. Maybe had nothing else and then we decided they weren't a
high-risk priority.
So I do have some concerns about that, and I wonder if you
could address that?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, as I think I have explained in
many settings, we are in the immigration enforcement area
setting priorities in part because we have resources. We don't
have an endless pocketbook. So we have focused on criminals, on
recent border crossers, on repeat violators, and others who may
be a National security risk. That process is going very well.
With respect to visa overstays, beginning in May 2011, I
directed that we go back and see if we could re-identify that
population and vet it against law enforcement and intelligence
community holdings, and DOD battlefield holdings. As we did
that vetting, we actually learned that quite a few of them--
almost 50 percent, actually had left the country, that just the
documents weren't linked up.
But we have now completed that re-vetting and the priority
cases have been referred to ICE for removal. We are current on
vetting on visas now.
Mrs. Miller. Yes, I appreciate that. Actually, there was a
backlog of several hundred thousand which I think has been
significantly----
Secretary Napolitano. I think the backlog has been
eliminated.
Mrs. Miller. Good to hear that. Good to hear that.
One other question I would have. I mentioned about Secure
Communities and, you know, as it has rolled out and now it is
almost everywhere really around the country, which has been a
tremendous assist, I think, for the first responders,
particularly when you look at them as a force multiplier for
your various agencies under your umbrella as well in
eliminating or deporting, I should say, deporting many of the
detainees through the Secure Communities by using your
database, et cetera.
But yet, we still see that there are several areas, couple
of them in the State of California, couple of cities in the
State of California, and I think Alabama as a State, but that
is going to be rectified by October, now with the Supreme Court
ruling about the immigration law. I think the people of Alabama
look forward to that.
But in particular, of course, it has gotten a lot of
attention--Cook County, which is essentially a sanctuary city.
They have declined to participate by our Federal law with
Secure Communities.
I am just wondering if you have had conversation with, for
instance, the Department of Justice about that?
I don't think we should allow it to continue. Certainly a
hammer that we would have initially is the State Criminal Alien
Assistance Program, SCAP dollars which is tremendous. I mean,
it is several million dollars a year.
So, on the one hand, they are saying, we are not going to
comply with Secure Communities; on the other hand, they are
saying, would you mind giving us all the Federal money so we
can pay for whatever they want to pay for in their system
currently. That would seem to me would be a place to start.
If you do intend to continue to give them the funding they
are asking for, at the same time they are violating this, I
guess I would look for respectfully how can we do that? Why
would you do that?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, SCAP is a Department of Justice
program, and we are evaluating all options with Cook County.
Their ordinance is not just they can't cooperate with Secure
Communities, it even precludes them from sharing any
information with us, so that we could put a detainer on an
individual and make sure they are not released back in the
community before we look at them for possible removal.
So it is a very, very broad ordinance. As I said before, we
are evaluating all options.
Mrs. Miller. I appreciate that. I hope that you do that.
Again, I think that is a very bad message to be sending out to
everybody else in the country to look at those kinds of things.
I would hope that you and Attorney General Holder would work
together to bring that to a resolve to the satisfaction of
everybody who has a mutual constituency which is every American
to make sure that if there are violators in the system, they
need to be deported.
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
Chairman King. The time of the gentle lady is expired.
I now recognize the new Ranking Member for the moment,
gentlelady from California, Ms. Hahn.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you, Chairman King. I moved up quickly. I
just passed my 1-year anniversary in Congress last week and
look at me now.
Thank you, Chairman.
You know I think there is a theme going on here in this
hearing this morning and I know you are aware of that and that
is port security and the issue of cargo scanning and screening.
Certainly it is an issue that I think still concerns a lot of
us. You know Los Angeles and Long Beach are America's port--44
percent of all the cargo that comes into this country comes
through that port complex.
Congress did pass a law that required 100 percent scanning
by this July 14. That date clearly has come and gone. You have
indicated pretty strongly that that is not probably going to
happen even with the 2-year waiver.
Well, my first committee that I sat in here, we had the 9/
11 report card. I remember specifically asking, you know, were
we doing enough in port security and the panel pretty much
unanimously said that was an area where we were still lacking.
On that, with the Chairman's help, I was able to actually pass
a bill a couple weeks ago--it is awaiting passage in the
Senate--that will ask the Department of Homeland Security to
take a comprehensive look again at our Nation's ports, the gaps
that may exist in port security and then come back and tell us
in a classified setting, you know, where are gaps, what can we
do in the future to close those?
So I know you have spoken about this a lot, but again,
could you discuss--elaborate on--give us a little comfort on
where you see us going with particularly the scanning of our
containers?
I know a big issue is the economy, jobs, commerce, you
know, we don't want to slow that down and yet one major
disaster at one of these ports could actually cripple our
economy.
So where do you see us going, particularly if there is new
technology that emerges that maybe makes this more possible
without slowing down Congress?
Secretary Napolitano. Well I think as Representative
Lungren's subcommittee heard with respect to the detection of
nuclear-type materiel, there are new technologies and things
that are in play. I won't go into that in an unclassified
setting.
Obviously, we pay a lot of attention to ports. Obviously,
we think the 100 percent rule, which does give the Secretary
the authority to waive, is not the only way to reach the goal.
There are multiple ways.
We also are more than willing to work with you and with the
committee on trying to give you a greater comfort level about
the safety of America's ports.
But interestingly enough, Representative, one of the things
you said is well, if there is one thing that happens,
Armageddon is going to occur and we will see a total crash of
the market. I think one of the hallmarks of really being
prepared for any kind of incident is the ability to respond and
to be resilient, and to get right back to work.
So you will see that a lot of our work has to do with
precisely the resilience point.
Ms. Hahn. I agree with that and I hope that is part of
maybe what you bring back to Congress is, you know, a better
plan for all of our ports to recover in the event of a
disaster.
Let me switch quickly to airports. I know at L.A.
International Airport, we had a big issue with an unacceptable
high wait time for people entering into this country which I
think presented a potential security threat at our airports.
We were able to get 20 more CBP officers at LAX. I think
several of us specifically requested that. But could you speak
to long-term staffing shortage of our CBP agents at our
airports and how we can address that in the future?
Secretary Napolitano. Right. We are spending some
significant time as we look at the fiscal year 2014 budget now
within the confines of all the other restrictions about what we
can do to increase the number of hours that we have for
inspectors, the number of personnel; looking at our staffing
model--seeing if we can adjust that.
We have had a problem at LAX. We have had a problem at some
of our other big international airports. All I can tell you,
Representative, we are doing everything we can think of to do
to rectify that situation.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you very much.
Chairman King. The time of the gentle lady has expired.
If I could just add on to what the gentle lady said. I know
that a number of airlines coming in and out of JFK made the
same request to me--the fact that there does seem to be a
shortage of customs people at the----
Secretary Napolitano. Yes. Mr. Chairman, one of the things
we have requested in connection with the fiscal year 2013
budget is the authority for us to receive participation and
payments from port authorities, from airlines, to help
subsidize the cost of additional inspectors.
So say for example, an airline in New York wants to bring
in a 3:00 a.m. flight from China, they help subsidize the cost
of having to have that shift of inspectors there. There are
other ways it can work, but it is something I would hope the
committee can help us with.
Chairman King. Thank you, Secretary.
Gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Speaker, and thank you to our
panel today.
Chairman King. Don't let John Boehner hear that.
Mr. Walberg. Well, I was hoping that your kind goodness
would produce something for the future for me, as well. But
thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me go back to leaks. There have been leaks in this
administration. We don't know who. We don't know why, but there
have been. Just to rehearse a non-exhaustive list, these leaks
have included information about drone strikes against al-Qaeda
in Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen.
We have leaks concerning reported cyber campaign against
Iran's nuclear arms program. Leaks that included terrorist
plans to destroy American airliners. Leaks and details of CIA
and Special Operations Forces efforts to kill Osama bin Laden
and others.
I guess what I want to ask, Madam Secretary and Director
Olsen, were DHS or NCTSC consulted in advance of these
disclosures?
Mr. Olsen. We certainly weren't consulted. In other words,
there was no--as far as I know, nothing within NCTC were we
involved in any of the leaks that you have referred to.
