[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
A DECADE AFTER 9/11 COULD AMERICAN FLIGHT SCHOOLS STILL UNKNOWINGLY BE
TRAINING TERRORISTS?
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 18, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-106
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79-848 WASHINGTON : 2013
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20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Ron Barber, Arizona
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Chairman
Daniel E. Lungren, California Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tim Walberg, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois, Vice Chair Ron Barber, Arizona
Robert L. Turner, New York Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Amanda Parikh, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Vacant, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Chairman, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 33
The Honorable Danny K. Davis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Illinois.......................................... 2
Witnesses
Mr. Steven M. Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Mr. Kerwin Wilson, General Manager for General Aviation, Office
of Security Policy and Industry Engagement, Transportation
Security Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. John P. Woods, Assistant Director, National Security
Investigations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Jens C. Hennig, Vice President of Operations, General
Aviation Manufacturers Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Mr. Douglas Carr, President and Chief Executive Officer, National
Business Aviation Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
Appendix
Questions for Kerwin Wilson From Chairman Mike Rogers............ 49
Questions for John P. Woods From Chairman Mike Rogers............ 50
A DECADE AFTER 9/11 COULD AMERICAN FLIGHT SCHOOLS STILL UNKNOWINGLY BE
TRAINING TERRORISTS?
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Wednesday, July 18, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Rogers, Lungren, Walberg,
Cravaack, Walsh, Turner, Thompson, and Davis.
Mr. Rogers. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security will come to order. The
subcommittee is meeting today to examine GAO's recent findings
about flaws that exist in the process forbidding foreign
nationals taking flight training.
I would like to welcome all of our witnesses for being
here, and everyone in attendance. I know the witnesses have a
lot of things they could be doing. Preparing for hearings, not
one of their favorite. But it really is helpful for us to have
these kind of hearings to talk about these important issues. So
I appreciate your time and testimony.
Today's hearing is a sobering reminder that we cannot
afford to let down our guard, or become complacent about
security. It is completely unacceptable that a decade after 9/
11, GAO has uncovered weaknesses in our security controls that
were supposed to be fixed a decade ago.
GAO's findings are clear, and those are, not all foreign
nationals who train to fly airplanes inside the United States
have been properly vetted. The Department of Homeland Security
does have a program to make sure foreign nationals are vetted,
but the program has significant weaknesses.
First, let me say this is extremely disturbing. According
to the GAO, the main cause of the problem is that TSA needs
stronger internal controls, and better coordination with ICE.
Here is what amazes me. We have TWIC program that charges
$130 to every American trucker for a security background check
to drive to a port. We have cancer patients, Iraq War veterans,
and Nobel Prize winners, all forced to undergo rigorous
security checks before getting on an airplane.
At the same time, 10 years after 9/11, there are foreign
nationals in the United States training to fly, just like
Mohammed Atta and the other 9/11 hijackers did. Not all of them
are necessarily getting a security background check.
Is that risk-based security? I don't think so. Two years
ago at a Boston-area flight school, ICE discovered 25 illegal
immigrants were enrolled and taking lessons.
That is not the worst of it. The owner of the flight school
was also here illegally. But surprisingly, individuals had
been--but surprisingly, the individuals had been approved by
TSA to take flight lessons, despite their illegal immigration
status.
So the same department that gave 25 foreign nationals a
green light to take flight lessons ended up investigating those
25 for being here illegally. Some improvements were made after
the Boston incident, but there are still big gaps in the GAO
report.
According to GAO, some foreign nationals who should not get
approved do, as the Boston case I just mentioned proves. Some
circumvent the vetting process all together. If foreign
nationals don't go through the program, TSA and ICE don't know
who is flying.
I have no doubt that the majority of people in DHS, and
those who operate flight schools in the United States, are
dedicated to security, and are doing the best that they can.
But the fact is, we have got to do better. I expect the
Department of Homeland Security to provide a concrete time line
today for implementing GAO's recommendations. The Department
needs to be smarter about security. I believe this is just one
of many examples that we need to deal with.
I now recognize Mr. Davis, who is standing in for the
Ranking Member, who is not available today. I recognize him for
5 minutes to make his opening statement.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would like
to take this opportunity to indicate, as you have already done
so, that Congresswoman Jackson Lee will not be here today. She
is attending the funeral of a friend of hers, Federal
Protective Service Officer, Inspector Phillip Preta.
Inspector Preta started his career as security officer, and
served as the assistant chief of police services for the
Veterans Administration, Central Texas Police Division. In
2008, Inspector Preta joined the Federal Protective Service at
DHS, and maintained an active role in a number of associations
empowering law enforcement personnel.
In her absence, I will now read Congresswoman Jackson Lee's
opening statement, and ask that it be inserted into the record.
``I want to first of all thank the witnesses for being here
today. General aviation accounts for about 54 percent of all
civil aviation activity in the United States. According to GAO,
general aviation is the source of 1.3 million jobs, and
contributes approximately $100 billion to the U.S. economy.
``Because G.A. includes such a diverse array of operations,
general aviation encompasses a wide spectrum of aircraft
personnel and pilots. Today, GAO is releasing a report that
outlines TSA's efforts to address G.A. security.
``I look forward to discussing GAO's findings today, and
identifying solutions to complex questions. Today's hearing,
however, appears to focus only on one aspect of general
aviation, and that is the vetting of foreign nationals seeking
to enroll in flight training school.
``I would be remiss if I did not take this opportunity to
note that the threat to G.A. expands beyond the vetting of
foreign nationals enrolled in flight training programs.
``A most recent example of this took place on February
2010, when a disgruntled individual flew his private one-engine
plane into an IRS building in Austin, Texas. This incident
killed two people, and hurt many innocent people who were
caught up in the fire after the crash.
``Today we will hear from TSA and industry about increased
collaboration between TSA and industry, and some of the
concrete examples that point to enhanced security across the
G.A. community because of these efforts. I think today's
hearing will lay important markers about general aviation
security, and how DHS can more efficiently harness its
resources, particularly that of information sharing, and access
to accurate information databases.
``Today's hearing will also afford us the opportunity to
learn more extensively about the steps taken by TSA and ICE to
address the vulnerabilities identified by the GAO. Since GAO's
findings were released, TSA and ICE have embarked on key
problematic changes that enhance G.A. security.
``First, TSA and ICE have formalized their cooperation.
Second, TSA and ICE are in the midst of enhancing an extensive
vetting project of all foreign nationals enrolled in flight
schools, pilots and crew members, and personnel at repair
stations.
``And finally, ICE and TSA have improved information-
sharing efforts that impact the mission and operations of both
agencies in GSA. There is no doubt that GAO's report provided
clarity to TSA and Congress on the vulnerabilities present in
general aviation.
``However, we cannot ignore that there is more to G.A.
security than just vetting foreign nationals. The department's
approach must continue to evolve to embrace a comprehensive
analysis of risk.
``I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield back to look forward
to hearing the witnesses.''
[The statement of Ranking Member Jackson Lee follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee
July 18, 2012
General Aviation [GA] accounts for about 54% of all civil aviation
activity in the United States. According to GAO, general aviation is
the source of 1.3 million jobs and contributes approximately $100
billion to the U.S. economy. Because GA includes such a diverse array
of operations, general aviation encompasses a wide spectrum of
aircraft, personnel, and pilots.
Today, GAO is releasing a report that outlines TSA's efforts to
address GA security. I look forward to discussing GAO's findings today
and identifying solutions to complex questions.
Today's hearing, however, appears to focus only on one aspect of
general aviation: The vetting of foreign nationals seeking to enroll in
flight training school. I would be remiss if I did not take this
opportunity note that the threat to GA expands beyond the vetting of
foreign nationals enrolled in flight training programs.
A most recent example of this took place on February 2010, when a
disgruntled individual flew his private one-engine plane into an IRS
building in Austin, Texas. This incident killed two people and hurt
many innocent people who were caught up in the fire after the crash.
General aviation encompasses aircraft of virtually every size that
perform a wide variety of missions, from crop-dusting to large
passenger charters.
Further, international inbound general aviation accounts for about
400 flights per day. Most--about 75%--are from Canada and Mexico, and
the remainder are from a variety of countries.
Today, we will hear from TSA--and industry--about increased
collaboration between TSA and industry and some of the concrete
examples that point to enhanced security across the GA community
because of these efforts.
I think today's hearing will lay important markers about general
aviation security and how DHS can more efficiently harness its
resources--particularly that of information sharing and access to
accurate information in databases.
Today's hearing will also afford us the opportunity to learn more
extensively about the steps taken by TSA and ICE to address the
vulnerabilities identified by GAO. Since GAO's findings were released,
TSA and ICE have embarked on key programmatic changes that enhance GA
security: First, TSA and ICE have formalized their cooperation. Second,
TSA and ICE are in the midst of enhancing an extensive vetting project
of all foreign nationals enrolled in flight schools, pilots and crew
members, and personnel at repair stations. Finally, ICE and TSA have
improved information-sharing efforts that impact the mission and
operations of both agencies in GA.
There is no doubt that GAO's report provided clarity to TSA and
Congress on the vulnerabilities present in general aviation. However,
we cannot ignore that there is more to GA security than just vetting
foreign nationals. The Department's approach must continue to evolve to
embrace a comprehensive analysis of risk.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chairman advises
other Members that their opening statements may be submitted to
the record.
We are pleased to have five distinguished witnesses before
us today on this important topic. We appreciate our Government
witnesses agreeing to testify alongside non-Government
representatives. I recognize this is deviation from standard
practice, but I do appreciate it. Also, let me remind the
witnesses their entire written statements will appear in the
record.
Our first witness today is Mr. Steve Lord. Mr. Lord is GAO
executive responsible for directing numerous engagements on
aviation and service transportation issues, and regularly
testifies before Congress.
Mr. Lord, as always, we appreciate your appearing before
the committee, and your important work that your office does.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Lord for 5 minutes to summarize
his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN M. LORD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Lord. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Davis,
other Members of the committee. I am really excited to be here
today to discuss the findings of our general aviation security
report, which we are releasing today to coincide with the
hearing.
This is obviously an important issue. Not only do you have
over 200,000 general aviation aircraft operating more than
19,000 facilities in this country, but as the Chairman
remarked, 9/11 hijackers learned to fly at U.S. flight schools.
Today, I would like to discuss two issues in parallel with
the issues in our report. First, I would like to describe some
steps TSA has taken in conjunction with industry to enhance
general aviation security. No. 2, I would also like to discuss
the TSA vetting process to ensure that foreign nationals coming
to this country for flight school training are properly vetted
before completing the training, and moving on to get their FAA
airman certificate, i.e., pilots' licenses.
Regarding the first point, we found that TSA has taken a
number of positive steps to work with industry to develop
voluntary guidelines to help enhance security at general
aviation facilities. They also indicated that an updated
version of these guidelines will be issued later this year. In
2008, TSA also developed a proposed rule that would have
imposed new security requirements on aircraft weighing over
12,500 pounds, thereby subjecting them to increased security
requirements and inspections.
However, to their credit TSA agreed to revise the proposal
after it encountered significant industry opposition and now
plans on issuing a new rule, either later this year or early
next year. Industry officials we interviewed as part of this
engagement generally gave TSA good marks for conducting
outreach with them.
The second point I would like to discuss today is we found
several weaknesses in TSA's process for conducting security
threat assessments, that is, background checks on foreign
nationals signing up for flight training, and in DHS' process
for identifying students who may be in the country illegally.
Under current program requirements, foreign nationals
seeking flight training must undergo a TSA security threat
assessment before flight training. To test whether this
actually occurs in practice, we downloaded the FAA database of
everybody who has a pilot's license and compared it to the TSA
database, which is maintained separately, of everyone who has
completed a background check. So in a perfect world, the two
databases should match.
But we were surprised to find that some--the exact number
is designated sensitive security information, so I can't tell
you the exact number--but some of the foreign nationals holding
pilots licenses were not in the TSA's database, indicating that
some foreign nationals had not been vetted before receiving
flight training, and ultimately receiving pilot's licenses.
Thus, in our report we are recommending that TSA
strengthens its controls of the vetting process to ensure this
doesn't take place again. Although DHS agreed with our
recommendation and indicated they are moving out on this, we
still have a lot of questions about how this is actually going
to occur in practice, as some of the steps are preliminary in
nature.
Another weakness we found is that a foreign national can be
approved for flight school training after entering the country
illegally. For example, as the Chairman noted, 25 foreign
nationals who were investigated by ICE at a Boston area flight
school in March 2010 had been approved through the TSA process
to begin flight school training. However, eight of these
individuals were in so-called ``entry without inspection
status,'' EWIS, meaning that they had entered the country
illegally.
Three of them had obtained pilots licenses; 17 of them, 17
of the 25 foreign nationals were in so-called overstay status,
meaning they had overstayed their authorized period of
admission into the United States.
This concerned us, because as part of the vetting process,
you are supposed to have an immigrations check. We assumed if
the immigrations check was performed properly this wouldn't
occur. Although DHS agreed to take some corrective action to
address this issue, which is the good news, we still have a lot
of questions about how it is going to work out in practice.
Again, a lot of this is preliminary in nature. In fact, one
of the agreements--arrangements agreed to--we were just
notified of last night, which I was a little surprised about,
given that we have spent 15 months looking at this.
Anyway, in closing we have identified a number of
weaknesses in TSA's and DHS's process for vetting foreign
nationals before they begin flight school training we think
deserves immediate departmental attention. Typically, we give
agencies several months to implement our recs, but I agree with
you, Mr. Chairman, given the significance we think they should
take immediate action to address them.
The good news is they have already announced a series of
measures to do that.
In closing, I look forward to working with this committee
to conduct additional oversight on this issue.
Thank you very much for inviting me to appear today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Lord follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen M. Lord
July 18, 2012
general aviation security.--tsa's process for ensuring foreign flight
students do not pose a security risk has weaknesses
gao-12-900t
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
committee: I am pleased to be here to discuss the findings of our
report assessing the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
efforts to address general aviation security.\1\ Altogether, more than
200,000 general aviation aircraft--from small aircraft with minimal
load capacities to business jets and larger aircraft such as privately
operated Boeing 747s--operate at more than 19,000 facilities.\2\ U.S.
Government threat assessments have discussed plans by terrorists to use
general aviation aircraft to conduct attacks. Further, analysis
conducted on behalf of TSA has indicated that larger general aviation
aircraft, such as midsized and larger jets often used for business
purposes, may be able to cause significant damage to buildings and
other structures. Also, the terrorists responsible for the September
11, 2001, attacks learned to fly at flight schools in Florida, Arizona,
and Minnesota. TSA, within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
has responsibilities for general aviation security, and developed the
Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP) to help determine whether foreign
students enrolling at flight schools pose a security threat.
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\1\ GAO, General Aviation Security: Weaknesses Exist in TSA's
Process for Ensuring Foreign Flight Students Do Not Pose a Security
Threat, GAO-12-875 (Washington, DC: July 18, 2012).
\2\ General aviation includes nonscheduled aircraft operations such
as air medical-ambulance, corporate aviation, and privately-owned
aircraft--generally, aircraft not available to the general public for
transport.
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My testimony this morning will address the key findings from the
general aviation security report that we are issuing today.\3\
Specifically, my statement will address: (1) TSA and general aviation
industry actions to enhance security and TSA efforts to obtain
information on these actions, and (2) TSA efforts to ensure foreign
flight students do not pose a security threat.
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\3\ GAO-12-875.
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For the report, we reviewed applicable laws, regulations, and
policies, as well as documentation provided by TSA on its oversight of
general aviation security, including procedures for conducting security
threat assessments of AFSP candidates. In addition, we interviewed 22
general aviation operators--including 5 private operators, 7 private
charter companies that also perform as private operators, and 10 flight
schools--located at eight selected airports to observe and discuss
security initiatives implemented. We selected these airports based on
their geographic dispersion, types of general aviation operations
present, and size of aircraft based at each airport. We also
interviewed representatives from six aviation industry associations.
