[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
TSA'S SURFACE INSPECTION PROGRAM:
STRENGTHENING SECURITY OR SQUANDERING
SCANT RESOURCES?
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 31, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-95
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Ron Barber, Arizona
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Chairman
Daniel E. Lungren, California Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tim Walberg, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois, Vice Chair Ron Barber, Arizona
Robert L. Turner, New York Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Amanda Parikh, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Vacant, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security........................................ 29
Witnesses
Mr. John O'Connor, Chief of Police, Amtrak Police Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Mr. Howard R. ``Skip'' Elliott, Vice President, Public Safety and
Environment, CSX:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Philip L. Byrd, Sr., President, Bulldog Hiway Express,
Testifying on Behalf of The American Trucking Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. William C. Blankenship, Chief Operating Officer, Greyhound
Lines, Inc.:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Mr. Doug Morris, Director, Safety and Security Operations, Owner-
Operator Independent Drivers Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
TSA'S SURFACE INSPECTION PROGRAM: STRENGTHENING SECURITY OR SQUANDERING
SCANT RESOURCES?
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Thursday, May 31, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:35 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Building, Hon. Mike Rogers [Chairman of
the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Rogers, Cravaack, Turner, Jackson
Lee, Davis, and Richmond.
Mr. Rogers. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security, will come to order.
The committee meeting is to receive testimony on TSA's Surface
Transportation Security Inspection Program.
I want to thank all of our witnesses at the hearing today
for being here. I know it took a lot of time to prepare for it
and to be here, and I do appreciate your willingness to do so.
It is very helpful to us.
Less than 2 percent of TSA's nearly $8 billion budget goes
toward surface. There are two primary reasons for this: First,
we know aviation continues to be a major focus of our enemies.
Second, our surface systems are inherently accessible to
millions of people every day. They have to remain open for many
reasons, not the least of which is to keep our economy on
track. No pun intended.
Having said that, terrorists see surface transportation as
a very attractive target. Since we can't screen everyone and
everything that gets on a train, truck, or bus, intelligence-
sharing deterrence and detection measures are extremely
important.
Since 9/11 there has been a long list of devastating
attacks against mass transit systems worldwide. There have also
been a number of plots against our own transit systems.
Thankfully, the work of our intelligence community and the
vigilance of everyday citizens has helped disrupt these plots.
But that does not mean that we can afford to lose focus.
Regardless of its failings in providing aviation security,
TSA's role is more clearly defined in that environment. On the
other hand, local transit agencies and local law enforcement
take the lead in providing security for surface transportation.
So far TSA has done a good job of making sure it stays that
way.
Unfortunately, it looks like one of the few surface
initiatives TSA is responsible for has not been well received
or well managed. At a hearing held by this subcommittee last
year, industry witnesses voiced their concern with TSA's
surface inspection program. Their concerns sparked our hearing
today.
Over the last several months subcommittee staff has
conducted oversight on the surface inspectors. Here are five of
the problems we know about:
No. 1, most surface inspectors have no surface
transportation experience or surface background whatsoever.
Many surface inspectors were promoted from screening passengers
at airports.
No. 2, these inspectors report to the Federal security
directors at the local airports who commonly also do not
possess any surface transportation experience.
No. 3, at least one local TSA official indicated that he is
always looking for things for his inspectors to do to occupy
their time.
No. 4, most surface inspectors have just two things to look
for on a typical day: Whether a transit system is reporting
incidents to the TSA and whether there is a security person on
duty.
Finally, the work of these inspectors may not be as robust
as reported. According to one former inspector, TSA management
encourages inspectors to record more activities to make it look
like they are busier than they really are. These findings are
disturbing to me. Here we have TSA hiring more and more surface
inspectors, and yet where is the security benefit?
In the last 5 years, the budget for this program has
quadrupled, and in the history of the program only one
situation has ever resulted in punitive fines across the entire
country as a result of these inspections.
Now, I have already stated that TSA has a very limited
amount of money dedicated to surface transportation security.
There are some great programs out there, particularly the
Transit Security Grant Program administered by FEMA. This grant
program allows local transit agencies and law enforcement to
fund counterterrorism teams, canine detection teams, and other
successful initiatives. We owe it to the taxpayer to look close
at the TSA inspectors program and determine whether this is a
good use of limited resources or if this funding would be
better spent on other surface initiatives that are designed to
prevent an attack, keeping in mind that we all want the safest,
most secure transit possible.
Today I look forward to hearing from industry stakeholders
about how the TSA could do a better job of allocating its
surface security resources. No one has more invested in this
than you do.
Normally right now, I would yield to the Ranking Member for
opening statements. She is, as I told the witnesses, is tied up
in the Intelligence Committee and will be in and out. When she
arrives we will turn to her for that.
Now I want go ahead and get started with our witnesses. I
would advise other Members, if they have opening statements,
they can submit them for the record.
We are pleased to have several distinguished witnesses
before us today on this important topic. Let me remind the
witnesses that their entire statements will appear in the
record. Our first witness is Chief John O'Connor who currently
serves as the chief of police for Amtrak. Chief O'Connor has
the responsibility for development of security strategies, the
implementation of security countermeasures, and the delivery of
uniformed investigative and special operations police for
Amtrak. Prior to his current position, Chief O'Connor served as
chief of patrol which followed his assignment as commanding
officer of Amtrak's metropolitan division in New York.
Before joining the Amtrak Police Department in 1998, Chief
O'Connor served with the Long Island Railroad Police
Department, the largest commuter railroad in the United States,
for 25 years. Having risen through the ranks, he retired as
chief of police. The Chairman welcomes back Chief O'Connor and
you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JOHN O'CONNOR, CHIEF OF POLICE, AMTRAK POLICE
DEPARTMENT
Chief O'Connor. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers
and committee Members. It is an honor and a privilege to appear
before this committee. In my opinion, the threat against
surface-based transportation systems is as high as it has ever
been. All too often, we hear news of another overseas attack
or, fortunately, a foiled attack in this country.
The Mineta Institute issued a report last year which
detailed attacks on transit systems since 9/11. It listed more
than 1,800 attacks on bus and rail targets, resulting in over
3,900 deaths and countless injuries. A 2012 Heritage Foundation
report states that in the United States alone, more than 50
terror plots have been foiled since 9/11, many of them targeted
at surface transportation systems. We know that al-Qaeda
continues to urge even more attacks through its magazine
Inspire, as well as through skillful use of the internet. We
must therefore make every reasonable effort to remain vigilant
because the threat is real.
Amtrak's approach to providing for the security of those
who depend on our system is one of prevention, partnership, and
participation. On the prevention side we deploy hundreds of
uniformed officers and investigators at more than 30 locations
around the country. These efforts are all overlayed by special
operations forces which include one of the most skillful canine
units in operation today. Many of our canines have been trained
at Auburn University, which has developed a technique known as
``vapor wake'' for detecting the movement of explosives through
large crowds such as those found at train terminals.
However, no one department can handle the enormity of the
transportation security task at hand. Thus, our emphasis on
partnership. Based initially on a Northeast Corridor coalition,
first formed by NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly, Amtrak has worked
with the TSA to form a network called RAILSAFE which now
coordinates the efforts of more than 200 agencies in over 40
States to protect Amtrak and local transit systems.
Amtrak has also been accepted as an associate member of
RAILPOL, a network of European rail police agencies sharing
best practices to protect our respective systems. Additionally,
we partner closely with the TSA to conduct thousands of joint
baggage screening efforts and VIPR deployments throughout our
system.
We have also turned to our 19,000 employees and the riding
public in an effort to leverage their knowledge and familiarity
with our system. Through a variety of training efforts and
public outreach, we have given our employees and the public
both the tools they need to identify suspicious circumstances
and the means to share their observations with the proper
authorities.
I would like to say that the TSA has been a good Federal
partner. Amtrak's partnership with the TSA has produced
significant improvements in transit security. The TSA has been
at the forefront in many important developments, including VIPR
deployments, joint baggage screening for explosives, the
establishment of a peer advisory group of transit police
chiefs, assisting in directing funding for infrastructure
protection and operational security surges, and the
administration of a base program to assist agencies in the
application of their security efforts. This is only a partial
list, but it is a substantial one.
That being said, in today's tough economic times, I think
it would be prudent to ensure that all of the TSA's efforts
make the best possible use of their respective budget
allocations.
One program in particular that I agree is worth a closer
examination is the Surface Inspection Program. Amtrak's
experience with this program has been somewhat mixed. On the
one hand, the program has been helpful to us in its base
assessment of the Northeast Corridor. On the other hand, Amtrak
has encountered difficulties over interpretation of regulations
by different TSA field offices. Informal inquiry has revealed
mission confusion and disconnects with TSA headquarters at
times.
Today the program is at least partially overseen by some 58
security directors who often have airline security as a higher
priority in their view of their responsibilities. It is not
clear to Amtrak that this is the best structure for surface
transportation, and it is also unclear whether the program, as
funded and structured, continues to add value to the overall
security efforts. Our preference would be that the program take
on a more operational focus.
In closing, I think the TSA deserves high marks for its
surface transportation security efforts, notwithstanding
improvements that could be made to the surface transportation
and inspection program.
I have submitted a written statement for the record and
appreciate the opportunity to share these remarks and would be
glad to answer any questions the committee may have. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Chief O'Connor follows:]
Prepared Statement of John O'Connor
May 31, 2012
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the House Homeland
Security Transportation Security Subcommittee.
I've been dealing with the challenges of rail and transit security
since the beginning of my career. I joined the Long Island Rail Road
Police Department in the early 1970s, and served there before coming to
Amtrak in 1998. Since coming to Amtrak, I've been responsible for the
development of security strategies, the implementation of security
countermeasures, and the delivery of uniformed, investigative, and
special operations police services for Amtrak system-wide. A lot has
changed since I first put on a uniform, and while the task of
developing a safer and more secure passenger rail system has always
been a demanding one, I think we've been fortunate in the support we've
received from our president and chief executive officer, Joe Boardman.
Mr. Boardman takes safety and security issues very seriously, and he
has worked hard to ensure that we have the resources we need to do the
job.
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, every American has become
conscious of the potential for terrorist action, or has heard about the
thwarted attempts of terrorists to conduct attacks within our borders
where more than 50 terror plots have been foiled. Overseas, terror
organizations have repeatedly attacked surface transportation services.
In 2011, the Mineta Institute reported that since the 9/11 attacks,
terrorists have carried out 1,804 attacks on bus and rail targets,
killing more than 3,904 people. For rail, the list of attacks and the
numbers of casualties makes sobering reading:
2003--Yessentuki, Russia--42 killed, 150 injured;
2004--Moscow, Russia--40 killed, 200 wounded;
2004--Madrid, Spain--191 people killed, 1,850 injured;
2005--London, England--52 killed, 700 injured;
2006--Mumbai, India--209 killed, 809 injured;
2008--Mumbai, India--164 killed, 308 injured;
2010--Moscow, Russia--39 killed, 70 injured;
2011--Minsk, Belarus--15 killed, 200 injured.
We know that al-Qaeda continue to urge even more attacks through
its Inspire magazine, the internet, and other means. The above list is
far from complete, for it doesn't include some of the smaller and less
lethal attacks, but it does make something clear: Terrorism as a tactic
is not limited by location, by cause, or by any ethnic or confessional
constraints. It is a tactic used by a wide range of conspiratorial
organizations across the world who are unmoored from any ethical
constraint and who are willing to kill innocent people in the hope that
by so doing, governments and peoples will be forced to alter not just
policies, but their fundamental natures.
With regard to today's hearing, I think that goal is particularly
important, because the purpose of agencies like the TSA is not just to
protect our lives, but our way of life. Over the past decade, Federal
agencies have worked unremittingly to accomplish this end, and I think
it's fair to say, there have been many successes. But, rail
infrastructure continues to be a terrorist target, and consequently, we
will need to have Federal agencies like TSA be leaders in this struggle
and to be a model for law enforcement organizations to emulate.
Clearly, we must make sure we are taking every reasonable effort to
remain vigilant to mitigate this potential threat.
Against this background, Amtrak, through the Amtrak Police
Department (APD), tries to do its part. It has been transformed into a
mobile and fluid department that uses diverse patrol tactics and unique
police operations to improve security on the Amtrak rail system. Our
cornerstone philosophy is predicated on what we call the 3 Ps--
Prevention, Partnerships, and Participation. This approach is designed
to inform and coordinate the efforts of APD, partner law enforcement
agencies ranging from local police forces to the DHS and TSA,
individual employee efforts, and passenger reporting to help keep our
system safe and secure.
In this regard, TSA has been a good Federal partner for APD. They
have supported many APD prevention initiatives, including the expansion
of our canine program of which I am particularly proud. Presently,
Amtrak has over 50 explosive canine detection teams. A portion of these
teams are ``vapor wake'' trained, a new technique which trains one
canine to cover and screen large areas of transportation facilities.
The dog's keen sense of smell is the foundation for this application,
as explosive components can be detected in the residual scent left by
people walking through a station's corridor or platform. As APD has
developed new patrol and counterterrorism tactics by increasing train
riding patrols, instituting random and unpredictable surges, baggage
screenings, and improving police officer training, DHS and TSA grant
programs have provided us with much-needed funding to carry out these
improvements and operations.
From a partnership view, TSA has also been at our side for programs
designed to create greater cooperation and support among all law
enforcement agencies for security issues related to rail surface
transportation. APD and TSA have performed over 1,700 VIPR Operations
and our agencies perform joint baggage screening operations on a
regular basis in many large Amtrak stations, including New York,
Washington, and Chicago.
TSA also supported APD's initiative to start Operation RAILSAFE.
This effort uses deployment exercises and various tactical deployments
to educate State and local agencies about the rail environment on which
their citizens travel and demonstrate organized law enforcement
activities at surface transportation locations. The last RAILSAFE
exercise in April of this year involved 190 agencies in 38 States,
Canada, and the District of Columbia.
Additionally, Amtrak participation programs for employee training
and passenger awareness have been accomplished with DHS/TSA
collaboration and backing.
Other security-supported efforts include:
Voluntary participation in the BASE analysis for the NEC
where Amtrak earned the TSA ``Gold Standard'' designation;
Support for the Northeast Coalition to bring more local
police offices in rail environments and for the APD membership
in RAILPOL to expand intelligence and information sharing with
EC Rail Police agencies;
APD is charter member of the Mass Transit PAG; and
Amtrak is a TSA R&D ``test bed'' agency.
That being said, in today's tough economic times, I think it would
be prudent to ensure that all of TSA's efforts make the best possible
use of their respective budget allocations. One program in particular
that I agree is worth closer examination is the Surface Transportation
Security Inspector program.
