[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
STOPPING THE FLOW OF ILLICIT DRUGS IN
ARIZONA BY LEVERAGING STATE, LOCAL, AND
FEDERAL INFORMATION SHARING
=======================================================================
FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 21, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-94
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Chairwoman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Henry Cuellar, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Ben Quayle, Arizona, Vice Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Paul Anstine, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Ben Quayle, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Arizona:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas........................................ 4
Witnesses
Mr. Matthew C. Allen, Special Agent in Charge, Homeland Security
Investigations--Phoenix, U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Douglas W. Coleman, Special Agent in Charge, Drug Enforcement
Administration--Phoenix, U.S. Department of Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Brig. Gen. Jose Salinas, Director, Joint Staff, Dept. of
Emergency & Military Affairs, Arizona National Guard:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Lt. Col. Jeffery A. Stanhope, Assistant Director, Criminal
Investigations, Arizona Department of Public Safety:
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
Ms. Elizabeth Kempshall, Executive Director, Southwest Border
HIDTA Arizona Region:
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Prepared Statement............................................. 42
Mr. Jay F. Nunamaker, Jr., Director, Borders, University of
Arizona:
Oral Statement................................................. 45
Prepared Statement............................................. 46
STOPPING THE FLOW OF ILLICIT DRUGS IN ARIZONA BY LEVERAGING STATE,
LOCAL, AND FEDERAL INFORMATION SHARING
----------
Monday, May 21, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Phoenix, AZ.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., at
Russell Auditorium of the Arizona National Guard, 5636 East
McDowell Road, Phoenix, Arizona, Hon. Ben Quayle, presiding.
Present: Representatives Quayle, Jackson Lee, and Gosar.
Mr. Quayle. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee
on Border and Maritime Security will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony from
Matt Allen, special agent in charge of Homeland Security
Investigations in Arizona; Doug Coleman, special agent in
charge of the DEA's Phoenix Field Division; Brigadier General
Jose Salinas from the Arizona National Guard; Lieutenant
Colonel Jeffery Stanhope, assistant director, Criminal
Investigations, Arizona Department of Public Safety; Elizabeth
Kempshall, who is the executive director, Arizona High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area; and Dr. Jay F. Nunamaker from
the University of Arizona on the topic of combating the cross-
border flow of illicit drugs in Arizona.
First, I want to thank everybody, including the witnesses,
for attending today. This is an official Congressional hearing,
as opposed to a town hall meeting. As such, we must abide by
certain rules of the Committee on Homeland Security and of the
House of Representatives.
I kindly wish to remind our guests today that
demonstrations from the audience, including applause and verbal
outbursts, as well as the use of signs or placards, are a
violation of the Rules of the House of Representatives. It is
important that we respect the decorum of the rules of this
committee.
Mr. Gosar of Arizona is here with us today. I ask unanimous
consent that he be allowed to take part in these proceedings.
Without objection, so ordered.
I would also like to mention that photography and cameras
are limited to accredited press only. I now recognize myself
for an opening statement.
It is an honor to be here today to discuss the vital role
of how Federal, State, and local entities collaborate to combat
the flow of drugs from entering our communities once they have
crossed our borders.
This field hearing will examine how these different
entities work together as a last line of defense before drugs
smuggled through Arizona make their way across the country.
A recent GAO report indicated that we only have operational
control of 44 percent of our border and Arizona has been on the
forefront of cartel violence and drug smuggling as a result.
Illicit drug revenues generate somewhere between $19 to $29
billion for the drug cartels every single year. It is a big,
sophisticated, and increasingly brutal business which moves
drugs north from the source zones in Columbia, Bolivia, and
Peru to the streets of America.
Key transportation hubs such as Phoenix are vital
transshipment points for large amounts of cocaine and heroin
that cross the border and are destined for cities throughout
the United States. In fact, according to the National Drug
Intelligence Center, most of the heroin entering the United
States from Mexico now comes through Arizona.
Crystal methamphetamine, produced by the Sinaloa cartel in
Mexican super labs, is a growing concern for law enforcement
due to the rapid rise in the number of seizures of large
quantities in Arizona. Drugs are moving north and bulk cash is
moving south.
Cartels, motivated by lucrative profits, are innovative and
use a wide array of methods to deliver their product through a
variety of methods: Through the land, from men with backpacks
traversing the rough terrain of the Arizona desert; using
hidden compartments and cars or cargo that move through the
ports of entry; underground, using tunnels for semi-submersible
boats that carry tons of cocaine; and through the air with
ultra-light aircraft that is difficult for radar to detect.
If the U.S. Government is going to be successful at
stemming the tide of illegal drugs and its corresponding
violence, we must be just as innovative, flexible, and nimble
as the cartels.
Last week in the House, we made progress combating the
proliferation of border tunnels with the passage of the Border
Tunnel Prevention Act, increasing the penalties for the
construction of tunnels across the border.
Competition for control in the drug plazas, human smuggling
routes, and the money that follows, has led to a previously
unimaginable level of violence and brutality. We saw last week
the grisly discovery of 49 people found decapitated on a
stretch of highway not far from McAllen, Texas as a result of
the on-going war between the rival Sinaloa and Zetas cartels.
Drug cartels competing for turf has led to the deaths of
more than 47,000 people. In many cases, Mexican cities are more
dangerous than war zones in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Northern Mexico is turning into a war zone with police
unable to control violence or enforce the law. Police,
prosecutors, and judges are routinely assassinated and the
local officials who are left are often given a stark choice,
``Plata O Plomo,'' silver or lead, take the bribe or be killed.
Once Mexican President Felipe Calderon began to increase
pressure against drug trafficking, we saw violence escalate.
Mexico holds its presidential elections later this year, and my
hope is that, regardless of the outcome, the new Mexican
president will be a partner committed to curbing the violence
and corrosive influence of the drug cartels.
Let me be clear. This is not just a Mexican problem. The
effects of the drug trade are felt here at home with huge law
enforcement costs, stash houses in our communities, cases of
Customs and Border Protection and TSA officers corrupted
facilitating drug smugglers and drug-related violence in our
streets.
While many of our cities have a low violent crime rate, on
occasion we see the violence spill over with stray bullets
finding innocent bystanders on the U.S. side of the border, or
ranchers gunned down on their property.
Denying the cartel's ability to deliver their poison to
America's cities should be one of this Nation's principal
goals. Cutting off the flow of drugs means less money for the
cartels to operate and less ability to corrupt officials on
both sides of the border. How then do we marshal our limited
resources to combat the grave threat posed by the drug cartels?
I believe that a layered approach that attempts to
eradicate the crops from ever being grown, interdicts drug
loads as they make their way from the source zones, quickly
identifying the drugs from being hidden among legitimate cargo
at the Nation's ports of entry, and deterring the illicit
crossing of the vast Arizona desert offers the best chance of
success.
Stopping this flow is the goal of many different agencies
at the State, local, and Federal level. The scale of the
problem means that no one agency or level of government can do
it alone, which means that cooperation and coordination becomes
crucial.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine how all levels
of government work together to combat the flow of illicit
drugs. We in Congress want to ensure you have the right tools
to disrupt the flow of drugs that move through our area and
eventually make their way into Chicago, New York, and
elsewhere. I look forward to hearing the witnesses' testimony
and suggestions on how we can work together to combat the
threat of cross-border drug trafficking.
[The statement of Mr. Quayle follows:]
Statement of Honorable Ben Quayle
May 21, 2012
It is an honor to be here today to discuss the vital role of how
Federal, State, and local entities collaborate to combat the flow of
drugs from entering our communities once they have crossed our borders.
A recent GAO report indicated that we only have operational control
of 44% of our border and Arizona has been on the forefront of cartel
violence and drug smuggling as a result.
This field hearing will examine how these different entities work
together as a last line of defense before drugs smuggled through
Arizona make their way across the country.
Illicit drug revenues generate somewhere between $19 to $29 billion
dollars for the drug cartels every single year. It's a big,
sophisticated, and increasingly brutal business which moves drugs north
from the source zones in Columbia, Bolivia, and Peru to the streets of
America.
Key transportation hubs, such as Phoenix, are vital transshipment
points for large amounts of cocaine and heroin that cross the border
and are destined for cities throughout the United States. In fact,
according to the National Drug Intelligence Center, most of the heroin
entering the United States from Mexico now comes through Arizona.
Crystal methamphetamine, produced by the Sinaloa cartel in Mexican
``super labs,'' is a growing concern for law-enforcement due to the
rapid rise in the number of seizures of large quantities in Arizona.
Drugs are moving north, and bulk cash is moving south.
Cartels, motivated by lucrative profits, are innovative and use a
wide array of methods to deliver their product through a variety of
methods; through the land from men with backpacks traversing the rough
terrain of the Arizona desert, using hidden compartments in cars or
cargo that move through the ports of entry, underground using tunnels
or semi-submersible boats that can carry tons of cocaine, and through
the air with ultra light aircraft that is difficult for radar to
detect.
If the U.S. Government is going to be successful at stemming the
tide of illegal drugs and its corresponding violence, then we must be
just as innovative, flexible, and nimble as the cartels. Last week in
the House, we made progress combating the proliferation of border
tunnels with the passage of the Border Tunnel Prevention Act,
increasing the penalties for the construction of tunnels across the
border.
Competition for control of the drug plazas, human smuggling routes,
and the money that follows, has led to a previously unimaginable level
of violence and brutality. We saw last week the grisly discovery of 49
people found decapitated on a stretch of highway not far from McAllen,
Texas as a result of the on-going war between the rival Sinaloa and
Zetas cartels.
Drug cartels competing for turf has led to the deaths of more than
47,000 people--in many cases Mexican cities are more dangerous than war
zones in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Northern Mexico is turning into a war zone with police unable to
control violence or enforce the law. Police, prosecutors, and judges
are routinely assassinated and the local officials who are left are
often given a stark choice: Plata O Plomo--silver or lead--take the
bribe or be killed.
Once Mexican president Felipe Calderon began to increase pressure
against drug trafficking organizations, we saw violence escalate.
Mexico holds its presidential elections later this year, and my hope is
that regardless of the outcome, the new Mexican president will be a
partner committed to curbing the violence and the corrosive influence
of the drug cartels.
Let me be clear, this is not just a Mexican problem. The affects of
the drug trade are felt here at home with huge law-enforcement costs,
stash houses in our communities, cases of Customs and Border Protection
and TSA officers corrupted facilitating drug smugglers and drug-related
violence in our streets.
While many of our cities have a low violent crime rate, on
occasion, we see the violence spill over with stray bullets finding
innocent bystanders on the U.S. side of the border, or ranchers gunned
down on their property.
Denying the cartel's ability to deliver their poison to America's
cities should be one of this Nation's principal goals. Cutting off the
flow of drugs means less money for the cartels to operate and less
ability to corrupt officials on both sides of the border.
How then do we marshal our limited resources to combat the grave
threat posed by the drug cartels?
I believe that a layered approach that attempts to eradicate the
crops from ever being grown; interdicts drug loads as they make their
way from the source zones; quickly identifying the drugs from being
hidden among legitimate cargo at the Nation's ports of entry; and
deterring the illicit crossing of the vast Arizona desert offers the
best chance of success.
Stopping this flow is the goal of many different agencies at the
State, local, and Federal level. The scale of the problem means that no
one agency or level of government can do it alone, which means that
cooperation and coordination becomes crucial.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine how all levels of
government work together to combat the flow of illicit drugs. We in
Congress want to ensure that you have the right tools to disrupt the
flow of drugs that move through our area, and eventually make their way
into Chicago, New York, and elsewhere.
I look forward to hearing the witness's testimony and suggestions
on how we can work better together to combat the threat of cross-border
drug trafficking.
Mr. Quayle. I now recognize the gentle lady from Texas, Ms.
Jackson Lee, for any statement of position.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding today's hearing.
I hope my presence here today will continue to remind
Arizonans that there is a National focus on your issues,
particularly the issue of stopping the flow of illicit drugs in
Arizona by leveraging State, local, and Federal information
sharing. I can assure you your former Governor, Secretary
Napolitano, who I had the privilege of working with now for a
number of years, is heavily concerned, as it impacts the
Nation's security. As well, President Obama is concerned as
relates to the funding that has been provided to ensure that we
have the kind of collaboration that is so very important.
I served on Homeland Security since the tragedy of 9/11,
first starting on the Select Committee on Homeland Security and
now continuing and serving as Ranking Member of Transportation
Security. My presence here today should emphasize the National
aspect of this issue and that we will continue to stand with
our friends throughout the Nation to ensure that our borders
are secure and that our people are secure as well.
The purpose of this hearing is to determine how Federal
agencies can work to stop the flow of illicit drugs in Arizona
by coordinating law enforcement activities and leveraging
relationships with State and local entities. In that respect
let me thank the entire Arizona Federal Congressional
delegation for their service and commitment, and to
particularly acknowledge my friend and colleague, Congressman
Ed Pastor, who serves in this area and serves on
appropriations, has worked very hard on this issue, along with
the Ranking Member of the full Committee, Bennie Thompson, who
I have worked with ensuring border security, along with the
Ranking Member and Chair of these committees, Ms. Miller and
Mr. Cuellar.
I have had the opportunity to travel to America's Northern
and Southern Borders on many occasions. I have walked the
borders. I have been with our Border Patrol in the late
darkness of the night. I have walked and seen the difficulty
and challenges that they face along with our other law
enforcement.
First-hand, it is important to acknowledge the good work of
law enforcement, Federal, State, and local, in these regions. I
have written and drafted legislation that has enhanced the
resources with night goggles, laptops, helicopters, Jeeps that
were necessary in the late 1990s into the 2000s. I am very
pleased to have been part of that effort, first as a Member of
the Judiciary Committee before 9/11 and then as a Member of the
Homeland Security Committee after 9/11.
Border security and immigration regulation is first and
foremost a Federal responsibility. We are not going to shy away
from it. We ensure and hope to ensure that that effort
continues to be our focus along with comprehensive immigration
reform.
In recognition of that fact, the Federal Government has
made an enormous investment in border security personnel,
technology, and infrastructure in recent years. However, State
and local law enforcement also has an important supporting role
to play. When the safety and security of our communities are at
stake, cooperation, coordination, and communication in these
matters is essential. Programs like BEST, B-E-S-T, the
Organized Crime Enforcement Security Task Force, and the High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas are an integral part of
promoting communication among law enforcement agencies in
cities and communities within border States as well as
providing the resources necessary for State and local law
enforcement to assist their Federal counterparts.
We have heard the citizens that are located along the
border in the many States that are on the border, including
Texas. I would like to hear from our witnesses today about
their experiences with these programs and what we could do to
further enhance their collective work on border security and
combating drug trafficking at the border and communities across
the United States.
It is our mission to make sure that we in the Federal
Government and local law enforcement work together as a team.
That is the best efforts of America. U.S. efforts along the
Southwest Border, in particular the States of Arizona and
Texas, have and continue to receive a great deal of attention.
The Obama administration has deployed more resources,
personnel, technology, and infrastructure to secure our borders
than ever before. The Border Patrol has almost doubled in size,
more than 21,000 Border Patrol agents on the entire U.S.
border. I have supported and written legislation to increase
those numbers. The current administration has also used more
than $21.5 million to increase the number of agents and
employees for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Let me thank ICE for its service. ICE has over 20,000
employees, consisting of about 7,000 special agents, 392 of
whom are located in Arizona working specifically to investigate
immigration crime; human rights violations and human smuggling;
smuggling of narcotics, weapons and other types of contraband;
financial crimes and cyber crimes; and export enforcement
issues.
On a personal note, I have taken the issue of human
smuggling personally and have worked closely with women and
girls who have been most impacted by this heinous crime. I
thank ICE for the work that we have done together to bring a
stop to that tide.
These men and women are working around the clock to secure
our border and keep illegal goods and products and dangerous
individuals from entering or remaining in the United States.
But more needs to be done, specifically in the State of
Arizona.
Currently Arizona is one of the primary entry and
distribution points for drugs that enter the United States from
Mexico. We are listening. Last year approximately 23 percent of
the narcotics and approximately 53 percent of the currency and
monetary instruments connected with narcotics investigations
that U.S. Immigrations Enforcement Customs, ICE, seized along
the entire Southwest Border were seized in Arizona. The good
news is that we are working. We can always work better and work
collaboratively.
Specifically, ICE seized approximately 307,000 pounds of
marijuana, 5,400 pounds of cocaine, 1,300 pounds of
amphetamines, and 423 pounds of heroin within the State of
Arizona. These numbers highlight the success of all the
Federal, State, and law enforcement entities within Arizona,
their sacrifice and their work. But they also indicate that
more remains to be done, particularly in border States like
this one and like mine, in the State of Texas.
As Members of the Committee on Homeland Security, we know
that securing America's border communities from drug
trafficking and its effects is an enormous task. Frankly, we
know that securing the Nation is an enormous task and how
grateful we are with all of the men and women. We thank them
that we have not had a tragic incident on our soil since 9/11.
We are working together. It does not matter what uniforms they
happen to wear. The American people expect all law enforcement
officers to work together in their vital effort.
Allow me just to acknowledge at this moment the Arizona
National Guard as well as the National Guards throughout
America, and as well as the United States military, and as well
to acknowledge Senator McCain and your Senatorial Federal
Congressional delegation for their leadership. I join his
remarks in ensuring the Federal ballot in Arizona will be fair
with all candidates, including President Obama, on the ballot.
I look forward to hearing more about how we can promote that
cooperation and coordination in the interest of the safety and
security of our Nation.
Again I thank the Chairman. I appreciate the opportunity to
participate in today's hearing and I look forward to what I
hope will be a very worthwhile and insightful dialogue.
I yield back to the Chairman.
Mr. Quayle. Thank the gentlelady for her statement.
Now recognize and introduce the witnesses.
First we have Matthew Allen. He is the special agent in
charge of Homeland Security Investigations in Arizona. Mr.
Allen has oversight of the full spectrum of ICE investigative
activities in the State of Arizona and leads more than 500
personnel assigned to offices in Phoenix, Tucson, Douglas,
Nogales, Yuma, and Flagstaff.
Prior to his assignment in Arizona, Mr. Allen served at ICE
headquarters in Washington, DC as the deputy assistant director
of the Financial, Narcotics, and Public Safety Division. In
this position he had oversight of the financial, drug, human
rights violations, and public safety programs within Homeland
Security Investigations.
Mr. Allen has previously served as unit chief for the
Contraband Smuggling Unit at ICE headquarters where he had
programmatic and operational oversight of all of ICE's drug and
contraband smuggling investigations throughout the United
States.
Next we have Doug Coleman, currently serving as special
agent in charge of the DEA's Phoenix Field Division. As a
special agent in charge, Mr. Coleman is responsible for
leadership and management of all DEA's operations in the State
of Arizona.
A 21-year veteran of the DEA, Special Agent Coleman was
appointed to his current position in March 2012. During his
career, Special Agent Coleman served in numerous enforcement,
training, supervisory, management roles throughout the agency,
including field investigative assignments in Las Vegas, Nevada;
Bakersfield, California; and Phoenix, Arizona. Special Agent
Coleman has also served as an instructor at the DEA Academy in
Quantico, Virginia, and numerous supervisory and managerial
positions at DEA headquarters in Washington, DC.
Next we have Brigadier General Jose Salinas. He is the
director, Joint Staff, Arizona Joint Force Headquarters. In
this capacity he is responsible for supporting the Governor and
the Adjutant General in the event of State/National crisis
response and consequence management. He also serves as the
joint task force commander, as required, to direct critical
support agencies. The Arizona National Guard Counterdrug
Program and the Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Team
also fall under his authority.
In 2009, General Salinas was assigned as the chief of staff
of the Arizona National Guard's Joint Staff and assumed his
current position in May 2010.
Next we have Lieutenant Colonel Jeffery Stanhope. He is the
assistant director of the Criminal Investigations Division at
the Arizona Department of Public Safety. The assistant director
is responsible for oversight of the Intelligence Bureau,
Narcotics and General Investigations Bureau, and the Gang
Enforcement Bureau. During his 28-year career with the
department, Colonel Stanhope has held a variety of
administrative and operational assignments, which provides him
with a comprehensive view of law enforcement.
Colonel Stanhope also serves on the Arizona Counter-
Terrorism Information Center executive board, Arizona High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area board, and the Alliance to
Combat Transnational Threats board.
Next we have Elizabeth Kempshall. She is the executive
director of the Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area,
or HIDTA. The Arizona HIDTA was established in 1990 as part of
the Southwest Border HIDTA, which includes California, Arizona,
New Mexico, and Texas.
Ms. Kempshall began her career with the DEA in 1984 as a
special agent in the Las Vegas district office where she worked
as an undercover agent in several major drug investigations.
From May 2007 to December 2010 Ms. Kempshall was the special
agent in charge of the Phoenix Field Division for the Drug
Enforcement Administration, which encompasses the entire State
of Arizona.
Dr. Jay Nunamaker is the director of the National Center
for Border Security and Immigration at the University of
Arizona. Mr. Nunamaker is widely published in the fields of
collaboration and technologies and deception detection. He has
co-founded four spin-off companies based on his research. Dr.
Nunamaker founded the MIS department at the University of
Arizona in 1974. He has served as the department head for 18
years.
I thank all the witnesses for being here today and look
forward to your testimony.
I now recognize Mr. Allen for five minutes of testimony.
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW C. ALLEN, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE,
HOMELAND SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS--PHOENIX, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
Mr. Allen. Chairman Quayle, Ranking Member Jackson Lee,
Congressman Gosar, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today and discuss ICE's role in stopping the flow of
illicit drugs along the Southwest Border by leveraging State,
local, and Federal information sharing to combat transnational
criminal organizations, or TCOs is how I will refer to them
today.
TCOs have grown more sophisticated, complex, and global
over the past 10 years. They have dramatically expanded in
size, scope, and impact, and they endanger people of all
countries. TCOs threaten National and global security, weaken
our economies and endanger the public by counterfeiting and
stealing intellectual property, profit from smuggling and
trafficking human beings, traffic in illegal narcotics and
weapons. They exploit minors and children and threaten
sensitive corporate and Government computer networks through
cyber crime.
However, no one entity can tackle global criminal
enterprises alone. Rather, it requires a multiagency,
multinational, and layered approach. To that end, HSI forges
strong and cooperative relationships and works closely with our
Federal, State and local, Tribal, and international partners to
accomplish these goals.
As you know, Arizona is one of the entry and distribution
points for drugs that enter the United States from Mexico. In
fiscal year 2011, I think as you heard this morning,
approximately 23 percent of narcotics and about 53 percent of
the currency and monetary instruments seized by ICE along the
Southwest Border actually are seized here in Arizona. We seized
about 307,000 pounds of marijuana, more than 5,000 pounds of
cocaine, more than 1,300 pounds of methamphetamine, and 424
pounds of heroin just in Arizona in HSI investigations.
Arizona is bordered by the State of Sonora to our south.
The Sinaloa cartel is the dominant criminal element in the
State of Sonora. The border areas of Mexico that adjoin the
United States are divided by the Sinaloa cartel into plazas
that are supervised by plaza bosses or gatekeepers. These plaza
bosses and gatekeepers are responsible for overseeing and
coordinating smuggling activities in a given geographic area
and collecting taxes and fees from anyone wishing to smuggle
contraband, including human smuggling organizations.
Smuggling organizations that we face are very agile and
creative. In response to law enforcement successes, these
organizations simply change smuggling tactics to increase their
chances of success and avoid arrest. One example was the
increased use of subterranean tunnels to smuggle drugs. We
believe that the continued attempt to use tunnels to smuggle
drugs, particularly in a place like Nogales, where we have seen
the most tunnels in Arizona, is evidence that smugglers are
being forced to move away from traditional smuggling techniques
due to enhanced enforcement efforts and resources.
