[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY:
AN EXAMINATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 17, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-92
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Billy Long, Missouri, Vice Chair Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Dr. R. Nick Palarino, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Tamla Scott, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 6
Witnesses
Mr. Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General, Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Deputy Commissioner, Customs and
Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Mr. James G. Duncan, Assistant Administrator, Office of
Professional Responsibility, Transportation Security
Administration, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Mr. Timothy M. Moynihan, Assistant Director, Office of
Professional Responsibility, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 22
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY: AN EXAMINATION OF ETHICAL STANDARDS
----------
Thursday, May 17, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and
Management,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:34 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul, Marino, Keating, and
Clarke.
Mr. McCaul. The committee will come to order.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine the ethical
policies, conduct, and alleged criminal activities within the
Department of Homeland Security.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
May 6 through the 12 was Public Recognition Week. We set
aside time each year to honor our public servants who keep us
safe, care for our veterans, control our borders, and find
cures for rare diseases. They make our country stronger and
make a difference in the world.
Most of our employees understand that public service is a
public trust. Each one has a responsibility to the United
States Government and the citizens they all serve to place
loyalty to the Constitution, laws, and ethical principles above
private gain. Most public servants adhere to this trust.
However, the Pew Research Center interviewed more than
3,000 adults about their views of our Government. Fifty-four
percent said the Federal Government is mostly corrupt while 31
percent said mostly honest and 11 percent said they don't know
either.
The survey also showed just a third of Americans has a
favorable opinion of the Federal Government: The lowest
positive rating in its 15 years.
A measure of dissatisfaction these days is to be expected.
The country is in economic trouble and our leaders promise
things they cannot deliver. What compounds this dissatisfaction
are Government scandals.
There have been many reports of Federal employees wasting
taxpayer dollars and in some cases, committing crimes which
erodes the trust American people put in our Government.
The General Services Administration employees spent over
$800,000 on a conference in Las Vegas. The Department of
Homeland Security spent nearly $1 billion on the Secure Border
Initiative Network with little return on this investment.
We have also found criminal activity within our
bureaucracies. Custom and Border Protection personnel
collaborating with drug smugglers, cartels, Immigration and
Custom Enforcement personnel filing fraudulent travel claims,
and TSA personnel stealing personal belongings of passengers.
Since 2004 over 130 agents of the United States Custom and
Border Protection have been arrested, charged, or otherwise
prosecuted on corruption charges. Allegations and convictions
include alien and drug smuggling, money laundering, and
conspiracy. The DHS acting inspector general, Mr. Charles
Edwards states that Mexican drug cartels attempt to corrupt DHS
employees and this impacts our National security. The inspector
general also reports that since 2004 there has been a 38
percent increase in the number of complaints against CPB
employees.
As recently as February 2012 an ICE agent pled guilty to 21
counts of obstruction and corruption violations. These charges
include illegally obtaining and disseminating Government
documents to individuals with ties to drug trafficking
organizations.
There have also been allegations of convictions of ICE
agents accepting thousands of dollars of bribes from immigrants
seeking U.S. documentation. A former intelligence chief for
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement is accused of
embezzling more than $180,000 stemming from a travel voucher
fraud, a kickback scheme that defrauded the Government of more
than $500,000. Four other ICE employees pled guilty to
involvement in a scheme to defraud the Government.
In the past year alone there have been numerous incidents
of alleged misconduct on the part of TSA officers and
employees. Thousands of dollars in cash and items have been
reported stolen. Dozens of TSA officers were fired over
improper luggage screening because they had allowed thousands
of pieces of luggage onto flights without proper screening.
TSA officers have allegedly taken bribes, allowing
passengers expedited security checks. A number of additional
allegations range from racially-charged statements and actions
to inappropriate sexual harassment. A recent 22-count
indictment alleges TSA employees took payments to provide drug
couriers unfettered access through Los Angeles International
Airport so that drugs could be smuggled into the United States.
Executive branch employees are subject to Executive Orders
issued by the President and ethics regulations issued by the
U.S. Office of Government Ethics. Some agencies also have
issued supplemental ethics regulations that apply to their
employees. Even though there are stacks of Government manuals,
training materials, and yearly briefings about ethics, these
lapses continue. They not only waste taxpayer dollars, they are
a threat to the security of our Nation.
While the majority of bureaucratic personnel are law-
abiding, this hearing will examine the ethical policies and
procedures of selected components of the Department of Homeland
Security in an attempt to understand why these ethical lapses
continue and what is to be done to prevent them from happening
in the future.
One final note; it is unfortunate the Department of
Homeland Security in the face of such serious ethical mishaps
refuses to provide witnesses from leadership to discuss these
matters in the open before the American people. We requested
the leadership from CBP, ICE, and TSA. However, only CBP
recognized the importance of these issues.
With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
may 17, 2012
May 6-12 was Public Recognition Week. We set aside time each year
to honor our public servants who keep us safe, care for our veterans,
patrol our borders, and find cures for rare diseases.
They make our country stronger and make a difference in the world.
Most of our employees understand public service is a public trust.
Each one has a responsibility to the United States Government and
the citizens they all serve to place loyalty to the Constitution, laws,
and ethical principles above private gain. And most public servants
adhere to this trust.
However, the Pew Research Center interviewed more than 3,000 adults
about their views of our Government. Fifty-four percent said the
Federal Government is ``mostly corrupt,'' while 31 percent said
``mostly honest,'' and 11 percent said they did not know, or neither.
The survey also showed just a third of Americans has a favorable
opinion of the Federal Government, the lowest positive rating in 15
years.
A measure of dissatisfaction, these days, is to be expected. The
country is in economic trouble and our leaders promise things they
cannot deliver. What compounds this dissatisfaction are Government
scandals.
There have been many reports of Federal employees wasting taxpayer
dollars, and in some cases committing crimes, which erodes the trust
American people have in our Government.
The General Services Administration employees spent over $800,000
on a conference in Las Vegas. The Department of Homeland security spent
nearly $1 billion on the Secure Border Initiative Network with little
return on investment.
We have also found criminal activity in our bureaucracies; Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) personnel collaborating with drug
smugglers, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) personnel filing
fraudulent travel claims and Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) personnel stealing personal belongings of passengers.
Since 2004, over 130 agents of the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection have been arrested, charged, or otherwise prosecuted on
corruption charges. Allegations and convictions include alien and drug
smuggling, money laundering, and conspiracy. The DHS Acting Inspector
General, Dr. Charles Edwards, states Mexican drug cartels attempt to
corrupt DHS employees and this impacts National security.
The IG also reports that since 2004 there has been a 38% increase
in the number of complaints against CBP employees.
As recently as February 2012, an ICE agent pleaded guilty to 21
counts charging obstruction and corruption violations. These charges
included illegally obtaining and disseminating Government documents to
individuals with ties to drug trafficking organizations.
There have also been allegations and convictions of ICE agents
accepting thousands of dollars in bribes from immigrants seeking U.S.
documentation.
A former intelligence chief for the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement is accused of embezzling more than $180,000 stemming from a
travel voucher fraud and a kickback scheme that defrauded the
Government of more than $500,000.
Four other ICE employees pleaded guilty to involvement in the
scheme to defraud the Government.
In the past year alone, there have been numerous incidents of
alleged misconduct on the part of TSA Officers and employees. Thousands
of dollars in cash and items have been reported stolen.
Dozens of TSA Officers were fired over improper luggage screening
because they allowed thousands of pieces of luggage onto flights
without proper screening. TSA Officers have allegedly taken bribes
allowing passengers expedited security checks. A number of additional
allegations range from racially charged statements and actions to
inappropriate sexual harassment.
A recent 22-count indictment alleges TSA employees took payments to
provide drug couriers unfettered access through Los Angeles
International Airport so that drugs could be smuggled into the United
States.
Executive branch employees are subject to Executive Orders issued
by the President and ethics regulations issued by the U.S. Office of
Government Ethics.
Some agencies also issue supplemental ethics regulations that apply
to their employees. Even though there are stacks of Government manuals,
training materials, and yearly briefings about ethics, lapses continue.
They not only waste taxpayer dollars, they are a threat to the security
of our Nation.
While the majority of bureaucratic personnel are law-abiding, this
hearing will examine the ethical policies and procedures of selected
components of the Department of Homeland Security and attempt to
understand why these ethical lapses continue, and what is being done to
prevent them from happening.
One final note; it is unfortunate the Department of Homeland
Security, in the face of such serious ethical mishaps, refuses to
provide witnesses from leadership to discuss these matters in the open
before the American public. We requested the leadership from CBP, ICE,
and TSA. However, only CBP recognized the importance of these issues.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you
for holding today's hearing examining the ethical standards at
the Department of Homeland Security.
In the beginning I would like to point out there were over
220,000 Department of Homeland Security employees who work
every day to secure our homeland from dangerous threats and
natural disasters. So, before I begin, I would like to thank
them for their service.
Unfortunately there are some among them that use their
position of public trust for their own personal gain. In doing
so they put the very Nation they were sworn to protect in
harm's way.
Since October 2004, 137 U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
CBP, employees have been indicted or convicted of corruption-
related charges. Many coming in recent years as the Border
Patrol doubled in size. During fiscal years 2010 and 2011 there
were at least 33 incidents of corruption or mission-
compromising corruption at CBP.
Furthermore, the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
ICE, Office of Professional Responsibility Investigations, they
have had investigations and allegations of misconduct occurring
at both CBP and ICE. The number of allegations pursued by that
office is staggering.
In 2012 alone, and this is only May, there have been a
total of 101 corruption allegations involving ICE employees,
and 362 from CBP. At the Transportation and Security
Administration in 2011 there were three allegations involving
corruption, 33 involving security and intelligence violations,
and 210 alleged general misconducts.
Although these allegations have not been proven, they are a
testament to the fact that eliminating public corruption in the
Department of Homeland Security is in dire need of improvement.
I am therefore pleased that representatives from TSA, CBP, and
ICE are testifying this morning, and look forward to hearing
from them regarding the steps that they are taking to remedy
this situation.
Of course there are other incidents of corruption that we
can point to. But what sets the situations at ICE, CBP, and TSA
apart is the risk to National security. That is inherent in the
public trust violations on the border and at our Nation's
airports.
I am troubled by allegations of turf battles within the
Department and disagreements on who should be in charge. Recent
efforts have been implemented to improve working relationships
among DHS, OIG, CBP, Internal Affairs--in addition to CBP
Internal Affairs--and ICE Office of Professional
Responsibilities.
I hope that new memoranda of understanding will truly cause
each agency to understand the delayed investigations as a
result of internal disputes will not only undermine efforts,
they will also perpetuate this kind of misconduct. Again I look
forward to hearing from the witnesses and I thank them for
their participation in this important hearing.
I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Keating follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member William Keating
May 17, 2012
There are over 220,000 Department of Homeland Security employees
who work every day to secure our homeland from dangerous threats and
natural disasters. I would like to thank them for their service.
Unfortunately, there are some among them that use their position of
public trust for their own personal gain. In doing so they put the very
Nation they were sworn to protect in harm's way.
Since October 2004, 137 U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
employees have been indicted on or convicted of corruption-related
charges--many coming in recent years as the Border Patrol doubled in
size.
And during fiscal years 2010 and 2011, there were at least 33
incidents of corruption or mission compromising corruption at CBP.
Furthermore the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Office of Professional Responsibility investigates allegations of
misconduct occurring at both CBP and ICE. The number of allegations
pursued by that office is staggering.
In 2012 alone, and this is only May, there have been a total of 101
corruption allegations involving ICE employees and 362 from CBP.
At the Transportation and Security Administration, in 2011, there
were 3 allegations involving corruption, 33 involving security and
intelligence violations, and 210 alleging general misconduct.
Although these allegations have not been proven, they are a
testament to the fact that eliminating public corruption at the
Department of Homeland Security is in dire need of improvement.
I am therefore pleased that representatives from TSA, CBP, and ICE
are testifying this morning and look forward to hearing from them
regarding steps that are being taken to remedy this situation.
However, ICE, CBP and TSA are not unique in that serious
allegations of public trust violations occur Department-wide.
Likewise, DHS is not unique in that each and every Executive branch
agency faces similar challenges and always have.
However, what sets these situations apart is the risk to National
security that is inherent in public trust violations on the border and
at our Nation's airports.
I am troubled by allegations of turf battles within the Department
and disagreements on who should be in charge.
