[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS REPORT:
ASSESSING THE STATE OF PREPAREDNESS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE,
AND COMMUNICATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 6, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-96
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Ron Barber, Arizona
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida, Chairman
Scott Rigell, Virginia Laura Richardson, California
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania, Vice Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Chair Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Blake Farenthold, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Robert L. Turner, New York (Ex Officio)
Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Officio)
Kerry A. Kinirons, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Vacancy, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications..................... 1
The Honorable Hansen Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications........... 2
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Timothy W. Manning, Deputy Administrator, Protection and
National Preparedness, Federal Emergency Management Agency:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Stanley J. Czerwinski, Director, Intergovernmental Relations,
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Panel II
Mr. John W. Madden, Director, Alaska Division of Homeland
Security and Emergency Management, On Behalf of the National
Emergency Management Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
Mr. Mike Sena, Deputy Director, Northern California Regional
Intelligence Center, On Behalf of the National Fusion Center
Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 32
Prepared Statement............................................. 34
Dr. Georges C. Benjamin, M.D., Executive Director, American
Public Health Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Prepared Statement............................................. 42
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Letter From the BuildStrong Coalition.......................... 3
APPENDIX
Questions Submitted by Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for Tim Manning. 53
THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS REPORT: ASSESSING THE STATE OF PREPAREDNESS
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Wednesday, June 6, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:07 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Gus M. Bilirakis
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Bilirakis, Farenthold, Turner, and
Clarke.
Mr. Bilirakis. I believe it is afternoon. Good afternoon.
The Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to receive testimony on
the state of our Nation's preparedness.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
At the start of another hurricane season and with no
evidence that the terrorist threat to the United States will
decline, it is important that this subcommittee has an accurate
picture of the level of preparedness across the country.
Anecdotally, we are all aware of advancements made in
preparedness. One need only look at the responses to the
tornadoes in Joplin and Hurricane Irene to see evidence of
enhanced preparedness and response capabilities at the State
and local levels. However, there is more to the story, and it
is my hope that the recently released National Preparedness
Report will help us gain a better understanding of the work
that remains to be done to ensure a prepared and resilient
Nation.
It is important to note that this National Preparedness
Report has been a long time coming. Section 652 of the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act requires the annual
completion of a Federal preparedness report to assess National
preparedness. The PPD-8, signed by President Obama in March
2011, further required the completion of a report assessing
National preparedness. The first such report was completed in
January 2009; however, another report was not completed until
the National Preparedness Report was released last month.
There is no doubt that we have made great strides in our
level of preparedness since September 11 and Hurricane Katrina.
However, we must have the ability to measure that preparedness
to determine steps still necessary to achieve core
capabilities. It is my hope that this National Preparedness
Report will mark the beginning of an annual assessment, as
required by the PKEMRA, one that includes validated information
received through surveys of stakeholders and that truly
includes the input of the whole community.
I am pleased that Deputy Administrator Manning is here
today to explain the methodology behind the report and how the
report's findings, coupled with needed performance measures for
the grant programs, will help inform efforts going forward to
enhance core capabilities at the Federal, State, and local
levels and with our nonprofit and private-sector partners. I
hope that this will provide us with the frank assessment of the
shortcomings identified in the report and the ways in which
FEMA, working with the whole community, plans to address them.
I am particularly interested in the perspectives on this
report of our experts on the second panel and from GAO. What
are the strengths of this report, and how could future
iterations be enhanced to provide a better picture of where we
stand and where we need to go in the future?
With that, I welcome all our witnesses, and I look forward
to your testimony on this very important topic.
Now I will recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Hansen Clarke
from Michigan, for any statement he may like to make. You are
recognized, sir.
Mr. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor for me
to serve with you today as the Ranking Member of this
subcommittee for this hearing.
I want to thank the Chairman for holding this hearing to
examine the findings of the National Preparedness Report. It is
very important. It is important to me because I represent
metropolitan Detroit, and since I have been in Congress the
past year and a half, I have been a strong advocate for more
funding for the Urban Areas Security Initiative and also for
the Assistance to Firefighters Grants. We actually need this
type of investment, and that is because our State and our local
units of government, they don't have the revenue to be able to
provide for the staffing and the equipment that we need to
better protect our people.
Now, I am pleased that the Department of Homeland Security
appropriations bill that we will be voting on soon, this week,
in the House does contain an additional $400 million in
additional funding to State and local grant programs. However,
over the past few years, there has just been too much money cut
out of the Assistance for Firefighters Grant program, and I
think we need--in fact, I know we have to restore that funding.
Congress really needs to do much more to better protect our
State and local communities, and I will tell you why. It is
because Congress did not adequately regulate and monitor the
housing crisis. That is the cause of why the cities and States
don't have the revenue right now to help better protect their
people. The housing crisis forced many families out of their
homes, depressed property values, and overall dramatically
reduced the tax base of many cities and States. So, as a
result, they have less money to count on right now to better
invest in National preparedness for their local communities and
States.
I look forward to the testimony of Deputy Administrator
Manning and also Mr. Czerwinski, especially your comments and
insight, Mr. Czerwinski, on how the recently released National
Disaster Recovery Framework could help better prepare
communities to recover from natural disasters and emergencies,
especially small businesses that need help reopening or
families who are displaced when their house is burnt down or
blown away, how they can get new housing again in a prompt
fashion without having to spend more money that they have
likely lost because of the emergency.
Also, I am interested to hear from both of you on how we
can better improve our cybersecurity capabilities. As you are
aware, the full Committee on Homeland Security recently
considered legislation on this issue. I don't feel that it went
far enough to protect us from cybersecurity threats. I would
like to know how you believe that we could strengthen the bill
that was reported out of this committee or other committees to
better protect us from cybersecurity threats.
Before I yield back my time, I want to again thank Chairman
Bilirakis for being thoughtful, conscientious. He understands
the importance of keeping our country strong, investing in
National preparedness. The fact that he is holding this
hearing, again, just underscores his insight and why it is
really a joy to work with him on this subcommittee.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. I appreciate it. Thanks for the
nice comments.
I ask unanimous consent to insert in the record a letter
from the BuildStrong Coalition.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Letter From the BuildStrong Coalition
June 6, 2012.
The Honorable Gus Bilirakis,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications, Committee on Homeland Security, U.S. House of
Representatives, H2-176 Ford House Office Building, Washington,
DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Bilirakis: The BuildStrong Coalition would like to
thank you, Ranking Member Richardson, and the Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications for holding today's hearing
on preparedness as we enter the 2012 Hurricane Season.
BuildStrong is coalition of National business and consumer
organizations, companies, and emergency management officials dedicated
to promoting stronger building codes to help communities withstand
major natural disasters while saving lives and taxpayer money at the
same time.
building codes save lives, property, and taxpayer money
Overwhelming evidence exists to demonstrate that the adoption and
enforcement of State-wide building codes saves lives and greatly
reduces property damage and the need for Federal assistance resulting
from disasters. The Louisiana State University Hurricane Center
estimated that stronger building codes would have reduced wind damage
from Hurricane Katrina by 80%, saving $8 billion.
In 2005, FEMA commissioned a study by the National Institute of
Building Sciences' Multihazard Mitigation Council. The goal of the
study, based on the work of more than 50 National experts, was to
``assess the future savings from hazard mitigation activities.''
According to the study, every $1 spent on hazard mitigation (actions to
reduce disaster losses) provides the Nation with about $4 in future
benefits.
A study done for the Insurance Institute for Business & Home Safety
(IBHS) found that losses from Hurricane Andrew, which struck south
Florida in 1992 and caused more than $20 billion (in today's dollars)
in insured damage, would have been reduced by 50 percent for
residential property and by 40 percent for commercial property if those
structures were built in accordance with Florida's 2004 State-wide
building code. Another IBHS study following Hurricane Charley in 2004
found that modern building codes reduced the severity of property
losses by 42 percent and the frequency of losses by 60 percent.
More valuable research is currently being conducted by the IBHS at
their new lab in Richburg, South Carolina. This research already has
clearly demonstrated how the human and financial costs of natural
disasters can be greatly reduced by building stronger homes. With
relatively simple upgrades in construction such as strapping to create
a continuous load path from the roof, through the walls, and into the
foundation, thicker roof decking, and textured, rather than smooth
nails, test homes were built to withstand 110 mile-per-hour winds with
little damage. Test homes with the same floor plan that were not
upgraded, were completely destroyed at wind speeds of only 95 mph to
100 mph. Taking steps to prepare in these ways before a disaster has a
real effect.
Despite this correlation, most States have not enacted State-wide
building codes and related inspection and enforcement measures. State
standards for construction, code-related inspection, and enforcement
vary widely across the country. Where State-wide codes exist, it is not
uncommon to allow individual jurisdictions (e.g., cities of a
particular class, or counties) to deviate from the State standards,
occasionally resulting in a weakening of the model minimum standards.
Model building codes govern all aspects of construction and help to
protect homes and buildings from the devastating effects of natural
catastrophes. Uniform, State-wide adoption and enforcement of model
building codes by States helps to significantly reduce long-term risks
affecting people, property, the environment, and ultimately the
economy. The model codes, developed Nationally in the United States by
a consensus process involving construction experts and local building
officials working together, are adopted and enforced at the State level
to mitigate effects of natural disaster perils inherent to each State.
the safe building code incentive act
The BuildStrong Coalition strongly supports H.R. 2069, The Safe
Building Code Incentive Act, legislation providing States with
additional disaster relief funding if they enact modern building codes.
The Safe Building Code Incentive Act would create a financial
incentive for States that have adopted and enforce State-wide building
codes. Under the proposed law, States that adopt and enforce Nationally
recognized model building codes for residential and commercial
structures would qualify for an additional 4 percent of funding
available for post-disaster grants. The program would be administered
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
Sixteen States currently enforce building codes that would already
qualify for the additional 4 percent funding. Another 15 States would
qualify with minor changes to current laws and regulations. As stated
prior, this legislation will not require any additional appropriation
to FEMA since it draws funds from the existing Disaster Relief Fund. In
addition, the nature of the incentive does not mandate the adoption of
State-wide building codes on any States that wish to maintain their
current patchwork structure.
The evidence supporting mitigation benefits proves this incentive
to be a fiscally responsible method of enabling FEMA to assist in
natural disaster recovery while working to prevent future damage. The
Safe Building Code Incentive Act is a forward-thinking, mitigation-
focused legislative proposal that will display Congress's leadership in
the midst of a heightened natural catastrophe year.
conclusion
While mitigation will not prevent natural catastrophes, stronger
homes and businesses will save private property, Federal funds,
environmental damage and insurance claims paid. Further, building codes
contribute to the resiliency of a community and the ability of a
community to ``bounce back'' from a hazard event. As a community begins
the recovery process, the quicker businesses can return to full
operation and citizens can return to their daily lives, the greater
ability the local economy has to recover and lessen the burden on
assistance providers. Most importantly, stronger homes and businesses
save lives.
Again, BuildStrong would like to thank Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking
Member Richardson, and the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness,
Response, and Communications for holding this important hearing.
Sincerely,
Jimi Grande,
Chairman, BuildStrong Coalition.
Mr. Bilirakis. Other Members of the subcommittee are
reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the
record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
May 6, 2012
Good morning. I would like to thank the witnesses for being here
today to discuss the long-awaited National Preparedness Report.
Reviewing the report, I was encouraged to learn that State and
local governments have made significant progress in the areas of all-
hazards planning, interoperable communications, and public health and
medical services.
This report proved what many of us on this side of the aisle have
been saying for quite some time: Targeted Homeland Security grants
work.
When we target our resources to address gaps in capabilities, we
become more prepared.
That said, having witnessed the suffering Hurricane Katrina
brought, I was disturbed to learn that we have made little progress in
developing the capabilities necessary to implement robust long-term
recovery plans.
The National Preparedness Report indicates that States are less
than half-way to achieving their preparedness capability objectives to
ensure long-term recovery for economic activity, natural and cultural
resources, and housing.
The Report candidly notes that recovery capabilities saw little
investment by way of Federal grant dollars.
But funding is only part of the problem.
Over the past 3 years, the Government Accountability Office has
issued a series of reports exploring the challenges of long-term
recovery projects and identifying lessons learned from previous
recovery efforts.
In particular, the GAO has indicated that confusion among
stakeholders and the Federal Coordinator regarding their roles and
functions during recovery efforts and a lack of clarity regarding
decision-making authority have historically hindered successful
recovery efforts.
In each report, the GAO has recommended strategies to address gaps
in recovery capabilities, from facilitating better public-private
partnerships to improve economic recovery to improving the
effectiveness and efficiency of Public Assistance Grant program.
I understand that many of GAO's recommendations are addressed in
the National Disaster Recovery Framework.
While it appears that some progress has been made, it is unclear
whether additional movement forward is likely.
I am mindful of NEMA's report which finds that funding has been
relatively flat at State and local emergency management agencies.
In most places, these agencies plan and oversee long-term recovery
efforts.
And given the discussion on long-term recovery, I would be remiss
if I did not briefly mention the findings in a GAO report released last
week on FEMA's Disaster Assistance Workforce.
It found that FEMA lacks hiring standards for Disaster Assistance
Employees, who comprise 57 percent of FEMA's workforce and play a major
role in recovery efforts.
GAO also found that FEMA does not provide DAEs with uniform
training.
Without uniform hiring standards and uniform training, it should
come as no surprise that DAEs do not have uniform skill sets.
Yet, even more troubling is GAO's finding that FEMA lacks a uniform
process for monitoring how DAEs implement disaster policies from region
to region.
In light of gaps in recovery capabilities identified in the
National Preparedness Report, the GAO's findings regarding DAEs are
particularly concerning.
I will be interested to learn how FEMA intends to address the long-
term recovery issues.
I look forward to the testimony of the witnesses and yield back the
balance of my time.
Mr. Bilirakis. I am pleased to welcome now our first panel
of witnesses.
Our first witness is Mr. Tim Manning. Mr. Manning is FEMA's
Deputy Administrator for Protection and National Preparedness,
a position to which he was confirmed by the U.S. Senate on May
6, 2009. Prior to joining FEMA, Administrator Manning served as
secretary of the New Mexico Department of Homeland Security and
homeland security advisor to Governor Richardson. Mr. Manning
has served as a firefighter and emergency medical technician.
He earned his bachelor's of science degree in geology from
Eastern Illinois University and is a graduate of the Executive
Leaders Program at the Center for Homeland Defense and Security
at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Following Administrator Manning, we will receive testimony
from Mr. Stanley Czerwinski. Mr. Czerwinski is the director of
intergovernmental relations at the U.S. Government
Accountability Office. Prior to this position, he served as
GAO's comptroller and as the director or assistant director for
various issues. Prior to joining GAO, Mr. Czerwinski worked at
both the Congressional Research Service and Congressional
Budget Office. He has a master's degree in public
administration from the University of Massachusetts and a
bachelor's degree from Wesleyan University in Connecticut.
Welcome. Your entire written statements will appear in the
record. I ask that you each summarize your testimony for 5
minutes.
Administrator Manning, you are now recognized. Thank you,
sir.
STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY W. MANNING, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR,
PROTECTION AND NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY
Mr. Manning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Members
of the committee.
Mr. Bilirakis. Good morning.
Mr. Manning. I am Tim Manning, FEMA's Deputy Administrator
for Protection and National Preparedness. On behalf of
Secretary Napolitano and Administrator Fugate, I thank you for
the invitation to testify today.
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, we have made
significant and measurable strides toward improving
preparedness for all hazards, including terrorism, natural
disasters, and technological hazards. This administration
arrived recognizing the significant progress that had been made
in improving the Nation's preparedness since September 2001. We
also recognized that we lacked the measuring systems and, in
many cases, the data that would allow us to answer definitively
the question we are being asked by the American people: Are we
better prepared?
We are better prepared. Based on our work, we can better
articulate what we are prepared for and where our capabilities
lie. For example, Federal, State, and local governments have,
since 2001, built a network of specialized teams capable of
interdicting and disrupting a variety of imminent threats. That
network includes over a thousand hazardous materials response
teams, 5,400 SWAT teams, and 469 FBI-trained and accredited
bomb teams. Prior to 2001, major population centers in many
parts of the country lacked advanced structural collapse and
urban search and rescue capabilities. Today, 97 percent of the
Nation's population is within a 4-hour response drive time of
an urban search and rescue team.
The National Preparedness Report developed pursuant to
``Presidential Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness'' and
the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act was recently
submitted to the President and provided to Congress. In
preparing the report, FEMA worked with a wide range of
community partners and individuals to identify quantitative and
qualitative performance and assessment data. Data were
integrated from the 2011 State preparedness reports, and we
conducted our own research into independent evaluations,
surveys, and other supporting data related to those core
capabilities.
Key findings and insights on critical preparedness issues
were identified, including areas of progress and where areas
for improvement remain. A number of broad trends emerged.
First, the Nation has developed areas of National strength
in several core capabilities, particularly in cross-cutting
common capabilities and those that support responses to
disasters, including: planning; operational coordination;
intelligence and information sharing; environmental response,
health, and safety; mass search and rescue operations;
operational communications; and public health and medical
services.
Second, Federal preparedness assistance programs have
helped build and enhance State and local, Tribal, and
territorial capabilities. Federal grants have clearly
contributed to the capability gains achieved since 9/11.
Third, identified areas of National strength align with the
investments made using Federal assistance. The most progress
has been made in capabilities identified as high priorities by
our State and local partners. Since 2006, Federal grantees have
used over $7 billion in preparedness assistance from the
Department of Homeland Security to support those core
capabilities identified as areas of National strength,
particularly public health and medical services, operational
communications and planning. Conversely, some core capabilities
identified as needing improvement have not historically
received significant investment by grantees, particularly
recovery-focused and cybersecurity-focused core capabilities.
Fourth, the Nation has made demonstrable progress in
addressing areas for improvement identified after September 11
and Hurricane Katrina.
The former identified challenges in multidisciplinary
operational coordination, and, as a result, the National
Incident Management System, or NIMS, was adopted as the common
doctrine for incident management across the country, and more
than 4 million community partners have received some form of
NIMS training. All States, Tribes, and territories now report
complete compliance with NIMS.
The 9/11 attacks also revealed limited information sharing
of actionable intelligence across the Government and within the
private sector. Development of a National network of fusion
centers, joint terrorism task forces, and standardized policies
and procedures for sharing suspicious activity reports have
greatly improved our capabilities in this area.
Both events identified difficulties in communications
interoperability within and across jurisdictions. With
significant support from Congress, high-risk urban areas
throughout the Nation have built and demonstrated the
capability to achieve full-response-level interoperable
communications within 1 hour of an emergency.
These examples represent measurable outcomes in our
National effort toward increased preparedness and have
demonstrated their value in real-world events.
The National Preparedness Report represents a step forward
in our efforts to assess overall National preparedness and
serves as a baseline evaluation of the progress made toward
building, sustaining, and delivering the core capabilities
described in the National Preparedness Goal. Future efforts
will focus on developing measures and assessment methodologies
that will guide the annual development of the National
Preparedness Report.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today, and I am happy to answer any questions the committee may
have.
[The statement of Mr. Manning follows:]
Prepared Statement of Timothy W. Manning
June 6, 2012
Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee, good morning. I am
Timothy Manning, deputy administrator for protection and national
preparedness at the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). On behalf of Secretary Napolitano
and Administrator Fugate, I thank you for the invitation to testify
today on the state of our Nation's preparedness.
