[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
SECURING AMMONIUM NITRATE: USING LESSONS LEARNED IN AFGHANISTAN TO
PROTECT THE HOMELAND FROM IEDS
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY,
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 12, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-105
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Ron Barber, Arizona
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND SECURITY
TECHNOLOGIES
Daniel E. Lungren, California, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Tim Walberg, Michigan, Vice Chair Laura Richardson, California
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Billy Long, Missouri William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Coley C. O'Brien, Staff Director
Zachary D. Harris, Subcommittee Clerk
Chris Schepis, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies................................................... 1
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California........................................ 3
Appendix
Lieutenant General Michael D. Barbero, Director, Joint IED Defeat
Organization, United States Army, Department of Defense:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Mr. John P. Woods, Assistant Director, Homeland Security
Investigations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department
of Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director, International
Counterterrorism & Security Assistance Issues, Governement
Accountability Office:
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
SECURING AMMONIUM NITRATE: USING LESSONS LEARNED IN AFGHANISTAN TO
PROTECT THE HOMELAND FROM IEDS
----------
Thursday, July 12, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection,
and Security Technologies,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:08 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Daniel E. Lungren
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Lungren and Richardson.
Also present: Representative Turner.
Mr. Lungren. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and
Security Technologies will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
the security of ammonium nitrate and the threat of IEDs to the
homeland. After consultation with Ms. Clarke, the Ranking
Member, and the witnesses, there is agreement that due to the
sensitive nature of this topic, following the Members' opening
statements, the subcommittee should recess and reconvene in a
closed classified session. Specifically, both the Department of
Defense and the Department of Homeland Security have indicated
that disclosure of the matters to be considered here today,
including the disclosure of potential domestic threats, would
endanger National security.
Therefore, pursuant to House Rule XI(g)(1), I ask unanimous
consent that the hearing move to a closed setting at such
appropriate time.
Without objection, it is ordered.
I would now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Pursuant to agreement I have with the Minority side, if Ms.
Clarke is able to get here before we move to the closed
session, she would give her opening statement at that time. If
she comes at the time we are going down to closed session, she
would be given the opportunity to do her opening statement in
the closed session, or we may have it spoken here. We will have
that determined shortly.
I want to thank our witnesses for appearing today and
agreeing to share with us their experience and their expertise
in countering the growing threat from improvised explosive
devices, otherwise known as IEDs. I also want to express my
strong disappointment that the National Protection and Programs
Director to the Department of Homeland Security declined our
invitation to testify.
The IED is killing our troops on the Afghan battlefield at
an alarming rate. During the 2011 fighting season, 1,978
American casualties were attributed to IEDs. This year, there
have been fewer IED attacks, but they have been, unfortunately,
more deadly. The IED continues to be the deadly weapon of
choice by insurgents in Afghanistan, responsible for 47 percent
of our troop casualties and 60 percent of civilian casualties.
There was no more tragic example of the lethal consequences
of an IED attack than last Sunday when six American soldiers
were killed by a roadside IED in Afghanistan.
However, the IED threat is not limited to Afghanistan. It
is a global threat. There are 500 IED events globally per month
outside of Afghanistan. It is also being used routinely in
Iraq, Colombia, Pakistan, India, and Syria. IEDs have also
delivered death and destruction in our homeland, the 1993 World
Trade Center truck bomb, the Oklahoma City bomb, the Times
Square car bomber. It is an unsettling fact that 17 years after
Oklahoma City, that type of bomb could still be made today.
The purpose of our hearing today is to review what lessons
have been learned to counter this serious IED threat, what
training, tactics, and techniques have been developed to combat
IEDs in Afghanistan, and how those lessons can benefit our
homeland defense.
I am a strong believer that the best defense against
terrorist attacks, including IEDs, is good intelligence.
Intelligence is always more effective when shared with the
agencies responsible for our counter-IED efforts. This
interagency coordination information sharing will help us
provide the strongest response to the IED homeland threat.
Project Global Shield, developed by ICE and CBP is one of
the efforts Director Woods will talk about today. It is a great
example of a well-coordinated DHS effort to counter the IED
threat. Global Shield is increasing international cooperation
and collaboration on investigations into the trafficking of
precursor chemicals used to manufacture explosive devices. One
hundred seventy-seven world customs organization countries have
now joined the effort to track illicit precursor chemicals.
This international effort has already seized 62 metric tons
of precursor chemicals and made 31 arrests. When possible,
attacking the IED threat at its source is clearly our best
strategy.
General Barbero will describe JIEDDO, working with the CIA,
FBI, and DHS, is participating in a whole-of-Government
approach targeting the IED chemical supply chain. This approach
includes defining a common picture of the supply chain,
identifying key facilitators of raw materials in the IED
pipeline, and uncovering their financial networks,
institutions, and financiers. This whole-of-Government approach
emphasizes the importance of interagency coordination and
information sharing to more effectively counter the IED threat.
While all these programs and cooperative efforts are
helpful in the counter-IED effort, they are not enough, as was
demonstrated by the 500 IED events that still occur. Improving
our counter-IED effort is certainly our goal, and I look
forward to the testimony of our distinguished witnesses today
to describe how that can be done.
