[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO AT TSA:
PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 10, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-103
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
79-845PDF WASHINGTON : 2013
___________________________________________________________________________
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,
http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Ron Barber, Arizona
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Chairman
Daniel E. Lungren, California Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tim Walberg, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois, Vice Chair Ron Barber, Arizona
Robert L. Turner, New York Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Amanda Parikh, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Vacant, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security........................................ 7
Witnesses
Dr. Richard W. Bloom, Associate Vice President for Academics,
Director of Terrorism, Espionage, and Security Studies, Embry-
Riddle Aeronautical University:
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Mr. Robert W. Poole, Jr., Searle Freedom Trust Transportation
Fellow, Director of Transportation Policy, Reason Foundation:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Rick ``Ozzie'' Nelson, Senior Fellow and Director, Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism Program, Center for Strategic and
International Studies:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Tom Blank, Executive Vice President, Gephardt Government
Affairs:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Ms. Colby Alonso, Association of Flight Attendants:
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 26
CHALLENGING THE STATUS QUO AT TSA: PERSPECTIVES ON THE FUTURE OF
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
----------
Tuesday, July 10, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:32 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Rogers, Cravaack, Turner, Jackson
Lee, and Barber.
Mr. Rogers. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security will come to order. The
subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on new and
effective ways to secure critical transportation
infrastructure. I would like to welcome everyone to the hearing
and thank our witnesses for being here.
I do want to give you a heads-up. We are scheduled to be
called for a procedural vote, just one vote, thank goodness,
any minute. So rather than keeping you all waiting and us
holding you up here while we are waiting for them to call us to
vote, I thought we would go ahead and start. I talked with a
Democrat staff and Ranking Member Jackson Lee is on her way; we
will go ahead and start.
I will make my opening statement. She will make hers, and
we will try to get as many of yours done as we can. Then we
will have a brief recess, about 15 minutes. We will go make
that vote and come back, then we will pick back up and go from
there. So I apologize for the inconvenience, but they don't ask
me about these things. They just kind of tell me. So I
appreciate your patience on that. Let me start by saying that
giving up on TSA without having something better to fill its
place is not an option. For all its faults, the fundamental
reason TSA was set up after 9/11 was to deploy enhanced
security measures to prevent another attack on aviation. That
security mission is just as important today, if not more
important, than it was 11 years ago.
Having said that, letting TSA carry on the way it has for
the last 11 years is equally not an option. TSA's poor conduct
is sending a strong message to the American taxpayer. The
message is TSA doesn't care or doesn't know how to best serve
and protect the traveling public. I am convinced we need to
undertake a major reform to the Federal Government's role in
our airports. I look forward to discussing some of those
reforms here today.
The fact is Band-aid measures won't solve TSA's problems.
This is going to require a great deal of collective thought and
ingenuity. The PreCheck program is a great first step, but at
this stage, PreCheck doesn't benefit the average traveler in
meaningful ways, and it is not clear where the program will go
from here.
Today's hearing is a chance to have an open discussion
about ideas for meaningful reform at TSA. Building upon the
success of PreCheck program, the private sector screening
program, known as SPP, and others, I remain committed to fixing
TSA and holding it accountable to do the job it was meant to do
in the first place. But we need to make our transportation
systems as secure as possible at the lowest cost possible and
with the least intrusion to passengers.
I want to extend a sincere thanks to the panel of witnesses
we have here today for contributing their insight in this
effort. With that, I will now suspend waiting for the Ranking
Member and we will go to the opening statement of our first
witness.
There is a beeper--let us try to get at least two of these
opening statements in and then I will recess.
The first witness is Dr. Richard Bloom, who currently
serves as associate vice president for academics and the
director of terrorism and espionage and security studies at
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.
Prior to his current position, Dr. Bloom served as
president of the Military Psychology Division of the American
Psychological Association.
Dr. Bloom carries out policy analysis and reviews applied
research in aviation security threat assessment, terrorism and
intelligence collection and analysis, covert action,
counterintelligence, personnel security, and the psychology of
information warfare.
The Chairman now recognizes Dr. Bloom for your 5-minute
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD W. BLOOM, ASSOCIATE VICE PRESIDENT FOR
ACADEMICS, DIRECTOR OF TERRORISM, ESPIONAGE, AND SECURITY
STUDIES, EMBRY-RIDDLE AERONAUTICAL UNIVERSITY
Mr. Bloom. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all
Members of the subcommittee.
There are a number of things I would like to share about
the future of the Transportation Security Administration. No.
1, I think we need qualitative and quantitative analyses of how
effective TSA is at the moment and how much it has been in
terms of how it's prevented, deterred, successfully resolved
any incidents of terrorism and other crime as well, especially
because terrorism and other kinds of crime are becoming more
and more interrelated.
As to the comparative analysis of the effectiveness of
public and private approaches to security, I think that is not
really the right question. The right question should be: What
principles do we need to have the right people doing the right
things, based on risk?
No. 2, if we keep TSA, I think we need to ensure there are
firewalls between whatever regulatory authorities might have
and whatever security services they may be providing. We also
need to decide whether it is too focused on aviation and too
little focus on other transportation modalities. We also have
to make a decision whether U.S. Government security efforts in
general are too focused on transportation, to the exclusion of
other terrorist and crime targets, given the infinite number of
the latter.
We have to have a greater perspective than transportation
securities related to global, international, and regional
cooperation, including that between transportation, security,
and custom authorities.
We have to focus less on how many and what kind of
resources are enough for adequate transportation security and
focus more on how do we get the most security with whatever
resources are available.
We have to move away from a vulnerability impact approach
towards a better threat approach, towards an optimal risk
estimate approach, but there are many complexities in doing
that.
Risk estimates have to continuously change because threat
vulnerability in the world in general continually change. We
have to develop and field various layers of transportation
security so that they continuously change as risk estimates
continuously change.
There needs to be more equal integration of offensive and
defensive security approaches. By offensive approaches, I am
talking about perception management: How do we get fewer people
to want to engage in or support terrorism or violate security?
Also intelligence collection and analysis, we can identify
the threat and then neutralize them, incarcerate them, detain
them, whatever, and then of course the defensive approach is
what the general public is more familiar with, the technology,
the profiling, the behavioral detection and so on.
They need to be, offensive and defensive, more fully
integrated together.
Very important, how transportation security personnel are
selected, trained, and managed: Do they have the right stuff?
Do we know what the right stuff actually is?
Does training best conform with knowledge and skills
associated with supporting security in the present and in the
future? Are they treated right; salaries, benefits, awards,
recognition, day-to-day respect?
This is especially the case, given that terrorists have
publicly stated that hurting their targets economically is a
priority.
Transportation security initiatives continue to be too
focused on technology and technological fixes, not on the
thought process involved in attacking and countering attacks.
Terrorism ultimately is psychological. While its
intermediate consequences are death, destruction, casualties,
and damage, its ultimate consequences are to create and
maintain desired perceptions and behaviors of specific targets
surviving terrorist acts.
TSA seems to be focused on terrorism's intermediary
consequences without being integrated with U.S. Government and
allied efforts on terrorism's ultimate consequences.
Too many people in the United States expect total safety
and security. This is an unreasonable mass psychology. At the
moment, from the terrorist perspective, both objective success
and objective failure qualify as subjective success, again
because terrorism is ultimately psychological.
TSA needs to better address this as it communicates to
populations Nationally and internationally.
Finally, our transportation security programs and their
cost, including the existence and functioning of TSA, actually
wins for terrorists because the economic resources utilized
could be better used in other ways to strengthen our country.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bloom follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard W. Bloom
July 10, 2012
opportunities for status quo challenge
Develop qualitative and quantitative analyses of TSA's
effectiveness and cost to answer question of whether TSA should
continue to exist. Effectiveness would include measures of prevention,
deterrence, and the successful resolution of terrorism and other crime.
Comparative analyses of various public and private approaches should
also be part of addressing effectiveness and cost.
Assess whether TSA should have regulatory authority over the
security services it also provides. For example, does the Japanese
experience with nuclear energy provision and regulation suggest that
TSA's dual responsibilities mitigate against regulatory and service
success?
Continue to assess whether TSA is too focused on aviation, too
little focused on other transportation modalities. Continue to focus on
whether overall U.S. Government security efforts are too focused on
transportation to the exclusion of other terrorist and crime targets.
Regardless of the future of TSA, U.S. Government concerns about
transportation security can only be resolved by more global,
international, and regional cooperation including that between
transportation security and customs authorities.
Better differentiate among the three main definitions of security
in TSA policies, programs, and procedures: (1) How secure we think we
are; (2) how secure we actually are; and (3) what we do to achieve
either or both of the first two--as a means to create more coherent
policy and programs.
Better address that what contributes to security one moment may
also contribute to violating it another moment--based on the creativity
and ingenuity of those seeking to violate transportation security
through terrorism and other crime.
Focus less on how many and what kind of resources are enough for
adequate transportation security. Focus more on how do we get the most
security with whatever resources are available. This is especially true
with the United States and its allies facing fiscal and economic
challenges globally, regionally, and domestically that necessitate
budget reductions or trade-offs with other priorities.
Continue to move away from a vulnerability-impact approach, away
from a better threat approach, and towards an optimal risk estimate.
Approach the ideal that risk estimates should continuously change
because threat, vulnerability, and the world in general continuously
change.
Develop and field the various layers of transportation security so
that they continuously change as risk estimates continuously change.
More equally develop and field in an integrated fashion both
offensive and defensive approaches. They should continuously match
changes in risk estimates.
The offensive approach includes perception management and
intelligence collection and analysis. In perception management, various
communication strategies are used to decrease how many people worldwide
want to attack transportation or support those who do. For intelligence
collection and analysis, information helps identify people intending to
attack transportation or support those who do. Then--in a legally and
ethically appropriate fashion--these people are detained, incarcerated,
and/or neutralized.
The defensive approach includes technologies and human activities
to catch people and things constituting an attack on transportation--
often near the location of the attack. This includes physical barriers;
motion detectors; closed circuit television; explosive, weapons,
radiation, and other threat detection systems; behavioral detection and
profiling systems; education, training, and assessment of human
operators who engage in technology-, eye-, and hand-mediated searches;
hardening of transportation cargo packaging; optimal configuring of
transportation cargo; and various supply chain security programs.
Resolve the challenge of time. Time works against transportation
security. It's pretty easy to learn about specific security measures,
and this provides the opportunity for people and organizations who seek
to attack transportation to pre-empt, counter, work around, or just
attack elsewhere. As resources continue to be sunk into a specific
offensive or defensive approach, many of those who seek to attack
transportation already have made allowances for security measures that
have not even been fully fielded.
Resolve the challenge of intelligence. While accurate and relevant
information is crucial to our understanding the threats and
vulnerabilities from which risk estimates come, this information is
almost always incomplete, contradictory, and ambiguous. There also are
many difficulties in sharing and transmitting this information to
transportation security personnel in a manner that is timely,
responsive, and secure. Too often, then, transportation security
personnel are flying blind . . . or at least with impaired vision.
There are always multiple threats, rarely actionable intelligence.
Resolve the challenge of technology. Estimates of security
technologies' effectiveness almost always keep decreasing as we move
from the laboratory, to field test, to an every-day travel and
operational environment. In fact, given the usually low probability of
a terrorist attack or other security violation--save for actionable
intelligence--statistically supporting the security effectiveness and
utility of technologies is a very difficult thing to do.
Resolve the challenge of profiling, behavioral detection, and
interviewing techniques in operational environments. It's just
extremely difficult to link specific aspects of people--sweating,
facial expressions, clothing, how they talk, what they talk about,
where they are in an airport or on-board an aircraft, let alone what
they may be thinking and feeling to terrorist and criminal intent and
behavior. And much more attention needs to be focused on the profiling
of situations and environments. Profiling efforts should continue for
shipments and things, as well as people.
Resolve the challenge of how transportation security personnel are
selected, trained, and managed. Let's see, these folks are being
entrusted with our lives. Do they have the right stuff and do we know
what the right stuff is--how to best think, what motivations are
appropriate for wanting the job, what powers of concentration are
appropriate, what types of emotional functioning are the right ones,
what behavioral capabilities are necessary including fatigue tolerance
and tolerance for people behaving at their worst? Does training best
conform with knowledge and skills associated with actually identifying
and stopping today's and tomorrow's terrorist and criminal attacks, not
yesterday's? Are transportation security personnel treated right--
salaries, benefits, awards, and recognition, day-to-day respect?
Resolve the challenge of the layers of security looking right. What
does this mean? If the layers look predictable and are predictable, we
have a big problem. This is because surveillance, reconnaissance, and
probing transportation security systems too often occur by potential
terrorist and criminal planners. Even the everyday security violations
like people going through the wrong door, entering restricted areas
accidentally, or leaving baggage unattended are studied by potential
terrorists for clues to the likely responses of transportation security
systems when a real attack occurs. A better choice is looking
predictable but being unpredictable. A best choice is looking
unpredictable and being unpredictable.
Resolve the challenge of culture. Cultural blinders impede how we
understand other people. Let's face it, even well-intentioned people
can be victims of their own racial, ethnic, ideological, and other
prejudices. These make it very difficult to implement some of the
offensive and defensive approaches to transportation security. As we
try to win hearts and minds of people throughout the world, we may be
creating enemies or just not affecting people at all--or affecting
different kinds of people in unknown ways. As just one example, when we
neutralize terrorists with violence, we may be increasing their total
number and losing opportunities to interrogate for valuable
information. This doesn't excuse or condone the threat. It does show
the difficulties in maintaining acceptable levels of security
Resolve the challenges of transportation security cost and value.
Governments and businesses continue to grapple towards accurate
calculations on the trade-offs of security overhead, impact on
security, profit-and-loss implications. What are needed are qualitative
and quantitative analyses and measures of deterring, preventing, and
successfully managing transportation terrorism and other crime--
including measures of false positives and false negatives in
operational environments. This is especially the case given that
terrorists have publicly stated that hurting their targets economically
is a priority. Are transportation security programs and their costs--
including the existence and functioning of TSA--actually wins for
terrorists?
Minimize the noxious consequences of partisan politics and turf
battles. Yes, there are highly competent political leaders with
backbone and character who do the right thing. But there are others who
engage in public posturing, outright lying, making true-believer
statements based on sheer ignorance, supporting positions based on
trading favors, doing whatever it takes to get elected, and all the
rest. This has been the case throughout history for all known cultures.
Even our truly great political leaders often have to make compromises
with such people . . . and transportation security can suffer. This
occurs in the context of a constant tension among the budgetary
interests of government, industry, academia, and the general public
versus legitimate transportation security needs.
Resolve the challenge of transportation cargo value. For example,
much less attention and fewer resources have been addressed to the
threat facing air cargo than to that facing passengers. Many citizens
and legal authorities seem to have less concern about aircraft carrying
only cargo and a crew than about commercial passenger flights with
cargo. That air cargo containing explosive materiel or other noxious
agents, whether on commercial passenger aircraft or on flights without
commercial passengers, can endanger large numbers of people seems to be
ignored, discounted, or repressed. Depending on the type of attack, the
consequences could include large numbers of human casualties; a small
number of casualties with high symbolic value; and symbolic,
significant, and even catastrophic damage and destruction to
communications, energy, and other infrastructure of National and
international significance--all with potentially huge economic damage.