We appreciate the committee's continued interest in and support for
National preparedness. We also appreciate your interest in defining and
measuring the progress we have made over more than a decade of
considerable effort.
Since the September 2001 terrorist attacks, we have made
significant and measurable strides toward improving preparedness for
the hazards faced by all levels of government and all segments of
society. We have improved our preparedness for the threats posed by
those who wish to bring us harm as well as for the myriad natural and
technological hazards that face our communities face every day.
This administration came into office recognizing the significant
progress that had been made in improving the Nation's preparedness
since September 2001 and cognizant of the need to better understand and
explain that progress--both qualitatively and quantitatively. As former
first responders, local emergency managers and State homeland security
officials, Administrator Fugate, Deputy Administrator Serino and I
understood that the investments made by the American people over nearly
a decade have significantly improved the capabilities and readiness of
our police, fire-fighters, emergency medical technicians, public health
workers, and other first responders. But we also recognized that we
lacked the measuring systems and, in many cases, the data that would
allow us to answer the question we were being asked by Congress, by the
President, and by the American people: Are we better prepared now than
we were on September 11, 2001?
We are better prepared, and based on our work over the past few
years we can better articulate what we are prepared for and where our
capabilities reside. To cite just a few examples:
In the 4 years between 2006 and 2010, the proportion of
States and urban areas that were confident in the effectiveness
of their emergency operations plans increased from 40 percent
to more than 75 percent;
Commercial radio broadcasters, in partnership with FEMA,
today can deliver public warning messages to more than 84
percent of the U.S. population, up from 67 percent in 2009. By
the end of 2013, coverage is expected to expand to more than 90
percent of the population;
Since 2001, Federal, State, and local governments have built
a network of specialized teams capable of interdicting and
disrupting a variety of imminent threats. That network includes
1,100 Hazardous Materials Response Teams, 5,400 SWAT teams, and
469 FBI-trained and accredited bomb squads;
Prior to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, major population
centers in many parts of the country lacked structural collapse
and urban search-and-rescue capabilities. Today, 97 percent of
the Nation is within a 4-hour drive of an urban search-and-
rescue team; and
Government agencies at all levels have improved their
strategic and tactical communications planning and
coordination. In 2006, only 42 percent of the Nation's urban
areas had a strategic plan in place to guide interoperable
communications. Today, 100 percent of the Nation's highest-risk
urban areas are capable of establishing response-level
interoperable communications within 1 hour of an event
involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies.
But preparedness is not an end-state; it is a process. As the
threats and hazards we face as a Nation emerge and evolve, so too must
the capabilities and resources we need to address those threats and
hazards. Similarly, we must sustain those capabilities that prepare us
for the enduring threats and hazards we face. We increasingly
understand where we have additional work to do--and we now have a
system in place to help us focus on those areas.
In March 2011, President Obama signed Presidential Policy Directive
8: National Preparedness (PPD-8), which describes the Nation's approach
to preparing for the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to
the security of the United States. This Directive required the
establishment of a National Preparedness Goal--an overall target that
the entire Nation will strive to achieve; the development of a National
Preparedness System to provide the processes for achieving the Goal and
for measuring our collective progress along the way; and an annual
National Preparedness Report to summarize progress.
The National Preparedness Goal delivered to the President in
October 2011 describes 31 core capabilities--identified and defined
through a collaborative process involving Federal departments and
agencies, State and local government officials, and individuals from
across the entire community--that we as a Nation must build and sustain
in order to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover
from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk to the Nation.
Those capabilities include activities such as intelligence and
information sharing; screening, search, and detection; vulnerability
reduction; mass care services; housing; and economic recovery, to name
just a few.
The National Preparedness System, described in a report submitted
to the President in November 2011, is a process for achieving the
National Preparedness Goal. It is best described as an on-going cycle
which begins with identifying and assessing the risks a jurisdiction
faces and then proceeds to include an estimating the capabilities
needed to address those risks, building or sustaining the required
levels of capability, developing and implementing plans to deliver
those capabilities, validating and monitoring progress, and reviewing
and updating efforts to promote continuous improvement.
the national preparedness report
The product of that validation and monitoring process is the
National Preparedness Report, which we recently submitted to the
President and provided to Congress. In preparing the report, FEMA
worked with a range of community partners--including all levels of
government, private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations,
communities, and individuals to identify quantitative and qualitative
performance and assessment data for each of the 31 core capabilities
described in the National Preparedness Goal. In addition, FEMA
integrated data from the 2011 State Preparedness Reports (SPRs), State-
wide self-assessments of core capability levels submitted by all 56
U.S. States and territories through a standardized survey. Finally,
FEMA staff conducted their own research to identify recent, independent
evaluations, surveys, and other supporting data related to those core
capabilities.
Our synthesis, review, and analysis of those data sources resulted
in several key findings and insights on critical preparedness issues,
including areas where the Nation has made progress and where areas for
improvement remain. During our analysis of the data on the core
capabilities, a number of broad trends in National preparedness
emerged:
First, the Nation has developed areas of National strength in
several core capabilities, particularly in cross-cutting, common
capabilities and those that support responses to disasters.
Preparedness capabilities have improved significantly since 2001, as a
result of concerted effort through planning, organization, equipment,
training, exercises, and dedicated funding provided by Congress,
States, Tribes, territories, and localities. Some areas of strength
pre-date the September 11, 2001
(9/11) terrorist attacks, while others have developed in the years
since. Areas of overall National strength as identified in the National
Preparedness Report include:
Planning;
Operational Coordination;
Intelligence and Information Sharing;
Environmental Response/Health and Safety;
Mass Search and Rescue Operations;
Operational Communications; and,
Public Health and Medical Services.
These strengths involve contributions from across the whole
community. State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners have built a
network of multi-disciplinary capabilities that they use to manage the
vast majority of emergencies. When disasters strike, Federal partners,
the private and nonprofit sectors, faith-based organizations, and the
public stand ready to augment existing State, local, Tribal, and
territorial response capabilities and to help provide many of the
essential services outlined in the core capabilities.
Second, Federal preparedness assistance programs have helped build
and enhance State, local, Tribal, and territorial capabilities through
multi-year grant investments across mission areas. Federal preparedness
assistance has clearly contributed to the capability gains achieved
since 9/11, and partner organizations from across the whole community
rely on Federal preparedness grants from a number of Federal
Departments and Agencies to build core capabilities. DHS' Homeland
Security Grant Program includes a suite of programs designed to support
the building and maintaining of core capabilities, and Health and Human
Services' preparedness grant programs administered by the Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR) and the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) support State, local, and
territorial jurisdictions in improving public health and health care
preparedness.
Third, areas of National strength align with the investments made
using Federal assistance programs, and the most progress has been made
in capabilities identified as high priorities. Since 2006, Federal
grantees have used more than $7.3 billion in preparedness assistance
from DHS to support the core capabilities identified in the National
Preparedness Report as areas of National strength, specifically Public
Health and Medical Services, Operational Communications, and Planning.
Conversely, some core capabilities identified as needing
improvement have not historically received significant investments by
grantees via preparedness grants. For example, while Federal grant
programs have increasingly sought to emphasize the importance of cyber
preparedness in recent years, State and local grant-funded investments
aligned with the cybersecurity core capability have been minimal.
Similarly, States and local jurisdictions have invested less than 1
percent of DHS non-disaster preparedness assistance from fiscal year
2006 to fiscal year 2010 in recovery-focused capabilities.
The link between investment and improved capability also reflects
the priority placed on each capability by State and local governments.
In the 2011 State Preparedness Report, States were asked to rate each
of the core capabilities as being a high, medium, or low priority.
Operational Communications, Operational Coordination, Public Health,
and Medical Services and Planning were four of the top-five-listed
high-priority capabilities and each aligns to National strengths and is
an area in which States reported relatively more progress toward
achieving preparedness goals. Similarly, two of the lowest-priority
capabilities identified in the State Preparedness Report, Health and
Social Services and Natural and Cultural Resources, fall within the
Recovery mission area and are identified as areas in which States
reported less progress toward achieving preparedness goals. One
interesting finding in the State Preparedness Report data is that while
approximately two-thirds of States identified housing, economic
recovery, and cybersecurity as high-priority capabilities, they also
reported being the least prepared in those areas. These results further
underscore that cyber-security and the recovery-focused core
capabilities should be areas for future emphasis and investment.
Fourth, the Nation has made demonstrable progress in addressing
areas for improvement identified after 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina. Both
the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina highlighted gaps in preparedness
activities Nation-wide and served as catalysts for change. The 9/11
Commission and the White House after-action review of the Federal
response to Hurricane Katrina identified dozens of recommendations. For
example, the 9/11 attacks identified challenges in conducting multi-
disciplinary operational coordination on-site at incidents and among
operations centers. As a result, the National Incident Management
System (NIMS) was adopted as the common doctrine for incident
management, and more than 4 million whole community partners have
received some form of NIMS training. All States, Tribes, and
territories now report compliance with NIMS.
Hurricane Katrina also revealed significant weaknesses in
catastrophic emergency planning. As a result, National planning-related
guidance was developed and funding was directed to this capability.
Subsequent Nation-wide Plan Reviews have demonstrated significant
improvements in State and urban area confidence in their catastrophic
plans.
The 9/11 attacks also revealed limited information sharing of
actionable intelligence across the Government and with the private
sector. Development of a National network of fusion centers, Joint
Terrorism Task Forces, and standardized policies and processes for
sharing suspicious activity reports have greatly improved this
preparedness activity.
Similarly, both the 9/11 attacks and Hurricane Katrina identified
difficulties in communications interoperability within and across
jurisdictions. In ensuing years and with significant support from
Congress through the Public Safety Interoperable Communications and
other grant programs, high-risk urban areas throughout the Nation have
demonstrated the capability to achieve full response-level
interoperable communications within 1 hour of an emergency.
Finally, decision-makers in the public and private sectors
increasingly are using risk analysis to shape and prioritize
preparedness activities across mission areas. PPD-8 and the Goal
emphasize the important role that risk--defined simply as the potential
for an unwanted outcome--plays in informing preparedness activities.
Faced with a range of threats and hazards and constrained by available
resources, whole community partners are increasingly using risk
analyses to inform policy and programmatic decisions across all five
preparedness mission areas.
For example:
Federal interagency partners conducted a Strategic National
Risk Assessment to help identify potential incidents that pose
the greatest threat to the Nation and to inform the development
of core capabilities and targets in the Goal;
DHS developed an annual National Risk Profile for the
Nation's critical infrastructure, describing risks facing the
Nation's infrastructure sectors and supporting public- and
private-sector risk management decisions;
Traditional mitigation planning has broadened to include
both natural hazards and terrorist threats in order to identify
a comprehensive suite of potential mitigation actions;
State and local public health departments are required to
use jurisdictional risk assessments to prioritize capability
enhancements through preparedness assistance from HHS ASPR and
CDC;
Risk analysis informs eligibility criteria for preparedness
assistance, including the State Homeland Security Program,
Urban Areas Security Initiative, Port Security Grant Program,
Transit Security Grant Program, and the CDC Public Health
Emergency Preparedness cooperative agreement program;
On-going efforts to implement the National Preparedness
System, as called for in PPD-8, further emphasize the
importance of risk analyses in driving preparedness activities.
The National Preparedness System emphasizes the need to
identify and assess risks in order to guide efforts to develop,
maintain, and assess core capabilities; and
States are required to conduct Threat and Hazard
Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA) as a condition of
receiving most preparedness grant funding and set hazard-based
targets as the context for their State Preparedness Report
capability assessments.
The requirement that States conduct a THIRA as a condition of
receiving preparedness grant funding, has become the source of much
discussion over the past few months. I would like to take a few moments
to clarify what THIRAs will--and will not--be used for.
Moving forward, States and territories will be required to conduct
Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments (THIRA) as a
condition for receiving homeland security grants. The THIRA process
provides a comprehensive approach for identifying and assessing risks
and associated impacts. It expands on existing local, Tribal,
territorial, and State Hazard Identification and Risk Assessments
(HIRAs) and other risk methodologies currently used by broadening the
factors considered in the process, incorporating the whole community
throughout the process, and accounting for important community-specific
characteristics.
The use of risk analysis is a long-standing and important first
step in the emergency management community. State and local governments
are very familiar with the use of Hazard Identification and Risk
Assessments to help them drive investments in mitigation activities.
The THIRA process is very similar, but adds a terrorism component to
account for the possibility of deliberate threats.
The THIRA process is a step-by-step analysis that can be used by
emergency management offices in small towns and by large urban areas
with access to advanced analytical capabilities. While the level of
detail may be greater for an urban area than for a rural community, the
methodology for both will be similar and both will have, as a result, a
comparable foundation for informed decision making. Critical to the
security and resilience of our communities is knowledge of the level of
capabilities needed to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond and
recover from our greatest risks. Using THIRA results, communities will
gain a greater understanding of their risk landscape and can therefore
evaluate current capabilities against known threats and hazards and
identify resources available to meet the identified needs. By
estimating their resource requirements, jurisdictions can make
decisions about how they will effectively use their resources to
deliver core capabilities toward their community's greatest risk. The
THIRAs and assessments such as State Preparedness Reports will identify
gaps in preparedness at the State and local levels and drive investment
towards building and sustaining core capabilities to address those
gaps.
Based on the assessments of what we've achieved and what we have
yet to accomplish, and in light of the National Preparedness Goal and
System, we proposed a new National Preparedness Grant Program to re-
align existing grant programs to focus on sustaining capabilities
developed, building new capabilities to fill the identified gaps,
preventing terrorism, protecting critical transportation and port
infrastructure, and other key resources. We propose to do this by
consolidating programs, streamlining the application process and better
focusing our efforts.
conclusion
With the October 2011 release of the National Preparedness Goal,
the Nation is transitioning to a refined set of core capabilities. As a
result, whole community partners are updating their efforts to collect,
analyze, and report preparedness progress according to the core
capabilities identified in the Goal. The 2012 National Preparedness
Report therefore relies on a range of existing assessment approaches
and associated quantitative and qualitative data to present the
Nation's preparedness progress and to report key findings. Assessment
processes, methodologies, and data will evolve in future years to align
more directly with the Goal and its capabilities. Efforts are already
underway to refine the Goal's capabilities and preliminary targets;
future efforts will focus on developing agreed-upon measures and
assessment methodologies that will guide the annual development of the
National Preparedness Report.
Since the release of the 2012 National Preparedness Report, we have
begun to embark on an outreach campaign to engage whole community
stakeholders in a discussion of the current findings and solicit input
for future reports. We expect to receive substantial feedback from
State, local, Tribal, and territorial stakeholders, as well as the
private and non-profit sectors on the findings from the National
Preparedness Report and areas for improvement. To broaden this outreach
effort, we are using social media including on-line collaboration
forums to solicit ideas on areas for improvement identified in the NPR.
These areas include cybersecurity, recovery-focused core capabilities,
access and functional needs, and supply chain interdependencies.
The National Preparedness Report represents a step forward in
efforts to assess overall National preparedness. Informed by inputs
from across the whole community, the 2012 National Preparedness Report
serves as a baseline evaluation of the progress made toward building,
sustaining, and delivering the core capabilities described in the Goal.
Building on these efforts, the vision for future Reports is to
establish a routine, repeatable process that engages whole community
partners.
To achieve the National Preparedness Goal, the Nation must continue
to build on the significant progress we have made to date and to
address areas identified for improvement. To do so, we will continue to
engage whole community partners as we revise and develop the National
Preparedness Frameworks and Federal Interagency Operations Plans called
for in PPD-8. The components of the National Preparedness System will
provide a consistent and reliable approach to support decision-making,
resource allocation, and on-going performance assessment.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I am happy to answer
any questions the committee may have.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Manning.
Mr. Czerwinski, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF STANLEY J. CZERWINSKI, DIRECTOR, INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Czerwinski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be
here today to talk about GAO's work looking at long-term
recovery.
In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Congress asked
GAO to undertake a number of studies, including reviews of the
Office of Federal Coordinator; HUD's Community Development
Block Grant Program, CDBG; and FEMA's public assistance and
long-term recovery efforts. Those reviews went up through 2010.
What I would like to do is to highlight a few high-level themes
and lessons from those today.
The first one is that there are so many Federal agencies
and programs, about 14 Federal agencies, over 60 programs, that
have to come together for recovery. Sometimes they don't come
together quite the way you want.
For example, in Louisiana, after Katrina, the State had a
Road Home Program that was geared toward rebuilding housing in
the State. The plan of this program was to take money from CDBG
and rebuild the houses and then match that up with money from
hazard mitigation out of FEMA to elevate the houses. So the
idea would be you would build the houses and put them on a
safer plain for future floods. That never came to pass because
of differences in the two programs' rules. That is just one
example of how sometimes the Feds have a hard time making
things match up.
As you mentioned in your opening statement, another key
player is State and local governments. So it is really
important that the Federal Government work effectively with
their State and local partners. Sometimes a really simple idea
can turn out to work out very well.
We have one for Mississippi, also after Katrina. What
happened there was that FEMA and the State of Mississippi
decided to collocate their staffs in Biloxi. Then the State of
Mississippi used a grant from FEMA to procure an accounting
system. This accounting system provided both the State and the
Federal partners with real-time on-line accountability data for
what was going on with their projects. What we found in looking
at this is this dramatically improved the collaboration and
coordination and had better decision-making.
The third point that I want to talk about is that sometimes
it is really important just to take a step back from what you
are doing and ask, is what I am doing accomplishing what I want
it to do?
We have an example from Kobe, Japan, on this. As you might
recall, in 1995 a massive earthquake struck Kobe, Japan. Kobe
is in what is called the Hyogo prefecture; that is the
equivalent of a U.S. county. The idea that the Japanese had--
and this was a really good idea--was to say, you know, during a
disaster and recovery from it, we want to put special attention
to those populations with special needs. Their plan was for the
elderly, to take them and put them in recovery areas, build
units, provide all the services you need, self-contained to
make it very simple.
Then the Japanese had a good idea; they said, let's see how
this worked. When they looked at it, they had a surprise.
Because even though on a service level it really worked, it had
some unintended consequences, and that is, they isolated the
elderly population from the rest of their families. As you
know, in the Japanese culture, the extended family is really
important.
The message in this is that sometimes when you take a step
back and look at how well you did, the next time it helps you
do better.
In that same vein, the U.S. Congress--and you cited this in
your opening statement, Mr. Chairman--required certain things
for FEMA and others to do after Katrina so we could avoid
future problems. One of those was to come up with a strategy
for recovering from disasters. That requirement resulted in the
National Disaster Recovery Framework, the NDRF.
We have taken a look at the NDRF, and we think it is a
really good first step, in that it contains all the points that
I made. However, I want to emphasize the first step. Because
behind that overall strategy, you need to have plans for how it
is implemented. The contrast that I draw is between the
National response framework and the National recovery
framework. Behind the response framework, you have probably 500
to 1,000 pages of detailed plans for what each agency is going
to do. We haven't gotten there yet on recovery.
In addition, even though it is nice to have plans, what you
want to do then is you want to practice them, because that is
how they become real, that is how people engage. Then you want
to take a step back and evaluate them. Then once your
evaluation shows you something, you say, well, what lesson did
I learn? It sort of feeds back.