In the last several years, we have seen smugglers utilize
ultra-light aircraft to smuggle marijuana payloads up to about
300 pounds. Again, we believe that the use of ultra-light
aircraft is an indication that smugglers are less capable of
smuggling marijuana using other preferred methods.
With respect to how we have leveraged Federal, State, and
local information sharing here in Arizona, I would like to
discuss the West Desert Task Force, an interdiction task force
established by my office in January 2012 and co-led with the
U.S. Border Patrol. The task force, which includes participants
from the Bureau of Land Management, Pinal County Sheriff's
Office, the Arizona Department of Public Safety, and Tohono
O'odham Police Department, focus on denying, degrading, and
ultimately dismantling drug trafficking organizations that
operate in Arizona's West Desert corridor through interdiction,
intelligence collection, and investigation.
The task force's intelligence efforts have been greatly
enhanced by our partnership with the Arizona HIDTA, whose
intelligence support has been invaluable.
Since January, the task force has seized more than 41,000
pounds of marijuana, 71 vehicles, six weapons and made 71
arrests. It exemplifies intelligence-driven law enforcement,
integrated interagency partnership, and expanded efforts to
share information with our Federal, State, local, and Tribal
partners and the government of Mexico. It illustrates the
sustained commitment of resources, both human resources and
technology, that DHS has designated toward securing the
Southwest Border.
Another example is Operation Pipeline Express, which was a
prelude and precipitated the West Desert Task Force. As you may
recall from last October, we concluded a 17-month multiagency
investigation that was responsible for dismantling a massive
narcotics trafficking organization suspected of smuggling more
than $33 million worth of drugs per month through West Desert.
The ring, organized around cells based in Chandler, Stanfield,
Maricopa, use backpackers and vehicles to smuggle loads of
marijuana and other drugs from the Arizona-Mexico border to a
network of stash houses located in the Phoenix area. After
arriving in Phoenix, the contraband, which also included
cocaine and heroin, was sold and distributed to various States
Nation-wide.
One of the most significant developments in the last 2
years has been a change in Mexican banking regulations that
have severely limited the amount of U.S. dollars that can be
deposited with Mexican financial institutions, which has proven
to be successful to combat money laundering by cartels. This
change has caused cartels to alter how drug proceeds are
laundered. While we believe that cartels are still adapting to
this change, we feel that one result may be a desire to place
these funds into U.S. financial institutions and then wire
proceeds to Mexico. We continue to work closely with the
government of Mexico and other law enforcement agencies to
identify emerging money laundering trends.
HSI continues to expand the Border Enforcement Security
Task Force program, which currently operates in 31 locations
throughout the United States and Mexico. BEST leverages about
750 Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement agents
and officers representing over 100 law enforcement agencies,
and provides a collocated platform to conduct intelligence-
driven investigations aimed at identifying, disrupting, and
dismantling organizations that operate in the air, land, and
sea environments.
Thank you again for inviting me to testify today and for
the subcommittee's continued support of ICE, Homeland Security
Investigations, and its law enforcement mission. We look
forward to working with our Federal, State, local, and Tribal
partners to ensure the safety and security of all Americans.
Happy to answer any questions you have later on.
[The statement of Mr. Allen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Matthew C. Allen
May 21, 2012
introduction
Chairman Quayle, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee: On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Director
Morton, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to discuss the
role of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Homeland
Security Investigations (HSI) in stopping the flow of illicit drugs in
Arizona and along the Southwest Border (SWB) by leveraging State,
local, and Federal information sharing, as well as our efforts to
combat transnational criminal organizations (TCO), including narcotics
smuggling and money laundering organizations that operate along the
SWB. Over the last 10 years, TCOs have grown more sophisticated,
complex, and global. They have dramatically expanded in size, scope,
impact, and endanger people of all countries. In addition, TCOs:
Threaten National and global security;
Weaken our economies and endanger the public by
counterfeiting and stealing intellectual property rights;
Profit from smuggling and trafficking human beings;
Traffic in illegal narcotics and weapons;
Exploit minors and children; and
Threaten sensitive corporate and Government computer
networks through cybercrime.
No one entity can tackle global criminal enterprises alone. Rather,
it requires a multi-agency, multi-national, and layered approach. To
that end, HSI forges strong and cooperative relationships and works
closely with our State, local, Tribal, Federal, and international
partners toward our mission to uphold public safety and protect
National security.
Today, I will discuss some of the specific drug smuggling and money
laundering threats we face and how HSI targets TCOs here in Arizona.
But first, let me give you a brief overview of who we are and what we
do.
ICE comprises more than 20,000 employees with an operating budget
of nearly $6 billion. Most people know that ICE is charged with
enforcing the immigration laws of the United States. However, ICE is
also responsible for investigating criminal offenses including
narcotics trafficking with a clear articulable nexus to the U.S./Mexico
border, money laundering, human smuggling and trafficking, violent
transnational gangs, and intellectual property theft.
We operate under two operational directorates--HSI and Enforcement
and Removal Operations (ERO). The men and women of ERO are charged with
enforcing our administrative immigration laws together with our
partners in U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services. ERO's main priority is to
apprehend and remove convicted criminals, fugitives, illegal re-
entrants, and recent border violators.
HSI is the criminal investigative component of ICE and the largest
criminal investigative program in the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), with statutory authority to investigate violations of
more than 400 Federal criminal statutes. HSI conducts criminal
investigations against terrorist and other criminal organizations that
threaten National security, and combats worldwide criminal enterprises
that seek to exploit America's legitimate trade, travel, immigration,
and financial systems. With nearly 7,000 special agents, HSI maintains
offices in every State and 71 offices in 47 countries. HSI's global
footprint strengthens our capacity to conduct successful domestic,
international, and multilateral investigations.
the drug smuggling and money laundering threat in arizona
Arizona is one of the entry and distribution points for drugs that
enter the United States from Mexico. In fiscal year 2011, approximately
23 percent of the narcotics and approximately 53 percent of the
currency and monetary instruments connected with narcotics
investigations that HSI seized along the entire SWB were seized in
Arizona. Specifically, in HSI's Arizona area of responsibility, we
seized approximately 307,000 pounds of marijuana, 5,400 pounds of
cocaine, 1,300 pounds of methamphetamines, and 424 pounds of heroin.
The State of Arizona is bordered by the State of Sonora to our
south and the Sinaloa cartel is the dominant criminal element in the
State of Sonora. The border areas in Mexico that adjoin the United
States are divided by the Sinaloa cartel into ``Plazas'' that are
supervised by ``Plaza Bosses'' or ``Gatekeepers.'' These plaza bosses
and gatekeepers are responsible for overseeing and coordinating
smuggling activities in a given geographic area and collecting taxes or
fees from anyone wishing to smuggle contraband, including human
smuggling organizations.
We are often asked whether human smuggling organizations are part
of the ``cartels.'' Based on HSI investigations and intelligence, it is
our opinion that while alien smugglers pay taxes and fees to the
cartels to smuggle in a specific geographic area, they are generally
run as distinct criminal enterprises in both Mexico and the United
States. We believe that the plaza bosses and gatekeepers play a
coordinating role with alien smugglers, dictating when and where they
will be allowed to cross the border. This coordination ensures that
alien smugglers and their human cargo do not bring unwanted law
enforcement attention, particularly in the United States, to their
smuggling efforts. Our investigations have shown that when alien
smugglers do not heed warnings from drug smuggling organizations about
where and when they smuggle, they can be targeted for physical
violence, including murder.
By volume, marijuana is the most frequently encountered smuggled
drug in Arizona, and is most commonly smuggled between the ports of
entry (POE) after having been backpacked across the international
border with Mexico. However, CBP Officers at POEs seize marijuana daily
from both commercial and privately-owned vehicles in quantities ranging
from under one pound to multi-thousand-pound loads in both commercial
vehicles and cargo.
Mexico continues to be a transit point for cocaine that has
originated in South America, primarily Colombia, ultimately destined
for domestic markets in the United States. Mexico also is both a
production country and a transit point for heroin. Partly as a result
of successful efforts to control precursor chemicals in the United
States, Mexico has become a major source country for methamphetamine.
The smuggling organizations that we face are very agile and
creative. In response to law enforcement successes, these organizations
simply change smuggling tactics to increase their chances of success
and to avoid arrest. One such example is the increased use of
subterranean tunnels to smuggle drugs. We believe that the continued
attempts to use tunnels to smuggle drugs, particularly in Nogales,
where we have seen the most tunnels in Arizona, is evidence that
smugglers are being forced to move away from traditional smuggling
techniques due to enhanced enforcement efforts. In addition, in the
last several years we have seen smugglers utilize ultra-light aircraft
to smuggle marijuana payloads of up to 300 pounds into the United
States. We believe that use of ultra-light aircraft is an indication
that smugglers are less capable of smuggling marijuana using other
preferred methods. Over 350 HSI Special Agents assigned to the HSI
Phoenix area of operations are engaged in identifying, disrupting, and
dismantling the smuggling organizations that employ these innovative
methods to smuggle narcotics into the United States.
Our investigations and intelligence also tell us that proceeds of
smuggling activities, particularly drug smuggling, move back to Mexico
in the same geographic areas where drug organizations exercise dominion
and control. For this reason, we believe that Arizona serves as a
consolidation point for drug proceeds owed to the Sinaloa cartel for
drugs smuggled into Arizona and distributed to other illicit markets
within the United States.
We believe that multi-million dollar quantities of drug proceeds
are broken down into smaller quantities for smuggling in order to
minimize the impact of a single seizure on an organization, a risk
management practice that mimics how drugs are smuggled into the United
States.
One of the most significant developments in the last 2 years has
been a change in Mexican banking regulations that severely limits the
amount of U.S. dollars that can be deposited with Mexican financial
institutions, which has proven to be a successful tool to combat drug
smuggling and the cartels. This change in Mexican regulations has
caused cartels to change how drug proceeds are laundered. While we
believe that cartels are still adapting to this change, we believe that
one result may be a desire to place these funds into U.S. financial
institutions and then wire the proceeds to Mexico. We continue to work
closely with the government of Mexico to identify emerging money
laundering trends.
Domestically, we have seen some changes in how drug proceeds are
moved within the United States. In the last several years, we have seen
domestic drug organizations attempt to place illicit funds in U.S.
financial institutions to avoid currency transaction reporting
requirements. In one version of this scheme, referred to as the
``funnel account'' model, drug organization members in destination
cities make cash deposits into bank accounts opened in Arizona. In
turn, the account holder (a nominee for the drug organization) will
withdraw funds in Arizona and turn them over (often minus a small fee)
to the drug organization. The scheme has been difficult for bank anti-
money laundering personnel to identify because the funds deposited are
under the statutory reporting limit of $10,000.
This tactic was initially identified in Arizona as being utilized
by human smuggling organizations, but we have since seen its use
expanded to domestic drug organizations. We believe that the emergence
of this tactic came as a direct result of the successful enforcement
focus on money service businesses (MSBs) that were being used by human
smugglers to receive payments from ``sponsors'' in the United States.
When the ability to easily use MSBs ended, a transition to the funnel
account model was observed. Through on-going outreach and education
efforts with financial institutions and the Treasury Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network, banks have begun to identify this activity and are
reporting it to law enforcement regularly.
money laundering and bulk cash smuggling investigations
One of the most effective methods for dismantling TCOs is to attack
the criminal proceeds that are the lifeblood of their operations. HSI
takes a holistic approach toward investigating money laundering,
illicit finance, and financial crimes by examining the ways that
individuals and criminal organizations earn, move, store, and launder
their illicit proceeds.
The combination of successful financial investigations, reporting
requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA), and anti-money laundering
compliance efforts by financial institutions have served to strengthen
formal financial systems. Criminal organizations are now being forced
to seek other means to diversify the movement of illicit funds, such as
the use of MSBs and bulk cash smuggling. HSI's broad jurisdiction
includes the enforcement and investigation of money laundering and bulk
cash smuggling violations. In fiscal year 2011, HSI special agents
initiated more than 4,200 financial investigations, which involved
allegations of some type of money laundering or cross-border financial
crime. During that same period, Federal prosecutors obtained
convictions in over 1,000 cases involving such conduct and ICE seized
approximately $359 million, including $331 million in currency and
monetary instruments.
illicit pathways attack strategy (ipas)
Last July, the administration took an important step in fighting
transnational crime by issuing the Strategy to Combat Transnational
Organized Crime. This strategy complements the administration's
National Security Strategy by focusing on the growing threat of
international criminal networks. The strategy's single unifying
principle is to build, balance, and integrate the tools of American
power to combat transnational organized crime, and related threats to
National security--and to urge our foreign partners to do the same.
HSI plays a key role in this multidimensional and collective
strategy. Our response was the creation of the IPAS to break TCO
strongholds. With the IPAS, we implement the administration's strategy
and identify significant threats to National security. Once threats are
identified, we integrate our authorities and resources (both domestic
and foreign) to target, disrupt, and dismantle them.
IPAS goes beyond our physical borders. We are working with our
foreign and domestic law enforcement partners to attack transnational
crime at all points along illicit pathways, and break down
transnational networks that operate within the United States.
IPAS is a coordinated strategy to attack criminal networks at
multiple locations along the illicit travel continuum. The concept
involves four basic principles:
Attack criminal networks within and beyond our borders;
Prioritize networks and pathways that pose the greatest
threats;
Participate and facilitate robust interagency engagement;
and
Pursue a coordinated regional approach that leverages
foreign partners.
We focused our first IPAS on high-risk human smuggling in the
Western Hemisphere to identify and target human smuggling organizations
and their pathways across the globe. We initially targeted human
smuggling as this is often a precursor crime that can lead to other
illegal activities, including human trafficking. People may have
illegally entered the United States only to find themselves in
exploitative circumstances and vulnerable to being used by force,
fraud, or coercion for the purposes of commercial sex or forced labor.
While our initial focus of IPAS has been on human smuggling, we are
currently expanding this strategy to include money laundering and,
eventually, to every HSI investigative program area.
attacking tcos through partnerships
We conduct outreach to industry, academics, and the general public.
Our domestic partnerships include the HSI-led Border Enforcement
Security Task Forces (BEST), the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Force (OCDETF), the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas, Suspicious
Activity Report (SAR) Task Forces, the Alliance to Combat Transnational
Threats, as well as our international partnerships including a BEST
operating in Mexico and our Transnational Criminal Investigative Units
(TCIUs).
border enforcement security task forces (best)
HSI continues to expand the BEST program, which currently operates
in 31 locations throughout the United States and Mexico. BEST leverages
over 750 Federal, State, local, and foreign law enforcement agents and
officers representing over 100 law enforcement agencies. BEST also
provides a co-located platform to conduct intelligence-driven
investigations aimed at identifying, disrupting, and dismantling
transnational criminal organizations that operate in the air, land, and
sea environments. In fiscal year 2011, HSI-led BESTs made 2,245
criminal arrests, 1,130 administrative arrests, and Federal prosecutors
obtained 1,358 indictments and 1,187 convictions in BEST-investigated
cases.
In 2009, Secretary Napolitano announced the formation of the first-
ever Mexico-based BEST to facilitate the exchange of law enforcement
information and to support the joint investigation of criminal activity
that falls within HSI's jurisdictional purview. These crimes include
weapons and munitions smuggling, money laundering, human smuggling,
human trafficking, customs fraud, and cybercrime violations. The Mexico
City BEST includes both Mexican law enforcement officers and
prosecutors working collaboratively with HSI and other U.S.
Governmental agencies to share information and expertise in cooperative
investigations.
alliance to combat transnational threats
The Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats is a collaborative,
cooperative enforcement approach against criminal organizations using
the capabilities and resources of a variety of Arizona agencies
including Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement and public
safety organizations. These strategic partners continue to develop
coordinated operational plans based on each agency's mission,
capabilities, and jurisdiction.
phoenix ocdetf strike force
The mission of the Phoenix OCDETF Strike Force is to disrupt and
dismantle major drug trafficking organizations designated by the U.S.
Department of Justice as Consolidated Priority Organization Targets and
their affiliates that operate in Arizona, thereby reducing the
availability of illegal drugs and reducing drug-related crime in
Arizona. The groups are co-located and comingled, and are supervised by
their respective agencies with a Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
Assistant Special Agent in Charge serving as the Strike Force Commander
who oversees fiduciary responsibilities and administrative taskings
related to the Strike Force. An executive committee, composed of
leaders of Federal agencies with a chairmanship that rotates annually,
approves changes in policy or procedures in addition to resolving
jurisdictional conflicts with other law enforcement agencies. The U.S.
Attorney approves funding based on a budget request submitted by the
Strike Force Commander on a monthly basis.
The OCDETF Strike Force consists of investigators from Federal,
State, and local law enforcement agencies. The Federal participants
include: HSI, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Arizona,
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Internal Revenue Service, the U.S.
Marshals Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and DEA. The State and
local partners include the Arizona Department of Public Safety, the
Phoenix Police Department, the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office, the
Mesa Police Department, and other State and local agencies.
arizona suspicious activity reports task force
In 2004, the Internal Revenue Service--Criminal Investigations
(IRS-CI), HSI, and other Federal law enforcement agencies began meeting
in Phoenix to exploit SAR and other BSA information to effectively
target money laundering in Arizona. Leads were developed by zip code
and case category, and then referred to the agencies for investigation.
In late 2006, the U.S. Attorney's Office took leadership of the SAR
Review Committee and an Assistant U.S. Attorney began attending
meetings and actively assisting in guiding investigations. In 2007, in
conjunction with the SAR Review Committee, a Federal grand jury was
empanelled to investigate and facilitate initial SAR investigations.
The HSI/IRS-CI SAR Task Force was formed as a result of the Phoenix
SAR Review Committee, where both HSI Phoenix and the IRS-CI jointly
cooperated to exploit BSA information. The SAR Review Committee evolved
from a working group that primarily focused on de-confliction to an
effort by HSI and IRS-CI to jointly work money laundering cases. The
dramatic increase in SAR filings by financial institutions in Arizona
led to a necessity by HSI to form partnerships with other Federal,
State, and local agencies to combat money laundering of criminal
proceeds in Arizona.
hsi's national bulk cash smuggling center
The National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center (BCSC) generates long-term,
multi-jurisdictional bulk cash investigations through the processing of
incident reporting and by conducting intelligence-driven operational
support to HSI field offices. When contacted by Federal, State, and
local law enforcement for support, the BCSC provides information to the
requesting jurisdiction by exploiting the full scope of its law
enforcement intelligence data sources, assisting that jurisdiction in
every way possible, including the referral to a local HSI field office
for immediate response. Since its inception in August 2009, the BCSC
has initiated 568 investigations, which have resulted in 319 criminal
arrests, 96 indictments, and 68 convictions.
operation firewall
HSI's Operation Firewall disrupts the movement and smuggling of
bulk cash en route to the border, at the border, and internationally
via commercial and private passenger vehicles, commercial airline
shipments, airline passengers, and pedestrians. Since 2005, Operation
Firewall has been enhanced to include surge operations targeting the
movement of bulk cash destined for the SWB to be smuggled into Mexico.
Since its inception in 2005 through March 2012, Operation Firewall has
resulted in more than 6,613 seizures totaling more than $611 million,
and the arrests of 1,416 individuals. These efforts include 469
international seizures totaling more than $267 million and 302
international arrests.
international partners and cooperation
HSI works closely with our Federal law enforcement and
international partners to disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal
organizations. As part of these efforts, HSI currently maintains nine
TCIUs worldwide composed of highly-trained host country counterparts
who have the authority to investigate and enforce violations of law in
their respective countries. Since HSI officials working overseas do not
possess general law enforcement or investigative authority in host
countries, the use of these TCIUs enables HSI to provide actionable
information in order to dismantle, disrupt, and prosecute TCOs while
respecting the sovereignty of the host country and cultivating the
international partnership. During fiscal year 2011, two more TCIUs
became operational and HSI plans to open additional TCIUs by the end of
fiscal year 2012.
In fiscal year 2010, HSI's international partners played a central
role in Operation Pacific Rim. Working closely with the Colombian
National Police, Mexican authorities, our partners in Ecuador and
Argentina, as well as the FBI and DEA, HSI led an investigation that
spanned the globe and effectively disrupted one of the most powerful
and sophisticated bulk cash and drug smuggling organizations in the
world. This organization was believed to be responsible for nearly 42
percent of all Colombian cocaine smuggled into the United States. The
case began when HSI and Colombian police intercepted a suspicious
shipment of what was labeled as fertilizer, but was instead bundles of
shrink-wrapped cash.
HSI's El Dorado Task Force, which coordinated Operation Pacific
Rim, targets financial crime at all levels and consists of 260 members
of Federal, State, and local law enforcement, intelligence analysts,
and Federal prosecutors. As a result of this domestic and international
law enforcement cooperation, this operation resulted in 12 convictions,
24 indictments, and the seizure of more than $174 million in cash, 3.8
tons of cocaine, and $179 million in property.
working with mexican authorities
Assisting the government of Mexico in its battle against drug
violence requires strong coordination to ensure both nations are
operating together to combat this transnational threat. HSI continues
to engage Mexican authorities on a number of levels in our joint
efforts to combat border violence. For example, HSI's Border Liaison
Officer (BLO) program allows HSI to more effectively identify and
combat cross-border criminal organizations by providing a streamlined
information and intelligence-sharing mechanism. The BLO program creates
an open and cooperative working relationship between United States and
Mexican law enforcement entities. HSI has recently quadrupled the
number of officers in the BLO program by redeploying agents to the SWB.
The HSI Attache Office in Mexico City has coordinated the
establishment of vetted Special Investigative Units of Mexican law
enforcement officers. HSI has also strengthened the coordination with
the government of Mexico by increasing HSI Attache personnel in Mexico
by 50 percent and deploying additional special agents to Mexico.
Through our Attache in Mexico City and associated sub-offices, HSI
assists in efforts to combat transnational drug trafficking, weapons
smuggling, human smuggling, and money laundering syndicates in Mexico.
HSI Attache personnel work on a daily basis with Mexican authorities to
combat these transnational threats, and these efforts have been
enhanced by additional officers.
transnational gangs
Transnational gangs often conspire with other dangerous criminal
organizations, which allow them to mature from small autonomous
criminal groups into larger, international criminal enterprises engaged
in human smuggling and trafficking, narcotics smuggling and
distribution, money laundering, weapons smuggling and arms trafficking,
kidnapping, extortion, and export violations.
Operation Community Shield, an anti-gang program, combines HSI's
statutory and administrative enforcement authorities with our law
enforcement partnerships. Operation Community Shield increases public
safety by combating the growth and proliferation of transnational gangs
in communities throughout the United States. Operation Community Shield
consists of targeted enforcement operations using criminal arrest and
administrative removal authorities against gang members, thereby
disrupting the ability of gangs to operate.
In addition, these targeted enforcement operations lead to the
development of information critical to the successful prosecution of
transnational gang members for conspiracy and racketeering-related
violations. Since its inception in 2005, Operation Community Shield has
led to the arrest of nearly 26,000 gang members and associates, of whom
over 10,000 had prior violent criminal histories. In addition, more
than 300 gang leaders have been arrested and more than 3,000 weapons
have been seized.
In April 2012, as part of Operation Community Shield's Nation-wide
transnational gang enforcement operation, HSI concluded ``Project
Nefarious,'' which consisted of enforcement operations in 150 cities in
both the United States and Honduras while working with 148 other law
enforcement agencies at the international, Federal, State, and local
levels. Of the 792 individuals arrested, 637 were identified as gang
members or associates from approximately 168 different gangs. Of the
637 gang members arrested, 479 were charged with criminal offenses, 158
were charged with administrative violations, 210 had violent criminal
histories, and 10 were wanted for murder. In addition, HSI special
agents seized 52 firearms, over 75 grams of methamphetamine, nearly
2,500 kilograms of marijuana, over 2,445 grams of cocaine, $201,437 in
U.S. currency, and 14 vehicles.
conclusion
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you here in
Phoenix and for the subcommittee's continued support of ICE and its law
enforcement mission. ICE is committed to enhancing public safety and
combating narcotics trafficking and money laundering through efforts
such as those I have discussed here today. We look forward to
continuing our good work, refining our existing programs and
partnerships, and collaborating with our Federal, State, local, and
Tribal partners to ensure the safety and security of all Americans.