Recent efforts have been implemented to improve working relations
among the DHS OIG and CBP Internal Affairs in addition to CBP Internal
Affairs and ICE Office of Professional Responsibility.
I hope that new Memoranda of Understanding will truly cause each
agency to understand that delayed investigations as a result of
internal disputes will only undermine efforts and perpetuate
misconduct.
Again, I look forward to hearing from the witnesses and thank them
for their participation in today's hearing.
Mr. McCaul. Thank the Ranking Member. Other Members of the
subcommittee are reminded opening statements may be submitted
for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
Today's hearing will focus on the ethical standards in place at the
Department of Homeland Security and allegations regarding employee
misconduct at the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Immigrations and
Customs Enforcement, and the Transportation Security Administration. I
would like to say at the outset that these three agencies form the
backbone of our homeland security enterprise.
Everyday CBP employees work tirelessly to secure our land and
maritime borders at and between ports of entry. At ICE--the second-
largest Federal law enforcement agency--over 20,000 employees enforce
Federal laws governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration.
And everyday almost 2 million travelers at 450 airports across the
United States depend on TSA employees to implement our multilayered
approach to aviation security.
While we discuss the small percentage that represents the bad
apples in the barrel, I want to first acknowledge those that perform
their mission with integrity and thank them for a job well done.
However, as the saying goes, a chain is only as strong as its weakest
link. It is imperative that the Department take seriously each and
every allegation of employee misconduct.
Department of Homeland Security employees come into contact with
sensitive, sometimes classified, information and, in many instances,
are National security interests literally lie in the palms of their
hands. As a result, corruption or ethical misconduct occurring at the
Department can have far greater National security implications than
misconduct occurring at other Federal agencies. Therefore, the
Department must have robust internal policies, standards, and
procedures in place that address head-on employee corruption.
The DHS Office of Inspector General is independent and has the
primary authority within the Department for investigating allegations
of criminal misconduct among Department employees. Yet, the OIG's
budget declined in fiscal year 2011 and only received a slight increase
in fiscal year 2012. Moreover, it is woefully understaffed given the
size and magnitude of the Department's mission.
To put this in perspective, the Department of Homeland Security has
over 220,000 employees. The Department of Health and Human Services has
65,000 employees, approximately one-third of the Department's
workforce. Yet, the Department's OIG budget was less than half of the
HHS OIG budget in fiscal year 2010 and 2011. The HHS OIG had a fiscal
year 2010 budget of $312 million and a fiscal year 2011 budget of $342
million. In comparison, the Department's OIG budget was $151 million in
fiscal year 2010 and $150 million in fiscal year 2011.
In light of the OIG being understaffed and underfunded, it comes as
no surprise that there exists a backlog of cases needing further
attention. Moreover, I am concerned about whether the numerous agencies
responsible for investigating employee misconduct at the component
level operate in a cooperative manner with the DHS OIG and with each
other. Hopefully, the witnesses can shed light on this today.
Mr. McCaul. We are pleased to have a very distinguished
panel of witnesses before us here today on this very important
topic.
First, Mr. Charles Edwards is acting inspector general of
the Department of Homeland Security. He is a frequent guest
here before this subcommittee. He assumed this position in
February 2011, served as deputy inspector general of the
Department of Homeland Security, has over 20 years of
experience in the Federal Government.
Next we have Mr. Thomas Winkowski who is the acting deputy
commissioner of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection. In this
capacity Mr. Winkowski serves as chief operating officer
overseeing the daily operations of CBP's 60,000 employees, and
manages an operation--operating budget of $11.5 billion. He
began work with the U.S. Customs Service in 1975 as a student.
We thank you for your service, Mr. Winkowski.
Next we have Mr. James Duncan who was appointed as
assistant administrator of TSA's Office of Professional
Responsibility in 2011. Mr. Duncan has more than 16 years of
experience supervising and handling employee misconduct cases
at OPR in the Department of Justice, my alma mater as well.
Next Mr. Tim Moynihan is assistant director at the Office
of Professional Responsibility at the U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement. He has more than 23 years of experience
working for the U.S. Government, has been in his current
position since 2009 where he focuses on workforce integrity,
personnel screening, inspections, and security management.
I want to thank all of you for being here today. With that
the Chairman now recognizes Mr. Edwards for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Edwards. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Keating, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for inviting me to testify today about ethical standards
within the Department of Homeland Security.
The vast majority of employees within DHS are dedicated
civil servants focused on protecting the Nation. While a small
percentage of employees have committed criminal acts and other
gross misconduct, those few should not be used to draw
conclusions about the character, integrity, or work ethic of
the many.
Over the past year DHS employees continue to demonstrate
this ethic of service from responding to 99 Federally-declared
disasters to unprecedented efforts to secure America's borders,
and to advances in protecting the Nation's transportation
networks and critical infrastructure, while those who violate
their sworn duties, a few, even one corrupt agent or officer
who allows harmful goods or people to enter the country puts
the Nation at risk.
Corruption within the ranks of DHS can have severe
consequences. A corrupt DHS employee may accept a bribe for
allowing what appear to be undocumented aliens into the United
States, while unwittingly helping terrorists enter the country.
Likewise, taking a bribe to allow the entry of what appears to
be drug contraband could expose the Nation to weapons of mass
destruction such as chemical or biological bombs.
OIG has made investigating employee corruption a top
priority. Both the personnel and organizational independence of
OIG investigators, free to carry out their work without
interference by agency officials, is essential to maintaining
the public trust in not only the work of the OIG, but also in
the DHS's workforce as a whole.
The OIG investigates all allegations of corruption
involving DHS employees or compromise of systems related to the
security of our borders and transportation networks. For
example, OIG received information about that a CBP officer was
using his position at a large, urban airport to support an
international drug trafficking organization. OIG joined a
multi-agency investigation led by ICE OPR, which led to the
dismantling of the entire drug trafficking organization and the
arrest of multiple offenders, including the CBP officer.
On at least 19 separate occasions the CBP officer had
bypassed airport security using his own badge to smuggle money
and weapons for the drug traffickers. In December 2010 he was
convicted and sentenced to 8 years in prison.
In another case, OIG conducted an investigation into
allegation of theft involving a transportation security officer
at the Orlando International Airport. The TSO had stolen more
than 80 laptop computers, cellphones, and iPods, estimated at
$80,000, from passenger luggage over the 3-year period from
2008 to 2011.
TSA terminated his employment in March 2011. In August
2011, the TSO plead guilty to Federal charges of embezzlement
and theft in connection with the investigation. In January
2012, was sentenced to 24 months of probation. On May 1, 2012,
the former acting director of intelligence of ICE plead guilty
to defrauding the Government of more than $180,000 in a 3-year
scheme involving fraudulent travel vouchers and time and
attendance claims. Sentencing is scheduled for July 2012.
He faces a likely prison sentence of 18 to 27 months. Three
other ICE employees and a contractor employee previously plead
guilty to charges related to the scheme, which cost ICE more
than $600,000. These examples of intolerable behavior by a very
small number of DHS employees, each represent a threat to our
Nation's security and the public's perception of DHS and its
mission. DHS employees are held to the highest standards of
professional conduct and OIG is committed to aggressively
pursuing those who violate DHS standards.
Chairman McCaul, this concludes my prepared remarks. I
would be happy to answer any questions that you or other
Members may have. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Edwards follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles K. Edwards
May 17, 2012
Good morning Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am Charles K. Edwards,
Acting Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Thank you for inviting me to testify today about ethical standards
within the Department.
First, let me state clearly that the vast majority of employees
within DHS are dedicated civil servants focused on protecting the
Nation. While a small percentage of employees have committed criminal
acts and other egregious misconduct warranting stiff sanctions,
including incarceration and removal from Federal employment, those few
should not be used to draw conclusions about the character, integrity,
or work ethic of the many. Over the past year, DHS employees continued
to demonstrate this ethic of service--from a historic response to 99
Federally-declared disasters, to unprecedented efforts to secure
America's borders, to advances in protecting the Nation's
transportation networks and critical infrastructure. These
accomplishments would not be possible without workforce commitment and
sacrifice, including long hours and time away from families, frequently
in demanding work environments. I am personally grateful for the hard
work and commitment to mission demonstrated daily by the DHS workforce.
scope of corruption issue
As I have testified previously, the smuggling of people and goods
across the Nation's borders is a large-scale business dominated by
organized criminal enterprises. The Mexican drug cartels today are more
sophisticated and dangerous than any other organized criminal groups in
our law enforcement experience. As the United States has enhanced
border security with successful technologies and increased staffing to
disrupt smuggling routes and networks, drug trafficking organizations
have become not only more violent and dangerous, but more clever as
well. The drug trafficking organizations have turned to recruiting and
corrupting DHS employees. The obvious targets of corruption are Border
Patrol agents and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers who can
facilitate and aid in smuggling; less obvious are those employees who
can provide access to sensitive law enforcement and intelligence
information, allowing the cartels to track investigative activity or
vet their members against law enforcement databases.
As demonstrated by investigations led by the Office of Inspector
General (OIG), border corruption may take the form of cash bribes,
sexual favors, and other gratuities in return for allowing contraband
or undocumented aliens through primary inspection lanes or even
protecting and escorting border crossings; leaking sensitive law
enforcement information to persons under investigation and selling law
enforcement intelligence to smugglers; and providing needed documents
such as immigration papers. Border corruption impacts National
security. A corrupt DHS employee may accept a bribe for allowing what
appears to be simply undocumented aliens into the United States while
unwittingly helping terrorists enter the country. Likewise, what seems
to be drug contraband could be weapons of mass destruction, such as
chemical or biological weapons or bomb-making material. While those who
turn away from their sworn duties are few, even one corrupt agent or
officer who allows harmful goods or people to enter the country puts
the Nation at risk.
OIG has made investigation of employee corruption a top priority,
as we work to help secure the integrity of our immigration system,
borders, ports of entry, and transportation systems. However, our
investigations are complicated by the brutality the cartels use to
control their organizations and coerce witnesses; and the
sophistication and advanced technologies available to organizations
with unlimited money. Drug trafficking organizations use their monetary
resources to purchase and deploy sophisticated and military grade
equipment and weapons to carry out their crimes, avoid detection, and
evade law enforcement. Criminals use the same sovereign borders they
are attempting to breach as a barrier to law enforcement efforts to
conduct surveillance and collect evidence.
roles and responsibilities within dhs for employee corruption
Through the Inspector General Act of 1978 (IG Act), Congress
established statutory Inspectors General, in part, in response to
questions about integrity and accountability and failures of Government
oversight. The IG Act charged Inspectors General, among other tasks,
with preventing and detecting fraud and abuse in agency programs and
activities; conducting investigations and audits; and recommending
policies to promote efficiency, economy, and effectiveness. The
position of Inspector General was strengthened by provisions in the IG
Act creating independence from the officials responsible for programs
and activities overseen, providing powers of investigation and
subpoena, and mandating reporting not just to the agency head but to
Congress.
Inspectors General play a critical role in assuring transparent,
honest, effective, and accountable Government. Both the personal and
organizational independence of OIG investigators, free to carry out
their work without interference by agency officials, is essential to
maintaining the public trust in not only the work of the OIG, but also
in the DHS workforce as a whole. The American public must have a
fundamental trust that Government employees are held accountable for
their crimes or serious misconduct by an independent fact finder.
The DHS Management Directive (MD) 0810.1, The Office of Inspector
General, implements the authorities of the IG Act within DHS. MD 0810.1
plainly establishes OIG's right of first refusal to conduct
investigations of criminal conduct by DHS employees, and the right to
supervise any such investigations that are conducted by DHS internal
affairs components. The MD requires that all allegations of criminal
misconduct by DHS employees and certain other allegations received by
the components be referred to the OIG immediately upon receipt of the
allegations.
For statistical and reporting purposes, the OIG classifies its
investigative cases into four categories:
(1) Employee Corruption.--Abuse of public office for private gain,
financial, or otherwise. Examples include:
bribery;
deliberate disclosure of classified, law enforcement, or
National security-related information;
theft;
espionage;
kickbacks; and
smuggling.
(2) Civil Rights/Civil Liberties.--Violations of civil rights or
the deprivation of personal liberties by DHS employees while
acting under color of their official authority. Examples
include:
coerced sexual contact;
coercion of a statement from a witness or arrestee;
custodial death;
detainee/prisoner/suspect abuse;
profiling; and
excessive use of force.
(3) Program Fraud/Financial Crimes.--Alleged activity targeting DHS
programs and/or financial systems, seeking to defraud the U.S.
