[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
ELIMINATING WASTE, FRAUD, ABUSE, AND
DUPLICATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 8, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-75
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] CONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Billy Long, Missouri, Vice Chair Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Dr. R. Nick Palarino, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Tamla Scott, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Witnesses
Hon. James S. Gilmore, III, Former Governor of Virginia, Former
Chairman, Congressional Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic
Response Capabilities For Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick, Managing Director, Homeland Security and
Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Mr. Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector General, Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 33
Prepared Statement............................................. 35
Mr. Scott Lilly, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress:
Oral Statement................................................. 40
Prepared Statement............................................. 41
ELIMINATING WASTE, FRAUD, ABUSE, AND DUPLICATION IN THE DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
Thursday, March 8, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and
Management,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:09 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul, Long, Duncan, and Keating.
Mr. McCaul. The committee will come to order. I recognize
myself for an opening statement.
Today we continue our examination of the Department of
Homeland Security's ability to adequately manage its own
people, its resources, and billions of taxpayer dollars, and
ultimately its ability to carry out its core mission of
protecting the American people.
Investigations recently completed by both the Government
Accountability Office and the DHS inspector general call into
question the Department's ability to operate effectively and
without susceptibility to waste, fraud, and abuse of authority.
For example, last year more than 150 Department of Homeland
Security employees were arrested for offenses that hindered
carrying out the Department's core mission to protect the
homeland. There were thefts by airport screeners. You can see
the slides. Between October 2009 and September 2010, at Newark
Liberty Airport, TSA screeners stole as much as $30,000 from
unsuspecting passengers who were trying to get through security
to board their plane. In Orlando, passengers had laptop
computers stolen from their luggage. There were immigration
officers accepting bribes; even Customs and Border Protection
officers conspiring with transnational drug traffickers. As a
former Federal prosecutor in the Department of Justice Public
Integrity Section, I find that to be extremely offensive.
The DHS inspector general received in fiscal year 2011
approximately 5,800 complaints against Customs and Border
Patrol employees, and of these complaints, the IG converted
approximately 730 of those complaints into active
investigations. Presently the inspector general has
approximately 1,200 CBP-related cases open for investigation.
Then there is wasted taxpayer money. After squandering
close to $1 billion on the failed SBInet, DHS is attempting yet
another border security project. Once again, the lack of
coordination, communication, and integration at the
administrative level has produced similar results. The
Department is unable to justify the rationale for specific
technologies, how much is needed, or even where to put it along
the Arizona border.
Further findings expose duplicative functions within the
Department that unnecessarily spend money and consume scarce
resources.
These findings call into question whether the Department of
Homeland Security, given the challenges it faces from within,
is capable of securing our borders, enforcing our immigration
laws, and protecting the American people from terrorist
attacks.
Last month the Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet
Napolitano, testified before our committee the administration's
fiscal year 2013 budget reflects a commitment to protect the
homeland and the American people through effective and
efficient uses of resources. She said the Department of
Homeland Security has implemented initiatives to cut costs,
share resources across its agencies, and consolidate and
streamline operations. This includes redirecting over $850
million from administrative and mission support areas to front-
line priorities, as well as saving over $3 billion through
various efforts since 2009, which has allowed DHS to redeploy
funds to mission-critical initiatives.
These are all positive initiatives, and I commend the
Secretary, but the fact is the Government Accountability Office
states the Department can do a better job saving taxpayer
dollars by eliminating duplication and finding additional cost
savings.
For example, last week the GAO issued a key report related
to duplication and cost-saving opportunities across the Federal
Government. The report identified 16 homeland security areas
where offices, programs, or initiatives have similar or
overlapping objectives. The GAO report also identified
inefficiencies within DHS that are causing other Federal
agencies that contract with DHS to spend more money than
necessary.
Last year DHS collected about $230 million in fees from
other agencies to pay for 2,500 facility risk assessments.
However, DHS's Federal Protective Service completed only four
of those assessments. The agencies that paid for the service
got nothing in return for their risk assessments.
In addition to GAO's work, the DHS inspector general found
hundreds of millions of dollars in questionable costs in 2011.
