[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
BUILDING SECURE PARTNERSHIPS IN TRAVEL, COMMERCE, AND TRADE WITH THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 8, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-89
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
77-803 WASHINGTON : 2013
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Chairman
Daniel E. Lungren, California Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tim Walberg, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois, Vice Chair Vacancy
Robert L. Turner, New York Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Amanda Parikh, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Vacant, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security........................................ 17
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. John W. Halinski, Assistant Administrator, Office of Global
Strategies, Transportation Security Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Mr. Mark R. Koumans, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Office of
International Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Hans G. Klemm, Economic Coordinator, U.S. Senior Official for
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, Bureau of East Asian and
Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Panel II
Mr. Roger Dow, President and Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Travel
Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 32
Prepared Statement............................................. 33
Mr. Gary E. Wade, Vice President of Security, Atlas Air Worldwide
Holdings, Inc., on Behalf of the Cargo Airline Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 37
Prepared Statement............................................. 39
Mr. Dorothy Reimold, Assistant Director, Security and Travel
Facilitation, International Air Transport Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 41
Prepared Statement............................................. 43
Mr. Michael C. Mullen, Executive Director, Express Association of
America:
Oral Statement................................................. 46
Prepared Statement............................................. 48
FOR THE RECORD
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security:
Statement of Richard P. Lawless, CEO, U.S.-Japan High-Speed
Rail, Inc. (USJHSR).......................................... 18
BUILDING SECURE PARTNERSHIPS IN TRAVEL, COMMERCE, AND TRADE WITH THE
ASIA-PACIFIC REGION
----------
Tuesday, May 8, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:30 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Rogers, Walberg, Walsh, Jackson
Lee, and Davis.
Mr. Rogers. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security will come to order. The
committee is meeting today to hear different perspectives on
how to build secure partnerships in travel, commerce, and trade
in the Asia-Pacific region.
Ranking Member Jackson Lee is in a Judiciary hearing right
now and will be along in a few minutes, but she has urged me to
go ahead and get started. I know we have two panels and we are
going to be interrupted by votes, so we are going to try to
move it along so the second panel can get their testimony in
before a couple of them have to leave for airplanes.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for being with us
today. I look forward to your testimony. I know it takes a lot
of time and effort to get ready for these things, so I do
appreciate that commitment.
Last month, I led a delegation of Members to China, Japan,
and South Korea and witnessed first-hand the importance of
building new partnerships and continuing to improve existing
relationships with the Asia-Pacific region. Strong U.S.
engagement with this region is vital to both our economy and
security. With such a vast number of people and products
transiting through Asia and the United States every day, we
rely on these partnerships to strengthen security and to
facilitate the movement of people and goods safely and
efficiently.
I look forward to today's discussion on cooperation between
the United States and the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in
regard to the Department of Homeland Security's footprint in
Asia, information sharing between DHS and its private-sector
partners, as well as the on-going work between the U.S. public-
and private-sector entities and their Asia-Pacific
counterparts.
The evolving terrorist threat to both commercial and
passenger transportation systems requires us to constantly
reevaluate how we approach international security in an effort
to develop common security standards with our foreign partners
in the most critical areas. This hearing is an opportunity to
discuss the global partnerships that currently exist as well as
new avenues for cooperation to encourage U.S. economic growth.
Again, I want to thank all the witnesses today. When Sheila
Jackson Lee arrives, we will recognize her for an opening
statement.
Right now, we are pleased to have several distinguished
guests before us today on this important topic. Let me remind
the witnesses that their entire written statements will appear
in the record.
Our first witness is Mr. John Halinski, who currently
serves as Assistant Administrator for the Office of Global
Strategies at TSA.
Welcome back, Mr. Halinski. You are now recognized for your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF JOHN W. HALINSKI, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, OFFICE
OF GLOBAL STRATEGIES, TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Halinski. Thank you. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
the opportunity to testify before you today.
During the next 30 years, Asia's share of world gross
domestic product is expected to grow more than 50 percent. The
Asia-Pacific region already accounts for 30 percent of
passenger air traffic and 40 percent of freight movement. Such
growth in the aviation market requires a more unified
transportation security strategy for the region.
Summarizing TSA efforts in the region, I will start with
Australia. Within Asia-Pacific, Australia is a vital strategic
partner of TSA. We regularly share information, test advance
screening technologies, and provide capability, improving
training in tandem. Australia has been forward-leaning in the
deployment of liquid screening equipment in addition to
advanced imaging technology.
In Thailand, TSA has provided capacity development training
and compliance support in an effort to raise baseline security
at Bangkok's international airport. By coordinating efforts,
TSA has successfully supported improvements that have resulted
in positive change to the airport's threat rating.
TSA's partnership with Singapore is of critical importance.
Singapore influences much of the Asia-Pacific region,
particularly as they hold the chairmanship of the ICAO Aviation
Security Panel. TSA and Singapore are in the process to
establish mutual cargo recognition and a variety of other
initiatives.
In China, sustained economic growth and increasing tourism
are driving the need for aviation infrastructure development
and capacity development. Boeing projects the Chinese aircraft
fleet will increase 400 percent by 2030, making China the
second-largest market for aircraft worldwide. Investment in
China's aviation industry is likely to reach $230 billion in
the next 5 years.
TSA is seeking new ways to engage with China and its Civil
Aviation Administration. For example, TSA recently joined the
Aviation Cooperation Program, or ACP, a robust public-private
partnership between our countries. Hosted by the ACP, the 2011
U.S.-China Aviation Summit identified technical, policy, and
commercial interests between the United States and China.
Participants discussed topics such as international
cooperation, airport development, air cargo infrastructure, and
general aviation. In promoting specific commercial
opportunities for U.S. businesses, TSA hopes to introduce U.S.
security and safety technologies and operations to improve in
aviation interests.
As Korea and Japan grow as major tourist transit points, it
is critical that threats from other countries within the region
be mitigated by using intelligence-based security measures.
Korea's aviation market also has grown significantly. Its
largest airport, Incheon International, was designed to handle
39 million passengers, but growth forecasts have rapidly
exceeded that. Incheon is now being expanded in several phases
to make it the largest hub in Asia, with an annual capacity of
100 million passengers and more than 7 million tons of cargo
per year.
In May 2010, TSA and its Korean counterpart began
establishing a formal bilateral cooperation group. Areas of
mutual interest include joint airport inspections and
collaboration on policy and technology for screening liquids,
aerosols, and gels. I will also attend an Aviation Security
Cooperation Group meeting in Seoul in 2 weeks.
Korea was the first country in the Asia-Pacific to purchase
and deploy advanced imaging technology. The rollout of this
equipment occurred just before the 2010 summit. TSA hopes to
continue the collaboration on technology with Korea.
Going forward, TSA is coordinating efforts to engage with
Japan on aviation security efforts, particularly as a regional
partner in enhancing baseline aviation security in less capable
countries. In addition to bilateral relationships, TSA engages
with international partners via multilateral organizations,
including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation. The most
important multilateral organization TSA engages with for the
Asia-Pacific, though, is the International Civil Aviation
Organization, or ICAO, a subsidy of the United Nations. TSA
encourages Korea and Japan to play a more active role in ICAO
and supports these nations as aviation security leaders in the
region.
One of TSA's cornerstone programs in the international air
cargo arena is the recognition of commensurate national cargo
security programs. This program permits operators to accept
cargo screened and secured further back in the supply chain and
decreases the rescreening requirements at last-points-of-
departure airports.
TSA has engaged China, Korea, and Japan on strengthening
supply chain security. Key initiatives include developing
baseline technology, defining high-risk cargo, appropriate
mitigation methods, and further development of regulated agent
and known consignor programs.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear today before you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Halinksi follows:]
Prepared Statement of John W. Halinski
April 18, 2012
Good afternoon Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today about the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA)
international cooperation on transportation security, challenges we
face, and areas for improved partnerships that will promote both
security and commerce.
TSA recognizes the significance of the growth in the Asia-Pacific
region given that it is expected for the region's share of global GDP
to increase significantly over the next 30 years. This will likely
result in significant increases in the transportation sector as people
and goods move to, from and within the region. With industry projecting
that Asia-Pacific countries will account for roughly half of the
world's air traffic growth by 2030, TSA has made a concerted effort to
engage with the major economies of the region, including China, Korea,
and Japan.
the people's republic of china
China's civil aviation sector has undergone significant development
in the last two decades and continues on a fast-paced upward
trajectory. Sustained economic growth and increasingly high tourism
rates have driven the need for infrastructure development and capacity
building in its aviation sector. With such expansion in the aviation
sector, China is an important partner for TSA both on a bilateral basis
and as a player in the transportation sector. TSA actively seeks new
ways to engage with China and, in 2011, became a member of the Aviation
Cooperation Program (ACP) which is a public-private partnership between
the U.S. Government, the Chinese Government, U.S. industry, and the
Chinese aviation industry.
In 2011, the ACP hosted the U.S.-China Aviation Summit to address
areas of continued growth and partnership in aviation development
between the two nations. Participants in the summit discussed airport
development, air cargo infrastructure, airport and aircraft security,
general aviation, air traffic management, airline operations and
training opportunities. In promoting specific commercial opportunities
for American businesses and expanding overall trade opportunities in
China, TSA hopes to introduce U.S. security and safety technologies and
operations that can improve immediate and long-term aviation interests
globally.
TSA also hopes to work with its Chinese counterparts, the Civil
Aviation Administration of China (CAAC) on aviation security technology
development and standards including collaboration on product
capability, standards, quality control and maintenance in order to
harmonize the capabilities and standards of Chinese manufactured
aviation security equipment to complement screening technologies
internationally. Chinese technology experts currently test and qualify
U.S.-manufactured equipment as part of the tendering process for
equipment bids in China. In concert with these activities, TSA will
continue testing aviation security equipment from Chinese companies to
promote greater partnership in this area.
Going forward, TSA and its Chinese counterparts have agreed to
exchange information and best practices regarding a number of aviation
security programs including behavioral detection, supply chain
security, and airport design. Additionally, both sides have committed
to work toward harmonization in future multilateral forums. While the
goal of ``harmonization'' is lofty, TSA will begin progress in this
area by simply sharing positions in advance with CAAC and soliciting
their comment/input for the upcoming International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) Assembly. To this end, Administrator Pistole
recently met with CAAC counterparts in September 2011 and hopes to
personally visit Beijing this year for an expanded conversation.
Assistant Administrator Halinski also visited CAAC in Beijing in March
2012 and will return to China in May to participate in the China Civil
Aviation Forum.
the republic of korea
As a result of rapid economic growth, high exports, and increased
tourism, Korea's aviation market has grown significantly. In May 2010,
TSA and its Korean counterpart, the Ministry of Land, Transport, and
Maritime Affairs (MLTM), signed a Terms of Reference establishing a
formal bilateral cooperation group through which the two entities could
pursue multiple work streams for consideration and possible action.
Areas of particular mutual interest between the two countries include
joint airport inspections and collaboration on policy and technology
for screening of Liquids, Aerosols, and Gels (LAGs). The next Aviation
Security Cooperation Group meeting is scheduled to take place in May
2012 in Seoul and will be attended by Assistant Administrator Halinski.
Administrator Pistole met with his MLTM counterpart for bilateral
discussions at an ICAO meeting in Malaysia during January 2012. In
addition, Korea was the first Asia-Pacific country to have purchased
and deployed Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT). TSA assisted its Korean
counterparts by providing resources and information regarding the
technology and background information regarding U.S. studies on the
equipment particularly in Automated Target Recognition for AIT and LAGs
screening equipment. In addition to these activities, TSA has provided
enhanced security measures on flights to Seoul during the lead-up to
major international events including the G20 and Nuclear Security
summit.
japan
With its multiple international airports, eleven of which have last
point of departure (LPD) service to the United States, Japan is
considered a regional transportation hub and is a strong aviation
security leader in international and multilateral fora. Following the
March 2011 earthquake, tsunami, and subsequent Fukushima nuclear
incident, Japan has focused its efforts inward on recovery and
stabilization. Funding previously designated for aviation security
infrastructure investments, particularly screening equipment such as
AIT, has been reallocated to recovery efforts. While TSA had no direct
role in disaster recovery, the incident highlighted the strong
relationship shared with Japan, evident though constant communication
and coordination.
TSA is coordinating efforts to re-engage with Japan on aviation
security, particularly as a regional partner in enhancing baseline
aviation security in other Asia-Pacific countries. Japan is active
within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and regularly
invites TSA subject matter experts to participate in the aviation
security working group. Japan's Civil Aviation Bureau has also
requested that TSA work on capacity building with the Japan
International Cooperation Agency (JICA), which conducts aviation
security training and hosts training sessions for a wide spectrum of
nations. TSA participated in JICA training in February 2010 and has
been offered the opportunity to participate in extended training at the
Yokohama facility in the future. TSA intends to harmonize capacity
development efforts to maximize the value of both USG and Japanese
efforts.
multilateral engagement
In addition to our bilateral relationships, TSA engages with
international partners via multilateral fora, including the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which supports sustainable
economic growth and prosperity in the region with the collaboration of
21 economies. APEC also works to advance transportation security
through the APEC Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF) and the
Transportation Working Group (TPTWG). Through key projects and
proposals, TSA seeks to advance information sharing, capacity building,
and public awareness in areas such as canine screening, cargo security,
bus transportation anti-terrorism practices, and checkpoint
optimization measures while encouraging economic development. APEC
representatives from Japan, China, and Korea have engaged in these
efforts by providing expert knowledge and feedback that help shape
agendas to best address the needs of the participating economies while
benefiting from the exchange of information and best practices on key
transportation security issues.
From a global perspective, the most important multilateral forum
with which TSA engages is ICAO, a subsidiary of the United Nations and
aviation's international governing body. As the U.S. Government's
representative to the ICAO Aviation Security Panel of Experts (AVSECP),
TSA works with other international representatives to shape
international aviation security standards on important issues such as
cargo security and coordination of capacity development.
strengthening international cooperation
While transportation security varies from country to country,
China, Korea, and Japan are leaders within the Asia-Pacific region. All
three countries are compliant with baseline ICAO requirements following
routine TSA airport assessments and air carrier inspection and are
considered to have a strong security posture by TSA's international
compliance branch.
A significant ICAO initiative to strengthen baseline aviation
security is centered on promoting air cargo supply chain security
practices amongst ICAO member-states. These efforts focus on defining
high-risk cargo and appropriate mitigation measures, known consignors,
and regulated agent security standards. Regulated agent programs are a
widely-accepted baseline security measure implemented by many member-
states, though there is significant room for growth to expand and
strengthen these principles in the region.
TSA's efforts are directly aligned with the National Strategy for
Supply Chain Security and TSA's risk-based security approach for the
aviation sector. Developed in close coordination with industry
stakeholders, these efforts coalesce in a consistent message from both
the U.S. public and private sector and enhance both the security and
facilitation of commerce. To this end, TSA works to recognize National
Cargo Security Programs (NCSPs) around the world in order to further
strengthen international air cargo arena security regimes. This effort
allows operators to accept cargo screened and secured throughout the
supply chain, decreases the re-screening requirements at last-point-of-
departure airports, limits backlogs, and facilitates commerce. TSA has
been coordinating with Japan and is working with Korea to identify
potential paths forward. We plan to engage China on a bilateral basis
to evaluate their supply chain security systems, promote solutions
which increase global security, and allow for the facilitation of
international commerce.
conclusion
TSA plans to continue strengthening supply chain security with
China, Korea, and Japan. In addition to NCSP recognition, TSA will work
to develop baseline technology standards and define high-risk cargo and
appropriate mitigation methods. TSA also hopes to leverage the strength
of China, Korea, and Japan across the Asia-Pacific region to harmonize
training, capacity improvement, and outreach to developing countries.
TSA will utilize multilateral fora such as APEC and ICAO, as well as
bilateral engagement, to strengthen baseline international security
standards while continuing to develop partnerships within the region.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
TSA's cooperation with international partners on transportation
security, challenges we face, and areas for improved relationships that
will promote the free and secure flow of travelers and commerce.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Halinski, for your testimony. We
appreciate you being here today. I know your time is valuable.
Our second witness is Mr. Mark Koumans, who is the Deputy
Assistant Secretary of the Office of International Affairs, the
Office of Policy at DHS.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Koumans for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF MARK R. KOUMANS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Koumans. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the Department's engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.
It is a pleasure to testify next to John Halinski, with
whom I am in touch weekly, if not daily, as well as Ambassador
Klemm, with whom I worked closely while he was coordinator for
rule of law and law enforcement at the U.S. Embassy in
Afghanistan.
Four of the top 10 U.S. trading partners--China, Japan,
South Korea, and Taiwan--are in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan,
Australia, and South Korea represent three of the top nine
participants in the Visa Waiver Program, accounting for some
4.5 million visitors to the United States a year. Security
treaties tie us to five allies in the region, and so DHS must
work closely with partners in the region to safeguard our
transportation networks, interdict threats, and facilitate
trade and travel.
Today's interconnected world means that seemingly isolated
events often have transnational origins and global
consequences. Although the flow of goods, ideas, and people
sustains our economy and promotes our interests, it also
creates borderless security challenges. We share a vested
interest in the region's stability, security, and prosperity.
We work with our partners to identify, detect, prevent, and
respond to threats which endanger the United States and our
allies. We are deepening and broadening our relationships with
partners like Australia, Japan, and South Korea. We are
building new partnerships with countries like China, Indonesia,
and Malaysia. We are leveraging the momentum of APEC. Last
week, Secretary Napolitano traveled to Australia and New
Zealand, where she concluded several texts to cooperate more
closely. In April, Deputy Secretary Jane Holl Lute traveled to
Japan and India, and Assistant Secretary Bersin also visited
Singapore and Malaysia.
I would like to highlight just a few of our regional
efforts.
Trusted Traveler and Trusted Trader programs facilitate the
secure movement of people and goods and help address the
exploitation of the global supply chain. We are expanding the
Global Entry program, as the Secretary said, in Canberra and
Wellington. Global Entry allows expedited clearance for pre-
approved low-risk air travelers upon arrival.
Customs and Border Protection's Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT, is a major incentive for
enhancing security for manufacturers and shippers. CBP conducts
on-site validation of their facilities to help defeat supply
chain disruptions. Companies benefit from expedited customs
clearance. Mutual recognition agreements exist with Japan, New
Zealand, and South Korea, and we have pilot programs in China.
As DHS builds our security programs, we find that we have
ready partners in Asia-Pacific to address our law enforcement
challenges. Our ICE and Secret Service officers stationed in
the region work with their counterparts to disrupt criminal
organizations, including those that present potential terrorist
threats. DHS focuses its efforts on human smuggling, child sex
tourism, smuggling, and counterfeiting, including
counterproliferation, and intellectual property rights
violations. Our efforts to disrupt and deter these security
threats also strengthen the disruption and deterrence of
transnational terrorists. In partnership with DOD and State,
DHS shares knowledge and expertise with its Asia-Pacific
partners via training programs.