Further, we reviewed TSA analysis comparing Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) data from January 2006 to September 2011 on
foreign nationals applying for airman certificates (pilot's licenses)
with AFSP data. We conducted this work in accordance with generally
accepted Government auditing standards. More detailed information on
the scope and methodology can be found in our published report.
tsa and aircraft operators have taken actions to secure general
aviation; tsa obtains information through outreach and inspections
TSA and aircraft operators have taken several important actions to
enhance general aviation security, and TSA is working with aviation
industry stakeholders to develop new security guidelines and
regulations. Among other measures, TSA worked with members of the
General Aviation Working Group of its Aviation Security Advisory
Committee in 2003 and 2004 to develop recommended guidelines for
general aviation airport security, and TSA expects the group to issue
updated guidelines later this year.\4\ In addition, pursuant to the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act, TSA established and oversees
implementation of a security program in which aircraft weighing more
than 12,500 pounds in scheduled or charter service that carry
passengers or cargo or both, and that do not fall under another
security program, must implement a ``Twelve-Five'' standard security
program.\5\ Aircraft operators implementing a Twelve-Five security
program must include, among other elements, procedures regarding bomb
or air piracy threats. TSA obtains information directly from aircraft
operators that fall under Twelve-Five through its review and approval
of the security programs developed by these operators and through
periodic inspections to determine the extent to which operators comply
with their security programs. TSA inspectors are responsible for
conducting these periodic inspections and determining whether operators
are in compliance with program requirements or whether a violation has
occurred. Independent of regulatory requirements, operators of private
general aviation aircraft not covered under existing security programs
we spoke to indicated that they implement a variety of security
measures to enhance security for their aircraft. For example, 7 of the
12 operators that perform as private operators that we interviewed
stated that they park their aircraft in hangars to protect them from
possible misuse or vandalism.
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\4\ Originally established in 1988, following the 1988 Pan American
World Airways Flight 103 bombing over Lockerbie, Scotland, the Aviation
Security Advisory Committee was developed to allow all segments of the
population to have input into aviation security considerations. The
committee's charter expired in 2010, but was subsequently reestablished
by TSA in November 2011.
\5\ See 49 C.F.R. 1544.101(d). See also Pub. L. No. 107-71,
132(a), 115 Stat. 597, 635-36 (2001).
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TSA has also conducted outreach to the general aviation community
to establish a cooperative relationship with general aviation
stakeholders. TSA officials we spoke to stated that the agency does not
have a systematic mechanism to collect information on the security
measures implemented by other general aviation aircraft operators that
do not fall under TSA security programs. Rather, the agency has
developed informal mechanisms for obtaining information on security
measures enacted by these operators, such as outreach conducted by TSA
inspectors, and has contacted general aviation industry associations to
obtain this information.
In 2008, TSA developed a proposed rule that would have imposed
security requirements on all aircraft over 12,500 pounds, including
those not currently covered under existing security programs, thereby
subjecting them to TSA security requirements and inspections. However,
industry associations and others expressed concerns about the extent to
which TSA obtained industry views and information in the proposed
rule's development. They also questioned the security benefit of the
proposed rule and stated that it could negatively affect the aviation
industry given its broad scope. In response to these concerns, TSA
officials said the agency is revising the proposed rule and plans to
issue a supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking in late 2012 or
early 2013. Officials from all six industry associations we spoke with
stated that TSA has reached out to gather industry's input, and three
of the six associations stated that TSA has improved its efforts to
gather input since the 2008 notice of proposed rulemaking.
weaknesses exist in processes for conducting security threat
assessments and for identifying potential immigration violations
TSA vets foreign flight student applicants through AFSP, but
weaknesses exist in the vetting process and in DHS's process for
identifying flight students who may be in the country illegally. In our
July 2012 report, we recommended two actions that DHS and TSA could
take to address these concerns.
Under AFSP, foreign nationals seeking flight training in the United
States must receive a TSA security threat assessment before receiving
flight training to determine whether each applicant is a security
threat to the United States. According to TSA regulations, an
individual poses a security threat when the individual is suspected of
posing, or is known to pose, a threat to transportation or National
security, a threat of air piracy or terrorism, a threat to airline or
passenger security, or a threat to civil aviation security.\6\
According to TSA officials, when a foreign national applies to AFSP to
obtain flight training, TSA uses information submitted by the foreign
national--such as name, date of birth, and passport information--to
conduct a criminal history records check, a review of the Terrorist
Screening Database, and a review of the Department of Homeland
Security's TECS system.\7\
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\6\ See 49 C.F.R. 1540.115(c).
\7\ Information in the Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated
database of known or suspected terrorists--the Terrorist Screening
Database--is used for security-related screening of foreign nationals
applying to AFSP. TECS, an updated and modified version of the former
Treasury Enforcement Communications System, is an information-sharing
platform that allows users to access different databases relevant to
the antiterrorism and law enforcement mission of numerous other Federal
agencies.
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According to TSA officials, most foreign nationals taking training
from a U.S. flight training provider will apply for an FAA airman
certificate (pilot's license) once their flight training is completed.
Information obtained by FAA as part of this application for
certification is placed in the airmen registry. From January 2006
through September 2011, 25,599 foreign nationals had applied for FAA
airman certificates, indicating they had completed flight training. We
provided data from FAA's airmen registry to TSA so that the agency
could conduct a matching process to determine whether the foreign
nationals in the FAA airmen registry were in TSA's AFSP database and
the extent to which they had been successfully vetted through the AFSP
database. The results of our review of TSA's analyses are as follows:
TSA's analysis indicated that some of the 25,599 foreign
nationals in the FAA airmen registry were not in the TSA AFSP
database, indicating that these individuals had not applied to
the AFSP or been vetted by TSA before taking flight training
and receiving an FAA airman certificate.\8\
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\8\ For its analysis, TSA used a software tool that performs
``fuzzy matching'' of data such as names, dates, or telephone numbers.
The specific number is deemed sensitive security information and is
therefore not included in this report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TSA's analysis indicated that an additional number of the
25,599 foreign nationals in the FAA airmen registry were also
in the TSA AFSP database but had not been successfully vetted,
meaning that they had received an FAA airman certificate but
had not been successfully vetted or received permission from
TSA to begin flight training.
Since 2009, TSA has continuously vetted all new and existing FAA
airman certificate holders against the Terrorist Screening Database,
which would include the foreign nationals identified through TSA's
analysis. However, this vetting does not occur until after the foreign
national has obtained flight training. Thus, foreign nationals
obtaining flight training with the intent to do harm, such as three of
the pilots and leaders of the September 11 terrorist attacks, could
have already obtained the training needed to operate an aircraft before
they received any type of vetting. In our report, we recommended that
TSA take steps to identify any instances where foreign nationals
receive FAA airman certificates without first undergoing a TSA security
threat assessment and examine those instances so that TSA can identify
the reasons for these occurrences and strengthen controls to prevent
future occurrences. DHS concurred with this recommendation and stated
that TSA signed a memorandum of understanding with FAA in February 2012
to exchange data. The memorandum, which FAA signed in March 2012,
outlines a process for FAA to provide certain data from its airmen
registry on a monthly basis and authorizes TSA to use the data to
ensure flight training providers are providing TSA with information to
conduct the appropriate background check prior to flight instruction.
This is an important first step toward addressing our recommendation,
provided that TSA uses the data to identify instances where foreign
nationals receive FAA airman certificates without first undergoing a
TSA security threat assessment, identifies reasons for these
occurrences, and strengthens controls to prevent future occurrences, as
we recommended.
Another weakness that we identified is that AFSP is not designed to
determine whether a foreign flight student entered the country legally;
thus, a foreign national can be approved for training through AFSP
after entering the country illegally. In March 2010, U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) investigated a Boston-area flight school
after local police stopped the flight school owner for a traffic
violation and discovered that he was in the country illegally. In
response to this incident, ICE launched a broader investigation of the
students enrolled at the flight school. ICE found that 25 of the
foreign nationals at this flight school had applied to AFSP and had
been approved by TSA to begin flight training after their security
threat assessment had been completed; however, the ICE investigation
and our subsequent inquiries revealed the following issues, among other
things:
Eight of the 25 foreign nationals who received approval by
TSA to begin flight training were in ``entry without
inspection'' status, meaning they had entered the country
illegally. Three of these had obtained FAA airman certificates:
2 held FAA private pilot certificates and 1 held an FAA
commercial pilot certificate.
Seventeen of the 25 foreign nationals who received approval
by TSA to begin flight training were in ``overstay'' status,
meaning they had overstayed their authorized period of
admission into the United States.
In addition, the flight school owner held two FAA airman
certificates. Specifically, he was a certified Airline
Transport Pilot (cargo pilot) and a Certified Flight
Instructor. However, he had never received a TSA security
threat assessment or been approved by TSA to obtain flight
training. He had registered with TSA as a flight training
provider under AFSP.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ We recently reported on issues related to ICE's oversight of
the Student and Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP). Specifically, ICE
certifies schools to accept foreign nationals on student visas in
academic and vocational programs, including those that provide flight
training. SEVP-certified flight schools are a relatively small
percentage of schools Nation-wide that offer flight training to foreign
nationals. See GAO, Student and Exchange Visitor Program: DHS Needs to
Assess Security Risks and Strengthen Oversight of Schools, GAO-12-572
(Washington, DC: June 18, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As a result, TSA and ICE jointly worked on a pilot program for
vetting names of foreign students against immigration databases, but
have not specified desired outcomes and time frames, or assigned
individuals with responsibility for fully instituting the program.
Having a road map, with steps and time frames, and assigning
individuals the responsibility for fully instituting a pilot program
could help TSA and ICE better identify and prevent potential risk. We
recommended that TSA and ICE develop a plan, with time frames, and
assign individuals with responsibility and accountability for assessing
the results of their pilot program to check TSA AFSP data against
information DHS has on applicants' admissibility status to help detect
and identify violations, such as overstays and entries without
inspection, by foreign flight students, and institute that pilot
program if it is found to be effective. DHS concurred with this
recommendation and stated that TSA will prepare a plan by December 2012
to assess the results of the pilot program with ICE to determine the
lawful status of the active AFSP population. The plan is to include
specific details on time frames and accountability and recommendations
for next steps. We believe that these are positive actions that could
help TSA address the weaknesses identified in our report and we will
continue to work with TSA to monitor progress on the proposed solutions
as the agency proceeds.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I look forward to
responding to any questions that you may have.
Mr. Rogers. That may be good news. The bad news is it took
them 10 years to do it.
Thank you, Mr. Lord.
Our next witness is Mr. Kerwin Wilson. Mr. Wilson serves as
general manager of general aviation at TSA. He assumed that
position in July. Prior to that, he served as assistant general
manager of general aviation at TSA. A veteran of the U.S. Air
Force as an officer, Mr. Wilson has over 20 years experience in
air traffic control and airport management, with a background
in security in formulating aviation policy and procedures with
various government agencies and foreign countries.
Chairman now recognizes Mr. Wilson for 5 minutes to
summarize his testimony.
STATEMENT OF KERWIN WILSON, GENERAL MANAGER FOR GENERAL
AVIATION, OFFICE OF SECURITY POLICY AND INDUSTRY ENGAGEMENT,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Wilson. Good morning, Chairman Mr. Rogers, Mr. Davis,
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I want to thank
you for the opportunity to testify today concerning the TSA's
alien flight student program.
TSA employs risk-based intelligence-driven operations to
prevent terrorist acts and to reduce the vulnerability of the
Nation's transportation system to terrorism. Our goal is to
maximize transportation security to stay ahead of evolving
terrorist threats while protecting privacy and facilitating the
flow of air commerce.
TSA security measures create a multi-layered system of
transportation security that mitigates risk. We continue to
evolve our security approach by examining the procedures and
technologies we use, how specific security procedures are
carried out, and how vetting is conducted. The mission of the
of AFSP is to ensure that foreign students seeking new or
recurrent training at flight schools in the United States do
not pose a threat to aviation or National security.
In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United
States in which terrorists trained at U.S. flight schools,
Congress, in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act in
2001, and later in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2003,
directed TSA to determine whether an alien, as defined under
the Immigration and Nationality Act, presented a risk to
aviation or National security before that individual could
train in an aircraft having a maximum certificated takeoff
weight of 12,500 pounds or more.
Subsequently, TSA issued an interim final rule to implement
these statutory requirements. Under the program, non-U.S.
citizens seeking to undergo FAA-certificated flight training
are required to submit a background check that includes a name-
based terrorism check, a name-based immigration check, a
fingerprint-based criminal history records check, submittal of
security documents including passport copies and specific
information about their desired training events.
The program also requires their flight training provider to
send a digital picture of the student within 5 calendar days
after the student initiates training. Flight training providers
regulated under this program are prohibited from providing
flight training to aliens until a security threat assessment
has been successfully conducted by TSA. These flight training
providers offer four different categories of training for
students applying for the AFSP. Detailed definitions of each of
those categories are within my written testimony.
TSA defines general aviation as all aviation operations
other than regularly scheduled passenger flights, cargo
operations, and military aviation. The general aviation
community consists of approximately 19,000 airports, 200,000
aircraft, 630,000 certificated pilots, and 7,000 flight
training providers.
These flight training providers are an important business
in the aviation industry, and continue to work with properly
vetted aliens as an economic benefit to the United States. In
general, the general aviation community accounts for roughly
1.2 million U.S. jobs and contributes $150 billion to the U.S.
economy each year.
From March 2011 to June 2012, the GAO assessed TSA's and
the general aviation industry's actions to strengthen security,
as well as efforts to ensure foreign flight students do not
pose a security threat. TSA concurred with all four of GAO's
recommendations. In fact, TSA self-identified three of the four
recommendations that GAO pointed out.
Because portions of the GAO report contain sensitive
security information, I cannot fully comment on many of the
recommendations today. To ensure that the subcommittee is kept
informed of TSA's actions to address these recommendations as
noted in the GAO report, the agency did provide the Chairman
and the Ranking Member with a letter dated July 16 which
outlined the current status of the implementation reports'
recommendations.
TSA continues to fully vet foreign flight school students
so that U.S. flight schools remain a world leader in flight
training, while ensuring that only advocates who satisfy the
security threat assessment receive such training.
Chairman Rogers, Mr. Davis, I thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today and I look forward to answering your
questions. I also recognize Senator Thompson, as well.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kerwin Wilson
July 18, 2012
Good morning Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today about the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP). TSA employs
risk-based, intelligence-driven operations to prevent terrorist attacks
and to reduce the vulnerability of the Nation's transportation system
to terrorism. Our goal at all times is to maximize transportation
security to stay ahead of evolving terrorist threats while protecting
privacy and facilitating the flow of legitimate commerce.
TSA's security measures create a multi-layered system of
transportation security that mitigates risk. We continue to evolve our
security approach by examining the procedures and technologies we use,
how specific security procedures are carried out, and how screening is
conducted. The mission of the AFSP is to ensure that foreign students
seeking new or recurrent training at flight schools in the United
States do not pose a threat to aviation or National security.
fulfilling a congressional mandate
Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, where
terrorists trained at U.S. flight schools in preparation for the
attacks, Congress included in the ``Aviation and Transportation
Security Act'' (ATSA) a provision that required the Attorney General to
determine whether an alien, as defined under the Immigration and
Nationality Act, presented a risk to aviation or National security
before that individual could train in the operation of any aircraft
having a maximum certified takeoff weight (MTOW) of 12,500 pounds or
more.
The ATSA gives TSA broad responsibility for securing the Nation's
civil aviation system, which includes general aviation operations. The
``Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act,'' (Pub. L. No.
108-176) was signed into law on December 12, 2003, and Section 612 of
Title VI, ``Aviation Security'' transferred the responsibility of
vetting foreign flight student applicants from the Department of
Justice to TSA, and included provisions distinguishing between training
on aircraft weighing more than 12,500 pounds and training on aircraft
weighing 12,500 pounds or less. Subsequently, TSA issued an Interim
Final Rule to implement these statutory requirements.
AFSP is a fee-based program that collects approximately $5 million
in annual fees and represents an added layer of security to protect our
Nation's transportation networks. Under the program, non-U.S. citizens
seeking to undergo Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)-certified
flight training are required to submit to a rigorous background
screening that includes a name-based terrorism check, a name-based
immigration check, a fingerprint-based criminal history records check,
submittal of security documents including passport copies, and specific
information about their desired training events. The program also
requires that flight training providers send a digital picture of the
student within 5 calendar days after the student initiates training.
Flight training providers regulated under AFSP are prohibited from
providing flight training to aliens until a Security Threat Assessment
(STA) has been successfully conducted by TSA.
the alien flight student program
Flight schools are an important business in the aviation industry
and continue to welcome properly vetted aliens as an economic benefit
to the United States. General aviation includes more than 200,000
aircraft operating at more than 19,000 facilities in the United States
for the purposes of such tasks as air medical-ambulance, corporate
aviation, and private charters. As a result of this demand, TSA
receives an average of 48,000 AFSP applications per year (4,000 per
month).