I would be pleased to answer any questions.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you, Mr. Allen.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Coleman for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS W. COLEMAN, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE, DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION--PHOENIX, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Coleman. Distinguished Members of the committee, on
behalf of Administrator Leonhart and the Drug Enforcement
Administration, I appreciate your invitation to testify today
regarding the growing threat of drug trafficking in the United
States and DEA's efforts to share information with our Federal,
State, and local partners.
The mission of the Drug Enforcement Administration's
Phoenix Field Division is to identify, target, and dismantle
major drug trafficking organizations operating in or
transshipping through the State of Arizona. The primary focus
of this mission is an intelligence-driven targeting of the
Sinaloa cartel-related command-and-control elements whose
operations have the greatest impact on Arizona.
By collectively focusing our State, National, and
international resources on disrupting and dismantling these
organizations through strategic high-level targeting, the DEA's
Phoenix Field Division, with its State, local, and Federal
partners, achieve a greater impact on the overall drug
trafficking operations affecting our State and Nation.
The Arizona-Mexico border provides a plethora of smuggling
opportunities for the Sinaloa cartel and other Mexican-based
DTOs. This corridor is a primary transshipment zone for
methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana destined for
U.S. markets. Arizona cities, including Phoenix and Tucson, are
home to large-scale drug trafficking organizations responsible
for sourcing wholesale quantities of many illicit drugs to
distribution cells throughout the United States.
In addition, because of Arizona's proximity to the Mexico
border, drug proceeds in the form of bulk currency flow from
the U.S. distribution cells back to Arizona based drug cells
for return to Mexico-based command elements.
Faced with this on-going threat, the achievements obtained
by DEA Arizona are directly attributed to the strong
partnerships developed with our State, local, Federal, Tribal,
and military colleagues. With our deconfliction, intelligence,
and resource sharing, drug law enforcement in Arizona has been
its most effective.
For example, the DEA's partnership with the Arizona HIDTA
has expanded the resources in both entities and driven a mutual
goal of achieving a greater impact on the DTOs operating
throughout this State.
Since August 2011 the DEA's intelligence manager has led
the HIDTA Investigative Support Center, facilitating the
intelligence sharing and investigative needs of other HIDTA
participants as well as non-HIDTA agencies throughout Arizona.
The combined intelligence efforts of State, local, and Federal
partnerships in the ISC promote the successes of the
investigations within the individual HIDTA initiatives, some of
which are led by DEA agents personnel.
DEA also participates in the Organized Crime Drug
Enforcement Task Force, the OCDETF program, which is another
major contributor to the success of DEA and drug law
enforcement in Arizona. Through its expanded resources to
support State and local investigations and the deputization
authority provided by DEA on OCDETF-designated cases, the
OCDETF program expands the potential for the continued and
collaborative identification and targeting of high-level drug
trafficking organizations by Arizona law enforcement. With more
State and local agencies taking advantage of this resource and
authority and partnership with DEA, an increase in
investigative information sharing and deconfliction proves to
be the certain gain.
One of the most valuable resources dedicated to the DEA's
enforcement intelligence operations has been provided by the
Arizona National Guard. The counterdrug operations and
intelligence support provided at the State, local, and Federal
law enforcement by the Guard has proven critical to the on-
going success of drug trafficking investigations both
tactically and strategically. Those intelligence analysts who
have been assigned to DEA's Arizona intelligence programs
assist with the overwhelming amount of information gleaned from
on-going operations and high-level investigations conducted by
DEA. The National Guard's commitment supplements the ever-
increasing need for intelligence support as DEA in Arizona
continues its pursuit of the command-and-control elements of
the Sinaloa drug cartel and its associated organizations.
The partnerships, programs, and dedicated resources shared
by and with the DEA have created multiple venues for
information intelligence sharing for law enforcement within our
State.
Enhanced by DEA's National-level participation in the El
Paso Intelligence Center, DEA's Special Operations Division,
the OCDETF Fusion Center, and programs including DEA's Internet
Connectivity Endeavor, National License Plate Reader
Initiatives, and State and local and National deconfliction
efforts, law enforcement opportunities to leverage the
resources available in furtherance of drug trafficking
investigations is at a unique and optimum level for all law
enforcement in Arizona.
Again, on behalf of DEA, I thank the committee for the
opportunity to speak today. I am happy to answer any questions
you have.
[The statement of Mr. Coleman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Douglas W. Coleman
May 21, 2012
Distinguished Members of the Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, on behalf of
Administrator Leonhart and the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), I
appreciate your invitation to submit written testimony today regarding
the growing threat of drug trafficking in the United States and DEA's
efforts to share information with our Federal, State, local, and Tribal
partners.
introduction
The mission of the Drug Enforcement Administration is to enforce
the controlled substances laws and regulations of the United States and
bring to the criminal and civil justice system of the United States, or
any other competent jurisdiction, those organizations and principal
members of organizations, involved in the growing, manufacture, or
distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for
illicit traffic in the United States.
DEA has the largest permanent U.S. investigative law enforcement
presence overseas, and since its formation in 1973, has been assigned a
global drug enforcement mission that extends far beyond our Nation's
borders. Currently, DEA has 85 offices in 65 countries.
national information sharing
DEA leads the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), a multi-agency
National tactical intelligence center that focuses its efforts on
supporting law enforcement efforts in the Western Hemisphere, with a
significant emphasis on the Southwest Border. Through its 24-hour Watch
function, EPIC provides immediate access to participating agencies'
databases to law enforcement agents, investigators, and analysts. This
function is critical in the dissemination of relevant information in
support of tactical and investigative activities, de-confliction, and
officer safety.
In support of National target deconfliction, DEA plays a primary
role in both supporting and participating in the National Virtual
Pointer System (NVPS). NVPS facilitates agents and officers
coordinating investigations of common targets by connecting existing
target deconfliction systems, such as those operated by the HIDTAs and
RISS network, throughout the country. As agents and officers enter the
subjects of current investigations, they are notified if another NVPS
participant is also investigating that target. Point-of-contact
information is exchanged and agents and officers contact one another to
exchange detailed information.
In December 2008, DEA launched a National License Plate Reader
(LPR) Initiative in direct response to the smuggling of illicit drug
monies out of the United States, primarily via the U.S.-Mexico border.
The LPR program promotes information sharing and coordination through a
deconfliction mechanism that notifies the appropriate parties when
common links are identified among investigations. This program uses
existing U.S. law enforcement database capabilities with LPR technology
to monitor and target vehicles commonly used to transport bulk cash and
other contraband. The program is available to all Federal, State,
local, and Tribal law enforcement organizations through the El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC) and through the DEA Internet Connectivity
Endeavor (DICE).
DICE enables any participating Federal, State, local, and Tribal
law enforcement agency to de-conflict investigative information, such
as phone numbers, email addresses, bank accounts, plane tail numbers,
and license plates, to identify investigative overlaps. The system,
accessible through the internet, allows users to be notified if an
overlap occurs and provides points of contact information so users can
discuss the investigative links.
Another example of DEA's commitment to information sharing is the
Special Operations Division (SOD): A DEA-led, multi-agency, operational
coordination center whose mission is to establish seamless law
enforcement strategies and operations aimed at dismantling National and
international trafficking organizations by attacking their command-and-
control communications. SOD facilitates coordination, deconfliction,
and communication among DEA divisions and over 20 participating
agencies identifying overlapping investigations and helps to ensure
intelligence is shared between DEA and SOD's participating agencies.
SOD has coordinated several of law enforcement's largest strikes
against the cartels in recent years, bringing together Federal law
enforcement agencies, State and local law enforcement, and our foreign
law enforcement counterparts to effect massive, coordinated enforcement
action against the cartels to deliver maximum impact.
Further, DEA participates in the OCDETF Fusion Center (OFC), an
operational intelligence center that provides Federal law enforcement
agencies with a complete intelligence picture of targeted drug
trafficking organizations (DTO) and their financial infrastructure
through enhanced technical capabilities and analysis in support of the
OCDETF program.
threat in arizona
Arizona encompasses 24 percent of the entire 1,969-mile shared
border with Mexico and houses six Ports of Entry (POEs). The Arizona/
Mexico border provides many smuggling opportunities for the Sinaloa
cartel as well as other Mexican-based DTOs. This corridor is a primary
transshipment zone for methamphetamine, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana
destined for United States markets. The cities of Phoenix and Tucson
are home to large-scale organizations responsible for sourcing
wholesale quantities of many illicit drugs to distribution cells
throughout the United States. Because of Arizona's proximity to the
Mexico border, drug proceeds in the form of bulk currency flow from
U.S. distribution cells back to Arizona-based drug cells for movement
to Mexican traffickers.
DTOs operating in the Arizona corridor utilize independent
organizations that specialize in smuggling drugs through the desert
areas or POEs whereby drugs are concealed in compartments in vehicles
or in cover loads on tractor trailers. Desolate areas between POEs act
as primary smuggling routes for the large-scale marijuana
transportation groups operating in this corridor. In addition, these
transportation groups utilize the many National parks, monument areas,
wildlife refuges, and Indian reservations along the Arizona/Mexico
border. The Tohono O'Odham Indian reservation, which covers
approximately 75 miles along the Arizona/Mexico border, is such a
remote area that there is virtually no chance of detection by law
enforcement. Additionally the Tribal members have traditionally
traveled to ancestral and sacred lands that they consider part of the
Tohono O'odham Nation but are located just south of the border with
Mexico.
dea response in arizona
The DEA Phoenix Field Division (PFD) Intelligence Program is
focused on the development and dissemination of law enforcement
intelligence that drives and supports enforcement operations towards
the highest level domestic and international targets. Through robust
intelligence collection efforts and a vigorous Title-III/wire intercept
program, the DEA PFD coordinates and disseminates drug-related
investigative leads and valuable intelligence to our Mexico offices,
SOD, EPIC, and other DEA offices throughout the United States.
Since August 2011, DEA PFD has been leading the Arizona High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA) Investigative Support Center
(ISC). The Arizona ISC is a combined Federal, State, local, and Tribal
initiative which serves as an information and law enforcement
intelligence hub in support of Arizona's HIDTA initiatives as well as
other non-HIDTA law enforcement entities within Arizona. ISC
Intelligence Analysts represent multiple agencies, including DEA,
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE), Arizona National Guard, Arizona's Department of
Public Safety, and law enforcement entities in Tempe, Tucson, and
Maricopa County. All are co-located in both Tucson and Phoenix
operating as one Investigative Support Center. These partnerships
promote a dynamic intelligence and information-sharing environment
which is critical to the analytical focus of the ISC in its effort to
support the various HIDTA initiatives in the detection, disruption, and
dismantlement of drug trafficking and other associated criminal
organizations. The collaborative focus of the ISC are as follows: To
identify and de-conflict information to the fullest extent; to
coordinate the dissemination of actionable intelligence; and to provide
investigators potential targets and relevant information to expand
investigations to the highest level in order to achieve the most
significant impact on large-scale drug trafficking organizations. This
streamlined analytical process facilitates the identification and
reporting of drug trends and availability as well as emerging drug
threats, officer safety issues, and an overall strategic picture for
the Southwest Border area in Arizona.
The DEA Phoenix Field Division includes 11 Task Force groups
located throughout the division and its subordinate offices. These task
forces include seven DEA Task Force groups as well as four HIDTA
groups. The PFD's task force program includes 56 task force officers
(TFO) representing 21 State and local law enforcement agencies from
throughout the State of Arizona. The task force program supports State
and local agencies throughout the State by providing training, funding,
investigative and intelligence resources, and Federal deputation to
State and local law enforcement agencies in Arizona. Task Force groups
frequently work investigations with a local and/or regional focus that
are brought to the respective groups by their State and local agency
TFOs. Virtually every enforcement group in the PFD has State or local
TFOs assigned to it. All DEA State and local TFOs are afforded access
to all of the resources available to any DEA Special Agent.
In closing, DEA will continue to work with its Federal, State,
local, and Tribal counterparts to investigate, disrupt, and dismantle
drug trafficking organizations operating globally, with a specific
nexus to Arizona and its surrounding region. Furthermore, DEA will
continue its priority of information sharing and coordination with all
of our partners in the law enforcement community.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you, Mr. Coleman.
The Chairman now recognizes General Salinas for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. JOSE SALINAS, DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF,
DEPT. OF EMERGENCY & MILITARY AFFAIRS ARIZONA NATIONAL GUARD
General Salinas. Mr. Chairman, Members of the committee, it
is a privilege to be here today providing you information
regarding the Arizona National Guard's role in stopping illicit
drugs from moving into and through our State.
Authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act of
1989, the National Guard counterdrug program authorizes up to
4,000 National Guard members to perform counterdrug activities
in all 54 States and territories. The Arizona National Guard's
counterdrug program, which is referred to as the Joint Counter
Narco/Terrorism Task Force, is currently the third largest
behind California and Texas. For the past 22 years, the task
force has provided unsurpassed support and has maintained
positive relationships with over 70 Federal, State, and local
law enforcement and community organizations, to include DEA,
DHS and ICE, FBI, the Arizona HIDTA, Arizona DPS, and the
Arizona Counter-Terrorism Information Center.
The task force support missions to these organizations
include criminal analyst support, communication support, ground
reconnaissance, aerial reconnaissance, and civil operations,
which were formerly known as drug demand reduction operations.
In fiscal year 2011 task force missions directly contributed to
operations resulting in drug-related seizures worth $176
million. With an '11, with a fiscal year 2011 budget of $9
million, this represents an 1,800 percent return on investment.
The Arizona task force has been gradually reduced from 300
personnel in the early 1990s to a program with approximately
115 today. According to the President's fiscal year 2013
proposed budget, the DOD counter narcotics budget will be
reduced by $100 million. Seventy-five percent of that reduction
will be borne by the National Guard's counterdrug program. As a
result, the National Guard counterdrug program is projected to
receive only 9 percent of the overall DOD counter narcotic
budget, which is down from 24 percent in fiscal year 2012.
The projected reduction in funding will result in over
1,000 fewer National Guard members across all 54 States and
territories. This reduction translates to approximately 4,000
fewer missions in the agencies in this area and 4,000 fewer
flying hours supporting counter narcotic operations against the
sizable, highly adaptive, transnational criminal organizations
that aim to exploit our borders and communities.
The impact on the Arizona Joint Narco/Terrorism Task Force
is devastating and will result in a 47 percent reduction from
115, approximately 115 personnel in fiscal year 2012 to 60
personnel in fiscal year 2013. This proposed $4 million
reduction represents a potential loss of $62 million in
seizures and support to all the agencies represented at this
table.
In addition to the task force, Arizona has supported two
Presidentially-declared Southwest Border operations in support
of DHS.
The first, Operation Jump Start, from 2006 to 2008 cost
$1.2 billion, involved 6,000 National Guard members and
resulted in $900 million worth of seizures across the four
Southwest Border States. Forty percent of Operation Jump Start
resources were allocated to Arizona.
Operation Phalanx, which has been on-going from 2010 to
present, has an Arizona-specific cost to date of $50 million,
has involved 560 Arizona National Guard members, and has
resulted in $90 million in seizures within Arizona.
Although these missions were effective, we believe you
would be better served with consistent funding to inure to
State, county drug programs with proven track records.
I must impress upon you the significant experience and
strategic capabilities that Arizona's Joint Counter Narco/
Terrorism Task Force can offer to our Federal, State, and local
law enforcement agencies. The task force's abilities and the
high quality of support they provide is the result of
partnerships built over the last 22 years.
In testimony to your committee in March 2011, the Arizona
Adjunct General, Major General Hugo Salazar, stated that
military support of law enforcement would be best served by
increased funding to the task force drug program in lieu of
temporary border security missions like Operations Jump Start
and Phalanx; providing adequate funding to the task force is
far more economical and presents a very limited military
presence. He argued that increased support would allow law
enforcement elements to more effectively integrate National
Guard resources knowing they will have a sustained and
predictable level of support for an extended period of time.
Only through dedicated and consistent funding will our law
enforcement partners continue to be able to trust and utilize a
powerful resource such as the Arizona Joint Counter Narco/
Terrorism Task Force.
Once again, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today.
The Arizona National Guard is an organization committed to our
Nation's security. More importantly, it is an organization
whose citizens, soldiers, and airmen will continue to train,
prepare, and stand ready to serve the President of the United
States, the Governor of Arizona, and the citizens of this great
Nation. I look forward to answer your questions.
[The statement of General Salinas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jose Salinas
21 May, 2012
overview
Madame Chair, Members of the committee, thank you for inviting me
here today. My name is Brigadier General Jose Salinas; I am the
Director of the Joint Staff for the Arizona National Guard. It is a
privilege to be here today providing you information regarding the
Arizona National Guard's role in stopping illicit drugs from moving
into and through our State.
The National Guard has a long and honored history of service to the
country. Although the present-day National Guard was established with
the Militia Act of 1903, the National Guard's heritage can be traced
back to December 13, 1636, when the Massachusetts legislature ordered
the formation of the first State-run militia. Since that day, the
National Guard has remained ready to answer the Nation's call during
times of emergency and conflict. In honor of that great tradition,
Soldiers and Airmen of the Arizona National Guard continue to stand
ready to answer that call. Since September 11, 2001, over 9,000 of our
Arizona Soldiers and Airmen have been mobilized, and served, or are
currently serving in harm's way in the defense of our great Nation.
The National Guard is unique in that it serves a dual mission and
must be ready and capable of performing both its State and Federal
mission. In addition to serving the Nation on a Federal deployment or
mobilization, members of the National Guard also serve the State, ready
to be called upon by the Governor to assist our civil authorities in
response to natural disaster or emergency, and to protect the lives and
property of the citizens of Arizona. Our National Guard Soldiers and
Airmen reflect the highest levels of professionalism and dedication.
They stand ready, be it at home or abroad, to answer the call to defend
our great Nation.
To understand the differences and distinctions of these dual
missions, it is first important to understand the various authorities
that Soldiers and Airmen can operate under, as these directly impact
mission sets, command and control, and ultimately organizational
readiness. There are three different statuses that a National Guard
Service member can operate under while performing military duties:
``State Active Duty,'' ``Title 32,'' or ``Title 10.''
Under State Active Duty status, the National Guard is, at all
times, a State government entity, operating under the command and
control of the Governor of Arizona and The Adjutant General. National
Guard forces under State Active Duty are paid with State funds and
perform duties authorized by the Governor and in accordance with State
law. While National Guard forces are in a State Active Duty status, the
Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S. Code, 1385), which restricts Federalized
troops from performing law enforcement duties, does not apply because
they are not under the command and control of the Federal Government.
The Posse Comitatus Act, along with its supporting legislation and
regulations, precludes Federal military forces from acting as a primary
instrument of law enforcement. It has come to symbolize the separation
of civilian affairs from military influence. Nonetheless, National
Guard troops in a State Active Duty status may participate in law
enforcement duties in accordance with the applicable provisions of
State law and as directed by the Governor of Arizona.
The U.S. Constitution also authorizes the National Guard to operate
under State control, but in the service of the Federal Government--
``Title 32.'' Title 32 of the U.S. Code, authorizes the use of, and
provides Federal funds to National Guard forces performing a Federal
mission while under the command and control of their respective
Governor. For example, National Guard forces were deployed by Governors
using Federal funds and in compliance with prescribed Federal
operational standards to our Nation's airports following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Although Federal appropriations were
used to fund National Guard forces for a Federal mission, Posse
Comitatus did not apply because National Guard forces were not under
the command and control of the President, but rather with their
respective Governors.
In addition to State Active Duty and Title 32 Status, National
Guard service members can also be in a ``Title 10'' status. National
Guard service members under Title 10 U.S. Code are Federally-funded and
are placed under Federal control for National defense purposes. The
Federal Government has the authority to ``Federalize'' National Guard
forces to mobilize and deploy for Federal missions. These service
members are commonly known to be in ``Title 10 or active duty status,''
meaning the President and Federal Government solely command and control
units under this title. This approach places the Federalized National
Guard forces in Title 10 Status under the Command and Control of the
President, the Secretary of Defense, and Combatant Commander. It severs
the National Guard's relationship with its State Governor.
The Arizona National Guard is tasked, under both State and Federal
authority with five additional missions: Emergency Response, Counter-
Drug, Counter-Terrorism, International Programs, and Southwest Border
security. Through the execution of these missions, the Arizona National
Guard has developed key relationships with various Federal, State, and
local agencies. Having our Soldiers and Airmen working with law
enforcement provides a mutually beneficial relationship. Beyond the
measureable results of this combined effort, both parties stand to
profit from the sharing of information and training. In addition to the
opportunity to use and hone their military skills, Soldiers and Airmen
gain additional skills by working with Federal, State, and local law
enforcement and other community organizations. This makes them better
Soldiers and Airmen, and improves their units when they are mobilized
for overseas deployments. Yet another quality of the National Guard is
this ability to utilize their unique civilian expertise. For example,
several of our Soldiers and Airmen work full-time for the very agencies
we support. However, it is the Arizona National Guard's cooperative
missions that provide the greatest opportunities for this mutually
beneficial cross-training.
arizona joint counter narco/terrorism task force
Authorized by the National Defense Authorization Act in 1989 under
Title 32, Section 112 of the U.S. Code, the National Guard Counterdrug
Program authorizes up to 4,000 National Guard members to perform drug
interdiction and counterdrug activities in all 54 States and
territories. The Arizona National Guard's Counter Drug program,
referred to as the Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task Force, began
operations in 1989 and is currently the third largest behind California
and Texas. The mission of the Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task Force
is to provide military counterdrug and drug demand reduction support to
local, State, and Federal law enforcement agencies and community-based
organizations. For the past 22 years, the highly skilled Soldiers and
Airmen of the Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task Force have provided
unsurpassed operational counterdrug support, and continue to offer the
continuity necessary to foster and maintain positive relationships with
over 70 Federal, State, and local drug enforcement agencies and
community organizations across the State of Arizona. These
relationships have resulted in significant contributions to counter-
narcotic operations along the Southwest Border.
The Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task Force is currently staffed
with 76 Army National Guard Soldiers, and 38 Air National Guard Airmen,
totaling 114 personnel serving in Full-Time National Guard Duty--
Counter Drug status in accordance with United States Code, Title 32,
Section 112. As stated earlier, Soldiers and Airmen of the National
Guard serving under State control are not subject to the provisions set
forth by the Posse Comitatus Act. Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task
Force members have been given authorization to perform ``Support Only''
Counter Drug duties. It is this support role that brings the greatest
benefit to our partners. The Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task Force
provides Department of Defense specific skill sets in support of
civilian agencies, enhancing their capabilities, and at the same time
allowing them to devote their skill sets to their primary mission.
The Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task Force provides support to
Federal agencies such as Customs and Border Protection, Homeland
Security Investigations, Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Arizona High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area Center. Along with these Federal agencies, the Joint
Counter Narco/Terrorism Task Force provides counter drug support to
State and local agencies such as Arizona Department of Public Safety,
Arizona Counter-Terrorism Information Center, Metro Intelligence
Support and Technical Investigation Center, and various county and city
law enforcement agencies. Currently, approved Joint Counter Narco/
Terrorism Task Force support missions include the following categories:
Investigative Case and Analyst Support.--Embedded analysts in law
enforcement offices throughout the State of Arizona serve to improve
information sharing between Federal, State, and local agencies. These
trained personnel assist assigned law enforcement agencies in
researching and analyzing case information and producing law
enforcement intelligence products. This investigative case and analyst
support allows for better utilization of law enforcement resources, and
enables the supported agencies to make effective strategic decisions
based on accurate and reliable intelligence. During fiscal year 2011,
58 personnel provided investigative case and analytical support to our
law enforcement partners, resulting in $121,986,032 in seized illicit
drugs, currency, weapons, and other property.