Government of program tax dollars. Examples include:
contract fraud;
conflict of interest;
grant fraud;
misapplication of Government funds;
cost mischarging/defective pricing;
product substitution;
immigration program fraud; and
program benefits theft.
(4) Miscellaneous.--Alleged violations of law or regulations with a
nexus to DHS programs, employees, or operations (not otherwise
classified as Corruption, Program Fraud/Financial Crimes or
Civil Rights/Civil Liberties) which may, or may not, be
criminal in nature, or which reflect unfavorably or
suspiciously upon the character and integrity of DHS, its
employees, or operations. Examples include:
child pornography;
computer fraud;
false statements;
harassment;
unauthorized personal use of DHS computers/networks;
unexplained affluence; and
contact with foreign governments/nationals.
In this context, ``DHS employee'' means an individual, who at the
time of the alleged offense, is appointed, contracted, or officially
engaged under authority of law in the performance of a Federal function
on behalf of DHS. This includes contractor employees, interns, Coast
Guard military personnel (active and Reserve), Coast Guard
Auxiliarists, and employees detailed to DHS from other Federal
agencies.
The IG Act and the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as amended,
establish a clear line of authority for investigating allegations of
criminal misconduct by DHS employees. The statutes vest investigative
authority in the DHS OIG, with the Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) having authority to
investigate those allegations involving employees of ICE and CBP
referred to it by OIG. The CBP Office of Internal Affairs (IA)
investigates noncriminal allegations against CBP employees referred to
it by ICE OPR.
Component internal affairs units, such as CBP IA, have a crucial
complementary role to OIG's criminal investigative function. For
example, CBP IA focuses on preventive measures to ensure the integrity
of the CBP workforce through pre-employment screening of applicants,
including polygraph examinations; background investigations of
employees; and integrity and security briefings that help employees
recognize corruption signs and dangers. These preventive measures are
critically important in fighting corruption and work hand in hand with
OIG's criminal investigative activities.
Congress has identified the OIG as the focal point for criminal
investigations of employee misconduct. Within DHS, MD 0810.1 requires
referral of all criminal allegations against DHS employees to OIG and
prohibits any investigation, absent exigent circumstances, unless the
OIG declines the case. DHS OIG operates a hotline for complaints which
may be accessed through telephone, facsimile, electronic mail, or paper
correspondence. In March 2004, ICE and CBP established the Joint Intake
Center (JIC) responsible for receiving, documenting, and appropriately
routing allegations of misconduct involving ICE and CBP employees. The
JIC is staffed jointly by ICE OPR and CBP IA. Both the OIG hotline and
the JIC provide DHS executive management with insight into the nature
and volume of allegations made against employees as well as the results
of investigations.
In addition to working closely with internal affairs elements
within DHS, we also work with ICE's Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI) directorate. HSI investigates activities arising from the illegal
movement of goods and people into, within, and out of the United
States. HSI investigates human smuggling and smuggling of narcotics,
weapons, and other contraband that typically form the predicate, or
underlying, offense for most border corruption cases. Consequently, we
work very closely with HSI and ICE OPR on many CBP employee corruption
cases.
dhs oig recent case transfer
It is the OIG Office of Investigations' policy to open all
allegations of corruption of DHS employees or compromise of systems
related to the security of our borders and transportation networks. OIG
has a total of 219 full-time, permanent criminal investigators (GS-
1811s) deployed at 33 offices around the country, with a concentration
of resources in the Southwest.
The growth of the OIG workforce necessary to investigate
allegations of criminal misconduct by DHS employees has not kept pace
with the growth of the DHS employee population, now over 225,000
strong, including Coast Guard military personnel. In fiscal year 2010,
the OIG Office of Investigations increased by 10 authorized positions
to address allegations of criminal wrongdoing across the entire DHS
workforce. The Border Patrol alone increased to more than 20,700 agents
in fiscal year 2010, double its size from 2004. With the increasing DHS
workforce, by fiscal year 2011, the OIG Office of Investigations saw a
38% increase from fiscal year 2004 in complaints against just CBP
employees. The increased complaint volume led to increased case
openings and the DHS OIG investigative staff was taxed beyond its
capacity, even with the addition of CBP IA detailees under the
provisions of the agreement executed between DHS OIG and CBP in August
2011. The average per agent caseload is 12, while OIG's goal is an
average caseload of 8.
Last month, as part of DHS OIG's commitment to ensuring that all
allegations of employee corruption are fully investigated, ICE Director
Morton and I agreed that OIG would transfer approximately 370 OIG
initiated investigations involving various criminal and administrative
allegations against named employees of CBP and ICE to ICE for
completion. Under the supervision of OIG, these cases will be
investigated by ICE OPR which will work with investigators from CBP IA
and HSI. This effort is part of OIG's effort to leverage all
investigatory resources to ensure that corruption allegations are
swiftly investigated. The actual transfer of case material will be done
at the field office level and is expected to be completed no later than
June 1, 2012.
Because DHS OIG continues to have oversight of the component
internal affairs elements, such as ICE OPR, OIG is requiring periodic
reports from ICE OPR on the status of the transferred investigations
until each investigation has been resolved or closed.
dhs oig investigative case statistics
The charts below show investigative statistics related to
indictments, arrests, and convictions arising out of OIG investigations
involving ICE, CBP, and the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA) for fiscal years 2008 through fiscal year 2012 to date. The
numbers show a somewhat steady increase in convictions over this period
which may be attributable to OIG's policy, adopted in 2009, of opening
100% of corruption-related allegations.
ICE, CBP, AND TSA RELATED INDICTMENTS BY FISCAL YEAR AS OF APRIL 30, 2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Year
Year Year Year Year 2012 Total
2008 2009 2010 2011 Year To
Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP................................................. 46 52 54 60 20 232
ICE................................................. 36 16 28 30 20 130
TSA................................................. 19 12 10 21 3 65
-----------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL......................................... 101 80 92 111 43 427
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICE, CBP, AND TSA RELATED ARRESTS BY FISCAL YEAR AS OF APRIL 30, 2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Year
Year Year Year Year 2012 Total
2008 2009 2010 2011 Year To
Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP................................................. 44 63 92 77 66 342
ICE................................................. 46 22 32 40 28 168
TSA................................................. 19 12 14 25 14 84
-----------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL......................................... 109 97 138 142 108 594
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ICE, CBP, AND TSA RELATED CONVICTIONS BY FISCAL YEAR AS OF APRIL 30, 2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal
Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Fiscal Year
Year Year Year Year 2012 Total
2008 2009 2010 2011 Year To
Date
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP................................................. 33 51 58 38 33 213
ICE................................................. 20 21 27 29 14 111
TSA................................................. 12 10 15 21 8 66
-----------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL......................................... 65 82 100 88 55 390
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even with the case transfer to ICE discussed above, it remains the
OIG Office of Investigations' policy to open all allegations of
corruption of DHS employees or compromise of systems related to the
security of our borders and transportation networks. The OIG continues
to work the majority of allegations of the most serious criminal
misconduct and corruption within DHS. For example, OIG developed
information that a CBP Officer was using his position at a large urban
airport to support an international drug trafficking organization. OIG
initiated a multiagency Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force
investigation that ultimately led to the dismantling of the entire drug
trafficking organization and the arrest of multiple offenders,
including the CBP Officer.
DHS OIG's investigation revealed that on at least 19 separate
occasions, the CBP Officer bypassed airport security using his own
airport security badge in order to smuggle money and weapons for the
organization. In December 2010, he was convicted and sentenced to serve
8 years' incarceration for money laundering, bulk cash smuggling,
entering an aircraft area in violation of security procedures, carrying
a weapon on an aircraft, fraud and related activity in connection with
computers, and conspiracy to commit marriage fraud.
The CBP Officer had been employed at CBP since 2003. Suspicions of
corruption first surfaced in 2008. He did not provide any cooperation
during the investigation and throughout the sentencing other than his
admission of guilt.
In another case, OIG conducted an investigation into allegations of
theft involving a Transportation Security Officer (TSO) at the Orlando
International Airport. The investigation revealed that, over a 3-year
period from 2008 through 2011, the TSO had stolen more than 80 laptop
computers, cell phones, and iPods, estimated at $80,000, from passenger
luggage while ostensibly performing his duties at the airport. The TSO
admitted to fencing the items to a middleman in Osceola County, FL. TSA
terminated his employment in March 2011. In August 2011, the TSO
pleaded guilty to Federal charges of embezzlement and theft in
connection with the investigation and in January 2012 was sentenced to
24 months probation. This case was initiated based on a tip from a
coworker reported to the Orlando Police Department and was worked
jointly with that Department.
On May 1, 2012, the former Acting Director of Intelligence for ICE
pled guilty to defrauding the Government of more than $180,000 in a 3-
year-long scheme involving fraudulent travel vouchers and time and
attendance claims. Sentencing is scheduled for July 2012. He faces a
likely sentence of 18 to 27 months in prison and a potential fine.
Additionally, as part of his plea agreement, he will forfeit the money
that he wrongfully obtained. Three other ICE employees and a contractor
employee previously pled guilty to charges related to the scheme. The
actions of the individuals cost ICE more than $600,000 in total.
The former Acting Director of Intelligence personally submitted
fraudulent travel vouchers and time and attendance claims. However, in
addition, he took a share in kickbacks of fraudulent proceeds obtained
by his subordinates who also submitted fraudulent travel vouchers. The
case was investigated jointly by DHS OIG, ICE OPR, and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
conclusion
The above cases are examples of egregious behavior on the part of a
very small number of DHS employees. These criminal acts represent a
threat to our Nation's security and undermine the vast majority of
honest and hard-working employees who strive to maintain the integrity
of the Department. DHS employees are held to the highest standards of
professional conduct. DHS OIG will aggressively pursue those who choose
to ignore the standards.
Chairman McCaul, this concludes my prepared remarks. I would be
happy to answer any questions that you or the Members may have. Thank
you.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Edwards.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Winkowski for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS S. WINKOWSKI, ACTING DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Winkowski. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Keating, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege to
appear before you today to discuss U.S. Customs and Border
Protections' ethical standards in our effort to combat
corruption and misconduct within our workforce. I would like to
begin by recognizing the dedication, bravery, and honor
demonstrated by the overwhelming majority of CVP agents and
officers who put their lives on the line each day to protect
our Nation.
As the largest uniformed law enforcement agency in the
country, CBP deploys over 60,000 agents, officers, and mission
support personnel in support of our critical mission of
securing America's borders against threats while facilitating
legitimate trade and travel. As we continue to see success in
our efforts to secure our Nation's borders, CBP employees will
continue to be targeted by criminal organizations and
individuals that grow more desperate in their attempts to
smuggle people and illegal contraband into this country.
I am here today to discuss the vulnerability and the
proactive steps we have taken to mitigate this threat. As you
mentioned, Mr. Chairman, we recognize that public services is
our--is a public trust. At the center of the CBP's core values,
is integrity. It is of the utmost importance to all of our
employees--that all of our employees are guided by the highest
ethical and moral principles.
I am proud that the overwhelming majority of the men and
women in the CPB workforce serve with honor and integrity.
While only a small fraction of the workforce have engaged in
the illegal or unethical behavior since the inception of CBP,
any such behavior disgraces the agency and betrays the trust of
the American public. One instance of corruption within our
workforce is one too many. Our commitment to integrity begins
as soon as an employee applies for employment and continues
throughout a CBP employee's career.
We utilize multiple tools including improved applicant
screening and exhaustive background investigations to ensure a
thorough vetting of the men and women seeking employment with
CBP. Since 2008, CBP has conducted pre-employment polygraph
examinations on law enforcement applications, a critical
important tool used to screen applicants before placing them on
the front line. CBP is building the capacity to polygraph 100
percent of all law enforcement applications in compliance with
the mandates of the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010 and is
on track to achieve this goal well in advance of the January
2013 deadline.
In addition to pre-employment prevention efforts, CBP has
also strengthened its capacities and capabilities to detect and
investigate corruption within our existing workforce. With
approximately 200 experienced investigators Nation-wide, CBP
internal affairs uses behavioral science, analytical research
methods to flag indicators of potential workforce corruption
and provide an intelligence-driven response.
In conjunction with these efforts, we have developed the
Analytical Management Systems Control officer--Office--called
AMSCO, which analyzes data in the ports of entry environment to
identify anomalies that may indicate potential misconduct.