I would just mention that ammonium nitrate is mentioned in
the title of our hearing today. We know it is a ubiquitous
chemical. It is something we have discussed in this committee
before and this subcommittee before. It is something that is
properly used in the area of agriculture, and we have Members
of this committee who represent districts in which that is used
rather readily for appropriate purposes. The challenge we have
is: How do you allow this for appropriate purposes, and at the
same time, have those tools available that will allow us to
interrupt the improper and lethal use of that chemical and
others like it?
Now, Ms. Richardson, I would recognize you for giving the
statement of the Minority.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing today, as the testimony before the subcommittee today
will allow us to learn about the efforts of the Department of
Defense and the collaborative interagency efforts of DHS and
many other U.S. agencies to stem the cross-border flow of
explosive chemicals in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here and all
of you for your personal experience in this issue we are about
to cover today. However, my preference would have been to take
testimony in public in an unclassified format. I am sure we
could have asked all of our witnesses to come back and to give
us a classified briefing if needed, Mr. Chairman, but I will
not object to your motion to go into executive session.
General, it is good to have an opportunity to meet with you
today and we look forward to welcoming you and hearing your
testimony.
This subcommittee has been very active on this issue of
domestic infrastructure protection and certainly on the
protection of our chemical facilities, as the Chairman alluded
to, from threats in illicit use of ammonium nitrate and other
explosive precursors. This is something that every Member here
thinks about on a daily basis, and it is our job to develop
legislation to address these complicated issues.
As our Ranking Member has said many times before, we have a
lot of expertise on this subcommittee and we have worked
carefully with the industry and security experts to balance the
needs of our farmers, our industrial users, and with very
challenging complex and security issues as well.
Balancing domestic concerns in a stable, civil society that
facilitates the smooth flow of commerce and supports the
biological processes of our farming operations can sometimes
present a more intricate challenge than might exist in other
geopolitical settings.
We look forward to learning about the Department of
Homeland Security's efforts to oversee how they collaborate
with other agencies and countries and how that experience can
inform us in developing more secure approaches to confront the
threats posed by the use of explosive chemicals in our Nation.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentlelady for her statements.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
I would ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from New
York, Mr. Turner, a Member of the full committee, be allowed to
fully participate in today's hearing.
Without objection, so ordered.
Pursuant to the previous unanimous consent, the
subcommittee will recess for at least 15 minutes and no more
than 30 minutes so that we can reconvene in closed session in
room HVC-302. We have votes scheduled, I think, at 11:30 today,
so if we could be as quick about moving over there as possible.
I apologize. Votes come up. We have got to make them. We didn't
have a schedule of the votes at the time we scheduled this
hearing. So we will move as quickly as we can on this important
subject.
[Whereupon, at 10:18 a.m., the subcommittee proceeded in
closed session, and was subsequently adjourned at 11:36 a.m.]
A P P E N D I X
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Prepared Statement of Lieutenant General Michael D. Barbero, Director,
Joint IED Defeat Organization, United States Army, Department of
Defense
July 12, 2012
Chairman King, Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to speak with you today
on the efforts to protect our troops from improvised explosive device
(IED) attacks and share some lessons the U.S. military has learned that
could be applied to the homeland.
In 2006, the Department of Defense (DoD) established the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) to focus on
the IED threat in Iraq and Afghanistan. JIEDDO's mission is to lead the
Defense Department's actions to rapidly provide counter-IED (C-IED)
capabilities in support of combatant commanders through rapid
acquisition, tactical operations-intelligence fusion, and pre-
deployment training. JIEDDO is singularly focused on this problem and
exists to rapidly field capabilities to reduce the effectiveness of
this asymmetric weapon.
It is clear the IED is the primary weapon of choice for threat
networks globally and is one of the enduring operational and domestic
security challenges for the foreseeable future. The global
proliferation of IEDs and associated technology is pervasive and
continues to threaten U.S. interests at home and abroad. Since 2007,
IED incidents outside of Iraq and Afghanistan have increased to more
than 500 IED events per month, with Colombia having the greatest number
of IED events followed by Pakistan, India, the United States, and
Syria, which recently moved into the top five.\1\ Since January 2011,
there have been more than 10,000 global IED events occurring in 112
countries, executed by more than 40 regional and transnational threat
networks.\2\
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\1\ Worldwide IED Database, Institute for Defense Analysis, June
2012.
\2\ Worldwide IED Database, Institute for Defense Analysis, June
2012.
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The domestic IED threat from both home-grown extremists and global
threat networks is real and presents a significant security challenge
for the United States and our international partners. In the early
1980s, the Provisional Irish Republican Army used ammonium nitrate-
based IEDs in multiple attacks in London. The United States witnessed
first-hand just how deadly ammonium nitrate can be in the 1995 Oklahoma
City bombing that claimed the lives of 168 American citizens. Most
recently, we saw the devastating effects in Mumbai, India, and Oslo,
Norway; both attacks used ammonium nitrate as an explosive. Throughout
the world these devices and the networks that use IEDs will remain a
threat for decades to come.
Since the successful attacks on September 11, 2001, externally-
based global threat networks have attempted numerous failed attacks
such as the underwear bomb aboard Northwest Airlines fight 253 on
Christmas day in 2009, the failed Times Square car bombing in 2010, and
the ink cartridges packed with explosives aboard two separate cargo
planes in 2010. These attempts clearly demonstrate the commitment of
these threat networks to continue to employ IEDs against our homeland
in traditional as well as new and creative ways. The use of advanced
IED technology and sophisticated tactics, techniques, and procedures
provide individuals and transnational networks with cheap and easily
accessible means to achieve high-visibility effect.
