[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
MEASURING BORDER SECURITY: U.S. BORDER
PATROL'S NEW STRATEGIC PLAN AND THE PATH FORWARD
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 8, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-88
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Chairwoman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Henry Cuellar, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Ben Quayle, Arizona, Vice Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Paul Anstine, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security.......................................... 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 7
Witnesses
Mr. Michael J. Fisher, Chief, Border Patrol, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Ms. Rebecca Gambler, Acting Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. Marc R. Rosenblum, Specialist in Immigration Policy,
Congressional Research Service:
Oral Statement................................................. 31
Prepared Statement............................................. 33
For the Record
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Article, Houston Chronicle..................................... 65
MEASURING BORDER SECURITY: U.S. BORDER PATROL'S NEW STRATEGIC PLAN AND
THE PATH FORWARD
----------
Tuesday, May 8, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Miller, McCaul, Duncan, Cuellar,
Thompson, and Jackson Lee.
Mrs. Miller. The Committee on Homeland Security, the
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, will come to
order. The subcommittee is meeting today to examine our Border
Patrol's new strategic plan. We have a great lineup of
witnesses today.
But before we begin talking about our border, I think it is
appropriate for this subcommittee to acknowledge the
extraordinary professionalism and work that happened with the
FBI and the CIA in regard to foiling this recent bombing plot
that was happening in Yemen.
I would say one thing that is very, very clear to all of us
is that the war on terror is not over. We have so many enemies
of freedom that are bent on attacking this Nation. I think,
again, Americans can be comforted by the fact that we have such
high vigilance and so many professional folks in all our
agencies. We are going to hear from a number of them today. But
they are working on the front lines each and every day to
protect us, protect Americans against the enemies of freedom.
One of the things that is incumbent on us as a Congress is
to make sure that we provide these individuals at the various
agencies with the tools that they need, the resources that they
need, the training that they need to be able to stop a plot
such as we saw here, as is becoming clearer of some of the
various things that happened. But being from the Detroit area
where the underwear bomber, Christmas day bomber, almost blew
up about 300 folks over my hometown several years ago, we
always need to be ever-vigilant, of course.
But, again, on behalf of the committee, subcommittee,
certainly the entire committee, I think we all are very, very
thankful that this plot was stopped.
Today our subcommittee is going to be talking, as I said,
about the Border Patrol's new strategic plan. Our witnesses
today are Chief Fisher of the U.S. Border Patrol; Rebecca
Gambler, who is the Director of Homeland Security and Justice
section within the GAO; and Marc Rosenblum, who is a specialist
in immigration policy from the Congressional Research Service.
We welcome them all. I will make the formal introductions after
the opening statements.
Clearly, along the enumerated powers of the Congress,
providing for the common defense, which is actually in the
Preamble of our Constitution, gives this committee the
authority and responsibility to ensure that we do secure our
Nation's borders. How we determine that or measure that and
what a secure border actually looks like has been the subject
of much of this subcommittee's work during this Congress.
The U.S. Border Patrol recently released an updated 5-year
strategic plan. It is the first updated strategy since 2004.
This new strategic plan is intended to mark a shift in focus
from being resource-based to risk-based, focusing resources on
the greatest border threats that we face. Principal themes for
the new strategic plan are information, integration, and rapid
response, all of which are very important aspects to consider
as we work to secure our border.
The Border Patrol certainly has to make the best use of the
resources that Congress provides to it and be poised to respond
quickly if conditions change, which they always are evolving
and changing. I certainly want to say that I am very encouraged
that the Border Patrol decided to update this strategy to
reflect the reality that we face on the border today.
But I am a bit concerned that the 2012 to 2016 Strategy
lacks a tangible way to measure our efforts on the border, and
we are going to be exploring that today. The new strategy I
think is absent in an emphasis on proven techniques, such as
defense-in-depth, which makes full use of interior checkpoints
to deny successful migration, which was a key facet of the 2004
Strategy, yet it is not mentioned at all in this new strategic
plan, so I am sure there will be a question on why that was not
included.
Basing operations and patrolling using the best
intelligence to inform how and where agents patrol is smart,
and the new strategy rightly focuses on using information to
better secure our borders. But intelligence is an imperfect
tool, and some degree of randomness should be incorporated to
keep drug cartels or what have you from finding holes in our
defenses or watching and tracking our patterns.
The most important question I think in many minds is: How
do we know if this new strategy is working, and so how can we
measure it? The Border Patrol's previous National strategy,
again released in 2004, was predicated on the concept of
gaining and maintaining miles of operational control. That sort
of became the de facto term of art, if you will, that indicated
how much or how little of the border the Border Patrol could
effectively control. However, it is clear that the Department
of Homeland Security is backing away from the use of that term,
``operational control,'' in its absence in this strategy.
In 2010, the Department really stopped reporting to
Congress the number of miles of border under operational
control, and, to date, we have not been supplied with an
alternative measure to replace this operational control matrix.
Performance measures, such as the number of apprehensions, as
noted by the GAO in their testimony, are really not adequate to
measure border security progress. I think as I have said and
many Members of this subcommittee have said often in the past,
we are open to a new, more robust standard if it supplements
operational control and if it better describes the level of
security at the border. But when we hear terms like ``the
border is more secure than ever,'' well, that may be so, but
how do you measure that, by what? That is what we are really
looking for.
Conditions along the Nation's border continue to evolve. It
is clear we need to have an agreed-upon measure to understand
progress, as I say, or lack thereof. The border is certainly a
much different place now than it was in 2004, and Congress, of
course, has invested in doubling the size of the Border Patrol,
building hundreds of miles of fence, utilizing new technology
such as the unmanned aerial vehicles, the UAVs, that this
subcommittee and the full committee have had many hearings
about. However, as the GAO has noted, all of these elements
were also prevalent in the 2004 Strategy, so, again, we will be
interested in learning what is different or new in the 2012
plan.
As mentioned in the new strategic plan, the Department is
working on something called the Border Condition Index, the
BCI, which is supposed to be an objective measure to inform and
to matrix our border security efforts. We have heard some
reports that the anticipated new standard is running into some
delays, maybe it is unworkable. Again, I think we will be eager
to hear how that is all happening.
Using apprehensions as a measure of progress tells us an
incomplete story, really. There are a number of reasons why I
think migration across our border is down. Certainly, our
efforts are one of the components, but the economy has been
weakened; drug cartels make trying to cross the border a
dangerous endeavor for many that were trying; and, certainly,
changing demographics. All of these things are critical
elements that play a role in the reduced number of illegal
aliens who are crossing the border or attempting to cross the
border.
I say that by not taking away for a moment from the work
that the Border Patrol has done. I think our enhanced
enforcement efforts and the introduction of significant
consequences, such as prosecution for multiple crossers and
smugglers, have made a tremendous difference. At the same time,
I think we obviously can't be complacent, as the number of
illegal aliens crossing in places such as the Rio Grande Valley
sector in Texas have recently increased, actually, which is
bucking the National trend.
So we have called on the Department of Homeland Security to
produce a comprehensive strategy to secure the border that
informs the Congress and the American people of the resources
that are needed to make that a reality. I certainly hope that
the forthcoming implementation plan will indicate what a secure
border looks like and provides us a pathway to get there.
I also want to mention it is the 88th anniversary,
actually, of the founding of the U.S. Border Patrol. That is
going to be later this month. Over that time, the men and women
in green have served our Nation in such an extraordinarily
remarkable and professionally well-executed way. On behalf of
this committee, I certainly want to commend all of the men and
women of the Border Patrol for the work that they have done
over the last decade, as well, the last 88 years, but certainly
since 9/11 and since we have really started to focus on our
border in a much more intense way. They have just done an
extraordinarily professional job for all of us.
So I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today on
how this change in strategy will move the ball forward to make
for a more secure border.
[The statement of Mrs. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairwoman Candice S. Miller
May 8, 2012
Among the enumerated powers of the Congress, providing for the
common defense gives this committee the authority and responsibility to
ensure that we secure the Nation's borders.
How we determine, or measure, what a secure border looks like has
been the subject of much of this subcommittee's work this Congress.
This hearing will continue the subcommittee's oversight in this area.
The U.S. Border Patrol recently released an updated 5-year
strategic plan, the first updated strategy since 2004. According to
Border Patrol leadership, the new Strategic Plan is intended to mark a
shift in focus from being ``resource''-based to ``risk''-based,
focusing resources on the greatest border threats.
The principal themes for the new strategic plan are information,
integration, and rapid response--all important aspects to consider as
we work to secure the border. The Border Patrol has to make the best
use of the resources this Congress provides and be poised to respond
quickly if conditions change.
I want to say at the outset that I am encouraged that the Border
Patrol decided to update this strategy to reflect the reality we face
on the border today, but I am concerned that the 2012-2016 Strategy
lacks a tangible way to measure our efforts on the border.
I would like to highlight the absence of proven techniques such as
defense-in-depth, which makes full use of interior checkpoints to deny
successful migration, which was a key facet of the 2004 Strategy yet it
is not mentioned at all in the 2012 Strategic plan. I will be
interested to hear why that was not included.
Basing operations and patrolling using the best intelligence to
inform how, and where, agents patrol, is smart, but intelligence is an
imperfect tool and some degree of randomness should be incorporated to
keep drug cartels from finding holes in our defenses, or watching and
tracking our patterns.
Border Patrol's previous National strategy, released in 2004, was
predicated on the concept of gaining and maintaining miles of
operational control.
It became the de facto term of art that indicated how much or how
little of the border the Border Patrol could effectively control.
However, it is clear that the Department of Homeland Security is
backing away from the use of ``operational control'' given its absence
in this strategy.
In 2010, the Department stopped reporting to Congress the number of
miles of border under operational control, but to date has not supplied
an alternative measure to replace operational control. Performance
measures such as the number of apprehensions, as noted by GAO in their
testimony, are not adequate to measure border security progress.
As I have said before, I am certainly open to a new, more robust
standard if it supplements operational control and better describes the
level of security at the border, but we cannot merely take the
Secretary's word that the border is more secure than ever.
Conditions along the Nation's border continue to evolve and its
clear we need an agreed-upon measure to understand progress, or lack
thereof. The border is a vastly different place than it was in 2004
because Congress invested in doubling the size of the Border Patrol,
building hundreds of miles of fence, and utilizing new technology such
as unmanned aerial vehicles.
However, as the GAO has noted, all of these elements were also
prevalent in 2004 Strategy, so I will be interested in learning what is
different or new in the 2012 plan.
As mentioned in the new strategic plan, the Department is working
on something called the Border Condition Index which is supposed to be
an objective measure to inform our border security efforts.
However, I have heard reports that the anticipated new standard is
running into delays, and may even be an unworkable measure. So, I am
eager to hear how this Congress and the American people can adequately
judge progress on border security in the interim.
Our economy is fragile, drug cartels make trying to cross the
border a dangerous endeavor, and changing demographics all play a role
in the reduced number of illegal aliens who cross the border.
That is not to take away from the work the Border Patrol has done--
I'm certain that our enhanced enforcement efforts and the introduction
of significant consequences, such a prosecution for multiple crossers
and smugglers have made a difference.
But I want to caution that we should not become complacent as the
number of illegal aliens crossing in places such as the Rio Grande
Valley Sector in Texas have recently increased, bucking the National
trend.
I have called on the Department of Homeland Security to produce a
comprehensive strategy to secure the border that informs the Congress
of the resource needs to make that a reality. My hope is that the
forthcoming implementation plan will indicate what a secure border
looks like and provides a path to get us there.
The 88th anniversary of the founding of the U.S. Border Patrol will
take place later this month and over that time, the men and women in
green have served our Nation well.
On behalf of this committee, I want to commend the men and women of
the Border Patrol for the work they have done over the last decade to
make our border more secure, but we cannot cede an inch to drug
cartels, human traffickers, smugglers, and potential terrorists.
I look forward to hearing from the witnesses today on how this
change in strategy will move the ball forward toward a more secure
border.
Mrs. Miller. At this time, I would recognize our Ranking
Member, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Cuellar, for his opening
statement.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you so much, Madam Chairwoman, for
having this meeting. I am glad that we are here to examine the
Border Patrol's recently released strategic plan.
I have long believed that border security is a core element
of the Department of Homeland Security. After the terrorism
attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress made providing the
resources necessary to secure that. We learned a lot from what
happened on September 11, 2001, and we certainly want to make
sure that we secure our land, air, marine, maritime borders,
make sure that is a top priority for all of us.
As a result, the number of Border Patrol agents patrolling
America's border has more than doubled. As of last month, there
were 21,328 Border Patrol agents.
Chief Fisher, I think you all just recently had your 1,000
graduating class, and congratulations on that.
Additional resources also allow for expanded border
infrastructure such as fencing and technology such as mobile
surveillance units. The U.S. Border Patrol refocused its
priorities in response to 9/11 while remaining committed to its
traditional duties of preventing illicit trafficking of people
and contraband between our official ports of entry.
To that end, the Border Patrol released its first National
strategic plan in March 2004. That plan provided the framework
for the on-going acquisition and deployment of personnel,
technology, and infrastructure resources along our Nation's
border. In the intervening years, the Border Patrol has
continued to grow and has only recently begun to level off its
expansion.
This is a very appropriate time for the agency to set forth
a new strategic plan which seeks to assure the new Border
Patrol is as effective and efficient as possible. Indeed, in
order to best utilize Border Patrol's workforce and advanced
technology, the agency has developed a risk-based strategy,
which, again, is something that--just like the Chairwoman and I
were interested in measures, because at the end of the day we
want to see, if you put X amount of dollars into an agency,
what are the results, how do you measure results? This is
something that we certainly, working with all the folks here,
we want to make sure. Trying to find the right results can be
difficult, I understand that, but we appreciate all the work
that you all have been doing to make sure that we focus on
results.
The new strategic plan is focused on identifying high-risk
areas and flows and targeting the response to meet those
threats. Cooperation is also key to the 2012 Strategy as it
would serve as a guide in the overall efforts of CBP, another
agency within DHS, to ensure progress continues on our borders.
The 2012 Strategy also builds on a strong relationship with
Mexico and Canada as it relates to border management and
security.
I am hopeful that today's discussion will help us gain a
better perspective not only of where Border Patrol is today but
also on the future direction of the agency. I am also
particularly interested in finding out how Border Patrol will
continue to build on the strong relationships with its State
and local counterparts on the Southern Border.
Chief, you and I have talked about the importance of making
sure that they are all working, because we can't do it by
ourselves, we have to involve the States and, of course, the
local governments. I appreciate all the work that you are doing
in that effort.
Living on the Southern Border has given us a first-hand
knowledge of the challenges facing the region and the
importance of providing not just the tools necessary to enhance
border security but also a sound plan to get us there. I am
also interested from our witnesses about how they believe we
can get to that point.
I want to thank Chairwoman Miller for having this meeting
but also for the field hearing, for allowing us to be down
there in my hometown of Laredo. Congressman Mike McCaul was
there. We got to see the work that has been done, not only the
ports of entry, but we also got on the boats and went up and
down the Rio Grande.
We want to thank you, Chief, for the work that you all are
doing in providing that type of work down there.
So I want to thank all the witnesses for joining us here
today. With that, I yield back. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman for his comments. We
heard excellent reports about your field hearing there, and
Chairman McCaul and Mr. Cuellar as well. So I thought that was
an excellent, excellent, excellent effort on all of your
behalf, and I appreciate your service to do such a thing.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking
Member of the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi,
Mr. Thompson, for any statements that he may have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
I welcome our witnesses here. Some I have seen one or two
times in the past. I am looking forward to your testimony.
I have long encouraged the Department of Homeland Security
to develop a comprehensive strategy for securing America's
borders. It is still my hope that the Department will do so.
While not a Department-wide strategy, I am pleased that the
U.S. Border Patrol has developed a new plan, the Border Patrol
Strategic Plan 2012 to 2016, to guide the agency over the next
4 years.
With the support of Congress, the Border Patrol has
experienced unprecedented growth over the last decade in terms
of both personnel and resources. As the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee has already indicated, the number of Border Patrol
agents has more than doubled over the last decade, from over
10,000 in 2002 to over 21,000 today. DHS has also added
hundreds of miles of pedestrian fencing and vehicle barriers in
that time, with about 650 miles in place along the Southwest
Border today. Furthermore, DHS has deployed additional
technology and equipment to the borders, including mobile
surveillance systems, cameras, and UAVs.
Given these sweeping changes, it seems necessary and
appropriate for the Border Patrol to set forth a new strategy
based on current realities. That said, the Border Patrol's
strategic plan is a relatively brief document compared to the
breadth and depth of the mission before the law enforcement
agency. I look forward to hearing more details today from Chief
Fisher about the strategic plan and how it will be implemented
in the near term and in the coming years.
I do have some initial thoughts on the plan, however. One
of the concerns I have expressed during prior oversight
hearings on the rapid growth of the Border Patrol was the need
to ensure proper training and supervision of less experienced
agents. I was pleased to see that the strategic plan gives
consideration to supporting the men and women of the Border
Patrol and ensuring that the agency matures as an organization.
The strategic plan also discusses the Border Condition
Index, BCI, which the Border Patrol is developing to replace
operational control as a metric for measuring border security.
We are told that the new BCI is intended to capture a more
comprehensive picture of border conditions, including border
security, public safety, and quality of life. It is my hope
that the BCI will truly offer a better indicator of the
situation along the border and is not just a case of finding a
new ruler when you do not like the first measurement. I look
forward to hearing more detail about the BCI at this hearing
and once the new system is implemented.
I thank the witnesses for joining us today and yield back
the balance of my time.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman for his comments.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements might be submitted for the record.
First of all, Michael Fisher. Chief Fisher was named the
chief of the U.S. Border Patrol in May 2010. Chief Fisher
started his duty along the Southwest Border in 1987 in Arizona.
He successfully completed the selection process for the Border
Patrol Tactical Unit in 1990 and was later selected as the
field operation supervisor for the tactical unit. Following
this, he served as a deputy chief patrol agent in the Detroit
sector and as an assistant chief patrol agent in Tucson,
Arizona.
Rebecca Gambler is an acting director in the U.S.
Government Accountability Office's Homeland Security and
Justice team, where she leads the GAO's work on border security
and immigration issues. She joined GAO in 2002 and has worked
on a wide range of issues related to homeland security and
justice, including border security, immigration, and DHS
management and transformation.
Marc Rosenblum is a specialist in immigration policy at the
Congressional Research Service and an associate professor of
political science in the University of New Orleans. Dr.
Rosenblum is the author of ``The Transnational Politics of U.S.
Immigration Policy'' and the co-editor of ``The Oxford Handbook
of International Migration.'' He has also published over 40
academic journal articles, book chapters, and policy briefs on
immigration policy and U.S.-Latin American relations.
So we welcome all of the witnesses.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Chief Fisher for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. FISHER, CHIEF, BORDER PATROL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Chief Fisher. Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar,
and other distinguished Members of the subcommittee, it is
indeed a privilege and an honor to appear before you today to
discuss the work that U.S. Customs and Border Protection does
in securing America's borders.
May 28, 2012, will mark the 88th birthday of the United
States Border Patrol. As this day approaches, I am reminded of
how Western author Louis L'Amour defined the term ``riding for
the brand'' as a compliment or an expression of loyalty to a
cowboy's outfit. For 88 years, the men and women of the United
States Border Patrol have been riding for a unique and
particular brand. Since the days of the mounted watchmen who
rode the borderlands of the Southwest, the Border Patrol has
done no less than protect and defend this country's borders. As
L'Amour wrote, ``If a man did not like a ranch or the way they
conducted their affairs, he was free to quit. And many did. But
if he stayed on, he gave loyalty and expected it.'' For 88
years, the men and women of the Border Patrol have stayed on,
giving their loyalty to their mission and this Nation.
Since May 28, 1924, the U.S. Border Patrol has responded to
an ever-changing and maturing Nation as it recognized the need
to curb the influx of people and contraband entering its
borders. As the Nation evolved, so did the job. During the
Prohibition era, inspectors pursued liquor smugglers in the
mountains of Arizona. As World War II raged in Europe and Asia,
Border Patrol inspectors scanned the Atlantic horizon for enemy
submarines off the coast of Florida. The Cold War found Border
Patrol personnel on board domestic airline flights, serving as
U.S. air marshals. During the civil rights movement, the U.S.
Border Patrol joined U.S. Marshals to enforce Federal law by
protecting James Meredith as he registered as the University of
Mississippi's first African American student. In the wake of
Hurricane Katrina, Border Patrol agents responded to help
victims and restore order. During the reconstruction of Iraq
and Afghanistan, agents stepped up across the ocean to bring
security and support.
Whether dealing with the problem of illegal immigration or
facing the threat of international terrorism, Border Patrol
agents have done their job with vigilance, integrity, and
pride. The threats have changed over the years, but the basic
mission remains unaltered. Defending and protecting our
Nation's borders is the Border Patrol's brand--a brand that is
as important today as it was in the past.
This month, as we take increased devotion from our past to
carry out our great task of securing America's borders, it is
altogether fitting and proper that I am here to discuss the
Border Patrol's future through the 2012-2016 Border Patrol
Strategic Plan.
The border is a very different environment today than when
I began my career. I have personally witnessed the evolution of
the border over the past 25 years, both in terms of additional
resources applied against the threat as well as the change in
the adversary's tactics. The Border Patrol Strategic Plan
builds on the foundation of the 2004 National Strategy. The
2004 Strategy focused on getting the Border Patrol organized
and resourced through the unprecedented deployment of
personnel, technology, and infrastructure. Our 2012-2016
Strategic Plan involves a set of objectives, strategies,
programs, and initiatives that apply information, integration,
and rapid response to develop and deploy new and better
tactics, techniques, and procedures to achieve our strategic
objectives.
The principal theme of our strategy is to use information,
integration, and rapid response to meet all threats. These
pillars are essential as we continue to build upon an approach
that puts the Border Patrol's greatest capabilities in place to
combat the greatest risks.
First, information provides situational awareness and
intelligence developed by blending things such as
reconnaissance, community engagement, sign cutting, tracking,
and technology to enable Border Patrol agents to get ahead of
the threat.