Resolve the challenge of transportation cargo variety. Cargo varies
in content, how the content is packaged and situated, and the
configuration and other characteristics of the transport vehicle. The
associated screening challenges include physical damage related to the
method of screening; levels of screening specificity and sensitivity
related to the cargo content; and terrorist knowledge of screening
methods.
Resolve the challenge of supply chain links and nodes. The biggest
problem here is the number of entities involved in the cargo supply
chain. A partial, generic list of supply chain entities: Manufacturers,
manufacturing facilities, freight forwarding facilities, shipping
facilities, third-party logistics providers, warehouses, other
distribution centers, independent cargo screening facilities, and more.
The associated screening challenges include physical damage related to
the method of screening; levels of screening specificity and
sensitivity related to the cargo content; and terrorist knowledge of
screening methods.
Resolve the challenge of the cargo security puzzle. What is this
puzzle? Implementing total, comprehensive, and intrusive screening can
significantly hurt our economy through huge costs of implementation.
[And there still will be significant error rates]. But partial and less
comprehensive and less intrusive screening also can significantly hurt
our economy through its very incompleteness leading to a greater
probability of successful terrorist attacks. The same applies to doing
nothing. Any way you cut it, terrorism seems to have a good shot at
being successful. Other transportation-related crime much more so.
Again, the costs of transportation cargo security may be an example of
terrorist on-going success. The key to counterterrorism and other
counter-crime successes is optimal intelligence collection, analysis,
and dissemination in a secure, responsive, and timely fashion.
Resolve the insider threat to transportation security.
Psychological research on how good people can go bad and bad people can
go good need to be studied, implemented, and assessed.
conclusions
Terrorism ultimately is psychological. While its intermediate
consequences are death, destruction, casualties, and damage, its
ultimate consequences are to create and maintain desired perceptions
and behaviors of specific targets surviving terrorist acts. TSA seems
to be focused on terrorism's intermediary consequences without being
integrated with U.S. Government and allied efforts on terrorism's
ultimate consequences.
Specific kinds of public discourse and classified analyses of
terrorism--including resulting estimates of threat, vulnerability, and
risk--are themselves targets of terrorism. So are specific security
programs. TSA seems to be inadequately focused on the potential for its
actions to support desired terrorist consequences.
Too many people in the United States expect total safety and
security--an unreasonable mass psychology that has not been addressed
adequately by political and security leaders. At the moment, from the
terrorist perspective, both objective success and objective failure
qualify as subjective success . . . again because terrorism is,
ultimately, psychological. TSA needs to better address this as it
applies to transportation security.
Transportation security initiatives continue to be too focused on
technology and technological fixes, not on the thought processes
involved in attacks and countering attacks.
It's less important to find some minimum resource threshold below
which transportation security is unacceptably endangered. More
important is to do what's best with the resources we have. In our
favor, resources not directly allocated to support security can be
still contribute to counterterrorism success and failure.
Transportation is only one of an infinite number of targets for
terrorism and other crimes like illicit trafficking and theft. Unless
TSA can be shown to provide more value than cost in an era of competing
budgetary and security needs, its disestablishment should be seriously
considered.
Prudence and good judgment are essential as we move forward. Yet,
in the history of the world, both are usually in short supply.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman for his opening
statement.
We have now been joined by my friend and colleague from
Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, and she is now recognized for her
opening statement.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you for your
courtesies.
Just for the record I will indicate that many times, as
usual, Judiciary Committee is engaged in a markup so I thank
you, Mr. Chairman, for your courtesies.
I always am just very happy to see all of the witnesses but
I am even happier to be able to welcome Mr. Barber of Arizona
as a new Member of the committee.
It is important to note that he comes from a very important
State, the State of Arizona, and he has had a very important
predecessor, Ms. Giffords, and of course he brings to this
committee a commitment and concern about securing the homeland.
I think it is extremely important to add to our western
presence and, Mr. Barber, you have welcomed and thank you so
very much for your service to this country.
Mr. Barber. You are very welcome.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Let me indicate, I always start by indicating that on 9/11
Transportation Security Administration and TSO officers were
not in place and we lost thousands of lives.
It is all right to ask and analyze the going forward of the
Texas, excuse me, the Transportation Security Administration,
but as I listen to our witnesses today many of you may have
taken some mode of transportation. Many of you may have flown.
A flight attendant flies often.
All of the critiquing does not take away the value of the
Transportation Security Administration and TSO officers. I will
be listening as I am in and out on solutions.
Solutions is the key of what we must proceed on. Terrorists
remain determined to attack our transportation system and we
must match their determination with our vigilance.
Our perspective on transportation security changed after
September 11. We established a 9/11 Commission and passed
legislation, which was based on the Commission's
recommendation. I think we have done quite well.
We have not had a terrorist act on our soil. Yes, there
have been a number of threats, those that have not been public.
But with the combined labor of TSO officers, others on the
front lines, intelligence collaboration, we are not what we
were pre-9/11.
We must all remember that in the wake of 9/11 our first
step was the creation of TSA and the replacement of contract
guards with Federal employees at this Nation's airport
checkpoints.
I travel throughout this Nation and I stop and talk to TSO
officers. They are former police persons, military persons, and
they are public servants and they are serving their Nation.
I will have great quarrel with any testimony that offers to
suggest we need to change them out and that there is a status
quo. What I will say is I am always prepared to ensure a more
efficient, effective, experienced group of public servants and
I welcome, in collaboration with the Chairman, to do so.
The American public needed to know that each passenger
would be screened and each bag would be checked. We owed it to
the 3,000 people who died that day to ensure that this would
not happen again.
Mr. Chairman, I welcome our efforts, as I said, to continue
to improve they system that secures our Nation's skies. Today
we will take a closer look at TSA's risk-based approach and the
agency's efforts to effectively address threats in
transportation security.
There have been many changes and they are looking forward
to those changes. The threat to inbound passenger and cargo
flights remains a reality.
These threats can only be resolved if Members of this body
are not afraid to ask difficult questions or embrace complex
answers, but not take a widespread view that we must throw out
the Transportation Security Administration or TSO officers.
Our witnesses today will discuss various ideas for
improving TSA's risk-based approach to securing our aviation
sector. As the authorizing committee for TSA, it is certainly
appropriate for us to hear and consider ideas from those who do
not work for TSA. In particular I look forward to hearing from
Ms. Alonso, a flight attendant who will provide her front-line
perspective on how TSA can enhance its layered security.
As we know, flight attendants do not just serve beverages.
They are often the first crewmembers to recognize and address
safety and security problems.
As a most recent example, this just took place a week ago
in China, crewmembers and passengers foiled a hijacking of the
six people attempted to break into the cockpit door.
Further, just this year we have had a number of instances
in which the decisive actions of flight personnel ensured the
safety and security of passengers. In each of these instances,
in-cabin security was the last line of defense in thwarting
potential terrorist acts.
To further reiterate, the threats we face in aviation, must
remember these incidents that frame our security discussions
today, I will just highlight December 22, Flight 63, American
Airlines to Miami from Paris, self-proclaimed al-Qaeda
operative attempted to detonate an explosive device.
December 25, Umar, the Christmas day bomber, also
remembered as the underwear bomber, attempted to detonate his
underwear. Finally, on May 22, American Airlines 787 from Paris
to Charlotte was diverted to Bangor after a passenger claimed
to have an explosive device in their body.
All these incidents took place of flights inbound to the
United States. Ms. Alonso was on the flight in May. I look
forward to hearing her testimony concerning this incident. Her
testimony will offer the kind of operational insight we need to
examine what should be done when all other layers of security
have been compromised.
Yes, we need to expand TSA to other modes of
transportation. Yes, we need to be efficient, effective, and
even look closely at how we use the personnel at TSA, but I
will be continuously committed to the structure that we put in
place. Let us look for solutions and answers as we work to
improve the security of this Nation.
I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chairman now will recess the committee for--subject to
the call of the Chairman, which should be about 15 minutes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Rogers. This subcommittee hearing is called back to
order. While we are waiting for the Ranking Member to return
from the vote, we will go ahead and pick back up with our
testimony. I want to thank Dr. Bloom for his opening statement,
and turn now to our second witness.
Mr. Robert Poole currently serves as director of
transportation policy at the Reason Foundation. Mr. Poole co-
founded the Reason Foundation in 1978 and served as its
president and CEO until 2000. Mr. Poole has written hundreds of
articles, papers, and policy studies on privatization in
transportation issues, and currently writes a monthly column on
transportation issues for the Public Works Financing. The
Chairman now recognizes Mr. Poole for his opening statement.
You are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT W. POOLE, JR., SEARLE FREEDOM TRUST
TRANSPORTATION FELLOW, DIRECTOR OF TRANSPORTATION POLICY,
REASON FOUNDATION
Mr. Poole. Thank you for having me, Mr. Chairman. I have
been researching aviation security since 2001, and I have been
studying competitive contracting of public services since I
wrote the first book on the subject in 1980.
When Congress enacted the ATSA legislation after 9/11, it
built in a conflict of interest for the TSA. That agency is in
charge of aviation security regulation, but it also operates
the largest component of airport security, passenger and
baggage screening. TSA regulates airports, airlines, rail
roads, and transit at arm's length, but when it comes to
passenger screening, TSA basically regulates itself.
Self-regulation is inherently problematic. The tendency of
any large organization is to defend itself against criticism
and make its image as positive as possible. So when screeners
perform poorly, TSA defends itself and minimizes the problem.
In addition, having TSA operate the screen conflicts with the
idea of unified airport security accountable to a single
airport security official.
The U.S. model that combines regulation and screening is
also out of step with other countries. I did a report for the
OECD on screening in 2008. I compared the way it is done in
Canada, the European Union, and the United States. In Canada
and the European Union, security regulation is done by a
National agency, like here, but screening is done either by the
airport or by security companies.
Separation of regulation from service provision is also
called for by ICAO security regulations. Member states are
supposed to notify ICAO if their practice differs from the
standard. The United States has never notified ICAO that we are
in noncompliance. Oddly enough, the United States came close to
adopting this international model.
Following 9/11, the House version of ATSA, which passed by
a large margin, removed airport screening from the airlines
where it should never have been and made it an airport
responsibility under new Federal regulation and oversight. But
many officials and commentators incorrectly believed that
flawed screening what was enabled the 9/11 attacks to succeed,
which was not the case.
So therefore they insisted on Federalizing screening,
meaning creating a Federal workforce to take it over. That
approach passed the Senate unanimously. In the conference
committee, unfortunately from my standpoint, the Senate version
prevailed with the House only getting a five-airport pilot
program for opt-out, and the promise that all other airports
could eventually opt out.
So when TSA created the SPP opt-out program, it designed a
highly-centralized version of competitive contracting. When
most governments want to contract for a service, they issue an
RFP, select the best proposal, sign a contract and manage the
relationship.
So you would expect that, as in Europe, the airport would
issue the RFP to companies that TSA had certified. The airport
would select the best proposal from among those companies and
then contract with that company, and TSA would regulate the
overall situation. But that is not how SPP works.
Instead, the airport asks TSA if it may opt out. If TSA
approves, then TSA selects a contractor and assigns it to the
airport. TSA signs the contracts and manages the contracts,
leaving the airport out of the loop. TSA also spells out in
detail the procedures and the equipment that the company must
use, and the legislation mandates that screening companies pay
the same wages and benefits as TSA.
Contrast that with the performance contracting approach, as
in Europe. If we had that approach, TSA would certify qualified
companies, would define the outcome measures that are supposed
to be achieved for airport screening. The companies could
design their own procedures and use various approved
technologies to achieve the required outcomes.
This would allow screening companies to innovate. For
examples, screeners could be cross-trained to do other airport
security tasks, thereby strengthening other aspects of airport
security and enriching the screener's work experience.
Now even with all the constraints on today's contractors,
the private sector is delivering more cost-effective screening.
The House T&I Committee in 2011 compared TSA's screening at LAX
with contract screening at SFO. They found SFO's contract
screening is 65 percent more productive than TSA's screening at
LAX. If the SFO model were implemented at LAX, the savings
would be $42 million per year.
And this--the reasons for this higher productivity, much
higher turnover of TSA screeners, to recruitment and training
costs are higher. TSA has to use its National deployment force,
which is very expensive, to fill in the gaps caused by that
high attrition rate. Security companies also do a much better
job of using part-time screeners to cover the peak periods
instead of having all--almost all full-time people.
I have two recommendations for reform of the program.
First, reduce the centralized nature of SPP by permitting each
airport to choose its own screening company from among those
TSA has certified, and let the airport manage the contract
under TSA's overall regulatory oversight at the airport.
Second, and probably longer-term, Congress should revise
the ATSA legislation to remove the built-in conflict of
interest, devolving all screening to the airport. Each airport
could either operate and manage the screening itself, as many
airports in Europe do, or contract with a TSA-approved company.
In either case, current TSA screeners should--would and
should have first preference for the screening jobs. This
change would produce greater accountability for screening
performance, and it would bring the United States into
conformity with ICAO regulations.
Thank you for this time, and I will be happy to answer
questions later.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Poole follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert W. Poole, Jr.
July 10, 2012
My name is Robert Poole. I am the director of transportation policy
at the Reason Foundation. Much of my work deals with aviation policy,
including airport security. Prior to my current position at Reason, my
principal area of expertise was competitive contracting of public
service delivery; I am the author of the first full-length book on the
subject, back in 1980 (Cutting Back City Hall, Universe Books, 1980).
a major design flaw in tsa
I served as an advisor to the House Transportation & Infrastructure
Committee in the days following the 9/11 attacks, as Congress was
grappling with how to improve aviation security. The legislation that
created the TSA--the Aviation & Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of
2001--built in a conflict of interest in the new agency. On the one
hand, TSA is designated as the agency that establishes transportation
security policy and regulates those that provide transportation
operations and infrastructure (airlines, airports, railroads, transit
systems, etc.). But on the other hand, TSA itself is the operator of
the largest component of airport security--passenger and baggage
screening.
When it comes to screening, therefore, TSA has a serious conflict
of interest. With regard to all other aspects of airport security--
access control, perimeter control, lobby control, etc.--security is the
responsibility of the airport, under TSA's regulatory supervision. But
when it comes to screening, TSA regulates itself. Arm's-length
regulation is a basic good-government principle; self-regulation is
inherently problematic.
First, no matter how dedicated TSA leaders and managers are, the
natural tendency of any large organization is to defend itself against
outside criticism and to make its image as positive as possible. And
that raises questions about whether TSA is as rigorous about dealing
with performance problems with its own workforce as it is with those
that it regulates at arm's length, such as airlines and airports. This
comes up again and again in news stories--such as a USA Today
investigation in 2007 found that TSA screeners at Chicago O'Hare and
LAX missed three times as many hidden bomb materials as did privately-
contracted screeners at SFO. TSA's 2007-08 studies comparing TSA and
private screening costs were criticized by GAO as highly flawed and
misleading.
Second, having TSA operate airport screening conflicts with the
idea of each airport having a unified approach to security, with
everyone responsible to the airport's security director. Numerous
examples of divided security have been reported at airports over the
past decade, where certain responsibilities have fallen between the
cracks and neither the airport nor the TSA was on top of the problem.