I would also like to highlight the importance of
information-sharing arrangements, such as our Preventing and
Combating Serious Crime, or PCSC, agreements. PCSC agreements
are part of the Visa Waiver Program's information-sharing
requirements. We have signed agreements with Australia, South
Korea, and Taiwan, and we have a substantially agreed text with
New Zealand. We are seeking agreements with Brunei, Japan, and
Singapore.
By building cooperative relationships and promoting
capacity building, DHS is helping to raise the standard for
regional transnational security and advancing our own security.
We are committed to a DHS presence and support for partners in
the region. DHS and United States leadership and engagement in
the Asia-Pacific region is essential to our long-term security.
The growth in Asia-Pacific will inevitably present both
challenges and opportunities for the United States. DHS is
committed to seizing opportunities and meeting those
challenges.
Chairman Rogers and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I
have submitted a written statement that I am grateful you
indicated would be included in the record. I would be happy to
answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Koumans follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark R. Koumans
April 18, 2012
introduction
Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee and
distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's engagement in Asia-
Pacific, a dynamic region of integral importance to the Department's
mission abroad.
As a diverse region, encompassing a broad range of cultures,
societies, and economies, Asia-Pacific shares many common interests
with the United States. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
engagement in the region is predicated on a belief that we must work
closely with regional counterparts to safeguard our shared
transportation networks, interdict threats before they reach America's
shores, and facilitate legitimate trade and travel.
The interconnected nature of world economies and international
infrastructure means that seemingly isolated events often have
transnational origins and global consequences. The increased flow of
goods, ideas, and people around the world and across U.S. borders helps
sustain our economy and promote our interests, but also creates
security challenges that are increasingly borderless and
unconventional. These trends are particularly evident in Asia-Pacific,
where rapid economic growth is coupled with an array of non-traditional
security threats. The attempted bombing of Northwest Flight No. 253 on
December 25, 2009, and the subsequent air cargo plot that was exposed
in October 2010, demonstrated that U.S. homeland security is
interdependent with the security of other nations, and these threats
can come from a variety of sources.
overarching engagement priorities
Before delving into the specifics of the Department's activities in
Asia-Pacific, I would like to address the overarching guidance that
drives our engagement abroad. The Department's first Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review (QHSR), released on February 1, 2010, clearly
states our five priority missions. Mission No. 1 is preventing
terrorist attacks against the United States and the American people.
DHS also integrates preventing terrorism into its four other primary
missions--securing and managing our borders, enforcing and
administering our immigration laws, safeguarding and securing our
cyberspace, and ensuring resilience to disasters of all kinds.
Internationally, DHS accomplishes these five missions by:
Working with international organizations to adopt common
security standards;
Developing agreements with key partner states to implement
high security standards; and
Enabling or encouraging partners to enhance security through
concrete steps.
In order to prevent threats from reaching the homeland from abroad,
we work with our international partners to try to identify, detect,
prevent, and respond to threats. Many of them threaten not only the
United States but also our allies, with whom we have made common cause
in the struggle against the threat of terrorism. To this end, we work
with foreign partners to respond operationally to security threats and
to share knowledge and expertise that will ultimately improve our
respective capabilities.
importance of asia-pacific to dhs
As an Asia-Pacific country, the United States shares a vested
interest in the region's stability, security, and prosperity. This
interest is amplified by Asia's growing role as an engine for global
economic growth, and its increasing engagement in transnational
security issues. Today, the United States enjoys extensive trade and
travel linkages with a number of countries in the region, including
four of our top ten trading partners--China, Japan, South Korea, and
Taiwan--and counts five treaty allies: Australia, Japan, the
Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand.
This degree of economic interdependence makes securing and
facilitating the legitimate movement of goods and people between the
United States and Asia a matter of paramount importance. Our shared
interests in protecting and promoting global prosperity have enabled
DHS to forge strong working relationships with many regional
counterparts, and create opportunities for expanded engagement across
the entire homeland security mission set.
Despite the Asia-Pacific region's tremendous growth, the region
still faces some of the most pressing security challenges of the 21st
Century, including many non-traditional threats such as terrorism,
cyber attacks, violent extremism, piracy, arms trafficking, and
transnational crime. These challenges are compounded in some parts of
the region by lack of effective border and immigration controls. Recent
terrorist activity in Southeast Asia, including the disrupted plot in
Bangkok in February 2012, indicate that, despite significant progress
since 9/11, the region still faces serious threats. This, in turn,
demands proactive and sustained engagement to build capacity, elevate
security standards, and develop collaborative solutions for
transnational challenges.
dhs engagement in asia-pacific: significant partners, myriad challenges
DHS engagement in Asia-Pacific is nested within the
administration's broader strategy to increase American strategic
engagement in, and focus on, Asia. In particular, the Department seeks
to deepen and broaden relationships with its counterparts in Japan,
South Korea, and Australia; build new partnerships with its
counterparts in China, Indonesia, and Malaysia; and develop robust
operational cooperation to address transnational threats.
Working bilaterally, and through multilateral fora such as the
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum (APEC), DHS pursues a series of
objectives within the region:
Deny physical, ideological, or virtual safe havens to
terrorists, violent extremists, and transnational criminals;
Establish secure travel corridors that identify and
criminals or terrorists while facilitating legitimate travel;
Develop a safe, secure, efficient, and resilient supply
chain;
Promote robust information sharing arrangements that
facilitate law enforcement cooperation while ensuring the
protection of privacy in accordance with U.S. law and DHS
policy;
Develop mature bilateral dialogues on cybersecurity; and
Enhance regional disaster response and emergency management
capabilities.
DHS prioritizes its regional engagement based on a dynamic threat
environment, vulnerabilities, and U.S. National security and foreign
policy objectives.
dhs programs in the asia-pacific region
DHS works with our partners in the region to build a framework that
shares security costs and responsibilities. Regional cooperation in the
areas of port and border security capacity, combined with a general
regional commitment to more enhanced cooperation, allows DHS to utilize
a wide range of programs to address the rapidly evolving challenges of
Asia-Pacific. I would like to highlight a few of our regional efforts.
Port Environment
The United States Coast Guard (USCG), working within the framework
of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code
encourages bilateral and multilateral discussions throughout the region
in an effort to exchange information and share best practices that
align implementation and enforcement requirements to international
maritime security standards. The USCG works closely with all of our
regional trading partners including its partners in China, Japan, and
South Korea, to promote reasonable and consistent implementation and
enforcement of the ISPS code for enhanced maritime security in
countries (and ports) that participate in global trade. The USCG also
leads multilateral efforts to promote maritime safety and law
enforcement through participation in and promotion of the North Pacific
Coast Guard's Forum.
Air Environment
As we look at the geography of Asia-Pacific, it becomes immediately
apparent that secure travel means aviation security. Passenger and air
cargo movements are growing rapidly--the region surpassed North America
as the largest aviation market in 2009, and in 2011, 10 of the top 30
airports, measured in terms of passenger travel, are in Asia-Pacific.
The security of this travel requires the same standards for vigilance
and due attention to security that we work to develop with our European
partners. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
developed an effective series of programs such as the intelligence-
driven, risk-based screening methods Foreign Airport Assessment
program, which Mr. Halinski will address, and DHS components deploy
effective personnel, port and border security efforts, multiple layers
of security structure.
The Immigration Advisory Program (IAP) is a partnership between
DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), foreign governments,
and commercial air carriers to identify and prevent high-risk travelers
who are likely to be inadmissible into the United States from boarding
U.S.-bound flights. CBP officer teams are stationed or deployed on a
temporary basis to work with foreign law enforcement and air carriers
at key airports in host countries. The Immigration Advisory Program
(IAP) teams in Asia-Pacific assess passengers and their documentation
with targeting support from the CBP National Targeting Center to
identify high-risk passengers. The CBP officers provide the on-site
capability to question and assess travelers and serve as a direct
liaison with foreign authorities. The IAP has been in operation at
Tokyo-Narita since January 2007 and deployed to Seoul-Incheon from
January 2008 and June 2011. From 2007, the IAP has provided 1,945 no-
board recommendations to air carriers on flights from those locations.
Identifying these high-risk travelers before they made it to the United
States addressed potential threats before they reached our borders.
DHS programs also include Trusted Traveler and Trusted Trader
programs that are essential for our international engagement in the
region. These programs facilitate the secure movement of goods and
people wherever they have been applied and represent essential steps
forward in broader international security. These programs are the core
elements that enable DHS to secure the Nation against the direct threat
of transnational crime against the homeland--including the movement of
terrorists--and secure the Nation against the exploitation of the
global supply chain for illicit purpose. Global Entry is a U.S. program
for U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and growing number of
foreign citizens that allows expedited clearance for pre-approved, low-
risk air travelers upon arrival. The President's January Executive
Order Establishing Visa and Foreign Visitor Processing Goals and the
Task Force on Travel and Competitiveness supports development of
similar partner nation programs and the potential for mutual
recognition arrangements. These mutual recognition arrangements greatly
facilitate movement through immigration control for pre-vetted
international travelers. More importantly, these arrangements will
allow the United States and our Asia-Pacific partners to focus our
security efforts on those individuals about whom we know the least. CBP
is in the process of establishing a mutual recognition arrangement with
South Korea, and we see additional opportunities for expanding these
arrangements with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Singapore. We are
also working on providing Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC)
Business Travel Cards to eligible U.S. citizens participating in CBP's
trusted traveler programs. This will enable them to use dedicated entry
lines at participating APEC economies and speed up our mutual private
sector exchange. In addition, as my colleague Mr. Halinski will
testify, TSA has efforts underway to achieve mutual recognition of air
cargo security programs with foreign partners, effectively according
them Trusted Trader status.
Supply Chain Security
In line with the recently released National Strategy for Global
Supply Chain Security, DHS is working with key partners to develop
regional commitment to efficient, secure, and resilient global supply
chains Secretary Napolitano signed joint statements with New Zealand in
2011 and just recently with Singapore on April 11, with the intent of
expanding on our already solid bilateral cooperative relationships by
facilitating legitimate trade and travel, while preventing terrorists
from exploiting supply chains; protecting transportation systems from
attacks and disruptions; and increasing the resilience of global supply
chains.
For example, through CBP's Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT), DHS participates in on-site validations of
manufacturing and logistics facilities to enhance cargo security in 97
countries. Mutual recognition between C-TPAT and the Authorized
Economic Operators programs of our Asia-Pacific partners is a sharp
incentive for enhancing security for the manufacturers and shippers
that voluntarily participate in the program. Over the last 4 years, DHS
has established mutual recognition of these programs with Japan, New
Zealand, and South Korea. Pilot programs in China and other states are
also promoting higher standards of security within the private sector
with the objective of preventing costly disruption to international
trade and commerce.
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) continues to be a highly
successful program in partnership with foreign authorities to identify
and inspect high-risk cargo containers originating at ports throughout
the world before they are loaded on vessels destined for the United
States. Key Asia-Pacific partners include high-volume ports in China,
Japan, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, South Korea, Malaysia, and
Singapore.
As DHS continues to build upon cooperative security programs, we
find that we have ready partners in Asia-Pacific to address cross-
cutting challenges to our law enforcement activities. Our U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Secret Service
officers stationed in the region develop relationships and work with
their local counterparts to disrupt criminal organizations, including
potential terrorist threats. We focus our investigatory efforts on many
forms of smuggling and counterfeiting including counter-proliferation,
child sex tourism, intellectual property rights violations, and human
smuggling. These criminal efforts would use many of the same gaps and
weaknesses that violent extremists seek to exploit. Our efforts to
disrupt and deter these non-traditional security threats also
strengthen disruption and deterrence of the transnational terrorist.
Information Sharing Collaboration
I would also like to highlight the importance of information
sharing arrangements such as our Preventing and Combating Serious Crime
(PCSC) agreements with Asia-Pacific countries that are members of or
seeking designation in the U.S. Visa Waiver Program. PCSC agreements
establish the framework for a new method of law enforcement cooperation
by providing each party electronic access to their fingerprint
databases on a query (hit/no hit) basis. The agreement exemplifies the
type of cooperative law enforcement partnership that enhances both
sides' ability to more quickly and efficiently prevent and investigate
crime and prevent the entry of criminals and terrorists into our
respective countries. We have signed PCSC agreements with Australia,
South Korea, and Taiwan, and are seeking similar such agreements with
Brunei, Japan, New Zealand, and Singapore.
States in Asia-Pacific as disparate as Australia, Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Japan are increasingly adopting sophisticated standards
for positively identifying individuals, particularly criminals. DHS has
worked with the Department of State, Department of Justice, and our
partners in the region to develop collaborative programs, including
assistance efforts where appropriate, to prevent the free movement of
bad actors across international borders. The Philippines biometric
initiative is a great example of cooperative sustained efforts to
prevent potential criminal or terrorist travel. As part of this effort,
an ICE Visa Security Unit worked directly with Philippine law
enforcement units to catalogue biometric data on individuals convicted
of terrorist acts.
By building cooperative relationships and promoting capacity
building, DHS is helping to raise the standard for regional
transnational security and, more importantly, concretely advancing the
security of the United States. But, there is still important work to be
done. Our aim in Asia-Pacific is to facilitate the development of a
model for secure trade and travel. We applaud the Malaysian passage of
their 2010 Strategic Trade Act, aimed at counter-proliferation and
smuggling of strategic goods, but we must also work with our Malaysian
customs counterparts in sharing best practices and practical solutions
to the challenges that they face based on our experience in
implementing export control legislation. We must also continue to
develop and contribute to information-sharing arrangements, including
PCSC agreements, in order to prevent the free movement of known threats
and risks while ensuring the protection of privacy and civil rights.
And we must remain committed to DHS presence and support for partners
in the region.
conclusion
United States leadership in the Asia-Pacific region is essential to
our long-term security and DHS will continue to play an important role.
The dramatic growth of Asian economies and our many linkages with the
region require a proactive cooperative approach that anticipates
sustained long-term growth while minimizing transnational threats. The
growth in Asia-Pacific will inevitably present both significant
challenges and opportunities for the United States. DHS is committed to
meeting these challenges and seizing opportunities through
comprehensive international engagement.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and distinguished
Members of the House Committee, let me conclude by reiterating that I
look forward to exploring opportunities to advance our cooperation with
Asia-Pacific partners. Thank you again for this opportunity to testify.
I would be happy to answer your questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Koumans, for your testimony.
Our third witness is Ambassador Hans Klemm. He is the
economic coordinator and senior U.S. official for Asia-Pacific
economic cooperation at the U.S. State Department.
The Chairman now recognizes Ambassador Klemm for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF HANS G. KLEMM, ECONOMIC COORDINATOR, U.S. SENIOR
OFFICIAL FOR ASIA-PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION, BUREAU OF EAST
ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Klemm. Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairman Rogers and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am grateful to
have this opportunity to testify before you today on building
secure partnerships in travel, commerce, and trade with the
Asia-Pacific region.
As President Obama and Secretary Clinton have underscored,
much of the history of the 21st Century will be written in
Asia. Secretary Clinton, in recognition of this, took her first
overseas trip as Secretary of State to Asia in 2009 and has
returned to the region 10 times since. I was pleased to hear
and learn, Mr. Chairman, that you were also able to lead a
fact-finding delegation to China, the Republic of Korea, and
Japan just last month.
We are constantly striving to strengthen our economic and
security partnerships in Asia. For example, last week the U.S.-
China Strategic and Economic Dialogue took place. This is an
important bilateral forum that allows the United States to
address a wide range of issues with China. Also, the United
States-Korea Free Trade Agreement recently entered into force,
which will create substantial new opportunities for U.S.
exporters to sell more American goods, services, and
agricultural products to Korean consumers and support tens of
thousands of new export-related jobs here at home.
In addition, the United States and Japan recently issued a
Joint Statement on Global Supply Chain Security, which outlines
ways to cooperate more closely to strengthen the security and
resiliency of the global supply chain and promote the timely,
efficient flow of legitimate commerce. Together, our two
countries seek to ensure that regional and global supply chains
are prepared for and can withstand evolving threats and hazards
and can recover rapidly from possible disruptions from acts of
terrorism or natural disasters.
These are just a few ways in which we engage bilaterally in
this region.
Another vital component of our strategic pivot toward Asia
has been the United States' elevated engagement with regional
institutions, including the Association for Southeast Asian
Nations and the forum for Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, or
APEC. ASEAN sits at the center of many of the region's
multilateral institutions, and we are taking steps to broaden
and deepen our already strong partnership with this
organization.
APEC, on the other hand, is also particularly important to
the United States because it is our primary platform for
multilateral engagement with the Asia-Pacific on economic
interests. APEC works to secure the region's transportation
networks, enhance the security and resilience of supply chains,
and help protect the region's economic and financial
infrastructure from attack or misuse. Because of its economic
focus, APEC seeks ways to strengthen security while also
facilitating the flow of legitimate travelers and commerce.
Today we face a challenge of continuing to promote both the
prosperity and security of the United States as well as of the
Asia-Pacific region. We are looking for new ways to collaborate
and form partnerships, both bilaterally and multilaterally,
with the international community. In the global society in
which we live, America's future success now intrinsically is
linked to the success of others.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to appear
before you and the subcommittee today to discuss building
secure partnerships in travel, commerce, and trade with the
Asia-Pacific region. I am happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Klemm follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hans G. Klemm
May 8, 2012
Good afternoon Chairman Rogers, Ms. Jackson Lee, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today on building secure partnerships in travel, commerce,
and trade with the Asia-Pacific region.
It is my pleasure to be here with my colleagues, Deputy Assistant
Secretary Mark Koumans from the Department of Homeland Security and
Assistant Administrator for Global Strategies John Halinski from the
Transportation Security Administration.
As President Obama and Secretary Clinton have underscored, much of
the history of the 21st Century will be written in Asia. Secretary
Clinton took her first overseas trip as Secretary of State to Asia in
2009 and has returned to the region ten times since. I was pleased to
hear that Chairman Rogers led a fact-finding Congressional delegation
to China, the Republic of Korea, and Japan just last month. The United
States is committed to building mature and effective partnerships in
the Asia-Pacific region that can mobilize common action and settle
disputes peacefully, so that we can work toward fostering rules and
norms that help manage relations between peoples, markets, and nations,
and establish security arrangements that provide stability and build
trust. We believe that now is the time to make the necessary
investments towards ensuring a robust and coherent cooperative
environment in the Asia-Pacific and that America's future success will
be dependent on the success of the region as a whole.
The world of the 21st Century is increasingly linked by new
technologies, rapid increases in international trade and financial
flows, global supply chain networks, and the rapid proliferation of
competitive companies. It poses both tremendous opportunities for trade
and investment--and job creation--as well as new challenges. The United
States is working to build a seamless economy in the Asia-Pacific by
finding practical and concrete ways to strengthen regional economic
integration, expand trade, and advance regulatory cooperation and
convergence. Participating in Asia's growth is central to our economic
prosperity, as it is one of the fastest growing regions and withstood
the 2008 economic crisis better than the rest of the world.
