[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THE DHS AND DOE NATIONAL LABS: FINDING EFFICIENCIES AND OPTIMIZING
OUTPUTS IN HOMELAND SECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY,
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 19, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-84
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] CONGRESS
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND SECURITY
TECHNOLOGIES
Daniel E. Lungren, California, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Tim Walberg, Michigan, Vice Chair Laura Richardson, California
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Billy Long, Missouri William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Coley C. O'Brien, Staff Director
Zachary D. Harris, Subcommittee Clerk
Chris Schepis, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies:
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
WITNESSES
Panel I
Dr. Daniel M. Gerstein, Deputy Under Secretary for Science and
Technology, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Dr. Huban A. Gowadia, Deputy Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Dr. Daniel Morgan, Specialist in Science and Technology Policy,
Resources, Sciences, and Industry Division, Congressional
Research Service:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Panel II
Ms. Jill M. Hruby, Vice President, International, Homeland and
Nuclear Security, Sandia National Laboratories:
Oral Statement................................................. 38
Prepared Statement............................................. 40
Dr. Michael R. Carter, Senior Scientist, National Ignition
Facility and Photon Science Directorate, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory:
Oral Statement................................................. 46
Prepared Statement............................................. 48
APPENDIX
Questions From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren for Daniel M. Gerstein. 61
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Daniel M.
Gerstein....................................................... 73
Questions From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren for Huban A. Gowadia... 80
Question From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren for Daniel Morgan....... 83
THE DHS AND DOE NATIONAL LABS: FINDING EFFICIENCIES AND OPTIMIZING
OUTPUTS IN HOMELAND SECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
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Thursday, April 19, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection,
and Security Technologies,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Daniel E. Lungren
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Lungren, Walberg, Long, Clarke,
and Richardson.
Mr. Lungren. The Committee on Homeland Security--the
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and
Security Technologies will come to order. The subcommittee is
meeting today to examine the National Labs of the Department of
Homeland Security and the Department of Energy; and the
homeland security research and development they produce.
I have been advised that we expect votes in 10 or 15
minutes, one short order of votes, and then we will come back.
Then we have votes 2 hours thereafter. So we will try and
proceed and get as much as we can get done before we have those
votes. I apologize for this but this is the last day of the
week that we are in session, so they allow votes before noon.
With the permission of the Minority, we are going to start.
When the Ranking Member arrives, I will recognize her for her
opening statement.
First of all, I want to thank you for being here. I think
this is an important issue because as much as anything else, we
are going to stay on the cutting edge in the areas of
responsibility for the Department of Homeland Security if we,
in fact, maintain our technological edge. We have tremendous
resources with the Department. We have tremendous resources
specifically with the National Labs. The question is: Are we
doing the best job to ensure that we get the best bang for the
buck?
The No. 1 stated goal of the DHS Science and Technology
Director is to, ``deliver knowledge, analyses, and innovative
solutions that advance the security mission of the
Department.'' The Homeland Security Act of 2002 included the
necessary statutory authorization for DHS to work with these
labs in support of homeland security needs. It also established
a special relationship allowing DHS to use the DOE Lab system
on an equal basis. In addition, the DHS Office of National
Laboratories coordinates with DOE to meet mission goals and
avoid duplication.
As I said before, these labs are wonderful resources which
deliver critical homeland security capabilities. DHS Labs--like
Plum Island--have provided crucial advances in Foot-and-Mouth
Disease vaccine to protect our agricultural infrastructure.
Plum Island, because its isolated environment offers unique
safety features for this type of contagious science work.
The Chemical Security and Analysis Center is another DHS
Lab in Aberdeen, Maryland, which studies hazardous chemical
release scenarios and how they impact our emergency response
protocols. Our DOE Labs, some dating back to World War II and
the start of the nuclear age, have been indispensible partners
in our National security efforts. DOE and DHS Labs across the
country bring together the best scientists to push the limits
of research and bio-detection, cutting-edge nuclear detection
capabilities for our ports and characterize the explosive
threats in our aviation environment.
Because the labs are such a significant piece of the
Department's research and development efforts, we must ensure
that they will be used efficiently and in-line with
Congressional intent. The lab operations, along with S&T
program costs, total hundreds of millions of dollars annually.
Because of these substantial investments, our subcommittee has
a responsibility to closely scrutinize the operations.
Are the labs costs reasonable? Are there cost savings to be
found? Is DHS prioritizing National Lab work appropriately?
Does DHS view the labs as a short-term contract or long-term,
strategic partner? Is existing laboratory capacity sufficient
to meet our needs or is more infrastructure justified? The last
question is of particular importance with regard to the
proposed National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility.
It is my hope that oversight from this subcommittee will
encourage S&T to work more efficiently with its shrinking
budget in support of its homeland security mission. I look
forward to the testimony from our witnesses today. Look, our
Governmental system was born out of a skepticism of Government
and, frankly, I think that is good. But if skepticism turns to
cynicism, we are in bad shape. We have to wrestle, as you do,
with these budget constraints that we have.
We have an obligation not only to make those tough
decisions, but to make those decisions explainable and
understandable to our constituents so they, in fact, would
support those programs that are necessary. That is part of our
inquiry here today. So we very much appreciate your being here.
Again, I apologize that we will have interruptions for votes.
As soon as the Ranking Member gets here, I will recognize her
for opening statement.
[The statement of Chairman Lungren follows:]
Statement of Chairman Daniel E. Lungren
April 19, 2012
We meet today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's use
of the Nation's extensive National Laboratory infrastructure. This
infrastructure is a valuable asset supporting our homeland security
mission with innovative R&D technology products to secure the homeland.
The No. 1 stated goal of the DHS Science and Technology Directorate
is to ``deliver knowledge, analyses, and innovative solutions that
advance the security mission of the Department.'' The Homeland Security
Act of 2002 included the necessary statutory authorization for DHS to
work with these laboratories in support of Homeland Security needs. It
also established a special relationship allowing DHS to use the DOE Lab
system on an equal basis. Finally DHS, through the Office of National
Laboratories coordinates with DOE to meet mission goals and avoid
duplication.
These labs are wonderful resources which deliver critical homeland
security capabilities. DHS Labs like Plum Island have provided crucial
advances in foot-and-mouth disease vaccine to protect our agricultural
infrastructure. This work can only be done at Plum Island. The Chemical
Security and Analysis Center is another DHS Lab in Aberdeen, MD which
studies hazardous chemical release scenarios and how that impacts our
emergency response protocols.
Our DOE Laboratories, some dating back to World War II and the
start of the nuclear age, have been indispensable partners in our
National security efforts. DOE Labs across the country bring together
the best scientists to push the limits on biodetection, develop
cutting-edge nuclear detection capabilities for our ports, and
characterize the explosive threats in our aviation environment.
Because the labs are such a significant piece of the Department's
research and development efforts, we must ensure that they are being
used efficiently and in line with Congressional intent. Hundreds of
millions of dollars are being spent on our labs annually ($600 million
estimated).
Because of these substantial investments, we must carry-out
rigorous oversight. Are these costs reasonable? Are there cost savings
to be found? Is DHS prioritizing National Lab work appropriately? Does
DHS view the labs as a short-term contractor or as a long-term
strategic partner? Is existing laboratory capacity sufficient to meet
our needs, or is more infrastructure justified? This last question is
of particular importance with regard to the proposed National Bio- and
Agro-Defense Facility.
It is my hope that oversight from this subcommittee will encourage
S&T to work more efficiently with its shrinking budget, to support the
homeland security mission.
I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses today from the
Science and Technology Directorate and our Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office, the primary customers of these labs. We also welcome two
current DOE Lab employees and the Congressional Research Service for
their perspective on these questions.
Mr. Lungren. I would like to introduce our witnesses here.
Dr. Gerstein is the Deputy Under Secretary for Science and
Technology at Department of Homeland Security. Before joining
DHS, he served as principal director of countering weapons of
mass destruction within the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
For policy, he served on four different continents,
participating in homeland security and counter-terrorism
peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance and combat, in addition
to serving for over a decade in the Pentagon, various high-
staff assignments.
Following return from active duty, Dr. Gerstein joined L-3
Communications as vice president for homeland security
services, a league and organization providing WMD preparedness
and response, critical infrastructure, security, emergency
response capacity genuine, and exercised support to U.S. and
international customers. That is just a portion of his resume.
We appreciate what you have done and we thank you for the
service now.
Dr. Gowadia.
Ms. Gowadia. Gowadia.
Mr. Lungren. Gowadia, excuse me.
Dr. Gowadia is the Deputy Director of Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office at the Department of Homeland Security. Prior
to this assignment, she served as assistant director of DNDO's
Mission Management Director, where she was responsible for
ensuring an effective link between user requirement,
operational support, technology development across nuclear
detection architecture.
Dr. Gowadia was appointed to the Senior Executive Service
2006, to serve as DNDO's first assistant director of
assessments, previously served as program executive for DHS'
Science and Tech Countermeasures test beds. Again, an
impressive resume and we appreciate your service.
Dr. Daniel Morgan, a Specialist in Science and Technology
Policy in the Resources, Sciences, and Industry Division at
Congressional Research Service. I might just throw in that I
think Congressional Research Service is an indispensable arm of
the Congress and one that doesn't get a whole lot of attention
but we thank you for your expertise and allowing us, sort of, a
third-party review of things when we take a look at that.
Dr. Morgan specialized in Research and Development programs
at the Department of Homeland Security, Department of Energy,
and NASA. He has a Ph.D. in Physics from University of Texas at
Austin and B.S. in Physics and Math from MIT. Previously a
study director at National Academy of Sciences.
We thank all of you. We would ask you to attempt to
summarize your statements in 5 minutes. We have your written
statements; they will be made a part of the record in their
totality. We would ask you to speak in the order in which I
introduced you.
Other Members are reminded that statements may also be
submitted for the record.
[The statements of Ranking Member Clarke and Ranking Member
Thompson follow:]
Statement of Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke
April 19, 2012
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing on the National
Laboratories and how the Department can best utilize these valuable
resources to accomplish our homeland security goals.
Mr. Chairman, I too, want to welcome our witnesses today, some have
traveled from the great State of California, and we appreciate their
participation. I also want to welcome Deputy Under Secretary Gerstein
to the subcommittee. He is relatively new to his position, obviously
well qualified, and since arriving has provided enthusiastic and
knowledgeable leadership efforts to S&T. During his short time on the
job, he has proven to be a valuable asset to Under Secretary O'Toole. I
am looking forward to his testimony today.
The Department, and S&T in particular, supports a broad range of
scientific and engineering research and development. Its purposes are
wide-ranging and address specific concerns such as chemical security,
biodefense, transportation security, and nuclear detection.
An important segment of the Department's laboratory's effort is
that it fosters the development of our country's scientific,
engineering, and technical workforce, which influences students at our
universities and even high schools. When teachers and students can see
that there is interesting and substantial work to be done in the
sciences at our laboratories, they show an incredible amount of
interest in striving to work there. Important things go on in our
laboratories, and they are seen as good and significant places to work.
Our scientists, researchers, engineers, and technicians work hard
to deliver solutions grounded in science and supported by innovative
engineering, and this strengthens U.S. innovation and competitiveness
in the global economy.
This committee has a long-standing interest in the strength of the
Department's research and development enterprise and in providing
support for its R&D activities.
We must anticipate the needs of our laboratories and the DOE Labs,
and provide the best support and oversight that can help provide
solutions to our toughest scientific, technical, and programmatic
challenges.
However, recent and projected budget cuts passed by the Majority
are driving difficult decisions such as the prioritization, and
sometimes the elimination, of R&D projects. This is causing stress
among competing priorities within the Department's S&T Directorate and
its R&D portfolio.
Congress will play a central role in defining the Nation's R&D
priorities as it makes decisions with respect to the size and
distribution of homeland security R&D funding.
We have expressed our serious concerns about the drastic decreases
voted on by this Congress, and passed by the Majority, in the level of
Federal funding for homeland security R&D funding. As the fiscal year
2013 appropriations process moves forward, it faces two overarching
issues: The extent to which the Federal R&D investment can grow, and
what little R&D funding available will be prioritized and allocated.
The Department and particular, the S&T Directorate, will need to
justify and make transparent its R&D investments.
President Obama's science advisor, John Holdren, and others--have
raised concerns about the potential harm of a ``boom-bust'' approach to
Federal R&D funding as seen in past, like rapid growth followed by much
slower growth, flat funding, or even decline.
Critics assert that there has been a variety of damages from this
boom-bust cycle, including interruptions and cancellations of needed
research projects, decreased student interest in pursuing graduate
studies, and reduced employment prospects for the large number of
researchers with advanced degrees.
More broadly, in a 2009 speech before members of the National
Academy of Sciences, President Obama put forth a goal of increasing the
National investment in R&D to more than 3% of the U.S. gross domestic
product (GDP). But, as they say, the devil is in the details, and the
details are what we are to hear about today.
This subcommittee and full committee have been real supporters of
the Department's R&D and National Labs, but we need a better, clearer
understanding of how things have gotten better, how management
oversight of R&D projects has increased, and what is the path forward
as we look toward the drastic funding cuts coming out of this Congress.
Mr. Chairman I yield back.
______
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
April 19, 2012
Thank you for holding this hearing to review the Department of
Homeland Security's involvement with the National Laboratories.
When the Department was created, the use of laboratories by DHS was
one of the first questions posed.
We all understood that the labs could serve as important incubators
for products and technologies that would enhance this Nation's
security.
We all understood that some of these efforts may be expensive to
undertake and have very low profit margins--making them unattractive to
the private sector.
Yet, we all believed that research and development could yield new
tools to fight terrorism.
At that time, we agreed about the importance of research and
development. We decided to permit DHS unprecedented access to labs
owned by the Department of Energy.
The Office of National Laboratories within S&T was created to
coordinate research and development efforts within DHS Labs and DOE
Labs.
Regardless of the location, the goal of the research would be the
same--to support the homeland security mission.
The alignment of DHS Labs within the mission programs of the S&T
Directorate has been changed over the years.
This committee needs to understand how these reorganization efforts
improve the ability of DHS' Office of National Labs to coordinate and
oversee research and development projects that improve this Nation's
security.
Additionally, because research and development is often a long and
expensive process, this committee needs to understand how the current
climate of fiscal austerity will impact the work of these labs.
In a previous hearing, we were told that budget cuts would severely
hamper on-going research projects and may cause new research to come to
a standstill.
Given the budgetary decisions made by my colleagues on the other
side of the aisle, it is extremely important that Members of this
committee have a clear understanding of the Department's research and
development strategy.
While we certainly should know about the role of the Office of
National Labs, our focus must be broader.
We must have an in-depth understanding of the strategy and
rationale that determines how homeland security research and
development funds are allocated--both in the Government labs and in the
private sector.
Thank you and I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. So, Dr. Gerstein.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL M. GERSTEIN, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Gerstein. Well, thank you, Chairman Lungren.
Well, good morning to everyone. Good morning, Chairman
Lungren, distinguished Members of the committee. It is a great
privilege to testify here today on this very important National
security topic, our laboratories.
I would begin my remarks by putting our laboratories in
context. In the 1930s and 1940s, the U.S. National Laboratories
ushered in the Nuclear Age. In a monumental effort, nuclear
weapons--engineers and scientists developed the nuclear weapons
that saw the end of the Cold War, served as a deterrent during
the Cold War stand-off, and continue to provide deterrents
today.
These facilities have redirected their work and combined
with other National and international laboratories, including
our own DHS Labs, to provide technology solutions for the major
threats and challenges we face today as a Nation. From threats
in cyberspace to home-made explosives to bio-defense, this
network of labs leverages science and technology for the
benefit of the Nation.
In the DHS Science and Technology Directorate, our vision
is to support the Homeland Security enterprise by being
operationally focused, developing innovative solutions, and
building partnerships. I want to use this framework to discuss
the importance of the DHS S&T internal labs, as well as our
vital collaborations with international, interagency, and
university lab partners.
First, operational focus. All of the labs that S&T operates
have strong customer alignment. They seek to identify
technology options and knowledge products that improve the
effectiveness, efficiency, and safety of the entire homeland
security enterprise. For example, our National Urban S&T
Laboratory, NUSTL, located in Manhattan, is working with New
York City on the Securing the Cities initiative, in
coordination with DNDO, to provide a robust detection and
interdiction capability against radiological threats.
Our National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
Center, NBACC, and the Chemical Security Analysis Center, CSAC,
both conduct science-based threat characterization studies that
are used by first responders, local communities, the
Department, and across the interagency for preparedness and
response planning.
Next is innovation; the seed corn of our future. At Plum
Island Animal Disease Center, we are developing an innovative,
recombinant Foot-and-Mouth Disease vaccine. That is a
breakthrough capability, affecting our $1 trillion per year
agricultural industry in the United States. Collaboration
between one of our DHS Centers of Excellence at Texas A&M, the
U.S. Department of Agriculture, and DHS is moving the vaccine
toward licensure, after which a commercial company will sell
it. Truly a great story.
By its very design, NBACC is an innovative National
security asset. Born out of the 2001 Amerithrax attacks, the
laboratory is developing forensics and threat characterization
capabilities that were not even contemplated at the time of the
attacks.
Finally, building partnerships. As a matter of the highest
priority, we partner with DHS components, the interagency
international partners, and academia. We are collaborating
across a wide variety of critical mission areas. An example of
this work is the recent Recovery Transformer Project, RecX,
worked with Idaho National Labs, which demonstrated the ability
to dramatically reduce down-time in the event of a large-scale
power outage.
I would be remiss if I did not discuss several important
issues with regard to our labs. First is governance and
sharing. We are working to encourage partnerships so that we
can better collaborate across the entire laboratory enterprise.
In these fiscally constrained times, this is both necessary and
the responsible thing to do.
Second, the fiscal environment is stressing the balance
between infrastructure and R&D. We cannot have one without the
other. The example is the National Bio- and Agro-Defense
Facility, NBAF, that is intended to replace, modernize, and
enhance the mission of the current Plum Island facility. Due to
fiscal constraints, we are evaluating the affordability of
building this facility; however, we must be careful not to
mortgage our future in times of austerity and postpone the
innovative solutions our Nation needs.
Finally, I would like to share with you some strategies
that we are using to achieve this long-term vision. A Mission
Executive Council, or MEC, is composed of the Department of
Defense, Homeland Security, Department of Energy and the
intelligence community and it now meets regularly to discuss
strategic planning for the utilization of the DOE Labs.
S&T's internal portfolio review process has been allowing
us to make informed, strategic decisions about how best to use
the scarce resources that are at our disposal. We will continue
to use this process in addition to implementing a systems
approach for all of our S&T programs. Recently we have also
held the first-ever consolidated laboratory review. All of our
internal labs reported out on their on-going efforts and we
began a strategic planning process that included discussion of
common strategies, best practices, and cost-saving measures. We
will continue to hold these meetings quarterly to improve our
lab governance.
In summary, let me state unequivocally that our S&T Labs
and those of our partners are National assets. Just as our
laboratories ushered in the Nuclear Era, we look forward to our
network of laboratories identifying new and innovative ideas
and capabilities. With this network as a foundation, we firmly
believe that achieving our value-added proposition of
operational focus, innovation, and building partnerships is
well within reach.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear here
today. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstein follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daniel M. Gerstein
April 19, 2012
introduction
Good morning Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and
distinguished Members of the committee. I thank you for this
opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T). My testimony
today will describe the critical role of the laboratories--both DHS S&T
Laboratories and the external laboratories including those from within
the interagency, universities, and international partners--in
supporting the missions of DHS as well as providing technology and
knowledge solutions for a variety of interagency partners.
In the 1930s and 1940s, the U.S. National Laboratories ushered in
the Nuclear Age. In a monumental effort, scientists and engineers
developed nuclear weapons that led to the end of World War II, served
as a deterrent during the Cold War stand-off, and continue to provide
deterrence today. The threats we faced were different, but the
laboratories that helped the United States prevail in the past remain
integral to our Nation's security. These facilities have redirected
their work and joined with other National and international
laboratories to provide technology solutions for the major threats and
challenges we face as a Nation today. From threats in cyberspace to
home-made explosives to biological agents, the network of interagency
\1\ laboratories leverages American science and technology expertise
for the benefit and protection of the Nation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The term ``interagency laboratories'' is intended as an
umbrella term to reflect both the DOE-owned National Laboratories and
the laboratories owned by other Federal agencies such as DHS and DoD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The interagency laboratories provide invaluable capabilities that
are unmatched in their relationship with the decision-maker and end-
user. These capabilities are essential to the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE) and our Nation's
Research and Development (R&D) enterprise. In the current budget
environment, there will be a temptation to fund near-term priorities
while sacrificing the future. In my judgment, this would be a mistake.
On a daily basis, the technologies and knowledge products developed by
our laboratories are helping the DHS and law enforcement operators
perform their jobs more efficiently, effectively, and safely. Many of
these technologies and knowledge products require long-term investments
to come to fruition.
dhs s&t value-added proposition for supporting the homeland security
enterprise
The mission of DHS Science and Technology Directorate is to
strengthen America's security and resiliency by providing knowledge
products and innovative technology solutions for the Homeland Security
Enterprise. Accomplishing this mission requires a robust and vibrant
system of laboratories.
Established under the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (HSA), under
section 302 of the HSA, the Secretary, acting through the Under
Secretary for Science and Technology, is responsible for, among other
things, ``conducting basic and applied research, development,
demonstration, testing, and evaluation activities that are relevant to
any or all elements of the Department . . . ''\2\ However, the reach of
DHS S&T extends well beyond the operational components of the
Department. The S&T Directorate works closely with our partners at all
levels of the Homeland Security Enterprise, including first responders,
State, Tribal, territorial, and local governments, and private
industry.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ 6 U.S.C. 182(4)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To meet the diverse needs of the Homeland Security Enterprise, DHS
S&T pursues a strategy which is operationally focused, highly
innovative, and founded on building partnerships between operators and
scientists and engineers across the dynamic R&D landscape. To this end,
S&T provides the HSE with strategic and focused technology options and
operational process enhancements. S&T provides the technical depth and
reach to discover, adapt, and leverage technology solutions developed
by Federal agencies and laboratories, State, local, and Tribal
governments, universities, and the private sector--across the United
States and internationally.
gaining operational capacity and innovation through our laboratories
In the pursuit of high-impact technologies and knowledge products
for the Homeland Security Enterprise, the S&T Office of National
Laboratories (ONL) oversees and manages S&T's laboratory operations,
infrastructure, and construction to support research, testing, and
evaluation, and technology development needs. These laboratories
provide specialized technical expertise and world-class research
facilities to DHS and other partners. Together, S&T's five facilities
support a diverse portfolio of capabilities to serve the Homeland
Security Enterprise.
Built specifically for DHS, the National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasures Center (NBACC) is a one-of-a-kind facility dedicated to
defending the Nation against biological threats. Located in Frederick,
Maryland, this 160,000-square-foot facility is a critical resource for
understanding the risks posed by malicious use of biological agents.
The capabilities contained in this facility did not exist prior to the
Amerithrax attacks in 2001. NBACC consists of two centers. The National
Bioforensic Analysis Center (NBFAC) conducts technical forensic
analyses in support of attribution investigations. As a partner with
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the NBFAC is available to support
operations 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The National Biological
Threat Characterization Center (NBTCC) conducts experiments and studies
to better understand the risks, vulnerabilities, and hazards from
current and emerging biological agents. Together, they possess a
variety of scientific capabilities including genomics, aerobiology,
bacteriology, virology, toxicology, and bioforensic studies. NBACC was
recently awarded accreditation as a Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4) facility,
making it one of six such facilities in the United States. As a true
interagency facility, NBACC brings DHS, law enforcement, defense, and
intelligence community partners together to better defend against high-
priority biological threats.
The Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC), built in 1954, has
served the front line of the Nation's defense against diseases that
could devastate markets for livestock, meat, and other animal products.
Located off the tip of Long Island, the mission of PIADC crosses three
areas: Animal disease diagnostics, research and development, and
education. With the U.S. Department of Agriculture and DHS staff, PIADC
is capable of diagnosing Foreign Animal Diseases (such as Foot-and-
Mouth Disease) and is working to develop countermeasures to such
diseases. As a BSL-3 facility, its research programs include developing
new diagnostic tools and preventatives (such as vaccines and
antivirals) for Foot-and-Mouth Disease and other Foreign Animal
Diseases. Since 1971, it has provided training to veterinarians on how
to recognize Foreign Animal Diseases. Facility upgrades to this aging
facility are underway to allow the laboratory to meet on-going mission
requirements in foreign animal disease research. One major recent
accomplishment includes the completed field-testing of the first
licensed Foot-and-Mouth Disease vaccine, which could be manufactured in
the United States.
The Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL) protects our Nation's
transportation systems through research, development, testing and
validation of explosives technology detection systems. A key partner to
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and based outside
Atlantic City, NJ, testing at TSL helps S&T develop products related to
explosive detection on persons and in checked baggage and small
parcels, containerized cargo inspection, conveyance protection, and
infrastructure protection. The laboratory has a long history of
success, garnering international recognition for its role in the
development of standards, protocols, and test articles necessary for
detection technology assessments. One such success was the Explosive
Effects and Survivability Group's (EESG) rigorous testing of the
Hardened Unit Load Device, a blast-resistant aircraft cargo container.
The National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL) serves as
a Federal technical resource and authority to State and Local First
Responders and promotes the successful development and integration of
homeland security technologies into operational end-user environments.
Located in New York, NY, this unique laboratory provides a testing,
evaluation, and assessment test bed in a true urban environment. NUSTL
supports the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's (DNDO) Securing the
Cities (STC) initiative, which seeks to design and implement
architecture for coordinated and integrated detection, and interdiction
of illicit radiological materials. In this pursuit, NUSTL uniquely
supports local responders agencies' training and exercise events,
adding to the overall goal of building self-sufficiency among the
partners. In fiscal year 2011, NUSTL supported DNDO training of almost
1,000 students in 24 Preventive Radiological and Nuclear Detection
(PRND) classes. In addition to training support, NUSTL has tested over
6,000 radiation detectors for STC partners and other emergency
responders, ensuring that each of these detectors works as specified.
Between NUSTL's training support, technology testing, and the
development of capabilities such as the Radiological Emergency
Management System (REMS), the NUSTL Lab is working to build a first-
response capability in New York City which is uniquely capable of
preventing and responding to radiological events and could serve as a
model for other large cities. Staff at NUSTL also develop low-cost
detection technologies such as the ``thin profile dosimeter,'' for
which DHS was granted a patent.
The Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC) provides a scientific
basis for the awareness of chemical threats and the attribution of
their use. Based in Edgewood, MD, CSAC draws upon expertise in chemical
defense, chemical agents, and toxic industrial chemicals. The Center
analyzes chemical threat characterization data, including toxic
industrial chemicals and chemical warfare agents, and integrates
science-based risk assessments using physical, chemical, and
toxicological information that is widely used. In an emergency, CSAC
can support other agencies and organizations with expert analysis. For
example, with the recent ``Jack Rabbit'' project, CSAC scientists
gathered scientifically validated data on an accidental release of
toxic inhalation hazards for chemical release models, shelter-in-place
guidance, hazard assessment at rail transit and chemical storage
facilities, and improved planning, response, and mitigation strategies.
A potential replacement for the aging PIADC is the National Bio-
and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF), which is currently awaiting
construction in Manhattan, Kansas. Authorized for construction under
the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2009 (Pub. L.
110-329, Div. D. Sec. 540), NBAF was expected to be fully offset by the
proceeds from the sale of Plum Island. Since then, the financial
landscape has changed significantly. Today, we face the overall funding
constraints of the Budget Control Act of 2011 (Pub. L. 112-25), which
are impacting both the Department and S&T's budgets. Additionally, due
to the current economic climate, the sale of Plum Island is not likely
to provide adequate funds in the foreseeable future requiring
appropriated funds for construction, and estimated construction costs
for NBAF have increased by more than 30 percent as a result of
construction delays and additional safety engineering requirements. At
the same time, Congressional appropriations have not kept pace with the
costs to build the facility expeditiously.\3\ Given these fiscal
challenges while considering the evolving security threats to U.S.
agriculture, we have asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to
convene an expert committee, in conjunction with the interagency, to
conduct a scientific assessment of the requirements for a large-animal
foreign and emerging diseases research and diagnostic laboratory in the
United States.
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\3\ In fiscal year 2012, Congress appropriated $50 million of the
$150 million the administration requested for NBAF.
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While there is no current large animal Biosafety Level 4 (BSL-4)
facility like NBAF operating in the United States, the challenge of
building NBAF highlights the dilemma faced by all Federal Government
research and development (R&D) organizations as they balance funding
priorities for infrastructure and for research in a constrained budget
environment. Effective innovation is the core of the U.S. economy and
U.S. National security; it requires investment in both facilities and
research and development (R&D). The United States must robustly fund
both of these activities in order to maintain the capability needed to
respond to the diverse threats against which the DHS is charged to
protect the United States.
To maximize the effectiveness of our labs, DHS S&T has been working
diligently to bring these diverse facilities together to develop a
shared sense of purpose for this critical mission; this will ensure a
higher degree of focus and customer alignment. In January, leadership
from each of the labs came together for the first time to discuss
development of a corporate vision for the S&T Laboratories. We have
already seen important results from this meeting in just the few months
since. For example, although the communities they serve are largely
different, NUSTL and CSAC Labs have found common interest in testing
chemical detectors in a first responder environment. We are currently
developing a corporate vision for our labs which includes fostering
common best practices. These kinds of collaborative relationships are
now explicitly part of the S&T focus, and we will continue to provide
opportunities and oversight to encourage superior collaboration.
building key partnerships outside dhs s&t
Building upon our significant internal laboratory capabilities, we
have developed a network of external partners which includes DOE and
other interagency, university (through our DHS Centers of Excellence
(COE) program) and international laboratories which provide necessary
collaboration and important economies in these lean fiscal times. They
also serve as a foundation for achieving our value-added proposition.
Department of Energy (DOE) Laboratory Partnerships
The DOE National Laboratories play a critical role in assisting S&T
in providing innovative science-based solutions to complex homeland
security problems. S&T selects the best performer-based technology
projects relying on a variety of factors, including the type of project
deliverable (e.g. prototype, knowledge product, or demonstration),
technical area of expertise, and cost.