The extremist networks that employ IEDs have proven to be
resilient, adaptive, interconnected, and extremely violent.
Globalization, the internet, and social media have extended the reach
of these organizations, providing platforms for recruiting, technical
exchanges, training, planning, funding, and social interaction. We see
IED tactics and techniques used by insurgents increase in
sophistication and proliferate globally. Wherever we see turmoil or
insecurity we see the spread of these networks and the spread of IEDs.
Today's IEDs are relatively simple, low-tech devices, which
routinely use command wire, pressure plates, or radio-controlled
triggers. Many readily available components such as cell phones,
agricultural fertilizers, and simple electronic transmitters and
receivers have legitimate commercial uses, but are easily and
increasingly adapted for illicit purposes in manufacturing IEDs. The
dual-use nature of IED components poses unique challenges in our
ability to regulate and limit terrorist access to IED precursors and
trigger components.
Future bomb-makers will incorporate such enhancements as ultra-thin
and flexible electronics; advanced communications mechanisms such as
blue-tooth, Wi-Fi, and broadband; optical initiators; and highly
energetic metals. In addition to more sophisticated technology, threat
networks will develop enhanced IED concealment techniques and may even
combine IED use with concurrent cyber attacks.
Today and in the future, U.S. forces will operate in an IED
environment. While IEDs cannot stop our units or deter our commanders
from taking the fight to the enemy, these devices are the greatest
source of combat casualties this decade. The cumulative effects of
casualties, both killed and wounded in action, inflicted on our force
and magnified by insurgent information operations have made IEDs a
challenge for the United States and a top priority for DoD.
To counter the IED and threat networks that employ these devices,
JIEDDO focuses our activities along three lines of operation: Defeat
the Device, Train the Force, and Attack the Network. To enable a
successful C-IED program, these lines of operation must work in
harmony.
Our first line of operation, defeating the device, is the immediate
and most obvious approach to protecting our service members from IEDs.
As hard as we try, we cannot stop every IED from being employed.
However, once the IED finds its way to the battlefield, we have fielded
a wide spectrum of initiatives to detect the components, neutralize the
triggering devices, and mitigate the effects of an IED blast. DoD has
developed and rapidly deployed a comprehensive portfolio of
capabilities, such as mine rollers, electronic countermeasures
(jammers), robotics, handheld detectors, pelvic protection garments,
and aerial and ground surveillance systems, to name a few. We do not
rely on just one capability. Our warfighters are provided an arsenal of
tools to customize and apply to the IED threat.
Defeating the device is critical to lowering effective attacks and
casualties. If we fail in this task, we could experience an
unacceptable level of causalities, resulting in the loss of will and
ultimately mission failure. While defeating the device is important it
is not decisive. Focusing solely on defeating the device relegates us
to playing defense and surrenders the initiative to the enemy.
The second area in which we focus our efforts is training. The
Train the Force line of operation brings our deploying warfighters up
to speed on the full range of available C-IED tools and the latest
tactics, techniques, and procedures emerging from theater. A well-
trained warfighter is our best C-IED weapon. A comprehensive pre-
deployment training approach is required to ensure our force has
adequate time to understand the integration of all aspects of the C-IED
fight before deploying to theater.
The third line of operation, attack the network, is the decisive
endeavor. It encompasses all the material and non-material C-IED
enablers to attack the network by first identifying, and then
exploiting, critical enemy network vulnerabilities. Attacking the
network is the most complex line of operation, but it is how we achieve
decisive results.
JIEDDO has built a deep base of knowledge in data fusion and
visualization to enable operational intelligence analysis. This
analysis, in turn, enables military and interagency customers to attack
violent extremist networks by using more than 180 data sources and
numerous Government and commercial off-the-shelf analysis tools. We
have five intelligence agencies embedded within our organization to
cross-train on the various tools, processes, and best practices.
The key enabler for achieving seamless sharing of information
begins with applying new techniques to enhance data processing upon
intake. The better we can sort or mine data, the faster our analysts
can manipulate this information to produce actionable intelligence for
our leaders and actionable evidence for our interagency partners. The
speed at which these threat networks operate mandates our ability to
produce faster analytical assessments of emerging operational
environments to support rapid exploitation. This requires us to think
differently and expand our community of action to share and fuse
information among domestic and international partners.
Today, JIEDDO is working with an expanded community of action for
C-IED that did not exist previously. We have established an interagency
forum consisting of U.S. intelligence and interagency partners, Federal
law enforcement, the Five Eyes (United States, United Kingdom, Canada,
Australia, and New Zealand) community, and forward-deployed forces to
achieve a more transparent and broader whole-of-Government effort to
disrupt threat networks employing IEDs against U.S. and Coalition
forces globally.
We recognize no single Government department or international
partner has the ability to fully limit access to IED precursors, so we
are integrating our efforts to go after the threat networks that
distribute these materials. Our U.S. Government partners bring
expertise in: Defeating and prosecuting criminal networks; applying
financial pressures by going after the assets of IED network members,
financers, and distributors; enacting export controls and treaty
compliance efforts that lead to the interdiction of IED components;
advancing C-IED objectives through public diplomacy and policy and
regulatory changes; advising on legitimate agricultural requirements;
and coordinating and executing domestic C-IED efforts through the
Department of Justice Joint Program Office. This is by no means a
comprehensive list of the actions our interagency partners are applying
to the C-IED fight, but it should give you an idea of the collaboration
that is occurring on all levels.