I mean, I think the main point for us, Congressman, is
that, you know, without getting into the specifics of the
allegations, that this is something that we take very seriously
within the National Counterterrorism Center.
I know that the director of national intelligence, Director
Clapper, has made a number of comments publically about the
importance of this issue and the reality that leaks have the
potential to interfere with on-going operations, and it is not
an exaggeration to say to endanger lives of American
intelligence officials and others.
So it is something that I know within the intelligence
community, we take extraordinarily seriously.
Mr. Walberg. I assume that would be your same position,
Madam Secretary?
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, and I have spoken with the
Director Clapper and promised our full cooperation in whatever
investigations occur and also with the FBI in the same vein.
Mr. Walberg. What is your position on--have these
disclosures impacted our National security?
Secretary Napolitano. They are certainly not helpful. I
will just leave it at that for now.
Mr. Olsen. Yes, that is what I would say as well.
Obviously, leaks, as I said, can be very damaging. In this
instance, these leaks are now the subject of investigations and
I wouldn't want to comment any further.
Mr. Walberg. Well, let me move on to that.
You are both former senior Federal prosecutors. Attorney
General Holder has refused bipartisan requests, and I would
note bipartisan request, to appoint special counsel to
investigate these disclosures relying instead on line
prosecutors to do the job.
In your professional opinion, is it realistic to expect a
U.S. attorney to question senior members of the administration
regarding these disclosures?
Madam Secretary.
Secretary Napolitano. Yes, as a former United States
attorney, they are not line prosecutors in that sense, they are
Presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed. They act
independently in a number of matters. So I think that is an
appropriate way to proceed.
Mr. Olsen. I agree completely with that.
Mr. Walberg. So, you don't see that it would be a challenge
for a person in this position, a line or whatever you would
call them, U.S. attorney, to question senior members of the
Obama administration regarding these disclosures?
Secretary Napolitano. No, I anticipate that there will be
several investigations and they will involve members of the
administration. As I said before, we have pledged our full
support.
Mr. Olsen. We are also cooperating with the investigation
and I also would say, again, these questions probably are
better posed to the Attorney General. Without knowing the----
Mr. Walberg. I have asked questions of the Attorney General
on a number of subjects and gotten no answer.
So, I would appreciate getting answers, but we can only
work with what we have.
Mr. Olsen. I don't know the specifics of the investigation,
but do have confidence in the U.S. attorney's offices to carry
these investigations out completely.
Mr. Walberg. So when you served as a U.S. attorney, or the
National Security Division, you would have authorized an
assistant to take sworn testimony from the President's National
security adviser?
Mr. Olsen. I am not sure it is appropriate for me to
comment on a hypothetical like that, Congressman.
Mr. Walberg. I thank you. My time has expired.
Chairman King. Gentleman's time has expired.
The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Barber, is recognized for 5
minutes. Once again, welcome to the committee.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
welcome.
Madam Secretary, Mr. Olsen, thank you so much for your
testimony. Particularly, I was appreciative of the Secretary's
very thorough report on the evolving and emerging threats to
our country's security. It is absolutely my honor to be here,
not only to be on this committee, but to add another Arizona
voice to an important issue that we all share; and that is: How
do we increase the security of our citizens and of our border?
As you know, Madam Secretary, there have been anecdotal
reports about material evidence of the presence of terrorists
along our Southern Border. My question is: Is there any
credible evidence that these reports are accurate and that
terrorists are, in fact, crossing our Southern Border with the
intent to do harm to the American people?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, first, welcome to the
committee. It is good to see you here in Washington, DC.
With respect, there have been--and the Ababziar matter
would be one I would refer to that is currently being
adjudicated in the criminal courts from time to time. We are
constantly working against different and evolving threats
involving various terrorist groups and various ways they may
seek to enter the country.
What I can tell you, however, is that the Southern Border,
the U.S.-Mexico border, is heavily, heavily staffed at record
amounts of manpower, materiel, infrastructure and the like, and
we are constantly making sure we are doing all we can to make
that border as safe as possible.
Mr. Barber. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
Chairman King. The gentleman from Arizona yields back.
The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you. Can you hear me? Thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I am not going to give you a hug. So there you go.
[Laughter.]
Chairman King. I thank the gentleman.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Cravaack. You are welcome.
Thank you for being here today, Madam Napolitano. I have
got a question for you. Last time we had a little exchange
regarding FFDOs. I said the last line of defense was the FFDO.
Would you care to comment any further on that position?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I think FFDOs play a valuable
part in airline security, aircraft security, which involves
multiple layers. I think in that exchange, we talked about the
FFDO. We talked about the cockpit door. We talked, I think,
about----
Mr. Cravaack. Which you classified as the last line of
defense.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, last line of physical defense
in that regard. But I would say that trained personnel aboard
aircraft, you know how to respond to events, is always, always
a very, very important factor.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. In testimony today, you said, regarding
risk-based analysis--what we talked about last time as well--
you said it is not perfect. It is an art. It is not a science.
With that said, given the different layers of security that
you just talked about, where a clean person can come through
the normal security process. Just in this hearing room we heard
not too long ago about the various holes that are around the
aircraft, in the shadow of the aircraft, the people that can up
and touch the aircraft and possibly place a device or a weapon
on-board the aircraft.
With that understanding, that a person coming through clean
through the airport, can hook up with a device on the aircraft
and plant it from the tarmac, which we see as a lot of
problems, I see the FFDO program as being absolutely vital,
with a 1.5 million sorties being flown annually, at the cost to
the American taxpayer for $15 a flight.
So I think that is probably one of your chief defenses. As
a pilot--I flew for 17 years--as a former Federal flight deck
officer, I can assure you, madam, that the Federal flight deck
officer is not only the last line of defense, but a chief
deterrent for those that wish to use an aircraft as a human-
guided missile.
The House also recently passed a homeland security
appropriations bill that would increase the FFDO funding. Now,
the proposals that were brought out by the administration
basically cut the program in half--would in essence eliminate
it.
If the funding level stands, will this administration work
to clear the backlog--and I am saying the increased funding--
increase the backlog of pilots that are waiting to join the
program?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, first of all, the
reason that the administration submitted the budget request it
did is because, as you all know, we are working under severe
budget constraints. The FFDO program, as compared to the air
marshal program, is not a risk-based program. So that is why
that decision was made.
Regardless, however, certainly if that appropriation goes
through and that is added back into the budget, we will work to
make sure the program is well-run and backlogs are relieved.
Mr. Cravaack. So is your intent then not to phase out the
program if you get this funding?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I don't speculate. I don't play
``what ifs.'' We will see what happens.
Mr. Cravaack. I ask you again--make sure I understand what
you are telling me. If the program is brought up to the level
of funding that the Congress approved, that it is your intent
not to phase out the program?
Secretary Napolitano. If there is funding for the program,
we will carry out the program, yes, sir.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you.
Switching gears, servicemembers at Fort Hood that we were
just talking about today have been denied purple heart medals
and related compensations on the basis of the judgment that
these shootings were workplace violence and not terrorism.
In your opinion, were the Fort Hood shootings by Nidal
Hasan--I will not give him the rank--who described himself as a
soldier of Allah on his business card, who was in active
correspondence and direction from al-Qaeda, and who cried
``Allah Akbar'' at the beginning of the attack, a terrorist
act?
Secretary Napolitano. I am not going to get into the
decisions of the Department of Defense. They have their own
criteria. But I would say, Representative, that an act can be
both workplace violence and a terrorist act at the same time.
This has all the hallmarks of both.
Mr. Cravaack. Do you think these servicemembers deserve the
medal--purple heart?
Secretary Napolitano. Again, I don't know the decision
making of the Department of Defense, but I have described how
we would look at that act.
Mr. Cravaack. So you classify it as a terrorist act?
Secretary Napolitano. As both.
Mr. Cravaack. One being a terrorist act. Okay.
In regards to recently----
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Cravaack. My time has expired. I will yield back. Thank
you.
Chairman King. The gentleman yields back.
The gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Madam Secretary and Director, for both being
here today before us.