Amtrak's experience with this program has been somewhat mixed. On
the one hand, the program has been helpful to us in its BASE assessment
of our Northeast Corridor. On the other hand, Amtrak has encountered
difficulties over interpretation of regulations by different TSA field
offices. Informal inquiry with several offices has revealed mission
confusion and disconnects among offices and TSA HQ's at times. Today,
the program is at least partially overseen by some 68 Federal Security
Directors who often have airline security as a higher priority in their
view of their responsibilities. It is not clear to Amtrak that this is
the best structure for surface transportation, and it is also unclear
whether the program, as funded and structured, continues to add value
to overall security efforts. Our preference would be that the program
take on a more operational focus.
In closing, I think the TSA deserves high marks for its surface
transportation security efforts, notwithstanding improvements that
could be made to its Surface Transportation Inspector program, and I
look forward to answering any questions you may have about our
transportation security program.
Mr. Rogers. I thank you, Chief O'Connor, for your
testimony.
Our second witness is Mr. Skip Elliott, vice president of
public safety and the environment at CSX, and he will be
testifying on behalf of the Association of American Railroads.
Mr. Elliott is a 34-year veteran of the railroad industry.
Prior to joining CSX in 1998, Mr. Elliott worked for
Consolidated Rail Corporation, CONRAIL, the Philadelphia-based
freight railroad, in a variety of capacities in the police
safety and environmental departments.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Elliott for 5 minutes to
summarize his opening statement. Welcome.
STATEMENT OF HOWARD R. ``SKIP'' ELLIOTT, VICE PRESIDENT, PUBLIC
SAFETY AND ENVIRONMENT, CSX
Mr. Elliot. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Members of the
committee. I have been a railroader for 35 years. I currently
serve as vice president of public safety and environment for
CSX Transportation. In that role I am responsible for the
environment, hazardous materials transportation safety, our
railroad police department, homeland security, and industrial
hygiene programs.
I am pleased to be here before you today testifying on
behalf of CSX and the Association of American Railroads on
freight rail security issues in general and on the
Transportation Security Administration's surface transportation
inspection program in particular.
On the topic of post-9/11 industry security action, CSX and
the rail industry remain deeply committed to rail security.
Immediately after 9/11 and well before there was a TSA or DHS,
our industry moved rapidly to voluntarily address the new
threat environment and developed and implemented a highly
regarded unified risk-based approach to security.
On the topic of TSA surface transportation inspectors, TSA
has enacted formal regulations and we support the goals of
these regulations and are committed to full compliance. That
said, we have several concerns regarding the TSA surface
transportation inspection program. First, CSX is troubled by
the lack of consistency by its surface inspectors on the
regulatory requirements for moving hazardous materials by rail.
We frequently encounter surface inspectors who apply provisions
of the regulations in different ways. Actions accepted as
compliant by some TSA field officers are labeled as violations
that produce official citations by others. This is troubling to
CSX as we strive to ensure consistent security practices
through a rail network that spans 21,000 miles of track in 23
States and encompasses over 13,000 local jurisdictions. Our
counterparts at other railroads indicate that this is not just
an issue for CSX.
Second, it is unfortunate that inspectors' enforcement
efforts routinely focus on minor paperwork issues that elevate
administrative errors to the level of serious infractions,
generating official letters of investigation that threaten a
$10,000 fine. For example, the regulation mandates chain-of-
custody requirements for railcars carrying toxic inhalation
chemicals. CSX has received warnings for noncompliance with the
chain-of-custody rule because the names of the employees were
not spelled the same on the forms that we use, times were off
by several minutes, and the names of the commodities were
inserted in the wrong location in the form.
Administrative inconsistencies such as variations in
spellings due to the verbal exchange of names, as allowed by
the law, does not present a meaningful security breach. In
fact, CSX had been praised by inspectors for providing
flawless, positive, and secure hand-off of these chemicals only
to receive violations for very minor administrative errors.
We believe that the lack of consistency and standardization
in inspection priorities and activities are related to the TSA
organizational construct. Surface inspectors do not report to
the TSA freight rail branch, to a TSA headquarters official
responsible for surface transportation, or regional security
inspector appointed to be a liaison with the railroads on
surface transportation issues.
Mr. Chairman, as you indicated, surface inspectors report
to Federal security directors whose primary focus is on
aviation security.
On the topic of information sharing and technology, we
asked the committee to encourage TSA's on-going efforts to
improve the quality and timeliness of actionable intelligence
analysis for the rail sector. These products will support the
efforts of railroad security professionals and TSA in focusing
on truly significant threats and concerns.
Finally, current TSA security regulations are mired in
cumbersome and manual procedures as evidenced by the chain-of-
custody rule. We encourage TSA to incorporate modern technology
approaches that provide better, more robust security
enhancements for freight rail transportation. The U.S. freight
rail industry is quickly expanding its technology solutions for
safety and security, and TSA needs to follow suit.
In conclusion, we recognize the complexity of challenges
faced both by the Government and U.S. rail industry in ensuring
the safe and secure movement of people and products in a post-
9/11 world. We look forward to working with this committee and
TSA, and we appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on
this important topic. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Elliott follows:]
Prepared Statement of Howard R. ``Skip'' Elliott
May 31, 2012
On behalf of CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX) and the Association of
American Railroads (AAR), thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss freight rail security issues in general and
the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) rail inspection
program in particular.
CSX operates a freight rail network spanning approximately 21,000
miles, with service to 23 eastern States, the District of Columbia, and
two Canadian provinces. We are part of a 140,000-mile U.S. freight rail
network that serves nearly every industrial, wholesale, retail,
agricultural, and mining-based sector of our economy. Whenever
Americans grow something, eat something, mine something, make
something, turn on a light, or get dressed, CSX or some other freight
railroad is probably involved somewhere along the line.
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Amtrak and several commuter railroads are members of the AAR and
they work in concert with CSX and other freight railroads on security
matters. Indeed, the rail industry has established a dedicated Freight
and Passenger Coordinating Committee, for which security is a primary
area of emphasis. However, my testimony today will focus on freight
railroads. My understanding is that Amtrak will present its own
testimony at this hearing.
Assuring the security of our rail network requires a multi-faceted,
cooperative effort that taps the full range of capabilities in the
private sector and at all levels of government--including, of course,
at the TSA--and applies them to best effect to assure preparedness and
to deter and respond to acts of terrorism. CSX and our Nation's other
railroads work continuously to meet this objective.
At the same time, railroads want rail security to continue to
improve, and they are always willing to work cooperatively with Members
of this committee, others in Congress, the TSA, other agencies in the
Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Railroad Administration,
rail labor, and others to find practical, effective ways to make this
happen.
the rail industry security plan
Last fall our Nation observed the 10th anniversary of the tragic 9/
11 attacks. In previous appearances before this and other committees,
rail industry representatives have detailed the many actions the
industry took in the aftermath of those attacks.\1\ I won't repeat
those particulars here, but it is well-documented that the rail
industry voluntarily developed and implemented a Terrorism Risk
Analysis and Security Management Plan, a comprehensive, intelligence-
driven, priority-based blueprint of actions designed to enhance
railroad security. The plan was adopted by the rail industry in
December 2001 and remains in effect today. And much has been done since
the initial voluntary efforts by the rail industry following September
11, 2001.
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\1\ See, for example, the statement of Edward R. Hamberger of the
AAR before the Committee on Homeland Security on March 6, 2007, and the
statement of Thomas L. Farmer of the AAR before the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection on July 12, 2011.
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This means that before there was a TSA, before there was a DHS, the
railroads had developed and implemented a unified, risk-based approach
to security based on terrorism alert levels and progressively
increasing protective measures to elevate preparedness to counter and
respond to threats.
The security plan is not simply something that has been put on a
shelf to be taken down and dusted off occasionally. Rather, it is a
robust and dynamic paradigm for rail operations that is evaluated and
modified, as necessary, to ensure maximum continued effectiveness and
includes network-wide risk assessments and asset specific
countermeasures focused on people, process, and technology. A
comprehensive review completed in 2009 evaluated the plan's guiding
assumptions, risk methodology, and countermeasures, yielding an updated
version that took effect in November of that year. Since then, as the
nature of the terrorist threat has evolved, the plan has been reviewed
to ensure its continuing effectiveness. As the Federal Government has
adjusted its procedures--most recently on terrorism alerts with the
adoption of the National Terrorism Advisory System--the rail industry
has made sure that its plan's alert-level process and accompanying
protective measures align well with the new Federal procedures.
Regular exercises, conducted both industry-wide and by the
railroads individually, appraise the effectiveness of the industry's
security plan. Lessons learned from these exercises and from actual
security-related incidents help ensure that the plan continues to
evolve to meet changing circumstances and needs.
The most recent industry-wide exercise occurred on October 13,
2011. For that event, the industry invited direct participation by
several Federal entities--including the TSA, DHS, FBI, and the FRA--
specifically to assure effective implementation of an efficient,
understandable, and sustainable process for sharing intelligence on
security threats and incidents by Federal Government agencies with the
rail industry.
the rail security working committee
A standing industry committee, comprised of senior railroad
executives, security officials, and police chiefs, coordinates the rail
industry's overall security effort. Supported by AAR's security staff,
this group--known as the Rail Security Working Committee--reflects the
industry's on-going commitment to working in a coordinated fashion,
with participation by all the major railroads.
Through monthly consultations, the committee identifies issues of
concern, develops appropriate responses to those issues, and works with
public-sector partners to implement solutions. The review, exercise,
and continuous improvement of the industry security plan, outlined
above, are a vital facet of the committee's functions. For example, the
committee has developed and implemented an industry-wide emergency
notification system to provide immediate awareness to railroads of the
most significant security incidents affecting a freight or passenger
train. The notification system has been successfully tested twice
already this year.
The committee also participates in open and candid discussions with
TSA's Freight Rail Branch on current programs and initiatives, future
priorities, and prevailing security issues and concerns, including
those discussed further below. This continuing dialogue, which is held
under the auspices of the Freight Rail Branch's Intermodal Security
Training and Exercise Program (I-STEP), sustains constructive
relationships and effective communication between the railroads'
security and law enforcement officials and their counterparts in the
Government.
information sharing
Useful intelligence and security information must be shared in a
timely, effective, and consistent manner if rail security efforts are
to succeed. In this regard, railroads helped build and maintain two key
resources focused on security information needs.
The first--the Surface Transportation Information Sharing and
Analysis Center (ST-ISAC)--was formed by the rail industry in 2002 at
the request of the U.S. Department of Transportation. Working in secure
facilities, ST-ISAC operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week at up to the
top-secret level to collect, analyze, and distribute security
information from a wide range of Government, academic, media sources.
With the high profile that cybersecurity concerns have garnered
recently, it is important to note the vital role the ST-ISAC plays to
help protect rail information technology systems and physical assets
from attack. Each day, the ST-ISAC issues several advisories to the
railroads addressing potential vulnerabilities in specific software or
equipment and providing guidance on protective measures. These
materials provide timely awareness of current or emerging threats and
concerns and inform the sustained preparedness that is the essential
foundation of the railroads' coordinated approach to cybersecurity.
The second resource is the Railway Alert Network (RAN). The RAN
serves as the rail industry's intelligence and security information
center. Each day, its staff reviews intelligence, including classified
information, from a broad range of sources and provides railroads with
notice of and security advisories on rail-related threats, incidents,
and suspicious activity.
In addition, because security threats and incidents impacting
railroads can emerge in other critical infrastructure sectors, the RAN
works with a private-sector coordination group and other DHS components
to ensure that railroads have relevant information on homeland security
concerns generally.
The RAN's products include a concise brief produced each day in
concert with the American Public Transportation Association and the ST-
ISAC called the Transit and Rail Intelligence Awareness Daily (TRIAD)
as well as focused security awareness messages that address rail
security implications of threats, incidents, disrupted plots, and
intelligence analyses. Examples of the RAN's output have been provided
to this subcommittee for your information and reference prior to this
hearing. The RAN shares most of the materials it produces and
disseminates with our Federal partners and with appropriate local and
State authorities.
Information sharing is a two-way street, though, and unfortunately,
CSX and the rail industry have found that information sharing by
various Government agencies with the rail industry is plagued by
persistent difficulties in timeliness, practical security relevance,
and means of dissemination. Railroads provide a plethora of security-
related information every day to various Governmental entities, but
this reporting yields comparatively very little in analyses of security
value for the industry.
The reporting to the Transportation Security Operations Center
(TSOC) is a case in point. By regulation, railroads report
``significant security concerns'' to TSOC. There does not seem to be
any process in place for analysis of these reports, and those in other
surface transportation modes, for trends or other indicators of
concern. Nor do the criteria for this mandated reporting align with
those applied by the rest of DHS, the FBI, and the Office of Director
of National Intelligence in the cross-sector Nation-wide Suspicious
Activity Reporting Initiative. Common reporting parameters, which the
Rail Security Working Committee has formally proposed, would facilitate
the inter-agency analysis and cross-sector sharing that is essential to
continuous situation awareness and sustained security preparedness.
Railroads are proud of their ability to react quickly and
decisively in the face of credible intelligence impacting the rail
network. However, the sluggishness and inconsistency with which we
receive important intelligence information hinders our ability to
respond to potential threats. Railroads will continue to work amicably
and professionally with our public-sector partners to resolve this
problem. Demonstrative of this commitment, and worthy of commendation,
is a new initiative by TSA's Office of Intelligence, announced at a
joint I-STEP meeting held in Newark this past March. That office has
adopted the rail industry's most significant intelligence requirement
as a priority in its analyses, shifting focus to thorough review of
past terrorist attacks, failed attempts, and disrupted plots that have
targeted rail worldwide--passenger and freight--for lessons learned and
inferences on likely future tactics in order to inform more effective
and sustainable security measures and actions. TSA analysts will
consult with rail industry security leads in the development of these
products. We will work in concert to ensure their effective
dissemination, integrating local and State law enforcement departments
as a means of fostering informed partnerships for security enhancement.
This coordinated effort flows directly from consultations in the joint
I-STEP meetings sponsored by TSA's Freight Rail Branch--and puts into
practical application Assistant Secretary John Pistole's commitment
that TSA is an intelligence-focused agency.
working with the tsa and tsa's rail security inspectors
CSX believes that partnerships are key to effective security
planning and enhancing public safety, and that this cooperation
provides lasting benefits to our employees and to the communities we
serve. I'm sure the other freight railroads agree with us on this
point. I'm also sure that, like CSX, the other railroads are proud of
the collaborative working relationship the industry has developed in
recent years with the TSA, DHS, and other Government entities.