To provide a couple of specific examples, the U.S. Department of
Commerce added 152 persons to the Entity List because of IED-related
matters. This designation stops U.S. companies from trading with these
entities--companies, organizations, persons--who violated U.S. export
laws. Since October 2010, the U.S. Department of Treasury has imposed
economic sanctions on 33 Afghanistan-Pakistan IED facilitators. Through
coordinated efforts and strong partnership across the U.S. Government
and with our international partners, we are going after these nefarious
actors and effectively countering the networks that use IEDs.
During the past 8 years, JIEDDO in conjunction with the military
services, U.S. interagency, and our multinational partners develop a
highly effective process to target extremist networks and defeat the
IED. Weapons Technical Intelligence (WTI) evolved from ``traditional
technical intelligence''\3\ and leverages law enforcement techniques as
well as forensic and biometric technology to collect, exploit, and
analyze IED-related materials and other weapons systems.\4\ This
process coordinates and integrates various DoD and Federal
organizations and programs to facilitate everything from the on-site
collection of IED material to the analysis of IED components in
National laboratories. This analysis is then delivered to our military
commanders to support targeting, track IED materials to their source,
aid in host nation criminal prosecution, and enhance force protection
for our Nation's warfighters.
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\3\ ``Intelligence derived from the collection, processing,
analysis, and exploitation of data and information pertaining to
foreign equipment and materiel for the purposes of preventing
technological surprise, assessing foreign scientific and technical
capabilities, and developing countermeasures designed to neutralize an
adversary's technological advantages. Also called TECHINT.'' Joint
Publication 1-02, 15 January, 2012.
\4\ WTI is ``a category of intelligence and process derived from
the forensic and technical exploitation of improvised explosive devices
(IEDs), associated components, improvised weapons, and other weapons
systems.'' WTI IED Lexicon, Edition 3.1, July 2011.
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The WTI process has proven its utility in defense of the homeland
as well. An example of this is the 2011 arrest and indictment of two
Iraqi nationals, Waad Ramadan Alwan and Mohanad Shareef Hammadi, on
Federal terrorism charges in Bowling Green, Kentucky. The Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had an on-going counterterrorism
investigation that identified the two subjects as having supported the
activities of insurgents in a specific part of Iraq from 2003-2006. The
Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center, operated by the FBI in
partnership with JIEDDO and other Governmental stakeholders, supported
the on-going FBI counterterrorism investigation by using biometric data
collected by U.S. forces and forensic techniques to definitively link
Alwan to components collected from an unsolved IED event in Iraq during
that time period. This is a textbook example of how WTI enables the
military to contribute to a whole-of-Government solution to a
transnational threat. It further illuminates the importance of a
seamless integration, U.S. forces operating outside of the United
States collecting intelligence that is placed into a shared database
used by law enforcement to protect the homeland.
The benefit of the WTI process has unlimited potential and
applicability to defeat improvised weapon systems that provide our
enemies an asymmetric advantage. Our commanders increasingly focus
operations to collect biometric data, and several have referred to it
as a game-changer. Biometric, forensic, and technical exploitation
remove a violent extremist's greatest defense--anonymity--and makes
them vulnerable to attribution. The WTI process provides a valuable
framework for collecting, exploiting, analyzing, and disseminating data
in a timely manner to those who need it most.
Emerging technologies such as stand-off biometric collection, rapid
DNA processing, and real-time latent fingerprint-matching hold enormous
potential to advance the WTI process into the next generation of
protection. These capabilities will allow security personnel to
identify threats before they reach checkpoints and to instantaneously
attribute criminal and illicit activities to the perpetrators.
Moving forward, we will continue to face an ever-present threat
from the overlapping consortium of threat networks employing IEDs as
their weapon of choice. Mitigating the global IED threat requires a
whole-of-governments approach. We must continue to synchronize C-IED
and counter-threat network capabilities and actions among National,
international, and other security stakeholders. These adaptive and
constantly evolving threat networks require an agile and responsive
counter-threat network to defeat them.
It is imperative we capture and institutionalize the lessons of a
decade of combat operations. These lessons may help fill some current
domestic-capability gaps which would strengthen our protection of the
homeland. There is no silver bullet to defeat an emplaced IED; our best
defense is a warfighter or first responder with the right intelligence,
training, and equipment. Chairman King, Chairman Lungren, Ranking
Member Clarke, Members of the subcommittee, again, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to your
questions.
______
Prepared Statement of John P. Woods, Assistant Director, Homeland
Security Investigations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
Department of Homeland Security
July 12, 2012
introduction
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee: On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Director
Morton, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
Improvised explosive devices (IED) are the most prevalent form of
explosive employed by terrorists around the world and the single
greatest threat to coalition forces in Afghanistan. According to the
2011 annual report from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Centre
of Excellence, Defense Against Terrorism, there were a total of 4,744
global IED incidents, 6,278 deaths, and 17,040 wounds from IED
incidents around the world in 2011. As I will discuss today, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is at the forefront of the
Nation's civilian efforts to disrupt, dismantle, and investigate the
international movement of IED components and explosives precursors.