Second, integration denotes our comprehensive planning and
execution of border security operations that leverages
partnerships to ensure we bring all available capabilities and
tools to bear in addressing threats.
Last, through rapid response, we will deploy capabilities
timely and effectively to meet and mitigate the risks we
confront. Put simply, rapid response means the Border Patrol
and its partners can quickly and appropriately respond to
dynamic threats.
Our strategy has two interrelated and interdependent goals.
Goal No. 1 is to secure America's borders. The Border Patrol
will work to achieve this goal by preventing terrorists and
terrorist weapons from entering the United States, managing
risk, disrupting and degrading transnational criminal
organizations, employing a whole-of-Government approach, and
increasing community engagement.
First, the current risk environment is characterized by a
variety of constantly evolving threats, and the Border Patrol
must harness information and intelligence to ensure that
operations are focused and targeted against potential terrorist
threats and transnational criminal organizations. The Border
Patrol's ability to prevent and disrupt such threats is
enhanced through increased information sharing and operational
integration, planning, and execution with our domestic and
foreign law enforcement partners.
Likewise, developing and deploying the best possible
information and intelligence is critical to assessing and
managing risk. The Border Patrol's capabilities must continue
to adapt to ensure that resources are being used effectively
and efficiently.
For example, the Border Patrol employs a tactical strategy
known as change detection capability, which uses various
techniques to gather situational awareness in low-threat areas.
Change detection capability allows the Border Patrol to
continue focusing other capabilities on areas where the highest
risk exists but ensures that any threat adaptation is
identified quickly.
In addition to assessing the threat and risk, the Border
Patrol must continue to develop its mobile response capability
to quickly redeploy scaleable capabilities to the highest-risk
areas. Through targeted enforcement against the highest-
priority threats and the expansion of programs that aim to
reduce smuggling and associated crimes, the Border Patrol will
increase the ability to disrupt and degrade transnational
criminal organizations along our borders. Our consequence
delivery system is one example of our ability to apply targeted
and effective strategies that guide management and agents
through a standardized process designed to uniquely evaluate
each subject and identify the ideal consequence that breaks the
smuggling cycle.
In order to maximize enforcement benefits from combined
resources, we must move beyond collaboration toward
integration. Our border security mission involves a multitude
of entities in the application of a whole-of-Government
approach to ensure that we are working together in an
integrated way.
Last, the Border Patrol will continue to engage and educate
the public on border activities and issues to leverage the
critical assistance of our border communities. Active
engagement by the Border Patrol with local law enforcement and
the public can assist in lowering crime and reducing violence
in border communities.
Goal No. 2 is to mature, refine, and integrate the Border
Patrol's institutional capabilities and techniques. The Border
Patrol will achieve this goal by strengthening our investment
in its people, supporting our employees, preserving our
organizational integrity, improving our processes, systems, and
doctrine, and enhancing our efficiencies.
First, we must strengthen our investment in our people and
capabilities through improved education, training, and support
of the Border Patrol personnel. Second, we must reinforce
employee support initiatives in programs that continue to
provide ways for Border Patrol employees to remain resilient in
the performance of their day-to-day duties. Third, the Border
Patrol must address threats to organizational integrity and
remain vigilant in training and promoting initiatives to combat
corruption to ensure morale and mission are not compromised.
Leaders must set the example and promote integrity through the
Border Patrol to reduce the potential for corruption.
As the Border Patrol grows and matures, it is necessary to
develop an institutionalized doctrine within the organization
that will help execute the long-term strategic plan and enable
the Border Patrol to seamlessly link the operational force to
emerging tactics, techniques, and procedures of our
adversaries.
Last, it is the Border Patrol's responsibility to ensure
that its leaders, agents, and support personnel are good
stewards of the American tax dollars. As the Border Patrol
progresses toward organizational rigor and maturity, an
essential element will be the development and continual
refinement of comprehensive, demanding, and results-driven
performance measures that hold us to account.
The Border Patrol strategic plan marks an important point
in the growth and development of the U.S. Border Patrol and
establishes an approach that is tailored to meet the challenges
of securing a 21st Century border against a variety of dynamic
threats and dangerous adversaries. Ultimately, leveraging all
available actions, programs, and techniques encompassed within
our strategic plan will strengthen the Border Patrol
internally, increase capabilities and our operations, and
enhance border security and ultimately National security
through the use of information, integration, and rapid
response.
Again, Chairwoman, thank you for the opportunity to testify
today. I look forward to working with you and the committee as
we design the strategic implementation plan. At this point, I
welcome your questions.
[The statement of Chief Fisher follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael J. Fisher
May 8, 2012
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today
to discuss the 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan and its role
within the work that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) does in
securing America's borders.
As America's front-line border agency, CBP's priority mission is to
protect the American public, while facilitating lawful travel and
trade. To do this, CBP has deployed a multi-layered, risk-based
approach to enhance the security of our borders, while facilitating the
flow of lawful people and goods entering the United States. This
layered approach to security reduces our reliance on any single point
of entry or program. It also extends our zone of security outward,
ensuring that our physical border is not the first or last line of
defense, but one of many.
BORDER SECURITY COMMITMENT
Over the past 3 years, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
has dedicated historic levels of personnel, technology, and resources
in support of our border security efforts and accomplishments. Most
recently, the President's fiscal year 2013 budget request continues
these efforts by supporting the largest deployment of law enforcement
officers to the front line in our agency's history: 21,370 Border
Patrol agents, over 1,200 air and marine agents, and 21,186 CBP
officers, all who work 24/7 with State, local, Tribal, and Federal law
enforcement in targeting illicit networks trafficking in people, drugs,
weapons, and money. Over the last year, we have brought greater unity
to our enforcement efforts, expanded collaboration with other agencies,
and improved response times.
CBP has also deployed additional technology assets--including
mobile surveillance units, thermal imaging systems, and large- and
small-scale non-intrusive inspection equipment--along our Nation's
borders, and currently has over 270 aircrafts including nine Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS), and 301 patrol and interdiction vessels that
provide critical aerial and maritime surveillance and operational
assistance to personnel on the ground. The UAS program is rapidly
changing how ground assets are deployed, supplying Border Patrol Agents
with unparalleled situational awareness through its broad area
electronic surveillance capabilities. Going forward, CBP will continue
to integrate the use of these specialized capabilities into the daily
operations of CBP's front-line personnel to enhance our border security
efforts.
The results of these resources dedicated to the border and our
layered approach to security are clear. Border Patrol apprehensions
along the Southwest Border--a key indicator of illegal immigration--
have decreased 53 percent since fiscal year 2008, and are less than
one-fifth of what they were at their peak in 2000. We have matched
these decreases in apprehensions with increases in seizures of cash,
drugs, and weapons. During fiscal years 2009 through 2011, DHS seized
74 percent more currency, 41 percent more drugs, and 159 percent more
weapons along the Southwest Border as compared to fiscal year 2006-
2008. In fiscal year 2011, CBP seized more than $126 million in illegal
currency and nearly 5 million pounds of narcotics Nation-wide. At the
same time, according to 2010 FBI crime reports, violent crimes in
Southwest Border States have dropped by an average of 40 percent in the
last two decades. Currently, some of the safest cities in America are
border communities.
Every key measure shows we are making significant progress;
however, we must remain vigilant and focus on building upon an approach
that puts the Border Patrol's greatest capabilities in place to combat
the greatest risks.
BUILDING ON THE PAST--FOCUSING ON THE FUTURE
Beginning with ``Operation Hold the Line'' in El Paso in 1993,
``Operation Gatekeeper'' in San Diego, CA in 1994, and ``Operation Rio
Grande'' in Brownsville, TX in 1997, the Border Patrol strategically
deploys resources to meet the highest-priority threats.
The evolution of the Border Patrol as a risk-based, intelligence-
driven law enforcement organization is part of a much larger change in
the U.S. Government's approach to border and homeland security, which
began with the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. The 2012-2016
Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012 Strategic Plan) builds on the
foundation of the 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy. The Border
Patrol's 2004 Strategy focused on getting the Border Patrol organized
and resourced to meet its new, post-9/11 mission and succeed in its new
parent organization. For instance, it facilitated the unprecedented
deployment of personnel, technology, and infrastructure to secure the
Nation's borders.
The 2012 Strategic Plan draws on earlier applications of a risk-
based approach as part of the administration's comprehensive approach
to border security.
2012-2016 BORDER PATROL STRATEGIC PLAN
The 2012 Strategic Plan, applying the principles of risk
management, sets a strong foundation for the continued evolution of the
Border Patrol as an integral part of CBP's overall border management
and homeland security enterprise.
The 2012 Strategic Plan encompasses three key objectives and
strategies concerning border security today. First, the Strategic Plan
supports National-level strategies, such as the President's Strategy to
Combat Transnational Organized Crime and the National Drug Control
Strategy. Second, it supports Departmental strategies, in particular
the DHS Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Finally, it supports CBP-
wide planning and integration efforts. It means being more effective
and efficient in our operations to mitigate risks. It also means
continued integration within CBP and working with Federal, State,
local, Tribal, and international partners.
The 2012 Strategic Plan involves a set of objectives, strategies,
programs, and initiatives which apply information, integration, and
rapid response to develop and deploy new and better tactics,
techniques, and procedures to achieve its strategic objectives.
INFORMATION, INTEGRATION, AND RAPID RESPONSE
The principal theme of the 2012 Strategic Plan is to use
information, integration, and rapid response to meet all threats. These
pillars are central as we continue to build upon an approach that puts
the Border Patrol's greatest capabilities in place to combat the
greatest risks.
Information gathered from reconnaissance, community engagement,
sign-cutting, and technology together provide situational awareness and
intelligence and helps us to best understand and assess the threats we
face along our borders. Information and intelligence will empower
Border Patrol leadership and front-line agents to get ahead of the
threat, be predictive and proactive.
Integration denotes CBP corporate planning and execution of border
security operations, while leveraging partnerships with other Federal,
State, local, Tribal, and international organizations.
Integration of effort with these organizations will ensure we bring
all available capabilities and tools to bear in addressing threats.
Last, through rapid response, we will deploy capabilities
efficiently and effectively to meet and mitigate the risks we confront.
Put simply, rapid response means the Border Patrol and its partners can
quickly and appropriately respond to changing threats.
GOAL 1: SECURE AMERICA'S BORDERS
The 2012 Strategic Plan has two interrelated and interdependent
goals. In the first goal, the Border Patrol will work with its Federal,
State, local, Tribal, and international partners to secure America's
borders using information, integration, and rapid response in a risk-
based manner. There are five objectives within this goal:
I. Prevent Terrorists and Terrorist Weapons from Entering the
United States
II. Manage Risk
III. Disrupt and Degrade Transnational Criminal Organizations
(TCOs)
IV. Whole-of-Government Approach
V. Increase Community Engagement
I. Prevent Terrorists and Terrorist Weapons From Entering the United
States
The current risk environment is characterized by constantly
evolving threats that are both complex and varying, and the Border
Patrol must strategically apply intelligence to ensure that operations
are focused and targeted against the greatest threats. The Border
Patrol's ability to prevent and disrupt such threats is enhanced
through increased information sharing and operational integration,
planning, and execution with our domestic and foreign law enforcement
partners. Integration with our Federal, State, local, Tribal, and
international partners' intelligence and enforcement capabilities into
the planning and execution of CBP operations is critical to our ability
to secure our Nation's borders.
II. Manage Risk
Developing and deploying the best possible information and
intelligence is critical to assessing and managing risk. The Border
Patrol has made significant progress in securing the Nation's borders
through the deployment of personnel, technology, and infrastructure.
These enhanced resources have made our borders more secure. Yet as
threats along the border continue to evolve, CBP's capabilities to meet
these threats must also continue to adapt. Accordingly, as we evolve
from a resource-based approach towards a more risk-based approach, we
must be able to focus the Border Patrol's capabilities in rapidly
responding to threats along the border.
Given the dynamic nature of cross-border threats, the Border Patrol
must become more mobile to respond appropriately to the changing
threat. Mobile Response Capability provides the Border Patrol with the
flexibility to deploy capabilities to the highest-risk areas of the
border. The Border Patrol also deploys scalable capabilities to areas--
before they become high-risk--to maintain the highest possible levels
of security in each border area. This capability builds on situational
awareness, because the Border Patrol must know when, where, and to what
extent to deploy its capabilities.
III. Disrupt and Degrade TCOs
Transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) represent a significant
cross-border threat to homeland security. These organizations control
most cross-border trafficking in guns and illegal drugs, as well as an
increasing percentage of human smuggling and trafficking. With efforts
in place to understand the origin and magnitude of threats along the
border, the Border Patrol can now focus on specific threats like TCOs,
and work to disrupt and degrade their operations. The Border Patrol's
response to this threat also will involve close collaboration within
CBP and includes Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners to advance
the common goal of disrupting and degrading TCO activity. For example,
CBP has developed, with the support of its strategic partners, a new
Consequence Delivery System (CDS) that guides agents through a process
designed to evaluate each subject and identify the appropriate
consequence to break the smuggling cycle. Consequences delivered under
this system that execute targeted enforcement techniques range from
administrative, criminal prosecution, and programmatic elements that
are designed to impact and change the way TCOs conduct business and
stem the flow of illegal activity.
IV. Whole-of-Government Approach
The U.S. Border Patrol will continue to integrate targeting
practices and joint operations with CBP's Office of Field Operations
(OFO) and Office of Air and Marine (OAM) to better achieve its goals.
The Border Patrol also will work with its Federal, State, local, and
Tribal law enforcement partners to achieve a holistic approach to
border security. This is accomplished by establishing a unity of
purpose; advancing operational integration and jointly planned targeted
operations; developing intelligence and accomplishing intelligence
fusion; and creating integrated partnerships. This whole-of-Government
approach, coupled with the application of the principles of targeted
enforcement, consequence delivery, and operational discipline, provides
the capability necessary to enhance the Border Patrol and its partners'
abilities to address threats or emergencies within a region.
V. Increase Community Engagement
The Border Patrol will continue to use its collective capabilities
to engage and educate the public on border activities and issues so we
can leverage the critical assistance of our border communities. Active
engagement by the Border Patrol with local law enforcement and the
public can assist in lowering crime and reducing violence.
Additionally, through briefings, tours, informal meetings, and
stakeholder ``academies,'' the Border Patrol is able to show the
operational achievements and challenges, which are essential to
fostering support from our partners and stakeholders.
GOAL 2: STRENGTHEN THE BORDER PATROL
The Border Patrol must also continue to mature, refine, and
integrate its capabilities and techniques. To meet current and future
operational and organizational requirements, it is essential to
develop, deploy, and manage institutional capabilities within the
Border Patrol. This includes areas such as human capital management,
training, leadership development, employee support, organizational
integrity, doctrine development, and technology research and
development. The Border Patrol will strengthen its institutional
capabilities through five objectives:
I. Strengthen Investment in People
II. Support Border Patrol Employees
III. Preserve Organizational Integrity
IV. Improve Organizational Processes, Systems, and Doctrine
V. Enhance Overall Efficiency of the Border Patrol
I. Strengthen Investment in People
People are our most valuable asset. The Border Patrol must hire the
most qualified applicants and train new employees to be successful in
performing the mission. Leaders must ensure that employees have the
opportunity to reach their highest potential by receiving the
appropriate education, training, and work experiences to progress in
the organization. Border Patrol will use a multi-tiered approach
incorporating education, training, and work experience to maximize the
effectiveness of Border Patrol personnel, such as succession
management, targeted placement, advanced education and training, joint
and inter-agency assignments, and mentoring.
II. Support Border Patrol Employees
We must reinforce employee-support initiatives and programs that
continue the tradition of the Border Patrol. Given the challenges law
enforcement face in their daily work, it is incumbent upon leadership
to provide ways for Border Patrol employees to remain resilient in the
performance of their day-to-day duties. The National Critical Incident
Response Team, a component of the Border Patrol's Traumatic Incident
Management Plan, supports CBP employees involved in small- and large-
scale, critical-incident operations. The team consists of peer support
members, chaplains, and mental-health professionals who have
specialized training in critical-incident-response management.
III. Preserve Organizational Integrity
The U.S. Border Patrol is fortunate in that the documented cases of
corrupt employees represent only a minute percentage of the workforce.
However, any instance of corruption within our ranks always has been--
and always will be--unacceptable. We are committed to organizational
integrity and remain vigilant in training and promoting initiatives to
combat corruption to ensure morale and mission are not compromised.
Leaders must set the example and promote integrity throughout the
Border Patrol to reduce the potential for corruption.
IV. Improve Organization Processes, Systems, and Doctrine
As the Border Patrol grows and matures, it is necessary to codify
best practices and policies to ensure that the organization continues
to provide professional border-enforcement capability for the United
States. Doctrine will focus on overarching enduring principles, sector
operations, and future border security initiatives that all agents can
use to execute their mission in the field.
V. Enhance Overall Efficiency of the Border Patrol
It is the Border Patrol's responsibility to ensure that its
leaders, agents, and support personnel are good stewards of American
tax dollars. As the Border Patrol progresses toward organizational
rigor and maturity, an essential element will be the development and
continual refinement of comprehensive, demanding, and results-driven
performance measures that hold us accountable. Even as the organization
internalizes these standards, it also must effectively communicate
overall performance to its most important stakeholders--the American
public.
CONCLUSION
The 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan marks an important point
in the growth and development of the U.S. Border Patrol, and
establishes an approach that is tailored to meet the challenges of
securing a 21st Century border against a variety of different threats
and adversaries. Ultimately, leveraging all available actions,
programs, and techniques encompassed within the 2012 Strategic Plan
will strengthen the Border Patrol internally, increase capabilities and
operations, and enhance border security through information,
integration, and rapid response.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished
Members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify
about the work of CBP, our efforts in securing our borders, and the
2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan. I look forward to answering
your questions at this time.
Mrs. Miller. Thanks very much, Chief.
At this time, I would recognize Ms. Gambler for her
testimony.
STATEMENT OF REBECCA GAMBLER, ACTING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Ms. Gambler. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking
Member Cuellar, and Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate
the invitation to testify at today's hearing to discuss GAO's
work on border security programs and performance measurement
which could inform the Border Patrol's efforts as it
transitions to its new strategic plan.
The Border Patrol is the Federal agency with primary
responsibility for securing U.S. borders between ports of
entry. From fiscal year 2004 through 2011, the number of Border
Patrol agents nearly doubled, from about 10,800 to nearly
21,500. Also, the Department of Homeland Security has reported
that since fiscal year 2006 about $4.4 billion has been
invested in border technology and infrastructure.
The Border Patrol is issuing a new strategic plan to guide
its border security efforts. According to the Border Patrol,
this plan will involve use of a risk-based approach based on
the three key elements of information, integration, and rapid
response.
Today I would like to focus my remarks on two key areas
related to Border Patrol strategy. First, I would like to
highlight GAO's prior work related to the Border Patrol's
implementation of its 2004 National Strategy. Second, I would
like to highlight GAO's prior work reviewing performance
measures and indicators for border security.
With regard to my first point, our work has shown that the
Border Patrol, and the Department of Homeland Security more
broadly, have made progress in developing and deploying
capabilities related to the three key elements of the new
strategic plan. Specifically, the Border Patrol and the
Department have deployed capabilities to provide information
and situational awareness, for securing the border to
coordinate efforts with border partners, and to provide for
mobile response.
For example, the Department has deployed various technology
systems to increase situational awareness, primarily along the
Southwest Border. Further, the Border Patrol and its
international and domestic law enforcement partners have
established task forces for coordinating security activities
along the Northern Border.
While these are positive developments, our work has
identified key challenges facing the Border Patrol and the
Department of Homeland Security in implementing the border
security strategy. Consideration of these challenges could
inform Border Patrol effort as the agency begins to implement
its new strategic plan.
For example, we have reported on the need for the
Department to better assess the benefits and performance of
technology and infrastructure deployed along the Southwest
Border to help provide situational awareness. We have also
reported on the need for the Department to enhance its
oversight of task forces to help identify and reduce any
potential duplication of effort.
Now turning to the issue of performance measurement, the
Department of Homeland Security's goal and measure of
operational control was used in conjunction with the Border
Patrol's 2004 Strategy. Operational control was defined as the
number of border miles where the Border Patrol had the ability
to detect, respond, and interdict cross-border illegal
activity. The Department last reported its progress and status
in achieving operational control of the borders in fiscal year
2010. At that time, the Department reported achieving
operational control for about 1,100 miles, or 13 percent, of
more than 8,600 miles across U.S. Northern, Southwest, and
Coastal Borders. On the Southwest Border specifically, the
Border Patrol reported achieving operational control of 873
miles, or 44 percent, of the nearly 2,000 miles of the U.S.
border with Mexico.
The Department of Homeland Security and Border Patrol have
several efforts under way to develop new measures or indicators
for assessing border security programs. Until these efforts are
completed, the Department is using interim measures, such as
the number of apprehensions on the Southwest Border. These
measures provide some useful information but do not position
the Department to be able to report on how effective its
efforts are at securing the border.
In closing, as the Border Patrol transitions to a new
strategic plan, it will be critical for the Border Patrol
itself and the Department more broadly to provide effective
direction and oversight of its implementation. It will also be
important for the Border Patrol and the Department to continue
to develop performance measures that are linked to missions and
goals, include targets, and produce reliable results.
This concludes my oral statement. I would be pleased to
answer any questions Members may have.
[The statement of Ms. Gambler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rebecca Gambler
May 8, 2012
GAO HIGHLIGHTS
Highlights of GAO-12-688T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
Border Patrol, within DHS's CBP, is the Federal agency with primary
responsibility for securing the National borders between the U.S. ports
of entry (POE). DHS has completed a new 2012-2016 Border Patrol
Strategic Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan) that Border Patrol officials
stated will emphasize risk management instead of increased resources to
achieve border security and continue to build on the foundation of the
2004 National Border Patrol Strategy (2004 Strategy). This statement
highlights key issues from prior GAO reports that discuss Border
Patrol's progress and challenges in: (1) Implementing key elements of
the 2004 Strategy, and (2) achieving the 2004 strategic goal to gain
operational control of the border. This statement is based on GAO
reports issued since 2007 on border security, with selected updates
from April and May 2012 on Border Patrol resource needs, actions taken
to address prior GAO recommendations, and efforts to develop
performance measures. To conduct these updates, GAO reviewed agency
documents such as operational assessments and interviewed DHS
officials.