This collaborative relationship is manifest in a variety of ways.
For example, TSA's Freight Rail Branch has initiated recurring
coordination meetings with railroads. As demonstrated by the progress
on the rail industry intelligence requirement, this forum fosters
effective communication and problem solving, and we commend the Freight
Rail Branch for establishing them via the I-STEP process. The most
recent coordination meeting took place in Newark, New Jersey, during
March 7-8, 2012.
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Railroads also work effectively with TSA on a variety of training-
related issues. For example, the Transportation Technology Center, Inc.
(TTCI), a wholly-owned subsidiary of the AAR in Pueblo, Colorado, is
the world's finest rail research facility. Among many other things,
TTCI trains thousands of emergency responders each year from all over
the country. Taking advantage of TTCI's expertise, TSA has been using
TTCI for employee training since 2006. In fact, more than 2,100 TSA
participants have trained at TTCI to date, in such areas as ``Railroads
101,'' hazmat transportation, motor carrier security and safety
compliance, and basic explosives. In 2010, TSA opened its own dedicated
facility at TTCI, though it continues to draw upon the expertise of
TTCI personnel in railroad training and orientation programs. The
industry values this effective partnership.
The cornerstone of CSX's public-private partnerships is sharing our
highly-specialized secure Network Operations Workstation
(``SecureNOW'') with Federal and State homeland security officials. The
SecureNOW system is a proprietary, secure on-line computer tool used to
monitor, identify, and respond to rail security and emergency issues
throughout the CSX network. This system, developed by CSX, provides CSX
employees and trained State homeland security and public agency
officials with a tool to promptly identify the location and status of
CSX trains and rail cars on our network. SecureNOW allows trained
security and public agency officials in several States to independently
track the location of CSX trains and the contents of the rail cars in
those trains in a nearly real-time environment. Before, officials
needed to telephone CSX to access this information.
CSX's SecureNOW system and our approach to information sharing
helps homeland security officials prepare for and--if needed--respond
to emergency situations. Access to SecureNOW also provides State and
Federal officials with additional information about what is carried on
our rails, and State officials can more efficiently allocate law
enforcement resources, coordinate with CSX security officials, and
integrate rail security into on-going law enforcement operations.
In fact, CSX has entered into partnerships with two Federal
entities--the TSA's TSOC and the DOT's Crisis Management Center. This
allows trained Federal homeland security officials to have nearly real-
time information regarding the location of CSX trains and the contents
of the rail cars transported on our lines. In addition to these Federal
partnerships, CSX also has partnerships for access to SecureNOW with
New York, New Jersey, Kentucky, Maryland, Indiana, Ohio, Georgia,
Florida. These partnerships formalize and enhance CSX's on-going
commitment to these States and Federal agencies to share information,
resources, and strategies in order to better protect the communities in
which CSX operates.
There are many other examples of successful cooperative initiatives
involving the TSA and railroads, and railroads appreciate the TSA for
its role in ensuring these successes. That said, we respectfully
suggest that there are also some areas where additional progress could
and must be made.
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For example, as Members of this committee know, the TSA has fielded
more than 400 ``Surface Transportation Security Inspectors'' (STSIs)
whose duty is to ``assist surface transportation carriers, operators,
owners, entities, and facilities to enhance their security against
terrorist attack and other security threats and to assist the Secretary
in enforcing applicable surface transportation security regulations and
directives.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 6 USC 1113.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Freight railroads readily acknowledge that the rail inspection
program is well intended. At the same time, though, CSX and the rail
industry have several concerns regarding the surface transportation
inspection program.
First, CSX is very troubled by the lack of consistency in STSIs'
interpretation of, and action on, regulatory requirements, especially
with respect to the transport of hazardous materials. Different TSA
STSIs have interpreted specific provisions of the Rail Transportation
Security Rule in different ways, and provided contradictory guidance
regarding what actions are and are not acceptable in meeting the rule's
requirements. Actions accepted as compliant by some TSA field offices
have been labeled violations that produce official citations by others.
Indeed, CSX and other railroads have found that TSA field offices, and
STSIs often disagree on how to interpret the rule. CSX and other
railroads have also seen disparities between the policies and
guidelines issued by TSA's Freight Rail Branch and the actions of TSA
inspectors in the field. Sometimes, STSIs are not even aware of
policies that have been clearly expressed by the Freight Rail Branch to
the railroads they're inspecting.
Second, it is unfortunate that STSIs' enforcement efforts seem to
focus on issues that, frankly, are fairly trivial and do not represent
meaningful homeland security breaches. For example, the Rail
Transportation Security Rule requires that shippers, receivers, and
carriers of hazardous materials implement ``chain of custody''
requirements for rail cars carrying certain highly hazardous materials.
Among other things, the transfer of custody from a shipper to a
railroad, from one railroad to another railroad, and from a railroad to
a receiver must be documented, with the railroad identifying by name
the individual with the interchanging railroad, the shipper, or the
receiver who is present at the time of transfer of custody. CSX has
received warnings for non-compliance with the chain of custody rule
because the names of the individuals attending the transfer of custody
were not spelled the same way as the names on the interchanging
railroad's form, even if they were phonetically identical.
CSX respectfully suggests that variations in the spelling of the
names of the individuals attending the transfer of custody do not
present a meaningful security breach, especially since the STSIs
frequently have witnessed the properly executed transfer of custody and
because spelling variations are inevitable when information is verbally
exchanged (as specifically allowed by TSA guidance on the issue). In
fact, these warnings for misspelling have been brought forth by STSIs
who, at the same time, offer praise for the execution of a flawless
person-to-person hand-off of these chemicals, attesting to compliance
with the intended security enhancement of the regulation.
This example is not isolated. Experience at other freight railroads
is similar. The inspections focus overwhelmingly on paperwork,
elevating administrative errors to the level of official letters of
investigation sent to railroads expressly citing the prospect of a
$10,000 fine. To be candid, this type of approach to regulatory
enforcement impugns the integrity of the hardworking professionals who
strive very hard every day at CSX and other railroads to perform vital
transportation services safely, efficiently, and in often difficult
conditions. More importantly, situations like this breed distrust and
ill feelings for no good reason. They certainly do not advance the
cause of security enhancement. Furthermore, as the U.S. freight rail
system continues to advance its use of technology and paperless
processes, TSA's implementation of a regulation that adheres to the use
of cumbersome manual procedures is inconsistent with modern-day
security solutions. CSX respectfully suggests that TSA resources should
be focused on technology solutions that can provide bona fide
enhancements to freight rail and National security.
We believe that the lack of consistency and standardization in
inspection priorities and activities noted above is related to the
organizational hierarchy regarding the STSIs. Our understanding is that
STSIs do not report to the TSA Freight Rail Branch or to a TSA
headquarters official responsible for surface transportation. Rather,
STSIs report to Federal Security Directors (``FSD'') in the field who
primarily focus on aviation security and lack the subject matter
expertise on surface transportation regulations and policies. This
arrangement promotes inconsistency of understanding, application, and
enforcement of security regulations and policies. Although TSA
appointed Regional Security Inspectors (RSIs) to be liaisons to the
railroads on surface transportation issues, the RSIs are not in the
chain of command of the STSIs in the field or the TSA Freight Rail
Branch and therefore lack the authority to resolve these issues or the
ability to provide meaningful subject matter guidance on freight rail
security issues. The appointment letters sent to the railroads in April
2010 state the RSIs are the ``technical specialist within OSO [Office
of Security Operations] at the National level for compliance oversight
activities'' and serve as ``points of contact for the Class I and
Regional Railroads for matters of regulatory compliance,'' with the
goal ``to ensure consistent application of regulations both nationally
and across a railroad's operating system.'' The railroads have
advocated strongly in joint meetings held by TSA, at which officials of
OSO have participated, for integration of the RSIs into the oversight
role defined in their appointment letters. In practice, the RSIs have
not ever actually played this role.
Finally, CSX is also concerned that STSIs directly engage rail
employees in the field without communicating or coordinating with the
designated Rail Security Coordinator (``RSC''). The Rail Transportation
Security Rule requires railroads (and other covered entities) to
designate one primary and at least one alternate Rail Security
Coordinator (RSC) at the corporate level. At least one RSC must be
available to TSA 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The RSC serves as the
``primary contact for intelligence information and security-related
activities and communications with TSA.'' Additionally, the RSC is to
coordinate ``security practices and procedures with appropriate law
enforcement and emergency response agencies.''
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If STSIs identify issues in the field, they should be communicating
with the headquarters-based RSC, since the STSIs lack the authority and
means to address the issues with our employees in the field. As TSA
explained in the preamble to the final rule, ``the RSC must be in a
position to understand security problems, raise issues with corporate
leadership, and recognize when emergency response action is
appropriate.'' Indeed, CSX headquarters personnel cannot take steps to
address issues identified by TSA in the field if TSA does not
communicate those issues to us. Our discussions with our counterparts
at other railroads indicate this is not just an issue for CSX.
visible intermodal prevention and response teams (vipr)
The rail industry acknowledges the potential value of the VIPR
program's random and unpredictable security measures for deterrence and
disruption of terrorist planning and preparations. Indeed, some
railroads have hosted deployments and derived substantial benefits from
the visible security enhancement. We remain concerned, though, about
inconsistency in the implementation of this program--both in management
(conflicts and duplications between TSA field offices) and in execution
of operations (continuing instances of inadequate notice to and
coordination with railroads on operations).
In September 2011, the Rail Security Working Committee defined
protocols to govern the conduct of VIPR operations with freight
railroads. These protocols, which comport with the provisions of the
authorizing legislation for the VIPR program, consist of the following
key points:
Prior notice to the Rail Security Coordinator (RSC) by TSA
of all proposed VIPR deployments at least 2 weeks in advance,
unless a credible threat or other emergency circumstances
dictate otherwise.
To assure consistency, efficiency, and timeliness,
coordination with the RSC to be made by the TSA RSI for the
participating freight railroad.
Rail safety training and orientation for all participants in
the operation.
Joint development by TSA and the affected railroad(s) of the
operations plan for each VIPR deployment or group of
deployments.
Integration of local law enforcement in the VIPR
deployment(s) to foster informed partnerships and elevated
preparedness for joint security enhancement actions.
Clearly stated risk-based justifications for the
deployments.
Priority attention in joint planning and execution of VIPR
deployments at or near the approaches to security control
points identified in the rail network identified by TSA's
Freight Rail Branch in assessments conducted with the
railroads.
The freight railroads are applying these protocols. However, a
formal agreement with TSA has proven elusive, apparently due to
differences amongst the main offices within the agency involved in the
VIPR program.
conclusion
CSX and others in the rail industry recognize and sincerely
appreciate the diligent efforts made by TSA, and the many other local,
State, and Federal personnel who work hard every day to help keep our
rail network, and our Nation in general, safe and secure. We share
their goals. Safety and security are, and will remain, our top
priority.
That said, we recognize that the freight rail industry and the
National security environment in which we operate are continually
changing and new challenges appearing. Effective security enhancement
can only happen if all stakeholders are on the same page and if
sufficient consideration is given to the real-world effects (including
unintended consequences) possible approaches to security policy can
have. Genuine, open communication between railroads and Government
security personnel can not only lead to practical solutions, but can
also open the door to solutions that might not otherwise have been
apparent.
CSX and other freight railroads look forward to continuing to
engage in constructive, meaningful dialogue with Members of this
committee, TSA, DHS, and others to ensure that our Nation's railroads
remain the most productive, the most efficient, and the safest and most
secure in the world.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you Mr. Elliott for your testimony.
Our third witness, Mr. Phillip Byrd, currently serves as
president of Bulldog Hiway Express. I like that name.
Mr. Byrd. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. He is testifying on behalf of the American
Trucking Association. Mr. Byrd previously served as chairman of
the South Carolina Trucking Association in addition to being
the chairman of the South Carolina Maritime Association and
Charleston Motor Carrier Association. Further, as president and
CEO of a 50-year-old trucking firm, Mr. Byrd is also a member
of the board of directors of the American Trucking Association.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Byrd for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF PHILIP L. BYRD, SR., PRESIDENT, BULLDOG HIWAY
EXPRESS, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN TRUCKING
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Byrd. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Rogers and Members of the subcommittee, thank you
for the opportunity to testify today on TSA's surface
transportation inspection program. My name is Phil Byrd, and I
am president and CEO of Bulldog Hiway Express, a company based
in Charleston, South Carolina. Today I am also testifying on
behalf of the American Trucking Association, where I presently
serve as vice chairman.
First, I want to thank this subcommittee for addressing the
continued multiplicity of background checks for commercial
drivers. ATA is a strong supporter of the Modern Security
Credentials Act and my hope is that Congress will soon pass
this bill to bring some common sense to our Government's
security credentialing process. Again, I thank you for your
support and leadership on this issue.
ATA and its members participate in many industry and
Government efforts to enhance security in the highway sector.
For example we meet on a quarterly basis, together with
community stakeholders, TSA officials and other Government
counterparts to increase communications and share ideas to
improve the security of our highways. Such initiatives are
essential to further enhancing cooperation and coordination
between industry and Government agencies.
ATA has followed with some interest TSA's efforts to
establish higher visibility operations in surface
transportation. These efforts have focused on the use of the
Visible Intermodal Preparedness and Response program, also
known as VIPR teams. ATA became aware of the VIPR team highway
exercise in Georgia and in Tennessee, mostly through the media.
It is important to note that ATA supports such operations as
long as they are based on intelligence or specific risks that
require increased vigilance and security on our highways. At a
recent meeting, TSA officials informed industry that the
presence of VIPR teams at highway facilities, such as weigh
stations, was not due to any specific threat or intelligence.
Rather, TSA stated that the VIPR teams were invited by State
law enforcement agencies to augment their security
capabilities. ATA was informed that during the highway
operations, VIPR teams distributed information to commercial
drivers about reporting suspicious activities that they might
witness while on duty. Deploying VIPR resources for such a
purpose seems contrary to TSA Assistant Secretary Pistole's
objectives of employing risk-based, intelligence-driven
operations to prevent terrorist attacks and reduce
vulnerabilities. ATA fully agrees with Mr. Pistole's approach
for deploying agency resources.
Though the VIPR highway operations made media headlines,
the same cannot be said of the results of these activities.
This committee should request reports describing the results of
the VIPR highway operations as well as other similar
initiatives. The report should detail the specific objectives
of such operations and their results. Only when such
information is provided will this committee, TSA officials, and
industry representatives be able to assess the cost and
benefits of undertaking such operations.
Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify before
the committee, and I am pleased to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Byrd follows:]
Prepared Statement of Philip L. Byrd, Sr.