Madam Secretary, I wanted to ask you a question and
actually ask you to help us and work through a problem that I
am sure you are aware of and somehow the buck keeps getting
passed around to different people. Madam Secretary, this has to
do with a border crossing between Mexicali, Mexico, and
Calexico, which is on the border of California and Mexico. A
very big crossing. My mother grew up in Mexicali, so I am very
well aware of that area. It has the best Chinese food in the
world, by the way.
There is a new border crossing or an expanded border
crossing--land crossing going between the two. One of the
things about Mexicali, Mexico and Calexico is that in the
summer it can get easily to 110 degrees. People are waiting to
cross the border there for up to 3 hours, with no shade,
standing in line, and that is a pedestrian crossing.
So there is an effort to make a new land crossing. Almost
all the Mexican side of that crossing has been built.
Meanwhile, we have failed to move from our end to meet it and
get this land bridge open.
Part of the problem is that it is a GSA facility. I
understand this. But how do we do what we need to do, which is
to get this built, so that we can meet the Mexican side, so
that commerce can move at a faster pace than 3 hours in line,
and that people crossing back and forth, many of them for work
and for family purposes and for purchasing purposes, also, so
that we can move forward and get this done?
How do we do that? Will you work with us? Will you help me?
Will you get us a meeting with the GSA administrator? Can we
all sit down? I mean, this is a very big and frustrating
problem for the people who live in that area.
Secretary Napolitano. I concur, and I think, you know, the
physical ports along the Southwest Border, many of them are
inadequate for the amount of people and cargo that needs to go
back and forth.
As you identify, it is GSA. Probably the No. 1 thing you
can do is provide the funding to GSA for the projects. If they
don't have the funding, they can't build the projects.
But we will be happy to work with you.
Ms. Sanchez. Great.
I would like, Mr. Chairman, to submit a letter from the
Board of Supervisors of Imperial Valley, where Calexico sits
there on the border, asking for some resolution, hopefully a
positive resolution to this. It is incredibly embarrassing to
see a brand-new built facility from Mexico, having done their
part, and nothing happening on our side.
Chairman King. Without objection, the letter will be made
part of the record.
[The information follows:]
Letter Submitted for the Record by Hon. Loretta Sanchez
July 3, 2012.
Secretary Janet Napolitano,
Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Washington, DC 20528.
Dear Secretary Napolitano: The Board of Supervisors of Imperial
County, California desperately requests your assistance and direct
involvement in helping us solve a health and safety emergency that
continues to exist as a direct result of Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) inaction along the U.S.-Mexico border between Calexico,
CA and Mexicali, Mexico.
Calexico is a small city of 38,000 that is separated only by a
fence from the city of Mexicali, the capital of the State of Baja
California with a population in excess of 1 million persons. Since the
establishment of these communities 100 years ago, Calexico and Mexicali
have been linked economically, culturally, educationally, and both have
significant familial ties.
Calexico and Mexicali are linked by two major ports of entry that
are administered by DHS through the Customs and Border Protection
Administration. Although the communities have been promised that the
major Port of Entry (POE) at downtown Calexico would soon undergo a
major remodel that would bring this 40-plus-year-old outmoded facility
up to modern standards to better facilitate the movement of people and
commerce, the necessary Federal appropriations have been stalled,
apparently indefinitely. In the mean time border waits for persons
wishing to cross into Calexico to work; shop; go to school; or visit
family, regularly exceed 2 hours. We are already in the summer season
where we can expect in excess of 130 days where the average
temperatures will exceed 100 degrees and often reach as high as 115
degrees. The lines are particularly dangerous for pedestrians who must
endure these 2-hour waits while standing unprotected from the excessive
heat.
We understand the difficulty the Federal Government is facing in
trying to find funding for the $300 million reconstruction of the
entire POE and we are actively seeking solutions including local
participation in a public/private, leaseback arrangement to help find a
local solution. In the mean time, we face an imminent public health
emergency that requires your immediate attention.
We urge your direct involvement in implementing a solution to
expedite the passage of northbound pedestrians before the intense heat
of this coming summer season causes more health and safety issues for
the pedestrian crossers, including elderly persons and young school
children. Regional CBP officials have looked into temporary solutions
to provide more northbound pedestrian turnstiles to help facilitate the
northbound inspection of pedestrians that we believe can be quickly
implemented to help solve this impending health emergency. Their plan
would involve relocating the southbound passage for pedestrians and
moving some office space within the pedestrian port to nearly double
the number of inspection gates at downtown Calexico. The Board of
Supervisors request that you immediately provide funds to Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) to implement these changes or any similar
reconfigurations or operational changes that will shorten the exposure
of these vulnerable populations from the extreme weather conditions
that will soon be upon us.
While the Board has not yet declared the existence of a State of
Emergency as a result of these increasingly long waits to cross into
the United States, we intend to have our health and environmental
officials continuously monitor the situation and, when warranted, we
are prepared to make such a declaration.
We would welcome a prompt response to this request so that we may
quickly engage in a dialogue that will lead to prompt action to rectify
the untenable conditions that have resulted from many years of Federal
inattention to the needs of the border-crossing communities along the
Southwest Border in general and in Calexico in particular.
Sincerely,
John Renison,
District 1.
Jack Terrazas,
District 2.
Michael W. Kelley,
District 3.
Gary Wyatt,
District 4.
Raymond Castillo,
District 5.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Chairman King. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Meehan,
Chairman of the Terrorism Subcommittee, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank both of the panelists for your distinguished
service to our country. I appreciate that when you come here
you get the tough questions. But I also appreciate the
tremendous service that you perform each and every day on
behalf of our Nation. But I am going to ask as well some
questions that I know have been a great importance to me.
Let me start with you first, Mr. Olsen. I want to ask you,
you know, because you are at the NCTC every day, you see the
global information. Do you believe that Boko Haram should be
designated a foreign terrorist organization?
Mr. Olsen. We certainly have seen, Congressman, the rise of
Boko Haram as a significant threat in Nigeria over the last
couple years, and in particular, a dramatic rise in the amount
of violence that that group has caused in Nigeria, particularly
over the last year.
If you recall, last August, the attack on the U.N.
headquarters----
Mr. Meehan. I am aware. We know. The record reflects. I
just want to know your opinion. Do you believe it should be a
foreign terrorist organization?
Mr. Olsen. That is a question, the question of whether to
designate that group----
Mr. Meehan. Yes.
Mr. Olsen [continuing]. That is within the province of the
Department of State to make that----
Mr. Meehan. I am aware that it is the Department of State,
but what do you believe? Because I am having trouble getting an
answer from the Department of State.
Mr. Olsen. Our role is to provide the intelligence on that
group to the--ultimate policy decision about whether to
designate. From the pure perspective of the definition of
terrorism and whether that group engages in terrorism the
answer is it does. It engages in acts of terrorism in Nigeria
and has.
Mr. Meehan. Well, let me take a second--let me just ask,
Madam Secretary, what is your opinion on that?
Secretary Napolitano. Well, I think I would concur with the
director and all that he has said. That is a policy decision
ultimately for the State Department.
Mr. Meehan. Well, let me go through because I am not
getting the ability for the State Department to make a
decision. The facts, we are attorneys and we talk about the
criteria, the elements. Are they a foreign organization?
Question No. 1--that is clear. Do they engage in terrorist
activity? Without a question. I think we can stipulate both of
those.
Really, the third question is, is the organization's
terrorist activity a threat to the security of the United
States or National security of the United States, either the
foreign relations or their economic interests?
Now, Mr. Olsen, you have testified here today that Boko
Haram remains focused on local and regional attack plotting,
including Western interests in Nigeria. You further testified
that Boko Haram is primarily focused on plotting against
attacks in Nigeria, but in April a spokesman for the group
publicly threatened to find a way to attack a U.S.-based news
outlet if its coverage of Islam did not change.
According to my interpretation of your testimony and each
of those elements, it meets all the criteria of designation for
a foreign terrorist organization. Would you agree with that?
Mr. Olsen. I would agree that the acts of that group meet
those criteria in terms of its activities, and the intelligence
supports that. Ultimately--and as you may know, sir, that a
number of the members of that group have been designated as
terrorists. Ultimately, the decision of whether to designate
the group is a policy call----
Mr. Meehan. But why, Madam Secretary, why would we not do
that? Because I think you appreciate, as I do, the ability to
have enhanced activities for investigation on our part. Let me
suggest that there is testimony, as well.