The DOE National Laboratories are particularly well-suited to
provide multi-disciplinary research and development capabilities to
solve complex National security problems. The National Labs possess a
legacy of excellence in scientific discovery, including 48 Nobel Prize
winners since 1977 and over 800 R&D 100 awards. The world-class
facilities that make up the National Labs allow for multi-disciplinary
research, including leading-edge work with: Advanced scientific
computing research, material sciences, basic energy sciences,
biological and environmental research, high-energy physics, and nuclear
physics. Certain labs possess unique facilities and infrastructure that
are not found in the private sector. These capabilities include super-
computing for biodefense activities and testing for certain
characteristics of home-made explosives.
The focused work of the DHS-DOE National Laboratory network has
introduced significant technology innovations and knowledge products
for the Homeland Security Enterprise. For example, innovations from
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Sandia National
Laboratory (SNL) are spearheading explosives trace detection systems
used to more rapidly screen passengers and cargo at airports. Advances
in the development of a resilient electric grid are being performed
with the collaboration of Oak Ridge National Lab (ORNL), Argonne
National Lab (ANL), and Pacific Northwest National Lab (PNNL). The
recent, highly successful deployment and demonstration of the Recovery
Transformer Project (RecX) stands to dramatically reduce downtime in
the event of a large-scale power outage; a highly valuable technology
tool developed by Idaho National Lab (INL). These technologies and many
other innovations from our National Labs are helping the Homeland
Security Enterprise become more resilient, efficient, and effective in
executing the DHS missions.
Since joining DHS S&T in August 2011, I have been meeting with our
partners at the DOE National Labs. At a recent trip to Sandia National
Laboratory, I saw a demonstration of their capabilities with home-made
explosives mitigation, cybersecurity, cutting-edge biological agent
characterization, and many others. I have also met with Pacific
Northwest National Lab, Lawrence Livermore National Lab, and Oak Ridge
National Lab to hear about the work they are doing on behalf of DHS and
to discuss further collaborations. I am preparing to attend
demonstrations at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and also at DOD's MIT
Lincoln Laboratory this year. These visits are not just for information
sharing and interagency discussion. Visits like this help S&T
leadership make informed decisions about where our investments are able
to ensure the biggest impact and the most effective transition to the
field.
Other Laboratory Partnerships
No discussion of research and development laboratories would be
complete without a mention of the other laboratories that support the
HSE. DHS also relies on collaboration and support from laboratories
across the interagency, such as those within the Department of Defense
(e.g. laboratories within the Services) and National Institutes of
Standards and Technology (NIST) within the Department of Commerce.
Recent meetings with the Army's Picatinny Arsenal in New Jersey have
focused on the development of a software interface that will allow the
current families of command-and-control software to communicate between
State and local fusion centers, first responders, and the military
support to civil authorities components to more readily share critical
information in times of disaster.
The S&T Centers of Excellence (COE) also provide the Department
direct and important access to laboratories within academia. The S&T
Office of University Programs (OUP) coordinates these valuable
partnerships with laboratories across the Nation. These diverse Centers
of Excellence provide access to cutting-edge capabilities in such areas
as cybersecurity, biodefense, and disaster mitigation to name a few.
Recent efforts have provided important operational capacity as well as
highly innovative solutions that have had an immediate impact. Examples
include the Coastal Wave Surge Model from the Coastal Hazards Center at
Jackson State University and UNC-Chapel Hill. Recently, this COE
allowed the U.S. Coast Guard to track the likely storm surge and wave
impact of Hurricane Irene and quickly share those data with operational
partners.
A final sector of laboratory collaboration extends beyond the
borders of the United States. Leveraging the expertise and capabilities
of our international partners allows us to not only jointly shoulder
the financial burden but also benefit from the unique perspective of
our allies. For example, DHS S&T is pursuing agreements with the
governments of Canada and Australia to collaborate on work with
agricultural biodefense. These agreements not only improve information
sharing and the exchange of best practices, they provide a minimum
response mechanism as the United States develops its own BSL-4
agriculture capability. In addition to biodefense, DHS S&T engages
internationally on diverse priority areas facing the Homeland Security
Enterprise.
supporting the laboratories and bringing value to the homeland security
enterprise (hse)
Funding research at our various laboratory partners while managing
the S&T internal laboratories represents a significant investment from
DHS. The direct reimbursement from S&T to our external lab partners and
the maintenance, operation, and research costs of our internal labs was
$241.6 million ($100 million for S&T Lab operations, $38 million for
research and, $103.6 million for DOE) in fiscal year 2011. Under the
Department's fiscal year 2012 appropriation, the S&T R&D budget was cut
by 56 percent, resulting in eliminating over 100 on-going projects,
overall. Despite all of the budget turbulence, the maintenance and
operations funding for the S&T internal laboratories has remained
relatively constant.
The value of these laboratories has been recognized by many DHS
components as well, which have been keen to take advantage of the
technical expertise and reach offered by these facilities. For fiscal
year 2011, DHS invested over $300 million at DOE Labs. The three
largest component investors for fiscal year 2011 were DHS S&T, the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and Customs and Border
Protection (CBP). These investments partially support laboratory
overhead costs for research activities.
The fiscal year 2013 budget request includes funding for critical
Research and Development (R&D) programs to improve homeland security
through state-of-the-art solutions and technology. The proposed R&D
funding level in fiscal year 2013 is commensurate with that in fiscal
year 2011 and will enable S&T to support the needs of front-line
operational components, while conducting R&D work in priority areas
such as: Explosives (aviation security); Bio-Threat Security;
Cybersecurity; and First Responders. Programs receiving funding were
carefully chosen to ensure high-priority initiatives maintain adequate
funding. The increases are as follows:
Biological defense--$58.2 million.--S&T will focus on the
development of tools to detect either an intentional or natural
biologic event, with a focus on rapid point-of-care bio-
diagnostic technologies, cost-effective indoor sensors,
bioforensics, and mandated CBRN risk assessments.
Explosives defense--$44.4 million.--S&T's efforts will
concentrate on technologies that assist TSA and other partners
in detecting explosives, with an emphasis on Home-Made
Explosives (HMEs) and other advanced threats.
Cybersecurity--$18.1 million.--S&T's Cybersecurity Division
is supporting the White House Comprehensive National
Cybersecurity Initiative with a variety of unclassified
research programs. S&T is the only funding agency in the U.S.
Government for unclassified cybersecurity research that
supports the public and private sectors, and the global
internet infrastructure.
First Responders--$23.2 million.--As the only Federal
organization that provides technical assistance to the First
Responder community, S&T will continue efforts to identify
technologies, formulate standards, and develop knowledge
products that enhance the productivity, efficiency, and safety
of first responders. Priority investment areas include:
Interoperable communications, data sharing systems, field-ready
detection equipment, and enhancements to protective gear.
The balance of fiscal year 2013 funding level will allow S&T to
resume R&D work in important areas that received little or no funding
in fiscal year 2012 such as: Border Security, Chemical Attack
Resiliency, Counterterrorism R&D, and Information Sharing and
Interoperability.
building a collaborative, cross-cutting laboratory network
The importance of building collaborative partnerships between the
diverse laboratories in this country cannot be overstated. In the
pursuit of innovative products which maximize our use of resources, DHS
S&T is seeking interagency collaboration. In fact, the increasing pull
on the same resources led the major National security departments and
agencies--DHS, DOE, DoD, and the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (ODNI)--to form the Mission Executive Council (MEC), an
executive-level forum at which strategic planning for the utilization
of the DOE National Laboratory capabilities is coordinated and
discussed.
The impetus for forming the council was to take collective stock of
the technical capabilities required by the principal departments with
National security missions (DoD, DHS, DOE, and ODNI) and to present
them to DOE as a whole. Within the forum, the Mission Executive Council
was developed to engage the charter members, fostering a better
understanding of long-term mission needs and serving as an opportunity
to partner with DOE to identify and preserve the mission essential
capabilities that are stewarded by the National Laboratory Complex.
By collectively identifying joint scientific and technical
requirements, we believe we are securing in an efficient manner the
necessary resources to conduct our respective missions. The increased
visibility across the National security community of our joint needs in
response to evolving threats fosters a sounder and more efficient
planning and operating environment. DHS's participation is directed by
the Deputy Secretary of DHS along with the leadership of the Under
Secretary of DHS S&T and the Director of DNDO.
conclusion
Our Nation's laboratories provide an invaluable capacity that
assist in evolving our understanding of current and future homeland
security risks and opportunities, as well as creating new and
innovative capabilities, knowledge products, and process enhancements
that will improve the Department's operational capacity today and in
the future. Further, our laboratories allow us to share the costs,
benefits, and ideas that are imperative to our National and homeland
security and are in the very spirit of innovation and scientific
discovery.
Our experiences are evidence that we must continue to invest in
both the infrastructure and the science as we rise to meet the threats
and challenges of the 21st Century that we face today and in the
future.
Just as the National Laboratories ushered in the Nuclear Era, we
look forward to our system of laboratories bringing forward new ideas
and capabilities critical to the enduring security of our Nation. We
look forward to continuing to expand the network of laboratories
including internal S&T, DOE, other interagency, university and
international facilities. With this network as a foundation, we firmly
believe that achieving our value-added proposition--operational focus,
innovative, building partnerships--in support of the Homeland Security
Enterprise is within reach.
In this pursuit, I am honored to serve in a leadership position at
the DHS S&T Directorate and look forward to your questions.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Dr. Gerstein.
Dr. Gowadia, please.
STATEMENT OF HUBAN A. GOWADIA, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC
NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Gowadia. Good morning, Chairman Lungren and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today with Doctors Gerstein
and----
Mr. Long. Ma'am, is your microphone on? It is? Can you pull
it a little closer? Thank you.
Ms. Gowadia. Is that better?
Thank you for the opportunity, again, to appear before you
this morning with Doctors Gerstein and Morgan to discuss the
important partnership the DNDO has with the Department of
Homeland Security and Department of Energy National
Laboratories. DNDO works closely with S&T to facilitate work
with the laboratories to help deliver critical homeland
security capabilities, bringing their unique expertise, skills,
and infrastructure to bear on our nuclear detection and
forensics mission.
In addition, DNDO's strong, in-house, technical expertise
on nuclear matters provides an important foundation for
optimizing our work within National Labs. While my written
testimony provides a larger overview of the range of programs
we have at the laboratories, this morning I would like to
highlight just a few illustrative examples.
I would like to begin with our long-standing partnership
with the Department of Homeland Security's National Urban
Securities Technology Laboratory, or NUSTL. Although the lab
participates in multiple DNDO efforts, primarily we leverage
NUSTL's strong ties to local law enforcement agencies in the
New York City region to support our Securing the Cities
program. Here, we collaborate with State and local partners to
design and implement the regional architecture to detect and
interdict illicit nuclear materials.
As I am sure you are aware, much of our Nation's expertise
in nuclear weapons and technical nuclear issues resides
primarily at the DOE National Laboratories. As such, they serve
as important partners in preventing nuclear terrorism. At DNDO,
we recognize the labs' strength in analysis and long-term
research, particularly in addressing complex problems that have
high technical risk and are not immediately attractive to
industry for development.
DNDO sponsors research and development activities across
the National Laboratory Complex that have resulted in
significant technical gains by way of new, more capable
detector materials as well as cutting-edge technologies. For
instance, Lawrence Livermore led a team that included Oak Ridge
National Laboratory, Fisk University, and R&D, in the
development of strontium iodide. This is a new scintillator
that won an R&D 100 Award and will allow us to build cheaper
detectors with enhanced resolution, thereby increasing our
deployable capabilities.
Over time, DNDO has steadily improved its specimen
evaluation and red team capabilities by leveraging our enduring
partnership with the laboratories. We rely on the DOE National
Labs for these assessment activities since they are the
Nation's repositories of special nuclear material and have the
expertise, infrastructure, and ability to handle these
materials, both in significant quantities and in threat-
relevant configurations.
Additionally, in order to appropriately assess the global
nuclear detection architecture, DNDO has engaged Los Alamos
National Laboratory to develop the Probabilistic Effectiveness
model. This allows us to simulate adversary tactics and
capabilities and so we are able to define strategies to
mitigate gaps and vulnerabilities in the architecture. DNDO is
also responsible for supporting the Nuclear Detection
Operations of our Federal, State, and local partners.
Sandia National Laboratory plays a critical role in these
efforts. Sandia scientists have developed the DHS isotope ID;
this is an algorithm that is used by National spectroscopists
to analyze radiation spectra and assist our law enforcement
partners in the alarm adjudication process.
In recognition of the Nation's dwindling nuclear
experience, DNDO supports the intellectual infrastructure at
the laboratories. We lead interagency efforts to restore and
maintain a highly-qualified nuclear forensics workforce by
collaborating with labs on a National, nuclear forensics
expertise development program.
Now, these are just a few examples of our important nuclear
security work at the National Laboratories. I would have liked
to share highlights on every lab with which we have
collaborative efforts. But in the interest of time, I will
suffice it to say that we have efforts across the entire
National Laboratory Complex to ensure that they contribute to
our mission. Recognizing their critical role in our nuclear
security mission, we have obligated a significant portion of
our budget to the laboratories for various projects on nuclear
detection and forensics.
In recent years, diminishing budgets have regrettably
resulted in the commensurate decrease in funds we have invested
at the labs. Large cuts in our transformational and applied
research budget, as well as our systems acquisition budget,
have negatively impacted the number and size of projects that
we are able to fund. However, we continue to use our
constrained resources as efficiently as possible to address
critical homeland and, particularly, nuclear security needs.
In conclusion, I would like to emphasize that DNDO has a
robust and effective working partnership with the DHS and the
DOE National Laboratories.
Thank you, again, Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke,
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, for this
opportunity to be with you this morning and talk about our
collaborative efforts at the laboratories.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gowadia follows:]
Prepared Statement of Huban A. Gowadia
April 19, 2012
Good morning Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to testify
today with my colleague from the Science and Technology Directorate
(S&T), Deputy Under Secretary Daniel Gerstein. I appreciate the
opportunity to highlight the important work executed by the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) and Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories
to support and implement the global nuclear detection architecture
(GNDA) and advance technical nuclear forensics.
As you know, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's (DNDO) unique
mission requires coordination with multiple intra- and interagency
partners to develop and enhance the GNDA; develop technical nuclear
detection capabilities; measure detector system performance; ensure
effective response to detection alarms; advance and integrate nuclear
forensics efforts; conduct transformational research and development
for nuclear detection and forensics technologies; and implement the
domestic portion of the GNDA. Countering nuclear terrorism is a whole-
of-Government challenge, and DNDO works with Federal, State, local,
Tribal, international, and private-sector partners to fulfill this
mission.
dndo work with s&t and dhs laboratories
Within DHS, work at DHS National Laboratories is coordinated
through S&T's Office of National Laboratories. DNDO works closely with
S&T on operational support, test, and evaluation efforts relevant to
the mission of both organizations, including evaluating nuclear
detection capability of existing explosives detection systems and non-
intrusive inspection radiography systems that can be used for nuclear
and contraband. DNDO and S&T leverage joint needs and efforts
efficiently through established DHS processes and integrated product
teams.
A good example of our coordination is the Securing the Cities (STC)
program. The STC program, initiated in the New York City region, is
designed to enhance the Nation's ability to detect and prevent a
radiological or nuclear attack in the highest-risk cities. In order to
perform nuclear detection-focused activities, DNDO has worked through
S&T to engage with the National Urban Security Technologies Laboratory
(NUSTL), formerly the Environmental Measurements Laboratory, to support
STC in the New York City region. With support from the DOE Brookhaven
National Laboratory, NUSTL ensures the sustainment of nuclear detection
equipment purchased for STC operational partners. This includes the
initial receipt of detection equipment, operations checks, and
distribution of STC equipment for all regional partners. NUSTL provides
training equipment for radiation detection courses and radiological
sources for training and exercise purposes. NUSTL also supports the STC
program by providing for receipt, storage, and shipping of training
materials, and provides subject matter expertise to the STC committees.
Beyond STC, NUSTL also assists with DNDO's technology test and
evaluation activities by providing test scientists and technical
expertise supporting test plan development and execution. Most
recently, NUSTL staff supported the Gryphon test campaign with a test
scientist to help prepare and conduct the evaluation of airborne
radiation detection equipment.
Additionally, DNDO has collaborated with S&T's Transportation
Security Laboratory (TSL) to evaluate the potential of existing
explosives detection systems for detecting radiological or nuclear
threats in baggage or small cargo at airports. DNDO worked with TSL to
utilize their expertise and facilities for testing equipment used in
airport environments. TSL focuses on explosives detection, and their
specialized facilities, labs, and knowledgeable teams have proved a
good partner for this effort.
dndo work with doe national laboratories
Much of the Nation's expertise in nuclear weapons and technical
nuclear issues resides at the DOE National Laboratories and they serve
as an important partner in preventing nuclear terrorism. This work is
also coordinated through the S&T Office of National Laboratories. DNDO
utilizes the National Laboratories across its mission space to execute,
support, advance, and analyze our work on nuclear detection and
forensics, as appropriate. My testimony outlines the funding spent at
the National Laboratories and highlights some of the important,
collaborative work conducted over the past few years.
Architecture planning
DNDO engages with the National Laboratories to study the
architecture and inform the development of plans for future
implementations of the GNDA. This includes studies and analyses of the
threat, adversaries, technical capabilities, and architecture pathways.
This work informs the prioritization and implementation of the nuclear
detection architecture by providing a framework for determining our
ability to reduce risk and efficiently deploy resources.
The National Laboratories support DNDO's efforts to analyze and
improve the GNDA through the development of specific architecture
studies, Concept of Operations analyses, and detector modeling efforts.
National Laboratory support of DNDO architecture studies typically
focuses on specific programs, operating environments, modes of
transportation, and/or specific threats and directly feeds into and
supports the ensuing solutions development process. The National
Laboratories also provide important inputs and support for annual and
Congressionally-mandated architecture documentation, like the Joint
Interagency Annual Report on the GNDA and the Radiological and Nuclear
Terrorism Risk Assessment.
Nuclear Detection Research and Development
Part of DNDO's mission includes leading and conducting research and
development activities for nuclear detection and forensics. The
National Laboratories play a critical role in providing innovative
ideas, establishing technical feasibility, developing prototype
systems, and supporting characterization and analysis for
transformational and near-term research and development projects.
Annually, DNDO releases a competitive Call for Proposals (CFP) for
Exploratory Research to the National Laboratories and other Federal
centers. The competitive CFP solicits proposals that may lead to
dramatic improvements in National capabilities for nuclear/radiological
detection and forensics. Topics areas for this research are defined
from prioritized gaps in the GNDA, technology needs defined by DNDO and
DHS operational components, and remaining technology hurdles discovered
in prior research. National Laboratories are encouraged to compete for
project funding early-stage exploratory research. National Laboratories
have contributed to advances in many technical areas including detector
materials development, passive detection techniques, neutron detection
and helium-3 replacement technologies, shielded special nuclear
material (SNM) detection, modeling and algorithms, and nuclear
forensics. In fiscal year 2012, DNDO is supporting 11 Exploratory
Research projects at the National Laboratories, focusing on early stage
and basic research that can be developed into new technologies for
improving nuclear detection capabilities or operations.
The National Laboratories also provide technical expertise,
technology characterization planning, and data analysis support to
DNDO's Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) Program. This program
strives to take innovative technology that has been proven in a
laboratory environment, often by a National Laboratory, from a
laboratory bench-top prototype into a full-scale performance test unit,
and characterize its performance in a simulated operation environment.
The National Laboratories have played a major role in each of the eight
ATD projects initiated to date. We recognize and leverage the fact that
they have the proper mix of technical expertise and scientific rigor to
assist in the development and characterization of advanced technology.
Program Support for Deployments
Another important area of on-going work with National Laboratories
is in the field of program support. DNDO uses National Laboratories to
provide specialized technical support services. For example, DNDO has a
long and continuing relationship with the Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory (PNNL) to support deployment and calibration, as well as
analyses, tests, and developmental technology studies for the Radiation
Portal Monitor (RPM) program. In this role, PNNL has supported the RPM
program throughout the purchase and deployment of current-generation
systems and DNDO has further leveraged the laboratory's expertise to
provide analyses of possible improvements, life extensions, and other
related work on RPMs. Similarly, other National Laboratories also
provide work to develop and test relevant technologies.
Test, Evaluation, and Standards
Testing and evaluation of nuclear detection systems is a key area
where DNDO leverages DOE National Laboratory facilities and expertise.
For test infrastructure, DNDO has worked closely with DOE National
Laboratories and other DOE facilities. Our standards-based testing must
be augmented with Government-sponsored performance and scenario-based
testing against threat quantities of special nuclear materials. This
type of testing can only be conducted at specially-designed and secure
facilities. To this end, DNDO constructed the Radiological and Nuclear
Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex at the Nevada National
Security Site. This facility was designed to be the Nation's premier
test complex for evaluating radiological and nuclear detection systems
against significant quantities of highly-enriched uranium and
plutonium. DNDO also maintains testing capabilities across the National
Laboratory complex to fulfill unique developmental, performance, and
operational testing needs.
For example, DNDO's collaboration with the European Union's (EU)
Joint Research Center (JRC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency
on a 3-year effort known as the Illicit Trafficking Radiation
Assessment Program (ITRAP+10) to survey the world market for
radiological and nuclear detection systems is supported by several DOE
National Laboratories. Collectively, the United States and our European
partners will test nearly 100 devices across nine different categories
of detection equipment. To date, devices have been proposed for testing
by 27 vendors from 11 countries. Testing is underway at the EU-JRC's
facility in Ispra, Italy, and at the Savannah River National
Laboratory, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), and PNNL. ITRAP+10
will provide the opportunity to ensure that standards for radiological
and nuclear detection devices are clearly defined, comprehensive, and
realistic, and promote greater homogeneity in United States and
international detection standards. Once completed, the tests will
provide Federal, State, and local law enforcement valuable information
about which radiological detection and identification instruments can
best serve their operational needs. In addition, manufacturers will
gain insights that may allow them to improve devices that are already
available or in development.
In addition, DNDO's Graduated Radiological/Nuclear Detector
Evaluation and Reporting (GRaDER) Program enables manufacturers to
have their commercial, off-the-shelf radiological and nuclear detection
equipment tested by various DOE National Laboratories that have been
accredited by the National Institute of Standards and Technologies
under the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program. The
purpose of the GRaDER program is to determine whether these radiation
detectors comply with National consensus and technical capability
standards adopted by DHS, allowing our operational partners in Federal,
State, local, and Tribal agencies to make better-informed decisions on
the procurement of radiological and nuclear detection equipment. DOE
National Laboratories are important partners in this effort.
Training, Exercise, and Assistance Support
DNDO's training, exercise, and assistance activities use National
Laboratories to help establish standards and templates for GNDA
activities as implemented by State and local entities. These standards
and templates will make it possible for the GNDA to be implemented in a
consistent manner across the country, while allowing flexibility for
local law enforcement to tailor their programs to meet their needs.
Once established, these standards and templates will be sustained by
DNDO and the National Laboratories.
Analyses and Reachback
DNDO's Joint Analysis Center (JAC) provides a centralized support
capability for the GNDA and its technical underpinnings rely on the
expertise at DOE weapons laboratories. The JAC is a 24/7 information
and analysis center that provides for situational awareness of the
deployed nuclear detection architecture, timely information reporting,
and facilitation of technical support for alarm adjudication and
resolution. The JAC relies on the National Laboratory-based Secondary
Reachback (SRB) Program to provide expert advice and analysis in
support of detection operations and adjudication of alarms. SRB
scientists also coordinate with the DOE Triage program to assist in the
adjudication of detection alarms. The integration of both programs
ensures efficiency and consistency by providing technically qualified
experts available through Triage and SRB to support operations in the
field. The JAC also relies on the Nuclear Assessment Program conducted
at the National Laboratories to provide expert technical advice on
efforts to define, monitor, and update the evolution of the GNDA.
Red Team Support
DNDO's Red Team activities provide a valuable service for DNDO and
our partners, allowing evaluation and assessment of deployed assets and
capabilities in an operational environment against realistic threat
scenarios. DNDO uses DOE National Laboratory expertise to provide
technical, operational, and threat device support for Red Team efforts.
For example, DNDO has engaged Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL) to provide operational support to our Red Team's
overt and covert testing program that assesses various operational
elements of the GNDA. LLNL provides subject matter expertise in
detector technology and assists with health physics and source handling
to ensure all assessments are conducted in a manner which is safe for
the law enforcement officers, the assessment team and the general
public.
Likewise, DNDO has engaged ORNL to research, develop, manufacture
and deploy unique radiological signature test devices with unique
nuclear signatures for use in our overt and covert testing program.
These test devices allow DNDO's Red Team efforts to present realistic
threat signatures to various operational elements of the GNDA, as well
as enabling opportunities for technology test and evaluation scenarios
against threat sources. These test devices present operators with
radioactive threat signatures that are not normally seen in daily
operations and provide a unique opportunity to exercise the
adjudication process from the point of detection up through various
levels of analysis and response.
Finally, DNDO engaged Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) to
develop the Probabilistic Effectiveness Methodology (PEM). PEM is a
software modeling and simulation tool that replicates adversary
motivation, capabilities, and intent; adversary transportation pathways
(air, land, and sea), the performance of detector architectures, and
individual detector performance. PEM allows for the identification of
GNDA gaps and vulnerabilities from an adversary's perspective, modeling
various elements of the GNDA and simulating adversary action. In
addition, the PEM model can be used to reflect changes in the GNDA and/
or adversary capabilities that may impact those gaps and
vulnerabilities.
Technical Nuclear Forensics
The field of technical nuclear forensics involves examining
materials recovered from radiological or nuclear events of an illicit
or hostile nature in order to determine their character and origin.
Technical nuclear forensics (TNF) enhances deterrence through improved
nuclear security and augments effective National response to such
incidents. TNF provides clues to identification and prosecution of
illicit smuggling networks and aids attibrution of planned and actual
attacks. The DNDO National Technical Nuclear Forensic Center mission is
four-fold: (1) Provide centralized stewardship for planning,
assessments, and integration of all Federal nuclear forensics and
attribution activities, (2) advance the capability to perform nuclear
forensics on nuclear and other radioactive materials in a pre-
detonation (intact) state, (3) through its expertise development
efforts, ensure a robust and enduring technical nuclear forensics
workforce and pipeline, and (4) maintain the National Strategic Five-
Year Plan for Improving the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution
Capabilities of the United States and annually submit the corresponding
Joint Interagency Annual Review. To fulfill this mission, the United
States Government, and particularly DNDO, relies upon the pre-eminent
expertise residing in eight DOE National Laboratories and two standards
development laboratories to conduct nuclear forensics analyses and
improve methods through research and development. Laboratory
measurements determine physical, chemical, and isotopic properties of
materials to provide insights about the material processing history,
potential geographic origins, transport pathways, and intended use of
the materials.
As mandated in the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Act, DNDO also
leads an interagency effort to restore the expertise pipeline and
provide a stable foundation to develop and maintain a highly-qualified
nuclear forensics workforce through the National Nuclear Forensics
Expertise Development Program (NNFEDP). This program is creating an
academic pathway from undergraduate to post-doctorate study in a
variety of nuclear and geochemical science specialties directly
relevant to technical nuclear forensics, such as radiochemistry,
nuclear engineering and physics, isotope geochemistry, materials
science, and analytical chemistry. The NNFEDP addresses a pressing need
to grow the next generation of scientists in these critical fields
which have experienced a decline in recent decades. The program
promotes an interdisciplinary approach that emphasizes collaboration
among academic programs, universities, and the National Laboratories,
to include providing nuclear forensics-related research and mentorship
opportunities at the DOE National Laboratories to students at the
undergraduate, graduate, and post-doctorate levels.
interagency coordination
In order to effectively and efficiently use resources at the DOE
National Laboratories, coordination across the USG is essential. While
coordination and collaboration with partners has been on-going since
DNDO's inception, the Mission Executive Council (MEC) was created in
2010 as a forum for USG to identify and plan strategic science,
technology, and engineering (ST&E) capabilities at the National
Laboratories. The MEC meets regularly with representatives from across
the interagency to ensure that the finite resources at the laboratories
are managed appropriately and work is aligned with the most pressing
National security needs. S&T and DNDO both have representation on the
MEC to facilitate interagency identification of joint scientific and
technical requirements that support National security efforts.
overview of dndo funding at doe national laboratories
DNDO has obligated a considerable amount of our funding to the
National Laboratories for important work on the GNDA and technical
nuclear forensics over the past 6 fiscal years. In fiscal year 2012,
DNDO expects to obligate approximately $43 million to DOE National
Laboratories, including current-year and prior-year appropriations
funds. This decrease in funding from prior years is due to significant
budget reductions in fiscal year 2012, especially in the
Transformational Research and Development and Systems Acquisition
areas. In recent years, the majority of funding obligated to DOE
National Laboratories has been concentrated on efforts to support
research, development, testing, and evaluation, as well as operations
support activities, in contrast to earlier funding dedicated to program
support for deployment. These investments partially support laboratory
overhead costs for research activities.
path forward
As I previously mentioned, coordination is a key element of our
work with the DHS and DOE National Laboratories. This coordination
extends to our planning and prioritization of projects. Our approach at
DNDO is evolving at every level to be disciplined and rigorous, while
prioritizing our work to make the best use of limited resources. We
seek to use the available expertise at our laboratories to implement a
responsive, agile nuclear detection architecture and strengthen our
nuclear forensics capabilities. While overall funding to DOE National
Laboratories from DNDO may be decreasing, due to present fiscal
realities, they remain a vital asset for National security research,
development, analyses, testing, and program support.
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, I thank you for this
opportunity to discuss our work with DHS and National Laboratories and
the progress of DNDO. I am happy to answer any questions from the
subcommittee.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
We have been called for votes but I am going to see if we
could get Dr. Morgan to give his first 5-minute statement, if
that is alright. Then, when we break we will come back and
start with Ms. Clarke and her opening statement and then go to
your questions--go to questions.
Dr. Morgan, please.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL MORGAN, SPECIALIST IN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY POLICY, RESOURCES, SCIENCES, AND INDUSTRY DIVISION,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. Morgan. Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
My name is Dan Morgan. I am a specialist in Science and
Technology Policy at the Congressional Research Service. My
testimony will provide an overview of the DHS and DOE
Laboratories and the statutory and policy framework for DHS'
use of laboratories. I will then discuss the alignment of
missions, planning, and prioritization and efficiency and cost-
effectiveness.