CBP's Office of Field Operations and Office of Border Patrol
have also established integrity and ethics committees which
provide strategic recommendations to combat and--to combat
corruption and promote integrity in the agencies distinct
operational environments. These efforts feed into CBP's
Integrated Planning and Coordination Cell, or the IPCC. The
IPCC, which includes representatives from our law enforcement
partners, examines best practices and seeks to coordinate
integrity-related initiatives within the agency.
CBP recognizes that collaboration and information sharing
is a critical factor in maintaining border integrity and
effectively addressing allegations of corruption lodged against
CBP employees. We have established MOUs with the OIG and ICE
authorizing the co-location of agents in order to assist in
investigations of CBP employees. We are also active
participants in the 22 FBI lead border-crossing task forces
Nation-wide. Mr. Chairman, Members of the subcommittee,
integrity is essential to CBP's identity and effectiveness as
guardians of the Nation's borders.
I thank you and the Members of the subcommittee for the
opportunity to appear today and make clear our core values and
strategic approach. I look forward to answering any questions
you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Winkowski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas S. Winkowski
May 17, 2012
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, I am Thomas Winkowski, Acting Deputy Commissioner,
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP). It is a privilege and an
honor to appear before you today to discuss CBP's efforts to address
issues concerning corruption and misconduct in which CBP employees are
involved. Ensuring the employees of CBP conduct themselves with
integrity and in accordance with the ethical standards so critical to
the positions of public trust they occupy is of the utmost importance
to CBP.
CBP has taken several preemptive and proactive steps to reinforce
with all its employees the standards of conduct to which they must
adhere both on and off duty. These efforts include recruiting
applicants of the highest integrity and moral character to become
members of the CBP workforce; developing and enhancing ethics and
integrity training delivered on a recurring basis throughout all levels
of the organization; implementing methodologies and utilizing existing
information and technology to enhance early detection of potential
employee misconduct; enhancing our internal affairs program which
includes the use of polygraph examinations in the hiring process for
CBP law enforcement applicants; establishing an investigative support
capacity within the Office of Internal Affairs (IA); and reinforcing a
unified message that honor comes first and all employees must maintain
their personal and professional integrity as public servants.
background
As America's frontline border agency, CBP is responsible for
securing America's borders against threats, while facilitating legal
travel and trade. To do this, CBP deploys a multi-layered, risk-based
approach to enhance the security of our borders while facilitating the
flow of lawful people and goods entering the United States. This
layered approach reduces our reliance on any single point or program
that has the potential to be compromised. It also extends our zone of
security outward, ensuring our physical border is not the first or last
line of defense, but is instead one of many. Ensuring the continued
integrity of the CBP workforce is essential to the successful execution
of the CBP mission.
CBP is the largest law enforcement agency in the country. We deploy
over 60,000 law enforcement officers and mission support personnel
along the U.S. borders, at ports of entry and overseas on a continuous
basis in support of our critical border security mission. Not only do
our officers and agents serve under difficult circumstances and in
dangerous environments, they do so in an environment where
transnational criminal organizations attempt to exploit our workforce
for criminal gains.
After the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
CBP experienced a level of growth in personnel resources unprecedented
in the history of U.S. law enforcement. Since the creation of CBP in
March 2003, the U.S. Border Patrol more than doubled in size to a force
today of 21,370 agents. During that time, CBP hired extraordinary men
and women, many of whom continue to serve our country with great
distinction and integrity every day. During the same period of time,
CBP integrated the Office of Field Operations from the workforces of
CBP's legacy agencies and grew the capabilities of the Office of Air
and Marine to its current level.
The overwhelming majority of the men and women who comprise the CBP
workforce serve with honor and integrity, adhering to the high
standards demanded of CBP personnel. Our high standards are reflected
in the quality of the people we hire, as well as in how we train and
evaluate our employees. Central to our standards is an absolute
commitment to integrity. Without integrity we cannot accomplish the
mission which the Nation has entrusted to us. Our commitment begins at
the time of application for employment with CBP and continues
throughout the careers of our officers, agents, and mission support
personnel. It defines our relationship with one another and the Nation
we serve.
While the overwhelming majority serve with honor and integrity, a
small minority have disgraced the agency and betrayed the trust of the
American public and their fellow CBP employees by engaging in illegal
and unethical behavior. Since October 1, 2004, 138 CBP employees have
been arrested or indicted for acts of corruption including drug
smuggling, alien smuggling, money laundering, and conspiracy. During
this same period more than 2,000 CBP employees have been charged in
other criminal misconduct, including off-duty behavior that serves to
undermine the confidence of the public that we serve.
CBP takes all allegations of misconduct and corruption very
seriously and is addressing the issue of misconduct and corruption
through a comprehensive strategy that integrates prevention, detection,
and investigation capabilities to deter and, when necessary, rectify
incidents of corruption and misconduct in the CBP workforce. No act of
corruption or misconduct within our agency can or will be tolerated.
CBP's leaders, including myself, are committed to creating and
maintaining an organization in which all employees have the strength of
character and support to reject all opportunities for corruption, in
whatever form they may take, and to reveal them when discovered.
The standards cited above form the basis of CBP policy with regard
to integrity and are in complete alignment with the mandates of Public
Law 111-376, the Anti-Border Corruption Act of 2010. This law requires
that by January 2013, all CBP law enforcement applicants must receive a
polygraph examination before being hired. The law further requires that
CBP initiate all periodic personnel reinvestigations that were overdue
for initiation and that Congress receive bi-annual reports on CBP's
progress toward meeting these requirements for a period of 2 years.
These requirements--background and periodic investigations as well as
polygraph examinations--are consistent with, and form the basis of, a
comprehensive workforce integrity plan.
CBP's comprehensive integrity strategy includes improved initial
screening of applicants, pre-employment polygraph examinations of law
enforcement candidates, and an exhaustive background investigation that
commences upon the initial selection of a prospective employee. Each
tool is capable of identifying vulnerabilities that the other cannot,
and in combination allow for a thorough vetting of the men and women
seeking employment with, or employed by, CBP. Periodic reinvestigations
of an employee's background are conducted every 5 years throughout an
on-board employee's career and may identify emerging integrity and
conduct concerns that have the potential to impact execution of the CBP
mission.
Currently, CBP is working diligently to increase its capacity to
polygraph all applicants for law enforcement positions consistent with
the statutory requirements. Polygraph exams, properly administered, can
be a valuable tool to screen law enforcement applicants and to help
ensure workforce integrity; and where possible, for use with on-board
employees on a voluntary or exculpatory basis.
Logistically, in an effort to increase efficiencies in the
background and periodic reinvestigation processes, the IA is moving to
a paperless environment. This effort will allow CBP to most efficiently
and effectively leverage its financial and human resources.
Based upon our progress to date, CBP is on track to fully meet the
requirements of the Anti-Border Corruption Act, including
implementation of 100 percent testing of all applicants for CBP law
enforcement positions by January 2013. Additionally, CBP will complete
its backlog of periodic reinvestigations by June 30, 2012 and will
remain current with initiation of periodic reinvestigations that will
continue to come due in future years.
training
Throughout an employee's career, CBP provides training that focuses
on integrity, ethics, and ethical decision making as part of an anti-
corruption continuum. When employees initially join CBP they receive
training promoting workforce integrity as part of CBP's New Employee
Orientation program. Newly-hired CBP law enforcement officers receive
an expanded level of mandatory integrity and ethics instruction as part
of the basic training curriculum.
Recurring integrity training is also an integral part of the
advanced and specialized training for CBP employees beyond their
initial entry on duty. This training, combined with proper leadership,
oversight, and management at all levels of the agency fosters a culture
of personal accountability and integrity within CBP. It clearly
communicates the standards of conduct with which all CBP employees must
comply and identifies the consequences of engaging in inappropriate
behavior. Most importantly, periodic in-service training equips CBP
employees with the tools they need to recognize, report, and respond to
integrity challenges they will encounter both on- and off-duty.
Our focus on integrity is not limited to our non-supervisory
personnel. CBP supervisory and leadership training programs such as
Supervisory Leadership Training, Incumbent Supervisory Training, the
Second Level Command Preparation, the CBP Leadership Institute, and the
Department's Senior Executive Service Candidate Development Program
incorporate classroom instruction and a series of practical exercises
that prepare CBP leaders to guide and direct the workforce in a manner
that promotes personal integrity and accountability through critical
thinking and integrity-based, ethical decision making.
additional integrity programs
In 2006, IA was tasked with promoting the integrity and security of
the CBP workforce. Since then, IA has aggressively reconstituted and
reinvigorated its internal investigative capability as part of a
comprehensive strategy to counter the threat of workforce corruption.
The IA staff now includes nearly 200 experienced investigators who
investigate employees suspected of misconduct and assist in
investigations of corruption, as well as personnel responsible for the
prevention and detection of these acts within prospective and on-board
employees.
IA's comprehensive strategy integrates prevention, detection, and
investigation capabilities to deter, identify, and respond to
corruption and serious misconduct in the CBP workforce. The strategy
includes background investigations as explained previously, as well as
security clearances; employee misconduct investigations; physical,
informational, industrial, internal, and operational security; and
management inspections.
The integrity strategy includes the application of behavioral
science and analytical research methods designed to flag indicators of
potential workforce corruption. These tools support an intelligence-
driven response to potential instances of corruption.
In 2011, CBP convened the Integrity Integrated Planning and
Coordination Committee (IPCC). This committee is a collaborative effort
amongst internal CBP components and its external law enforcement
partners. The Integrity IPCC allows each participating entity to openly
discuss integrity-related issues and ideas and to share best practices
among the members.
In concert with IA's efforts, the Office of Field Operations (OFO)
has taken significant steps to utilize its resources to identify
operational data anomalies. Under the leadership of OFO's Analytical
Management Systems Control Office (AMSCO), CBP law enforcement officers
and agents use CBP's automated systems to analyze crossing, referral,
and results data to identify anomalies that may be indicative of
integrity issues. This analysis is especially important as CBP
continues to implement new systems to process travelers and cargo
electronically in a more efficient and effective manner. The Office of
Border Patrol (OBP) also works in collaboration with AMSCO and IA to
identify and mitigate any potential threats.
When AMSCO identifies an anomaly in the manner in which a CBP
employee is performing his duties, the office works collaboratively
with IA to mitigate any potential threat to the CBP mission. As a
result of the excellent work AMSCO is doing, CBP has already identified
and corrected operational vulnerabilities that created potential
opportunities for employee corruption. The efforts AMSCO has undertaken
have also resulted in the development of new approaches, methodologies,
and tools that, once fully tested, will be deployed at the ports of
entry to identify performance deficiencies and counter potential acts
of corruption as well as serve as an important training and
instructional tool.
The OFO also established the OFO Integrity Committee, composed of
members from Headquarters Office of Field Operations, the Directors of
Field Operations, Port Management, CBP IA, OBP, and Human Resources
Management Labor and Employee Relations. The objectives of the OFO
Integrity Committee include reviewing various types of misconduct and
corruption cases regarding OFO employees that have resulted in arrests;
analyzing misconduct and corruption trends to determine what actions
OFO can take to eradicate those types of behavior; and assessing
current OFO integrity initiatives. OFO has also established Integrity
Officers within each of its 20 Field Offices. These officers act as
liaisons to field personnel on integrity issues and are a conduit to
headquarters for potential integrity concerns. Integrity Officers
participate in local task forces, committees, and working groups, and
collaborate with various Federal law enforcement agencies to provide
assistance in operational inquiries, research, and analysis to assist
in the detection and deterrence of corruption and misconduct.
The U.S. Border Patrol has an Integrity Advisory Committee (IAC)--
comprised of selected field leadership ranging from first-line
Supervisory Border Patrol Agents through members of the Senior
Executive Service--to proactively combat the threat of corruption
within its ranks. The IAC provides a strategic analysis of
vulnerabilities to corruption that can exist due to the unique nature
of the Border Patrol operating environment and provides recommendations
to effectively address and reduce vulnerabilities. In addition, the
Border Patrol has established ethics committees in the majority of its
20 sectors--many of which have integrated with other CBP offices in a
cooperative effort to build greater character and integrity within the
workforce.
corruption investigations
Beyond our proactive measures to prevent corruption before it
begins, CBP is prepared to address allegations of employee corruption
and misconduct in a timely and effective manner to ensure the integrity
of the border. CBP maintains a cadre of experienced IA agents assigned
to headquarters and 22 Internal Affairs field offices strategically
located throughout the United States where the potential threat of
workforce corruption is most acute. CBP coordinates its internal
investigative activities with the DHS Office of Inspector General
(OIG), U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's Office of
Professional Responsibility (ICE OPR), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), and numerous other Federal, State, local, and
Tribal law enforcement authorities. Effective collaboration and
information sharing among the Federal agencies that have a stake in
border corruption is a critical factor in maintaining border integrity
and security and effectively addressing allegations of corruption
lodged against CBP employees.