I think most significantly the letter from the Department
of Justice requesting that this be done, one of your, you know,
colleague agencies, from Deputy Attorney General Monaco,
specifically requesting.
I have met with the CIA, and I would represent to you their
genuine concern and hope that this would be accomplished.
General Ham himself of the African Command has talked
himself about the concern that AQIM and others are
collaborating with the--you know, al-Qaeda's collaborating with
Boko Haram.
So given all of those facts, why would the State Department
not designate them as a foreign terrorist organization if you
have an opinion?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, I think that is a
question to address to the State Department.
Mr. Meehan. Okay, well, I appreciate that. I think the
facts speak for themselves on that.
I am fearful and, here, let me just go for the record. My
concern is we took the same stance with TTP. We took the same
stance with AQAP after--we did not designate them until after
they attempted to carry out acts of terrorism within the United
States. So I am very concerned about this issue.
Madam Secretary, let me just ask one quick, sort of
overarching question: Those visa overstays here in the United
States, are we doing enough to try to deal with the issue of
visa overstays, or can we do more? Or are we concerned about
that?
Secretary Napolitano. We have gone back and revetted the
backlog. We are current with visas coming in. Doesn't mean that
there aren't overstays in the country that are problematic, and
we should always be concerned about that. We are open to ideas
or suggestions on other things we could do. But I think from a
Departmental standpoint, in the last 13 months--12, 13 months,
quite a bit has been done from a security standpoint to look at
those visa overstays.
Mr. Meehan. Well, thank you.
Thank you, again. My time is expired. But I am tremendously
grateful for your service. Thank you.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman is expired.
Madam Secretary, I have just been informed that you have to
leave by 12:30, 12:35. We will do our best to expedite it, but
we do have four Members left.
The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Quayle, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Madam Secretary, last week we talked a lot in the Judiciary
Committee about your June 15 memo. One of the things I wanted
to talk about is not part of that. I have been hearing a lot
of--I have talked with a number of sheriffs down in
southeastern Arizona, and they have been talking about CBP
reports about--where they have a new policy where they just
turn illegal entrants back south if they don't pose a threat
either criminally or violently.
With the onset of the Morton memos, your June 15 memo--and
then I recently got a copy of a CBP memo that says, ``CBP
guidance for exercising discretionary authority and
prosecutorial discretion in the enforcement of immigration
laws.'' what it states is that they, again, are prioritizing
people who have ties to terrorist organizations or those that
could present a threat or smuggling.
Then they also say that you can exercise discretion when it
is confirmed that the alien does not--well, actually,
generally, when it is confirmed that the alien does not fall
within the categories. Then they list a number of different
examples or key factors where they actually take into account
of whether they just turn them back south rather than
processing them, one of them being the likelihood that the
alien will be granted temporary permanent status or other
relief from removal, or the alien's ties to their home country
and conditions in that country.
One of the things that they are allowed to do is just have
the voluntary return at the time that they are actually
encountered along the border.
How are the CBP agents actually going to be able to
determine all of these different factors if they are just
encountering them when they are making that illegal entry in
between the ports of entry?
Secretary Napolitano. What they do--and I think,
Representative, we can provide you with a briefing off-line.
But what they do is they bring the immigrant, the illegal
alien, to a central center.
I think we need to distinguish between when they make a
referral to ICE for removal versus apply the consequences that
we apply along the border with respect to detention and
movement back to the country of origin. That is different than
I think you are thinking of like a turnaway or something of
that sort. We don't do turnaways at the Southern Border.
Mr. Quayle. It actually does say that they have--``in the
enforcement context exercising discretion applies to a broad
range of discretionary enforcement decisions, including but not
limited to the following between the ports of entry: voluntary
return.'' So that is----
Secretary Napolitano. That is right.
Mr. Quayle. Yes. Voluntary----
Secretary Napolitano. Voluntary return is not turnaway.
Voluntary return means you stay in Border Patrol process for
purposes of being handled versus going into the immigration
court context.
Mr. Quayle. But this actually says with the language--and
language does matter within these memos. It says, ``Although
the initial exercise of discretionary review should be made at
the second line supervisor level''--it doesn't say ``must be
made.''
So that gives actually the discretion to the CBP agent at
the time of the apprehension not to actually process the
individual and take them into custody, but actually have the
voluntary return to where they came from.
So that is the disturbing thing that I have seen from this
memo, along with your June 15 and along with the Morton memos
is that they have this ability where they have discretion that
wasn't actually given within the statutory authority.
Secretary Napolitano. No, I think that is inaccurate. We
will be happy to provide you with a specific Border Patrol
briefing on that point.
Mr. Quayle. So it is inaccurate, but it says that,
``Although the initial exercise of discretionary review should
be made.'' I mean, you are an attorney. You know language
matters. That is some of the other things that you have, you
know, within your June 15--it also uses ``should'' not
``must.'' These are the things that are troubling when we are
trying to draft legislation here to not allow and actually have
enforcement of laws.
We have your June 15 memo. You believe you have
prosecutorial discretion. HHS believes that they have the
ability to waive the work requirement for welfare, even though
it specifically states that that section can't be waived.
We are in a situation--we discussed this last week--where
we need to be able to write laws and make the Executive branch
actually enforce them. Even when we put these ``you can't waive
it,'' or, ``you must do it,'' it seems the Executive branch
continues to say, ``Oh, well, we have the discretion,'' even
though the statute doesn't state that you do.
So if you could just answer, you know--CBP, where did they
get this discretion to have the ability to allow the voluntary
removal of illegal entrants when it doesn't state that within
any statutory authority?
Secretary Napolitano. It is hard for me to follow your
question, Representative, but I cannot identify a prosecutor or
a former prosecutor who would sit at a table before you and
tell you they don't have discretion. It is why U.S. attorneys'
offices typically don't do check-cashing cases, even though
there is a law there.
You have to enforce the law in a strong and sensible
manner.
As you know, we have actually removed more people from this
country in the last 3\1/2\ years than any prior administration.
We have removed more felons. We have removed more aggravated
felons. So the enforcement record is quite strong.
Mr. Quayle. All right, thank you, Madam Secretary.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Now I will ask unanimous consent, the gentleman from
Arkansas, Mr. Crawford, be allowed to sit on the dais and
participate in the hearing.
Without objection.
Just have to say, Mr. Crawford, the witnesses may have to
leave before we get to you, but you are certainly welcome to
join us.
The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Long, is recognized for 5
minutes. He will be followed by Mr. Duncan and Mr. Rogers, and
then Mr. Crawford if we are still here.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for being here for your testimony today.
Madam Secretary, I just stepped out of the room a few
minutes ago to talk to a couple of college students from my
area that go to Drury University and one of them happens to be
from Joplin, Missouri. I just want to thank you for all of your
efforts after our horrendous event, the tornado that took 161
of my constituents' lives down there a year ago in May.
You all were exemplary and unwavering and steadfast with
your efforts down there, and I want to thank you for that.
I do have a question--a couple of questions on today's
issue.
Representative Lungren a while ago was asking you about the
Fort Hood shooting, Madam Secretary. In his questioning about
the Fort Hood shooting and point out that Major Hasan was e-
mailing probably the second-leading terrorist. His question to
you, if I understood the question was: How was this missed? How
did all of this be missed that people couldn't look into it,
when you have got a major e-mailing jihadist ideas and things
to the second-leading terrorist in the country?
I hope I was wrong in understanding your answer, but to me
your answer was, what is going on in society--we need to be
concerned with what is going on in society that leads to the
violent extremism.
Secretary Napolitano. No, Representative, first of all, I
continue to watch the progress in Joplin and your constituents
are amazing.
With respect to that, what I was saying is that, within the
whole universe of violent extremism, we need to understand
better what causes it. We need to work with non-governmental
organizations, NGOs. We need to have a very strong community
base policing curricula that looks at early warnings, tactics,
behaviors, techniques, that could be employed.
So, I hoped you didn't interpret my answer as suggesting
that this is a sociology issue. There were clearly lessons to
be learned about the communication between FBI and the
Department of Defense with respect to that Fort Hood shooting,
that Fort Hood tragedy. I think all of us, even if we were not
directly involved are going to read--are reading the Webster
report with great attention.