During the past year, the IG made recommendations to improve
acquisition controls, to reduce duplication, develop more
efficient fraud-prevention efforts for FEMA, strengthen
information sharing between the Government and private industry
on cyberthreats, and improve TSA's oversight of airport badging
procedures, among other important findings.
Just as American families have had to make difficult
choices concerning their finances, so should the Department.
DHS has a responsibility to not only protect and secure the
homeland, but also ensure that it is a good steward of the
taxpayer dollars.
In February, our subcommittee began a series of hearings
examining the challenges faced by DHS. These hearings seek to
answer three basic questions: What challenges does DHS face?
More bluntly, what is wrong with the Department? Why is it
taking so long to become ``One DHS'', as Secretary Napolitano
often talks about? Do the DHS shortcomings hinder it from
carrying out its core mission of securing the homeland?
Today we continue that discussion. Stealing from airline
passengers, conspiring with drug traffickers, blindly throwing
resources onto the border, and unnecessarily duplicating
efforts contributing to the waste, fraud, and abuse of
authority that fleeces the American taxpayer and breaches their
trust. We need to assess to what extent internal control
weaknesses exist that, if corrected, could prevent incidences
like these in the future.
Given the fiscal challenges facing our Nation and the
possibility for continued waste within DHS, it is important to
assess how Congress could help make DHS a stronger
organization. So I look forward to hearing more about these
cost-saving areas from the GAO and DHS inspector general and
the witnesses here.
We are honored to have Governor Gilmore here as well. I
appreciate you being here, Governor.
With that I recognize the Ranking Member.
[The statement of Mr. McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
March 8, 2012
Today we continue our examination of the Department of Homeland
Security's ability to adequately manage its people, its resources,
billions of taxpayer dollars and, ultimately, its ability to carry out
its core mission of protecting the American people.
Investigations recently completed by both the Government
Accountability Office and the DHS Inspector General call into question
the Department's ability to operate effectively, and without
susceptibility to waste, fraud, and abuse of authority.
For example, last year more than 150 Department of Homeland
Security employees were arrested for offenses that hindered carrying
out the Department's core mission to protect the homeland.
There were thefts by airport screeners. Between October 2009 and
September 2010 at Newark Liberty Airport, TSA screeners stole as much
as $30,000 from unsuspecting passengers who were trying to get through
security to board their plane. In Orlando, passengers had laptop
computers stolen from their luggage.
There were Immigration officers accepting bribes. Even Customs and
Border Protection officers conspiring with transnational drug
traffickers. The DHS Inspector General received in fiscal year 2011
approximately 5,800 complaints against Customs and Border Protection
employees. Of these complaints, the Inspector General converted
approximately 730 into investigations. Presently, the Inspector General
has approximately 1,200 CBP-related cases open for investigation.
Then there's wasted taxpayer money. After squandering close to $1
billion on the failed SBINet, DHS is attempting yet another border
security project. Once again, the lack of coordination, communication,
and integration at the administrative level has produced similar
results. The Department is unable to justify the rationale for specific
technologies, how much is needed, or even where to put it along the
Arizona border.
Further findings expose duplication of functions within the
Department that unnecessarily spend money and consume scarce resources.
These findings call into question whether the Department of
Homeland Security, given the challenges it faces from within, is
capable of securing our borders, enforcing our immigration laws and
protecting the American people from terrorist attacks.
Last month, the Secretary of Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano,
testified before our committee the administration's fiscal year 2013
budget reflects a commitment to protect the homeland and American
people through effective and efficient use of resources.
She said the Department of Homeland Security has implemented
initiatives to cut costs, share resources across its agencies, and
consolidate and streamline operations. This includes redirecting over
$850 million from administrative and mission support areas to front-
line priorities, as well as saving over $3 billion through various
efforts since 2009, which has allowed DHS to redeploy funds to mission-
critical initiatives.
These are all positive initiatives. But the Government
Accountability Office states the Department can do an even better job
of saving taxpayer dollars by eliminating duplication and finding
additional cost savings.
For example, last week the GAO issued a key report related to
duplication and cost savings opportunities, across the Federal
Government. The report identified 16 homeland security areas where
offices, programs, or initiatives have similar or overlapping
objectives.