These efforts were enhanced in December 2010, when CBP and ICE
executed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that established protocols
for IA agents and ICE OPR to collaborate in CBP employee-related
misconduct and corruption investigations. The collaboration of CBP IA
and ICE OPR agents in these CBP employee-related investigations
provides a level of insight and dialogue not previously available to
the CBP leadership team and has increased CBP's and ICE's combined
ability to ensure the integrity of the border.
In August 2011, CBP entered into a similar MOU with the DHS OIG and
deployed approximately 14 CBP IA agents to OIG offices across the
United States. Today, CBP IA agents are working side-by-side with DHS
OIG agents in approximately 90 CBP employee-related investigations of
alleged corruption and misconduct.
CBP is striving to more effectively and expediently use existing
administrative authorities to mitigate the threat caused by CBP
employees accused of corruption during the course of an investigation.
This may include reassignment to administrative duties, administrative
leave, indefinite suspension, suspension of law enforcement
authorities, or other appropriate actions. Where a preponderance of
evidence indicates that a CBP employee is engaged in corruption or
serious misconduct, CBP managers will take appropriate actions without
undue delay to address the issue and where appropriate, remove the
employee from his or her position. This forward-leaning approach
provides CBP with the flexibility to address the threat posed by
employee corruption and misconduct in a manner that reduces the impact
on the agency, its mission, and its responsibilities to the American
public.
conclusion
Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Keating, integrity is central to
CBP's identity and effectiveness as guardian of the Nation's borders.
It is the cornerstone of leadership and success not only for an
organization such as CBP, but also for individuals. I thank you and the
Members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to appear today and
make clear our core values and strategic approach. I will be pleased to
answer any questions that you might have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Winkowski.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Duncan for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF JAMES G. DUNCAN, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Duncan. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Keating, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is a
privilege and an honor to appear before you today. Every day
nearly 57,000 full-time TSA employees work to ensure the
security of our Nation's vast transportation networks. TSA
employs risk-based, intelligence-driven operations to prevent
terrorist attacks and reduce the vulnerability of our
transportation network to terrorism.
Our goal is to maximize security while protecting privacy
and facilitating the flow of legitimate travel and commerce
through a multi-layered system of transportation security.
TSA's workforce accomplishes its security mission by screening
passengers and baggage at more than 450 airports in the United
States. Every week, we vet 14 million passenger reservations
and 13 million transportation workers against the terrorist
watch list.
Our efforts facilitate the secure air travel for 1.8
million persons each day. Success of our mission depends upon
the dedication and integrity of our workforce. Therefore,
everything we do at TSA, from hiring, promotion, and training
to inspections, investigations, and adjudications, is driven by
our commitment to the highest ethical standards. Administrator
Pistole has made clear that integrity, professionalism, and
hard work are the bedrock principles for the entire TSA
workforce.
When a TSA employee fails to live up to our high standards,
he or she violates the public trust, tarnishes the excellent
work of the rest of our workforce, and damages TSA's reputation
with the American people. For that reason, we hold all of our
employees to the same high professional and ethical standards
and we have zero tolerance for any kind of criminal activity in
the workplace. TSA's Office of Human Capital publishes the
policies that govern employee conduct. All employees are
required to know our standards and to re-review them on an
annual basis.
To further assist, TSA's on-line training center provides
training to all new or first-time TSA supervisors to give them
the tools to identify, report, and prevent misconduct. When
allegations or incidents of misconduct arise, they are
investigated by TSA's Office of Inspection, an independent
investigative arm of the agency that reports directly to the
TSA administrator and deputy administrator. The Office of
Inspection reviews allegations and reports them to the DHS
Office of the Inspector General and conducts investigations if
the OIG elects not to handle them themselves.
The Office of Inspection also proactively conducts
independent oversight inspections of operational programs,
procedures, and policies, both in the field and at TSA
headquarters. The inspections check on compliance and equally
important, they provide employees an opportunity to raise
allegations of misconduct in a confidential setting. To promote
consistency, timeliness, and accountability in the disciplinary
process, TSA has created an Office of Professional
Responsibility, OPR. OPR adjudicates all allegations of
misconduct involving senior-level officials and law enforcement
personnel.
OPR officials also review each reported investigation
involving a TSA employee where the investigation is conducted
by the Office of Inspector General. Working with TSA's Office
of Human Capital, OPR is developing a unified database that
will allow us to track all disciplinary matters throughout the
agency. This is going to help us promote consistency and
accountability. OPR has also created greater consistency and
transparency in the entire TSA disciplinary system by creating
a table of offenses and penalties. The table, which is
available to all TSA employees, provides ranges of penalties
for each type of offense and guides the decisions of officials
both at OPR and in the field.
As we strive to continue strengthening transportation
security and improving the overall travel experience for all
Americans, we always bear in mind that the success of our
mission depends on the integrity of our workforce. The freedom
to travel is a--is fundamental to our American way of life and
TSA is fully committed to ensuring that everyone can do so
securely. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you
today. I will be pleased to address any questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Duncan follows:]
Prepared Statement of James G. Duncan
May 17, 2012
Good morning Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today about the importance of ethical standards
and professional standards of conduct in workforce issues related to
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA).
security demands diligence and accountability
Both in the field and at headquarters, the nearly 57,000 full-time
employees who comprise the TSA workforce are tasked daily with ensuring
the security of people and commerce that flow through our Nation's vast
transportation networks. TSA employs risk-based, intelligence-driven
operations to prevent terrorist attacks and to reduce the vulnerability
of the Nation's transportation system to terrorism. Our goal at all
times is to maximize transportation security to stay ahead of evolving
terrorist threats while protecting privacy and facilitating the flow of
legitimate travel and commerce. TSA's security measures create a multi-
layered system of transportation security that mitigates risk.
The TSA workforce occupies the front line in executing the agency's
transportation security responsibilities in support of the Nation's
counterterrorism efforts. These responsibilities include security
screening of passengers and baggage at 450 airports in the United
States that facilitate air travel for 1.8 million people per day;
vetting more than 14 million passenger reservations and over 13 million
transportation workers against the terrorist watch list each week; and
conducting security regulation compliance inspections and enforcement
activities at airports, for domestic and foreign air carriers, and for
air cargo screening operations throughout the United States and at last
point-of-departure locations internationally.
The success of TSA's mission is ultimately dependent upon the
dedication and professionalism of our workforce. While technology and
instruction manuals support our efforts, it is our people that protect
travelers. Public service is a public trust and demands adherence to
the highest ethical and personal conduct standards. As public servants
charged with protecting the Nation's vital transportation systems, we
owe the American people nothing less. All aspects of our workforce
regimen--hiring, promotion, retention, training, proactive compliance
inspections, investigations, and adjudications--are driven by adherence
to the highest ethical standards. TSA Administrator Pistole has made
clear that integrity, professionalism, and hard work are bedrock
principles and expectations that he has for the entire TSA workforce.
Whenever a TSA employee fails to live up to TSA's high standards of
conduct and violates that public trust, the security standards that all
of our employees work so hard to establish and maintain are tarnished.
In addition to diminishing the hard work of colleagues, the misconduct
of any employee can damage TSA's reputation with the American people.
TSA holds all of its employees to the highest professional and ethical
standards and has a zero tolerance for criminal activity in the
workplace. Accountability is an important aspect of our work, and TSA
takes prompt and appropriate action with any employee who does not
follow our procedures and engages in misconduct.
a dedicated workforce adhering to professional standards of conduct
TSA is fortunate to employ a diverse workforce. Approximately 23
percent of our employees have served our Nation honorably in uniform
through prior military experience. Our commitment to recruiting and
hiring veterans continues, and TSA continues to work collaboratively
with the Department of Defense, veterans groups, and other outside
agencies towards that end. We are also proud of the dedication our
workforce has to the mission. Overall attrition including full-time and
part-time employees was 7.2 percent in fiscal year 2011. This is a
significant decrease from 18 percent in fiscal year 2004. As TSA marks
its 10th anniversary, the average Transportation Security Officer (TSO)
has been with the agency nearly 6 years and more than half have spent
more than 5 years on the job.
With many members of the TSA workforce dealing directly with the
public at airport checkpoints and in other transportation venues, and
with a large number of employees occupying sensitive security
positions, their conduct is held to the strictest standards. TSA's
Office of Human Capital (OHC) provides the workforce with policies
governing employee conduct, which state that conduct directly affects
the accomplishment of employee duties and emphasizes the importance of
public trust in the success of TSA's mission.
TSA has outlined employee responsibilities and conduct in policy
documents that address a broad range of employee matters, including
behavior towards the public, use of alcohol and illegal drugs on- or
off-duty, reporting requirements for arrests and criminal activities,
and other fitness for duty requirements. The Employee Responsibilities
and Conduct policy is communicated to all employees during employee
orientation and all employees are required to read and certify that
they have read and understand this policy. This policy requires all
employees to seek advice and guidance as needed concerning their
responsibilities through their supervisory chain, local Human Resources
Specialist or ethics counselor. To further assist employees, TSA's
Online Learning Center provides required training on ethics in the
Federal Government for all new, first-time TSA supervisors to enable
them to identify and report situations that may result in waste, fraud,
or abuse, or the appearance of trying to influence a person or
situation for personal or private gain.
acting affirmatively to allegations of misconduct
The overwhelming majority of TSA employees meet and exceed the
highest ethical and professional standards of conduct. While
allegations and incidents of misconduct arise from time to time, such
cases are investigated by TSA's Office of Inspection (OOI), which
reports directly to the TSA Administrator and Deputy Administrator. OOI
reviews allegations and complaints made against TSA employees, reports
all allegations to the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG), and
conducts investigations when necessary. OOI conducts investigations in
accordance with the standards published by the Council of the
Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency, and consults with
appropriate law enforcement or other Government officials regarding
specific allegations or complaints. The Office prepares and issues a
comprehensive report of investigation of criminal and/or administrative
matters to appropriate TSA management officials. OOI also proactively
conducts independent oversight inspections of operational programs,
procedures, and policies at TSA headquarters and at our Nation's
airports to check on compliance and afford employees an opportunity to
discuss allegations of misconduct in a confidential setting.
adjudicating instances of employee misconduct
TSA has a streamlined disciplinary process in comparison to most
other Federal agencies. Leveraging the flexible personnel authority
that Congress provided under the Aviation and Transportation Security
Act, TSA requires only a 7-day advance written notice period for
disciplinary actions as compared with the 30 days advance written
notice required under Title 5. More significantly, TSA's policy
includes a one-step removal action, which allows TSA to remove
immediately TSOs whose misconduct involves theft, illegal drug and on-
duty alcohol usage, and intentional serious security breaches. TSA's
streamlined disciplinary process enables TSA to act quickly to ensure
that employees are held accountable for any misconduct.
To promote consistency, timeliness, and accountability in the
disciplinary process, TSA created the Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR), which performs its responsibilities through a
combination of direct adjudication and oversight. First, OPR
adjudicates all allegations and misconduct involving employees and law
enforcement personnel, reviews evidence, and determines whether to
charge the employee with misconduct. Additionally, the OPR Appellate
Board, a unit within OPR, adjudicates the appeals of adverse actions--
removals and suspensions of 15 days or more--taken against the
uniformed workforce. Finally, OPR has visibility into all misconduct
cases adjudicated in the field by officials outside of OPR. Working
with TSA's OHC, OPR is helping to develop a database that will afford
OPR and OHC insight into all disciplinary actions throughout the agency
to drive consistency and fairness throughout the agency.
OPR has promoted greater consistency and transparency in the entire
TSA disciplinary system by creating and implementing a Table of
Offenses and Penalties. The Table, which is available to all TSA
employees, provides ranges of penalties for each type of offense and
guides the decisions of officials both at OPR and in the field. OPR has
also worked to promote greater efficiency and timeliness for
disciplinary actions by introducing specific time lines for
investigating and for adjudicating allegations of misconduct. These
steps have resulted in integrity and efficiency built into the
disciplinary system.
conclusion
As we strive to continue strengthening transportation security and
improving the overall travel experience for all Americans, we must
always remember that our success is defined, in large part, by the
conduct of our people. Whether it is for business or for pleasure, the
freedom to travel from place to place is fundamental to our way of
life, and to do so securely is a goal to which everyone at TSA is fully
committed. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
am pleased to address any questions you may have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Duncan.