Under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which established
DHS, the Department received laboratories from four other
agencies; the Plum Island Animal Disease Center from the
Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Measurement
Laboratory, now the National Urban Security Technology
Laboratory, from the Department of Energy, early plans for what
is now the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
Center from the Department of Defense and the Transportation
Security Laboratory, which was then part of TSA.
The first three of these immediately became part of the
Science and Technology Directorate. The Transportation Security
Laboratory was transferred to S&T Directorate in 2006. DHS also
has plans to construct a new facility to replace the Plum
Island Center. Several DHS components have additional, smaller
laboratories and centers.
The Homeland Security Act also provided specifically for
DHS use of DOE facilities. DHS funds activities at 12 DOE
facilities, including 10 of the National Laboratories. The S&T
Directorate, the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and at least
eight other DHS components participate. Historically, DHS
expenditures at DOE facilities have typically been between $400
and $475 million per year.
The Homeland Security Act gives DHS a special relationship
with the DOE Laboratories. First, it allows work for DHS to
have the same priority as work for DOE. Second, it directs the
laboratories not to charge DHS more than they would charge DOE
for similar work. The Homeland Security Act established the
Office of National Laboratories within the S&T Directorate to
coordinate DHS use of DOE facilities.
Although this office reviews proposed work, it does not
have the ability to prevent issuance of a contract and it does
not oversee contracts after they have been issued. DHS has
expanded the Office's responsibilities to encompass the S&T
Directorate's own laboratories. This additional role is not
mentioned in the statute. DHS use of DOE facilities is not
limited to research and development. Indeed, in some years,
expenditures on operational support exceed expenditures on R&D.
Regarding the alignment of missions, the missions of the
DHS Laboratories are generally aligned with specific DHS
programs and missions. DOE sets the strategic direction for the
DOE Laboratories. Their capabilities encompass many aspects of
DHS' mission but not all and this could be a consideration for
the committee in identifying areas where DHS needs its own
capabilities. Coordination by the Office of National
Laboratories could contribute to an alignment between
laboratory missions and DHS missions. However, as I mentioned,
the Office's gate-keeping and oversight functions are limited.
Regarding planning and prioritization, past studies have
examined these mostly at the program level. Planning and
prioritization at the laboratory level raised some additional
questions. What strategic plans has DHS developed for the DHS
Laboratories and for its use of the DOE Laboratories? How does
DHS determine whether to assign work to a DHS Laboratory, a DOE
Laboratory, or another organization? How are DOE and DHS
planning efforts coordinated?
Finally, regarding efficiency cost-effectiveness, Although
DHS has a special relationship with the DOE Laboratories, this
doesn't include a management role. For this reason, the DOE is
probably better able than DHS to address efficiency and cost of
the DOE Laboratories. But compared with DOE, there has been
only limited, outside scrutiny of DHS Laboratory management.
DHS may find some applicable lessons learned in past
assessments of other Federal laboratories and it could also
draw on an existing literature on R&D performance measurement
for guidance in developing metrics for efficiency and cost-
effectiveness.
Thank you, again, for the invitation to testify today and I
look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Morgan follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daniel Morgan
April 19, 2012
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today. My name is Daniel Morgan. I am a
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy at the Congressional
Research Service. My prepared testimony begins with an overview of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Laboratories; the Department's
use of the Department of Energy (DOE) Laboratories; the statutory
origins for both of these in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L.
107-296); and related policies subsequently established by other
legislation and by DHS and DOE themselves. It then discusses three
specific issues that the committee asked CRS to address:
the alignment of the missions of the DHS and DOE
Laboratories with the overall DHS mission;
the planning and prioritization of DHS's use of the DHS and
DOE Laboratories; and
the efficiency and cost-effectiveness of that use.
the dhs laboratories
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a number of
laboratories that conduct research and development (R&D), testing and
evaluation, and other activities. Most notably, the Department's
Directorate of Science and Technology (S&T) has the following five
major facilities:
Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC).--Located off the
coast of Long Island, New York, PIADC defends against foreign
animal diseases by performing diagnostic tests; developing
diagnostic tools, vaccines, and antivirals; and training
veterinarians to recognize diseases of concern. The PIADC was
established in 1952. DHS has plans to construct a new facility,
the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility (NBAF) in
Manhattan, Kansas, to replace PIADC and to engage in expanded
activities. In February 2012, however, DHS announced that it is
assessing whether and for what purpose a facility like NBAF
should be built. The assessment will include a review of
alternatives to the current plans.
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center
(NBACC).--Located at Fort Detrick in Frederick, Maryland, the
NBACC has two parts: The National Biological Threat
Characterization Center (NBTCC), which aims to understand the
science of biological threats, and the National Bioforensic
Analysis Center (NBFAC), which aims to identify and attribute
the use of biological threats in terrorist and criminal
incidents. Construction of the NBACC facility began in fiscal
year 2006 and was completed in fiscal year 2010. Final
certification of the high-containment laboratories occurred in
September 2011. These laboratories operate at the highest level
of biocontainment, known as biosafety level 4 (BSL-4), which
allows NBACC to perform R&D on pathogens for which no vaccine
or treatment exists. Unlike the other S&T Directorate
Laboratories, NBACC is operated as a Federally-funded research
and development center (FFRDC) by a contractor, Battelle
National Biodefense Institute, LLC.
Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL).--Located in
Atlantic City, New Jersey, the TSL performs research,
development, and validation of solutions to detect and mitigate
threats against transportation, especially the threat of
improvised explosive devices. The TSL also provides
certification testing for Explosive Detection Systems.
National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL).--
Located in New York City, NUSTL is the new identity of the
former Environmental Measurements Laboratory (EML). The primary
mission of the EML was monitoring low-level radiation. The
NUSTL mission is to test, evaluate, and analyze homeland
security capabilities and serve as a technical authority for
first responders and State and local entities as they integrate
homeland security technologies into urban operational use.
Chemical Security Analysis Center (CSAC).--Located at the
Edgewood Area of Aberdeen Proving Ground in Maryland, the CSAC
aims to provide a scientific basis for the awareness and
attribution of chemical threats. The CSAC was established in
interim facilities in fiscal year 2006 and moved to permanent
facilities in fiscal year 2009.
These laboratories generally do not receive appropriations
directly. Their construction, operation, and maintenance are funded
through the S&T Directorate's Office of National Laboratories out of a
dedicated Laboratory Facilities budget line item. The fiscal year 2012
appropriation for Laboratory Facilities is $176.5 million. Total
expenditures at the laboratories are greater than this, however. The
costs of particular projects and programs carried out at the
laboratories are funded through the directorate's technical divisions
out of funds that also support work at other Federal and non-Federal
facilities. The appropriations for these activities do not specify how
much will be spent at the DHS Laboratories. In addition, some of the
laboratories receive funds from other agencies, such as the Department
of Agriculture.
The S&T Directorate and other DHS components also have several
smaller laboratories and laboratory-like centers. For example, the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) has an Algorithm Test Bed at
the Applied Physics Laboratory of Johns Hopkins University, and the
U.S. Coast Guard has a Research and Development Center in New London,
Connecticut.
the doe national laboratories
In addition to these laboratories of its own, DHS makes use of the
National Laboratories of the Department of Energy. The Department of
Energy has more than 20 laboratories and technical centers in locations
around the United States.\1\ All are Government-owned, but most are
operated by contractors. Some focus on a single field of research,
while others are multipurpose. Three--Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Sandia National
Laboratories--are commonly referred to as the weapons laboratories
because of their work on nuclear weapons, but the weapons laboratories
also do work in other areas. The National Nuclear Security
Administration, a semiautonomous agency within DOE, is responsible for
the three weapons laboratories. The DOE Office of Science has
responsibility for 10. Four other DOE offices are responsible for one
each.
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\1\ The term National Laboratories has long been used to refer to
the major DOE Laboratories. Since 2005, the term has been defined in
statute (Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-58, Sections 2(3) and
991). Seventeen DOE facilities are designated as National Laboratories.
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The DOE National Laboratories generally do not receive
appropriations directly. Rather, Congress appropriates funds for
specific programs, and DOE then determines whether those funds are
spent at a National Laboratory or in some other fashion (such as a
contract with a private-sector company or a grant to a university). The
annual DOE budget documents do, however, report how DOE funds were
allocated to each laboratory in the previous year and provide projected
allocations for the coming year. The funding of the various National
Laboratories is quite disparate, ranging from the $25 million DOE
anticipates spending at Ames Laboratory in Iowa in fiscal year 2012 up
to the $1.95 billion it expects to spend at Los Alamos National
Laboratory. Total DOE expenditures at the National Laboratories in
fiscal year 2012 is expected to be $10.8 billion. In addition, other
organizations, such as DHS, the Department of Defense and other Federal
agencies, State and local governments, and private companies, can fund
work at the National Laboratories through the DOE Work for Others
program and other mechanisms.
DHS funds activities at 10 of the 17 DOE National Laboratories:
Argonne National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, Idaho
National Laboratory, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Oak
Ridge National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory,
Sandia National Laboratories, and Savannah River National Laboratory.
In addition, DHS funds activities at the Nevada National Security Site
and the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education, DOE facilities
that are not categorized as National Laboratories. Total DOE
expenditures at these 10 facilities in fiscal year 2012 is expected to
be $9 billion. From fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2010, according to
DOE, annual DHS expenditures at DOE facilities ranged between $400
million and $475 million. In each of those years, the facility
receiving the most DHS funding was Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory, and the facility receiving the second-most was either
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory or Sandia National
Laboratories.\2\
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\2\ Department of Energy, Homeland Security Activities at
Department of Energy Facilities, issued annually. The dollar amounts
given here are for work conducted through the Work for Others program.
The annual reports do not identify the customer for other types of non-
DOE-funded work, such as work performed under cooperative research and
development agreements (CRADAs). These other types appear to represent
only a small fraction of the total.
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While the S&T Directorate and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
are among the heaviest DHS users of DOE facilities, they are by no
means the only ones. Both Customs and Border Protection and the
National Protection and Programs Directorate are also often heavy
users, spending more than DNDO in some years. Between fiscal year 2007
and fiscal year 2010, at least another six DHS components also
sponsored work, though at lower levels. The title of today's hearing
refers to research and development. The DHS work conducted at DOE
facilities is not limited to research and development. Indeed, in some
years, research and development account for less than half of the
total, with the majority of work for DHS made up of operations support
and other types of activity.\3\
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\3\ Department of Energy, Homeland Security Activities at
Department of Energy Facilities, issued annually, and additional
information provided to CRS by DHS and the DOE National Laboratories.
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statutory origins of dhs use of laboratories
The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which established DHS, provided
specifically for both DHS-owned laboratories and DHS use of the DOE
Laboratories.
Statutory Origins of the DHS Laboratories
Four of the five major S&T Directorate Laboratories described above
became part of DHS at its establishment, under specific statutory
provisions of the Homeland Security Act.
First, the Plum Island Animal Disease Center was transferred to DHS
from the Department of Agriculture by Section 310 of the Act. Congress
has also given statutory direction regarding this facility's planned
successor, NBAF, in each homeland security appropriations act since
fiscal year 2009. These additional provisions include mandates for
safety and security risk assessments, requirements for outside review
of those assessments, and authority for DHS to use receipts from the
sale of Plum Island to offset NBAF construction and PIADC
decommissioning costs.
Second, the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
Center, referred to in the Homeland Security Act as the National Bio-
Weapons Defense Analysis Center, was transferred to DHS from the
Department of Defense by Section 303 of that Act. At the time, it was
in the early planning stages and did not yet exist as an actual
facility. For the first few years of DHS's existence, the NBACC program
conducted research without a dedicated DHS-owned facility through
partnerships and agreements with other Federal and private
institutions. Construction of the NBACC facility began in June 2006. As
noted above, NBACC is operated by a contractor as a Federally-funded
research and development center. The Homeland Security Act provides
specific authority for DHS to establish or contract with FFRDCs in
Section 305.
Third, the Transportation Security Laboratory was previously the
Aviation Security Laboratory of the Federal Aviation Administration. It
became part of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) when
Congress created the TSA in November 2001.\4\ The following year, the
Homeland Security Act incorporated TSA into the new Department of
Homeland Security. Section 424 of that act required that TSA be
maintained as a distinct entity for 2 years, but in September 2003,
Congress directed DHS to consolidate the Department's R&D functions in
the S&T Directorate.\5\ Following this direction, DHS implemented the
transfer of TSL from TSA to the S&T Directorate in fiscal year 2006.
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\4\ Aviation and Transportation Security Act (Pub. L. 107-71).
\5\ H. Rept. 108-280, p. 56. This was the conference report on the
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2004 (Pub. L. 108-
90).
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Fourth, the Environmental Measurements Laboratory, now NUSTL, was
transferred to DHS from DOE by Section 303 of the Homeland Security
Act.
The fifth laboratory, CSAC, was established without specific
statutory direction. The Under Secretary for S&T has the authority to
establish additional laboratories under Section 308(c)(2) of the
Homeland Security Act. He or she also has the general authority and
responsibility under Section 302 to carry out R&D and related
activities through both intramural and extramural programs.
Most of the smaller laboratories and laboratory-like centers were
also established under general authorities without specific statutory
direction. Pre-existing facilities in other components, such as the
Coast Guard R&D Center, became part of DHS under the Homeland Security
Act when their parent organization was incorporated into the new
department, but they are not specifically named in the act. Regarding
DHS components other than the S&T Directorate, Section 306(b) of the
Homeland Security Act specifically directed that the establishment of
the S&T Directorate did not preclude other components from carrying out
their own R&D and related activities.
statutory origins of dhs use of the doe laboratories
The Homeland Security Act (in Section 309) also provided
specifically for DHS use of the DOE National Laboratories and sites.
Note that the inclusion of the words ``and sites'' extends the
provisions to facilities that are not designated as National
Laboratories. For example, the same statutory provisions apply to DHS
use of the Nevada National Security Site.
Section 309 authorizes DHS use of DOE facilities through the Work
for Others program, joint sponsorship arrangements, direct contracts
with a laboratory's managing contractor, cooperative research and
development agreements (CRADAs), licensing agreements, or any other
method provided by law. In practice, it appears that Work for Others
has been the primary method DHS has actually used. Section 309 makes
additional specific provisions for each of these mechanisms as well as
for cost reimbursement, interagency coordination, and other matters. In
February 2003, 3 months after passage of the act, DHS and DOE entered
into a memorandum of agreement to establish a framework for
implementing this section.\6\ The memorandum addresses three types of
DOE capability available to DHS:
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\6\ A copy of this memorandum is on-line at http://www.doecaa.org/
Docs/DOE-DHS_MOA.pdf.
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DHS use of the resources and expertise of the DOE National
Laboratories and other sites, including production plants;
DOE assets making up the Nuclear Incident Response Team,
which come under DHS operational control in certain
circumstances; and
DHS intelligence activities using DOE intelligence
personnel, information, technology, and systems.
The first of these three capabilities is the focus of today's
hearing.
Subsection 309(a)(2) of the Homeland Security Act gives DHS a
special statutory relationship with the DOE Laboratories that allows
DHS-funded work to have the same priority as work funded by DOE itself.
Work funded by DHS is to be performed ``on an equal basis to other
missions at the laboratory and not on a noninterference basis with
other missions of such laboratory or site.''\7\ This language is in
contrast with most Work for Others projects, which are conducted on the
condition that they may not interfere with DOE activities. Provisions
similar to this statutory language are repeated in the 2003 memorandum
of agreement.
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\7\ Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-296), Sec.
309(a)(2).
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Another aspect of the special relationship is provided by
Subsection 309(e), which directs that DHS not be subject to
administrative charges or personnel costs in excess of those that would
be charged to DOE for similar work. In particular, the memorandum of
agreement and the implementing DOE directive clarify that work for DHS
is not subject to the 3% Federal administrative charge usually imposed
on Work for Others participants to defray DOE's costs of managing and
overseeing the Work for Others program.\8\ This 3% Federal
administrative charge is a DOE charge, not part of the performing
laboratory's overhead charges. Laboratory overhead charges generally
apply to DHS projects the same as to any other project.
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\8\ DOE Order O 484.1, Reimbursable Work for the Department of
Homeland Security, approved August 17, 2006, amended March 14, 2011,
https://www.directives.doe.gov/directives/0484.1-BOrder-ac1/view. This
order replaced DOE Notice N 481.1A, which is referred to in the 2003
memorandum of agreement.
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Subsection 309(g) of the Act established the Office of National
Laboratories (ONL) within the S&T Directorate and made it responsible
for ``coordination and utilization of the Department of Energy National
Laboratories and sites under this section in a manner to create a
networked laboratory system for the purpose of supporting the missions
of the Department.'' This makes ONL one of the few offices within the
S&T Directorate that was specifically established by statute. The
directorate has subsequently expanded the scope of ONL's
responsibilities to encompass the construction and operation of the S&T
Directorate's own laboratories. This additional role is not mentioned
in statute.
A DHS management directive establishes policies and procedures for
DHS components engaging with the DOE National Laboratories and other
FFRDCs.\9\ As part of that process, the ONL, acting on behalf of the
Under Secretary for Science and Technology, reviews contract statements
of work to ensure that they comply with the terms and conditions of the
laboratory's prime contract with DOE. This review is designed to
increase coordination among the components of DHS. It does not provide
ONL with the ability to prevent issuance of a contract or other
agreement. The ONL does not provide oversight of contracts after they
have been issued.
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\9\ Department of Homeland Security, Establishing or Contracting
with Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) and
National Laboratories, MD 143-04, May 25, 2007. This management
directive replaced a similar directive (MD 10400) dated April 25, 2006.
With respect to the use of DOE National Laboratories, the content of
the two directives is effectively the same.
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The statute authorizes a broad scope for DHS use of DOE facilities.
In particular, such work is not limited to R&D, or to the S&T
Directorate. This is consistent with the patterns of use described
above. DHS work at DOE Laboratories is not entirely free of
restrictions, however. There are certain categories of DHS work for
which the DOE Laboratories may not compete. The DOE implementing
directive states that the DOE National Laboratories may not respond to
DHS requests for proposals (RFPs) or other DHS solicitations that
involve head-to-head competition with the private sector.\10\ They may,
however, under certain conditions, respond to broad area announcements
(BAAs) and other competitive solicitations that do not involve head-to-
head private-sector competition.\11\
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\10\ DOE Order O 484.1, Sec. 4j.
\11\ DOE Order O 484.1, Sec. 4k.
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Some of the early proposals that led to the Homeland Security Act
would have transferred one of the DOE Laboratories to DHS ownership.
These proposals were rejected. Instead, Section 308(c) authorizes DHS
to establish an intramural headquarters laboratory, if the Secretary so
chooses, and provides criteria and procedures for the selection of such
a facility. To date, a headquarters laboratory has not been
established. In the early years of the Department, there was a proposal
to designate certain DOE Laboratories as intramural for DHS purposes,
and the rest as extramural. This proposal too was ultimately rejected.
alignment of laboratory missions with dhs missions
The committee asked CRS to address the alignment of the
laboratories' missions with the DHS mission overall.
The DHS Laboratories are focused on particular topics of specific
interest to DHS. The Plum Island Animal Disease Center also hosts an
active R&D program for the Department of Agriculture, and other DHS
Laboratories work collaboratively with the Department of Defense and
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. In general, though, the missions
of the DHS Laboratories are aligned with specific DHS programs and
mission needs. How that mission alignment is reflected in the
organization of the S&T Directorate has varied from time to time as the
directorate has been reorganized. For example, the PIADC and the NBACC,
which now report to the Office of National Laboratories, formerly
reported to the Chemical and Biological Countermeasures Division. It is
not clear whether these organizational changes within the directorate
have had any impact on the missions of the laboratories, or whether
they were intended only to improve management efficiency.
The situation with respect to the DOE Laboratories is more complex.
The capabilities of the DOE Laboratories are vast and varied, and their
missions are inherently much broader than the work they do for DHS.
While the Homeland Security Act directs that their work for DHS is to
be performed on an equal basis with their other missions, DOE remains
their primary funder, as well as the overseer of their management and
operating contracts. In practice, therefore, DOE retains the primary
role in setting their overall strategic directions. Their capabilities
include many topics directly relevant to homeland security, especially
because of DOE's long-standing National security mission. The DOE
Laboratories were not established with a homeland security mission in
mind, so their capabilities may not encompass every needed topic. This
could be a consideration for the committee in identifying areas where
DHS should have its own capabilities.
As noted above, the statutory responsibility of the Office of
National Laboratories is to coordinate DHS use of DOE facilities for
the purpose of supporting DHS missions. This coordinating role could
contribute to alignment between laboratory missions and DHS missions.
However, as already noted, the office's gatekeeping and oversight roles
are limited. While it serves as one point of contact between DHS and
the DOE Laboratories, it is not the only point of contact. Any DHS
component can contract with a DOE Laboratory to do work.
In 2007, the S&T Directorate announced an alignment of the DOE
Laboratories with the directorate's research divisions. This alignment
was not one-to-one. Each division was aligned with multiple
laboratories, and several of the laboratories were aligned with
multiple divisions. At the time, DHS stated that the alignment would
help DHS and DOE staff to develop more enduring professional
relationships and a better mutual understanding of each other's
capabilities and needs. It is unclear whether this organizational
alignment had an impact on the alignment of missions. The S&T
Directorate's divisions have since been reorganized, so the divisional
alignment with the DOE Laboratories may or may not still be in effect.
planning and prioritization
The committee also asked CRS to address the planning and
prioritization of DHS work at the DHS and DOE Laboratories.
Within the constraints mentioned above, the DOE Laboratories can
compete for some types of DHS funding. In such cases, DHS planning and
prioritization are at the program level, and the selection of a
proposal from a DOE Laboratory comes at the end of the process when
awards are made. Program-level planning and prioritization have been
examined frequently by this committee and others, as well as by
independent organizations such as the Government Accountability Office,
the National Academy of Public Administration, and the National Academy
of Sciences. Among the issues these examinations have raised are the
adequacy of the S&T Directorate's strategic planning; the effectiveness
of its portfolio review process; the sufficiency of the Department's
risk analysis efforts and the extent to which those efforts inform R&D
priorities; and the mechanisms for ensuring alignment between the S&T
Directorate's R&D priorities and the needs of its customers, including
other DHS components as well as State and local first responders.
The planning and prioritization of work at the DHS-owned
laboratories and work funded through non-competitive awards to the DOE
Laboratories raise a number of additional questions for the committee
to consider:
Has DHS developed a strategic plan for the DHS
Laboratories?\12\
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\12\ There are strategic plans for at least some of the individual
laboratories. For example, see Department of Homeland Security, Science
and Technology Directorate, National Urban Security Technology
Laboratory, National Urban Security Technology Laboratory Strategic
Plan FY2009-FY2013; and Battelle National Biodefense Institute,
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC)
Strategic Plan, June 2009.
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Has it developed a strategic plan for its use of the DOE
Laboratories?
What is the appropriate content for such plans?
What mechanisms are in place to ensure that they are
implemented?
How does DHS determine whether to assign work to a DHS
Laboratory, a DOE Laboratory, or another organization, such as
a private-sector company or a university?
What policies, procedures, and criteria are in place to
guide these decisions?\13\
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\13\ In 2004, the S&T Directorate reported on four criteria for
choosing to execute work at DHS and DOE Laboratories: Inherent Federal
responsibility, maintenance of enduring capabilities, limited private-
sector interest, and leveraging of other Government investments. A
number of other policies described in the 2004 report have since
changed. It is unclear whether the four criteria are still in effect.
See Department of Homeland Security, Science and Technology
Directorate, Utilization of the National Laboratories: Report to
Congress in Response to House Report 108-541 to the Fiscal Year 2005
Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Bill, October 2004.
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How does the Office of National Laboratories ensure DHS-wide
coordination of planning and prioritization?
How do DOE and DHS planning efforts fulfill the Homeland
Security Act's mandate (in Section 309(h)) to ensure that all
homeland security research, development, test, and evaluation
activities conducted by DOE, whether funded by DOE, DHS, or any
other organization, are fully coordinated between DOE and DHS
to minimize duplication of effort and maximize the effective
application of Federal resources?
efficiency and cost-effectiveness
Finally, the committee asked CRS to address the efficiency and
cost-effectiveness of DHS's use of the DHS and DOE Laboratories.
At the DOE Laboratories, work is generally done on a cost-
reimbursement basis, with overhead rates and other conditions
determined by the laboratory's management and operating contract with
DOE. Management efficiency, cost, and related issues have been
discussed from time to time throughout the history of the DOE
Laboratories.\14\ Congress and the administration have addressed these
through a variety of mechanisms, including the recompetition of
management and operating contracts and the establishment of
performance-based fees. Many questions remain unanswered, however. A
recent report by the DOE Inspector General raised the following
concerns:\15\
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\14\ See, for example, General Accounting Office, DOE's National
Laboratories: Adopting New Missions and Managing Effectively Pose
Significant Challenges, GAO/RCED-94-113, February 1994; Secretary of
Energy Advisory Board, Task Force on Alternative Futures for the DOE
National Laboratories, Alternative Futures for the DOE National
Laboratories, February 1995; Department of Energy, Report of the
Department of Energy for the Interagency Federal Laboratory Review in
Response to Presidential Review Directive NSTC-1, March 1995; General
Accounting Office, Department of Energy: Uncertain Progress in
Implementing National Laboratory Reforms, GAO/RCED-98-197, September
1998; National Research Council, Preliminary Assessment of DOE Facility
Management and Infrastructure Renewal, 2004; and National Research
Council, Maintaining High Scientific Quality at Los Alamos and Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratories, 2004.
\15\ Department of Energy, Office of Inspector General, Management
Challenges at the Department of Energy, DOE/IG-0858, November 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Can DOE sustain all its current facilities?
Are there opportunities for consolidation and realignment?
Are laboratory efforts aligned with agency priorities?
Are laboratory missions clear and well-coordinated?
Is the laboratory complex appropriately-sized?
Could alternatives to the usual management and operating
contracts enhance efficiency and economy?
To reduce overhead costs, should DOE make more use of non-
DOE facilities, such as universities and non-profit research
centers?
Under current circumstances, DOE is probably more able to address
issues of cost and efficiency at the DOE Laboratories than is DHS.
Although the Homeland Security Act gives DHS special status with
respect to work at the DOE Laboratories, it does not give DHS a direct
role in their management.
While many studies of the DOE Laboratories have addressed
efficiency and cost-effectiveness, there has not been comparably
detailed scrutiny of the management of the DHS-owned laboratories.
However, an extensive body of related work exists that could provide
relevant insights:
There is an academic literature on mechanisms for measuring
R&D productivity and effectiveness.\16\ Some of this work could
assist DHS in developing metrics for the efficiency and cost-
effectiveness of its laboratories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ See, for example, Mark G. Brown and Raynold A. Svenson,
``Measuring R&D Productivity,'' Research Technology Management,
November-December 1998, pp. 30-35; Martin Karlsson, Lars Trygg, and
Bengt-Olof Elfstroem, ``Measuring R&D Productivity: Complementing the
Picture by Focusing on Research Activities,'' Technovation, 2004, pp.
179-186; and Albert Sciarretta, et al., ``A Methodology for Assessing
the Military Benefits of Science and Technology Investments,'' Center
for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense
University, September 2008.
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Federal organizations such as the Government Accountability
Office and the agency Inspectors General have often assessed
the laboratories of other agencies.\17\ These assessments may
contain lessons learned that could be applied to the DHS
Laboratories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ See, for example, Government Accountability Office, Department
of Energy: Additional Opportunities Exist for Reducing Laboratory
Contractors' Support Costs, GAO-05-897, September 2005; Department of
Defense, Office of the Inspector General, ``Evaluation of the
Department of Defense Forensic Laboratories,'' September 16, 1998; and
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, DOE Best Practices Pilot Study,
LBNL/PUB-865, February 2002.
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Outside organizations have also conducted assessments of the
laboratories of other agencies. The National Academy of
Sciences, for example, issues periodic evaluations of the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the
Army Research Laboratory (ARL), and from time to time
undertakes similar assessments for DOE, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and other agencies.\18\
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\18\ See, for example, the assessments of NIST and ARL listed on
the website of the Academy's Laboratory Assessments Board, http://
sites.nationalacademies.org/DEPS/LAB/DEPS_047831; and National Research
Council, Evaluating Research Efficiency in the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are some general considerations for Congressional
policymakers in comparing the potential for efficiency and cost-
effectiveness between the DHS Laboratories and the DOE Laboratories.
First, the DOE Laboratories are generally operated by contractors
rather than directly by the Government. This may provide some
opportunities for management and personnel flexibility that are not
available to most DHS Laboratories. On the other hand, to the extent
that the operating contractors of the DOE Laboratories earn fees over
and above the costs they incur, that may increase their cost relative
to the Government-operated DHS Laboratories. Second, the DOE
Laboratories have an extensive and long-established infrastructure of
facilities, equipment, and personnel. This may allow them to perform
some types of work without the cost of acquiring additional
infrastructure, but it may increase the on-going costs of maintaining
the DOE Laboratory infrastructure. Third, because the DOE Laboratory
system is much larger than that of DHS, it may enjoy economies of
scale, and it may have more capacity to adjust to fluctuations in
utilization if the resources available to DHS increase or decrease. If
DHS expenditures at the DOE Laboratories decrease, however, any
additional infrastructure that the laboratories have invested in to
meet DHS needs may not be applicable to DOE's own needs. It seems
likely that these general considerations will be outweighed by the
specific circumstances of individual laboratories and projects.
concluding remarks
Thank you again for the invitation to testify today. I look forward
to answering any questions you may have.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Would you like to make your opening statement now or when
we come back?
Ms. Clarke. [Off mike]
Mr. Lungren. Okay, I am going to recognize Ms. Clarke for
her opening statement so we can get all of this in before we go
vote. Then, we will come back and start with our questions.
Ms. Clarke. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your
indulgence and I thank our panelists for coming to testify
today. Mr. Chairman, I too want to welcome our witnesses. Some
have traveled from the great State of California and we
appreciate their participation.
I also want to welcome Deputy Under Secretary Gerstein to
the subcommittee. He is relatively new to his position,
obviously well-qualified and, since arriving, has provided
enthusiastic and knowledgeable leadership efforts to S&T.
During his short time on the job, he has proven to be a
valuable asset to the Under Secretary O'Toole. I am looking
forward to his testimony today.
The Department and S&T, in particular, supports a broad
range of scientific and engineering research and development.