ICE's Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) directorate protects
the Nation by investigating criminal organizations that seek to exploit
weaknesses in legitimate trade, travel, and financial systems to
further their illicit enterprises. HSI special agents detect, disrupt,
and dismantle transnational criminal organizations (TCO) engaged in the
smuggling of people, narcotics, bulk cash, weapons, and weapons-related
components across our borders. HSI also has authority to investigate
criminal violations of, and enforce, all U.S. export control laws
related to military items, controlled ``dual-use'' commodities (i.e.,
items that have both commercial and military applications), and
sanctioned or embargoed countries. Further, we have the capability to
expand the scope of our investigations beyond our domestic offices to
72 international offices situated throughout the world.
program global shield
To combat the illicit use of precursor chemicals by terrorist and
other TCOs for the manufacture of IEDs, ICE initiated Program Global
Shield (Global Shield) an unprecedented, multi-lateral law enforcement
effort aimed at combating the illicit diversion and trafficking of
precursor chemicals used in making explosives by monitoring their
cross-border movements. This joint ICE and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) global project--proposed by ICE at the World Customs
Organization (WCO) Enforcement Committee Meeting in Brussels, Belgium
in spring of 2010--is based on collaboration among the WCO, INTERPOL,
and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). This
collaboration represents the first time that the threat posed by
explosives precursors has been collectively addressed by the
international community.
The ultimate goal of Global Shield is to identify and interdict
falsely-declared precursor chemicals, initiate investigations, and
uncover smuggling networks. In doing so, ICE and CBP aim to build
capacity among strategic partners to detect illicit shipments of
explosive precursors and promote cooperation among foreign customs and
police administrations in combating the illicit diversion of explosive
precursors along the global supply chain. By working together and
sharing real-time information and intelligence, countries will be able
to verify the legitimacy of individual shipments while identifying,
disrupting, and dismantling the terrorist networks involved in the
illicit procurement of these chemicals via front companies and
complicit middlemen. ICE and CBP are working closely with stakeholders
from across the Federal Government, including the U.S. Departments of
State (DOS) and Defense (DOD), to accomplish these goals.
The mass production of ammonium nitrate (which can be used for a
variety of legitimate purposes) and other precursor chemicals occurs
largely beyond the borders of countries most afflicted by IEDs. A
global effort is therefore essential to effectively combat their
illicit smuggling and diversion. The government of Afghanistan took a
crucial first step on September 23, 2009, by banning the importation of
ammonium nitrate fertilizer and issuing a decree permitting its
confiscation if stored in or transported through Afghanistan. This ban
quickly achieved significant results. In November 2009, Afghanistan
seized 500,000 pounds of ammonium nitrate in Kandahar--one of the
largest seizures of its kind in Afghanistan.
Due to the successes of Global Shield's pilot project, which
commenced operations in November 2010 and concluded in April 2011, the
WCO designated Global Shield as a long-term program in June 2011. In
September 2011, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs in DOS provided $5.9 million in funding to the WCO
to support and execute Global Shield over the next 3 years. This
funding will support technical assistance and operational training,
communications and industry outreach, and program management and
quality assurance and support. To date, 79 countries and 11
international organizations participate in Global Shield. As of early
June 2012, Global Shield successes include 40 enforcement actions and
41 seizures totaling 125.16 metric tons of explosives precursor
chemicals.
Through Global Shield, ICE and CBP have developed a training
program to develop and build capacity for foreign partners. The
capacity-building program can be customized based on our partners'
current abilities and legal structures. The program assists our
partners in customs process development, including adoption of laws and
regulations, commodity identification, IED awareness, inspection of
chemical shipments, seizure of illicit shipments, investigations, and
prosecution. This process not only focuses on seizing illicit shipments
of precursor chemicals, but on identifying the networks responsible and
dismantling or disrupting these networks. The first regional Global
Shield training took place in June 2012, in Baku, Azerbaijan with nine
countries participating. Additional training is being scheduled for
other countries.
We believe that Global Shield provides invaluable data for trend
analysis to increase the global understanding of the risk posed by
precursor chemicals and their illicit movement. The program will
identify best practices to combat the illicit diversion and trafficking
of precursor chemicals used to manufacture explosives, as well as
monitor and track legitimate shipments of precursor chemicals to assist
in identifying high-risk routes for future enforcement activity. Global
Shield will set the foundation for future multilateral initiatives to
deny terrorists access to explosives components.
ice's counter-proliferation investigation program
ICE is at the forefront of the U.S. Government's efforts to prevent
foreign adversaries from illegally obtaining U.S. military products.
HSI's Counter-Proliferation Investigations (CPI) Unit targets the
trafficking and/or illegal export of conventional military equipment,
firearms, controlled dual-use equipment and technology, and materials
used to manufacture weapons of mass destruction, including chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear materials. HSI special agents
investigate illegal exports of military equipment and dual-use items to
embargoed countries, and significant financial and business
transactions with proscribed countries and groups. HSI special agents
provide outreach with private industry in the United States and
internationally. As a capacity-building partner with the Department of
State's Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS)
Program, HSI also conducts export enforcement training for foreign law
enforcement and customs agencies.