Communications Support.--Technical experts are assigned to law
enforcement agencies such as Customs and Border Protection for use at
their stations along the international border and to assist with
command and control operations. This support requires the mastery of
many complex monitoring devices, cameras, ground sensors, and voice
communication equipment and directly enhances officer safety in the
field. In fiscal year 2011, 13 personnel provided communications
support that assisted our law enforcement partners in the seizure of
10,521 pounds of marijuana valued at $5,524,043.
Ground Reconnaissance.--The Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task
Force's ground reconnaissance teams support local, State, and Federal
law enforcement agencies with uniquely suited advanced optical
technology. These teams operate covertly, and always in support of law
enforcement in field conditions to provide military-specific skills to
supported agencies' interdiction efforts against the flow of illegal
drugs that enter the United States between Arizona's Ports of Entry. In
fiscal year 2011, the 21 members of Arizona's Ground Reconnaissance
teams were instrumental in the seizure of over 27,370 pounds of
marijuana, 20 weapons, and assorted confiscated equipment and currency
with a total value of $17,867,578.
Aerial Reconnaissance.--The Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task
Force employs both the OH-58 helicopter and RC-26 fixed-wing aircraft
as aerial observation assets. Arizona Army National Guard OH-58
helicopters are available to support law enforcement during both day
and night operations using forward-looking infrared systems, thermal
imaging reconnaissance, Aviator's Night Vision Imaging System, live
video downlink, and illumination systems. The Arizona Air National
Guard RC-26 aircraft is employed as a regional asset for high-value
counterdrug and narco-terrorism cases. This fixed-wing platform
provides superior standoff capability for covert operations. Both
aerial assets provide enhanced officer safety, improved interdiction
operations in remote drug corridors, and other forms of valuable aerial
command-and-control capabilities. During fiscal year 2011, Aerial
Reconnaissance support resulted in the seizure of illicit drugs,
currency, weapons, and other property valued at $30,231,477.
Civil Operations, formerly known as Drug Demand Reduction
Support.--Civil Operations/Drug Demand Reduction teams work closely
with community-based organizations and support the specific needs of
local communities and school systems. All Civil Operations/Drug Demand
Reduction support efforts are focused on identifying, supporting,
educating, and mentoring/coaching Arizona youth in collaboration with
local community organizations. Whereas other Joint Counter Narco/
Terrorism Task Force missions focus on combatting illicit drugs through
drug trafficking interdiction, Civil Operations/Drug Demand Reduction
focuses on reducing the demand for those drugs. Operating in line with
the 2012 National Drug Control Strategy, the Joint Counter Narco/
Terrorism Task Force utilizes Civil Operations/Drug Demand Reduction
support to assist those community organizations that have opened a
second front against the drug traffickers moving through our State.
Civil Operations/Drug Demand Reduction Support places some of our
Nation's heroes in front of our children and young adults. Our soldiers
and airmen come from a variety of backgrounds, and as National Guard
members, live in the communities they support. This shared background
allows our Civil Operations/Drug Demand Reduction soldiers and airmen
to relate to the children they mentor. It allows them to not just see
random children, but children who are from the same places they live
and work in everyday. The soldiers and airmen of Civil Operations/Drug
Demand Reduction are trained leaders and mentors.
The nature of the Civil Operations/Drug Demand Reduction mission
makes it difficult to measure success. There is no way to track the
decisions that these children will make in the future. However, in
fiscal year 2011, Civil Operations/Drug Demand Reduction, through their
involvement in over 200 community events, was able to engage, educate,
and mentor 52,200 of Arizona's children. Despite the vital role Drug
Demand Reduction has played in the drug prevention education of our
children, this mission is currently projected to be eliminated, given
the resource constraints of the Department of Defense's proposed fiscal
year 2013 budget.
The combined capabilities of the Arizona Joint Counter Narco/
Terrorism Task Force have made significant contributions to the drug
interdiction efforts of the Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies working together to stop the flow of illicit drugs into
Arizona. In fiscal year 2011, Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task Force
missions directly contributed to law enforcement operations resulting
in seizures of 145,759 pounds of marijuana ($93,394,817), 1,918 pounds
of cocaine ($15,633,625), and 1,872 pounds of methamphetamine
($27,152,337). A total value of all seized drugs (including those not
listed) resulted in $140,887,700 in drug seizures. The addition of
$35,607,723 in non-drug seizures (guns, vehicles, illicit cash)
combined to equal a total of $176,495,423 that did not reach the hands
of drug traffickers as a result of the combined effort of the Joint
Counter Narco/Terrorism Task Force and their supported agencies. Given
the Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task Force's fiscal year 2011 budget
of $9,344,745.00, the amount in seizures represents a 1,889% return on
investment.
The Arizona Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task Force has shrunk
over the years from a program consisting of well over 300 personnel in
the early 1990s, to a program of approximately 115 today. Many of these
reductions have been the result of reduced funding, and redefined
mission sets; however the recent economic challenges facing the Nation
have begun to have a major effect as well. According to the President's
fiscal year 2013 budget request, the Department of Defense Counter
Narcotics budget of $1.1 billion represents a loss of $100 million in
OCONUS and CONUS drug interdiction activities. Seventy-five million
dollars of the $100 million reduction is projected to come out of the
National Guard Counterdrug State Plan's budget. This $75 million
reduction represents a 42% loss of the National Guard's fiscal year
2012 budget.
The Department of Defense's counter narcotic support to the
National Guard Counterdrug Program decreased gradually from 2003 to
2012. These gradual reductions were small enough that the Joint Counter
Narco/Terrorism Task Force leadership could realign resources to gain
optimum strategic advantage. In fiscal year 2013, proposed budget
support to the National Guard Counterdrug Program was reduced
dramatically to a historic low of 9% of the Department of Defense's
counter narcotic budget from 24% in fiscal year 2012. This reduction
will significantly degrade the National Guard's ability to support its
Congressionally-mandated mission in support of the National Drug
Control Strategy. The projected reduction in funding will result in
over 1,100 fewer National Guard members across all 54 States and
territories. This reduction translates to approximately 4,100 fewer
missions and 4,000 fewer flying hours supporting counter-narcotic
operations against the sizable, highly adaptive, organized drug cartels
and transnational criminal organizations, aiming to exploit America's
borders and communities.
The impact to the Arizona Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task Force
is devastating and will result in a 47% reduction in force from 114
personnel in fiscal year 2012, to 60 personnel in fiscal year 2013.
This represents a 60% reduction from 2011 personnel levels. Potential
loss of personnel in fiscal year 2013 by mission set:
Intelligence Analyst.--Loss of 14 personnel (30% reduction);
Communications Support.--Loss of 9 (100% reduction);
Ground Reconnaissance.--Loss of 9 (39% reduction);
Aerial Reconnaissance.--Loss of 3 (33% reduction);
Drug Demand Reduction.--Loss of 11 (92% reduction).
A potential loss of $62,248,318 in seizures of drugs, weapons,
vehicles, cash, and other property as a result of a $3,793,529
reduction in funding from fiscal year 2012 to fiscal year 2013.
arizona border operations--historical perspective
Geographically speaking, Arizona has a total area of just over
113,998 square miles and is the sixth-largest State in the union.
Arizona has an estimated population of well over 6 million. Arizona
shares 389 miles of international border with Mexico and has seven
major ports of entry. Found between Arizona's ports of entry are a
variety and combination of barriers that include pedestrian fencing,
vehicle fencing, Normandy barriers, triple strand barbed wire fencing
and cattle guard crossings located on the Tohono O'odham Indian
Reservation only. The sovereign territory of the Tohono O'odham Nation
consumes 75 miles (28%) of the Arizona/Mexico border. Nearly one-third
of this reservation extends south directly into Mexico. The Tohono
O'odham Nation does not acknowledge the international border between
the United States and Mexico, and residents living on Tribal lands in
Mexico can traverse freely at any time.
operation jump start (june 2006-july 2008)
Operation Jump Start was a Presidentially-declared, 2-year, $1.2
billion program, spread across the four Southwest Border States. The
mission required 6,000 National Guard members the first year, and 3,000
the second year. The Department of Homeland Security and Customs and
Border Protection were allocated forces based on their assessed needs
that resulted in Arizona receiving 40% of the forces; the largest
percentage of the four Southwest Border States. The goal of Operation
Jump Start was to augment Customs and Border Protection with additional
manpower for administrative and operational assistance missions,
alleviating Border Protection agents of these responsibilities and
allowing those agents to be sent back out to the field where they were
needed most. Guard members from 51 of the 54 States and territories
served in Arizona performing duties that included Entry Identification
Teams, camera operators, logistical support, aviation support and
engineering support. In total, 17,750 personnel participated on the
mission. These personnel were comprised of individual volunteers,
sourced unit rotations, and unit annual training rotations. During the
first year of Operation Jump Start, an average of 2,400 National Guard
personnel conducted operations in support of law enforcement efforts in
Arizona. That number was reduced to 1,200 personnel during the second
year.
From data collected from all four Southwest Border States,
Operation Jump Start resulted in the seizure of approximately 321,625
pounds of marijuana and cocaine worth nearly $900,000,000. The mission
was also responsible for 176,721 alien apprehensions, 1,116 vehicle
seizures, and $80,688 in currency seizures. In Arizona, engineering
support created 23.5 miles of permanent vehicle barriers, 43 miles of
temporary barriers, 24.5 miles of primary fence, 9.1 miles of secondary
fence, 5 miles of road construction, and 57 miles of road improvement.
The mission ended in July, 2008.
operation phalanx phase one (july 2010-february 2012)
On May 25, 2010, the President directed the temporary use of up to
1,200 National Guard personnel on the Southwest Border to support
Department of Homeland Security requirements. Arizona was authorized
560 of the 1,200 personnel for the mission which equates to 46% of
total mission personnel. Like Operation Jump Start, National Guard
personnel are funded under U.S. Code Title 32 502(f), in accordance
with the published Department of Defense order. Operation Phalanx
supports both Customs and Border Protection and Homeland Security
Investigations by supporting three key mission sets; Entry
Identification Teams, Video Surveillance System support, and
Intelligence Analysis.
Of the 560 personnel initially authorized for Operation Phalanx in
Arizona, 504 personnel were tasked to support entry identification
sites that operated on a 24-hour basis in close proximity to Arizona's
Southern Border. Soldiers and Airmen staffed 25 overt Entry
Identification Team sites across four stations in the Tucson sector.
Due to increased threat and violence along the international border,
Arizona National Guard personnel were armed and assumed a higher arming
status than similar missions during Operations Jump Start. Rules for
the use of force were clearly defined, published, and provided to each
service member on the mission.
Phase One of Operation Phalanx continued through 29 February 2012,
with operations in Arizona costing $48.7 million. The mission resulted
in 35,628 observations leading to 19,778 apprehension assists with
87,035.49 pounds of marijuana being seized. The value of the marijuana
seized exceeded the cost of Arizona's portion of the mission by $30
million. As a result of the mission, Homeland Security Investigations
saved an estimated 83,160 manpower hours, representing an estimated
$3.2 million in savings to the agency.
operation phalanx phase two (march 2012-present)
In December 2011, the Department of Defense announced National
Guard personnel supporting the Department of Homeland Security would be
reduced from 1,200 to no more than 300 personnel, and included a change
in mission. In addition to continuing the intelligence analyst mission,
the National Guard transitioned from a ground observation role to an
aerial reconnaissance mission. Given the new mission scope, there are
currently 52 personnel conducting aerial surveillance operations in
support of Customs and Border Protection. This aerial task force
utilizes six OH-58 helicopters equipped with advanced aerial
surveillance capabilities organic to the military. In addition to
National Guard aviation assets, there are 15 personnel assigned as
intelligence analyst providing support to Homeland Security
Investigations at offices in Phoenix, Tucson, and Yuma. For the current
portion of Operation Phalanx, Arizona has an authorized strength of 77
personnel.
The Soldiers and Airmen of Operation Phalanx continue to work
closely with supported agencies to better integrate efforts and
resources. Through interagency collaboration, greater information
sharing is emerging, enabling the employment of assets in a more
deliberate manner with higher levels of effectiveness. The development
of techniques, tactics, and procedures is on-going and is producing
favorable results.
Since initiation of the second phase of Operation Phalanx, Aviation
operations in Arizona have executed a total of 953 flight hours.
Additionally, the task force has been credited by Customs and Border
Protection in assisting with 2,457 observations, leading to 1,875
apprehension assists resulting in the seizure of 22,720 pounds of
marijuana.
usnorthcom and joint task force north
USNORTHCOM was established on October 1, 2002 to provide command
and control of Department of Defense homeland defense efforts, and to
coordinate Defense Support of Civil Authorities. Operating under the
control of USNORTHCOM is Joint Task Force North. Joint Task Force
North's mission is to support our Nation's Federal law enforcement
agencies in the identification and interdiction of suspected
transnational threats within and along approaches to the continental
United States. In the execution of this mission, Joint Task Force North
has designated the Southwest Border as an area of high priority, and
has designated Arizona's border area as a primary focus.
Like the Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task Force and other
National Guard Southwest Border initiatives, Joint Task Force North
supports Federal law enforcement agencies by providing Department of
Defense capabilities. However, Joint Task Force North forces are
restricted by the Posse Comitatus Act to only operate in a civil
support role. The performance of these support roles offer tremendous
training opportunities for Federal active duty and reserve units,
allowing them to hone military skills while providing valuable support
to our Federal law enforcement agencies.
Given the similarities in mission, the Arizona National Guard and
Joint Task Force North continue to develop their partnership. Recent
discussions with Joint Task Force North have brought to light several
possible benefits of a closer working partnership. Such a partnership
could serve to create valuable training opportunities for our soldiers
and airmen, while providing much-needed support to our Federal, State,
and local law enforcement agencies. This dialog serves to show that all
military organizations will continue to pursue avenues that will ensure
the highest level of service and support to the Nation.
The National Guard in a Title 32 status is the only Department of
Defense provider capable of fully supporting domestic law enforcement
agencies in the fight against illicit drugs and transnational threats
to the homeland due to its exemption from the Posse Comitatus Act.
Congress has repeatedly demonstrated its recognition of both the
capabilities and efficiencies that the National Guard brings to the
counterdrug fight, while simultaneously providing training and
operational experience for National Guard personnel. The National Guard
has played a crucial role in securing our borders and stopping the flow
of illegal drugs into Arizona and our Nation. Throughout Operation Jump
Start and Operation Phalanx, our soldiers and airmen displayed
dedication and professionalism in their support of Federal law
enforcement. The Arizona National Guard is proud to have had the
opportunities to serve our Nation and our State during these border
security missions, and will always be ready to continue this service.
Before closing, I must impress upon you again, the significant
experience and strategic capabilities that Arizona's Joint Counter
Narco/Terrorism Task Force can offer to our Federal, State, and local
law enforcement agencies. The Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task
Force's abilities and the high quality of support they provide is the
result of a partnership built over 22 years. In a testimony to your
committee on March 15, 2011, the Arizona Adjutant General, Major
General Hugo Salazar stated that military support of law enforcement
would be best served by increased funding to the Joint Counter Narco/
Terrorism Task Force in lieu of temporary border security missions like
Operations Jump Start and Phalanx; providing adequate funding to the
Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task Force is far more economical.
General Salazar argued that increased support would allow law
enforcement elements to more effectively synchronize, plan, and
integrate National Guard resources and personnel, knowing they will
have a sustained and predictable level of support for an extended
period of time. The Arizona Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task Force
offers proven effective and efficient support of our law enforcement
agencies, and does so by presenting a very limited military presence.
Only through continued and consistent funding will our law enforcement
partners continue to be able to trust in and utilize a powerful
resource such as the Joint Counter Narco/Terrorism Task Force. For our
Federal, State, and local law enforcement agencies to continue to
effectively combat the movement of illicit drugs into and through
Arizona, they must do so with a united front and consistent resources.
Once again, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today. The
Arizona National Guard is an organization committed to our Nation's
safety. More importantly, it is an organization whose citizen soldiers
and airmen will continue to train, prepare, and stand ready to serve
the President of the United States, the Governor of Arizona, and to
bring continued pride to the people of this great Nation.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you, General.
The Chairman now recognizes Lieutenant Colonel Stanhope for
his testimony.
STATEMENT OF LT. COL. JEFFERY A. STANHOPE, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS, ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
Colonel Stanhope. Mr. Chairman, Members of the
subcommittee, good morning. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you today.
Given our limited time today, I would like to highlight
several key points related to my department's efforts to
stopping the flow of narcotics through information sharing.
My department is a State-level law enforcement agency which
has primarily jurisdiction over highway safety, narcotics,
organized crime enforcement, and intelligence. We also provide
such services as scientific analysis, criminal justice
information management, communications, and investigative
assistance in support of Federal, State, Tribal, local law
enforcement partners.
As one of the four Southwest Border States, Arizona has
been identified as a major transshipment point of narcotics
coming from Mexico for distribution throughout North America.
The Arizona border with Mexico is approximately 372 miles long,
has a rugged terrain and is sparsely populated. The crime
groups who prefer to operate under a veil of secrecy capitalize
on these factors. We at DPS have identified drug cartels and
organized crime as the single largest criminal threat to public
safety in Arizona.
In order to disrupt the flow of narcotics, DPS utilizes an
intelligence-led policing model to focus our enforcement
efforts to maximize impact we have on drug trafficking. DPS
also seeks out partnership opportunities with our Federal,
State, Tribal, local law enforcement partners in order to
combat narcotics trafficking.
Intelligence-led policing, which you have heard from my
colleagues earlier, in partnering strategies yield two
important critical results: The first, information sharing, and
the second, program partnering such as task forces.
At DPS we believe both information sharing and partnering
maximizes our ability to impact public safety issues through
forced multiplication and increased operational efficiencies.
Some of the more prominent multiagency programs which combat
narcotics trafficking that we are involved in are Arizona
Counter-Terrorism Information Center; the HIDTA, Arizona HIDTA;
Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats; the Rocky Mountain
Information Network; Gang and Immigration Team Enforcement
Mission; Arizona Auto Theft Authority; Vehicle Theft Task
Force; highway interdiction and canine programs and Highway
Patrol; and Commercial Vehicle Enforcement, also in Highway
Patrol Division.
Each of these information sharing enforcement programs, and
partnerships therein, impact organized crime groups who traffic
narcotics but also who traffic weapons, bulk cash, and human
smuggling. An intended consequence of these partnering efforts
is the networking information sharing that occurs between law
enforcement agency officials and investigators. This
information sharing further enhances Arizona law enforcement's
ability to combat narcotics trafficking through refined
targeting, case and operational deconfliction, and building
trust and understanding between our law enforcement partners.
One of the most significant challenges we face when it
comes to stemming the flow of narcotics is the fiscal reality
in which we operate. Drug cartels are not constrained by budget
or manpower issues, political considerations, statutory
prohibition, or geographic boundaries. In contrast, to combat
the war on drugs, DPS has relied upon Federal and State grant
programs to support our enforcement and partnership efforts.
DPS receives Federal, State grant funding to support the
following intelligence support enforcement programs: The ACTIC
through Arizona DHS, Department of Homeland Security; HIDTA
through funding from ONDCP. Commercial Vehicle Enforcement is
heavily funded by the Motor Carrier Safety Alliance Program,
which is a Federal initiative. Vehicle Theft Task Force is
funded through the Arizona Auto Theft Authority. RMIN is a RISS
project; Federal funding is received there. GIITEM is funded
wholly by line item State funding.
Without grant funding it is unlikely DPS would be able to
sustain current enforcement programs targeting drug traffickers
and organized crime along the border. We would, therefore,
appreciate your continued support of these Federal and State
grant programs.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I will be happy
to answer questions you and other Members have regarding DPS'
efforts to share information in furtherance of stemming the
flow of narcotics in Arizona and our Nation. Thank you.
[The statement of Colonel Stanhope follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeffery A. Stanhope
May 21, 2012
Chairman Miller, Vice Chairman Quayle, and Members of the
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, thank you for the
opportunity to provide this written statement for the record of the
Arizona Department of Public Safety's views regarding information
sharing by Federal, State, and local law enforcement as a means to
stopping the flow of illicit drugs into and through Arizona. The
Arizona Department of Public Safety (DPS) is one of many committed law
enforcement partners who work together in the fight to stop narcotics
trafficking into and through Arizona.
In this report, I will provide you with information on the DPS
mission, organization, and partnerships. By creating clear agency
strategies, building relationships with our law enforcement partners,
and sharing of information we are better able to respond to the threats
created by the transnational crime groups that operate along the
Arizona-Sonora border area. I will attempt to demonstrate the level and
depth of cooperation that DPS and Arizona law enforcement have achieved
to combat drug trafficking.
agency overview
The Arizona Department of Public Safety enforces State law with
primary responsibility in the areas of traffic safety, criminal
interdiction, narcotics enforcement, organized crime investigations,
auto theft, and specific regulatory functions as prescribed in Arizona
Revised Statute 41-1711 and 1712. DPS is comprised of the Director's
Office and three divisions, Highway Patrol, Criminal Investigations,
and Technical Services. Department services include: Criminal
intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination; scientific
analysis and evidence preservation; criminal justice information
management; State-wide communications; licensing of security guards and
private investigators; Arizona's fusion center and aviation medical and
rescue operations. DPS also provides support to other Federal, State,
and local agencies in operational support, investigations, technical
assistance, and training.
Today, the department, with its State headquarters in Phoenix,
maintains offices in more than 80 Arizona communities and cities within
the State's 15 counties. Roughly, 1,700 full-time department employees,
and more than 150 volunteers, help the agency fulfill its support and
operational objectives in the critical areas of highway and public
safety, criminal interdiction, scientific analysis, as well as
technical and operational support of other criminal justice agencies.
The Director's Office provides guidance and oversight to the agency
and defines the mission of the agency. The Director is responsible to
the Governor for the conduct and administration of the department.
The Highway Patrol Division (HPD) at DPS is the largest and most
recognized division within the agency. HPD is often referred to as the
agency's flagship division and has a history dating back to 1931 when a
State highway patrol function was first created in Arizona. The mission
of HPD is to ensure the safe and expeditious use of the highway
transportation system for the public and to provide assistance to local
and county law enforcement agencies. DPS patrols approximately 5,798
\1\ miles of interstate and State highways in Arizona. HPD also
provides services and enforcement in commercial motor vehicle, tow
truck, school bus enforcement and safety programs, as well as being
responsible for the air rescue and aviation services for the Department
and in support of other law enforcement agencies State-wide.
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\1\ Highway Patrol Division, Review of statistical data, Captain
Jeff King, May 9, 2012.
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The division is comprised of four Patrol Bureaus, Commercial
Vehicle Enforcement Bureau, Capitol Police Department, and Aviation
Section. The Patrol Bureaus are aligned based on geographic regions--
North, South, Metro West, and Metro East. The Commercial Vehicle
Enforcement Bureau and the Aviation Section are State-wide programs
administered centrally with satellite offices strategically located
throughout the State. In addition to its patrol function, the Metro
East Bureau also administers many of the division's specialty units
such as the Canine District, the Motor District, the DUI Enforcement
Squad, Drug Interdiction, and the DUI Warrant Squad.