Let me just say that while we certainly appreciate your
presence here today, we did request a witness at a higher
policy level, either Administrator Pistole or his deputy. I
think it is important to have someone at the policy level to
discuss these important issues and yet TSA failed to produce
that witness.
Next, the Chairman now recognizes Mr. Moynihan for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY M. MOYNIHAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Moynihan. Good morning.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, on behalf of
Secretary Napolitano and Director Morton, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss the ways in which ICE upholds DHS
standards for integrity and professionalism.
The overwhelming majority of ICE employees demonstrate the
highest levels of integrity and perform their duties with honor
every day. However, as in any large organization, isolated acts
of employee misconduct do occur from time to time.
My testimony today focuses on the mechanisms that are in
place to ensure robust process for investigating allegations of
employee misconduct and ensuring the integrity of the ICE
mission.
Since the creation of DHS, the ICE Office of Professional
Responsibility has been delegated the authority to investigate
allegations of criminal and administrative misconduct committed
by ICE and CBP employees.
Although we refer allegations of misconduct to the DHS
Office of the Inspector General for review and potential
acceptance, many are referred back to ICE OPR for appropriate
investigative action.
ICE has a comprehensive integrity strategy that integrates
training, prevention, detection, and investigation capabilities
to deter and respond to misconduct in the ICE workforce.
This strategy involves collaboration with other law
enforcement entities, a vigorous comprehensive screening
process for new hires and education and training of existing
employees.
OPR is comprised of three operational divisions that play a
major role in maintaining the highest level of ethical
standards. The investigations division conducts criminal and
administrative misconduct investigations through personnel
maintained in 26 field offices Nation-wide and in Puerto Rico.
OPR field offices are responsible for investigating
allegations of criminal and serious administrative misconduct,
reporting investigative results to the principle offices,
conducting field-delivered integrity training to ICE employees,
and providing integrity guidance to all offices within their
areas of responsibility.
The Inspections Division reviews ICE offices, programs, and
detention facilities to ensure compliance with agency
regulations, policies, and applicable detention standards in
order to provide executive management with an independent
review of the agency's organizational health and assess the
effectiveness and efficiency of the overall ICE mission.
Finally, the security division is responsible for the
implementation of agency-wide security programs including
personnel, physical, information, operational, and
counterintelligence.
Screening employees on the front end is an important step
we take toward ensuring the integrity of our mission.
ICE's vigorous screening process includes pre-employment
security checks followed by full background investigations and
periodic background investigations every 5 or 10 years.
In addition, once employees are on board, we apply
proactive training measures and oversight and management of
employees at every level to ensure the integrity of the ICE
workforce.
In addition to the training provided by ICE OPR, the ICE
Ethics Office provides training and guidance to all ICE
employees with respect to the standards of the conduct and the
Federal conflict of interest statutes.
Collaboration among Federal agencies is critical to the
mission of enhancing employee integrity.
In 2010, ICE and CBP entered into a Memorandum of
Understanding whereby CBP internal affairs investigators are
assigned to OPR field offices to participate in all
investigations of CBP employee criminal misconduct; thus
enabling CBP management to make informed decisions when
considering alternative administrative remedies.
This collaboration has solidified ICE's commitment to
providing CBP with complete and timely awareness of involvement
and criminal investigations of CBP employees.
Recently DHS OIG transferred approximately 370 cases to OPR
regarding criminal and administrative allegations involving ICE
and CBP employees. The cases regarding CBP employees would work
in conjunction with CBP internal affairs and OPR will provide
monthly status updates to DHS OIG.
In summation, we have taken aggressive proactive steps
toward ensuring that all allegations of misconduct within the
agency are swiftly addressed. We do everything we can to uphold
the agency's values.
I speak for Director Morton when I say that ICE's
leadership is proud of the integrity and professionalism of our
workforce.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today and for your continued support of ICE and its long--law
enforcement mission.
[The statement of Mr. Moynihan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Timothy M. Moynihan
May 17, 2012
introduction
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee: On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Director
Morton, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the ways in which U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
(ICE) upholds the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
standards for integrity and professionalism. The ethical and integrity
issues faced daily by ICE and our employees are neither straightforward
nor easy to resolve; however, ICE provides priority attention to these
issues and is heavily invested and effective in ensuring that our
employees uphold the public's trust and confidence.
ICE is the principal investigative agency with the largest team of
criminal investigators in DHS. With more than 20,000 employees Nation-
wide and in 47 countries, ICE promotes homeland security and public
safety through the criminal and civil enforcement of Federal laws
governing border control, customs, trade, and immigration. ICE's
primary priorities are to prevent terrorism and enhance security;
protect the borders against illicit trade, travel, and finance; and
protect the borders through smart and effective interior immigration
enforcement.
The overwhelming majority of ICE employees demonstrate the highest
levels of integrity and perform their duties with honor every day.
However, as in any other large organization, isolated acts of employee
misconduct do occur from time to time. My testimony today will focus on
the mechanisms put in place to ensure a robust process for
investigating allegations of employee misconduct and ensuring the
integrity of the ICE mission.
the ice office of professional responsibility
The ICE Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR) investigates
allegations of criminal and administrative misconduct involving ICE and
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employees. OPR also contains
an inspection branch that ensures ICE operates consistently with the
high standards we promulgate to regulate our program offices and civil
detention system. OPR is also responsible for the employee suitability
and security clearance processes. We accomplish this mission by
preparing comprehensive reports of investigation in a thorough and
impartial manner for judicial or management action; conducting
inspections and reviews of ICE offices and detention facilities to
assess adherence to policies and applicable standards; and managing a
layered security approach in order to protect ICE personnel,
facilities, and information from criminal and/or terrorist
organizations.
Roles and Responsibilities
Since the creation of DHS, OPR has been delegated the authority to
investigate allegations of criminal and administrative misconduct
committed by employees of ICE and CBP. Although DHS policy requires ICE
and all other component agencies to refer allegations of misconduct to
the DHS Office of the Inspector General (OIG) for review and potential
acceptance for investigation, many are referred back to OPR for
appropriate investigative action. OPR is staffed by a workforce of
criminal investigators who have an expert knowledge of immigration and
customs laws, regulations, and procedures.
In 2010, ICE and CBP entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) ensuring that the integrity of DHS employees remains critical to
fulfilling the DHS mission. ICE and CBP have established a program
whereby CBP Office of Internal Affairs investigators are assigned to
OPR field offices to participate in the investigations of CBP employee
criminal misconduct, thus enabling CBP management to make informed
decisions when considering alternative administrative remedies. This
collaboration was not always available prior to the MOU, and has
solidified ICE's commitment to providing CBP with complete and timely
awareness and involvement in criminal investigations of CBP employees.
Recently, the DHS OIG transferred approximately 370 cases to OPR
regarding criminal and administrative allegations involving ICE and CBP
employees. The cases regarding CBP employees will be worked in
conjunction with the CBP Office of Internal Affairs (IA). OPR will
provide monthly status updates to the DHS OIG.
Composition of the Office of Professional Responsibility
OPR comprises three operational divisions that play a major role in
maintaining the highest level of ethical standards: Investigations,
Inspections, and Security. OPR has a current staff of 517 full-time
equivalent employees, including 265 criminal investigators.
The Investigations Division conducts criminal and administrative
employee misconduct investigations through personnel maintained in 26
field offices across the United States and Puerto Rico, including an
investigative unit based at ICE headquarters in Washington, DC. OPR
field offices are responsible for investigating allegations of criminal
and serious administrative misconduct; reporting investigative results
to principal offices; conducting field-delivered integrity training to
ICE employees; and providing integrity guidance to all offices within
their areas of responsibility.
The Inspections Division also evaluates and inspects ICE offices,
programs, and detention facilities to ensure compliance with agency
regulations and policies and applicable detention standards. This
Division reviews ICE offices, programs, and processes in order to
provide executive management with an independent review of the agency's
organizational health and assess the effectiveness and efficiency of
the overall ICE mission.
The Security Division is responsible for the implementation of
agency-wide security programs, including personnel, physical,
information, operational, and counterintelligence.
In fiscal year 2011, ICE and CBP's Joint Intake Center (JIC), which
serves as the central clearinghouse for receiving, processing, and
assigning allegations of misconduct involving ICE and CBP employees and
contractors, received 10,374 unconfirmed allegations of misconduct and
other reportable information. Most of the information reported to the
JIC is less serious in nature and is best addressed by referring the
matter to ICE and CBP management for review and appropriate action. As
a result, OPR initiated over 1,030 investigations resulting in the
criminal arrests of 16 ICE and CBP employees and 70 civilians, 86
indictments and 55 convictions. OPR also completed 265 administrative
investigations involving ICE employees. Some of the violations
investigated included bribery, narcotics smuggling, theft of Government
money/property, wire fraud, and the trafficking of counterfeit goods.
The civilian arrests consisted largely of impersonation of DHS officers
or agents and attempted bribery of DHS personnel. These arrests reflect
the commitment ICE personnel have in maintaining the highest levels of
integrity, and can be attributed to continual integrity awareness
education and training.
comprehensive integrity strategy
ICE has a comprehensive integrity strategy that integrates
training, prevention, detection, and investigation capabilities to
deter and respond to misconduct in the ICE workforce. This strategy
involves collaboration with other law enforcement entities, a vigorous
comprehensive screening process for new hires and education and
training of employees. OPR's investigative strategy is a multi-layered
approach utilizing the full capabilities of the three operational
divisions previously mentioned.
Collaboration
OPR collaborates with numerous other Federal, State, and local law
enforcement authorities in criminal misconduct investigations. This
collaboration among Federal agencies is critical to the mission of
enhancing employee integrity.
One noteworthy example of this collaboration is the corruption
investigation of former CBP Officer (CBPO) Devon Samuels in Atlanta,
Georgia. CBPO Samuels utilized his position of trust with CBP to bypass
Transportation Security Administration security measures at the
Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport to smuggle narcotics,
currency, and firearms for a major Jamaican drug trafficking
organization. This OPR-led investigation was conducted in close
coordination with various Federal and State law enforcement partners,
including ICE's Homeland Security Investigations; the DHS OIG; CBP IA;
the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration; the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI); the Internal Revenue Service; the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the U.S. Marshals Service;
the U.S. Attorney's Office for the Northern District of Georgia; the
DeKalb County [Georgia] Police Department; the Jamaica Constabulary
Force; and the corporate security department for Delta Air Lines.
Through a coordinated effort, the investigation resulted in a total of
17 arrests, 18 indictments and the seizure of 15 firearms, 1 kilogram
of cocaine, 314 pounds of marijuana, over 750,000 units of ecstasy, and
over $226,400 in U.S. currency. CBPO Samuels pled guilty to conspiracy
to commit money laundering and trafficking in firearms and was
sentenced to 8 years' incarceration.
Another significant example of collaboration is the investigation
of former ICE Special Agent (SA) Jovana Deas. Former SA Deas utilized
her position of trust to access law enforcement databases illegally,
and shared the accessed information with members of a drug trafficking
organization which included members of her family. The investigation
was conducted by OPR and the FBI under the auspices of the Southern
Arizona Border Corruption Task Force. Former SA Deas was arrested and
on February 1, 2012, pled guilty to a 21-count indictment for misuse of
a Government computer; false statements; conversion of public money,
property, or records; obstruction of agency proceedings; and
conspiracy. SA Deas's matter is pending sentencing.
Comprehensive Screening Process for New Hires
ICE requires a vigorous screening process for new applicants. This
includes pre-employment security checks, followed by full background
investigations and periodic background investigations every 5 or 10
years (depending on the sensitivity level of the position). OPR then
administers a continuous evaluation program, a method of evaluating
people after their initial investigation and adjudication. These
evaluations depend on employees and supervisors to report misconduct as
well as events that could potentially have a significant effect on an
employee's personal finances, thereby potentially making them
susceptible to committing acts of fraud.
Education and Training
Once a new employee begins working for ICE, we apply proactive
training measures and oversight and management of employees at every
level to ensure the integrity of the ICE workforce. This professional
development continues throughout the entire careers of all employees.
ICE also developed a mandatory annual Integrity Awareness Program
Training for all employees, which reinforces the standard that every
employee is responsible for upholding the integrity of ICE. The course
encompasses sections on integrity, professional conduct, and reporting
misconduct.