The GAO report also identifies inefficiencies within DHS that are
causing other Federal agencies that contract with DHS to spend more
money than necessary.
Last year, DHS collected about $230 million in fees from other
agencies to pay for 2,500 facility risk assessments. However, DHS's
Federal Protective Service completed only four of those assessments.
The agencies that paid for the service but got nothing in return ended
up conducting their own risk assessments.
In addition to GAO's work, the DHS Inspector General found hundreds
of millions of dollars in questionable costs in 2011. During the past
year, the Inspector General made recommendations to improve acquisition
controls to reduce duplication, develop more efficient fraud prevention
efforts for the Federal Emergency Management Agency, strengthen
information sharing between the Government and private industry on
cyber threats, and improve TSA's oversight of airport badging
procedures, among other important findings.
Just as American families have to make difficult choices concerning
their finances, so should the Department. DHS has a responsibility to
not only protect and secure the homeland but also ensure that it is a
good steward of taxpayer dollars.
In February, our subcommittee began a series of hearings examining
the challenges faced by DHS. These hearings seek to answer three basic
questions:
What challenges does DHS face and put bluntly, what is wrong
with DHS?
Why is it taking so long to become ``One DHS''? as Secretary
Napolitano so often mentions, and
Do DHS shortcomings hinder it from carrying out its core
mission of securing the homeland?
Today, we continue that discussion. Stealing from airline
passengers, conspiring with drug traffickers, blindly throwing
resources onto the border and unnecessarily duplicating efforts
contribute to the waste, fraud, and abuse of authority that fleeces the
American taxpayer and breaches their trust. We need to assess to what
extent internal control weaknesses exist that, if corrected, could
prevent incidents like these in the future.
Given the fiscal challenges facing our Nation and the possibility
for continued waste within DHS, it is important to assess how Congress
can help make DHS a stronger organization. We look forward to hearing
more about these cost savings areas from GAO and the DHS Inspector
General.
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Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for having
this hearing, which I think is a timely examination of the ways
to ensure that our scarce Homeland Security funds are being
utilized properly.
I do agree with you in terms of the Arizona border
surveillance technology plan. I agree with you, as a former
district attorney myself, there is no place for criminal acts,
you know, with the people that are there to protect us in the
law enforcement field in our country. But I do think it is
important to note as well that DHS itself has been vigilant in
rooting out this kind of behavior, and they are to be commended
in that respect.
The current economic climate does have all people
tightening their belts across the country. The same is true for
our Federal Government. Congress has the responsibility of
safeguarding taxpayer funds by eliminating instances of
duplication and wasteful spending. Yet streamlining operations
can at times be distinguished from reducing the resources of
Federal employees so drastically that they can't perform their
jobs effectively and provide needed Government services.
I mentioned at our last hearing both the necessity of
looking at these issues from a broader perspective; that
shortsighted plans that eliminate job-creating programs and
compromise our safety for the sake of short-term savings are
not always the answer. For this reason, I am pleased to see the
GAO has taken a bird's-eye view of Federal Government programs
and provided with us a roadmap for actual savings prospects.
The report identifies 51 areas that require greater efforts at
efficiency, as well as suggestions for providing more effective
Government services. It also identifies Government duplication,
overlap, fragmentation to help Congress discover more cost
savings and revenue-enhancement opportunities.
Although the report contains a Government-wide assessment,
it highlights several broad areas where duplication, overlap,
and fragmentation exist within DHS. Accordingly, this
subcommittee received testimony from DHS Under Secretary Rafael
Borras last week on efforts the Department is making to
integrate its management system.
Pursuant to his testimony, the Department is making
positive strides in this regard and is having clear plans in
place to reduce duplicated efforts in the management area. In
fact, the Department's Efficiency Review Initiative, which was
highlighted by Vice President Biden as a model for all Federal
agencies, has resulted in more than $1 billion in DHS cost
avoidances, including $180 million saved by consolidating
duplicative software-licensing agreements.
Moreover, the Department serves as one of the leading
Federal agencies in the administration's Shared First
Initiative, which requires Federal agencies to eliminate
duplicative IT systems. Due to this program, there aren't any
duplicative IT efforts at DHS, even in the face of at least
$1.2 billion in duplicative IT investments at the Departments
of Energy and Defense. So according to the GAO head,
Comptroller Gene Dodaro, again, DHS is to be commended for
moving in this direction.