Given the diversity of the general aviation landscape, there are
four different categories under which students can apply to the AFSP,
depending on the type of flight training they seek:
Category 1--training for operation of aircraft with a MTOW
of more than 12,500 pounds, but not fitting into Category 2.
Category 2--training for operation of aircraft with a MTOW
of more than 12,500 pounds for individuals who demonstrate
certain preliminary indications of reliability such as: A
candidate employed by a foreign air carrier that operates under
14 C.F.R. Part 129 and that has an approved security program
under 49 C.F.R. Part 1546; a student who holds unescorted
access authority to a secured area of an airport; a flight crew
member who has successfully completed a criminal history
records check in accordance with appropriate regulations; or a
student who holds an airman's certificate from a foreign entity
that is recognized by the FAA or appropriate U.S. military
agency and that permits the student to operate a multi-engine
aircraft with a MTOW of more than 12,500 pounds.
Category 3--training for operation of aircraft with a MTOW
of 12,500 pounds or less for Single Engine Land, Instrument
Rating, and/or Multiengine Land events. 49 U.S.C. 44939(c).
Category 4--recurrent training for operation of all aircraft
for individuals who are current and qualified on the aircraft
for which they are requesting training.
Since 2001, the AFSP has vetted over 350,000 applications of
approximately 125,000 unique individuals.
gao study on strengthening security in the general aviation environment
From March 2011 to June 2012, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) assessed TSA's and the general aviation industry's actions to
strengthen security as well as efforts to ensure foreign flight
students do not pose a security threat. These efforts include vetting
foreign flight student applicants through AFSP. GAO found that TSA has
taken steps to enhance communications with general aviation industry
stakeholders and improve the vetting of foreign nationals enrolling in
U.S. flight schools. GAO also found weaknesses in the vetting process
and in the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) process for
identifying flight students who may be in the country illegally.
TSA concurs with the GAO recommendations on identifying how often
and why foreign nationals are not vetted under AFSP. The GAO also
recommends that TSA work with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
to check TSA AFSP data against information DHS has on applicants'
admissibility status.
TSA concurs with all of the recommendations identified in the
report and is in the process of preparing the 60-day update to be
submitted to GAO by August 10, 2012. TSA will also provide this
subcommittee with a 90-day status update as requested. Because portions
of the GAO report contain sensitive security information, I cannot
fully comment on all the recommendations and TSA's responses in this
statement. To ensure that the subcommittee is informed of the actions
TSA undertakes to address the recommendations noted in the GAO report,
the agency provided the Chairman and the Ranking Member with a letter
dated July 16, 2012, which outlined the current status of
implementation of the report's recommendations.
GAO's first recommendation asked that TSA take steps to identify
any instances where foreign nationals receive pilot certificates
without first undergoing a TSA STA and examine the reasons for these
occurrences in order to strengthen controls and prevent future
occurrences. On February 21, 2012, TSA entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement with the FAA to receive a monthly dataset of foreign
nationals who received their first FAA airman private, sport, or
recreational pilot certificate. The dataset includes the certificate
holder's full name, date of birth, certificate level and type ratings,
date of issuance, certificate number, citizenship, responsible Flight
Standards District Office, recommending Certified Flight Instructor,
physical address, and flight school number if applicable. This
information is a subset of the information that TSA receives daily for
recurrent vetting and is tailored for AFSP use. TSA utilizes this
information to cross-check it against the current AFSP database to
identify individuals who may have circumvented the AFSP STA
requirements.
GAO also asked that TSA, in collaboration with ICE, ``develop a
plan with time frames, and assign individuals with responsibility and
accountability for assessing the results of a pilot program to check
TSA AFSP data against information DHS has on applicants' admissibility
status.'' In November 2010, TSA began working with ICE to mitigate the
identified concern and conducted the first recurrent lawful status
check in May 2011. This pilot program was with ICE's Counterterrorism
and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) and the U.S. Visitor and
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Arrival Departure
Information System (ADIS) and laid out a process to detect and identify
AFSP applicants who are in violation of U.S. immigration laws. With
positive results assessed during the pilot, TSA moved forward with a
new process to check active alien flight students against the US-VISIT
ADIS database to identify whether the individual may have overstayed
the terms of their admission, and providing the results to CTCEU to
take appropriate immigration enforcement action. If CTCEU identifies
any issues, they notify TSA for action with respect to aviation
security. In addition, TSA entered into an information-sharing
Memorandum of Agreement on February 21, 2012, allowing ICE to access
the AFSP database to aid in their investigations. By the end of this
year, TSA plans to further automate this process by interfacing with
US-VISIT ADIS through their new web services platform. In the mean
time, TSA will continue to conduct the above-described manual vetting
process through US-VISIT ADIS to mitigate the issue identified by GAO.
conclusion
TSA continues to fully vet foreign flight school students so that
U.S. flight schools remain a world leader in flight training while
ensuring that only those applicants who satisfy our STA requirements
receive such training. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, I
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Rogers. Well, thank you, Mr. Wilson.
Our next witness is Mr. John Woods. Mr. Woods is assistant
director for national security investigations at ICE. His
division is responsible for programs that target trans-national
security threats stemming from illicit travel, trade, and
financial enterprises. Mr. Woods has served in this position
since 2009. He has 26 years of distinguished experience in law
enforcement.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Woods for 5 minutes to
summarize his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JOHN P. WOODS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, NATIONAL
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
Mr. Woods. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Davis, and
Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity today to appear
before you to discuss our efforts to identify, address
vulnerabilities, and prevent the exploitation of our visa
systems by terrorists and/or criminals.
Today, I would like to focus on the role and responsibility
of our counter-terrorism and criminal exploitation unit, or the
CTCEU, and the opportunities we see to collaborate with TSA to
improve the vetting process of the alien flight student program
and the alien flight student population.
The CTCEU is the first and only National program dedicated
to the enforcement of non-immigrant visa violations. It is part
of ICE's Homeland Security Investigations National Security
Investigations Division. The unit prevents terrorists and other
criminals from exploiting the Nation's immigration system
through fraud. It investigates the non-immigrant visa holders
who violate their immigration status and places a high priority
on scrutinizing the activities of known or suspected terrorists
and those associated with terrorists.
It also prevents criminal exploitation of our student visa
system. Since its creation in 2003, the CTCEU have had analysts
resolve more than 2 million such records using automated and
manual review techniques. ICE opens approximately 6,000
investigative cases annually and assigns them to our HS-ICE
special agents in the field for further investigation.
These investigations result in approximately 1,800
administrative arrests and 35 criminal arrests annually. In
2010 HS-ICE special agents investigated TJ Aviation, a flight
school in Boston, whose flight students consisted primarily of
visa overstays and illegal aliens. This investigation drew
attention to the alien flight training in the United States and
the vulnerabilities that persisted after nearly a decade after
the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Shortly after the TJ Aviation investigation, HS-ICE has
worked with TSA to help refine the alien flight school program
policies and procedures. The CTCEU has assigned resources to
the alien flight school program and to assist in the review of
HSI and TSI procedures and processes involving alien flight
students and the schools that train them.
Since the enhancement of this relationship with TSA,
several significant changes have been implemented to enhance
National security of the alien flight school program. One
significant change is that TSA conducts checks of active alien
flight students against US-VISIT's arrival and departure
information system to identify whether an individuals may have
overstayed the terms of their mission and provides results to
the CTCEU to take enforcement action.
Another significant change is TSA has been refining their
operating procedures to include having TSA inspectors talk to
alien flight students and physically inspect their documents
and log books. Additionally, we are conducting these
inspections with them on weekends where a majority of the
flight training takes place.
In December 2011, CTCU developed and implemented Operation
Clipped Wings. This is a three-phase enforcement operation
aimed at mitigating the vulnerabilities identified in Alien
Flight School Program, and the critical infrastructure areas
associated within aviation.
The first phase consists of HSI's special agents focusing
on investigative efforts on those foreign nationals who have
been identified in the AFSP database, having received flight
training in the United States, and who have overstayed the
terms of their admission.
The second phase will be centered on conducting proper
immigration checks of all Federal aviation certified pilots and
crew members. The final phase will focus on employees at repair
stations, locations that are certified by the FAA to repair
aircraft.
To date, Operation Clipped Wings has identified over 30
investigative leads for HSI special agents to follow up on, and
has led to four criminal--four administrative arrests.
These are just a few examples of how ICE is committed to
promoting National security in working with our DHS
counterparts in identifying and preventing terrorists from
exploiting our visa process. I thank you again for the
opportunity to testify here today, and I would be pleased to
answer any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Woods follows:]
Prepared Statement of John P. Woods
July 18, 2012
introduction
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee: On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and
Director Morton, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the efforts of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) to identify and address vulnerabilities in, and
prevent the exploitation of, our visa system by terrorists and
criminals. In June 2012, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
issued a report entitled, ``General Aviation Security: Weaknesses Exist
in TSA's Process for Ensuring Foreign Flight Students Do Not Pose a
Security Threat.'' In response to the report and its recommendations,
ICE's Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) Counterterrorism and
Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is working in collaboration with the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) on a pilot to determine
lawful status of the active Alien Flight Student Program (AFSP)
population. By December 31, 2012, TSA will prepare a plan, with
specific details on time frames and accountability, to assess the
results of the pilot including recommendations for future steps.
Visa overstays and other forms of status violation bring together
two critical areas of ICE's mission--National security and immigration
enforcement. We cannot overstate the importance of determining who to
allow entry into the United States and ensuring compliance with the
conditions of such entry. We are proud of the good work we have done
over the last 10 years to protect the integrity of our visa system. My
testimony will focus on the role and responsibility of the CTCEU, our
successes and the opportunities we see to collaborate with TSA to
improve the vetting process for the AFSP population.
The Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit
The CTCEU is the first and only National program dedicated to the
enforcement of non-immigrant visa violations. It is part of ICE's
Homeland Security Investigations' (HSI) National Security
Investigations Division. The unit prevents terrorists and other
criminals from exploiting the Nation's immigration system through
fraud. It investigates non-immigrant visa holders who violate their
immigration status and places a high priority on scrutinizing the
activities of known or suspected terrorists and terrorist associations.
It also combats criminal exploitation of the student visa system.
Today, through the CTCEU, ICE analyzes and recommends leads for
investigation from the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System
(SEVIS) and the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology (US-VISIT) program.
SEVIS is the internet-based system that maintains information on
Student Exchange Visitor Program (SEVP)-certified schools and
international students who come to the United States on F (academic) or
M (vocational) visa status to study at those schools, as well as the
students' dependents. SEVIS also maintains information on U.S.
Department of State-designated exchange visitor sponsors and J visa
exchange visitor program participants and their dependents. US-VISIT
owns two systems: The Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT)
and the Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS), which house
biometric and associated biographic data on foreign nationals who have
entered or applied to enter the United States. IDENT and ADIS maintain
data on foreign nationals such as students, tourists, and temporary
workers, present in the United States at any given time (including
flight students and foreign students) and those who have overstayed or
otherwise violated the terms and conditions of their admission.
Each year, the CTCEU analyzes records of hundreds of thousands of
non-immigrants who may have violated their terms of admission or visa
status, based on data received from SEVIS, US-VISIT, and other sources.
These records are resolved by further identifying potential Federal
violations that would warrant field investigations, establishing
compliance with their terms of admission, or establishing departure
dates from the United States. Since the creation of the CTCEU in 2003,
analysts have resolved more than 2 million such records using automated
and manual review techniques. ICE opens approximately 6,000
investigative cases annually, and assigns them to our special agents in
the field for further investigation. These investigations result in
over 1,800 administrative arrests and approximately 35 criminal arrests
per year.
ICE furthers its counterterrorism mission by initiating or
supporting high-priority National security initiatives based upon
specific information from the intelligence community. The practice is
designed to detect and identify individuals exhibiting specific risk
factors, including international travel from specific geographic
locations to the United States, and in-depth criminal research and
social network link analysis.
A critical component of the CTCEU is the SEVIS Exploitation
Section, which combats exploitation of the Student and Exchange Visitor
Program by analyzing SEVIS data and referring school fraud criminal
investigations to the field for further investigation. The SEVP is part
of the National Security Investigations Division and is responsible
for: Certifying schools to accept international students; administering
SEVIS; and collecting, maintaining, analyzing, and providing
information so only legitimate foreign students or exchange visitors
gain entry to the United States.
For instance, in November 2011, the CTCEU Group in Los Angeles
arrested Karena Chuang of Wright Aviation Academy for encouraging the
illegal entry of aliens for private financial gain. On February 6,
2012, Ms. Chuang pleaded guilty to two counts of this crime. Wright
Aviation Academy, a non-SEVP-certified flight school, was suspected by
ICE's Visa Security Program of fraudulently recruiting and training
foreign flight students from Egypt. As a result of ICE's
investigation--representative of ICE's layered enforcement approach
that works to identify and disrupt visa fraud overseas, with a focus on
dismantling supporting transnational organizations committing such
fraud, and prosecuting the alleged perpetrators in the United States--
Chuang is alleged to have applied to SEVP-certified schools, posing as
a foreign student, for the sole purpose of obtaining valid Forms I-20
(Certificates of Eligibility for Nonimmigrant Student). The students,
in turn, allegedly used the fraudulently obtained Forms I-20 to get M-1
(vocational) visas to enter the United States to attend Wright Aviation
Academy. This investigation successfully upheld the integrity of the
SEVP program through ICE's layered enforcement approach--identifying
and disrupting visa fraud overseas, dismantling the transnational
organization, and prosecuting the perpetrators in the United States.
In 2010, ICE HSI special agents investigated TJ Aviation, a flight
school in Boston, whose flight students consisted primarily of visa
overstays and illegal aliens. This investigation drew attention to
alien flight training in the United States and the vulnerabilities that
persisted nearly a decade after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Three of the 9/11 hijackers attended flight schools while
bearing visas that did not permit flight training.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shortly after the TJ Aviation investigation, TSA requested an HSI
liaison to help refine the AFSP policies and procedures. The CTCEU
assigned a National Program Manager/special agent to the AFSP who is
currently working to review HSI and TSA procedures and processes
involving alien flight students and the schools that train alien flight
students.
After reviewing TSA procedures and processes, the CTCEU's Liaison
identified several areas of systemic vulnerabilities. ICE and TSA have
identified and are discussing several ways to alleviate these issues
by:
Sharing AFSP data with ICE and SEVIS information with TSA;
Implementing ways for TSA Transportation Security Inspectors
to review but not make determinations of legal presence of
alien flight students during their semi-annual inspections of
AFSP flight training providers and record this information in a
historical database;
Implementing a system for ICE and TSA to cooperatively
conduct lawful presence checks on aliens in TSA databases;
Implementing joint HSI/TSA outreach to flight training
providers that train alien flight students and local airport
officials; and
Providing additional assistance and support while
investigating flight schools and flight students.
During the tenure of the CTCEU liaison at TSA, several significant
changes have been implemented to enhance the National security of the
AFSP. One significant change is that TSA AFSP conducts checks of active
alien flight students against US-VISIT's ADIS database to identify
whether the individual may have overstayed the terms of their admission
and provides the results to CTCEU to take appropriate action. This
allows HSI to potentially target the immigration violator without TSA
alerting the individual. The CTCEU liaison has access to TSA's AFSP
database and has provided several accounts for HSI special agents
throughout the United States. Additionally, the CTCEU liaison has
participated in TSA Special Emphasis STRIKE Operations,\2\ which has
resulted in TSA refining their operating procedures to include having
TSA inspectors talk to alien flight students and physically inspecting
their documents and logbooks and conducting these inspections on the
weekends when the majority of flight training occurs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ A ``STRIKE'' is an operational activity involving TSA
compliance personnel from multiple locations surging at one particular
location to conduct inspections.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In December 2011, the CTCEU developed and implemented ``Operation
Clipped Wings,'' an enforcement operation aimed at mitigating the
vulnerabilities identified in the AFSP and the critical infrastructure
areas associated with aircrafts. This operation will be implemented in
three phases. In the first phase, HSI is focusing its investigative
efforts on those foreign nationals who have been identified in the AFSP
database as having received flight training in the United States and
overstayed their terms of admission. The second phase will be centered
on conducting proper immigration checks on all Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA)-certified pilots and crew members. The final phase
will be focused on employees at repair stations--locations that are
certified by the FAA to repair aircraft. To date, Operation Clipped
Wings has identified over 30 HSI investigative leads and led to four
administrative arrests.
conclusion
ICE is committed to promoting National security and has made
significant progress in identifying and preventing terrorists from
exploiting the visa process.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and for your
continued support of ICE and its law enforcement mission.