All new law enforcement agents and officers, as well as all new
supervisors, receive integrity training at the ICE Academy. ICE OPR
also conducts periodic integrity presentations to ICE programs which
emphasize that actions and decisions by employees can often have
implications that not only affect the individuals involved, but also
DHS as a whole.
In addition, ICE OPR also provides numerous information security-
related training courses/briefings to the ICE workforce. The subject
matter of the training programs include counter-intelligence awareness,
operational security, foreign travel threats, security awareness, and
classified information protection. The ICE OPR-developed training is
designed to provide the ICE workforce with information that will assist
them in performing their duties effectively and in a safe manner. In
addition to the training provided by ICE OPR, the ICE Ethics Office
provides training and guidance to all ICE employees with respect to the
standards of conduct and the Federal conflicts of interest statutes.
All new employees must complete the ICE ethics orientation for new
employees within 90 days of coming on board. In addition, all required
financial disclosure filers receive mandatory ethics training annually.
For years, ICE OPR has provided anti-corruption outreach training
to international law enforcement partners. The training program informs
our strategic allies about procedures used by OPR to combat corruption
and other criminal misconduct. The program is coordinated through the
ICE Office of International Affairs, the U.S. Department of State, and
the World Customs Organization.
As noted earlier, ICE has offices in 47 countries, in addition to
our domestic offices. In furthering its efforts to promote integrity in
the foreign environment, ICE OPR provides pre-deployment integrity
presentations for ICE employees departing for long-term foreign
assignments, as well as mandatory on-site integrity training when
conducting inspections of foreign offices.
conclusion
ICE takes employee misconduct extremely seriously, and we are
heavily invested in addressing these issues to ensure that ICE upholds
the public trust and conducts its mission with integrity and
professionalism. Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today,
and I would now be pleased to answer any questions.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Moynihan.
Let me also reiterate, we certainly appreciate you being
here and your testimony. We requested that either Director
Morton or someone at--or a deputy or a policy level to appear
before this committee and unfortunately your agency failed to
produce that witness.
With that, the Chairman now recognizes himself for 5
minutes for questioning.
You know, I worked in the public integrity section in the
Department of Justice. I serve now on the ethics committee and
so I have always believed that the public service is a public
trust. While the vast majority of your employees are honest and
hard-working, unfortunately the actions of a few bad apples
taint the entire organization.
The purpose of this hearing is not to taint the overall
organization at all, but rather it is to look at the specific
abuses and determine how can we fix the problem.
I will go with each agency. I will start with you, Mr.
Winkowski.
CBP, you know, the allegations of Border Patrol agents, CBP
officers working with drug traffickers to facilitate their
business is just unconscionable. You know the threat from a
National security standpoint and you know that they are trying
to infiltrate our organization.
I want to first start and ask you about your polygraphs
that you do conduct with employees prior to employment. If you
can elaborate on what some of your findings have been in terms
of these pre-employment screenings.
Mr. Winkowski. Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
that question.
As I mentioned in my oral interview, we have begun--we
began doing polygraphs in 2008 and we have done about 10,000
polygraphs, about 400 a month come January 2013 under the Anti-
Border Corruption Act that we mandated to do all law
enforcement officers. We will meet that mandate of 2013. As a
matter of a fact, we will meet that mandate sometime this
summer.
So this summer, we will have 100 percent of our law
enforcement officers undergoing a polygraph prior to coming on
board as a law enforcement officer.
So of those 10,000 polygraphs that we have done, we have
discovered a whole host of individuals that apply to be the
Border Patrol agents or Customs and Border Protection officers
and the polygraph was able to identify individuals that had a
very, very questionable past.
Let me just give you several examples, Mr. Chairman. We had
a case where between 2002 and 2009 applicant smuggled several
bundles of marijuana within the United States and was paid
$200.
On at least there occasions, the applicant personally
unloaded duffle bags of drugs from vehicles and stored them at
his--at this residence and the applicant also accepted $1,000
in exchange for allowing vehicles loaded with marijuana to be
stored at his home.
So the polygraph was able to identify that and obviously
the employee was not hired for a law enforcement position.
In another example, in March 2009, the applicant and a
friend became involved in transportation of cocaine and
marijuana. The applicant's friend profited an unknown amount of
the transportation of marijuana and he profited from $3,500 for
the transportation of the cocaine.
So we have these individuals that, in some cases I believe,
their sole purpose of wanting to become a Customs and Border
Protection officer or a Border Patrol officer is to infiltrate
us. The way in which we have robust background process while we
have AMSCO-type systems that I talked about in my oral reply
and data mining and looking for anomalies, we really believe
that the polygraph is going to be a real game changer for us.
So we are ready for that. We have been doing polygraphs,
but come this summer will undergo one.
I think one of the things, also that both you and the
Ranking Member has talked about is the National security
positions. I view the CBPs and the Border Patrol agents as
National security positions. As such, I think we need to take a
different view of that position.
So for example, while we are starting the polygraph prior
to their employment and weeding out those individuals that are
deceptive, our data indicates that really a--an officer goes on
the other side at about 8.8 years into service.
So the question becomes, while we have data mining and we
are doing AMSCOs and doing--looking for anomalies and we have
the periodic reinvestigations every 5 years, I think we need to
be looking at polygraphs throughout the employee's career. I
think that is very, very important and we will work with the
Office of Personnel Management towards that end.
But I couldn't agree more with what you said and Mr.
Keating said about the National security positions.
Mr. McCaul. Well, let me say I agree with you that it
really is a National security issue and I think the cases that
you discussed in terms of pre-employment screening with
polygraphs demonstrates that they are trying to infiltrate our
law enforcement.
Mr. Winkowski. Yes.
Mr. McCaul. There are other law enforcement agencies that
require post-employment polygraphs and you and I talked about
this yesterday; can you tell me some of the hurdles because,
you know, as a former public corruption prosecutor, usually the
corruption occurs after employment----
Mr. Winkowski. Yes.
Mr. McCaul [continuing]. After they have been down on the
border or----
Mr. Winkowski. Yes.
Mr. McCaul [continuing]. Points of entry where they are
then corrupted by organizations with high dollar amounts to
infiltrate the United States with drugs and human trafficking.
So can you elaborate on what would be the challenges and
hurdles to require post-employment polygraph?
Mr. Winkowski. One of the challenges we have is working
through the hiring policies that we have in the Office of
Personnel Management and I will make it very clear, we have not
approached the Office of Personnel Management on this
particular issue but we will do that.
I have asked my staff to begin the process of identifying
what those hurdles are. So, you know, the Anti-Border
Corruption Act clearly gives us the authority on the pre-
employment. We need to work through internally, with our
personnel offices as well as the Office of Personnel
Management, to look at what it will take to do polygraphs from
a standpoint of--at the time of the periodic reinvestigations
and in between those periods of time, whether it is looking for
reasonable suspicion or looking at more like a drug screening
type of process where randomly we do polygraphs.
I think we have a lot to learn from other agencies that
employ polygraph on a more routine basis and we are going to
undertake that endeavor.
Mr. McCaul. Well, let me just say, I would like to work
with you and CBP and I hope the Ranking Member would like to
join me in this in terms of changing that policy. Certainly if
any legislation is required to--making that change, I think
this is vitally important. I will try to keep my time limited,
but Mr. Duncan, turning to TSA, allegations and indictments of
TSA employees stealing personal belongings of passengers,
improper luggage screening, which, you know, after we saw the
latest attempt out of Yemen to potentially smuggle a explosive
device onto an airplane, again a National security issue.
We can't afford to have corrupt TSA officers. So what is
TSA doing to address that?
Mr. Duncan. Senator, there are three aspects to TSA's
efforts to prevent and detect the kind of corruption that the
committee is justly concerned about. The first echoes what Mr.
Winkowski has discussed in terms of background checks to make
sure that we are not hiring people into TSA who are going to be
problems. In the last 3 years, our background checks have
actually disqualified more than 5,600 applications who were
subjected to criminal history checks, financial checks, and
other mechanisms to make sure that we are not bringing people
in who have vulnerabilities.
The second aspect really has to do with prevention. We have
undertaken various prevention initiatives in the wake of
scenarios such as Honolulu where we did determine that there
was a large number of bags not being screened or subject to
security. Some of the working groups that we have created in
the wake of Honolulu have focused on identifying tools the
local leadership can use to prevent and detect violations of
our security protocols.
I know there are some recommendations that they have come
up with working in conjunction with our investigative office
and those recommendations are focusing on metrics and on other
kinds of reports that can be used by field leadership so that
we can, you know, identify difficulties before they blossom
into full-blown corruption.
Mr. McCaul. Yes, let me--because my time is limited. A 22-
count indictment TSA employees took payments to provide drug
couriers unfettered access through the Los Angeles
International Airport so that drugs could be smuggled into the
United States. That is outrageous and really unacceptable. I
understand what you are trying to do pre-screening. As I
understand it, you mentioned a system--a tracking system that
you are implementing to--basically a systematic tracking system
to look at these--this misconduct.
You have 400 different offices out there. Yet it is not
integrated into one system. I understand you are trying to
develop that. When do you anticipate that that will be
completed?
Mr. Duncan. I don't have a specific time frame for you,
sir. But I know as a result of the IG audit that has recently
been released, that the TSA is working, not just on coming up
with a workable single definition of security breaches, but to
overhaul its reporting system so that security breaches are
reported consistently. That they are validated and that the
headquarters gets the information from all 450 airports so they
can study it and come up with more comprehensive----
Mr. McCaul. Again when--what is the time frame when this
would be completed?
Mr. Duncan. I will have to get back to you on that, sir.
[The information follows:]
The TSA integrated database is a case tracking system that
currently supports the investigation and disciplinary action activities
of the Office of Inspection (OOI), the Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR), and the Office of Human Capital, Employee
Relations (ER). The integrated database is web-based, which permits
authorized users to access the system TSA-wide. All disciplinary
matters, whether handled by OPR at TSA Headquarters, or by ER users at
more than 400 airports, are input into the system and are accessible to
authorized users to promote consistency of adjudication.
In addition, when each case is input, it is coded to the relevant
section of the TSA Table of Offenses and Penalties, which will enable
all adjudications to be tracked for consistency. At present, the
integrated database is ``live'' and all cases are uploaded into it. The
contractor with whom TSA is working--Lockheed Martin--has represented
to TSA that it will incorporate the OOI Hotline into the system, and
continue with system improvements and enhancements. Lockheed Martin
should have the full functionality of an integrated reporting
capability complete this fall.
Mr. McCaul. Okay, I would appreciate that. Moving onto--to
ICE. You know, accepting thousands of dollars in bribes to
provide documentation, you know ties to drug trafficking
organizations. This is exactly the kind of thing that
terrorists want to exploit, getting documentation to get into
the United States and attack the American people. Again this
is--it is just really unacceptable. What are you doing within
ICE to remedy this?
Mr. Moynihan. Mr. Chairman we have a vigorous pre-
employment screening process and thorough background
investigation to try to weed out those individuals, you know on
the front end prior to employment. Subsequent to that, it was
constant. All new employees go through ethics and integrity
training. We have an annual requirement to take an integrity
awareness program, which is a policy for all employees to kind
of refresh our responsibilities and rules of conduct.
All new supervisors attend--get extensive integrity
training at the ICE Academy, as well as all law enforcement
officers, a much more extensive integrity training. We put out
constant guidance regarding the guidelines in reporting
employee misconduct. Oftentimes information is received from a
co-worker or colleague that sees that something is not--doesn't
seem right or they have actual information.
So we kind of--constantly going back and educating the
workforce and making sure that they know what the standards of
integrity, what the agency expects from them, and the proper
ways to report that. I discussed briefly about--we have offices
located Nation-wide. You know, upon receiving the allegation,
we are required to refer it to the DHS OIG and either may be
working the investigation collaboratively with them. But if
they decide to not retain that for investigation, refer it back
to our office and you know, we would address it as swiftly as
possible.
Mr. McCaul. In conclusion, we need to move on. I did look
to some of your manuals. There really--doesn't seem to be any
overarching policy within ICE and there is no specific ethics
policy for ICE employees. It is very generic. I would ask that
you maybe go back and look at that in terms of specific ethics
policies that you could direct towards your employees. A lot of
this is just commonsense though. You know as I said, a public
service is a public trust.