Examples include video surveillance cameras at Newark and access
control doors at Orlando.
out of step with other countries
In 2008 the OECD's International Transport Forum commissioned me to
do a research paper comparing and contrasting aviation security in the
United States, Canada, and the European Union. In the course of that
research, I was surprised to discover that the conflict of interest
that is built into TSA does not exist in Canada or the E.U. countries.
If you go to Canada or any of the major E.U. countries, airport
screening looks similar to what you experience at U.S. airports. But
the way in which this service is provided and regulated is quite
different. In all these cases, the policy and regulatory function is
carried out by an agency of the national government, as in the United
States. But actual airport screening is carried out either by the
airport itself or by a Government-certified private security firm.
Legally, in Europe airport security is the responsibility of the
airport operator. Whether the screening is carried out by the airport
or a security company varies from country to country, but in no case is
it carried out directly by the National Government aviation security
agency.
In Canada, the legislative body created an aviation security agency
following
9/11--the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA). Transport
Canada remains responsible for airport security policy and regulation,
while CATSA is responsible for the mechanics of airport security, such
as development of biometric ID cards and implementing a system of
airport screening. But rather than providing the screening function
itself, CATSA certifies private security companies and contracts with
them to provide screening services at the 89 airports where such
services are provided.
Separation of aviation security regulation from the provision of
security services is called for by the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO), to which the United States (along with 188 other
countries) is a signatory. This policy is found in ICAO Annex 17,
Standard 3.4.7. Under the Chicago Convention which created ICAO,
``contracting states are required to notify [ICAO] of any differences
between their national regulations and practices'' and ICAO's
international standards. On this point, the United States has failed to
notify ICAO that it does not comply.
the united states came close to adopting the eu/icao model
In the difficult months following the 9/11 terrorism attack, there
was intense political pressure to improve U.S. aviation security.
Despite the fact that the low-quality airline-operated screening was
not responsible for the 9/11 disaster, numerous commentators and public
officials called for ``Federalizing'' airport screening. The Senate's
version of ATSA embodied this view, calling for a new Federal workforce
to be parachuted into some 450 U.S. airports; it passed 100-0. The
House, by contrast, took somewhat more time and learned that only two
other countries had delegated airport screening to airlines as an
unfunded mandate (Bermuda and Canada). They also heard testimony about
the performance contracting model widely used in Europe well before
2001, a fact documented in a GAO report that year.
The resulting House bill removed screening from the airlines and
shifted it to airports, under Federal regulatory supervision and
permitted E.U.-type performance contracting. Both airport
organizations, ACI-NA and AAAE, supported the House bill, which passed
by a wide margin, 286-139. But in the subsequent conference committee,
the Senate version of Federalizing security largely prevailed. The only
consolation prize given to the House was a five-airport opt-out pilot
program, and the promise that eventually all airports would be given
the right to opt out of TSA-provided screening.
tsa contracting vs. performance contracting
Competitive contracting has been widely used at local, State, and
Federal levels of government. In recent decades, it has been embraced
by elected officials of both parties as a way of achieving greater
value for the taxpayer's dollar. One of the most influential books on
the subject was Reinventing Government by David Osborne and Ted
Gaebler, advisors to Vice President Gore's National Performance Review
project. Under this approach, a government wanting a service delivered
more cost-effectively must define the outcomes it wishes to achieve,
leaving qualified bidders free to propose their own procedures and
technology for achieving those outcomes. Such contracts typically
stress measurement of outcome variables, and often provide financial
penalties and bonuses.
By contrast, under the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) set up
by TSA's interpretation of the opt-out provisions in the ATSA
legislation, the entire process is micromanaged by TSA. Instead of
permitting the airport in question to issue an RFP to TSA-certified
firms, TSA itself selects the company and assigns it to the airport.
And TSA itself manages the contract with the screening company, rather
than allowing the airport to integrate screening into its overall
security program, under TSA supervision and regulation. Moreover, TSA
spells out procedures and technology (inputs) rather than only
specifying the desired outcomes of screening, thereby making it very
difficult for screening companies to innovate. Moreover, the ATSA
legislation mandates that compensation levels for private screeners be
identical to those of TSA screeners.
Under a performance contracting approach, with screening devolved
to the airport level, TSA would continue to certify screening companies
that met its requirements (e.g., security experience, financial
strength, screener qualifications, training, etc.). It would also spell
out the screening performance measures (outcomes) that companies or
airports would be required to meet. Airports would be free to either
provide screening themselves (with screeners meeting those same TSA
requirements) or to competitively contract for a TSA-certified
screening company. Companies bidding in response to the airport's RFP
would propose their approach to meeting the performance requirements,
in terms of staff, procedures, and technology. This could include, for
example, cross-training screeners to carry out other airport security
duties, such as access and perimeter control. The airport would select
the proposal that offered the best value, subject to TSA approval. TSA,
in its role as regulator, would oversee all aspects of the airport's
security operations, including screening.
even today's limited spp shows private-sector benefits
Observers such as the GAO have noted how little flexibility private
screening contractors have over the variables involved in providing
this service, given the narrow confines of ATSA and TSA's highly
centralized way of implementing SPP contracts. Yet the limited
available information suggests that even within those constraints, the
private sector is more flexible and delivers more cost-effective
screening.
The most dramatic data come from a study carried out by the staff
of the House Transportation & Infrastructure Committee in 2011. They
obtained data on screening at two major airports, LAX with TSA
screening and SFO with contractor screening. Both are Category X
airports, the highest level in TSA's categorization of airports. The
study found that the company at SFO is dramatically more productive,
processing an average of 65% more passengers per screener than TSA
screeners at LAX. If the screeners at LAX had comparable productivity,
the screener workforce at LAX could be 867 persons smaller, saving $33
million per year.
Given that the company serving SFO is required by law to pay the
same wages and benefits to its screeners as TSA, and to use essentially
the same procedures and equipment, what accounts for this enormous
difference in productivity? One factor is a 58% higher attrition rate
for LAX screeners, compared with those at SFO. That means significantly
greater recruitment and training costs for screening at LAX. Another
result of higher turnover is that the LAX screener workforce needs to
be backed up by the expensive TSA National Deployment Force, to fill in
temporary vacancies. No such backup is needed at SFO. Third, the
private sector has done better than TSA at hiring and retaining part-
time screeners to handle peak periods, rather than staffing up with
enough full-timers to handle peaks and therefore paying some of them
for unproductive off-peak hours. Overall, the study estimated that
screening at LAX would cost $42 million less per year if it were
carried out via an SFO-type screening contract.
Neither the outside study that TSA commissioned from Catapult
Consultants in 2007 nor TSA's own study that was sharply criticized by
the GAO identified these major productivity differences. Both focused
mostly on accounting costs, omitting various overhead costs and extras
such as the cost of using the National Deployment Force. Those
essentially ``inside'' studies created the misleading impression that
it costs more, rather than less, to contract with qualified security
firms for airport screening.
recommendations
Based on the foregoing assessment, I have two recommendations for
improving airport screening.
The most urgent one is to further reform the current SPP. Recent
legislation that puts the burden of proof on TSA in denying an
airport's request to opt out of TSA-provided screening is a modest step
in the right direction, but does not correct TSA's overly centralized
approach. SPP should be further reformed so that:
The airport, not TSA, selects the contractor, selecting the
best-value proposal from TSA-certified contractors.
The airport, not TSA, manages the contract, under TSA's
overall regulatory oversight of all security activities at the
airport in question.
I believe these changes could be made by directing TSA to adopt
them as policy changes, without the need to revise the actual language
of the ATSA legislation.
Second, I recommend revising the ATSA legislation to remove the
conflict of interest that Congress built into that law. The revision
would devolve the responsibility for passenger and baggage screening
from TSA to individual airports, as part of their overall security
program. Airports would have the option of either hiring a qualified
screener workforce or contracting with a TSA-certified security firm.
As is already standard practice when airports join SPP, current TSA
screeners would have first right to screening positions at the airports
shifting over, subject thereafter to the airport's or the company's
rules and human resources policies. This change would produce greater
accountability for screening performance and would also bring the
United States into full conformity with ICAO regulations.
This concludes my testimony. I would be happy to answer questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Poole, for your testimony. Our
third witness, Mr. Ozzie Nelson. I like that. I grew up in that
era. Some of these youngsters back here don't know who that is,
but I think that is pretty cool. Currently serves as senior
fellow and director of Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Mr. Nelson joined CSIS in September 2009 after retiring
from the U.S. Navy where he served in a variety of senior
policy and operational positions. In 2005, he was selected to
serve as an inaugural member of the National Counterterrorism
Center's Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning.
Prior to his assignment at the NCTC, Nelson served as
associate director for maritime security in the Office of
Combating Terrorism on the National Security Council staff at
the White House where he led the development of the National
Strategy on Maritime Security.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Nelson for 5 minutes to
summarize his testimony.
STATEMENT OF RICK ``OZZIE'' NELSON, SENIOR FELLOW AND DIRECTOR,
HOMELAND SECURITY AND COUNTERTERRORISM PROGRAM, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Nelson. Thank you.
Good afternoon Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee,
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
the opportunity to testify today. I would like to take this
time to discuss how the Transportation Security Administration
Congress and the American people can work together to enhance
aviation security in the coming years.
The manner in which the TSA was created and the
requirements we have placed on it have, unfortunately, led to
an inherently flawed system. The TSA was not carefully designed
but instead cobbled together and stood up in the middle of a
crisis just a few short months after 9/11.
Further, we charged it with the immense responsibility of
mitigating every potential risk to America's transport system.
In doing so, we created an unworkable ``zero-failure''
construct in which no risk was acceptable.
The hurried creation untenable model has constrained TSA
and fueled bad policy and bad practice. If TSA is to become the
agency we want it to be, then we must give it the support and
operational freedom it needs to evolve.
At the same time, we must remain cognizant of continued
threats to the homeland. While the core of al-Qaeda that
perpetrated 9/11 has been significantly reduced, its
international affiliates continue to pose a threat to the
aviation system.
Our remarks today will focus on three key areas where I
believe evolution can occur: Risk-based strategies, science and
technology, and strategic communications.
The first step in TSA's evolution must be the full embrace
of intelligence-driven, risk-based models of security. While
significant progress has been made under Administrator John
Pistole, the system still tends to treat every passenger like a
potential terrorist, wasting time and resources in extensive
screening and monitoring procedures.
Adopting a model of security based on risk in which limited
resources are applied strategically would increase the
effectiveness of our overall security efforts and decrease the
cost associated with the screening of millions of individuals
every day.
Keys to the success of this risk-based model would be
information intelligence-sharing efforts. While significant
progress has been made in improving information sharing at the
Federal level, we still need to perfect sharing with State and
local entities as well as the private sector.
Further, given the international nature of aviation
systems, we must improve with our international partners.
Thankfully, TSA has already moved in this direction through
such efforts as a PreCheck program. However, we must seek to
expand these types of trusted traveler programs.
As we move forward, we must remember that with these
efforts, risk-based screenings do involve an inherent degree of
risk. In implementing them, we must be willing to accept the
potential consequences. We simply cannot revert to a broken
``zero failure'' model if and when there is another terrorist
incident. But we must commit ourselves to making a risk-based
model work.
Yet adopting risk-based security will not be enough. In
today's atmosphere of fiscal austerity, technology represents
another means to increase efficiency without compromising
security. Therefore, it is essential that the Department of
Homeland Security's Sciences and Technology budget be
maintained.
While there may be immense short-term pressure to cut S&T
funding, Congress must think of the long-term savings and
efficiencies the technology represents.
For instance, S&T recently created technology for detecting
explosives in checked luggage that is ten times more powerful
than existing systems, yet still costs the same.
It will be necessary moving forward to incentivize private
companies to invest in homeland securities. An important step
would be for DHS to issue clear requirements for technology
acquisition and provide multi-year funding guidance which will
help private industry and direction insurance that need to
develop these two technologies.
It would also be worthwhile to investigate the feasibility
of a venture capital firm that would identify and invest in
companies developing cutting-edge technologies applicable to
homeland security. In developing such a model, TSA could look
to the relationship between In-Q-tel and the intelligence
community.
Yet, even if the technologies are improved, TSA will
continue to face challenges with its public images and
hindering its evolution. Few, if any, U.S. Government agencies
interact in such a consistent and personal level with the
general public as does TSA.
While TSA has already begun implementing image-building and
communications initiatives such as ``TSA Cares'', it will be
impossible for TSA to improve its image significantly if
Government officials continue to use the agency as a source of
political rhetoric. TSA can grow into a respected, efficient,
and effective institution only if it is depoliticized.
TSA also needs to communicate with and utilize travelers to
a greater degree for everyone's mutual benefit. TSA should
explore programs such as DHS's ``If You See Something, Say
Something'' campaign by educating travelers on what they can do
for aviation's safety and then trusting them to do this. TSA
can utilize passengers in a constructive manner.
Finally, TSA would benefit immensely from a greater degree
of leadership continuity. TSA's challenging, and unfortunately
highly politicized, mission demands leadership that transcends
the political cycle.
The administrator position should perhaps be treated
similar to the director of the FBI, which is a set 10-year
term. Since its inception, TSA has had five administrators,
while in this time, the FBI has had one director.
Extending the terms of the TSA administrator would help
them depoliticize the position while increasing their ability
to institute long-term plans and evolve the organization to
what we need it to be.
In conclusion, there are a variety of means by which we can
meet the challenges transportation security, particularly
aviation, faces.
I want to recognize that TSA is already on the right path
toward finding innovative ways to meet these challenges and
Administrator Pistole should be commended for his leadership.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Nelson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rick ``Ozzie'' Nelson
July 10, 2012
Good afternoon Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today. I will be discussing how the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Congress, and the
American people can work together to enhance aviation security in the
coming years.
The manner in which the TSA was created and the requirements we
have placed on it have, unfortunately, led to an inherently flawed
system. Following the fall of the Soviet Union, we had an opportunity
to prepare ourselves to meet new threats, including to our
transportation sector. Yet instead of creating homeland and
transportation security agencies then, we waited until we were in a
crisis. After September 11, we cobbled together and stood up the TSA in
a matter of a few brief months. Further, we charged this new entity
with the immense responsibility of mitigating every potential risk to
America's transport system. In doing so, we created an unworkable
``zero-failure'' construct in which no risk was acceptable. The TSA is
expected to maintain absolute security without infringing upon
passengers' civil liberties or making travel a cumbersome experience--
an unreasonable and arguably unattainable goal. In 2011, an average of
2.2 million airline passengers passed through TSA airport checkpoints
every day.\1\ This figure does not take into account passenger transit
on all the other forms of mass transportation that the TSA is charged
with protecting. Given this enormous volume of passengers, it is
impossible for any agency to completely mitigate all risk to our
transport system, yet we have been forcing TSA to operate under a model
that promotes this goal, fueling bad policy and practice. If TSA is to
become the agency we want it to be, then we must give it the support
and operational freedom to do so.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ http://www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At the same time, we must remain cognizant of continued threats to
the homeland. While the core of al-Qaeda that perpetrated 9/11 has been
significantly reduced, its international affiliates--including al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula and a host of al-Qaeda-inspired homegrown
terrorists, among others--continue to pose a threat to the aviation
system. For whatever reason, al-Qaeda and its affiliates remain
obsessed with attacking the aviation system. While this conveniently
allows us to focus our resources on aviation, we must not be
complacent. The threat will change over time and our enemies will seek
to exploit vulnerabilities in other sectors of transportation system.