May 31, 2012
introduction
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee on Transportation Security, thank you for the opportunity
to testify today on TSA's Surface Transportation Inspection Program. My
name is Phil Byrd and I am president and CEO of Bulldog Hiway Express,
a company based in Charleston, South Carolina. Founded in 1959, Bulldog
Hiway Express is an intermodal motor carrier that moved the first
container to come off a vessel in the Port of Charleston. The company
has approximately 200 power units, 350 trailers, and 250 employee-
drivers.
Today, I am also testifying on behalf of the American Trucking
Associations (ATA) where I presently serve as vice chairman. ATA was
founded in 1933 and serves as the Nation's preeminent organization
representing the interests of the U.S. trucking industry. Directly and
through its affiliated organizations, ATA encompasses over 37,000
companies and every type and class of motor carrier operation.
As a longstanding ATA member, I have served on various committees
within the association including as chairman of its Homeland Security
Policy Committee (HSPC) and as vice chairman of its Intermodal Motor
Carriers Conference (IMCC). In those capacities, I have had the
pleasure to testify before this committee on a number of issues and I
am pleased to testify today on efforts to secure our surface
transportation operations.
First, I want to recognize this subcommittee's Members for their
efforts and bipartisan leadership in addressing the continued
multiplicity of Security Threat Assessments (STA) that commercial
drivers undergo to deliver America's freight. ATA and its members
strongly support enacting the MODERN Security Credentials Act of 2011
and we look forward to Congress passing this important legislation.
This issue remains ATA's top security policy priority for its potential
to bring relief to millions of truck drivers and thousands of trucking
companies from unnecessary and overlapping background checks and the
resulting excessive costs.
The trucking industry is an integral component of our economy,
earning more than 80% of U.S. freight revenues and employing
approximately 7 million workers in trucking-related jobs, including
over 3 million commercial drivers. It is important to note that the
trucking industry is comprised primarily of small businesses, with 97%
of trucking companies operating 20 trucks or less, and 90% operating
six trucks or less.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ American Trucking Associations, American Trucking Trends 2012
(March 2012).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
highway sector supports strong national and economic security
The U.S. highway and motor carrier sector has been defined by the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as one of 19 Critical
Infrastructures/Key Resources (CI/KR). In 2006, various private-sector
highway-related organizations established the Highway and Motor Carrier
Sector Coordinating Council (SCC). The SCC works in partnership with
public-sector representatives established under a counterpart
Government Coordinating Council (GCC) under the auspices of the
Critical Infrastructure Protection Advisory Committee (CIPAC). The SCC
and GCC have met for the past 6 years on a quarterly basis to share
ideas and exchange information to improve the security of the Nation's
highways. In addition to the SCC, ATA and its members participate in
many industry and Government-led initiatives focused on enhancing
security and ensuring an open and efficient transportation system to
deliver America's freight.
Although a decade has passed since the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, our Nation continues to maintain a steady level of
alertness by implementing a number of initiatives, both domestically
and abroad, to prevent our enemies from planning and executing further
terrorist attacks against us. To further mitigate the risks of future
attacks, we must continue to strengthen cooperation between Government
agencies and private-sector entities, improve coordination among
Federal, State, and local governments, and we must coordinate closely
with our international trade partners.
tsa efforts to secure surface transportation highway mode
In addition to various security regulations that TSA has
implemented, many directly impacting the highway sector, TSA has
initiated efforts to increase its operational presence throughout the
transportation sector. For example, last October it was widely reported
that TSA deployed Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR)
teams at several locations along highways in Tennessee.\2\ A similar
``counter-terrorism exercise'' was conducted in the fall of 2010 in
Douglas County, Georgia on Interstate 20 which also involved the
participation of VIPR teams with commercial vehicles stopped and
inspected.\3\ According to media reports, the inspections that took
place in Georgia involved more intensive inspections, including sending
trucks through equipment measuring radiation.
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\2\ http://www.newschannel5.com/story/15725035/officials-claim-
tennessee-becomes-first-state-to-deploy-vipr-statewide.
\3\ http://www.wsbtv.com/news/news/counter-terror-operation-stops-
trucks-on-i-20/nFCry/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At a meeting of the Highway Motor Carrier SCC and GCC earlier this
month, TSA officials informed industry representatives that no specific
intelligence or threat information compelled TSA to mobilize VIPR teams
for these operations at highway facilities including commercial vehicle
weigh stations. Rather, TSA officials stated that the VIPR teams were
present at such locations at the invitation of State law enforcement
entities, such as the Tennessee Highway Patrol, to augment the security
capabilities of State law enforcement personnel and to increase the
visibility of such operations.
ATA does not oppose TSA mobilizing VIPR teams within the surface
transportation arena as long as such mobilizations are undertaken to
increase the level and presence of law enforcement personnel based on
sound intelligence that warrant a heightened level of security.
However, it seems that the presence of VIPR teams in Tennessee last
October was not based on any specific threat or intelligence calling
for an increase presence of security personnel. Instead, it appears
that the VIPR teams were present to distribute information to
commercial drivers about means to report suspicious activities they
might witness while performing their duties.
As a key agency within DHS, TSA can have a positive impact by
strengthening the partnership with private-sector counterparts,
including the development of security initiatives or training
exercises. Unfortunately, it appears that the objectives of the VIPR
team operations that took place in Tennessee did not follow a
fundamental goal enunciated by TSA's leadership. On June 2, 2011,
Assistant Secretary John Pistole made the following statement at a
hearing before this committee:
``TSA employs risk-based, intelligence-driven operations to prevent
terrorist attacks and to reduce the vulnerability of the Nation's
transportation system to terrorism . . . TSA works collaboratively with
industry partners to develop and implement programs that promote
commerce while enhancing security and mitigating the risk to our
Nation's transportation system.''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Pistole, John S.; Statement before the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security, June 2, 2011, p. 1.
ATA fully agrees with Mr. Pistole's approach and we are ready to
work with him, his TSA colleagues, and other Federal agencies to
improve the security and safety of the transportation sector using a
risk-based approach. Because both Government and private-sector
resources are finite, it is critical that such resources are dedicated
to programs and operations in areas that face a constant heightened
level of risk or in sectors where sound intelligence and specific
threat analysis indicate a need for increased security.
If TSA is going to conduct operations or exercises as those
described in Georgia and Tennessee, ATA requests that the agency inform
trusted industry representatives, such as SCC members, that such
initiatives are likely to take place in particular time frames and
geographic areas to ensure commercial trucking operations can plan
accordingly and not face unnecessary disruptions for time-sensitive
deliveries. Also, involving or raising awareness about such operations
with trucking companies could improve the outcomes of such exercises,
especially if the goal of such operations is to provide commercial
drivers with information about security awareness.
In regards to outcomes, ATA further recommends that this committee
require TSA to report and provide specific information about the
results of such VIPR highway operations, and any other similar
initiatives that the agency implements in the surface transportation
sector. Such reports should clarify if the operations were conducted
due to specific intelligence or threat information, or if such
operations were conducted simply as training or information exercises.
These reports would provide valuable information regarding the costs
and benefits of such exercises and efforts, and should also provide TSA
with valuable information regarding potential improvements and the
actual value of undertaking VIPR operations in the highway environment.
conclusion
As this committee considers the present security challenges within
the surface transportation sector and how to mitigate these risks, ATA
reiterates the importance of improving communication between industry
and the various levels of Government to strengthen our security posture
and capabilities.
The private sector and Government share a strong mutual goal of
impeding any potential terrorist attacks on our Nation. At a similar
hearing before this committee last year, ATA described how an alert
trucking company employee prevented a terrorist plot involving
explosives. In that case, the employee recognized and researched some
of the materials listed in a package and alerted the company's security
team. Federal law enforcement personnel were brought in and the would-
be terrorist was eventually arrested when he tried to pick up the
package.
As with other terrorist plots inside the United States, this event
garnered much media attention. One media outlet described the events
that transpired as follows:
``In the end, it wasn't a TSA agent, a Homeland Security operative or
an FBI agent who first spotted alleged terror plotter Khalid Ali-M
Aldawsari. It was the employees of a private shipping company.
According to the government, somebody at the shipping company called
local police after becoming suspicious about a chemical package that
Aldawsari was set to receive.
``Meanwhile, officials at the chemical company that sent the material
called the FBI with their suspicions about Aldawsari--and later worked
with an FBI agent who posed undercover as a company employee in
dealings with the suspect.''\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``How Two Companies Stopped a Terror Suspect'', CNBC.com;
February 24, 2011; http://m.cnbc.com/us_news/41766933.
This incident underlines the fact that industry, just as much as
Government, has increased its level of alertness and vigilance to
prevent terrorists from utilizing or targeting our U.S. transportation
system, including the surface modes.
ATA and its members are presently participating in a number of
information-sharing initiatives to facilitate the flow of information
and intelligence to improve the security posture of our industry.
Initiatives involving the Homeland Security Information Network, the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the FBI's InfraGard
program, as well other Federal, State, and local efforts, are allowing
industry to share information directly with the intelligence and law
enforcement community.
ATA urges this committee to encourage Federal agencies to continue
improving information-sharing initiatives and cooperation as a better
alternative to establishing security operations that do not have clear
goals and objectives, and that are undertaken without any specific
intelligence or information that call for heightened levels of security
in our Nation's transportation system.
I thank you again for the opportunity to testify before this
committee and I am pleased to answer any questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you Mr. Byrd for your testimony.
Our next witness, Mr. William Blankenship, is chief
operating officer of Greyhound Lines. Mr. Blankenship has been
with Greyhound Lines since 1996. As chief operating officer,
Mr. Blankenship oversees the operations of Greyhound Lines as
well as monitors safety and security. Prior to becoming COO of
Greyhound Lines, Mr. Blankenship served as the division
director and general manager for the western region.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Blankenship for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM C. BLANKENSHIP, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER,
GREYHOUND LINES, INC.
Mr. Blankenship. Good afternoon.
Chairman Rogers and Members of the subcommittee, I am Bill
Blankenship, chief operating officer of Greyhound Lines, and I
am honored to be here today to discuss intercity bus security
and the TSA's Surface Inspection Program.
In October 2001, less than 30 days after 9/11, a terrorist
attacked and overpowered the driver of an Atlanta-bound ground
bus, took over the bus and crashed it, killing 7 passengers,
including the terrorist, and injured 30. Not knowing if this
was the first of a coordinated series of attacks, Greyhound's
CEO ordered the Nation-wide shutdown of all Greyhound service.
After approximately 12 hours, the FBI determined that this was
the work of a lone wolf and Greyhound services resumed. It
underscores the vulnerability of America's uniquely accessible
intercity bus network.
Greyhound buses serve every major city in the Continental
United States with open terminals in downtown locations, and
operate over almost every interstate highway across most of the
Nation's major bridges, with multiple daily trips.
Greyhound has responded vigorously to the terrorist threat.
Since 2001 we installed driver shields and on-board emergency
communications and threat response systems on buses, installed
or upgraded facilities security systems, instituted random
screening of passengers at major terminals, and conducted
security training for all operational and maintenance
personnel.
Greyhound has also participated in two programs that
involved TSA surface transportation inspectors: The base
assessment and the Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
program, VIPR. These programs have been somewhat helpful to
Greyhound but are not at the core of Greyhound's security
efforts.
Under the base assessment, TSA inspectors do an on-site
analysis of individual Greyhound terminals. A score is assigned
based on analysis, and recommendations are made for security
improvements at each terminal. Some of these recommendations
are helpful, although others are not particularly realistic in
the context of a bus terminal. So far there have been eight
Greyhound terminals that participated in this analysis.
The VIPR teams are groups of two or more individuals that
do sweeps of bus terminals looking for potential terrorists or
suspicious activity. These visits are completely random and
appear to be more focused on transit and Amtrak. Greyhound does
not usually receive any feedback after these visits. The visits
are useful as a visible deterrent when they occur, but
Greyhound's own security efforts are concertedly more important
in addressing our security.
One area of concern that we have is the silo approach to
surface transportation security that TSA has taken in the past.
This limits the effectiveness of TSA's surface transportation
efforts. For example, TSA funding canine explosive detections
for major transit agencies. Greyhound tried to get TSA to
authorize the use of these dogs at nearby Greyhound terminals
which would have little if any incremental cost, but we could
not break through the modal walls at TSA to make that happen.
We are pleased that recently TSA has taken action to
integrate all the surface transportation modes under a new
director of surface transportation. We recently met with the
new director and are encouraged that he understands the risks
associated with intercity bus service and will move to
integrate intercity buses into TSA's security program in a way
that will enhance overall surface transportation security.
The single most important TSA activity with regard to
intercity bus security is its administration of the intercity
bus security grant program, which has averaged around $10
million per year through fiscal 2011. In fiscal 2012, Congress
included the intercity bus security grant program as one of the
eligible surface transportation programs, but DHS chose not to
make funding available for it. We believe that intercity bus
security projects should remain eligible for Federal funding,
either through a combined surface transportation fund or
otherwise. The fact is that intercity buses carry roughly 720
million passengers annually, which is comparable to the
airlines. Given those numbers and the worldwide track record of
terrorist bus attacks, it is difficult to conclude that a
Federal security program that makes billions of dollars
available for aviation security and nothing for intercity bus
security is well-balanced. In our view, priority projects such
as maintenance of Greyhound passenger screening programs should
continue to be supported.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Blankenship follows:]
Prepared Statement of William C. Blankenship
May 31, 2012
Chairman Rogers and Members of the subcommittee, I am Bill
Blankenship, Chief Operating Officer of Greyhound Lines, Inc., Dallas,
TX, and I am honored to be here today to discuss intercity bus security
and the Transportation Security Administration's oversight of surface
transportation security.
In early October, 2001, less than 30 days after 9/11, a terrorist
attacked and overpowered the driver of an Atlanta-bound Greyhound bus,
took over the bus and crashed it, killing 7 passengers, including the
terrorist, and injuring 30. Not knowing if this was the first of a
coordinated series of attacks, Greyhound's CEO ordered the Nation-wide
shutdown of all Greyhound service. After about 12 hours, the FBI
determined that this was the work of a ``lone wolf'' Croatian
individual, and Greyhound services resumed.
As far as I know, this is the only ``successful'' terrorist attack
on a U.S. transportation system since 9/11. It underscores the
vulnerability of America's intercity bus network, and was a wake-up
call for Greyhound, which is the only Nation-wide intercity bus system
in the United States.
Intercity buses (a/k/a motorcoaches or over-the-road buses) are
inherently vulnerable to terrorist attacks because of their unique
public accessibility. Greyhound buses serve every major city in the
continental United States with open terminals in downtown locations and
operate over almost every interstate highway and cross most of the
Nation's major bridges with multiple daily trips.