We are constantly striving to strengthen our bilateral relations,
which form the basis for many of our economic and security partnerships
in Asia. Last week, the U.S.-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue
convened. This is an important bilateral forum that allows the United
States to address a wide range of issues with China. Also, the U.S.-
Korea Free Trade Agreement recently entered into force, which will
create substantial new opportunities for U.S. exporters to sell more
American goods, services, and agricultural products to Korean customers
and support tens of thousands of new export-related jobs here at home.
In addition, the United States and Japan recently issued the U.S.-Japan
Joint Statement on Global Supply Chain Security, which outlines ways to
cooperate more closely to strengthen the security and resiliency of the
global supply chain and promote the timely, efficient flow of
legitimate commerce. Together, our two countries seek to ensure that
regional and global supply chains are prepared for, and can withstand,
evolving threats and hazards, and can recover rapidly from possible
disruptions such as terrorism and natural disasters. These are just a
few ways in which we engage bilaterally in this region.
I also want to highlight a vital component of our strategic pivot
toward Asia, the United States' elevated engagement with regional
institutions, including the Association for Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF),
the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Plus, the Secretary's Lower Mekong
Initiative, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum.
ASEAN sits at the center of many of the region's multilateral
institutions, and we are taking steps to broaden and deepen our already
strong partnership with ASEAN. In 2010, we were the first non-ASEAN
country to open a dedicated Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta, and in 2011,
President Obama appointed our first resident Ambassador to ASEAN, David
Carden. We maintain communications on a range of issues, including
policy, security, economics, standards, and energy, as part of our
comprehensive engagement with ASEAN. We have also committed to support
ASEAN's Strategic Transport Plan in our U.S.-ASEAN Plan of Action 2011-
2015. Additionally, the ARF has proven itself to be an important body
to address the region's pressing security concerns, including maritime
security. We are working closely with the Coast Guard to co-host with
Korea and Indonesia an ARF meeting to discuss civil maritime law
enforcement cooperation and how we can build stronger partnerships in
the region on issues like port security and environmental disaster
response. The USTR-led Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement
(TIFA) also represents our expanding engagement with ASEAN. This year,
we are increasing our focus on U.S. export opportunities and commercial
engagement with ASEAN, through the TIFA, as whole-of-government, and
with a focus on concrete sectors that ASEAN is supporting through the
ASEAN Master Plan on Connectivity. We are putting an infrastructure in
place to sustain our increased engagement and help these institutions
continue to develop into results-oriented and effective bodies capable
of mustering collective action to address pressing transnational
challenges.
In addition to ASEAN, APEC is particularly important to the United
States because it is our primary organization for multilateral
engagement with the Asia-Pacific on economic interests. The 21 APEC
members account for 55 percent of the world's GDP, 45 percent of global
trade, and 40 percent of the world's population. Sixty percent of U.S.
export goods go to APEC economies and five of America's top seven trade
partners are APEC members.
APEC is unique in that it already has the tools and focus to ensure
regional economic prosperity by promoting policies that will spur long-
term economic growth and ensure all citizens have the opportunity to
thrive in the global economy. It promotes free and open trade and
investment and initiatives to build healthy and resilient economies.
APEC also maintains a unique partnership with the private sector--
including many of the region's leading companies--which ensures that
its initiatives are focused, constructive, and of tangible benefit to
all economic stakeholders. It is a prime example of how we can leverage
the interconnectedness of our economies to benefit the region.
APEC brings together officials at every level of government--from
leaders to technical experts--to tackle a multiplicity of important
issues in practical and concrete ways. While APEC's main focus is on
strengthening regional economic integration by addressing barriers to
trade and investment, its members recognize that security plays a vital
role in a healthy and growing economy. APEC works to secure the
region's transportation networks, enhance the security and resilience
of the supply chains, and help protect the region's economic and
financial infrastructure from attack or misuse.
APEC's commitment to securing the transportation of people and
goods is reflected in the APEC Consolidated Counter-Terrorism and
Secure Trade Strategy, endorsed by APEC Ministers last year. The
Strategy highlights secure travel and secure supply chains as two of
its priority areas of work over the next 5 years. In recent years, APEC
committees have undertaken projects designed to protect aviation, land,
and maritime transportation from terrorist attacks and other
disruptions. Because of its economic focus, APEC seeks ways to
strengthen security while also facilitating the flow of legitimate
travelers and commerce. For this reason, APEC has taken a particular
interest in fostering layered, risk-based approaches to security, which
allows authorities to expedite legitimate trade and travel, while
focusing on a small percentage of goods and travelers that may pose a
greater risk.
One example of this approach is the Travel Facilitation Initiative
(TFI). The TFI is a multi-year initiative that was introduced by the
United States and was endorsed at the 2011 APEC Leaders Meeting. The
TFI is meant to expedite the movement of travelers across the Asia-
Pacific region, with the goal of enabling more efficient, more secure,
and less stressful travel. It benefits business and non-business
travelers, the private sector and governments. The TFI includes a range
of programs including: an APEC Airport Partnership Program envisioned
to showcase best practices and build capacity on the efficient and
secure processing of travelers for international departures and
arrivals at airports; the APEC Business Travel Card which allows
frequent business and government travelers expedited immigration
processing; a Network of Trusted Traveler Programs for Ports of Entry
which is still under development, but ultimately could dramatically
reduce processing times for travelers while enabling high levels of
security throughout the region. I would note that a bilateral Trusted
Traveler program was agreed to last year and is currently under
development between the Republic of Korea and the United States, and
last week the United States and Japan announced they would work to
establish a bilateral program as well. The TFI also includes the
Facilitation of Air Passenger Security Screening which has the goal of
fostering technologies and approaches that will increase travel
efficiency and security in the region--APEC already supports capacity-
building workshops to implement low-cost ways to screen passengers and
baggage as well as canine security programs--and the Advance Passenger
Information Program. By receiving passenger information in advance of
travel, APEC economies can identify and mitigate risks and expedite the
processing of legitimate travelers through ports of entry and focus
resources on those requiring additional scrutiny. APEC as a whole seeks
to enhance the resiliency of regional trade, travel, finance, and
infrastructure against attacks and other disruptions, as this is
critical to the health of our economic systems.
conclusion
Today we face the challenge of continuing to promote the prosperity
and security of the United States, as well as the Asia-Pacific region.
We are looking for new ways to collaborate and form partnerships both
bilaterally and multilaterally with the international community,
because in the global society in which we live, America's future
success is now intrinsically linked to the success of others.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
building secure partnerships in travel, commerce, and trade with the
Asia-Pacific region, I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Klemm, for that testimony.
The Chairman now recognizes himself for questions.
Mr. Halinski, you mentioned commensurate cargo screening.
Tell me more about that. That is the first time I have heard
that term. I know we have talked about the concept, but I
didn't know you all had a program in place.
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. What I mean by that is the
recognition of a country's national cargo security program. The
way we look at that is a process where we do initial outreach
to the government, we analyze the information that we obtain
from them on their national cargo program. During that
analysis, we look for compatibility so that they are
commensurate so that we ensure that they are meeting the
requirements for 100 percent screening of inbound cargo on
passenger aircraft. Then, at that point, we visit and we ensure
compliance to those measures. Then, at that point, we recognize
them formally as having a program which is commensurate with
the U.S. program for inbound cargo, sir.
Mr. Rogers. So that is inbound cargo on passenger planes.
You are not talking about just cargo planes, are you?
Mr. Halinski. Right now, sir, it is inbound cargo on
passenger aircraft, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. That makes sense then. I was hoping that
you had some program I didn't know about that dealt with cargo
planes as well. As you know, that is a bigger problem.
But, anyway, I want to talk to you a little bit about TSA's
national cargo security recognition program. How extensive is
that being used, what you just described? Now, you said it was
with countries, not companies?
Mr. Halinski. It is with countries, sir. What we have done
is we have done an analysis of what we consider--what we have
found after an analysis is that approximately 20 countries
account for 85 percent of the inbound cargo on passenger
aircraft. So what we have done is we are approaching those top
20 countries to recognize their programs first, and then the
other countries that are involved, with the idea that we will
be able by the end of this year to ensure compliance to the
regulation of 100 percent screening of inbound cargo, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Of those 20 countries, how many have you been
able to achieve agreements with?
Mr. Halinski. Right now, sir, we have accomplished nine. We
are in the process of another four. I think by the end of this
year we will have the top 20 complete, sir, plus a couple of
the others.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
Well, you know I am a big fan of the explosive-detection
canines. My view is they provide a flexible, scaleable measure
of screening that other technologies cannot. TSA currently does
not certify private-sector canines for screening cargo, whether
within the United States or in other countries. Does TSA have a
plan to help develop these standards for canine screening
outside the United States?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir, we do. In fact, we have worked--for
example, we have what is called the ``Quad Group,'' which is
Australia, Europe, Canada, and the United States. We have a
working group within there. The idea behind this group is to
push forward advanced technologies and other policies
throughout the world. We have a working group on canine.
Additionally, we have----
Mr. Rogers. On canine certification?
Mr. Halinski. Canine certification, yes, sir. We have also
worked very closely with Europe for canine certification.
We are in the preliminary stages in the Asia-Pacific area,
sir. Last year at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation group
meeting, we had a 2-day conference on canine for Asian
countries. We have a lot of interest from Australia, New
Zealand, Japan, Taiwan on canine programs sir. We also plan to
have another 2-day seminar on canine programs for the Asia-
Pacific this fall, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Are you aware of any Asian country that is not
utilizing canines to assist in baggage and cargo screening?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. I would tell you that most of the
countries in Asia-Pacific do not use canines currently.
It is something that we are trying to get out there to
them. We believe that canines are a significant answer in that
layered effect for cargo screening and passenger screening. We
are trying to push that forward and, for lack of a better term,
we are trying to market it to them, sir, so that they get on
board.
Mr. Rogers. Well, that was one of the things I found in all
three countries that I visited. They were very interested. They
look to us as the gold standard. So I think the more that they
see those assets incorporated into our layered system, the more
they are going to want to emulate that. As you know, I am a big
proponent of vapor wake canines for the passenger screening as
well as for the cargo, and I think there is a lot of interest.
But it is going to be very important that we reach some
certification standards pretty soon. Do you have any kind of an
idea about a time line as to when those certification standards
may be achieved?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I don't right now, but I can get back
with you on a follow-up on when we think that will be
achievable, sir.
Mr. Rogers. I would appreciate that.
The Chairman is now happy to recognize the Ranking Member,
who has graced us with her presence, my friend and colleague
from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for an opening statement and any
questions she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, first of all, for
this follow-up meeting, and to the witnesses that are here for
their graciousness for being here today. Mr. Chairman, thank
you again.
I would like to first join the administration in
recognizing all the men and women in our intelligence and
counterterrorism agencies for their role in yesterday's events
that led to the disruption and capture of a suicide bomber from
Yemen who intended to detonate an explosive aboard a U.S.-bound
flight.
It is noted that the events that unfolded yesterday, and
compounded by the events surrounded the failed attack aboard
Flight 253 on December 25, 2009, display that we must address
vulnerabilities of foreign airports with direct flights to the
United States. The security at these last-point-of-departure
airports is as critical to our aviation security as the
security of our domestic flights.
Just as an aside, Mr. Chairman, and just putting it on the
record, I think it is appropriate that we have, particularly
our Transportation Security Committee--I imagine it will be
something for the entire committee--but a full briefing on the
incident that was at least announced yesterday.
I would also ask that we collaborate together in another
hearing on aviation security. One of the issues that I raised
early on was cabin security, but I think we are familiar with a
new climate dealing with these items or these particular assets
that detonate. What is in the public domain is how they are
detonating, who is using them, the physical aspect of it, and
who is at the genesis of it. So I would hope that we would be
able to have that hearing.
But I look forward to hearing from Mr. Halinski today and
continue the discussion on our efforts to strengthen
international screening processes that yield sustainable
detection capabilities for inbound flights. Recently, the
subcommittee traveled on a CODEL to the Asia-Pacific region,
and I must applaud its structure and its benefits. With a
slight bit of humor, I had to let the Chairman proceed in one
place. I was stuck in an airport for a period of time. But I
gleaned what we were reviewing and reached there shortly
thereafter.
So, Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for allowing me to
join that delegation and be part of co-leading, co-sponsoring
in joining you. We must continue to take critical steps to
strengthen international cooperation on transportation security
with the Asia-Pacific region.
One of the most interesting aspects of the trip was the
opportunity to learn more about Japan's bullet train, also
known as high-speed rail. It is imperative to note that we are
currently in a unique position with regards to ground
transportation security policy. Unlike with aviation, we have
the opportunity to build a brand-new mass transit system and
develop superior security standards at the design level as
opposed to retrofitting an existing system in response to an
attack.
I look forward to continuing this dialogue with the
Department and learning more about best practices gleaned from
other countries on mass transit security.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the
record a statement by the U.S. High-Speed Rail Association
which articulates significant findings concerning this matter.
Mr. Rogers. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Richard P. Lawless, CEO, U.S.-Japan High-Speed Rail, Inc.
(USJHSR)
April 18, 2012
Good Morning, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
other Members of the Subcommittee on Transportation Security. My name
is Richard Lawless, and I am the CEO for United States Japan High-Speed
Rail (USJHSR), LLC.
It is my pleasure to provide a Statement for the Record for the
committee today following the subcommittee's recent visits to Japan,
South Korea, and China, during which Members and staff had the
opportunity to ride high-speed trains in Japan and observe first-hand
the safety and security systems supporting these important national
transportation services.
Since beginning in Japan in 1964, high-speed passenger rail
services have been embraced and further developed by Asian and European
nations. The United States has been noticeably absent. It is long
overdue for the United States to become more serious about how we can
deploy true high-speed rail in the right markets in the United States,
and how we can deliver these services reliably, safely, and securely.
In my statement today, I want to provide the committee with some
additional information regarding Japan's high-speed rail safety and
security programs to complement your trip experiences. I want also to
touch briefly on our plans to deploy high-speed rail service in Texas,
using Japan's considerable high-speed rail expertise and safety/
security experiences.
central japan railway's ``total system'' approach
Given the complexity of high-speed rail operations, high-speed
railways must be conceived from the very beginning as a closely
integrated system.
One of the world's best examples of a ``total system'' approach for
high-speed rail is Central Japan Railway Company (JRC)'s Tokaido
Shinkansen system. Since 1964, with the inauguration of the first high-
speed train service in the world, what we still refer to today as the
``bullet'' train, the Tokaido Shinkansen has maintained a superlative
performance record and a perfect safety record of no passenger
fatalities or injuries due to train accidents, including derailments or
collisions.
In addition, Japan's rail system is designed to withstand major
natural disasters with sophisticated sensors and automated train-stop
systems. The major 9.0 earthquake that struck Japan in March 2011 was a
tragic event, but it proved the safety and effectiveness of Japan's
high-speed rail system--by both alerting train operators to the event
and braking automatically to prevent derailments and safeguard
passengers.
A total system design for high-speed rail considers the physical
and operational dynamics among all the major railway sub-systems
(track, right-of-way, bridges and structures, tunnels, communications
and signals, rolling stock, automated train control systems, operations
centers, power and electrification, stations, support facilities). The
challenge is to optimize and align these components to deliver service
safely, securely, and efficiently.
We know there is much to be learned about the success of Japan's
rail operations, including their approach to rail security.
japan's high-speed rail safety & security systems
High-speed rail safety and high-speed rail security are closely
linked, and the nexus between these system attributes is important to
understand and appreciate.
Japan designed and constructed its Shinkansen system on what is
known as a ``sealed'' corridor. This means that the high-speed rail
system mainline tracks are grade-separated, solely dedicated to
Shinkansen trains, and are specifically designed to restrict and
prevent access by unauthorized vehicles or persons. The security
provided by the sealed corridor of the Shinkansen system is further
complemented by an integrated and layered perimeter of safety and
security measures.
The majority of Japan's high-speed rail system is protected by
barriers (including fences and walls), right-of-way monitoring, CCTV,
and physical access control for key operations centers.
Without compromising security measures and protocols in use in
Japan, here are some examples of Tokaido Shinkansen's security
approach:
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Security cameras are positioned in key locations of the station:
(1) ticket gates (entering and exiting),
(2) stairs/escalators/elevators, and,
(3) station waiting areas/platform.
Cameras will continuously record a passenger entering and leaving
the gates of any Shinkansen station, making it extremely difficult for
a suspicious person to trespass onto the premises unnoticed. Cameras on
the platform are set in a position where they can monitor the track for
the purposes of confirming safe boarding/de-boarding of passengers and
for quickly identifying trespassing or persons entering onto the
tracks. On-board cameras and random patrols by police and security
personnel further serve as detection and deterrent procedures to
safeguard the 140 million and more annual Tokaido Shinkansen passengers
(in fiscal year 2010).
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
On board JRC's Tokaido Shinkansen, which several of you experienced
en route from Kyoto to Tokyo, train conductors are encouraged to
communicate with passengers during their ticket checking. This kind of
customer contact is a proven security measure. In addition to on-board
staff, security guards board the train and patrol randomly.
Security personnel also monitor and patrol the Shinkansen right-of-
way to ensure the integrity of the railroad. On the Tokaido Shinkansen
line, there are 60-90 patrol teams dedicated to maintaining 24/7
coverage of the vital high-speed rail line.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The security approaches to protecting the Tokaido Shinkansen are an
integral part of JRC's ``total system'' approach. All assets of the
high-speed service are examined for vulnerability, hardening,
monitoring, loss consequence, recovery, and redundancy. Over several
decades of practice, Japan has demonstrated the effectiveness of using
technology, railway staff, and design to provide a safe and secure
high-speed service.
international rail security cooperation
The first international rail security conference was held in
February 2005, 11 months after the March 2004 Madrid attacks, and 5
months before the attacks in London. This conference was sponsored by
the Association of American Railroads (AAR) and the Amtrak Office of
Inspector General and served as the beginning of on-going dialogs about
rail security among international rail carriers, including mass
transit, conventional rail, and high-speed rail.
Japan Railway companies continue to participate in these
international discussions. In September 2011, the TSA sponsored a
security conference in Baltimore, attended by railway security experts
from the United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Belgium,
Israel, Russia, Thailand, and Japan. Japan was also represented by
representatives of its Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation
and Tourism (MLIT).
The conferee working groups were solicited for describing both
``current practice'' and ``best practice'' for security measures on
their systems. Information was shared as to roles and responsibilities
of security personnel, training and exercises, alert systems,
infrastructure monitoring, employee background checks, cooperation with
responding agencies, and a myriad of related concerns. Conferees also
discussed collective past experiences and lessons learned from their
activities.