What GAO Recommends
In prior reports, GAO made recommendations to, among other things,
strengthen border security technology, infrastructure, and
partnerships. DHS concurred with the recommendations and has reported
actions planned or underway to address them. CBP reviewed a draft of
information contained in this statement and provided comments that GAO
incorporated as appropriate.
BORDER PATROL STRATEGY.--PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTATION AND
ASSESSMENT EFFORTS
What GAO Found
GAO's prior work has highlighted progress and challenges in various
areas related to Border Patrol's implementation of its 2004 National
Strategy, which could provide insights as Border Patrol transitions to
its 2012 Strategic Plan. Border Patrol officials stated that the 2012
Strategic Plan will rely on Border Patrol and Federal, State, local,
Tribal, and international partners working together to use a risk-based
approach to secure the border, and include the key elements of
``Information, Integration, and Rapid Response'' to achieve objectives.
These elements were similar to those in the 2004 Strategy and GAO's
past work highlighted the progress and challenges the agency faced
obtaining information necessary for border security; integrating
security operations with partners; and mobilizing a rapid response to
security threats. Border Patrol successfully used interagency forums
and joint operations to counter threats, but challenges included
assessing the benefits of border technology and infrastructure to,
among other things, provide information on situational awareness. For
example, in May 2010 GAO reported that the Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had not
accounted for the effect of its investment in border fencing and
infrastructure on security. GAO recommended that CBP conduct an
analysis of the effect of tactical infrastructure on border security,
with which CBP concurred. Further, GAO identified challenges in DHS
efforts to coordinate with partners that help to secure the border. For
example, in December 2010 GAO reported that various Northern Border
security partners cited on-going challenges sharing information and
resources for border security operations and investigations, and that
DHS did not have mechanisms for providing oversight. GAO recommended
that DHS provide oversight, to which DHS concurred and stated that in
January 2012 the Department established an intercomponent Advisory
Council to provide oversight of compliance with interagency agreements.
GAO's prior work showed that as of September 30, 2010, Border
Patrol reported achieving its 2004 goal of operational control--where
Border Patrol has the ability to detect and interdict illegal
activity--for 1,107 (13 percent) of 8,607 miles across U.S. Northern,
Southwest, and Coastal Borders. DHS transitioned at the end of fiscal
year 2010 from using operational control as its goal and outcome
measure for border security to using an interim measure of
apprehensions on the Southwest Border. DHS reported that this interim
measure would be used until such time as DHS developed a new goal and
measure for border security that will reflect a more quantitative
methodology across border locations and the agency's evolving view of
border security. As GAO previously testified, this interim measure,
while providing useful information on activity levels, is an output
measure that does not inform on program results. Therefore, it limits
oversight and accountability and has reduced information provided to
Congress and the public on program results. DHS stated that it had
several efforts underway to establish a new measure used to assess
efforts to secure the border but as this measure is under development,
it is too early to assess it.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work
highlighting the U.S. Border Patrol's progress and challenges
implementing its 2004 National Border Patrol Strategy (2004 Strategy)
that could be relevant to the new 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic
Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan). Border Patrol, within the Department
of Homeland Security's (DHS) U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
is the Federal agency with primary responsibility for securing the
National borders between the designated U.S. land border ports of entry
(POE).\1\ Border Patrol's 2004 Strategy to secure the borders focused
on ensuring the agency had the right mix of personnel, technology, and
infrastructure across locations, and Border Patrol experienced
significant increases in these resources since 2004. For example, from
fiscal year 2004 through 2011, the number of Border Patrol agents has
nearly doubled from about 10,800 to nearly 21,500; and DHS reported
that since fiscal year 2006, about $4.4 billion has been invested in
border technology and infrastructure. These resources were used to
support the DHS goal to achieve operational control of the Nation's
borders. The extent of operational control--also referred to as
effective control--was defined as the number of border miles where
Border Patrol had the ability to detect, respond to, and interdict
cross-border illegal activity. DHS last reported its progress and
status in achieving operational control of the borders in fiscal year
2010, and reported this information to Congress and the public in its
Fiscal Year 2008-2010 Annual Performance Report in accordance with
requirements in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
(GPRA).\2\ DHS has completed but not yet publically released a new
2012-2016 Strategic Plan that Border Patrol officials stated will
emphasize risk management instead of increased resources to achieve
border security and that will continue to build on the foundation of
the 2004 Strategy.\3\ However, the performance goal and measures that
will be used to provide oversight and accountability for the new
strategic plan have not yet been established. In its Fiscal Year 2010-
2012 Annual Performance Report and subsequent reports, DHS replaced the
border security goal and measure of operational control with an interim
measure of the number of apprehensions on the Southwest Border to
report its status and progress in achieving border security to Congress
and the public. As of April 2012, DHS had yet to develop a new goal for
border security. DHS reported that the interim measure of apprehensions
on the Southwest Border would be used until such time as DHS developed
a new goal and measure for border security that will reflect a more
quantitative methodology across border locations and the agency's
evolving view of border security.
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\1\ POE are officially designated places that provide for the
arrival to, or departure from, the United States.
\2\ Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285, amended by The GPRA
Modernization Act (GPRAMA) of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat.
3866. Under GPRA, agencies are required to hold programs accountable to
Congress and the public by establishing program goals, identifying
performance measures used to indicate progress toward meeting the
goals, and using the results to improve performance, as necessary. The
information is publicly reported each year in the Department's
performance accountability report. Under the amendments made by GPRAMA,
agencies are to describe how the performance goals contribute to the
agency's strategic plan, establish clearly-defined milestones for
achieving performance goals, and describe how they will ensure the
accuracy and reliability of the data used to measure progress.
\3\ In the context of risk management, ``risk-based'' and ``risk-
informed'' are often used interchangeably to describe the related
decision-making processes. However, according to the DHS Risk Lexicon,
risk-based decision making uses the assessment of risk as the primary
decision driver, while risk-informed decision making will consider
other relevant factors such as effectiveness and cost in addition to
risk-assessment information. In our prior work we have reported on the
importance of risk-informed decision making with respect to homeland
security strategies given DHS's limited resources. See GAO, Department
of Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Reduce Overlap and Potential
Unnecessary Duplication, Achieve Cost Savings, and Strengthen Mission
Functions, GAO-12-464T (Washington, DC: Mar. 8, 2012).
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In the past, we have reviewed and reported on a variety of border
security programs and related performance goals and measures supporting
the 2004 Strategy that could inform discussions regarding the 2012-2016
Strategic Plan. Today I will highlight key issues on the Border
Patrol's progress and challenges relevant to: (1) Implementing key
elements of the 2004 Strategy, and (2) achieving the 2004 strategic
goal to gain operational control of the border.
In addition, appendices I and II provide information on
characteristics of effective National security strategies and
performance measures, respectively.
My statement is based on prior products issued from 2007 to the
present that examined DHS's efforts to secure the U.S. borders (see
related GAO products at the end of this statement), with selected
updates related to the Border Patrol's new strategic plan conducted in
April and May 2012. For those reports and testimonies, we obtained and
analyzed documents and information from officials from various
components of DHS; the Department of Justice (DOJ); the Department of
Interior (DOI); the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA); and
Canadian, Tribal, State, and local law enforcement agencies with a
vested interest in border security along the Northern or Southwest
Borders. More detailed information about our scope and methodology can
be found in our reports and testimonies. For the selected updates we
interviewed Border Patrol headquarters officials regarding the
forthcoming 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan and the status of
agency efforts to develop performance measures for assessing the
security of the border between the POEs, as well as reviewed relevant
information contained in Border Patrol 2012 Operational Requirements
Based Budget Process (ORBBP)--operational assessments--and other
documents.\4\ We also reviewed our prior work on key elements of
effective National security strategies and previous work on key
attributes of successful performance measures consistent with GPRA.\5\
Our work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted Government
auditing standards. These standards require that we plan and perform
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions, based on our audit objectives.
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\4\ The ORBBP is Border Patrol's standardized National planning
process that links sector- and station-level planning, operations, and
budgets. This process documents how sectors identify and justify their
requests to achieve effective control of the border in their area of
responsibility, and enables Border Patrol to determine how the
deployment of resources, such as technology, infrastructure, and
personnel, can be used to secure the border.
\5\ See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected
Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-
408T (Washington, DC: Feb. 3, 2004); Rebuilding Iraq: More
Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, GAO-
06-788 (Washington, DC: July 11, 2006); and Tax Administration: IRS
Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance Measures,
GAO-03-143 (Washington, DC: Nov. 22, 2002).
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BORDER PATROL PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IMPLEMENTING KEY ELEMENTS OF ITS
2004 NATIONAL STRATEGY
The Border Patrol developed its 2004 Strategy following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, as a framework for the
agency's new priority mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist
weapons from entering the United States and to support its traditional
mission of preventing aliens, smugglers, narcotics, and other
contraband from crossing U.S. borders illegally. The 2004 Strategy was
designed to facilitate the build-up and deployment of agency and border
resources and to consolidate the agency into a more centralized
organization.
Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that the 2012-2016
Strategic Plan will rely on Border Patrol and Federal, State, local,
Tribal, and international partners working together to use a risk-based
approach to secure the border that uses the key elements of
``Information, Integration, and Rapid Response'' to achieve Border
Patrol strategic objectives. Our past reviews of border security
programs contained information on the progress and challenges related
to implementing these key elements. Our observations are as follows.
Obtaining Information Necessary for Border Security.--Critical to
implementation of the 2004 Strategy was the use of intelligence to
assess risk, target enforcement efforts, and drive operations,
according to the strategy. As part of their intelligence efforts, CBP
and Border Patrol worked to develop and deploy the next generation of
border surveillance and sensoring platforms to maximize the Border
Patrol's ability to detect, respond, and interdict cross-border illegal
activity. Border Patrol headquarters officials reported that the new
2012-2016 Strategic Plan also has a focus on information that provides
situational awareness and intelligence developed by blending
technology, reconnaissance, and sign-cutting \6\ and tracking, to
understand the threats faced along the Nation's borders. Our prior work
reviewing CBP's efforts to deploy capabilities to, among other things,
provide situational awareness along U.S. borders provides insights that
could inform Border Patrol considerations in implementing its new
strategic plan.
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\6\ ``Sign'' is the collective term for evidence that Border Patrol
agents look for and find after they have dragged dirt roads using tires
lying on their sides flat on the ground and pulled by chains behind an
SUV. ``Sign'' can be footprints, animal prints, and tire or bicycle
tracks--any indication in the polished surface created by the drag. The
term ``cutting'' refers to the practice of concentrating on the marks
within discrete, manageable slices or segments of terrain. Border
Patrol agents track illegal cross-border activity by cutting for sign
to find persons who may have crossed the border illegally.
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As of fiscal year end 2010, Border Patrol reported having
substantial detection resources in place across 45 percent of the
Nation's border miles. The remaining 55 percent of border miles--
primarily on the Northern and Coastal Borders--were considered
vulnerable due to limited resource availability or inaccessibility,
with some knowledge available to develop a rudimentary border control
strategy. Our review of Border Patrol 2012 operational assessments also
showed concerns about resource availability to provide the information
necessary to secure the border. Across Border Patrol's 20 sectors
located on the Northern, Southwest, and Southeast Coastal Borders, all
sectors reported a need for new or replacement technology used to
detect and track illegal activity, and the majority (19) reported a
need for additional agents to maintain or attain an acceptable level of
border security.\7\ Additionally, 12 sectors reported a need for
additional infrastructure.\8\
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\7\ For example, one station in a northern sector requested
additional agents to enhance limited border detection and enforcement
capability to an acceptable level, and one station in a southwest
sector reported a need for fixed and mobile technology to secure the
remote and rugged terrain, reporting that without this technology,
rapid response was often impossible.
\8\ For example, one station in a northern sector reported that
insufficient infrastructure and personnel meant violators had a high
probability of crossing a remote/rural border area undetected, and one
station in a southwest sector reported that lack of infrastructure
hindered its ability to address a more than 91 percent increase in
aliens who are able to get away before apprehension.
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DHS, CBP, and Border Patrol are continuing to focus attention on
development, acquisition, and deployment of technology and
infrastructure needed to provide the information necessary to secure
the borders, with priority for the Southwest Border. Our past work
highlighted the continuing challenges the agency faced implementing
technology and infrastructure at the U.S. land borders.
Technology.--We previously reported that in January 2011,
after 5 years and a cost of nearly $1 billion, DHS ended the
Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet), a multi-year, multi-
billion-dollar technology effort aimed at securing U.S. borders
because it did not meet cost-effectiveness and viability
standards. DHS developed a successor plan to secure the
border--the Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan--
where CBP is to focus on developing terrain- and population-
based solutions utilizing existing, proven technology, such as
camera-based surveillance systems, for each border region
beginning with high-risk areas in Arizona. In November 2011, we
reported that CBP's planned technology deployment plan for the
Arizona border, the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology
Plan, was expected to cost approximately $1.5 billion over 10
years.\9\ However, we also reported that CBP did not have the
information needed to fully support and implement the
technology deployment plan in accordance with DHS and Office of
Management and Budget guidance, among other things.\10\ We
recommended that DHS determine the mission benefits to be
derived from implementation of the plan and develop and apply
key attributes for metrics to assess program implementation.
DHS concurred with our recommendation and reported that it
planned to develop a set of measures to assess the
effectiveness and benefits of future technology investments.
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\9\ $1.5 billion then-year dollars. Then-year dollars reflect the
cost at the time of the procurement.
\10\ GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information
on Plans and Costs Is Needed before Proceeding, GAO-12-22 (Washington,
DC: Nov. 4, 2011).
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Infrastructure.--In May 2010, we testified that CBP had not
accounted for the effect of its investment in border fencing
and infrastructure on border security.\11\ Border fencing was
designed to impede people on foot and vehicles from crossing
the border and to enhance Border Patrol's ability to detect and
interdict violators. CBP estimated that border fencing and
other infrastructure had a life-cycle cost of about $6.5
billion for deployment, operations, and maintenance. CBP
reported a resulting increase in control of Southwest Border
miles, but could not account separately for the effect of the
border fencing and other infrastructure. In a September 2009
report, we recommended that CBP conduct an analysis of the
effect of tactical infrastructure on border security.\12\ CBP
concurred and reported that it had contracted with the Homeland
Security Institute (HSI)--a Federally-funded research and
development center--to analyze the effect of tactical
infrastructure on the security of the border.\13\ As of May
2012, CBP had not provided an update on this effort.
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\11\ GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges
Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border, GAO-10-
651T (Washington, DC: May 4, 2010).
\12\ GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays
Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO-09-
896 (Washington, DC: Sept. 9, 2009).
\13\ The Secretary of Homeland Security established HSI pursuant to
section 312 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. See 6 U.S.C. 192.
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Integrating Border Security Operations with Federal, State, Local,
Tribal, and International Partners.--Leveraging the law enforcement
resources of Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international partners
was a key element of Border Patrol's 2004 Strategy and Border Patrol's
implementation of the strategy, on the Northern and Coastal Borders
where Border Patrol had fewer resources relative to the size of the
geographic area, and on the Southwest Border where Border Patrol used
the assistance of law enforcement partners to conduct surge operations
in high-priority areas. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated
that integration of border security operations will be a key element of
the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan across all borders. Our prior work
reviewing coordination among various stakeholders with responsibilities
for helping to secure the border provides insights for consideration as
Border Patrol transitions to its new strategic plan.
We previously reviewed Border Patrol efforts to coordinate law
enforcement resources across partners on the Northern Border and on
Federal border lands.\14\ On the Northern Border, we reported in
December 2010 that Federal, State, local, Tribal, and Canadian partners
operating in four Border Patrol sectors we visited stated that efforts
to establish interagency forums were beneficial in establishing a
common understanding of border security status and threats, and that
joint operations helped to achieve an integrated and effective law
enforcement response. However, numerous partners cited challenges
related to the inability to resource the increasing number of
interagency forums and raised concerns that some efforts may be
overlapping. We found that DHS did not oversee the interagency forums
established by its components. Further, we also reported that while
Border Patrol and other Federal partners stated that Federal agency
coordination to secure the Northern Border was improved, partners in
all four sectors we visited cited long-standing and on-going challenges
sharing information and resources for daily border security related to
operations and investigations.\15\ Challenges were attributed to
continued disagreement on roles and responsibilities and competition
for performance statistics used to inform resource allocation
decisions. DHS established and updated interagency agreements designed
to clarify roles and responsibilities for agencies with overlapping
missions or geographic areas of responsibility, but oversight by
management at the component and local levels had not ensured consistent
compliance with provisions of these agreements. We previously reported
that Government-wide efforts to strengthen interagency collaboration
have been hindered by the lack of agreement on roles and
responsibilities and agency performance management systems that do not
recognize or reward interagency collaboration.\16\ Thus, we
recommended, among other things, that DHS provide guidance and
oversight for interagency forums established or sponsored by its
components and provide regular oversight of component compliance with
the provisions of interagency Memorandum of Understandings. DHS
concurred with our recommendation and stated that the structure of the
Department precluded DHS-level oversight, but that it would review the
inventory of interagency forums through its strategic and operational
planning efforts to assess efficiency. DHS officials stated that in
January 2012 the Department established an intercomponent Advisory
Council to address our recommendation that DHS provide oversight of
compliance with interagency agreements.\17\
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\14\ GAO, Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of
Interagency Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border, GAO-11-97
(Washington, DC: Dec. 17, 2010), and Border Security: Additional
Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated Federal Response to
Illegal Activity on Federal Lands, GAO-11-177 (Washington, DC: Nov. 18,
2010).
\15\ These partners included DHS's Offices of Border Patrol and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, DOJ's Drug Enforcement
Administration, and USDA's U.S. Forest Service.
\16\ GAO, National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to
Strengthen Interagency Collaboration, GAO-10-822T (Washington, DC: June
2010), and Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional
Oversight of National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce,
and Information Sharing, GAO-09-904SP (Washington, DC: Sept. 25, 2009).
\17\ According to DHS officials, this intercomponent Advisory
Council meets quarterly to, among other things, identify cross-cutting
issues, identify areas for closer collaboration, and share best
practices.
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We also reported in December 2010 that while there is a high
reliance on law enforcement support from partners on the Northern
Border, the extent of law enforcement resources available to address
border security vulnerabilities was not reflected in Border Patrol's
processes for assessing border security and resource requirements.\18\
We previously reported that Federal agencies should identify resources
among collaborating agencies to deliver results more efficiently and
that DHS had not fully responded to a legislative requirement to link
initiatives--including partnerships--to existing border vulnerabilities
to inform Federal resource allocation decisions.\19\ Development of
policy and guidance to integrate available partner resources in
Northern Border security assessments and resource planning documents
could provide the agency and Congress with more complete information
necessary to make resource allocation decisions in mitigating existing
border vulnerabilities. Thus, we recommended that DHS direct CBP to
develop policy and guidance necessary to identify, assess, and
integrate the available partner resources in Northern Border sector
security assessments and resource planning documents. DHS concurred
with our recommendation and has taken action to formulate new policy
and guidance in associated strategic planning efforts.
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\18\ GAO-11-97.
\19\ GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help
Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15
(Washington, DC: Oct. 21, 2005), and Northern Border Security: DHS's
Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources,
and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities, GAO-09-93
(Washington, DC: Nov. 25, 2008).
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In our November 2010 report on interagency coordination on northern
Federal borderlands in Border Patrol's Spokane sector and southwest
Federal borderlands in Border Patrol's Tucson sector, we reported,
among other things, that Border Patrol, DOI, and USDA had established
forums and liaisons to exchange information.\20\ However, while
information sharing and communication among these agencies had
increased in recent years, critical gaps remained in implementing
interagency agreements to share intelligence information and compatible
secure radio communications for daily border security operations. We
reported that coordination in these areas could better ensure officer
safety and an efficient law enforcement response to illegal activity.
In addition, there was little interagency coordination to share
intelligence assessments of border security threats to Federal lands
and develop budget requests, strategies, and joint operations to
address these threats. We reported that interagency efforts to
implement provisions of existing agreements in these areas could better
leverage law enforcement partner resources and knowledge for more
effective border security operations on Federal lands. Thus, we
recommended that DHS, DOI, and USDA take the necessary action to
further implement interagency agreements. The departments concurred
with our recommendation. In response, Border Patrol issued a memorandum
to all Border Patrol sectors emphasizing the importance of USDA and DOI
partnerships to address border security threats on Federal lands. While
this action is a positive step toward implementing our recommendation,
we continue to believe that DHS should take additional steps necessary
to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing interagency
agreements, including provisions to share intelligence and resource
requirements for enhancing border security on Federal lands.
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\20\ GAO-11-177.
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Mobilizing a Rapid Response to Border Security Threats.--One of the
elements of Border Patrol's 2004 National Strategy was to improve the
mobility and rapid deployment of personnel and resources to quickly
counter and interdict threats based on shifts in smuggling routes and
tactical intelligence. CBP reported expanding the training and response
capabilities of the Border Patrol's specialized response teams to
support domestic and international intelligence-driven and
antiterrorism efforts as well as other special operations. Border
Patrol headquarters officials stated that ``Rapid Response,'' defined
as the ability of Border Patrol and its partners to quickly and
appropriately respond to changing threats, will also be a key element
of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan; and in fiscal year 2011, Border Patrol
allocated agent positions to provide a National group of organized,
trained, and equipped Border Patrol agents who are capable of rapid
movement to regional and National incidents in support of priority CBP
missions. Our prior work and review of Border Patrol's 2012 operational
assessments provide observations that could inform Border Patrol's
transition to and implementation of its new strategic plan.
Our review of Border Patrol 2012 operational assessments showed
that Border Patrol sectors had used resources mobilized from other
Border Patrol sectors or provided by law enforcement partners to
maintain or increase border security. Border Patrol, for example,
mobilized personnel and air assets from Yuma sector to neighboring
Tucson sector, which cited that the coordination of operational
activities was critical to the overall success of operations.