Its purposes are wide-ranging address specific concerns such as
chemical security, biodefense, transportation security, and
nuclear detection. An important segment of the Department's
laboratory--the Department's laboratories' effort is it fosters
the development of our country's scientific, engineering, and
technical workforce, which influences students at universities
and even high schools.
When teachers and students can see that there is
interesting and substantial work to be done in the sciences at
our laboratories, they show an incredible amount of interest in
striving to work there. Important things go on in our
laboratories and they are seen as good and significant places
to work. Our scientists, researchers, engineers, and
technicians work hard to discover, excuse me--to deliver
solutions grounded in science and supported by innovative
engineering. This strengthens U.S. innovation and
competitiveness in the global economy.
This committee has a long-standing interest in the strength
of the Department's research and development enterprise and in
providing support for its R&D activities. We must anticipate
the needs of our laboratories and the DOE Labs and provide the
best support and oversight that can help provide solutions to
our toughest scientific, technological, and problematic
challenges.
However, recent and projected budget cuts passed by the
Majority are driving difficult decisions, such as
prioritization and, sometimes, the elimination of R&D projects.
This is causing stress among competing priorities within the
Department's S&T Directorate and its R&D portfolio. Congress
will play a central role in defining the Nation's R&D
priorities as it makes decisions with respect to the size and
distribution of Homeland Security R&D funding.
We have expressed our serious concerns about the drastic
decreases voted by this Congress and passed by the Majority in
the level of Federal funding for Homeland Security R&D funding.
As the fiscal year 2013 appropriations process moves forward,
it faces two overarching issues; the extent to which the
Federal R&D investment can grow and what little R&D funding
available will be prioritized and allocated.
The Department and, in particular, the S&T Directorate will
need to justify and make transparent its R&D investments.
President Obama's Science Advisor, John Holdren, and others,
have raised concerns about the potential harm of a boom-bust
approach to Federal R&D funding as seen in the past. Like rapid
growth followed by much slower growth, flat funding, and even
decline.
Critics assert that there has been a variety of damages
from this bust-boom cycle, including interruptions and
cancellations of much-needed research projects, decreased
student interest in pursuing graduate studies, and reduced
employment prospects for the large number of researchers with
advanced degrees. More broadly, in a 2009 speech before members
of the National Academy of Sciences, President Obama put forth
a goal of increasing the National investment in R&D to more
than 3 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product.
But, as they say, the devil is in the details and the
details are what we are here to talk about today. This
subcommittee and full committee have been real supporters of
the Department's R&D and National Labs but we need a better,
clear understanding of how things have gotten better, how
management oversight of R&D projects has increased and what is
the path forward as we look forward--as we look forward and the
drastic funding cuts coming out of this Congress.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
We will take a recess and be reconvened as soon as we get
back from our vote.
[Recess.]
Mr. Lungren. Alright, we will resume and thank you for your
indulgence in the time that was taken for our votes. We are
going to try and move along here so that before the next votes
we are here. So I will recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Dr. Gerstein, I know this is a general question but do you
view the job that you have, with respect to the kinds of
research that we are talking about, to be one of basic research
or applied science or a mixture of two or is that a
inappropriate distinction in this environment in which you
work?
Mr. Gerstein. Well, thank you. No, that is a great
question, actually, and it fits very well into our value-added
proposition and the way we have been thinking about science and
technology or research and development. So if you looked at our
organization a couple of years ago, you would have seen much
more focus on basic research and, then, some applied research.
But, today, what we are focusing in on is instead of big ``R'',
big ``D'', we are looking at little ``R'', big ``D''.
So we are doing less basic and applied research and we are
looking for more development. The point here is what we are
trying to do is be very operationally focused. That is to get
products to the Homeland Security enterprise. To do that at the
numbers that we are at, you absolutely have to find work that
is on-going in the community; you have to partner with other
entities, whether that is the DOE Labs, whether that is other
interagency partners, international partners.
So it is absolutely essential that we continue to focus on
this later-stage development and move things forward where it
can be commercialized and brought forward.
Mr. Lungren. Same question for you, Dr. Gowadia.
Ms. Gowadia. Gowadia.
Mr. Lungren. Gowadia.
Ms. Gowadia. It is a strange name, I will give you----
Mr. Lungren. No, no, people mess my name up too. I don't
know how they do that but they do. But go ahead.
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, we, actually, have been fortunate in that
we have the entire scope of effort for the nuclear threat in
DNDO. So we are able to take a holistic, integrated approach to
the countering nuclear threats mission. As such, we make sure
that our sustainment of the early R&D in our transformational
research portfolio stays consistent. Also, our forensics
mission. Of course, it is all driven from an analysis of the
architecture.
So we have vulnerabilities that come up from analyzing the
gaps in the architecture and our close coordination with our
partners, so we know what is needed operationally to deliver.
So we have tried, actually, to have a fair balance between the
early research and the applied end.
Mr. Lungren. Look, we can all talk about budgets and so
forth. The fact of the matter is we are in a budget crisis; we
are all looking at tougher decisions than we have ever had to
make, I believe, if we are going to be serious about this. So
you are not going to have all the money you want to have. My
question is, therefore, Dr. Gerstein, in the area of Plum
Island and, then, its successor, now, as I understand it, you
are asking the National Academy of Sciences to assess the very
need for the successor and development of an analysis of
alternatives, delineating all options to meet the threat.
It is easy to do Monday-morning quarterbacking but have we
made a mistake in saying that we had to go to an alternative to
Plum Island? Did we make a mistake in deciding that we were
going to site in Kansas and not do the proper development that
we needed? Or is this the result of budget reality staring us
in the face that causes us to reassess?
Because, you know, we were bragging about this just a
couple years ago and now we are saying we have got to reassess
the whole thing. That might be an intelligent decision; it
might be a statement that we wasted a pile of money that we
can't afford to waste. Where are we on that?
Mr. Gerstein. So, a fair question, and what I would like to
do is start off with the strategic context and say that Plum
Island is 58 years old. It has been a magnificent facility; we
have done great work there. We are continuing to do great work
there, as evidenced by the Foot-and-Mouth disease vaccine work
and the eventual licensure that we are going to get.
On the other hand, there are some limitations with Plum
Island; they are significant limitations and we are continuing
to modernize the facility even as we look to move to a new
facility with the NBAF. By ``modernize'', I mean we are looking
at putting in a new wastewater treatment handler so that we can
ensure that the products that come out of the experimentation
is all safely put through and there are no pathogens
contaminates in that. That is just one example of the
modernization.
So what are some of the limitations? Well, Plum Island
doesn't have the highest containment level, or BSL-4
capability; that is a major drawback, giving the infectious
emerging diseases, such as NIPA and Hendra, and even some of
the old-world diseases, such as Rift Valley and West Nile
Virus.
In fact, we are so concerned about this lack of capability,
that I have recently been to Canada and talked to them in
Winnipeg about their one health facility that deals with
agricultural contaminates by biological pathogens. They can
handle a BSL-4. On the other hand, they can handle one cow at a
time; in our studies, we are handling 100 cows at a time,
multiple rooms, and doing herd analysis. So very different
level of scale.
I am also going to Australia to talk to them about their
BSL-4 Ag. They are working on diseases that we simply do not
have the capacity for. Our facility right now, at Plum, we are
only looking at three diseases; the Foot-and-Mouth Disease and
we are doing the vaccine trials, we are looking at classic
Swine Fever and African Swine Fever, where we are doing--
development.
So here is the NAS study that we have asked for. It is not
to say, ``Do we need this facility?'' it is to say, ``In view
of the current fiscal environment, is it going to be
affordable?'' So we have asked NAS to look at three basic
options: One is to build NBAF as it is originally intended and
as it is currently designed; to build a smaller version of
NBAF; or to keep--and to try to leverage the foreign MOUs and,
therefore, not build NBAF.
But, in terms of protection of our $1 trillion agricultural
industry, we know that there is a valid requirement to have a
capacity for a BSL-4, high-containment facility, dedicated to
agriculture.
Mr. Lungren. I thank you and my time is expired but I would
like, at some point in time to get around to the question of
when is that study going to be done and when do you think you
can act on it?
Mr. Gerstein. May I just follow up on that because that is
a short answer. The study should be done by the 30th of June.
Mr. Lungren. Of this year?
Mr. Gerstein. Of this year. We intend to have that to the
Secretary and then a decision will be made on affordability.
Mr. Lungren. Okay, we will be very interested in looking at
this as soon as that comes up.
The Ranking Member is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Gerstein, I wanted to just ask a couple of questions
relative to ONL. In addition to the oversight at S&T
Directorate Laboratory Operations, ONL is to coordinate
homeland security-related activities and Laboratory Directorate
research, conducted within the DOE's National Laboratories. So
I was wondering if there is a--if ONL has a current list or
breakdown of the DHS research and development projects
conducted at the S&T-owned National Laboratories and at the
DOE-owned Laboratories. If so, how much does DHS spend annually
on R&D at the National Labs?
Mr. Gerstein. Okay, so let me begin by talking about the
total spending and some of the trends. So for fiscal year 2010,
at the DOE Labs, we spent $152 million. In 2011, it was $103.6
million and, this year, year-to-date, we have spent $10.1
million. That is a reflection of the down-sizing of the number
of projects. We have gone from, approximately, 250 projects in
fiscal year 2010 to 63 projects today.
So that is why you see the numbers change. Now, that is the
S&T spending in the DOE Labs. If you were to back out, or if
you were to add, all the spending to the DOE Labs from the
Department of Homeland Security that number would be $312.7
million and it cuts across seven different components from
within the Department of Homeland Security. So your first part
of the question, though, was on this idea of ONL and
authorities and whether or not they have the appropriate
authorities.
Here, I would say that I think we are actually well-endowed
with our authorities, in that we, under the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, were given authorization under section 309, to
have direct funding into the Department of Energy Laboratories.
That has been very powerful and that has been augmented with a
management directive, 143, from within the Department of
Homeland Security, that gives us the ability in ONL and S&T to
look at the appropriateness of the work that is being conducted
in the DOE Laboratories.
So let me make clear, though, this is not a go, no-go, but
if we are presented with a project and we look at it and we
say, ``You know, this is not really in the laboratory sweet
spot,'' we do not feel any degree of bashfulness about saying
this is not the right performer. Now, we will not be able to
stop that if the component were dead-set.
Now, most recently, our Secretary has said she wants to
have greater visibility into the work that is being done at the
Federally-funded research centers, or FFRDCs. To that end, to
gain that greater visibility, she has put in place that S&T
will assist the components in developing a portfolio review
process, which is very similar to the process that we have. She
is not going to have it directed so that everyone will look
identically but the requirement to have a portfolio review
process and to gain visibility of the work that is being done
in research and development across the components will, indeed,
become part of our culture.
Ms. Clarke. Let me just follow up with a couple of other
questions here. The development of the Homeland Security
workforce, including the next generation of scientists and
researchers engaged in homeland security activities, has one
goal of DHS. How are DNDO and the S&T Directorate engaging
scientists at the DHS Laboratories and the DOE National
Laboratories to foster homeland security scientific workforce?
What programs or activities does DHS have that leverage the
scientific capabilities of these facilities to strengthen
outreach to other scientists, for example, in academia?
Ms. Gowadia. I will take this question----
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
Ms. Gowadia [continuing]. First. At DNDO, we actually have
a legislative mandate and two strong programs that are focused
specifically at the intellectual infrastructure of developing
sciences for our nuclear detection and forensics mission. The
first is a legislatively-mandated program--is the National
Nuclear Forensics and Expertise Development program--every
aspect of the program is close-coupled with the National
Laboratories, we are looking for maintenance of our Nation's
capabilities for geochemical sciences, nuclear sciences, to
make sure that our forensics expertise pipelines is consistent.
We have students--170, actually, have come through our
process so far and we have five universities, major
universities, involved in the program and additional 10 summer
interns, all the way from undergraduate through graduate
school, post-Docs and faculty, are encouraged and, actually,
stipulated that they have to work with the National
Laboratories on their research. We continue to assess the needs
of the program based on the mission, as well as the supply and
demand of the human capital chain. So that is the legislative
part.
In addition to the forensics mission, of course, we have
this large nuclear detection responsibility. For that, we have
our academic research initiative. This is a joint partnership
we have with the National Science Foundation and we select
programs or projects from the universities. It is specifically
with the universities; we are looking for our next generation
of researchers in the nuclear detection realm.
Not only do we weigh the proposals on their technical
merits but, also, we look to see what support the university
will give the student and, thereby, develop a career path,
ensuring that the innovative solutions that can come from this
next generation will be made available to us.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Dr. Gowadia.
Thank you, Dr. Gerstein.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, the gentlelady's time has expired.
The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Long, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Gowadia, on the National Laboratories--everybody knows
that they have been around for 60 years, or whatever, and, kind
of, the centerpiece of R&D capabilities. What steps are the
Department of Energy that has those National Labs now or
their--has the jurisdiction over them, what steps are they
taking to partner with you all, with DHS?
Ms. Gowadia. Thank you, Representative Long. My colleague,
Dr. Gerstein, mentioned the Mission Executive Council. So that
is just one of the many interagency--we have, where we look at
not just the relevant capabilities that are relevant to our
projects immediately, but what needs to be sustained for the
long-term, the maintenance, development, and sustainment of the
facilities, the people, the resources, the knowledge base.
We work very closely with the National Laboratories to make
sure that those interagency--are well-supplied with information
to make the right strategic decisions at the U.S. Government
level. Of course, we involve the laboratories in everything we
do at DNDO, based on their unique and special expertise in the
nuclear realm. So all the way from planning through assessment
through operation support, of course, the research and
development. So we have a very good partnership there, not just
with our Federal partners but, also, with our laboratory
partners.
Mr. Long. So, as far as defining the mission that you are
confident, or you are pleased that they are working together
with DHS?
Ms. Gowadia. Yes, sir. Yes, they are very dedicated to the
nuclear mission.
Mr. Long. Okay, thank you. Pronouncing Dr. Gowadia is one
thing but I am still caught up on the fact people mispronounce
``Dan.'' I don't understand how that happens but--I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. Well, all I can say is the former Governor of
Mississippi used three syllables to say ``Dan,'' if you ever
heard him talk--``Da-a-an''. So that is how it is.
All right, gentlelady from California is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Well, my first question I would like to ask
of the Chairman. That is, for those of us who participated
today, do we get extra brownie points for showing up 2 days in
a row and----
Mr. Lungren. Absolutely, and, particularly----
Ms. Richardson. [Off mike]
Mr. Lungren [continuing]. If the quality of the questions
are good.
[Laughter.]
Ms. Richardson. Oh, okay, that is why you are the Chairman.
Representatives of the DOE National Laboratories serve
within DHS in advisory roles, often temporary IPA employees.
The National Academy of Public Administration and DHS Office of
Inspector General and the GAO office, all have highlighted the
need for DHS to maintain strong managerial controls, in order
to maintain transparency and funding activities and to avoid
conflicts of interest.
My question is: Please describe how DNDO and the S&T
Directorate ensure that these representatives avoid conflicts
of interest.
How is that, Mr. Chairman?
Mr. Lungren. Well, we will see what the answer is.
Ms. Richardson. All right.
Mr. Gerstein. Could I ask you to clarify which
representatives are you referring to?
Ms. Richardson. Specifically, I was referring to the IPA
employees that are often temporary.
Mr. Gerstein. Well, so, when we look at this, obviously,
and we decide who is going to be a performer and what projects
are going to be worked on, there is an analysis that gets done.
Through our portfolio review, what we have done is to look and
pare down those projects. Based on that, we make a corporate
decision on who the performers are going to be.
We are not placing people in a position where a conflict of
interest is likely to occur. So we wouldn't want, for example,
an IPA to be directly working on something that they had worked
on in their previous incarnation at the laboratory where they
serve. So----
Ms. Richardson. Do you keep records, though, to verify
that, in fact, is not occurring?
Mr. Gerstein. Well, because of the number of projects we
are dealing with, we actually have very few IPAs that come from
the DOE Labs. So this does not serve to be a major problem.
Ms. Richardson. But do you have records to determine if
that could occur?
Mr. Gerstein. We certainly do know where people work. Yes,
we do keep those records.
Ms. Richardson. You keep it into consideration?
Mr. Gerstein. We absolutely do. We look to see who the best
performer is and, based on that, we make the assessment of
whether or not we go with the DOE Lab, whether we go with a--
typical contractor, whether or not we go to an interagency
partner or an international partner.
Ms. Richardson. Okay, could you specifically reference the
NAPA study, though, and the concerns that they provided in
our--let us see, I am having National Academy of Public
Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, your
department--June 2009--the Office of Inspector General had a
report and it said, ``DHS needs to improve ethics-related
management controls for the Science and Technology
Directorate.'' Also, referenced December 22, 2005.
Mr. Gerstein. Yes, so, let me say, I would like to take
this for the record but I do believe that our management
controls have greatly improved with the entire process of
conducting a systems analysis, doing the portfolio reviews,
ensuring that we are working towards projects that will,
indeed, transition long-term. But I would like to provide a
more detailed answer to you.
Ms. Richardson. Sure, well, if the Chairman does not
object, I would suggest that you review those two reports, June
2009 and December 2005, and come back to the committee based
upon those recommendations and see if they have, in fact, been
addressed.
My next question is--the DHS budget, especially that for
research and development within DHS, is experiencing great
fiscal pressure. I heard you saying ``greatly endowed.'' I
thought that that was interesting. But, for all of us, there is
extreme pressures of what gets funded. What procedure does DHS
have in place to guide program managers regarding performing
research and development?
Mr. Gerstein. So we have instituted a number of what we are
calling ``knowledge management activities'' and, really, the
centerpiece is the portfolio review process and the way we
select those programs that we are going to put into as a
portfolio.
As we mentioned earlier, we have come down from $1 billion,
of which about $600 million was dedicated to R&D, and we had
250 projects down to, current year, 63 projects and $265
million. Through that portfolio process, we have pared back
considerably. So we also have, in addition to the portfolio
review process, a program manager handbook, which is designed
to tell program managers what their duties and responsibilities
are as part of the enterprise that we are running.
Ms. Richardson. Mr. Chairman, could I have an additional 10
seconds?
Mr. Lungren. Yes.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, sir.
What criteria, though, building upon that, does the DNDO
and S&T Directorate use to determine whether industry,
academia, or DOE National Laboratory or the DHS Laboratory
should perform the research and development?
Mr. Gerstein. So that is a great question. Let me start by
saying that there are certain activities that are ideally
suited for the Department of Energy Laboratories and our
consortium of laboratories' internal labs. So, what we do is we
think about what project and what is the problem we are trying
to solve through our systems analysis approach.
But what it comes down to is this--that if you are looking
for something that is multi-dimensional, highly complex, it is
going to be a long-term effort--that is something that is
ideally suited to the DOE Labs and our internal labs. On the
other hand, if you are looking for just simple program
management, there are many contractors who can perform that
role and probably do it at a more cost-effective basis.
Ms. Gowadia. We have a very disciplined approach, ma'am, at
DNDO, for going through our entire portfolio on an annual
basis. Our requirements are based entirely on the analysis of
the global nuclear detection architecture for which we are
responsible. We seek to address the vulnerabilities, both in
the long-term research portfolio and in our shorter-term fixes,
not just by way of research and development but, also, by way
of operational changes and non-material solutions.
We have found that we are able to actually tap nicely into
the laboratory structure, academia, and industry as
appropriate. As Dr. Gerstein mentioned, some of the shorter-
term engineering development is done in industry but the long-
term challenges that require the lab's expertise, access to
special nuclear material, assessments, et cetera. We certainly
work with the labs on those things.
Ms. Richardson. Sure, my time is expired.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very, very much. I apologize for the
shortness of time because of the votes. We are going to have
votes later and I want to make sure we get the second panel.
Dr. Morgan, I apologize for us not asking you any questions
here. I believe there will be questions submitted by the panel
in writing and we would ask you to respond to them.
Dr. Gerstein, I am going to ask a question in writing with
respect to our inability to get spreadsheets from you in terms
of exactly how much is being spent by DHS to the labs over the
past number of years; there was some question about different
analyses from DOE versus DHS. But it is disappointing for us so
we are going to submit a specific series of questions to you on
that. We would appreciate a response in a timely fashion. Other
Members may also ask questions as well.
Again, I thank you for appearing before us. I thank you for
the work that you are doing. These are difficult budget times.
This is very important work for us, spanning all the way from
nuclear threat to the threat to agriculture and everything in
between.
Dr. Morgan, thank you for the work that you are doing to
help us get a--sort of, a third voice and third set of eyes
there. Thank you very much.
We would dismiss the first panel now and call forward the
second panel, Ms. Jill Hruby, Vice President, International,
Homeland and Nuclear Security Management Unit at Sandia
National Laboratories and Dr. Michael Carter, Senior Leadership
Staff, National Ignition Facility, Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory.
Once again, thank you for being here and thank you for the
work that you are doing. We are trying to make sure we get
between two sets of votes on what is known as a ``getaway day''
for Congress. So I know I have four of us here now. After the
votes, I am not sure we would have too many folks here. So we
are going to try and proceed very quickly.
Ms. Jill Hruby is the Vice President of International,
Homeland and Nuclear Security at Sandia National Laboratories.
Ms. Hruby focuses on nuclear security, including non-
proliferation, technology support to arms control activity,
global nuclear security and threat reduction, nuclear asset
protection, detention and response to weapons of mass
destruction.
In addition, she is also Vice President for Energy Security
and Defense Technologies, has been with Sandia more than 25
years, and previously serving as director of homeland security
and defense systems and director of materials in engineering
sciences. Over the course of her career, she has been actively
engaged in nanoscience research, hydrogen storage, solar energy
research, mechanical component design, Thermal Analysis, and
microfluidics.
Dr. Michael Carter is the Senior Scientist for the National
Ignition Facility and Photon Science Directorate at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. Prior to this appointment, he
served as a deputy principal associate director for program,
within the laboratory's Global Security Principal Directory. He
came to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory after working
for more than 3 years at Department of Homeland Security, was
the deputy director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
and Nuclear--and director of the DHS Science and Technology
Directorate's Nuclear and Radiological Countermeasures Program.
He has also served as technical advisor, for 8 months, at
the White House's Transition Planning Office for the
Establishment of the Department. Again, as I mentioned, your
written statements are made a part of the record in their
totality and we would ask you to summarize in 5 minutes.
Thank you, Ms. Hruby, and we would now recognize you.
STATEMENT OF JILL M. HRUBY, VICE PRESIDENT, INTERNATIONAL,
HOMELAND AND NUCLEAR SECURITY, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES
Ms. Hruby. Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and
distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify. I am Jill Hruby, the Vice President of
Sandia National Laboratory's International, Homeland and
Nuclear Security Strategic Management Unit. Sandia is a multi-
program National security laboratory owned by the United States
Government and operated by Sandia Corporation for the National
Nuclear Security Administration.
Sandia supports multiple Government agencies, providing
science and end-to-end, engineering solutions for complex and
high-risk systems to protect the Nation from the worst, often
existential, threats. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to
you today concerning the best use of the DOE National Security
Labs, that help address the mission challenges at DHS.
The labs, acting in their role as R&D, Federally-funded,
research and development centers, help DHS more effectively get
ahead and stay ahead of threats to our homeland by filling the
need for a science, technology, and engineering enterprise,
dedicated to their mission. An example of why enduring S&T
enterprise is so important was highlighted in the aftermath of
the 2001 Anthrax attacks.
Because our scientists anticipated the threat of deliberate
use of pathogens against civilian populations, we had to
develop foam that was used to safely and effectively
decontaminate many of the contaminated buildings in the
District of Columbia. There was no commercial market for the
foam, nor was there yet any perceived urgency about the
biological threat. But, because of the special nature of the
DOE National Security Laboratories and their enduring focus on
National security challenges, the Nation had, in its hip
pocket, a novel technology to immediately mitigate the
consequences of the attack.
The National Academies wrote, in their post-9/11 report,
that it is critical to establish a flexible supporting science
and technology enterprise. The unique nature and capabilities
of the DOE National Security Labs make us natural partners in
this enterprise. Congress also recognized the capabilities the
DOE Labs had applied to DHS, recognizing that the mission space
could not be covered simply by adapting solutions developed for
other reasons, but required solution providers to develop and
maintain considerate domain knowledge and expertise.
An ability to see the art of the possible. They understood
the benefits of leveraging knowledge and solutions across the
homeland security place, including DOE, DOD, and the IC. That
is why Congress explicitly created pathways that would
facilitate DHS access to, and use of, these labs through
legislation. Clearly, the labs do not fulfill all homeland
security technology needs; the private sector and academia
supply important element of the continuum of technology needs
from near- to long-term.
What we do fill is a crucial niche by acting as an
objective brain trust, with extensive domain knowledge and
broad and deep technical expertise, to help buy down risk and
understand the role science and technology can play in real-
world solutions. We are available 24/7. While DHS and the
Nation have benefitted from many technical solutions, resulting
from long-term research and development performed by the labs
before and after 2002, I fear the pipeline may be drying up.
The role that the labs play for DHS today is not one of
R&D, Federally-funded research and development centers. Now, we
are mainly contractors on competitively-bid research projects,
which is not optimum. The very best use of the special
character of the labs, which will simultaneously sustain the
scientists and engineers, is to focus the labs on understanding
the mission needs by working with operators and assessing
threats and using the knowledge of the mission and threat
realities to suggest and, in some cases, pursue long-term
innovation to fill major gaps.
Finding the right balance between harvesting available
technologies and driving innovation for the long term is
fundamental to success in securing the homeland. There are some
on-going efforts between DHS and the labs that begin to model
what partnership could look like. For example, development of
an integrated bio security strategy for the S&T Directorate--
excuse me, helping TSA develop risk-based systems and working
with FEMA to establish a longer-term modeling and simulation
agenda, are good applications of the labs.
Secretary O'Toole has expressed an interest in engaging
with the labs to articulate major emerging homeland security
challenges, along with the R&D required to address those
challenges. We are committed to the homeland security mission.
We can make a difference. It is what we strive to do; provide
exceptional service in the National interest.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity I am privileged you
have afforded me today. I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Hruby follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jill M. Hruby
April 19, 2012
introduction
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and distinguished Members
of the House Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies,
thank you for the opportunity to testify. I am Jill Hruby, Vice
President of Sandia National Laboratories' International, Homeland and
Nuclear Security organization. Sandia is a multi-program National
security laboratory owned by the United States Government and operated
by Sandia Corporation for the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA).
I appreciate the opportunity to comment on a topic that is so
important to the long-term security of our Nation. I hope my statement
today, along with those of my colleagues in the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and from the National security science and technology
provider community, will result in concrete actions to ensure that DHS
can provide science and technology (S&T) solutions that allow our
Nation to get, and stay, ahead of threats to our homeland. In order to
do this, I believe DHS needs to create and foster an enduring
environment where dedicated, outstanding scientists and engineers can,
as providers of solutions that will deter acts of terrorism, enable
resilience to natural disasters and other incidents, and facilitate
trade and travel while enhancing security.
One example of how dedicated scientists made a difference in urgent
circumstances was the decontamination foam that was used to clean up
nearly all the contaminated buildings in Washington, DC after the
anthrax attacks. Our scientists had been watching the biological threat
for years--concerned that pathogens would someday be used against our
population--and that we would need to rapidly respond. When the attack
came, we had already developed a novel, effective technology to quickly
mitigate the consequences. That kind of threat awareness, and the
ability to do something concrete about it, comes from a special type of
person in a special type of institution. The DOE National Security
Laboratories cultivate those committed people and establish and
maintain those capabilities. My hope is that, with a shift in the way
DHS and these labs engage with each other, we will realize a robust and
enduring approach to ensure our Nation is always prepared.
major points of this testimony
The only way DHS can get ahead of the threat is with a
dedicated and flexible science and engineering enterprise
focused on solutions for the long term and the unique nature
and capabilities of the DOE National Security Laboratories
makes us natural partners in this dedicated enterprise.
DHS has benefitted from many technical solutions that the
DOE National Security Laboratories contributed as a result of
long-term research and development performed for other agencies
long before its creation, but that pipeline is not being
sustained.
DHS as a whole is not taking advantage of the systems
analysis and long-term innovation that the DOE National
Security Laboratories are best-suited to provide; however,
there are some on-going efforts that begin to model what the
partnership could look like--and lead to enduring solutions to
hard homeland security mission challenges.
need for dedicated homeland security research and development
In the aftermath of 9/11 and the Amerithrax attacks, the National
Academy of Sciences completed a rigorous assessment of major Homeland
Security challenges. ``Making the Nation Safer''\1\ described in detail
how important technical approaches were to effectively managing the
risks in the homeland security mission space--especially since many of
the most consequential threats are posed by technology. The report
pointed out what we now accept as a basic truth--that our society and
infrastructures are very complex and completely interconnected.
Understanding threats and potential consequences to these systems, as
well as understanding how to optimally balance the components of the
systems--technologies, people, and concepts of operations--is the
fundamental first step in changing the risk equation in our favor. And
although the National Academies proposed a suite of near-term, high-
priority research and development activities, they also stated it was
critical to establish a flexible supporting science and technology
enterprise that could change and adapt as circumstances change. Getting
in front of the threat--and staying there--is what the DOE National
Security Labs were created to do--and what we have been doing well for
over 60 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in
Countering Terrorism, Committee on Science and Technology for
Countering Terrorism, National Research Council, http://www.nap.edu/
openbook.php?record id=10415, 2002, The National Academies Press, 440p.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Congress recognized the capabilities the DOE Labs could apply and
explicitly created pathways that would facilitate the new Department's
access to and use of these labs in the 2002 enabling legislation--Pub.
L. 107-296, Sec 309. This legislation was remarkably forward-looking,
and explicitly gave DHS direct access to the DOE Labs' unique
expertise, knowledge base, and experimental and computational
facilities--developed over years of taxpayer investments--to help with
needed science and technology for homeland security on an equal basis
with other missions. As a result, it provided a direct path to
establishing a cadre of experts with an enduring focus on the hard
problems in homeland security within the DOE National Laboratories.