Several studies in recent years have shown that worldwide, buses
are the most vulnerable to terrorist attacks of all modes of
transportation. A 2009 GAO Report to this committee found that between
1997 and 2008, there were 510 terrorist-related commercial bus and
truck bombing attacks worldwide, killing over 6,000 people. Over 70% of
those attacks were bus or bus terminal-related.\1\ The Mineta
Transportation Institute maintains a database of all surface
transportation attacks from 1970 through 2009. Its latest report
indicates that during that period, there were 757 terrorist attacks on
buses and bus stations compared to 442 attacks on trains and train
stations.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Government Accountability Office Report to the Chairman,
Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives entitled
``Commercial Vehicle Security, Risk-Based Approach Needed to Secure the
Commercial Vehicle Sector,'' GAO-09-85, February, 2009, see page 11.
\2\ Mineta Transportation Institute, Terrorist Attacks on Public
Bus Transportation: A Preliminary Empirical Analysis, MTI Report WP 09-
01, March, 2010, see page 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While intercity buses and terminals are vulnerable to attack, their
use as a delivery mechanism for other weapons may leave the Nation's
critical infrastructure vulnerable. This mobility is a material
differentiator between intercity bus and mass transit.
Greyhound has responded vigorously to the terrorist threat. Since
2001, we have completed several comprehensive assessments of the risks
facing Greyhound and have taken numerous actions to reduce those risks.
These actions include:
installing driver shields on all Greyhound buses to limit a
terrorist's ability to attack the driver;
installing an on-board emergency communications and threat
response system on all buses, which includes remote vehicle
disabling (kill switch), driver authentication, and an enhanced
emergency communications and response system, and finalizing
geo-fencing and real-time bus inventory components of that
system;
installing and/or upgrading security fencing and lighting
and CCTV camera systems in major terminals and garages;
random magnetometer screening of passengers and their bags
at major terminals; and
security training for all personnel with operational or
maintenance responsibilities.
Greyhound has also worked with TSA in a variety of ways, including
two programs that involve TSA surface transportation inspectors, the
Base Assessment program and the Visible Intermodal Prevention and
Response (VIPR) teams. These programs have been somewhat helpful to
Greyhound, but are not at the core of Greyhound's security efforts.
Under the Base Assessment program, a team of 2-4 TSA inspectors do
an on-site analysis of individual Greyhound terminals, including a
questionnaire of more than 100 questions concerning the security
practices at that terminal. A score is assigned based on that analysis
and recommendations are made for security improvements at that
terminal. Some of those recommendations are helpful, although others
are not particularly realistic in the context of a bus terminal. So
far, there have been 8 Greyhound terminals that have participated in
that analysis.
The VIPR teams are groups of 2 or more individuals that do
``sweeps'' of bus terminals looking for potential terrorist activity.
Although we are generally notified ahead of time, these visits are
completely random. They appear to be more focused on transit and
Amtrak. The Greyhound visits are infrequent and Greyhound does not
usually receive any feedback after these visits. The visits are useful
as a visible deterrent when they occur, but Greyhound's own security
efforts are considerably more important in addressing our security
needs.
Greyhound has partnered with TSA in several other important ways.
TSA and Greyhound participated in a pilot program to test airport-
style baggage screening devices in Los Angeles and Houston. Results of
the program revealed an annual estimate of 500,000 items that could be
used to overtake Greyhound's drivers. Moreover, the pilot program
proved the viability of reducing National infrastructure risk by
deploying TSA surplus equipment, currently warehoused. However, the
cost of Greyhound's operating and maintaining the equipment would be
prohibitive.
TSA and Greyhound partnered on a pilot program to test the use of
canine teams in several terminals. The tests demonstrated that canines
were effective as explosive screeners and as highly visible deterrents
to terrorists, but were not practical in bus terminals unless used
along with the facilities of other modes.
Greyhound participates in TSA's First Observer and TSOC reporting
program. Greyhound is an active participant in reporting suspicious
behavior and incidents that could be of a terroristic nature. Moreover,
Greyhound has adopted ``See Something, Say Something'' in its efforts
to build a culture of awareness and maintains a solid relationship with
DHS intelligence.
Greyhound also participates in TSA's Intermodal Security Training
and Exercise Program, which provides table-top exercises and security
training and planning tools and services to the transportation
community.
Finally, in support of our partnership, Greyhound donated 2 buses
for TSA to use as part of its training curriculum at the Transportation
Technology Center. In addition, the CEO of Greyhound, our Director of
Security and myself visited the Transportation Technology Center in
support of their efforts.
Overall, Greyhound believes that these TSA initiatives have helped
Greyhound to sharpen its focus on what works and what doesn't with
regard to improving intercity bus security.
One area of concern that we have is the ``silo'' approach to
surface transportation security that TSA has taken in the past. This
limits the effectiveness of TSA's surface transportation efforts. For
example, TSA has funded canine explosive detection for major transit
agencies. Greyhound tried to get TSA to authorize the use of those dogs
at Greyhound terminals that were either part of an intermodal facility
with transit or close to transit facilities. It seemed to us that with
little, if any, incremental cost, canine explosive detection could be
extended to many major Greyhound terminals. But we could not break
through the modal walls at TSA to make that happen.
We are pleased that recently TSA has taken action to integrate all
of the surface transportation modes under a new Director, Surface
Transportation. We believe that action should help remove the modal
barriers to cooperation and efficiency and provide a better platform
for TSA to assess the highest risks among the modes and respond
effectively to those risks. We recently met with the new Director and
are encouraged that he understands the risks associated with intercity
bus service and will move to integrate intercity buses into TSA's
security programs in a way that will enhance overall surface
transportation security.
The single most important TSA activity with regard to intercity bus
security is its administration of the Intercity Bus Security Grant
Program. From 2003 through 2011, Congress appropriated a small fund for
intercity bus security. That program was formalized in Public Law 110-
53, The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007, as the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program. The IBSGP averaged
around $10 million per year with $5 million appropriated in fiscal year
2011. In fiscal year 2012, Congress included the IBSGP as one of the
eligible surface transportation programs for preparedness funding, but
DHS chose not to make any funding available for the IBSGP.
Although the IBSGP grants have been processed by FEMA, TSA has made
all of the substantive decisions with regard to the program. We think
that TSA has done a good job administering the program. Each year, it
has conducted a rigorous competition with awards based on a
comprehensive risk-based analysis. Greyhound, as the Nation's only
Nation-wide intercity bus system, has received the largest amount of
program funds, but more than 100 other bus companies have received
awards since the program began.
IBSGP funds have greatly enhanced the security of the National
intercity bus system. It helped Greyhound pay the capital costs of the
on-board emergency communications system and the facility security
upgrades and it has enabled Greyhound to roughly double the size of its
passenger screening program. Without these funds, the capital would not
have been available for the emergency communications system and the
facility security upgrades and the screening program would have been
much smaller. It is important to emphasize that Greyhound spends
roughly $10 million per year of its own funds on security, including at
least a 25% match for the IBSGP funds and all of the on-going operating
funds associated with the emergency communications and facility
security capital grants.
For the last several years, the administration's budget proposal
has recommended terminating the IBSGP on the grounds that there was no
risk assessment of intercity bus security and the private sector could
make these investments. It recommended combining the program with the
transit and rail programs and prioritizing the risks within that
combined program. We note that both the GAO and Mineta reports
establish the inherent vulnerability of intercity buses, and indeed,
TSA has done its own risk assessment and has recommended a program like
the IBSGP.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Transportation Security Administration, Over-the-Road Bus
Security Assessment, January 4, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We do think that intercity bus security projects should remain
eligible for Federal funding, either through a combined surface
transportation fund or otherwise. The fact is that intercity buses
carry roughly 720 million passengers annually, which is comparable to
the airlines. Given those numbers and the track record of terrorist bus
attacks, it is difficult to conclude that a Federal security program
that makes billions of dollars available for aviation security and
nothing for intercity bus security is well-balanced. In our view,
priority projects such as maintenance of Greyhound's passenger
screening program should continue to be supported.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify. I would be happy to
answer any questions you might have.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you Mr. Blankenship for your testimony.
Our final and eagerly anticipated witness Mr. Morris: Mr.
Morris serves as director of safety and security operations,
Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association. He also serves
as vice chairman of the Department of Homeland Security's
Highway-Motor Carrier Sector Coordinating Council, the HMCSCC.
Mr. Morris was previously commander of the transportation
security section and the transportation safety division of the
Maryland State Police, has over 28 years of experience in
transportation safety.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Morris for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF DOUG MORRIS, DIRECTOR, SAFETY AND SECURITY
OPERATIONS, OWNER-OPERATOR INDEPENDENT DRIVERS ASSOCIATION
Mr. Morris. Thank you, Chairman Rogers. Good afternoon. My
name is Doug Morris and I am currently the director of safety
and security operations for the Owner-Operator Independent
Drivers Association. I have over 28 years of experience in
transportation safety and security, including commanding
positions within the Maryland State Police.
Approximately 150,000 members are small business truckers
from all 50 States. The majority of trucking in this country is
small business; 93 percent of our Nation's motor carriers own
20 or fewer trucks. More than 69 percent of all freight tonnage
is moved by truck, and the bulk of those shipments are
completed by small business truckers.
Involving the men and women who make their livelihoods
behind the wheel of a truck makes sense for our Nation's
homeland security efforts. These men and women travel through
all areas of our infrastructure. With the proper training,
these individuals add tremendous value to securing our Nation.
The First Observer program, of which OOIDA is a strong
partner, is DHS's tool for providing them that training. First
Observer helps promote the security of our transportation
infrastructure by enabling the sharing of information from
well-trained and concerned professionals who have the capacity
to observe, assess, and report risk and potential security
breaches. OOIDA brings to the program its unique perspective
and experience to help develop training modules that enhance
participation from professionals, like truckers, of a
particular vantage point to best report suspicious activity
that may have been overlooked in the past.
First Observer currently offers 12 different training
modules, covering everything from truck and motor coach drivers
to port and highway workers. One example of how this training
is best utilized was during the lead-up to the 2012 Super Bowl.
First Observer trainers trained over 1,000 event staff and
other related personnel in homeland security awareness. First
Observer is the only program that is capable of meeting these
specialized training needs while also engaging the thousands of
long-haul truck drivers on the road every day. It is truly a
force multiplier for homeland security.
Some of the recent success stories that I can speak of
include a full hijacking of a motor coach, the disruption of a
bomb plot targeting former President George W. Bush, and foiled
plots against West Coast power plants. These successes validate
the First Observer mission. OOIDA has learned that
transportation professionals are more receptive to training
from individuals who have distinct knowledge and first-hand
experience of their industry. Feedback from our members
participating in the First Observer program show that the
training that they received was geared specifically towards
them and they felt part of the mission. This program takes
homeland security seriously; and in return, First Observer
members are taking it seriously and are helping to make this
program a success.
To the best of my knowledge, First Observer has far
exceeded TSA's expectations. The program has been endorsed by
137 industry and affiliate associations and organizations.
Despite these successes, the program faces challenges. First
Observer has been operating under a no-cost extension since
January 1, 2012. Broader budgetary challenges, unbalanced
funding, and resource priorities within DHS--especially TSA--
threaten this program's ability to continue its mission.
Allowing this program to falter would send a clear message that
TSA places greater value on other modes of transport. It is
widely known that the lion's share of funding within TSA is
allocated toward the aviation sector. Less than 2 percent is
dedicated to the surface transportation arena, not taking in
regard the significant economic importance of surface
transportation trade and its infrastructure. OOIDA is hopeful
that Congress will address this imbalance.
First Observer participants are committed to playing a role
in ensuring the protection of our country, but they need a
commitment from Congress and the Department. Training our
Nation's collective surface transportation personnel on what to
observe, assess, or report in their areas of expertise helps
achieve homeland security's overall mission at a cost below
some of TSA's other priorities, especially those focused on
substituting technology for real live professional eyes on the
road.
To date, First Observer has over 160,000 program members.
Of these, we have several hundred school bus and truck drivers
in the Chairman's district alone, as well as over 2,000 in the
Ranking Member's district. This program has proven its value
and it is an activity that should be prioritized moving
forward.
Thank you very much for your time, and I am happy to answer
any questions that you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Morris follows:]
Prepared Statement of Doug Morris
May 31, 2012
Good afternoon Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you very much for
inviting me to testify this afternoon on the subject of surface
transportation security. My name is Doug Morris and I have been
involved with transportation safety and security for over 30 years and
currently serve as the director of safety and security operations for
the Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association (OOIDA). I also
represent the Association as the vice chairman of the Department of
Homeland Security's Highway Motor Carrier Sector Coordinating Council.
Prior to joining the staff at OOIDA I was employed as a Maryland State
Trooper--retiring in 2009 after 28 years of service. During my tenure
with the Maryland State Police, I served as the assistant commander of
the Commercial Vehicle Enforcement Division as well as the commander of
the Transportation Security Section and Transportation Safety Division.
I have received over 500 hours in advanced training in the
transportation and handling of hazardous, radioactive, and biological
materials as well as emergency management, disaster assistance, and
incident command.
The Owner Operator Independent Drivers Association is the
international trade association representing the interests of small
business trucking professionals and professional drivers on all matters
that affect the trucking industry. OOIDA currently has more than
150,000 members who collectively own and operate over 200,000
individual heavy-duty trucks Nation-wide. Small-business trucking
companies dominate the industry with approximately 93% of U.S. motor
carriers operating 20 or fewer trucks in their fleets, 78% operating 5
or fewer trucks and roughly half of the motor carriers registered with
the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration having fleets of just 1
truck. Considering that 69 percent of freight tonnage in the United
States is moved by truck, and the bulk of that is by small business
truckers, OOIDA and its members have a unique perspective on a variety
of facets of the infrastructure system. It makes sense for the U.S.
Government to partner with small businesses to act as the eyes and ears
in the interest of furthering National security. It should also be
noted that over 40% of OOIDA's members have prior military service and
as a group are steadfastly patriotic. As such, involving the trucking
community, specifically the men and women who make their living behind
the wheel, is a natural fit as they simply want to be involved and with
the proper training these individuals add tremendous value to securing
our Nation's infrastructure.