If TSA is to meet these threats, it must be allowed to evolve beyond
its current construct.
My remarks today will focus on three key areas where I think
improvements can be made: Risk-based strategies, science and
technology, and strategic communications. I hope that my remarks will
serve to advance the homeland security dialogue between the TSA,
Congress, and the American people.
risk-based strategies
The first step in TSA's evolution must be to fully embrace
intelligence-driven, risk-based models of security. While significant
progress has been made under Administrator John Pistole, the system
still tends to treat every passenger like a potential terrorist,
wasting time and resources in extensive screening and monitoring
procedures. The concept of risk-based security transcends presidential
administrations, yet we continue to slow the agency's evolution towards
this goal.
Instead of applying the same security measures to all situations
and individuals regardless of how likely they are to pose a threat, a
risk-based approach would take advantage of intelligence and
information to allocate security resources where they are most likely
to be needed. These measures would increase the effectiveness of our
security efforts and decrease the costs associated with screening
millions of individuals every day.
Information and intelligence sharing are keys to a successful risk-
based security model. By its very nature, risk-based security relies on
having access to timely and accurate information. Obviously,
significant progress has been made in improving information sharing at
the Federal level. However, for DHS and TSA to build a truly effective
information-sharing regime and meet their unique goals, they will have
to enhance sharing with State and local entities as well as the private
sector. State and local law enforcement represent the first line of
defense against terrorism and private industry owns 85% of all critical
infrastructure, yet we have not perfected systems for sharing with
these actors. Further, given the international nature of the aviation
system, we must improve our efforts to share with our international
partners through such efforts as shared Passenger Name Records (PNR).
This type of sharing with multiple partners and sectors will be
critical to implementing a risk-based model.
The TSA is already moving towards risk-based security. One way they
are doing this is through the PreCheck program, in which low-risk
passengers can bypass certain security measures. PreCheck was initially
implemented last fall and currently operates at 16 airports Nation-
wide, with plans to expand to 19 more airports by the end of 2012. This
program has been implemented in phases, with only certain airlines and
airports participating. This has allowed TSA to closely monitor the
impact of the program. Yet in order to fully realize the benefit of
PreCheck, the program should be expanded to include a greater number of
trusted travelers from a variety of sources. Further, trusted travelers
enrolled in the program should be provided an ID number that would be
recognized across all airlines and airports, greatly increasing
PreCheck's interoperability.
Given the great potential risk-based models hold for security,
these efforts should not only be supported by Congress and the public,
but also expanded, so that risk-based security models are the norm
rather than the exception. Yet we must remember that these efforts do
involve an inherent degree of risk; in implementing them, we must be
willing to accept not only the risks, but the potential consequences.
We cannot simply revert to a broken ``zero-failure'' model if and when
there is another terrorist incident. For aviation security to evolve,
Congress, the public, and TSA must commit themselves to making a risk-
based model work.
science and technology
In today's atmosphere of budget cuts and fiscal austerity,
technology represents another means to increase efficiency without
compromising security. In the long run, investment in new technologies
will enhance TSA's threat detection abilities while at the same time
potentially reducing other costs.
To this end, it is essential that the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) budget be maintained.
While there may be immense short-term pressure to cut S&T funding,
Congress must think of the long-term savings in efficiency that
technology represents. Research and development allows technologies to
be designed to specifically target the threat, instead of having to
alter other technologies to serve the intended purpose. The rapid
creation of the TSA led to the agency using existing technologies that
needed to be modified or creatively manipulated to serve the required
purposes. Now, the S&T is at the point where it is able to develop
technologies that specifically fit the form and function of the TSA.
For instance, S&T recently created a technology for detecting trace
amounts of explosives and drugs on checked luggage that is ten times
more powerful than existing systems, yet still costs the same. If S&T
funds are slashed, such advances as well as the security and efficiency
increases they bring with them will be difficult to realize.
In order to promote the development of products specifically for
homeland security applications, it will also be necessary to
incentivize private companies to invest in these technologies. DHS must
be encouraged to develop partnerships with industry. An important step
would be for DHS to issue clear requirements for technology
acquisition, which will help to incentivize private companies. Further,
multi-year funding guidance from TSA would decrease uncertainty for
technology vendors, allowing them to invest in technologies that may
require multiple years to develop. It would also be worthwhile to
investigate the feasibility of a venture capital firm that would
identify and invest in companies developing cutting-edge technologies
applicable to homeland security. In developing such a model, TSA could
look to the relationship between In-Q-tel and the intelligence
community. Such efforts will be essential to developing a mature
homeland security industrial base, realizing long-term savings, and
increasing security.
strategic communications
Yet even if technologies are improved upon, TSA will continue to
face challenges with its public image. Few, if any, U.S. Government
agencies interact on such a consistent, personal level with the general
public as does TSA. It will be difficult for TSA to evolve without the
support of the public, yet this support is unlikely if the TSA
continues to be viewed as an adversary, rather than as a public good
like police or firefighters. TSA must enhance its image and communicate
with the public in a way that builds mutual trust.
While TSA has already begun implementing image-building and
communications initiatives such as ``TSA Cares'', it will be impossible
for TSA to improve its image and public relations significantly if
Government officials continue to use the agency as a source of
political rhetoric. Although airport security measures are tedious to
all, their goal is to keep Americans safe. Thus, TSA policies should be
framed as serving the public good, instead of unnecessary, cumbersome
red tape. Transportation security and the TSA need to be de-politicized
if they are to evolve, yet this will not occur if short-term political
points are consistently scored at the agency's expense. The TSA can
grow into a respected, efficient, and effective institution, but only
if supported, rather than undercut.
TSA also needs to communicate with and utilize travelers to a
greater degree. Despite the perceived hassle of security measures, it
is in everyone's best interest to promote aviation security. TSA should
explore programs such as DHS' ``If You See Something, Say Something''
campaign, which capitalizes on the vigilance of the travelers
themselves. Furthermore, passengers have shown themselves to be
proactive about their safety. For example, Dutch filmmaker Jasper
Schuringa was the first to subdue Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab when he
tried to light an explosive in his underwear. By educating travelers on
what they can do for aviation safety, and then trusting them to do
this, TSA can take advantage of thousands of watchful eyes.
Finally, TSA would benefit immensely from a greater degree of
leadership continuity. TSA's challenging, and unfortunately highly
politicalized, mission demands leadership that transcends the political
cycle. The administrator position should be afforded a greater degree
of continuity, perhaps treating it similar to the director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, which has a set 10-year term. Since
its inception TSA has had five administrators, with some serving less
than a year. No matter their skills as leaders or managers, no one can
be expected to implement a charter such as TSA's in short, 1- or 2-year
bursts. In contrast, since 9/11 the FBI has had one director, which has
allowed the organization to alter its operations and structures to meet
the evolving threat and to usher in some of the agency's most
significant bureaucratic changes in its history. If the leadership of
the TSA were kept in place for longer--spanning Presidential
administrations--it would allow TSA to escape politics and the
political cycle, increasing their ability to institute long-term plans
and evolve into the organization we need it to be.
conclusion
In conclusion, there are a variety of means by which we can meet
the challenges transportation security, particularly aviation, faces.
These include the implementation of risk-based security models, an
emphasis on science and technology, and improvements in strategic
communications.
However, I want to recognize that TSA is already on the right path
toward finding innovative ways to meet these challenges and
Administrator Pistole should be commended for his leadership. Many of
the suggestions I have made today are already being considered or
implemented by the TSA. Though the TSA is still working to address the
challenges born out of its creation, it does not need increased
regulation. Instead, to continue to innovate and evolve the TSA needs
the support of Congress and the American people. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Nelson. That was some very
intriguing thoughts.
Our next witness, Mr. Tom Blank, currently serves as
executive vice president at the Gephardt group.
In 2006, Mr. Blank served as the TSA as the acting deputy
administrator where he oversaw relationship-building with
aviation stakeholders during a series of major changes
following 9/11.
Mr. Blank created the first ever Office of Transportation
Security Policy and was later tasked as TSA's chief support
systems officer in charge of technology development, Nation-
wide deployment of Federal screener force, and the agency-wide
reform in its acquisition function.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Blank for 5 minutes to
summarize his testimony.
STATEMENT OF TOM BLANK, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT, GEPHARDT
GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS
Mr. Blank. Chairman Rogers and Members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the invitation to appear here today.
As a former TSA senior executive, I can attest to the
commitment of the agency's men and women who do their utmost
24/7 to keep Americans secure and all modes of transportation
functions freely.
As this subcommittee weighs the future of TSA, it is
important that you consider steps that will support TSA in
enhancing its consistency, credibility, and currency.
First, consistency in management, organization, and
leadership.
In the years following TSA's creation with the signing of
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act in November 2001,
the Congress has acted to change a range of the act's original
provisions.
ATSA created the post of under secretary for transportation
security as the third-ranking position in the U.S. Department
of Transportation hierarchy and accorded the post the same
executive rank as the DOT Deputy Secretary. Most importantly,
ATSA created the post with a stated term of 5 years.
Over the intervening years, the 5-year term provision was
removed and the executive rank of the TSA administrator was
reduced.
I submit that, at the least, the 5-year term stipulation be
reinstituted because it will help assure leadership consistency
and non-partisanship over the long term. It will help make
management of the agency more predictable and permit the
overall organization to focus more intently on mission
execution.
Since TSA was created nearly 11 years ago, there have been
six TSA administrators, including one long-term acting leader,
and the same number of deputy administrators, including my
brief acting tenure and the most current appointee who just
assumed his post.
With changes at the top usually come a re-wiring of the
organization chart and a reallocation of responsibilities. From
consistency in leadership would come broad policy and
operational buy-in by Government and private-sector
stakeholders. Such buy-in from stakeholders remains critical to
TSA's homeland security mission success. This 5-year term
provision mirrors that for the FAA administrator for many of
the same reasons. Second, credibility by taking steps to reduce
adverse aviation passenger experiences at the checkpoint. A
potential path to achieving this credibility is the empowerment
of the TSA's workforce of checkpoint supervisors to intervene
in screening processes and to diffuse those situations that
often intrigue the news media.
TSA does have more than 3,000 management personnel
designated as checkpoint supervisors present at most
checkpoints in the Nation's largest airports. These personnel
should be authorized to intervene in ``special situations''
involving unnecessary scrutiny of children and elderly travel
and elderly travelers and to pass them through.
In a recent appearance before this subcommittee, TSA
Administrator Pistole acknowledged that this approach had merit
and noted that the agency is moving to provide the necessary
training to the 3,000 checkpoint supervisors.
Third, currency, by having the most advanced security
technology capability possible at all times.
Having the most advanced security technology to help ensure
the agency stays ahead of the terrorist threat will require the
Congress to provide TSA with innovative financing authority and
to facilitate the use of independent third-party testing to
more effectively and cost-efficiently bring technologies to use
by the agency.
The subcommittee should give due consideration to the
concept of a voluntary multi-billion dollar tax credit bond
program under which airports would issue debt to pay for
security equipment and the necessary infrastructure to support
TSA operations.
I would suggest that this is spending that is not avoidable
and such an approach may support efficiency and more common-
sense planning. It is also private-sector dollars what would be
leveraged by Federal action.
For instance, TSA is required by ATSA to screen checked
baggage using Explosives Detection Systems; an advanced X-ray
technology. Across the system this equipment is now headed
toward the end of its useful life and will soon have to be
replaced. Despite TSA's best efforts, that will be a budget-
buster if it all needs replaced within a short time frame which
could easily happen.
The subcommittee has heard testimony about TSA's Risk-Based
Screening program. RBS is supported by new and emerging
technology. The full benefits of RBS will not be realized as
swiftly as everyone might like if the TSA is left to advocate
year over year for budget resources to support it.
Once again, I greatly appreciate the opportunity to share
my thoughts about future changes that will support TSA becoming
widely known for consistency, creditability, and currency.
I would be pleased to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blank follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tom Blank
July 10, 2012
Good afternoon. First, let me extend my appreciation to you,
Chairman Rogers, and to Ranking Member Jackson Lee for the invitation
to appear before you today. The work the subcommittee is doing by
conducting a series of hearings on critical issues confronting the U.S.
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) will support improvements
in efficient and effective operations and an enhanced understanding
among all stakeholders of the significant challenges the TSA confronts
each and every day. As a former TSA senior executive, I can attest to
the commitment of the agency's men and women who do their utmost 24/7
to keep Americans secure and all modes of transportation functioning
freely. To serve at TSA following the horrific attacks of 9/11/01
remains, for me, a high honor, and my testimony today is delivered in
the spirit of a continuing devotion to TSA's mission and to those who
serve there.
As this subcommittee weighs the future of TSA, it is important that
you consider steps that will support TSA in enhancing its consistency,
credibility, and currency. I do not mean to suggest that TSA lacks
these attributes, but there are changes that would help the agency
operate more efficiently and effectively, reduce criticism of the TSA,
and allow the agency to be recognized for the invaluable contribution
to homeland security that it makes every day.
First, consistency--in management, organization, and leadership.
In the years following TSA's creation with the signing of the
Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) on November 18, 2001,
the Congress has acted to change a range of the Act's original
provisions. It is now time to review certain of these original
provisions and ask whether or not they should be restored going
forward.
ATSA created the post of under secretary for transportation
security as the third-ranking position in the United States. Department
of Transportation hierarchy and accorded the post the same executive
rank as the DOT deputy secretary. Most importantly, ATSA created the
post with a stated term of 5 years.
Over the intervening years, the 5-year term provision was removed
and the executive rank of the TSA administrator was reduced. This was
done following the creation of the Department of Homeland Security so
that TSA would fit into an organizational structure that has since been
abolished.
I submit that, at the least, the 5-year term stipulation be
reinstituted because it will help assure leadership consistency and
non-partisanship over the long term. It will help make management of
the agency more predictable and permit the overall organization to
focus more intently on mission execution and efficient use of
resources.
Since TSA was created nearly 11 years ago, there have been six TSA
administrators, including one long-term acting leader, and the same
number of deputy administrators, including my brief acting tenure and
the most current appointee who just assumed his post. The turnover in
other TSA senior leadership positions is much the same story, often
driven by the changes at the top.
With changes at the top usually come a re-wiring of the
organization chart and a reallocation of responsibilities.
I suggest the ATSA provision for a 5-year term for the TSA
administrator was intended to support long-term consistency in
leadership, management, and to assure organizational stability. From
consistency in leadership would come broad policy and operational buy-
in by Government and private-sector stakeholders. Such buy-in from
stakeholders remains critical to TSA's homeland security mission
success. This 5-year term provision mirrors that for the FAA
administrator for many of the same reasons.
Related to the provision for a 5-year term is the original
executive rank of the TSA administrator. If the post retained the same
rank ATSA accorded it, the TSA administrator would be an official of
near-equal status as the DHS deputy secretary. It may seem like a small
matter--the designation of a Federal post on the OPM Executive
Schedule. But the complexity and global visibility of the TSA
administrator position is such that, in fact, rank does matter in
dealing with agency counterparts across the Executive Branch and in
working with international partners. ATSA accorded a very senior rank
to the TSA administrator position in recognition that the agency would
require the ability to be flexible, swift, and responsive without
having to engage in cumbersome departmental or intergovernmental
bureaucratic deliberations over certain policy and resource allocation
matters.