Mr. Long. Has this been thoroughly gone through to see
where the dots were not connected or why--if San Diego was
saying, ``Hey, we have got a huge problem here, this guy is
talking about jihadist ideas and he is talking to the second-
leading terrorist, has anyone gone back to the people in the
middle that made the decision not to pursue it?'', and said, oh
no we can't get into that, because it is a civil rights, civil
liberty?
I am concerned about the civil rights and civil liberty
about the 13 people that were killed.
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, again DHS was not in
that Fort Hood shooting situation, per se, but we all have
copies now of the Webster report. We are all going to read it
and are reading it with great attention.
Mr. Long. Okay, one other----
Secretary Napolitano. NCTC wants to answer.
Mr. Olsen. If I could add to that? The Fort Hood tragedy
continues to be a touch point for us at NCTC as an event that
we need to learn from on how to share that type of information
and to make sure that as NCTC represents the hub of much of
that information, whether it is reporting from the FBI or from
CIA, from DHS, from DOD. We need to continue to make sure that,
that information that is of threat nature and those types of
communications find their way into the hands of the individuals
who can take action.
So, again, the Webster report is one of the after-action
reports, but there have been others. Those are all part of the
overall effort of the National intelligence community to
respond----
Mr. Long. All right, I have got limited time. Let me get
back into my second question for the Secretary.
On the Egyptian Hani al Deen, or however you pronounce the
name, the visit to the White House last month. Apparently, you
testified that he had been through three vetting processes and
no information was found indicating anything was wrong. But the
Chairman mentioned that on his own Facebook page, he had that
he belonged to a known terrorist organization.
My question is this, when he has been vetted and re-vetted
and vetted a third time, I believe you said with the Secret
Service at the White House, do those people that did that
vetting, are we going to hold them accountable?
Is anybody going to go back and say: Look, who did this
vetting? This guy had on his Facebook page that he is in a
known terrorist organization. Do we do that? Do we go back to
those people and say, how did you miss this little item?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, as I said to the
Chairman, he was vetted multiple times. What happens, and what
we will see out of the Arab Spring, among other developments,
is that organizations that have been named as terrorist
organizations in the past may or not be--all of the members may
or not be--may or may not be terrorists themselves. That is
what needs to be looked at, because these organizations and
parties have evolved considerably over the last several years.
We have seen this historically--Representative, we have
seen this historically, as well. So, if the question is: Did
someone get into the United States--did somebody get into the
White House who was not vetted? The answer is no.
Should we look at the process, as the Chairman pointed out
to me? We can absolutely look at that.
Mr. Long. I am not interested in the process. I am
interested in the individuals that looked at the vetting. If my
friend Mr. Duncan did the vetting, I would like for someone to
go to Mr. Duncan and say, I don't care if it was an evolving
terrorist organization, if it is one that used to be on and now
it is not on the list. I would like to hear that from Mr.
Duncan.
I would like to hear that from the guy that did the
vetting, to tell me, ``Well, the reason I didn't flag that he
had on his Facebook page that he was a member of a known
terrorist organization is because after the Arab Spring, we
have kind of taken that group off.'' I think that is going to
prevent my friend Rick here who sat next to Mr. Duncan in this
vetting process, if Mr. Duncan is held to accountability----
Secretary Napolitano. I think----
Mr. Long [continuing]. Then when something like this comes
up, Rick might be a little more careful, and protect our
citizens a little more. Does that not make sense?
Secretary Napolitano. Representative, that particular case
has been looked at, and there were no mistakes made in the
vetting. I will just leave it at that.
Mr. Long. Three separate vettings, and no mistakes----
Secretary Napolitano. None that we can----
Mr. Long [continuing]. On a guy that had on his Facebook
page, that he belonged to a terrorist organization that was at
the White House a couple weeks ago.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, again, Representative, I think
I have discussed this long enough this morning. I will be happy
to provide you more detail off-line.
Mr. Long. You know, and I appreciate--I wouldn't want to
see a flowchart on all your responsibilities, because you have
got an extremely, extremely complicated and tough job. I do
appreciate what you do. But sometimes it is the little things
that matter. If we could go back and look at these three--I
just can't get through my head that three groups of people
vetted this fellow and on his Facebook----
Secretary Napolitano. Well and it began with--and the State
Department, because this was a State Department-sponsored trip
to bring individuals who are now going to be potentially part
of the leadership of a country with whom we have dealings to
Washington, DC. It was vetted at every appropriate process--
every appropriate side----
Mr. Long. I would like to hear that again from the people
who did the vetting say, ``Hey, that is why we did it.''
So again, thanks for your testimony. Thanks for being here.
I know you have got a very complicated job.
Chairman King. Time of the gentleman is expired.
I would just add again, though, that the law does not allow
him into the country unless there is a visa waiver. It may be a
noble purpose if the organization may have evolved, but right
now it is on the foreign terrorist organization list. He is a
member of it. He should not have been allowed in without a
waiver, which would have had your name and Secretary Clinton's
name on it giving the reasons why.
Gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Duncan, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
By the way, Mr. Duncan is not on the terrorist watch list,
despite references by Mr. Long.
Mr. Duncan. Well let me just say, I appreciate the
gentleman from Missouri continuing down that path, because I
think it is very important. You know I would like to once hear
somebody from this administration admit they made a mistake,
and own up to it, and see some disciplinary action, if
necessary.
Madam Secretary, you are the Secretary of Homeland
Security. Somebody as a member of a foreign terrorist
organization coming into this country is absolutely your
responsibility. Absolutely. The buck stops right there.
Homeland Security is something that I know you take a grave
responsibility for, and we take very seriously on this
committee and in Congress. So, let me just say that is not the
path I wanted to go down, and I am going to stop right there.
In the final report of the Webster Commission on the FBI
and the events at Fort Hood that was recently released, at the
time of the Fort Hood attack, the FBI did not have access to
all the relevant DOD databases. Even though there MODs for that
sharing of information, they didn't have access to that to
search for relevant information on Hasan.
The FBI agents were not checking all of the FBI databases
because there were so many of them, and the agents had not
received formal training on how to use them. Some agents didn't
even know that certain databases existed.
Even when putting in a query for information on Major
Hasan, or his e-mail exchanges with Awlaki, the databases did
not produce all the relevant information necessary for clarity
on that case. Now I know that FBI is a separate organization,
but.
In 2009, you all broke ground on a $3.4 billion facility
housing 15,000 employees, the largest building project in the
District of Columbia region, 68 years since the Pentagon was
built. At that time, you said we are going to have a One DHS
atmosphere. DHS has a large amount of databases. Each of these
databases do not appear to be linked in one central database
with a Google-like interface, allowing the simultaneous
searching of all the relevant databases within DHS's wide
system.
In January 2010, the FBI deployed the data-integration
visualization system, DIVS, allowing authorized users to search
more than 50 FBI and non-FBI databases simultaneously. The
Webster report points out very clearly that ``the Washington
field office and TFO''--I am not sure which field office that
was--``did not search the DWS, EDMS, IDW, or the DALAS,
although he was a member of a blank''--that has been redacted--
``counter-terrorism squad, he says he did not know that DWS and
EDMS even existed.''
It goes on to say that--let me find this--``at the time of
the Fort Hood shootings, however, with few exceptions, users
accessed each database using a discreet interface, discreet
password, and discreet search engine.'' From what I understand,
there are so many different databases. You have got a different
password for every one of them. You are not supposed to write
those passwords down. It is a frustrating system for everyone
involved at every level--not just in your agency, but every
agency within the Federal Government.
It goes on to say that the historical evolution of the
multiple FBI and other U.S. intelligence community databases as
discreet platforms had impeded the FBI and the USIC's ability
to access, search, organize, manage electronically stored
information in an efficient manner.
So, under this One DHS mindset that you talk about, does
DHS have any plans to expedite a process similar to DIVS for
normalizing, consolidating, and integrating the information?
What I mean by that is, you know, we have got folks coming
into this country on visas and we don't know when they leave
the country, because there is no information sharing between
the State Department or other agencies. This is a serious
problem of information sharing that goes back to the 9/11
Commission report that talks about the stovepipe aspects of
information between agencies.