The Criminal Investigations Division (CID) at DPS is committed to
providing the highest-quality investigative and specialized response
services to the public and the criminal justice community. The mission
of the Criminal Investigations Division is to protect the public by
deterring crime using innovative investigative and specialized
enforcement strategies and resources.
The Criminal Investigations Division conducts State-wide criminal
investigations, specialized enforcement activities, and high-risk
tactical response on behalf of or in support of other Federal, State,
Tribal, and local criminal justice agencies. The Division's primary
investigative responsibilities are narcotics trafficking, fugitive
apprehension, organized crime, intelligence, vehicle theft, gangs,
human smuggling, computer and financial crimes, as well as major
criminal investigations and sensitive special investigations when
requested by other criminal justice agencies. CID has three bureaus,
Intelligence, Investigations, and Gang Enforcement. Within these
bureaus specialized services such as Special Weapons and Tactics
(SWAT), Explosives Ordinance Detail (EOD), Special Investigations Unit
(SIU), State Gang Task Force (GIITEM) and Vehicle Theft Interdiction
(VTI) are provided.
The Technical Services Division (TSD) at DPS is responsible for
developing and coordinating scientific, technical, regulatory, and
support services essential for promoting public safety in Arizona.
Special attention is given to providing scientific analysis and
criminal justice support to Arizona's criminal justice agencies. TSD
further develops, operates, and maintains the data processing and data/
voice communications systems that operate State-wide. TSD also
maintains a Nationally-recognized crime lab program, fingerprint
analysis unit, sex offender registration unit, and is responsible for
the Arizona Criminal Justice Information System (ACJIS).
situation
Arizona shares 372.5 \2\ miles of border with Mexico, primarily
with the State of Sonora. The Federal Government has installed
approximately 123 miles of pedestrian fencing and 183 \3\ miles of
vehicle fencing along the Southwest Border. The topography in the
Arizona-Sonora border area varies between mountainous and flat terrain.
The border area also has a diversity of vegetation wherein some areas
are heavily forested; other areas are covered with desert grasses and
cacti. The major urban areas in Arizona are Phoenix and Tucson.
Criminal organizations are known to use Interstates 8, 10, 17, 19, and
40 as well as U.S. Highways 85 and 86 as primary routes for
transporting contraband through Arizona and from Arizona to other
regions of the country. We believe Phoenix is a major trans-shipment or
staging area for narcotics prior to being transported to other areas in
the country.
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\2\ The Arizona Republic, ``Nogales Gets a More Secure Border
Fence,'' June 30, 2011.
\3\ The Arizona Republic, ``Nogales Gets a More Secure Border
Fence,'' June 30, 2011.
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Arizona has over 75 \4\ smaller public airports, 200 private
airports, and approximately 600-abandoned airstrips. Historically drug
traffickers often used these airports and airstrips to smuggle illicit
drugs into the United States. There are six land ports of entry along
the Arizona portion of the United States-Mexico border, including San
Luis, Lukeville, Sasabe, Nogales, Naco, and Douglas. Nogales and
Douglas operate 24 hours a day and are the busiest ports in the State.
There are numerous unofficial entry points (gates or open areas)
located in remote and sparsely-populated areas along the border between
Arizona and Mexico, which are often used by traffickers.
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\4\ National Drug Intelligence Center, ``Arizona Drug Threat
Assessment,'' December 2003.
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There are 171 \5\ State and local police agencies operating in
Arizona with a combined sworn contingent of 14,775 personnel. In
addition, our Federal law enforcement partners maintain a significant
presence in Arizona. We also have 22 \6\ Tribal communities that are
established as sovereign nations and who have their own system of
governance. These communities maintain their own police forces and have
responsibility to provide law enforcement services to their individual
Tribal communities.
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\5\ Arizona Peace Officer Standards and Training, ``Current
Statistical Review,'' Compliance Manager Bob Irish, May 9, 2012.
\6\ The University of Arizona, Economic Development Research
Program, ``Arizona's Native American Tribes,'' http://
edrp.arid.arizona.edu/tribes.html, May 2012.
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threat assessment
We believe there is no greater criminal threat to the citizens of
Arizona and to this Nation than Mexico's drug trafficking
organizations. These syndicates are believed to be largely responsible
for all Government corruption in Mexico and they hinder Mexico's growth
and prosperity as being a Nation with promise. President Calderon
remarked in speeches in March and October 2009 that corruption was a
serious problem in the police forces and a primary reason for the use
of the military in the domestic counter-narcotics fight. President
Calderon stated that the future of democracy in Mexico is at stake in
the Government's fight against corruption and organized crime.\7\
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\7\ Global Security, ``Mexico-Corruption,'' http://
www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/mexico/corruption.htm, May 2012.
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In October 2008, the Executive Director of the United Nations
Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Antonio Maria Costav,\8\ during the
first-ever gathering of the Ministers Responsible for Public Safety of
the Americas in Mexico City he stated, ``As a hemisphere, the Americas
face the world's biggest drug problem.'' Mr. Costa added that ``whether
we measure it in hectares of cultivation, tons of production, its
market value or even by the gruesome number of people killed in the
dirty trade'' the drug crisis affecting the security of the ordinary
people in the area is huge. ``Your citizens indeed say that what they
fear the most is not terrorism, not climate change, not a financial
crisis. It is public safety. And in the Americas, the biggest threat to
public safety comes from drug trafficking and the violence perpetrated
by organized crime,'' he stated.
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\8\ UN News Centre, ``Drug-Related Crime Biggest Threat To Public
Safety In The Americas, Warns UN,'' October 9, 2008.
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The drug cartels fiercely defend their control over the Arizona-
Sonora border area in order to facilitate their criminal enterprises.
There is no limit of items to be trafficked; people, illicit drugs,
guns, stolen property, and pirated goods, as long as there is money to
be made. These criminal organizations will stop at nothing--murder,
assaults, thefts, acts of terrorism, bribery, etc., to accomplish their
goals.
According to a May 14, 2012, New York Times article,\9\ dated
January 2012, the Mexican government reported that 47,515 people had
been killed in drug-related violence since President Felipe Calderon
began a military assault on criminal cartels soon after taking office
in late 2006. The official tallies provided by the attorney general's
office included data only through September 2011 and it showed that
drug-related killings increased 11 percent, to 12,903, compared with
the same 9-month period in 2010. Still, a government statement sought
to find a silver lining, asserting that it was the first year since
2006 ``that the homicide rate increase has been lower compared to the
previous years.''
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\9\ New York Times, ``Mexico Updates Death Toll in Drug War to
47,515, but Critics Dispute the Data,'' May 14, 2012.
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strategic response
DPS and its law enforcement partners understand what is at stake
and that there is an on-going assault by organized crime groups on the
safety and security of our citizens. We view our role in combating
these organized crime groups as a No. 1 priority. We believe they are
the root cause of many of the public safety issues that Arizona law
enforcement faces. To accomplish our mission we utilize Intelligence
Led Policing, which is, ``a strategic, future-oriented, and targeted
approach to crime control, focusing upon the identification, analysis,
and `management' of persisting and developing `problems' or `risks.' ''
In simpler terms, ``it is a model of policing in which intelligence
serves as a guide to operations, rather than the reverse.''\10\ This
model promotes an efficient, effective, and targeted approach to
combating identified threats. This approach also enhances our ability
to identify new or emerging threats and allows us to focus our efforts
in the most troublesome areas in order to maximize our impact in
improving or maintaining public safety.
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\10\ Wikipedia, Definition of Intelligence-Led Policing, http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligence-led_policing, May 12, 2012.
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Creating and maintaining strong partnerships with all criminal
justice organizations that operate in Arizona is also a component of
our strategic response. When intelligence-led policing is combined with
outstanding law enforcement cooperation we maximize our combined
abilities to disrupt, degrade, or dismantle drug trafficking and
criminal organizations. By combining Intelligence-Led Policing and law
enforcement partnering, two very important opportunities are realized;
the first, information sharing and the second, program partnering. Some
of the more prominent multi-agency programs, which affect drug
trafficking, that DPS is involved include:
Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC)
One of the most serious challenges affecting public safety is the
timely exchange of intelligence and critical information between State,
local, Tribal, and Federal agencies. Accurate and timely intelligence
is the key to the most fundamental responsibility of Government,
protecting its citizens and critical infrastructures.
The Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center is a prime example
of our intelligence-based strategy and our efforts to share information
with our partners. The Arizona Fusion Center developed as a joint
effort between the Arizona Department of Public Safety, Arizona
Department of Homeland Security, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
private sector and participating Government agencies from around the
State. Initially developed to support the Arizona homeland security
effort, the ACTIC was established and became operational in October
2004. The Center provides tactical and strategic intelligence
collection, analysis, and dissemination, and is Arizona's central point
of contact for criminal intelligence and counter terrorism issues. As
the ACTIC program has matured its role has developed into an ``All
Threats'' strategy.
Today personnel from DPS, Phoenix Police Department, DHS, Arizona
National Guard, Phoenix Fire Department, and other participating
agencies staff the ACTIC. The Center operates on a 24/7 basis,
providing intelligence; investigative and technical support to State,
local, Tribal, and Federal law enforcement agencies as well as other
agencies critical to Arizona and the country's homeland security
efforts. The ACTIC also shares information with all other State fusion
centers around the Nation thereby strengthening the security and safety
of all our citizens. The FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and the
ACTIC, although no longer co-located, maintain a close working
relationship and share information in furtherance of the ACTIC and JTTF
missions.
The ACTIC executive board provides leadership, oversight, and
guidance to the operation of the fusion center. An added benefit of
utilizing an executive board is the sharing of information and problem
solving that occurs from relationships created amongst the board
members who represent all levels of law enforcement and public safety
agencies. Today the following agencies play a key role to the ACTIC and
serve as members of the executive board:\11\
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\11\ ACTIC Executive Board, ``Current Roster'', DPS Nancy Buck,
promulgated May 10, 2012.
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Arizona Department of Transportation
Arizona Department of Homeland Security
Arizona Department of Public Safety
Arizona National Guard
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
Department of Homeland Security
Eloy Police Department
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Glendale Police Department
Immigration and Custom Enforcement
Maricopa County Department of Emergency Management
Maricopa County Department of Public Health
Maricopa County Sheriff's Office
Mesa Police Department
Navajo County Sheriff's Office
Phoenix Fire Department
Phoenix Police Department
Prescott Police Department
Rocky Mountain Information Network
Transportation Security Administration
Tohono O'odham Nation Police Department
Tucson Police Department
United States Attorney's Office
United States Marshals Service
In addition to the executive board member representatives, there
are over 700 Terrorism Liaison Officers (TLO's) from agencies located
around the State. TLO's play a vital role in collecting and sharing
information with the ACTIC which are then reviewed and evaluated by
ACTIC personnel to determine possible threat and/or target
identification. Once actionable intelligence is developed, information
is forwarded to a law enforcement agency to continue the investigation.
The ACTIC communicates and shares information through publishing
intelligence bulletins and alerts disseminated to all our law
enforcement partners via electronic media. The executive board receives
security briefs dealing with new threats as needed.
It is important to point out that the ACTIC receives significant
Federal grant funds, managed by the Arizona Department of Homeland
Security (AZ DHS) used to support the ACTIC and its mission. In the
past 2 years, the AZ DHS budget has been reduced by approximately 50%
and 37%\12\ respectively. If these budget cuts to AZ DHS continue and
without other Federal grants available to support initiatives such as
the ACTIC, it is unlikely that fusion centers such as the ACTIC will
continue to exist in their present form due to fiscal challenges at the
State and local level.
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\12\ Arizona Department of Homeland Security, Discussion with ADHS
Director Gil Orrantia, April 2012.
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High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area (HIDTA)
The Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) manages all High
Intensity Drug Trafficking Areas across the Nation. ONDCP, through the
HIDTA's, provides Federal grant funds used to support Federal, State,
Tribal, and local task forces and their efforts to combat the
trafficking and transportation of illicit drugs.
State-wide, DPS collaborates with many other agencies who
participate in the HIDTA task forces. The HIDTA Grants Program
financially supports these task forces. We believe there are many
benefits derived from our HIDTA task force participation, including
force multiplier of personnel, enhances inter-agency relationships, and
improved information sharing.
The HIDTA executive board provides leadership and management to the
19 task forces within the Arizona Region. Relationships developed by
board membership help to facilitate information sharing, inter-agency
cooperation, and problem solving. Membership on the HIDTA executive
board is represented by the following agencies:
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
Arizona Attorney General's Office
Arizona Department of Public Safety
Arizona National Guard
Cochise County Sheriff's Office
Drug Enforcement Administration
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Immigration and Customs Enforcement
Department of the Interior--National Parks Service
Internal Revenue Service
Kingman Police Department
Maricopa County Sheriff's Office
Phoenix Police Department
Pima County Sheriff's Office
Tucson Police Department
United States Attorney's Office
United States Customs and Border Protection
United States Marshals Service
Yuma County Sheriff's Office
A key component of the information-sharing strategy within the
Arizona HIDTA is the Investigative Support Center (ISC), which provides
intelligence and investigative support to all the HIDTA task forces.
The ISC also shares information with the other investigative and
intelligence groups, such as the ACTIC, in order to maximize law
enforcements impact on the drug trafficking organizations that operate
in Arizona. In addition, task force personnel share information with
one another and are viewed as agency liaisons when it comes to case
development or case de-confliction.
Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT)
DPS is a member of the Alliance to Combat Transnational
Threats,\13\ which is a collaborative strategy that brings together
Federal, State, Tribal, and local law enforcement entities under a
unified command, wherein intelligence is shared and field operations
are coordinated targeting the drug and human transportation routes
established along the Arizona-Sonora border area. The following
agencies are members of the ACTT:\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats, ``Charter
Document'', March 2010.
\14\ Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats, ``Charter
Document'', March 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Customs and Border Protection, Border Patrol Tucson Sector
Customs and Border Protection, Border Patrol Yuma Sector
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Homeland Security
Investigations
Drug Enforcement Administration
Department of the Interior, Bureau of Land Management
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Enforcement and Removal
Operations
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
Arizona Department of Public Safety
United States Attorney's Office
Tohono O'odham Nation Police Department
Representative Border Sheriff--(Yuma County Sheriff's
Office)
Southwest Border HIDTA, Arizona Region
Customs and Border Protection, Office of Field Operations
Information sharing is integral to the success of the ACTT
operations. The HIDTA ISC, the ACTIC, and the Border Patrol Joint
Intelligence and Operations Center (JIOC) provide the intelligence in
support of field operations. DPS partners with ACTT member agencies to
conduct unique and specialized joint enforcement details focused on the
transportation routes in southern Arizona.
Rocky Mountain Information Network Inc. (RMIN)
RMIN\15\ is a Federal-grant project administered by the Department
of Justice's (DOJ) Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA). The RMIN program
is one of six Federally-funded regional projects comprising the
Regional Information Sharing System (RISS). In 2011, RMIN transitioned
from being a DPS sub-program and attained legal standing as a non-
profit 501(c)(3) organization. DPS continues to support RMIN through
assignment of personnel, sharing of information, and providing
leadership through membership on the RMIN executive board.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Arizona Department of Public Safety, ``Agency Overview--
RMIN,'' http://www.azdps.gov.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
RMIN serves more than 15,000 law enforcement officers from more
than 1,046 agencies in the Rocky Mountain region to include Arizona,
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming, and the
Canadian provinces of Alberta, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan. It
provides vital support to law enforcement agencies in the detection,
enforcement, and prosecution of multi-jurisdictional criminal
activities that traverse local, State, and National boundaries within
the RMIN region. It also provides members an on-line state-of-the-art
network of criminal intelligence databases can be queried 24 hours a
day using a secure link via the internet. Furthermore, RMIN assists
officers with analytical resources for case preparation, charts for
courtroom display, computer forensics, financial analysis, and other
analytical products.
RMIN also publishes a monthly law enforcement bulletin that
provides pertinent, timely information to member agencies. RMIN assists
member agencies by providing intelligence and investigative-related
training as RMIN provides individual and co-sponsored training support
for conferences and workshops. RMIN also provides assistance to member
agencies by loaning technical surveillance, investigative and
communications equipment to RMIN members.
Exclusively Federal funding supports RMIN. The RISS program funding
has been reduced in recent years, which has affected RMIN and its
ability to provide law enforcement services. RMIN is integral to
Arizona law enforcement as well as its regional customers. We would
encourage policy makers to re-evaluate those cuts as they directly
diminish the support law enforcement agencies need to combat drug
trafficking along the border.
Gang and Immigration Intelligence Team Enforcement Mission (GIITEM)
GIITEM is one of many specialized enforcement programs within DPS.
The DPS CID Gang Enforcement Bureau is home to the Gang and Immigration
Intelligence Team Enforcement Mission. GIITEM is a State-wide multi-
agency task force consisting of five districts that provide gang and
illegal immigration enforcement and intelligence services. GIITEM
strives to accomplish its mission through a task force concept
involving personnel from Tribal, Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies. GIITEM efforts are developed to fit the needs of
individual communities for maximum efficiency and effectiveness. GIITEM
trains criminal justice personnel regarding identification and
interdiction of gangs but also collects and disseminates gang and human
smuggling intelligence to other law enforcement agencies, through a
web-based, state-of-the-art system.
Within the GIITEM Bureau are the Illegal Immigration Prevention and
Apprehension Co-op Teams (IIMPACT). The Arizona Corridor is one of the
busiest and most violent smuggling corridors in the country. The
criminal organizations involved in the smuggling of aliens will violate
any law and have total disregard for human life. The violent,
collateral crimes related to the smuggling infrastructure include
murder, kidnapping, extortion, assault, sexual assault, home invasions,
and vehicle collisions while attempting to evade the police. The
mission of IIMPACT Arizona is to deter, disrupt, and dismantle violent
criminal organizations profiting from illegal immigration. The project
provides investigative resources and removal assistance to local
jurisdictions plagued by illegal immigrant drop houses. The IIMPACT
investigation squads are comprised of personnel from DPS and
Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE). These multi-agency squads will
assist with the investigation of property, financial, and violent
crimes associated with illegal immigration and human smuggling in the
greater Phoenix and Maricopa County areas.
Vehicle Theft Task Force (VTTF)
DPS CID Investigations Bureau manages the Vehicle Theft Task Force,
which targets individuals and organizations who commit auto theft. The
VTTF participants include Federal, State, and local law enforcement
agencies. Task Force personnel collaborate and share information with
other agencies. Two task force squads are deployed in Phoenix and one
squad in Tucson, where the majority of vehicle thefts occur. Task force
staffing is comprised of DPS and local agencies from the Phoenix and
Tucson areas. Border Patrol has dedicated two agents in the Sierra
Vista area to facilitate auto theft investigations.
Although auto theft is down Nation-wide, criminal organizations
continue to have a need for vehicles used to transport contraband from
Mexico into Arizona, and more specifically into Phoenix. According to
the AATA,\16\ ``The Mexican drug cartels have active theft cells that
operate in our State's metropolitan areas, acting as the transportation
division of their syndicate.'' They state, ``These auto thieves, with
their ties to the drug cartels, have become increasingly brazen and
violent.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Arizona Automobile Theft Authority, ``Annual Report,'' page 6,
CY 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Arizona Auto Theft Authority (AATA) provides the financial
support to operate the task force. The AATA executive board provides
the leadership and guidance to the task force.
Highway Patrol Division (HPD) Enforcement Programs
DPS Highway Patrol Division is responsible for patrolling the
State's interstates and highways. HPD officers trained in the latest
interdiction methods and presented with the most up-to-date
intelligence regarding drug organizations methodologies and recent drug
seizures. HPD interdiction efforts are supported by funding obtained
through the HIDTA's Drug Highway Enforcement (DHE) Grant, Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) Operation Stonegarden Grant or through State
appropriations. HPD also maintains and deploys canines State-wide
trained to locate narcotics secreted in vehicles. HPD officers
routinely participate in multi-agency special operations involving
Federal, State, and local agencies, which utilize intelligence and
statistical data to target their enforcement efforts.
The mission of the DPS Canine Unit is to disrupt criminal
organizations of various types while protecting human life in Arizona
by utilizing the unique and incredible capabilities of highly-skilled
law enforcement canines. The unit, which is especially effective in
narcotics detection along State highways, has more than 25 canines and
sworn canine handlers strategically placed throughout the State,
including five canines and handlers that focus exclusively on border
crimes in the southern part of the State.
Officers assigned to Highway Patrol and Canine District utilizes
license plate reader (LPR) technology. The information gathered through
the LPR program is accessible by other work groups and other agencies
through the ISC program.
Border Enforcement Manager
The DPS Border Enforcement Manager, a DPS command-level officer, is
responsible for liaison with and coordination of special operations
utilizing DPS enforcement groups and our Federal, State, Tribal, and
local law enforcement partners, targeting the southern Arizona area of
operation. The Border Enforcement Manager reviews all available
intelligence (ACTIC, ISC, JIOC, etc.) and statistical data and shares
this information with field command from DPS and our law enforcement
partners in order to facilitate special enforcement efforts focused on
drug traffickers.
Commercial Vehicle Enforcement (CVE)
The mission of the DPS Commercial Vehicle Enforcement Bureau is to
assure the safety of the motoring public by enforcing the Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Regulations and through educational programs. Primary
functions include inspections, weighing, and traffic enforcement. In a
joint effort with the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA), Commercial Vehicle Enforcement officers enforce the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Regulations and the Federal Hazardous Materials
Regulations. Commercial Vehicle Enforcement is also responsible for
training local, county, and Tribal officers in conducting inspections,
thereby assuring that regulations are enforced in a uniform manner.
The biggest challenge to the Bureau is attempting to deal with the
impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on commercial
vehicle safety. Since little is known about the condition of Mexican
vehicles, which cross the border into the State, officers in the Bureau
have been conducting special enforcement details at the border and have
informed Mexican carriers about the Federal Motor Carrier Safety
Regulations. Officers are also training Mexican officers to conduct
inspections in Mexico. This issue is at the forefront of the Bureau's
activities now. Officers throughout the State conduct over 46,000
inspections annually. Commercial vehicles are a known transportation
mechanism for narcotics coming into the United States. CVE officers are
trained to identify non-factory modifications and detect contraband
secreted in commercial vehicles.
CVE operations are dependent upon Federal grant funding received
through the Motor Carrier Safety Alliance Program (MCSAP). Without such
funding it is uncertain we would maintain operations at the current
levels.
Each of these programs has an information-sharing and collaborating
component to them. DPS recognizes the importance of communication,
cooperation, and collaboration with our law enforcement partners to
accomplish our mission. Utilizing an ``Intelligence-Led Policing''
model is integral to our ability to target enforcement activities.
Participating in the task force environment is a force multiplier of
our personnel. Both these strategies also aid in developing
relationships and fundamental understandings regarding the threats
facing Arizona and the law enforcement community.
key outcomes
Capturing and reviewing empirical data is one way to measure the
success or failure of a strategy to impact the public safety issues
facing the State. Another measure of success, less empirical, is
determining if the strategy has improved the spirit and level of
communication and cooperation between Federal, State, Tribal, and local
law enforcement agencies. In Arizona, the level of cooperation has
never been better. Clearly, we did not accomplish this without our
partners' willingness to engage and dedication to duty. Included in
this report is a statistical recap from DPS HPD and CID enforcement
groups.
Attachment ``A'' provides you with the DPS success
statistics in drop houses and border interdiction details
conducted for calendar years 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 year to
date.
Attachment ``B'' provides you with the DPS success
statistics in drug and other seizures in calendar years 2010,
2011, and 2012 year to date.
conclusion
In summary, this is an overview of the DPS organization, its
responsibilities, and the strategic response to the largest threat to
public safety--the drug cartels. It is through intelligence-led
policing that we collect, analyze, and disseminate intelligence
information to stakeholders. We seek out opportunities to share
information and form partnerships in order to maximize our ability to
affect all public safety issues confronting Arizona.