Second, credibility--by taking steps to reduce adverse aviation
passenger experiences at the checkpoint.
If TSA can significantly reduce adverse experiences, the agency's
overall credibility as a bulwark of post-9/11 homeland security will go
up markedly. A potential path to achieving this credibility is the
empowerment of the TSA's workforce of checkpoint supervisors to
intervene in screening processes and to diffuse those situations that
often intrigue the news media for days on end when they represent only
a rare exception to the experience of 2 million passengers each day. To
be sure, TSA cannot permit individual line officers to set aside
security procedures as they see fit. However, TSA does have more than
3,000 management personnel designated as checkpoint supervisors present
at most checkpoints in the Nation's largest airports. These personnel
should be authorized to intervene in ``special situations'' involving
unnecessary scrutiny of children and elderly travelers and to pass them
through.
While TSA is making changes to procedures aimed at reducing adverse
passenger experiences by procedural adjustments, the experienced front-
line checkpoint supervisors can get TSA out of the headlines
expeditiously thus elevating overall agency credibility. In a recent
appearance before this subcommittee, TSA Administrator Pistole
acknowledged that this approach had merit and noted that the agency is
moving to provide the necessary training to the 3,000 checkpoint
supervisors. This should occur on an expedited basis.
Third, currency--by having the most advanced security technology
capability possible at all times.
Having the most advanced security technology to help ensure the
agency stays ahead of the terrorist threat will require the Congress to
provide TSA with innovative financing authority and to facilitate the
use of independent third-party testing to more effectively and cost-
efficiently bring technologies to use by the agency.
Innovative financing authority has been discussed and the
subcommittee has heard testimony on this topic previously. Further, the
Essential Technology Taskforce Report presented to Secretary Chertoff
in 2008 outlined several approaches. I would suggest that the
subcommittee give due consideration to the concept of a voluntary
multi-billion dollar tax credit bond program under which airports would
issue debt to pay for security equipment and the necessary
infrastructure to support TSA operations.
This approach has not gained strong support in these lean budget
times given that the tax credits would show up as an increase in
spending under Congressional Budget Office rules. However, I would
suggest that this is spending that is not avoidable and such an
approach may support efficiency and more common-sense planning. It is
also private-sector dollars what would be leveraged by Federal action.
For instance, TSA is required by ATSA to screen checked baggage
using Explosives Detection Systems; an advanced X-ray technology.
Across the system this equipment is now headed toward the end of its
useful life and will soon have to be replaced. Despite TSA's best
efforts, that will be a budget-buster if it all needs replaced within a
short time frame which could easily happen. As it is, the agency is not
moving toward replacement in the most efficient way since long-term
infrastructure approaches, in many instances, are being put on hold.
Further, those of us who have been engaged in the budgeting process
for a Federal agency know that winning approval for capital equipment
expenditures is never easy outside of an emergency. If TSA had
innovative financing authority the agency could develop a strategy to
keep its technology completely current.
The same holds true for passenger checkpoint technologies as the
current generation of X-ray and personnel scanners ages and better,
faster versions become available.
Concerning independent, third-party testing of security
technologies, TSA can better leverage its limited resources to more
quickly facilitate the development and testing of technologies to TSA
standards in preparation for final certification and deployment by the
agency.
With third-party testing, vendors can proceed more expeditiously to
develop and test the technologies that TSA requires; better leveraging
their limited resources and expediting development. TSA benefits from
more rapid and efficient development of technologies and enhances its
credibility by being able to point to the independent testing.
From a budget standpoint, again recognizing the continued budget
constraints our Government must operate under and the need to show the
taxpaying public we are providing them with their ``money's worth,''
independent, third-party testing should depend primarily on
reallocation of existing resources, and in some case will rely on
private or other-than-Government funding.
The subcommittee has heard testimony about TSA's Risk-Based
Screening program. RBS is supported by new and emerging technology. The
full benefits of RBS will not be realized as swiftly as everyone might
like if the TSA is left to advocate year over year for budget resources
to support it. In addition, with innovative financing authority and
independent, third-party testing will come the best possible leverage
of dollars to be invested in the technology required to keep our
security regime robust and ahead of the terrorist threat.
So, assurance that TSA's full suite of security technologies is
maintained as current is the third future need I suggest the
subcommittee consider.
Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Jackson Lee, once again, I
greatly appreciate the opportunity to share my thoughts about future
changes that will support TSA becoming widely known for consistency,
credibility, and currency.
I would be pleased to answer any questions the Chairman, Ranking
Member or other Members of the subcommittee may have.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Blank.
Which equipment did you talk about being at the end of its
life expectancy and would be a budget-buster?
Mr. Blank. The baggage screening equipment----
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Mr. Blank [continuing]. And explosive detection systems.
Mr. Rogers. All right.
Now I know that a couple of major airports I recently
toured, they are in the process of replacing that now. Are you
saying that there is a problem across the spectrum of airports?
Mr. Blank. It is not across the spectrum. Some of the
largest airports are being taken care of. TSA is not completely
without a plan.
But when we look at 450 airports----
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Mr. Blank. We don't even have EDS at all 450 airports----
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Mr. Blank [continuing]. Today.
Mr. Rogers. All right. You shook me up there for a minute.
All right. We have saved the best for last. No pressure.
Our final witness is Ms. Colby Alonso, who currently serves as
a flight attendant with US Airways and who will be testifying
on behalf of the Association of Flight Attendants and
Communication Workers of America.
The AFA represents nearly 60,000 flight attendants employed
by 21 different airlines. It is the world's largest flight
attendant union.
Ms. Alonso also has 16 years of experience as a flight
attendant. In May, Ms. Alonso was working on US Airways Flight
787 from Paris to Charlotte when she responded to a woman's
claim that she had a device implanted inside her. Thankfully,
the claim turned out to be false.
The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Alonso for 5 minutes to
summarize her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF COLBY ALONSO, ASSOCIATION OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS
Ms. Alonso. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, and Members of the
committee for allowing me to speak on our perspectives
regarding the future of transportation security.
As you said, I am a member of the Association of Flight
Attendants, which represents 60,000 flight attendants at 21
different airlines and is the world's largest flight attendant
union.
As FAA-certified safety professionals, flight attendants
are required to be on-board commercial aircraft to fight fires,
to provide first aid, to handle emergency situations, and to
command evacuations when necessary.
Our responsibilities for ensuring the security of
passengers on the aircraft and protecting the flight deck and
cabin from an attack are vast and make us an integral part of
security.
As a 16-year flight attendant, I take pride in my role as
an on-board aviation safety and security professional. I
appreciate the opportunity to recount my experience from May
22, 2012, as a front-line first responder.
On that day I was working as the French translator on US
Airways Flight 787 from Paris to Charlotte, North Carolina.
Following our initial in-flight service, a female passenger
called me to her seat and handed me a note written in French
for the captain.
Since the captain did not speak French, I asked the
passenger if I could read it. The note stated she had been
surgically implanted with a device that was out of her control.
I reconfirmed my understanding of the note was correct. I
asked her if she thought the device would solely harm her or if
it could possibly harm others or the aircraft.
She didn't know and could not confirm it wouldn't.
I proceeded to the forward galley with the note, her
boarding pass, and passport. I briefly explained the situation
to the cabin service director then entered the cockpit to brief
the captain.
The captain suggested I make an announcement seeking
medical assistance for a passenger in need. It took two
announcements before any doctors responded. I requested their
help and discretion.
We escorted the female passenger to the back galley and
requested her permission for the doctors to examine her. Their
joint assessment was that there was nothing visible or tangible
to indicate she posed any threat.
I relayed this information to the captain. It was decided
that out of caution we would divert to Bangor, Maine.
Instructions were given to restrain the passenger, which she
willingly allowed.
Once on the ground in Bangor, Federal officers came on
board and removed the passenger, after which the captain
explained the real circumstances of our diversion to the
passengers.
The FBI then came on and took my statement, the original
note, and my rough translation.
Our flight eventually continued on to Charlotte.
Fortunately, the threat we encountered did not end tragically
and was addressed the best we could, given our limited
resources and the operational environment.
I am required to attend recurrent training at my airline
yearly in order to remain qualified. This training includes a
security module that gave me a foundation to respond to the
threat I encountered that day.
But I also believe there are many improvements that should
be made in order to be better prepared in the future.
When I was hired, my initial security training was based on
a 1970s hijacking scenario of a dissident who wanted to go to
Cuba. The old strategy emphasized a negotiated resolution.
Today's security training requirements, known as Common
Strategy II, were created after the events of 2001 to respond
to the ever-present aggressive threat defensively.
It has been more than 10 years since the change to Common
Strategy II. It is time for an independent panel to review
flight attendant security training.
Otherwise, we run the risk of again stagnating our approach
to security training, as we did in the years prior to 9/11.
Flight attendant self-defense training is essential to a
comprehensive counterterrorism strategy.
The TSA offers a voluntary 1-day crewmember self-defense
training course. I took the course on a day off in Charlotte on
my own time and at my own expense.
AFA has long called for making the concepts of this
voluntary self-defense training mandatory. Flight attendants
are not asking to become martial arts experts but our level of
preparedness is inconsistent.
Additionally, AFA has also pressed for alternative
screening for flight attendants. As a flight attendant, I am
subject to the same level of screening and background checks as
pilots, with the exception of those pilots participating in the
FFDO program.
Our advocacy on alternative screening methods is all the
more important and relevant as TSA moves to implement risk-
based passenger security screening.
Alternative screening initiatives for frequent travelers as
well as for active-duty service members should not be further
expanded while the inclusion of flight attendants into the
known crewmember program still has no concrete dates or
milestones set.
Lastly, regarding Flight 787, the only way for me to relay
information from the doctors to our ground support accurately
was through entering the flight deck and using the pilot
headset.
AFA supports the development of discreet, secure, hands-
free wireless communication systems. The hands-free concept
will allow crewmembers under general emergency and security
threat conditions the ability to communicate from anywhere in
the aircraft at any time, under any circumstance.
AFA recommends a robust, layered security approach that
includes intensive self-defense modules into crewmember
security training, a risk-based approach to security screening
that incorporates flight attendants into known crewmember, and
the institution of discreet, portable wireless communication
devices for improved and safer two-way communications.
Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Jackson Lee, thank you
for allowing me to talk about being a first responder and the
last line of defense in the aircraft cabin.
I will be happy to answer any questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Alonso follows:]
Prepared Statement of Colby Alonso
July 10, 2012
Thank you Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Jackson Lee and
Members of the committee for holding this hearing and allowing me to
speak on our perspectives on the future of transportation security. My
name is Colby Alonso and I am a 16-year flight attendant and a member
of the Association of Flight Attendants--Communication Workers of
America (AFA). AFA represents nearly 60,000 flight attendants at 21
different airlines and is the world's largest flight attendant union.
We appreciate having the opportunity to testify at today's hearing on
``Challenging the Status Quo at TSA: Perspectives on the Future of
Transportation Security.''
A flight attendant's duty as a first responder in the aircraft
cabin is to ensure the safety, health, and security of passengers. We
receive training in fire fighting, first aid, aircraft evacuation, and
emergency procedures. Following the 9/11 attacks, flight attendants
have been assigned increased responsibilities for ensuring the security
of passengers on the aircraft and for protecting the flight deck and
cabin from an attack.
This key role in security gives flight attendants an important
perspective on the roles and responsibilities of the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) and other agencies that regulate U.S.
homeland security. We are pleased to have an opportunity today to share
AFA's recommendations on some improvements that can be made to the U.S.
aviation security and to express our continued strong support for a
Federalized TSA workforce, expedited screening for all airline
crewmembers, self-defense training for flight attendants, and to
propose the acquisition and deployment of equipment that will assist in
responding to emerging security threats.
I take pride in my role as an on-board aviation safety and security
professional. I appreciate the opportunity to share with you my
experience of May 22, 2012 as a front-line first responder. I was
working as the French Language of Destination/Origin (LOD/O) translator
on US Airways flight 787 from Paris, France to Charlotte, North
Carolina.
As the LOD/O I was at the boarding door during the passenger
boarding process, during which time I noticed nothing out of the
ordinary. Our flight boarded and departed as normal. However, following
our initial in-flight service, things began to change. A female
passenger called me to her seat and handed me a note, written in
French, and asked me to deliver it to the Captain.
Since the Captain did not speak French I asked her if I could read
it. She said yes. The summary of statements from the note were as
follows: She was coming to the United States to ask for assistance in
saving her life. The note claimed said she had been used as a guinea
pig by doctors for the past 10 years, and that she had undergone
surgery against her will. She believed that she had been surgically
implanted with a device that was out of her control. She said she was
afraid to return to France and afraid for her safety because of things
she had written.
After I had read the letter and reviewed the details with her, I
reconfirmed that my translation was a reflection of her thoughts. I
asked her if she thought the device would only harm her or if it could
harm others or the aircraft. She apologized and appeared to be
remorseful and scared and said she didn't know and could not confirm it
wouldn't.
I went to the forward galley with the note and briefly explained to
the ``A'' flight attendant the circumstances of the situation and then
went into the cockpit to brief the Captain. I had taken a copy of her
writings, boarding pass, and passport with me.
The captain's recommendation was to make an announcement requesting
doctors on board because a passenger needed medical care. It took two
announcements before one person in coach and one in first class rang
their call buttons. I asked them to come to the forward galley and
explained the situation quietly to them. I requested their help and
discretion. I asked the female passenger to come to the back galley.
She did and I interpreted for the doctors asking her permission to
examine her. She agreed and showed them multiple scars where she
believed incisions were made. They palpated those areas looking for
protrusions or abnormalities.
The doctors then gave me their thoughts. They both agreed that
given her weight and build they would be able to see and feel if
something was implanted. They also believed the scars looked more like
ones resulting from an accident and not from a recent surgery. Their
joint assessment was that there was nothing visible or tangible to
indicate she posed any threat. I relayed this information to the
Captain.
It was decided that out of caution we would divert to Bangor,
Maine. At the Captain's request I asked the passenger if she would come
to the back of the aircraft with me again and she agreed. We escorted
her and her belongings to the rear of the aircraft. I was given
instructions to restrain the passenger; which she willingly allowed. At
the same time we had someone sit in the same row with her on the
inboard seat to block her egress to the aisle.
Once on the ground in Bangor immigration/customs officers came on
and removed her via the aft left aircraft stairs. They took all her
belongings with them. Once she was removed, the captain came on the PA
system and explained the real circumstances to the passengers. The FBI
came on and took my statement, the original note, and my rough
translation.
Our flight eventually continued on to Charlotte where our crew was
met by our airline base managers, chief pilot, and corporate security
where we were debriefed and gave our statements. Representatives from
AFA's Employee Assistance Program (EAP) were also available to support
us as needed. We addressed the situation that day the best we could
given our limited resources in the operational environment.
Fortunately, the threat we encountered did not involve a terrorist; if
it had it would have probably ended tragically.