The primary goal of the HSI CPI program is the detection and
disruption of illegal exports and networks before any controlled items
or technologies fall into the wrong hands. HSI's export enforcement
program uses a three-pronged approach: Detecting illegal exports,
investigating potential violations, and obtaining international
cooperation to investigate leads abroad. HSI relies on specially-
trained CBP officers stationed at ports of entry to inspect suspect
export shipments. Following detection of a violation, HSI special
agents deployed throughout the country initiate and pursue
investigations to identify, arrest, and seek prosecution of offenders
of the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, the Export Administration
Regulations, the International Emergency Economics Powers Act, and
other related statutes and provisions.
The international nature of proliferation networks and schemes
requires a global investigative response. The HSI Office of
International Affairs has 72 offices around the world that work to
enlist the support of their host governments to initiate new
investigative leads and to develop information in support of on-going
domestic investigations.
Due to the threat IEDs pose to the United States and our interests
abroad, the HSI CPI Unit established a specialized program to initiate
investigations and share law enforcement intelligence information
concerning the illicit movement of IED components and precursor
chemicals. To this end, HSI partnered with CBP, the DHS National
Protection and Programs Directorate's Office of Bombing Prevention, and
DOS and DOD (specifically with the Joint Improvised Explosive Device
Defeat Organization (JIEDDO)). As part of HSI's own counter-IED
strategy, these partners are currently working with our colleagues in
CBP to schedule additional investigative and interdiction training for
customs and law enforcement officials in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In
December 2010, HSI provided training for approximately 100 customs
officials from these countries.
HSI's collaboration with JIEDDO's homemade explosives working group
has led to a better understanding of how transnational criminal
networks are exploiting the global supply chain to illegally move IED
precursor chemicals. Additionally, HSI's Attache office in Kabul,
Afghanistan worked with JIEDDO elements in country to identify networks
smuggling IED precursor chemicals from Pakistan into Afghanistan.
HSI also worked with the DOS during the U.S.-Pakistan Strategic
Dialogue relating to IEDs and controls of IED components and precursor
chemicals. These partnerships are leading to a more holistic approach,
allowing agencies to identify the most effective method to disrupt the
criminal and terrorist networks procuring and using IEDs.
project shield america (psa)
One of the most effective tools HSI special agents use as part of
HSI's larger counter-proliferation strategy is our industry outreach
program, Project Shield America (PSA). Through this program, HSI
special agents conduct outreach to manufacturers and exporters of
strategic commodities to educate them on U.S. export control laws,
discuss export licensing issues and requirements, teach them how to
identify ``red flag'' indicators used in illegal procurement, and
explain which Government agencies are responsible for the licensing of
different categories of export-controlled commodities and technology.
By the end of 2011, HSI special agents had delivered over 20,000
outreach presentations to private industry and other entities as part
of the PSA program.
export enforcement coordination center (e2c2)
A part of the President's Export Control Reform Initiative is to
improve law enforcement coordination to investigate violations of U.S.
export control laws. In November 2010, President Obama signed an
Executive Order creating the Export Enforcement Coordination Center
(E2C2)--a multi-agency center housed within HSI that serves as the
primary Government forum for the exchange of information and
intelligence related to export enforcement. Operational since April of
this year, the E2C2, which is managed and operated by ICE, enhances the
United States' ability to combat illicit proliferation by working to
coordinate investigative and enforcement activities related to export
control.
The E2C2 is staffed with full-time personnel from HSI, as well as
individuals detailed from other departments and agencies including the
U.S. Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, Justice, Commerce, and
Energy; the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; and other
Executive branch departments, agencies, or offices as designated by the
President. Specifically, the functions of the E2C2 include:
Coordinating the de-confliction of criminal and
administrative enforcement actions, and resolving conflicts
among partner agencies that have not been otherwise resolved in
the field;
Serving as a primary point of contact between enforcement
authorities and agencies engaged in export licensing;
Coordinating law enforcement public outreach activities
related to U.S. export controls; and
Establishing Government-wide statistical tracking
capabilities for U.S. export enforcement activities.
The E2C2 replaced HSI's National Export Enforcement Coordination
Network (NEECN), which led coordination among DHS components to address
challenges inherent in dismantling transnational procurement networks.
Unlike the NEECN, the Executive Order requires E2C2 participation by
law enforcement and the intelligence community.
conclusion
HSI special agents are working hard to ensure that IED components
and precursors do not reach the wrong hands, and to prosecute those who
subvert the rule of law and threaten our National security.
Furthermore, HSI is coordinating our efforts with other U.S. and
foreign governments to enhance our and other agencies to counter IED
abilities. We look forward to continuing to work with this subcommittee
on this critical National security issue.
Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I would now be pleased to answer any questions you have.
______
Prepared Statement of Charles Michael Johnson, Jr., Director,
International Counterterrorism & Security Assistance Issues,
Governement Accountability Office
Thursday, July 12, 2012
counterterrorism.--u.s. agencies face challenges countering the use of
improvised explosive devices in the afghanistan/pakistan region
gao-12-907t
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here to discuss the collaborative
efforts of U.S. agencies to detect and prevent the smuggling into
Afghanistan of calcium ammonium nitrate (CAN) fertilizer produced in
Pakistan. Approximately 80 percent of the improvised explosive devices
(IEDs) in Afghanistan contain homemade explosives, primarily CAN
smuggled from Pakistan. These IEDs have been a major source of
fatalities among U.S. troops in Afghanistan and have been used by
various insurgent groups in Pakistan to kill thousands of Pakistani
civilians and members of Pakistani security forces. U.S. officials
recognize the threat posed by the smuggling of CAN and other IED
precursors from Pakistan into Afghanistan, and various U.S.