The territorial disputes, the turf wars of agencies
responsible for protecting this country has got to end. As
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, it is your
responsibility. I will wait for an answer.
Secretary Napolitano. Well, Representative, first of all,
as you correctly note, those are comments made by the Webster
report as to FBI.
Let me comment as to DHS and extend an invitation to you.
Because we actually have done a massive amount of work over the
last 3\1/2\ years, particularly since the Christmas day bomber
attempt in 2009, to unify databases in such a fashion. Because
data comes in from all over the place, so you need the data,
but you also need some analytics with it or else the data is
just--it is just there. There is so much of it. Matt Olsen can
talk to that, I suspect.
But if you were to go out, for example, to our National
Targeting Center, you would see how we are now able to process
and analyze 1.8 to 2 million passengers per day as they seek to
fly into this country or around this country.
So you know, data can always be improved. It is never
perfect. I am not saying it is. But what I am saying is I don't
think there is a recognition by the committee yet of how much
work has actually been done with the committee's support.
Mr. Duncan. Do I have to get into another system and look
there? Are there no cross-references and sharing of the----
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The reason I am saying that is that Director Olsen said he
had to leave by 12:30, 12:35. We will be finished in 10
minutes, if you could both stay. Okay.
The gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Rogers, the Chairman of the
Transportation Security Subcommittee is recognized.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the Chairman.
Secretary Napolitano, it is good to see you here today and
appreciate your service and appreciate your recent visit to
Alabama, the Center for Domestic Preparedness. We really do
know it is difficult for you to make those kind of visits, so I
appreciate it.
You are aware that last Wednesday this committee--
subcommittee I chair, the TSA Subcommittee, had Mr. Wilson, the
head of TSA's General Aviation Department, along with Mr. Lord
of the GAO, testify before us about a study the GAO had just
completed on foreign flight school training or training in our
flight schools of illegal individuals in this country.
The report was pretty upsetting. It showed that over a
period of years, this has been a very--I won't go into the
number because I can't--but not an unusual occurrence. It made
several recommendations. The gentleman from the TSA
acknowledged all those recommendations were accurate and that
his department had already started working on repairing several
of them.
What I am asking you about is the very next day, on
Thursday, you testified before the Judiciary Committee and Mr.
Lungren brought this up. I have seen the videotape and you
disagreed with that. Can you tell me why you disagree with the
GAO report and Mr. Wilson's testimony?
Secretary Napolitano. I think the disagreement with the TSA
witness was on another point, Representative. But with respect
to the GAO report, the flight school that it was focused on and
those were as of 2010 and before. What I was taking note of was
that we had already fixed that problem moving ahead.
What we had not done and which is what the GAO recommended
is institutionalize it in a way with memorandums of
understanding. Those are in process right now.
Mr. Rogers. But you are talking about with regard to that
one school, not across the flight school system.
Secretary Napolitano. No, with respect to the flight school
system----
Mr. Rogers. Well, the GAO, after your testimony, we reached
out to them and they came back and said that is flatly not
provable. That is what disturbs me. We are 10 years----
Secretary Napolitano. It is not provable because what we
have done is a practice. It was not committed to writing. It
now is. It will be. It is in the process of being drafted.
Mr. Rogers. Well, that was not their observation. I would
love to get that reconciled because it is disturbing. You know,
we are 10 years after 9/11 and we have evidence that on a
regular basis, people who are in this country illegally can get
flight school training.
The other thing----
Secretary Napolitano. Well, if I might, respectfully, if
you have such evidence, please share it with us. Because if we
have any problems, we want to fix them.
Mr. Rogers. I agree and we will share it with you. Because
I would like these things reconciled. I take this stuff very
seriously, as you know.
Also, earlier in this hearing--I was in Armed Services and
couldn't be here--but I understand Mr. Thompson raised this
issue with you about U.S. citizens and those who are here
legally being able to get flight school training without being
bumped against the no-fly list. He has introduced a bill to
change that.
I agree with the effort to remedy that, but I want to take
a little bit more time to study, you know, what we need to do.
So I have asked the CRS to look at this, and they say you
already have the power; that the Secretary can designate an
individual or category of individuals that must be vetted under
current statute. But I understood you told Mr. Thompson that
you probably do need some additional statutory authority.
Secretary Napolitano. I think what I told Representative
Thompson is it would be nice to tidy it up, because there is a
lack of clarity there. But with respect to this, when somebody
that is actually on the no-fly list and is a U.S. person, we
have a variety of ways of knowing what they are doing before
they apply for certification, but they are not formally vetted
or pinged against the system until they are applying to the
FAA.
Mr. Rogers. But see, that is the problem. That is what we
want to get remedied, because you are right, once they apply
for their license, they are bounced against that list. But as
we found from the 9/11 terrorists, they just want to learn how
to take off and fly. They weren't interested in landing or
getting a license.
So we want to get it fixed so that if somebody is applying
for training, whether they are in this country or not, legally,
they should, at a minimum, have to be bounced against the no-
fly list.
We want to work with you to that end, so I would urge you
to get us any proposed language that you would like to see
happen. I am going to be working with Mr. Thompson and the rest
of this committee to get it done for you.
Secretary Napolitano. Indeed.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. The gentleman yields back.
The gentleman from Arkansas is recognized for 5 minutes,
and that will end the hearing.
Mr. Crawford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your
flexibility in allowing me to come and participate in the
hearing.
Secretary Napolitano, I am a former Army EOD tech, so I am
very concerned about the threat to our National security with
respect to IEDs, remote-controlled particularly. I am a co-
founder of the House EOD Caucus, and that is one of our main
concerns is that we address that on an on-going basis.
Despite repeated requests, State and local police bomb
squads remain without the electronic counter-measures, also
called ``jammers,'' that are used to protect from these R.C.
IEDs. The FBI techs with jammers may be hours away from an
incident site. At the same time, we spend tens of millions of
dollars to give hundreds of jammers to Afghanistan and
Pakistan, where according to a GAO report, half of those
jammers will simply collect dust in storage.
What is your plan to help State and local police bomb
squads here in the United States?
Secretary Napolitano. I will tell you, Representative, that
is a new one. I mean, we meet with State and locals all the
time and I meet with them also when I travel around the
country. I have never heard the issue about jammers raised. I
will be happy to look into it.
Mr. Crawford. Okay. I hear that issue a lot. Because of
being the chairman of the EOD Caucus here in the House, they
have raised that to me and that is why I am here today is to
make sure that you are aware of it, and what a critical tool
that is in helping to prosecute the war on terror with respect
to IEDs. So your attention would be greatly appreciated on
that.
Secretary Napolitano. Thank you for raising it.
Mr. Crawford. I yield back.
Chairman King. The gentleman yields back.
I want to thank Secretary Napolitano and Director Olsen for
your time, for your testimony, for the answers you gave. Again,
we look forward to working with you.
I want to just say for the record, Members of the committee
may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we
would ask you to respond to those in writing. The hearing
record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, unless either of you object, the
committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Peter T. King for Hon. Janet Napolitano
Question 1. How do you assess the threat from domestic improvised
explosive device attacks from terrorists and narco-traffickers? Why has
DHS not issued a regulation securing a main IED component, ammonium
nitrate?
Answer. A review of overseas attacks since 2009 aligns with our
assessment that IED attacks by a transnational terrorist group continue
to pose a threat to homeland security. Al-Qaeda's stated goals remain
consistent and focused on targets that maximize economic damage and
loss of life. Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, including al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Tehrik e-Taliban Pakistan (TPP), and al-
Shabaab have all publicly stated that the United States is a legitimate
target for terrorist attack and each group has successfully employed
IEDs overseas.
AQAP, the affiliate that represents the greatest near-term threat
to the homeland, was the first al-Qaeda affiliate to attempt an attack
in the United States with their effort to detonate an IED on-board an
aircraft on Christmas day 2009. AQAP continued to pursue artfully
concealed IEDs by advancing in Yemen, the October 2010 printer plot.