Shortly after the 9/11 attacks AFA called upon Congress to
implement many changes, some of which we continue to work toward today.
I would now like to elaborate on several of AFA's security
recommendations that I believe will help our industry continue to move
forward and remain vigilant in pursuit of a safer and more secure
aviation industry.
Every 12 months I am required to attend ``recurrent'' training at
my airline to remain qualified to perform my safety, health, and
security duties on-board the aircraft. Part of that recurrent training
includes a security module. I believe my training gave me sufficient
resources to respond to the limited, fortunately non-serious threat
encountered that day. I should note that my carrier's training program
meets today's regulatory requirements.
The current ``Common Strategy II'' training requirements were
created after the events of 2001 to replace the outdated 1970's
scenario of a dissident hijacker who wanted to go to Cuba. The old
strategy emphasized a negotiated resolution. Flight attendants were
unprepared to deal with the September 11 attacks, primarily because
flight attendant training had stagnated. AFA had been and continues to
be a consistent advocate for improving flight attendant training. AFA
participated in the writing of the Common Strategy II guidance to
update and improve flight attendant security training requirements in
response to the 9/11 threat. The goal was to ensure crewmembers had the
information, skills, and tools necessary to respond to a new form of
security threat.
Now more than 10 years since the inception of Common Strategy II,
AFA recommends that flight attendant security training be reviewed and
updated to ensure that training programs and procedures ensure
appropriate, efficient, and effective responses to current and emerging
threats. Otherwise, we run the risk of again stagnating with our
approach to security training as we did in the years before
9/11. We need a robust system that can counter current and emerging
threats, and ensure that we have the best possible security system in
place. AFA's recommendations for an efficient, robust, layered security
approach incorporates intensive modules on self-defense and situational
awareness into crewmember security training, implements a Known
Crewmember system as part of a risk-basked approach to security
screening, and utilizes discreet, portable wireless communication
devices for two-way communications between cabin and flight deck
personnel.
Flight attendant self-defense training is an essential component of
a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy. Today basic security
training provided by air carriers includes actual hands-on self-defense
training that varies from 5 minutes to 30 minutes. This training module
is developed and provided by the air carrier themselves, and is in
compliance with existing requirements.
Despite repeated requests by AFA and others for updated training
that includes basic self-defense maneuvers to allow flight attendants
to defend themselves against a terrorist attack, we still do not
receive mandatory training about how to effectively recognize suspect
terrorist behavior and how to defend ourselves and others against
terrorist attacks aboard the aircraft. We are not asking for flight
attendants to be certified black belt martial arts experts. We are
asking for flight attendants to be provided with the appropriate and
effective training that is required to perform our duties as first
responders and the last line of defense for the flight deck.
There is alternate self-defense training developed by TSA called
Crew Member Self-Defense Training (CMSDT). This is a voluntary 1-day
(6- to 8-hour) course conducted throughout the year at various
locations around the country such as community colleges and focuses on
hands-on self-defense training. I voluntarily took the course. It was
done on my day off in Charlotte, NC. I was not paid nor did I receive
any financial assistance to attend. I thought the training was a good
start. Every year at recurrent training when our instructors ask if
anyone has taken this class I enthusiastically raise my hand. AFA has
long called for making the concepts of this voluntary self-defense
training mandatory.
For more than 5 years AFA has also pressed for alternative
screening for Flight Attendants that accurately reflects our
credentials as pre-screened safety professionals. Our advocacy on
alternative screening methods is all the more important and relevant as
the TSA moves to implement risk-based passenger security screening.
Flight attendants are subject to the same level of screening and
background checks as pilots, with the exception of those pilots
participating in the FFDO program. As my testimony today reflects,
flight attendants are an integral part of the crew and the purpose of
our jobs is to ensure in-flight safety and security. As a flight
crewmember I have access to the cockpit and sometimes my presence in
the cockpit is required. Unfortunately, flight attendants are still not
included in the same alternative screening as pilots. TSA has stated
that a similar screening process is contemplated for flight attendants,
but concrete dates or milestones have yet to be announced.
While TSA continues to consider when to include flight attendants
in the Known Crewmember (KCM) Program, the agency has announced that
pilots from additional airlines will be included, and that other
alternative screening initiatives for frequent travelers and active-
duty service members are being developed. AFA supports risk-based
screening initiatives designed to make the screening process more
efficient without sacrificing security. Flight attendants should be
recognized for the security and safety our presence ensures, and should
therefore participate in alternative screening. To support security
program efficiency and traveler convenience, TSA should move quickly to
include all crewmembers in KCM.
Flight attendants have access to the flight deck and are subject to
the same 10-year background checks as pilots. Like pilots, we carry a
certificate issued by the Federal Aviation Administration. We encourage
this committee to request a report from TSA establishing milestones for
including flight attendants in an expedited, alternate screening
program as mandated for all crewmembers by the 9/11 Commission Act.
Other stakeholders agree, as both ALPA and A4A have requested that the
TSA expand the program to include flight attendants.
We are disappointed with the slow implementation of flight
attendants into KCM. The time is now to rectify the situation.
Passengers are being invited to opt-in to expedited security screening
programs simply because they log a certain number of miles on U.S.
carriers. The Nation's certified flight attendants, serving as the last
line of defense for commercial aviation security, surely meet the
requirements of the Known Crewmember Program.
Finally, since the aircraft we were flying that day was an older
Boeing 767, the only way to communicate during the event to the
authorities was through the flight deck headset. When I was recounting
the information from the doctors about the exam to our ground support
group I had to use the headset in the flight deck.
AFA has supported the development of discreet, secure, hands-free,
wireless communications systems, as authorized by the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, as one means to prevent a potentially catastrophic
security breach by terrorists. The device will allow all crewmembers
the ability to communicate from anywhere in the aircraft at any time
under any circumstance. Each personal device must have capability for
encrypted, bidirectional communications to allow plain language
communications during crisis situations; this will ensure security and
reduce confusion.
Security of the system is further ensured through use of dedicated
hardware components that are accessible only to authorized personnel
such as crewmembers and, potentially, any active law enforcement
officers who may have presented credentials to the crew prior to the
flight. The hands-free concept will allow crewmembers under both
general emergency (e.g., medical crises, emergency evacuations) and
security threat conditions to use their hands to protect themselves,
the cockpit, other crewmembers, passengers, and the aircraft while
continuing to coordinate and communicate with the cockpit, the ground,
and the rest of the crew.
Before I end I would like to comment in support of TSA
Administrator Pistole's efforts to limit privatization of security
services at additional airports. AFA opposes any measures that would
require the TSA administrator to allow more privatization. There are
many advantages to a Federalized screening workforce. Federalized
airport screening has been a success and has improved the security of
air travel. A Federalized workforce provides stability throughout our
Nation's airports by providing a multi-layered aviation security system
from the time a passenger buys a ticket to the time a passenger exits
the airport.
When our members encounter discrepancies, a Federalized workforce
allows us an efficient means to resolve discrepancies through a central
organization versus trying to determine which screening company works
in which airport and then searching for the appropriate contact person.
A Federal screening workforce also ensures that TSA can adapt quickly
to emerging threats and allows greater flexibility to transfer
personnel from one location to another in times of emergency or crisis.
In a study earlier this year conducted by TSA and examined by the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), it is estimated that the cost
to TSA of contracted screening is generally between 3 and 9 percent
more than the cost of Federal screening. Thus, Federalized screeners
actually cost the taxpayer less than private screeners.
In conclusion, flight attendants are first responders and since 9/
11 we have also taken on the role as the last line of defense for
commercial aviation security. Flight attendants routinely identify and
manage threat levels, use our training to de-escalate threats, and
provide direction to passengers willing to assist in restraining
assailants. We are charged with protecting the cockpit at all costs,
including the loss of our own lives. Security doesn't just happen; over
100,000 flight attendants working in the U.S. aviation system ensure
that our skies are safe.
Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Jackson Lee, thank you for
allowing me to talk about being a front-line employee and the last line
of defense in the aircraft cabin. As my testimony proves flight
attendants are trained to perform their jobs and handle any
circumstances that may arise. There is still much work to be done.
There needs to be an independent panel of subject matter experts
commissioned by Congress to evaluate the efficacy of security training
to ensure we have the training and tools that meet the changing
threats. And, as a safety professional, who's demonstrated that my
duties should entitle me to the same screening process as my flight
deck flying partners it is way past time to allow flight attendants to
participate in the Known Crewmember screening program.
Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you for that and for your service.
I will start with my set of questions for the first 5
minutes.
I have to admit I am impressed by the broad array of
perspectives that we have seen in your opening statements and
your suggestions and observations. I find it intriguing.
I think everybody has pretty much acknowledged that TSA's
got, at a minimum, some perception problems and more
accurately, some organizational problems that need to be
addressed.
If you are familiar with what we have been doing recently
in a recent hearing I talked about, as did our witnesses, about
the bloated size that we are starting to see in TSA and how
that is hindering its public image.
One of the things that I have heard consistently from the
public is their complaint about the large number of people who
seem to be not doing anything and along with their frustrations
about the process they are having to go through for security.
In my last testimony and there is reason for this, over my
tenure as Chairman of this committee, it has been my assessment
that we have got about one-third of the TSA that could be
reduced, as far as personnel size, and still do the job as
efficiently, if not more efficiently and effectively than
current.
I know that is nothing magic about that. But I would like
to frame the question this way: Would you agree that the TSA is
bloated in its personnel structure or size, whether that bloat
is 10 percent too many or 40 percent, somewhere within that
spectrum would you agree that there is excess that we can
afford to trim as a part of our effort to reform and reorganize
the TSA? As a yes or no question, let us start with Dr. Bloom.
Mr. Bloom. I do agree. Just two basic points about that, if
I could?
Mr. Rogers. Well, I want to come back to that.
Mr. Bloom. Okay.
Mr. Rogers. I will. I promise.
But Mr. Poole.
Mr. Poole. I agree certainly, as far as the screening
workforce is concerned.
Mr. Rogers. Right. That is what I am talking about. That is
all I am talking about.
Mr. Nelson. ``Ozzie?''
Mr. Nelson. No.
Mr. Rogers. All right.
Mr. Blank.
Mr. Blank. I agree.
Mr. Rogers. Yes. Ms. Alonso.
Ms. Alonso. I would have to defer to AFA International. I
don't have the expertise to answer that question.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Mr. Bloom, let us go back to you. I want to hear your two
points.
Mr. Bloom. Well, first of all, there is nothing magical
about aviation or transportation. From a terrorist perspective,
you have an infinite amount of targets. You are trying to
symbolically communicate something through killing people,
damaging things, or threatening to.
Whether you use an airport, an aircraft, another
transportation modality or whatever, the world is your oyster.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I am gonna go down that pig trail with
you in a few minutes on my next series of questions. So I would
ask you this then and I would ask you to keep your response to
about 10 seconds or so because my time is gonna run out.
If you were king for a day--and I have heard of what Mr.
Nelson and Mr. Blank have already said, but if you were king
for a day, what is the one thing you would change immediately
about TSA? Ten seconds.
Mr. Bloom. I would take maybe 20 to 30 percent of the
resources and put it into intelligence collection analysis and
then use that to apprehend and detain and neutralize more
adversaries of the U.S. Government.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
Mr. Poole.
Mr. Poole. I would devolve screening responsibility to the
airport level and remove TSA from delivering service as opposed
to regulating,
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
Mr. Nelson.
Mr. Nelson. Make a term limit for the administrator of 5 or
10 years.
Mr. Rogers. That is a good idea. Mr. Blank, I think agrees
with you on that.
Mr. Blank. I do. I do agree. My change would be to empower
those checkpoint supervisors to get rid of the mistakes at the
checkpoint as much as possible.
Mr. Rogers. Ms. Alonso.
Oh, I am sorry. Go back to Mr. Blank. She wanted to hear
what you said again.
Mr. Blank. In my testimony I suggested that the checkpoint
supervisors, 3,000 personnel at major checkpoints, be empowered
to intervene in the screening process as necessary to avoid
some of the problems of the treatment of elderly, young people,
and other special populations.
Mr. Rogers. Yes. We have had that from previous witnesses
in previous hearings.
Ms. Alonso.
Ms. Alonso. I would immediately add the flight attendant
complement to the Known Crewmember program in order to expedite
clearance through security.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
Mr. Poole, this will be my last question before my time
expires. But you made an observation that you just now restated
again about--in your opening statement you said that you would
like to see TSA approve a group or pool, no pun intended, of
contractors who could do the private screening.
That once they were approved, the airports on their own
could then contract with anybody who was in that group of
people. Tell me more about how that would work.
Mr. Poole. The way that would work, it would be like all of
the other competitive contracting that is out there at Federal,
State, and local level. The direct party involved would choose
among the pre-qualified set of suppliers----
Mr. Rogers. Would the contract amount or set of parameters
be included in that pre-approved deal?
Mr. Poole. Depends how much responsibility is devolved but
ideally, yes. If it was true performance contracting then the
companies would submit proposals that might differ in price,
differ in the procedures that they would use.
They would have to use TSA-approved equipment, technology,
but they could put it together in possibly different ways. They
might also use the people in somewhat different----
Mr. Rogers. My time has expired but I want to come back to
that in my next set of questions. I want to pick that topic
back up because I really think that is intriguing.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member for her
opening set of questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Again,
Ms. Alonso, let me thank you for your service. You are aware of
the legislation that I have had, I hope, trying to increase the
training--security training of flight attendants.
Ms. Alonso. Yes, madam.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you all support that?
Ms. Alonso. Yes, we do.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Legislation that would make it a
requirement because I want to thank you, and I should thank all
the flight attendants who have voluntarily gone to training.
But what you are suggesting is that we need to ramp up the
training for first responders, flight attendants. Is that not
correct?
Ms. Alonso. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would it be more helpful if that was
required training and periodical training for flight attendants
that the airlines would provide?
Ms. Alonso. Absolutely. The reason there is a need for it
is because we have to develop cognitive recognition of
terrorist acts based on previous attempts. The current
counterterrorism intelligence is not reinforced enough to
maintain a basic level that is consistent across the board for
flight attendants to address these issues.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think it is very important to make note
of your intervention, even though you have already reported it
by your statement, but what is important is that we are aware
that this was a dangerous commentary that this particular
passenger was saying. It generated great possibilities of
danger, did it not?
Ms. Alonso. Yes, madam.
Ms. Jackson Lee. One could not rely upon whether there was
a mental health issue. You had to take it seriously, and you
did. Is that correct?
Ms. Alonso. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Nelson, thank you. It looks as if you
answered that the TSA is not too many. I appreciate what Mr.
Blank said about giving supervisors authority to intervene. As
I indicated, I welcome corrective measures.
Tell me, Mr. Nelson, how you would handle the present
population of TSOs in terms of a futuristic view to training,
to duty assignment, so that we have a full complement of
individuals on the front lines securing the homeland?
Mr. Nelson. Thank you, Ranking Member, for that question.
My perspective on saying no is--comes from my military
background of trusting the person on the ground. That is
Administrator Pistole, who I respect tremendously for his
service in the FBI and now as the administrator. If he says
that we need this many agents and screening officers, then I
agree with that assessment.
Then what it becomes is how--your question. How do you
train them appropriately? How do you get them to interact with
the public? What we have created is a zero-failure construct.