Similarly, National Guard personnel and resources have been used to
bridge or augment Border Patrol staffing until new agents are trained
and deployed. The Department of Defense (DOD) estimated costs of about
$1.35 billion for National Guard support of DHS's border security
mission in the four Southwest Border States (California, Arizona, New
Mexico, and Texas) from June 2006 through September 30, 2011.
However, Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that they had
not fully assessed to what extent the augmented mobile response
resources would be sufficient to preclude the need to re-deploy
personnel and resources needed to secure higher-priority border
locations at the expense of lower-priority locations, or changes in the
type or continued need of resources from its law enforcement partners.
Within Border Patrol, for example, our review of the 2012 operational
assessments showed that Border Patrol reported difficulty maintaining
border control in areas from which resources have been redeployed.
Border Patrol stations within six of the nine Southwest Border sectors
have reported that agent deployments to other stations have affected
their own deployment and enforcement activities.
Border Patrol law enforcement partners also cited challenges. For
example, we testified in April 2012 that DOD officials expressed
concerns about the challenges to identify and plan a DOD role in the
absence of a comprehensive strategy for Southwest Border security.\21\
In addition, we reported in March 2012 that while Border Patrol expects
an increase in air support for rapid deployment of its mobile forces,
it had not fully coordinated requirements with CBP's Office of Air and
Marine (OAM).\22\ OAM officials stated that while they deployed a
majority of resources to high-priority sectors, budgetary constraints,
other National priorities, and the need to maintain presence across
border locations limited the amount of resources they could redeploy
from lower-priority sectors. In addition, the agency does not have
documentation of analyses assessing the effect of these constraints and
whether actions could be taken to change the mix and placement of
resources within them.\23\ In response to our recommendation, in part,
that CBP reassess the mix and placement of OAM air resources to include
anticipated CBP strategic changes, DHS agreed and stated that it
planned to complete such actions as part of the next iteration of the
Aircraft Deployment Plan.\24\
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\21\ GAO, Observations on Costs, Benefits, and Challenges of a
Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land
Border, GAO-12-657T (Washington, DC: Apr. 17, 2012).
\22\ GAO, Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More
Effective Use of DHS's Air and Marine Assets, GAO-12-518 (Washington,
DC: Mar. 30, 2012).
\23\ GAO-12-518.
\24\ Aircraft deployment plans are intended to match assets to
operational requirements.
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BORDER PATROL PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES IN ACHIEVING ITS STRATEGIC GOAL
FOR BORDER SECURITY
The DHS goal and measure of operational control used in conjunction
with the 2004 Strategy provided oversight of five levels of border
control that were based on the increasing availability of information
and resources, which Border Patrol used to detect, respond, and
interdict illegal cross-border activity either at the border or after
entry into the United States (see table 1). The top two levels--
``controlled'' and ``managed''--reflect Border Patrol's reported
achievement of ``operational control,'' in that resources were in place
and sufficient to detect, respond, and interdict illegal activity
either at the immediate border (controlled level) or after the illegal
entry occurs (managed level), sometimes up to 100 miles away. The
remaining three levels reflected lower levels of border control, where
Border Patrol has less ability to detect, respond to, or interdict
illegal activity due to insufficient resources or inaccessibility.
TABLE 1: DEFINITIONS OF BORDER PATROL LEVELS OF BORDER SECURITY UNDER
2004 STRATEGY
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Level of Border Security Definition
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Controlled--operational control........ Continuous detection and
interdiction resources at the
immediate border with high
probability of apprehension
upon entry.
Managed--operational control........... Multi-tiered detection and
interdiction resources are in
place to fully implement the
border control strategy with
high probability of
apprehension after entry.
Monitored.............................. Substantial detection resources
in place, but accessibility
and resources continue to
affect ability to respond.
Low-level monitored.................... Some knowledge is available to
develop a rudimentary border
control strategy, but the area
remains vulnerable because of
inaccessibility or limited
resource availability.
Remote/low activity.................... Information is lacking to
develop a meaningful border
control strategy because of
inaccessibility or lack of
resources.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Border Patrol data.
DHS reported achieving operational control for 1,107 (13 percent)
of 8,607 miles across U.S. Northern, Southwest, and Coastal Borders at
the time it discontinued use of this performance goal at the end of
fiscal year 2010 (see fig. 1). Nearly 80 percent of border miles Border
Patrol reported to be under operational control were on the U.S.
Southwest Border with Mexico. Border Patrol sector officials assessed
the miles under operational control using factors such as operational
statistics, third-party indicators, intelligence and operational
reports, resource deployments and discussions with senior Border Patrol
agents.\25\ Our analysis of the 1,107 border miles Border Patrol
reported to be under operational control showed that about 12 percent
were classified as ``controlled,'' which was the highest sustainable
level for both detection and interdiction at the immediate border. The
remaining 88 percent of these 1,107 border miles were classified as
``managed,'' in that interdictions may be achieved after illegal entry
by multi-tiered enforcement operations.
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\25\ Operational statistics generally include the number of
apprehensions, known illegal border entries, and volume and shift of
smuggling activity, among other performance indicators. Border Patrol
officials at sectors and headquarters convene to discuss and determine
the number of border miles under operational control for each sector
based on relative risk.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Across the 20 Border Patrol sectors on the National borders, Yuma
sector on the Southwest Border reported achieving operational control
for all of its border miles as of the end of fiscal year 2010. In
contrast, the other 19 sectors reported achieving operational control
ranging from 0 to 86 percent of their border miles (see fig. 2). Border
Patrol officials attributed the uneven progress across sectors to
multiple factors, including a need to prioritize resource deployment to
sectors deemed to have greater risk of illegal activity as well as
terrain and transportation infrastructure on both sides of the border.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Our analysis of the remaining 7,500 National border miles that
Border Patrol reported as not under operational control at the end of
fiscal year 2010 showed that nearly two-thirds of these border miles
were considered at the level of ``low-level monitored,'' meaning that
some knowledge was available to develop a rudimentary border control
strategy, but border security was vulnerable due to limited resources
or inaccessibility (see fig. 3). The approximate one-third of these
border miles remaining at the higher ``monitored'' level were judged to
have substantial detection resources in place, but accessibility and
resources continue to affect Border Patrol's ability to respond. Border
Patrol reported that these two levels of control were not acceptable
for border security. No border miles were classified at the lowest-
level of ``remote/low activity'' as a result of insufficient
information to develop a meaningful border control strategy.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
DHS transitioned from using operational control as its goal and
outcome measure for border security in its Fiscal Year 2010-2012 Annual
Performance Report, which since September 30, 2010, has reduced
information provided to Congress and the public on program results.
Citing a need to establish a new border security goal and measure that
reflect a more quantitative methodology as well as the Department's
evolving vision for border control, DHS established an interim
performance measure until a new border control goal and measure could
be developed. As we previously testified, this interim GPRA measure--
the number of apprehensions on the Southwest Border between the ports
of entry (POE)--is an output measure, which, while providing useful
information on activity levels, does not inform on program results and
therefore could reduce oversight and DHS accountability.\26\ Studies
commissioned by CBP have documented that the number of apprehensions
bears little relationship to effectiveness because agency officials do
not compare these numbers to the amount of illegal activity that
crosses the border.\27\ CBP officials told us they would continue to
use interim measures for GPRA reporting purposes until new outcome
measures are implemented; as of April 2012 CBP officials did not have
an estimated implementation date for a new border security goal and
measure.
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\26\ GAO, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border
Control Measures for the Southwest Border, GAO-11-374T (Washington, DC:
Feb. 15, 2011).
\27\ For example, see Homeland Security Institute, Measuring the
Effect of the Arizona Border Control Initiative (Arlington, Va.: Oct.
18, 2005).
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DHS stated that it had three efforts underway to improve the
measures used to assess its programs and activities to secure the
border. However, as these measures have not yet been implemented, it is
too early to assess them and determine how they will be used to provide
oversight of border security efforts. One of two efforts, led by CBP
with assistance from the Homeland Security Institute (HSI), is to
develop a Border Condition Index (BCI) that is intended to be a new
outcome-based measure that will be used to publicly report progress in
meeting a new border security goal in support of GPRA. The BCI
methodology would consider various factors, such as the percentage of
illegal entries apprehended and community well-being. CBP is in the
process of finalizing the BCI measure and did not provide us with a
time frame for its implementation. The second CBP effort is to create a
measure of the change in illegal flow of persons across the Southwest
Border using a statistical model developed by HSI, which uses data on
apprehensions and recidivism rates for persons illegally crossing the
border. DHS officials said that they had not yet determined whether
results from this model would be used for GPRA reporting in the Fiscal
Year 2012 DHS Annual Performance Plan, or for internal management
purposes and reported to Congress in support of the annual budget
request. The third effort, led by Border Patrol, is to standardize and
strengthen the metrics that had formerly supported the measure of
``border miles under effective (operational) control'' that DHS removed
as a GPRA goal and measure beginning in fiscal year 2011. As of April
2012, Border Patrol headquarters officials were working to develop
border security goals and measures, but did not yet have a target time
frame for implementation.
While these new metrics are in development, Border Patrol
operational assessments from fiscal years 2010 and 2012 show that field
agents continued to use a different and evolving mix of performance
indicators across Border Patrol sectors to inform the status of border
security. These performance indicators generally included a mix of
enforcement measures related to changes in the number of estimated
known illegal entries and apprehensions, as well as changes in third-
party indicators such as crime rates in border communities. Border
Patrol officials said that the differences in the mix of performance
indicators across sectors and time reflected differences in sector
officials' judgment of what indicators best reflect border security,
given each sector's unique circumstance. Border Patrol headquarters
officials said that they were moving to standardize the indicators used
by sectors on each border but did not yet have a time frame for
completing this effort.
Chairwoman Miller and Ranking Member Cuellar this completes my
prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or
the Members of the subcommittee may have.
Appendix I: Characteristics of Effective Security Strategies
We have previously reported on desirable characteristics of
effective security strategies through our prior work on National
security planning.\1\ These six characteristics and their elements
could assist Border Patrol in its efforts to ensure that the 2012-2016
Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan) is an effective
mechanism for achieving results.
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\1\ See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected
Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-
408T (Washington, DC: Feb. 3, 2004), and Rebuilding Iraq: More
Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. Goals, GAO-
06-788 (Washington, DC: July 11, 2006).
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Purpose, scope, and methodology.--This characteristic
addresses why the strategy was produced, the scope of its
coverage, and the process by which it was developed. Border
Patrol could discuss the specific impetus that led to the new
strategic plan, for example, a terrorist event or changes in
the external environment such as decreases in illegal activity
or changes in organizational makeup such as significant
increases in resources and capabilities. In addition to
describing what the strategy is meant to do and the major
functions, mission areas, or activities it covers, a National
strategy would address its methodology, such as which
organizations drafted or provided input to the document. For
example, Border Patrol could identify parties or stakeholders
who were consulted in the development of the strategy, such as
Federal law enforcement partners, relevant State and local
agencies, and Tribal organizations.
Problem definition and risk assessment.--This characteristic
addresses the particular National problems and threats the
strategy is directed towards. Border Patrol could develop a
detailed discussion of primary threats--such as the illegal
flow of migrants, smugglers, and other criminals or persons
linked with terrorism across the border--as well as their
causes and operating environment.\2\ This characteristic also
entails a risk assessment, including an analysis of the threat
to, and vulnerabilities of, critical assets and operations.\3\
Border Patrol could ensure that the strategic plan is informed
by a National risk assessment that includes a comprehensive
examination of threats and vulnerabilities across all U.S.
borders, to include key infrastructures and assets. A
discussion of the quality of data available for this
assessment, such as known constraints or deficiencies in key
data on estimated volume of persons illegally crossing the
border, could also be pertinent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ If the details of the analyses are classified, an unclassified
version could include a broad description of the analyses and stress
the importance of risk assessments to implementing parties.
\3\ Risk assessment includes a threat assessment, a vulnerability
assessment, and a consequences assessment (formerly referred to as a
``criticality'' assessment). For more in-depth discussion of these
subjects, see GAO, Homeland Security: Key Elements of a Risk Management
Approach, GAO-02-150T (Washington, DC: Oct. 12, 2002).
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Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance
measures.--This characteristic addresses what the strategy is
trying to achieve, steps to achieve those results, and
priorities, milestones, and performance measures to gauge
results. For example, Border Patrol could identify what the
strategic plan is attempting to achieve--a specific end-state
such as securing the Nation's borders--and identify and
prioritize the specific steps and activities needed to achieve
that end-state, such as prioritizing the resourcing of sectors
and stations in high-risk border areas. Identifying milestones
and performance measures for achieving results according to
specific time frames could help to ensure effective oversight
and accountability. Border Patrol could, for example, identify
milestones for developing an implementation plan, with time
frames, which would guide the execution of the strategy and
ensure that key steps such as completing a comprehensive risk
assessment or developing appropriate outcome measures are
achieved. This characteristic also emphasizes the importance of
establishing outcome-related performance measures that link
back to goals and objectives. For example, Border Patrol could
develop outcome measures that show to what extent it has met
its goal for securing the Nation's borders.
Resources, investments, and risk management.--This
characteristic addresses what the strategy will cost, the
sources and types of resources and investments needed, and
where resources and investments should be targeted based on
balancing risk reductions with costs.\4\ A National strategy
could include criteria and appropriate mechanisms to allocate
resources based on identified needs. Border Patrol could
develop information on the costs of fully implementing the
strategic plan, as well as a comprehensive baseline of
resources and investments needed by sectors and stations to
achieve the mission of securing the Nation's borders. According
to our previous work, risk management focuses security efforts
on those activities that bring about the greatest reduction in
risk given the resources used. The strategic plan could
elaborate on the risk assessment mentioned previously and
provide guidance on how to manage resources and investments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Risk management also involves assessing risk through an
assessment of threat, vulnerability, and consequence.
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Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination.--
This characteristic addresses who will be implementing the
strategy, what their roles will be compared to others, and
mechanisms for them to coordinate their efforts. A strategy
could clarify organizations' relationships in terms of
partnering and might also identify specific processes for
coordination between entities. For example, Border Patrol could
build upon relations with Federal, State, local, and Tribal law
enforcement organizations by further clarifying how these
relationships can be organized to further leverage resources.
Integration and implementation.--This characteristic
addresses how a National strategy relates to other strategies'
goals, objectives, and activities, and to subordinate levels of
Government and their plans to implement the strategy. For
example, a National strategy could discuss how its scope
complements, expands upon, or overlaps with other National
strategies. Border Patrol could ensure that its 2012-2016
Strategic Plan explains how it complements the strategies of
other CBP agencies, such as the Office of Air and Marine and
the Office of Field Operations, which oversees the Nation's
ports of entry, as well as U.S. Customs and Border Protection's
overall strategy.
Appendix II: Characteristics of Effective Performance Measures
Under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), Border
Patrol performance measures should be developed in the context of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) mission and objectives for
securing the U.S. border. In its Annual Performance Report for fiscal
years 2010-2012, DHS discussed border security under Mission 2:
Securing and Managing Our Borders. Under this mission, there were
interim Border Patrol performance measures supporting Goal 2.1: Secure
U.S. Air, Land, and Sea Borders, defined as preventing the illegal flow
of people and goods across U.S. air, land, and sea borders. There were
two objectives supporting this goal:
Objective 2.1.1 Prevent illegal entry of people, weapons,
dangerous goods and contraband, and protect against cross-
border threats to health, the environment, and agriculture,
while facilitating the safe flow of lawful travel and commerce.
Objective 2.1.2 Prevent illegal export and exit of weapons,
proceeds of crime, and other dangerous goods, and the exit of
malicious actors.
We have previously reported on key attributes of successful
performance measures consistent with GPRA.\1\ Some of these attributes
suggest that U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Border Patrol
consider the following in efforts to develop and standardize
performance indicators and metrics:
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\1\ Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing
Season Performance Measures, GAO-03-143 (Washington, DC: Nov. 22,
2002).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Measures should cover the core program activities that
Border Patrol is expected to perform.--At the broadest level,
the DHS goal suggests measuring Border Patrol outcomes for
preventing the illegal flow of people across the border between
the ports of entry, as well as the illegal flow of goods.
Border Patrol metrics comparing estimated illegal entries to
apprehensions could serve to show how its efforts contribute to
stemming the illegal flow of people across the border. As of
April 2012, Border Patrol did not have a metric for performance
related to stemming the illegal flow of goods, such as drugs,
between the ports of entry in support of the border security
goal. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that they
were not likely to develop a measure, per se, on contraband
seizures that would apply across all sectors. According to
these officials, although the Border Patrol plays a vital role
in seizing contraband at the borders, it views this role as
part of the larger security function played by many different
agencies at all Government levels.
Measures should be balanced to cover CBP and DHS
priorities.--Border Patrol could establish specific performance
measures that support CBP and DHS priorities, such as those
listed in the objectives supporting the overall DHS goal. For
example, in measuring the ability to prevent the illegal flow
of persons, Border Patrol, in consultation with CBP and DHS,
could choose to separately measure the illegal flow of
migrants, smugglers, and other criminals, or persons linked
with terrorism, crossing the border between the ports of entry.
Similarly, in measuring the ability to prevent the flow of
dangerous goods, Border Patrol could choose to separately
measure the flow of weapons, illegal drugs, or proceeds of
crime, such as bulk cash. Border Patrol could also establish
separate performance measures for its ability to prevent the
entry and exit of persons and goods across the border.
Measures should link and align with measures of other
components and at successive levels of the organization.--DHS
could ensure that performance measures established by Border
Patrol align with measures at the CBP and Departmental level,
as well as those established by other components that
contribute toward the goal to secure our borders, such as
Customs and Border Protection's Office of Field Operations
(OFO), which has responsibility for securing the border at the
ports of entry. For example, Border Patrol metrics estimating
the flow of illegal entries between the ports of entry aligns
with OFO metrics to measure for the illegal flow of persons
through the ports of entry,\2\ and metrics of both components
could be aligned with an overall effort by CBP to measure the
overall flow of persons illegally crossing the Southwest
Border. DHS could also choose to establish a performance
measure informing on the flow of persons into the United States
who overstay their authorized period of admission or other
means that could similarly link to the overall DHS estimate of
persons illegally residing in the United States. Linking
performance measures such as these across the organization
informs on how well each program or activity is contributing
toward the overall goal to prevent illegal entry of persons,
reinforces accountability, and ensures that day-to-day
activities contribute to the results the organization is trying
to achieve.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ OFO uses a statistical program (model), COMPEX, which estimates
the total amount of illegal activity passing undetected through U.S.
ports of entry--including persons transporting illegal drugs, guns, or
other banned substances--to calculate the apprehension rate and gauge
the effectiveness of Customs and Border Protection officers to
interdict them. As of March 2011, OFO officials said COMPEX was used at
air and land ports of entry, but not sea ports of entry, and at land
ports of entry it was used for passenger vehicles, but not cargo
vehicles or pedestrians.
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Measures should reflect Government-wide priorities, such as
quality, timeliness, and cost of service.--Border Patrol could
establish performance measures that are consistent with any
measures developed by CBP and DHS to reflect the time frames
and cost efficiencies in securing the border across locations.
For example, CBP and DHS could establish measures that reflect
the overall cost or time frame to secure the border as
indicated by changes in the illegal flow of persons or goods
relative to its investment across components and programs. At
the Border Patrol level, such a measure could compare the
relative cost efficiencies achieved across border locations
that use a different mix of personnel, technology, or
strategies to secure the border.
Measures should have a numerical goal, be reasonably free
from significant bias or manipulation, and be reliable in
producing the same result under similar conditions.--As of
April 2012, Border Patrol was working to improve the quality of
its border security measures to reflect a more quantitative
methodology to estimate the number of illegal entries across
the border compared to apprehensions, and other metrics.\3\
However, Border Patrol officials said that comparable
performance measures should not be applied to the Northern or
Coastal Borders, providing an inconsistent picture of security
for the majority of U.S. border miles.\4\ We reported that in
circumstances where complete information is not available to
measure performance outcomes, agencies could use intermediate
goals and measures to show progress or contribution to intended
results.\5\ For example, Border Patrol could lack the detection
capability necessary as a first step to estimate illegal
entries across most of the Northern Border and some other
border locations. In these circumstances, Border Patrol could
choose to establish performance measures tracking progress in
establishing this detection capability. Once Border Patrol
achieves the ability to detect illegal activity across its
borders, it could then transition to measures for reducing the
flow of illegal activity and for interdiction. On the Southwest
Border, Border Patrol could also choose to establish
intermediate measures in reaching Southwest Border security
goals. Such intermediate performance measures could include
those that use Global Positioning System data for each
apprehension to show Border Patrol progress in apprehending
persons at or close to the border compared to enforcement tiers
located miles away.
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\3\ For example, Border Patrol officials said they were working to
standardize the methodology used by sectors to estimate the number of
illegal entries.
\4\ Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that this was
because the threat of illegal entries differs across borders.
\5\ GAO, Agency Performance Plans: Examples of Practices That Can
Improve Usefulness to Decisionmakers, GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69 (Washington,
DC: Feb. 26, 1999).
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much for that testimony, Ms.
Gambler.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Dr. Rosenblum for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF MARC R. ROSENBLUM, SPECIALIST IN IMMIGRATION
POLICY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Rosenblum. Thank you. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member
Cuellar, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
subcommittee, I am honored to present testimony today on behalf
of the Congressional Research Service.
My testimony makes three main observations. First, the U.S.
border in 2012 is a very different place than it was in the
mid-1990s when the core of the current Border Patrol strategy
was developed. Second, the changes at the border have entailed
costs, and I will discuss a few of them. These observations
lead to the third, which is that the new Border Patrol strategy
comes at an appropriate time and raises important questions. In
some ways, we are at a critical juncture with respect to how we
define border security and how we understand risks and threats
to the United States.