So my point is that, on recovery, we are at a relatively
early stage that could be greatly enhanced by further
implementation plans, further practice, further evaluation,
further revision from what we learn. If we do that, we believe
we have the ability to really improve recovery from disasters
in this country.
That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I am glad to
respond to any questions that you have.
[The statement of Mr. Czerwinski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stanley J. Czerwinski
June 6, 2012
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-12-813T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications, Committee on
Homeland Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
The many challenges and difficulties experienced in the wake of
Hurricane Katrina and other catastrophes have led to considerable
reflection on what lessons might be learned regarding disaster
recovery. Congress has recognized the importance of improving the way
our Nation approaches disaster recovery by including in the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 the requirement that
FEMA develop a National Disaster Recovery Strategy. The administration
has also placed a greater focus on recovery, as demonstrated by its
development of the National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) with the
goal of helping Federal agencies and others to more effectively
organize in order to promote recovery.
GAO was asked to testify on themes from its previous work on
disaster recovery that may assist the subcommittee in its oversight of
disaster recovery issues.
What GAO Recommends
In multiple reports between 2008 and 2010, we made several
recommendations to FEMA and others addressing recovery challenges
involving coordination, communication, and information sharing, among
other topics. The NDRF is directly responsive to several of the
recommendations contained in these reports. However, it will require
the successful implementation of this framework in order to ultimately
resolve these issues.
disaster recovery.--selected themes for effective long-term recovery
What GAO Found
From 2008 to 2010, GAO produced a body of work on disaster
recovery, including reviews of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency's (FEMA) Long-Term Community Recovery efforts, recovery lessons
based on past experiences at home and abroad, the use of Community
Development Block Grants and Public Assistance grants and the operation
of the Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding
(OFC). Among other things, this work highlighted themes that are
important to successful disaster recovery efforts. Three of these key
themes are: (1) The need for clearly-defined recovery roles and
responsibilities; (2) the importance of effective coordination and
collaboration among recovery stakeholders; and (3) the value of
periodic evaluation of, and reporting on, recovery progress.
When recovering from a major disaster, having clearly defined and
well-understood roles and responsibilities is a critical first step in
coordinating and implementing the responsibilities of the various
parties involved in the long-term recovery process. These roles,
responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of Government
must be clearly defined, communicated, and understood in order to be
effective. GAO's previous work provides numerous examples of the
challenges that result when this does not take place and, conversely,
illustrations of benefits that can occur when it does. For example,
GAO's 2009 review of the OFC found confusion and disagreements among
key recovery stakeholders as well as with the Federal Coordinator
himself regarding the office's appropriate scope and function. This
confusion, accompanied by the lack of clear decision-making authority
on the part of OFC, may have ultimately slowed down the resolution of
some recovery problems.
Recovery from a major disaster is a long, complex process that
involves an extensive group of participants both across the Federal
Government and at the State and local level. At least 14 Federal
departments and agencies are responsible for administering dozens of
recovery-related programs, many of which rely heavily on active
participation by State and local government for their implementation.
Because these parties are dependent on each other to accomplish
recovery goals, effective coordination and collaboration is essential.
GAO's past work has explored this issue in considerable detail. For
example, in the wake of the 2008 Midwest floods, Federal, State, and
local officials said that FEMA's facilitation of regular interagency
meetings to coordinate Federal and State partners helped to identify
and effectively leverage recovery resources, as well as identify
coordination problems and other concerns.
Finally, the collaboration between recovery partners can be
enhanced by periodically evaluating and reporting on what worked, what
can be improved, and what progress is still needed to address long-term
recovery goals. This last step will assist decision makers, clients,
and stakeholders to obtain the feedback needed to improve both the
policy and operational effectiveness of recovery efforts. For example,
after a 1995 earthquake, the city of Kobe, Japan and the surrounding
region held periodic external reviews over a span of 10 years on the
progress made toward achieving recovery goals. As a result, the city of
Kobe gained insight into unintended consequences of how it relocated
elderly earthquake victims, which subsequently led to a change in
policy.
Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of the
subcommittee: I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today
some key themes from GAO's previous work on long-term recovery after
disasters. In contrast to the response phase, which takes place in the
immediate aftermath of a disaster and focuses on essential lifesaving
activities, recovery is a much longer process that can last years or
sometimes decades where attention shifts to restoring both the
individual and the community, including the redevelopment of damaged
areas. The many recovery challenges experienced after Hurricane Katrina
affected the Gulf Coast in 2005--including difficulties with
coordination, communication, and the loss of attention and focus--
during the long recovery process, have led to considerable reflection
on what lessons might be learned in how we, as a Nation, approach
disaster recovery. Congress has recognized the importance of improving
the way our Nation approaches disaster recovery by including in the
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) the
requirement that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) develop
a National Disaster Recovery Strategy.\1\
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\1\ The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department
of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120
Stat. 1355 (2006). Most provisions of the Post-Katrina Act became
effective upon enactment, October 4, 2006, Under PKEMRA, DHS was
required to submit a National Disaster Recovery Strategy no later than
270 days after enactment.
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We also have seen the administration place a greater focus on the
issue of recovery, as demonstrated by its development of--for the first
time ever--a National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) with the goal
of helping Federal agencies and others to more effectively organize in
order to promote recovery. This effort represents a welcomed emphasis
on thinking seriously about the challenges and possibilities presented
by the disaster recovery process, and the NDRF generally represents a
step in the right direction. Yet challenges in this area remain. As the
recently issued 2012 National Preparedness Report points out, States
and territories ranked core capabilities related to disaster recovery
among the lowest of all the areas assessed.
With this in mind, and as agreed with the subcommittee, my
testimony today will focus on three themes drawn from our previous work
on disaster recovery that may prove useful in the subcommittee's on-
going oversight of disaster recovery issues. These themes are: (1) The
need for clearly-defined recovery roles and responsibilities; (2) the
importance of effective coordination and collaboration among recovery
stakeholders; and (3) the value of periodic evaluation of, and
reporting on, recovery progress.
My statement is largely based on a body of work that we have
developed on the topic of disaster recovery that dates from 2008 to
2010. These include our March 2010 review of FEMA's Long-Term Community
Recovery Branch (LTCR) in providing and coordinating assistance to
support long-term recovery; a July 2009 report that identified recovery
lessons based on past experiences at home and abroad; an April 2009
examination of the use Community Development Block Grants on the Gulf
Coast; an April 2009 overview of the Office of the Federal Coordinator
for Gulf Coast Rebuilding (OFC); as well as our December 2008
examination of FEMA's Public Assistance Grant program.\2\ These reports
contain multiple recommendations to FEMA and others aimed at addressing
recovery challenges involving coordination, communication, and
information sharing, among others. The NDRF is directly responsive to
several of the recommendations contained in these reports; however it
will require the successful implementation of this framework in order
to ultimately resolve these issues. More complete information on our
scope and methodology, findings, and recommendations is available in
each published report.
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\2\ See GAO, Disaster Recovery: FEMA's Long-term Assistance Was
Helpful to State and Local Governments but Had Some Limitations, GAO-
10-404 (Washington, DC: Mar. 30, 2010); Disaster Recovery: Experiences
From Past Disasters Offer Insights for Effective Collaboration After
Catastrophic Events, GAO-09-811 (Washington, DC: July 31, 2009); Gulf
Coast Disaster Recovery: Community Development Block Grant Program
Guidance to States Needs to Be Improved, GAO-09-541 (Washington, DC:
June 19, 2009); Office of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast
Rebuilding: Perspectives and Observations, GAO-09-411R (Washington, DC:
Apr. 10, 2009); Disaster Recovery: FEMA's Public Assistance Grant
Program Experienced Challenges With Gulf Coast Rebuilding, GAO-09-129
(Washington, DC: Dec. 18, 2008); Disaster Recovery: Past Experiences
Offer Insights for Recovering From Hurricanes Ike and Gustav and Other
Recent Natural Disasters, GAO-08-1120 (Washington, DC: Sept. 26, 2008).
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We conducted these reviews in accordance with generally accepted
Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
clearly defining recovery roles and responsibilities is a critical
first step for effective recovery
When recovering from a disaster, having clearly-defined and well-
understood roles and responsibilities is a critical first step in
coordinating and implementing the responsibilities of the various
parties involved in the long-term recovery process. Roles,
responsibilities, and lines of authority at all levels of government
must be clearly defined, communicated, and understood in order to be
effective. Our previous work provides examples of the challenges that
result when this does not take place, and conversely, illustrations of
benefits that can occur when it does, which I describe below.
Our 2009 review of the operations of the Office of the Federal
Coordinator (OFC) for Gulf Coast Rebuilding found confusion and
disagreements among key recovery stakeholders as well as with the
Federal Coordinator himself regarding the office's appropriate scope
and function.\3\ According to OFC and officials from several State and
local governments located on the Gulf Coast, one of the functions of
the office was to work to resolve problems and obstacles in the
recovery process by directly intervening in program-specific matters
such as FEMA's Public Assistance Grant program. However, FEMA believed
that such actions were outside the scope of a coordination office, and
instead viewed OFC's proper role as being responsible for broad cross-
agency concerns, such as alleviating inconsistencies across Federal
programs or looking for program gaps. This confusion, accompanied by
the lack of clear decision-making authority on the part of OFC, may
have ultimately slowed down the resolution of recovery problems in some
cases by increasing the number of meetings and the amount of paperwork
involved.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO-09-411R.
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In 2010, we reported that misunderstandings about the role of LTCR
and its recovery partners working under National Response Framework's
Long-term Community Recovery Annex (ESF-14) had an adverse effect on
the timing of Federal recovery assistance.\4\ For example, Federal,
State, and local officials working in Texas in the wake of Hurricane
Ike reported that LTCR and ESF-14's involvement ended before critical
long-term recovery coordination and planning needs were addressed.
Among the reasons cited for this were differing interpretations of
FEMA's mission and authorities and varying interpretations of LTCR's
mission by Federal Coordinating Officers. A senior FEMA official told
us that, based on his experience, Federal Coordinating Officers
generally believe that FEMA's long-term recovery mission is primarily
to work with the States immediately after a disaster to develop a long-
term recovery plan. Under this view, assisting States and local
communities with coordinating Federal assistance to implement their
recovery plans is not the responsibility of staff working under ESF-14,
but rather that of regional staff or other FEMA recovery officials who
remain in the disaster area. However, FEMA regional staff sometimes did
not take on this role. As a result, in some cases, such as in Texas
after Hurricane Ike, State and local officials found that they were
left without Federal coordination and planning assistance during a
critical period in the recovery process.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO-10-404.
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An effective way to avoid conflicts and misunderstandings regarding
the roles and responsibilities of the many entities involved in the
disaster recovery process is to clearly delineate them ahead of time
through planning. On the State and local level, we found several
examples of jurisdictions that used pre-disaster recovery plans to do
this. For example, in 1987, several years before the Northridge
Earthquake hit in 1994, the city of Los Angeles created a Recovery and
Reconstruction Plan that clearly identified the roles and
responsibilities of key officials involved in recovery. Specifically,
the plan identified which city departments have responsibility for
implementing predetermined activities before and after a disaster in
several functional categories, including residential, commercial,
industrial rehabilitation, and economic recovery. To be most helpful,
such a plan must be more than simply paper instructions, rather it is a
dynamic and inclusive process that is brought to life by periodic
exercises. Long-term recovery planning exercises held by the city of
Los Angeles brought police and fire officials together to engage in
role-playing exercises in which they assumed the responsibilities of
recovery officials. For example, a public safety officer played the
role of a building inspector responsible for issuing building permits
after an earthquake. A city official at the time of the earthquake told
us that such exercises were an important part of developing
relationships among stakeholders and ensuring city staff understood
their post-disaster roles and responsibilities. According to a
Federally-funded evaluation of this plan, the contacts established
during the planning process facilitated recovery after the Northridge
Earthquake. Communities in other areas including San Francisco,
California, and Palm Beach, Florida, have taken action to develop
recovery plans prior to a disaster that identify roles and
responsibilities for recovery.
FEMA has taken steps to more clearly define the roles and
responsibilities of Federal, State, and non-Governmental partners in
the NDRF that was finalized in September 2011. The NDRF explicitly
acknowledges that clearly-defined roles and responsibilities form a
foundation for unity of effort among all recovery partners to jointly
identify opportunities, foster partnerships, and optimize resources.
Toward this end, the framework has a section devoted to describing the
roles and responsibilities for a range of participants in the recovery
process including Federal, State, Tribal, and local governments, the
private and nonprofit sectors, as well as individuals and households.
The NDRF also created the position of Federal Disaster Recovery
Coordinator (FDRC) and established a process for involving this
official in coordinating Federal recovery assistance during various
phases of recovery to help ensure that State and local needs are met,
including extending this assistance beyond the closeout of Federal
disaster response activities. Further, the NDRF provides clearer
criteria regarding when and how recovery stakeholders become engaged in
the process. It identifies the entities that will be involved in the
decision-making process as well as the factors or criteria they will
consider. In these ways, the NDRF provides the groundwork for
addressing challenges identified in our previous work and thus
represents a positive step forward, but still requires additional
details regarding implementation.
coordination and collaboration among stakeholders facilitates
successful recovery
Recovery from a major disaster is a long, complex process that
involves an extensive group of participants both across the Federal
Government and at the State and local level. At least 14 Federal
departments and agencies are responsible for administering dozens of
recovery-related programs, many of which rely heavily on active
participation by State and local government for their implementation.
Because of this, and the fact that under Federal law, States and
localities have the lead in disaster recovery, the capacity of State
and local governments to act effectively directly affects how well
communities recover after a major disaster. Therefore, effective
coordination and collaboration both within the Federal community as
well as with State and local partners is critical. Our past work has
explored this issue in considerable detail. Today, I would like to
briefly focus on three of the ways the Federal Government has sought to
improve coordination and collaboration in order to facilitate disaster
recovery.
First, the Federal Government has worked to foster coordination by
bringing Federal and State stakeholders together collectively and by
working one-on-one to identify and resolve recovery challenges. For
example, in the wake of the 2008 Midwest floods, FEMA's LTCR branch
held biweekly meetings in Iowa with Federal and State agencies, such as
the Small Business Administration, the Departments of Housing and Urban
Development, Labor, Agriculture, Commerce, and Transportation, and the
Environmental Protection Agency; the State counterparts to these
agencies; State finance offices; and others.\5\ According to officials
we spoke with, these meetings provided a forum to identify and leverage
Federal and State resources to support disaster recovery, as well as
discuss potential coordination challenges such as gaps in funding or
other long-term recovery concerns. Similarly, following the 2005 Gulf
Coast hurricanes, OFC also worked to coordinate across agencies and
with State and local partners, and address conflicts.\6\ Toward this
end, OFC sponsored ``workout sessions'' focused on specific recovery
topics and invited State and local agencies to address coordination
challenges, and developed detailed matrices of the agreements reached,
tasks to be performed, and stakeholders responsible for implementation.
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\5\ GAO-10-404.
\6\ GAO-09-411R.
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Second, in addition to coordination at the Federal level, we have
previously reported on the Federal Government's efforts to work with
State and local governments to help them take advantage of all
available disaster assistance and achieve long-term recovery goals.\7\
For example, in the wake of the 2008 Midwest floods, LTCR provided
technical assistance to affected communities by conducting or
facilitating recovery assessments to identify the long-term effects of
the disaster, providing staff to advise the communities on steps to
take as they developed recovery plans, creating planning tools that the
communities used to guide their planning activities, and hosting
workshops to discuss and share recovery-planning lessons, among other
things. In addition LTCR helped communities to prioritize their
potential long-term recovery projects and identify potential sources of
funding.
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\7\ GAO-10-404.
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Third, collaboration between Federal, State, and local recovery
partners in jointly administering disaster-assistance programs is also
improved by effectively sharing information. For example, in
Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina, Federal, State, and local
officials adopted strategies that helped to facilitate the sharing of
information on specific Public Assistance Grant projects. Following the
disaster, FEMA's Mississippi Transitional Recovery Office and the
Mississippi Emergency Management Agency were located in the same office
complex in Biloxi, Mississippi, and officials from these agencies were
also positioned together throughout the State. They reported that this
co-location had multiple benefits for information sharing and exchange,
including the timely sharing of critical documents and facilitation of
daily meetings on project-development issues. In addition to
collocating, FEMA and Mississippi State officials used Public
Assistance Grant funding to secure an on-line accounting system that
made operational documents associated with projects readily available
to all parties. As a result, FEMA and the State had immediate access to
key documents that helped them to make project-approval decisions,
thereby improving collaboration.
Improving coordination and collaboration is one of the key
objectives of the NDRF, and the framework contains several strategies
to do so. One of these involves the creation of the position of Federal
Disaster Recovery Coordinator (FDRC). The FDRC is assigned the
responsibility and authority to facilitate the coordination of
information and activities among the Federal agencies whose programs,
technical assistance, and expertise are relevant to recovery, within
the framework of the Recovery Support Strategy. In large-scale
disasters and catastrophic incidents, the NDRF also states that the
FDRC will take over as the lead from the Federal Coordinating Officer
(FCO), when the FCO demobilizes, to continue management of Federal
recovery resources, for those incidents that require continued
significant interagency disaster-recovery coordination. The NDRF also
introduces the concept of recovery coordinators at the State/Tribal and
local level that will work with the FDRC to facilitate coordination
across levels of government. Along with establishing the position of
the FDRC, the NDRF creates six Recovery Support Functions (RSF) to
facilitate coordination and collaboration among the many different
players involved in recovery. The NDRF also outlines ways to improve
collaboration between Federal, State, and local communities in
developing recovery plans. The framework states that Federal officials
should provide timely, accurate, and accessible information to the
public and manage such expectations in coordination with local, State,
Tribal, and other stakeholders. However, the NDRF currently does not
provide the details for how to do this.
periodic evaluation and reporting of recovery progress is key
Periodic reporting on organizational activities can help decision
makers, clients, and stakeholders obtain feedback for improving both
policy and operational effectiveness of recovery efforts. Although
``after-action reports'' often are a standard feature of response
operations, they are less common in the recovery context. The city of
Kobe, Japan, and Hyogo prefecture (the larger governmental unit,
similar to a county, that covers the city's surrounding region) both
provide examples of how evaluation and reporting can be effectively
incorporated into community and regional recovery. They established a
process through which government officials, community members, and
recovery experts worked together to assess the recovery progress and
recommend improvements.
Hyogo prefecture and the city of Kobe created a system of periodic
assessments of recovery in the wake of their 1995 earthquake. Both
governments designed a two-phase approach to evaluating the progress
they have made toward recovery, the first taking place about 5 years
after the earthquake and the second about 10 years afterward. This
design allowed for both a short- and longer-term assessment of the
recovery. Although the Hyogo and Kobe governments funded these
evaluations, neither prefecture nor city employees were directly
involved in conducting these assessments; rather they used external
staff to perform the reviews. Hyogo prefecture invited domestic and
international disaster-recovery experts to serve on its evaluation
panels, while the city of Kobe staffed its reviews with members of
local community groups.
These evaluations focused on the goals established in the recovery
plans approved by the national government 6 months after the
earthquake. They enabled policymakers to measure the progress made by
various stakeholders in achieving recovery goals, identify needed
changes to existing policies, and learn lessons for future disasters.