Today, the DHS and laboratory community recognize the unique nature
of homeland security work relative to other National security
challenges. When supplying technical solutions for homeland security,
consideration must be given to the operator and his or her environment
and training, to individual freedoms and U.S. public acceptance, to
interagency coordination, and to other practical and policy
considerations. In addition, the homeland security missions are broad
including everything from natural disaster preparation to protection
from, response to, and recovery from the use of a weapon of mass
destruction against the U.S. civilian population. This is not a mission
space that will be covered simply by adapting solutions being developed
for other reasons--it is a unique mission space requiring solution
providers with considerable domain knowledge and expertise.
doe national laboratories construct
Let me start with a brief summary of the DOE Laboratories for those
of you who are unfamiliar with us. DOE manages 17 National
Laboratories, 3 being managed under the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA). Sandia and our two sister NNSA Labs--Lawrence
Livermore and Los Alamos--are large, multidisciplinary research and
development (R&D) institutions wholly dedicated to the National
security. Most of the DOE Laboratories have missions devoted to science
and energy, although two of those--Pacific Northwest National
Laboratory and Oak Ridge National Laboratory--have significant
footprints in National security. All of the National Laboratories have
operated as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)
since our creation about 65 years ago during the Manhattan project.
Today, Sandia's prime sponsor is the NNSA and we work with support from
multiple Government agencies to provide science and engineering
solutions for complex and high-risk systems, endangered by often
existential threats.
The FFRDC construct has served the Nation exceptionally well for 70
years. The core tenets of FFRDCs (from FAR Title 48CRF35.017) govern
the practices and culture of the National Laboratories:
An FFRDC meets a special long-term research or development
need,
An FFRDC is required to conduct its business in a manner
befitting its special relationship with the Government, to
operate in the public interest with objectivity and
independence, and
A long-term relationship between the Government and FFRDCs
should provide the continuity that helps the FFRDC both attract
and retain high-quality personnel. This relationship should
also be of a type to encourage the FFRDC to maintain currency
in its field(s) of expertise, retain its objectivity and
independence, preserve its familiarity with the needs of its
sponsor(s), and provide a quick response capability.
The fact that we are FFRDCs, coupled with the nature of our work
over decades, has created a truly valuable and unique resource for the
U.S. Government to meet its special long-term needs for science,
technology, and engineering. Efforts at the DOE National Security Labs
span the complete technology life-cycle from basic research and
development to testing and evaluation, modeling and simulation,
technology system deployment, operator and decision-maker support and
training, and policy advice. Our special relationship with the
Government provides for independence and objectivity--and our bottom-
line commitment is to the mission rather than the shareholder. This
creates a different mindset among our staff, one of total commitment to
sponsors' needs and to the security of the Nation. The labs do not
compete with industry; rather we partner with them to pave the way for
commercialization of technology once it is sufficiently mature to
become operationally viable. We do not fulfill all of the needs for
homeland security technology solutions--but we fill a crucial niche as
a brain trust of homeland security domain expertise and deep and broad
science and engineering in addressing both urgent and long-term needs
for science, technology, and systems advice.
Each of the DOE National Security Laboratories has unique strengths
and capabilities. At Sandia, our culture of both scientific excellence
and large-scale systems engineering drives us to think about the
totality of a problem and to understand what will really make a
difference; not to simply reach for ``low-hanging fruit'' but to really
explore how to change the game. Nothing is more likely to inspire lab
staff to innovation than stating an important problem is too complex to
solve. All of the DOE National Security Labs have the ability to bring
together interdisciplinary teams to tackle problems that are beyond the
scope of academic institutions--although we frequently partner with
academia to feed the innovation pipeline, to keep our skills sharp, and
to develop future generations of laboratory staff. Sandia creates and
maintains large facilities for the U.S. Government such as
environmental test ranges, including those for testing novel
explosives; nano- and micro-fabrication facilities capable of producing
both research prototypes and unique, radiation-hardened
microelectronics; and high-performance computing. These facilities can
be used for high-risk, classified experiments and push the envelope
beyond the scale of those existing at purely academic or commercial
entities.
a brief summary of sandia's homeland security contributions
All of the DOE National Security Laboratories have applied their
unique expertise individually and in collaborative partnerships over
the years to create solutions to high-impact homeland security
problems. The examples below are a subset of the areas in which Sandia
has contributed. Each of the labs could share a similar list of
contributions.
Looking Over the Horizon--Biological Risk
The long-term relationship codified by the FFRDC construct provides
for an enduring focus on significant National security issues that
creates the deep and broad knowledge base that not only enables the
labs to understand the immediate threats, but also to look over the
horizon and anticipate future risks. Before the creation of DHS, the
labs anticipated the potential for a biological threat to be used on
civilian populations in the United States, and invested in solutions to
use if needed--such as the specialized foam (mentioned earlier) used to
decontaminate 53 of the 56 Washington, DC-area buildings that were
contaminated by the 2001 anthrax attacks. Our microanalytical methods
that allowed characterization of the Amerithrax material were
incorporated into specialized equipment and transferred to DHS'
National Bioforensics and Analysis Center (NBAAC) for routine use in
the investigation of biocrime and bioterror events. We were engaged in
developing the first generation of the BioWatch program, which placed
detectors in locations around numerous U.S. cities to rapidly detect
the release of pathogens into the air. As DHS is now enhancing the
system, the labs are performing trade-off studies to inform the
requirements for the next-generation system to ensure performance
metrics for response time and detection sensitivity are understood and
incorporated. Today, rapid advances in biology have opened the door to
the possibility that terrorists might engineer existing or develop
novel organisms to enhance their efficacy and evade current detectors
and countermeasures. Sandia is investing in methods to rapidly identify
new threat organisms to allow response to these new potential threats.
Leveraging and Coordinating Efforts--Nuclear and Cyber Risk
Another key strength of our National security laboratories is the
ability to leverage across the breadth of related National security
missions--helping to create a more consistent and robust system across
multiple U.S. Government agencies and international partners. As
expected, the labs have contributed to the current goals of nuclear and
radiological risk reduction beginning with aggressively accelerating
research to modify radiological detection technologies originally
developed for DOD and NNSA for use in homeland security applications.
DHS operations required that equipment originally capable only of
identifying specific radionuclides in controlled lab conditions rapidly
evolve for effective deployment in the noisy, environmentally variable
real world and for use by non-technical operators. The DOE National
Security Labs were key to this technology transition.
The labs continue to work with the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) to build the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA)
and develop international guidelines documents on core concepts related
to nuclear detection. DNDO's ``Model Guidelines Document'' is currently
being adapted by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to be
part of its Nuclear Security Series. DHS has been able to leverage
capabilities and past experiences at Sandia including those gained from
supporting the NNSA's nuclear non-proliferation efforts such as Second
Line of Defense (SLD), the Department of State's Export Control and
Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS), the Department of Defense
CENTCOM workshops on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) interdiction and
border security, IAEA initiatives, and others. The benefit to DHS
includes not only specific technologies but also technical bench
strength that have been built by the DOE National Security Laboratories
for other agencies to apply to the unique problems in homeland
environments. Those agencies, in turn, benefit from the contributions
sponsored by DHS--resulting in an overall uplift of the Nation's
nuclear security capabilities.
Because of our long history in cybersecurity for a variety of
sponsors and beginning with our responsibility for the security of the
command and control of the U.S. nuclear weapons, DHS' National
Protection and Programs and Science and Technology Directorates are now
leveraging Sandia's knowledge of the most sophisticated cyberthreats to
perform adversarial analyses on potential new cybersecurity approaches
before they are deployed for use by Government and industry. We also
use our deep knowledge base and ties to other Government entities to
develop and extend tools for analysis of risk factors, to perform
threat assessments, and conduct vulnerability assessments on systems of
interest to the DHS.
The Nation's Technical First Responders--Urgent Response to Natural and
Man-Made Incidents
Our enduring focus provides an ability to quickly respond to urgent
needs--and this is particularly true for WMD and other high-consequence
threats. The labs are the Nation's technical first responders. In the
aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, the Christmas day bombing attempt, and
the Deepwater Horizon and Fukushima disasters, our deep technical
expertise was used as an immediate and integral part of the overall
response to guide executive leadership in characterizing the situation,
predicting the evolution of the incident, and advising on appropriate
response and consequence management approaches.
Applying System Solutions and Developing Requirements Informed by
Domain Knowledge--Border and Aviation Security
No homeland security solution exists in a vacuum. These solutions
are all part of complex, interdependent systems that include
technology, human operators and decision makers, environmental and
operational constraints, policy drivers, and many other competing and
reinforcing requirements. Sandia systems analysts work with both DHS
S&T and DHS operational components to refine the understanding and
definition of problem space, create and apply an analytic framework
that utilizes ``measures of effectiveness'' germane to stakeholders'
objectives, analyze options within that framework, and then explain
options, insights, and trade-offs to enable action.
The highly complex and enduring challenge of enhanced border
security requires developing a detailed and accurate understanding of
the global systems architecture and all of its important components:
Ports of entry and unattended borders at the ground level and below, in
the air and on the water, across all modes of transportation and
conveyances, moving legitimate and illegitimate people and goods. The
border is a complex interdependent system that can only be addressed
through a multidisciplinary, sustained, and long-term effort. For over
60 years, Sandia has been providing trusted National service in the
form of end-to-end analysis and full life-cycle support solutions for
safeguarding critical National assets.
In the early 1990s, Sandia performed a mile-by-mile analysis of the
Southwestern U.S. Border for the Immigration and Naturalization
Service. The study assessed the impact of potential technological and
operational changes, and made specific recommendations such as the very
successful multi-layer San Diego fence. The 1993 report continues to be
frequently requested and referenced by DHS and others interested in
understanding the border system.
More recently, Sandia led a team to contribute to aviation security
by performing system modeling and analysis of the TSA airport
checkpoint system in order to understand the effect of deployment of
new systems on the checkpoint operations. As a result, a decision
framework and prototype tool was provided to TSA to apply a structured
approach for evaluating system impacts and tradeoffs among key aviation
security objectives. And when TSA starts its next system acquisition,
it will know in advance how effective it will be for the dollars
expended and how best to deploy the systems so the technologies and its
human operators work smoothly together.
dhs relationship with the doe national security laboratories
As discussed above, Sandia worked on many homeland security
challenges long before the September 11 attacks and we have been
committed to DHS since its inception. Our lab, along with other DOE
National Security Labs, provided scientists who established the
framework for the S&T Directorate (and later DNDO) and who also filled
key roles in the initial senior leadership team. The labs played a
foundational role in creating the systems configuration and enabling
the technical basis for major homeland security capabilities in use
today, including the BioWatch System, radiation detection technologies
used at major points of entry, and the technical basis for assessing
aircraft vulnerability. Sandia remains firmly committed to the homeland
security mission, even though DHS work is a very small and decreasing
percentage of our work.
While the 2002 legislation creating DHS authorized utilization of
the DOE National Laboratories as R&D FFRDCs for DHS that is not the
role that we have today. Now our laboratories are used predominantly as
contractors on competitively bid research projects. We perform discrete
research and technology development in response to specific technical
requirements. While the labs have been relatively successful in
competing for projects on a transactional basis, this model fails to
utilize the unbiased technical advice and analysis for systems-based
solutions based on a thorough understanding of the mission and the
operational needs of the sponsor, deep scientific understanding, and
multidisciplinary National security expertise unique to these
laboratories. In fact, working on projects rather than mission is
precisely the wrong use of these labs.
Part of the issue with appropriate use of the DOE National Security
Labs is it requires coordination between S&T and the operational
components in a way that doesn't exist today. The S&T Directorate is
responsible for R&D efforts and priorities in support of DHS' mission,
and performing associated demonstration, testing, and evaluation and
assessing threats and vulnerabilities. But the responsibility for
understanding the systems-level mission challenges lays with the
operational components--e.g., CBP, TSA, and FEMA.
Mission-relevant R&D must have an integral connection to the needs
of the operational components and the environments in which they work.
Solving major homeland security challenges requires systems-level
solutions enabled by a combination of thorough understanding of
operational missions, subject matter expertise, and R&D focused on core
challenges. The most fruitful collaborations begin with scientists and
engineers working directly with the operators. The depth of insight
gained during these collaborations is invaluable in characterizing the
entire system, determining the most crucial needs, and creating a
vision of what is possible. If the operational components directly
access the DOE National Security Labs as FFRDCs to support them in
developing their systems requirements--the result could be avoiding the
monetary and security costs incurred with suboptimal systems.
Another issue has occurred because of the shift in the S&T
Directorate, an almost exclusive focus on foraging for existing
technologies that can be rapidly adapted and integrated into existing
systems. It is not surprising that in today's operationally dominated
homeland security environment, the operational components and the S&T
Directorate are driven by immediate needs and have neither the time nor
an ingrained cultural inclination, to focus on systems-level solutions
for the rapidly evolving global environment. While this approach can be
a useful part of overall solutions, it is equally also important to
find the right balance between harvesting available technologies and
driving innovation for the long term.
Many of the most impactful technical solutions to the homeland
security problem arose from investments made by the Government before
DHS stood up. That pipeline that benefitted from long-term R&D has
dwindled or, in some cases, perhaps even been lost. If technology
foraging is the sole focus of DHS, then it will fall farther and
farther from achieving the levels of risk reduction required to protect
the Nation now and in the future. The lack of interest in the type of
creativity the labs bring to bear on the homeland security problem
coupled with the lack of DHS commitment reflected in intermittent and
unpredictable funding has resulted in lab staff, who had previously
dedicated themselves to this mission, walking away to work on other
important National security problems. The longer this absence of
enduring mission partnership continues, the less likely will we be able
to recapture the most talented scientists and engineers to attack
problems unique to the homeland security mission and operational
environments--and drive the innovation required to stay ahead of the
rapidly adapting adversaries and effects that propagate through our
highly interdependent systems.
For all of these reasons, if DHS can institutionalize the FFRDC
partnership relationship with the DOE National Security Laboratories
that was envisioned and authorized in the 2002 Homeland Security Act,
we can provide a very important capability for meeting homeland
security challenges and fill the keystone niche that bridges the gap
between what we have and what we need in terms of effective security
technology systems.
Presently there are some activities that show promise to result in
mission-level work that takes advantage of the character of a FFRDC
relationship and that would provide substantial benefit to the homeland
security mission.
In biosecurity, DHS S&T has recently engaged a few DOE
National Security Laboratories in the on-going development of
an integrated biosecurity strategy.
A group of DOE Labs together with the Homeland Security
Systems Engineering and Development Institute and the Homeland
Security Studies and Analysis Institute has been working with
TSA to develop systems analysis resources for the development
and implementation of risk-based screening.
S&T and FEMA have engaged Sandia, not just as a technology
provider for technologies used by emergency preparedness
professionals to enhance their training, but also as a long-
term strategic partner to help create a roadmap for development
and utilization of technology to enhance the Nation's emergency
preparedness. This partnership has also allowed S&T and FEMA to
demonstrate several near-term wins, while continuing to pursue
a longer-term R&D agenda to address tomorrow's technology
needs.
Recently, Under Secretary Tara O'Toole has asked a group of
DOE National Security Laboratories to articulate major emerging
homeland security challenges, along with the capabilities and
R&D that will be required to address those challenges.
a future with dedicated homeland security research and development
The pace of technology change and the increasing complexity and
interdependence of the systems homeland security manages and employs
demands that DHS moves to the forefront of innovation to keep in front
of the threat--and even more importantly, to shape the environment
which the threat operates and affects. As stated by the National
Academy of Sciences back in 2002, it is critical to establish a
supporting science and technology enterprise that could change and
adapt as circumstances change.
The only way to move from a reactive to an anticipatory posture in
the homeland security mission space is to establish and sustain a
dedicated R&D enterprise that is a full partner in creating the future.
This partnership can help ensure that not only the urgent--but also the
most important and enduring problems are addressed. This partnership
can ensure that dedicated scientists and engineers develop and preserve
familiarity with the needs of its DHS sponsors, establish a long-term
enduring relationship that keeps high-quality personnel engaged in
addressing mission challenges, maintain currency in fields of expertise
important to the mission, can provide a quick yet deeply knowledgeable
response capability, and can provide the advice and systems
understanding needed to implement solutions that truly address the most
important risks.
With a full partnership with the DOE National Security Labs, we can
imagine a future where:
We no longer simply reacted to novel explosive threats in
the months and years after they have been used--but rather
developed in advance synthesized information from intelligence
assessments, detection R&D, explosive performance R&D, and
advanced detection concepts. This information could drive
development and prioritization of mitigation methods for
various adversary threat pathways, concealments and threat
materials. The labs already created the structure to accomplish
this task and have many of the component parts, which could be
resourced and sustained as an integrated capability.
We could enhance security without disrupting the flow of
people or commerce. We have already begun working with TSA and
industry to develop risk-based, threat-informed screening
architectures and enabling technologies that enable graded
passenger screening, with maximum screening of only the
highest-risk passengers. A systems approach would consider the
entire system and not just the checkpoints. Protective measures
throughout the airport and aircraft could eventually lead to
the point that you won't have to take off your belt and shoes--
and perhaps you can even carry a bottle of shampoo on board the
plane with little or no risk that a terrorist could smuggle in
enough liquid explosives to bring down an airplane.
The labs have applied their expertise to push the envelope
on data to decisions--enabling the analysis of enormous and
diverse data sets and quickly providing the most important
elements of the information to decision makers in order to
react to events in near-real time. For instance, it were
possible to pull together the vast array of data on nuclear
materials that is currently collected and stored in hundreds of
different locations in different formats; synthesize and
analyze it and then push actionable information out to front-
line operators in near-real time.
A biosurveillance system and key enabling technologies
provide a cost-effective risk-based mix of environmental
monitoring and medical diagnostics and surveillance to give
early warning of attacks to major population centers--saving
countless lives by allowing timely medical intervention for
those people who have actually been exposed and require
medication.
A National-level analysis capability for understanding the
impacts of cyber attacks across interdependent U.S.
infrastructure elements allows us to defend our civilian
infrastructure against asymmetric and ubiquitous cyber threats.
Analysis tools and subject matter experts decipher the
complex interdependencies of our critical infrastructure,
assess vulnerabilities and potential cascading effects, thus
enabling the Government, private sector, and citizens to
dramatically increase resilience saving lives, property, and
services.
We are committed to the homeland security mission; we can make a
difference. It is what we strive to do--provide exceptional service in
the National interest.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Now, Dr. Carter.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL R. CARTER, SENIOR SCIENTIST, NATIONAL
IGNITION FACILITY AND PHOTON SCIENCE DIRECTORATE, LAWRENCE
LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
Mr. Carter. Hi, good morning, Chairman Lungren, Ranking
Member Clarke, and distinguished Members of the committee. I
also thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today
on this important relationship between the Department of
Homeland Security and Department of Energy's National
Laboratories.
I bring a unique perspective to today's hearing, having
served as a scientist at Livermore for more than 40 years, and
in a Government role, as the first Director for their
Radiological Nuclear Countermeasures, in the Department of
Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate and,
subsequently, as the first Deputy Director of DNDO. Having
served in these roles, I have an appreciation for both the
requirement and challenges at DHS and the roles and scientific
capabilities that the National Labs have, that are best suited
to help fulfill the DHS mission.
My recommendations today are based on my experience from
both of these phases in my career. This is especially true for
the protections against the determined and adaptive adversaries
intent on the use of weapons of mass destruction. Over the last
10 years, the Department of Energy Labs have developed many
technical solutions in support of DHS. These contributions
include innovation in biodefense, nuclear detection and
forensics, aviation security and explosive countermeasures,
infrastructure protection and support to on-going DHS
operations.
I will briefly mention just a few of these and then I will
speak a little bit more about today's challenges. Prior to the
Anthrax attacks in the Fall of 2011, the National Laboratories
were funded by internal laboratory--director of research and
development funds and Department of Energy, and were already
pioneering the field of rapid, DNA-based, detection of
biological pathogens. These detection methods became the basis
for the Nation's Biowatch program.
In the last decade, more than a million samples, from over
30 U.S. cities, have been analyzed for the signatures of a
biological tag, without a single false alarm. In the subsequent
decade, the Department of Homeland Security has supported the
laboratories in the development of autonomous, biological
detection systems and, also, invested in bioinformatics and DNA
microarrays. These microarrays provide the potential for the
detection and, also, identification of both engineered or
previously unknown pathogens, by searching for DNA similarities
with thousands of known viruses and bacteria.
In 2004, the Department of Homeland Security established a
Bio Defense Knowledge Center at Livermore. The BKC has produced
more than 100 studies for the biodefense community, served as a
technical reach-back center for DHS, and has recently partnered
with CVP's initial targeting center to develop methodology for
the interdiction of bioterrorism-related materials at our U.S.
borders.
Similarly, the DHS entity has established a tri-lab program
focused on aviation security countermeasures. Leveraging the
extensive experience and infrastructure for explosives research
for our nuclear weapons program, the lab scientists have turned
their attention to the home-made explosive threats. Scientists
are working to understand the formulation, the energetic
properties and the detection methods, for hundreds of potential
home-made explosives, with the goal of--you know, again,
keeping TSA ahead of an ever-attacking adversary.
Similarly, the nuclear security R&D programs, which began
over a decade ago, are beginning to bear fruit. The development
of new detection materials for both gamma ray and neutron
detection systems are setting the foundation for improved
systems deployed at our borders and with our State local law
enforcement community. But major gaps in our capability remain.
In particular, stand-off detection and detection of shielded
nuclear materials remain grand challenges, with very little
support in the R&D community.
Because of cuts, by nature, in nuclear weapons, the
National Laboratories are the Nation's repository of expertise
and are the natural partners in development of next generation,
radiological, nuclear countermeasures. I urge the Congress, the
Department of Homeland Security and the DOE Labs to not lose
focus on the difficult challenges that pertain to the homeland,
especially against the threat of weapons of mass destruction.
The DOE Labs bring unique, specialized, S&T capability and
expertise to the DHS mission, yet with reduced budgets and
increasingly near-term priorities, the resources available for
these partnerships with the laboratories are in significant
decline. I believe the Department of Homeland Security should
utilize the National Labs for enduring, difficult problems
where multi-disciplinary teams are required to anticipate, to
innovate, and deliver solutions.
I also encourage the DHS to partner with the National
Laboratories as that party sees, and bring together the
operational elements of the Department and its stakeholders
with the S&T workforce from the labs, to ensure the technology
that is developed is focused on the Department's unique
requirement. We should all work to make homeland security
mission a career path choice for scientists and engineers at
the laboratories. I encourage this committee's continued
support and I thank you, again, for the opportunity to testify
today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Carter follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael R. Carter
April 19, 2012
introduction and summary
Good morning Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and the
distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify before you today on the critically important relationship
between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of
Energy (DOE) National Laboratories.
I am Dr. Michael Carter, currently a Senior Scientist at Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). In 2002 I had the privilege to
serve as a technical advisor to the DHS Transition Planning Office and
served as the first director of radiological and nuclear
countermeasures in DHS S&T Directorate (DHS S&T) and subsequently as
the deputy director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO). I
returned to Livermore in 2006 and have since served in multiple
capacities including the program director for counterterrorism programs
at LLNL. The recommendations I provide are based on my experience and
knowledge gained from these activities.
DHS has been tasked with a very broad mission including the
responsibility for homeland defense against determined and adaptive
adversaries and preparation for and response assistance to natural
disasters. ``Making the Nation Safer,'' a National Academy of Sciences
report prepared soon after the events in 2001, stated ``strengthening
the National effort in long-term research that can create new solutions
should be a cornerstone of the strategy for countering terrorism.''
This need for long-term research prompted the establishment of an S&T
Directorate within DHS.
The DOE National Laboratories--principally the National Nuclear
Security Administration (NNSA) Laboratories (Livermore, Los Alamos, and
Sandia) and two Office of Science laboratories (Oak Ridge and Pacific
Northwest)--have provided critical support to the DHS S&T over the past
decade. Their focus has been on S&T development to tackle some of our
Nation's most difficult challenges, which are typically longer-range
than the immediate day-to-day operational issues facing DHS. I will
highlight in my testimony examples involving efforts at LLNL.
As the tenth anniversary of the founding of DHS approaches, I look
ahead with concern. Determined and adaptive adversaries--now and in the
future--pose some truly drastic threats to our Nation which we
currently have no way to stop, inadequate means to mitigate the
effects, and insufficient concerted investment in S&T to devise systems
and technologies to improve our defensive and responsive capabilities.
The Nation would greatly benefit from increased DHS attention to
sustained, focused investments in S&T to address threats such as an
engineered or emergent biological pathogen and a smuggled improvised
nuclear device. These are examples of specific areas where the DOE
National Laboratories are prepared to deliver unique S&T support to our
National security. However, in response to changing priorities and
reduced resources, the funding from DHS to LLNL has decreased from its
peak in fiscal year 2006 of $131 million to an estimated funding level
of $40 million in fiscal year 2012.
I believe that the DOE National Laboratories are well-suited to
shoulder responsibility for providing research and development (R&D) to
counter serious homeland security threats. DHS reliance on the
capabilities of the DOE Laboratories is a workable, effective answer to
a pressing National need. I base this recommendation on four points:
Solving hard, enduring S&T problems.--The DOE National
Laboratories were established to serve the National interest by
solving challenging S&T problems best tackled by multi-
disciplinary teams using state-of-the-art research
capabilities. Many of the challenging S&T issues facing DHS
fall into this category. Overcoming these challenges will
require sustained investment in R&D suitable for the DOE
National Laboratories and aligned with their National security
mission.
Leveraging existing S&T investments.--The DOE National
Laboratories perform considerable work for Federal sponsors in
mission areas closely aligned with those of DHS, develop
technologies that can be adapted to DHS missions, and/or have
special research capabilities that can be applied to unique DHS
mission needs. It is advantageous and cost-effective for the
Nation and DHS to leverage these previous investments.
Providing an S&T expertise base focused on homeland security
issues.--Working with diverse set of law enforcement and
emergency response agencies, DHS has unique needs for S&T
solutions that fit within their operational requirements. This
calls for the S&T professionals supporting DHS to understand
its operational needs, help shape requirements, and execute R&D
programs to meet DHS mission challenges. These S&T
professionals would also be available to provide technical
assistance to support on-going operations and prepared to
assist the Department's response to a terrorist event or
natural disaster.
Developing trusted partnerships.--DHS would benefit from an
enduring relationship with FFRDCs that understand their unique
operational requirements and can serve as ``honest brokers''
and trusted partners. The DOE Laboratories are also natural
partners in establishing and sustaining a pipeline of young
scientists and engineers emerging from our Universities
interested in careers in S&T dedicated to National security
missions. The laboratories have served these roles for the DOE
since their creation.
These benefits were implicitly recognized by the Homeland Security
Act of 2002, which established the Department and set the foundations
for DHS S&T through the transfer of funding, responsibility, and key
technical capabilities to counter nuclear and biological terrorism from
DOE to DHS. The Homeland Security Act also authorized DHS to establish
contracts with one or more Federally-funded research and development
centers (FFRDCs) to carry out its responsibilities. Congress
specifically authorized multiple methods, including a joint sponsorship
agreement, for DHS to utilize the DOE National Laboratories. The
examples I provide demonstrate that the partnership between DHS and the
DOE National Labs has proven vital in leveraging the Nation's S&T
capabilities to protect the homeland. This partnership needs to be
rejuvenated and continued.
bio security
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11 and the anthrax attacks, the DOE
National Laboratories were called upon to provide the technology for
the Nation's biosecurity program. They were ready to do so because the
underlying technical foundation for the Biowatch program was in place.
The technology development for Biowatch started through Laboratory
Directed Research and Development (LDRD), an internal investment
program at the DOE Laboratories targeting exploratory S&T to meet
current and emerging mission needs. Scientists at the laboratories
recognized Biosecurity as a critical National security need and
pioneering work began on the technology for rapid agent detection via
polymerase chain reaction methods (PCR) in the 1990s. The LDRD work led
to program support from NNSA's Office of Non-Proliferation Research and
Development's Chem/Bio program.
Thanks to exploratory investments and the existence before 9/11 of
a DOE program focused on a critical National security need, these DNA-
based PCR detection methods quickly became available and have
demonstrated the capability to detect, identify, and characterize a
threat organism in less than an hour. Detection systems have now
operated for almost a decade, analyzing more than a million samples
without a false alarm. Biowatch samplers are now located in more than
30 U.S. cities monitoring for the early signs of bioterrorism enabling
early treatment and intervention.
The DOE Laboratories continue to lead the way in the development of
advanced assays and DNA-based detection methods by leveraging their
expertise in microfluidics and bioinformatic analysis of DNA sequences
utilizing high-performance computing. Researchers have developed
massively parallel, high-density DNA microarrays able to detect
thousands of potential viruses and bacteria. This capability provides
the potential for the detection and identification of previously
unknown pathogens by searching for similarities in genetic sequences of
known pathogens. Advances in detection technology funded by DHS S&T
also provide benefit to the public health community. These DNA
microarray-based detection methods have been used to identify a
contaminating pig virus in a human vaccine for rotavirus.
In 2004, DHS S&T established the Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC)
at LLNL to develop and deliver knowledge products critical for
anticipating, preventing, characterizing, and responding to an attack
using biological warfare agents. BKC personnel have authored dozens of
rapid-turnaround analyses and in-depth threat and capability-based
technical assessments on biodefense topics; published awareness
bulletins focused on technical analysis of the potential for nefarious
uses of biotechnologies; and developed information management tools
that provide unique knowledge discovery capabilities for biodefense
analysts Nation-wide. They have also authored 12 Material Threat
Assessments, 26 Awareness Bulletins, 55 agent-specific factsheets;
published a biothreats agent factbook; and responded to more than 100
technical reachback requests from DHS and other operational entities.
In addition, the BKC maintains an information system at three security
levels with more than 34 million documents from a wide variety of
Government sources.
More recently, under sponsorship from DHS S&T, the BKC has
partnered with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
Agricultural and Biological Terrorism Countermeasures (ATBC) Program to
develop improved methodology to intercept suspicious enabling
biological material and equipment that could support bioterrorism. This
new capability has been integrated into the Automated Targeting System
for routine use at the National Targeting Center and will be accessible
to all 22,000 CBP Officers at our Nation's ports of entry. This
successful partnership between CBP and the BKC was acknowledged in a
commendation letter from then Assistant Commissioner Thomas Winkowski
to DHS S&T. Mr. Winkowski specifically called out the need to ``further
build this partnership, one that bridges science and law enforcement,
to undertake the daunting tasks and vital work that remain in
preventing ag/bio-terrorism.''
nuclear security
In the aftermath of 9/11, nuclear terrorism emerged as a top threat
to our National security. Early assessments identified key weaknesses
in the technology base for detecting and interdicting a smuggled
nuclear device, including the ability to robustly detect shielded
nuclear material at our borders. DHS S&T developed an R&D roadmap to
improve the radiation detection technology base with particular focus
on the operational needs of the DHS components. This roadmap identified
the need to develop better gamma and neutron detection methods to
dramatically improve detection sensitivity and reduce false alarms from
other radioactive but non-threatening materials. Because of the
classified nature of nuclear weapons, the fundamental understanding of
the signatures of special nuclear material and nuclear weapons resides
primarily at the DOE/NNSA Laboratories (Los Alamos, Livermore, and
Sandia). These laboratories therefore played a key role in developing
the R&D roadmap and investigating potential solutions to improve
detection systems performance.