Let me begin with the changes at U.S. borders. The core of
the current strategy since the mid-1990s is prevention through
deterrence--the idea that the concentration of personnel,
infrastructure, and surveillance technology along heavily-
trafficked regions of the border will discourage unauthorized
aliens from attempting to enter the United States. A new
strategy was published in 2004 that continued to emphasize
investments along the border and in the post-9/11 environment
also focused on intelligence to assess risk and to target
enforcement to the greatest security threats, including
potential terrorists. At the same time, DHS announced the
Secure Border Initiative, a National program emphasizing
personnel, surveillance technology, and fencing, as well as
interior enforcement and new removal practices.
My written testimony includes several data points that show
that these plans have largely been implemented, and we have
heard some about it already. One example is the growth in
Border Patrol personnel: Slow growth in the 1980s, faster
growth in the 1990s, and even faster growth in the most recent
decade, all of it concentrated primarily on the Southwest
Border.
More importantly, there is an increasing body of evidence
suggesting that these investments have begun to pay off. As we
have already heard, apprehensions of unauthorized migrants,
while an imperfect measure, are at their lowest level in about
40 years. My written testimony includes several additional
indicators that suggest falling illegal migration.
Several factors have contributed to this trend, as the
Chairwoman noted, including the U.S. economic downturn, crime
and violence in northern Mexico, Mexico's strong economic
recovery since 2010, demographic changes in Mexico. But the
data suggests that U.S. enforcement efforts are likely an
important contributing factor behind declining illegal
migration.
This figure illustrates one of the causal dynamics. The
figure shows two measures of the fees migrants pay to be
smuggled from Mexico to the United States. Smuggling fees were
essentially flat during the 1980s and then rose sharply
beginning in the early 1990s through the first half of the last
decade. So the figures suggest that it was relatively easy to
cross the border during the 1980s but became much more
difficult to do so during the 1990s as enforcement intensified.
These gains at the border have entailed costs. One way to
think about cost is in terms of direct appropriations, and my
written testimony describes the dramatic growth in border
spending. My written testimony also identifies a number of
unintended consequences of border enforcement on migration
flows and a number of indirect costs of border enforcement on
crime, migrant mortality, the environment, border communities,
and U.S. foreign relations.
Border enforcement also entails opportunity costs. How does
funding for enforcement between ports of entry compete with
other DHS priorities and with priorities outside of DHS? For
example, this figure compares resources that have gone to
border security between ports of entry to resources for
inspections and enforcement at ports of entry. Funding for
enforcement between the ports has more than doubled since 2004,
while funding at the ports has increased by less than a third.
FTEs, full-time employment, lines for enforcement between the
ports has increased 99 percent, while the FTEs at the ports
have increased just 12 percent.
We often think of border security in terms of how many
unauthorized migrants make it through the Arizona desert, but
the 2012 Strategy highlights the Border Patrol and DHS's
broader approach to risk management. Four types of
transnational threats may be especially important to consider:
Weapons of mass destruction, drugs and other contraband,
potential terrorists and other bad actors, and then regular
unauthorized migrants. These threats have different risk
profiles. Most experts agree that WMD are a high-consequence,
low-probability threat. Regular illegal migration is a lower-
consequence, higher-probability threat. The entry of illegal
drugs falls somewhere in between on both of these dimensions.
The threats also differ across border zones. The Southwest
Border between ports of entry is a point of vulnerability with
respect to illegal migration and marijuana smuggling. But WMDs
and other drugs and contraband, both are considered more likely
to be smuggled into the United States through a port of entry
rather than carried across the border. Given existing
infrastructure, the Southwest Border also may not be the
greatest point of vulnerability with respect to terrorists and
other bad actors, who may be more likely to attempt illegal
entry through a port or to enter the United States from Canada
or at a Coastal Border.
Given the gains we have made at the border, the new Border
Patrol strategy offers a moment to think about the broader
context and bottom-line goals for U.S. border security. What
are the most serious security threats confronted by the United
States? Where are its greatest points of vulnerability? What
additional investments in policies may most effectively reduce
risks to the United States?
Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Rosenblum follows:]
Prepared Statement of Marc R. Rosenblum
May 8, 2012
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the
subcommittee, I am honored to present testimony today on behalf of the
Congressional Research Service. My testimony today makes three main
observations:
The U.S. border in 2012 is a very different place than it
was in the mid-1990s when the former U.S. Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) developed the core of the current
U.S. Border Patrol strategy. The U.S. Border Patrol (USBP) and
other components within the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) have made major changes at the border and in the broader
immigration control system; and these changes appear to have
contributed to a sharp reduction in illegal migration, though
increased enforcement is just one of many factors that explains
the reduction.
These gains entail costs, including direct appropriations
for border security, indirect costs, and unintended
consequences of the current approach, and opportunity costs
that come from high investments between ports of entry on the
Southwest Border, arguably at the expense of competing
priorities.
The first two observations suggest that the new USBP comes
at an appropriate time and raises important questions. The
USBP's mission is to prevent illegal entries between ports of
entry, and most of its resources are on the Southwest Border.
Yet many of the most serious transnational criminal and
terrorist threats to the United States may be more likely to
exploit points of vulnerability at ports of entry (POE) and at
Northern and Coastal Borders, rather than to risk entry across
the Southwest Border in light of existing enforcement measures
there.
the current border strategy: prevention through deterrence \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ This section and much of this testimony draws heavily on CRS
Report R42138, Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between Ports
of Entry, by Marc R. Rosenblum (hereinafter CRS, Immigration
Enforcement Between Ports of Entry); please see that report for a
fuller discussion of these issues and additional citations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the 1990s, migration control at the border has been guided by
a strategy of ``prevention through deterrence''--the idea that the
concentration of personnel, infrastructure, and surveillance technology
along heavily trafficked regions of the border will discourage
unauthorized aliens from attempting to enter the United States. The
strategy was developed in 1994 as part of the former INS' ``National
Strategic Plan'' (NSP) in response to a widespread perception that the
Southwest Border was being overrun by unauthorized immigration and that
drug smuggling was a serious threat along the Southwest Border. The
plan described a multi-phased approach. Implementation began with
Operations ``Hold the Line'' and ``Gatekeeper'' in El Paso, TX, and San
Diego, CA; and the plan called for expanding enforcement in three
additional phases to cover the remaining areas of the Southwest Border
followed by the Gulf Coast and Northern Borders. In descending order of
importance, the plan emphasized personnel, equipment, technology, and
tactical infrastructure.
Shortly after the creation of DHS, USBP began to formulate a new
National strategy to better reflect the realities of the post-9/11
security landscape. Published in March 2004, the strategy places
greater emphasis on interdicting terrorists and features five main
objectives: (1) Establishing the substantial probability of
apprehending terrorists and their weapons as they attempt to enter
illegally between the ports of entry; (2) deterring illegal entries
through improved enforcement; (3) detecting, apprehending, and
deterring smugglers of humans, drugs, and other contraband; (4)
leveraging ``Smart Border'' technology to multiply the deterrent and
enforcement effect of agents; and (5) reducing crime in border
communities, thereby improving the quality of life and economic
vitality of those areas.\2\ Thus, the 2004 Strategy builds on
``prevention through deterrence,'' but places added emphasis on the
rapid deployment of USBP agents to respond to emerging threats. This
approach depends on tactical, operational, and strategic intelligence
to assess risk and target enforcement efforts, relying on surveillance
systems and close coordination with U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's (CBP) Office of Intelligence and other intelligence
apparatuses. The plan formulates different strategies for each of the
agency's three operational theaters: The Southwest Border, the Northern
Border, and the coastal waters around Florida and Puerto Rico.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection, ``National Border Patrol Strategy,'' 2004.
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In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security announced a
comprehensive multi-year plan, the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), to
secure U.S. borders and reduce illegal migration, reiterating many of
the themes from the 1994 and 2004 Border Patrol Strategies. Under SBI,
DHS announced plans to obtain operational control of the Northern and
Southern Borders within 5 years by focusing attention in five main
areas: Increased staffing, improved detention and removal capacity,
surveillance technology, fencing and tactical infrastructure, and
interior immigration enforcement.\3\ DHS noted that these programs
initially would focus on the southwest land border between official
ports of entry and that it would deploy a mix of personnel, technology,
infrastructure, and response assets in order to ``provide maximum
tactical advantage in each unique border environment.''\4\
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\3\ DHS, ``Fact Sheet: Secure Border Initiative,'' http://
www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_release_0794.shtm.
\4\ Department of Homeland Security, DHS FY2008 Congressional
Budget Justification, p. CBP-BSFIT 3.
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CHANGES SINCE THE 1990S
With the implementation of prevention through deterrence beginning
in the 1990s and elements of SBI since 2005, U.S. border security and
immigration enforcement look quite different today. Changes include:
(1) New enforcement resources at the border, (2) different enforcement
practices at the border, and (3) additional modifications to the
migration control system at ports of entry and within the United
States. Most importantly, a growing body of evidence suggests that
illegal migration to the United States has fallen to its lowest level
in decades, although it is not possible to describe how much of the
decrease is a function of border enforcement versus several other
factors that also likely have contributed to reduced flows.
Additional Resources: Border Patrol Personnel
Congress has passed at least four laws since 1986 authorizing
increases in Border Patrol personnel.\5\ Appropriators generally have
supported such growth; and as Figure 1 illustrates overall USBP
staffing has grown about ten-fold from 2,268 in 1980 to 21,370 today.
The Border Patrol numbered just 4,287 when the Prevention through
Deterrence strategy was articulated in 1994; Border Patrol numbers
roughly doubled during the remainder of the 1990s as the strategy was
implemented; and numbers have more than doubled again in the post-9/11
period.\6\
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\5\ The Immigration Act of 1990 (Pub. L. 101-649), the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA,
Pub. L. 104-208, Div. C), the Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT, Pub. L. 107-56), and the Intelligence
Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (Pub. L. 108-458).
\6\ CRS analysis based on data from Syracuse University
Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse and USBP Office of
Legislative Affairs.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
These data on USBP personnel understate law enforcement staffing
along U.S. borders, because numerous other Federal, State, local, and
Tribal law enforcement officials also operate in the border region,
including 5,551 CBP officers at Southwest Border POEs in 2011.\7\ About
a quarter of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement's (ICE) 20,000
personnel were deployed to the Southwest Border in fiscal year 2011,\8\
along with about 1,200 National Guard troops.\9\
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\7\ CBP Office of Legislative Affairs, Sept. 20, 2011.
\8\ Department of Homeland Security, ``Secure and Manage Our
Borders,'' http://www.dhs.gov/xabout/gc_1240606351110.shtm.
\9\ Also see CRS Report R41286, Securing America's Borders: The
Role of the Military, by R. Chuck Mason.
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Additional Resources: Border Fencing
The former INS installed the first border fencing beginning in
1990, eventually covering the 14 miles of the border east of the
Pacific Ocean near San Diego. Congress expressly authorized the
construction and improvement of fencing and other barriers under
Section 102(a) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA; Pub. L. 104-208, Div. C), which
also required the completion of a triple-layered fence along the 14
miles near San Diego. The Secure Fence Act of 2006 (Pub. L. 109-367)
amended IIRIRA to require double-layered fencing along five segments of
the Southwest Border, totaling about 850 miles.\10\ IIRIRA was amended
again by the Consolidated Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 2008 (Pub. L.
110-161), which requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to
construct reinforced fencing ``along not less than 700 miles of the
Southwest Border where fencing would be most practical and
effective.''\11\ The Act further specifies, however, that the Secretary
of Homeland Security is not required to install ``fencing . . . in a
particular location . . . if the Secretary determines that the use or
placement of such resources is not the most appropriate means to
achieve and maintain operational control over the international border
at such location.''\12\ As of April 11, 2012, DHS had installed 352
miles of pedestrian fencing and 299 miles of vehicle fencing (total of
651 miles) out of 652 miles DHS had identified as appropriate for
fencing and barriers.\13\
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\10\ Pub. L. 109-367 identified five specific stretches of the
border where fencing was to be installed; CBP Congressional Affairs
provided CRS with this estimate of the total mileage covered by the law
on September 25, 2006.
\11\ Pub. L. 110-161, Div. E, 564.
\12\ Ibid.
\13\ CBP Office of Congressional Affairs communication with CRS,
April 11, 2012.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Additional Resources: Surveillance Assets
The Border Patrol utilizes advanced technology to augment its
agents' ability to patrol the border. Under a series of related
programs since the 1990s,\14\ the border surveillance system has
consisted of a network of Remote Video Surveillance (RVS) systems
(including cameras and infrared systems) and sensors (including
seismic, magnetic, and thermal detectors) linked into a computer
network. USBP personnel in a central location screen the network,
monitor locations where sensor alarms are tripped, and alert field
agents to intrusions and coordinate responses. These systems have
struggled to meet deployment time lines and to provide USBP with the
promised level of ``situational awareness'' with respect to illegal
entries,\15\ and have come under criticism for non-competitive
contracting practices, inadequate oversight of contractors, and cost
overruns.\16\ DHS ordered a Department-wide assessment of the most
recent surveillance system, SBInet, in January, 2010 and terminated the
program in January 2011.\17\
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\14\ The former INS' Integrated Surveillance Information System
(ISIS) was initiated in 1998. ISIS was folded into a broader border
surveillance system named the America's Shield Initiative (ASI) in
2005, and ASI was made part of DHS' Secure Border Initiative (SBI) the
following year, with the surveillance program renamed SBInet.
\15\ See e.g., testimony of DHS Inspector General Richard L.
Skinner before the House Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on
Management, Integration, and Oversight, New Secure Border Initiative,
109th Cong., 1st sess., December 16, 2005; and U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO), Secure Border Initiative: Technology
Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been
Assessed, GAO-09-896, 2009, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09896.pdf.
\16\ See DHS Inspector General (IG), Secure Border Initiative: DHS
Needs to Address Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology
Investment, DHS OIG-09-80, Washington, DC, June 2009; and DHS IG,
Controls Over SBInet Program Cost and Schedule Could Be Improved, DHS
OIG-10-96, Washington, DC, June 2010.
\17\ See DHS, Report on the Assessment of the Secure Border
Initiative Network (SBInet) Program, Washington, DC, 2010; DHS, Annual
Financial Report: Fiscal Year 2011, Washington, DC, 2011, p. 14.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Under DHS' new Alternative Surveillance Technology Plan, DHS plans
to deploy a mix of RVS systems consisting of fixed daylight and
infrared cameras that transmit images to a central location, mobile
surveillance systems mounted on trucks and monitored in the truck's
passenger compartment, hand-held equipment, and existing SBInet
integrated towers.\18\ In addition to these ground-based surveillance
assets, CBP's Office of Air and Marine (OAM) deploys 270 aircraft and
280 marine vessels to conduct surveillance operations and contribute to
the interdiction of unauthorized aliens and other smuggling operations,
and OAM operates nine unmanned aircraft systems along the borders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Statement of Randolph C. Hite, Director, Information
Technology Architecture and System Issues, Testimony Before the
Subcommittees on Management, Investigations, and Oversight; and Border,
Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism; Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Follow
Through on Plans to Reassess and Better Manage Key Technology Program,
110th Cong., 2nd Sess., Thursday, June 17, 2010.
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New Border Enforcement Practices: Enforcement with Consequences
Since about 2005, CBP has been phasing in a new set of enforcement
practices that it now describes as ``enforcement with consequences.''
Historically, immigration agents returned most people apprehended at
the border to Mexico with minimal processing or (in the case of non-
Mexicans) often released them pending a formal deportation or removal
hearing. The enforcement with consequences approach seeks to minimize
such ``low consequence'' responses in order to raise the costs to
migrants of being apprehended, to make it more difficult for illegal
migrants to reconnect with smugglers following a failed entry attempt,
and thereby to discourage people who have been apprehended from making
subsequent efforts to enter the United States illegally.\19\ The
approach includes the following elements:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Does Administrative
Amnesty Harm our Efforts to Gain and Maintain Operational Control of
the Border, testimony of U.S. Border Patrol Chief Michael J. Fisher,
112th Cong., 1st sess., October 4, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Expedited removal (ER).--ER is a provision of the INA that
allows certain arriving aliens without documents to be formally
removed from the United States without an inadmissibility
hearing or an appearance before an immigration judge. Thus, ER
orders can be implemented quickly and at minimal expense, but
carry the same administrative penalties as standard removal
orders. After being added to the INA in 1996, ER initially was
reserved for aliens apprehended at ports of entry. With a
series of notices in 2002-2006, ER was expanded to cover
certain aliens who had entered the United States within the
previous 2 weeks and were apprehended within 100 miles of any
U.S. border.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ See CRS Report RL33109, Immigration Policy on Expedited
Removal of Aliens, by Alison Siskin and Ruth Ellen Wasem. Under the
2006 policy, most Mexicans apprehended at the Southwest Border were not
placed in expedited removal proceedings unless they had previous
criminal convictions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Detention.--Non-Mexicans apprehended at the border usually
are placed in removal proceedings prior to being returned by
air to their country of origin.\21\ Historically, backlogs in
the immigration court system meant that most such aliens were
released on bail or their own recognizance for some period of
time between their apprehension and removal hearing; and many
failed to show up for their hearings.\22\ Under a policy
implemented in August 2006, DHS now detains 100% of removable
non-Mexicans apprehended at the border until their removal
orders are finalized and executed.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Most Mexicans were returned by bus with minimal processing--an
option not available for aliens from most countries.
\22\ DHS estimated that there were 623,292 alien ``absconders'' in
August 2006, many of whom had failed to appear for removal hearings
after being apprehended at the border. See Doris Meissner and Donald
Kerwin, DHS and Immigration: Taking Stock and Correcting Course,
Migration Policy Institute, Washington, DC, February 2009, p. 44,
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/DHS_Feb09.pdf.
\23\ CBP, ``DHS Secretary Announces End to `Catch and Release' on
Southern Border,'' http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/admin/c1_archive/
messages/end_catch_release.xml.
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Immigration-related criminal charges.--Unauthorized aliens
apprehended at the border may face Federal immigration charges,
but historically most have not been charged with a crime.\24\
In cooperation with the Department of Justice, CBP has worked
since 2005 to bring criminal charges against such aliens more
often. The most systematic effort in this regard has been
Operation Streamline, a program through which CBP works with
U.S. Attorneys and District Court judges in border districts to
expedite criminal justice processing. Operation Streamline was
established in the USBP's Del Rio Sector in December 2005, and
expanded to four additional sectors by June 2008.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Aliens apprehended at the border may face criminal charges for
illegal entry (8 U.S.C. 1325) or (on a subsequent apprehension)
illegal re-entry (8 U.S.C. 1326), and in some cases they may face
charges related to human smuggling (8 U.S.C. 1324) and visa and
document fraud (8 U.S.C. 1546). See CRS Report RL32480, Immigration
Consequences of Criminal Activity, by Michael John Garcia. In contrast,
unlawful presence, absent additional factors, is a civil violation.
\25\ According to CBP Office of Legislative Affairs, November 1,
2011, Operation Streamline was initiated in the Yuma Sector in December
2006, Laredo Sector in October 2007, Tucson Sector in January 2008, and
Rio Grande Valley Sector in June 2008. A total of 164,639 people were
processed through Operation Streamline through the end of fiscal year
2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Remote repatriation.--Under the Alien Transfer Exit Program
(ATEP), certain Mexicans apprehended near the border are
repatriated to border ports hundreds of miles away--typically
moving people from Arizona to Texas or California.\26\ Under
the Mexican Interior Repatriation Program (MIRP), certain
Mexican nationals are repatriated to their home towns within
Mexico, rather than being returned just across the border.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ See U.S. Congress, House Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security, Does Administrative
Amnesty Harm our Efforts to Gain and Maintain Operational Control of
the Border, testimony of U.S. Border Patrol Chief Michael J. Fisher,
112th Cong., 1st sess., October 4, 2011.
\27\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To manage these diverse programs, CBP has developed a ``Consequence
Delivery System . . . to uniquely evaluate each subject and identify
the ideal consequences to deliver to impede and deter further illegal
activity.''\28\ According to public comments by former CBP Commissioner
Alan Bersin, the goal of the program, in certain sectors of the border,
is to ensure that virtually everyone who is apprehended faces ``some
type of consequence,'' and to eliminate voluntary return in most
cases.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\28\ Ibid.
\29\ Alan Bersin, The State of US/Mexico Border Security, Center
for American Progress, August 4, 2011, http://www.americanprogress.org/
events/2011/08/usmexicoborder.html. Bersin indicated that certain
aliens would not be subject to enforcement with consequences, such as
aliens younger than 18 years old traveling without a parent or legal
guardian.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Figure 3 depicts two indicators of enforcement with consequences:
Removal cases initiated by the Border Patrol and immigration-related
criminal charges brought in the Federal court system, including illegal
entry and illegal re-entry. As the figure indicates, the number of
immigration-related criminal cases tripled between fiscal year 1999 and
fiscal year 2010 (from 28,764 to 84,388 cases); and USBP removals
increased fourteen-fold from 12,867 to 189,653. These increases
occurred at a time of falling alien apprehensions, as described below,
so that the ratio of such consequences relative to all USBP
apprehensions increased from 1% in 1999 to 58% in 2010.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ Not all people facing charges were apprehended by USBP, and
not all aliens subject to removal were apprehended during the same
fiscal year. Thus, the proportion of aliens facing enforcement with
consequences as described in Figure 3 is not precisely defined as a
percentage of USBP apprehensions, though USBP apprehensions represent
the great majority of such cases.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Additional Changes to the Migration Control System
Changes to the Border Patrol's enforcement resources and practices
have not occurred in isolation. While the focus of this hearing is on
the Border Patrol, the effects of Border Patrol policies also depend on
CBP enforcement efforts at POEs and on immigration enforcement within
the United States. Without addressing them in detail, four changes
since the 1990s have further contributed to a changed immigration
control environment: More robust screening at ports of entry;\31\
expanded removals from the interior, including through the Secure
Communities program;\32\ the expansion of the E-Verify electronic
employment eligibility verification system and other worksite
enforcement efforts,\33\ and the passage of dozens of State and local
laws--some of which are subject to legal challenges--related to the use
of E-Verify, the role of State and local law enforcement officials in
immigration enforcement, and other measures to combat illegal
migration.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ See archived CRS Report RL31733, Port and Maritime Security:
Background and Issues for Congress, by John Frittelli; and archived CRS
Report RL32234, U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
(US-VISIT) Program, by Lisa M. Seghetti and Stephen R. Vina.