The panels examined several broad recovery topics--including health,
industry, employment, and urban development--which resulted in many
recommendations to improve recovery from the Kobe earthquake.
For example, as a result of its 10-year evaluation, Hyogo
prefecture gained insight into the unintended consequences of its
policies regarding the relocation of victims, an insight that
subsequently led to policy revisions. After the earthquake, the
prefecture gave priority to the relocation of elderly victims and
grouped them together in special-care residences located outside the
city. While this policy ensured that this vulnerable population
received housing quickly, it also had the unintended effect of
isolating the relocated seniors, who were removed from their
communities. In fact, the verification committee attributed the
untimely deaths of some seniors to this housing arrangement. After
learning of this finding, the prefecture built new types of residential
housing that offer comprehensive lifestyle support for seniors. In
addition, for future disasters the prefecture plans to develop a system
to track displaced populations as they move from temporary to permanent
housing to help maintain better contact with victims.
While the NDRF does briefly address the issue of measures and
metrics, the document emphasizes neither this concept nor the potential
value of regular evaluations as the recovery process moves forward.
concluding observations
Disaster recovery can be a long, complex, and expensive process
involving a large number of Federal, State, and local parties. This
makes it especially important to have clearly-defined roles that are
well understood by all participants. Because these parties often depend
on each other to accomplish recovery goals, effective coordination and
collaboration is essential. Experience shows us that successful
collaborative relationships are not built overnight. Such coordination
requires building effective relationships among participants before,
during, and after a disaster occurs. Since such collaboration often
must continue for years, it can be enhanced by periodically looking
back to evaluate what worked, what can be improved, and what progress
is still needed. Clearly defining roles and responsibilities, effective
coordination, and evaluation are critical ingredients in going beyond a
recovery framework to a useful implementation plan. While the creation
of the NDRF is a significant step, the implementation of this broad
framework will be a key to determining its ultimate success.
Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond
to any questions you may have at this time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
I will recognize myself for questions.
The first question is to Administrator Manning. The
National Preparedness Report, the NPR, ranked the core
capabilities based on a fixed percentage that was formulated by
the State Preparedness Report survey data. Interestingly, in
the self-assessment surveys completed by the States,
respondents were only given the option of selecting one of five
provided statements, where each successive statement indicates
a higher capability. Why is this the case? Can you please
explain how FEMA translated data from the State Preparedness
Reports into the overall fixed percentages?
Second, were other factors like the independent evaluations
and studies by other Federal agencies used to determine the
final rankings? How, if at all, did FEMA verify the data
provided by States to determine that it had provided a complete
and accurate picture? If FEMA did not verify the data, what
plans do you have in the future for future reports to include
such validations?
You are recognized.
Mr. Manning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The National Preparedness Report included a wide variety of
data sources and methodologies in our analysis to its
conclusions. The State Preparedness Report data that you
reference actually was a very small percentage of the overall
data analysis included in the report. Only 13 percent of the
capability analysis is based on the State Preparedness Report
data. The ranking of the survey results of that data set
represents the relative impression that the States have in
their activity in that regard.
We did, in fact, validate anomalies in the analysis as we
were analyzing the State Preparedness Report data. For example,
we looked for statistical anomalies in the responses and in the
data sets. One, for example, we identified a State that ranked
a volcano hazard as very high in a State that had no volcanoes,
as an example. But it turned out, on our further review and
deeper analysis of that particular example, that their concern
there was the impact from a neighboring State. Another example
would be areas where they ranked catastrophic disasters across
the board above other concerns. So, in the course of the
analysis of the SPR data, we identified a number of places and,
on further review, determined that in almost all of those cases
they were statistically valid data sets.
Across the rest of the National Preparedness Report, we
used over 800 other documents--State, Federal reports and
analysis; analyzed over $24 billion worth of Department of
Homeland Security and Health and Human Services grant
expenditures; quantitative data on what was procured, in what
time, for what particular capabilities; and evaluated household
survey data that we have been conducting for a number of years
that represents over 98 percent of U.S. households.
As we progress into subsequent years of the National
Preparedness Report, we continue to evaluate the data sources,
identify new sources of capability to be analyzed, gaps in the
existing data sets, refine our survey tools. For example, in
the State Preparedness Report, the State Preparedness Report
was based on--the analysis of State Preparedness Report was
based on a time period that predated PPD-8 and the
identification of the 31 core capabilities. As we progress with
the State Preparedness Report into the future, they are
realigned into the core capabilities to give us a stronger
ability to link the activities of our partners to those core
capabilities against the goal and be able to measure our
preparedness to meet that goal.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
This question is regarding, Mr. Manning, CMAS.
Administrator Manning, the WARN Act required Nation-wide
deployment of CMAS, which is the Commercial Mobile Alert
System, by April 2012. Yet, according to FEMA, only 24 alert
originators have been approved at this point. Despite early
deployment in the D.C. area, the D.C. Homeland Security and
Emergency Management Agency has yet to be approved as an alert
originator.
What is the status of the CMAS deployment? What is the
process for authorization of alert originators? When will the
many alerting authorities awaiting authorization be approved by
FEMA?
Mr. Manning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CMAS is an important new tool available to the emergency
management community to communicate alert and warning to the
public. We are very happy to say that we do have seven of the
National carriers, including all of the major, big carriers
across the country, cellular phone carriers, are participating
and have that capability Nation-wide today. We have 18 States
that are currently enrolled and active as message originators,
an additional 46 cities and counties across the country, and a
number that are in the process.
Mr. Chairman, you asked what is involved in becoming an
originator and specifically to the District of Columbia. There
are steps--basically, the steps that are required to become a
message originator boil down to, at the local government level,
to having taken the appropriate training to understand what is
required, what are the threshold criteria to originate a
message and how to go about doing that; the acquisition of the
software to be able to promulgate that message, which is a very
simple thing; and an MOU with the Department of Homeland
Security in order for the technical systems between a State or
local government to interface with ours.
We have been working with the District of Columbia on
coming into the system. They have met the training, they have
met the other criteria. The MOU is awaiting signature with the
District office of emergency management, D.C. Emergency
Management Agency. We are doing everything in our power to
facilitate that on their end.
Mr. Bilirakis. But what seems to be the problem, you know,
specifically the District of Columbia, but also--you know,
there are only 24 alert originators. I mean, what is holding it
up? This was supposed to go on-line, you know, according to the
WARN Act, in April 2012. What seems to be the problem?
Mr. Manning. Well, Mr. Chairman, it appears that the delay
on the--CMAS is deployed from a technical perspective from FEMA
and with our partners in the cellular phone industry, with the
seven major carriers. The delay in getting the message
originators--it is a voluntary program, so it requires State
and local governments to choose to enroll and become message
originators.
We can today promulgate a message, a Presidential message.
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the
National Weather Service has the ability to promulgate warning
today--two phones that are enabled over the carriers that are
carrying it. The local government----
Mr. Bilirakis. I don't mean to interrupt, but, I mean, how
many have chosen to enroll? It is a voluntary program.
Approximately how many are waiting? You know, if you can give
me some specifics on that.
Mr. Manning. Mr. Chairman, we have 18 States that are
currently active that are enrolled that are approved as message
originators. An additional 46 cities and counties are approved
as message originators. I believe we have another 20 that are
in the process of negotiating the MOUs.
We are also actively pursuing, at the very least, all 56
States and territories to become message originators. A State
has the ability to promulgate a message to a geographic area
within a city or county, whether the city or county has chosen
to sign up as a message originator. By focusing our efforts on
the States, actively focusing our efforts on getting all 56
States and territories to be message originators, we can cover
the American population while we work with the cities and
counties.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
I want to ask Mr. Czerwinski a question, and then I am
going to yield to my colleagues here.
Looking over the report, sir, I can see that one of the
mission areas the Nation needs to continue to develop and
sustain is the recovery mission. In the NPR, most of the
recovery-focused core capabilities received a ranking of 62
percent or lower, and that is unacceptable.
What recommendations do you have that will help the Nation
continue to develop and sustain recovery capabilities?
Mr. Czerwinski. Mr. Chairman, thank you for asking that
question because it matches up perfectly with the point that I
was making, and that is, in terms of recovery, we are behind
where we are in response.
The point that I made in my opening statement is the one
that I would reiterate, and that is, we need to come up with
the plans that implement the framework, we need to practice
them. I cannot express how more important practice is, because
that is how things really get learned and done. It is then you
have to take a step back and evaluate.
On the response side, we have the concept of after-action
studies. That is something that would be very useful on the
recovery side, to do those kind of evaluations and then make
those changes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much. I appreciate it.
Now I will recognize Mr. Farenthold for 5 minutes, the
gentleman from Texas. You are recognized, sir.
Mr. Farenthold. Thank you very much.
Mr. Manning, it is my understanding, at least in broad,
general terms, you have the preparedness, the response, and the
recovery are kind of the three phases of what we would do.
We have suffered in Texas quite a few disasters, obviously
a hurricane-prone area. Knock on wood, we have dodged anything
serious in recent years. But we recently had the fires in
Bastrop County. There were some issues during the second--
obviously, you know, I am not sure how involved FEMA with
preparing for those. But the early response, we hit a couple of
bumps. Now, from what I am hearing from the people in the area,
FEMA is starting to pull out before the recovery is completely
finished.
How far is FEMA set to go on recovery? I mean, where do you
say, ``All right, we are done, it is time to leave''?
Mr. Manning. Thank you.
Under the National Disaster Recovery Framework that we
promulgated last year, it changes the way we approach recovery.
We look at recovery as the economic viability of a community;
the community is back functioning and back healthy. In the case
of the Bastrop fires, I will look into that when I return back
to the office, and the progress that is being made there.
But, generally, in recovery, we have--we break our recovery
activities into two areas. We have public assistance, where we
assist the local governments in rebuilding the infrastructure,
and then our individual assistance, where we work with
individuals and families.
The NDRF takes a new approach at working with families. We
prefer to do this as a whole community, with case management
and ensuring that we work and follow through as individuals
that are trying to recover from the effects of disasters. We
work in support of the States and the Governors. We don't close
our disasters or leave a community until we all, with the
Governor, feel that we have reached that point.
Mr. Farenthold. If you have somebody that could visit with
my office at some point in the future and follow up with me on
where we are with that, because some of the community leaders,
I am hearing, are not entirely--let's go to preparedness for a
second.
One of the things that is facing us in Texas is, you all
are redoing flood maps for the Federal flood insurance. It has
substantial impact both on the Government and in the private
sector that is going down there. Is anything being--I assume
the technology has improved for the mapping, and that is one of
the reasons we are doing it. If there are others, I would like
to know about them.
Does FEMA have any program or help available to local
governments that are adversely affected by that or some of the
remediation efforts that they have to do to come into
compliance with some of the new regulations? Or do these maps
just result in some sort of unfunded mandate for local
governments?
Mr. Manning. No, sir. We certainly do have the ability and
do, in many circumstances, work to alleviate or find any
problems that may have arisen.
You are absolutely right, the map modernization project,
Risk MAP, is a reflection of new technology, new ability to
have much greater detail in our maps and a better understanding
of our flood insurance rate maps of where areas are at risk. I
would be very happy to point our Flood Insurance and Mitigation
division personnel to work with your office to find who in your
community needs assistance and put them in touch with our
people and, of course, in FEMA Region 6 in Texas.
Mr. Farenthold. All right. Then I will yield back the
remainder of my time.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, sir.
I now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr.
Marino. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
I am sorry, I thought it was Mr. Marino. You look a little
like him. Okay, Mr. Turner. I am sorry. You are recognized.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I just got 20 years back.
With the changes to the threat levels against the United
States, the need for first responders to receive vital
intelligence information has become a critical component in the
Nation's ability to prevent and protect against, mitigate the
effects of, and respond to and recover from terrorist attacks
and disasters.
I believe that, within the National Preparedness System,
the intelligence- and information-sharing core capability needs
to be integrated into all the mission areas and frameworks. I
am particularly concerned with the high-rises in New York City,
the HAZMAT groups and special rescue units within the FDNY.
What is FEMA doing to ensure that these first responders,
particularly in these high-risk areas, are receiving the timely
and necessary information across all the mission areas?
Mr. Manning. Thank you. That is an extremely important
topic.
We have been very happy over the years to be able to
support our partners through the development of the network of
fusion centers that have been built up across the country in
our State and urban areas. Some of our colleagues here today
and on the next panel will talk about that, as well.
We have a large percentage of the investment that we have
made over the past 10 years in our Homeland Security Grant
Programs have gone to support intelligence and information
sharing, specifically in the fusion centers but also across
information sharing, the technology and the planning, to
integrate across the traditionally bifurcated response
emergency management community and the prevention and
protection community of law enforcement and the intelligence
community.
You mentioned the core capabilities. In the National
Preparedness Goal, under Presidential Directive 8, for the
first time we have a synchronized linking of our capabilities,
of all 31 core capabilities. We do categorize them as
prevention, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation as a
way to develop frameworks around the sharing across those, but
having them linked into one National preparedness system. So
the activities in information sharing, information and
intelligence sharing, and all of the prevention and protection
activities are seamlessly linked through the National
Preparedness System with the activities in response and
recovery of our emergency management community, the traditional
fire services, the public works agencies that have not always
been part of that law enforcement community on information
sharing.
I think we have made great strides in those regards. There
are great examples in the New York metropolitan area in recent
years. I think we see through the example this week of the
National Level Exercise 12, NLE 12, part of the National
Preparedness System is the National Exercise Program, along
with our National Training and Education System, along with
building our core capabilities through the National Incident
Management System to be able to protect the public. The
exercise system, the exercise program is how we evaluate our
plans, how we evaluate how well we have planned and how well we
work together.
This year we are doing a cybersecurity exercise, when we
were working across State and Federal governments to share
information and intelligence on the potential nation-state and
terrorist actors that are attacking the United States and
synchronizing that through the response community that is
preparing for and responding to the physical manifestation of
these cyber attacks in this exercise. I think that is a good
example of where we are pulling those threats together.
Mr. Turner. All right.
In the days and weeks following 9/11, NYPD was working
heroically downtown in a very hazardous environment. There were
things that were known by some branches of Government that
seemed not to be known by others. How would that be addressed
today?
Mr. Manning. Specifically in referring to the coordination
of information in a response on the streets, we have a vastly
different structure of organizing how we do both the policy and
information coordination at the Federal Government level and
across the country since 2001.
Information sharing across Federal agencies is dramatically
better than it was in 2001 through the advent of our National
security staff, a change from looking holistically at National
security and homeland security issues; the National
Counterterrorism Center and the work of I&A, Intelligence and
Analysis, at Department of Homeland Security, being able to
pull information from the intelligence community and provide it
right to State and local law enforcement; things like the ITAG,
the threat advisory group, that is made up of State and local
law enforcement officers, in some case fire service officers,
working at the National Counterterrorism Center. There is an
ability to share information that didn't exist in 2001.
Additionally, on-the-street coordination. One of the things
we identified in the responses to the 9/11 attacks as needing
critical attention was operational coordination--how we worked
together, how multiple governments worked together, cities and
States from around the country, and how law enforcement and the
fire service and public works and the public health community,
how do we coordinate?
So President Bush issued Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 5, which established the National Incident Management
System, then passed by Congress in the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act. We now have--all the States and local
governments in the country have reported compliant with the
National Incident Management System. We now have one National
system for coordinating multi-jurisdiction, multi-governmental
levels of response on the street. We didn't have that in 2001.
We have it today, and we have the entire country that has had
that training.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, sir. I apologize for calling you
Mr. Marino, but he is a good guy. I have some vision problems.
Mr. Turner. I am flattered.
Mr. Bilirakis. So I apologize.
Okay. Before I dismiss the first panel, I want to ask one
question of Mr. Manning.
To what do you attribute the lag of cyber capabilities on
the State level, as reported in the State Preparedness Report?
Mr. Manning. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think an important first thing to keep in mind is that
the National Preparedness Report--this National Preparedness
Report covers an analysis of the time period between 2001 and
2010. We have learned a great deal just in the past 18 months
and made great strides.
So cybersecurity we see as a low level of response on the
part of the States. Over a time period where it was emerging as
a homeland security threat, it was an area where many people
were identifying emerging threats, both nation-state and
nongovernmental actors, but unsure of how to focus an effort on
building capability. This is something we have made great
strides on just in the last 18 months. I mentioned the National
Level Exercise this week. We also have things like the National
Cyber Incident Response Plan, the NCIC, the center for
coordinating that response. I think we have seen an uptick just
in the last year of activity on the part of the State and local
governments in preparing for cyber attacks.
Another important thing is the purpose of the National
Preparedness Report is to identify the areas we are strong in
but also to identify areas that we need more focused attention.
So I think identifying areas such as cybersecurity as an
activity, as a homeland security activity of State and local
governments that needs attention is a success of the report. It
draws attention to the fact we need to do more, and we are
already seeing more in that. It becomes a priority for us going
forward in how we identify the threats and hazards for which we
have to prepare.
Mr. Bilirakis. I would like to continue to track that, so I
would like to get with you on that and get some more details on
the progress we are making on the State level.
Thank you very much. I thank the panel for their testimony.
Of course, I thank the Members for their questions.
I want to dismiss you and move on to the second panel.
Thank you very much again.
I would like to welcome the second panel.
Our first witness is Mr. John Madden. Mr. Madden is the
director of the Alaska Division of Homeland Security and
Emergency Services--welcome, sir--a position to which he was
appointed in January 2007. Mr. Madden has served in the U.S.
Army and as a civilian in many Federal departments and
agencies, including the Navy, National Weather Service, Federal
Aviation Administration, and the Transportation Security
Administration. Mr. Madden currently serves as the vice
president of the National Emergency Management Association.
Welcome, sir.
Following Mr. Madden, we will receive testimony from Mr.
Mike Sena. Mr. Sena is the deputy director of the Northern
California Regional Intelligence Center and serves as president
of the National Fusion Center Association. He has served in law
enforcement for nearly 20 years, including with the California
Bureau of Investigation and Intelligence, the California Bureau
of Narcotics Enforcement, and the California Department of
Alcoholic Beverage Control. Mr. Sena received his bachelor of
arts in criminal justice from California State University--San
Bernardino.
Finally, we will receive testimony from Dr. Georges
Benjamin. I am sure that is probably not the way to pronounce
``Georges,'' but anyway. Dr. Benjamin is the executive director
of the American Public Health Association, a position he has
held since December 2002. Prior to this position, he served as
a secretary of the Maryland Department of Health and Mental
Hygiene. Dr. Benjamin is a graduate of the Illinois Institute
of Technology and the University of Illinois College of
Medicine.
Welcome, all the witnesses. We look forward to your
testimony. Your entire written statements will appear in the
record, and I ask that you summarize your testimony for 5
minutes.
Again, we are expecting votes in about 20 minutes or so, so
I think we can probably wrap this up. But, you know, I want to
make sure that we hear all your testimony and we ask as many
questions as possible. But I appreciate you being here today.
We will go ahead and begin with Mr. Madden. You are
recognized for 5 minutes, sir.
STATEMENT OF JOHN W. MADDEN, DIRECTOR, ALASKA DIVISION OF
HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT, ON BEHALF OF THE
NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION
Mr. Madden. Chairman Bilirakis and Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on
behalf of the National Emergency Management Association. NEMA
represents the State emergency management directors in all 50
States, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories.