Future meetings for these international security events are
planned, and Japan and USJHSR will continue to participate to garner as
much knowledge as possible to further improve on safety and security
design and practice.
our approach to high-speed rail in the state of texas
The United States is a relative neophyte in true high-speed
passenger rail operations (180-220 MPH), based on current generation
steel-wheel technology, with some limited experiences in the Northeast
Corridor Acela services, but with no real experiences outside that
shared, congested corridor. International carriers have told us that
true high-speed rail operations presents special challenges to secure
and safeguard.
We know the best time to ``design in'' and ``build in'' security
components is at start-up and with our eyes wide open. We have formed a
new company, Texas Central High Speed Railway, LLC (TCR). TCR is a
Texas-based company dedicated to promoting high-speed intercity
passenger rail within the Dallas/Fort Worth-to-Houston corridor.
Strongly supported by JRC, TCR and its partner USJHSR are uniquely
organized to bring world-class high-speed intercity passenger rail to
Texas. Working with community and industry stakeholders to market and
deploy JRC's 5th generation ``N700-I Bullet'' train system and
technology, TCR will offer to the State of Texas the world's safest,
most efficient, most environmentally friendly, and most reliable
intercity transportation solution.
One of our foremost concerns is the safety and security of our new
railroad. In addition to working with DHS and TSA in their security
conferences, we plan to work with the new national High-Speed Rail
Policy Center at the Mineta Transportation Institute (MTI) at San Jose
State University. They have already begun work on high-speed rail
safety and security international benchmarking and best practices for
the design, construction, and operation of new systems, and we will
exchange information with them to ensure we capture all available
technology and experience in our design.
We are very appreciative of the subcommittee's efforts to establish
on-going dialogs with international transportation service groups,
including Central Japan Railway Company, as their considerable
experiences in operating safe and secure high-speed rail systems can be
the foundation on which we build America's first generation high-speed
rail system in Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. However, our discussion on international
cooperation does not end there. In October 2010, international
cooperation and public-private interaction successfully
intercepted explosive devices shipped on passenger and all
cargo aircraft from Yemen. Today I look forward to hearing from
the Department and Express Association of America about the
most recent developments in private-public partnerships across
all cargo and supply chain security.
This hearing offers an opportunity to continue a critical
security dialogue on securing our skies while allowing for the
flow of the passengers and goods between the United States and
the Asia-Pacific region. Domestically, we try to ensure that
commerce is not impeded by security requirements. However, our
concerns about these important issues are magnified when the
supply chain involves the international aviation arena.
Secretary Napolitano and Administrator Pistole have put
forward this important issue of raising and harmonizing
security standards before the governments of the world. In the
last 2 years, the administration worked diligently to take
significant steps to harmonize security standards and establish
a stronger working relationship with the Asia-Pacific region.
Agreements have been signed, and accords have been reached.
Today we must ask the question: How can the United States
leverage these developments to secure aviation from terrorist
attacks and ensure that terrorists do not sabotage our cargo
supply chain? I remember speaking to those who pilot cargo
planes and committing to them that we will not leave them out
of this circle of security.
I welcome our witnesses today and look forward to your
perspective and insight on the feasibility of increasing
security at international airports and throughout the global
supply chain.
This administration has taken significant steps to
establish stronger relationships with countries across the
Asia-Pacific region. Now, more than ever, we must collaborate
with our partners abroad in government, at airports, with air
carriers, and throughout industry to reach solutions to the
complex issues associated with aviation and the global supply
security chain.
Let me say that America is embarking on high-speed rail,
which is a complement to what we are doing here today. That was
one of the items that we were able to see first-hand when we
were in the Asia-Pacific area. Texas--Houston, Dallas, and
other cities are excited about the opportunity for high-speed
rail. We realize that on the West Coast they are eagerly
waiting to begin. Texas is waiting to begin, and as I came back
and reported on our efforts to my community, the excitement is
without boundary.
We will be meeting and organizing to talk about not only
high-speed rail but security. We learned best practices and
learned what legislative initiatives we need to have in place.
We also learned how to work internationally, again, on the
transportation security circle. That certainly includes, in
light of the last 24 hours, making sure that no one--no one--
believes or ever can penetrate our aviation circle of travel
and cargo on behalf of the American people and people around
the world.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your extended courtesy. Just
to offer, Mr. Chairman, I am in a markup right at this moment,
and so I will likely be in and out. My staff will be here to
take diligent notes, and hope that in the course of the
hearing, before it is completed, I will be able to join you.
But I will sit for a moment. But I wanted to thank you for your
courtesies. I yield back my time.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Walberg for any questions
he may have.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thanks to the panel for being here today and sharing your
experience and expertise.
Mr. Koumans, in your opinion, what are the biggest
challenges to the security in the Asia-Pacific region?
Mr. Koumans. That is a very broad question, sir.
Mr. Walberg. It is a broad question, but you can detail it
as closely as you want.
Mr. Koumans. Yes. As I tried to say in my statement, the
growth in trade and travel in the region presents one series of
challenges, because as the size of the haystack increases when
you are looking for those needles, that complicates the effort.
So that is one that I would cite, is just the volume that we
are contending with, the growth.
Second is, I would mention the not-insignificant terrorist
threats that exist, particularly in Southeast Asia. We have
seen some of the attacks, some of the arrests in recent months
and years in Thailand, in the Philippines, and Indonesia. We
all do what we can to work with those partners and to
strengthen their ability to combat those threats.
Then, third, I would highlight organized crime. Organized
criminality from many of the countries in the region takes
different shapes, whether it be in the maritime environment,
working with the Coast Guard in terms of the piracy threat that
exists in certain parts of Asia-Pacific, mainly in Southeast
Asia, or to other kinds of organized criminality that is
involved in people smuggling, child sex exploitation. It takes
many different shapes, but I would characterize that as perhaps
the third.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
Ambassador Klemm, since the signing of the free trade
agreement in 2007, what have been the economic implications for
both the United States and South Korea since that signing?
Mr. Klemm. Thank you, Mr. Representative.
Although initially signed in 2007, as you are aware, the
legislation enabling the implementation of the Korea-U.S. Free
Trade Agreement was not passed by Congress until the fall of
last year and then signed into law by President Obama I believe
it was October or November of last year. The agreement went
into effect, finally, on March 15. Both governments have been
working very hard since that date to ensure its implementation
goes as smoothly and fully as possible.
To support the implementation and report on its progress,
the two governments will be holding bilateral consultations
during the course of next week here in Washington at the vice
ministerial level, and also will be working to establish
necessary oversight bodies, again, to ensure that the agreement
smoothly and fully goes into effect as intended.
Because it has only been implemented essentially less than
60 days, it is probably too early to tell exactly the
consequences of either----
Mr. Walberg. We have not seen any trade increase in the
short period of time?
Mr. Klemm. I don't think we have the data yet, sir.
Mr. Walberg. Okay.
Mr. Klemm. But the anticipation, both from our business
community as well as the Korean business community, is that
they were intending to take full advantage of the agreement's
benefits as quickly as possible.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
Mr. Halinski, let me ask you, U.S. carriers depend upon
foreign contract repair stations to perform necessary
maintenance and repairs of aircraft. In 2008, the FAA since
then has been unable to certify new foreign repair stations.
Rulemaking has been taking place. February 2010 ended the
public comment rulemaking period.
What impact would a finalized rule have on economic
opportunity in Asia-Pacific?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I think that when we look at the number
of foreign repair stations in Asia-Pacific, there are
approximately about 160 foreign repair stations in there. When
there is a final rule, it would seem that the number of foreign
repair stations would probably increase overall when there is a
final rule.
We are looking at the matter. We understand that the rule
has taken time. We are----
Mr. Walberg. Significant time.
Mr. Halinski. Absolutely, sir. We are trying to work with
both industry, conducting outreach while the rule is in process
so that we are validating the rule--let me say, validating the
rule by these outreach and visits--to ensure that there is
security there. So we are trying to ensure that we are doing
the due diligence from a security standpoint while the rule is
being moved forward.
We have done a significant amount of outreach to industry
in this case, sir. There is a total of approximately 750
foreign repair stations. About 458 of those are in Europe; as I
said, about 160-some in Asia. We believe that number will
increase when the final rule is there.
We also think that, until the rule is complete, one
possible solution is to take that on a case-by-case basis,
working with FAA to review the security at that particular site
that is under application, do an analysis of the criticality of
that and the threat, and possibly be able to give a temporary
certificate as part of that----
Mr. Walberg. Is that to be decided soon?
Mr. Halinski. I believe, sir, that is--we are working on
that right now, sir. We are looking at a case-by-case basis to
move forward on this while the rule is being made, sir.
Mr. Walberg. Okay.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member for any
questions she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Halinski, do you believe it is crucial for there to be
a security matrix and a rule regarding the foreign repair
stations from the TSA?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am, I do. I believe that there has to
be a rule for security. We think that that is--we have reviewed
this; we have done detailed intelligence analysis and also
analysis of the criticality of some of the parts. We look
forward to the rule when it is complete.
As I just stated, we have moved out and conducted a
significant amount of outreach on the rule. What do I mean by
outreach? We are trying to verify, are there security programs
present in these locations? What we have found is, by and
large, they do have security programs. Part of that is
because----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just intrude because the time is
short. What do you think the impact would be for FAA to certify
without having the new security rules? Why is it important for
them not to certify while you are reviewing and handling this
rule?
Mr. Halinski. Ma'am, based on the analysis we have done, we
know that there is some threat there, there is in vulnerability
there. We would prefer that we would work closely with FAA on a
case-by-case basis. Instead of opening it up for temporary
certifications, we would prefer to work on a case-by-case basis
with them on specific repair stations to ensure that they have
a security program in place and that we have done an analysis
on the criticality of that station.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am going to come back to you, Mr.
Halinski.
Mr. Koumans, was it your testimony to say how many foreign
repair stations we had in Asia-Pacific? Was that your
testimony?
Mr. Koumans. No, that was not.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. Who was the one that gave the
number? How many do we have----
Mr. Halinski. That was mine, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Go ahead.
Mr. Halinski. It is roughly about 160 foreign repair
stations in Asia-Pacific.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. I assume all of them have not
been assessed regarding security?
Mr. Halinski. No, ma'am. We have conducted outreach at
approximately 58. That number we have based that outreach on is
the criticality of the station and the threat posed, so that we
are trying to get repair stations with the highest threat and
the criticality based on what they repair in the station.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right, so----
Mr. Halinski. In other words, it is something that could
affect the flight of the aircraft.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Koumans, did you testify to the level
of concern with security in that region? Was that your
testimony?
Mr. Koumans. In general, yes. Now----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can you repeat it? What is the level of
concern?
Mr. Koumans. Our level of concern in Asia-Pacific, I
wouldn't say it is any higher or any lower than any other part
of the world. We are at a constant state of vigilance, where we
are working closely with our partners to address any threats
that arise.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But terrorists move around, right? Are you
saying that it is equal to the Mideast? I mean, the Mideast is
obviously diverse, but it is equal to what has been a concern
coming out of the Mideast?
Mr. Koumans. Right. My intention, ma'am, was not to say
that Asia-Pacific was any higher or any lower. We are at a
constant state of vigilance. We are looking at threats wherever
they might arise.
But you are absolutely right. In terms of where terrorists
are currently active, where the U.S. military is engaged,
clearly there are----
Ms. Jackson Lee. South Asia would be a concern.
Mr. Koumans. The Asia-Pacific region is certainly a
concern, as I mentioned a couple of minutes ago, particularly
the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, some of the particular
areas of concern.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just go--and thank you very much
for that.
I wanted to frame the question, because I think again--let
me just pose this again so that you can restate it, Mr.
Halinski, of the importance of the FAA not certifying
additional foreign repair stations until the final rule is
issued. But as you do that--we have been working on this issue
for a very long time, and I have great respect for the agency.
But can I, in light of the last 24 hours--and I certainly know
that the last 24 hours does not point to a foreign repair
station. But what it does point to is that aviation
infrastructure is still a target. That means that, without
giving new ideas, you know that the foreign repair stations
deal with flights or deal with aircraft at their vulnerability.
I mean, they are trying to make them better or make sure that
they are able to fly.
So, Mr. Halinski, can we raise the level of, if you will,
crises for this rulemaking process to move on?
In working with DHS, in working with the leadership of the
Secretary, let me put on the record, Mr. Chairman, this is
absolutely too long. It is absolutely imperative that we move
forward. It is absolutely imperative that DHS and TSA move
forward. It is absolutely imperative that it is a rule rather
than any other approach, because as long as you continue to
delay, you are going to find yourself entrapped with efforts,
if you will, to move forward. That is understandable. So I am
somewhat disappointed of how slow we have been moving.
Can you give me a best guess of when you expect to produce
this rule so that the degree of threat that has been speculated
on here today, in the last 24 hours, when we know that the
aviation industry is a target, can have some relief as it
relates to foreign repair stations, which this particular
committee has been discussing for at least 6 years?
Mr. Halinski. You are at TSA.
Mr. Halinski. Yes, ma'am. I don't know that I can give you
right off the top of my head, ma'am, a best guess on when the
rule will be complete. I would tell you that we will put an
emphasis on the rule; we will continue to push the rule. I
don't know that I can give you a date or a best guess at this
point, ma'am. I can get back on a follow-up with you or your
staff, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would appreciate if you would do that
for the committee. But, more importantly, is it that you are
limited in your best guess because it is winding its way
somewhere and you can't put your hands on where it is?
Mr. Halinski. No, ma'am. We know where it is. The rule
right now is under economic analysis at TSA. We are trying to
finalize that economic analysis and get it up to DHS to
continue the rulemaking process, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me close, Mr. Chairman, by
saying I appreciate the detailed work in which Mr. Halinski is
involved in, which Administrative Pistole is involved in. I
would like a definitive answer.
I only say this with a sense of humor and not with any
disrespect: Economics has never killed anybody, and so I think
we can move it on out of economics at this point. I do think it
is important that we don't undermine the economic structure of
the industry, which I assume is what you are looking at. But I
am very disappointed that we are still here talking about a
rule when we need it greatly.
Can I acknowledge Mr. Danny Davis of Illinois, who is a
Member of the committee, who is here? I thank him for being
here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlelady. I know I can say with
confidence that she speaks for all of us on this committee with
expressing her frustration over this issue. I know Mr. Walberg
has touched on it, but all of us are frustrated and feel like
it should be moved along.
Mr. Klemm, in your testimony you stated that the United
States introduced a multi-year initiative titled Travel
Facilitation Initiative, TFI, that was endorsed by Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation. The TFI is meant to expedite the movement
of travelers across the Asia-Pacific region while also making
it more secure and efficient.
Is APEC promoting a risk-based approach to both passenger
and our cargo screening?
Mr. Klemm. Yes, sir, it is.
I would like to spend a moment to perhaps discuss the
Travel Facilitation Initiative but then also to point to the
work that APEC has done on the nexus of security and travel
facilitation.
As you mentioned, the leaders of APEC in November of last
year endorsed a multiyear Travel Facilitation Initiative. That
initiative has five main objectives: One, to support an airport
partnership program so that best practices on passenger
screening, for example, can be shared across international
airports in the APEC region. The initiative also supports the
further development of the APEC Business Travel Card.
In support of the Department of Homeland Security, the
initiative is also supporting the further development of
Trusted Traveler programs in the APEC region. Right now, as my
colleague Mr. Koumans mentioned, there are very extensive
consultations occurring between the United States and Korea on
establishing a Trusted Traveler program, but similar
consultations have also been done between Singapore and the
United States, as well as Japan and the United States.
Mr. Rogers. When do you expect full implementation of TFI
in the Asia-Pacific?
Mr. Klemm. It has a 5-year time frame, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
Mr. Klemm. Two other, quickly, initiatives contained within
them. One, as I mentioned earlier, is an air passenger security
screening program and, also, work to support advanced passenger
information sharing across economies within the APEC.
On the broader issue of does APEC support a risk-based
approach to aviation security--yes, it does. There is a
comprehensive counterterrorism and security program that was
also agreed to by the organization in November of last year.
Then in the past year, under United States leadership, a number
of initiatives have been supported within APEC to support a
risk-based approach to aviation security. There was a workshop,
for example, held in Australia in June of last year and then
also a workshop on low-cost/no-cost measures to strengthen
aviation security that was held--or it will be held in early
2013.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
In your testimony, you also highlighted that President
Obama appointed our first resident ambassador to the
Association for Southeast Asia Nations. What are the
responsibilities of this new resident ambassador?
Mr. Klemm. Yes, Ambassador David Carden became--the United
States has had an ambassador representing the United States to
the Association for Southeast Asia Nations for quite some time.
But up until Ambassador Carden, that individual has been
resident here in Washington, simultaneously having other duties
at the Department of State.
Mr. Carden took up his post I believe at the beginning of
last year. Essentially, he represents the United States to that
organization. It is a 10-nation association which has the goals
of forming an economic community, much like the European Union,
by 2015. The United States, as a consequence, has great
interest in the economic potential of ASEAN, but we also have
an active engagement with them to work on issues such as
maritime security, nonproliferation, education, and others.
Mr. Rogers. Has he made any progress on enhancing our
security agreements with any of these ASEAN nations?
Mr. Klemm. I believe he has. Or perhaps it might be better
said that the United States has. One objective that the
administration pursued during the course of 2011 was to support
a nonproliferation initiative that ASEAN has been pursuing for
quite some time to make that region a non-nuclear zone. That is
just one example, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you. My time has expired.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois,
Mr. Davis, for any questions he may have.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Halinski, in your testimony, you point to significant
recent progress in U.S.-China relations. Particularly, you
mention China's involvement with the Aviation Cooperation
Program. Could you elaborate on how China's program
participation supports our own aviation security relationship
with China?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir. I think the best example that I
think would illustrate this is, we have been working with China
very closely. I have an office there; we have a TSA
representative there. We have been working along with the FAA
representative there to try to encourage the Chinese in the
area of technology.
They are producers of aviation security technology. We are
producers. What we have found is that there is a lot of
Chinese-made aviation technology throughout the world. What we
are trying to do is encourage joint standards because we think
it is very, very important that there is a bar there where you
have significant like standards, so that passing through
different countries, if you are going through a walk-through
metal detector or an X-ray machine, there is one standard for
the world instead of standards that are very country-dependent.
We are working with China. We have invited the Chinese here
this summer, the director-general of civil aviation, to talk
about technology and where we can go with technology. We have
also tried to increase the dialogue across the board in the
area of capacity development, because we know that the Chinese
do significant capacity development in areas in Africa and
other parts of the world. We want to ensure that we work with
them and are consistent on our approach in aviation security,
sir.
Mr. Davis. Does the Aviation Cooperation Program offer
benefits to the United States by affording increased visibility
regarding Chinese transportation and cargo security packages?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir, I believe it does. We know that the
FAA has probably made much further progress with us in this
particular initiative, as have some U.S. stakeholders in
working with the Chinese on the sale of aircraft, for example.