I would be pleased to answer any questions at this time.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Woods. Our next witness is Mr.
Jens Hennig. Mr. Hennig is vice president of operations for the
General Aviation Manufacturers Association.
Mr. Hennig joined GAMA as the manager of operations in
2003, and in advance to vice president of operations. Prior to
joining GAMA, he served as manager of flight operations at
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Hennig for 5 minutes to
summarize his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JENS C. HENNIG, VICE PRESIDENT OF OPERATIONS,
GENERAL AVIATION MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Hennig. Chairman Rogers, Congressman Davis, Ranking
Member Thompson, I am Jens Hennig, and I am vice president of
operations for the General Aviation Manufacturers Association.
I appreciate you convening this hearing to examining the TSA's
Alien Flight Student Program.
GAMA represents over 75 companies, the world-leading
manufacturers of general aviation products. Our members are
also involved with the service and support of the industry and
our flight-training providers in 2011, and accounted for 16,000
of the individual checks conducted by the TSA, including 56
percent of the checks conducted for recurrent training.
Today's hearing specifically focuses on GAO's
recommendations on ways to strengthen the program with respect
to visa adherence and data sharing between different governing
agencies. GAMA views the GAO's recommendations are targeted and
appropriate to strengthen a specific part of the framework of
the Alien Flight Program.
GAMA, however, believes there are some additional securing
enhancements that also need to be implemented. These
enhancements will better target TSA's limited resources by
aligning the required security threat assessment for foreign
nationals with other security programs.
The United States is a global leader in pilot training.
There are currently 944 FAA-certified pilot schools. According
to the FAA, approximately 22 percent of the airmen tests
administered last year were to foreign citizens.
Pilot training is also essential for a healthy
manufacturing industry. When GAMA members sell new aircraft to
a customer, it is often accompanied by training for the pilot
and the crew.
The current Alien Flight Student Program was created after
9/11, and the program was transferred from the Department of
Justice to TSA in 2003, with the requirements established with
an interim final rule published late 2004.
As an interim final rule, the program was not subject to
public review and comment. This was a result in a number of
areas needing policy interpretations.
As an example, for many years, there was uncertainty
between TSA and industry about what constituted recurrent
training vetting. Recurrent training received specific
attention both by Congress, and in the rule, for how to create
a proportional set of requirements to people who are already
pilots, and pose less risk for training events from a threat
scenario.
The lack of clarity resulted in an overly-cautious approach
by TSA and industry, in vetting people for training activities
that awarded no additional flying privileges.
The TSA worked with industry, and in 2010, published new
policy that drew clear lines as to what is captured by the
required check. The TSA showed industry how to comply with a
regulation without redundant checks of the same individual. The
policy is one of several issued by the TSA over the past 4
years.
GAMA welcomes this engagement by TSA with industries to
develop clear compliance guidance. There are, however, several
unclear areas and inefficiencies that cannot be addressed
without changing the framework of the regulation.
The primary inefficiency is the requirement that a foreign
national for each stand-alone training event, certificate, or
rating that they hold. I have provided some examples in my
written testimony.
In short, the typical situation is a fully-certified pilot
who is employed by a foreign commercial airline, and approved
to operate multiple different types of aircraft. If that
airline elects to contract with an FAA training center, the
alien flight regulation is structured to require the pilot to
be subject to a security threat assessment for each type rating
that they hold.
This training, and the multiple--often occur within a
period of just a couple of weeks. This approach clearly does
nothing to add to enhanced security, but it wastes Government
and industry resources in the conduct of the multiple vets of
the same person.
GAMA believes that the TSA should shift the approach for
the STA, and approach--to the approach taken by other programs.
Basically, we believe that the TSA should shift from an event-
based STA to one that is time-based.
Based on these concerns, GAMA, in April 2011 petitioned the
TSA for a rewrite of the program. We did this in response to
the administration's call for a regulatory review of all
agencies.
In August of last year, DHS accepted our proposal for the
rewrite. At the same time, outlined the TSA's plan to establish
a streamlined procedure for the vetting of the foreign
national, implement new information technology, and shift the
STA to have a validity of 5 years. We believe these changes
will benefit both the TSA and the students.
Chairman Rogers, Congressman Davis, thank you for providing
me the opportunity to discuss with the subcommittee the need to
make changes to the program. GAMA believes the changes will
streamline the program, increase Government efficiencies, and
provide a more effective vetting of foreign nationals seeking
flight training in the United States.
At the same time, the rewrite of the program will also lend
itself to the enactment of the GAO's recommendations, and
establish a clear regulatory framework for industry. The TSA
has been a good partner within industry, and we look forward to
working with them to fully implement the changes.
Thank you, and I would be glad to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hennig follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jens C. Hennig
July 18, 2012
introduction
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, distinguished Members
of the subcommittee; my name is Jens Hennig and I am the vice president
of operations for the General Aviation Manufacturers Association
(GAMA). GAMA represents over 75 companies who are the world's leading
manufacturers of general aviation airplanes, rotorcraft, engines,
avionics, and components. Our member companies also operate airplane
fleets, airport fixed-based operations, as well as pilot training and
maintenance facilities world-wide.
On behalf of our members, I appreciate your convening this hearing
to examine the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) security
program for flight schools; often referred to as the alien flight
student program.\1\
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\1\ 49 CFR Part 1552 Flight Training for Aliens and Other
Designated Individuals; Security Awareness Training for Flight School
Employees; Interim Rule.
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gao recommendations
Today's hearing specifically focuses on recommendations by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) on ways to strengthen the alien
flight student program. GAMA understands the recommendations of the GAO
are two-fold: (1) To strengthen the TSA and the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) interactions
to ensure adherence to visa requirements; and (2) Improving data
sharing between TSA and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) about
FAA-certified pilots.
GAMA views the GAO's recommendations as targeted and appropriate
for strengthening specific parts of the framework of the alien flight
program. If implemented these recommendations will clarify the
requirements placed upon flight schools for identifying trainees and
further define record-keeping requirements about students.
GAMA believes additional program enhancements need to be
implemented in other areas. We applaud action taken by TSA over the
past several years to continue to improve the program, but we have also
made recommendations in response to the administration's regulatory
review \2\ that we believe will further streamline the program based on
risk. These changes, if implemented, will better target the TSA's
limited resources using risk consideration by aligning the required
Security Threat Assessment (STA) for foreign nationals with other TSA
security programs. GAMA is encouraged by the TSA's engagement with
industry over the past 4 years to clarify the requirements and
applicability of the program and consider a risk-based approach to
vetting foreign nationals who elect to obtain flight training from
companies certificated by the FAA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAMA petitioned the Department of Homeland Security in response
to its notice Reducing Regulatory Burden; Retrospective Review under
Executive Order 13563, see Volume 76 Federal Register at 13526.
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history and current state of the program
The regulatory framework in place today originated after September
11, 2001. The program was originally administered by the Department of
Justice (DOJ),\3\ but in 2003 Congress transferred the authority over
background checks for flight training to the TSA.\4\ \5\ GAMA welcomed
this shift in authority because the background check process under DOJ
had effectively halted the U.S. flight training industry's ability to
train foreign nationals, further exacerbating the effects of the 2000-
2001 recession. The TSA established the requirements of the current
program through the publication of an interim final rule in September
2004.
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\3\ Pub. L. 107-71, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act
(ATSA), Section 113 introduced a prohibition against flight training
providers from providing flight training to aliens and certain
designated individuals pending the Attorney General not notifying the
training provider within 45 days that the candidate presented no threat
to aviation or National security.
\4\ The impact of the DOJ program for vetting for aliens seeking
flight training in the United States was discussed by GAMA in testimony
before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Commerce, Science &
Transportation of the U.S. Senate, Hearing on Aviation Security, on
February 5, 2003.
\5\ Vision 100 Century of Aviation Act, Section 612.
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The interim final rule introduced four different categories to
vetting foreign nationals based on the type of flight training that
they would undertake where Category 1 or 2 is required for large
aircraft; Category 3 is required for small aircraft; and Category 4
applies to recurrent flight training on an aircraft.
Due to its status as interim final regulation, however, the TSA
program was not subject to the typical regulatory review and comment
that allows work between an agency and the industry to establish an
effective program that ensures security concerns are addressed without
unnecessarily burdening industry as well as providing for a clear
process for regulatory compliance.
During the last 4 years the TSA worked with industry through a
cross-section of policies, clarifications, and interpretations to
define today's alien flight student program requirements. Examples of
issues that industry identified as needing new policy or clarification
within the framework of the existing regulation include:
What is defined as ``recurrent training''?
Who holds responsibility for ensuring compliance with the
program when ``dry leasing''\6\ a simulator?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ The term ``dry lease'' refers to a flight training provider
leasing its training facilities and devices to an airline which then
conducts its training at the flight training provider's facilities
using its equipment.
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With respect to oversight of the program, does the TSA have
responsibility to ensure that the foreign national is in the
United States on a valid visa?\7\
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\7\ A number of other policy clarifications were developed or
identified by industry including requirements for U.S. Government
employees; requirements for U.S. Government-sponsored employees that
are foreign nationals; and handling of fingerprints.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The TSA's policy clarifications about the program greatly improved
the processing time for a foreign national seeking flight training. Our
members have seen the processing time for recurrent flight training
reduced to approximately to 1-2 days as compared to 3-6 days as
recently as a couple of years ago. Additionally, the TSA's staff is
directly engaged with industry and through their ``help desk'' function
provide necessary support to achieve regulatory compliance for
individual pilots and flight training providers.
Industry does, however, face a compilation of regulatory
interpretations, policy letters, and frequently asked questions when
determining how to comply with the program. The core remaining concern
of industry is the requirement that a foreign national seeking to
undertake flight training in the United States submit to an STA prior
to starting each training course.
economic impact on the flight training industry and role of the program
The United States is the global leader in pilot training. There are
currently 688 active 14 CFR Part 141 FAA-certificated flight schools
and 256 active 14 CFR Part 142 certificated training centers;\8\ many
of which involve multiple locations and dozens of aircraft or
simulators. Additionally, there is training conducted at many schools
under 14 CFR Part 61. According to the FAA, approximately 22 percent of
airman tests administered in 2011 were to foreign citizens.\9\
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\8\ Organizations certificated by the FAA under 14 CFR Part 141
typically conduct primary training which is regulated by the TSA under
Category 3 while organizations certificated under 14 CFR Part 142
typically conduct aircraft type-specific training and are regulated by
the TSA under Category 1, 2, and 4 of the 49 CFR Part 1552.
\9\ See, FAA analysis of airman certification knowledge exams in
response to GAMA request July 12, 2012.
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The economic importance of the foreign individuals seeking flight
training in the United States cannot be understated. In 2011, the TSA
conducted 47,651 individual checks of foreign nationals seeking flight
training in the United States including 20,407 for Category 4 recurrent
trainees.\10\
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\10\ See, TSA analysis of 2011 alien flight activity in response to
GAMA request received July 13, 2012 identified Category 1 (3,930),
Category 2 (4,095), Category 3 (19,219), and Category 4 (20,407) for a
total of 47,651 checks.
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The future need for commercial, business, and general aviation
pilots continues to grow. In a forecast released just last week, the
predicted need for commercial airline pilots will be 460,000 pilots
world-wide through 2031.\11\ This figure does not include the tens of
thousands of pilots needed by operators outside commercial aviation
such as business and general aviation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See, 2012 Pilot and Technician Outlook, Boeing, July 11, 2012
at www.boeing.com/commercial/cmo/pilot_technician_outlook.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The TSA's alien flight program is at the center of commerce both
for the companies that are in the business of pilot training, but also
of great importance to manufacturers of commercial and general aviation
aircraft and their operators. The impact on the manufacturing industry
is indirect, but for each export of an aircraft to a foreign customer,
the aircraft manufacturers will as part of the sales contract include
the training of the customer's pilots. Without the ability to
effectively train pilots to safely operate aircraft, the aviation
manufacturing and operator industry would be grounded. The U.S.-based
flight training and aircraft manufacturing industry supports tens of
thousands of high-paying jobs.
GAMA's members worked with the TSA to facilitate the vetting of
16,683 customers' individual checks in 2011 including 56 percent of the
Category 4 checks. Training is conducted by GAMA members in numerous
flight training centers across the United States and the world in
hundreds of simulators and aircraft.
gama's petition for regulatory review
GAMA began work with the TSA in 2009 to address several policies
that we believe were either unclear or not addressed when the
requirements for vetting foreign nationals were established. TSA had
recognized the issues that existed with the program and worked
cooperatively with industry to develop guidance. One example was the
uncertainty about what the TSA viewed as constituting ``recurrent
training''\12\ which had the troublesome effect of the same person
being subject to not one STA, but often several STAs for different
programs over the course of just a few weeks. There were also different
interpretations applied to flight training providers as to what
activity would require the trainee to undergo another Category 4
recurrent check.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Congress specifically separated the requirements for recurrent
training, that is pilots who already know how to competently and safely
operate and aircraft, when transferring the authority to the TSA as it
is widely recognized that STAs of a pilot who is in the United States
to undertake recurrent training exposes the aviation system and
National security to de minimis risk. Congress, however, in 2009
expanded the requirements of the alien flight student program in the
Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing
Appropriations Act, 2009 (Appropriations Act of 2009), which amends 6
U.S.C. 469, and requires the Secretary of the Department of Homeland
Security to: (1) Establish a process to determine that an alien who
takes recurrent flight training is properly identified and does not
pose a threat to aviation or National security; and (2) impose
reasonable fees to recoup the cost of checking recurrent training
candidates.
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TSA published a new policy \13\ that provided clarity about
recurrent training in 2010. The TSA's new policy identified what types
of courses are subject to STA using common aviation terminology. This
policy has had the positive impact of reducing the number of times that
the same person is vetted by the TSA in a short period of time. This
efficiency has greatly enhanced the competitiveness of FAA-certified
flight training providers and was achieved without reducing security
since all foreign nationals are still subject to the same STA, but
without the duplication.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ TSA Docket No. TSA-2004-19147, Interpretation of ``Recurrent
Training'' and Changes to Security Threat Assessment Process for
Recurrent Training, September 13, 2010.
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The TSA, working jointly with industry during 2009 through 2011,
successfully implemented a number of other policy clarifications for
the alien flight program that resulted in shorter threat assessment
review times and reductions in the number of times one person is vetted
by the TSA within a short period of time. The program, however, in its
current status as an interim final rule remains difficult to understand
for applicants and still includes several inefficiencies. As a result,
numerous policy clarifications have been necessary and the TSA was
prompted to post a Frequently Asked Question section on its website.
The flight training industry is also experiencing some confusion in the
field when subject to TSA audits since the current program looks quite
different from the requirements in 49 CFR Part 1552.
The primary inefficiency remaining is the requirement to vet a
foreign national for stand-alone training courses for new certificates
or ratings. There are two common problems.
(1) Persons who are not pilots, but come to the United States to
become commercial pilots, (so called ab initio training). A
training program to become a commercial pilot covers 4-5
separate FAA certificates or ratings which are typically taken
by the student over the course of 1 year. Currently, the TSA
program requires that the foreign national submit to the alien
flight program STA for each individual certificate or rating
course with the result that the TSA conduct multiple vets of
the same person within 1 year for a corresponding fee for each
vetting.
(2) Professional pilots that hold multiple type ratings which each
permit that pilot to fly a unique aircraft. The pilots with
multiple type ratings that elect to do recurrent type rating
training in the United States must submit to the STA for each
type rating they hold. This means that a foreign national in
the United States doing three type ratings within a couple of
weeks must submit their information to an STA three times prior
to starting training.
These practices raise costs, create confusion, and they do not
enhance security. It is GAMA's belief that the intent of Congress and
the regulation was not to vet the same person on multiple occasions
simultaneously or with high frequency, but instead ensure that each
person that receives FAA flight training is vetted one time prior to
the start of training and that the TSA has an understanding of who is
taking flight training. If not, the TSA wastes scarce Federal resources
when checking the same person multiple times, sometimes on the same
day. At the same time, industry is subject to duplicative and redundant
requirements at direct cost through the payment of the STA fee and
indirectly through the requirement to submit the same personal
identifiable information multiple times.
GAMA believes that the TSA should shift its approach to Security
Threat Assessment of foreign nationals seeking flight training to the
approach in other TSA programs. For example, instead of having the STA
be event-based (that is, when a person elects to do a certain
activity), it could be time-based (that is, the person be required to
submit to an STA with a certain frequency and allow the agency to
maintain the information about the individual to conduct constant
vetting of that person's name and information against appropriate
threat lists and the flight training provider notifying the TSA that
additional training is about to commence with that person.)