First Observer is a program that helps promote the security of our
transportation infrastructure by enabling the sharing of information
from well-trained and concerned professionals who have the capacity to
observe, assess, and report risks and potential security breaches. As
you may be aware, the program was originally created by the TSA's
Highway Motor Carrier Division when private infrastructure security
professionals observed a need and desire for such a program and worked
to initiate the program almost immediately. OOIDA was among the first
supporters and helped secure the viability of the exceptional
opportunity by obtaining a trademark for the First Observer name and
logo. Through trademarking and securing the brand, we not only helped
to ensure that the program is officially recognized and helped raise
awareness, but it also gave the TSA the ability to have control over
the brand for future use so that it may seamlessly continue under the
current name and not be subject to rebranding based on changing or
evolving participants. In short, it gave the program foundation and
continuity from the inception so that it has a better chance of
success. Branding and re-branding has been problematic for similar
programs--including the predecessor to First Observer. So, solving this
simple problem was a necessary and important first step in order to
make it recognizable, reliable, and trustworthy in eyes of both
transportation industry and homeland security professionals.
As an association that has been in existence for nearly 40 years
representing the men and women of the professional truck driving
community, OOIDA brings to the program its unique perspective and
experience in safety and security to help facilitate a dialogue between
trucking, law enforcement, and other transportation/security
professionals in the identification of areas where specific security
training should be conducted. As a result of this dialogue and our
input, training modules have been developed and implemented to enhance
participation from those professionals who best know their working
environment and who have a particular vantage point to best report
suspicious activity that may have been overlooked in the past.
As you are likely aware, currently there are 12 training modules in
operation which address the following topics: Trucking and Motor Coach,
School Bus, Intra and Inter City bus, Law Enforcement, Highway Workers,
Critical Infrastructure Protection Professionals, Ports, Hazmat, Cargo,
Truck Rental, Parking and Event Staff, and Food Safety and Security.
The purpose for developing these as individual training modules was to
directly address areas that were of specific concern in the counter-
terrorism field. Recent success stories of the program include a foiled
hijacking of a motor coach traveling between Arlington, Virginia, and
Durham, North Carolina; the disruption of a Texas bomb plot targeting
former President George W. Bush; and foiled plots against power plants
along the West Coast. All of these successes validate the First
Observer mission. If not for a transportation professional that knew
their business and knew that something was suspicious about numerous
deliveries of hazardous materials to a private residence, a terrorist
act on U.S. soil may have resulted.
Since OOIDA's involvement with this program, we have learned that
transportation professionals are more receptive to individuals who have
distinct knowledge and first-hand experience of their industry.
Previous training programs in this area were flawed as they tended not
to be geared toward the end-user. In the past participants may have
been involved in a previous homeland security presentation or training,
but did not feel that the training addressed their needs or concerns
and the instructors had little or no knowledge of their industry. In
short, OOIDA knows trucking and can communicate with the men and women
who comprise the truck driving community in the United States. We know
that many of these professionals, who are working daily within a
variety of surface transportation venues, feel a tremendous sense of
pride and duty as a participant in First Observer. They feel as if they
are a part of a public/private sector cooperative that is vital to
helping protect the infrastructure that millions, including themselves,
rely heavily upon to meet their most basic needs. They know that the
training that they received was geared specifically toward their
industry and was produced by professionals in their line of work in
coordination with law enforcement and counter terrorism professionals
who have been brought together under one roof. This program takes
trucking seriously and in return, truckers are taking it seriously and
helping to make this program a success.
To the best of my knowledge, the First Observer program has far
exceeded TSA's expectations and has been recently moved from the former
Highway Motor Carrier Division of TSA to the Surface Transportation
Division, a sign of its integral role in the Department's broad
mission. The program has been endorsed by 137 industry and affiliate
associations and organizations.
Despite these successes, the program faces near- and long-term
challenges. First Observer has been operating under a no-cost extension
since January 1, 2012. Broader budgetary challenges throughout the
Federal Government, from the recent history of funding DHS activities
through continuing resolutions or delayed appropriations bills to
unbalanced funding and resource priorities within DHS, especially the
TSA, threaten the program's ability to meet its requirements from the
Department.
Allowing this program to falter would send a clear message to
surface transportation professionals that TSA places much greater value
on other transport modes and their mode as unimportant if not
irrelevant. It is widely known that the lion's share of funding within
TSA is allocated towards the aviation sector and relatively little is
dedicated to the surface transportation arena where the economic and
other costs of a homeland security incident could far exceed those that
this Nation suffered on September 11, 2001. Congress has an opportunity
to address this imbalance and ensure needed prioritization within TSA.
One of the major benefits First Observer has is its flexibility,
and I would like to offer a few examples. The first was the program's
ability to train dozens of parking lot attendants working the 2012
Super Bowl in Indianapolis. Our training ensured that these workers,
many of whom were hired on a temporary basis, were on watch during one
of our Nation's highest-profile public events.
In the same vein, First Observer training has been given to
numerous airport service personnel throughout the country as many had
no training in what to observe, assess, or report related to surface
transportation in their environment. With continued or additional funds
to the program it could be easily expanded to all aspects of surface
transportation specifically, in areas of concern such as the rail
sector, public utilities, and any other venue that could become a
target of future terrorist acts. These are areas where we should
continue to expand and improve upon the continued successes of the
First Observer program.
It is more cost-effective to be proactive as opposed to being
reactive and throwing money at something to attempt to secure it at all
costs. Training our Nation's collective surface transportation
personnel on what to observe, assess, and report in their areas of
expertise would help homeland security's overall mission.
Thank you very much for your time. I am happy to answer any
questions you may have.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Morris. I do agree with you; we
can be smarter about the way we are spending our money. That is
one of the reasons we want to have this testimony on the
record.
Mr. Rogers. I will recognize myself for the first set of
questions. Chief O'Connor, what did you mean when you said TSA
should have more operational focus? What does that term mean to
you?
Chief O'Connor. As I said in my testimony, Amtrak's
approach is prevention, partnership, and participation. I think
that is where the TSA inspectors should be focusing their
efforts. They should be helping agencies in direct prevention
efforts, like supporting the VIPRs. They should be helping us
partner with the communities to help protect the local transit
systems, and they should be helping us train our employees and
doing public outreach, not going out enforcing regulations that
do not add to the value of security.
Mr. Rogers. Have you noticed the increased numbers of these
TSA assets in your stations?
Chief O'Connor. We get a lot of support on the normal
VIPRs. In terms of the inspectors, we are getting sporadic
reports around the country on showing up and station profiles
and efforts that I am sure are well-intentioned but I am not
sure add to the value of security. They did assist us with our
base program. But again, once the program is in place, where do
we go from there?
Mr. Rogers. Well, I had the privilege of visiting with one
of your facilities in New York a couple of weeks ago, and I was
very impressed with what you are doing with vapor-wake canines.
As you know I am a big supporter of that.
Mr. Elliott I am aware that Alabama participates in the CSX
Secure Now program. Can you elaborate more on that, please?
Mr. Elliot. Yes, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I would like
to thank the State for participation in what we think is a very
worthwhile program. At CSX we believe that transparency is very
important in building solid and credible security partnerships.
Our Secure Now program is actually a technology-based program
that allows bona fide security, homeland security agencies--in
the case of the States, it is typically State homeland fusion
centers. We also have partnerships at several Federal agencies
that actually allow these agencies to see in a real-time format
every train that is operating on CSX transportation and then to
quickly identify every railcar, every commodity that is being
transported within those trains. We think that is very
important, because oftentimes States and Federal agencies may
be dependent upon CSX to translate information, and you lose
valuable time.
What the Secure Now program does is it allows these State
and Federal homeland security centers to have this real-time
access to all CSX trains and commodities so, if they do get an
indication of a credible or confirmed threat, they can see the
rail commodities that are moving through their States on CSX
and they can take the appropriate action by contacting CSX, so
we can either stop trains or move trains through at a faster
pace in order to provide the level of security that we need.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Do we have a way for this to be put up
on the screen?
Well, visually, I hope that you can get the gist of this.
But in 2008, we had just under 200 of these inspectors for
surface transportation. In a 5-year period you can see it has
doubled to where we now have 404 of these inspectors.
My question is: Do y'all think that we have seen a
commensurate enhancement of security or not? I will open that
up to anybody. I will start with you, Mr. Elliott.
Mr. Elliot. Mr. Chairman, I think it is fair to say that,
much like my colleagues on the witness stand today, we
appreciate a lot of the very good work that TSA does. However,
it has been our experience that with the increase of surface
transportation inspectors, who we see with increased frequency
in our rail yards, that really all we are seeing is not just
one inspector who would come to kind of review the transfer of
custody regulation, but we are seeing multiple inspectors
basically just showing up to look at the same regulations. So I
am not sure we are seeing any commensurate enhancements in
security by the addition of more surface transportation
inspectors.
Mr. Rogers. I will ask you: Yes or no? Do you think it has
been worth doubling the workforce from a security standpoint?
Mr. Elliot. I have not seen that, no.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Byrd, yes or no? I have got 24 seconds.
Mr. Byrd. No.
Mr. Rogers. Chief O'Connor.
Chief O'Connor. No. I would rather see an increase in
canines and an increase in public and employee training.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Blankenship.
Mr. Blankenship. The only increase we are really seeing is
in the baseline inspections that have occurred.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. No, sir, I have not.
Mr. Rogers. We have been joined by my friend and colleague
from Texas who has come from the Intelligence Committee, where
I am sure she has made the world safer. We are glad to have her
here now. I recognize her for any opening statements she may
have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to
the witnesses for their testimony. The Chairman has been
gracious. Thank you, Members--Mr. Davis, Mr. Turner, and Mr.
Cravaack--for your courtesies. We are also in an Immigration
Subcommittee so I thank you very much.
This is a subject that is enormously close to my heart and
I thank all of you for your participation in this valuable
hearing that will provide and is providing insights on critical
transportation issues.
As the Ranking Member of the Transportation Security
Subcommittee, I have continuously supported the allocation of
adequate resources aimed at enhancing the efficiency, safety,
and security of our rail and mass transit systems. There is no
doubt--and I know that you, as gentlemen on the front lines,
that when we think of a target, the target that has been most
attractive to whatever franchised terrorist group you can speak
of, it is a transportation mode. We will fool ourselves if we
don't recognize that the surface transportation is clearly in
the eye of the storm.
This morning's news reported that buses transport more
people or at least the same amount of people as the aviation
industry. How many Americans would know that? Which is why I
offered an amendment to the surface transportation security
measure recently considered by the full committee. My amendment
would authorize $400 million for the Transportation Security
Grant Program in fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013.
I want you to know, the good news is the amendment was
unanimously supported by this committee. I am pleased that
Members on both sides of the aisle recognize the need to
authorize these funds. In the near future the House will
consider the fiscal year 2013 Department of Homeland Security
appropriations bill, and I will respectfully request that my
colleagues continue their strong commitment to transportation
security grant funding when the appropriations measure is on
the floor of the House.
If you are happily going off to the casinos in Louisiana
and parts of Texas, or if you are having to get to grandma's
house, you are using a mode of transportation that could in
essence be a target.
I cannot overstate the importance of funding for grants
that allow State and local jurisdictions to secure our Nation's
transportation infrastructure. According to the National
Counterterrorism Center, since 2004 over 1,000 terrorist
attacks were waged worldwide against mass transit and passenger
rail targets, resulting in over 2,000 deaths and over 9,000
injuries. In fact, we were one of the first Congressional
delegations to visit Mumbai after the series of attacks there
and to visit the station where these heinous attacks occurred--
Madrid, London, Mumbai, and Moscow. We have been fortunate that
we have not put on that list one of our sites, even though of
course there was a plot to attack the New York City subway
system in 2009, and everyone remembers the Times Square alleged
bomber that was trying to disrupt Times Square a, if you will,
center-point for rail subway lines crossing in that area.
Given the open nature of our mass transportation system and
the millions of people who use our subways, buses, and highways
each day, the effort to assure adequate funding for the
transportation security grants should be a high priority for
this Congress. Since the demise of Osama bin Laden, we must be
diligent.
Last year I introduced the Surface Transportation and Mass
Transit Security Act of 2011. If enacted, this bill would
ensure that TSA provides the kind of attention and resources
necessary to effectively operate surface and mass transit. The
bill authorized the hiring of additional surface inspectors to
validate security programs that impact our surface and mass
transit.
Let me indicate how much I think this hearing is crucial,
and I will caution that we must not throw the baby out with the
bath water. It is important that we work with TSA to make
changes. It is important that TSA hires additional
transportation security inspectors, being the first step.
However, the agency must also ensure that regulations impacting
training of front-line workers across surface and mass transit
are issued and shared for public comment. Without this
overreaching framework, single acts and individual programs
will likely have little impact.
However, this overreaching framework must include the kind
of mechanism my bill, such as a protocol to strengthen
stakeholder outreach revisions to the public transportation
security assistance grants program in recognition of the
importance of increased resources for canine teams. I am
looking forward for these efforts to go forward in a fast and
expeditious way.
I also look forward to the testimony that has come about to
the First Observer program, formerly known as Highway Watch. I
believe that this hearing, Mr. Chairman, answers a number of
questions that the Congress does maintain its responsibilities
of oversight and vigilance, because it is important to secure
the homeland in all aspects.
With that, I yield back on my statement.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Would the Ranking Member like to go ahead and take her 5
minutes of questions----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would like to do so, and try to
abbreviate my questions as well.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. The Chairman recognizes the Ranking
Member for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much.
First of all, I have taken it to heart, visiting various
sites and watching the work that is done. Let me give you just
this one question: Unlike at airports where security is
completely Federalized, the local transit and law enforcement
agencies bear the brunt of implementing effective security
programs for surface transportation systems. As we discuss
moving forward with TSA's program, I would like to know what
your major resource and operational challenges are and how TSA
can use inspectors with proper surface experience and expertise
to help you meet those challenges. I would like to start with
Chief O'Connor.
Chief O'Connor. Thank you, Ranking Member.
Ms. Jackson Lee. As I interrupt you, let me say that you
have one of the toughest tasks. Might you just put on the
record, if I missed it, what you think your traveling census is
up and down that East Coast corridor? Chief.
Chief O'Connor. Thank you. I appreciate those comments. My
task is made easier by working with some of your colleagues in
Texas, with Chief Rodriguez and former Chief Lambert. I visited
Houston just last month to consult with them.
In terms of the usefulness of the inspectors, I testified
earlier that our efforts are geared towards prevention,
partnership, and participation. I think that is where the TSA
needs to go. Focus less on repeating vulnerability assessments
and regulations, which do not add to security but develop a
partnership with the agencies that help in their prevention
efforts, help in partnering with local communities, and help in
training employees and doing public outreach.
I think the whole program needs to be looked at from top to
bottom to see if that is where their efforts are going.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you. I am going to yield back and
come back to get these questions answered at the next go-
around. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. The Chairman recognizes Mr. Turner for 5
minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am interested, Mr. Elliott, in the inspectors. There are
now 400 rail inspectors; did I hear that right?