I would say that in the area of cargo we have had
discussions with the Chinese. We regularly visit their
airports. We view their cargo facilities. Coincidentally, China
is also now on the Aviation Security Panel of the International
Civil Aviation Organization. We have worked together as of at
the annual meeting in March to ensure that we are working
toward common cargo security standards world-wide.
Mr. Davis. Mr. Koumans and Mr. Halinski, under TSA's
National Cargo Security Program, TSA verifies foreign cargo
screening programs are commensurate with the level of security
in the United States. To date, TSA has contacted
representatives of all of the top 20 high-volume countries,
which account for 84 percent of the cargo volume on passenger
aircraft.
To what extent has DHS's Office of Policy and TSA's Office
of Global Strategies been involved in working with foreign
governments to facilitate their participation in the National
Cargo Security Program?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I will start out with that answer.
I would say that we work very closely with our partners in
DHS, particularly in the area of cargo. For example, with DHS,
in the Office of Policy, they have taken on board the global
supply chain problem. We have had significant movement on that.
The Secretary herself has been involved and gone to ICAO
several times.
I think what is really pushing it forward, quite frankly,
is the recognition that cargo is a global problem. It is
involves not just ICAO, but we also are involving the World
Customs Organization. So there are other components than DHS
which are moving forward to push out and try to resolve the
issue of cargo security.
So I think it is a two-pronged approach: One at a very
international level, multilateral level, with ICAO, World
Customs Organization; and then bilaterally, with the amount of
push both DHS and TSA has put bilaterally in countries on cargo
recognition as well as trying to come up with same standards.
I would say the third prong would absolutely be what we are
trying to do with our stakeholders, the private sector, on
cargo, trying to ensure that we are moving forward on cargo
security without killing industry, sir.
Mr. Davis. Would you say that these efforts are being
successful?
Mr. Halinski. Yes, sir, I would say they are, sir. I would
say that since the cargo incident in Yemen significant progress
has been made. It will continue. There is a very large push. In
fact, in September of this year, there is an extraordinary
meeting in Montreal of the International Civil Aviation
Organization, where it is a ministerial level meeting of
countries worldwide to discuss just security. That is
unprecedented. Some of the things that they will be discussing
and approving are international cargo standards.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Walberg, do you have any additional questions?
Mr. Walberg. Yes, I do.
Mr. Rogers. The Chairman recognizes the gentleman.
Mr. Walberg. I don't want to belabor the point, Mr.
Halinski. Well, I guess, in all honesty, I do want to belabor
the point, just to make sure I understand.
You indicated that while the rule isn't finalized yet and
public comment was completed in 2010, you indicated a case-by-
case basis for foreign repair stations was being considered. Is
it being considered or being implemented?
Mr. Halinski. Sir, I would say at this point it is being
considered. We have talked about this. We want to try to move
forward, but make sure that when we move forward we are using
due diligence in this case. So it hasn't been finally decided,
but we are moving forward to try to do this on a case-by-case
basis, sir.
Mr. Walberg. If you could, what would be some of the
criteria on a case-by-case basis?
Mr. Halinski. Well, first off, sir, we would work very
closely with FAA. Second, we would look at the criticality of
the repair station that is there. Is it a high-critical repair
station, or is it a low-critical repair station? What I mean by
that is: Does that repair station deal with avionics that would
take the bird out of the sky or does it fix the wheel on the
catering cart?
Then we would look at the overall aviation security program
that they have in place itself. Then we would turn to our intel
section and look at the threat analysis that has been done for
foreign repair stations. At that point, we would take that
information, put it together. In TSA, sir, we use a risk-based
approach to everything. I would say that we would make a
decision based on those factors, sir.
Mr. Walberg. Well, it sounds like you have some robust
thinking on how you would do that, at this point. I would just
encourage, along with my other colleagues, that we get this
rule in place. It seems like a case-by-case basis--the criteria
that you are considering certainly goes with the rule,
certainly indicates a concern about the security and the
necessity of dealing with that, but economically as well, to
continue belaboring with the minutia, putting in place
something that is not only in security terms protective but
also economically helpful and protective. I just want to appeal
as strongly as possible that we get this thing going here.
Let me go over to Ambassador Klemm on the same issue,
coming from the Department of State. Do you have any security
concerns about foreign repair stations in the Asia-Pacific?
Mr. Klemm. Mr. Representative, this is an issue that the
Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation Security
Administration have the lead on, but----
Mr. Walberg. But you certainly have concerns in that area.
Mr. Klemm. We do have concerns, and we certainly are eager
at any time to work closely with my colleagues as well as their
departments to move this issue forward as appropriate.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
As you all heard the beepers going off for the bells, we
have been called for votes. I want to thank this panel for the
preparation that you have made for this hearing and offering
yourself for testimony. There may be some additional questions
that Members have that they will submit to you, and I would ask
that you get your answers back in writing within 10 days.
But, with that, this panel is dismissed. The second panel
we will call up when we come back from votes, which will be
between 2 o'clock and 2:10.
With that, this panel is dismissed, and this subcommittee
is in recess.
[Recess.]
Mr. Rogers. The subcommittee will come back to order from
its recess. I appreciate your patience. I apologize for that
interruption, but they don't ask me when they are going to call
us for votes.
We are very happy to have our second panel with us now. Let
me remind the witnesses that their entire statements will
appear in the record.
Our first witness is Mr. Dow, who is the chief executive
officer and president of the U.S. Travel Association.
Mr. Dow, you are recognized for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF ROGER DOW, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
U.S. TRAVEL ASSOCIATION
Mr. Dow. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for allowing me
to speak first. I appreciate your courtesy. Thanks for holding
this hearing, and also thanks for all the work that you and
your subcommittee members do when it comes to travel security,
especially with TSA.
When you look at international travel, it is a huge
opportunity for increasing U.S. revenue, jobs, and at no cost
to the American taxpayer, and especially in this Asia-Pacific
area, whether it is hotels, restaurants, et cetera, small
businesses, but even more important, the people that come to
conventions and buy American products and services. If you look
at exports from international travel, it is $153 billion for
our economy.
The travel industry is truly a jobs generator these days
when we need them. We have added 142,000 jobs in the past year,
adding jobs about 34 percent faster than other industries
because the industry is built and it is just a matter of
turning on the faucet, which is an opportunity in Asia-Pacific.
When you look at the Asia-Pacific, it is extremely critical.
The growth in the past year in international travel, 24 percent
of it came from four countries, and that was Australia, China,
Japan, and South Korea. That growth stimulated some 233,000
jobs. So it is extremely important.
To give you a snapshot of just what it is, Japan is No. 4
in international inbound travel, 3.2 million travelers,
spending over $5,000 each; South Korea and Australia, both a
million travelers, spending $3,700 each. China has almost
doubled in the past 2 years, so a huge increase from China. As
I say, they buy so many business products.
Asia-Pacific is extremely important and can really be a way
that we can drive economic recovery. But, unfortunately, even
with that growth, it is not as great as it could be. The last
decade, while long-haul travel in other countries is growing by
40 percent, or 60 million travelers, the United States only
grew by 1\1/2\ percent, or 460,000 travelers. The opportunity
to regain this travel and regain our share--we lost, went from
a 17 percent share to 12 percent--really stands with these
countries, especially Asia-Pacific.
There are three things that we need to really have a proper
plan to make that happen.
First, we have to promote. Brand USA was recently created,
which will begin explaining U.S. travel policies and promoting
travel to the United States in these countries and also not
cost the U.S. taxpayer--a great public-private partnership. In
Japan, they will be launching their campaign in Japan this
month, and South Korea and China in the next couple of months.
Visas, the ability to get secure, efficient visas from
China. The other three countries I mentioned are visa-waiver
countries, as you know. But the challenge we have in China--we
have five consulates. The wait time had been up over 100 days
to get your interview. The State Department has done a terrific
job this past year in bringing that down to under 2 weeks.
I think Congress has a key role to ensure that we keep
sustaining this progress they have made and not have it just be
a glitch. So we are looking for Congress' support for a 10-day
standard, a multi-year visa. In Canada you can have a 10-year
visa from China. It is only 1 year here, and it is one-third of
the people going through. So just a multi-year visa would help.
To also look at secure videoconferencing. When you look at the
five consulates in China, I always say it is sort of like
having one cashier at Costco during the holidays. I mean, the
opportunity there is so big.
The last area is in the entry process. We need a secure and
efficient process. Too many stories are about people coming to
these countries and having to wait up to 3 hours. What we need
is a multi-pronged approach here. First is to ensure a 20-
minute standard. I am not talking about an average, because you
could say 10 minutes earlier in the day and 4 hours later in
the day, but 20 minutes per person. Find a sensible funding
plan to get the people needed to reach that goal. Have metrics
on customer service, because I think customer service and
welcoming and security are not mutually exclusive. You can do
both. To expedite Global Entry. The previous speakers talked
about Global Entry. It is a phenomenal program. I am in it, and
it is just amazing what it can do to relieve the pressure.
So I think if we are really going to look to be competitive
in these global markets and increase our share beyond where
they are, the stakes are high. With the right policies, we can
get a phenomenal return to the taxpayers and to jobs.
I want to thank you for your on-going interest in this
area. I pledge that our industry will help you do all the
things needed to make sure we have safe and secure travel from
the Asia-Pacific countries. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Dow follows:]
Prepared Statement of Roger Dow
April 18, 2012
introduction
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to offer testimony on behalf of the U.S.
Travel Association (U.S. Travel), the National, non-profit organization
representing all sectors of America's travel industry. U.S. Travel's
mission is to increase travel to and within the United States. Last
year the $759 billion travel industry generated a total of $1.8
trillion in total economic output.
I applaud you for holding today's hearing, in the wake of your
recent trip to the region, to discuss how to build stronger
partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region in order to facilitate travel,
trade, and commerce and spur greater economic growth and job creation
in the United States. I would also like to thank you for the strong
leadership you have demonstrated on travel security issues,
particularly around TSA, during your time here in Washington.
the economic opportunities of travel
Travel provides good, domestic jobs that cannot be outsourced. In
2010, travel supported 14.4 million jobs, including 7.5 million
directly in the travel industry and 6.9 million in other industries,
and is among the top 10 employers in 48 U.S. States and the District of
Columbia. For example, travel directly employs nearly 78,000 Alabamans,
contributes $7.2 billion annually to the Alabama economy and generates
more than $889.5 million in State and local tax revenue. Similarly,
travel directly employs more than 551,000 Texans, contributes more than
$47.2 billion to the Texas economy and generates nearly $8 billion in
tax receipts. In every region of America, travel helps pay the salaries
of police, firefighters, and teachers without creating much new demand
for those public services.
International travel to the United States in particular is one of
the most effective forms of economic stimulus--and it doesn't cost
taxpayers a dime. When international visitors travel to the United
States, they inject new money into the U.S. economy by staying in U.S.
hotels, spending in U.S. stores, visiting U.S. attractions, and eating
at U.S. restaurants. In many cases, they are also here to conduct
business by inspecting products and services they are purchasing,
attending meetings, and negotiating business contracts.
Every dollar these visitors spend in the United States counts as an
export--just like agricultural crops, minerals, or manufactured goods.
In 2011, travel exports rose to a record $153 billion, larger than
exports of other service industries as well as major manufacturing
industries such as machinery, computers and electronic products, and
aircraft. Expenditures made by international visitors made up 1 out of
every 7 travel dollars spent in the United States. This record level of
travel exports led to a record $43 billion travel trade surplus, which
mitigated to some degree the $738 billion trade deficit in the United
States in manufacturing and other goods.
Complementing this export growth is job growth for Americans. The
employment recovery in the travel industry has outpaced the rest of the
economy and much of this employment growth is being supported by the
spending of international visitors traveling in the United States. Of
the 142,000 jobs added in the travel industry in 2011, more than half
(54 percent) were supported by international travel spending.
The most lucrative segment of international travel for the United
States is the overseas market. These visitors tend to stay longer and
spend more money while in the United States. On average, every overseas
visitor spends $4,300 during their trip to the United States compared
with less than $800 for Canadian and Mexican visitors. In fact, the
spending of every 35 overseas visitors traveling in the United States
supports 1 U.S. job.
In looking at the specific subject of this hearing, travel from the
Asia-Pacific region makes up a critical element of the overseas travel
market. Nearly a quarter (24 percent) of the increase in travel exports
over the past 2 years has come from four countries in the Asia-Pacific
region: Australia, China, Japan, and South Korea. Collectively, the
spending by these four countries in 2011 supported 233,000 U.S. jobs,
14,200 more than were supported in 2010. Below please find a snapshot
of travel from each country to the United States and how each
contributed to exports and job creation in America.
Australia.--From 2009 to 2011, the number of arrivals to the
United States from Australia increased by 314,000 to over 1
million. With Australian visitors spending on average $3,900
during a trip in the United States, spending totaled $4.5
billion in 2011. This accounted for 10 percent of total U.S.
exports of goods and services to Australia in 2011. The
spending by travelers from Australia supported 34,000 jobs in
the United States last year.
China.--From 2009 to 2011, the number of arrivals to the
United States from China increased by 565,000 to 1.1 million.
Chinese nationals are now the highest-spending visitor to the
United States, spending on average $5,300 during their trip.
Spending from Chinese visitors to the United States totaled
$5.7 billion in 2011. Since 2009, travel exports from China
have increased by 59 percent, which is 20 percent faster than
the growth rate of other U.S. goods and service exports to
China. The spending by travelers from China supported 44,000
jobs in the United States last year.
Japan.--From 2009 to 2011, the number of arrivals to the
United States from Japan increased by 331,000 to 3.2 million.
With Japanese visitors spending on average $5,100 during a trip
in the United States, spending totaled $16.7 billion in 2011.
This accounted for 14.5 percent of total U.S. exports of goods
and services to Japan in 2011. Spending by travelers from Japan
supported 127,000 jobs in the United States last year.
South Korea.--From 2009 to 2011, the number of arrivals to
the United States from South Korea increased by 401,000 to 1.1
million. With South Korean visitors spending on average $3,400
during a trip in the United States, spending totaled $3.8
billion in 2011. This accounted for 6.2 percent of total U.S.
exports of goods and services to South Korea in 2011. The
spending by travelers from South Korea supported 29,000 jobs in
the United States last year.
Much of the growth in travel from South Korea can be attributed to
its entry into the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). The VWP allows
the United States to sign bilateral visa-free travel agreements
with countries that are certified by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) as meeting stringent security standards. In
South Korea's first year in the VWP, spending by South Korean
visitors surged 23 percent, adding an extra $1 billion to the
U.S. economy.
While it is clear that international travel to the United States,
and in particular travel from the Asia-Pacific region, is helping to
drive the U.S. economic recovery, the benefits are not as great as they
could be. The United States' share of global international long-haul
travel actually fell from 17 percent in 2000 to just 12.4 percent in
2010 despite a 40 percent growth in overall global travel. So while
global international travel boomed over the last decade, America failed
to keep pace. Thankfully, we have a chance to regain our lost market
share and attract billions in new travel exports. On a world-wide
basis, total international tourist arrivals are projected to grow
another 36 percent between 2010 and 2020. Outbound long-haul travel
from Australia, China, Japan, and South Korea specifically is expected
to increase by 24 million over the next 5 years. This presents enormous
economic and diplomatic opportunities for the United States. However, a
proper plan must be put in place promptly to aggressively pursue a
larger share of this market. In the Asia-Pacific region, our efforts
must include three key elements:
(1) international travel promotion of America as a premier travel
destination;
(2) a visa issuance process that efficiently secures visas for
qualified Chinese visitors; and
(3) a more efficient and welcoming customs clearance process at
major U.S. ports of entry for our international guests.
I will discuss each element in turn.
international travel promotion
Thanks to the support of Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Jackson
Lee, in 2010 the Travel Promotion Act was enacted and created a public-
private organization, known today as Brand USA, to help explain U.S.
travel and security policies and develop global promotion campaigns to
attract millions of additional visitors to the United States. Oxford
Economics estimates that the travel promotion program authorized by the
Act could attract as many as 1.6 million new visitors each year,
generate as much as $4 billion in new visitor spending annually and
create 40,000 new U.S. jobs. Recognizing that the United States was
facing a global competitive disadvantage in the international travel
marketplace, Congress showed strong leadership, and America will reap
the rewards for years to come.
As a tangible first step in this regard, Brand USA will launch its
first global advertising campaign to entice foreign travelers to visit
the United States later this month. The first campaign will target the
Japanese market along with the United Kingdom and Canada; South Korea
has been identified for a second round of global advertising. We are
confident that travel promotion will be a success and will help attract
more international visitors to the United States.
visa issuance process
The Chinese travel market is growing exponentially. Over the next
decade, economists predict that long-haul travel from China will
increase by 151 percent. The United States must aggressively pursue a
large share of that out-bound travel from China, but to succeed it must
be prepared to handle the growth in demand for U.S. visas. Unlike
travelers from Australia, South Korea, and Japan, each visitor from
China, must first apply and be granted a U.S. visa at an American
consulate in order to travel to the United States. Once a visa is
granted it is valid for just 1 year.
Initially, the State Department struggled with the growth in visa
demand from China which resulted in crowded and cramped waiting rooms
at U.S. consulates and visa processing waiting periods of up to 90
days. Working in partnership with the travel industry, the State
Department has undertaken several constructive steps, most importantly
dedicating more personnel and resources toward visa adjudication and
has addressed the long delays in visa issuance.
We believe Congress can play a key role in ensuring that the visa
reforms the State Department has implemented in China are sustained
over time by working in support of the following recommendations:
Codifying a 10-day visa processing standard for
applications;
Directing the State Department to tie visa personnel
staffing levels to meeting a 10-day visa processing standard;
Requiring yearly reports from the State Department on the
short-, mid-, and long-term plan to meet visa demand from China
efficiently;
Granting Chinese nationals multi-year leisure and business
visas; and
Directing the State Department to pilot the use of secure
video-conferencing technology to interview visa applicants
remotely.
efficient and welcoming customs clearance process
In order to gain a larger share of the out-bound travel market from
the Asia-Pacific region, it is essential that the United States process
visitors securely and efficiently through our Nation's airports. Today,
a shortage of inspection agents and inefficient staffing allocation
decisions produce excessive delays in processing international
passengers at some of this Nation's highest-volume international
airports. Some international airports have reported to U.S. Travel that
passengers arriving from long flights--some from the Asia-Pacific
region--experience delays of up to 3 hours at U.S. customs processing
facilities.
We would like to work with your subcommittee to find a sensible
funding solution to ensure adequate staffing is provided to process
international travelers visiting our Nation. Furthermore, we intend to
continue our partnership with DHS and U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), and hope you will join us in supporting the following
recommendations that will result in a more effective and efficient
entry process for millions of visitors from the Asia-Pacific region.