On April 13, 2011, GAMA petitioned the TSA to rewrite the alien
flight student program in response to the administration's call for a
regulatory review of all agencies. In our petition, we identified
several areas that need further policy clarifications and proposed that
the TSA shift to require foreign nationals to be vetted no more
frequently than annually. GAMA also proposed the removal of the four
categories in the existing program and the sunset of recurrent training
as a separate requirement in favor of a single consistent process where
the flight training provider and the TSA ensure foreign nationals are
subject to an STA within the prescribed time frame.\14\ GAMA's petition
was formally endorsed by the Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
(AOPA), the main association representing the general aviation pilot
community.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See, TSA Docket No. DHS-2011-0015: DHS Retrospective Review.
\15\ See, TSA Docket No. DHS-2011-0015; AOPA Letter Dated April 12,
2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In its final plan for executing the regulatory review, the
Department of Homeland Security accepted GAMA's proposal.\16\ At the
same time, DHS identified the TSA's plan to introduce a streamlined
procedure for students; implement new information technology
infrastructure to better administer the program; make the STA valid for
5 years; and sunset the four categories for training in the existing
program. We believe these changes will benefit both TSA and students
and that the rewrite of the program would lend itself to incorporate
those recommendations by the GAO that are applicable to regulated
entities. GAMA also expects noticeable savings to the TSA through a
reduced volume of STAs; more targeted oversight through a more
efficient program; and enhanced competitiveness of U.S.-based flight
schools when catering to the growing world-wide pilot training market.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Final Plan for the
Retrospective Review of Existing Regulations, August 22, 2011.
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next steps
GAMA, in cooperation with other associations and our member
companies, have worked with the TSA since 2011 to further refine the
new regulatory framework of the alien flight student program. GAMA met
as recently as February with the TSA to respond to questions on
specific ways to enhance the program including new information
technology. We continue to encourage the TSA to prioritize the rewrite
internally and to advocate consideration by the Department of Homeland
Security so that the rulemaking process can conclude.
While the agency has been a willing partner for the alien flight
program, its inability to complete other rulemaking continues to impede
our manufacturing competitiveness and the DHS's rulemaking pipeline
remains a concern to GAMA.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for providing me the opportunity to discuss
with the subcommittee an overview of the necessary changes to the alien
flight student program. GAMA believes that these changes will
streamline the program, increase Government efficiencies, and provide a
more effective execution of vetting of foreign national seeking flight
training in the United States. At the same time, the restructuring of
the program will also lend itself to the enactment of GAO's
recommendations in a new, clear regulatory framework that industry and
Government can build upon in a safe and secure manner.
Thank you and I would be glad to answer any question that you may
have.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Hennig. Our last witness is Mr.
Douglas Carr. Mr. Carr is the National Business Aviation
Association's vice president for safety, security operations,
and regulations. He is responsible for leading the
association's efforts on business aviation safety and security,
and has oversight of NBAA's regulatory activity involving
business aviation, aircraft equipment mandates, operations, and
security.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Carr for 5 minutes to
summarize his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS CARR, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, NATIONAL BUSINESS AVIATION ASSOCIATION
Mr. Carr. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Thompson, Mr.
Davis, thank you very much for the opportunity and the
invitation to speak before you today. As the Chairman
mentioned, my name is Doug Carr. I am the vice president for
safety, security, and regulation at the National Business
Aviation Association.
NBAA's over 9,000 members represent a wide variety of
companies who all operate business aircraft to support their
travel needs, or are involved in the support of the business
aviation industry.
In my role at NBAA, I have had the opportunity to work with
TSA since its early days as an agency, and have served in a
number of advisory capacities. That includes currently serving
as the co-chairman of the TSA's Aviation Security Advisory
Committee, General Aviation's subgroup.
Let me start by reaffirming the general aviation's
community to working with our Government leaders to improve
security for our transportation system. We continue to seek
productive and innovative ways to partner with the Federal
Government to develop reasonable and effective security
regulations, policies, and programs that ensure our National
security while facilitating general aviation operations. This
includes the Alien Flight School Program.
Business aviation, as you have heard earlier, is a vital
portion of our National economy. With over $100 billion worth
of economic output each year, and over 1 million employees
involved in the industry, it is a vital part of our economy.
The operations conducted by business aviation are wide and
diverse, including firefighting, EMS operations, agricultural,
to law enforcement, non-profit, and business operations of all
shapes and sizes.
Many small and rural communities are connected to the
broader transportation system by business aviation aircraft.
These companies that utilize these aircraft also recognize the
value of giving back to their local citizens through
participation in charity, and charitable organizations such as
the Corporate Angel Network, the Veterans Airlift Command, and
Angel Flight, that provide free transportation to cancer
patients, to military veterans and their families, and to
others needing medical assistance.
As has been mentioned earlier, the general aviation
community has been very proactive in working with TSA and other
Government agencies in the development of a number of security
enhancements for our community. These include the development
of a toll-free hotline to report suspicious activity at
general-aviation airports; a recommendation to issue
Government-issued, tamper-proof identification for pilots;
financial transaction monitoring improvements; and TSA
guidelines for aircraft, for general aviation aircraft, and
airport operators.
The focus of today's hearing being the Alien Flight School
Program, is one of TSA's programs that affect many people
beyond our borders. It is important, I think, that we look at
some of the improvements that have been made in the program
since its early days.
Initially, the program required a foreign flight-training
candidate to come to the United States to initiate that
clearance process, and often then wait here for 30 to 45 days
as that clearance process took place.
Today, the candidate no longer is required to come to the
United States, and that clearance process takes only a few
days. That has significantly improved the system for the
flight-training candidate, and for the flight schools who have
to schedule a number of simulators, classrooms, instructors,
and aircraft.
But as with any program, there is always room for
improvement. We look forward to working with TSA following this
hearing to address many of the issues raised by the GAO report.
Some of the things that we have addressed with TSA that
will come as no surprise to them, in terms of areas of
improvement, include the area identified by Mr. Hennig, dealing
with focusing the clearance on the candidate, as opposed to the
training event. We believe that will allow TSA to focus its
resources in areas that will have a dramatic improvement.
In addition, we believe that increased guidance and
regulatory support for helping flight schools identify exactly
what they need to do to comply with the rules, will eliminate
much of the ambiguity and variability that exists today across
the flight-school community in complying with the Alien Flight
School Program.
In addition to improving guidance related to a unique
situation, dealing with dry-leasing of full flight motion
simulators, the U.S. flight-training industry, we believe, is
the best in the world. These flight schools produce students
that are well qualified to fly in both private and commercial
environments throughout the world. Thousands of U.S. jobs are
supported by the U.S. flight-training industry.
We should ensure that our regulations and policies not only
eliminate and prevent the opportunity for terrorists to exploit
that system, but also to ensure that our flight-training
industry remains the best in the world. Thank you for the
opportunity to be here today, and I look forward to answering
any of your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carr follows:]
Prepared Statement of Douglas Carr
July 18, 2012
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, Members of the
subcommittee, on behalf of the more than 9,000 members of the National
Business Aviation Association (NBAA), we appreciate this opportunity to
provide our views at this important hearing on general aviation
security and American flight schools.
I am Doug Carr and I serve as vice president for safety, security,
and regulation at the National Business Aviation Association based here
in Washington, DC. NBAA represents over 9,000 diverse companies with
one thing in common--they all depend on general aviation aircraft for
the conduct of their business. In this position, I have worked with the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) since its first days as a
Government agency and have served in several advisory capacities, which
include currently serving as co-chairman of the Aviation Security
Advisory Committee (ASAC) General Aviation Subgroup.
The general aviation community is committed to the security of our
National transportation system. We continue to seek productive ways to
partner with the Federal Government on developing reasonable, workable,
and effective regulations that simultaneously ensure security and
facilitate general aviation operations. This includes the TSA's Alien
Flight Student Program (AFSP).
facts about business aviation
From creating growth opportunities and global connectivity for
America's small towns and rural areas to supporting the Nation's
productivity, business aviation is an important economic engine,
creating jobs and investment, while contributing to the world's leading
aviation system. Business aviation is absolutely essential as U.S.
companies work to compete in a global marketplace. Simply put, business
aviation is a vital part of the Nation's economy and transportation
system.
Business aviation is defined by the FAA as the use of any general
aviation aircraft (piston or turbine) for a business purpose. NBAA was
founded 67 years ago to represent companies that utilize general
aviation aircraft as a tool for meeting some of their transportation
challenges. While NBAA member companies purchase billions of dollars
per year in commercial airline tickets, there are critical situations
where the use of a general aviation aircraft is indispensible. For U.S.
companies to be successful in these challenging economic times, every
business tool must be available--including general aviation aircraft.
General aviation is an essential economic generator, contributing
more than $150 billion to annual U.S. economic output, and employing
more than 1 million people. Most general aviation aircraft operating
around the world are manufactured and/or completed in the United
States, and our industry is continuing to build a strong American
manufacturing and employment base that contributes positively to our
National balance of trade.
General aviation includes diverse operations, with business uses
that range from agriculture, to law enforcement, to fire and rescue
services, to varied Government, educational, nonprofit organizations
and businesses of all sizes. Servicing and supporting these
organizations are FBO's, maintenance technicians, suppliers, and
service providers.
Business aviation is not only an economic lifeline for thousands of
our Nation's smaller communities; it also supports people and
communities in times of crisis in the United States and around the
world.
General aviation has snapped into action when there's a need to
confront floods in the Midwest, fires in the West, or a whole host of
other natural disasters. The business aviation community--working
mostly on a volunteer basis--has always been quick to help assess
damage, rescue those affected by these disasters, and carry in
lifesaving support and supplies to the affected regions.
In addition, hundreds of GA operators carried thousands of
passengers and over a million pounds of supplies to and from Haiti
after the devastating earthquake there. In fact, Congress passed a
resolution commending general aviation for its response to the crisis.
The people who rely on a general aviation aircraft for business are
also dedicated to helping provide life-saving flights to the
communities in which they live and work. Operations like the Corporate
Angel Network arrange free air transportation for cancer patients
traveling to treatment using the empty seats aboard business airplanes.
Angel Flight America's seven member organizations and 7,200 volunteer
pilots arrange flights to carry patients to medical facilities.
The Veterans Airlift Command uses business airplanes and unused
hours of fractional aircraft ownership programs to provide free flights
for medical and other purposes for wounded service members, veterans,
and their families. Veterans Airlift finds volunteers in the business
aviation community to fly missions on request and contribute the full
cost of their aircraft and fuel for the missions flown.
economic challenges facing business aviation
Unfortunately, the people and businesses in general aviation, like
other industries, are weathering one of the worst economic storms
anyone has ever seen. The impact of the flagging economy on the
companies and communities that rely on general aviation is visible in
all parts of the country.
Over the past few years, we saw business aviation flying decrease
by as much as 35 percent in some locations--which unfortunately led to
thousands of layoffs across the industry and country. While we have
seen some uptick in flight activity in recent months, activity is still
below the 2008 levels and experts agree that the recovery will be slow
and gradual over the next several years.
tsa's alien flight student program (afsp)
Since the events of 9/11, NBAA and indeed the entire general
aviation community has been very proactive in enhancing security by
developing and implementing a large number of workable and effective
security measures.
The general aviation community has worked closely with several
Government agencies including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
and the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and this
partnership approach has produced tangible results. The security
measures we have implemented include the creation of a toll-free
general aviation security reporting hotline for any suspicious activity
at an airport, the monitoring of aircraft financing transactions, a new
requirement for Government-issued, tamper-proof photo IDs for pilots,
and guidelines for security at general aviation airports and an AOPA
Airport Watch program. In addition, 8 years ago, NBAA members in the NY
area voluntarily initiated a pilot program to design a security program
specifically for operations in that area.
The Alien Flight School Program (AFSP) represents one of TSA's
programs that affect many people beyond our borders. The goal of the
program, we believe, is vital in protecting our National security.
While the program initially created a substantial burden for foreign
citizens seeking flight training in the United States, recent program
changes and continued feedback from the flight training industry have
produced improvements not only in the program, but also for foreign
flight training candidates.
It is important that we note the improvements made in the Alien
Flight School Program since its inception. When the program began, it
was common for a flight training candidate to come to the United States
for processing, only to then wait an additional 30-45 days for a review
and approval to then begin training. These days, processing takes only
a few days and does not require the candidate to come to the United
States in advance. The improvements made to the clearance process have
reduced the uncertainty of securing a clearance while improving the
flight school's ability to schedule classroom, simulator, and aircraft
training.
These improvements resulted from on-going and collaborative
feedback from the flight training industry and is an example of how we
can work together to overcome challenges. NBAA looks forward to
partnering with DHS and TSA in working to address concerns raised by
the recent GAO report. This hearing today will be extremely beneficial
in this effort.
We continue to work with the TSA on other areas of the AFSP that
need improvement. These include:
Assigning a security clearance to an individual, not a
training event.--Currently, a flight school must submit an
individual for clearance for every training event he or she
attends, regardless of how many training visits this entails.
We believe that one candidate-centric review should suffice for
a defined period of time, perhaps 5 years, regardless of the
number of training events.
Improving regulatory guidance.--Flight schools still face a
wide variety of interpretation regarding various, sometimes
basic elements of the program. More standardized guidance to
flight schools about the program would assist with compliance
and oversight.
Dry leasing of simulators.--Current guidance requires both
the simulator owner and simulator lessor to submit candidates
for clearance. This seems duplicative and does not appear to
enhance security. Updating TSA's guidance on who should submit
names for clearance would greatly reduce the burden on both the
Government and the industry in the clearance process.
We strongly believe that the U.S. flight training industry is the
best in the world. Students leave U.S. flight schools very well
prepared to deal with the challenges of private and commercial flying
regimes throughout the world. Thousands of jobs in the United States
are supported directly from the flight training industry and our
policies and regulations should not only ensure that flight candidates
do not represent a security threat to our Nation, but also continue to
appropriately support the United States as the preeminent flight
training location in the world.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Jackson Lee and Members of the
subcommittee, the general aviation community is grateful for the
tremendous leadership this committee has provided as we collectively
work to address these vital homeland security issues.
We would like also to note the efforts of this committee to support
the inclusion of the GA community in the TSA ASAC process--including
most recently in Ranking Member Thompson's ``Aviation Security
Stakeholder Participation Act'' (HR 1477)--which passed the House on
June 28. On behalf of NBAA, I would like to reiterate our appreciation
to the committee for your continued support for general aviation.
Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Carr. The Chairman now
recognizes himself for 5 minutes of questions.
Mr. Lord, isn't it true that, based on your report, the
Transportation Security Administration cannot assure the
American people that foreign terrorists are not in this country
learning how to fly airplanes? Yes or no?
Mr. Lord. At this time, no.
Mr. Rogers. That is what I thought. Mr. Wilson, who bears
responsibility for that?
Mr. Wilson. Ultimately, the Transportation Security
Administration is responsible for the Alien Flight Student
Program. During Mr. Lord's testimony in the GAO report, what
was not noted was that there is an additional Federal agency
that has the autonomy to allow Alien Flight students to also
begin training. That was not captured during the testimony.
When he spoke of several weaknesses, and there was a
disconnect between the FAA's registry information and TSA's
AFSP database, no one really looked into the other Federal
agency to see how many of those were vetted through that
particular agency.
Mr. Rogers. But shouldn't the TSA know--shouldn't they be
working in coordination with Immigration and Customs
Enforcement and other Federal agencies to know who is being
vetted and approved and who is not?
Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir. As you have heard before from all
these panel members before me today, you have heard that TSA
has done a tremendous job in the collaboration with our
stakeholders, as well as other Federal agencies.
We have increased our--treaty engagement very greatly in
the last 24 months. This panel here recognizes that TSA is
making its best effort to ensure that we address the
inefficiencies in all of our problems, not just the Alien
Flight Student Program, as well as addressing all of the
vulnerabilities.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Wilson, I beg to differ with you. The only
thing that TSA has done a tremendous job of is losing the
American people's confidence. GAO identified this, Mr. Wilson.
GAO identified examples where foreign nationals were rejected
by TSA but somehow managed to complete flight training anyway.
How is that possible?
Mr. Wilson. Chairman Rogers, I don't recall seeing that in
the GAO report. What I do recall seeing is that there are
individuals that were still being adjudicated through the
vetting process that hadn't been allowed to conduct flight
training.