When you see that violated in these egregious examples, it
is just unacceptable and again they are--overall though, the
majority of employees are honest and hardworking. Do a great
job every day. With that I now recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A couple of comments
I want to make first. First of all, taxpayers are spending
enormous amounts of money to try and make sure that safety is
ensured in their travel. American citizens are going through
enormous personal intrusions themselves. Going through the
gate, getting screened, getting scanned, having their
belongings gone through. This is a very serious matter and I
would think given the fact that our security and what the
public puts into this, that at this hearing we would at least
get the people that were requested from TSA and from ICE to
show up.
That to me says something about how seriously they are
taking this issue, or how not seriously they are taking this
issue. Now I want to be clear about that in the beginning.
Second, this is just an old saw that we have had. It is before
my time here as well. The 9/11 Commission has made it clear
that one of the primary problems that has to be addressed is
the issue of jurisdiction. This patchwork quilt of
jurisdictions conflicting with each other, still is with us.
It seems in every hearing we have, it is an underlying
theme that we have and I think it is here again today. So it
prompts a couple of questions I have. Mr. Edwards and Mr.
Winkowski, last year in testimony before the Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and Government Affairs Commissioner Bersin
stated, and I quote, ``That there is more than tension and
friction between CBP, IA, and DHS IOG.'' So between Customs and
Border and Department of Homeland Security, there was
``outright confrontation and an unacceptable situation.''
The fact that CBP and OIG, both part of one Department of
Homeland Security, had to enter into a Memorandum of
Understanding in the first place for OIG to perform a function
that statutorily belongs to that office, raises some grave
concerns. Has the inclusion of CBP IA employee as required by
that memorandum, improved that cooperation at all? Even though
we had to do that to get there, has that improved the
situation?
Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Senator for the question. August 11
of last year I signed the MOU with Commissioner Bersin. I can
assure you that we have taken every step to work closely. In a
number of my offices I have CBP IA agents working closely
jointly with us, some cases. There is absolutely no turf
battle. OIG, CBP, and ICE, we are all working together because
this is not just a DHS problem, this is a problem for the
entire Nation. We want to make sure that we address each
investigation effectively and in a timely manner.
Mr. Winkowski. Just a couple of comments. I agree with Mr.
Edwards that the MOU I believe has done a good job of really
laying out the path forward. As Mr. Moynihan had indicated,
cases are being transferred from the IG over to ICE, and CBP is
part of that process. So I think we have come a long way since
former Commissioner Bersin's testimony.
Mr. Keating. Just a couple of questions too that came to
mind. If it is possible to give us a generalization. The bulk
of the people that have been involved in this corruption,
unethical conduct, what is their salary range for--I know, you
know I just want to get a generalization. How much are these
people getting paid? Most of them that are committing these
things?
Mr. Winkowski. I would say in the average of a base salary
when you look at a Border Patrol agent or a CBP officer at the
GS-12 level, which I think is about $75,000.00 a year. Then
there is overtime associated with that. Especially when you
look at the Southwest Border, they are some of the highest-
paying individuals down there in some of those communities.
Mr. Keating. A question for Mr. Edwards? Your office's
primary authority over the investigation instances of public
corruption and employee misconduct within the Department of
Homeland Security. However, you have the right of first refusal
there as well. Now recently there has--that right has been
heavily exercised. Your office has transferred hundreds of
cases to CBP and ICE to handle. What contributed to that?
Was it a result of a backlog that you did that? What
contributed to that backlog if that is what led to this?
Mr. Edwards. Sure. Thank you, sir. We have 2,360 open
cases. I have 219 agents. Clearly the workload for each agent
is more than 12 cases per agent. I have been working actively
with CBP to have their agents detailed to our office to work
the cases jointly. There is 38 percent increase in Border
Patrol allegation corruption in the last several years. Border
Patrol agents have doubled in size. OIG has not had the
resources that he had requested.
In short, I cannot keep piling up these cases. I need to
act on it. This is a DHS problem that we have to address. So,
under my supervision I have transferred 374 cases of named
subjects to CBP--I mean ICE OPR, the CPB IA folks have detailed
over there.
I am not transferring any CRCL cases. It is employee
corruption, program fraud, and miscellaneous cases; 301 of
those cases are CPB cases and 73 of those cases are ICE cases.
Still, because ICE OPR has an average right now of about 4\1/2\
cases per agent. So, clearly I am taking their resources and
you know in some of my FEMA fraud cases an agent is carrying 22
to 25 cases.
So, clearly we need to--you know I cannot keep taking these
cases long time to close. I need to address them quickly and
bring resolution to these cases quickly. So, for this one time
on the named subjects we took that effort.
All of those 2,260 cases, 40 percent of them are unnamed
subjects. We have an analysis group to vet those unnamed cases.
But CBP also has those resources. So does ICE. So, our
intention on this is to work jointly on those unnamed subjects
and try to see if we can come up with some leads on that and
then investigate.
So, I think you know talking to John Morton and David Adler
this is a joint effort. This one time I am fairly confident
with the systems we have put in place. With this initiative we
are going to address this problem effectively and as soon as
possible.
Mr. Keating. It is partially resulting in your budget
situation----
Mr. Edwards. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Keating [continuing]. And your--situation.
Mr. Edwards. Absolutely, sir.
Mr. Keating. All right. I want to be clear on that.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. McCaul. I thank the Ranking Member. The gentlelady from
New York is recognized.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I thank all
of our panelists for coming in to share their insights with us
this morning. I want to follow up and pick up on Mr. Keating's
last question, and ask that both Mr. Edwards and Mr. Moynihan
respond to this.
From fiscal year 2010 to the present ICE OPR has received a
total of 26,983 allegations of employee misconduct. Some
involve corruption while others did not. In any event, this
number is extremely high. In addition to investigating these
matters I want to know, does ICE OPR work with ICE at large,
and CBP, to incorporate lessons learned from these
investigations into new standards and procedures?
Given what you just stated, Mr. Edwards, having to deal
with the budgetary constraints, you know how does this actually
work out when ICE seems to have a whole host of their own
investigations to conduct? I mean, I think if you add up all of
the allegations together I don't even know how personnel is
able to manage. But that is for you to answer.
Mr. Edwards. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for your question.
Even for OIG the complaints we have received in fiscal year
2012 so far has been 10,438. Nonetheless, I think even before
these investigations this is--there needs to be--and all the
components are doing is the proactive effort in terms of the
prescreening, the pre-employment screening, background
investigation, integrity briefing, and ethics briefing; we do a
number of those as well. Also let the employees know what to
look for when there is potentially fraud happening. Then when
the allegation comes in you know we go to the vetting process
just like ICE does the same vetting. When a criminal case is
there then we work jointly not only with ICE OPR, with ICE HSI,
with FBI, with any number of partners jointly because you know
the more aggressively we try to do this is going to get to a
resolution sooner. So, looking at our caseload and what ICE has
presently I think this effort that we have taken on is going to
address these problems quickly.
Mr. Moynihan. Thank you, ma'am.
You know first I would like to--you know the Joint Intake
Center is like the central clearinghouse for ICE and CBP for
reporting allegations of misconduct as well as other reportable
information. That is a collaborative effort. It actually sits
in CBP's office space and it is staffed by both ICE and CBP
Internal Affairs personnel. So, which is a great working
relationship and a collaboration that has existed since the
creation of DHS.
The number represented as far as allegations, those are
actually items that were reported to the Joint Intake Center
so--and they involve less degrees of misconduct or items such
as lost, missed things, stolen property--things that are not
necessarily allegation-based.
So, that number seems much larger then. It is things that
we want to document and ensure there is a proper record of. But
not all those 26,000 allegations are true allegations of
misconduct and warrant investigation. I can get back to you as
far as the specific number of what was.
From our case inventory perspective, we have about 600
cases in our inventory right now. Then in addition to the 374
that Mr. Edwards will be transferring here shortly. But we are
working closely with CBP Internal Affairs, full participation,
we--during this transfer.
Obviously it is a big lift. You know it is a large number
of cases at one time. We set up teams together to triage, look
at cases that have, you know, viable leads and most egregious
allegations that are showing us the greatest vulnerability. We
will do that as collaboratively in an effort to address them as
quickly as possible and the most serious----
Ms. Clarke. My question is what happens with those
employees who are--who have alleged to do something? Do they
remain in their posts? You know, how was that handled? Because
you know certainly we are concerned about the public and their
interactions with these individuals who have alleged to have
some sort of misconduct, whatever that may be, and also their
colleagues. Sometimes one bad apple can spoil a bunch. So, how
is that managed?
Mr. Edwards. Absolutely, ma'am. I also want to, before
answering your question about the number of open cases, I just
want to make it clear you know we have open cases and we have
closed cases. But as you may know that a lot of cases that we
have done all the investigations that we have done and then we
are waiting for some judicial action. So, there is another
category that really is not classified. We have within our
systems working with our partners here we are going to classify
another like a J-case. Many law enforcement agencies have the J
type-of cases.
While we are carrying on with this criminal investigation
we also get the--we want to get the administrative portion of
it working as well because a lot of times there is the U.S.
attorney is not going to accept the criminal--as a criminal
case. We want to make sure that we have done enough work on
their administrative front end so the components can take quick
administrative action. So, it is a dual-front end that we have
worked with the components.
Ms. Clarke. Do you want to add anything to that, Mr.
Moynihan?
Mr. Moynihan. Ma'am, I was just going to say that you know
every case stands on its own merits. You know just the receipt
of an allegation, depending on egregiousness or as the case
develops and evidence is developed; you know we work closely
with whether it is ICE management or CBP management to make a
decision of whether that vulnerability of leaving that person
in that particular position, the vulnerability is too great.
We may need to put them onto administrative duties while
the investigation continues or reassign them; or depending on
the level of evidence and seriousness or the level or position
of that individual, they may be put on administrative leave or
things. But that would be--each case would be--would stand on
its own and the facts and circumstances of that would be--would
help us base that decision.
Ms. Clarke. If you just indulge me for a moment, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Winkowski, I think that you looked as though you may
have had something to add.
Mr. Winkowski. Yes. I would just like to add a couple of
issues here, a couple thoughts. I think you know it is very,
very important that these allegations be worked quickly. So, we
have a responsibility to exonerate people as well. When someone
writes a--and I think the panelists would agree with me on
that. We have a responsibility to do that.
But we also have a responsibility if we have an individual
that is under some kind of suspicion that we really need for
that investigation to move quickly because that individual is
still on the line, if you will, is still processing people.
They are still processing cargo. Once we are notified by the
investigation and the investigators that there is an issue, we
will take that person off the line and put them in
administrative duties as Mr. Moynihan said.
Once an indictment takes place and that individual is put
on what we call indefinite suspension and then it is dealt with
through the court systems. Right now we have about 11 people
that are on indefinite suspension. To the other point of your
question, ma'am, was--and I think it is a really good point
here--what do we do after that? So, we have the investigation.
There is an indictment. There is a conviction. You know what do
we do next?
What we do in CBP is through our Office of Internal
Affairs, we dissect that. We look at where the vulnerabilities
are, what do we need to do from a standpoint of changing
policies or changing processes so our management controls or
internal controls so it doesn't happen again? So, it is a
constant layer effect that we have implemented in CBP, which I
think is very, very important from the standpoint of making
inroads in this very, very important subject.
Mr. McCaul. Let me just in closing associate myself with
the Ranking Member's remarks. In terms of the seriousness of
these charges and indictments and convictions, Federal law
enforcement bribes taken by TSA to improperly screen luggage.
You know first of all, stealing personal belongings as people
go through these screeners all the time and scanners. Yet the
idea that TSA officials are stealing personal property.
But beyond that as a National security implications, the
idea that a TSA officer would take a bribe to allow thousands
of pieces of luggage to go through improperly screened, or to
allow drug trafficking organizations to have unfettered access.
This is precisely what the terrorists are looking for; ICE
providing, you know, fraudulent documentation. You know, all
these cases that we look at are--they are trying to get things
through airports, improper screening, improper documentation,
that is exactly the way they are trying to exploit, you know
and then of course CBP, you know, taking bribes from drug
cartel organizations.
Given the seriousness of this, I do first want to say thank
you to CBP for Mr. Winkowski, for you showing up at the policy
level, but I do want to express my extreme disappointment that
TSA and ICE, given these allegations--and not just allegations
but proven fact--did not bring forth the policy-level witnesses
that we requested. So it sends a signal to the Congress that
either they are not taking it very seriously or these officials
are just trying to hide from the American people.
So I am not very happy with that. I, again, associate
myself with the Ranking Member, with his remarks.
With that, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:37 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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