Efficient Passenger Screening
Direct CBP to establish a passenger wait time goal of 20
minutes per individual at international airports, and use
it as a performance measure to help CBP assess whether
staffing levels are sufficient to address passenger volume.
Airport Staffing Levels
Dedicate enough CBP officers to the Nation's top 20
highest-volume international airports to meet the 20-minute
passenger screening goal.
CBP should brief Congress on its recently completed
Workload Staffing Model and identify the resources needed
to staff the Nation's airports appropriately.
CBP should also expand the Staffing Workload Alignment
Tool (SWAT) to additional airports in order to better
anticipate short-term staffing demands and reduce wait
times at primary inspection areas.
Limit the practice of reducing authorized expenditures of
CBP Officer overtime pay. Overtime pay inflexibility can
lead to extended passenger processing wait times.
DHS should ensure that the $110 million in annual funding
resulting from the elimination of the COBRA fee exemptions
from Canadian, Caribbean, and Mexican air and sea travelers
be reinvested into CBP staffing and facilitation at air and
sea ports of entry.
Implementation of a Customer Service Improvement Strategy
Develop comprehensive CBP customer service reports using
the data submitted by passengers through CBP's comment
cards, and include the reports in the Air Travel Consumer
Report issued by Department of Transportation's Office of
Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings (OAEP).
Work with the private sector to review existing customer
service training and, where appropriate, develop new
training techniques.
Establish metrics to measure the customer service
performance of CBP officers at airports, and provide
rewards for officers that demonstrate exceptional
performance.
Direct CBP officers to greet passengers arriving at
primary inspections with ``Welcome to the United States''
or ``Welcome home.''
Global Entry Program.--CBP has implemented some travel
facilitation recommendations quite effectively, such as the
creation of a trusted traveler program for pre-approved, low-
risk travelers known as the Global Entry program. This program
provides fast-track immigration processing for previously
vetted Americans and select international visitors. It adds
significant efficiency to the entry process by removing
participants in the program from the general processing queues
and allowing them to use automated kiosks that can process the
average person within 40 seconds. Additionally, Global Entry
adds to the security of our borders by gathering voluntarily
provided background information from each program applicant.
That information, in turn, is run against a series of terrorist
watch lists and criminal history records before determining an
applicant's eligibility to participate in Global Entry.
Currently, Global Entry is available broadly to citizens from
Canada, the Netherlands, and Mexico. There is a very limited
pilot program with the United Kingdom and Germany. As it
relates to the Asia-Pacific region, the United States has
signed an agreement with South Korea to participate in the
program but it is not yet in operation. DHS has also begun to
have discussions with Australia, Japan, and South Korea about
Global Entry. Expanding access to Global Entry to more
countries in the Asia-Pacific region is critical to our
Nation's success as a strong partner on travel facilitation and
security.
CBP should fully and expeditiously implement the
reciprocal agreement signed with South Korea for use of
Global Entry this year.
A reciprocal agreement should be signed with Australia
that would allow Australian's access to Global Entry and
American's access to Australia's trusted traveler program,
known as SmartGate.
A reciprocal agreement should also be signed with
Singapore and Japan that would allow nationals from these
two countries to apply for Global Entry access.
CBP should work to develop a more user-friendly process
for individual Global Entry enrollment registration to the
program.
CBP should prioritize implementation of the APEC Business
Travel Card, which was authorized by Congress last year. By
taking this step, CBP would facilitate the processing of
American business leaders seeking to expand commercial
relations with the growing APEC region.
closing
Becoming more competitive in a global economy entails increasing
our Nation's share of the travel market from the Asia-Pacific region
and beyond. The stakes are high, but with the right policies, we should
be successful. Thank you for your on-going interest in travel exports.
Our industry is eager to continue to work closely with you to welcome
many more leisure and business visitors to the United States.
Mr. Rogers. I thank you for that opening statement.
The Chairman now recognizes our second witness, which is
Mr. Gary Wade, the vice president of security at Atlas Air
Worldwide. He will be testifying on behalf of the Cargo Airline
Association.
Mr. Wade is now recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GARY E. WADE, VICE PRESIDENT OF SECURITY, ATLAS
AIR WORLDWIDE HOLDINGS, INC., ON BEHALF OF THE CARGO AIRLINE
ASSOCIATION
Mr. Wade. Thank you, sir.
Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson
Lee, and Members of the subcommittee. I am vice president of
security for Atlas Air Worldwide Holdings. I am here today to
speak on behalf of the Cargo Airline Association, where I serve
as the chairman of the association's Security Committee. I
appreciate the opportunity to testify today.
The Cargo Airline Association is a Nation-wide trade
organization representing the interests of the Nation's all-
cargo air carriers. Operating safely and securely in a
worldwide marketplace is the No. 1 priority of Atlas and the
rest of the all-cargo air carrier industry.
Specializing solely in the transportation of cargo, CAA
members are the primary drivers of a global economy that
demands the efficient time-definite transportation of a wide
range of commodities. Looking specifically at the Pacific
region, Hong Kong alone, for example, processed 1.4 billion
tons of cargo for export, about 20 percent of the Asian market.
The Asia-to-U.S. market today is estimated to be a 4 billion to
5 billion kilo market per year.
Atlas is a leading provider of global aviation operating
services and owns a fleet consisting largely of Boeing 747
freighter aircraft, eight of which are in full-time service to
the Asian market. In addition, Atlas offers world-wide ad-hoc
charter service with significant uplift for the U.S. Air
Mobility Command.
In 2011, Atlas operated more than 18,500 cargo flights,
serving over 250 destinations in more than 90 countries. Last
year, Atlas transported approximately 6 billion pounds of cargo
around the globe. Atlas has also expanded in recent years for
passenger charter service, which is based in Houston, Texas,
that operate around the world, to include the Asia-Pacific
region.
In applying the necessary security measures to protect our
businesses, it is important to understand that the one-size-
does-not-fit-all approach to the air cargo security is not as
effective as a risk-based approach. As a practical matter, the
aviation industry is composed of a myriad of businesses, each
with their own unique operational models. These differing
characteristics must continue to be taken into account in
developing and implementing security policy.
Our industry has learned a lot since October 2010 when the
dissemination of intelligence led to the interception of the
explosive devices originating in Yemen and ultimately bound for
the United States on all-cargo aircraft. Simply put, the
importance of good intelligence in the identification of high-
risk shipments, as we learned just yesterday, cannot be
overstated. In addition to intelligence, isolating high-risk
cargo involves the ability to learn as much as possible about
the shippers and shipments as early as possible in the supply
chain.
Administrator Pistole testified in front of this committee
last June and stated, ``TSA's existing security measures create
a multilayered system of transportation security that mitigates
risk. No layer on its own solves all of our challenges, but in
combination they create a strong and formidable system.'' We
absolutely agree with Administrator Pistole and TSA's approach.
The approach that must be taken in securing the
international supply chain is to screen 100 percent of
shipments identified as high-risk. Using a risk-based approach
is not only the right way to address cargo security, it is
truly the most effective way to address cargo security.
Identification of high-risk shipments requires a
combination of shared intelligence and the ability to learn as
much as possible about shipments as early as possible in the
shipping process. In turn, effective screening involves
adequate training of security personnel, the application of the
appropriate technology at the appropriate time, and, where
available, the use of canines trained to detect explosives.
All segments of the cargo industry are engaged in efforts
to enhance these elements of the security equation. For
example, in conjunction with both TSA and CBP, industry members
are participating in an extensive pilot program known as the
Air Cargo Advance Screening Program, designed to provide as
much shipment information as possible to the Government for
purpose of targeting anomalies and inconsistencies. TSA is also
in the process of developing a Trusted Shipper concept that
would recognize that certain repeat shippers may pose less of a
threat than the occasional single shipper.
But it is important not to overlook low-tech initiatives to
screen air cargo in both the international and domestic
markets. Specifically, the use of canines has proven effective
in the screening of air cargo, but the use of dogs has been
hampered by the relative scarcity of TSA-trained animals. The
use of canines should be aggressively expanded by permitting
the use of private-sector but TSA-certified canines as a
primary screening method.
Simply stated, the threat-based approach combined with
Administrator Pistole's commitment to work collaboratively with
the stakeholder community is the key to enhancing security
across the transportation system.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wade follows:]
Prepared Statement of Gary E. Wade
April 18, 2012
introduction
Good afternoon Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
Members of the subcommittee. My name is Gary Wade and I am the Vice
President of Security for Atlas Air, Inc. I'm here today to speak on
behalf of the Cargo Airline Association where I serve as the Chairman
of the Association's Security Committee. I appreciate the opportunity
to testify today on secure partnerships in travel, commerce, and trade
with the Asia-Pacific region.
The Cargo Airline Association is the Nation-wide trade organization
representing the interests of the Nation's all-cargo air carriers.\1\
Specializing solely in the transportation of cargo, CAA members are the
primary drivers of a world-wide economy that demands the efficient
time-definite transportation of a wide range of commodities. Our
industry segment has grown over the years to a point where, in fiscal
2011, it accounted for 87.6% of the Revenue Ton Miles (RTMs) in
domestic markets (up from 70.0% in 2000) and 69.2% of the RTMs in
international markets (up from 49.3% in 2000). By 2032 the all-cargo
industry domestic share is predicted to reach 89.7%.\2\ Looking
specifically at the Pacific region, international air cargo RTMs had a
significant increase in 2011 of 9.1%, increasing from 8.4 to 9.1
billion RTMs.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Association members include ABX Air, Atlas Air, Capital Cargo,
DHL Express, FedEx Express, Kalitta Air, and UPS Airlines.
\2\ FAA Aerospace Forecast, Fiscal Years 2012-2032, p. 48.
\3\ FAA Aerospace Forecast, Fiscal Years 2012-2032, p. 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Atlas Air, Inc. is a leading global provider of aviation operating
services. Atlas owns a fleet consisting largely of Boeing 747 freighter
aircraft which are leased to airlines and express carriers on a
contract basis offering aircraft, crew, maintenance, insurance (ACMI),
as well as offering world-wide ad-hoc charter service with significant
uplift for the U.S. air mobility command. Atlas also has expanded in
recent years to passenger-charter operations based in Houston, Texas
that operate around the world to include the Asia-Pacific region. In
2011, Atlas Air operated more than 18,500 flights, serving over 250
destinations in more than 90 countries. Last year Atlas transported
approximately 6 billion pounds of cargo around the globe.
operating securely in today's world
Operating safely and securely in a world-wide marketplace is a
paramount priority of Atlas and the rest of the all-cargo air carrier
industry.--We continuously strive to achieve the highest possible level
of security while simultaneously operating a successful company and
facilitating the flow of commerce throughout the globe. At the end of
the day, smart effective security is smart business. None of us can
afford to lower our guard in a world filled with potential terrorist
threats.
In applying the necessary security measures to protect our
businesses, it is important to understand that a ``one-size-fits-all''
approach to air cargo security is not as effective as a risk-based
approach.--As a practical matter, the aviation industry is composed of
a myriad of businesses, each with their own unique operational models.
For example, all-cargo operators do not carry ``passengers'' in any
generally accepted definition of that term; have substantial operations
that never touch U.S. soil (sometimes in the livery of foreign
carriers); provide substantial support services for the U.S. military;
and in many cases, have control over the pickup and delivery, as well
as the transportation, of cargo. Some all-cargo carriers offer a time-
definite service and are generally known for their express operations,
while other companies such as Atlas concentrate on traditional freight
operations providing the transportation function through the air
freight forwarder community. These differing characteristics must
continue to be taken into account in developing and implementing
security policy. Accordingly, all-cargo air carriers today operate
under a different Security Program and different Security Directives
than our passenger counterparts or the members of the indirect air
carrier community. Each of these different regulatory requirements is
tailored to address the unique threats and vulnerabilities of the
separate industry segments.
the risk-based approach to transportation security
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Administrator John
Pistole testified in front of this committee last June and stated
``TSA's existing security measures create a multi-layered system of
transportation security that mitigates risk. No layer on its own solves
all our challenges, but, in combination, they create a strong and
formidable system.''\4\ We absolutely agree with TSA's approach and I
would like to take the opportunity to explain what risk-based security
means within the all-cargo community, including the measures being
taking to mitigate identified risks in Asia and around the world.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Statement of John Pistole, House Homeland Security Committee
Subcommittee on Transportation Security hearing on TSA Authorization
legislation, June 2, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We firmly believe that the approach that must be taken in securing
the international supply chain is to identify high-risk shipments and
to screen 100% of those shipments found to possess such high-risk
characteristics.--Using a risk-based approach is not only the right way
to address cargo security; it is truly the only effective way to
address cargo security. Identification of high-risk shipments requires
a combination of shared intelligence and the ability to learn as much
as possible about shipments as early as possible in the shipping
process. In turn, effective screening involves adequate training of
security personnel, the application of appropriate technology, and,
where available, the use of canines trained to detect possible
explosives.
The importance of the role of good intelligence in the
identification of high-risk shipments cannot be overstated.--
Intelligence is absolutely crucial in enabling companies such as Atlas
to target potentially dangerous shipments. To be effective, however, we
must find better ways to communicate such intelligence to those in the
air cargo supply chain. If there were any doubt about the role of
effective intelligence, that doubt should have been erased by the
events of October 28, 2010, when the dissemination of intelligence led
to the interception of explosive devices on all-cargo aircraft
originating in Yemen and ultimately bound for the United States.\5\ The
necessary intelligence sharing includes not only information on threats
from U.S. Government sources to industry and from industry to TSA and/
or Customs and Border Protection (CBP), but also cooperation from
foreign governments. This foreign government component is clearly an
on-going challenge that TSA and CBP continue to face.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ It is perhaps important to note that the shipments intercepted
through the application of intelligence had already been physically
screened multiple times without uncovering the hidden explosives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the intelligence element, isolating high-risk cargo
also involves the ability to learn as much as possible about both
shippers and shipments as early as possible in the supply chain.--All
segments of the air cargo industry are currently engaged in efforts to
enhance these elements of the security equation. For example, in
conjunction with both TSA and CBP, industry members are participating
in an extensive program known as Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS)
pilot program designed to provide as much shipment information as
possible to the government for purposes of targeting potential
anomalies. This program began with the express industry segment and is
now expanding to passenger carriers, air freight forwarders, and
traditional heavy freight operators.
TSA is also in the process of developing a Trusted Shipper concept
that would recognize that certain repeat shippers may possess less of a
threat than the occasional single shipper. In the case of Atlas,
upwards of 90% of non-express cargo exported from Asia comes from
repeat customers in the high-tech arena, such as Apple and Samsung.
Indeed, there are instances where certain shippers ship cargo from the
same city pair with the same goods every month or every year. This
predictability and understanding of the cargo being transported poses
less of a threat to air cargo security compared to an aircraft loaded
with shipments from many different shippers, some of whom may only
occasionally ship on an airline or may be first-time shippers. The
challenge is to mature this concept to permit the free flow of goods,
while at the same time protecting against insider threats in the
international environment. Eighty percent of the world's cargo comes
from approximately 20 countries. Therefore, expanding ACAS coupled with
a trusted shipper concept would produce a very effective security
system and provide a foundation for what air cargo security should look
like.
As noted above, it is important not to overlook ``low-tech''
initiatives to screen air cargo--in both international and domestic
markets. Specifically, the use of canines has proven effective in the
screening of air cargo, but the use of dogs has been hampered by the
relative scarcity of TSA-trained animals. We firmly believe that the
use of canines should be aggressively expanded by permitting the use of
private, but TSA-certified, canines as a primary screening method.
While all of these initiatives apply generally to all international
air cargo, they are particularly important in Asian markets where
growth has far exceeded industry averages and further expansion of
markets is expected in the coming years.
industry/government cooperation
Finally, it is important to point out that supply chain security,
in Asia and elsewhere, can only be effective if the industry and
Government work together to identify both problems and solutions.
Administrator Pistole's commitment to work collaboratively with the
stakeholder community to develop the programs necessary to enhance
security across the transportation system has been applauded by
industry. To his credit, the administrator has made good on his promise
to engage the industry in formulating policy as we move forward. This
cooperation, including the understanding of the operationally unique
characteristics of the various industry segments, will result in the
best possible security regime.
conclusions
To summarize, growth in air cargo all over the world and in the
Asia-Pacific region is predicted to grow steadily throughout the next
several years. Therefore, the challenges we face today in transporting
cargo throughout the world will only continue. Addressing the security
challenges both domestically and globally will hinge on a few key
factors. Perhaps the two most important points to stress include the
necessity for good, reliable, and timely intelligence and the focusing
of resources on a risk-based, threat-based security system. Atlas and
the rest of the all-cargo industry will continue to work cooperatively
with both TSA and CBP to develop and implement the best possible
security regime. We've learned the threats are constantly evolving and
we need to continue to adapt to these dynamic challenges whether they
be from our homeland or abroad.
Thank you very much and I am happy to answer any questions from the
committee.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Wade, for your testimony. We
appreciate you being here today. We know your time is valuable.
Our next witness is Dorothy Reimold, who currently serves
as assistant director for security and travel at the
International Air Transport Association.
The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Reimold for her statement.
STATEMENT OF DOROTHY REIMOLD, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, SECURITY AND
TRAVEL FACILITATION, INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
Ms. Reimold. Chairman Rogers and Members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of IATA's
240 members on the importance of cooperation between the United
States and Asia.
IATA member airlines traverse the globe, safely carrying
passengers and cargo to their destinations. As our industry
continues to evolve, we must keep pace to ensure that this
safety is never compromised and that the full benefit of
aviation can be realized.
IATA recently partnered with Oxford Economics to assess the
impact of aviation around the world, and the picture is clear:
Aviation drives the world economy. Aviation provides 56.6
million jobs and 3.5 percent of the global GDP. These numbers
are expected to grow in the coming years, with nearly 6 billion
passengers, 82 million jobs, and $6.9 trillion in economic
activity forecast by 2030.
Perhaps no part of the world better exemplifies the
potential of aviation than the Asia-Pacific region. Given its
exploding aviation markets, it currently represents 43 percent
of the total jobs and 34 percent of the passenger traffic, the
largest share of any individual region.
Whether in Asia-Pacific or elsewhere, aviation needs
regulatory support to sustain its growth and to continue to be
an economic catalyst. But we need to strike a balance. Aviation
is one of the most heavily-regulated industries in the world,
and this burden is increased by sometimes uncoordinated and
conflicting regulations.
Growth also compels the need for a more harmonized approach
to aviation security. The industry has changed dramatically
over the last many decades, and while we have adapted to the
changing environment, regulators have had to augment and
sometimes patch systems to keep up with evolving threats, more
passengers and cargo, and uncoordinated mandates. IATA believes
that governments must continue to emphasize compatible security
regulations. We support programs such as the Air Cargo Advance
Screening Program being advanced by the CBP and TSA and laud
their efforts to seek industry input.