As I said earlier in my testimony, sir, the first line of
defense in order to prevent these individuals from protecting
flight training is our flight training providers. Flight
training providers are not supposed to allow these individuals
to begin in training until they have received information from
TSA that these individuals have undergone and completed a
successful----
Mr. Rogers. What about if a certain time period lapses
without the TSA making a determination? Are they allowed to go
ahead and start their training?
Mr. Wilson. Yes sir, they are.
Mr. Rogers. So they can get trained without TSA?
Mr. Wilson. They can begin training, but within a certain
period of time we continuously vet these individuals until we
can determine whether or not that they are suited to begin
flight training or not.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Lord, you heard my question a minute ago
about the foreign nationals who were rejected by TSA somehow
managing to get flight training anyway. Is that not in your
report?
Mr. Lord. Yes, that is the second example we provide under
the vetting process. We didn't use the word rejection. We said
they initiated the vetting process, but did not receive an
affirmative response from TSA yet they were still able to go on
and take flight training.
For the record, I would like to respond to one comment Mr.
Wilson made. The one agency he indicates we did not mention, it
is fully discussed in the SSI version of our report. So I just
want to be clear. We have a full understanding of the vetting
process and all the various Government agencies involved.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I agree, and nobody's hands are clean.
Mr. Woods, obviously this committee is concerned about this
report and its finding. Are you concerned about it?
Mr. Woods. We are concerned, and we are working closely
with our DHS counterparts with TSA to ensure that their
procedures in vetting these Alien Flight students goes the
right way. We have been working with them for over a year now,
and as I used in my opening statement, in correcting the
processes they use in the vetting process. They were previously
using for immigration checks the database that would not
necessarily determine an immigration status. So we are making
sure they use the right database, and we are working with the
program to ensure that they determine the right status before
they give that clearance.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. You learned about these report's findings
preliminarily 2 months ago. Have you already started programs
or processes to remedy these problems?
Mr. Woods. Absolutely, previous to even the report being
issued based on the--as I said, the TJ aviation investigation.
Mr. Rogers. Can you tell this committee a time certain in
which you think that those remedies will be completely in place
and satisfactorily operating?
Mr. Woods. From what I understand, TSA plans to issue a
report by December outlining their new policies and procedures.
Mr. Rogers. Goodness gracious. We have got to wait until
December to find out what you all are going to do to fix this?
I mean, surely you can tell us that you have remedied these
problems, Mr. Wilson, without having to wait to December.
Mr. Wilson. Chairman Rogers, we have remedied the
situation. What we were talking about and we are providing in
December is a report based on the activities that we recover
from the time frame that we complete this process up until
December. We do have a plan in place. We are working very
closely with ICE in terms of automating the process to ensure
that TSA is also checking for immigration status, as well as
the terrorist screening database.
The individuals that are being vetted today are undergoing
a TSDB check. They are undergoing the--criminal history check,
as well as the tax check. We also discussed immigration
concerns with ICE. When there is an individual that is
identified as having immigration issues, we immediately prevent
them from taking training and discuss it with ICE.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. My time is expired. The Chairman now
recognizes Mr. Davis for 5 minutes.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Wilson,
GAO's report states that TSA has not ensured that all foreign
nationals seeking flight training in the United States have
been vetted through the Alien Flight Student Program prior to
beginning training.
Further, it states that TSA has not established controls to
help verify the identity of individuals seeking flight training
who claim U.S. citizenship. What responsibility does a flight
training school have to ensure that a foreign national seeking
flight training has been vetted through the Alien Flight
Student Program prior to training beginning?
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Davis. As I stated earlier,
flight training providers, as regulated under this program, are
required to wait for TSA to tell them that these individuals
have completed a security threat assessment. Our first line of
defense in preventing these individuals from flying is the
flight school. It is the flight training providers.
The second thing: TSA does inspections yearly, sir. We do
approximately 7,000 inspections of the flight training
providers. We have a 96 percent compliance rate. That is a very
high percentage, 96 percent. When we talk about whether or not
these individuals haven't been vetted or processed through
TSA's program, once again, no one has really addressed that
there is another Federal agency that also vets these
individuals prior to them starting flight training.
Mr. Davis. Well, does TSA have any process in place to
verify the citizenship of persons who self-certify as U.S.
citizens?
Mr. Wilson. Sir, in regards to that particular question,
the information--I can't go into great details about that
information. It is SSI.
But I will tell you that issue is a Government-wide issue
in terms of verifying the U.S. citizenship, not only within the
general aviation community but through various other
transportation sectors and other communities as well. We do
understand it is an issue. We do understand it is a concern. We
are taking the necessary steps to look at some technology that
will be applicable to certain activity.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Woods, let me ask you: How can ICE support
TSA's on-going process to vet foreign nationals prior to
training at a flight school?
Mr. Woods. Representative Davis, thank you. We have been
for the past year vetting TSA's Alien Flight School population.
We have vetted over 19,200 individuals for them for their
immigration status. As I said in my oral statement, we have
identified 30 possible individuals that were here unlawfully or
overstayed their visa, and we sent those leads out to the field
under Operation Clipped Wings to initiative investigations.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Wilson, according to your testimony, since
2001 the Alien Flight Student Program has vetted over 350,000
applications of approximately 125,000 unique individuals. What
would cause the same individual to be vetted multiple times,
and is there a more efficient system that could be put in place
to prevent this?
Mr. Wilson. Senator Davis, yes sir. Mr. Hennig to my left
here brought that issue up during his oral testimony.
When an individual applies for training, whether it is
Category 1, Category 2, or Category 3 or 4, each time that
individual applies for training, he or she must go through that
same vetting process again. The program itself is set up that
way. It has become an issue in the industry, and the industry
has identified that this is costly, and at times is sometimes
as well as burdensome.
As Mr. Hennig said earlier, in order for TSA to really
address this issue and this concern, it is going to take
rulemaking. I have sat down with our leadership to discuss the
applicable tool in order to address the concerns of the AFSP.
But we have gotten a tremendous amount of support and input
from our stakeholders, training providers, as well as Mr.
Hennig's association.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I see my time
is about to expire.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. What was that thing you
said? In order for us to be successful, we are going to have to
have what?
Mr. Wilson. In what terms? I am sorry, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Right at the end of your statement, you said in
order for us to be successful we are going to have to have, and
I missed that word.
Mr. Wilson. I am sorry. We will have to conduct rulemaking.
Mr. Rogers. Rulemaking. Okay. All right. Thank you. I just
couldn't hear it. All right. The Chairman will now recognize
Mr. Cravaack for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the panel
for being here today. You know, it is kind of a personal note
here is that Moussaoui was actually flying the same simulators
I flew at Northwest Airlines. So this is kind of a personal
issue with me.
Mr. Wilson, thank you very much for your service in the Air
Force. Appreciate your service to this great country of ours.
From important testimony, it appears that not all--my
understanding is not all flight attendees are actually going
through the screening before they actually start flight
training. Did I hear you say that correctly?
Mr. Wilson. What I said earlier, sir, there is a percentage
of individuals that do not process through the TSA AFSP. There
is an additional Federal agency that we will not discuss today
because that information is SSI that has its own process. That
is what I said, sir.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. So just to make sure I am clear on
this, before anybody steps into any type of training, they have
to be totally--the promise is everyone is cleared if everybody
is doing their job at the flight training schools?
Mr. Wilson. That is correct, sir. If everyone is doing
their job, a flight training provider is not permitted to allow
anyone to conduct training, unless cleared by TSA or the
additional--or the other agency that we cannot speak about
today.
Mr. Cravaack. Roger that. Okay. Mr. Lord, can you comment
on that?
Mr. Lord. Yes. What he said is technically accurate, but I
just want to clarify something. Again, we did--we compared the
two databases. We found the discrepancy. We asked them, we
asked TSA what percent is doing to--you know, for legitimate
reasons as allowed by this other agency he is referencing, and
we could not get any granularity beyond that.
We found a discrepancy, but TSA couldn't explain what
portion of the discrepancy was contributed by this one other
Government agency Mr. Wilson is referring to. So we think they
need to do some more work and figure that out.
People aren't getting vetted. We want to know, is it
because it is this other Government agency, or is it for some
other reasons? That is what our recommendation is intended to
accomplish. We think that is where they need to do some more
homework.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. I understand that. Mr. Wilson, I guess
you have taken that for action?
Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir, Mr. Cravaack. We have already been in
active engagement, that other agency, to ensure that the
information that they collect on the students that they are
endorsing is shared with TSA--training.
So what you will see is in the next month or so is that
that particular issue has been addressed and the mitigation
plans are underway.
Mr. Cravaack. With this other agency, are you finding
compliance and cooperation?
Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir, we are.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. Excellent. That is what we need to
hear. Now, Mr. Wilson, do you go back, and do you go ahead and
you--I think you said the percentage was 96 percent. You go
back, and you ensure that there is some type of audit being
done, that there is no one slipping through the cracks. Would
that be a correct statement?
Mr. Wilson. That is correct, sir. In 2011--well, let me go
back first. We normally implement one comprehensive inspection
per year for our 7,000 flight-training providers.
In 2011, we actually inspected each flight-training
provider twice with the 96 percent compliance rate, and 4
percent of non-compliance rate. We talk about non-compliance,
we are talking about administrative issues, not something very
egregious.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. That was the last time you did, in
2007. Are you planning to do it again, or are you doing
annually, or----
Mr. Wilson. I am sorry, sir. Say it again?
Mr. Cravaack. You said in 2007----
Mr. Wilson. No, sir, 2011, we actually----
Mr. Cravaack. 2011.
Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir. 2011, we conducted two inspections
per flight-training provider.
Mr. Cravaack. Sorry, I am a half-deaf helicopter pilot. Mr.
Lord, on page 27 of the report, you say that the TSA has only
afforded the same level of access to FBI databases that a
private company doing a background check would be.
In your report, you say that the FBI and the TSA were
collaborating on options, but had not identified the extent
which the potential security risk may exist under the current
process, and the cost of benefits pursuing alternate--
alternatives to provide additional access.
What is the likelihood in your opinion of allowing a
terrorist in, because the TSA is not having a higher level
access to the FBI systems?
Mr. Lord. That is difficult to answer directly. But we
studied this issue in great detail. I should mention it is not
unique to the Alien Flight School Program. It is a Government-
wide issue.
TSA has limited access to the FBI database because they are
considered a non-criminal justice agency, and the searches they
are running are considered for non-criminal-justice purposes.
So we, in our prior report, we recommended TSA and FBI get
together to explore options for giving them greater access. If
you do a criminal history records check, there is a lot of
information, especially at the State and local level, that they
don't have visibility over.
So we think that would improve their vetting process. But
again, it is a Government-wide issue, and TSA's constraint on
multiple fronts in running criminal-history records checks
because of this.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Lord, Mr.
Wilson. My time is expired. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. Chairman now recognizes
Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson. Mr. Thompson, you have 5 minutes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I would
like to have my written statement entered into the record.
[The statement of Mr. Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
July 18, 2012
The issue of General Aviation security has long been of great
interest to the Democratic Members of this committee. I am pleased the
subcommittee is turning its attention to this issue today. At the
outset, I would like to thank all of the witnesses for appearing before
the subcommittee today.
In particular, I would like to thank the Government Accountability
Office for their diligent work on the report on general aviation
security they are releasing today. GAO undertook this report as a
result of a joint request by both the Chair and the Ranking Members of
the full committee and the subcommittee. We made the request because of
our shared interests in identifying areas where TSA's policies
affecting a large segment of the aviation community are working and
need increased attention.
Before focusing on the challenges highlighted by the report, I
would like to commend TSA for enhancing its collaboration with the
general aviation community. In passing legislation that I introduced
this Congress to statutorily authorize the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee, this Congress has indicated its desire that TSA and the
General Aviation industry cooperate to improve the security of the
General Aviation sector.
I look forward to hearing from both TSA and the stakeholders before
us today on how increased collaboration has and will continue to
enhance security. Turning to the challenges identified by GAO, TSA must
answer for its shortfalls in identifying whether non-U.S. citizens
obtaining flight training represent a threat.
We cannot allow loopholes exploited by the 9/11 hijackers to be
exploited again. However, we cannot ignore that violent domestic
extremists can also pose a threat to our aviation security.
The last individual to fly a plane into a building and kill
innocent civilians in this country was not a foreign national or
``Islamist extremist,'' it was a United States citizen with an
extremist and violent ideology regarding the Internal Revenue Service.
I look forward to hearing from TSA about the measures they have
employed to ensure that such a scenario does not occur again and our
current capacity to identify persons who may pose a threat.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony this
morning. One of the concerns I have is between TSA and ICE's
coordination role. Are we to understand that there exists a
memorandum of agreement between the two agencies to coordinate?
Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Chairman Thompson, that is correct, sir. We
have a memorandum of agreement in place, where we are sharing
information with ICE, as well as ICE is sharing information
with us.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Woods, is that your testimony, too?
Mr. Woods. We do share information under the information-
sharing agreements, all through DHS. I am not aware of an
incident of our specific memorandum. We do share information on
a regular basis.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Lord, were you able to get a copy of that
agreement?
Mr. Lord. I notice, there appears to be some confusion on
what the nature of this agreement is. Is it in fact an MOU, or
does it take up some other form? But this again, we have a copy
of the MOU between TSA and FAA. Whatever this other agreement
is, we were just alerted to this yesterday in fact.
So we are going to follow up on this. I would like to know
a little bit more about it. Is it an MOU, or does it take some
other form? What are they going to do with the information once
they get it? I think that is just as important, if not more
important.
Mr. Thompson. So you see from a policy perspective, if we
are trying to create a law that makes sense, at least the
agencies who are tasked with the responsibility. One says yes.
One says maybe. Another says, ``Well, I just heard about it
yesterday.''
You know, training goes on every day. So we have a problem.
In addition to that, Mr. Wilson, can you provide me with the
copy of whatever agreement you reference?
Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir. I will get that to you today.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Woods, can you provide the committee with
whatever agreements that you understand we operate under----
Mr. Woods. Absolutely.
Mr. Thompson [continuing]. With respect to this? Now, Mr.
Wilson, would a U.S. citizen on the no-fly list be able to
obtain flight training without undergoing a security threat
assessment?
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Thompson, that is correct. But keep in
mind, the way the program is set up, there are--there is
layered security put in place. You are right.
Initially, a U.S. citizen who is on the no-fly list could
commence flight training. But once the individual receives a
flight certificate, an FAA certificate, that individual is
bounced against the various databases as well, perpetually
vetted, meaning that individual was vetted once a day, once a
week.
Mr. Thompson. Well, I guess my concern is, the last time we
had somebody do something wrong, it was a U.S. citizen who flew
into an Internal Revenue building in Texas a couple years ago.
But if we train them, and the only thing we don't do is
provide a license, then we have created a problem at that
moment. I don't think somebody who wants to do harm is going to
not do harm because they don't have a license. We have trained
them to do it. That is my concern.
If flight training is the public policy question for this
committee, why do we have a policy for training U.S. citizens,
and a policy for training non-U.S. citizens, and the same
schools are training the same people? Mr. Lord, you want to try
that?
Mr. Lord. I think you are raising a good policy question. I
am just an auditor, and that is probably best left to Congress
to decide, whether the scope of the program should be expanded.
Mr. Wilson is correct. If you are a U.S. citizen, you are
not subject to this Alien Flight School vetting process. It
is--that is----
Mr. Thompson. The point is, is that we could--the last time
we had an incident since 9/11 using an airplane, it was a U.S.
citizen. I think if we are going to look at one segment of the
threat, let's look at the entire segment of the threat, and see
if we can fix the whole threat. That is the public policy
question.
Mr. Lord. Yes. This question as to what extent do you want
to vet people against a terrorist watch list, regardless if
they are a U.S. or not, I think that is a question you are
answering.
Under the current process described by Mr. Wilson, once you
get an airman certificate, once you learn to fly, get a pilot's
license, you are perpetually vetted. But in some respects, that
may be too late. The person has already learned to fly an
aircraft.
So if I hear you correctly, you are suggesting they move
that vetting process up earlier. But again, there would be some
administrative regulatory costs, I am sure, are associated----
Mr. Thompson. I just think the reasonable approach is to
say you can apply for the training. But until you are vetted,
you don't receive the training. Now, I don't understand how
difficult that is. I mean, how much would that cost?
Mr. Lord. I don't have that information. Perhaps Mr. Wilson
would have some more information on this.