\32\ See CRS Report R42057, Interior Immigration Enforcement:
Programs Targeting Criminal Aliens, by Marc R. Rosenblum and William A.
Kandel.
\33\ See CRS Report R40446, Electronic Employment Eligibility
Verification, by Andorra Bruno.
\34\ See CRS Report R41423, Authority of State and Local Police to
Enforce Federal Immigration Law, by Michael John Garcia and Kate M.
Manuel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
border enforcement outcomes \35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ For a fuller discussion of enforcement outcomes, see CRS,
Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Total Apprehensions
For many years, the INS and DHS have used USBP apprehensions as a
proxy to measure illegal entries,\36\ and changes in apprehensions as
an indicator of border enforcement outcomes. As Figure 4 illustrates,
total USBP apprehensions have fallen each year since 2005, and the 2011
total of 328,000 apprehensions was less than one-fifth the 1.68 million
apprehensions recorded in 2000. Apprehensions in 2011 were at their
lowest point since 1970.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ See e.g., CBP, Securing America's Borders: CBP Fiscal Year
2010 in Review Fact Sheet, Washington, DC, March 15, 2011, http://
www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/newsroom/fact_sheets/cbp_overview/
fy2010_factsheet.xml.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
While apprehensions data are useful indicators of illegal inflow
trends, they are problematic indicators of unauthorized migration for
at least three reasons. First, apprehensions data exclude successful
unauthorized aliens, certain unsuccessful unauthorized aliens
(including aliens who are denied entry by CBP officers at ports of
entry, aliens who are apprehended by law enforcement officials other
than USBP, and aliens who die while crossing the border); and would-be
unauthorized aliens who are deterred at the border or who never attempt
to migrate at all. These exclusions mean that apprehensions data are an
incomplete picture both of unauthorized migration and of migration
enforcement. Second, apprehensions data count events rather than
people. Thus, an unauthorized migrant who is caught trying to enter the
country three times in one year counts as three apprehensions in the
data set. Apprehensions data therefore may over-estimate the actual
number of people trying to cross the border. Third, apprehensions are a
function of illegal flows and of the unknown effectiveness of border
enforcement. Thus, fewer apprehensions may reflect fewer attempts at
illegal entry, lower apprehension rates for the same number of entries,
or some combination of the two.\37\ The Border Patrol estimates the
number of successful illegal entries (``get-aways'') and the number
deterred at the border (``turn backs''), but these data are limited by
the agency's surveillance capacity, among other factors, and are not
available to outside researchers.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ Also see U.S. Congress, House Committee on Appropriations,
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Bill, 2012, Report to Accompany H.R. 2017, 112th Cong.,
1st sess., May 6, 2011, H. Rept. 112-91 (Washington: GPO, 2011), p. 33.
\38\ According to CBP's Office of Legislative Affairs (December 22,
2011) and other sources, CBP reportedly plans to incorporate its
estimate of successful illegal entries into a soon-to-be-released
``border conditions index.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given these limits, it is useful to consider several additional
data sources that offer insight into illegal migration and the
effectiveness of border enforcement and migration control efforts.
Unique Apprehensions
The DHS Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT) is a
biometric database that includes about 138 million individual
records.\39\ Since late 1999, the system has been deployed to all USBP
stations, allowing DHS to track individual case histories of most
people apprehended by USBP, among others. The IDENT database provides
additional insight into enforcement outcomes by describing the number
of unique individuals apprehended by USBP per year, rather than the
number of apprehension events. As Figure 5 indicates, the number of
unique individuals apprehended by USBP fell from about 880,000 in 2000
to about 618,000 in 2003 before climbing back to about 818,000 in 2005
and then dropping sharply to about 269,000 individuals in 2011. Thus,
perhaps more importantly, the ratio of total apprehensions to unique
individuals apprehended also fell during this period: from an average
of 1.63 apprehensions per individual in 2000 to an average of 1.27
apprehensions per individual in 2011. Figure 5 also presents IDENT data
on the percentage of unique subjects apprehended by the Border Patrol
more than once in a fiscal year (the recidivism rate). The recidivism
rate peaked at 28% in 2007 and fell to 20% in fiscal year 2011, the
lowest level since USBP began collecting these data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ US-VISIT Office of Legislative Affairs, December 16, 2011.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Smuggling Fees
The great majority of unauthorized migrants to the United States
make use of human smugglers to help them enter the United States.\40\
Migrants' reliance on human smugglers, along with prices charged by
smugglers, are an additional potential indicator of the effectiveness
of U.S. border enforcement efforts, as more effective enforcement
should increase the costs to smugglers of bringing migrants across the
border, with smugglers passing such costs along to their clients in the
form of higher fees.\41\ Figure 6 summarizes available time-series data
describing average smuggling fees paid by certain unauthorized migrants
for transport from Mexico to the United States, based on surveys
conducted with unauthorized migrants in the United States and in Mexico
(i.e., after migrants had returned home). According to these data,
smuggling fees were mostly flat throughout the 1980s, at about $750-
$1,000 (in 2010 dollars), with an average annual growth rate of less
than 1.5%. Smuggling fees began to rise during the early 1990s, climbed
by over 7% per year throughout the 1990s and early 2000s to $2,400-
$2,700 in 2005-2006, and have remained roughly flat since that time--
possibly because the economic downturn since 2007 has placed a cap on
what smugglers may charge.\42\ These data suggest that crossing the
border illegally became more difficult (or at least most expensive) in
the decade after the USBP began to implement its National strategy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ See Princeton University Mexican Migration Project, ``Access
to Border-Crossing Guides and Family/Friends on First Undocumented
Trip,'' http://mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/002coyote-en.aspx.
\41\ See Bryan Roberts, Gordon Hanson, and Derekh Cornwell, et al.,
An Analysis of Migrant Smugglng Costs Along the Southwest Border, DHS
Office of Immigration Statistics, Washington, DC, November 2010, http:/
/www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/publications/ois-smuggling-
wp.pdf.
\42\ See attachment for sources.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Probability of Apprehension
Social science research also provides data (reported by migrants in
the United States and Mexico) on the probability that migrants will be
apprehended while attempting to enter the United States illegally.
Existing data sources indicate that many migrants are apprehended one
or more times prior to successfully entering the United States.
According to one source, a growing proportion of Mexicans who attempt
to migrate illegally are apprehended at the border at least once: 28%
for one sample of migrants who attempted to enter prior to 1986 versus
41% for aliens attempting entry in 2002-2009.\43\ Another major survey
finds that the probability of being apprehended on any given crossing
has hovered around 25% since 1965.\44\ Yet both surveys have found that
the vast majority of migrants who attempt to cross the border
eventually succeed.\45\ Taken together, these data offer additional
evidence that it became somewhat more difficult to cross the Southwest
Border illegally in the decade after 1994, but that the border remains
broadly vulnerable to illegal crossers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ University of California--San Diego (UCSD) Mexico Migration
Field Research Project, data provided to CRS Sept. 23, 2010.
\44\ Princeton University Mexican Migration Project, ``Probability
of Apprehension on an Undocumented Border Crossing,'' http://
mmp.opr.princeton.edu/results/008apprehension-en.aspx. The probability
of apprehension fell somewhat during the 1990s to less than 20% in
2001, possibly as a function of increased use of smugglers during this
period. This trend was reversed between 2001 and 2006, as the
probability of apprehension climbed to an all-time high of about 35%;
but by 2011 the probability of apprehension had once again fallen below
20%.
\45\ In the UCSD surveys, 98% of intending migrants from Jalisco,
Mexico eventually managed to enter the United States before 1986, and
97% eventually succeeded in 2002-2009. Overall, the UCSD researchers
recorded eventual success rates of 92% or higher in four different
surveys conducted between 2005 and 2009. CRS' analysis of data provided
by the Princeton survey suggests that 99% of Mexicans surveyed reported
being able to enter the United States illegally after one or more
attempts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Survey Data from Mexico
The Pew Hispanic Center has analyzed survey data collected in
Mexico from illegal migrants who were transferred from U.S. custody to
Mexican authorities. In research published in 2012, Pew reports the
following findings:
Mexicans repatriated in 2010 were more likely to have lived
in the United States for a long period of time than Mexicans
surveyed during earlier periods. In 2010, 27% of repatriated
Mexicans had lived in the United States for at least a year,
compared to 6% in 2005 and 5% in 2000. And 17% of repatriated
Mexicans had lived in the United States for at least 5 years,
compared to just 2% in 2005.\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\46\ See Jeffrey Passel, D'Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, Net
Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero--And Perhaps Less, Pew Hispanic
Center, Washington, DC, 2012, http://www.pewhispanic.org/files/2012/04/
PHC-04-23a-Mexican-Migration.pdf, p. 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mexicans repatriated in 2010 were more likely to have been
apprehended at work or at home than Mexicans surveyed during
earlier periods: 17% in 2010 versus 3% in 2005. The proportion
of Mexicans surveyed who had been apprehended at the border
fell from 49% in 1995 to 33% in 2005 to 25% in 2010.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ Ibid., p. 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mexicans repatriated in 2010 were less likely than those
repatriated in previous years to report that they intended to
return to the United States. Among those who migrated illegally
to look for work (83% of those in the survey), 60% reported
that they intended to return to the United States immediately,
and 80% reported that they intended to return eventually, down
from 81% and 92%, respectively, in 2005. Among new unauthorized
migrants (those who had spent less than a week in the United
States before being repatriated to Mexico), 18% of those
repatriated in 2010 reported that they would not return to the
United States compared to 6% in 2005.\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Ibid., pp. 24-25.
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Conclusions: The Effectiveness of U.S. Border Control and Migration
Enforcement
Taken together, the data described above suggest that illegal
inflows have fallen substantially during the last 5 years, and that
border control and migration enforcement policies likely have
contributed to this downturn. Yet available data do not allow for a
precise description of the importance of migration enforcement relative
to other factors that also influence illegal migration, or for concrete
conclusions about the effectiveness of border control and migration
enforcement.
A fundamental obstacle to evaluating the effectiveness of migration
enforcement measures is that individual and aggregate migration
decisions are highly complex, reflecting not only the risk of
apprehension and the costs of migration, but also--at least as
importantly--a range of socio-economic ``push'' and ``pull'' factors at
both ends of the migration chain, as well as social and family networks
that facilitate migration.\49\ Thus, even if we know with certainty
that illegal inflows have fallen in a given period, as appears to be
the case since 2007, it is not possible to describe how much of the
downturn is a result of enhanced enforcement, and how much is a
function of these other factors. It is especially difficult to measure
``remote deterrence'': the decision by potential migrants, who may be
thousands of miles from the border, to choose not to embark on a trip
to the United States--though such deterrence may well reflect U.S.
enforcement efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ See for example, Douglas S. Massey, Joaquin Arango, and Graeme
Hugo, et al., Worlds In Motion: Understanding International Migration
at the End of the Millenium, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Assigning causality is particularly difficult in the case of the
post-2007 downturn because many of the most significant new enforcement
efforts--including a sizeable share of new border enforcement
personnel, most border fencing, new enforcement practices at the
border, and many of the new migration enforcement measures within the
United States--have occurred in the context of the most severe
recession since the 1930s. The economic downturn has been particularly
intense in certain industries that have historically employed a large
number of unauthorized migrants.
Additional factors may have further contributed to reduced illegal
migration from Mexico, historically the source of about 60% of
unauthorized migrants in the United States. Abuses of migrants by
smugglers and transnational criminal organizations and high levels of
border-area violence appear to have discouraged some potential Mexican
migrants.\50\ The Mexican economy has recovered from the 2007-08
downturn more quickly than the U.S. economy, and expanding job
opportunities in Mexico may have discouraged some would-be
migrants.\51\ Perhaps most importantly, long-term demographic trends
mean that relatively few Mexican workers have entered the labor market
in recent years, as Mexico's fertility rate has fallen from an average
of 7.2 children per woman in 1960 to about 2.2 today.\52\
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\50\ See David Scott Fitzgerald, Rafael Alarcon, and Leah Muse-
Orlinoff, Recession Without Borders: Mexican Migrants Confront the
Economic Downturn (La Jolla, CA and Boulder, CO: Center for Comparative
Immigration Studies (CCIS) and Lynne Reiner Publishers, 2011).
\51\ According to Mexican data, Mexico's GDP grew by 5.5% in 2010
and 3.9% in 2011; see Jeffrey Passel, D'Vera Cohn, and Ana Gonzalez-
Barrera, Net Migration from Mexico Falls to Zero--And Perhaps Less, Pew
Hispanic Center, Washington, DC, 2012, http://www.pewhispanic.org/
files/2012/04/PHC-04-23a-Mexican-Migration.pdf, p. 31.
\52\ Pew Hispanic Center, The Mexican-American Boom: Births
Overtake Immigration, July 14, 2011, http://pewhispanic.org/files/
reports/144.pdf, p. 7.
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THE COSTS OF BORDER ENFORCEMENT
As described above, the prevention through deterrence approach to
border security has been resource-intensive, relying on the deployment
of personnel, infrastructure, and technology to U.S. borders. To
evaluate the strategy and weigh it against alternative approaches, it
may be useful to consider the costs of border enforcement, including
direct costs, indirect costs and benefits, and opportunity costs.
Direct Costs
The two largest components of the Border Patrol's prevention
through deterrence approach, when measured in terms of direct spending,
have been outlays for personnel and for border fencing and surveillance
technology, depicted in Figure 7. As the figure indicates, USBP funding
grew from $232 million in 1989, to $1.3 billion in fiscal year 2002
(the last data available prior to the creation of DHS), to $3.6 billion
in fiscal year 2012--a nominal increase of 1,450% and an increase of
750% when accounting for inflation. Appropriations for fencing and
technology increased from $25 million in fiscal year 1996 to $298
million in fiscal year 2006, an eleven-fold increase (eight-fold when
adjusting for inflation), and then jumped to $1.5 billion in fiscal
year 2007 before falling to $573 billion in fiscal year 2011 and $400
billion in fiscal year 2012.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Indirect Costs and Benefits \53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ For a fuller discussion of indirect costs and benefits, see
CRS, Immigration Enforcement Between Ports of Entry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Border enforcement also may entail a number of indirect, and
sometimes unintended, costs and benefits that also may be useful to
consider as part of a comprehensive analysis of the issue:
Crime and migrant mortality.--The concentration of
enforcement resources around the border may exacerbate crime
and migrant mortality by making migrants more reliant on
smugglers and more likely to cross in dangerous locations. On
the other hand, if enforcement deters illegal crossers, such
prevention should reduce crime and mortality; and the
concentration of law enforcement personnel near the border may
further enhance public safety and migrant protection. The
empirical record suggests that crime rates have fallen in
certain Southwest Border cities faster than in other cities of
a similar size, but the impact of border enforcement on border
area crime and migrant mortality is unknown because available
data cannot separate the influence of border enforcement from
other factors. Available data about known migrant deaths along
the Southwest Border suggest that mortality rates have risen
and that border crossings have become more hazardous since the
``prevention through deterrence'' policy went into effect in
the 1990s, though once again the precise impact of enforcement
on migrant deaths is unknown.
Migrant flows.--Social science research suggests that border
enforcement has had the unintended consequence of encouraging
unauthorized migrants to settle permanently in the United
States rather than working temporarily and then returning home,
as was more common prior to the mid-1980s.\54\ A second
unintended consequence of enhanced border enforcement between
ports of entry has been an apparent increase in illegal entries
through ports of entry and other means.\55\ There is also
anecdotal evidence that unauthorized aliens have turned to
maritime routes and border tunnels as alternative strategies to
cross the U.S.-Mexican border.\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ For example, see Wayne Cornelius, ``Evaluating Recent US
Immigration Control Policy: What Mexican Migrants Can Tell Us,'' in
Crossing and Controlling Borders: Immigration Policies and Their Impact
on Migrants' Journeys, ed. Mechthild Baumann, Astrid Lorenz, and
Kerstin Rosenhow (Farmington, MI: Budrich Unipress Ltd, 2011).
\55\ See for example, Jonathan Hicken, Mollie Cohen, and Jorge
Narvaez, ``Double Jeopardy: How U.S. Enforcement Policies Shape
Tunkaseno Migration,'' in Mexican Migration and the U.S. Economic
Crisis, ed. Wayne A. Cornelius, Davide FitzGerald, Pedor Lewin Fischer,
and Leah Muse-Orlinoff (La Jolla, CA: University of California, San
Diego Center for Comparative Immigration Studies, 2010), p. 66.
\56\ See for example, Richard Marosi, ``Border Battle Over Illegal
Immigration Shifts to Beaches,'' Los Angeles Times, March 24, 2011;
Associated Press, ``Major Drug Tunnel Found in San Diego,'' Washington
Post, November 30, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Effects on border communities and environmental impact.--As
with border crime and violence, the effects of enforcement on
border communities and the environment are complex because they
reflect changes in migrant behavior and the secondary effects
of enforcement per se. Border enforcement benefits local
communities because unauthorized migration imposes costs on
local services, strains public safety resources, and undermines
the rule of law. Yet enforcement also may disrupt local
economic activity by discouraging travel and commerce; and some
residents of border communities see enhanced border enforcement
as leading to racial profiling, wrongful detentions, and other
adverse consequences.\57\ Similarly, border enforcement may
benefit the environment because some illegal border crossers
transit through sensitive environmental areas, cutting
vegetation for shelter and fire, causing wildfires, increasing
erosion through repeated use of trails, and discarding
trash.\58\ At the same time, the construction of fencing,
roads, and other tactical infrastructure may damage sensitive
border-area ecosystems; and some environmental groups have
opposed border infrastructure projects.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ See for example, NY School of Law, NY Civil Liberties Union,
and Families for Freedom, Justice Derailed: What Raids On New York's
Trains And Buses Reveal About Border Patrol's Interior Enforcement
Practices, New York: November, 2011, http://www.nyclu.org/files/
publications/NYCLU_justicederailedweb.pdf; Lornet Turnbull and Roberto
Daza, ``Climate of Fear Grips Forks Illegal Immigrants,'' Seattle
Times, June 26, 2011.
\58\ Department of Homeland Security, Environmental Impact
Statement for the Completion of the 14-mile Border Infrastructure
System, San Diego, California (July 2003), pp. 1-11.
\59\ See e.g., Defenders of Wildlife, ``Wildlife and Border
Policy,'' http://www.defenders.org/programs_and_policy/
habitat_conservation/federal_lands/border_policy/. Also see CRS Report
R42346, Federal Land Ownership: Overview and Data, by Ross W. Gorte et
al.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. foreign relations.--The United States has strong border
partnerships with Mexico and Canada, but issues related to
migration control and border enforcement have been occasional
sources of tension, particular in the U.S.-Mexican case, and
may lead to missed opportunities for deeper cooperation at the
border and beyond.\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\60\ On U.S.-Canadian border issues, see CRS Report 96-397, Canada-
U.S. Relations, coordinated by Carl Ek and Ian F. Fergusson; on U.S.-
Mexican border issues, see Marc R. Rosenblum, Obstacles and
Opportunities for Regional Cooperation: The US-Mexico Case, Migration
Policy Institute, April 2011, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/
USMexico-cooperation.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Opportunity Costs
In a world of scarce resources, funding for USBP may be seen as
competing with funding for other DHS components like CBP's Office of
Field Operations (OFO), which is responsible for inspections and
enforcement at POEs, and ICE, which is responsible for DHS
investigations and most enforcement activities related to transnational
crime within the United States, among other competing priorities.
For example, Figure 8 focuses on the allocation of resources to
enforcement between POEs vs. inspections and enforcement at POEs since
the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The bars indicate
the number of full-time equivalent (FTE) positions funded for these two
activities, and the lines represent total Congressional appropriations
to each (including funding to USBP and for fencing and tactical
infrastructure in the case of enforcement between the ports). As the
figure illustrates, resources between the ports (the green bars and
lines in the figure) have grown much faster than OFO resources (the
blue lines and bars in the figure). Funding for enforcement between the
ports more than doubled in the 2004-2012 period, from $1.9 to $4.0
billion (108% growth), while OFO funding has increased by less than
one-third, from $2.2 to $2.9 billion (32%). Similarly, FTEs for
enforcement between POEs increased from 11,745 to 23,306 (98% growth),
while OFO FTEs increased from 17,467 to 21,893 FTEs (25% growth).
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
2012 NATIONAL BORDER PATROL STRATEGY
Based on preliminary information USBP has made available about the
2012 Border Patrol Strategic Plan,\61\ the plan will emphasize a risk-
based approach to border security that emphasizes the use of
information and intelligence to identify threats, and the integration
and rapid deployment of USBP resources to target enforcement to the
points of greatest vulnerability and where the risk of incursion is
highest. Whereas the 1994 plan focused primarily on moving adequate
resources into the border region, the 2004 plan began to focus
attention on how such resources were allocated, and the 2012 plan
reportedly will continue the shift in this direction to focus
enforcement on high-priority targets. The plan reportedly will continue
to strike a balance between USBP's traditional emphasis on preventing
illegal migration and the agency's post-9/11 priority missions of
preventing the entry of terrorists and terrorist weapons, along with
the recent U.S. focus on combating transnational criminal
organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ Information about the 2012 National Strategy is based on USBP
Office of Legislative Affairs staff briefing for the Senate Committee
on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, February 13, 2012.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
concluding comments: threats, vulnerabilities, and policy responses
The 2012 USBP Strategic Plan reportedly describes the goal of
border security in terms of risk management: A process that involves
``identifying, analyzing, assessing, and communicating risk and
accepting, avoiding, transferring or controlling it to an acceptable
level considering associated costs and benefits of any actions
taken.''\62\ DHS defines risk as a function of specific threats,
America's vulnerability to such threats, and their potential
consequences.\63\
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\62\ DHS Risk Steering Committee, DHS Risk Lexicon, September 2010,
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/dhs-risk-lexicon-2010.pdf, p. 30.
\63\ Ibid., pp. 27-38.