departments, including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), are
assisting Pakistan's government in countering this threat. My remarks
today are based on our May 2012 report on this issue.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Combating Terrorism: State Should Enhance Its Performance
Measures for Assessing Efforts in Pakistan to Counter Improvised
Explosive Devices, GAO-12-614 (Washington, DC: May 15, 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to the Department of Defense (DOD), CAN is produced in
Pakistan at two factories. DOD estimates that about 240 tons of CAN--
representing less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the two factories'
total annual production capacity--is used by insurgents to make IEDs
for use in Afghanistan. When processed and mixed with fuel oil, CAN
fertilizer becomes a powerful homemade explosive. DOD officials noted
that only a small amount of CAN is required to make powerful IEDs.
According to DOD, a 110-pound bag of CAN yields about 82 pounds of
bomb-ready explosive material. This small quantity has the capacity to
destroy an armored vehicle or detonate 10 small blasts aimed at U.S.
forces conducting foot patrols.
Afghanistan outlawed CAN in 2010, but because of demand for CAN as
fertilizer and for IEDs, smugglers bring it into the country, for
example, on trucks hidden under other goods. Afghanistan and Pakistan
face challenges similar to those that the United States and Mexico face
in trying to prevent smuggling across sections of our shared border.
U.S. officials note that Pakistan maintains two primary border
crossings along the approximately 1,500-mile border with Afghanistan,
and only a small percentage of the trucks crossing the border are
inspected. Our May 2012 report contains a video of activity at border
crossings along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
Our May 2012 report: (1) Described the status of U.S. efforts to
assist Pakistan in countering IEDs, and (2) reviewed the Department of
State's (State) tracking of U.S.-assisted efforts in Pakistan to
counter IEDs. To describe these efforts, we reviewed documentation from
multiple U.S. agencies--including DHS, State, the Department of Defense
(DOD), and the Department of Justice--to inventory and describe their
relevant activities and performance measures. We also interviewed
representatives of U.S. agencies and international partners in the
United States and Pakistan.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ More detail on our scope and methodology is available in the
issued report. We conducted this performance audit from October 2011 to
May 2012 in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In summary, we identified four categories of assistance U.S.
agencies have provided: (1) Counter-IED training and equipment, (2) a
counter-IED public awareness campaign, (3) training of border
officials, and (4) legal assistance for laws and regulations to counter
IEDs and IED precursors. We found that each agency providing counter-
IED assistance to Pakistan performs a unique role based on its
specialized knowledge and expertise. DHS, for example, takes primary
responsibility for border management and customs investigation
training. DHS conducts joint regional training and operational
exercises for both Pakistani and Afghan border officials, including
international border interdiction training and cross-border financial
investigation training. DHS also plays a lead role in Program Global
Shield to foster cross-border cooperation and initiate complementary
border management and customs operations.\3\ According to DHS, the main
goals of Program Global Shield are: (1) To identify and interdict
falsely declared explosive precursor chemicals, (2) to initiate
investigations of smuggled or illegally diverted IED materials, and (3)
to uncover smuggling and procurement networks that foster illicit
trade.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Program Global Shield is an international effort to counter the
smuggling of chemical precursors that could be used to manufacture
IEDs, including CAN. The World Customs Organization, the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime, Interpol, and DHS jointly initiated this
project in 2010 and established it as a program in June 2011 with
funding of about $5.9 million that State provided through its Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, according to the
Bureau's Global Shield liaison officer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
According to agency officials, U.S. agencies work through various
organizations to coordinate and share information related to assisting
Pakistan with counter-IED efforts. These include the following:
The U.S. Embassy-Pakistan Counter-IED Working Group helps to
keep counter-IED efforts a priority. Coordinated by State, the
group also includes participants from DHS, DOD, and the
Departments of Justice and Agriculture as well as the U.S.
Agency for International Development, the British High
Commission, and the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime.
The Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization
(JIEDDO) \4\ leads DOD's counter-IED efforts by providing
intelligence and expertise on IEDs. For example, JIEDDO hosted
a global conference on homemade explosives in fall 2011 that
was attended by fertilizer producers and representatives from
several agencies. JIEDDO conducted several studies and provided
technical assistance to fertilizer producers on how they could
mark the product to help inhibit smuggling.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ JIEDDO is an agency of DOD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Office of the Special Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan participates in regular discussions on counter-IED
issues with Central Command (CENTCOM), Special Operations
Command (SOCOM), JIEDDO, and the Counter-IED Working Group at
the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan, which includes DHS.
In providing assistance to Pakistan, which adopted a counter-IED
strategy in 2011, U.S. agencies have encountered a range of challenges.
U.S. officials in Washington, DC, and Islamabad, Pakistan identified
the following key difficulties that hamper the provision of training
and equipment.