Emergency management and homeland security officials have
long been challenged on how best to measure the effectiveness
of our preparedness efforts. Are we doing the right thing for
the right outcome? Do our efforts before the disaster improve
our actions during and after the disaster?
Much as the Department of Defense once planned and trained
for the last war, until the last decade we prepared for the
last disaster. But we learned there is great uncertainty on
how, when, and where disasters strike and with what motivations
and sophistication criminals and terrorists plan, practice, and
conduct their attacks.
We find ourselves today in the midst of a much-needed
transformation--a transformation of preparedness from a
reaction to a discipline, but not a discipline that is rigid
and bureaucratic, rather a discipline that enables us to turn
swiftly to a new adversary, to recognize an evolving hazard and
recognize an increasing risk, and to confront a new emerging
threat.
We consider the first National Preparedness Report a very
good start. It is well-written, well-documented, but it is
still transitional. There is no solid linkage yet between the
analysis of threats and hazards at the State and local level
and the broad assessment of preparedness across the Nation.
This must be our foremost emphasis in future reports.
Before we will achieve a truly useful National Preparedness
Report, we need a completely integrated system of analysis and
problem solving, a system for sharing innovations and lessons
learned between all of our stakeholders, a system that fosters
partnerships and does not create undue competition with winners
and losers. We need to identify and address vulnerabilities
that exist beyond the ability of a city or of a State to
resolve. We must document how our systems work and what can go
wrong; identify potential consequences and what capabilities we
need to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond, and recover; and,
finally, how best to prioritize our actions and our resources
to close the most critical gaps.
Our focus must be on our ability to prepare for and respond
to events of extreme complexity based on size, duration,
consequences, or concurrent or remote events. FEMA's approach
of the maximum of maximums is an interesting thought
experiment, but why limit ourselves to an assumption of
sheltering 100,000 for 30 days? Why not 200,000 for 60 days, in
winter, during a pandemic? The National Preparedness Report
should lend insight in setting priorities and investing in
capabilities that draw down the risks to the Nation and its
vital interests.
Earlier this year, NEMA released the proposal for a
comprehensive preparedness grant structure in which we stated
our fundamental principles and values of the States. One is
very relevant to this discussion on the National Preparedness
Report: Build and sustain a skilled cadre across the Nation
that is well-organized, rigorously trained, vigorously
exercised, properly equipped, prepared for all hazards, focused
on core capabilities, and resourced for both the most serious
and the most likely threats and hazards.
Mr. Chairman, these are the hallmarks of a prepared Nation,
and these are what we should be measuring.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify.
[The statement of Mr. Madden follows:]
Prepared Statement of John W. Madden
June 6, 2012
introduction
Chairman Bilirakis, Representative Richardson, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee; thank you for the opportunity to present
testimony today on behalf of the National Emergency Management
Association (NEMA). NEMA represents the State emergency management
directors of all 50 States, the District of Columbia, and the U.S.
Territories.
One of the most significant challenges facing State and local
emergency management and homeland security officials is assessing the
effectiveness of preparedness. Are we doing the right things for the
right outcome? Do our efforts before the disaster improve our actions
during and after the disaster? Such measurement remains elusive due to
the ever-changing nature of preparedness itself.
Congress and various administrations have instituted several
programs to address preparedness. For example, the Emergency Management
Performance Grant (EMPG) has built a strong State and local baseline
capability of emergency management in this Nation. The State Homeland
Security Grant Program has enabled significant investment in equipment
and capabilities.
We truly are a more prepared Nation. From neighborhood communities
through all levels of government, we have acquired resources, achieved
collaboration, and built systems to mitigate, prevent, prepare for, and
respond to natural hazards and terrorist threats.
Today, I will examine the evolution of preparedness in this Nation,
the engagement by State officials in this process, and the future
direction of preparedness.
the evolution of preparedness in this nation
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) released the
National Preparedness Report earlier this year. The document was
intended to be one of many reports to assess capabilities and help the
Nation set priorities in coming years. To fully understand the origins
of the report, we must first review several seminal events that drove
changes on how this country approaches preparedness from a Federal,
State, and local perspective.
Until the last decade, most preparedness efforts by the Nation were
backward-facing. In other words, we prepared for the events and
disasters of the past. We focused on improving our response to the last
disaster. Unfortunately, neither nature nor humans are so cooperative
as to follow this strategy. The repeated lesson learned is great
uncertainty in how, when, and where disasters strike and with what
sophistication criminals and terrorists plan, practice, and conduct
their attacks.
After the tragic events of September 11, 2001, it became a National
priority to create and sustain the ability of State and local
governments to prevent and respond to a broad range of severe homeland
security events. Much like the events of 60 years earlier at Pearl
Harbor, September 11 identified gaps in our approach to awareness of
what is going on and how we prepared for future disasters or attacks.
September 11 also challenged all our assumptions about preparedness.
The focus of many new Federal programs was to avoid another surprise by
building the necessary capabilities to prevent incidents when possible
and respond appropriately when the next event occurs.
The terrorist attacks of 2001 and anthrax attacks later the same
year brought ``Homeland Security'' from theory into practice. It also
forced the reexamination of preparedness. The Nation began a
transformation in our approach to preparedness--from reaction to
discipline. Our goal was not a discipline which is rigid and
bureaucratic; but rather a discipline enabling us to turn swiftly to a
new adversary, recognize an evolving hazard, and confront an emerging
threat. Two years later, then President Bush issued Homeland Security
Presidential Directive (HSPD) 8; National Preparedness. This document
strengthened preparedness by articulating a clear and definable goal,
and established mechanisms to improve preparedness and strengthen
capabilities. Unfortunately, HSPD-8 overlooked one key aspect of
preparedness--the natural disaster.
In 2005, Hurricane Katrina ravaged the Gulf Coast and demonstrated
a clear lack of preparedness for a catastrophic event at practically
every level of government. In the aftermath of the storm, Congress
passed the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA). Among
its many elements, this legislation required States to submit an annual
State Preparedness Report to FEMA. The most recent report submission
occurred at the end of last year.
Finally, last year the President signed Presidential Policy
Directive (PPD) 8: National Preparedness, which replaced HSPD-8. PPD-8
called for several new elements, including a National Preparedness Goal
and a National Preparedness Report. This report, published on March 30,
2012, was partially built by integrating data from the State
Preparedness Reports. PPD-8 has not yet been fully implemented or
institutionalized. The supporting frameworks are still being refined
and must be integrated with each other and within the entire
preparedness system.
connection between the national and the state reports
We consider the initial National Preparedness Report as
transitional. There is no solid linkage yet between the analysis of
threats and hazards at the State and local level and the broad
assessment of preparedness across the entire Nation. In assessing
preparedness, we must not start at the end but at the beginning. The
key element for successful integration is the threat, hazard
identification, and risk assessment or ``THIRA.'' This tool has
potential for being the analytical foundation for understanding and
setting priorities. The THIRA should be the means by which we document
how the system operates, what can go wrong, a means to identify
potential consequences, and how best to address gaps. By their very
nature, all threats and hazards are variable. There is no single
descriptor of hurricane or of an improvised explosive device. The THIRA
enables a problem-solving approach to preparedness. For example, a
county with a variable flood hazard may partner with a neighboring
county to meet its sheltering needs for a local flood. But if the
partner county faces the same hazard, shelters may remain unavailable
for use requiring a broader, regional, or State solution.
Preparedness is about priorities. There is an old saying that a
ship in harbor is safe but does not represent why we build ships. This
Nation must seek and achieve the balance of actions toward preparedness
to enhance our economy and not create burdens. The removal of such
encumbrances will enable the continued movement of goods and people
without undue restrictions and ensure the continued provision of
essential services under all conditions.
Our examination of preparedness must not be abstract, but rather
form the basis for action. FEMA should improve these reports to enable
a greater return on investment to the States and the local governments.
The value should be placed on local decision-making as much as on
National assessment. First, States must fully integrate Core
Capabilities into their planning, analysis, and organizations. Even
though FEMA did not require States to address all the Core Capabilities
in the latest report the States seek to integrate them thoughtfully and
systematically.
According to a July 2011 report completed by NEMA, ``In fiscal year
2010, States addressed anywhere from one to 25 of these National
priorities for each investment. The capabilities most often addressed
included Planning, Communications, Community Preparedness and
Participation, Critical Infrastructure Protection, and On-Site Incident
Management. Whether a small or large expenditure, or a project
impacting multiple or just a few capabilities, each of the National
Capabilities found representation in at least one justification
throughout the country.''
FEMA should increase its collaboration on the implementation of the
National Preparedness System. Within the States stand countless
examples of innovation in methods, approaches, and products.
Considerable sharing of these innovations can be found across the
States. The emphasis should be on achieving the ability to prepare for
and respond to events of extreme complexity based either on size,
duration, consequences, or concurrent or remote events. FEMA's approach
of the ``maximum of maximums'' is an interesting thought experiment;
however, every claimed maximum can be surpassed and is by definition a
compromise.
The National Preparedness Report should be based on realistic
analysis valuing qualitative as well as quantitative values. The
knowledge base of threats and hazards, levels of preparedness, and how
to address gaps is best identified by including the broadest possible
stakeholder base. But the Nation is not well served by any reductionist
analysis based on a ``GREEN, YELLOW, RED'' coding or by assigning a
value of ``one through five'' when attempting to manage highly complex
and inter-related issues.
Overall, States agree with some of the findings of the National
Preparedness Report. For example, Federal preparedness assistance
grants have certainly helped build and enhance State, local, Tribal,
and territorial capabilities throughout multi-year investment. The
entire systems could be improved, however, if the existing disjointed
preparedness system could be revamped.
moving preparedness forward
Besides these specific suggestions, overall preparedness in this
Nation can be greatly enhanced by systemic changes in how the Federal
Government supports preparedness functions at the State and local
levels. Earlier this year, NEMA released the Proposal for a
Comprehensive Preparedness Grants Structure. This proposal looks at
preparedness grant funding holistically and brings State, local, and
National priorities into alignment with one another.
The current grants structure is complex and often contradictory.
This creates unintended inefficiencies in investments and duplication
of efforts. The current and continuing fiscal condition of our Nation
requires us to invest every dollar more wisely than ever before. We
want to gain efficiencies in our grants in order to increase the
effectiveness of our mission. Within a grants system based on
``flexibility with accountability,'' the States, local governments, and
the disciplines charged with our safety and security are capable of
insight leading to ideas, innovation guiding investment, and a system
of sharing which ensures we improve both our efficiency and
effectiveness.
We must integrate our efforts to improve agility in confronting
threats to the homeland, whether they are natural, technological, or
man-made. This Nation must effectively build strengths and capabilities
against a range of threats, reduce the consequences of many hazards,
and thus reduce the risks to our communities.
From the purchase of basic equipment to such citizen involvement
campaigns as ``See Something, Say Something,'' and from procuring major
communications systems to improving the way State and local governments
share information, these programs have continued a National effort
toward better safeguarding and securing our communities. State and
local governments use these essential programs to support our
neighborhoods across a range of Government programs, faith-based
initiatives, regional collaborations, and personal preparedness
efforts.
The Department of Homeland Security does not stand alone in this
effort. Many other Federal agencies also oversee hundreds of
preparedness programs, from the Department of Health and Human Services
to the Department of Education. All programs provide a level of
confidence in the ``system'' so when a major event does occur the
citizens of this country remain confident the whole of Government and
community has the skills, resources, and knowledge to effectively save
lives and protect property.
In these tough economic times, the Federal Government does not bear
the burden of securing our homeland alone. Billions of State and local
funds are also invested in homeland security activities. Even citizens
all across America--some barely able to afford the expense--supply
themselves with preparedness kits to contribute to this truly National
effort.
mitigation as a function of preparedness
Emergency management organizations at the Federal and State levels
often are structured more for execution than for planning. We separate
the major functions of the profession such as preparedness, protection,
mitigation, response, and recovery into easily managed directorates;
however, an increasing reliance on the overlap occurs between them
naturally. While preparedness and mitigation activities can differ in
their mission and execution, the natural similarities provide the
emergency management community with opportunities to leverage resources
and expertise.
Mr. David Miller, Associate Administrator of the Federal Insurance
and Mitigation Administration (FIMA) at FEMA is often quoted as saying,
``Mitigation is the thread that permeates the fabric of National
preparedness.'' This sentiment is echoed in the working draft of the
National Mitigation Framework. Since FEMA and its partners began the
process of developing frameworks under PPD-8, it has become very clear
that mitigation cannot exist in a vacuum. Mitigation benefits from the
whole community approach to disaster preparedness and supports the
other four mission areas of PPD-8. Frameworks and preparedness goals
cannot be truly representative or actionable if they promulgate
stovepipes. The proliferation of preparedness must be achieved by
embracing the unique elements of each mission while understanding and
building off of their shared goal of resiliency and sustainability.
While the Federal programs geared towards mitigation are crucial to
the success of many activities around the country, many States have
committed millions of dollars to building their own mitigation
capabilities and leveraging limited resources to accomplish independent
preparedness goals. NEMA has always supported mitigation and its
critical role in the cycle of preparedness and continues to encourage
investments in mitigation activities at the State level.
Resilient communities are those that take proactive measures to
protect investments made across the full range of infrastructure. Many
of the messages of preparedness are geared towards dealing with or
managing the effects of disasters, but mitigation takes preparedness a
step further. The actions taken under the name of mitigation reduce the
impact of the disaster before it happens and can be used to rebuild an
affected area in a more resilient manner. While neither community
members nor emergency managers can stop the next disaster from
occurring, every member of the community can play an active role in
lessening the consequences from those disasters in the future.
conclusion
The States believe the often-mentioned need to ``measure
preparedness'' is being realized all across the country. The commitment
made by Congress, State and local governments, and Main Street
Americans continues each day amidst constantly-evolving threats and
hazards . . . certainly a measured change from the mindset of September
10, 2001.
The National Preparedness System must take the longer view and not
the bureaucratic lowest common denominator where the only issue
addressed is the one currently under consideration. Our view must be
extended from being focused on the current budget or the latest grant
cycle to the distant horizon. The National Preparedness Report should
contribute to an understanding of what we need to accomplish. Such a
document, however, is not the final word or sole measure of our
efforts.
Preparedness is an objective rather than a destination. A condition
of perfect preparedness cannot be achieved but this should not deter us
from our mission to try. No single report will complete this critical
mission. The National Preparedness System holds the potential of
drawing down risks to the Nation and its vital interests. Accomplishing
such reductions in risk is the true business of the homeland security
and emergency management enterprise of our Nation.
In our Proposal for a Comprehensive Preparedness Grants Structure,
NEMA stated our fundamental principles and values. One is very relevant
to this discussion on the National Preparedness Report. ``Build and
sustain a skilled cadre across the Nation that is well organized,
rigorously trained, vigorously exercised, properly equipped, prepared
for all hazards focused on core capabilities, and resources for both
the most serious and most likely threats and hazards.''
These are the hallmarks of a prepared Nation. These are what we
should measure.
Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify today and look
forward to your questions.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sena, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MIKE SENA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA
REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL FUSION
CENTER ASSOCIATION
Mr. Sena. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
committee. On behalf of the National Fusion Center Association,
I would like to thank you for the opportunity to share our
views on the National preparedness.
The NFCA represents the 77 State and major urban area
fusion centers that comprise the National network of fusion
centers, including the Northern California Regional
Intelligence Center, where I serve as the deputy director on
detail from the California Department of Justice Bureau of
Investigation.
We think the National Preparedness Report can be a helpful
assessment of where we stand, but we discovered that the
National network of fusion centers was not consulted during the
development of the NPR. As a pillar of our National
preparedness, we recommend that FEMA, in coordination with DHS
I&A, consult directly with the National network of fusion
centers in the development of any future reports.
With that said, we fully agree with the report's key
findings that a network of State and major urban area fusion
centers and JTTFs has significantly improved analytical and
information-sharing capabilities among law enforcement,
homeland security, and intelligence community entities at all
levels of government.
Let me give you an example of what this looks like on the
ground. My fusion center is collocated with the FBI JTTF Threat
Squad and the Northern California HIDTA. Our analysts have the
ability to sit shoulder-to-shoulder with DHS intelligence
officers, FBI, Federal, State, and local analysts. We have
emergency managers, firefighters, EMS and public health
workers, cops, and private-sector representatives working
together. Subject to strict privacy guidelines, we analyze
suspicious activity reporting from the public and California's
network of 40,000 trained terrorism liaison officers. We share
timely information with the FBI, DHS, State, and local entities
on terrorism and criminal threats to our region. This is deep
collaboration, and it did not exist before the National network
of fusion centers was created.
But we realize that there is still a lot of work to do. I
outlined several on-going challenges in my written statement,
but let me mention a few of them.
We need to harmonize the platforms for secure messaging and
collaboration across the National network and our Federal
partners. We need to continue broadening and deepening fusion
center relationships with all relevant stakeholders, and that
includes our States, Governors, our HSAs, our UASI
coordinators, our emergency managers, and critical
infrastructure owners and operators. Fusion center analysts
need equal access to classified systems, specifically FBI
systems, to ensure top-quality threat analysis. Cleared fusion
center personnel should have the same access as DHS, I&A, and
FBI personnel to classified systems.
On the issue of investment, earlier this year the NFCA
conducted an analysis of fusion center budgets, which revealed
that more than 60 percent of all fusion center funding is
provided by State and local governments. Less than 40 percent
is supported by Federal grants. At the Florida fusion center,
for example, 10 percent is Federal funding and 90 percent is
State and local. Homeland security intelligence and information
sharing is a shared responsibility, and our analysis clearly
shows that there is a shared sacrifice and a deep commitment at
the State and local levels.
We have real concerns about the impact of DHS grant cuts.
Fusion centers in some States will lose analytical personnel
beginning this year. Some may cease operating as fusion centers
altogether. If these scenarios play out or if the budget
sequestration takes effect next year and nondefense
discretionary programs like preparedness grants are cut even
more, we will lose terrorism prevention capabilities. There is
no doubt our National preparedness will suffer from this, and
Congress should not let that happen.
Let me close with an example that demonstrates our
increased preparedness. During riots in the city of Oakland,
the California Highway Patrol received a 9-1-1 call from a
citizen concerned about a posting they saw on a popular social
networking site. The posting indicated that person was headed
to the riot location with handguns and malicious intent. The
Highway Patrol immediate relayed the information to the State
Threat Assessment Center, our STAC, which is California's
designated primary fusion center. The STAC located the web
posting, which included photographs of the subject with
firearms. Analysts at the STAC ran initial database checks on
the subject and quickly notified my fusion center, the NCRIC,
on the potential threat.
The NCRIC had personnel working at the Oakland Emergency
Operations Center to facilitate information sharing and
intelligence support during the riots. NCRIC personnel
conducted further analysis of the subject and disseminated an
officer safety bulletin to 8,000 fusion center partners in the
region. More than 1,000 on-scene law enforcement officers from
multiple jurisdictions were receiving real-time information on
the potential threat. All that happened within hours.
Days later, the matter was resolved when, thanks to the
NCRIC alert, a trained terrorism liaison officer identified the
subject, who happened to be an employee of a secure facility.
Key elements of National preparedness allowed this rapid
sharing of actionable information to happen: Citizen reporting
of suspicious activity, advanced analytical capabilities at the
fusion center, the network of trained TLOs, and real-time
collaboration among public safety partners.