Arizona will continue to serve as a destination and transshipment
point for illicit drugs. Mexican DTO's will remain the greatest threat
to the State in the near future. These organizations use Arizona to
transport and distribute large amounts of methamphetamine, cocaine,
heroin, and marijuana destined for markets in Arizona and other areas
of the United States. Collateral crimes, such as homicide, assault,
robbery, thefts, and fraud occur in the wake of drug trafficking and
drug abuse.
Budgets, staffing, infrastructure, new technologies, emerging
threats, and new demand for services are all challenges we in law
enforcement face now and into the future. With reductions in budgets
seemingly endless and the ever-increasing costs to provide basic
services, we are coming upon an inflection point at which policy and
decision makers must make some very difficult financial decisions
addressing law enforcement's ability to combat threats to the public's
safety. The fact is providing for the safety and security of our
citizens is an expensive endeavor of which there are limited resources.
The second undeniable fact is that the drug trafficking organizations
have virtually unlimited funding and staffing to conduct operations.
Enforcement is just one approach to mitigate the drug transportation
issue. We also must consider new strategies and opportunities for
educating citizens regarding the hazards of drug usage and also look at
possible engineering solutions to restrict the accessibility of the
border by organized crime groups.
Thank you.
Attachment ``A''
TABLE: PROGRAM STATS YEAR
------------------------------------------------------------------------
HPD and CID--
IIMPACT--Drop Border
Year Houses Interdiction
Investigated Operations
------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009.................................... 181 25
2010.................................... 140 24
2011.................................... 53 31
2012 ytd................................ 5 8
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Quayle. Thank you, Colonel.
The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Kempshall.
STATEMENT OF ELIZABETH KEMPSHALL, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, SOUTHWEST
BORDER HIDTA ARIZONA REGION
Ms. Kempshall. Good morning, Chairman Quayle, Congresswoman
Jackson Lee, and Congressman Gosar.
It is my privilege and pleasure to address you today on
behalf of the Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area's
executive board to demonstrate how intelligence is the
cornerstone of the Arizona HIDTA program.
The HIDTA program, a grant-funded initiative of the Office
of National Drug Control Policy, provides assistance to
Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies
operating in areas determined to be critical drug trafficking
regions of the United States. Every year HIDTAs identify the
most current threat, develop a strategy to address the threat,
and evaluate the results. This procedure allows HIDTAs the
flexibility to adjust in a timely manner and redirect resources
to have the greatest impact. The productivity and success of
the program has been a model for efficient and effective
government.
The Arizona HIDTA was established in 1990 as a part of the
Southwest Border HIDTA, which includes California, New Mexico,
and Texas. The Arizona HIDTA, under the leadership of its
executive board, coordinates and supports the efforts of more
than 575 sworn law enforcement officials from 72 participating
agencies throughout Arizona. The executive board is comprised
of equal Federal and State and local law enforcement agency
members. Participating Arizona HIDTA counties include Cochise,
La Paz, Maricopa, Mohave, Navajo, Pima, Pinal, Santa Cruz, and
Yuma. The Arizona region also encompasses the Phoenix and
Tucson metropolitan areas, with a combined population of
approximately 1.5 million residents. Of the 21 Native American
reservations in Arizona, 17 fall within the Arizona HIDTA.
The mission of the Arizona HIDTA is to facilitate
cooperation among all law enforcement agencies through the
sharing of information and to support coordinated law
enforcement efforts to eliminate the drug-trafficking and
money-laundering organizations operating in Arizona. By
focusing on this mission, the Arizona HIDTA program has evolved
into a reliable and accountable counterdrug grant program.
Arizona law enforcement agencies have come to rely upon the
Arizona HIDTA to assess regional drug threats, facilitate the
creation of cooperative strategies, and provide resources to
enhance their ability to implement those strategies.
During the past year, the Arizona HIDTA executive board
directed the successful restructuring and refocusing of the
Arizona HIDTA Investigative Support Center. Through those
efforts, intelligence has become an integral component of the
infrastructure of the Arizona HIDTA program. The ISC is staffed
by representatives of participating agencies who have direct
on-site access to their agencies' information databases. The
Arizona HIDTA ISC now enhances the sharing of intelligence
among law enforcement agencies, the Arizona Counter-Terrorism
Information Center, the Alliance to Combat Transnational
Threats, and the El Paso Intelligence Center. Systematic
collection, analysis, and dissemination of secure, accurate,
and timely intelligence promotes interagency communication and
coordination. Increased communications enhances officer safety
through deconfliction and eliminates duplication of effort.
Coordination through shared intelligence is critical to
combating the increasing threat of narcotics traffickers and
criminal organizations.
Following the enhancements to its infrastructure, the
members of the newly-formed ISC Threat Analysis and Production
Unit conducted a comprehensive threat assessment to identify
new and continuing trends in the Arizona region. The purpose of
this yearly threat assessment is to provide strategic
intelligence to Arizona HIDTA and its partners to assist in the
development of drug enforcement strategies.
The Phoenix and Tucson areas are being exploited by Mexican
drug trafficking organizations as transportation and
distribution hubs. The transportation of drugs through the
Arizona corridor and to drug markets across the United States
is accomplished in two ways: Drug loads are shipped to other
locations in the United States by the same transportation group
that smuggled the drug into Arizona, or the drug loads are
taken to stash houses in the Phoenix and Tucson metropolitan
areas where drug loads are repackaged and then shipped to the
drug markets throughout the United States.
The executive board uses the threat assessment as the
foundation for developing the Arizona HIDTA strategic plan. The
strategic plan is designed to enhance the impact the 19 Arizona
HIDTA task forces are having on drug-trafficking and money-
laundering organizations, and thereby improving public safety
in Arizona.
The Arizona HIDTA task forces are organized into three
primary initiatives: Enforcement, which includes interdiction,
investigation, fugitive arrests and prosecution; intelligence,
which includes coordination, deconfliction, investigative case
support, threat analysis and intelligence gap identification;
and support, which includes management and training. The
initiatives consist of full-time Federal, State, and local law
enforcement investigators, prosecutors and intelligence
analysts. Through collocation and interagency cooperation and
the consolidation of strategic and tactical intelligence at the
ISC, the framework for the Arizona HIDTA provides for a
coordinated and comprehensive response to drug-trafficking
threats that are both regional and National in scope. From the
policymakers on the executive board to the initiatives, there
is a shared vision to attack the threats that pose--threats
posed by the drug trafficking and drug abuse.
The ISC, in concert with initiatives, monitors
investigative needs and collection requirements and integrates
them into the intelligence collection process to fully develop
and expand the scope of the investigations. Intelligence
garnered during these operations is provided to the ISC for
analysis via an open-loop intelligence process from which time-
sensitive and actionable intelligence is disseminated to the
initiatives and appropriate law enforcement entities.
Fully understanding the drug threat in Arizona and using an
intelligence-driven enforcement strategy, the Arizona HIDTA
initiatives are having a more significant impact on drug-
trafficking organizations operating in Arizona and throughout
the United States.
In 2011, Arizona initiatives disrupted or dismantled 37
drug-trafficking organizations or money-laundering
organizations operating in Arizona, 57 percent of which were
international or multi-State in scope. Arizona investigations
focused on five Consolidated Priority Organization Targets and
three Regional Priority Organization Targets. The Organized
Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force-designated cases totaled six.
The level of sophistication of those cases necessitated the use
of 298 separate court-ordered pen registers and 123 Title III
orders, 413 percent over 2012--or 2011. Local community impact
investigations were extremely successful and accounted for 43
percent of the drug trafficking and money-laundering
organizations disrupted or dismantled.
The Arizona HIDTA seized illicit drugs with an estimated
wholesale value of $1.19 billion, a 106 percent increase over
2010. Marijuana continued to lead as the most seized drug, with
over 500,000 kilograms, an increase of 118 percent. Arizona
initiatives experienced significant increase in both
methamphetamine and heroin seized, with methamphetamine
seizures over 700 kilograms, an increase of 88 percent, and
heroin seizures of more than 200 kilograms, an increase of over
1,000 percent. The return on investment for every $1 received
by the Arizona HIDTA during 2011 was $112, a 100 percent
increase over 2010.
Drug-related corruption poses a significant detriment to
law enforcement efforts to combat smuggling, drug
transportation, and drug trafficking in Arizona. The Arizona
HIDTA investigated seven corruption-related cases, which
resulted in one court-ordered wiretap, the serving of 23 search
warrants and 35 corruption-related indictments. Quantities of
heroin and methamphetamine were also seized.
Mr. Quayle. Ms. Kempshall, in the interest of time, if you
could wrap up.
Ms. Kempshall. Yes. I am just wrapping it up.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and for
the subcommittee's continued support of the HIDTA program.
Arizona HIDTA remains committed to facilitating cooperation
among Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement through
the sharing of intelligence to support law enforcement.
I will be glad to address any questions that you may have
at this time.
[The statement of Ms. Kempshall follows:]
Prepared Statement of Elizabeth Kempshall
May 21, 2012
Chairman Quayle, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee: It is my privilege and pleasure to address you
today on behalf of the Arizona High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area's
(HIDTA) executive board and to demonstrate how intelligence is the
cornerstone of the Arizona HIDTA Program.
The HIDTA Program, a grant-funded initiative of the Office of
National Drug Control Policy, provides assistance to Federal, State,
local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies operating in areas
determined to be critical drug-trafficking regions of the United
States. Every year HIDTAs identify the most current threat, develop a
strategy to address the threat, and evaluate the results. This
procedure allows HIDTAs the flexibility to adjust in a timely manner
and redirect resources to have the greatest impact. The productivity
and success of the program has been a model for efficient and effective
government.
The Arizona HIDTA was established in 1990 as part of the Southwest
Border HIDTA, which includes California, New Mexico, and Texas. The
Arizona HIDTA, under the leadership of its executive board, coordinates
and supports the efforts of more than 575 sworn law enforcement
officials from 72 participating agencies throughout Arizona. The
executive board is comprised of equal Federal and State/Local law
enforcement agency members. Participating Arizona counties include
Cochise, La Paz, Maricopa, Mohave, Navajo, Pima, Pinal, Santa Cruz, and
Yuma. The Arizona region also encompasses the Phoenix and Tucson
metropolitan areas, with a combined population of approximately 5.1
million residents. Of the 21 Native American Reservations in Arizona,
17 fall within the Arizona HIDTA region.
The mission of the Arizona HIDTA is to facilitate cooperation among
all enforcement agencies through the sharing of information and to
support coordinated law enforcement efforts to eliminate the drug-
trafficking and money-laundering organizations operating in Arizona. By
focusing on this mission, the Arizona HIDTA Program has evolved into a
reliable and accountable counter-drug grant program. Arizona law
enforcement agencies have come to rely upon the Arizona HIDTA to assess
regional drug threats, facilitate the creation of cooperative
strategies, and provide resources to enhance their ability to implement
those strategies.
During the past year, the Arizona HIDTA executive board directed
the successful restructuring and refocusing of the Arizona HIDTA
Investigative Support Center (ISC). Through those efforts, intelligence
became an integral component of the infrastructure of the Arizona HIDTA
Program. The ISC is staffed by representatives of participating
agencies who have direct on-site access to their agencies' information
databases. The Arizona HIDTA ISC now enhances the sharing of
intelligence among law enforcement agencies, the Arizona Counter
Terrorism Information Center (ACTIC), the Alliance to Combat
Transnational Threats (ACTT), and the El Paso Intelligence Center
(EPIC). Systematic collection, analysis, and dissemination of secure,
accurate, and timely intelligence promote inter-agency communication
and coordination. Increased communication enhances officer safety
through deconfliction and eliminates duplication of effort.
Coordination through shared intelligence is critical to combating the
increasing threat of narcotics traffickers and criminal organizations.
Following the enhancements to its infrastructure, the members of
the newly-formed ISC Threat Analysis and Production Unit conducted a
comprehensive Threat Assessment to identify new and continuing trends
in the Arizona region. The purpose of the yearly Threat Assessment is
to provide strategic intelligence to the Arizona HIDTA and its partners
to assist in the development of drug enforcement strategies.
The Threat Assessment found that the Sinaloa cartel presents the
primary operational threat to Arizona, possessing vast resources to
source, distribute, transport, and smuggle large amounts of cocaine,
marijuana, heroin, and methamphetamine in and through Arizona. The
Sinaloa cartel exploits well-established routes in Arizona and
perfected smuggling methods to supply drug distribution networks
located throughout the United States. The Mexican State of Sonora is
home to key drug trafficking plazas controlled by the Sinaloa cartel.
The plazas are used for off-loading, stashing, and staging of drugs,
money, and weapons. Furthermore, the Sinaloa cartel's influence in
Arizona is growing stronger as the cartel continues to gain control of
additional drug trafficking corridors and routes in Sonora, Mexico, and
neighboring Baja California, Mexico.
The Phoenix and Tucson areas are exploited by Mexican drug
trafficking organizations as transportation and distribution hubs. The
transportation of drugs through the Arizona corridor to drug markets
across the United States is accomplished in two ways: Drug loads are
shipped to other locations in the United States by the same
transportation group that smuggled the drugs into Arizona; or drug
loads are taken to ``stash houses'' in the Phoenix and Tucson
metropolitan areas, where the drug loads are re-packaged and then
shipped to drug markets throughout the United States.
The executive board uses the Threat Assessment as the foundation
for developing the Arizona HIDTA Strategic Plan. The Strategic Plan is
designed to enhance the impact the 19 Arizona HIDTA Task Forces are
having on drug trafficking and money laundering organizations and
thereby improve public safety in Arizona.
The Arizona HIDTA Task Forces are organized into three primary
Initiatives: Enforcement (interdiction, investigation, fugitive
arrests, and prosecution); Intelligence (coordination, deconfliction,
investigative case support, threat analysis, and intelligence gap
identification); and Support (management and training). The Initiatives
consist of full-time Federal, State, and local law enforcement
investigators, prosecutors, and intelligence analysts. Through co-
location, inter-agency cooperation, and the consolidation of strategic
and tactical intelligence at the ISC, the framework of the Arizona
HIDTA provides for a coordinated and comprehensive response to drug
trafficking threats that are both regional and National in scope. From
the policymakers on the executive board to the Initiatives, there is a
shared vision to attack the threats posed by drug trafficking and drug
abuse.
The ISC, in concert with the Initiatives, monitors investigative
needs and collection requirements and integrates them into the
intelligence collection process to fully develop and expand the scope
of investigations. Intelligence garnered during these operations is
provided to the ISC for analysis via an open loop intelligence process
from which time-sensitive and actionable intelligence is disseminated
to the Initiatives and appropriate law enforcement entities.
Fully understanding the drug-related threat in Arizona and using an
intelligence-driven enforcement strategy, the Arizona HIDTA Initiatives
are having a more significant impact on the drug trafficking
organizations operating in Arizona and throughout the United States.
In 2011, Arizona Initiatives disrupted or dismantled 37 drug-
trafficking and money-laundering organizations operating within
Arizona, 57 percent of which were international or multi-state in
scope. Arizona investigations focused on five Consolidated Priority
Organization Targets (CPOTs) and three Regional Priority Organization
Targets (RPOTs). Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF)-
designated cases totaled six. The level of sophistication of those
cases necessitated the use of 298 separate court-ordered pen registers
and 123 Title III orders, a 413 percent increase over 2010 Title III
orders. Local community impact investigations were extremely successful
and accounted for 43 percent of the drug-trafficking and money-
laundering organizations disrupted or dismantled.
The Arizona HIDTA seized illicit drugs with an estimated wholesale
value of $1.19 billion, a 106 percent increase over 2010. Marijuana
continued to lead as the most seized drug, with 519,954 kilograms
seized in 2011, an increase of 118 percent over the previous year.
Arizona Initiatives experienced a significant increase in both
methamphetamine and heroin seized, with methamphetamine seizures of 728
kilograms, an increase of 88 percent, and heroin seizures of 257
kilograms, an increase of 1,017 percent. The return on investment for
every $1 received by the Arizona HIDTA during 2011 was $112.09, a 100
percent increase over 2010.
The Arizona HIDTA Domestic Highway Enforcement (DHE) program
conducted 898 operations and assisted in the coordination of 2,650
Stonegarden Project Operations. The intelligence and investigative
leads developed from those operations were essential to the overall
Arizona strategy. DHE operations seized illicit drugs with an estimated
wholesale value of over $39 million and seized $7.2 million in cash and
assets. Two international drug trafficking organizations were
identified, with one disrupted and 782 individuals arrested.
The Arizona HIDTA State-wide fugitive Task Force arrested 4,228
subjects, an 18 percent increase over 2010. Drug-related arrests
accounted for 32 percent of the overall arrests, with a higher
percentage of those arrested wanted for crimes related to drug use or
violent crimes associated with drug rip-offs and/or home invasions.
Fugitive apprehensions resulted in seized drugs, currency, and assets
valued at $2 million.
Drug-related corruption poses a significant detriment to law
enforcement efforts to combat smuggling, drug transportation, and drug
trafficking in Arizona. The Arizona HIDTA investigated seven
corruption-related cases, which resulted in one court-ordered Title III
wiretap investigation, the serving of 23 search warrants, and 35
corruption-related indictments. Quantities of heroin and
methamphetamine were also seized, along with $197,000 in U.S. currency.
Prosecutors dedicated to Arizona HIDTA Initiatives reviewed over
375 search warrants, obtained 2,701 indictments, and convicted 2,467
individuals.
The ISC produced and disseminated over 147 intelligence-related
documents, including officer safety, situational awareness, suspect
aircraft, and DHE-related bulletins. The ISC presented numerous
briefings for the Arizona HIDTA executive board, Initiative Commanders,
and Congressional representatives.
Arizona HIDTA is actively involved with outreach, training, and
coordinating with Arizona Tribal communities. As an active participant
with the Arizona Indian Country Intelligence Network, the Arizona HIDTA
sponsored and participated in a 2-day Strategy Session with
representatives from 11 Arizona Tribal communities to develop an
intelligence and information-sharing framework within Arizona. In
addition, eight tribes took advantage of HIDTA-sponsored training,
which included a Prescription Drug Abuse Summit, Prescription Drug
Abuse Epidemic workshop, narcotics investigative techniques, and
Domestic Highway Enforcement training.
The Arizona HIDTA philosophy of cooperation and coordination is
based upon enhanced information and resource sharing through co-located
and/or collaborative Task Force Initiatives strategically located
throughout the region. Under the coordination umbrella of the Arizona
HIDTA, the participating law enforcement agencies eliminate duplicative
operational and investigative programs and facilitate tactical,
operational, and strategic intelligence sharing. The extent of inter-
agency cooperation supported by the Arizona HIDTA illustrates that all
Initiatives are working investigations in an efficient and effective
manner. The Arizona HIDTA approach demonstrates that when traditional
organizational barriers are overcome, Federal, State, and local law
enforcement entities can better focus investigative and intelligence
resources in dismantling and disrupting the most dangerous and prolific
drug-trafficking and money-laundering organizations.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you and for the
subcommittee's continued support of the HIDTA Program. The Arizona
HIDTA remains committed to facilitating cooperation among Federal,
State, local, and Tribal law enforcement through the sharing of
intelligence and to supporting coordinated law enforcement efforts.
I will be glad to address any questions you may have at this time.
Mr. Quayle. Thanks, Ms. Kempshall.
Now we are going to recognize Dr. Nunamaker for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF JAY F. NUNAMAKER, JR., DIRECTOR, BORDERS,
UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA
Mr. Nunamaker. Mr. Quayle, Ms. Jackson Lee, and Mr. Gosar,
it is an honor to appear before you today and to address the
question of what are the issues and challenges involved with
the goal of information----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Excuse me. Can you push your microphone a
little closer, please?
Mr. Quayle. You need to speak up.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. Raise your voice a
little. Thank you.
Mr. Nunamaker [continuing]. To address the flow of drugs
and what training and systems would be necessary to make that
happen. So I am 100 percent supportive of the goal of sharing
information, but I just want to emphasize that it is actually a
very difficult task and it will be extremely hard to do.
I base this on 40 years of experience studying information
sharing and developing collaboration technology. The systems we
developed have been used by IBM, American Express, and many
other Fortune 500 companies as well as throughout DOD, the
White House, and foreign governments. We had a 10-year project
with DARPA and the Navy to develop collaboration technology and
information sharing for the command ship of the future, the USS
Coronado. These technologies are still in operation today and
throughout the carrier fleet.
We have an extensive background with CBP. In 2008, we were
awarded the Center of Excellence for Border Security and
Immigration, a 6-year project with a 6-year extension. We also
have a project on checkpoints, evaluating the effectiveness of
checkpoints. We are currently conducting interviews of the
illegals that have been apprehended and evaluating their
propensity to cross the border many times.
We have also, and which Mr. Quayle has visited our lab, a
prototype of a system that is being tested now at the Nogales
port of entry for the Trusted Travelers Program for vetting
applicants for that program.
In addition, we have been involved with Hsinchun Chen with
the University of Arizona on the development of COPLINK, which
is an information-sharing system for police departments. It is
now in use by 5,000 police departments.
So, based on 40 years of experience, the issues of trust,
culture, and behavior are just as important as developing the
technology. That's difficult for me to say, because I am a
technologist. But the other issues of trust and culture really
play an important part.
So what is required is to build trust and social networks
between all agencies, a facility, a system for sharing tacit
and explicit knowledge in real time, to make things happen, and
an integrated data structure and data infrastructure across all
agencies and local and State governments. It can be done, but
it will take a lot of work.
So I had a proposed system for field agents for inputting
information, and a lot of it is tacit information and it has to
be in real time; also the ability to target social media,
Facebook, Twitter, e-mail for drug leads; access to Federal
databases across the agencies, State and local databases, and
make sure they are interoperable; and then feed it all into
something that would be a modification of the COPLINK system
but for drug activities. So you are building a system that
contains cues from many different places that can be put
together and playing detective. It has proven in the State and
local government, police departments, it has been quite
effective and integrated into a collaborative system where you
can share plans and activities.
So it is not going to be easy to accomplish. It is
difficult to share and collaborate in real time. No one does it
well, we found. It has taken the Navy years and years, and they
are still working on it. Nobody does it well except sports
teams, and many of them don't do it well either.
So thank you for the opportunity to discuss information
sharing. I look forward to answering your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Nunamaker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jay F. Nunamaker, Jr.
May 21, 2012
summary
The purpose of this testimony is to propose a solution to
facilitate information sharing and collaboration across Federal, State,
and local agencies in order to reduce the illicit flow of drugs. Based
on over 40 years of research in these areas, I discuss three key
components to successful information sharing and collaboration:
Trusted social networks;
Shared tacit and explicit knowledge;
An integrated data infrastructure.
Each of these components is carefully laid out in my testimony.
Information sharing by State, local, and Federal agencies to stop
the flow of illicit drugs is an important goal, but a difficult task to
accomplish. In order to be effective, it requires cultural, behavioral,
and technical infrastructure changes, as well as cooperation and the
alignment of agency goals and objectives. This will not be easy to
accomplish. It is difficult to share information and collaborate in
real time, while simultaneously being effective and making a
difference. No one does it well, except for sport teams, and not even
all of them do it effectively. There are many reasons why information
sharing is difficult, including lack of trust, power, and
infrastructure. Even if all these reasons are resolved, the issue of
change still remains. No one likes to change.
I have spent over 40 years studying information sharing and
developing collaboration technology. The systems we created are used by
leading companies such as IBM, American Express, Proctor and Gamble; as
well as by all branches of DOD, the White House, and many foreign
governments. We had a long-term project with DARPA and the U.S. Navy to
develop collaboration technology and information sharing for the
``command ship of the future,'' the U.S.S. Coronado. These technologies
are still in operation on the carrier fleet today.