Mr. Thompson. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. It is mind-blowing. Mr. Walberg is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to the
witnesses to be here today with us.
Mr. Hennig, what responsibilities do flight-school
operators, instructors, have in reducing security
vulnerabilities?
Mr. Hennig. Well, the way that regulation is structured,
there are really three. There is adherence-to-visa policy,
which is going through ICE. There is adherence to the Alien
Flight Student Program specifically on the vetting of any
foreign nationals taking training. Then of course, there is
also requirement of--it is part of the same rule, which is
focused on training the employees, so the flight school to be
aware of security.
This predates the ``See Something, Say Something,'' which
is a big program here at DHS discussing today. But ever since
this rule was put in place in 2004, every employee of that
flight school is told to look for things that are suspicious.
So within the flight-training community, we have one of the
most involved training process, to just raise the awareness
about things to look for.
Mr. Walberg. Is there anything that Congress, TSA, ICE,
FAA, any other Federal entities that are involved, could do to
help the industry carry out these requirements and these
responsibilities? I would ask Mr. Carr as well to respond to
that.
Mr. Hennig. Well, for our members, whatever rule we are
talking about, give us a clear framework that we can comply
with. As I discuss in my testimony, what we have struggled with
over the past several years is that the rule was written very
quickly. It was, you know, just a couple of years after 9/11
and there was not enough time to really structure a good
framework.
Give us a clear framework for how to comply with TSA rules
and ICE rules and the flight schools will do their utmost to do
so. When you look at the GAO's recommendations specifically,
what I see as a good benefit is the data flow, especially
within agencies of the Department of Homeland Security. As
industry, I hate duplicative activities.
So if I am providing some data to ICE, if I am supplying
some data to TSA, I am in the hope that they are sharing data
with each other. So those kind of things between the clear
regulatory framework and then the Government just working with
itself to share any data because we don't see that obviously as
industry.
Mr. Walberg. You are not certain that they are sharing
this. That is my common concern.
Mr. Hennig. My understanding of the briefing on the GAO
report that I have received is that one of the shortfalls, at
least a few years ago, was the data sharing about visa status
between ICE and the TSA.
Mr. Walberg. Mr. Carr, additional?
Mr. Carr. I would like to support what Mr. Hennig has
mentioned in terms of greater clarity in terms of the
requirements that flight schools are required to comply with.
As is common across Government, when it comes to regulatory
guidance and compliance, better guidance, better clarity from
the Government on exactly what is required to not only comply
with the rule, but to then show compliance has always aided the
private industry in ensuring that not only are we meeting our
requirements to comply with the rule in letter but also in
spirit, so that when we are faced with an audit or an
inspection, it is pretty clear to demonstrate that I either am
or am not meeting the requirements.
Mr. Walberg. In your organization's view, how effective is
the AFSP program? How effective is it working for you?
Mr. Hennig. Especially in the past several years, it has
gotten a lot better. Our--one of the biggest problems early on
was the timeliness of the vets. These are businesses trying to
compete for contracts to train pilots. Early on, we were--we
were signing up contracts. We were scheduling training times,
and we would be--we would be bringing people over here and put
them up in a hotel down in Florida waiting for the TSA vet.
That has changed drastically. TSA is doing a great job
lately. For the vast majority of vets that we are looking to
have done on foreign nationals arriving in the United States,
it is done within 24 to 48 hours. It is predictable, and that
is very useful for our members.
Mr. Walberg. It is predictable, but you said the vast
majority. Why aren't--why isn't it the majority? Why isn't it
the full majority?
Mr. Hennig. It is actually the system working the way it is
supposed to. The vast majority of the people who are not in any
way a concern to the TSA or others are cleared within 24 to 48
hours. The person that requires some additional attention
experiences longer times. It may be a name that is very similar
to another name. It may be something else that raises a
concern.
So from the framework of how the system should work, I
think where the TSA has gotten us, where 24 to 48 hours for
most people and then if there is attention maybe a few more
days, it is predictable and we know what to expect.
Mr. Carr. If I could add to Mr. Hennig's statement, the
notion that coming to the United States to receive your flight
training because it is so good is I think something very
positive. We should look to the U.S. flight training industry.
It is significant. It is very robust, and the world looks to us
to train pilots.
The improvements that TSA has made over the past several
years in the program I think have changed a trend where we have
flight training going elsewhere, going to other countries where
this kind of program is not in place. These improvements are
really helping to restore the United States to its preeminence
as the world's leader in flight training.
The--the vast majority of people that are coming to the
United States do not pose the kinds of threats that I believe
we are concerned about. However, where they do, the program
absolutely is effective in at least raising that awareness.
But I think what we have seen with GAO is that there are
lots of opportunities for improvement, and we definitely want
to work with TSA to help close those loopholes so we are not
exploited and the flight schools aren't exploited in doing
something they shouldn't be.
Mr. Walberg. Okay. Thank you. I see my time is expired.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chairman now
recognizes Mr. Lungren from California for 5 minutes of
questions.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Carr, I
think you made a good point. We are preeminent in the world, or
have been, in terms of flight training. Might have something to
do that manned flight started here, and hopefully we keep that
up. If I am flying on a foreign carrier, I would certainly feel
better about it in most cases if a pilot was trained under our
standards. I think we ought not to lose sight of that.
Let me ask you this: There has been raised the question of
doing checks on American citizens, American residents, as well
as aliens. Mr. Hennig, Mr. Carr, do you see any problem with
that?
Mr. Carr. Let me offer maybe just some perspectives, in
that the applications that are required to be completed to
begin your flight training process, which often begins with an
FAA airman medical certificate and then follow on your FAA
pilot certificate, there is a lot of information that is
required in those applications that I think give the Government
access to other sources of data that would allow a realistic
assessment of the threat posed by an individual.
The data that is available to non-U.S. citizens is, in our
view, a little harder to get. The U.S. Government doesn't
always have access to the same data sets for foreign citizens
that they for U.S. citizens. I think that is where the vetting
process has real value to bring that visibility to non-U.S.
citizens who are training in the United States where, for our
own citizens, we have hopefully a better data set that we can
make some realistic determinations with.
Mr. Hennig. I think there is a risk approach that lends
itself to this. About 1 in 20 people trained are holding an FAA
airman certificated as a foreign national. If we were to expand
that to U.S. citizens as well, TSA would have to expand its
resources by 20 times. I have certainly appreciated the focus
of TSA to, so to say, reduce the size of the haystack. It is
terminology we often hear from the administrator.
So if we want to look at a broader scope, as long as risk
and especially data sharing of what already exists within the
FAA and what already exists within other agencies about these
individuals, maybe the first step to explore before you expand
the program by orders of magnitude.
Mr. Lungren. Would it make sense to you or would it seem
logical or illogical to you that we might look at the no-fly
list for those people who are wanting to become pilots?
Mr. Hennig. When we look at other TSA programs that have
supplied to general aviation, the vetting that those pilots who
are flying those types of aircraft, we are talking about
regulated programs that are already in place, some of them
established by Congress, the no-fly list is certainly one of
the vets that the person goes through specifically, but it is
also criminal history, record check, and other things that are
subject to those pilots.
But again, in those cases it is based on what the pilot is
able to fly, so there is a risk discussion about what actually
the threat and the consequences would be from the event.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Carr, you mention in your written
testimony that we could have some better operations of the
program that currently exists, the AFSP program, and you say
that assigning a security clearance to an individual is not a
training event. Can you tell us exactly what you mean by that?
Mr. Carr. Certainly. As Mr. Hennig mentioned earlier in his
testimony, and one which we completely agree with, today's
process for vetting is triggered any time a candidate presents
themselves for training, regardless of how many times that
candidate comes for training.
Aviation--the aviation industry requires a lot of regular
training and checking to ensure compliance with the
regulations. Our view is that repetitive training cycles should
not necessarily be the focus of the vetting. The individual
should be the focus of the vetting.
If we are able to develop a construct that allows an
individual to be vetted once and allow that clearance to be
valid for a period of time, perhaps as much as 5 years, that
would allow the individual to return to training as often as is
needed without involving duplicative additional processes that
are technically the same.
Mr. Lungren. What if the training is of a higher level?
Would not it be good information for the vetting agency to know
that someone who may have just started out at one level of
ability is now seeking another level?
Mr. Hennig. What we have proposed is today you have four
different types of vetting that the TSA makes the person
subject to based on the size of the aircraft. The proposal,
which we believe TSA has endorsed publicly, is for a single,
standardized vet applying to everybody. Then, in combination
with that, a reporting back to TSA when any type of training
occurs. So we actually bring everybody up to the highest level
of check, and then----
Mr. Lungren. Then you would report each time they come for
training and that would go to TSA. Then it would be on TSA's
shoulders to utilize that information as we direct them or as
they see fit in the program.
Mr. Hennig. Yes, sir. We will comply with providing the
data, and it is for them to do the appropriate checks on that
individual.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chairman now
recognizes Mr. Walsh of Illinois for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walsh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, panel.
Comment for me on whether this following statement is true: As
things are today, a person who would not be allowed to board a
commercial plane as a passenger, as policy is today would be
allowed to receive training to fly that commercial plane. Mr.
Carr, Mr. Wilson, let's start there. As things are today, a
typical person who would not be allowed to board a plane as a
passenger would be allowed to receive training to begin to fly
that commercial plane.
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Walsh, this is going back to the similar
question that Mr. Thompson asked earlier about individual U.S.
citizens who are considered no-flies is basically what you are
talking about. Yes, in theory, yes, they would be allowed to
conduct----
Mr. Walsh. They would not be allowed to board a plane as a
passenger.
Mr. Wilson. Right. They would not be allowed to board an
airplane as a passenger, but they could engage and enter flight
training. Now keep in mind, when you talk about--you just said
something about the individual being allowed to fly the same
aircraft that he or she is being prevented from getting on. It
takes a very long time for the individual to get to that type
of rating.
The individual will start off in a Category 1 status, which
would mean that once they get their airman certificated under
Cat 1, that individually is perpetually vetted. Once they
receive that first certificate, they are perpetually vetted. It
is going to take several hours before they work their way up to
a multi-engine aircraft.
Mr. Walsh. Right. It may take time, but they can't set--
that person couldn't set foot on that plane as a passenger, yet
they can begin to receive training to fly that plane no matter
how long it takes.
Mr. Wilson. Correct. That is correct.
Mr. Walsh. Does that make sense?
Mr. Wilson. Well, as we said earlier, what you are posing
is that we are looking--we should be looking at anyone and
everyone that wants to take training regardless of their
status, whether it is a U.S. citizen or it is an alien. As Mr.
Hennig and Mr. Carr testified here, there may be some
additional costs involved. There is something that we can look
at, and I could take that back to our administrator,
Administrator Pistole, and take a look at that. But we have to
realize that we are going from a very larger population.
Mr. Walsh. Mr. Woods, quick question on flight schools.
Outside of that Boston-area flight school, have there been any
other schools that ICE has investigated?
Mr. Woods. Yes. We have investigated several other schools.
We have investigated a school in California that was taking
students that were lawfully brought--coming to take other
flight-school training, and went to a different flight school
for a cheaper price, unlawfully violating the status. So we do
investigate flight schools as they come to our attention.
Mr. Walsh. You have found some problems elsewhere?
Mr. Woods. We do find some problems, yes.
Mr. Walsh. Somewhat related, in the news this morning, a
bipartisan group of Senators just released what they called a
disturbing GAO report, revealing that hundreds of non-certified
sham colleges and universities were awarding student visas to
foreign nationals at an alarming rate.
Of special concern to us was their finding that 167 of the
434 U.S. flight schools were not accredited by the FAA, but
they still awarded student visas like those given to two of the
9/11 terrorists. Mr. Hennig and Mr. Carr, any comment on that?
Mr. Hennig. I will take first stab at it. I think there
is--if you look at the framework that we have for flight
training in the United States, there are several different
approaches to doing the training.
In the mid 1990s, I believe it was, the FAA established
requirements to become a flight school, so-called Part 141 or
142. For decades before that, the FAA had established
regulations to teach people how to fly. This is called Part 61.
So the FAA doesn't go out and necessarily certify the
latter schools. This may be individual persons that our flight
instructor said do certain types of training. These may be
businesses for whom the type of training they do, becoming an
FAA-certified school doesn't make sense. They just comply with
the regulations.
At the same time, and I will lean on Mr. Woods here with
respect to ICE, ICE has processes providing visa for the
students, whether they are 141, 142, or 61. So there is the
compliance with the rules. There is the difference between
being a certified school versus something else.
Mr. Walsh. Mr. Woods, quick comment.
Mr. Woods. Yes. I am familiar with that GAO report that was
released yesterday. ICE right now has certified 469 schools
that are CFIT-certified to bring in students for flight
training. Of those schools, 153 were a question of the GAO
report. We have done a drill-down on that where we identify
several of these schools lapsed their 141 certificate. It is
apparently a very expensive process to maintain. They reverted
back to a 61 certificate.
Several schools utilized subcontractors in violation of
their CFIT certification. They are under compliance review now.
Additionally, we have identified some--several schools have
completely closed, and no longer provide flight training as
part of their curriculum, but there was still--due to that.
So I don't think it is that alarming as the GAO report made
it out to be. But at the same time, we are looking at it on a
compliance level to ensure that schools that are certified to
bring students in to fly do have their 141, 142 certificate.
Mr. Walsh. Thank you. I see my time is expired. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. Chairman now recognizes
himself for a second round of questions.
I think it is fair to say, Mr. Wilson, that I am shocked to
hear that somebody on the no-fly list can be approved for
flight lessons in this country. I think the people watching
this hearing are, too. You don't have to worry about bringing
it to Mr. Pistole's attention. I am going to take care of that.
Mr. Lord, prior to this report coming out, if the 9/11
hijackers had applied to take flight training in the United
States as they did in 2000, do you think they could have been
approved for flight lessons?
Mr. Lord. I am sorry. I couldn't hear you because of the
door slamming. Sorry.
Mr. Rogers. We will wait until they sit down. If the 9/11
hijackers had applied--goodness gracious.
If the 9/11 hijackers had applied for flight training, as
they did in 2000, in this country today, or up until this
report was released, do you think they would have been
approved?
Mr. Lord. That is a real difficult one to answer directly.
We have a lot of questions about how to process as working, and
whether or not they would have been--I am sorry, Mr. Chairman.
There are a lot of unknowns right now. I just don't know.
Mr. Rogers. What do you think, Mr. Woods?
Mr. Woods. Based on the information I have, I would agree
with Mr. Lord, that it would be difficult to make that
determination. These individuals are checked for criminal
history. They are checked to see if they are on the terrorist-
screening database, and checked for their immigration status.
In those individuals that were trained prior to 9/11, if
they fell into any of those categories in violation, they would
not receive training today.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. I piggyback on Mr. Woods' response. He is
exactly correct. Before these individuals could start flight
training, they would have to undergo the AFSP process, which
would include a terrorist-screened database check, a TECS
check, as well as a fingerprint base--records check.
Mr. Rogers. If a foreign national goes to flight school
part-time, does that person still have to be vetted? Mr.
Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Rogers. Chairman Rogers,
regardless of whether they go part-time or full-time, before an
individual can conduct flight training as an alien, the
individual must undergo a security threat assessment.
Mr. Rogers. So the standards are the same, whether they are
part-time or full-time?
Mr. Wilson. Whether you are part-time or full-time, sir. If
you are starting training, you have to undergo that security
threat assessment.
Mr. Rogers. In your opinion, do you think more legislative
or regulatory authority is--or changes are going to need to be
made by us for you to be able to better do your job?
Mr. Wilson. Well, it depends on the recommendations we are
discussing. There was a particular recommendation by GAO that
would require significant rule-making that TSA hasn't
considered. We do need to talk about that in the very near
future. Based on the technological concerns that we may have
there, that is one.
As far as our regulatory authority with the existing
programs that we have now, we have pretty good authority in
order to accomplish the necessary measures we need to in order
to address the vulnerabilities identified. I think the panel
here has recognized that we have been collaborating with them,
ensuring that we are able to meet our 60-day notice to GAO.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Woods, do you agree that if the part-time
student applies, has to go through the same vetting standards
as a full-time student?
Mr. Woods. Yes. I would think even our aviation partners,
this is what they want--it is event-based. So every time they
attend training, they have--whether it is part-time or full-
time----
Mr. Rogers. I was informed by my staff that ICE had told my
staff that it is 18 hours of training or less, they didn't have
to be vetted. Is that not accurate?