Mr. Elliot. Well, there are 400 surface transportation----
Mr. Turner. What is their mandate?
Mr. Elliot. Congressman, with regards to freight rail
security, there is one TSA regulation, the one that deals with
the secure and positive hand-off of toxic inhalation hazards.
So their focus has been wholly to go out to our rail facilities
and basically focus on how well that regulation is being
adhered to.
Really, as I had mentioned before in my testimony, we value
a lot of the good positive relationship with TSA. But what we
are typically seeing now--we do have concerns about the level
of knowledge and training that the surface transportation
inspectors are getting, especially since their growth was so
fast. But we are basically seeing multiple inspectors coming
out to basically observe the same function in a number of
limited locations. So, again, we recognize that TSA brings some
great value in the partnerships that we have with them, but I
am not sure that we are seeing the total value of this program.
Mr. Turner. Isn't there already a rather profound
infrastructure for safe handling of coupling and uncoupling of
cars and toxic materials, and, in other agencies,
transportation? These are homeland security inspectors.
Mr. Elliot. That is correct. Predominantly freight rail
safety and security regulations come under the auspices of the
Federal Railroad Administration. We traditionally see a number
of FRA inspectors who are out on the rail property looking at
compliance with the regulations that they oversee. But the one
regulation currently that TSA has jurisdiction over is this
secure and positive hand-off of toxic inhalation hazards that
basically requires that there is a physical hand-off of toxic
inhalation hazards products such as sulfur dioxide, chlorine,
and hydrous ammonia, make sure that there is that physical
security.
We recognize that there is a significant difference in the
security threat to freight transportation versus the security
that needs to be focused on with the traveling public. Again,
we focused quite significantly on a number of security issues.
We are just not quite so sure that the focus that TSA has put
on this one particular interest is really----
Mr. Turner. Do you see this as a redundancy?
Mr. Elliot. There are two things. One, I do see it as
somewhat of a redundancy with what the Federal Railroad
Administration focuses on in its security and safety
initiatives. Quite honestly, I will tell you that I think we
work very hard internally to ensure full compliance with the
regulation.
Again in my testimony, we get lauded on one hand by an
inspector who watches this physical hand-off and indicates that
we are doing it perfectly, then only to take exception to the
fact that we may have a misspelled name or something maybe
out--so the indication to us, then, has to be that we are
meeting the intention of the regulation, but the inspectors may
have to find something so they are turning to some very minor
administrative issues instead.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Another question for Chief O'Connor.
For railroad stations, et cetera, the only effective detectors
are the noses of canines; am I correct? Do we have enough of
them?
Chief O'Connor. I don't think there would be a chief in the
country who tells you he has enough resources. But certainly in
terms of canines, we need to expand that. They are one of the
most versatile tools and most skilled tools out there. I think
they should be expanded not only in surface transportation but
in----
Mr. Turner. And they work cheap, too.
Chief O'Connor. Well, they are very appreciative of their
handlers and a good program creates a good team. But I think
they should be widely used throughout the whole transportation
industry.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Now you know why I like Chief O'Connor.
Mr. Richmond is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For a person who represents a district that has just about
everybody at the table with a large footprint in the New
Orleans, Louisiana, and you can take Amtrak and Greyhound,
which hub is right next to the New Orleans Superdome and the
New Orleans arena, or you can look at CSX and all of our major
rail lines that come right into the Port of New Orleans and
some of our chemical plants and not to mention the truckers. I
guess the disturbing part is it appears as though you all take
your jobs very, very seriously, and you all have
recommendations from being the boots on the ground, so to
speak, the front line of defense, and it appears as though that
the working relationship with TSA in terms of suggestions on
how to make things actually work better and safer, that there
is some gap in terms of feedback or input or maybe the sense
that they don't respond or take your suggestions seriously.
So I guess my first question would just be a very general
question, and you can submit further answers in writing, but I
would be curious to know when you all make recommendations,
such as less focus on operational and not get stuck on
regulations that have no direct connection to safety, what kind
of feedback do you get? Do you have any suggestions for us?
Specifically, this may take writing, those regulations that
are redundant, that are misguided in terms of not a very direct
connection to safety, I would like to know about those because
at the end of the day, I think that New Orleans is a very
sensitive or delicate city when it comes to transportation
security, so we want to make sure we get it right.
So, Chief O'Connor, if we can start with you and just go
down the line, that would be very beneficial.
Chief O'Connor. Let me start by saying in other areas
working with the TSA, our partnership has been very good. When
we first started out with VIPRs, we had a lot of problems, but
then we reached agreement to work on operational plans together
and where we both signed off on the purpose of VIPRs and how
they would be deployed. But for some reason, that hasn't
happened in the inspector program.
In the canine program, we work hand in glove with them, and
in fact, they come to us to learn about the canine program and
have made efforts to expand it based upon our experience.
We have raised these issues with the Administrator Pistole.
He is aware of them. He has promised that he would look into
some of these issues, but we are still waiting for the results
of those meetings.
Mr. Richmond. So just to be clear, for you, it is really a
problem with the inspector program?
Chief O'Connor. That is correct.
Mr. Richmond. Okay.
Mr. Elliot. Congressman, I would underscore what Chief
O'Connor says, in that in our dealings with TSA, I would rate
our relationship with the freight rail branch, the headquarters
group that basically focuses on regulation and policy, as being
very good. We have had good interaction with that group since
its inception, and traditionally, they will listen to our
concerns. Most of the folks within that group actually come
from rail backgrounds, which we find very helpful. We don't
always agree with some of the regulations that they bring
forward. What we understand, that they have a task in trying to
make this country in rail transportation safer, and we can
appreciate that task.
We also have what we think is a very good relationship with
our regional safety coordinator, whose job is to kind of
understand the concerns and issues that we have at CSX.
But finally, I think our relationship with the surface
transportation inspectors, given that they report up to a
director who focuses more on aviation security, we find that
that communication and coordination probably is lowest of the
three groups that we deal with regularly at the TSA.
Mr. Richmond. I may have missed it, but any suggestion on
who should be at the top of that command chain?
Mr. Elliot. I think that perhaps, in my point of view, it
is not who should be at the top, but they should all be
together.
Mr. Richmond. With the focus on surface transportation as
opposed to aviation, at least for this group.
Mr. Elliot. Correct, yeah, I would tell you that a rail
yard and a freight train is entirely different from an airport
and air passenger security.
Mr. Richmond. Mr. Byrd.
Mr. Byrd. Thank you, Congressman. I would agree with my
colleagues to the right that the relationship between the
trucking industry and TSA is good on one hand and, on the other
hand, can be improved. I think that is, in basic terms, is a
partnership and a trusted partnership and one that needs to be
expanded on. When we--the trucking industry has been dealing
with what is known as the Transportation Work Identification
Card for approximately 5 years. That program has been an
economic burden to our industry and returned very little
results in terms of antiterrorism or securing our seaports and
other venues.
Its purpose was to be a single biometric credential that
the trucking industry could use to gain access into sensitive
and secure areas, and it has yet to fulfill that requirement.
We still don't have readers in the field, and yet we are
looking upon a situation where these cards that were first
issued are going to expire shortly, and we are going to have to
go through that economic burden again, and we still don't have
readers. So that is a problem for us.
In terms of the VIPR situation that I made comment to in
the testimony, in Georgia and Tennessee, as a taxpayer, is it a
good investment to have a second level of inspectors go out
just simply to hand out material to our commercial drivers
about how they can communicate what they see when we already
have effective programs both in our private businesses and as a
industry at large?
So I think that the key from the trucking industry would be
to expand on the trusted partnership program, work together,
communicate together, and develop that.
Mr. Rogers. The gentleman's time has expired.
I now go to the gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack.
We will have another round of questions if you want to pick
up, Mr. Richmond, at that point.
Mr. Richmond. That is fine. Thank you.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all for coming here today. I appreciate it.
If I could, please, Mr. Elliott, I just have got a couple
questions for you in regards to some rail issues. In your
experience, do the TSA inspectors that you have dealt with, are
they more focused on securing the environment or technical
compliance?
Mr. Elliot. Technical compliance.
Mr. Cravaack. So they are dotting the i's, crossing the
t's?
Mr. Elliot. That is correct.
Mr. Cravaack. Not looking at security--the environmental
security, then. When I say ``environmental,'' I mean
conditions.
Mr. Elliot. Correct.
Mr. Cravaack. Do you think the current structure in which
TSA inspectors are reporting to Federal security directors in
the field is working well?
Mr. Elliot. I believe there is probably too much
inconsistency with the current TSA organizational structure
that has a group of individuals who are responsible for coming
out and providing security inspection of the freight rail yards
not in any way shape or form connected with the headquarters
organization that really is responsible for formulating policy
and regulations, and I think what happens is that then we see
this tremendous inconsistency with the application of the
regulations and interpretations.
We have spent an inordinate amount of time and resources
dealing with very minor and trivial administrative issues. Fact
in point, approximately 2 weeks ago, we received notification
from our regional security liaison about what they considered
to be a serious security breach, violation breach in a railyard
in Jacksonville, and they asked for a meeting. So I brought my
security team in, myself, the representatives from the TSA
surface inspections side came in. They laid out the issue as
they saw it and only to find out that it was a
misinterpretation of their own regulation and that the regional
or, excuse me, the regional security liaison actually then had
to call back after he called the headquarters group, the
freight rail group in Washington, to get the interpretation to
find out that what to them was a significant violation of the
regulation wasn't a violation at all.
We spent a lot of time and effort preparing for that
meeting trying to understand what we may have done wrong, only
to find out that it was an inappropriate or an inaccurate
application of the regulation by the inspectors who are
supposed to know those things.
Mr. Cravaack. You are touching on a point I want to try to
hammer home. When railroads speak of the regional security
inspectors, the RSIs with concerns about surface transportation
security inspectors, what actions are RSIs available to
actually take?
Mr. Elliot. Probably very, very little, if any, actions
directly, but I do give our regional security inspector good
marks for his consistent communications with us in trying to
act as an intermediary to solve some of our concerns. But you
are correct. He has very little capability to solve any
problems independently.
Mr. Cravaack. That is pretty much because of the chain of
command, as I understand it. Now the problem is STSIs do not
report to the TSA freight rail branch do they?
Mr. Elliot. No.
Mr. Cravaack. Or to the TSA headquarters.
Mr. Elliot. That is correct.
Mr. Cravaack. Rather the STSIs report to the Federal
security directors, is that correct?
Mr. Elliot. Yes.
Mr. Cravaack. In the field, whose primary focus--isn't
their primary focus on aviation?
Mr. Elliot. It is.
Mr. Cravaack. That is what I thought. So now, although the
TSA appointed the regional security inspectors to be liaisons
to the railroad, on surface transportation issues, the RSIs are
not in the chain of command of the STSIs, is that correct?
Mr. Elliot. That is correct.
Mr. Cravaack. Or the TSA freight rail branch?
Mr. Elliot. Yes.
Mr. Cravaack. So, therefore, they lack really any authority
to resolve any issues or the ability to provide meaningful
subject matter guidance on freight rail security issues, is
that correct?
Mr. Elliot. Yes.
Mr. Cravaack. So it is a pretty messed-up system, would you
agree?
Mr. Elliot. It could be better.
Mr. Cravaack. You should run for politics. Okay.
I just wanted to show the inadequacy of the system and how
it is working, and you brought up the point--I mean, your
example was right on, on just how ineffective and inefficient
the system is when there is an issue, and you have to go to
great lengths to explain yourself to somebody who may not even
understand what you are talking about.
So, thank you very much, sir, I appreciate your time, and I
will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes my friend and colleague from
Illinois, Mr. Davis, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and let me
thank the witnesses. Why don't I begin and ask each one of you
if you would respond? I will begin with Mr. Morris.
The Department has been championing its ``See Something,
Say Something'' campaign for the last couple of years. How does
your membership report or collect data on the reporting
incidents?
Mr. Morris. Thanks, Congressman, the ``See Something, Say
Something'' is basically a slogan, an ad campaign. We are
involved in a First Observer Program. The First Observer
Program has a call center. We have over 168,000 program
members. Last year we received over, since the inception, we
received somewhere in the area of 4,000 calls; 400 of those
calls have been referred for further action to the
Transportation Security Operations Center for investigation. So
the ``See Something, Say Something'' campaign is basically an
ad campaign. The First Observer has training involved with it
and it tells people what to look for.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Blankenship.
Mr. Blankenship. We train our entire workforce on to report
any instances, and we have a 24/7 operation center that is
manned to take those calls. Based on the level of incidents,
there is a call down tree or a notification tree so the more
serious instances get raised up very quickly. It is
instantaneous, and it is distributed through the entire
corporation as appropriate.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Byrd.
Mr. Byrd. Congressman, thank you for the question, and I
would just simply say that the ``See Something, Say Something''
program has been effective in the trucking industry. We have
two prime examples to share. In my testimony, written testimony
I submitted, you will note that we make mention of an incident
that occurred by one of our carrier members where a very alert
employee of a trucking company saw suspicious chemicals coming
through and going to a suspicious residence, made comment of
that, took it up the chain of command, as he had been trained
internally and through our association to do. The end result of
that ``See Something, Say Something'' scenario was a terrorist
attempt was frauded and apprehended.
Another such incident, the American Trucking Association
ran the program Highway Watch, and I am sure all of us here
remember the Washington sniper, it was because of that program
and the effectiveness of communicating a need of the community
to see something and say something that that individual was
apprehended by the recognition of seeing something and saying
something by a truck driver.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Elliott.
Mr. Elliot. Congressman, in the freight rail industry, and
specifically CSX, we have for a number of years a similar
program that we call ``Recognize, Record, and Report,'' which
is basically training our employees to identify any suspicious
or unusual activities even to the equivalent of our 9/11
location, our public safety coordination center, or if it is a
bona fide concern, to the local police at 9/11. We will gather
that information, and we typically then will report that
further up to our trade association, the Association of
American Railroads, through their Rail Alert Network, and they
will then move it forward to other Federal security agencies.
Oftentimes, too, we will make individual contacts to TSA at
their operation center out in Herndon, and even perhaps to the
Federal DOT security center here in Washington.
Mr. Davis. Chief O'Connor.
Chief O'Connor. Yes, sir. We have trained our 19,000
employees in the ``See Something, Say Something'' program as
well as the general public. We have developed a program called
PASS, or Partners for Amtrak Security and Safety, and any and
all reports come into our National communication center. They
are investigated at the local level, and those that have a
substantive are then passed on to our representatives at the
Joint Terrorism Task Force. So it has been a very successful
program for us.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
I want to revisit something. I think you can tell from my
opening statement that I am of the impression that this
inspector program is too heavy in personnel and based on its
earlier history was able to get by pretty efficiently and
effectively with about 100 inspectors; certainly no more than
200 would be necessary based on what I have heard prior to this
hearing from and from you all.