In addition to planning operations against the West, AQAP also has
sought to radicalize and inspire others to conduct attacks. AQAP's
English-language on-line magazine Inspire, a sophisticated propaganda
publication geared to a Western audience, provides information on
manufacturing explosives, constructing an IED, and building a remote-
controlled IED trigger to encourage Homegrown Violent Extremists (HVEs)
to stage independent attacks.
Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) have not conducted an IED
attack directly against U.S. officials, citizens, or interests in
Mexico or in U.S. Southwest Border States. DTOs have employed IEDs to
target commercial and government security interests in Mexico and to
intimidate rivals and law enforcement.
DTOs first employed Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices
(VBIEDs) in 2010, but have not demonstrated a desire to execute the
type of large-scale explosive attacks that have been a driving factor
in plotting by terrorist organizations. Analysis of recovered IEDs in
Mexico does not provide indicators of direct sharing of technology,
devices, or training between DTOs and terrorist organizations.
The Department continues to work on developing comprehensive
regulations on the sale and transfer of ammonium nitrate, as required
by section 563 of Division E ``Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2008'' of the Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161 (adding subtitle J ``Secure Handling of
Ammonium Nitrate'' to title VIII of the Homeland Security Act of 2002).
This has included extensive consultation with Federal and State
security partners with a vested interest in securing the sale or
transfer of ammonium nitrate, as well as with private-sector
stakeholders.
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for the Ammonium Nitrate Security
Program was published in the Federal Register on August 3, 2011, and
the public was given 120 days to provide comment(s) concerning the
proposed rule. See Ammonium Nitrate Security Program, 76 Fed. Reg. at
46908. Additionally, the Department held 12 public meetings during the
120-day comment period to inform the public on the proposed rule,
listen to their concerns, and gather comments provided during those
forums.
The Department continues to move forward with the rulemaking
process, and expects to develop a final rule in a time frame that
ensures that DHS can consider and respond appropriately to the concerns
raised during the public comment period while enabling DHS to comply
with applicable Federal rulemaking requirements and procedures. The
final rule must comply with the Secure Handling of Ammonium Nitrate
provisions of the Homeland Security Act, ensure continued access by the
public to ammonium nitrate for legitimate purposes, and improve the
security of ammonium nitrate with minimal economic impacts. The
Department must also plan, develop, and field information technology
systems necessary to support the Ammonium Nitrate Security Program,
which will impact the time frame for implementation of a final rule.
In addition to the authority granted to DHS by the Secure Handling
of Ammonium Nitrate provisions of section 563 of the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2008, the Department also has authority under
section 550 of the Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007, Pub.
L. No. 109-295 (2006), to issue the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism
Standards (CFATS) regulations governing the security of high-risk
chemical facilities. CFATS addresses hundreds of chemicals including
ammonium nitrate.
In developing the Ammonium Nitrate Security Program, DHS intends to
draw on information gained under the CFATS program about ammonium
nitrate, and will work to ensure that CFATS and the Ammonium Nitrate
Security Program complement each other.
Question 2. What has DHS done to secure sensitive critical
infrastructure information submitted to DHS by industry?
How does DHS alert critical infrastructure operators about leaks of
such information?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) uses several
mechanisms to protect sensitive critical infrastructure information,
including the Protective Critical Infrastructure Information (PCII),
Sensitive Security Information (SSI), and Chemical-terrorism
Vulnerability Information (CVI) programs, and other For Official Use
Only regimes.
DHS established the PCII Program to implement the provisions of
Critical Infrastructure Information (CII) Act of 2002, subtitle B of
Title II of the Homeland Security Act (Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat.
2135, sections 211-215), and regulates the use and disclosure of
information submitted to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
about vulnerabilities and threats to critical infrastructure. Operating
on authority given by the CII Act, the PCII Program protects critical
infrastructure information voluntarily submitted to the Federal
Government by critical infrastructure owners and operators. CVI, a
category of sensitive, unclassified information established under
Section 550(c) of the DHS Appropriations Act of 2007 (Pub. L. No. 109-
295) and the Chemical Facility Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS)
regulation, protects certain information developed or submitted as part
of the CFATS process.
To date, no leaks or misuse of PCII have been identified. In the
event that a leak of PCII is identified, the PCII Program Office,
located within the National Protection and Program Directorate's (NPPD)
Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), would notify the owner or
operator that submitted the critical infrastructure information that a
leak has occurred and that an assessment of the potential impact of the
release is underway. While the initial notification may be verbal, the
PCII Program Manager would also send the submitter a written
notification.
DHS safeguards sensitive information by retaining it in systems of
records associated with each submitter, which allow information
relating to the compromise of data to be shared with the submitter or
with those that might be harmed from the loss of data. How this
information is shared is determined based on the context and the need
for responding to the loss of the information.
Question 3. How do DHS expenditures fit in with a National bio-
defense strategy? Does DHS plan to build the Nation Bio and Agro-
defense Facility?
Answer. In 2009, the National Bio and Agro-defense Facility (NBAF)
was expected to be fully offset by the proceeds from the sale of Plum
Island. However, due to the current fiscal climate, the sale of Plum
Island is not likely to provide adequate funds in the foreseeable
future. In addition, estimated construction costs for NBAF have
increased by more than 30 percent as a result of construction delays
and safety engineering requirements. Furthermore, the Department faces
significant funding constraints from the Budget Control Act of 2011
(Pub. L. No. 112-25). At the same time, Congressional appropriations
have not kept pace with the costs to build the facility expeditiously
and the aging facility on Plum Island is well past its life expectancy,
resulting in increased maintenance costs and risk to operate.
Given current fiscal challenges, and in light of evolving threats
to U.S. agriculture, in fiscal year 2012, DHS asked the National
Academy of Science (NAS) to convene a committee of experts to conduct a
comprehensive assessment of the requirements for a large foreign animal
and emerging disease research and diagnostic laboratory facility in the
United States. The Mission Need Assessment was recently completed by
NAS and provided to the Department of Homeland Security for review.
The Department looks forward to working with Congress on the future
of NBAF while maintaining critical research at Plum Island.
Question 4. The Council on American Islamic Relations (CAIR), the
Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), and the North American Islamic
Trust (NAIT) are unindicted co-conspirators in a terror fundraising
case. What are DHS' relationships with CAIR, ISNA, and NAIT, or their
members?
Answer. The Department works with many diverse community groups and
organizations to build crucial channels of communication, both
educating DHS about the concerns of communities and giving those
communities current, accurate information about DHS policies and
procedures. The Department has worked with CAIR, ISNA, and NAIT in
community engagement and outreach efforts conducted by a number of DHS
offices and components around the country.
Question 5. Please update us on DHS' countering violent extremism
programs.
Answer. The Department has responsibility for implementing a range
of CVE initiatives outlined in the administration's National CVE
Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) for Empowering Local Partners to
Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States. This role includes
leveraging the Department's analytic, research, and information
capabilities, engaging State and local authorities and communities to
bolster pre-existing local partnerships, and supporting State, local,
Tribal, and territorial law enforcement and communities through
training, community policing practices, and grants. DHS works closely
to coordinate and collaborate on these efforts with the National
Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC), the Department of Justice (DOJ), the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and other interagency and
community partners.
The Department is working with its Federal, State, local, Tribal,
and territorial partners to fully integrate CVE awareness into the
daily activities of law enforcement and local communities Nation-wide.
Specifically, DHS has made substantial progress in CVE in three key
areas:
1. Better understanding the phenomenon of violent extremism through
extensive analysis and research on the behaviors and indicators
of violent extremism;
2. Enhancing operational partnerships with local communities, State
and Local law enforcement, and international partners; and
3. Supporting community policing efforts through curriculum
development, training, and grant prioritization.
Better Understanding the Phenomenon of Violent Extremism
DHS has conducted extensive analysis and research to better
understand the threat of violent extremism. This includes over 75 case
studies and assessments produced by the DHS Office for Intelligence and
Analysis (I&A) since 2009 on home-grown violent extremist activities
and potential material support activities in the United States on
behalf of violent extremist groups or causes, including an in-depth
study that looks at the common behaviors associated with 62 cases of
al-Qaeda-inspired violent extremists. DHS has also produced numerous
unclassified homeland security reference aids analyzing domestic
violent extremist groups.