Mr. Woods. I don't think it is whether they do 18 hours or
less. I think it is whether, if they are training, there is
going to be a flight training, it has to go through AFSP. The
18-hour rule pertains to their visa type, many times, what type
of visa they are allowed to do training on.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Lord, you talked a little bit about this in
your opening statement. What do you in your estimation view as
a reasonable amount of time to give TSA and ICE to fully remedy
these shortcomings?
Mr. Lord. Well, there are a lot of questions here. They
have discussed the new data they are going to be sharing. But
again, they still haven't figured out why some of these
individuals weren't vetted to begin with. Mr. Wilson keeps
talking about the STA process, where they do the three checks.
But as our report shows, you could be out of status on the
immigration side of the house, yet successfully pass the TECS
check. So we don't quite understand why the TECS check doesn't
pick up these people in overstay status that ICE, you know,
provided us data that clearly showed there was a conflict in
the system.
So there are some kinks in the system. It is going to take
a while to figure out. I think 3 months is reasonable amount of
time. We are not talking about a cutting-edge technology. A lot
of it is just management attention and priority.
Mr. Rogers. Great. My time is expired. The Chairman now
recognizes Mr. Davis for 5 minutes.
Mr. Davis. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Chairman, I would ask
unanimous consent to switch times with the Ranking Member. He
has an appointment he needs to keep.
Mr. Rogers. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Thompson. Thank the gentleman from Chicago for allowing
me to ask the question. Mr. Woods, would you provide the
committee with the statistics of people who have applied
through your various programs for flight training, and a number
who have been denied? Do you have those statistics available?
Not Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. I am sorry, sir. You said ``Woods.''
Mr. Thompson. Yes, Woods.
Mr. Woods. Well, first of all, it is Mr. Wilson's program
that does the Alien Flight School Program. We have cooperated
and vetted them for immigration purposes.
Mr. Thompson. Yes. I am going to get to him.
Mr. Woods. Very good. We have vetted 18,900 individuals at
an Alien Flight School Program. Of those, 9,700 came up
initially to automated databases to be in status, and lawfully
here to take flight training.
Nine thousand two hundred we had to drill down on, and look
at--and do manual checks on. Of those--and I can go through all
the numbers all the way down to how many were in compliance,
how many had already departed the United States, all the way
down to 30 cases, like I said, that we identified there were
possible visa violators that needed to----
Mr. Thompson. Went from 18,000 to----
Mr. Woods. Thirty.
Mr. Thompson. Thirty. They were denied?
Mr. Woods. Those individuals are under investigation right
now for overstaying their visa. This is going back through the
database of people that have applied for----
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Wilson, can you elaborate on the
statistics that your department reflects?
Mr. Wilson. Ranking Member Thompson, I do not have specific
numbers in front of me. But we do have very few individuals
that are denied flight training because of various issues; one
of them being the immigration status. That is something we have
worked out recently with ICE.
Other issues may be information that has not been supplied
to TSA, which we will put through in a vetting-process status,
meaning that they haven't been cleared, and they haven't been
denied.
Mr. Thompson. All right. They haven't been cleared, haven't
been denied. They can still receive training?
Mr. Wilson. No, sir. They cannot begin training until they
have----
Mr. Thompson. Well, if they are ICE people, they--but in--
if they are American citizens, they can be.
Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir. If they are U.S. citizens, they do
not go through any track.
Mr. Thompson. Right. Mr. Carr, on a public policy side, do
you see any problems with vetting American citizens before the
training commences on a no-fly list, or whatever?
Mr. Wilson. Well, I guess, if we take a quick look at the
history of this program, it quickly came into place after 9/11
as part of the Aviation Transportation Security Act of 2001.
The focus of that program was clearly on foreign citizens
coming to the United States for training, which we identified
as a source of problems on 9/11.
I think, when we look at vetting U.S. citizens for flight
training, we have--we would have to take a broader look.
Because I think there are a number of training activities,
beyond just flight training, where additional vetting might be
viewed as valuable. I don't think flight training is a unique
activity when we look at complex operating requirements.
So while flight training has been viewed as one area that
should possibly receive some additional scrutiny, I think there
could be others as well that we should take a holistic look at
and determine if there is really value in doing this check
against U.S. citizens who are seeking to enjoy this type of
privilege.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chairman recognizes
Mr. Cravaack of Minnesota for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cravaack. I think, in just listening to some of the
conversation, I think everybody here wants to do the right
thing. We want to make sure that a person doesn't step inside
of an aircraft that has mal intentions.
Also, they should be attending a ground school without
having--with the same type of intentions. So those are just
some of the comments in listening to what I have heard today.
What I would like to just encourage everyone to do is to
ensure that the end goal is not lost, in making sure that we
protect the United States. We never want to have a Moussaoui
being able to take flight training, being able to go to that
extent and be able to fly an aircraft into a building. We never
want that, and nobody on this panel wants that to occur as
well.
We also understand, coming from the commercial industry, we
have a viable business in the United States in making sure that
people without mal intent want to come to the United States to
become one of the best pilots in the world.
So I would just encourage everyone on this panel and, Mr.
Wilson, unfortunately, a lot of it falls upon your shoulders,
to ensure the safety of the general public in ensuring that no
one, including those in the United States that never step in an
aircraft--now--I remember taking, you know, there was some of
what are the mental background that had to be taken a look at
as well.
We don't want to--we want to make sure that nobody flies
into an IRS building who has mal intent, but we will never have
100 percent security. That just won't happen. Somebody that is
perfectly normal one day can flip because of whatever he or she
are under.
So my comment is just make sure that everybody here works
very closely together in ensuring a common-sense solution to
this problem, to ensure that we never, ever have a 9/11 again.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman and I recognize Mr. Davis
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Woods, in your testimony, you described five actions
TSA and ICE intend to take to mitigate vulnerabilities
identified in the procedures and processes associated with the
Alien Flight Student Program.
Has a time table been established for the implementation of
these action items?
Mr. Woods. A time table has not been established, but we
are--some of these items are already in effect that we are
working on. We are working cooperatively, doing the alien
checks of the TSA databases already. We are sharing our ICE
data with them. We are working on sharing the CFIUS data with
them in the near future. We are working already on their strike
teams with doing the inspections.
So some of these have already been implemented. We will
continue to move forward on others.
Mr. Davis. Thank you. Mr. Wilson, both of the stakeholders
appearing before the committee today have praised TSA's
interaction with the general aviation community over the past 2
years. What is being done by your office to ensure that this
progress will continue and is sustained?
Mr. Wilson. Well, sir, in my current position--I assumed
this position last year--I put together a plan for the next 3
years to ensure that certain items have been addressed within
the general aviation realm.
Back in January 2012, I laid out my plan of action for the
general aviation community. It included the Alien Flight
Student Program. It included the large aircraft security
program. It included the repair station role. It included South
Capitol Street Heliport. It included the Maryland Three.
It included a vetting process, an automated vetting process
for general aviation aircraft operating within the Private
Charter Standard Security Program and the Twelve Five Standard
Security Program.
So as you can see, that long laundry list that I put
together will keep us busy for a very long time.
One additional item that I did not mention was access to
temporary flight restrictions by general aviation aircraft. We
have done a tremendous lot of work with the industry, as well
as our Federal partners, to allow increased access to these
temporary flight restrictions in the last 24 months.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Woods, how confident are you that individuals out of
status are not receiving flight training in the United States
today?
Mr. Woods. Well, with the new process TSA has in checking
the automated arrivals and departure information system, ADIS,
through US-VISIT, I feel much more comfortable that we are
identifying those individuals on the front end that may be out
of status before they take any training.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Lord, do you believe that establishing the
Aviation Security Advisory Committee and the General Aviation
Working Group and statute, as Ranking Member Thompson's bill
H.R. 1447 proposes--do you think this would help stabilize the
relationship between TSA and the general aviation community?
Mr. Lord. Personally, I think it is important to have a
stable ASAC process, whether you do it through legislative
means or not. Again, that is not my call. That is Congress'
call. But, again, we were concerned about the lapse in
observations, and now we are encouraged to see, you know, it is
functioning again. It seems to be very active.
But the particular way you establish it, I mean, obviously,
that is something for Congress to consider, not us.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no further questions.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chairman now
recognizes Mr. Lungren for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lungren. Just to follow up on Mr. Davis, I would ask
Mr. Lord and Mr. Wilson and Mr. Woods, is there anything that
has been suggested here about cooperation, about considering
doing more vetting of non-aliens, Americans, or of the
information that is allowed to be transferred among the various
Government agencies, including the unnamed Government agency
here?
Is there anything that either--that any of the three of you
would believe requires legislative authority?
Mr. Wilson. Mr. Lungren, yes, sir, in regard to the vetting
of U.S. citizens prior to them starting training, yes, I think
that would require some type of mandate in order for them to be
required to submit certain information prior to pilot training.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Woods.
Mr. Woods. I would defer to Mr. Wilson on this, but I
think----
Mr. Lungren. I am not asking for the administration's
position. What I am asking for is an answer to some of our
questions here, there have been some suggestions about more
action being taken and so forth, and I am just trying to find
out whether that would require us to legislatively authorize it
or mandate it or is that within the ambit of jurisdiction that
is already allowed to the various of aspects of DHS?
Mr. Woods. I am not clear if it is within TSA's authority
to mandate U.S. citizens to be vetted for flight training. I am
aware of the Alien Flight Training Program and I worked for
Immigration Customs Enforcement so I am very familiar with the
alien rules of taking flight training at any school in the
United States.
Mr. Lungren. Okay, well, there was one question that was
brought up about the incongruity of having a no-fly list which
would't allow somebody to get on a commercial aircraft but not
being checked when they are beginning the training for learning
how to pilot aircraft.
I guess one of my questions is: If you could state it on
the record, if you know, is the impediment--is there an
impediment to that legislatively or is that something that
could be considered by TSA in carrying out its responsibility
as already authorized?
Mr. Woods. Again, I would have to defer to----
Mr. Lungren [continuing]. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Sir, not off-hand whether our existing
authorities are that broad.
Mr. Lungren. But maybe you can get back to us on that.
Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir, I will.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Lord.
Mr. Lord. I would argue that ATSA provides TSA broad
authority to do a number of things. So that is the question:
Could they do that within the current legislative conferred by
ATSA? It is a question the lawyers would probably answer for
you.
Mr. Lungren. We always blame it on the lawyers.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Lord. But they do have broad authority now to identify
any individual posing a threat to the U.S. aviation systems, so
perhaps.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Thank you all for testifying. We appreciate the work that
you are doing, the cooperation that you have exhibited and
being forthright in your comments here with us at this
subcommittee hearing today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
A couple of things. Mr. Lord mentioned he thought 90 days
was a reasonable amount of time for you all to be able to make
these corrections. Mr. Wilson, do you agree with that?
Mr. Wilson. Yes, sir, I concur.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Woods, do you agree with that time frame?
Mr. Woods. I concur.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Mr. Wilson or Mr. Woods, has there been
a U.S. citizen on the no-fly list that has actually gone
through training, to your knowledge?
Mr. Wilson. Chairman Rogers, I am not aware of that, and I
will have to get back with you on that, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Woods.
Mr. Woods. I am not aware of anyone.
Mr. Rogers. All right. I do, Mr. Woods, want to point out
that the staff still seems confused with what your Department
has told us about the part-time students, so we want to get
your question for the record, and if you could go back and
check with the Department on this part-time status and see if
there is any differential at all for somebody who may be in the
country as a tourist, maybe, and once they get here decide they
want training.
Go ahead, Mr. Woods.
Mr. Woods. As I said earlier, you brought up a strong
point. A person that comes in as a tourist to take training
incidental to their arrival as opposed to a person who comes as
a student to the United States on a student visa, on an F-M
visa, they are allowed to take a certain amount of training
incidental----
Mr. Rogers. Okay, so they can come in as a tourist and get
training without being vetted?
Mr. Woods. I think the thing that they are unvetted for is,
when they are coming to the United States on a student visa or
F or M visa. You are allowed to take a certain amount of
training incidental.
Mr. Rogers. Okay so they can't come in as a tourist and get
training without being vetted?
Mr. Woods. The thing that they are not vetted for is coming
to the United States, but what the purpose of their visit is
and we can take enforcement action against them for taking
their training in violation of their status. What we would be
looking for is clarification and legislation of who is allowed
to take----
Mr. Rogers. That goes back to Mr. Lungren's question. You
may need some regulatory or legislative authority.
Mr. Woods. Who is allowed to come to the United States and
take training or under what visa class and categories? Whether
it is a visitor, as a non-immigrant worker or whether it is as
a student itself? Currently the interpretations are varied
through the Federal agencies where you may have a visitor who
can take on his visit to the United States to go to Disneyland,
can take incidental training.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. All right, well I want to thank the
witnesses for, as Mr. Lungren said for a frank, eye-opening
discussion here. I want to remind all of the witnesses that
some of the Members of the committee that couldn't be present,
may have questions and so we will leave the record open for 10
days. I would ask you if there are any questions that are
submitted to you, that you get those back to us in written form
within that 10-day period of time. With that, this committee is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions for Kerwin Wilson From Chairman Mike Rogers
Question 1a. In your written statement, you indicate that TSA has
moved forward with a new process to check active alien flight students
against the US-VISIT ADIS database to identify whether an individual
may have overstayed the terms of his or her admission and provide the
results to ICE's CTCEU to take appropriate immigration enforcement
action. However, as of July 18, ICE program officials characterized
this information-sharing effort as being in the ``testing phase.''
At what point in the AFSP process will TSA check ADIS?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. In addition to identifying whether an individual may
have overstayed the terms of his/her admission, will the check of ADIS
allow TSA to determine whether someone may have entered the country
illegally (``entry without inspection'')? If not, what additional
checks will TSA do to determine this?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1c. What controls has TSA put in place to ensure that
information is provided to ICE for enforcement action?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. As part of its compliance inspections of flight schools
participating in AFSP, TSA inspectors check for documentation that the
school received approval from TSA before training a foreign national.
Yet GAO found instances where foreign nationals completed flight
training without receiving approval from TSA.
What specific actions has TSA taken to determine why TSA's
inspections of flight school compliance with AFSP did not identify the
problems GAO raised in its report (i.e., that foreign nationals could
complete training at U.S. flight schools without applying to AFSP, or
after their applications were denied or canceled in AFSP)?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3a. The February/March memorandum of understanding between
FAA and TSA to share certain data on foreign pilots was signed by the
TSA officials responsible for overseeing flight school compliance
inspections, but not officials responsible for completing security
threat assessments.
Does this effort involve the TSA officials who are responsible for
the AFSP security threat assessment process as well? If so, how?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3b. How do you think FAA and TSA can work more
collaboratively to ensure that foreign nationals are being properly
vetted by TSA before receiving flight training and an airman's
certificate?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4a. FAA officials indicate that they began sending data to
TSA in March.
How, specifically, has TSA used the FAA data to help ensure that
all foreign flight students have received the appropriate background
checks?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4b. How many foreign nationals has TSA identified through
this process that did not successfully complete AFSP security threat
assessments? How many of those were required to complete AFSP security
threat assessments?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4c. What specific actions has TSA taken to address any
weaknesses identified through the data matching process?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. Now that TSA is receiving data from FAA on foreign
nationals with pilot's licenses, has TSA discovered any foreign
nationals with commercial or airline transport pilot licenses who did
not receive approval to begin training through AFSP? If so, what
actions have TSA and FAA taken to resolve these issues?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. Do TSA inspectors issue violations if a flight training
school does not maintain the required documentation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7a. Can you provide some examples of when a flight
training provider would be deemed non-compliant and what penalties it
could face?
How often do you re-inspect a provider that has failed inspection?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7b. Have there been any instances where an applicant was
denied by TSA because of the individual's country of origin? If so,
which country(s)? Does TSA have a prohibited list of countries from
which it will not accept students into AFSP?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions for John P. Woods From Chairman Mike Rogers
Question 1. If a foreign-national arrives in the United States on a
student visa or F or M visa and then decides to enroll in a flight
school part-time, does that person get vetted against terrorist watch
databases? Do you think there needs to be clarification throughout the
Federal Government of what type(s) of visa allows for an individual to
take flight training?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2a. In May 2011, TSA provided ICE with the identification
of 142 potential overstays that were in TSA's AFSP database. After
further vetting ICE reduced the list of possible overstays to 22.
Can you share the results of the investigations?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2b. How many of the 22 individuals had completed flight
training when you began your investigation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2c. Were any of the foreign nationals deported?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
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