We have to create a career force. After 9/11, there were not a
bunch of, you know, DHS Homeland Security officials sitting on
the sideline.
We have only been creating that workforce for about 10
years now, and we have to continue to do that. Homeland
Security training is very different than intelligence training,
very different than DOD training. So even though these
individuals may be from military or law enforcement
backgrounds, that doesn't make them necessarily a great fit for
what they are doing with TSA.
So we need to expand this program as far as training is
concerned. We need to have rotations and promote by doing
rotation assignments and things of that nature and being
creative about how we manage our personnel. I think that they
are moving in that direction, but that is something that is
going to take an investment.
Any time you take someone off the front line to go training
or education, they are not doing their job. That is an
investment we are going to have to make if we want that--the
TSA to be the organization--the entity we want it to be.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So Mr. Nelson, let me just say,
professional development, developing a team that is
professionally trained, using their previous experience but is
professionally geared to the service of their responsibility,
which in some instances is aviation.
I have been arguing for using these officers on our mass
transit. That is obviously more difficult, but it certainly is
important. Is that what you are saying today, developing that
professional team that fits into the matrix that is needed to
secure the homeland?
Mr. Nelson. Absolutely. Again, we look at the Homeland
Security intelligence model as well. Just because it works at
the CIA or works at DOD for intelligence doesn't mean it works
at DHS. It is a very specific requirement. It requires a very
specific background. It requires specific training. So it will
leverage the skills that they already have, whether it be law
enforcement, aviation, or military. But that training needs to
be augmented for the DHS and the TSA's specific requirements.
Absolutely.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Dr. Bloom, why would--or Mr. Bloom, why
would you quarrel with what I think are very insightful,
instructive comments by Mr. Nelson? No. 1, I agree with the
idea of term limiting the administrator. I think 10 years, I
think 5 years would be completely undoable. But what--what
evidence do you have that it is too large, other than to say
that we need to make it more efficient and more professionally
trained?
Mr. Bloom. Well, by no means did I want to quarrel, but
based on the public discussion we are having, in my opinion
from a terrorist point of view with surveillance,
reconnaissance, being able to find out the aspects of
technology being used by Transportation Security Administration
personnel, by finding out the typical security procedures,
either deployed and employed, it is only a matter time
between--before these can either be exploited or folks can go
around them.
I don't think terrorists are impressed by organizational
charts, by bureaucracies, by bureaucratic cultures. I think we
have--by studying terrorism in the last 10, 20, 30 years, they
take what they--what is in front of them. Anything that is a
security procedure can be exploited or gone around, whether it
is technology or human practice.
Ms. Jackson Lee. My time has run. Mr. Bloom, I thank you
for that, because you have helped clarify for me your comment,
which I think ties closely into me, my perspective and Mr.
Nelson, and even Ms. Alonso, which is that we must constantly
alter the thinking, training, and strategy--strategic strategy
because terrorists are constantly altering.
That has nothing to do with size of the organization, which
I believe we should adhere to the administrator, in essence the
``general.'' But it does adhere to that we have to get more
sophisticated in not having charts and just having bureaucracy
and leveraged individuals who have supervisor titles or other
titles.
But we have to focus on making this an effective machine
against the changing world of terrorism. On that, we have no
disagreement. But I don't think we can call that a need for
lessening the total population of those who are in the service.
We need to use them in a more effective manner. So I thank you
for your instructive testimony today. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady. The Chairman now
recognizes Mr. Turner from New York for any questions he may
have.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am not sure, was it
you, Mr. Bloom, who talked about the baggage equipment
screening? Its life-cycle is coming near an end.
Mr. Blank. That was me, sir.
Mr. Turner. I am sorry. If we have to replace all of this,
I guess most of this was done in 2002.
Mr. Blank. December 31, 2002, was the statutory deadline
for installing it at commercial airports.
Mr. Turner. Okay. Just because of the arcane way we book-
keep here, we expense the entire item on the year that it is
replaced. How big a number would this be?
Mr. Blank. I don't have a precise number, but it would
certainly be many billions of dollars.
Mr. Turner. All right. Is there a mechanism for some
flexibility in this going to third-party leasing over the life-
cycle of the equipment, or----
Mr. Blank. During my tenure at TSA and subsequently in
discussions with equipment manufacturers, I have never seen
anything, nor am I aware that the private sector has anything,
a model, that would say leasing makes sense. I advocated for
bonding authority to airports that it would make more sense to
do that on an airport-by-airport basis.
Mr. Turner. But is there--are you running into Government
regulations, or--or just bureaucratic stonewall?
Mr. Blank. What--it is very difficult for an agency to
effectively advocate to the Congress for capital expenditures
on equipment. They are more effective generally in advocating
for expanded personnel----
Mr. Turner. How true.
Mr. Blank [continuing]. And usually the capital
expenditures get put off until there is a real emergency, and
then they will come up to Capitol Hill and say, ``We have no
choice but to do this.'' What I am advocating for is a better
planning, more efficient, common-sense approach to how we
invest our capital dollars.
Mr. Turner. All right. But in view of the size of the 1-
year expenditures, and they are all terminating at about the
same time, is there really a practical way to do this outside
of third-party leasing?
Mr. Blank. Well, let me--let me clarify. TSA does have a
plan and is executing a plan bit-by-bit, year over--year over
year. What I am questioning is, are they going to get there
fast enough under their current plan or are we going to have
equipment that is out there and that is just not useable before
the rate of replacement catches up with the need?
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chairman now
recognizes the--my friend and colleague from Minnesota, Mr.
Cravaack, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
panel. I appreciate that. You flew the 860? You are a JSOC.
Mr. Nelson. I was.
Mr. Cravaack. Yes. I was at SAC-T, so--SAC LAN back then. I
am old.
Mr. Poole, you mentioned in your testimony that TSA has a
built-in conflict of interest, that was a rather interesting
statement, by both establishing security policies and then
trying to implement those policies because self-regulation is
inherently problematic.
You then talk about how the TSA isn't as rigorous in
dealing with its own performance problems as it--those that it
actually does regulate. It is kind of like the fox guarding the
hen house, if you will pardon the expression.
Your proposal is to shift the performance contracting
model. Can you give me examples of the screening performance
measures and what it would look like as a contractor to
implement them?
Mr. Poole. Well, one would certainly be the kinds of
measures that are used now when red teams go in and try to get
material past the screening--across things that are prohibited.
So the rate of successful interception of--of bogus material or
dangerous material.
Another would be cost-effectiveness measures, productivity,
the number of passengers screened per hour in accordance with
standards. That kind of measure I don't see anywhere being used
today. That is the kind of measure that the House T&I Committee
used when they compared the contract screening at San Francisco
with the TSA screening at LAX and found enormous difference in
the actual productivity.
That suggests that the TSA staff are not being used
anywhere near as efficiently as the contractors are able to do.
So that would be another useful measure.
Mr. Cravaack. Well right now the TSA has, what, an $8
billion budget. How much--how much savings do you see that
occurring if you saw that throughout the system?
Mr. Poole. I think you could probably save 20 to 25
percent. Given that screening is about $5 billion of the $8
billion.
You could probably save 20 percent at least of TSA's
overall total budget from removing that going to the
performance contracting.
Mr. Cravaack. You would have a pretty large savings
associated with that and, of course, we are also concerned
about quality. You would not see any hits in quality
whatsoever?
Mr. Poole. Well the point is that the quality control would
be built in through the threat of losing contracts. I mean if
you can't guarantee that every contract is going to be carried
out to the highest level that you would want. But you have the
ability to quickly and decisively replace a failing contractor
with another one from the prequalified list. So it builds in a
kind of control mechanism that lets you get rid of bad apples,
should some arise, fairly quickly.
Mr. Cravaack. That kind of dovetails on what you also
mentioned reforms in the Security Partnership Program moving
away from the TSA's current practice of spelling out
procedures, technology, and compensation.
What changes do you anticipate producing in the current SSP
airports--SPP, excuse me?
Mr. Poole. Right. I have not--did not try to spell all that
out and I think what we want to do is encourage innovation----
Mr. Cravaack. Right.
Mr. Poole [continuing]. And get away from the one-size-
fits-all model that there is only one best way. I don't know a
better way to do passenger screening but, you know, given that
I support the risk-based approach that TSA is moving toward.
But if you give contractors outcome measures and stress
more competition, we may find some methods that are more--that
combine people and technology in ways that lead to a more
productive system and that is--obviously we want a system that
leads to that.
Mr. Cravaack. What do you think holds airports back from
joining the SPP?
Mr. Poole. I, you know, this is only speculation, but I
think we have created kind of a difficult situation because TSA
is their regulator of everything. They are in effect, if they
want to join SPP, they are having to basically kick the TSA out
and that is a difficult thing for a high--for a very visible
airport to do. It creates potential for a not very good
relationship in the subsequent years. So we would mostly see
small airports doing this so far.
Mr. Cravaack. So what do you think would be an incentive to
get airports into the SPP program?
Mr. Poole. Well I think if the airport themselves had a
bigger role in it, if they were able to select their own
contractor, for example and manage the relationship, I think a
lot more of them would be willing to take that course because
they would see it as they would have more to gain by developing
that relationship rather than having TSA assign someone to
them.
Mr. Cravaack. Yes, okay. Thank you.
Mr. Nelson, when did you get your wings?
Mr. Nelson. August 1990.
Mr. Cravaack. 1990, okay, a little after me.
My time has expired, I have more questions but I will yield
back to the Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for your
kindness.
Let me quickly impose some very quick questions at the
Chairman's courtesy.
Ms. Alonso, I think you are familiar with the Known
Crewmember Program operated by the TSA which is receiving high
praises by pilots and industry as a good step forward in
implementing a risk-based screening process at our checkpoints.
This system allows pilots to obtain expedited screening
procedures as long as the pilots are validated to be on the job
and in good standing.
Can you elaborate why flight attendants or crewmembers
could also benefit from the program and whether it should be
extended to them and could this be accomplished without
compromising security? Then, what protections can be integrated
into the system in order to ensure that only working
crewmembers in good standing can use the system?
Ms. Alonso. Yes, thank you Ranking Member Jackson Lee. We
are under the same security screening and 10-year background
check and scrutiny as the pilots. We also have access to the
cockpit and then sometimes are required to be in the cockpit
and we are the last line of defense on the aircraft.
For those reasons alone, we feel it should not be a breach
of security for us to have the same clearance to go through
another alternative screening process.
As far as protections go, it is up to the airlines to keep
the database current with up-to-date data and employee records
and to require employees that are terminated or separated, for
instance on leave, et cetera, to return their IDs in a timely
manner and that is mandated by law.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Just a quick question, in the last FAA
bill, it seems that the airlines were required to give you
training on serving alcoholic beverages. Do you think that that
required training suggests that the idea of securing the
airline, the idea of being the first responders in the cabin
should also be required training?
Ms. Alonso. Absolutely. We do feel that currently, having
only a voluntary crewmember self-defense training added to our
yearly additional recurrent training, which the FAA requires,
is not sufficient; 5 to 30 minutes is what is currently in
place for flight attendants to be prepared for security
breaches. It is developed and provided by the carriers
themselves and it just doesn't allow us to be prepared at the
level that we should be.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me just say, watching you do
your work and seeing the doors of the cockpit open and seeing
the only ones being able to go while we are in-flight, as
flight attendants, I can assure you that I believe that you are
warranted in this security and warranted in this training.
Mr. Chairman, I am just going to ask to be put on the
record that I hope that we can work together on a cabin
security hearing. Ms. Alonso's experience evidences the need of
that. So I would look forward to working with you on that, Mr.
Chairman.
I have one more quick question.
Mr. Poole, in your testimony, you cite to a USA Today
investigation in 2007 that found that TSA screeners at O'Hare
and LAX missed three times as many hidden bomb materials as did
privately-contracted screeners at San Francisco.
I am sure you are aware that a 2006 DHS Office of the
Inspector General reported that covenant aviation security
officials at San Francisco International Airport compromised
OIG covert security testing between August 2003 and August
2004.
Are you at all concerned that a private company seeking to
maximize profits and retain a contract may work to high
potential deficiencies such as the accompanying did within 2
years after their contract?
Then of course, is it not correct for many of us who
believe that the Federal Government, who has a pure
perspective, their service is to the American people, not to
their pocketbooks would, in essence--and to the American
people's pocketbooks, to be efficient but to compromise
security is a very dangerous perspective. So why are you
pushing complete privatization of TSA?
Mr. Poole. Well, it is not complete privatization, Ms.
Jackson Lee.
What I am arguing for is performance contracting with
strong incentives but also sanctions for poor performance and
the threat of having contracts revoked is a very powerful
threat a business model can't really survive if you stand a
good chance of losing the very thing that brings in revenue.
So that is the model. It is not total privatization in any
sense. The TSA would still be the regulator and it may be that
the need for sanctions should be stronger in the event of
contractor malperformance.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me just say that those airports
that private contractors, I work harmoniously with them and
certainly those are in place. But the expansion of the program,
I think, is questionable even to the extent of having
sanctions. But I appreciate your clarification.
I think all of us collectively at this hearing, Mr.
Chairman, are committed to securing the homeland and making TSA
the most effective agency that it can be along with our flight
crew, both our pilots and our flight attendants who are on the
front lines of any airplane that is traveling and traveling
both domestically and internationally.
Let me thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chairman now recognizes himself for a second series of
questions.
Mr. Poole, I was talking to you earlier about how this
group of approved contractors could--could function and you
talked about bidding based on size of airport or whatever.
Is there another example of that outside the--obviously
there is not one in TSA, we think it should be there. But is
there one that you are trying to model after? Is there another
department that does something like that?
Mr. Poole. Well actually, in the airport screening area
itself, Canada has entire--100 percent private-sector
screening. There are 12--last I checked, there were 12
certified companies in Canada that----
Mr. Rogers. The government certifies them?
Mr. Poole. The government certifies them and in fact it is
an agency called CATSA which is the thing that they created in
Canada when we created TSA following 9/11.
CATSA certifies the companies that meet its standards.
Mr. Rogers. Does this CATSA then go in and supervise them
at the airports?
Mr. Poole. That is correct. That is correct.
Mr. Rogers. You know, one of the things we have had in a
previous hearing about from the private sector was that at the
airport where we already have private contractors, the number
of TSA personnel supervising is exorbitant. I mean like 100 or
more TSA people for a contractor.
Do you all see that? Mr. Blank, have you seen that in any
instances or heard any complaints or criticisms about that?
Mr. Blank. Well, first of all, let me say that many of the
things that we are talking about here, I believe and I think
TSA would support would require changes in ATSA in order to be
able to do----
Mr. Rogers. Right, right.
Mr. Blank [continuing]. Under, you know, from a legal
perspective.
But in terms in terms of supervisors, I have heard that
criticism, but I am not aware of its accuracy that we have a--
--
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Mr. Blank [continuing]. Bloat of supervisors.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Poole, I see you nodding in the
affirmative.
Mr. Poole. I wanted to say that is part of the problem is
that the way TSA runs SPP, it is TSA that is the contract
manager and the relationship is between TSA and the private
company.
In the model I am suggesting, the airport would select,
negotiate the contract and manage the relationship, TSA would
regulate the overall airport security as it----
Mr. Rogers. So TSA wouldn't have personnel on the ground
supervising?