I hope that this testimony provides some insights into better ways
to facilitate the collaboration and information sharing across agencies
that will greatly inhibit the illicit flow of drugs into our country.
______
Distinguished Members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear
before you today to discuss ``Stopping the Flow of Illicit Drugs in
Arizona by Leveraging State, Local, and Federal Information Sharing.''
Information sharing by State, local, and Federal agencies to stop
the flow of illicit drugs is an important goal, but a difficult task to
accomplish. In order to be effective, it requires cultural, behavioral,
and technical infrastructure changes, as well as cooperation and the
alignment of agency goals and objectives. This will not be easy to
accomplish. It is very hard to share information and collaborate in
real time, while being effective and making a difference. No one does
it well, except for sport teams, and not all of them do it well. There
are many reasons why information sharing is difficult, including lack
of trust, power, and infrastructure. Even if all these reasons are
resolved, the issue of change still remains. No one likes to change.
I have spent over 40 years studying information sharing and
developing collaboration technology. The systems we created are used by
leading companies such as IBM, American Express, Proctor and Gamble; as
well as by all branches of DOD, the White House, and many foreign
governments. We had a long-term project with DARPA and the U.S. Navy to
develop collaboration technology and information sharing for the
``command ship of the future,'' the U.S.S. Coronado. These technologies
are still in operation on the carrier fleet today.
We have a strong relationship with Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) that started in 2005. As part of an Air Force project, we tested
technology at the Nogales Port of Entry for effective secondary
screening. In 2008, we were awarded a 6-year Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Center of Excellence for Border Security and Immigration
(BORDERS), with CBP as one of our primary stakeholders. In 2010, The
University of Arizona, along with the University of Texas at El Paso,
was awarded a 2-year project to evaluate the effectiveness of border
checkpoints. At the present time, we are conducting interviews of
apprehended illegal border crossers in the Tucson Sector on behalf of
the (DHS) Office of Immigration Statistics. In cooperation with the CBP
Tucson Office of Field Operations (OFO), we have completed phase 1 of a
pilot project for screening applicants for the SENTRI Trusted Travelers
Program at the Nogales Enrollment Center. In addition, we have been
involved with Dr. Hsinchun Chen on the development of COPLINK, an
information-sharing system for local law enforcement agencies. This has
provided us with extensive knowledge of Federal, State, and Federal
[sic] law enforcement agencies regarding information sharing. The
purpose of this testimony is to propose a solution to facilitate the
collaboration and information sharing across agencies in order to
reduce the illicit flow of drugs.
There are three key components to successful information sharing
and collaboration: Trusted social networks, shared tacit and explicit
knowledge, and an integrated data infrastructure.
trusted social networks
Although research on cross-organizational problem-solving and
information sharing is scarce, there is evidence that it can be done.
This generally takes place in social networks where individuals rely on
each other to accomplish mutual goals. Trust plays an important role in
these networks. Current research points out that trust comes from
different sources and takes different forms during the relationship.
Early on, trust is frequently built on a calculative basis as people
consider the perceived risks and benefits associated with a particular
interaction. As the relationship evolves, the calculative component is
gradually replaced by a knowledge-based component, which involves
positive and negative experiences in individual interactions. At any
point, trust can be based on an institutional component through
contracts, formal agreements, or legal frameworks. Many times, this
institutional component plays an important role in the early stages of
a relationship because it reduces the perception of risk or improves
the legitimacy of the network. Another important component in
successful networks is the design and adaptation of a governance
structure that facilitates and manages interactions among network
members.
shared tacit and explicit knowledge
In order to be effective and innovative in finding solutions to
problems, social networks need to share knowledge. While using subject
matter experts to solve a problem may lead to more robust solutions, it
is important to remember that expert knowledge is socially constructed
in specific contexts and linked to local practices. Knowledge has two
dimensions, an explicit dimension that is contained in documents,
databases, and other objects created by experts; and a tacit dimension
that is embedded in practice. This tacit dimension of knowledge is hard
to share and it can be a barrier to developing better understanding of
a particular problem. Moreover, research has also identified different
levels of knowledge sharing, a syntactic level (concerned with common
sets of symbols), a semantic level (related to shared meanings), and a
pragmatic level (associated with practice).
integrated data infrastructure
A final component to information sharing is an integrated data
infrastructure, which is frequently associated with the concept of
interoperability. Interoperability can be defined as ``the mix of
policy, management, and technology capabilities (e.g., governance,
decision making, resource management, standards setting, collaboration,
and Information and Communication Technologies such as software,
systems, and networks) needed in order for a network of organizations
to operate effectively.'' Interoperability delivers value by creating
new knowledge by integrating information from multiple sources across
organizational boundaries. In order to build interoperable systems,
many different ``agencies'' must be crossed. Creating cross-agency
interoperability requires support from the highest levels of
government, particularly when creating interoperable systems across
government levels or National boundaries.
cross-agency issues
The framework provided above provides a set of ideas to organize
conversations related to information-sharing challenges to reducing
illicit drug flow. As mentioned above, trust is a critical ingredient
in any relationship. As different levels of law enforcement explore
ways to cooperatively reduce the flow of illicit drugs, the issue of
trust becomes paramount and can affect all levels of cooperation. For
example, as agreements are reached, there must be a genuine faith that
all agencies will live up to their obligations. Furthermore, on the
front line, personnel from all agencies must feel comfortable that
their counterparts will act in good faith. Issues such as corruption or
commitment can seriously undermine security efforts and willingness to
collaborate. New methods for inspiring trust must be established to
ensure interagency cooperation to reduce illicit drug flow.
Perhaps no other area of cooperation is as dependent on trust as
information sharing. The primary question is: What information should
be shared and how can its accuracy be verified? Information such as
personal identification, criminal history, and sensor data could
provide valuable insight and lead time for agency personnel. There is
evidence to suggest that some agencies find it inconvenient or not in
their best interest to share information with offices under the same
umbrella, let alone those outside of their organization. Issues such as
classification of data, concerns about collection methods, and who has
the authority to release information must be addressed to allow
meaningful information sharing.
Beyond trust, there is a technological component to information
sharing. Even if the decision is made to share information, a
deficiency across agencies in infrastructure capabilities could hinder
the ability to accomplish this goal. For example, transferring
information from one database to another is not a simple procedure,
especially when disparate technologies exist. Additionally, when
considering real-time video and sensor data, the data files can become
extremely large. Even voice communication through radios and cell
phones can pose significant challenges, especially when security is an
issue. Therefore, in order to maximize information sharing, it would be
prudent to examine the IT architectures of all agencies and address any
significant imbalances.
Another important component to effective information sharing is
related to the need of a governance structure to coordinate the efforts
of the Federal, State, and local agencies involved. Although there may
be strong incentives to resist cross-agency collaboration, interagency
governance, and collaboration through networks appears to be effective
in solving these problems.
Assuming trust, information sharing, technological obstacles, and
governance can be overcome, differences in institutional culture may
still undermine these efforts. These may include agency attitudes
toward technology, personal privacy, and what they perceive as legal
obstacles to cooperation. These cultural differences need to be
thoroughly understood and mitigated in order to effectively collaborate
and share information.
specific challenges
Based on the field studies conducted at The University of Arizona,
we found that there are common areas of concern for Federal, State, and
local law enforcement personnel. I will summarize the top four issues
with the hope that it will spur discussion on how to resolve them from
a multiagency perspective. First, all personnel called for better
interagency coordination, especially in regard to information sharing.
While roles and responsibilities in the field are fairly well-defined,
agents believe that better coordination at the political and high-level
leadership levels would improve both information sharing and resource
allocation/sharing.
The second issue involved managing disparate databases. Every
organization develops and maintains its own set of databases for
tracking information relevant to the agency, and may be protective of
who can gain access. However, the information maintained in one
database could be of use to another agency if shared. Furthermore, when
one database is updated, related information in a related database may
not be automatically updated. This creates a significant amount of
extra work to determine which information is accurate. Also, when a
database is shared but not integrated, agents often need to use
multiple login/password combinations thus hindering efficient
information sharing.
The third concern is field communications. For example, when Border
Patrol switched from analog radios to digital versions for improved
secure communications an unforeseen byproduct was occasional
communication outages. Another complication is that it is often
difficult for Federal personnel to talk directly to local law
enforcement. As a result, many agents carry field radios, cell phones,
and BlackBerrys to enable mobile communication with other agencies.
Universally, all agents interviewed requested a single, reliable voice
and data communications system for use in the field. Many agents also
expressed the need for improved data communication in the field,
including the ability to transmit and store large amounts of video,
sensor, and biographical data (fingerprints/photos) for future
analysis. The current data communications architecture does not
adequately support large data file transfer, especially between
individual agents in mobile vehicles and station headquarters.
The fourth issue is the need for improved Standard Operating
Procedures across multiple agencies. This often is a highly political
issue, especially when the coordination involves processing, detention,
prosecution, and suspicion of transporting illicit drugs. Each agency
follows the directives of its leadership, but the interpretation of
what is acceptable in the field can vary between organizations.
Stronger leadership and inter-agency cohesion is needed in this area.
overcoming the challenges
The four challenges outlined in the previous section stress the
importance of an integrative approach to the organizational and
technological issues to reduce illicit drug flow. On the technical
side, personnel call for better technology for field communications. On
the organizational side, better coordination and information sharing is
a key challenge, as well as designing standard processes across
organizational boundaries.
a model for collaborative governance
Figure 1 shows a model to guide the collaboration processes across
agencies' boundaries. The model comprises five components: Starting
conditions, institutional design, facilitative leadership,
collaborative processes, and outcomes.
The starting conditions refer to the main incentives and
constraints on participating in a collaboration effort. As suggested by
the model, these incentives are conditioned by a series of asymmetries
in terms of power, resources, and knowledge as well as previous history
of collaboration among partners. Understanding the differences will
play an important role in the development of a technical infrastructure
to support collaboration. As stated earlier, it is likely that the
perception of the usefulness of technology will vary from one agency to
the other. Moreover, the need to integrate disparate databases or
standard processes will also increase.
A second element is institutional design. This involves the main
rules followed by the network to make decisions and design policies. It
also involves the network structure, as well as assessment mechanisms.
This element suggests that collaboration inside networks needs to be
managed in a participatory and transparent way, including mechanisms to
make decisions and solve conflicts.
A third component of the model involves facilitative leadership.
The role of the leader is important, particularly when problems need to
be solved by networks of agencies where power is shared. The leader in
this environment has new roles to play. First, the leader is a designer
of vision, policies, and learning processes that enable knowledge
utilization. The leader is also a teacher that helps people get more
insight into the problem. Finally, the leader is a steward of peoples'
needs while ensuring the success of the broader mission.
The fourth component involves the collaboration process itself. The
process is a virtuous cycle where collaboration brings trust and
commitment among participants, as well as a shared understanding of the
problem area. However, the main challenge is to find strategies to
start the virtuous cycle. When there is no trust, people will not
develop commitments or shared understanding, and are unlikely to
achieve the desired outcome. In many cases, trust starts building when
all participants understand the benefits of the collaboration by seeing
early results. These ``small wins'' have proven effective in starting
or accelerating the collaboration process.
Finally, the model considers the outcomes of collaboration. In the
particular case presented in previous sections, the main outcomes
involve the reconciling the secure and expedient transit of legitimate
goods and people, while identifying and interdicting contraband items,
such as illicit drugs.
recommendations
The following are my recommendations for what needs to be done to
improve information sharing to stop the illicit flow of drugs. It is
imperative to develop a multi-agency information sharing system that
incorporates the following elements (Figure 2).
Training Program to Promote Trust.--Since trust is a key
component of information sharing, training will be required to
improve the level of trust. This training will draw upon the
latest research in this field and the best practices for
transmitting this knowledge to organizations.
Social Media Monitoring.--This system will target data
collection of all social media with relationship to drug
activities, by extracting and synthesizing relevant data.
Social networks, such as Facebook and Twitter, capture rapidly
emerging and changing information regarding illicit activities.
This high-value data will inform decision making based on
periodic data sources with highly dynamic social networking
data.
Databases.--Provide access to State, local, and Federal
databases related to drug trafficking to all agencies in the
network.
Drug-Link.--Develop a COPLINK-like system to display cues
for analysis for illicit drug flows. IBM i2 COPLINK organizes
vast quantities of seemingly unrelated data to provide
tactical, strategic, and command-level users with access to
shared data in a single, or multiple, consolidated
repositories. Its proven ability to quickly identify
investigative leads has helped law enforcement agencies to
solve crimes faster and ensure the safety of officers and
communities. IBM i2 COPLINK seamlessly scales from single-data
source deployments to regional information-sharing initiatives,
tying multiple agencies and data sources together. The product
is used in fusion centers, police, and sheriff departments
across the United States and currently supports one of the
largest information-sharing initiatives in the world.
Collaborative Systems.--The goal is to share insights and
integrative relevant actions and plans. This system will enable
the sharing of information by receiving input from all relevant
systems. It will facilitate idea generation and organization,
consensus building, and action planning.
I hope that this testimony provides insight into better ways to
facilitate collaboration and information sharing across agencies to
stop the illicit flow of drugs into our country.
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Mr. Quayle. Thank you, Dr. Nunamaker.
I want to thank all the witnesses for their testimony. I
will kick off the first line of questioning.
My first question is for Mr. Coleman and Mr. Allen. As I
mentioned in my opening statement, you know, the drug cartels
are going to stop at nothing if they can make a buck. The
amount of resources that they have pretty much dwarfs any
single agency to combat them.
So there are several different task forces out there trying
to combat drug smuggling. The groups that we have mentioned,
like BEST, HIDTA, Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats,
Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Force, they are all
competing for limited funding. Some have overlapping goals.
So I am going to start with you, Mr. Allen, and then Mr.
Coleman. You know, one of the lessons that we learned from the
9/11 Commission was that we need to move away from information
satellites. But do you think we can streamline some of these
task forces so that we can actually get more bang for the buck
so that we are not having to overlap, we are not having as many
competing task forces going for the same amount of funding to
better utilize the limited resources that we have available?
Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Well, I would say that I think we are going to
go through a period in Government where we are all going to
look for as much efficiency as we can. I think to the extent
that we can gain efficiencies in any of those programs we
should.
I don't necessarily agree that BEST and OCDETF strike
forces, for instance, overlap. I think they are very
complementary. They look to a certain extent at different
aspects of drug trafficking or drug smuggling.
But I do agree on the front regarding stovepiping of
information. I think that's where we have really made some of
the greatest strides. You know, I think we have broken down a
lot of walls in terms of information sharing between agencies
at every level of government. We need to continue to work in
that direction.
You know, one of the things I would say, as somebody who
has done this for a long time, is that some of that is a
leadership question, is how do we develop our leaders. It is
one of those things that starts right at the top. If the heads
of organizations both in Washington and in the field strongly
personally believe in information sharing, you will get that to
happen.
So I would say that one of the things we need to work on
is, as you develop Federal leaders and Federal executives, very
analogous to the military, we need to be encouraging and
causing Federal leaders to work across agency lines.
I will tell you one of the best experiences I have had in
my career is actually working at DEA for 14 months on one of my
headquarter stores. Imbedding with DEA and seeing the world
through their eyes, learning about the organization has paid
great dividends for me. It has made me much more knowledgeable
about the organization and how we can work together. I think
encouraging cross-pollination between the Federal agencies is
how you continue to break down some of those barriers.
Mr. Quayle. Mr. Coleman.
Mr. Coleman. I agree with Matt. I think that there are a
lot of we are all going to have to streamline. We all know
that. We know what is coming down the pipe.
But I also agree with Matt in the fact that multiple layers
of task force, the different task forces that we have, they
don't all do the same job. I think we commonly make a mistake
in thinking that if something is a drug task force, well, then
it is doing the same job as another drug task force. Not
necessarily, drug trafficking, there are task forces operated
at all different levels. So I don't think that it is
necessarily duplication. Now, are there some duplicate efforts
out there? Certainly. But I think all in all we can't lump all
types of drug trafficking organizations and task forces into
one.
Mr. Allen. I will give you an example of that. In talking a
little bit about the West Desert Task Force and the importance
of HIDTA in that, I will give you an example of something that
happened recently that exemplifies how we need to move
information across agency lines.
One of the participants in the West Desert Task Force is
the Bureau of Land Management. Recently a Bureau of Land
Management law enforcement officer found a scouting location in
the west desert. They found a cell phone. That information was
given to HSI. We turned it over to HIDTA. Within 24 hours,
HIDTA was able to tie numbers from that cell phone to
investigations that DEA had an interest in and that we had an
interest in. We need to be focusing on that movement, that
rapid movement of information every day across agency lines.
Mr. Quayle. Okay. I am going to go back to you guys as
well.
In '85, in 1985, Enrique Camarena, who was an undercover
DEA agent, was killed in Mexico. Following the U.S. Government
response, it seemed that the cartels had an informal hands-off
policy towards U.S. Government officials. Then, last year, ICE
agent Jaime Zapata was killed and his partner, Victor Avila,
was wounded in Mexico despite actually identifying themselves
as U.S. Government officials.
Now, my understanding is that the attack was not sanctioned
by cartel leadership. But as cooperation with Mexico has
increased and we have sent more agents and officers to work in
Mexico over the last few years, what precautions are we putting
in place to protect our men and women in the field when they go
across the border?
Mr. Allen. I would actually, I would probably prefer to
take that question for the record only because I--you know, my
leadership responsibilities are here in Arizona. I can't
necessarily speak----
Mr. Quayle. Okay.
Mr. Allen [continuing]. About our foreign presence in
Mexico; although, Mexico is where we have the largest number of
HSI agents outside the United States. But I can't probably talk
on behalf of the agency about how we are preparing our people
to go overseas.
Mr. Coleman. DEA has obviously a very large presence in
Mexico. As Matt said, we have training courses and a variety of
things like that we send our folks to before they go over
there. Then there are several other things that we do to take
care of them while they are there that I can't really speak
about in a public forum. But there are certain things that we
do all the time to ensure their safety as best as we possibly
can. Obviously it is a dangerous environment at times for them
and we do everything we can to try and protect them while they
are there.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you.
I now recognize Ms. Jackson Lee for her questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. To all the witnesses,
thank you for very instructive testimony.
Mr. Allen, let me start with you. I guess you are getting
the hot seat. I will proceed over here.
It is my understanding that drug loads interdicted by
Border Patrol between the ports of entry are turned over to DEA
while drug loads interdicted by CBP's Office of Field
Operations at the ports of entry are turned over to ICE for
investigation.
This bifurcation seems to be relic of the days before the
creation of DHS when Border Patrol, like DEA, were part of DOJ.
Is that still the case? What challenges, if any, does this
situation pose for ICE as you attempt to investigate drug-
trafficking organizations that may be sending drug loads
between and through the ports of entry?
Mr. Allen. It certainly is a construct that predates the
creation of DHS. You know, I think there are several different
factors that argue both for and against kind of maintaining the
status quo.
You know, the reality of the situation is, going into the
budget that we are now, HSI and ICE are certainly not resourced
to take on the level of work that DEA takes on every day in
servicing the Border Patrol and their drug activity. So I am
not sure we have the resources to take on what DEA takes on
today.
But if we go back to the previous question, I think the key
factor there is information. When either the Office of Field
Operations or the Office of Border Patrol at CBP makes an
interdiction, I think, you know, what generally HSI and DEA are
looking for out of that is information and leads. As long as we
can focus on the flow of information from those seizure
incidents, I am not sure in the end whether it matters whether
prosecution is taken by DEA for presentation to the U.S.
Attorney's Office or HSI. As long as there is a healthy flow of
information that emanates from those seizure incidents, I think
we maintain the status quo, unless somebody is going to look at
resources.
Ms. Jackson Lee. You are comfortable with the Homeland
Security Investigations structure.
Mr. Allen. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Are you comfortable with, in answer to
your own comment, that you are giving another information so
that information is exchanging even though the interdiction is
by a different organization?
Mr. Allen. Yeah. I think, you know, the way our case
management system is set up, which right now is shared jointly
with Customs and Border Protection, for any individual name,
company name, license plate number that we put into our case
management system, CBPCs, it is transparent to them. Similarly,
it goes across the DEA at the same time. So increasingly our
ability to share information, even transparently, is enhanced.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask you if you could give us a
quick response to the seriousness of the question of potential
money laundering into U.S. banks, which is part of your
testimony.
Mr. Allen. You know, I think one of the really good things
you can say about U.S. anti-money laundering laws that go back
35 or 40 years is that for a very long time we have been
successful at kind of pushing illicit funds out of U.S.
financial institutions. That is because the banking industry
has been very good at developing good anti-money-laundering
screening tools.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So what are you seeing now, that you are
saying----
Mr. Allen. What I see is Mexican TCOs trying to get back
into U.S. banks. I think we need to focus on making sure that
we can keep illicit money out of the U.S. financial system.
That's going to take us sharing information with U.S. banks,
which we are now, so that they can detect that kind of illicit
activity and keep it out of the banks.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So this is a red flag for this hearing, to
be attentive to the fact that this may be a next move----
Mr. Allen. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. For Mexican cartels. I think
that's a very important point that we should flag.
Let me move to Mr. Coleman. I think in your testimony you
emphasized something that is extremely important to me,
intelligence. I think that we have managed to be secure for now
10, going on 11, years since 9/11 because we understood the
importance of intelligence sharing. In this instance, with drug
interdiction and drug trafficking, how important for DEA is the
intelligence gathering and sharing?
Mr. Coleman. It is critical to what we try to do every day.
There is nothing that we as DEA, which is the Federal
Government's sole and primary drug law enforcement agency, we
have to--we need all this information that we get from all
these various sources to make our cases. We are a small agency,
but we are a single-mission agency. We do one thing and we do
it very well. But we need all the information from the other
sources, State and local, Tribal, whatever it may be, to try to
build these cases.
One piece of information that a State and local agency may
have may be the key to my agents being able to indict a
significant Sinaloa cartel lieutenant or something like that.
If we don't share that, I may never know about that piece of
information. So systems like the HIDTA, things like that, where
everybody comes together and then everything is pushed out to
everybody that is involved, are critical to what we are trying
to do.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me, in answer to Professor Nunamaker,
do you think we are moving toward a trusted collaboration,
breaking those distinctive lines that we have? Have you seen
collaboration? Do you think you can overcome some of these
challenges that he offered in terms of sharing information? Are
you doing that now?
Mr. Coleman. I can speak for DEA in that there is virtually
no piece besides classified information of DEA information that
State, local, or Tribal law enforcement cannot access. Now,
they have, they may have to talk to the investigator that has
the case, but we have systems in place that match up and notify
the State cop that's on the street, they will notify him what
DEA agent he needs to talk to to get information about that. We
have multiple systems on that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me quickly ask you about the
challenges of desolate areas for DEA.
Mr. Coleman. Extreme challenges. We have poor
communications out there. Our, the infrastructure is tough for
our agents that are out there. DEA by and of itself is not an
interdiction agency. We are an investigative agency. So we
don't do a lot of interdiction but we certainly have operations
that are in those areas. It is tough to manage our resources
out there. It is a safety issue for our agents as it is for the
BP and the ICE agents that are out there all the time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Anything that you need in particular, that
relates to that issue of desolate areas?
Mr. Coleman. I think that the biggest need, the thing that
we need is infrastructure built up so that we can access
communications in some of those areas. There are desolate areas
we can't even communicate with each other. That's obviously a
safety issue.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask a last quick question to
Lieutenant Stanhope. I was eager to hear the importance from
local and State government's perspective of the partnership
with the Federal Government, particularly in grants. Can you
emphasize again how important those grants are for you to be
able to do your work?