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From a border security perspective, four types of transnational
threats may be especially important to consider: Weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), drugs and other contraband, potential terrorists and
other ``bad actors,'' and ``regular'' unauthorized migrants (illegal
migration). These threats have substantially different overall risk
profiles. By most estimates, the entry of WMD and ``bad actors'' are
high-consequence but low-probability risks. Conversely, compared to the
threats from WMD and ``bad actors,'' illegal migration is a lower-
consequence, higher-probability event--though some of the consequences
of unauthorized migration do not lend themselves to precise
measurement, and people may disagree about how to evaluate them. The
entry of drugs and other contraband fall in between these two extremes.
Important differences also exist across different border zones in
terms of America's vulnerability to transnational threats. For example,
while the Southwest Border between POEs historically has been a major
point of vulnerability with respect to illegal migration and marijuana
smuggling, most experts do not consider the Southwest Border between
POEs to be the most important point of vulnerability to WMDs or other
types of drugs and contraband, both of which are more likely to be
smuggled into the United States through a port.\64\ Similarly, given
existing enforcement infrastructure, the Southwest Border may not be
the greatest point of vulnerability with respect to individual ``bad
actors,'' who may be more likely to attempt illegal entry through POEs
or to enter the United States from Canada or at a Coastal Border.\65\
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\64\ See for example, U.S. Department of Justice, National Drug
Intelligence Center, National Drug Threat Assessment: 2011, Washington,
DC: August, 2011.
\65\ See for example, testimony of K. Jack Riley before the House
Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Economic Security,
Infrastructure Protection, and Cybersecurity, Border Security and the
Terrorist Threat, 109th Cong., 2nd sess., August 8, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A third set of considerations focuses on expected policy benefits:
The potential for a given policy to reduce risk. Most border security
policies per se are designed to reduce vulnerability to a threat or
group of threats. Policies within the United States also may be
designed to lower the consequences and/or likelihood that a potential
event will occur, for example, by hardening infrastructure, reducing
demand for illegal employment, or disrupting smugglers' financial
networks.
For these reasons, the USBP 2012 National Strategy appears to raise
important and appropriate questions about future U.S. border security
investments and policies. What are the most serious security threats
confronted by the United States, and where are its greatest points of
vulnerability? What additional investments and policy responses would
produce the greatest reduction in risks to the United States? While
some of the answers undoubtedly will direct attention to traditional
investments in Southwest Border personnel, infrastructure, and
technology, USBP's focus on risk management also may direct additional
attention to how we manage flows through ports of entry and to
enforcement policies within the United States.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Doctor.
I want to thank all of our witnesses for being here today,
particularly you, Chief, who I am noticing is really the only
person in uniform. We are all here telling you of our hopefully
constructively critical way of looking at all of this in your
new strategic plan. I appreciated you articulating again the
long and distinguished history of the CBP, certainly.
I also was taking some notes as you were talking, and I
have been looking at your new strategic plan here a bit, and as
you mentioned information, integration, and rapid response and
also about the amount, I think Ms. Gambler mentioned, over $4
billion that the Congress and American taxpayers have invested
in technology and these kinds of things. You know, with all the
technology that we do need to utilize, obviously, for all of
our borders, sometimes there is really no second for human
intel, really. As I mentioned at the outset, with foiling this
bomb plot, I am certain that much of that was human intel and
the work of our intelligence community, counterintelligence,
counterterrorism, et cetera. The same thing applies, I think,
for border security in many, many ways.
It seems to me that a good way to get that kind of
intelligence--and it is utilized, or, certainly, as you mention
it in the strategic plan--is when you talk about increasing
community engagement and other kinds of things with all the
various stakeholders at all of our borders. We have often said
that they are really a force multiplier. I think you can
probably get a lot more intel from the local law enforcement
that is, sort of, out in the neighborhoods a bit and sharing
that information with you, whether that is at the Southern
Border, the Northern Border, our Coastal Borders, what have
you. One thing about the street, the street talks.
Chief Fisher. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Miller. The street talks. Your officers are trained to
understand and start to develop a threat assessment based on
some of that intel.
Also--and I am not sure if you have that in here, but I was
recently--and, of course, I am from the Detroit sector, and was
recently over on the Canadian side of the Blue Water Bridge
looking at what our Canadian counterparts were doing, and I had
one of your officers with us. What did they have there more
than anything? Dogs. The dogs were sniffing--I mean, with all
this technology, the dogs were sniffing everything that went
through, whether it is people or drugs. Their ability for
apprehensions was not something high-tech. So, particularly
when you have all these military dogs coming back now that have
had the ability to sniff with IEDs and everything else--and I
know we have talked about how that can be a layer of your
strategic approach to border security.
But I mention that because when we talk about defense-in-
depth, really looking at ports of entry, making utilization of
interior checkpoints, I know along the Northern Border and I
think the Southern as well, a big part of what you were doing
was, like, going into the bus terminals, talking to folks at
transportation hubs, et cetera, sometimes just a random
approach that you start picking up intel that is incredibly
important.
I guess I would first ask: Are you still doing that? I am
not sure if you still continue to do that. What is your thought
about utilizing the community engagement, et cetera, for
intelligence gathering, which I think is certainly as critical
a component as even UAVs or anything else?
Chief Fisher. Yes, Chairwoman. Well, to your first point,
we are still doing checkpoints, although we are moving away
from the term ``defense-in-depth'' because defense-in-depth in
the previous strategy really implied a first and fundamental
strategic imperative which was terrain denial. So in that
context, it made sense to have some defense-in-depth-like
checkpoint operations, whether they were tactical or permanent.
So we will continue, and that is what we have asked the field
chiefs to take a look at.
Just because it is not necessarily written in those few
pages of the strategy--remember, the strategy is a broad
framework of how we want the organization to start thinking. So
there are going to be things that even since 2004 that we will
continue to do. If it makes sense to continue on that path
forward, we will do that. I think some of our terminology in
what we are trying to accomplish is also going to change.
With respect to the community engagement, it is going to be
critical for our leaders to understand the change from
community relations toward community engagement. As you so
artfully articulated, you know, we have 21,370 Border Patrol
agents; we also have 21,370 intelligence collectors. We have to
train the Border Patrol agents to recognize that every
individual that they encounter is a potential source of
information.
When you say ``information,'' also, it is because we also
don't want to discount open-source information. People that
live in the border communities, quite frankly, have a lot of
information that, unless we ask them, aren't going to be able
to share that with us. I think that was some of the lessons
learned in 2006 and into 2007, that the Department of Defense
in shifting their thinking in terms of their strategy and how
they were going to actually confront, you know, the threats
that they were seeing overseas.
It is the same broad approach that we are taking in
recognizing that we have to make sure that we don't just ask
somebody, ``Hey, give us a call if you see something
suspicious.'' Actually take the time and explain to them in
their particular area what is suspicious and why it is
important that they respond and, to the extent that they are
able to, to provide that level of information for us.
So it is kind of a strategic shift, as well, in terms of
what our expectations are of the communities in which we serve.
Mrs. Miller. I appreciate you saying that. Because, again,
I think, just an example in the northern sector--and I think
this is a pilot program; I am not sure if you have plans to
replicate it along a northern tier or the southern tier, as
well--is the Operational Integration Center in Michigan, where
you literally have all of the various shareholders.
You mentioned the DOD, but, I mean, it wasn't--really, the
9/11 Commission recommendation that I always talk about because
I think it was one of the most important ones, we need to go
from the need to know to the need to share, the need to share
information amongst the various agencies or all of the
stakeholders. In the case of the OIC, where you have CBP, NBP,
and the Coast Guard, the Royal Mounted, we have the State
police, the counties, as I say, all their marine patrols, et
cetera, the local cities and village police departments and
first responders, all of this information being analyzed by
state-of-the-art data, so you are using the computers, really,
to analyze the human intel that can assess the threat and then
have a product that can be given to the men and women that are
out on the front lines, whether that is the northern tier,
southern tier, or what have you. I think that is something that
the Department needs to think about replicating. It has had
great success in that particular area.
I know my time is running over here, but I do have just a--
what is really new? What is really new in this strategic plan?
I am looking at it, and everything in here--I mean, I agree
with everything that is here, but there wasn't really something
that grabbed me as being really new. Is there anything really
new in here that you would highlight as a marquee component of
this new plan?
Chief Fisher. I will give you one example--actually, I will
give you two quick examples. One is the change detection
capability. That was something that----
Mrs. Miller. The what?
Chief Fisher. Change detection capability.
The other one talks about optimizing capability.
We weren't able to do that 8 years ago because, No. 1, we
didn't have the level of resources and, No. 2, we didn't have
the technology that allowed us to look into areas like the
Northern Border or some of the very remote areas along the
Southern Border because we weren't able to get into those
locations. Road systems did not exist; the terrain did not lend
itself for patrols in that area. With the UAS systems that CBP
has had over the last few years, it gives us the ability now to
use things like synthetic aperture radar, to go out and fly
sorties along the border to confirm or deny any changes in that
threat environment or any entries, which over the course of,
say, for instance, 2 or 3 weeks we hadn't seen anything. So
that allows us to use technology to be able to understand where
those threats are going to be evolving.
So those phrases, although they are somewhat new, that
takes a whole new meaning when you look at the implementation
and what it means along our borders.
Mrs. Miller. Just as a follow-on, do either of the two
witnesses have any comment in regards to that? What is really
new in this strategic plan, as you have reviewed it? Do you
agree with what the chief is pointing out, or do you have
something else that caught your eye?
Ms. Gambler. I think from our perspective some of the same
elements are in the 2012 Strategy as were in the 2004 Strategy.
I think there is a different level of emphasis on some of the
capabilities and a different way of thinking through how those
might be implemented going forward. So I think it is a
difference in emphasis, to some extent.
Mrs. Miller. Doctor.
Mr. Rosenblum. I would agree that there is a clear
evolution. When you look at the prevention through deterrence
as it was described in the 1990s through the 2004 plan, there
is sort of a clear trend of the Border Patrol describing having
adequate resources now put in place at the border and thinking
more strategically about how to deploy them and how to use them
flexibly.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr.
Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you so much, Madam Chairwoman.
First of all, Doctor, let me ask you--or let me just say,
first of all, thank you for the report that you gave us.
Also, Members, if you haven't seen the Congressional
Research report of the--I think it is dated January 6 of this
year, called ``Border Security: Immigration Enforcement Between
Ports of Entry,'' I would ask you--I think one of the charts
that you had up there on how much a coyote charges and how the
price has gone up. I appreciate the good work that you have
done.
Let me ask you, since I authored--passed the law on
modernizing GPRA, let me ask you about some of the GPRA
changes. Do you know if Border Patrol--maybe it is more under
the umbrella--have they appointed a performance improvement
officer already? That is supposed to be under the law. If you
know.
Mr. Rosenblum. I am not certain. I don't know.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Do you know if they started working on,
according to their law, I think, a priority goal? Have they set
up their priority goals, or is that more under the Homeland
Security? There are certain things they are supposed to be
doing under the law; I am just asking if they have done that
already.
Mr. Rosenblum. I am not certain about that either. I know
that they owe some reports to you guys, and I haven't seen all
of those reports yet.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay.
Chief Fisher, have you all done that? Do you know who your
performance improvement officer is, or is that more under
Homeland?
Chief Fisher. It is a little bit of both, Congressman. As a
matter of fact, within our Strategic Policy and Plans division
within the headquarters, we have Border Patrol agents that are
assigned and work closely----
Mr. Cuellar. No--and I am sorry, I don't mean to interrupt.
I apologize, I really apologize. But under the law, you are
supposed to have an executive, high-ranking officer not in the
field. It is supposed to be under the law, Chief. I don't know
if it should be more under the umbrella that it applies. But do
you know who your chief improvement officer is?
Chief Fisher. I don't know whether it is within the Border
Patrol. More likely, it may be within Customs and Border
Protection or at the Department level.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay.
Chief Fisher. But we do have Border Patrol agents that are
assigned to run those reports and work on a continual basis to
make sure that whatever we are reporting against the GPRA
requirements each year, they are doing that both in concert
with CBP and the Department.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Are you familiar with the Interagency
Performance Improvement Council?
Chief Fisher. I am not, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. I would ask your gentlemen there
sitting, and ladies, behind you if they would look at House
Resolution 2142. It became law I guess over a year ago.
Agencies are supposed to be following certain things. It has to
do with the performance measures and what the priority goals
are. I would ask you just respectfully if your folks behind you
could just take notes and look at that law and report back to
us on that.
The reason I say that is because I know there are some
changes--and I appreciate all the work. But, for example, there
have been changes. I think now we are moving away from
operational control. As of September 30, if you look at that
definition, 88 percent of our borders were classified as
managed. There is a definition for managed control, as to
operational controls. So, basically, we had 12 percent of all
the borders--Northern, Southern borders, Coastal areas--that
were under operational control. The rest were under managed
control.
Is that correct, Dr. Rosenblum?
Mr. Rosenblum. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Again, there are definitions, and you go
through what managed and operational control mean. Operational
control means a tighter reign than managed control.
I think out of Southwest Border, 2,000 miles, 873 were
under operational control. On the Northern Border, I think, out
of all of the miles that you have, 69 miles were under
operational control. Then under the whole Coastal, east and
west, only 165 miles were under operational control. Is that
correct?
Mr. Rosenblum. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. They are moving now, Border Patrol is now
moving into another type of performance measures. According to
your report, since headquarters has not come up with new
performance measures or new goals on that, according to your
report, different officers at different ports are using
different intra-measures for GPRA reporting measures. Is that
correct?
Mr. Rosenblum. That is what I understand, that there are a
number of additional measures that Border Patrol does track,
including, you know, there are estimates of--they track
apprehensions, and we know something about that. The measures
that you were citing, the operational control and effective
control, refer to the time within which, after somebody crosses
the border, Border Patrol is able to apprehend them, as we were
discussing earlier.
But at the sector and station level, I understand--and
Chief Fisher could tell you much more about this--that the
stations also track their estimates of how many people get away
and successfully enter the United States, how many people are
turned back. Those are some of the kinds of things that could
also be incorporated into our analysis of the apprehension rate
and of illegal flows.
Mr. Cuellar. As of April 2012, Border Patrol headquarters
officials were working to develop border security goals and
measures, but they have not given you a target time frame as to
when they will be implementing that.
Because here we are talking about a strategy, correct? So
the first part is the strategy, but then we got to go into the
goals and then we got to go into the measure, you know: How do
you measure results from failure?
So, Chief, do you have an idea of when we will get to--and,
again, thank you. I appreciate that the strategic is the first
step, but we got to go into the goals and then the measures.
Any idea what sort of time frame we will have for that?
Chief Fisher. Yes, sir. We are looking at the beginning of
the next calendar year.
Although I should also mention, it is not like we are just
erasing everything that we have done and trying to come up with
new things. What we are trying to do is dovetail onto some of
those things that we have previously used and inform beyond
some of the data sets.
I think the one that comes to mind is apprehensions. I
mean, we have talked even within this committee about, you
know, apprehensions, in and of themselves, really don't tell us
anything in terms of the extent to which we are being
successful and/or levels of border security. What is
interesting, what we are doing now is taking a look at those
apprehensions only as a start point to really delve down, to
really understand the rate of recidivism, the rate of re-
apprehension in different locations, and doing the comparatives
to make sure that we are having a better sense of what is
actually happening, not just independently trying to evaluate
on whether the apprehensions went up or whether they went down.
So it is a whole host of re-thinking. In some cases, we are
looking at new measures, to include the effectiveness ratio.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes. My time is over. If I can just finish
with this thought. I would ask you again, Chief, to look at the
new GPRA. I would ask you all to look at the requirements that
are in law already.
I would ask you also to look at page 21, Appendix 2 of the
report. When it talks about performance measures--and I will
just highlight them. ``Performance measures should cover core
program activities that Border Patrol is expected to perform.
Measures should be balanced to cover CBP and DHS priorities.
Measures should link and align measures with other components
at successful levels of the organizations. Measures should
reflect Government-wide priorities such as quality, timeliness,
and cost of service, also what it costs to provide that.
Measures should have a numerical goal to be recently free from
significant bias and manipulation and be reliable, producing
the same results from the same conditions.''
I ask you to do that, because, again, I appreciate the
strategic plan, but we still got a lot more work to go--the
goals, the priority goals, and the performance measures so we
know exactly what we are measuring. Is it results or failure
from work there?
Again, I appreciate all of the good men and women that work
for you. It is good work. I know it is very hard. GPRA is a
very important part, so we can look at efficiency,
effectiveness, accountability to the taxpayers, especially
since we are putting so much money into Homeland Security.
So, again, we look forward to working with you, Chief. I
would ask you to work with Dr. Rosenblum and some of the other
folks here on some of the ideas here, and especially the
requirements under GPRA.
Chief Fisher. Yes, Congressman. Thank you.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you so much. Appreciate it.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the
full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Chief Fisher, one of the constants that this committee runs
into is departments or agencies will come up with a new plan, a
new strategy, but when you talk about who was involved in
crafting the new plan or strategy, it ends up being just a
snapshot of the agency rather than the agency as a whole.
So can you tell us, in developing this new strategy, or the
third strategy that I have been a part of, did we involve other
counterparts of CBP in putting it together, like the Air and
Marine and other operations? Tell us a little bit about that.
Chief Fisher. Yes, Congressman. That is actually a really
good question.
It has been in process, the design and development of the
strategic plan, for about 18 months. During that process, not
only within CBP and those other operational offices that you
mentioned, Office of Field Operations and Office of Air and
Marine, had opportunities to comment on multiple drafts as we
were developing the strategy throughout. We also had input
certainly from the Department. Even before that, as we were
working with our field commanders, and we had them reach out to
the employees to understand and help us develop the framework
as well. We wanted to make sure that we harnessed the ideas
from the field leadership.
Then we took the opportunity and had about a dozen peer
review, folks that were actually outside of the uniform, some
retired Border Patrol agents, in some cases who were just
outside of law enforcement, folks that we had, within the
staff, had worked with throughout our last few years. Certainly
respected their opinions, whether it was in the academic
environment or whether it was in some outside consulting. We
had them just take a look at it and give us their cold hits and
reactions to it, as well.
Certainly it was not done in a vacuum, and we really needed
broad perspective in order to put this together. I would also
add that part of the implementation plan is taking on that same
approach, sir.
Mr. Thompson. So, in this process, did you have any State
or local involvement in the preparation of this plan, or was it
strictly within CBP?
Chief Fisher. That I am not really sure, Congressman. If it
was done at the local level, that is probably where they would
have provided some of the drafts and feedback, whether it was
to the sheriffs for their input or the police departments. It
was not at my direction for them to do so because it was a
working draft and it really was the broad strategy.
I will tell you when we actually design the implementation
plan, clearly the State and locals are going to have to sit
down and understand what it means to implement this strategy
within their operational environment. So that certainly will be
done with a broader law enforcement eye, as well.
Mr. Thompson. Ms. Gambler, maybe we are a little premature,
but are we able to quantify the new strategy that is being put
forth at this point, or would that come a little later? We
talked about operational control, and there were some things we
could measure. Have we arrived at that point yet, or are we
still in the infancy of how we put that together?
Ms. Gambler. At this point, the Border Patrol has not
released performance goals and measures for assessing how
effective it will be at implementing its new strategic plan.
That is something that the Border Patrol will be focusing on
going forward and has efforts under way right now to develop
some new or additional measures.
I think you are raising an important point, which is that,
in the interim, the Border Patrol is using the number of
apprehensions on the Southwest Border as its primary
performance measure, which is being reported out in the
Department's annual performance report. As we have discussed,
that kind of measure has some useful information, in that it
provides insights into the activity levels of the Border
Patrol, how many apprehensions they are making.
But what is really important and really key going forward
is for the Border Patrol and the Department to move toward
outcome-oriented measures that would allow the Department, the
Congress, and the public to really get a sense of how effective
the Border Patrol's efforts are.
Mr. Thompson. So, chief, is that where you are headed?
Chief Fisher. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Thompson. Okay. Good.
Dr. Rosenblum, you have had an opportunity to look at each
one of the Department's efforts. Do you have some comments on
where we are at this point with this one?
Mr. Rosenblum. Well, yes. Thank you, Congressman.
I think just to echo a couple of points that were just made
and to respond to both of your questions, in terms of these
sort of outcome measures, I would just add that even as we
await the new Border Conditions Index, there are important data
sources that exist that we should be looking at, for example,
with the data that DHS already tracks through the IDENT
database.
In addition at looking at apprehensions, one of the things
that the report that Mr. Cuellar mentioned looks at is unique
apprehensions, and that allows us to look at recidivism rate
and reapprehension rate, which is something that Border Patrol
is looking at. Those offer a lot of insight beyond simply
apprehensions and allow us, you know, to say quite a bit more
about what we know about effectiveness and about illegal flows.
The CBP Office of Field Operations also does some tracking.
They do, sort of, a sample of people who are admitted and
wouldn't normally receive secondary inspection, they subject a
sample of them to secondary inspection. They can do an analysis
that way of how many people appear to be getting through and to
make an estimate of illegal migration through the ports.
So there are some important data sources out there that
aren't, sort of, systematically part of our conversation that
probably could be and should be.
So I think that, you know, certainly, when you compare over
time throughout DHS, they are collecting a lot more data and
putting us in a position to say a lot more than historically we
have been able to say about what is happening in different
sectors and at different border zones and through the ports.
So, you know, I am optimistic that they will continue to do a
better job of tracking that kind of information.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I yield back, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from South
Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I want to piggyback on something you said earlier, the need
to share. Dr. Rosenblum, you mentioned the IDENT and the
biometric ID system. How integrated is that with other
agencies?
Because we have heard some testimony about visa overstays,
and I have raised some questions about whether these agencies
are actually communicating about illegal entries or visa
overstays or people that the CBP sees there is a trend. So I am
concerned. The
9/11 Commission report identified that agencies weren't
talking. This is very, very important to me.
How integrated do you think that is?
Mr. Rosenblum. I mean, the agency people could give you an
answer to that question. My understanding is that, I mean, as
you know, IDENT is currently part--it is not part of CBP or
ICE; it is a separate office within DHS under the US-VISIT
system. There is a proposal to move it now into CPB and ICE.