Mr. Chairman, our level of preparedness has increased
dramatically in recent years, and we ask for your continued
support as we work to enhance it even further. On behalf of the
NFCA, thank you again for this opportunity, and I look forward
to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Sena follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mike Sena
June 6, 2012
Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, Members of the
subcommittee, on behalf of the National Fusion Center Association
(NFCA), thank you for inviting me to testify today. My name is Mike
Sena and I serve as deputy director of the Northern California Regional
Intelligence Center (NCRIC), the fusion center for the San Francisco
Bay area. I currently serve as president of the National Fusion Center
Association (NFCA). The NFCA represents the 77 State and local owned
and operated fusion centers that comprise the National Network of
Fusion Centers.
It is clear to those of us on the front lines that the state of
National preparedness with regard to intelligence and information
sharing has improved dramatically since 9/11, with a noticeable
acceleration in improvements over the past few years. At the same time,
we recognize that a range of capabilities must be further developed,
and we are working with our Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners
through a variety of forums to integrate the whole community and
improve our state of preparedness every day.
As the National Preparedness Report (NPR) states, ``fusion centers
are focal points within the State and local environment for the
receipt, analysis, gathering, and sharing of threat-related information
between Federal, State, and local governments and private-sector
partners. Fusion centers position law enforcement, public safety,
emergency management, fire service, public health, critical
infrastructure protection, and private sector security personnel to
understand local implications of National intelligence.''
In other words, fusion centers analyze National threat information
in a local context, disseminate relevant and actionable information to
State and local decision makers, and pass critical State and local
information up to Federal partners in the intelligence community. All
of this is done while protecting the privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties of American citizens.
A snapshot of my own fusion center, the NCRIC, gives you a sense of
how we can collaborate today on intelligence and information sharing.
We are collocated with the Northern California HIDTA and the FBI Joint
Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) Threat Squad. Our analysts have the ability
to sit shoulder-to-shoulder with FBI analysts. We have emergency
managers, firefighters, EMS workers, public health workers, cops,
analysts, Federal, State, local, and private-sector representatives
working at our fusion center. We analyze suspicious activity reporting
and share information on terror, crime, and other threats to our
region, and we make sure that the right organizations and decision
makers get the information they need.
The National Network of Fusion Centers--which includes 49 centers
designated by State Governors as primary fusion centers, two
territorial fusion centers, and 26 major urban area fusion centers--is
maturing at an increasing pace. The overall level of information
sharing and intelligence analysis Nation-wide has increased as well. We
fully agree with the NPR's key finding that ``A network of State and
major urban area fusion centers and JTTFs [FBI Joint Terrorism Task
Forces] has significantly improved analytical and information-sharing
capabilities among law enforcement, homeland security, and intelligence
community entities at all levels of government.'' At the same time, we
think it is helpful to review the progress we have made and address the
primary on-going challenges we are working with our partners to solve.
The National Network of Fusion Centers has played a major role in
transforming the way Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments
share intelligence information to protect the homeland. The National
Network--together with the full complement of Federal partners--
embodies what the 9/11 Commission and the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 envisioned a decentralized,
distributed information sharing model to help ``connect the dots'' and
prevent attacks. In fact, the National Network has become the central
information-sharing point between the Federal Government and State,
local, Tribal, territorial, and private-sector partners. The 2010
National Security Strategy of the United States specifically cites
fusion centers a central element in preventing future acts of
terrorism.
After investing $40 billion in Federal preparedness grants over the
past decade--the lion's share of which has been directed at response
and recovery activities--it is safe to say we are much better prepared
to prevent, respond to, and recover from terror attacks and other
disasters than we were prior to 9/11.
There is good reason to pat ourselves on the back; but there is
much to do, and there is also real reason for concern. As the dramatic
declines in Federal grant funds that have been approved by Congress--
more than 50% for SHSP and UASI--begin to take effect at the end-user
level this year, we will struggle to maintain the momentum that has
developed over the past decade. Fusion centers in some States that rely
heavily on Federal grant dollars to support operations will likely lose
significant numbers of analytical personnel, and some may cease
operating as fusion centers altogether. Other centers may turn their
focus ``inward'' to become intelligence support functions within State
or local law enforcement agencies. We were happy to see last month that
both the House and Senate DHS appropriators recommended increases in
funding for State and Local Programs at FEMA. But if these scenarios I
just mentioned become reality, there is no doubt that our National
preparedness would suffer greatly.
That is why we think that DHS preparedness grants going forward
should emphasize the intelligence and information-sharing element of
our National preparedness. This must be prioritized to continue
building and sustaining prevention and protection capabilities. That
includes the sustainment of a strong National Network of Fusion
Centers. Fusion centers are focused on prevention, but a growing number
of fusion centers support the full range of preparedness activities and
partner with the emergency management, fire, and public health
communities as well as the private sector.
The NFCA fears the consequences of the impending budget
sequestration. Non-defense discretionary funding has been cut
substantially over the last 3 years. It is shocking to us that the some
of the hardest-hit programs have been those that support homeland
security preparedness. FEMA State and Local Programs have been cut by
50% over the last 3 years. We understand the desire to avoid cuts to
Defense spending under sequestration, but after the 50% cuts we have
sustained, we strongly urge Congress to avoid saddling NDD programs--
especially preparedness grants--with even deeper cuts. Security is
Government's No. 1 responsibility at all levels, and that means
Congress must take a balanced approach to deficit reduction and not hit
State and Local Preparedness and other non-defense discretionary
programs with further cuts.
No more effective mechanism exists to coordinate the sharing of
multi-source information for diverse stakeholders and facilitate broad
collaboration on threat analysis. Consider the difficulties if the
Federal Government had to share information directly with the 18,000
separate law enforcement agencies in the United States. Or, consider if
the Federal Government could only obtain value-added information from
State and local agencies on a piecemeal basis to support terrorism
investigations. Relative to the tens of thousands of public safety
agencies across the county, the National Network of only 77 centers is
a very efficient way to leverage the capabilities of an entire Nation
to support the analysis and sharing of threat information.
One common misperception that must be corrected is that fusion
centers duplicate other joint law enforcement and counterterrorism
efforts. That is not the case; they do not duplicate, they objectively
add what others cannot add--complementing with vital granular data and
analysis the information that others possess--to allow timely action
against identified threats. FBI Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs)
play the lead role in counterterrorism investigations. Owned and
operated by the FBI with close cooperation and participation by State
and local partners, JTTFs are key ``customers'' of fusion center
analytical products.
The National Network of Fusion Centers supports the dissemination
of information from JTTFs to the broader public safety community. JTTFs
deal primarily with terrorism and other criminal matters related to
various aspects of the counterterrorism mission. Fusion centers
generally take an all-crimes approach and deal with criminal,
terrorism, and other public safety matters across multiple disciplines.
JTTFs primarily conduct terrorism investigations and share intelligence
with law enforcement and homeland security agencies as appropriate.
By contrast, fusion centers analyze and assess local implications
of National threat information and produce actionable intelligence for
dissemination to public safety stakeholders in their area of
responsibility and beyond. In short, fusion centers do not duplicate
the functions of JTTFs, and JTTFs are not organized to achieve the
missions of fusion centers. The two programs both have complementary
and critical missions. Both are essential to effective homeland
security information sharing and investigations. Congress must ensure
that both efforts are fully supported if the outcome sought is
seamless, well-informed, effective protection of this Nation.
Most fusion centers today have an ``all-crimes'' mission--and many
also now have an ``all-hazards'' mission--because an exclusive focus on
terrorism simply misses the point that you cannot separate crime and
terrorism. In addition, the analytical and sharing capabilities that
fusion centers offer are useful in every-day crime-fighting efforts.
Identifying trends and anomalies, analyzing suspicious activity
reporting, and providing actionable information to decision makers is
just as essential in fighting gangs, home invasions, human trafficking,
and on-line child exploitation as in preventing terrorist attacks. In
short, the ``fusion process'' is valuable in protecting all communities
against all threats.
Most law enforcement officers will tell you that the best
intelligence collaboration and information sharing happens when
relationships among agencies and individuals are built on trust and
experience. The right policies, technology, processes, protocols, and
funding are essential enablers of effective information sharing, and
we've seen dramatic improvements in these areas since 9/11. But
information sharing is fundamentally about creating, building, and
sustaining RELATIONSHIPS. Legislation and mandates can only get us so
far. When it comes to leveraging the full scope of the public safety
community in the United States for homeland security purposes, a
constant effort to build relationships and develop trusted mechanisms
is how it will get done.
That's where the NFCA comes in. It is our association's mission to
support the development of the National Network of Fusion Centers and
improved information sharing. Since we formed 3 years ago, we have made
a point of fostering relationship development across the network and
vertically among Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial, and
private-sector stakeholders. We work regularly with these stakeholders,
and we just approved the addition of a representative from the Major
Cities Chiefs Intelligence Commanders Group on the NFCA Executive
Board. Progress does not happen overnight. Those who expect a switch to
be flipped and have instant and seamless sharing of information on
threats across all possible stakeholders are bound to be disappointed.
The appropriate vision for intelligence collaboration and information
sharing was laid out by the 9/11 Commission and was emphasized in the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004: A
decentralized, distributed network that involves all levels of
government and collaborates routinely on information analysis and
sharing with Federal intelligence and law enforcement partners.
The thankless business of improving intelligence and information-
sharing preparedness is often carried out in efforts coordinated by the
Criminal Intelligence Coordinating Council (CICC). The CICC is a strong
and trusted mechanism for coordinating all the relevant stakeholders in
this mission. The CICC and its research arm--the Global Intelligence
Working Group (GIWG)--have been responsible for developing and
fostering Nation-wide adoption of standards for sharing criminal
intelligence.
The GIWG and the CICC focus on the development of documents that
have the force of National policy and are widely adhered to. They have
facilitated the development of the National Criminal Intelligence
Sharing Plan, Law Enforcement Analytic Standards, technical data
exchange standards, Fusion Center Privacy Policies, Fusion Center
Guidelines, Baseline Capabilities for Fusion Centers, and have
contributed to the National Strategy for Information Sharing, among
other important initiatives. This institutionalized collaboration in
the development of policy is needed to ensure the continued commitment
and building of trust among the greatest possible number of
stakeholders. It is how improvements in National preparedness in this
area will continue to be matured.
Despite our progress, we are concerned that 10 years without a
major attack has led to a level of apathy. All stakeholders must
continue to invest in the long-term effort to improve our capacity to
share information. If the Federal Government does not continue to take
steps to ensure the National Network is strengthened and sustained, we
will start moving away from the vision of the 9/11 Commission and
IRTPA, leaving the Nation more vulnerable to successive attacks on
public safety--large and small--that could have been prevented through
a well-supported National Network of Fusion Centers.
We think the National Preparedness Report shows a continued need
for focused investment in the Network as the core homeland security
information sharing and intelligence analysis facilitator in
partnership with State, local, Federal, and Tribal law enforcement,
fire, emergency management, and public health agencies. To the extent
that the NPR is a ``roll-up'' of individual State preparedness reports,
law enforcement entities in many States have not been as integrated
into the development of the State reports as they should be. In fact,
it appears that the methodology used to create the NPR is not as
analytically rigorous as it should be. The National Network of Fusion
Centers was not consulted in a systematic way. If the Network is a
pillar of our National preparedness, then the report should not be
developed without a coordinated process directly with the fusion
centers. As future State preparedness reports are generated, the NFCA
recommends that Homeland Security Advisors and State Emergency Managers
integrate information directly from fusion centers in their States. We
are pleased that data was integrated into the NPR from the detailed
assessment of the National Network of Fusion Centers that is conducted
annually by the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis. But the
appropriate stage for engagement of the fusion centers in preparedness
reports is also at the State level. Going forward, the NFCA will
encourage direct State-level interactions in addition to the use of
data collected through the annual fusion center assessment process.
While we agree with the NPR's key finding on the National Network,
we do not think the report provides helpful context for the capability
percentage ratings it lays out. There have been dramatic improvements
in recent years, and I would argue that these improvements are actually
accelerating. We all recognize that the wave of a magic wand will not
result in an ideal operating situation. When you are in the business of
developing, shaping, and maintaining an intelligence and information-
sharing culture across governmental and jurisdictional lines, you are
constantly pressing for incremental improvements over time.
And that is what we've seen. From the development and
implementation of the Nation-wide Suspicious Activity Reporting
Initiative (NSI), to the enhanced support provided to the National
Network by DHS Intelligence & Analysis, to increased FBI/JTTF
interactions and collocation with fusion centers, to improvements in
analysis and sharing technology, to deeper relationships across the
National Network and within States, our preparedness has gotten
steadily more robust. Through our work on the CICC, we have had
substantial input into the refresh of the National Information Sharing
Strategy. I think that strategy will lay out a way ahead that reflects
both the progress made and the focused investments of energy and
resources that will be needed over the next decade.
We can see that a National intelligence enterprise is being created
by connecting fusion centers, their information sharing and analysis
partners, JTTFs, the HIDTA Investigative Support Centers, the RISS
centers, major city and major county intelligence centers, the Nation-
wide SAR Initiative, and the FBI Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs). This
enterprise has been woven into a protective fabric for our Nation. The
enterprise has matured because partners have rolled up their sleeves
and created solutions that are crossing boundaries efficiently. Strong
leadership from the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Office
of the Program Manager of the Information Sharing Environment, the
Bureau of Justice Assistance at the Department of Justice, the Nation-
wide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative's Program Management
Office (NSI-PMO) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation has resulted
in the strengthening of governance structures that are intended to
lower barriers between Federal, State, and local organizations.
Of course there is a lot of room for improvement. Intelligence and
information-sharing capability gaps that we must continue to address
include:
standardized or harmonized platforms for secure messaging
across the National Network of Fusion Centers and with our
Federal partners;
training and retention of high-quality analytical personnel
across the National Network;
sustainable funding support for the National Network through
DHS preparedness grants;
broadening and deepening of fusion center relationships with
all relevant stakeholders in our States, including Governors'
homeland security advisors, emergency managers, and critical
infrastructure owners and operators;
tighter coordination of information collection, analysis,
and sharing with our Federal partners;
secure and reliable access to classified systems,
specifically FBI systems, and reforms that allow cleared fusion
center personnel to have the same access as DHS I&A and FBI
personnel to FBI classified systems; and
recognition of security clearances across agencies and
domains to ensure timely and efficient access to relevant
information.
One issue that we are currently dealing with provides a good
illustration of how far we have come in terms of the intelligence and
information-sharing element of National preparedness, and the
challenges that still remain.
Earlier this year the FBI Terrorist Screening Center halted sharing
of ``encounter notifications'' with fusion centers in the manner in
which they previously had been shared. Briefly, encounter notifications
refer to the notices sent by the TSC to fusion centers regarding any
Governmental agencies' encounters with individuals on the consolidated
Terrorist Watchlist in the interior of the country--for example in
traffic stops. The NFCA discussed the issue directly with TSC
leadership and others at the FBI. We convened a conference call with
the TSC, FBI, DHS, NFCA, International Association of Chiefs of Police,
National Sheriffs' Association, Major County Sheriffs' Association,
Major Cities Chiefs Association, Association of State Criminal
Investigative Agencies, CICC, and the Governors' Homeland Security
Advisory Council to address the issue. Just days later we had worked
out a way ahead to ensure encounter notifications were available to all
fusion centers going forward. Today the TSC, DHS, and State, local, and
Tribal partners are working to address the issue. This kind of broad-
based and real-time effort to improve intelligence and information
sharing would have been extremely difficult 10 years ago, or even just
5 years ago. The process is never easy, but this enhanced
coordination--enabled by the fusion centers--ensures that we continue
on the path to greater preparedness.
We cannot have true preparedness without true information sharing.
We need to continue to work with the FBI and all our Federal partners
to improve sharing of critical information while maintaining
operational security and preserving citizens' privacy and civil
liberties. In addition, we have to continue working with our Federal
partners to develop secure communications platforms that enable
efficient information sharing and analytical collaboration. We continue
to see several different information-sharing platforms in use across
the 18,000 State and local law enforcement agencies in this country. No
single entity is in a position to mandate standardization, but efforts
continue to ensure data can be shared and received when needed. Event
deconfliction is another major area of needed focus. True information
sharing includes both threat information and event deconfliction. We
believe we need a single National deconfliction system. While there are
several good examples of event deconfliction systems in use by
different law enforcement agencies, we need to work toward
standardization or interoperability of systems.
Overall, we have made excellent progress, but we are not where we
want to be. Not a day goes by without conversations among partners that
are serving to build the trust, confidence, and relationships necessary
to realize true information sharing.
Congress can also play a helpful role. We note that just last week
the House passed two bills--H.R. 2764, the WMD Intelligence and
Information Sharing Act, and H.R. 3140, the Mass Transit Intelligence
Prioritization Act--that have intelligence analysis and information
sharing through the National Network of Fusion Centers as a primary
purpose. Both pieces of legislation are examples of how Congress can
support the incremental improvements we need to make over time to
advance our homeland security intelligence- and information-sharing
capabilities.
Another way Congress can support these advances is by ensuring
sustained grant support for the National Network. This committee
shepherded the Implementing
9/11 Commission Recommendations Act of 2007. Section 2006 of that Act
mandated that 25% of the UASI and SHSGP preparedness grants be
allocated by recipients to ``Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention
(LETP) Activities.'' This is how many States support their primary
designated fusion centers with DHS grants. But there is no single
funding model for fusion centers, and there is no guarantee that the
LETP portion of DHS grant funds will be sufficient to support an
adequate level of functionality at every fusion center in every State.
A required fusion center investment justification in States'
applications for DHS preparedness grants helps, but it does not ensure
that allocated funds are sufficient to support a robust fusion process
in each State.
Earlier this year the NFCA conducted a survey of its members which
revealed that more than 60% of all fusion center funding is provided by
State or local governments. Less than 40% is supported by Federal
grants.\1\ In addition, since fusion center operating budgets do not
include the salaries of ``donated'' personnel assigned by local and
State agencies to fusion centers, the contribution ratio of State-to-
Federal financial contributions is likely closer to 70/30. This
concrete data demonstrates that, consistent with the spirit of
Presidential Policy Directive/PPD-8, homeland security intelligence and
information sharing is a shared responsibility with shared benefits,
and that all stakeholders are sharing in the required investment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ National Fusion Center Association membership survey, March,
2012. Fifty-six out of the 77 fusion centers responded. Survey
responses were not independently audited or verified.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The data also help to dispel a myth we often see reported that
fusion centers are DHS entities. DHS did not create the fusion centers,
and they do not operate them. No fusion center is funded exclusively
with DHS grant dollars. For example, Federal funding through SHSGP
constituted 10% of the Florida Fusion Center's $2.7 million budget in
fiscal year 2011. At the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) in
Los Angeles, combined SHSGP and UASI grant funding comprised just over
40% of the $12.7 million budget in fiscal year 2011.