Enhancing Operational Partnerships and Best Practices with Local
Communities, State, and Local law Enforcement, and
International Partners
DHS has made significant advancements in operational CVE exchanges
with international partners. We have international CVE partnerships
with Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands,
Spain, and the United Kingdom, as well as partnerships with
international law enforcement organizations such as Europol. For the
past year, DHS, Europol, and E.U. partners have exchanged information
on U.S.- and E.U.-based fusion center best practices, CVE training
standards, and research and case studies, including a joint case study
on the 2011 Norway attacks. These exchanges help us support State and
local law enforcement by equipping them with up-to-date analysis on the
behaviors and indicators of violent extremism, so they can prevent
potential future violent extremist incidents from occurring in their
communities. In addition, DHS has coordinated with the Department of
State to train field-based U.S. Government officials, both domestically
and internationally, on how to engage and partner with local
communities to build community resilience against terrorist recruitment
and radicalization to violence.
The Department has also significantly expanded outreach to
communities that may be targeted for recruitment by violent extremists
and promote a greater awareness of Federal resources, programs, and
security measures available to communities. For example, the DHS Office
of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) has held over 72 roundtable
events Nation-wide since 2011, which have helped to address grievances,
increase awareness of CVE resources, and build partnerships between
State and local law enforcement, local government, and community
stakeholders.
Supporting Community Policing Efforts Through Curriculum Development,
Training, and Grant Prioritization
Over the past year, DHS has worked closely with the State and
Provincial Police Academy Directors, the International Association of
Chiefs of Police, the Major City Chiefs Association, the Major City
Sheriff's Association, NCTC, DOJ, and the FBI to develop CVE training
for Federal, State, local, and correctional facility law enforcement.
DHS has hosted seven workshops to receive feedback from front-line
officers on the training materials, including workshops in Columbus,
OH, San Diego, CA, Washington, DC, and Minneapolis, MN and the recent
``Train-the-Trainer'' CVE Workshop in San Diego, CA during the last
week of September 2012. Two workshops were also conducted for
correctional facility officers in Sykesville, MD and in Orange County,
CA.
DHS launched a new CVE web portal through the Homeland Security
Information Network (HSIN) for CVE law enforcement training
practitioners Nation-wide on September 28, 2012. This web portal serves
as an efficient and easy resource to access CVE training materials,
which can be incorporated into existing training programs and contains
over 160 CVE training resources.
DHS expanded fiscal year 2012 grant guidance to include funding for
training and local CVE efforts, including participating in CVE training
workshops, developing CVE training curriculum, participating in the new
CVE web portal, and incorporating CVE training resources into existing
training programs.
Question 6. In Inspire magazine, al-Qaeda member Anwar al-Awlaki
admitted that he was radicalized in 1991 and traveled to Afghanistan
for jihad, and that he rebuffed FBI requests to become a source. Now
that we know Awlaki was a radical and an ``Arab-Afghan'' at the time of
his interactions with the 9/11 hijackers, should the Government re-
examine the roles of Awlaki and his associates in 9/11?
Answer. DHS defers to FBI and other investigative partners for
determinations as to precisely when Anwar al-Awlaki first became
formally associated with al-Qaeda, and whether or not al-Awlaki had any
foreknowledge or pre-operational role in the September 11, 2001
attacks. DHS I&A continues, however, to assess the credibility and
value of any new information involving the role that now-deceased al-
Awlaki's public statements play--particularly through Inspire
magazine--in radicalizing subjects to commit acts of violence against
the United States.
Questions From Hon. Robert L. Turner for Janet Napolitano
Question 1. Given that Islamic terror groups are decentralized
organizations and non-traditional enemies, what do we know about the
underlying principles of Islamic terror groups and how are we using
that information to prevent further attacks?
Answer. Within the context of U.S.-based violent extremism, we know
that foreign terrorist groups affiliated with al-Qaeda, and individual
violent extremists, are actively seeking to recruit or inspire
Westerners to carry out attacks against Western and U.S. targets via
social media, personal interaction, and publication of magazines.
The Department operates with the understanding that we face
significant risk of terrorism from violent extremists who have either
been recruited by al-Qaeda or its affiliates or inspired by their
ideology. This threat is real, as evidenced by the recent thwarted
attacks of domestic violent extremists inspired by al-Qaeda's ideology,
to include the arrest of Naser Jason Abdo at Fort Hood in July 2011 and
the arrest of Amine el-Khalifi in February 2012 in Washington, DC.
Recognizing that communities across the country may face such
threats, DHS has designed a community-based Countering Violent
Extremism (CVE) approach that applies to all forms of violent
extremism, regardless of ideology. We have conducted significant
analysis and research on multiple types of threats in order to equip
law enforcement with the tools needed to detect and mitigate all forms
of violent extremism. This analysis and research is being shared with
Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial authorities, fusion
centers, local communities, and international law enforcement partners
to empower, support, and equip them with the knowledge to better detect
and identify potential behaviors associated with violent extremism to
prevent violent crime in their communities. All of this information is
also being integrated into all of the Department's CVE training for
Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial and correctional facility
law enforcement; it is also available on the DHS CVE Training Resources
web portal for law enforcement training practitioners.
Question 2. Clearly, terrorists are radicalized early in their
lives. What specifically is being done to prevent radicalization among
Muslim youth?
Answer. Research and analysis suggests that there are multiple
pathways to violent extremism and that while there may be common
behaviors that are exhibited prior to an attack, no one factor can
explain why youth radicalize to violence. It is also important to note
that the vast majority of Muslim-Americans living in the United States
do not subscribe to violent extremist ideologies and are actively
working with local authorities, the FBI, DOJ, and DHS to protect their
local communities from violence.
As mentioned in the White House's Strategic Implementation Plan for
Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United
State (SIP), partnerships with community members are vital to our
security, as evidenced by the fact that of the 86 foiled terrorist
plots against the United States, between 1999-2009, almost half of the
plots were thwarted with help and participation from communities.\1\
The SIP recognizes the importance of forming strong partnerships with
communities and lists the actions the U.S. Government will take in
support of a community-based approach to CVE. The DHS Office for Civil
Rights and Civil Liberties (CRCL) conducts regular roundtable meetings
across the United States and dozens of community meetings at the
request of community leaders. CRCL has also conducted youth engagement
with in cities such as Minneapolis, San Diego, Portland (ME), and
Columbus (OH) to build trust and to discuss issues such as preventing
violent extremism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``Building on Clues: Examining Successes and Failures in
Detecting U.S. Terrorist Plots, 1999-2009,'' Institute for Homeland
Security Solutions, October 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2012, DHS's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) sponsored a
study conducted by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism
and Responses to Terrorism (START), a DHS Center of Excellence at the
University of Maryland. The study identified a range of risk and
protective factors that may have impacted the involvement of some
Minneapolis-St. Paul Somali-American youth in violent extremism and,
based on these factors, provided recommendations on how preventative
efforts could be developed at the individual, family, community, and
Government levels. DHS's CVE efforts focus on ensuring that these and
other findings from research and analysis are made widely available
through training and workshops to law enforcement training
practitioners via the DHS CVE Training Resources web portal.
Question 3. Within the Muslim community there is an internal
struggle, one leading toward destruction and violence, the other side
seeking to join the global community and embrace the freedoms of a
democratic society. Are we conveying all viable alternatives to radical
Islam, to mainstream Muslims, before moderate are radicalized?
Answer. Research and analysis suggests that there are multiple
pathways to violent extremism and that while there may be common
behaviors that are exhibited prior to an attack, no one factor can
explain why individuals radicalize to violence. It is also important to
note that the vast majority of Muslim-Americans living in the United
States do not subscribe to violent extremist ideologies and are
actively working with local authorities, the FBI, DOJ, and DHS to
protect their local communities from violence. Recognizing this, DHS
has designed a CVE approach that applies to all forms of violent
extremism, regardless of ideology. DHS has been highly involved in
implementing the 2011 White House Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP)
for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the
United States. The goals of the SIP include: (1) Enhancing engagement
with and support to local communities; (2) building Government and law
enforcement expertise; and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda
while promoting our ideals.
______
[Note.--The response to Questions for the Record which were
submitted to the Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, the
Honorable Matthew G. Olsen, necessitated a classified response. These
were provided to the committee and retained in committee files.]
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