The Nuclear Security R&D programs that began almost a decade ago
are beginning to bear fruit with the development of new detector
materials and detection methods. These new materials provide dramatic
improvements in affordability, operational utility, and effectiveness
in detecting and discriminating materials that could be part of a
weapon from other radiation sources. In particular these more effective
radiation detection materials enable the next generation of hand-held
detection systems for secondary inspections at our ports of entry. New
detection methods and advances in signal processing enable significant
improvements in detection and identification of threat materials and
significant reductions in false alarms rates. DHS DNDO has also
supported R&D on alternative neutron detection methods in response to
the worldwide shortage of Helium-3 used for conventional neutron
detection systems.
The R&D has resulted in dramatic improvement in detection and
identification capabilities, but major challenges remain. However,
resources for the DNDO's Transformational and Applied R&D program have
been significantly reduced in the last 2 years and a focus on near-term
solutions has replaced attention to the enduring challenges of stand-
off detection and detection of shielded materials. Agencies such as the
DOE and DoD continue to pursue R&D in radiation detection but this
research is often directed toward a set of requirements that do not
necessarily fit DHS operational needs. DHS, DOE, DoD, and the Director
of National Intelligence (DNI) work closely together to leverage scarce
R&D resources to meet urgent needs in domestic nuclear security but in
order to ensure effective technology development and deployment, DHS
must sustain an R&D program focused on the unique operational
requirements of the Department and its stakeholders.
The National Laboratories have also played a key role in training
and supporting DHS operational elements in their front-line role of
detection and interdiction of nuclear material. Working closely with
CBP, DNDO established a technical reachback network at the laboratories
with trained scientists available for technical assistance to front-
line law enforcement officers 24 hours a day. This reachback support
network has fielded hundreds of support requests and continues to work
with DNDO, CBP and other DHS entities to support and improve the alarm
adjudication processes. DOE Laboratory scientists bring a unique
understanding of the signatures of nuclear materials and weapons as
well as experience with the detection technologies deployed in the DHS
operational environment. The training and technical support network
will be critical if and when we are faced with our first domestic
nuclear smuggling event.
Scientists and engineers at the National Laboratories have also
worked with DNDO in creating and assessing the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture (GNDA). This global view of the radiation detection
systems deployed both domestically and internationally enables
considered assessments of the capabilities and vulnerabilities in our
collective abilities to detect and interdict a nuclear terrorist
attempt. Working with partners across the interagency the laboratories
have supported the integration of this network of systems and, through
detailed technical assessments and operational analysis, have developed
options to expand the deployed detection architecture to further reduce
the risk of nuclear terrorism. Understanding the signatures of nuclear
materials and the operational effectiveness of deployed systems and
inspection processes is key to an ``honest broker,'' independent
assessment of the capabilities and gaps of the GNDA. LLNL is now
developing a searchable database and visualization system to help DNDO
visualize and interrogate the GNDA and provide enhanced insight into
detection assets world-wide.
The National Laboratories are uniquely positioned to perform such
systems analysis in support of DNDO and its interagency partners. LLNL,
in particular, has played a critical and unique role in support of
DNDO's red team efforts. LLNL has partnered with DNDO in understanding
the nuclear threat space, designing and developing surrogates for the
key nuclear signatures, planning and executing red-team operations, and
developing lessons learned. This program has successfully worked within
DHS and across the interagency bringing credible, independent
assessment of technology and field operations dedicated to detection
and interdiction of nuclear smuggling.
Another example of a successful partnership model is the National
Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC) within DNDO. The NTNFC has
two major roles: Acting as the lead for interagency coordination in the
nuclear forensics arena and supporting a wide variety of expertise-
based programs including exercise development and planning. These
programs include the Nuclear Forensics Science Panel, the Federal
Expertise Development Program, and pipeline development activities
(e.g., university fellowship programs). NTNFC leadership is clearly
committed to their mission and has worked to create strong partnerships
across the interagency as well as with the DOE Laboratories that
provide the enduring technical capabilities that support the mission.
This success, however, is limited. While the NTNFC plays a key
coordination role, the center is not a majority stakeholder in the
forensics community, either in budget or scope. This limits their
ability to affect the priorities of their interagency partners
including the FBI, DOE, DoD, and the DNI. Efforts have been made to
create a coherent set of requirements for both pre- and post-detonation
nuclear forensics, but local priorities at each agency still have a
strong influence on how they expend their resources. The DOE
Laboratories act as integrator, working across this space, but often
without the integrated programs to invest in the required laboratory
infrastructure, drive innovation, and solve grand challenge problems.
aviation security and explosives countermeasures
In response to the liquid explosives threat in London in 2006 and
the prospect of a broad suite of home-made explosives threats, DHS
turned to the DOE Laboratories within NNSA, which have a deep
scientific understanding of explosives stemming from 60 years of work
in the nuclear weapons program and other DoD missions. These
laboratories are home to an extensive experimental infrastructure and a
multi-disciplinary scientific and engineering staff with expertise in
development and characterization of explosive compounds, explosive
detection, modeling and simulation of explosive properties using high-
performance computing, and assessment of explosive effects.
Livermore's High Explosive Applications Facility (HEAF) is one
example of a $100 million facility, constructed for and operated by the
LLNL's nuclear weapons program, that supported activities focused on
the improvised explosive device threat to aviation security.
Researchers in HEAF and other similar facilities at Los Alamos National
Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories teamed together to provide
technical support to DHS. The Department sought to establish guidelines
for allowed liquid quantities through passenger checkpoint screening
and enhancement of technology and screening protocols for both checked
baggage and passenger screening.
Scientists at HEAF have formulated hundreds of home-made explosive
compounds (HMEs), characterized their explosive properties, and
evaluated their potential risk to aviation security. LLNL has also
tested explosive screening technologies to understand and improve their
detection performance against a broad array of military-grade and home-
made explosive materials. In DHS S&T-sponsored Project Newton, the
laboratories are developing structural models of aircraft and the
evaluating the effect of explosive blasts on the structure to determine
the mass of conventional high explosives required for catastrophic
damage. Laboratory characterization of HME properties are then used to
establish the equivalent mass of different HMEs that would result in
the same level of catastrophic damage. This work at the
DOE/NNSA Laboratories complements live-fire aircraft testing, detection
development, and certification testing done at the DHS Transportation
Security Laboratory. This R&D supporting DHS S&T and the Transportation
Security Administration (TSA) has had significant impact protecting the
Nation's aviation infrastructure and passengers from ever-evolving
terrorist tactics.
The DOE/NNSA Laboratories have also worked with DHS S&T, TSA, and
several mass transit agencies across the Nation to secure mass transit
systems from asymmetric attacks using high explosives. The laboratories
have assembled multi-disciplinary teams of structural engineers,
computational scientists, physicists, mathematicians, and statisticians
to assess vulnerabilities and mitigation methods. This work includes
system-wide vulnerability assessments, non-destructive and destructive
analysis of construction materials and methods, simulation of explosive
properties and potential failure modes, and development and deployment
of solutions that significantly reduce system vulnerabilities. These
DHS-sponsored programs have resulted in improved measures to ensure
public safety and protect billions of dollars of infrastructure at a
cost of a few tens of millions of dollars in security and safety
enhancements.
need for enduring partnerships
In each of the programs above, a key enabler to success is
partnership between the Federal program managers and the scientists and
engineers at the National Laboratories. In the decade since 9/11, these
partnerships have made critical contributions to the Nation's homeland
security efforts. The DOE National Laboratories have deep technical
capabilities, particularly in the area of countering weapons of mass
destruction, which are key to the DHS efforts to develop effective,
sustainable countermeasures against the threats of WMD. The
laboratories have established extensive capabilities in high-
performance computing, precision measurement science, nuclear and
radiological materials, high explosives, and modeling and simulation
expertise, which would not be affordable otherwise. These technical
capabilities are a direct result of investments made by multiple
Government agencies, as well as investments from the laboratories
themselves in directed R&D programs to address key National security
priorities. Because of these and other investments, DHS's programs are
highly leveraged.
In our most successful programs, our scientists and engineers work
with DHS to understand the threat space, develop an understanding of
the operational requirements, evaluate alternatives, research and
develop technology, test potential solutions in an operational
environment, provide training and operational support to front-line
operations, and develop lessons learned. These end-to-end programmatic
partnerships have near-term impact and provide a basis for sustainable
mission roles for the laboratories. The National Laboratories can bring
unique, core capabilities to bear, partner with DHS, develop technical
solutions to difficult National security challenges and develop a
dedicated, knowledgeable workforce focused on mission success.
The Nation would be best served if the relationship between DHS and
the DOE National Laboratories were more than just a contractual
relationship. A partnership with joint, enduring commitment between DHS
and the DOE Laboratories would ensure focusing the laboratories'
expertise and unique capabilities on S&T needs for homeland security
with requisite sustained support from DHS. Reducing the risk of WMD
requires a sustained effort to develop effective solutions, which in
turn, require the mission-focused research, development, testing, and
evaluation that the DOE National Laboratories offer. The combination of
the right technologies, in the hands of a trained, equipped, and
supported front-line workforce will be a key component of interdicting
or responding to the WMD threat.
what's facing us now?
Concurrently, the Nation is facing serious Federal budget issues
and a dangerous, evolving WMD threat. As Congress and the Executive
Branch work to tighten Federal discretionary expenditures, we as a
Nation must not lose sight of the requirements to protect the homeland
against the threats of catastrophic terrorism. The nature of the WMD
threat, especially biological terrorism, continues to evolve and our
ability to counter it lags further and further behind.
At the same time, the threat grows more formidable and more
sophisticated. Recent trends in explosive threats to commercial
aviation have demonstrated that our adversaries adapt to our deployed
countermeasures. Recent work on genetic modifications to pathogens such
as the H5N1 virus highlight the increasing risk of an engineered
pathogen deliberately or accidently introduced into the environment.
DHS efforts to develop technologies for early detection and
characterization of emergent pathogens are critical to our ability to
stay ahead of the threat. An attack using an engineered biological
agent or a smuggled nuclear device would result in human and economic
consequences that are orders of magnitude more severe than anything we
have experienced to date.
To be successful in protecting the homeland, DHS must be ahead of
the evolving threats and adaptations of our adversaries. Effective and
enduring solutions are science-based, intelligence-informed, and
developed with the DHS end-user community requirements in mind.
Enduring solutions to difficult problems take time to mature. The
typical technology maturation times from the beginning of an R&D
program to the transition to the operational community can often be
more than a decade.
concluding remarks
The threat of the use of WMD, rather than fading with time, is
growing more serious; yet, the focus on the S&T required to effectively
counter the WMD threat has eroded. Since the stand-up of DHS, DOE no
longer provides R&D funding to the National Laboratories in chemical,
biological, and explosives countermeasures. There is increasing
downward pressure on S&T resources within DHS as focus turns to near-
term technology gaps in the day-to-day operational missions of the
Department and its stakeholders.
DHS and Congress should not lose focus on the difficult challenges
in protecting the homeland from the threat of WMD. I believe DHS should
partner with the DOE National Laboratories as FFRDCs to meet critical
National needs in homeland security. The laboratories have demonstrated
that they bring unique, specialized S&T capability and expertise to the
mission. In particular, DHS should:
Utilize the DOE National Laboratories for enduring,
difficult problems where multi-disciplinary teams are required
to anticipate, innovate, and deliver solutions to meet the most
demanding DHS mission needs.
Work with the DOE National Laboratories as FFRDCs and enable
program partnerships which bring together the operational
elements of DHS with the S&T workforce from the National
Laboratories to better ensure technology development focused on
the Department's unique requirements.
Leverage investments in the DOE National Laboratories made
by other sponsors (DOE, DoD) and adapt technology to Homeland's
unique mission requirements.
Develop a sustainable, mission-focused set of homeland
security S&T professionals with deep understanding of the DHS
operational environment and solutions that can be incorporated
into the homeland security operations and culture.
By strengthening the partnerships between DHS and the DOE
Laboratories, we will be able to better serve the mission of DHS to
defend the homeland. I encourage this committee's continuing support of
S&T activities supporting the DHS mission, and I thank you for the
opportunity to testify before the committee.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much for your testimony.
I will now recognize myself for the first 5 minutes of this
round of questioning. Back in the 1980s, when I happened to
serve here the first time around, I remember holding some
hearings on the nature of our National Labs and whether we
appreciated them and whether there was an ability to transfer
knowledge out of them into the commercial sector. You know,
creatives and all sorts of things, that we developed at that
time or extended development of that time.
We are in a different world now at the National Labs. We
had a re-organization--I call it a ``re-organization''--of
National Labs a few years ago. In a sense--and, again, this is
just a generalization but it is almost as if the National Labs
were required to stand on their own in a new way. I will put it
this way, with DHS being a partner or a client or a client
partner, in some ways I can see relying more on that as a
funding source and, therefore, being very responsive to the
immediate needs, as we have asked DHS to be involved in
immediate needs application, as we have dealt with the post-9/
11 world.
So the question of how you maintain your capacity for self-
initiative in terms of the areas of research versus responding
to the immediate requirement that you get from a client
partner, is a difficult one, I would think. So let us go back
to that Anthrax question. As I understand it, it was not
because the Federal Government had directed you to do Anthrax
research; it was as a result of larger-scale, general analysis
of potential threats, as unknown as they could be, that you had
continued with research--that when we had the Anthrax attack,
you were able to respond with this foam as you said, is that
correct?
Ms. Hruby. The Anthrax foam was, indeed, an idea that was
created through the Laboratory Directorate research and
development efforts. But it was also supported at that--before
the stand-up of DHS by the Department of Energy, who had a very
small chem bio program, which helped get the technology to the
stage where it could be deployed.
Mr. Lungren. So, I guess, my question would be--was that
was a success? We don't want to not have those successes in the
future. You seem to caution, or give us some alarm, that,
perhaps, the balance is not quite the one that you would
foresee in terms of us responding more to the immediacy of a
particular problem as opposed to, I would call, a basic
research and development.
But you also said, in your written testimony, that the
enabling legislation that established DHS' relationship with
the labs was remarkably forward-looking. So, I guess, with a
benefit of 10 years of hindsight, do you have any
recommendations for any legislative changes that would make
that balance more possible or is this just going to be a
continuing problem we are going to have as we deal with the
reality of budgets and the idea of deal with the immediate
versus the potential, long-range, unknown?
Ms. Hruby. Let me say that I do think that the legislative
framework exists for this to--the work between--you know, the
work for DHS to be appropriate. There are practices that are
difficult for the labs. So, you know, we have a portfolio of
projects and the total amount of funding--you know, it has gone
down but, okay--you know, it is a tough economic time.
But, if you look at the size of the average project
contract, if you will, that the labs contracted to for DHS, it
is small. A half--I mean, even if I just use the numbers that
Dr. Gerstein just reported--a couple hundred thousand dollars--
a $500,000, sort of, on-average, size of project, that is small
for our workforce. It makes it hard to sustain scientists and
engineers doing this, you know, as multi-disciplinary teams. It
is not the right way to use the labs for such small projects.
So it is not about the overall, total amount of money; it
is about the kind of work. Part of this is a better
relationship between DHS, S&T, and DNDO. This is more S&T
because of the nature of their business, the labs and the
operating units, so that the labs can understand deeply the
needs of the operating units, can see what is possible in the
long-term, can figure out the gaps and fill those gaps, as
opposed to responding to detailed needs through proposals to
fill shorter term gaps.
Mr. Lungren. Okay, I don't want to put any words in your
mouth but my sense, from what I take out from this, is we still
need more effort of an integration of the mission of DHS in a
science and technology arena and your operation, or the
operation of the National Labs, that is not a--I wouldn't view
that as a criticism; it is a suggestion of a larger,
collaborative environment in which you might work. How you get
there, of course, is the question that we would love to be a
part of the participancy in coming to that. I don't view that
as a criticism, I view that as a maturation of our
responsibilities in a fiscally challenging time.
Ms. Clarke is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is very interesting because its really an evolutionary
question that we are dealing with here. Many of the products of
research and development that is taking place and has been
taking place for quite some time in our labs, now it is where
the rubber meets the road because a lot of what we could only
envision has become reality in our lives as Americans.
So it's about, you know, how we now come into the 21st
Century understanding that reality and then integrating it in a
way in which its productive. So I want to thank you for your
testimony here this morning because you have brought a lot of
clarity to what, you know, has been, I guess, sort of--you have
an agency that is relatively young and you have National
Laboratories that have been on this mission for quite some time
now trying to be of mutual support to one another in fiscally
austere times.
So I want to get your viewpoint, both of you, on a couple
of things. The DOE National Labs have very broad capabilities
that may overlap with the needs of multiple DHS components and
offices within the DHS components. So multiple laboratories may
be well-positioned to provide services to DHS, the previous
administration aligned the DOE National Laboratory capabilities
with specific S&T Directorate technology divisions.
This served to clarify which laboratories might be
appropriate recipients of funding for certain topics. But it
may have failed to recognize the unique contributions available
at specific laboratories. Again, just an outgrowth of where we
are in the 21st Century. Can you give me your viewpoints on
that?
Mr. Carter. Yes, I think it is also important to realize
that, you know, in a lot of fields, in response to an urgent
need or a long-term use in the Department of Homeland Security,
what the laboratories are often able to do is partner with each
other. So we know our relative strengths and weaknesses and
gaps and vulnerabilities, you know, as well as anybody, if not
better. What we find is when we partner with the laboratories--
Livermore, for example, has a long track record of partnering
very closely with Sandia National Labs. What you would end up
with is the best technologies and the best cultures and
behaviors from each laboratory integrated into one collective
partnership to execute an important mission.
When the Federal Government tries to stovepipe one
particular laboratory to be, you know--for example, the sole
provider or the prime provider of a particular approach, those
partnerships can break down. I think that is to the disservice
for our Government sponsors and also to the laboratories, which
would then build up multiple, duplicative--areas of expertise
instead of taking the efficiencies that often come with
partnering. So I think it is important to keep these partnering
options and opportunities in the right perspective too.
Ms. Hruby. Let me just add, that is a great question
because that was an effort that held some promise to focus but
it wasn't really successful and, therefore, was dropped. The
alignment to specific areas--one of the things that happened is
there are some large, dedicated National security laboratories,
certainly the three NNSA Labs--PacificNorthwest Labs, Oak Ridge
National Labs--that are really dedicated, wholly, to the
National security; that is what we do.
There are other great DOE Laboratories that have missions
in energy and science, that have great capabilities to apply to
some specific homeland security problems. But when they did
this by--this alignment by divisions, there was no distinction
between any of these labs in terms of their, you know, sort of,
mission space and commitment to the area. There just, frankly,
isn't enough money to have a wide--to have everybody play equal
roles.
So this is a very difficult situation because, of course, I
have high regard, we all have high regard for each other's
expertise, but we have to say that missions for National
security and the labs that do that are distinct from the labs--
some other labs that have other primary missions in Energy
Science and other things. So, I think, it is a matter of
recognizing that in addition to things like focus and
alignment.
Ms. Clarke. It really becomes a matter of flexibility as
well.
Ms. Hruby. Absolutely.
Ms. Clarke. You are tied into a commitment and you know
that the expertise is resident in a smaller lab that has been
working on a project, but you don't have the flexibility to
incorporate that. It doesn't serve us any well and it may be
even more costly to try to wield out the capacity that already
is resident in another lab.
Ms. Hruby. Yes.
Ms. Clarke. Okay, so--I have more--okay, sure.
What process has the S&T Directorate established to align
the DOE National Labs with the S&T Directorate's requirement?
What is your understanding of that? When conducting reviews of
statements of work, how does the Office of National
Laboratories align the DOE National Laboratory capabilities
with the needs of DHS components outside of the S&T
Directorate? If you have any knowledge of either of those,
please.
Ms. Hruby. To the best of my knowledge, in the competitive
processes, DHS looks for what they consider to be the best
proposal. It is this issue of alignment to a certain area, I do
not believe, exists from my perspective. With respect to
components, the labs, of course, do work with components that
S&T is not very involved in.
But S&T has a responsibility to review and make sure that
mission is aligned. I commend the Office of National
Laboratories for doing that effectively and efficiently and
allowing the work to continue but, to the best of my knowledge
with transparency perspective, it is about the best idea and
not about an institution.
Mr. Lungren. Okay.
Mr. Long is recognized.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
My question is similar to the one that I asked the first
panel, from the other side of the coin, and that is: Are the
Department of Homeland Security and Department of Energy
working together to define your mission in your opinion?
Doc Carter, I will start with you.
Mr. Carter. So there are certainly activities between the
two Federal agencies that help bring awareness to the
Department of Homeland Security other than, for example, the
Department of Energy's Laboratories' capabilities. Of course,
in the end, the Department of Homeland Security contracts to
the National Labs, you know, through the Department of Energy
and Department of Energy site offices.
But, as far as developing a joint strategy with respect to
homeland security technologies joined between the Department of
Energy and the Department of Homeland Security, I don't know of
any process outside the Mission Executive Council process,
which is relatively new, that begins to pull that strategic
alignment of the laboratories together to meet the mission
needs of, for example, the Department of Homeland Security.
I believe the Mission Executive Council is one opportunity
for the Deputy Secretary to level within multiple departments
to at least begin to communicate and develop, you know, a joint
understanding of what the relative, important, unique
priorities for the departments are. But, as yet, we haven't
seen that process actually come to much--that actually impacts
the laboratory's work with the respect to the departments to
date.
Mr. Long. Okay.
Ms. Hruby.
Ms. Hruby. I agree with Dr. Carter. The best hope here is
the Mission Executive Council to have all the National security
agencies compare notes, think about the health and the
capabilities at the National Laboratories to make sure they are
properly utilized and funded. That has been a slow start and,
in part, there hasn't been much engagement of the labs directly
in that. So the assessment of the health of our capabilities
have not yet entered into that discussion.
I would say that----
Mr. Long. Precipitate that, how can we get that to moving?
Ms. Hruby. Well, your interest in it, I am sure, will be
important. I would say that I do think that the collaboration
between DNDO and NNSA has been significant over the years and
is quite good.
Mr. Long. Okay, thanks, you all, and thanks for being here
and your testimony.
Mr. Lungren. The gentlelady from California is recognized.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to clarify--as you can tell, some of the
questions are following some of the same areas and I would like
to talk about, in your view, some of the competitiveness that
DOE, in fact, has to go through in order to receive some of the
DHS funding for contracts.
Specifically, I am referring to, like, the DHS might rely
upon the expertise of DOE National Laboratories in specific
topic areas because of their long history of work in a
particular area and we heard that from the first panel--their
special relationship with Federal agencies and/or their ability
to perform classified National and homeland security work.
In other cases, the DOE National Laboratories may be one of
many possible performers that could have performed that same
job. In your opinion, how much of DHS funding to the DOE
National Laboratories is awarded on a competitive basis and how
much is it not?
Ms. Hruby. I don't have any numbers, although I can
certainly get back with you on those specifics. But it is the
case that most, well over 50 percent, of the work that we do
for DHS is based on a competitive process, which, by the way,
we don't mind. I mean, we do--we don't mind competing, you
know, we like competing. The issue, really, is, you know, we
want to make sure we are competing for the best ideas while
balancing that with maintaining a dedicated science and
technology enterprise.
What we have found is because of the small size and very
specific nature of some of the competition, that our scientists
and engineers are not always that interested. They don't feel
that is the best use of their talent. That is why I make
statements that I fear that the pipeline could be drying up, is
because we are finding our scientists and engineers turning
away from those mission, small, specific projects to work at
other areas where they have more flexibility and long-term
commitment.
Ms. Richardson. So would you be able to provide to this
committee, without the objection of the Chairman, a percentage
of how many of these you think you receive and how many go
outside?
Ms. Hruby. I would be happy to.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Then, building upon that same idea,
it is my understanding that the Office of National Laboratories
does not have an official gatekeeper role, is how I would
describe it, in determining whether a contract may be provided
to a DOE National Laboratory. Do you agree with that? Also,
what oversight mechanisms does the laboratory then have in
place to track or assess DHS' investment in the DOE National
Laboratories?
Mr. Carter. I would say, yes, since the formation of the
Office of National Laboratories, they have played a
coordination role to be primarily not in oversight and
governance role of the works that we do for DHS S&T. They do
provide a valuable conduit, now, into Department of Homeland
Security science and technology but, also, to the other
operational components of the Department. They are often there
in place to help us understand what the operational needs of an
operational agency might be and assess, or at least help us
assess, whether or not the micro trace capabilities are
appropriate to offer up to the component of the Department as a
potential solution.
Ms. Richardson. So are you suggesting that, in fact, they
have given you other options to consider?
Mr. Carter. They have, actually, connected us in many cases
with operational gaps across the Department and that helps us
develop our strategies. Our technology base could, ultimately,
be applied to those challenges.
Ms. Richardson. How much of a percentage of time would you
say that is actually implemented? One, that you receive the
feedback and two, that you follow it.
Mr. Carter. So I am not sure I completely understand the
question. But they probably help us with about half of the work
that we do outside the S&T Directorate and outside DNDO. So
they help us with that alignment in that strategy.
Ms. Richardson. Okay, and can you tell me--do you know of
whether the percentage of where you are being suggested
something else or have you been?
Mr. Carter. No, I don't know that number directly. You
know, typically, the Office of National Laboratories won't make
those kinds of detailed suggestions but they will connect us
with the operational elements that would have feedback and we
would, of course, listen to that.
Ms. Richardson. The operational elements within where?
Mr. Carter. Within the departments so that that might be
FEMA or CVP or GSA or whatever it might be.
Ms. Richardson. So, then----
Mr. Carter. [Off mike]
Ms. Richardson [continuing]. Based upon my questions, and
my time is running out, it sounds like to me that, in fact--the
initial of how I lined up this question, it doesn't appear that
there is a real true gatekeeper.
Mr. Carter. So they don't play an official gate-keeping
role, i.e. we are not required to check in with them before you
talk to an operational agency outside S&T, but they play an
advisory and assistance role, a coordination and collaboration
role.
Ms. Richardson. Okay, thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Long [presiding]. I thank the gentlelady and I thank
the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the Members for
their questions.
The Members of the committee may have additional questions
for the witnesses and we will ask you all to respond to those
in writing. The hearing record will be open for 10 days. This
subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren for Daniel M. Gerstein
Question 1. This committee has been unable to obtain detailed
budget numbers from the Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate on how
much money goes from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to the
labs each year for the past few years. The numbers that were provided
were insufficiently detailed, and took a week for S&T to pull together.
This is concerning is because your office has the statutory role as
coordinator of all Departmental research to the labs.
Please explain why the office in S&T (Office of National
Laboratories) that is legally charged with coordinating Departmental
research to the labs cannot easily delineate annual expenditures to the
labs. (Please do not address the discrepancies between DHS and
Department of Energy (DOE) expenditure records until the next
question.)
Answer. In accordance with Section 309(g) of the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (Pub. L. No. 107-296) the Science and Technology
Directorate's (S&T) Office of National Laboratories (ONL) was
established within S&T, and is responsible for the coordination and use
of the Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories to create a
``networked laboratory system for the purpose of supporting the
missions of the Department.'' S&T's performs appropriateness reviews of
the tasks components send to the laboratories. S&T has not tracked DHS
expenditures at the laboratories. Components requesting the work track
the funds spent at the laboratories. Therefore, providing total DHS
expenditures at the labs requires time to compile expenditure data from
all components with work at the labs.
ONL's role, working with DOE and its laboratories and sites, has
resulted in the establishment of processes and procedures that have
enabled the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Components to engage
with and use the DOE National Labs to meet their respective R&D and
technology needs.
To this end, ONL reviews all statements of work issued from DHS and
directed to DOE National Labs prior to the preparation and submission
of the final requisition package. The purpose of this review is to
ensure the proposed work is within scope of and complies with the terms
and conditions of the prime contract between DOE and the respective
laboratory operator (Federally Funded Research and Development Center).
Question 1b. In addition, can you please explain the nature of the
discrepancies between DHS and DOE expenditure records? What is the
delta, in dollars, for each of the last 3 fiscal years between the
records of the two agencies? Are these differences of concern to you?
Answer. Nature of discrepancies.--The difference between DOE and
DHS funding records is that DOE reports Homeland Security Activities as
DOE ``direct-funded,'' non-DOE ``direct-funded,'' and DOE ``indirect-
funded'' activities which includes Work for Others (WFO), Laboratory
Directed Research and Development, Cooperative Research and Development
Agreements, and Interagency Personnel Agreements. The expenditures
reported by DHS have been DHS sponsored WFO categorized as DHS
``direct-funded'' expenditures. Also, DHS does not fund all work
categorized by DOE as ``Homeland Security''. It is also possible that
other agencies fund work that fall into this category. In addition the
DOE report has been developed for the current year and during execution
of that year these numbers will have been estimates. These are the
likely sources of discrepancies between reported numbers.
Question 1c. Please provide a detailed breakdown of all
Departmental expenditures from fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year
2013 (expected) for both the DHS Labs and the DOE Labs. Please include
the components by name, the laboratories they fund by name, and the
amount funded. Please also include the type of project or the name of
the project that was funded.