DHS recognizes the value of a robust National Network of Fusion
Centers as critical to homeland security intelligence analysis and
information sharing, and they have focused resources and other support
to the centers as an invaluable partner to help nurture the National
Network. Secretary Napolitano, Under Secretary for Intelligence and
Analysis (I&A) Caryn Wagner, and Deputy Under Secretary for I&A Scott
McAllister deserve great credit for requiring that States include an
investment justification for fusion centers in their applications for
UASI and SHSGP funding beginning with the fiscal year 2011 grant
guidance. We were pleased to see this guidance remain in place in
fiscal year 2012. This sends a clear signal--the right signal--that
Federal-State-local partnerships to receive, gather, analyze, and share
information to prevent terrorism will remain a top priority for DHS
investment.
Grant funds allocated to fusion centers help to build and sustain
``critical operational capabilities'' or COCs--defined as the ability
to receive, analyze, disseminate, and gather information on threats to
the homeland. Going forward, NFCA strongly supports the continued
fusion center investment justification requirement, since this will
assure that gaps in critical operational capabilities identified in the
annual fusion center assessments are addressed across the National
Network.
As the threat of homegrown violent extremism (HVE) has risen, the
role of State and local law enforcement has become indispensable in
detecting and preventing terror attacks. Efforts are underway through
the Nation-wide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative (NSI)--
supported by the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of
Justice--to train State, local, and Tribal law enforcement officers to
recognize and report behavior-based suspicious activity. The fusion
centers are essential in this effort as both training hubs and
receivers of suspicious activity reporting. As the newly-published NSI
Annual Report for 2011 states, ``fusion centers are uniquely situated
to provide an analytic context to SAR data, an essential element of
NSI's overall mission.''
The NSI Annual Report indicates that as of March, 2012 68 fusion
centers have the capability to contribute and share SARs. More than
250,000 front-line law enforcement officers have received NSI Line
Officer Training. Training tailored to other public safety sectors has
also been developed, which will expand the ability of those in the best
position to notice suspicious activity will know what to do. The
quality and quantity of SARs have increased over time, especially as
implementation of NSI has progressed. As of March, more than 43,000
searches had been conducted by analysts authorized to use the system,
and more than 17,000 SAR reports were available in the system.
There is still a lot to be done to fully implement NSI, but the
progress has been encouraging. Over the past year we have worked
closely with the FBI and the NSI Program Office to address challenges
related to input of SAR information into accessible databases for
timely analysis. The NSI recently implemented a technical solution that
allows fusion center SAR information to be submitted to the NSI
Federated Search system and simultaneously to the FBI's eGuardian
system. In addition, the NFCA signed onto a ``unified message'' earlier
this year with several Federal, State, and local law enforcement
organizations regarding suspicious activity reporting that emphasizes
collaboration, sharing, and lanes of responsibility, while calling for
advanced training and strict adherence to the privacy and civil rights
policies and responsibilities that we are obligated to observe.
Information sharing and intelligence collaboration efforts continue
to develop. We are intimately involved in the refresh of the National
Information Sharing Strategy. We are pleased with the way the
intergovernmental discussions have gone over the past year, and the
quality of ideas put on the table has been good. Kshemendra Paul, the
Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, has made
substantial contributions and has ensured that our perspectives are
carefully considered. There is a sense of real commitment to make the
revised strategy a document that will serve us well and set a clear
direction. We believe the strategy should be a living document that is
updated more frequently and flexes as developments occur.
In addition, the NFCA has begun working with DHS to conduct an
exercise later this year regarding Critical Operational Capability No.
1--Receive. This is likely to involve the entire National Network of
Fusion Centers and will help assess progress and identify areas for
improvement. Fusion centers continue efforts to train ``fusion liaison
officers'' or ``FLOs''. Thousands of State, local, and Tribal law
enforcement officers have received FLO training and the centers are
committed to continue this training. Supporting this training is one of
the primary reasons that we need to ensure sustained funding is
available.
Another example of our enhanced level of preparedness is the event
that I plan to attend immediately after this hearing: A secure video
teleconference jointly held by DHS and FBI along with the National
Network of Fusion Centers and Governors' homeland security advisors.
The call will outline the current threat environment, and will also
consider suspicious activity reporting, SAR training, and engagement
with the public.
We have made tremendous progress and our level of preparedness has
increased significantly in recent years. Fusion center directors are
committed to continuous improvement and are engaging at the operational
and strategic levels every day across the National Network and with our
Federal partners. We continue to push for more advances, build trust,
and overcome obstacles. I realize that these activities rarely rise to
the level of Congressional awareness, but the examples I mentioned are
just a few of the many efforts happening today. As a result of
sustained focus at all levels, we are better prepared to gather,
analyze, and share information and intelligence that improves our
homeland--and hometown--security. We ask for your continued support for
these initiatives.
Thank you again on behalf of the National Fusion Center Association
for the opportunity to provide our perspectives.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you very much.
Now to Dr. Benjamin. I apologize if I mispronounced your
first name. But you are recognized, sir, for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GEORGES C. BENJAMIN, M.D., EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
AMERICAN PUBLIC HEALTH ASSOCIATION
Dr. Benjamin. Mr. Chairman, you are right on target. It is
Georges Benjamin.
Let me thank you very much for having me, Mr. Chairman and
Members of the committee, to represent the views of the public
health community.
We have certainly had a long and proud history of providing
emergency preparedness in public health emergencies. As you may
know, we have really been challenged for many, many years of
underinvestment in public health, but since September 11, 2001,
and of course the subsequent anthrax attacks in the years that
followed, we have really made a substantial investment. I have
no question that that has improved the health and well-being
and preparedness of the Nation.
However, there are concerns of where we have gone because
of infrastructure loss and funding loss. I think the report is
a good report, that the writers ought to be commended. But I do
want to add some emphasis on one area of the report where they
talk about some of the infrastructure loss in the public health
system.
During the anthrax attacks, I actually happened to be the
secretary of health in Maryland. In my testimony, we learned
several lessons, and let me just focus on a couple of them. One
was that preparedness is everybody's second job. No matter
whether or not you are an administrative clerk or an
epidemiologist in the maternal/child health program, or whether
you do the AIDS programs, preparedness is everybody's secondary
job. The second thing, more importantly, we were lucky. Had we
had another big event that occurred, we would have been really
challenged to respond.
In light of some of those concerns, I would just point out
to you a big pertussis outbreak that is going on right now in
Washington State. Pertussis is whooping cough. Most of us have
certainly been vaccinated as children for pertussis, and yet
they have had for the last 21 weeks an amazing outbreak that
has occurred. They have had over 1,900 cases, compared to 154
cases during the same time period last year. That outbreak
continues to grow. There are lots of, probably, reasons for
that: Some changes in vaccine formulation, people who haven't
gotten vaccinated. But having said that, they are very
concerned about their inability to respond as effectively as
they would like to because of staffing shortages that have
occurred in their State, at least in some parts of their State.
Also, we have had reductions in some of the public health
laboratories in the Nation. An excellent example here is in New
Jersey, where the number of scientists certified to work on
select agents, the ones you are most concerned about with
terrorism, is down from 15 to 5. I think you would agree that
that means that their surge capacity is greatly impaired.
As you look at the workforce in public health, we have lost
over 52,000 people since 2008 within the public health
workforce. If you look at programs, for example, that have been
downsized, about 23 percent of the local health department
programs, local health departments in the country, have cuts in
their emergency preparedness programs, specifically, in
addition to many, many other programmatic cuts.
Of course, the biggest challenge we have is around funding.
I call it yo-yo funding, where we put a fair amount of money
into something, respond to a crisis, and then just before we
really get it all taken care of, we begin to then down-cycle
the funding. That doesn't build a sustainable, long-term
system. I think if we did that for defense, we would be in a
terrible, terrible shape.
I think as we--my testimony also talks about our concern
about many of the cuts. There is not, obviously, enough time to
go through all of those various concerns about funding. But
having said this, I think we need to begin looking at a much
more sustainable, long-term funding mechanism that helps us
integrate public health within the rest of emergency
preparedness. We have gone a long way to doing that. I mean, we
are no longer showing up at emergencies, like we did before
2001, exchanging business cards. That does not occur anymore.
Public health folks know the emergency preparedness folks, they
know the police and fire and EMS folks. They work very, very
well together. But the erosion of our system, I think, remains
a big concern to us, particularly if we have something that is
catastrophic.
With that, I thank you very much for your attention and
certainly will answer any questions that you have.
[The statement of Dr. Benjamin follows:]
Prepared Statement of Georges C. Benjamin
June 6, 2012
Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson and Members of the
subcommittee, my name is Dr. Georges Benjamin and I am the executive
director of the American Public Health Association (APHA). Founded in
1872, APHA is the oldest, largest, and most diverse organization of
public health professionals in the world. The association aims to
protect all Americans and their communities from preventable, serious
health threats and strives to assure community-based health promotion
and disease prevention activities and preventive health services are
universally accessible in the United States. APHA represents a broad
array of health providers, educators, environmentalists, policy-makers,
and health officials at all levels working both within and outside
Governmental organizations and educational institutions. I appreciate
the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the state of
public health emergency preparedness and thank you for your leadership
on this important topic.
The Nation's public health system has a long and proud history of
providing services during public health emergencies by providing a
range of services from acute infectious disease detection, post-
disaster environmental risk assessment, and long-term surveillance for
emerging post-disaster threats to health. The public health system then
works to make us safer by preventing or mitigating these risks to
health using a variety of clinical and nonclinical interventions. For
many years we as a Nation had underinvested in public health system
emergency preparedness, however, since the terrorist attacks on
September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax attacks later that year,
significant investments in public health preparedness and response have
occurred. There is no question that these investments have greatly
improved the Nation's overall ability to prevent, respond to, and
recover from public health emergencies including bioterrorism, chemical
incidents, radiological and nuclear events, infectious disease
outbreaks and natural disasters. However, we still have a long way to
go to achieve a level of optimal preparedness. In fact, we have had
significant regression in the infrastructure needed to achieve this
desired level.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency's 2012 National
Preparedness Report highlights many of the improvements we have seen
since 2001 across a wide range of preparedness activities and
highlights several areas where we have made enormous progress. I
believe the report authors should be commended for the areas where they
have focused most intently. There is one area of the report however,
that does require more detail to give the committee a fuller
understanding of the Nation's level of public health and medical
preparedness. That area is found on page 47 where a key finding of the
reports notes ``The Nation has built a highly respected public health
capability for managing incidents, but recent reductions in public
health funding and personnel have impacted these capabilities.'' I
would like to give a more complete explanation about the impact that
current funding and workforce reductions have on the ability of the
public health system to respond not only to public health emergencies,
but also to undertake the day-to-day responsibilities that keep our
communities safe and healthy.
the state of public health preparedness
There are core functional capacities you want in a public health
preparedness system. You want to know when a disease syndrome first
enters a community, the ability to rapidly identify the cause of the
disease and how it is contracted, the ability to conduct accurate new
case findings and tracking, the ability to communicate effectively to a
range of stakeholders (including the public) and disease containment
and treatment ability. In a terror attack the forensic component of
these efforts magnify the importance of these requirements. Over the
past several years we have had significant erosion in our core capacity
to do many of these things. Let me start by putting it in perspective
and relate the critical role Federal programs and funding play in State
and local public health emergency preparedness and response activities.
During the anthrax attacks in October 2001, I was the secretary of
health for the State of Maryland. Baltimore City and all 23 of
Maryland's counties responded in order to treat people who had been
exposed through the U.S. postal system or in the Hart Senate Office
Building and to address, State-wide, white powder reports which
paralyzed the Nation. This experience taught me several important
lessons:
A good plan is an essential first step.--Fortunately for
Maryland, we had previously developed a public health
preparedness plan and had some early capacity because of my
interest in preparedness (I am an emergency physician) and more
importantly, a small grant from the U.S. Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC). We also learned how important it
is to actually exercise the plan because it had been untested
and many lessons were learned from actually having to use it.
Disease response does not recognize borders.--The index case
in the Washington, DC area was a Maryland resident who was
exposed in Washington, DC and hospitalized in Virginia. Only
the Federal Government can build a regional capacity to address
this kind of disease exposure. No single jurisdiction could
have handled this alone. A robust surveillance system,
sustained training, and local, State, and Federal cooperation
is required for an adequate response.
Delivering countermeasures is complex.--The Maryland plan
anticipated the need to get pharmaceuticals in large amounts
quickly and recognized the turnaround time to get the contents
of the strategic National stockpile (SNS) was longer than we
could wait. We had a short-term plan to utilize the pharmacy
system from our mental health system for pharmaceuticals
(Cipro) until the SNS was available. This temporary system
worked but we recognized the benefits of the SNS as soon as it
became available because of the prolonged nature of the Nation-
wide response to the anthrax letters. We designed an on-the-
spot distribution system and when the SNS supply arrived we
distributed it to local health departments all over the State
during the night. If the SNS did not exist or if we had not
owned our own hospitals we would not have had any meaningful
capacity to respond. Those exposed would have had anthrax in
their systems for much longer periods of time and we may have
had many other serious cases.
Communication is a big deal.--Anthrax is a rare disease to
the general practicing medical community. Over days and weeks
our call center was swamped with calls from health
professionals looking for current diagnostic and therapeutic
information about anthrax. We also had numerous calls from the
general public and the media seeking reliable information. Our
ability to utilize a range of communication tools from
automated telephone responses, our web page, press releases,
news conferences and live call takers was essential to keeping
the people informed and calm. The newly instituted Health Alert
Network was an important enterprise-wide communication tool
that provided reliable public health information in a timely
way on a regular basis. These efforts were coordinated with a
range of State, local, and Federal agencies. In those days
every health department in America did not have ready access to
email as we do today. Clearly our National capacity to respond
is more effective when we have a system that can leverage all
of the available components.
Preparedness is everyone's secondary job for surge
capacity.--Our disease surveillance staffs were superb but we
were often challenged to keep up with our day-to-day
responsibilities before the attacks. When the attacks occurred,
we utilized many other staff from across the agencies that were
in programs unrelated to public health preparedness to use
their skills in support of this emergency response. In this
way, chronic disease epidemiologists, maternal child health
epidemiologists, and HIV/AIDS workers were recruited to help.
Often working 18 to 20 hours a day, sleeping on the floor or on
cots in their offices, these heroic public servants did what
was required to respond to this effort. Erosion in other
programs unrelated to preparedness has a negative impact on the
ability of a public health agency to scale up when a disaster
occurs.
A robust National public health laboratory network is
essential.--Maryland is fortunate to have had one of the best
public health laboratories in the country. A public health
laboratory is very different from a hospital or clinical
laboratory. We served as the reference lab for many lab
samples, the prime testing lab for many clinical and
nonclinical samples and the link to the FBI for forensic
samples. Our laboratory was swamped with samples from sources
all over Maryland and the District (as their laboratory did not
have appropriate equipment to do the testing at the time). Over
300 samples a day came into the lab for several weeks. All of
the positive samples required follow-up with the sender and had
to follow a chain of custody to be sent to the FBI. This
relatively limited and small, but serious incident (five
letters), completely inundated our system. It was a massive
undertaking for months and a staffing and logistical challenge.
The Federally-supported laboratory response network played a
critical role in our response activities.
We were lucky.--Five letters resulted in a Nation-wide event
with 17 cases of illness, five deaths, more than 33,000 people
being placed on antibiotics and thousands of emergency
responses because of the fear that any white powder discovered
could be anthrax. In Maryland, an additional naturally-
occurring outbreak such as a food-borne outbreak at a
restaurant, a wedding, or a second terror attack with another
agent would have been impossible to manage effectively with our
existing State infrastructure at the time.
I have followed the progress of Maryland's efforts since I left in
December 2002 and have been generally pleased that the State and the
agency have continued to improve on their preparedness system and have
effectively switched to an all-hazards approach, as has most of the
Nation. Yet, I remain concerned about erosion in capacity of the system
when I see what is happening in places like Washington State where an
outbreak of pertussis continues to grow and response capacity is
hampered by the deterioration of the local public health infrastructure
in particular.
The State of Washington began experiencing an outbreak of pertussis
about 21 weeks ago. Pertussis is a disease commonly found in childhood
that has been greatly eliminated because of a safe and effective
vaccine given during childhood. As of May 26, 2012 there have been
1,947 reported cases, 127 under the age of 1 with 30 of them
hospitalized. As of this reporting there have not been any deaths. This
is compared to 154 reported cases during the same time period in 2011.
The outbreak continues to grow. While the exact causes of the outbreak
are unclear, it may be related to children not getting their full
series of vaccinations and waning protection in the previous vaccine
due to changes in the vaccine formulation.
Responding to this outbreak is believed to be hampered by staffing
shortages in some parts of the State (as reported in the New York Times
on May 12, 2012 and in my personal communications with the Washington
State Health Officer). My concern is that this is a superb State health
department with solid leadership that has to contend with dwindling
resources particularly at the local level. According to reports
mentioned above, local health departments in Washington have
experienced reductions in funding due to the recession, resulting in
diminished staffing levels, and as a consequence, affected their
ability to respond in a more effective manner. I am very concerned that
this represents a microcosm of what is awaiting the rest of the Nation
as our infrastructure further dwindles. If we cannot address a large
but classic outbreak I have real concerns about our ability to respond
effectively to a novel or an intentional one.
Our Nation's public health laboratories are also facing serious
challenges due to funding and staffing reductions. According to surveys
conducted by the Association of Public Health Laboratories, which
represents laboratories with a public health mission, many public
health laboratories have also lost staff and have had to curtail other
important programs in order to maintain preparedness capabilities. The
State Public Health Laboratory in California, for instance, had to
eliminate a training program intended to produce laboratory workforce
leadership in order to maintain adequate preparedness funding. In New
Jersey, the number of scientists certified to work on select agents
(testing on biothreat materials, like anthrax) has been reduced from 15
down to 5, threatening the State's laboratory surge capacity in the
event of a public health emergency or disease outbreak. Massachusetts
has also been forced to reduce other areas of funding in order to
maintain its preparedness activities, including reductions in
laboratory oversight management and quality assurance.
As a Nation we are facing two major challenges that this committee
should be aware of as you assess the state of public health emergency
preparedness in America: The public health workforce crisis and
worsening fiscal support.
an eroding public health workforce
Our State and local health departments continue to struggle with
significant job losses and painful budget cuts. Unfortunately, State
and local budgets have not recovered from the recession. Since 2008,
more than 52,000 public health jobs have been lost at local health
departments and State and regional health agencies. These numbers
represent 17 percent of the State and territorial public health
workforce and 22 percent of the local public health workforce.
State and territorial health agencies continue to report on-going
job losses and budget cuts to critical public health programs.
According to the most recent survey of State health agencies conducted
in March 2012 by the Association of State and Territorial Health
Officials, between July 1 and December 31, 2011, 30 percent reported
staff layoffs, 41 percent reported the loss of staff through attrition,
24 percent reported cutting entire programs and 46 percent reported a
reduction in services provided. Cumulatively, since 2008, the numbers
are even greater with 56 percent reporting layoffs, 62 percent cutting
entire programs, and 91 percent reporting a reduction in services
provided.
The situation is just as dire among local health departments.
According to a January 2012 survey of local health departments
conducted by the National Association of County and City Health
Officials, 57 percent of local health departments reduced or eliminated
at least one public health program in 2011, with emergency preparedness
activities taking the biggest hit. Twenty-three percent of local health
departments reported cuts to emergency preparedness programs in 2011.