Mr. Poole. It wouldn't have the same extent of direct
supervision of the contractor. It would be supervising it as
part of its overall surveillance of the airport. So the----
Mr. Rogers. Other than Canada, is there any other country
you can think of that does that?
Mr. Poole. Well almost all of the major European airports,
I mean the policy in Europe vary somewhat from country to
country but there is no--I was not able to find any European
country, any E.U. member that has a combination of regulation
and screening provision in the same national government entity.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
Mr. Poole. Either the airport that does it or private
contractors reporting to the airport.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
Mr. Nelson and Mr. Blank, both of you brought up in your
opening statement a concept that frankly, I am embarrassed to
say I hadn't thought of before, that is term limits for the
administrator. I think that it is very appealing and then as
you heard from the Ranking Member, she finds it very appealing
as well.
You all mentioned the FBI Director as an example. I would
like to know if there is anybody else--is there another
department where this works like the FBI that comes to the top
of your head?
Mr. Blank. I mentioned, I believe, in my statement that the
FAA administrator is also a 5-year term.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Let me ask this, and this goes to Mr. Nelson, you made the
point that the reason you answered no when I talked about the
bloat of the bureaucracy was that Administrator Pistole thinks
that is what we need and you support him.
Now, I have great respect for Administrator Pistole. I
think he is an extremely competent fella and doing the best he
can under the circumstances.
Let me ask it to you this way. We--Mr. Pistole does not
have a definite term. He works at the pleasure of the President
and under the supervision of the Secretary.
If Administrator Pistole had a 10-year term limit, or 8
years, or whatever, and Mr. Pistole then said we need 70
percent of what we got right now and I can do just fine and I
can take that other money and redirect it into some areas that
are more helpful as far as threat-based information, would you
then think that was whatever that administrator felt like would
happen would be what you would still support?
Mr. Nelson. Mr. Chairman, I think I understand that
question. I would like to see an evolution towards a more risk-
based security model.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I am talking about the personnel. So here
is my concern: The administrator at present serves at the
pleasure of the President. This President has a very close
relationship with organized labor.
They don't want to see Federal employees be reduced. So
even if the administrator felt like we had 20 or 30 or 40
percent too many employees, he can't let them go. Because when
he starts letting them go, the President is gonna call him up
and go no, we are not gonna go there. See my point?
I like the idea that you all have made that if they had a
term the politics would get out of it. It could be the other
way around, you know. You could have a Republican President and
there was something that the Republican President didn't like.
I like the idea of somebody who is competent and capable
having the latitude to make those kind of managerial decisions
like we would in the private sector, without the risk of
getting a phone call from the White House saying you have
irritated a group of or a constituency of mine that I don't
want irritated.
See my point? That is one of the things I find appealing
about that, plus trying to attract competent, quality people
who aren't gonna be worried about getting a phone call any day
that they are gone.
So it is an interesting concept. One of my staff just told
me that Congressman Wolf has a bill to do something like that
so I am gonna see if we can't move something like that along
that has got that great potential.
Mr. Cravaack, do you have any more questions?
Mr. Cravaack. Actually, Mr. Chairman, you have asked them,
so thank you.
Mr. Rogers. All right. Well, then I want to keep going. You
are all mine.
Mr. Blank, tell me what your thoughts are. Here, let me
tell you one of my concerns about this is, as I was processing
this concept, unlike the FBI, which the President appoints,
this administrator has to work under the Secretary of Homeland
Security.
How would you deal with that term? Do you foresee any
conflicts that would occur if the Secretary can't fire the
administrator because of term limits?
Mr. Blank. I think certainly that that could come up but I
would start by saying that may be a good thing, if we have that
kind of independence and that kind of security in somebody that
is going to take on a responsibility to our National security
on this particular level.
I think that is one of the valuable things relative to an
FBI director who can't be shoved aside by the sharp elbow, by
an attorney general.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Mr. Nelson, again, I want to point to our board. Can you
see those? If you will look at the red line, that is the
personnel levels that we have in TSA.
The blue graph or lines going up and down is the number of
travelers that we have had. You will see the big dip and now we
are starting to see a little tick back up.
But the number of people, full-time employees that we have
got working is dramatically higher than the level of transport
of flight activity that we have.
Do you have a problem with that? I mean, I hate to pick on
you but you are the only one said no.
Mr. Nelson. Yes. But, you know, Mr. Chairman, it is your
prerogative. Please pick on me.
No, it is a fair point. You know, in my Government career,
we saw this cut with the pilots in 1993----
Mr. Rogers. Right.
Mr. Nelson [continuing]. And in the military in 1993 and
1995 because we had a peace dividend and we cut all the
personnel and then 5 or 6 years later we were trying to make up
for the cuts that we made in 1993 and 1995.
We did the same thing with intelligence officers prior to
9/11. We cut a lot of the case officers because we didn't need
them any more. Then all of the sudden we needed them and the
size of the CIA had half the workforce who has come on board
since 9/11.
So I am always very cautious when we use personnel cuts
alone as a solution to a budget problem or a solution to a
security model problem.
I am all for revamping how TSA operates if we make
alternate changes such as investing more in science and
technology, investing more in risk-based security, which
requires us to invest more in information and intelligence
sharing.
You can't have a successful risk-based security model, a
reduced number of personnel screeners----
Mr. Rogers. Right.
Mr. Nelson [continuing]. Physical screeners, without having
improved intelligence information sharing.
Mr. Rogers. See, and that goes to what Mr. Bloom was
offering in his opening statement earlier that he wants to see
less emphasis on technology and more on intelligence gathering,
human-based assets, which I agree with. What I want to
emphasize is with that number it is hard for us as policymakers
to make the case for spending money on those assets because
people think we are wasting what we are giving out.
The fact is in our current environment, we are not getting
any more money in the Department of Homeland Security. I think
the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Defense are, because of the dangerous world that we live, are
not gonna be as affected by cuts as other departments may be
because we have gotta be safe and secure.
But the days of the numbers going up are over. Having said
that, we gotta find a way to take the number we have got, which
is roughly $35 billion and reshuffle it so that it is more
effective.
What I contend is that we can't justify that number,
particularly when people are going to the airports with their
terrible perspective or perceptions of TSA and expect them to
go along with us spending more money on the kind of
intelligence-gathering assets.
Because it has gotta become more threat-based. We can't
keep treating grandma like she is from a Middle Eastern country
like Yemen. So that--I want to see that shift and that is why I
keep emphasizing in these hearings we can't keep doing that if
we want to be able to do what you suggest and that is move to a
more threat-based infrastructure and process than we have now.
The fact is the public is outraged with TSA. Trust me, as
Chairman of this committee I hear it daily. It doesn't matter
if I am in Walmart or Sunday school people hate the TSA.
We have gotta do something about that because we need this
system and we have gotta have a system and if not this one,
something like it, to protect us because it is still a very
dangerous world. I get the briefings, as do the other Members
of this committee.
But we gotta be smarter and leaner in the way we do things.
And that--which brings me back to the threat-based approach.
Mr. Bloom, you talked about a shift away from technology to
more intelligence gathering, smart systems. Tell me more about
what you mean by that. What would you like to see specifically?
Mr. Bloom. Thank you.
A couple of things, going back quickly to a comment made by
Ranking Member Jackson Lee about the current size of TSA and
whether it should be reduced or not, I believe no one has made
a coherent rationale for how that size correlates with the risk
and what those folks are supposed to be doing against whatever
the risk might be.
Until we have answers to those questions, staying with the
resources we have right now, it is really an un-defendable
position that really has to be worked. Also, because just about
everyone here believes a risk approach is the way to go, well,
that means you have to have an understanding of threat and
vulnerability. If a threat is basically intelligence-based how
are you going to figure out what the threat might be?
It changes from moment-by-moment and that is why both TECH-
INT and human, technical intelligence means and human
intelligence means, collecting the information, analyzing it,
transmitting it in a secure and responsive fashion to all the
people who are responsible for our layers of security, for
aviation, for other transportation modalities, that whole
system is really crucial.
Once that is optimal or close to it, that is when we know
exactly how much we can reduce, given the economic climate we
are in and the rest of it.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cravaack has a question.
Mr. Cravaack. I was just gonna ask you to yield for a
second.
In this very committee room, didn't Secretary Napolitano
actually come out and say that we were going to a risk-based
type of----
Mr. Rogers. She has and Administrator Pistole have but--at
a snail's pace----
Mr. Cravaack. They took that off there but wouldn't that be
the exact opposite about what is happening here in regards to
personnel?
Was she willing to not fund last line of defense measures
using risk-based analysis? So I just wanted to bring that up.
Mr. Rogers. Well, I mean, when we had Administrator Pistole
here about a month ago, that was one of my questions is, you
know, appreciate it is a great first step.
You heard me talk about it in my opening statement. But we
gotta go a lot faster and a lot broader. But that kind of
program is what we gotta do, where we are taking known
travelers who travel every week, we know more about them than
they think we know, and we know they are not a threat, move
them out of the line.
There are the things we can do with other people that are
intelligence-based that we can get them away from being treated
like they are a fundamentalist terrorist, you know, Islamic
fundamentalist.
So no, that we are not getting the kind of movement that
backs up that rhetoric. Let me ask you this. By the way, Mr.
Blank, you made a great observation earlier about the
supervisors being given more discretion. We have been after
them to do that.
That is another example of what we are frustrated about is
this is not rocket science. They have had this pointed out.
They say we are gonna do it, just like what Mr. Cravaack was
just talking about.
They say we are gonna do it, but it is just not happening.
What can you think of would be a good way for this committee to
put some action behind that rhetoric on that particular issue
with supervisors?
Mr. Blank. On the chart that you had up, first of all, if I
can, I would just want to address the personnel levels.
On the chart that you had up----
Mr. Rogers. Put that back up, please.
Mr. Blank. Every one of the red Xs is a result of a formula
that TSA has devised. In other words, they take inputs and
they--in the early going we had a lousy formula.
We hired 65,000 people. We had to lay off nearly 20,000
people. They revised the formula. When you see a number of
full-time equivalents and I think what I am suggesting is you
ought to ask what is the out--what are in the elements of that
formula?
It has things like time to screen people. You should ask:
Where are the promised efficiencies from technology? We have
been promised that for years and years. That was gonna drive
down FTEs; doesn't seem to have materialized.
You are absolutely right. Less flights should mean less
screeners. The airports have a role in that in terms of
physical infrastructure.
So there are all these inputs that I think the TSA should
have to come and justify to you because it is the result of not
a personal--not a human judgment. It is the result of a formula
that has them moving toward a particular staffing level.
I think in terms of the supervisors, I believe that
Administrator Pistole testified he didn't have the money to do
the training. My own feeling is, is that money is not the
problem at TSA.
It should be a relatively simple matter, in my view, to
reprogram existing funds toward doing the training for the
supervisors in order to have them be utilized as we have
suggested and discussed here.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
Let me ask this and I will throw this out to whoever wants
to answer it. Everybody nodded affirmatively when I talked
about PreCheck being a good initiative. It is going too slow.
We know now that very frequent travelers are the people,
are that are put into that. Who else should be included? Who
would you go to, the next couple of categories of people and,
Mr. Poole?
Mr. Poole. You could start with everyone who holds a secret
or higher clearance.
Why on earth that these people are handling sensitive
defense material----
Mr. Rogers. That is a great----
Mr. Poole [continuing]. Entrusted with that, why should
they go through the third-degree at the airport?
Mr. Rogers. That is a great idea.
Who else? Ms. Alonso.
Ms. Alonso. Again, I want to go back to my statement,
previous, that flight attendants do go through the same
background checks, back 10 years and security screenings as
pilots.
I am sure that everyone here has experienced a delay where
we have had to cut ahead of passengers in line.
Mr. Rogers. Oh, yes.
Ms. Alonso. Not only is time----
Mr. Rogers. Happened yesterday, I was standing in line at
the Atlanta Airport----
Ms. Alonso. We apologize.
Mr. Rogers. Didn't bother me but I know the other people
who are not regular travelers were probably upset about it.
Ms. Alonso. It is not only about time, it is about security
as well.
When I have to put my items on the belt and I have to make
sure that no one around them, you know, is doing anything to my
bags, it is very difficult for me to maintain vigilance on all
ends, at all times, based upon the security procedures that are
set up in place.
I mean, I can stand there for a certain amount of time and
then they move me along to try to get the next one----
Mr. Rogers. So you are not advocating not going through any
screening, but going through the PreCheck----
Ms. Alonso. Not at all.
Mr. Rogers [continuing]. Just a magnetometer like the----
Ms. Alonso. We are not advocating superseding security
screening. We are just asking to use the alternative screening
processes that are already set up in place that the pilots use
at this time, Known Crewmember.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. That was two great examples.
Mr. Nelson.
Mr. Nelson. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would just start by allowing the frequent flyers to have
transferable interoperability so that if I am a frequent flyer
on Delta and not on United and I fly on United I get the same
screening.
That is not happening right now. That is an easy fix that
is being controlled by the airlines.
Mr. Rogers. That is another great idea.
Mr. Bloom--Dr. Bloom.
Mr. Bloom. Well, I would just like to point out, in a very
respectful way that although all these suggestions are good,
they are nothing on the terrorist threat or make the country
any safer.
In a way the suggestions are dealing with the side effects
of a very imperfect medication. What we should be looking at
instead while we try to come up with a better medication, is
dealing with the disease and that is where the intelligence
activities come in.
Mr. Rogers. I agree. What I am after is a smarter way of
using our resources so that we are leaner, for public
perception purposes, and smarter, which gets to your point.
So the more of these people we can get out of the line, the
easier it is for us to look thoroughly at who is left. Is this
their first time ever to fly? Did they buy a one-way ticket?
Did they pay cash? All the things that we want to look for,
it is more manageable if we have a smaller group. So that is
why I want to get--Supreme Court justices have no business
going through--maybe after the ruling 2 weeks ago, but they
have no business going through that.
You have got Donald Rumsfeld getting patted down at the
airport; Henry Kissinger, you know, that is just mind-numbing
that that kind of stuff is happening.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Bloom. Well, just to briefly follow up, there was a
National Academy of Sciences study done a few years ago, which
recommended a partial random, partial--well, I will use the
term profiling, even though it is politically loaded,
combination of random and profiling with a partial sample of
the total traveling public as the most cost-effective approach
to support security.
Mr. Rogers. There is a host of things we can do from the
intelligence threat-based perspective on that.
I would point out for the people in the audience who don't
know, even if you are in the PreCheck category, which I am, I
go through PreCheck when I fly on Delta, which goes back to
your point, there is a reason we can be doing that with other
airlines too.
I don't get that on US Air. No offense, Ms. Alonso, which I
fly pretty regularly, too.
But there is no reason why that shouldn't be the case no
matter which airline you are flying.
But there is a lot of other things that we could do to get
these people out of line and that is what I want to emphasize
because I want us to be a much smarter, much more effective,
much more threat-based organization that has the public's
confidence because right now we don't.
That is a real concern to me as a policymaker that the
public does not have confidence in the TSA.
So you all have been a very good panel, very thought-
provoking, great ideas and I appreciate your time, for
preparing for your testimony and for your attendance here
today.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:16 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