So I would like to start with Mr. Morris. Is that your
view? Would you agree or disagree with that observation, yes or
no? Or you can plead the fifth if you are scared.
Mr. Morris. I agree with that, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Blankenship.
Mr. Blankenship. I agree with that observation.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Byrd.
Mr. Byrd. I agree with the observation, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Elliott.
Mr. Elliot. Agree.
Mr. Rogers. Chief.
Chief O'Connor. I will give you a little more qualified
answer. The numbers don't----
Mr. Rogers. I thought everybody was going to be just a
badge of courage, and then he came up.
Chief O'Connor. The numbers, I don't turn away any help.
But it has got to be the right kind of help. If they are not
doing the right thing, then increasing the numbers doesn't
help. So whatever the number turns out to be, it needs to do
the right thing.
Mr. Rogers. You just basically concurred with the other
four gentlemen when you say you don't need that many people. I
am getting to this: If it were up to you all and we could
reallocate the money being spent on 300 of those 400 inspectors
and put them into a grant program--now several of you have
talked about grants that pay for canine assets. It could be
some other security asset. Would you think that would be a
higher and better use of the money?
Start with Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Yes, sir, we would wholeheartedly support that.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Blankenship.
Mr. Blankenship. Yes, in my statement, I refer to the inner
city bus security grant and how effective that program has been
so we would support that.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Byrd.
Mr. Byrd. We would agree.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Elliott.
Mr. Elliot. Congressman, I think we would like to see more
risk-based approaches that promote technology-based security
solutions and not just drawing manpower that may not be wholly
effective.
Mr. Rogers. Would the grants accomplish that?
Mr. Elliot. Yes, it could.
Mr. Rogers. Chief.
Chief O'Connor. I'm a proponent of the expansion of canine
without qualification.
Mr. Rogers. Great. I am glad you all helped me get that on
the record because I am going to try to bring that amendment
when we proceed to the floor with this. I do think that this
money could be used better in these various grant programs.
Mr. Blankenship, you mentioned earlier, and this will be my
last question, that TSA wouldn't work with you on trying to put
canine assets in your systems at very modest expense. What was
the problem?
Mr. Blankenship. They just couldn't coordinate the
activities. In most cases, downtown locations were a couple
blocks, three or four blocks away, so why not come by the
Greyhound terminal, have canine unit do a quick run through the
terminal as a preventative, and we weren't able to break that
silo down. We asked to have that reconsidered. We think it
could be valuable and at very little incremental cost.
Mr. Rogers. You are telling the right person. I may be able
to help you with that.
Mr. Blankenship. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Davis, do you have any more questions?
Mr. Davis. One more.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. O'Connor, you indicate that you would not turn away the
extra support or help. How can TSA do a better job or what kind
of support do you need or could you use?
Chief O'Connor. They have been very helpful in doing
passenger baggage screening, helping us multiply our forces.
They have been very helpful in the canine aspects. Those
efforts that actually do something in the field to enhance
boots on the ground is what I am looking for.
Mr. Davis. Also, and each one of you if you could just
respond quickly, in the June 2008 DHS OIG report entitled
``TSA's Administration and Coordination of Mass Transit
Security Programs,'' several concerns were raised by transit
security officials indicating that TSA's risk management did
not account for certain needs of cities and their transit
systems.
In developing the fiscal year 2012 Transit Security Grant
Program priorities and evaluated submissions, how do you think
DHS can improve on its transparency in the evaluation and
selection of transit security projects?
Chief, why don't we just start with you?
Chief O'Connor. Well, it is a pretty long question, and I
will say this, that with limited resources, again, those
efforts that enhance front-line operational efforts are the
ones that, in my opinion, are best invested in, those that
encourage partnerships. For instance, we worked very closely
recently with the Secret Service and the City of Chicago police
department during the NATO conference, and in fact, our canines
were used by the Secret Service in helping protect that whole
event. So those efforts that help in the development of
partnerships, that help the front-line efforts are what I
support.
Mr. Davis. If you read the Chicago papers, you will note
that everybody felt that the entire team did an excellent job,
an outstanding job, and we command you for that.
Mr. Elliott.
Mr. Elliot. Congressman Davis, at first blush, most folks
may not think that a freight rail transportation network has
much to do with passenger rail security, but that is really not
the case. At CSX, we have over 8 million rail miles a year of
passenger and commuter operations on our network. We are very,
very fortunate to have great working relationships with my
colleagues at Amtrak and some of the other passenger
transportation networks.
One of the things that we do through our police department,
and yes we use canine as well--I am happy to announce we are
assigning a new canine unit right here to a community-based
policing effort that we have in Washington--but one of the
things we do recognizing that, and we do have the traveling
public on CSX rails that use our police department to basically
go out and try to train other law enforcement agencies who are
going to be the first to respond to a rail-related terrorist
incident. But again, we understand the importance of the
transit security side, and we try to do our best to help our
colleagues to deal with it on a more frequent basis.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Byrd.
Mr. Byrd. Obviously, we are not involved in the mass
transit of people in that, but just to respond in general as a
citizen, again, I think it just highlights the fact--and from
what my colleague Chief O'Connor mentioned, communication,
working together, partnerships are invaluable to making a
successful program work and that is the only comment I would
have.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Blankenship.
Mr. Blankenship. I think my comment is more geared toward
Greyhound lines is a private bus company, and most of the
security cost is at our burden. Congress did include the inner
city bus security grant in fiscal year 2012, but DHS chose not
to fund it, and we would like to see that revisited. We think
that is a big help with very little dollars and it goes a long
way to screening our customers.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Yes, sir, as a representative for drivers, we
applaud any efforts in any surface transportation security
realm. Transit, wherever, our drivers count on the fact that
they need to have that bridge there, or they need to have that
road there; if their wheels aren't rolling, they are not making
any money.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. The Chairman recognizes Mr. Turner for any
additional questions if you have any.
Mr. Turner. No questions.
Mr. Rogers. I will close with this. It is an invitation.
Next week I will have Administrator Pistole before our
committee. If there is anything you would like me to ask him,
tee it up.
Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Yes, sir, I would like to ask him if any future
grants are going to be out there, more homeland security
efforts, surface transportation, if he is going to dedicate
more money to surface transportation.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent. I will do that.
Mr. Blankenship.
Mr. Blankenship. I would have the same response, an inner
city bus grant program, getting that revitalized with some
other type of grant; also better coordination on the VIPR teams
when they do come into the Greyhound terminals, coordination on
time of day and so forth. We don't need them coming in when we
don't have passengers.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent. I will do that.
Mr. Byrd.
Mr. Byrd. The trucking industry would like to know when our
TWIC readers are going to be available to us.
Mr. Rogers. I will get you an answer.
Mr. Elliott.
Mr. Elliot. Mr. Chairman, I think it has to do with better
coordination, perhaps consolidation of the organizational
construct of TSA, especially as it focuses on freight rail
security. They shouldn't be separate entities. They should all
be one single-focused effort that focuses on surface
transportation.
Mr. Rogers. Why don't you do this for me? Why don't you
fashion the question you want tendered in writing, and I will
read it verbatim for you?
Chief O'Connor, short-timer.
Chief O'Connor. Short-timer. I would ask the administrator
if he would take a look at within the organization on them, the
surface security inspectors, looking to partner with industry
as they do in other areas of TSA, take a hard look at that.
Mr. Rogers. Great. For those folks who didn't get the
short-timer remark, Chief O'Connor is about to retire, and I am
proud for him, a little jealous, but he has been a great asset
to come before us before, and I appreciate it. I wish you well
in your retirement and hope we see you around here in more
relaxed attire in the future.
Chief O'Connor. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Davis. Before you close, can I just ask, Mr. Morris----
Mr. Rogers. Certainly.
Mr. Davis [continuing]. A question. You discussed the First
Observer Program as an important layer of security. Could you
amplify that a little bit?
Mr. Morris. The First Observer Program is a trainer
program. It puts together people who know their realm, know
their driving or whatever realm it is, gets them together, we
put training modules together geared toward their expertise,
their professional area of expertise. They in turn call us when
they see something that is out of the ordinary; it is either
suspicious or out of the ordinary, calls that you generally
would probably not get in the past, or they would call 9/11,
and those calls would go to the wayside. Those calls are then
taken to or vetted and analyzed by a transportation security
professional in the Transportation Security Operational Center,
and there are actionable items taken as a result of those calls
and analysis.
Mr. Davis. You think there is perhaps any additional
training opportunities that exist or if there were training
opportunities, if this would be effective to the extent of
really being useful in terms of people learning perhaps more
effective techniques and approaches and what to look for and
how to look?
Mr. Morris. Yes, sir, Congressman. The original program was
supposed to be just for trucking security. It has evolved into
12 modules now, different venues due to the gaps that people
saw. TSA came to us and said: Hey, can you put together more
modules? We did it, no extra money or anything like that. We
just did it because we thought it was the right thing to do,
and we did it. If there is additional money or additional
training, we could put everybody on surface transportation
under the umbrella. The problem is that the funding is scant at
this time.
Mr. Davis. Well, thank you very much.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I see that the Ranking Member
has returned, and I am pretty certain that I probably didn't
ask half the questions that she might have asked, but I would
yield.
Mr. Rogers. The Chairman recognizes the Ranking Member for
any questions she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank all of the witnesses.
To give me some reprieve and excuse, I was dealing with the
intelligence bill on the floor of the House, and I know that
gentlemen rely a lot on intelligence, and we need to coordinate
together.
Let me, because a lot of you are from the areas in which we
are attempting to work with TSA, I would like to just ask the
question, Chief O'Connor and Mr. Morris, the importance of
making sure that we continue the transportation security
grants. As I indicated, my amendment put in $400 million, and
we will always hear from some that resources don't always
answer the question. But I have been on the ground. I know the
vastness of the work that law enforcement is asked to cover,
particularly the local structure and infrastructure.
Chief O'Connor, I have, as many other Americans, ridden on
Amtrak. Amtrak, I must say, I think relatively, without
documentation, has a safety track record that is more than
respectable based upon how old it is. Amtrak, if you ride it,
rides through neighborhoods and urban centers. It therefore,
can be enormously attractive to somebody who wants to do us
harm. So both of you could answer what those resources,
particularly this $400 million, and keeping those funding
cycles open and flowing to be constructively, efficiently,
effectively, and with the taxpayer's dollars in mind, how this
continues to help secure the homeland.
Chief O'Connor.
Chief O'Connor. Yes, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, the Amtrak
operates in more than 500 communities in 46 States, and we
interact with about a dozen commuter agencies across the
country, so it is not just protecting America's railroad, but
it is also protecting communities in major urban areas and
major commuter centers around the country.
The transit security grants go a long way toward helping us
in our canine programs, toward helping us in gathering the
proper intelligence, toward buying down vulnerability and
lowering the risk.
It is a daunting task just to protect the public on a day-
to-day basis. When you overlay that with the threat of
terrorism, the assistance that the Federal Government gives to
us and the transit agencies across the country is vital, and
there would be serious breaches and increases in vulnerability
without it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. Yes, ma'am, Ranking Member, the First Observer
Program, as you are aware, is on a no-cost extension since
January 1, 2012. Over 160 program members--that is what we
have--these are volunteers and a lot of different venues,
ports, school bus, trucking, there are 12 different venues. In
your district alone, we have 2,000 school bus and truck
drivers. These are volunteers who came there for the training
to help out in the homeland security mission.
If TSA walks away from this, it sends a message to them
saying that they don't care about surface transportation. That
is the only thing I can say.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let's get Mr. Elliott.
Let me focus the question in quite a different way, we have
the massive freight system and part of the work that you do,
the major work that you do. I think there is no question that
there are hazardous materials that are being transported, makes
for a vulnerability for those who might wish to do us harm, how
important it is to have a partnership with the Federal
Government on securing the homeland, particularly with
inspectors dealing with surface transportation?
Mr. Elliot. As I had mentioned earlier, we recognize that
there are many valuable programs between TSA and the freight
rail industry. With regards to the surface transportation
inspectors, we have some concerns that we wish they had better
knowledge and understanding of the freight rail system. Freight
railroads can be inherently unsafe places, and we prefer that
the folks that are entrusted by the Government to basically
come out and provide those inspections have received the kind
of commensurate training and understanding of railroad.
We would also like to see that to be, as wholly effective
as the current group of surface transportation inspectors can
be, that, again, that there is better coordination between the
entities that we deal with in TSA. The surface transportation
inspectors report up through one entity. We also assigned a
regional security inspector as a liaison to try and help us
with issues that we have. Then, of course, we deal with the
headquarters, freight rail branch, that deals a lot with
regulations and policy, and there is no consistency between
those three.
We would really ask that TSA kind-of does a better job of
bringing those groups together to provide better service to us
on the freight rail security side.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So your comments are not the lack of
recognition of the value of inspectors, what your instruction
and insight is that we need to improve our training and
outreach so that we have inspectors who are sufficiently
trained for each discipline, each industry, am I hearing you
correctly? If I might, any coordination within TSA?
Mr. Elliot. Ranking Member Jackson Lee, I think currently,
and I have to say what I observe and that is that we don't see
the current cadre of surface transportation inspectors that are
focusing on freight rail transportation are as effective as
they possibly could be.
We are dependent upon our network of employees, our police
department, our security professionals to provide most of the
security to our freight rail network, and I think some of this
lack of coordination between the entities that focus on freight
rail security that perhaps makes the current group not nearly
as effective as probably they should be.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What I would say as I close, Mr. Chairman,
is that there is no doubt that transportation security
inspectors are a valuable asset. I think if I look at the
railroad industry for a long time, you have been under the U.S.
Department of Transportation pre-9/11. Now there is overlapping
jurisdiction, and what I hear you crying out for is what I
think is a bipartisan cry at least it is mine; no, I cannot
yield to the Department of Transportation Federal Railroad
Agency for security, but what I will listen to and I think is
important is the idea that we can improve training, we can
improve coordination, and we can answer your question or your
concern that we need to have focus on your industry in the
right way.
So I conclude by thanking Chief O'Connor for his service. I
understand he is retiring, and I congratulate him for the
service he has given to this Nation.
I yield back.
Mr. Turner [presiding]. I thank the witnesses for their
valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. The
Members of the committee may have some additional questions for
the witnesses, and you will be asked to respond to these in
writing. The hearing record will be open for 10 days.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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