Answer. Below is a list of DHS expenditures at DHS and DOE
Laboratories. A detailed breakout of expenditures is attached.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year 2013 Amount
DOE Laboratory 2010 Amount 2011 Amount 2012 Amount Funded/
Obligated Obligated Funded YTD Projected
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Ames Laboratory................................. $70,899 $179,101 $0 $186,279
Argonne National Laboratory..................... 30,522,882 33,680,703 22,470,776 17,226,679
Brookhaven National Laboratory.................. 784,592 369,581 988,000 322,000
Idaho National Laboratory....................... 25,027,463 27,393,413 27,848,993 25,100,843
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory........... 5,332,220 5,935,540 2,759,418 5,404,328
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.......... 67,045,723 59,319,013 25,207,559 51,227,295
Los Alamos National Laboratory.................. 38,616,545 32,531,836 21,791,440 22,046,279
National Energy Technology Laboratory........... 515,000 500,000 495,000 520,039
National Renewable Energy Laboratory............ 0 1,095,000 0 1,138,886
Nevada National Security Site................... 3,960,000 3,161,660 5,173,470 0
New Brunswick Laboratory........................ 2,407,000 0 1,045,000 1,218,000
Oak Ridge National Laboratory................... 70,045,542 37,653,430 30,788,549 26,307,490
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory........... 50,213,479 53,690,126 28,223,479 28,572,888
Remote Sensing Lab.............................. 5,282,000 1,047,000 0 1,088,962
Sandia National Laboratories.................... 74,481,969 63,421,006 45,810,564 41,727,829
Savannah River National Laboratory.............. 11,220,486 12,053,424 4,090,000 4,700,000
Y-12 National Security Complex.................. 684,375 708,000 470,000 420,000
TBD............................................. 0 0 0 8,823,000
---------------------------------------------------------------
Total..................................... 386,210,175 332,738,833 217,162,248 236,030,797
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year 2013 Amount
DHS Laboratory Operation and Maintenance Funding 2010 Amount 2011 Amount 2012 Amount Funded/
Obligated Obligated Funded YTD Projected
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chemical Security Analysis Center............... $5,370,000 $4,236,277 $5,005,409 $5,005,409
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures 45,360,842 41,035,903 36,500,000 41,035,903
Center.........................................
National Urban Security Technology Laboratory... 3,778,560 6,054,795 5,183,036 6,054,795
Plum Island Animal Disease Center............... 38,612,282 41,756,527 42,016,557 42,016,557
Transportation Security Laboratory.............. 24,316.530 16,122,783 22,579,361 22,579,361
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Below is the programmatic funding provided to the S&T Laboratories outside of operation and maintenance:
S&T DOLLARS OBLIGATED TO S&T LABS BY DIVISIONS OTHER THAN S&T'S OFFICE OF NATIONAL LABORATORIES TO DATE 5/15/
2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2010
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Division Project DHS Lab
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explosives.............................. Air Cargo Systems Integrated Approach...... TSL $1,862,177
Automated Carry-on Detect.................. TSL 402,764
Explosives Trace Detect.................... TSL 585,000
Next Generation Passenger Checkpoint....... TSL 137,500
Borders and Maritime.................... Container Security Test Bed (CSTB)......... TSL 35,000
Chem/Bio................................ Foreign Animal Disease Vaccines and PIADC 7,032,237
Diagnostics (Near/Long Term). PIADC 642,325
Agrodefense Basic Research................. CSAC 5,760,000
CSAC....................................... CSAC 1,335,000
Model Large Scale Toxic Chemical Transport CSAC 3,503,450
Release. NBACC 21,931,350
Chemical Infrastructure Risk Assessment.... NBACC 14,105,150
Bio Threat Characterization................ NBACC 1,918,800
National BioForensics Operations...........
NBFAC......................................
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL............................. ........................................... ......... 59,250,753
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2011
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Division Project DHS Lab
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explosives.............................. Check Point/Detection...................... TSL $2,684,890
Next Generation Passenger Checkpoint....... TSL 258,922
Mass Transit............................... TSL 921,899
Air Cargo Systems Integrated Approach...... TSL 811,597
Chem/Bio................................ Foreign Animal Disease Vaccines and PIADC 9,366,434
Diagnostics (Near/Long Term). PIADC 641,333
Ag Screening Tools......................... CSAC 3,936,263
CSAC....................................... CSAC 860,000
Model Large Scale Toxic Chemical Transport CSAC 1,100,000
Release. CSAC 1,577,200
Increase Safety of Hazardous Materials..... CSAC 300,000
Chemical Infrastructure Risk Assessment.... NBACC 12,933,936
IT Security Services....................... NBACC 9,541,486
National BioForensics Operations........... NBACC 306,000
Bio Threat Characterization................
BioForensics Research and Development......
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL............................. ........................................... ......... 45,239,960
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2012
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Division Project DHS Lab To Date Planned
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
First Responder Group........... Rad/Nuc Recovery Plan.............. NUSTL $0 $150,000
Explosives...................... Next Generation Passenger TSL 631,558 0
Checkpoint.
Checked Baggage/Next Generation TSL 423,228 0
Passenger Checkpoint/PBIED. TSL 492,370 0
Checked Baggage....................
Air Cargo/Algorithm and Analysis of TSL 294,139 0
Raw Images/Next Generation TSL 594,705 0
Passenger Checkpoint. TSL 321,349 0
Air Cargo/Checked Baggage..........
Air Cargo/TSL Operations...........
Chem/Bio........................ Foreign Animal Disease Vaccines and
Diagnostics (Near/Long Term). PIADC 3,412,744 211,000
Ag Screening Tools................. PIADC 188,003 0
Chemical Security Analysis Center.. CSAC 3,545,360 0
Bio Threat Characterization........ NBACC 6,180,042 0
Bio-Defense Knowledge Center NBACC 800,000 0
Analyses and Assessments. NBACC 7,303,572 0
National BioForensics Operations... NBACC 351,157 0
BioForensics Research and
Development.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL..................... ................................... ......... 24,538,227 361,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FUNDING FROM OTHER THAN S&T TO S&T LABORATORIES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2012--From USDA to PIADC:
FADD School Operations/animal care.................. $44,082
Fiscal Year 2011--From USDA to PIADC:
FADD school operations, overtime hours, contractor 22,688
costs, materials, and supplies.....................
Animal per diem, copier charges, employee physicals, 36,300
and DNA analyzer maintenance.......................
Animal per diem, copier charges, and employee 91,130
physicals..........................................
USDA APHIS International Services................... 22,163
Fiscal Year 2011--From DNDO to NUSTL:
Securing the Cities program......................... 120,000
Fiscal Year 2011--From NPPD to NUSTL:
Shielded Nuclear Alarm Resolution Technology 83,922
Demonstration and Characterization.................
Fiscal Year 2010--From USDA to PIADC:
Animal care......................................... 78,403
Costs associated with animal care, employee 27,179
physicals, and DNA analyzer........................
Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostics.................. 28,144
North American Foot-and-Mouth Bank.................. 23,051
Fiscal Year 2010--From TSA to TSL:
Determine the security applications of a CAT/BPSS 2,076,073
device.............................................
Develop an initial baseline standard image format... 325,000
TSA requires continued support for the additional 1,000,000
functionality of the development of the Fedtrak
system.............................................
Supplemental tests for the Chlorine Rail Tank Car 100,000
Vulnerability Assessment...........................
Fiscal Year 2010--From DNDO to TSL:
Computed Tomography................................. 544,701
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2. In your analysis, where can cost savings be found with
respect to the Department's work with the DHS and DOE Laboratories?
Answer.
DOE Labs
Cost savings occur when DHS leverages existing technologies,
capabilities, and infrastructure at the DOE National Laboratories. If
DHS did not leverage the DOE National Labs, DHS would have to create
the needed capability at great cost. In addition, DHS leverages basic
research that is performed at the DOE Labs that other components and
Government agencies fund.
In addition, cost savings are being realized when the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) applies a systems approach to Department of
Energy (DOE) Labs working in multiple laboratory teams. This approach
allows DHS to take advantage of the core competencies of each lab,
while accessing the body of work performed by respective team members,
and taking advantage of identified synergies.
The Science and Technology Directorate's (S&T) sponsored program to
develop Rapid Diagnostic Tools is an example of realizing costs savings
through the systems approach and teaming with the right lab partners.
Working with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and Sandia
National Laboratory (SNL), S&T is accessing the wealth of genetic
sequencing work performed by LLNL and coupling it with the
photolithography and micro-fabrication capabilities of SNL to develop
peptide microarrays for rapid diagnostic tools. Additional savings are
being realized through S&T's leveraging of SNL's existing
photolithography and micro-fabrication capacity for the research and
development, prototyping, and ultimate manufacture of the microarrays.
DHS Labs
To maximize the facility use/scientific deliverables and minimize
risk, S&T's Office of National Laboratories (ONL) has:
Initiated performance-based operations and maintenance
contract at Plum Island Animal Disease Center.
Looked at consolidating and minimizing the number of support
contracts at all DHS Laboratories.
Developed a work for others operational requirement,
primarily at the National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasure Center (NBACC) (Located at Ft. Detrick, Maryland
and contains the National Bioforensics Analysis Center [NBFAC]
and the National Biological Threat Characterization Center
[NBTCC]) to use the capacity of labs and increase mission
support with small increases in fixed operational costs.
The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) provides
funding for their casework done by NBFAC.
Because of the unique capabilities of the NBACC facility,
other Federal agencies have expressed an interest in having
NBACC staff perform mission work in biocontainment space
(under the caveat that this work is consistent with the
facility mission and/or special expertise, the work must
not affect the achievement of DHS work requirements, the
sponsor's proprietary data will be protected, etc.).
Memorandum of Understanding between S&T and another
Federal Agency was signed in February 2012 for
collaboration on biological defense countermeasures test
and evaluation (e.g., leverage existing facility space,
programs and trained staff at NBACC with respect to
Biosafety Level 4 Good Laboratory Practice procedures).
Decreased rented space for the National Urban Security
Technology Laboratory (NUSTL) (Located in New York City),
resulting in reduced rent and security payments to the General
Services Administration.
Formed an IT Working Group to leverage certification and
accreditation work and lessons learned at one DHS Laboratories.
Question 3. What rigorous process is S&T using to ensure that
mission and research requirements are driving capacity (in terms of
what labs get built and how large they are) for any new labs?
Answer. All construction programs (new laboratories and additions
to laboratories) within the Science and Technology Directorate's (S&T)
Office of National Laboratories are managed using the Acquisition Life-
cycle Framework (ALF) as defined in the Department of Homeland
Security, Acquisition Management Directive 102-01.
The ALF is a template for planning and executing acquisitions,
which ensures mission requirements are defined, validated, and then
translated into what is built.
Question 4a. S&T recently released its new strategic plan, which
lays out its vision for meeting its mission to provide knowledge and
technology solutions for the homeland security enterprise. Goal 4.6 is
explicitly to ``improve S&T's knowledge and use of . . . research
facilities with a focus on DOE National Labs and DOE efforts.''
In what ways does S&T believe it stands to improve its knowledge
and use of the DOE Labs?
Question 4b. How can S&T take advantage of the labs more as a
partner, and less as a contractor, if there would be value in such a
thing?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T) continues to evolve its relationship with
the Department of Energy (DOE) Laboratories, moving away from being a
``performer'' and towards the role of ``partner.'' S&T values the
strategic perspective resident in the DOE Labs and recently, in the
case of S&T's Technology Foraging effort, has sought their advice.
S&T's Office of National Laboratories is extending and deepening
our strategic partnership with the DOE Labs, we are also undertaking to
increase awareness of the DOE Labs' capabilities in the Homeland
Security space with our own DHS Components. In fiscal year 2012, S&T is
embarking on an educational and awareness drive through briefings and
``road shows'' to inform S&T's Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency Division and DHS Components about the research
opportunities at the labs. In addition, S&T has put in place an agency-
to-agency master agreement that streamlines the business processes
around contracting to simplify collaboration and use of DOE Labs.
Information, forms, templates, guides, and relevant resource documents
are all available on-line.
In the last 6 months, S&T has called on the DOE Labs to share their
``best guess'' on emerging over-the-horizon technologies that can be
put to use for the Homeland Security Enterprise. The applications of
the technologies are in the areas of border security (air-based
technologies, ground-based technologies, maritime-border security);
bio-agent detection; chemical detection; explosives detection;
biometrics; cyber security; disaster relief, first responder equipment
and capabilities; and information sharing, analysis, and
interoperability.
As noted earlier, in order to increase the value-added received
from the labs, S&T encourages the labs to work in teams or consortia.
This approach allows S&T to receive the benefit of a broader knowledge
and skill base that may be resident in several labs as opposed to
sourcing a project to just one lab or having to select a single lab
capability.
For example, the exceptional capabilities at one lab in high-
performance computing can be paired with another's excellence in
modeling and simulation to create disaster training scenarios for first
responders. Currently, S&T is working with a consortium, the National
Explosives Engineering Sciences Security Center (NEXESS) made up of
Sandia, Los Alamos, and Lawrence Livermore Laboratories. NEXESS's work
is focused on characterizing specific home-made explosive threats, and
providing technical, test, and evaluation services to DHS's
Transportation Security Administration.
Question 5a. Dr. Gerstein's written testimony stated that ``in the
current budget environment, there will be a temptation to fund near-
term priorities while sacrificing the future. In my judgment, this
would be a mistake.'' And yet, the DHS S&T technology foraging strategy
and the proposed budget emphasis away from transformational projects
does just that.
Can you explain this discrepancy? Is S&T's approach a long-term or
a short-term one?
Question 5b. Can you please describe the rigorous process you have
in place to ensure that all of these funds would go to projects that
the end-users ultimately need, and that they will reliably work in the
field? How are the labs partners in this process?
Answer. In general, funding for future efforts such as research and
development are sacrificed in austere budget environments in favor of
operational funding. While operational funding is imperative, we must
make every effort to look into the future, anticipate threats, and fund
longer-term efforts. In recent years the Science and Technology
Directorate (S&T) discretionary research and development budget saw a
decrease of nearly 56 percent; from $598 million in fiscal year 2010 to
$265 million in fiscal year 2012. To minimize the impact of the budget
decrease on near-term R&D, S&T reduced the basic research funding.
With this budget environment, we have established a process of on-
going reviews of our entire research and development portfolio to
ensure that we are: (1) Investing in technologies that will
significantly improve DHS's efforts to help secure the country, and (2)
meeting the goals established by our partners in the operating
components and the broader homeland security enterprise. We have
committed to an annual review of our portfolio of basic and applied
research and development and all proposed new projects. During this
annual review we study written materials, hear a presentation by the
project manager, and carefully analyze the project's likely impact and
feasibility (or ``riskiness''), judging these attributes against
specific metrics determined by the Science and Technology Directorate
(S&T) with input from the operating Components. S&T also reviews other
basic research portfolios in other agencies. For example, ONL
participates in reviews at the DOE Laboratories to identify
opportunities to leverage on-going research or identify partnership
opportunities for future investments.
These metrics establish a framework to address elements essential
to programmatic success in the context of the DHS missions spelled out
in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. The framework assesses the
project's overall impact on customer mission; transition of products to
the field; investment in technology to position S&T for the future;
coordination with customers to align projects with their requirements;
and application of an innovative strategy. Each project is evaluated by
a review panel composed of S&T leaders, DHS component representatives,
and independent experts. By measuring all of S&T's projects against the
framework, we establish a transparent view of all research and
development within S&T to enable more strategic, longer-term budget
decisions; ensure efficient delivery to the component or individual
user; and cultivate effective communication. These are the same review
model and framework used by both Federal and private research and
development organizations, including the award-winning Army Engineer
Research and Development Center.
Having an adequate infrastructure for a viable R&D capability
requires long-term investment. Currently, S&T puts priority on R&D
investments with an 18-24 month transition time to maximize impact in a
difficult economic time, but the on-going investment in DHS Labs, DOE
Labs, and University Centers of Excellence show a commitment to
maintain long-term effectiveness.
Question 6a. The work that DHS does with the labs can statutorily
be performed under three mechanisms: No. 1, joint sponsorship with DOE;
No. 2, direct contract with the lab; or No. 3, ``work for others.''
How often are these three options utilized? If work for others is
used the most often, what is the basis for that?
Question 6b. Would there be benefit to taking advantage of the
other types of contracting mechanisms?
Answer. The Homeland Security Act of 2002, (Pub. L. No. 107-296)
authorizes four mechanisms for utilizing the Department of Energy (DOE)
Labs, the three listed above and any other method provided by law,
which includes Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADA).
Work for Others is the easiest and most straightforward mechanism for
conducting work at the DOE Labs.
The bulk of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) sponsored
work is performed on a ``work for others'' basis with the remainder
being performed under CRADAs. Using a modified work for others basis
was included in implementation of the February 2003 DOE/DHS Memorandum
of Agreement that established a framework to ensure that the
capabilities of the DOE Labs and sites were made available to DHS. The
processes and procedures associated with the work for others basis is
routinely reviewed by DHS and DOE to ensure their efficiency. For
example, in an effort to enhance the work for others process, DHS and
DOE implemented a master Interagency Agreement that provides standard
contract terms and conditions for all DHS-sponsored work.
While the Homeland Security Act of 2002 authorizes direct
contracting, the Act further specifies that direct contracting only
applies to programs or activities transferred from DOE to DHS that were
being carried out through direct contracts. As a result this method is
not applicable for ``new'' DHS-sponsored programs or activities.
Joint Sponsorship Agreements have a significant disadvantage in
that DHS would be responsible for associated infrastructure costs.
However, in order to assure alliance between DHS's and DOE's National
Laboratory's future research agendas, along with those of other Federal
agencies with similar research concerns, DHS is a member of the four-
agency governance charter that led to the Mission Executive Council
that includes DOE, DOD, and DNI. Through this mechanism, DHS and DOE
coordinate critical science and technology issues that currently meet
this need. DHS will continue to evaluate opportunities and situations
where these mechanisms could be used.
Question 7a. Three entities within DHS are understood to formally
perform or fund research and development: S&T, the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office, and the Coast Guard. But the list is actually much
longer, and includes the Office of Health Affairs, Customs and Border
Protection, the Secret Service, and a number of others. S&T has the
statutory role of coordinator of all research and development at the
Department.
How does ONL ensure DHS-wide coordination of planning and
prioritization?
Answer. The statutory authority to coordinate all research and
development in the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) lies within
DHS's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), not S&T's Office of
National Laboratories (ONL) specifically, and the Directorate has been
taking a larger role in this responsibility.
The past Integrated Product Teams (IPT) and current S&T Resource
Allocation Strategy STRAS processes help S&T maintain awareness of not
only the needs and requirements of Component partners, but also their
own research and development activities.
In addition, as noted earlier, ONL is meeting with other DHS
components to make them aware of the capabilities that reside in DOE's
National Laboratories and of processes that ONL has lead to systematize
and simplify the administrative processes for getting work underway at
DOE's laboratories.
Question 7b. Is there a compliance check in place on ONL's part?
What procedures allow S&T to manage the role of DHS in using the labs,
particularly in the context of ``One DHS''?
Answer. S&T is the primary DHS focal point for work to be performed
by the Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories pursuant to a
``work for others'' arrangement formalized by the Memorandum of
Agreement Between Department of Energy and Department of Homeland
Security dated February 23, 2003, and in accordance with 6 U.S.C.
189(a)(1)(c).
ONL is the primary point of contact to conduct reviews and
recommend approval of work by DOE National Laboratories. As noted
earlier, ONL reviews all statements of work issued from DHS and
directed to DOE National Laboratories to ensure the work complies with
the terms and conditions of the prime contracts between DOE and each of
the National Laboratory operators.
As noted above, ONL is meeting with DHS's components to advance
their knowledge of the National Laboratories's capabilities and
processes that would simplify the placement of work.
Question 7c. Can you provide any example of capabilities that have
slipped through the cracks or projects that have not been done well
because components did not coordinate with S&T?
Answer. We do not have detailed insight into what might be viewed
as other DHS components' lost opportunities for improved products had
work otherwise contracted for been performed at a DOE National
Laboratory.
In addition, in fulfillment of the Science and Technology
Directorate's role under section 302 of the Homeland Security Act of
2002, it has engaged in the operational testing and evaluation aspects
of acquisitions of a certain size through S&T's Test and Evaluation and
Standards Office. Moreover, the Directorate has become increasingly
engaged in the design and implementation of the Department's
acquisition process. As this process evolves, we will play an on-going
role.
The Department recognizes the need to improve the acquisition
process; accordingly, it is implementing improvements to reduce cost
and schedule overruns. DHS recently published an Integrated Strategy
for High-Risk Management. That report provides a comprehensive vision
and strategy to manage all Department-wide investments. We will be a
prominent member at the beginning of the acquisition cycle and remain
involved throughout the acquisition cycle, working closely with four
groups: The Department Strategy Council, Capabilities and Requirements
Council, Program Review Board, and Investment Review Board.
Question 8. Please describe S&T's process for determining how to
allocate projects to the different research entities at its disposal.
What are the guiding principles for project prioritization, and how do
these map to your new strategic plan?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T) has a mission to strengthen America's
security and resiliency by providing knowledge products and innovative
technology solutions for the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE). To
achieve this mission, S&T has outlined three critical areas of
strategic focus. First, S&T will pursue technology options and process
enhancements that are operationally-focused. Second, S&T will seek
innovative, systems-based solutions to complex problems. Third, S&T
will foster robust partnerships across the Federal Government, State,
local, and Tribal governments, universities, private sector, and
internationally in order to leverage expertise and solutions and share
resources. S&T priorities for areas of research, development, and
analysis are derived from an understanding of near- and long-term
threats, National needs, and DHS mission needs and operational
vulnerabilities, as articulated in the administration's National
Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR), and
the capability gaps and operational requirements of DHS Components and
first responder communities. S&T has established a rigorous portfolio
review process. Each proposed ``new start,'' as well as each on-going
project in our research and development portfolio, undergoes an on-
going review to ensure that it remains relevant, feasible, and
effective.
In reviewing the portfolio, we study written materials, listen to
the project manager's oral presentation, and carefully analyze the
project's likely impact and feasibility (or ``riskiness''), measuring
these attributes against specific metrics determined by S&T with input
from the operating Components. These metrics establish a framework to
address elements essential to ensuring that the program will help DHS
meet one or more of its missions, as defined in the QHSR. These
elements include:
Systems Analysis.--How well does the project's product(s) align
with a customer's existing operational context/concept of use or an
alternative that is agreeable to the customer?
Customer Buy-in.--Have the project objectives been developed
through close consultation with appropriate decision authorities?
Efficiency.--What level of savings can be achieved by this project
with respect to the customer's operations?
Capability.--To what extent does this project provide risk or
threat reduction
and/or improved fidelity, performance, etc.?
Technical/Research Feasibility.--How likely is it that the team
will overcome the technical and/or research challenges facing this
technology and/or knowledge product?
Transition Likelihood.--Is there a clear path/mechanism to enable
transition/commercialization? Customer readiness? Are there any
secondary issues related to the concept of use, prepotency, budgeting,
affordability, regulatory or statutory realities, or business value?
Timeline.--When will the project achieve either an efficiency or
capability improvement, as defined on the Impact page, as part of
normal operations? Or, when will the first demonstration of the
capability/efficiency be observed in an operational context?
Innovation.--Does the project attempt to realize its objectives in
a way that others have not previously considered or exploited?
Resource Leverage.--What level of interaction exists between the
project team and the target component or customer?
Foraging.--Does the project exploit existing technology or
research, and/or new or existing partnerships to minimize time and
expense?
Cost Realism.--Is the cost projection credible?
Project Clarity.--How well is the project described, laid-out--is
it clear what the team will do? Is the problem well-defined and the
approach clear? Has a letter of intent or TTA been obtained?
Each project is evaluated and rated by a review panel composed of
S&T leaders, DHS component representatives, and independent technical
experts. By measuring all of S&T projects against the framework, we
establish a shareable view of all research and development within S&T.
In so doing, we enable more strategic, longer-term budget decisions;
ensure efficient delivery to the component or individual user; and
cultivate effective communication throughout the process.
Question 9. How much money per year do the DOE Labs typically spend
on LDRD projects that are applicable to the homeland security mission?
What has been the return on investment, if any, from this independent
R&D?
Answer. Laboratory Directed Research and Development (LDRD) is a
critical component of keeping the laboratories at the forefront of
basic research relevant to the Homeland Security Enterprise. LDRD has
provided the laboratories with the opportunity to recruit and retain
staff and acquire and build foundational tools necessary to ensure
their long-term vitality at the leading edge of technical fields
relevant to the Homeland Security mission area. In a typical year
assuming $360 million in total program funds at the laboratories from
the Department of Homeland Security, LDRD would be about $18 million at
the laboratories. The laboratories had $192 million of LDRD projects
applicable to DHS science, technology, and engineering missions.
Technical contributions have included:
Enabling research in Rapid Bio-Diagnostics;
Enabling research in Home-made Explosives characterization;
Basic materials research that has led to enhanced personnel
protection equipment for first responders;
Advanced computing, modeling, simulation, and virtual
training;
Data analytics resulting in visualization and situational
awareness tools;
Battery and renewable power solutions for remote sensors.
Question 10a. S&T operates about ten test beds around the Nation.
What is the rationale for establishing test beds, rather than
contracting with DOE Labs, DHS Centers of Excellence, or other existing
entities for the work?
Question 10b. Does the funding for these test beds come from ONL?
Answer. Test beds provide controlled environments in which
scientific testing, evaluation, and demonstration can take place. To
ensure the highest return on the time and resources invested in a
project, the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) uses the most
appropriate facility for each project, including using existing
capabilities whenever possible. However, in some cases, projects
require test beds that do not exist for certain operational
environments to assess continuity of operations, live demos, human
response, etc., and in many cases a lab or Center of Excellence cannot
meet these needs.
In fiscal year 2010, the Resilient Tunnel Project constructed a
full-scale test tunnel at West Virginia University in Morgantown, West
Virginia, and configured it with an internal geometry that closely
matches tunnels of a mass transit partner. In this case, the West
Virginia University test bed has the capability to allow testing with
water pressures equivalent to those expected in a breached underwater
transit tunnel. Such simulation could not be accomplished without
severe disruption to services and risk of significant damage in an
actual transit tunnel. The test tunnel also provides ready access and
observation of both sides of the inflatable tunnel plug during its
deployment.
The DETER test bed is a shared cybersecurity facility globally
accessed through the internet by the research community for the
research, development, testing, and education of cybersecurity
technologies. DETER is a unique facility that provides researchers with
secure environments that can replicate different portions of the
internet, allowing safe exploration of new defenses against emerging
cyber threats. DETER's computing infrastructure and software is
developed and maintained by the University of Southern California's
Information Sciences Institute and the University of California,
Berkeley. Research at both institutions provides constant improvements
and allows the test bed to keep pace with the technology developments,
support increasingly larger experiments, and efficiently develop and
execute experiments. DETER is the largest, unclassified public test bed
and this on-going research ensures that it is also one of the most
advanced.
The inherently distributed design and virtual nature of the test
bed has allowed for additional computing resources, from National Labs
and educational institutions, to be seamlessly integrated over the
internet and made accessible through DETER.
Funding for the individual test beds can come from a variety of
sources including Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and non-DHS
sources. Generally, S&T's Office of National Labs does not fund test
beds.
Question 11a. The National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures
Center (NBACC) has endured considerable delays due to infrastructure
problems. It also has a lot of unused space.
How much square footage is vacant at the NBACC? Please provide a
break-down by biosafety level, and indicate how this figure will change
when the lab space is fully accredited. Was the excess space
unintended? What is DHS' plan for leasing the space to other entities?
Answer. Currently 10,500 square feet of BSL-4 space and 11,000 sq.
ft. of BSL-2 space are being utilized at NBACC for BSL-2, 3, and 4
operations. Approximately 20 percent of the total National Biodefense
Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC) Laboratory capacity of
55,000 sq. ft. (including 34,000 sq. ft. of BSL-3 space being activated
in calendar year 2012) may be available for additional research and
development to support the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and
non-DHS entities.
The strategy is for NBACC staff to perform work for other entities
in the NBACC Laboratories rather than leasing space. DHS and NBACC have
developed Memoranda of Understanding with multiple Federal agencies to
fund externally-sponsored program activities in the near term (i.e.,
fiscal year 2013) as well as part of potential strategic
collaborations.
DHS envisions that this approach will address additional National
biodefense priorities, enhance the competencies and capabilities
available at NBACC, and increase the overall use of the facility. NBACC
was always intended to be a National resource available to support
other entities. Due to DHS's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T)
funding reductions and delays in registering some of the laboratories,
the current annual investment is below the intended DHS level when
fully activated.
Question 11b. Please provide the total cost of remediation of the
laboratory due to piping problems. Please also indicate how far back,
in terms of time until full operational capability, these problems have
set the lab.
Answer. Remediation of the stainless steel pipes cost $563,000. The
corrosion was identified in August 2010, and remediation was completed
in March 2011 resulting in a 7-month delay in laboratory activation.
NBACC submitted the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)/
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) registration for the BSL-4 in
April 2011 and received registration in September 2011. The delay due
to corrosion remediation was partially mitigated by using the time to
conduct additional planning, documentation, training, reviews, and use
of the laboratories at BSL-2 (already activated) to ensure readiness
for the CDC/USDA registration process.
Remediation of the glass piping system cost $913,000. The piping
installation issues were identified in August 2010, and remediation was
completed in April 2012 resulting in a 20-month delay in laboratory
activation.
NBACC is scheduled for submittal of the CDC/USDA registration for
the BSL-3 in June 2012 with projected registration in December 2012.
The delay due to glass piping remediation was partially mitigated by
conducting BSL-3 activities inside the BSL-4 laboratories allowing
critical work to proceed.
Question 12. What office has final oversight of NBACC activities?
What is the difference between the roles of the Chemical and Biological
Division and ONL with regard to NBACC oversight and management?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate's (S&T) Office of
National Laboratories (ONL) has responsibility for the overall
execution of the NBACC mission. ONL oversees and manages the NBACC
Laboratory including planning, staffing, funding, and utilization. In
addition, ONL has responsibility for the facility operations, including
safety and security regulations are met.
S&T's Chemical and Biological Defense Division (CBD) is a customer
of the NBACC. CBD oversees the technical management of specialized
research and development projects in the bio-threat characterization at
NBACC as well as requests work to be completed on CBD division-level
goals and objectives.
Question 13. Many foreign animal diseases are emerging that could
impact livestock and human health. Given that the terrorist threat
should be a primary focus of DHS' involvement in agricultural security,
how do the Plum Island Animal Disease Center and the presumptive
National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility contribute to this security
mission in a way that is unique from the Department of Agriculture's
approach to agricultural security?
Answer. Plum Island Animal Disease Center (PIADC) represents an on-
going partnership between the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), the U.S. Department of
Agriculture's (USDA) Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)
and USDA's Agriculture Research Service (ARS).
PIADC is responsible for conducting research, diagnostics, and
countermeasure development (e.g., vaccine development) for high-
consequence foreign animal diseases (FAD) with a priority on Foot-and-
Mouth Disease (FMD). S&T is responsible for the operation and
maintenance of the laboratory, and ensuring a safe and secure
environment for conducting the mission.