Obtaining visas for U.S. officials.--We have previously
reported that U.S. officials face delays in obtaining visas to
travel to Pakistan.\5\ During our January 2012 meetings at the
U.S. Embassy, officials from several agencies told us that it
is difficult to obtain visas for U.S. officials, including
trainers, to travel to Pakistan. According to officials, visa
renewals sometimes take up to 6 weeks, which can force trainers
to leave the country until they get their visa renewed. This
has sometimes resulted in disruptions and cancelled training
courses.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ GAO, Accountability for U.S. Equipment Provided to Pakistani
Security Forces in the Western Frontier Needs to Be Improved, GAO-11-
156R (Washington, DC: Feb. 15, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Vetting Pakistani officials to receive U.S. training.--U.S.
law requires that U.S. agencies determine whether there is
credible evidence of gross violations of human rights by
security force units or individuals slated to receive security
assistance.\6\ According to U.S. officials, Pakistan must
provide in advance the names of individuals who will be
receiving U.S. training in order for them to be vetted. In
addition U.S. officials stated that Pakistan has not always
been timely in releasing the names of officials who are to
receive the training, which can create logistics and scheduling
difficulties. For example, according to DHS officials, lack of
sufficient time to complete the vetting process resulted in the
cancellation of a Program Global Shield training session in
October 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ See 22 U.S.C. 2378d regarding assistance furnished under the
Foreign Assistance Act or the Arms Export Control Act. For programs
funded by DOD appropriations, the provision is limited to training
programs and is incorporated annually in the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act. See, for example, Pub. L. No. 112-10, Div. A. sec.
8058.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ensuring timely delivery of equipment.--Problems clearing
customs and other issues have delayed the transfer of counter-
IED equipment from the United States to Pakistani forces. For
example, as of April 2012, of the 110 IED jammers that DOD
procured in 2009 for Pakistan at a cost of about $22.8 million,
55 jammers were still in Karachi awaiting release from
Pakistani customs. The remaining 55 jammers were being kept in
storage in the United States until the initial 55 were
released.
Reaching agreement on the specifics of U.S. assistance
projects.--Efforts by the United States to reach agreement with
Pakistan on the specific terms of assistance projects can be
challenging. For example, the United States and Pakistan
planned to establish a facility capable of exploiting chemical,
technical, biometric, and documentary evidence to enable
Pakistan to disrupt insurgent networks. According to DOD
officials, once it became clear that the United States and
Pakistan could not reach agreement on joint use of the
facility, DOD terminated its support for establishing this
facility.
In addition to these challenges to U.S. efforts to assist Pakistan,
U.S. officials identified several broader challenges to Pakistan's
ability to counter IEDs and, more specifically, to suppress the
smuggling of CAN and other IED precursors across the Pakistani border
with Afghanistan.
History of smuggling across the Pakistan-Afghanistan
border.--Segments of the Afghanistan-Pakistan border remain
porous and are difficult to patrol. The border between Pakistan
and Afghanistan is approximately 1,500 miles long and much of
the terrain along the central and northern border is rugged and
mountainous. There is a history of smuggling goods in both
directions at many points along this porous border.
Availability of CAN substitutes for IEDs.--Even if the
smuggling of CAN could be suppressed, insurgents can readily
use another precursor chemical to make IEDs. According to DOD,
other products available in Pakistan--such as potassium
chlorate, used in making matches, and urea, another commonly
used fertilizer--can also be used to produce IEDs. At a JIEDDO
conference on homemade explosives, a panel of experts agreed
that insurgents could easily substitute these commodities to
make IEDs if it becomes more difficult for them to access CAN.
Smuggling of IED precursors into Afghanistan from other
bordering countries.--While Pakistan is the principal source of
CAN coming into Afghanistan, China and Iran are also reported
to be suppliers of IED precursor chemicals. According to State
officials, other substitutes for CAN, including potassium
chlorate and urea, are exported by countries other than
Pakistan.
Delay in finalizing Pakistan's National Counter-IED
Implementation Plan.--Pakistan's Directorate General for Civil
Defense has developed a National Counter-IED Implementation
Plan as outlined in the National Counter-IED Strategy. However,
as of April 2012, the plan had not been approved due to
concerns over resourcing and other issues.
Our May 2012 report also found that U.S. agencies have developed a
new performance indicator and three targets to track some U.S.-assisted
Pakistani counter-IED efforts. Specifically, State's fiscal year 2013
Mission Strategic and Resource Plan--which is designed to reflect U.S.
priorities in Pakistan--included a performance indicator to monitor
Pakistan's implementation of effective measures to prevent illicit
commerce in sensitive materials, including chemical precursors used to
make IEDs in Afghanistan. To measure progress toward this performance
indicator, the plan included three targets: (1) Implementation of the
Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement for fiscal year 2011, (2)
improved competency of Pakistani customs and border officials and
improved monitoring at border stations for fiscal year 2012, and (3)
Pakistan's implementation of a real-time truck-tracking system for
fiscal year 2013.
While the inclusion of a counter-IED performance indicator and
targets to measure progress toward the indicator in the fiscal year
2013 MSRP is a positive step, it does not reflect the broad range of
U.S.-assisted counter-IED efforts in Pakistan. As a result, our report
included a recommendation to State to enhance its counter-IED
performance measures to cover the full range of U.S.-assisted efforts.
State concurred with our recommendation and noted that comprehensive
metrics would better enable evaluation of progress in counter-IED
efforts in Pakistan. State committed to improve assessment of its
programs by looking for ways to broaden the scope of existing metrics
in order to better reflect and evaluate interagency participation in
counter-IED efforts. In its comments on a draft of our report, DHS
noted that it is committed to working with interagency partners to
improve capacity for tracking counter-IED efforts in Pakistan.
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer
any questions you may have at this time.
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