The Asia-Pacific market is becoming a prominent voice in
defining aviation security. As an example, consider the
business model of low-cost carriers, which depend on the fast
turnaround of aircraft. In Asia, LCCs have grown from nearly
zero percent to 25 percent of the market over the last decade.
The success of this bourgeoning market will depend on increased
efficiency across the aviation system, including security.
In terms of passenger screening, we are proud of the vastly
improved security environment that our collective efforts have
provided. We also acknowledge that the combination of more
people traveling and inconsistent security regulations and
practices have resulted in less efficient security processing.
This, in turn, has led to increased security costs, delays, and
passenger frustration. The one-size-fits-all security screening
model is outdated.
IATA commends Secretary Napolitano and Administrator
Pistole for their leadership in moving toward risk-based
security screening. IATA is currently working with governments
and industry around the world to drive the evolution of
passenger security with our Checkpoint of the Future concept.
We believe that this evolution is fundamental to our industry's
ability to grow.
Here again, we point to the need for a consistent
regulatory approach. As with passenger screening, cargo
security represents a challenge to the industry. The 2010 Yemen
printer cartridge event is regarded by many as air cargo's 9/11
in terms of the changes it brought to the business.
IATA promotes two parameters to the solution. First, we
must preserve speed along with security. Entire industry
sectors have built their business models on the availability of
a fast air cargo supply chain. If we don't keep the speed,
business models around the world would change dramatically and,
in fact, many could disappear. The second element is a need for
a multi-layered approach that includes the entire value chain.
We need to focus on risk management, securing the supply chain
at the beginning, and utilizing technology. We recognize the
efforts within the Asia-Pacific region to advance some of these
elements.
It is also important to note that the International Civil
Aviation Organization has been instrumental in driving toward
harmonized security standards and has included both government
and industry in these efforts. IATA will continue to advocate
the need for harmonization at this year's High-Level Aviation
Security Conference.
Global cooperation on security is complicated, and
yesterday's news reinforces this all too well. But a
complicated environment cannot create an excuse for lack of
coordination or unilateral implementation of new regulations.
Chairman Rogers and Members, on behalf of IATA, thank you
again for the opportunity to speak with you today.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Reimold follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dorothy Reimold
April 18, 2012
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
committee, thank you for inviting me to testify on behalf of IATA's
members on the importance of cooperation on aviation security between
the United States and Asia. IATA's 240 member airlines crisscross the
globe every day, safely carrying passengers and cargo to their
destinations. At the beginning and throughout every stage of the
journey, aviation security is paramount to the safety and success of
our industry. As the industry continues to evolve, security must keep
pace with the changing world to ensure the benefits of aviation are
realized.
IATA recently partnered with Oxford Economics to study the impact
of aviation on 57 countries around the world, and the picture is clear:
Aviation drives the world economy. Aviation is responsible for 56.6
million jobs globally and 3.5% of global GDP. If aviation were a
country, it would rank 19th in size by GDP. The industry is comprised
of 23,844 aircraft, 3,846 airports, 192 air navigation service
providers, 34,756 routes, and 1,568 airlines. All of these numbers are
expected to grow over the coming years, with nearly 6 billion
passengers, 82 million jobs, and $6.9 trillion in economic activity by
2030. In addition, aviation carries about 35% of global trade by value
but only 0.5% of actual tonnage, representing 48 million tons of cargo
and $5.3 trillion in value. Over the next decade, world trade is
expected to nearly double, with emerging markets leading the way.
Perhaps no part of the world better exemplifies the potential of
aviation than the Asia-Pacific region, whence a significant portion of
this growth will originate. And cooperation between the United States
and Asia will have a dramatic impact on the future of aviation.
The Asia-Pacific aviation market is growing. The Asia-Pacific
region represents 43% of total jobs and 21% of the GDP generated by the
air transport industry world-wide. In 2010, airlines carried nearly 2.7
billion passengers. Thirty-four percent of that traffic belonged to the
Asia-Pacific region, the largest share of any individual region.
Beijing is the second-largest airport in the world in terms of
passenger traffic, and of the top 10 countries by passenger traffic,
four are from the Asia-Pacific region. Over the next 20 years, these
numbers are expected to grow significantly. Passenger numbers are
expected to almost triple in the region from 779.6 million in 2010 to
over 2.2 billion in 2030. This increase represents an astounding 6.7%
annual growth rate for passenger traffic, and cargo is expected to grow
similarly in the region by 6.3% per year. However, if the region
continues to press for liberalization in the industry and investment in
infrastructure, this growth could be much larger.
Yet for all of its potential, aviation's continued ability to serve
as an economic catalyst is highly dependent on regulatory relief and
support. Open Skies agreements, such as the one between the United
States and Japan, have greatly increased the opportunities for growth
in the U.S.-Asia markets. But more work needs to be done. Aviation
growth cannot translate into economic benefit unless we have a
regulatory regime that supports it. And the unfortunate reality is that
aviation is one of the most heavily-regulated industries in the world.
Other transportation modes benefit from fewer regulations and better
harmonization. For example, maritime cargo security regulations are far
less burdensome than aviation security regulations, leading businesses
to choose shipping over air freight. Fortunately for our industry, this
isn't always an option. Speed remains a critical component for some
industries, but without proper regulatory support, the full benefits of
air freight cannot be realized.
Similarly, harmonization and cooperation in aviation security has
never been more important. The aviation industry today is dramatically
different than it was when the security checkpoint was designed some 40
years ago. While airports, aircraft manufacturers, and airlines have
adapted to the industry's growth, regulators continue to augment and
patch their current systems to keep up with evolving threats, more
passengers, and uncoordinated approaches. Security lines are sometimes
considered the single worst part of the travel experience. That's on
the passenger side.
Cargo screening also suffers from myriad approaches and reactive
over-regulation and imparts enormous cost on the cargo supply chain. We
must change the paradigm in aviation security to be proactive instead
of reactive and to fit the industry as we know it today. To this end,
governments must renew their emphasis on compatible security
regulations. We are excited about programs such as Air Cargo Advance
Screening (ACAS), a program of the U.S. Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) and the U.S. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) that is
being developed with industry input. While the United States has been a
leader in aviation security, the emerging Asia-Pacific market is
quickly becoming a prominent voice in security regulation. In order to
maintain aviation's competitiveness across borders, regulators from the
United States and Asia must work together to promote regulations that
both improve security and also support efficiency in the industry.
Inconsistencies and reactive, often duplicative regulations have
led to less efficient security processing, which in turn has led to
skyrocketing security costs for governments and industry, passenger
frustration, and global confusion. Today's security checkpoint is
outdated and does not fit our industry. Each passenger is processed at
the same threat level, even though we know that all but a very select
few travelers pose no threat to the system. Under Homeland Security
Secretary Napolitano and Transportation Security Administrator Pistole
we have seen important initiatives to move to a risk-based approach to
screening. An example is TSA's PreCheck program, which will
dramatically improve security and efficiency by focusing resources on
passengers about whom a threat level is unknown or undecided. However,
substantial challenges remain.
The one-size-fits-all mandate limits the ability to focus resources
where threats are greatest. Additionally, while some have suggested
that the market-based increase in carry-on baggage has led to this
slowdown, we know this is not the case. We have assessed security
throughput since 2005, and checkpoints were slowing down long before
fare unbundling caused more carry-on bags. In reality, the requirement
for passengers to remove jackets, shoes, and belts and to remove
numerous items from their bags has dramatically slowed throughput at
U.S. airports. And every new requirement at the checkpoint, such as the
3-3-1 rule for liquids and gels, leads to longer lines, more confusion,
and more frustration. This slowdown has also hampered airline
schedules. For instance, the business model of low-cost carriers (LCCs)
depends on the fast turnaround of aircraft. In Asia, LCCs have grown
from nearly 0% of the market to 25% over the last decade and are
projected to reach 50 airlines by the end of 2012. The success of this
burgeoning market will depend on increased efficiency across the
aviation system, including security.
On top of these frustrations, global cooperation on security is
complicated by a lack of coordination and by regulatory conflicts
between nations and regions. Europe is looking to lift restrictions on
liquids, aerosols, and gels next year, but what happens to the
passenger transiting through one of Asia's major hubs? Screening
practices for passengers vary from country to country, for instance:
Shoes off in one country and not in the other. Furthermore, aviation
security often suffers from significant duplication, such as at certain
airports where boarding passes are checked at the entrance to the
airport and then again at the checkpoint. This must change. Our
industry must be able to be assured that security practices are
consistent but unpredictable. They must be clearly understood, and they
must be uniformly implemented.
IATA is working with industry and regulators from around the world
to try to modernize and reform the security checkpoint through the
Checkpoint of the Future project. We are working to evolve today's
security checkpoint to focus on risk-based passenger differentiation
and proactive, targeted screening. A pivotal piece of this reform will
be global cooperation. Regulators must come together to address common
challenges and to devise a path to create a truly global security
system, where passengers can move more freely across borders through a
more effective security regime. Efficiency does not preclude security.
In fact, by increasing the effectiveness of security and focusing on
proactive threat assessment and detection, efficiency improvements are
virtually automatic. We imagine checkpoints in the future will allow
passengers to walk through screening without cumbersome requirements to
remove clothing or items from their bags. But the key to defining this
future is to ensure that we undertake this evolution with a consistent
and harmonized approach, especially for regulations.
As with passenger screening, cargo security represents a key
challenge to industry and regulators. The 2010 Yemen printer cartridge
incident was a reminder of the evolving challenge and the need for
constant vigilance. Many regard it as air cargo's 9/11 in terms of the
changes it is bringing to the air cargo business. There are two
parameters to the solution. First, we must preserve speed along with
security. Entire industry sectors have built their business models on
the availability of fast air cargo supply chain links. If we don't keep
the speed, business models around the world would change dramatically,
and many could disappear. The second element is the need for a multi-
layered approach that includes the entire value chain. The areas we
should focus on are: Risk management; securing the supply chain
upstream; and, using the latest technology.
On risk management, IATA is working with stakeholders and
regulators to harmonize risk-assessment measures in compliance with the
World Customs Organization SAFE standards. IATA, Airlines for America
(A4A), the International Federation of Freight Forwarders Associations
(FIATA), and other stakeholders are working jointly with regulators on
projects such as the European Union and the U.S. Air Cargo Advanced
Screening pilot project to achieve harmonized results. And a jointly
developed e-Consignment security declaration is being put forward as a
recommended practice within the International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) Annex 17 regulations. This will help facilitate a
consistent provision of data to regulators for risk-management
purposes.
The second element is securing the supply chain, and Asia-Pacific
is in the forefront, as Malaysia launched the first IATA Secure Freight
pilot initiative in 2010. Secure Freight evaluates the strength of a
Nation's aviation security infrastructure and works with the civil
aviation authorities to ensure that cargo has come from either a known
consignor or regulated agent and has been kept sterile until it is
loaded. It identifies the gaps within a security regime and helps to
seal this process upstream, which will prevent bottlenecks at the
airport. Meanwhile Kenya, Mexico, Chile, South Africa, Egypt, and the
United Arab Emirates are set to start their own programs, and China and
Brazil are showing interest.
Complimentary to the focus on cargo security is IATA's e-freight
program, a supply chain initiative, which is designed to remove paper
from cargo manifests in favor of electronic airway bills. To be
successful, the air cargo value chain must meet customer expectations
with efficient and quality products and processes. In addition,
electronic information allows data to be kept in a secure, need-to-know
channel and provides improved tracking of shipments within the supply
chain. Moving to a completely paperless system is a huge challenge, and
e-freight is the single most important project to shore up the
competitiveness and efficiency of air cargo. The Asia-Pacific market is
providing significant leadership in e-freight, and global participation
by regulators and freight-forwarders will be pivotal to this program's
success. It is imperative that the U.S. Government embrace the need for
electronic commerce to keep America competitive with other nations and
to facilitate trade between the United States and Asia-Pacific. This
includes the expedited adoption of paperless documents for import and
export shipments of all types.
On the technology side, we all know the present constraints of
security systems. The good news is that regulators are listening to and
involving industry in discussions on technology. It is clear that a
robust risk assessment needs both physical and data screening programs.
And of course these must be harmonized. The worst thing for both
industry and states would be to have these programs competing with each
other across airline networks. It is imperative that Customs
Administrations and Civil Aviation Authorities coordinate their
requirements and initiatives.
Cargo security harmonization is being driven by ICAO, which since
the Yemen incident has undertaken a significant role in getting
industry and regulators to the table. Secretary Napolitano and ICAO
joined forces immediately following the incident to convene a series of
conferences around the world to focus on harmonization, with the
recognition that we are only as strong as our weakest link. In 2011,
the ICAO Aviation Security Panel established a working group to address
air cargo security concerns in an inclusive manner, in accordance with
terms of reference that incorporate the relevant elements of the
Secretariat Study Group on Supply Chain Security. The primary task of
the new working group is to recommend practical measures that could be
adopted by states on an urgent basis to enhance cargo security on
passenger and cargo aircraft. In parallel, the ICAO Secretariat is
carrying on with development of guidance material in the field of air
cargo security, with a particular focus on international cooperation
and information sharing, technology, and processes for the detection of
explosives, personnel training, and quality control and oversight
inspection systems to ensure proper implementation of supply chain
security processes.
Passenger and cargo security are paramount to the continued safety
and success of the aviation industry. We are confident that continued
efforts by the TSA, ICAO, and other regulators as well as industry will
continue to improve security and efficiency in passenger and cargo
markets. Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Jackson Lee, thank you
again for the opportunity to speak to you today about the future of
aviation and security. IATA applauds your commitment to improving
aviation security and making the experience more enjoyable for
passengers. The future of flight is bright, and your collaboration is
vital to our continued success as an industry.
Mr. Walberg [presiding]. Thank you, Ms. Reimold. It is hard
to keep track of the players up here. Chairmen change so
quickly. But thank you for your testimony.
Now I recognize Mr. Mullen for your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL C. MULLEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, EXPRESS
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
Mr. Mullen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a real pleasure
and an honor to be able to appear before the committee today.
I am going to focus my testimony today on the Air Cargo
Advance Screening, or ACAS, project, which, as my colleagues
have indicated, began in late 2010 after al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula attempted to ship explosive devices hidden in
printer cartridges coming out of Yemen on express delivery
flights. While technical screening, canines, and physical
inspection failed to detect the bombs, the plot was disrupted
when specific intelligence describing the details of the threat
allowed the express companies to immediately identify and
neutralize the shipments.
The day after the Yemen bombs were discovered and the plot
disrupted, the four member companies of the Express Association
of America--DHL, FedEx, TNT, and UPS--had a telephone
conference with senior U.S. Customs and Border Protection and
Transportation Security Administration officials. We all agreed
the express carriers needed to provide information on air cargo
shipments from high-threat areas earlier in the supply chain so
the government could complete its targeting process sooner in
order to prevent a similar attack in the future.
The express companies were permitted to take the lead in
developing an operationally feasible approach to providing this
data, and this became the ACAS project. To date, information on
over 18 million air cargo shipments has been analyzed by the
ACAS unit. No terrorist threats to aviation have been detected,
and no shipments have been designated as ``do not load.''
The express companies are constantly expanding the number
of countries, which is now over 150, for which shipment data is
transmitted, with the ultimate goal of providing global
information on shipments coming to the United States from any
country. Deliveries from Asia to the United States represent a
large percentage of the millions of packages moved by express
delivery firms around the world on a daily basis. Some very
high-volume Asian countries--China, Japan, and Korea--are
considered low-risk for terrorist threats and are just now
being added to the ACAS pilot. As more countries in the Asian
region are added to ACAS, the resulting increase in the volume
of information will require that both the Government and the
private sector ensure adequate resources are available to
provide the information, conduct the analysis, and respond
operationally to the results of the targeting.
Several really innovative things were done to implement the
ACAS project. For example, the express companies are providing
access to their proprietary information and targeting systems
to help CBP and TSA resolve anomalies in the shipment data. I
cannot say enough about how skillfully CBP and TSA cooperated
with each other and with the express delivery industry to make
this project a success.
To establish ACAS, CBP, and TSA employed an approach that
has come to be known as co-creation, in which the private
sector determined at the outset an operational concept for the
project and how the data will be transmitted. This approach
differs significantly from the normal method of allowing the
business community to comment on the Government's approach to a
security issue only after a regulation has been drafted.
Based on the success of this approach, after the pilot
project has run for a sufficient amount of time and the results
are analyzed, the ACAS private-sector participants will engage
with CBP and TSA to draft a regulation that is based on the
operational lessons learned from the pilot.
I want to end by mentioning four key lessons we already
have learned from the ACAS project. First, the private sector
and the Government should approach a new security challenge
from the outset as fully equal partners who share common goals
and a dedication to finding a solution that will meet the
highest security standards while preserving operational
capabilities the private sector needs to remain fully
competitive internationally.
Second, the Government needs to develop a more robust
capability to share intelligence information with the private
sector. Third, security programs can be tailored to private-
sector business models in a way that is operationally feasible.
Fourth, analysis of all available information should be the
basis for focusing technical screening resources on shipments
identified as potential threats. Once screening has determined
that a shipment is not a threat to aviation, that clearance
should stay with the shipment regardless of it being
transferred to another carrier, and additional screening should
not be necessary.
So, again, I very much appreciate the opportunity to
discuss these issues with you.
[The statement of Mr. Mullen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael C. Mullen
April 18, 2012
i. our response to the yemen bomb incident
On October 28, 2010, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula attempted to
ship explosive devices hidden in printer cartridges coming out of Yemen
and destined for the United States on express delivery air cargo
flights. While technical screening, canines, and physical inspection
failed to detect the bombs, the plot was disrupted when specific
intelligence describing the nature of the threat was obtained which
allowed the express companies to immediately identify and neutralize
the shipments.
The day after the Yemen bombs were discovered and the plot
disrupted, the four member companies of the Express Association of
America (EAA)--DHL, FedEx, TNT, and UPS--had a telephone conference
with senior U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) officials. All participants in the call
agreed that providing information on air cargo shipments earlier would
be a key step toward improving security and disrupting any future
terrorist attempts to deliver a weapon through the air cargo supply
chain. A series of meetings began which focused on concrete approaches
to achieving this goal. Government agencies identified seven key data
elements from the existing manifest submission that are critical to
risk-targeting capabilities. The concept was to provide this data as
soon as possible, with the complete information in the manifest on the
aircraft continuing to be submitted in accordance with the Trade Act 4
hours before arrival. The express companies were permitted to take the
lead in developing an operationally feasible approach to providing this
data as early as possible in the supply chain. The express firms found
the data could be transmitted several hours before the shipment left
the last point of departure on its trip to the United States, and each
company worked with the CBP National Targeting Center to develop the
technical means to deliver the information.
ii. development of acas
The resulting project is named Air Cargo Advance Screening or ACAS.