Due to the threat of agro-terrorism, DHS has supported the
development of new forensic capabilities at PIADC. In the event of a
FAD outbreak, the Federal Bureau of Investigations can now work at
PIADC to conduct forensic testing to investigate whether the incident
was intentional or naturally-occurring. PIADC programs would transition
to the National Bio- and Agro-defense Facility.
S&T's basic role concerning foreign animal disease outbreaks is
unique and distinct from the USDA mission:
------------------------------------------------------------------------
USDA S&T
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Basic research and discovery for Administer and provide a
vaccines and diagnostics for foreign facility for foreign animal
animal diseases. disease laboratory work.
Manage operational response during a Later development including
foreign animal disease outbreak. proof of concept through
commercialization.
Develop modeling, diagnostic,
and screening tools to
minimize the number of animals
affected and limit economic
impact of an outbreak.
Provide scientific and
technical support to
operational response during an
incident.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
The agricultural sector and food supply are designated critical
infrastructures by DHS.
For this reason, PIADC and the presumptive NBAF have a critical
role in preventing and protecting against devastating animal diseases
in the United States as well as responding to or mitigating the effects
of such diseases. Regardless of whether the cause is terrorism or
naturally-emerging disease, the outbreak of a foreign animal disease
has the potential to be devastating to critical infrastructure and the
U.S. economy. In either case, DHS would be responsible for coordinating
the National response if the event were of sufficient scale and impact.
Questions From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson for Daniel M. Gerstein
Question 1. The Office of National Laboratories has at least two
major roles: Its statutory responsibility to coordinate and use DOE
National Laboratories and its DHS-assigned responsibility of
constructing, operating, and maintaining S&T Directorate Laboratories.
How are the resources of the Office of National Laboratories
divided between these functions, in terms of staff, full-time
equivalents, or budget authority?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate's (S&T) Office of
National Laboratories (ONL) has two main roles as defined by current
funding: Construction (including lab upgrades) and Operations. These
programs are appropriated through the Laboratory Facilities budget
authority that is part of the S&T appropriations. In fiscal year 2012,
the total Laboratory Facilities budget was $176.5 million ($50 million
for construction, $18.2 million for upgrades, and $108.3 million in
operations).
The coordination and utilization of the Department of Energy (DOE)
National Laboratories and the Department of Homeland Security
Technology Transfer program do not have assigned budgetary
responsibilities.
ONL has a director that oversees the branches and programs to
execute its mission. The resources of ONL are divided into the
following areas:
ONL Director: 3 full-time employees; overall budget of
$176.5 million.
Operations Branch: 9 full-time employees (budget of $108.3
million operations for five S&T Labs).
Constructions/Lab Upgrades: 9 full-time employees (budget of
$50 million for the National Bio- and Agro-Defense Facility,
$18.2 million for Transportation Security Lab upgrades).
DOE Lab Utilization: 3 full-time employees.
Technology Transfer Program: 2 full-time employees.
Question 2a. The S&T Directorate realigned itself in late 2010.
Some S&T Laboratories are associated with the programs they support
(for example, the National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL)
is aligned with the Homeland Security Enterprise and First Responders
Group), while others are aligned with the Office of National
Laboratories (for example, the Chemical Security Analysis Center).
Why are different approaches taken to the organization of the S&T
Directorate Laboratories?
Question 2b. How does the direct connection or lack of a direct
connection to the programs the laboratories support affect the work
done by the laboratories?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T) operates five laboratories: Plum Island
Animal Disease Center; the Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL);
the National Urban Security Technology Laboratory (NUSTL); the Chemical
Security Analysis Center; and the National Biodefense Analysis and
Countermeasures Center.
S&T's Office of National Laboratories (ONL) oversees and funds
operation and maintenance for all five S&T Laboratories through the
Laboratory Facilities budget.
Laboratories whose key function is scientific research are
administered under ONL. Laboratories that have a major non-scientific
research mission are aligned to the appropriate functional group. For
example, TSL has a major test and evaluation mission and is aligned to
S&T's Acquisition Support and Operation Analysis Group that includes
the Test and Evaluation Standards Office.
Similarly, NUSTL's major mission is to support First Responder
activities and is aligned to the Homeland Security Enterprise and S&T's
First Responders Group. This alignment ensures that these laboratories
provide the focused support to the specialized non-scientific
activities needed to ensure success.
Question 3a. The DHS Congressional budget justifications from
fiscal year 2009 through fiscal year 2011 provided a break-down of
operations and maintenance funding for each S&T Directorate Laboratory.
DHS discontinued this practice in the fiscal year 2012 Congressional
budget justification, and now doesn't report the amount of programmatic
funding sent to the S&T Directorate Laboratories. Also, DHS does not
detail the amount of funding provided by DNDO to its laboratory-like
facilities.
Why has DHS changed the amount of information provided to Congress
regarding the operations and maintenance of the S&T Directorate
Laboratories?
Question 3b. How much programmatic funding has been provided to the
S&T Directorate Laboratories and by what entities both inside and
outside the directorate?
Question 3c. Why does DHS not report the total amount of funds
budgeted annually for each S&T Directorate Laboratory in the same
manner that DOE reports regarding its laboratories?
Answer. For fiscal years 2008-2011, the Science and Technology
Directorate (S&T) included program level funding below the Program/
Project Activity (PPA) level in the President's budget request.
Beginning in fiscal year 2012, S&T included PPA-level funding
information in the budget request and separately provided Congressional
staff a much greater level of detail down to the project level. This
information provided greater insight into S&T funding requests than was
previously available in the S&T budget request for fiscal year 2009
through fiscal year 2011. Attached is the information provided with the
budget submission. The more detailed information provided includes
funding information on operation and maintenance of each S&T
Laboratory.
Below is the programmatic funding provided to the S&T Laboratories
outside of operation and maintenance:
S&T DOLLARS OBLIGATED TO S&T LABS BY DIVISIONS OTHER THAN S&T'S OFFICE OF NATIONAL LABORATORIES TO DATE 5/15/
2012
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2010
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Division Project DHS Lab
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explosives.............................. Air Cargo Systems Integrated Approach...... TSL $1,862,177
Automated Carry-on Detect.................. TSL 402,764
Explosives Trace Detect.................... TSL 585,000
Next Generation Passenger Checkpoint....... TSL 137,500
Borders and Maritime.................... Container Security Test Bed (CSTB)......... TSL 35,000
Chem/Bio................................ Foreign Animal Disease Vaccines and PIADC 7,032,237
Diagnostics (Near/Long Term). PIADC 642,325
Agrodefense Basic Research................. CSAC 5,760,000
CSAC....................................... CSAC 1,335,000
Model Large Scale Toxic Chemical Transport CSAC 3,503,450
Release. NBACC 21,931,350
Chemical Infrastructure Risk Assessment.... NBACC 14,105,150
Bio Threat Characterization................ NBACC 1,918,800
National BioForensics Operations...........
NBFAC......................................
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL............................. ........................................... ......... 59,250,753
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2011
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Division Project DHS Lab
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Explosives.............................. Check Point/Detection...................... TSL $2,684,890
Next Generation Passenger Checkpoint....... TSL 258,922
Mass Transit............................... TSL 921,899
Air Cargo Systems Integrated Approach...... TSL 811,597
Chem/Bio................................ Foreign Animal Disease Vaccines and PIADC 9,366,434
Diagnostics (Near/Long Term). PIADC 641,333
Ag Screening Tools......................... CSAC 3,936,263
CSAC....................................... CSAC 860,000
Model Large Scale Toxic Chemical Transport CSAC 1,100,000
Release. CSAC 1,577,200
Increase Safety of Hazardous Materials..... CSAC 300,000
Chemical Infrastructure Risk Assessment.... NBACC 12,933,936
IT Security Services....................... NBACC 9,541,486
National BioForensics Operations........... NBACC 306,000
Bio Threat Characterization................
BioForensics Research and Development......
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL............................. ........................................... ......... 45,239,960
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2012
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Division Project DHS Lab To Date Planned
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
First Responder Group........... Rad/Nuc Recovery Plan.............. NUSTL $0 $150,000
Explosives...................... Next Generation Passenger TSL 631,558 0
Checkpoint.
Checked Baggage/Next Generation TSL 423,228 0
Passenger Checkpoint/PBIED. TSL 492,370 0
Checked Baggage....................
Air Cargo/Algorithm and Analysis of TSL 294,139 0
Raw Images/Next Generation TSL 594,705 0
Passenger Checkpoint. TSL 321,349 0
Air Cargo/Checked Baggage..........
Air Cargo/TSL Operations...........
Chem/Bio........................ Foreign Animal Disease Vaccines and
Diagnostics (Near/Long Term). PIADC 3,412,744 211,000
Ag Screening Tools................. PIADC 188,003 0
Chemical Security Analysis Center.. CSAC 3,545,360 0
Bio Threat Characterization........ NBACC 6,180,042 0
Bio-Defense Knowledge Center NBACC 800,000 0
Analyses and Assessments. NBACC 7,303,572 0
National BioForensics Operations... NBACC 351,157 0
BioForensics Research and
Development.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
TOTAL..................... ................................... ......... 24,538,227 361,000
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
FUNDING FROM OTHER THAN DHS TO S&T LABORATORIES
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Amount
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year 2012--From USDA to PIADC:
FADD School Operations/animal care.............. $44,082
Fiscal Year 2011--From USDA to PIADC:
11-9100-0900-IA FADD school operations, overtime 22,688
hours, contractor costs, materials, and
supplies.......................................
11-9100-1080 Animal per diem, copier charges, 36,300
employee physicals, and DNA analyzer
maintenance....................................
60-1940-1-043 Animal per diem, copier charges, 91,130
and employee physicals.........................
11-5000-2074-1A USDA APHIS International 22,163
Services.......................................
Fiscal Year 2011--From DNDO to NUSTL:
HSHQDC-11-X-00188 Securing the Cities program... 120,000
Fiscal Year 2011--From NPPD to NUSTL:
HSHQDC-11-X-00254 Shielded Nuclear Alarm 83,922
Resolution Technology Demonstration and
Characterization...............................
Fiscal Year 2010--From USDA to PIADC:
60-1940-0-019 Animal care....................... 78,403
10-9100-1080 Costs associated with animal care, 27,179
employee physicals, and DNA analyzer...........
10-9100-0900-1A Foreign Animal Disease 28,144
Diagnostics....................................
10-9100-1194-1A North American Foot and Mouth 23,051
Bank...........................................
Fiscal Year 2010--From TSA to TSL:
HSTS04-09-X-CT4033 Determine the security 2,076,073
applications of a CAT/BPSS device..............
HSTS04-09-X-CT1331 Develop an initial baseline 325,000
standard image format..........................
HSTS02-10-X-MLS112 TSA requires continued 1,000,000
support for the additional functionality of the
development of the Fedtrak system..............
HSTS02-09-X-MLS360 Supplemental tests for the 100,000
Chlorine Rail Tank Car Vulnerability Assessment
Fiscal Year 2010--From DNDO to TSL:
HSHQDC-10-X-568 Computed Tomography............. 544,701
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 4a. The DHS budget, and especially that for research and
development within DHS, is experiencing fiscal pressure. Maximizing the
value of research and development expenditures is essential.
What procedures does DHS have in place to guide program managers
regarding performing research and development?
Question 4b. What criteria do DNDO and the S&T Directorate use to
determine whether industry, academia, a DOE National Laboratory, or a
DHS Laboratory should perform the research and development?
Question 4c. How have the results from these investments been
assessed on a cost and performance basis?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate's (S&T) Value-Added
Proposition guides our efforts to maximize the impact of research and
development of technologies that will serve DHS's components. The
Value-Added Proposition is operationally focused, seeking innovative
solutions, and expanding critical partnerships.
To support the Value-Added Proposition, we have established a
process of on-going reviews of our entire research and development
portfolio to ensure that we are: (1) Investing in technologies that
will significantly improve the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
efforts to help secure the country and (2) meeting the goals
established by our partners in the operating components and the broader
Homeland Security Enterprise.
We have committed to an annual review of our portfolio of basic and
applied research and development and all proposed new projects. During
this annual review we study written materials, hear a presentation by
the project manager and carefully analyze the project's likely impact
and feasibility (or ``riskiness''), judging these attributes against
specific metrics determined by DHS's S&T with input from the operating
components.
These metrics establish a framework to address elements essential
to programmatic success in the context of the DHS missions spelled out
in the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. The framework assesses the
project's overall impact on customer mission; transition of products to
the field; investment in technology to position S&T for the future;
coordination with customers to align projects with their requirements;
and application of an innovative strategy.
Each project is evaluated by a review panel composed of S&T
leaders, DHS component representatives, and independent experts. By
measuring all of S&T's projects against the framework, we establish a
transparent view of all research and development within S&T to enable
more strategic, longer-term budget decisions; ensure efficient delivery
to the component or individual user; and cultivate effective
communication.
Feedback from these reviews highlight areas of strength within each
program but also highlight areas for improvement. This provides
valuable input to program managers to help improve program management.
S&T has seen a substantial improvement in quality over the 2 years the
portfolio review has been conducted.
The program managers are also guided by the work of S&T's Knowledge
Movement and Process Improvement Office (KMO). KMO developed a
comprehensive program management guide; templates for program
documents; and a framework for information sharing including a new
Sharepoint site that houses all of the program names, descriptions, and
key documentation.
Question 5a. Representatives of the DOE National Laboratories serve
within DHS in advisory roles, often as temporary ``IPA'' employees. The
National Academy of Public Administration, the DHS Office of Inspector
General, and the Government Accountability Office all have highlighted
the need for DHS to maintain strong managerial controls in order to
maintain transparency in funding activities and to avoid conflicts of
interest.
Please describe how DNDO and the S&T Directorate ensure that these
representatives avoid conflicts of interest.
Question 5b. How does the S&T Directorate, in performing
appropriateness reviews of work sent to DOE National Laboratories,
assess and address such potential conflicts?
Answer. The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) currently has
one individual detailed under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act
Program (IPA) whose employer is a Department of Energy (DOE) National
Laboratory. In accordance with the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, all
IPAs are legally required to adhere to all of the ethics statutes and
regulations applicable to Federal employees, including the Standards of
Ethical Conduct for Employees of the Executive Branch in the Code of
Federal Regulations and the criminal conflict of interest statutes as
outlined in Title 18 of the United States Code. For example, IPAs must
comply with 18 U.S.C. 208 (prohibiting personal and substantial
participation in a particular matter in which he or she has a financial
interest).
All IPAs, before they are assigned to the Department, including the
sole IPA within S&T from a DOE National Laboratory, are required to
file an Office of Government Ethics Form 450, Confidential Financial
Disclosure Report and to discuss the disclosure report with an ethics
attorney prior to appointment. IPAs are also are required to receive an
ethics briefing from the Department of Homeland Security's Office of
the General Counsel (OGC) Ethics Division upon appointment and annually
thereafter.
If the Ethics Official identifies a potential conflict of interest
between the candidate's personal financial interests and his/her IPA
duties, the Ethics Official notifies the S&T supervisor of the
potential conflict, reviews possible options to resolve the potential
conflict, and, in consultation with S&T management, determines the
appropriate option to resolve the potential conflict.
The Ethics Official works directly with the IPA candidate to
resolve the potential conflict.
Any potential conflicts and necessary remedial measures taken to
avoid or resolve a conflict are documented by the ethics attorney on
the IPA's financial disclosure report. New employee and annual ethics
briefings emphasize that employees are prohibited from participating
personally and substantially in an official capacity in a particular
matter that he/she knows will have a direct and predictable effect on
his/her financial interests to include those of a current employer. In
addition, the impartiality ethics regulations prohibit an IPA or
Federal employee from participating in a Government matter if their
current employer is a party to the matter or is representing a party to
the matter if a reasonable person would question the IPA's
impartiality. Both of these restrictions require the IPA to disqualify
from participating without prior authorization from an agency ethics
official.
With respect to the IPA from the DOE National Laboratory, as with
all IPA appointees, the IPA is bound by the restrictions set forth in
the Office of Government Standards of Ethical Conduct for Employees of
the Executive Branch in 5 Code of Federal Regulations Part 2635, and
the financial conflict of interest statute at 18 United States Code
Section 208 with regard to any particular matters pertaining to his or
her employing institution and other conflict of interest laws in Title
18. IPAs are responsible for adhering to the laws and the standards by
recusing themselves, if appropriate, if a matter comes to their
attention that may have a direct and predictable effect on the
financial interests of their employing institution or if their
employing institution is a party to a matter to which they are
assigned, or representing a party to a matter to which they are
assigned. The IPA should alert his/her supervisor of any potential
conflicts before participating in a matter. Finally, when the IPA
leaves the position with DHS, the Ethics Division is available to
provide post-employment counseling to the departing IPA.
The appropriateness reviews that S&T performs for work sent to the
DOE National Laboratories do not specifically address potential
conflicts of interest. Any conflict of interest would be handled
through the ethics process described above by the IPA and his/her
supervisor.
Questions From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren for Huban Gowadia
Question 1. In looking at the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's
(DNDO) utilization of the labs over the past few years, it looks like
there has been a substantial decline in funding. In fiscal year 2010,
your funding to the five Department of Energy (DOE) Labs you use the
most was $134 million, and that dipped to $91 million in fiscal year
2011. I understand that fiscal year 2012 will decline further, to
almost half of fiscal year 2011. Yet, DNDO's total budget has not been
reduced by half.
Can you explain the reason for this change? Does it demonstrate a
shift in DNDO's research budgets to other entities or other priorities?
Answer. The reduction of funding going to the DOE Labs in fiscal
year 2012 is projected to be $65 million less than the amount obligated
during fiscal year 2011. Rather than a shift away from research, this
lower amount is a direct reflection of the lower amount of funding
appropriated for research and development in fiscal year 2012.
The Transformational Research and Development Accounts alone were
reduced by 58 percent, or ($56 million) from the fiscal year 2011
funding levels. DNDO historically has sent approximately 30 percent of
the Transformational and Applied Research (TAR) funding to the National
Laboratories. In addition, DNDO will spend significantly less than the
fiscal year 2011 obligations as a result of lower funding levels in our
Systems Development and Systems Acquisition Accounts.
Question 2a. Funding put toward DNDO's Transformational and Applied
(TAR) R&D program has been on the decline.
How can DHS sustain an R&D program that meets the unique
operational requirements of the Department and its stakeholders? What
role do you foresee the labs playing here?
Question 2b. What is the relationship between the transformational
research program and DNDO priorities?
Answer. DNDO's Transformational and Applied Research (TAR) budget
was relatively level between fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2011, but
was drastically reduced by 58 percent ($56 million) in the fiscal year
2012 appropriations act. In order to account for this budget decrease,
many initiatives were terminated and more were delayed with the
anticipation of higher funding in fiscal year 2013. The fiscal year
2013 President's funding request restored the TAR budget to $84
million, which is 87 percent of the fiscal year 2011 level. This
increased level of funding will meet the unique Research and
Development (R&D) mission to address gaps in the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture (GNDA) and to dramatically improve the
performance and reduce the operational burden of nuclear and
radiological detection and technical forensics technologies. DNDO's
Solution Development Process ensures there is a direct link between
TAR's program and DNDO priorities by defining and prioritizing research
needs and by performing reviews of on-going and purposed research
projects.
The relationship between TAR and the rest of DNDO is unique within
the Government, in that TAR work is very closely connected to the
strategic development, implementation, and enhancement of the global
nuclear detection architecture and National technical nuclear forensics
efforts. DNDO brings a holistic approach to the problem of nuclear
terrorism, combining multiple functions which are necessary to build a
complete nuclear detection capability. In particular, DNDO brings:
An understanding of the threat with gaps in the architecture
to inform current deployment of technology as well as near-term
and long-term research, and
Operational support to end-users to help develop CONOPs,
training, exercises, and conduct alarm adjudication.
The National Laboratories play a critical role in support of the
TAR research and development mission by providing innovative ideas,
establishing technical feasibility, developing prototype systems, and
supporting characterization and analysis for transformational and near-
term research and development projects:
DNDO annually releases a competitive Call for Proposals
(CFP) for Exploratory Research to the National Laboratories and
other Federal centers. The competitive CFP solicits proposals
that may lead to dramatic improvements in National capabilities
for nuclear/radiological detection and forensics. Topics areas
for this research are defined from prioritized gaps in the
GNDA, technology needs defined by DNDO and Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) operational components, and remaining
technology hurdles discovered in prior research.
National Laboratories are encouraged to compete for project
funding exploratory research at the early stages of research
and development. National Laboratories have contributed to
advances in many technical areas including detector materials
development, passive detection techniques, neutron detection
and helium-3 replacements, shielded special nuclear material
detection, modeling and algorithms, and nuclear forensics.
In fiscal year 2012, DNDO is supporting 11 Exploratory
Research projects at the National Laboratories, focusing on
early-stage and basic research that can be developed into new
technologies for improving radiation detection capabilities or
operations.
The National Laboratories also provide technical expertise,
technology characterization planning, and data analysis support
to DNDO's Advanced Technology Demonstration (ATD) Program. This
program strives to take innovative technology that has been
proven in a laboratory environment from a laboratory bench-top
prototype into a full-scale performance test unit, and
characterize its performance in a simulated operational
environment. Because they have the proper mix of technical
expertise and scientific rigor to assist in the development and
characterization of advanced technologies, the National
Laboratories have played a major role in each of the eight ATD
projects initiated to date.
Question 3a. I understand that DNDO may at times find itself in
possession of expensive equipment or prototypes that for one reason or
another do not get deployed. Some of this equipment, or its components,
can be quite expensive. A good example of this is the radiation
detection crystals inside portal monitor equipment.
Does DNDO have a mechanism in place to transfer this equipment or
its components to the labs, so that even if it is non-deployable, it
can at least provide some research value?
Question 3b. If no such mechanism exists, what do you need to make
that happen?
Answer. Yes, DNDO has a mechanism to transfer non-deployable
equipment or system components to the National Laboratories for
research. Section 302 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L.
107-296) granted the Secretary authority for ``establishing a system
for transferring homeland security developments or technologies to
Federal, State, local government, and private-sector entities.'' This
authority is in addition to the property disposal authorities of the
General Services Administration (GSA). The following generally outlines
DNDO's process for handling excess equipment, which complies with DHS
and GSA property policy:
1. Declare assets ``Excess''.
2. Determine if the asset should be dismantled for parts/
components.
3. Keep desired assets or components in storage.
4. Determine if other entities can use the assets (in the following
order):
Within DNDO;
DHS components;
Federal agencies;
State & local agencies (as applicable);
National Laboratories (emphasis added);
Universities.
5. Transfer assets.
As an example, DNDO has transferred excess equipment such as
Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP) Low Rate Initial Production units
to the Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense Program and the
State of Georgia. DNDO has also transferred ASP components (including
crystals) to labs and universities to support research and development.
DNDO does not have authority to sell property and retain the
proceeds to be applied toward other acquisitions or research and
development projects. DNDO has made use of surplus materials as the
Government contribution to Cooperative Research and Development
Agreements, or as outright transfers.
Question 4. DNDO is fundamentally responsible for helping to
safeguard the homeland against a nuclear or radiological attack,
primarily by supporting detection capabilities. Many efforts to detect
illicit nuclear activities, supported by other U.S. agencies, are on-
going in the international arena.
Does DNDO take advantage of existing assets fielded by other
agencies for illicit nuclear activities internationally, and leverage
them for homeland security purposes? Does it work with the National
Laboratories to do so?
Answer. DNDO cooperates extensively with both U.S. and non-U.S.
efforts in the international arena to detect radiological and nuclear
material out of regulatory control. Under the framework of the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), which currently numbers
85 partner nations and four international observers including the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), DNDO has led the development
of international guidelines and best practices for nuclear detection
efforts in the GICNT's Nuclear Detection Working Group chaired by the
Netherlands. Developed in concert with the GICNT community, these
guidelines leverage best practices from domestic U.S. efforts to
enhance our National-level radiological and nuclear detection
capability as well as the best practices established at the
international level. The National Laboratories are a critical part of
the U.S. Government (USG) programmatic assistance to build nuclear
detection capacity in the international arena, and thus offer insight
into the USG's myriad nuclear detection assistance efforts and are
uniquely positioned to inform DNDO's attempts to characterize the GNDA
through regional architectural analyses and other studies of
transnational issues related to the GNDA.
DNDO has also leveraged the experience of the National Laboratories
in testing and characterizing nuclear detection equipment, gathering
intelligence information related to radiological and nuclear threats,
and developing and implementing nuclear detection architectures.
An example of international and domestic cooperation for
radiological and nuclear detection capabilities is the Illicit
Trafficking Radiation Assessment Program+10 (ITRAP+10) program. The
ITRAP+10 is a partnership between the European Union (EU), the United
States, and the IAEA to evaluate the performance of available
commercial radiation detection equipment against accepted standards.
The EU initiated the program to test EU manufactured equipment to the
radiological portion of the IEC standards at the Joint Research Center
(JRC) in Ispra, Italy. Since countering nuclear terrorism is a concern
to the entire world community, DNDO proposed in 2010 to expand the
scope of the test to include all instruments regardless of National
origin, and to conduct testing against all sections of the standards
(radiological, mechanical, environmental, and electro-magnetic). DNDO
has committed funding, subject matter experts, and test facilities to
support the expanded scope.
Today, ITRAP+10 is a dynamic partnership between the JRC-Ispra,
DHS/DNDO, Department of Energy's Second Line of Defense program (DOE/
SLD) and the IAEA, that has embarked on the ambitious project to test
nearly 100 commercially-available systems in nine categories of
instruments against ANSI and the IEC standards. Presently, testing is
being conducted at the JRC, Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL),
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) and the Savannah River
National Laboratory (SRNL). To harmonize test processes between the
European Union and all of the U.S. test facilities, the participating
agencies have agreed to share resources and personnel.
Question 5. In a budget environment in which funding is on a
general decline, how does DNDO plan to address serious nuclear and
radiological threats that academia and the private sector simply do not
have the infrastructure to study? What efficiencies can you find to do
more with less?
Answer. DNDO uses use all sources of assistance to develop
solutions to address nuclear and radiological threats: Private
companies, Federal partners, National Laboratories, academia, and our
own in-house expertise.
Transformational research and development funding is focused on
addressing high-risk or longer-term solutions. DNDO engages with the
private sector, National Laboratories, and the academic community to
advance fundamental knowledge for nuclear and radiological threat
detection and related sciences with emphasis on fundamental research to
solve long-term, high-risk challenges or dramatically improve the
performance of domestic radiological and nuclear detection systems and
enabling technologies
In light of the decreased appropriation for transformational
research and development, DNDO's strategy is to allocate funds to the
near-term Advanced Technology Demonstration projects to more readily
demonstrate the benefits of investment, but at the expense of the much
longer-term Exploratory Research and Academic Research Initiative
projects in DNDO's portfolio. DNDO will continue to seek to find the
appropriate balance between long- and short-term research in this
current fiscal environment.
In order to use resources more effectively and capitalize on the
advances being made by industry, DNDO's acquisition and commercial
engagement strategy will focus on the ``Commercial First'' initiative
to leverage industry development of systems and solutions. This
capitalizes on the great strides made by industry in developing new
detection technologies and provides insight into operator needs. DNDO
will work with industry closely, and share technical requirements and
advances in research and development projects that could potentially be
integrated into next-generation systems.
Question From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren for Daniel Morgan
Question. DHS components may have short-term, urgent needs for
which they request the help of the labs. It seems that one of the roles
of S&T, then, should be to infuse longer-term guidance on how to meet
those needs in the context of longer-term R&D needs and evolving
threats.
Do you think that S&T has figured out how to play a role in this
space?
Has S&T struck a balance of taking requirements from components,
integrating them with next-generation threats that components wouldn't
necessarily know about, and using the labs or other entities to
facilitate the whole spectrum of needed research in a given area?
Answer. When the DHS operational components request assistance from
the DOE National Laboratories, they often seek near-term solutions to
specific, identified operational needs. This approach may help to
ensure that the resulting work is relevant and useful. On the other
hand, some laboratory representatives argue that it fails to capitalize
on the full range of their scientific and technical expertise. They
advocate the use of science and technology to identify long-term needs
and opportunities, not just to supply short-term solutions to needs
that have already been identified. A longer-term approach could include
roles for the S&T Directorate as well as the laboratories themselves.
If the S&T Directorate were to place more emphasis on identifying
long-term needs and opportunities, it could benefit from a detailed
understanding of the missions of the operational components, as well as
from strong relationships with the components to facilitate its
infusion of scientific and technical guidance. The directorate's on-
going work in systems analysis, which seeks to develop structured
models of the activities of DHS operational components, will likely
help it to develop a better understanding of their missions. Stronger
relationships are explicitly called for by Objective 1.2 of the
directorate's 2011 strategic plan: ``Strengthen relationships with DHS
components and the first responder community to better understand and
address their requirements.''
The directorate's efforts to meet Objective 1.2 include Apex
projects, which are agreed to at the leadership level between the S&T
Directorate and an operational component, and the forging of stronger
relationships at lower levels between S&T technical experts and front-
line operators. In addition, the Integrated Product Team process for
involving the operational components in S&T Directorate planning,
formerly a keystone of the directorate's prioritization efforts, is
still in effect, though less prominently than before. As currently
structured, however, all these mechanisms appear to be focused mostly
on obtaining input from the operational components, to guide the S&T
Directorate's research and development programs, rather than on
facilitating a two-way flow of information between S&T and the
components. A more two-way approach could help S&T provide long-term
scientific and technical guidance and alert the components to next-
generation threats and new technology opportunities.
Instead of moving toward a longer-term approach, however, it
appears that the S&T Directorate has recently increased its focus on
delivering technologies that can meet immediate operational needs. For
example, the directorate formerly had a goal of devoting 20% of its
resources to long-term basic research. According to DHS officials, this
goal is no longer in effect. Rather, the directorate's emphasis is
increasingly on near-term technology development, operations analysis,
and acquisition support. This trend is evident in directorate
initiatives such as technology foraging, in the establishment of an
Acquisition Support and Operations Analysis Group in the August 2010
management realignment, and in the establishment of a separate line
item for Acquisition and Operations Support in the fiscal year 2012
budget. This shift toward a near-term focus may, in part, result from
past criticism by policy-makers that the directorate has been
insufficiently successful in transitioning the results of its research
and development into fielded applications.
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