My understanding is that, you know, all of the different
DHS agencies have access to, you know, the IDENT database
through US-VISIT and that there is extensive at least
information sharing between IDENT and agencies like DOD and
State. State, you know, taps into that in the visa issuance
process. But I am not sure I could give you an informed answer
about exactly how smooth that integration is.
Mr. Duncan. Well, I don't want to dwell on it.
Chief Fisher, I will just ask that your office contact my
office with just some information on how we are sharing some of
that, because it is sort of off on a tangent from what we are
talking about today.
The lady mentioned earlier, the GAO defines operational
control--``The extent of operational control was defined as the
number of border miles where Border Patrol had the ability to
detect, respond to, and interdict cross-border illegal
activity.'' That is a fairly-defined metric.
Then she goes on in her testimony to say, ``However, the
performance goals and measures that will be used to provide
oversight and accountability for the new strategic plan have
not yet been established.'' I think the gentleman from Laredo,
Texas, was kind of going down that--how do we define the
metrics?
So, in our meeting, Chief Fisher, where you said you wanted
to reframe operational control in this new strategy, can you
elaborate really how you will do that?
Chief Fisher. Yes, Congressman, I would be happy to.
I think your question was one of the things that we were
looking at 2 years ago. You know, certainly within the 2006
Secure Fence Act operational control was defined. We had a
tactical definition that the Border Patrol chiefs in the field
were using to be able to report. GAO has their definition.
Everybody had a different understanding of what operational
control was.
I will tell you, within the organization at the tactical
level, where these were Border Patrol chiefs that would report
every year all of those miles that we were, you know, chalking
up over the last few years, is that tactical definitions--let's
just take for ``controlled'' and ``managed.'' Each of the
tactical definitions start with the phrase, ``A border is
considered or a border zone will be considered controlled when
resources are at such a level that,'' and then it kind of
qualified basically what that border zone or the activity
levels or some of those other things that we would use.
Well, when you look at the definition, it was dependent,
solely dependent, on resources. So if you didn't have the
resources at either the controlled or managed level, because
both of those definitions started with that phrase, the Border
Patrol in the field was not going to increase effective
control, which, by definition, was either at the controlled or
managed level.
So what we wanted to be able to do in reframing that was to
have a better understanding about, it is not necessarily
dependent on resources as much as it is about the intelligence,
what are those threats in the border areas, and the
vulnerabilities, which were not equal across the board.
So instead of having the conversation about whether the
border is secure or not, to suggest somehow that that is an
either/or proposition, what my response would then be is, well,
what section of the border are you talking about? We can talk
about Zone 21 in Nogales, Arizona, and we can show you all the
information and intelligence that we have in that border zone.
We will show you what deployments we have, and we will then be
able to show you on a 24-hour cycle how many people came in
and, of that number, how many people did we apprehend? At the
broader end, we can talk at the campaign level, for instance,
our initiative in south Texas, for instance, the campaign. You
want to have an assessment about, well, what is the border
security status in south Texas?
To me, it has been more about a methodology, not
necessarily a metric. That is where, when I talk about
reframing operational control, that to be consistent with the
intent and the language within the 2006 Secure Fence Act, and
then talk about what it means to prevent all entries, at what
level and where do we start and where do we need to end for our
end-state.
Mr. Duncan. Well, I think the American people do want to
have a conversation about what level of the border is secure
and what we are doing. There has to be some measurable
parameter that I can talk to my constituents about the Southern
Border. You can hold your people accountable to a standard or
to an achievement.
I think there are three things that come to mind: You know,
arrests made at the border for people trying to cross
illegally; apprehensions in the homeland, interior, where we
have identified illegals that have made it through your web and
they are caught, apprehended by ICE maybe in another city. Then
I think a standard that we don't talk about is what is the
amount of drugs on the street. Because the illegal smuggling
activity that comes into this country, you know, we don't hear
that much. But we need to lessen the amount of drugs on the
street, and I think that is a parameter that we can use to
measure your performance by.
So, with that, Madam Chairwoman, I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Let me thank you
again for the field hearing in Laredo. It was very productive,
with Mr. Cuellar.
Chief, thank you for being here. Thanks for your service.
I always learn something new every time I go down there. We
note the task force, and they talked about in Nuevo Laredo the
cartel activity going on there between the Sinaloa and the Zeta
cartels--and this was last week--predicting that the violence
was going to go up, that it was going to spike. Sure enough,
last Friday, 23 individuals were killed in Nuevo Laredo, hung
over bridges, decapitated--just a reminder that the border is
not a safe place, that we do need to secure the border.
I think the thing that keeps me up the night the most would
be the idea of weapons-grade uranium being smuggled from a
place like Iran to Venezuela and then between a port of entry.
A dirty bomb in a major city--that, to me, is terrifying. Yet,
it is not farfetched. I think that is something that is very
foreseeable.
So operational control of the border is important. Last I
looked, it was 44 percent under operational control. You know,
we have this new strategy now that scraps operational control,
and now the GAO has come in to testify that this new strategy
does not have performance measures.
I guess I am a little confused. We are not talking about
operational control anymore, we are taking that off the table,
and now the new strategy has no performance measures at all.
How can we possibly measure whether the border is secure or
not?
Chief.
Chief Fisher. Yes, Congressman. We will have--we have
measures right now. In other words, we are not, again, going to
dismiss all of the measures or the metrics or the comparative
statistics that we have done within the organization. Those
continue. What we are trying to do is match those now with the
strategic objectives that are outlined in this particular
strategy.
The scenario that you outlined is one of the primary
factors in our rethinking about how we apply resources to the
border. In one instance in 2004, quite frankly, it was brute
force. We realized that we were getting more resources, both in
terms of Border Patrol agents, we were getting fence built, we
were getting technology. So the strategy really was get
everything forward. We wanted to stop the flows that were
coming in.
The scenario that you depict is very akin to being able to
identify a needle in the haystack, if you will. Now, in order
to extract the needle--and I will use this in terms of a
particular threat that you just mentioned--there are two
different general approaches that you can do to get that
needle. The first is having very specific intelligence,
information regarding the intent and capability of the
opposition, timing, to be able to surgically go into that
haystack and remove it. Well, over the last 10 years or so,
that really was not applicable in our border scenario. We were
not getting that level of intelligence to be able to extract it
that way. So the other approach that you can do to find the
needle is to reduce the haystack. So if you look at some of the
shifts in our approach between strategies, 2004 was built to be
able to reduce the haystack.
As we have done that, in terms of people coming across the
border, in terms of not just the apprehensions but the
individuals, those unique individuals that make up, our border
environment in which we operate has changed. So what we try to
do is now leverage and try to figure out, what is it going to
take? Of this new strategic approach, what, then, are those
metrics that are going to continue to carry over that we have
traditionally been reporting? In addition, what are new metrics
that we haven't been reporting that really talk to more about
the risk along our borders?
That is why when I said earlier it is more of a methodology
than a particular metric, we want to be able to come back to
the committee, either in an open or a closed hearing, to be
able to tell you about the information and the intelligence
that we are hearing either very tactically or in a broad sense,
talk about the capabilities that CBP has, to be able to show
you how we are assessing risk and how we are going to minimize
that risk at any given----
Mr. McCaul. I would very much like to get that briefing.
The one thing we learned also is that human smuggling at
the port of entry has gone way down. We saw 5,000 18-wheelers
go through the port of entry, and they said that they rarely
find humans now in the cargo. It is mostly drugs coming
through. So that means they are coming through the ports of
entry. While the apprehensions have gone way down, the
disturbing statistic is that the OTM rate has gone way up, the
``other than Mexicans.'' So between the port of entry is where
the scenario I outlined is probably most likely to happen.
I do think technology is going to be the solution to
getting that, you know, secure. Can you tell me where you are
with the latest advances in technology? What is your strategic
plan to deliver technology to the border?
Chief Fisher. Well, the strategic plan really talks about
optimizing capability. The first thing before we say, hey, we
need 10 more of these and 15 more of these, is to take a look
about what capability, what technology has been deployed over
the last few years. No. 1, are we utilizing it in the right
combination?
I will give you a quick example. If you take a look at
Arizona, we have everything from unattended ground sensors that
are implanted in the ground, we have mobile surveillance
systems, we have integrated fixed towers, we have light- and
medium-lift helicopters that are running forward-looking
infrared, and we have UASes that are running payloads. That
whole suite of capability is something that this organization
over the last few years is just trying to figure out: How do
you deploy that within the theater of operation? They are not
deployed equally because they all have different capabilities.
So we have to understand organizationally and within the
leadership how we maximize those capabilities, and then how we
shift and redeploy resources from areas that were once in areas
of high threat in terms of activity levels and redeploy those
to new areas where we have seen the displacement or new
emerging threats along our border.
Mr. McCaul. Well, thank you. You have an enormous
challenge, and I thank you for your service.
Chief Fisher. Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. With that, I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentlemen.
I certainly want to thank all of the witnesses for being
here today and your testimony.
We are going to close the subcommittee here, but I also
wanted to mention and follow up on something Mr. McCaul said
about operational control. I think there is a lot of
consternation on behalf of the subcommittee about moving away
from the term ``operational control.'' Again, as I say, I think
we are all totally open to using a new term or a new metric if
we can understand exactly what all of that is.
I had a bill that actually passed the subcommittee, the
full committee, and I am very, very optimistic it is going to
have floor action in front of the full House very shortly,
actually. That is the Secure Border Act of 2011. Essentially
what this requires is that the Secretary of Homeland Security
submit a comprehensive strategy to Congress within 180 days to
gain and maintain operational control of the border within 5
years.
We sort of anticipated, perhaps, the Department moving away
from the strategy of utilizing the term ``operational
control,'' so if you used any other standard--I see we have
another Member, so we will indulge her in her questioning. But
if we use any other term than ``operational control,'' the
Secretary is required to vet that standard through a National
laboratory that has prior expertise on border security, of
which there are about a half a dozen in the Nation.
Also, the Secretary would have to submit a measurement
system to the committee within 180 days that analyzes the
effectiveness of security at all of the land, air, and sea
ports of entry, as well--as Mr. McCaul was mentioning about the
ports of entry. Again, you would have to vet that through a
National laboratory with expertise in border security to
evaluate the port-of-entry measurement.
So I am looking forward to floor action on that particular
piece of legislation. I know many things pass the House and
never see the light of day in the Senate; however, I think with
this particular piece, we may have some success there as well.
Mr. Cuellar. Before you go to----
Mrs. Miller. Yes, the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. Cuellar. I would ask, to follow up on what you said,
because I think you are absolutely correct. Chief Fisher--and,
Ms. Gambler, I am sorry. You are at GAO. I apologize for that.
Thank you for the great work. I am a big supporter of GAO and
all the work that you did on GPRA. Appreciate it.
One of the things we did in Texas when we went through
performance measures and all that, we actually worked--the
agency would work with the members of the State legislature to
work out definitions, performance measures, and goals. I guess
Washington does things a little different, where you all go off
and do your own. It is not only you; it is the other agencies,
the Executive branch. It doesn't matter if it is Democrats or
Republicans.
But believe it or not, you have a lot of folks with
experience here that could help you on some of those
definitions, you know. We may not agree 100 percent, but any
way we can bounce that off. Because, you know, the ideas that
the Chairwoman had and some ideas that I have and some of the
other Members here, we could work with you. I know Washington
is done a little different, but on performance measures, on
objectives, goals, all that, we could help you. So, any way we
could help you, Chief Fisher, we would appreciate it,
especially from the GAO, because I know when we worked on GPRA,
you all were very, very, very helpful.
I apologize, I was giving credit to Dr. Rosenblum on that,
for your report, this report. Thank you for the work that you
have done.
Mrs. Miller. The Chairwoman recognizes for 5 minutes the
gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the committee for holding
this hearing, and let me thank all the witnesses. We are
marking up in another committee, and I am very pleased to have
the opportunity to raise some issues with you.
First, Chief Fisher, I just want to ask just a
straightforward question. Are you comfortable with the 2012
Strategy that you have put forward?
Chief Fisher. Yes, I am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What do you think is the most important
element of that strategy?
Chief Fisher. It is the focus of--there is a common theme
within that strategy that I certainly see, is identifying,
developing, and training future leaders of this organization.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you see in that 2012 Strategy an
undermining of the National security of the United States of
America?
Chief Fisher. I do not.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you see in that 2012 Strategy an
undermining of the securing of the Northern Border?
Chief Fisher. I do not.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Of the Southern Border?
Chief Fisher. No, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me indicate that I have, I think, been
somewhere affiliated with the Border Patrol, Customs and Border
Protection for the entire time of my career in Congress, first
on the Judiciary Committee and then subsequently as the
Homeland Security Committee was designed and my original
membership as this began to emerge. You came under that
umbrella.
I remember, after 2000, we worked very hard to secure night
goggles, lap computers, vehicles, and other necessities that we
thought were imperative for that intense work on the border of
capturing those entering illegally. Do you think you have
enough of those resources now? Are you able to maximize those
resources to deal with the present conditions of the Southern
Border in particular?
Chief Fisher. To your first part, no, we probably don't
have enough of those resources.
To the second part, I don't think that we are maximizing to
the extent that we need to all of those capabilities, which is
a common theme within our strategy now.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So, the strategy is going to utilize or to
improve on personnel. Is that correct?
Chief Fisher. It will, yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But, also, if we were to provide you with
resources, you would add to the equipment. Is that what I am
understanding?
Chief Fisher. That is correct, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But you believe you have the territorial
range to be able to do your job?
Chief Fisher. At this point--and that is part of the
implementation plan, where I am asking the field leaders to
assess what they have based on these new objectives. I think it
is important; I am glad you raised that point, Congresswoman.
Because I don't want to leave the impression nor in some of the
reports that I have seen that suggest that this strategy does
not require additional resources. It may. But what we are doing
now is taking a look at the resources that we do have. No. 1,
are we maximizing the capability of all of those resources? No.
2, do we have them in the right locations against the emerging
threats?
That is a process that we are looking at within the
implementation. It may be coming back to this committee say,
here is the gap--it may be in technology, it may be in other
resources--that we will continue to do as an evolution process
like any other strategy.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So we can expect a report forthcoming? As
you analyze, you will be reporting back to Congress?
Chief Fisher. Right, we will be--and we are in the phase
right now, have been for the last few months, we are
transitioning from the strategic----
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is fine.
Chief Fisher. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. The other thing that I will ask
is that the regional territory that you are working with now on
the border, that is the territory that you feel comfortable in
working in?
Chief Fisher. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right.
Let me just indicate that the chief has already said that
he has strengthened relationships with Federal, local, Tribal,
and international partners, which I think is good. That is part
of your strategy. I would hope, as we listen to the chief going
forward, that we be particularly sensitive on any attempt to
expand the area of control into Federal lands 100 miles in
without listening to the work of the Border Patrol, Customs and
Border Protection, and others that are dealing with this. I am
quite concerned that we not listen to the report that may be
forthcoming. I think the strategy is effective in its
collaborative efforts. I think it is effective in its
assessment efforts. I think it is important to do so.
I would ask the last question to Ms. Gambler. Are you
comfortable with the 2012 Strategy from the perspective of
assessment? Do you have any sense that there is a need to
expand the range into Federal lands for the Customs and Border
Protection and Border Patrol?
Ms. Gambler. I think your question is really getting at, in
part, how well the Border Patrol coordinates with other
agencies that have some border security responsibilities. We
have reported in the past that CBPM, the Department, and Border
Patrol have made progress in those coordinating mechanisms and
in partnerships but that there was a need for some additional
oversight, including additional oversight in how the Border
Patrol coordinates with agencies that do have some
responsibilities for border security on Federal lands.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just conclude, Madam Chairwoman--
thank you for the time--and just indicate that, at this point,
I would be quite concerned about any legislation suggestion
that is countering the strategic plan and asking Congress to
extend the jurisdiction of the Border Patrol hundreds of miles
inland and, particularly, suggesting that they be in the
Federal lands at this point without a complete strategic report
and analysis by DHS and the Border Patrol, Customs and Border
Protection of the United States.
Let me thank you very much, and I will yield back my time.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentlelady.
I certainly want to thank the witnesses for all their
testimony today. I think it has been a very informative
hearing. As has been said here I think by all of the Members,
we look forward to working with all of you, particularly you,
Chief, with the unbelievable mission that we have tasked your
agency with. We want to make sure that you do get the resources
and the training and the availability.
Again, we are operating under a very tight, constrained
budget environment here, but at the same time, border security
is something that the American people have made very clear they
have the political will to do so, and they are looking for the
Congress to do that as well.
So we appreciate all of you being here, and I appreciate
all of the Members' participation----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chairwoman?
Mrs. Miller [continuing]. Today.
The hearing record is going to be held open for 10 days if
there are any other questions from any other Members.
The gentlelady from Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would like to submit into the record an
article from the Houston Chronicle by Tony Freemantle regarding
border security.
Mrs. Miller. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
[The information follows:]
Some See Border Security Bill As Threat To Ecology, Preservation
By Tony Freemantle
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Big Bend National Park is one of the U.S. parks that could be affected
by a proposed law that would allow the Department of Homeland Security
to assume control of all Federal land within 100 miles of Mexico and
Canada. Photo: Tony Freemantle/HC.
HOUSTON AND TEXAS
Imagine sitting on a rock at Big Bend National Park gazing out over
the Rio Grande at the Santa Elena Canyon on a clear day, Mexico so
close you could reach out and touch it. Immemorial silence cloaks the
soaring cliffs, broken only by the caw of a raven above and the rustle
of the reeds in the river.
Then imagine the buzzy whine of a Customs and Border Protection
four-wheeler patrolling the sandy banks, or the growl of a grader
carving a road into the Chihuahuan Desert to a forward operating base,
or a Government helicopter bristling with surveillance equipment
hovering overhead.
Hard to imagine?
A bill making its way through Congress would, in the interests of
National security, bequeath to the Department of Homeland Security
complete control of all Federal lands in a coast-to-coast zone 100
miles south of the Canadian border and 100 miles north of the Mexican
border from California to the Gulf of Mexico.
The bill, sponsored by U.S. Rep. Rob Bishop of Utah with strong
Republican support, is being touted as a necessary step in securing the
Nation's borders. But it is also being roundly condemned as a thinly
veiled attempt to ``gut a century's worth'' of environmental laws aimed
at preserving public lands, historic sites, and National monuments.
In essence, the National Security and Federal Lands Protection Act
gives DHS, or more specifically U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
authority to build fences, roads, and operating bases, to use aircraft
and to install surveillance equipment and sensors in some of the most
pristine, environmentally sensitive lands in the Nation--including Big
Bend and Guadalupe National Parks and Padre Island National Seashore in
Texas.
And to clear the way for its stewardship of public lands, the
agency would be exempt from compliance with more than 30 environmental
laws--among them the National Environmental Protection Act, the
Endangered Species Act, the Clean Air Act, and the Safe Drinking Water
Act.
The bill has cleared committees in the House and is on the calendar
for a vote on the floor. There is not yet a companion bill in the
Senate.
``REALLY UNNECESSARY''
Bishop and the other sponsors, including Texas Rep. Lamar Smith,
argue that CBP's mandate to secure the Nation's borders is being
``thwarted'' by the need to consult with and obtain permission from
Federal land managers--chiefly the Department of the Interior and the
Department of Agriculture--before conducting operations.
``The nonpartisan Government Accountability Office has found that
less than half of the U.S.-Mexico border is under the operational
control of the Border Patrol,'' Smith said in a statement. ``At the
same time, the Obama Administration prevents the Border Patrol from
accessing Federal lands in the name of environmental preservation.
Because the Border Patrol is prohibited from securing Federal lands,
drug smugglers and human traffickers trample the earth and terrorize
communities.''
Opponents, including the Department of the Interior, CBP, and
National environmental organizations, charge that the proposed
legislation is an ``overreach,'' since a 2006 memorandum of
understanding between border security agencies and Federal land mangers
already establishes the framework for cooperation between them.
``This is a solution looking for a problem,'' said Dan Millis,
borderlands program coordinator for the Sierra Club. ``There is already
a framework in place for Border Patrol to work with public land
management. If Border Patrol doesn't even have to try to work with
managers, we will see a huge proliferation of roads, forward operating
bases and fences on public lands.''
The Coalition of National Parks Retirees is more blunt. The
legislation would ``gut a century's worth of land protection'' laws and
open up ``millions of pristine acres of National parks'' to unregulated
intrusion.
``It's a really, really unnecessary bill,'' said Joan Anzelmo, a
former superintendent of the Colorado National Monuments and board
member of the organization. ``It's an incredible assault on our
National parks.''
OTHER PARKS
In addition to Big Bend and Guadalupe parks in Texas, some of the
other Federal lands that fall within the 100-mile security zone, and
hence under control of DHS, include Saguaro National Park in Arizona,
Joshua Tree National Park in California, Olympic National Park in
Washington, Glacier National Park in Montana, Boundary Waters
Wilderness in Minnesota and Acadia National Park in Maine.
Bishop believes his bill will end a ``turf war'' between Border
Patrol and Federal land mangers who use environmental laws to block
efforts to secure the Nation's borders.
``What I want to do is get the Border Patrol what they need to
secure the border,'' Bishop said, ``and they tell me that what they
need more than money and people is access. There are enormous swaths of
public land that have effectively been ceded over to the drug
cartels.''
The DHS already has been granted waivers from a slew of
environmental laws in order to build the controversial ``fence'' along
certain sections of the U.S.-Mexico border, which environmentalists
charge has already cause significant damage to Organ Pipe Cactus
National Monument in Arizona and to the Lower Rio Grande Valley
National Wildlife Refuge in South Texas.
Giving control of all lands within 100 miles of the borders to a
single agency is unnecessary, they argue, and poses a significant
danger.
``This is worse than misguided policy, although it is certainly
misguided,'' said Kevin Dahl, the Arizona project manager for the
National Parks Conservation Association. ``It's a real danger to the
parks because it means that the people who have made a career of public
land management are not in control.''
Mrs. Miller. With that, the subcommittee will stand
adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:31 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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