By January 2011 all four express firms were transmitting data on
shipments from a list of countries identified by the Department of
Homeland Security as high priorities. CBP and TSA initially focused the
pilot program on express consignment operators since this sector of the
trade accounts for more than 70% of all international air cargo
shipments. The four members of the Express Association of America
account for approximately 93% of the international air cargo shipments
in the express consignment environment.
As operational experience with the ACAS pilot project increased,
both the Government and the express companies found innovative
approaches to improving the targeting and risk management process. The
express companies are providing access to their proprietary information
and targeting systems to help CBP and TSA resolve anomalies in the
shipment data, which allows a more rapid risk assessment of the cargo.
Express carrier personnel have worked with the ACAS Unit at the
National Targeting Center to share their expertise on express delivery
operations with Government personnel and to develop a deeper
understanding of the Governmental targeting process. ACAS Unit
personnel have visited express delivery hubs to gain awareness of the
operational environment. CBP and TSA, and other key stakeholders, have
developed and refined rules and weight sets within the automated
targeting system to better identify shipments that pose a security risk
to aviation. The express companies are constantly expanding the number
of countries--now over 100--for which shipment data is transmitted,
with the ultimate goal of providing global information on shipments
coming to the United States world-wide. CBP and TSA are providing
additional resources to the ACAS unit to manage the increasing volume
of information and still ensure the shipment risk assessment process is
completed expeditiously. In short, ACAS has become an extremely
effective and well-developed partnership between the public and private
sectors.
iii. acas results
To date, information on 17.5 million air cargo shipments has been
analyzed by the ACAS Unit. Over 250,000 shipments have been selected by
the targeting system for further review and nearly 3,000 of these have
been identified for additional data analysis or screening. No terrorist
threats to aviation have been detected and no shipments have been
designated as ``do not load''. Security concerns for identified
shipments are mitigated through TSA-implemented security screening
protocols conducted by the carrier prior to lading. In the event of a
``do not load'' situation, protocols have been developed to engage
host-country authorities and lines of communication are defined to
ensure all relevant stakeholders would receive required information.
The key factor to the success of the ACAS project has been the
flexibility displayed by both the public and private sectors. From the
beginning, the Government agreed that no time deadlines would be
applied to the submission of ACAS data, and no penalties would be
assessed for inaccurate or incomplete data. The National Targeting
Center developed a capability to accept ACAS data in any format and map
the information to existing targeting databases, as opposed to
requiring the data in a specific format from all participants. The
private sector agreed to submit the data as early as possible in the
supply chain, which has developed into a capability to transmit the
information nearly as soon as it is recorded in express carrier
databases. The transmission time is often 24 hours or more before the
shipment is loaded on the aircraft that will bring it to the United
States. As ACAS is expanded to additional countries and eventually the
entire globe, maintaining a flexible approach to the information
reporting will be critical to ensuring the continued success of the
project.
iv. screening issues
ACAS also has served to illuminate issues around the operational
protocols for screening shipments considered to be elevated risk. ACAS
information analysis can result in a requirement to screen a shipment
at origin, before it begins a trip to the United States that may
involve several plane changes. We need to find a better way for the
results of this screening, and the identification of a package as non-
threat, to stay with the shipment as it moves through the supply chain,
assuming it is kept in secure environments. Under existing TSA-
regulated procedures and National requirements of other governments,
shipments screened at origin often require re-screening, particularly
at the last point of departure of the flight to the United States. A
more rapid expansion of TSA's National Cargo Security Program is a
potential approach to providing upstream screening that would meet TSA
requirements. Developing an international version of TSA's domestic
Certified Cargo Screening Program is another potential solution for
this problem. The air cargo industry is developing a proposal to
present to TSA on this issue.
v. acas expansion
Deliveries from Asia to the United States represent a large
percentage of the millions of packages moved by EAA members around the
world on a daily basis. As more countries in the Asian region are added
to ACAS, the resulting increase in the volume of information will
require that both the Government and the private sector ensure adequate
resources are available to provide the information, conduct the
analysis, and respond operationally to the results of the targeting.
The volume of ACAS information is also expanding through the
addition of more participants to the pilot project. Since late 2011
several passenger airlines and air cargo consolidators such as freight
forwarders have engaged in the ACAS project, and information on the
cargo being shipped and carried by these entities is being analyzed.
CBP and TSA have published a plan to bring additional air cargo
entities into ACAS, including heavy lift air cargo airlines. The
Government has been particularly adept at realizing that the business
models of the new participants are quite different from express
delivery operations, and that a ``one size fits all'' approach is not
feasible for ACAS.
vi. acas: the new public-private partnership
ACAS represents a breakthrough in the development of public-private
partnerships to achieve mutual security and trade facilitation goals,
or, as the CBP Commissioner has described it, ACAS is a ``game
changer''. To establish ACAS, CBP and TSA employed an approach that has
come to be known as ``co-creation'', in which the private sector
determined at the outset an operational concept for the project, how
the data would be transmitted, and how the reaction to the results of
the risk assessment would be managed. These pillars of the project were
then discussed with the Government and refined to ensure the effort
would meet their requirements. The private sector also decided the pace
and direction of the expansion of ACAS to additional countries, within
a set of priorities that was determined by CBP and TSA. This approach
differs significantly from the normal method of allowing the business
community to comment on the Government's approach to a security issue
only after a regulation has been drafted.
Based on the success of this approach, CBP and TSA intend to use a
similar method to eventually move ACAS to a regulatory framework. After
the pilot project has run for a sufficient amount of time and the
results are analyzed, the ACAS private-sector participants will engage
with CBP and TSA to draft a regulation that is based on the operational
lessons learned from the pilot and that incorporates the flexibility
and feasibility of the approach employed in the pilot. The regulation
will also not attempt to employ a ``one-size-fits-all'' approach, but
will recognize the different business models of the ACAS participants
and provide a flexible approach to ensuring optimum security, tailored
to the specific industry entities in the air cargo environment. While
participation in ACAS is now voluntary, CBP and TSA have often pointed
out that the primary benefit of engaging in the ACAS pilot will be the
opportunity to engage in the regulation writing process.
vii. lessons learned
ACAS has already provided significant lessons learned, and as the
project moves forward the members of the Express Association of America
would like to see these lessons applied to establish a permanent air
cargo security regime characterized by flexibility and driven by a
determination to employ the most operationally feasible approach. The
key lessons from ACAS are:
The private sector and the Government should approach a new
security challenge from the outset as fully equal partners who
share common goals and a dedication to finding a solution that
will meet the highest security standards, while preserving the
operational capabilities the private sector needs to remain
fully competitive.
The Government needs to develop a more robust capability to
share intelligence information with the private sector. More
effective information sharing needs to occur in the short term
in the event of a terrorist incident to ensure the operational
response is optimally effective in disrupting the attack, as
well as in the longer term to make the private sector more
aware of trends that may indicate their resources are being
targeted.
Flexibility and a willingness to discard previous practices
and adopt new procedures, sometimes overnight, is the key to
defeating an adaptive terrorist enemy and ensuring attempted
attacks do not have a serious negative impact on U.S. and
global economic interests.
Security programs must be tailored to private sector
business models in a way that is operationally feasible, but
still meets high security standards. The division of the
international logistics system into four ``modes''--air, sea,
rail, and truck--is overly simplistic and creates operational
inefficiencies. There are at least three air cargo business
models and possibly more.
Analysis of all available information should be the
precondition for focusing technical screening resources on
shipments that have been identified as potential threats. If
this analysis indicates screening is required, it should occur
as far upstream as possible, preferably at origin, to ensure a
high-risk shipment is interdicted early in the supply chain.
Once screening has determined that a shipment is not a threat
to aviation, that result should stay with the shipment
regardless of it being transferred to another carrier, and
additional screening should not be necessary.
Mr. Walberg. I thank the gentleman for your testimony.
I understand that Mr. Dow is on a tight time schedule here,
and our having to recess has hurt that. So, understanding that
you have to get to a carrier to do some travel, we certainly
would say you are welcome to be dismissed.
If you have a moment, could I ask you one question before
you leave? Going back, you were here for the testimony----
Mr. Dow. Yes.
Mr. Walberg [continuing]. Of the previous panel, and
specifically in relationship to the foreign repair stations.
Has your industry been negatively impacted by the lack of rules
for the foreign repair stations?
Mr. Dow. Our industry, as far as--I can't speak for the
airlines, but the travelers, the consumers, and the business
travelers have not. But I do think there is a necessity of
getting those regulations in place.
Mr. Walberg. Okay. Well, thank you, and pleasant journeys.
Mr. Dow. Thank you.
Mr. Walberg. Let me recognize myself for questioning time
here, since I am the only one in the room right now.
Let me turn to each member of the panel. I would like to
ask for your response to this same question: In your opinion,
what are the biggest challenges to security in the Asia-Pacific
region?
Mr. Wade.
Mr. Wade. Well, the Asia-Pacific region is a large area to
cover. I think you have to look at it in different sectors of
that region. I think a large majority of the cargo coming out
of Asia--as I said earlier in my testimony, we have eight
aircraft dedicated to Asia--the large majority of it is coming
out of Hong Kong and Shanghai, Korea, and Japan. I think the
threat level there is different, demonstrably different, than
it is in other places in the region, specifically Indonesia and
the Philippines.
Mr. Walberg. Why is that the case?
Mr. Wade. Both the Philippines and Indonesia are known to
be the base for several extremist groups that have acted out
and been part of or completely responsible for terrorist acts
in the region, in the Philippines and in Indonesia.
So I think when you look at that region, one of the
challenges is to understand that the risk-based model can be
regionally directed, that you would not necessarily apply the
same security measures in Hong Kong or Shanghai, certainly, as
you would in Jakarta. So that is a big challenge for us. So
recognize that, and apply the right security measure that meets
and deals with the specific threat of the region.
Mr. Walberg. Ms. Reimold, what are the biggest challenges
of security in the Asia-Pacific region for you?
Ms. Reimold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
When we talk about Asia, as my colleague has mentioned, it
is a very broad range of states and certainly landmass. But
when we look at a country like China and look at its rapidly
growing aviation market, we have to consider that along with
growth comes some attendant considerations in terms of both
safety and security. The ability to develop an aviation market
like any other market and to do so safely and securely takes
resources and it takes know-how. So I would propose that one of
the challenges certainly that has been identified by the Civil
Aviation Authority of China is its organizational capacity. So
IATA, in fact, has a very robust capacity development program
to try to help them build their organizational capacity. That
is one area.
The second would be, there is a differing level of maturity
between some of the established countries within Asia--Japan
certainly comes to mind, and it has had a long-time aviation
relationship with the United States--and then like an emerging
market such as China.
You know, again, Australia has been a long-time partner
with the United States, and we have had the ability to work
with them on a number of issues and their aviation for our
member airlines. The good news when you have a long-term
partnership like that, you can look at some of the established
carriers and have them work with some of the emerging countries
to mentor the airlines. So we have taken our capacity
development into a mentoring relationship, as well.
I highlight these two areas because they are, you know,
directly in response to your questions. The challenge, just to
summarize again, is about organizational ability and capacity
development.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
Mr. Mullen, same question.
Mr. Mullen. Thank you.
I would agree with Mr. Wade that when you look at the high-
volume countries for air cargo out of Asia--China, Japan,
Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore--that these are highly secure
countries, both due to the relative absence of international
terrorist activity in those countries but also the fact that
the governments themselves have very strong security programs
when it comes to air cargo and aviation in general. So when you
add to that the relatively strong security programs that
companies like the express industry and other air cargo
industry bring to the table, I think you have an already very
strong environment.
The key thing I think you need to look at is, if you are
taking this already very secure operation and a very secure
supply chain, what steps make sense to add what is only going
to be an incremental increase in the amount of security that
you can provide through additional Government activities? I
think that is the challenge that has to be looked at very
carefully.
Really, in the end, from Asia or any other part of the
world, there is no such thing as 100 percent security. But you
have to ask yourself, what is a reasonable cost to add a small
amount of security, a kind of incremental amount of security,
to this very secure system that already exists? I think that is
the challenge for both Government and private sector going
forward.
Mr. Walberg. Okay. I appreciate that. Thank you.
We are waiting for a few other Members potentially to
arrive. Based upon that, I will have the luxury of asking some
further questions.
Going back to Ms. Reimold, would you talk a bit more about
some of the over-regulation that you feel is placed on the
aviation industry? You mentioned in previous statements about
excessive regulations. What are some of those?
Ms. Reimold. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My comments were directed largely at the sometimes
conflicting regulations. We certainly support the regulators'
mandate to ensure that our systems remain safe and secure. Our
concern, as expressed by our member airlines and certainly by
other parts of our industry, are the inconsistency of the
regulations--the shoes off in one country and not off in
another country, liquids in a bag in one country and not in
another country.
So I would like to characterize my comments in terms of the
inconsistency and then sometimes that inconsistency leading to
a direct conflict in regulations between one state and another.
Mr. Walberg. Okay. We see some of that inconsistency in
airports in the United States, as well, on some of those same
things. Thank you.
Going back to a question I asked Mr. Dow before he left on
the issue of foreign repair stations, have any of you seen
negative impacts to your specific area of the industry related
to foreign repair stations?
Mr. Wade.
Mr. Wade. At Atlas we have not. We support the rule as it
is proposed.
But I think one thing from a pure security standpoint that
it is important to understand is that, speaking for Atlas, at
foreign repair stations we have Atlas employees present during
the large maintenance--or during all maintenance operations,
large or small. So we have a USFA-certified mechanic who is
there who, No. 1, validates the person doing the repairs as
being qualified to do it, being qualified on that airframe, and
after doing that they oversee the entire operation. I am not
suggesting it is 24-hour-a-day oversight, but every repair has
to be verified and signed off on by an Atlas mechanic who is
FAA-certified.
Mr. Walberg. That is in 400 stations?
Mr. Wade. That is in all the stations that Atlas uses.
Mr. Walberg. Okay. Okay.
Mr. Mullen.
Mr. Mullen. Mr. Chairman, my members have also not
expressed a problem in this area, and I think the procedures
that they are using are almost identical to what Mr. Wade
described.
Mr. Walberg. Okay.
Ms. Reimold.
Ms. Reimold. I would go back to my earlier comments about
the potential of there being a direct impact when you have a
growth market. It is easy to envision that while I am not
personally aware of any direct member complaints from our
airlines, but I could speculate that in a market like China
that is forecast to order billions of dollars' worth of new
aircraft and put those into service, that the issue could
potentially get very serious if there are not enough repair
stations to accommodate their service requirements.
Mr. Walberg. Okay.
Let me ask one final question of each of you. What efforts
has your industry made to encourage harmonization within the
countries in the Asia-Pacific?
Mr. Wade.
Mr. Wade. We work very closely with TSA to come up with a
harmonization policy that works for us. Harmonization not only
in Asia but around the world is extremely important. As I
mentioned earlier, Atlas flies to over 90 countries in over 170
locations a year. If you can imagine each one of those having
their own set of rules and regulations for cargo security, it
is an impossible task to meet each one of those regulations and
the notifications required behind those.
Most recently, TSA has worked with the European Union on
harmonization and what cargo security should look like there. I
think it is important that TSA communicate closely with the
aviation industry to make sure that they express our opinions
and our methods of achieving the level of security, because no
one knows our business as well as we do.
Mr. Walberg. Are they open to those opinions? Is there a
fairly free flow?
Mr. Wade. Yes, Administrator Pistole is. It is just
important that we continue to express the opinions of the
aviation community on how we can best achieve the regulations.
Specifically on this issue, it is the issue of 100 percent
screening on all cargo aircraft as opposed to screening 100
percent of at-risk cargo. In my opinion, there is very little
use in making a regulation that no one can comply with. We have
to find regulations that accomplish the goal that we can comply
with.
Mr. Walberg. Okay.
Ms. Reimold, what would you add?
Ms. Reimold. I would add that, in addition to the
relationship that IATA has established with ICAO as it works to
harmonize the regulations, whether we are talking about
passenger screening or cargo screening, there are some more
direct efforts, I think, about the issue of the liquids,
aerosols, and gels, the regulations, and the efforts going on
in the European Union to remove the restrictions. We are
working directly, through our member airlines, with the
governments to ensure that there is a harmonized approach--if
their restrictions are lifted in one part of the world, that
they are lifted similarly.
This really comes into play in the Asia-Pacific region, as
well. Australia is working very aggressively on testing some of
the newer technologies to ensure that they can, you know, do a
positive identification on the liquids, aerosols, and gels. Our
role very much is to promote that information sharing among our
member airlines and, in fact, with their respective
governments.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
Mr. Mullen.
Mr. Mullen. Mr. Chairman, the express industry is also very
active, working through ICAO, to ensure that air cargo security
regulations are harmonized globally to the greatest extent
possible. As you are well aware, this is an industry where
minutes are extremely important to the success of the
operation. The industry would also have an extremely difficult
time dealing with a proliferation of different regulations,
screening requirements, and information-reporting requirements
from a number of different countries globally, including the
United States.
So the harmonization efforts that are driven by adherence
to ICAO rules we feel is the best approach to making sure that
that challenge doesn't become too severe.
Mr. Walberg. Okay. Thank you. My time has expired.
Welcome back, Mr. Chairman. I recognize you for any
questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. I only have one thing that I would
like to put on the record. I apologize for having to leave. I
had to go to another hearing with the Armed Services Committee.
Mr. Wade, before the hearing, you and I discussed this
topic, and I just want to make sure I get on the record what
you shared with me in our meeting earlier today. That is, when
you look at cargo screening technologies that are out there and
you know that we have a lot of pressure to try to achieve 100
percent screening with some type of technology in the near
future, what do you think is the most viable technology that
would help the cargo industry achieve 100 percent screening of
their merchandise?
Mr. Wade. Oh, I don't think there is any question, sir,
that private-sector canine screening, from an undeveloped
initiative standpoint, is by far the most important to us. It
allows us flexibility. Canines can be retrained for new
threats, very little cost, very quickly. As we know, terrorists
adapt quickly and change. Once we find out their methodology,
they will adapt those. We need to be able to do something in a
manner to address that cost-effectively and quickly. Canines
give us that capability.
The governments, including TSA and around the world, do not
have the capability all the time or maybe any of the time to
address all of the aviation needs given a specific threat.
Private-sector canines give us that capability at a reasonable
cost and immediate capability, especially concerned about the
cargo. If there is a threat, the fact is the passenger
carriers, and rightly so, are going to get the attention of the
TSA canine teams. We understand that and agree with that, but
that leaves us without an alternative of primary screening. So
it is very important to us to see that measure move forward.
Mr. Rogers. Great. I appreciate that, and I appreciate you
putting that on the record for us.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all I have.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony today
and the Members for their questions.
The Members of the committee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you to respond to
these in writing, if you would, please. The hearing record will
held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