The effects of the recession continue to be felt among local health
departments with 41 percent of departments reporting that their current
year's budget is less than the previous year and 41 percent reporting
that they expect additional cuts in the coming fiscal year.
a pattern of destructive cyclic funding for public health
Funding for public health programs has a history of ``yo-yo
funding.'' That is, funding continues until we get improvements in
capacity and improved health outcomes, then the funding cycles downward
only to find the problem return often at an increased overall cost.
This happens at the Federal, State, and local level. An unreliable,
insufficient, and unsustainable funding pattern erodes system
preparedness for all hazards and threats and leaves our Nation at risk.
Like many domestic programs critical Federal dollars that fund many
of the public health emergency preparedness activities that fall to our
State and local health departments continue to decline. According to
the report Ready or Not? Protecting the Public from Diseases,
Disasters, and Bioterrorism issued by Trust for America's Health in
December 2011, from 2005 to 2012, Federal funding for State and local
preparedness activities has been reduced by more than 38 percent (when
adjusted for inflation).
CDC's Public Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) program is the
foundation and bedrock of public health preparedness in the United
States. The program provides critical resources, scientific expertise,
and coordination to ensure that our State and local health departments
are prepared to respond to an emergency and to ensure that all
Americans will be protected. Unfortunately, funding for this critical
program has decreased significantly over the past several years.
Reductions to this funding will certainly limit the ability of our
health departments to monitor, assess, and respond to public health
threats in their communities. These cuts could impact the capacity of
disease surveillance staff to detect an outbreak or a bioterrorist
attack, which would limit the ability of State laboratories to quickly
respond to the surges in testing that would be needed, and hamper the
ability of State and local health authorities to respond adequately in
order to protect the public from exposure or ensure the rapid
distribution of life-saving medicine and medical supplies.
Unfortunately, the President's budget request would reduce support for
State and local preparedness by an additional $8 million in fiscal year
2013.
Funding for the Strategic National Stockpile is also at risk. As
noted earlier the SNS is an essential component of the Nation's ability
to ensure an adequate supply of critical medicine and equipment to aid
State and local public health agencies are armed with the tools they
need to respond to a National health emergency. Experience has shown
how valuable the SNS supplies of antibiotics, chemical antidotes, and
other life-saving medicines and equipment are when local supplies
become depleted during an emergency. CDC's ability to maintain the SNS
and State and local government's ability to implement the distribution
are dependent on a well-funded, agile, and reliable system. In addition
to supplies, it is the strategically coordinated distribution plans
that Federal, State, and local government have designed and are
required to exercise regularly that will impact how quickly and
thoroughly these supplies are distributed. Sustained funding is
essential to maintain a sense of readiness for this capacity.
Unfortunately, funding for the SNS was reduced by $57 million in
fiscal year 2012 and the President's fiscal year 2013 budget request
proposes cutting this critical funding by an additional $48 million in
fiscal year 2013. By cutting this funding, we jeopardize efforts to
develop initiatives to reduce distribution response times. Reductions
in this funding also put the Nation at risk of being unprepared and
unable to provide needed medication to all persons affected by a public
health emergency. The SNS supply must be replenished when the shelf
life of the medications expire. Additionally, the facilities maintained
and staff involved in the production of the medical countermeasures
must be in place to appropriately respond to the changing needs of the
stockpile. Speed, sufficient supplies and staff who know and have
practiced using the plans are all essential to a rapid response and
recovery.
Another key Federal program that provides needed resources to State
and local health departments to prepare and respond to all hazards is
the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) administered by the HHS Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response. Funding
provided through this critical program enhances and improves overall
medical surge capacity at hospitals and other key components of the
health care system in a public health emergency. We have seen the value
of this program very recently in Joplin, Missouri. After the tornadoes
devastated that city last year, roughly 30 percent of the city of
Joplin's infrastructure was destroyed including St. John's Regional
Medical Center, which had to evacuate all 183 patients from the
facility. Equipment funded through the HPP assisted staff in evacuating
patients down as many as eight flights of stairs and a fully
operational 60-bed mobile medical unit was deployed and fully
operational within a week of the tornado. This program, unfortunately,
is also at risk. The President's fiscal year 2013 budget request
proposes to reduce funding for HPP by $142 million or 36 percent.
In addition to reductions in funding for State and local
preparedness and response capabilities, we are also concerned with the
declining funds for CDC's preparedness and response activities. While
the President's budget request provides a small $9 million increase for
fiscal year 2013, funding for CDC's internal capacity has declined by
nearly 50 percent since fiscal year 2006. With this funding, CDC
operates its Emergency Operations Center around the clock and serves a
critical role providing rapid logistical support to deploy personnel
and transfer supplies and equipment to support State and local
authorities on the front lines during public health emergencies. The
center also plays a central role in activating response operations,
deploying personnel to disaster zones and investigating health security
threats. Continued underfunding of CDC's preparedness and response
activities will undermine the agency's ability to coordinate
communications and response activities and to provide scientific,
logistical, and personnel support to State and local responders.
APHA is also very concerned about the additional blow that the
pending sequestration would have on funding for public health programs
broadly. As you know, the Budget Control Act created a process known as
sequestration to encourage the so-called ``supercommittee'' to come up
with a viable deficit reduction proposal. Because the supercommittee
failed to reach agreement on a plan, sequestration, or across-the-board
cuts to discretionary funding estimated in the range of 8-10 percent,
is scheduled to take place in January 2013. Cuts of an additional 8-10
percent on top of the recent cuts to Federal preparedness programs
would be nothing short of devastating. Cuts of this magnitude could
eliminate funding for the 10 National Level 1 chemical labs, shut down
CDC's emergency operations center, and further reduce funding for SNS
and other State and local preparedness funding.
conclusion
Public health has historically been asked to do more with less. It
is now at a breaking point. Unless we start supporting our public
health system in a more sustained way, our capacity will continue to
erode and our ability to respond quickly and competently will
evaporate. Funding public health emergencies once the disaster has
already occurred is not an effective way to ensure either preparedness
or accountability.
We must have a robust public health system with adequate levels of
personnel who are well-trained and properly equipped to address a
variety of public health threats. Additionally, the ability to generate
immediate surge capacity by using an ``all hands on deck'' and ``whole
of community'' approach is essential and requires a better recognition
of the role other components of the public health system plays in
preparedness. Funding is tight at all levels of Government but as the
economy recovers and we begin to make new strategic investments in
homeland defense, Congress must make funding the public health system a
top priority. Protecting the public's health is a matter of National
security.
Time and again, we have failed to think more strategically about
the future of our Nation's public health system, to develop a blueprint
for where we want to be in the future and how best to fund it. APHA
believes that far more significant sustained investments in public
health need to occur if we are to prepare the Nation's public health
system to protect us from the leading causes of death, and prepare us
for a rapid response to a range of public health emergencies, whether
naturally occurring or the result of a chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear attack.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today about
state of the Nation's preparedness and our ability to deal with public
health emergencies. On behalf of the American Public Health
Association, I look forward to working with you to strengthen all
aspects of our Nation's public health infrastructure to ensure the
health and safety of the American public. I am happy to answer any
questions you may have.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Doctor.
I want to thank all of you for your testimony.
I will go ahead and recognize myself for 5 minutes. First
question for Mr. Madden.
Since the State Preparedness Reports were critical
components in developing the National Preparedness Report, I am
interested in learning more about how States develop their
annual preparedness reports. I am concerned that the self-
assessment survey the States filled out did not allow for
States to accurately portray the current State preparedness.
Can you explain more about the self-assessment surveys that
States filled out this year? Did this survey allow Alaska,
specifically, to accurately report its capacity levels in all
31 core capabilities?
When Alaska was developing its preparedness report, was
your office able to solicit input from the local emergency
management and law enforcement personnel and others for input?
In other words, was there time allotted, did you have the
opportunity to get input from the community?
Mr. Madden. Sir, I think that we found ourselves in a
position of collecting far more information and insight than
there was room to put into the State Preparedness Report. The
format was, I understand, limited so that they could quickly
aggregate the 50 States and get the depth and breadth of the
issues.
We worked very strongly with our local jurisdictions, along
with the other disciplines of fire, police. We also worked with
the private sector, with which we have a very powerful--it is a
very strong public-private partnership. We gained the access
that allowed us to increase our effectiveness even if there was
not room for it inside the State Preparedness Report. So it was
of value to us to work broadly and deeply on these issues.
But the return, so far, returns back into the State and
local for us to improve our priorities. It has not yet reached
that level of sophistication where that can be immediately
brought into the National Preparedness Report. That is why I
believe the emphasis has to be on that analysis and problem
solving that the States are using to set our priorities.
Mr. Bilirakis. Very good. Thank you. Appreciate it.
Mr. Sena, in recent years, we have seen a dramatic shift in
the terrorist threat, which now includes plots from homegrown
and lone-wolf actors in addition to attacks formally directed
by al-Qaeda and other affiliates. We must be prepared to
prevent and, if necessary, respond to a variety of techniques,
as you know, including vehicle-borne IEDs, the potential for
secondary attacks to target first responders, or, as we read in
the recent issue of the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the
Inspire magazine, possibly even wildfires.
Given this shift, I believe that first responders like
firefighters should be more fully integrated into the fusion
center network and certainly be included as recipients of
intelligence information. If you can give me some information
on that and give me your opinions on that.
Do fusion centers include local firefighters presently as
recipients of intelligence bulletins and products? Although
many fusion centers in the network include fire services into
the analytic ranks and/or the liaison programs, many, I
understand, do not. In your opinion, what is the best way to
incorporate first responders into the fusion center process?
Then I have one more question for you, as well.
Mr. Sena. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As far as firefighters and--all disciplines should be
incorporated into the fusion center process. Information
sharing is not a solely law enforcement function. It should
include emergency managers, public health, all of the other
disciplines that are available. As far as incorporation in
fusion centers, those disciplines have a perspective that law
enforcement, a person like myself, doesn't quite understand the
needs that they have in the field for their personnel.
As far as the network and dissemination, fire services are
heavily involved in that. The Fire Service Intelligence
Enterprise was actually worked on with a number of firefighters
from New York, Arizona--in fact, one of the firefighters in my
own center worked on that project--to develop how the fire
service would interrelate into this intelligence enterprise
made up of State, local, urban area fusion center partners.
They are very valuable to what we do. They are a group of
people not acting as agents of the Government for, you know,
collection of the data, but if they come across information in
the course of their duties, they have the ability, if trained
properly, to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil
liberties, and move that suspicious activity forward to fusion
centers, where that information can be developed and
potentially be turned over to the Joint Terrorism Task Force.
As far as the issue regarding the emerging threat of the
homegrown violent extremists, traditionally in the intelligence
community and our Federal law enforcement partners, the focus
has been on those external threats. But looking into the
threats coming domestically from those folks who have been
self-radicalized either on-line or by, you know, radicalization
from small cells within the United States, they had at one
point the ability to look beyond, using the intelligence
community tools. But those tools do not work domestically
because, you know, they don't have those resources within the
United States. It is those police officers, firefighters,
emergency medical personnel, public health personnel that will
contact those radicalized individuals. Based on the defined
suspicious activity reporting requirements we have, they will
be able to give us the information we need.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
I am going to ask one last question. In the interest of
time, I wanted to ask Dr. Benjamin, and maybe we can talk
afterwards, Mr. Sena, at another time. Then I want to yield to
the gentleman from New York.
But, Dr. Benjamin, figures from the National Association of
County and City Health Officials show that local health
departments are continuing to struggle in the face of difficult
fiscal times. I am sure you agree. These departments self-
reported that during 2011 they continued to struggle. Fifty-
seven percent of them reduced or eliminated services in at
least one program area. Of 10 areas in public health, emergency
preparedness ranks second-hardest-hit. Your testimony also
reflects concern over this decline in local resources; you
mention that.
What do you think we might want to ask States in the next
preparedness report to perhaps better capture a full picture of
the status of public health security in the United States?
Dr. Benjamin. Yeah, I would think that it would be helpful
to have them report on two or three leading measures about
their capacity to respond to an everyday event. You know, if
they can't respond to an outbreak of--a foodborne outbreak or
something like that, it is going to be very difficult for them
to scale up.
So I think having, you know, us identify two or three
measures that measure their current capacity to do something
routine would, I think, give you a better measure of their
capacity to do broader public health preparedness than us
thinking about--because we often get hung up in thinking about
these big things. When you fill out these kinds of measures,
you are thinking, okay, I can do the small stuff, but I can't
do the big stuff. But if you can't do the small stuff, you will
never get there.
I think that that would be a good way for you to get an
early indicator, which I think is what your committee wants to
do, an early indicator as a red flag that we need to focus in
on that area.
Mr. Bilirakis. Good suggestion. Thank you very much, sir.
Now I will recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Turner, for, within reason, as long as he would like. I will
give you Mr. Marino's time, too.
Mr. Turner. Thirty seconds will be fine.
New York City has no fusion center. Is that a hole in the
fabric of the overall system? Is it something that should be
addressed or corrected? Is it of concern?
Mr. Sena. As fusion centers were developed, it was left up
to the decision of the Governors of each State, urban areas, to
develop their fusion centers. Currently, we have 49 State
centers, we have 2 territorial centers, and 26 urban areas. As
far as the determination of where fusion centers should be, I
believe it should be left up to that region. It is not up to
the Federal Government to decide, but I believe that those
regions should make that decision of whether they need a fusion
center or not.
The State of New York has the New York State Intelligence
Center, which is the fusion center for the State. They cover a
great deal of that area. Right across the way is the New
Jersey--the regional intelligence center, ``the Rock.''
So, between those two centers, there is a great deal of
support. But, you know, I would leave it and say that it is up
to that area of whether they want to develop that attribute.
Mr. Turner. Okay. So my fellow New Yorkers are not being
unnecessarily problematic, eh?
Mr. Sena. I would say that, you know, as far as looking at
gaps in the country, that, you know, bringing fusion centers up
to, you know, beyond baseline capabilities and beyond core
operation capabilities, having that ability to network--saying
that everyone needs a fusion center is not necessarily
something that is a good idea. As I found in my own experience,
the more operations you may have in a very specific area, the
more issues you have with collection, dissemination of
information, and having the proper flow of data.
Mr. Turner. Uh-huh.
Mr. Sena. So it really is up to your city of how they want
to build it.
Mr. Turner. Okay. Diplomatically handled. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
I have one last question, if you don't mind.
Mr. Madden, again, explain and elaborate on how States are
getting the private sector involved in preparation in any
operations.
Then if you guys want to elaborate on that issue, I would
appreciate it. Thank you.
Mr. Madden. Mr. Chairman, Alaska decided early on that we
had a partnership with our private infrastructure. They are
essential to the conduct of our missions and our economy. In
this partnership, we decided not to go sector-by-sector but to
invite the members of the key elements and then expand out. We
have representatives from tourism, from communications, from
transportation, energy.
In our engagement with them, we look at the things that we
have in common. We have recently run a very in-depth analysis
of the effects of a cyber attack on any one of our members, but
looking for the cascading or escalating effects. When we had
our volcanic eruptions in 2009, a volcano very close to
Anchorage, our largest city, what are the effects of this? We
worked it through, and we worked out the effects on maritime
traffic, on public health, on the movement of goods and
services.
Our private sector is very, very eager to do this, and we
are not only sustaining our activities, but we are increasing
them across the State. We use very much of a market-driven
approach, that there is a return on the investment of their
participation. They get not only access to the State so that we
can improve our plans, they get access to each other so they
can support each other on their continuity efforts.
There cannot be a transportation system without energy.
There cannot be an energy system without communications. All of
these things put together is our approach to the private
sector. I believe my approach within Alaska is representative
of many areas around the country.
Mr. Bilirakis. Excellent. Thank you.
Anyone else want to elaborate and talk about that topic?
Otherwise, I would like to give you a couple minutes, if
you would like, to briefly discuss another issue. They just
called for votes, but we have a couple more minutes. I think
they will hold it open for a while.
Anyone else want to talk about that particular issue or
anything else before I----
Dr. Benjamin. Let me just add that the recent pandemic flu
of H1N1 really gave the public health community an opportunity
to work with a broader group than just the health community on
continuity plans, the identification of sick people, reporting
of disease, treating folks, using innovative ways to do disease
control. But it has really opened up an opportunity to do a
dialogue with a much broader part of the public health
community, which I think will be very productive over the next
several years.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
Anyone else.
Mr. Sena. Sir?
Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, please.
Mr. Sena. For the prevention and what we do as fusion
centers, the private sector is critical. They have over 80
percent of what we consider critical infrastructure, key
resources within the country. Having them have the knowledge
and ability to basically create their own fence and defenses,
not in brick structure or, you know, building fences
physically, but in the ability to identify suspicious activity
reporting, to pass that information.
Then, also, to have that confidence that fusion centers in
the Government, going into their facilities to review their
security procedures, evaluate their vulnerabilities to attack,
is critical to what we do.
Also, you know, having the ability to share information
with them, conversely, so that they feel like they are true
partners, as they should be, that is critical to what we do.
Mr. Bilirakis. I agree. It is all voluntary.
Okay. Anyway, if there is nothing else to add, I really
appreciate it very much that you all are here. The testimony
was excellent. Of course, I thank the witnesses for their
testimony and the Members for their questions.
The Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions for you, and we ask that you respond in writing. The
hearing record will be open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. Thank
you again.
[Whereupon, at 1:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions Submitted by Chairman Gus M. Bilirakis for Timothy W. Manning
Question 1. The 9/11 Commission wrote that ``The biggest impediment
to an all-source analysis--a greater likelihood of connecting the
dots--is the human or systematic resistance to information sharing.''
Why in the drafts of the National Planning Frameworks has the
Department of Homeland Security limited information and intelligence
sharing as a core capability for prevention and protection, rather than
as a common core capability across all frameworks?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. A key finding of the report was that the Federal
coordination of medical countermeasure efforts across agencies has
greatly improved since 2001, a topic on which the subcommittee has
focused significant oversight. We have many more countermeasures
available, and improved capacity to distribute and dispense them.
Are you confident, however, that this represents a substantial gain
in preparedness, such that we could get these countermeasures to all of
the people who might need them within the 48-hour window required for
some of the doses? While I think we're all comfortable that we could do
this on a small scale, are you confident that we could do it
effectively on a mass scale of the kind that we worry about in the
homeland security context?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. While the Stafford Act exempts certain activities from
NEPA requirements, according to Section 301, it does not grant a
general authority to waive the requirements for Environmental Impact
Statements (EIS) or Environmental Assessments (EA). Given that the
delays caused by applying for EIS' and EA's has been an impediment to
short- and long-term recovery efforts, has FEMA developed a system to
work with the EPA for expedited applications or a waiver process for
specific activities related to recovery and mitigation?
Is there an MOU process which covers this issue to allow for short-
term construction (housing, temporary public buildings, infrastructure
support) to assist with quickly bringing critical infrastructure
systems back on-line after an event?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Because most critical infrastructure is privately owned
and operated, there is no public assistance available for rapid
restoration. Pursuant to 50 U.S.C. 5172, the President has the
ability to make contributions to a person that owns or operates a
structure deemed to be of a ``National, critical nature''. If the
contribution were to be made, it could only happen after the owner/
operator had applied for and received the full amount of a Small
Business Administration loan.
Has FEMA considered an exception or worked with the White House on
the interpretation of the governing regulations to hasten the recovery
of critical systems post-event without imposing an undue economic or
bureaucratic burden on the owner/operator by virtue of the Title 50
process?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
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