Colonel Stanhope. Mr. Chairman, Ms. Jackson Lee, I will
tell you that, you know, all the Federal grants, particularly
that we currently are engaged in, are absolutely essential for
us to impact this problem in the fashion that we are. The
reality is I do not have the appropriate budget to backfill if
those grants go away. As Mr. Coleman indicated or mentioned
about mission, well, DPS has multiple missions that we try and
accomplish. Narcotics enforcement is one of many missions.
But those grants are integral to us being able to partner
with all the folks here at this table and agencies around the
State, absolutely essential.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield back for a moment. Thank you very
much.
Mr. Quayle. I recognize Mr. Gosar.
Mr. Gosar. Mr. Chairman and Subcommittee Ranking Member,
thank you very much for including me.
Let me go back to Mr. Allen, Mr. Coleman, and Ms. Kempshall
at this point in time. I believe that we can accomplish
anything if we put our minds to it and not eliminate certain
jurisdictions. I am going to focus on the border and the
environmental aspects that you are inhibited with.
The Border Patrol, or the border is a place where the
environmental security or environmental patrol and security
come into a nexus. Stretches of land along our border are
closed off to the Border Patrol so they are unable to perform
basic security activities like motorized patrolling, road
construction, and even electronic surveillance. Why? That's
because of environmental regulations.
We all agree on the importance of protecting the
environment. But I believe that current policies are extremely
dangerous and ties the Federal law enforcement's hands when it
comes to protecting our Southwest Border. Even worse, the areas
in question are often trashed and ruined by drug smugglers and
illegal crossers. In fact, the Arizona Department of
Environmental Quality reported picking up over 5,000 pounds of
trash in the Nogales area just in January alone.
I believe this policy is broken and is not serving the
environment or protecting our citizens. My colleagues and I on
the Natural Resources Committee support Congressman Rob
Bishop's legislation 1505, the National Security and Federal
Lands Protection Act. It would stop the Secretary of the
Interior or the head of the Forest Service from taking action
to disrupt the activities of the Border Patrol and grant the
Border Patrol immediate access to public land in order to
conduct common-sense measures to secure the border, patrolling,
surveillance, and the like.
My question is: How would a law like this assist in your
mission? What obstacles have you encountered in your time on
the board or managing environmental regulations? What increased
security efforts could you do if 1505 were put in place?
Mr. Allen first.
Mr. Allen. You know, as the leader of a investigative
component of DHS, I cannot tell you that environmental
regulations have ever impeded my mission or my agents' missions
out there.
Mr. Coleman. I am the same on both, sir. We are primarily
an investigative agency; we don't do a lot of that type stuff.
Mr. Gosar. Ms. Kempshall.
Ms. Kempshall. The agencies that are participating in the
Arizona HIDTA include Bureau of Land Management. They are very
active then in participating and sharing their intelligence
with us. I don't have any ability to comment on the
environmental impact.
Mr. Gosar. How about you, Lieutenant Colonel?
Colonel Stanhope. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Gosar, no, I don't have
any information on that.
Mr. Gosar. Mr. Nunamaker, do you see a problem with that?
Mr. Nunamaker. No.
Mr. Gosar. Okay. One of the things that you talked about
was the key in regards to having a policy from up above and
having a uniform policy. It is a war, and our border is not
secure, unlike what has been said. Drug and human smuggling is
a form of organized crime, the kind of crime that requires
political protection from those in power in order to thrive in
the way the cartels have.
My question for Mr. Allen and Mr. Coleman and Ms.
Kempshall: As you know, the Department of Justice sued the
State of Arizona over SB 1070. The law empowers local
enforcement to identify and detain illegal immigrants. Sadly it
is not a cooperative working relationship from the top down. In
fact, truth is, looks like it is lacking. However, across the
country, we, and through the Southwest, we have sanctuary
cities, policies in which one way or another purposefully
ignore the presence of illegal immigration within the city.
What kind of message does this actually send when the Federal
Government sues the State trying to assist them in enforcing
the law and does nothing to cities and States who actually
flaunt and ignore the law with sanctuary cities?
Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. That's a little beyond the scope of my
attendance here today. I am certainly not in a position to
comment on the administration's position or decision to sue on
1070.
What I can say with respect to our cooperation with other
agencies on the immigration side of our mission is that we have
a great working relationship with law enforcement agencies
around the State. We do a lot of joint work with other agencies
on immigration enforcement. On a daily basis, law enforcement
agencies are turning over illegal aliens that have been
identified to ICE primarily, our enforcement and removal
operations component throughout Arizona. So we have a very good
working relationship with our counterparts in that area.
Mr. Coleman. Nothing to answer. I don't have anything.
Mr. Gosar. Ms. Kempshall.
Ms. Kempshall. The primary mission of HIDTA is involved
with the drug-trafficking organizations. So I have no comment
on the immigration situation.
Mr. Gosar. Okay. Quick question for you, Ms. Kempshall. I
know you have a number of HIDTA but it doesn't include all of
Arizona. What kind of benefit would it be to have 100 percent
of Arizona under HIDTA?
Ms. Kempshall. The current process to become a HIDTA county
is very extensive and very involved and goes through rigorous
reviews on multiple levels.
The interaction with HIDTA participants and non-
participating agencies or counties is very robust. The
intelligence that we develop, or the support that we develop or
have is not limited solely to participating agencies or
participating counties. Arizona, it has, one of the largest
areas of its State has been designated as HIDTA county. That
has been very helpful to the development and sharing of
intelligence in our enforcement efforts.
Mr. Gosar. Just one real quick thing. So there has been no
point in which an environmental access has impeded law
enforcement on the board. I find that hard to believe.
Mr. Allen. Again, I am talking from the investigative point
of view where our investigators go out there every day. It
hasn't stopped us.
Mr. Gosar. Brigadier General.
General Salinas. We, we are a support agency, Congressman,
so we really don't take the lead on any of that. For instance,
when we were on the border with entry identification teams, CBP
was the agency that coordinated with the other Federal agencies
and the local law owners for us to be positioned. So we are a
background support organization. We don't make any of those
negotiations unfortunately.
Mr. Gosar. It seems like we are missing the right people to
answer the question.
General Salinas. I believe CBP would be the best
organization to answer that question.
Mr. Gosar. Well, thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Quayle. Mr. Gosar.
I will kick off the second and final round of questions.
Colonel Stanhope, awhile back there was talk about putting
up quick response teams, CBP and ICE, to help DPS as you guys
continue to monitor the interstates with 40, 8, 10, 17. Has
that come into effect? Do you think that a quick response team
in various areas of small groups of CBP or ICE agents in
various areas along the corridors would help with you
interdicting either drug smugglers or human smugglers on the
interstate DPS patrols?
Colonel Stanhope. Mr. Chairman, my short answer is yes. Let
me explain.
Obviously we have highway patrolmen out there every day
running up and down the freeways making traffic stops.
Oftentimes they will come across, they will interdict loads of
narcotics, cash, et cetera. Oftentimes my division, Criminal
Investigations Division, provides direct support to the men and
women of the Highway Patrol, provide them investigative
services and support.
Obviously, in these times, my agency, as many agencies, are
challenged in staffing. We do participate in a lot of task
forces which have, which have their own mission parameters.
So my answer is yes, it would, because those folks would be
able to, to go out and respond to some of the calls for service
for highway patrolmen that my own agency cannot support right
now. Oftentimes what will happen is they will, let's say, seize
a load, 300 pounds of marijuana. If there is no one from my
agency that can immediately respond, the subject is booked,
marijuana is seized. The timeliness of the investigative
effort, in other words furthering that investigation, time is
critical. If we don't have an investigator go out and take that
investigative role, controlled deliveries basically are
worthless if you don't get on them right away, if you don't
perform them right away. The value of the information may be
lost from the subject after being booked and/or deported,
things of that nature.
So there is an immediacy that I think would benefit law
enforcement, and my agency in particularly, in particular. But,
so yes, I would absolutely support that concept, sir.
Mr. Quayle. Mr. Coleman, I was talking about the Mexican
elections coming up. You know, there has been very good
cooperation between the Mexican and the U.S. authorities. How
damaging would it be if the next president of Mexico does not
continue Calderon's call to try to stop the drug cartels and
the drug trafficking and does not provide the cooperation with
U.S. authorities for our guys who are south of the border?
Mr. Coleman. I think it would be very damaging to the
efforts that we have had for the last 6 years. Under President
Calderon's administration, the cooperation and the high-level
crossover of information sharing with the Mexican government
has been unprecedented. We have indicted and extradited
probably hundreds of high-level narcotics traffickers from
Mexico, something that was unprecedented prior to his
administration.
So I think if the--not getting too political, anything that
would change that level of cooperation is going to be damaging
to DEA's efforts to indict the biggest and the baddest of the
drug traffickers in the world.
Mr. Quayle. Kind of going along that thread, there were
some news articles I have read recently where it indicated that
the head of the Sinaloa cartel, Chapo Guzman, was actually
providing quality information to Customs Enforcement and to the
DEA to actually make good arrests and seizures at the expense
of his rivals, which was the Tijuana cartel, I believe.
How do these respective agencies kind of guard against
somebody like Chapo giving you information just for the benefit
of Sinaloa cartels at the expense of one of his competitors, or
do you just see it as: ``Hey, we got one of the competitors and
got one of the cartels and made some interesting seizures''?
Mr. Allen. Well, there is--I mean that's one angled look at
it, though, but I am not sure that is the only angle you should
look at.
You know, one of the things we try and teach our agents and
instill in them is that, you know, first of all, human sources
are a key ingredient to what we do every day. A lot of what we
do couldn't be done without human information. But one of the
key things that agents have to learn early in their career
hopefully when they are dealing with human sources is that the
most important thing you learn from them isn't necessarily the
information that they provide you about the criminal activity;
it is why they are coming forward in the first place.
Mr. Quayle. Right.
Mr. Allen. You know, you have to understand what their
motivation is for providing information. There is a wide range
of those. You know, some of it is revenge. Some of it is they
have had a change of heart and want to provide, you know,
information to U.S. law enforcement. Some of it is, you know,
more Machiavellian and involves, you know, organizational
politics in Mexico. We have to, we have to be asking the kinds
of questions that elicit that background information about why
a person is comfortable to talk to law enforcement.
Mr. Quayle. Okay. Thank you very much.
I now recognize Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me
first of all say this has been very instructive and I
appreciate the witnesses very much for what they have provided.
Let me just glean from comments that have been made, and I
think it is important for the record, and that is the focus of
this hearing, dealing with the illicit flow of drugs in
Arizona, and to indicate the various success stories that have
been told here, along with the challenges. I think that's very
important. We should acknowledge all of you for the success
that we have achieved. Yet we want to do more. I think--I see
some nodding heads--that's where we are. But we really
shouldn't leave this hearing without acknowledging the work
that has been done and that we need to continue to work. That's
extremely important.
I think it is important to note as well that we reinforce
the fact that many are Federal agencies here. Some under
General Salinas, by statute, can be Federalized but work under
the Governor until that point. We thank you as well for your
service.
Then I think it is important to emphasize that, though we
don't have the principals here that deal with this issue, that
immigration is truly a border security and Federal issue and we
should ensure that we have all the resources necessary to work
on those issues.
Let me, Lieutenant Colonel Stanhope, can you just give me
one of the grants that is so very important to you so that we
can be guided by that as we go back to Washington?
Colonel Stanhope. Mr. Chairman, Ms. Jackson Lee, certainly.
The Operation Stonegarden, for example, is a grant program
which I believe is through DHS, through Border Patrol, funneled
through the counties and we get a portion of that at DPS. Those
funds are used to support interdiction details along the
highway with many of our partners. But it is also used to
conduct desert operations in furtherance of some of those
remote corridors that we try to interdict drug loads on. That's
one example.
Another example, frankly, is funding we get for our Arizona
Fusion Center through DHS. That funding provides us that
infrastructure in order to operate that facility. It does not
pay for personnel but it does pay for the infrastructure.
Again, as I mentioned before, it is about a million dollars
that we receive from Arizona DHS, or $980,000, for that. I
don't have that money in my budget or my department's budget in
order to facilitate that. So if that money went away, I am not
sure how we would have to handle that at a State level.
Stonegarden money, again, I think we totally get about $800,000
from all the counties involved with that, and, again I don't
have the resources in order to provide that service or to
support that, those efforts without our Federal partnership.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, that's very important. I want you to
know that we are listening.
Let me emphasize another statement for the record is that,
at least by those witnesses who are here, is that presently
environmental laws or regulation are not impacting your work. I
think it has to do with our Federal lands. Many of us want to
make sure that our Federal lands continue to be protected
without relieving environmental structures. So we appreciate
that information.
To General Salinas, I want you to know that we are not
finished with our work in the budgeting and appropriations
process. I am delighted that you have taken to note about the
$4 million. I think all of us will look forward to working on
that issue and bringing to the attention of our appropriations
process the vital aspect of this $4 million, across the Nation
I think it is, and you dropping down from 24 to 9 percent.
So what you are suggesting is that just that amount and the
amount of numbers of personnel that you lose will have an
impact and we should look closely and squarely at that issue?
Is that what you are saying?
General Salinas. Yes, ma'am. It is going to have a huge
impact on many of the organizations that you see here.
Currently I provide 15 to ICE, a large number to DEA, DPS, and
HIDTA. This budget is essentially going to cut us in half.
You know, when you look back to previous years when we were
in the 300 range, we are now going to be down to 60. So it is
an 80 percent cut over time.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I can assure you that this is ringing a
bell with bipartisanship, and it is an issue that we will take
back to Washington, I will take back to Washington. I just want
to thank you for the 9,000 men and women who have been deployed
out of the Arizona National Guard, as I understand since, 9/
11----
General Salinas. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. And to be deployed.
Let me go to Professor Nunamaker. Thank you for the very
detailed approach that we may take back to Washington. But let
me get you to see a glimmer of optimism.
If we look at some of the principles that you have
annunciated, can you see--I see a sense of trust here--can you
see that trust building and then that collaboration enhancing
through technology? How would you instruct us? I see the trust.
Where are you thinking that we can do better?
Mr. Nunamaker. I think it will be involving education and
making people aware of the implications of trust and so there
is self interest in putting in information hopefully for the
greater good.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That would be for the laymen or for these
groups here? We are talking about law enforcement groups
collaborating with each other.
Mr. Nunamaker. I think it is all the way up the chain from
the boots on the ground to the top leadership.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you see improved communications and
trust amongst these individual component law enforcement in
your research, from HIDTA to ICE, DEA? I mean, as they gave
their testimony, the State, they all seem like they are working
together.
Mr. Nunamaker. I think that's right. We have dealt with
Matt Allen in the past. It is just that it has to work up from
the ground.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Ground up. We will take that note back.
Let me--I just, Mr. Chairman, have a few more questions
here, I think, hopefully, or two more questions for Ms.
Kempshall.
I am fascinated, of course, with the work that HIDTA is
doing. I think it is an important component that it was
established, at least the Arizona one, way before, I think I
was on judiciary, and we were dealing mostly with those issues
before we even had a Homeland Security department. I started
talking historically.
But what have you seen in the growth of this system and its
improvements--1990 here in Arizona, we are now 2012--the growth
and improvement of your work, what have you seen? What kind of
progress are you seeing? What do you see going forward?
Ms. Kempshall. Well, I appreciate the opportunity to answer
that question because I have been in drug law enforcement for
about 28 years and I have seen a lot of growth. I would like to
focus right here in Arizona as what I have been seeing over the
last 5 or 6 years that I have been in Arizona.
The law enforcement community, specifically the drug law
enforcement community, is facing challenges in this State like
I have never seen throughout my career. The cooperation and the
dedication of the law enforcement agency leaders and the men
and women on the street is just incredible.
I have seen it since I have been with the Arizona HIDTA
over the last year and a half, how, when law enforcement
agencies come together with a common strategy, knowing who our
enemy is and leveraging all the resources that our Federal,
State and local, and Tribal law enforcement can bring against
that enemy, man, it is exciting to see the progress that we are
making. The strides that we are making to go after the most
significant targets through using intelligence to drive that
strategy is just--you should see the look on these men and
women, the agents on the street, when they get a piece of
intelligence from the ISC that ties their seizure into a major
investigation being done by a Federal agency. It is just
incredible when you see them coming together.
You asked about, you know, the duplication of task force
efforts. I don't see it that way because I have been involved
in all of them over my career. I see us as layering our
approach to take out the infrastructure of these drug
trafficking organizations. Combining the resources that we all
bring to the table, we are going to be successful here.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is a powerful message. Mr. Coleman--
very powerful. It is very important for us to know in my
sitting on both committees, the Judiciary and Homeland
Security.
But you, Mr. Coleman, in particular, if you could, clarify
the question of whether you do or do not share classified
information with other agencies, and, if not, why or how can
they access it in an appropriate classified manner. When I say
that, obviously State agencies and other agencies.
Mr. Coleman. We do share classified information, but
through appropriate mechanisms that we have built in place
within the agency and within the Federal Government. Our
standard nonclassified investigative information is pretty much
accessible to any law enforcement agency through a variety of
mechanisms that we do.
But, again, my statement was that our classified
information goes through the, the sharing of that, goes through
the regular Government systems that are set up to apply that
kind of sharing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So can I take from this that no local,
State, or coordinating agency is barred from any access to your
great arm of what you do, which is the gathering of
intelligence? No one is barred as long as they are classified
going through the appropriate procedures which then allows that
agency to be collaborative and to build on what they may have.
Mr. Coleman. The sharing of the classified information
would be if they were authorized to see it, of course, within
the Government regulations. But the actual investigative
standard information that we have, yes, they can access that
through any system.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
All of you view the Fusion Centers as a positive element?
That's everyone by that?
They are all nodding.
So those who are working in Government are saying yes.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.
I now recognize Mr. Gosar.
Mr. Gosar. This is for all the witnesses.
Recent reports have highlighted the increase of crystal
meth seizures both in Mexico and here in Arizona. Crystal meth
is a drug, as you know, that absolutely destroys the users and
the addicts. We made progress in restricting the availability
of the precursor chemicals in the United States. But the
unintended consequences are the development of super labs in
Mexico that just produce immense quantities of this drug.
In your view, how can we stop the rising threat of meth
from making its way onto the streets of Arizona and making this
problem larger?
Mr. Allen.
Mr. Allen. Well, you might find this surprising from
somebody in law enforcement, but demand reduction is one of the
key things that we actually haven't talked about today. It
wouldn't get produced and it wouldn't come here if we didn't
use it.
Mr. Gosar. Mr. Coleman.
Mr. Coleman. I think that the chemical regulations that
were put in place in the United States restricting pseudo and
things like that have certainly pushed that down. There are
some limited chemical regulations in place in Mexico but not to
the extent of what we have done in the United States. If we do
something like that, maybe Mexico will have the same type of
results that we had here in the United States as far as
shrinking that production.
Mr. Gosar. Brigadier General.
General Salinas. Congressman, I would like to piggyback on
the drug demand reduction. That was, that is part of our
program this year, but because of budget cuts and the way the
Department of Defense is looking at that particular program, I
am going to have to cut that.
It is one of the most difficult programs to quantify. You
know, you can't put drug seizure numbers against it. But when
you sit down and you talk to the coalition leaders and the
communities where my soldiers and airmen teach primarily sixth,
seventh, and eighth graders, and you talk to the principals of
those schools, we are making an impact. It is just very hard to
quantify. Unfortunately, in this next year's budget I am going
to have to cut that entire program.
Mr. Gosar. Lieutenant Colonel.
Colonel Stanhope. Sir, I would say I would agree with my
colleagues that education is obviously a big component of it.
As you have heard today, enforcement is also a big component. I
think there is an opportunity for some engineering to occur
along the border to help make it more secure or restrict some
movement along the border as far as methamphetamine and the
hard drugs.
I would also, I would also echo the working with the
government of Mexico as far as trying to stem the flow of the
chemicals from China and from, I believe, India into Mexico
that help fuel those super labs, so work with our, work with
our friends in Mexico to come up with some type of Mexican law
to prevent that or slow that down.
Mr. Gosar. Ms. Kempshall.
Ms. Kempshall. Yes, sir. You know, the challenges that our
country faced from methamphetamine production and abuse in our
country in the early 2000s, you know, it was, it was a horrific
situation. You saw Federal, State, local, and demand reduction
efforts come together. We changed what was happening, the
threat that we were facing. Currently in our State, we are
seeing a decrease in some of the methamphetamine abuse by our
children as recently reported.
You know, when I first started in law enforcement I thought
I was going to arrest my way out of the problem, that I was
going to arrest every bad guy and we were going to eliminate
the drug abuse problem. Well, I have learned through experience
and hard knocks that it has to be a coordinated approach
between law enforcement, demand reduction, and treatment. When
we work together in collaborative efforts, we do make a
difference, as seen in the early 2000s with the threat of
methamphetamine.
We need to continue those efforts. We need to continue to
partner with folks like the National Guard that has an already
established program that is well respected in our communities.
We need to keep teaching our children about the dangers of drug
abuse.
Mr. Gosar. Mr. Nunamaker.
Mr. Nunamaker. I have nothing more to add.
Mr. Gosar. Okay. A quick question, I am running short of
time. Give me a grade of the relationship that you see between
the United States and Mexico, quick grade, A to F.
Mr. Allen. B+.
Mr. Coleman. B+.
General Salinas. I would have to rate mine on a military
scale. I would say that we are gradually improving that
relation through the work of U.S. Northern Command. But I
really don't have anything to offer in terms of the drug nexus.
Colonel Stanhope. I have nothing, sir.
Ms. Kempshall. Significant improvement over the years and
continued need to improve.
Mr. Gosar. B? C? D.
Ms. Kempshall. Let's go with B.
Mr. Nunamaker. B.
Mr. Gosar. One thing that you could ask that we should
demand of Mexico in the more securing of our border, what one
thing would you demand?
Mr. Allen. I would say continued development and
professionalization of their Federal law enforcement
organizations.
Mr. Coleman. Continued development of the cooperation with
the United States.
General Salinas. Again, for me, sir, it would be more of a
military focus. I would say that we need to continue the on-
going military-to-military engagements that we have going on at
this very moment.
Colonel Stanhope. I would say ditto, and both sides work
together to secure the border.
Ms. Kempshall. Continuing to share intelligence.
Mr. Nunamaker. Technology and information sharing.
Mr. Gosar. I am going to leave with one quick comment. I
hope that just, when we are looking at securing the border, we
look outside the realm of just law enforcement. For example,
the Santa Cruz Wash is one of the things we try to highlight.
You know, when you are bringing significant infrastructure
improvements, we ought to be talking to you folks in regards to
how we can utilize those infrastructure projects to make a
better deterrent along those ways and look outside the box
there.
But I would also say, you know, from natural resources, to
the gentle lady from Texas, we are very aware of impedance
along the border in interdiction with environmental laws. I
think we need to streamline that process accordingly.
So with that being said, I thank the Chairman for including
me in today's hearing.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you, Mr. Gosar.
I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony
and Ms. Jackson Lee, Mr. Gosar for their questions. Just a
second.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me say a couple concluding remarks
before you conclude since you are the final speaker.
Mr. Quayle. Real quick. We have got to go.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just say that I think one of the
most telling statements that you made today was the issue of
reducing demand. I am very proud of all of you for being
willing to acknowledge that. I do think that will be, among
other messages, the strongest message I take back to the
Department of Homeland Security and the Border Security
Committee, that we can look at this issue because our boots on
the ground have acknowledged it as a component to your work. I
join in that and conclude with my good friend from Arizona that
is two gentlemen down that we will continue to have
disagreement on the protection of Federal lands and
environmental regulation.
So I thank you each very much. I yield back.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.
We agree to disagree on things. It is not a shock in
Congress.
But I want to again thank the witnesses for their
testimonies. Members of the committee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses. We will ask you to respond to
these in writing. The hearing record will be open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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