These are the good stories. I am pleased to see that
Secretary Napolitano has advanced internal measures aimed at
eliminating waste, fraud, and duplication. Unfortunately, this
does not change the fact that DHS is still made up of 22 legacy
agencies, and a number of its activities are still shared by
other Federal agencies. It is within these instances where GAO
identifies numerous instances of undefined roles,
responsibilities, and duplicative efforts that ultimately
result in spending taxpayer money that could have been better
utilized.
For example, when it comes to personnel background
investigations, cybersecurity training, and the identification
of fraudulent travel documents, the lines between multiple
agencies are blurred. Furthermore, despite its management
strides, the Department has yet to fully address efficiencies
in component operations that result in wasted funds.
The Department's Federal Protective Service has received
over $230 million from Federal agencies for risk assessment and
security services, yet these agencies have not found the FPS's
services adequate or satisfactory, so they perform their own
assessments as well.
Mr. Chairman, I think that a much more sound strategy to
eliminate and streamline bureaucratic programs that haven't
been working for years over preventing new programs and
technologies with potential for taking effective due cost
concerns in place is a sound strategy. I look forward to
receiving testimony from our witnesses on these and other
issues in the relevance of today's hearing. With that, I yield
back my time.
[The statement of Mr. Keating follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member William R. Keating
Thank you, Chairman McCaul for holding this important hearing,
which is a timely examination of ways to ensure that scarce homeland
security funds are being utilized properly.
The current economic climate has people all across America
tightening their belts and cutting back on spending.
The same is true of our Federal Government.
Congress has the responsibility of safeguarding taxpayer funds by
eliminating instances of duplication and wasteful spending.
Yet, streamlining operations is not one and the same with reducing
the resources of Federal employees so drastically that they cannot
perform their jobs effectively and provide needed Government services.
I have said this time and again, both on and off the committee,
shortsighted plans that eliminate job-creating programs and compromise
our safety for the sake of immediate savings are not always the answer.
For this reason, I am pleased to see that the Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has taken a bird's-eye view of Federal
Government programs and provided with us a road map for actual savings
prospects.
The report identifies 51 areas that require greater efforts at
efficiency as well as suggestions for providing more effective
Government services.
It also identifies Government duplication, overlap, fragmentation
to help Congress discover more cost savings and revenue-enhancement
opportunities.
Although the report contains a Government-wide assessment, it
highlights several broad areas where duplication, overlap, or
fragmentation exist within the Department of Homeland Security.
Accordingly, this subcommittee received testimony from DHS Under
Secretary of Management Rafael Borras last week on the efforts the
Department is making to integrate its management system.
Pursuant to his testimony, the Department is making very positive
strides in regard to having clear plans in place to reduce duplicative
efforts in the management arena.
In fact, the Department's Efficiency Review Initiative, which was
highlighted by Vice President Biden as a model for all Federal
agencies, has resulted in more than $1 billion in DHS cost avoidances,
including $180 million saved by consolidating duplicative software-
licensing agreements.
Moreover, the Department serves as one of the leading Federal
agencies in the administration's Shared First Initiative, which
requires Federal agencies to eliminate duplicative IT systems.
Due to this program, there aren't any duplicative IT efforts at
DHS, even in the face of at least $1.2 billion in duplicative IT
investments at the Departments of Energy and Defense, according to GAO
head, Comptroller General Gene Dodaro.
These are the good stories. And I am pleased to see that Secretary
Napolitano has advanced internal measures aimed at eliminating waste,
fraud, and duplication.
Unfortunately, this does not change the fact that DHS is still made
up of 22 legacy agencies and a number of its activities are still
shared by other Federal agencies.
It is within these instances where GAO identifies numerous
instances of undefined roles and responsibilities and duplicative
efforts that ultimately result in spending taxpayer money that could
have been better utilized.
For example, when it comes to personnel background investigations,
cybersecurity trainings, and the identification of fraudulent travel
documents, the lines between multiple agencies are blurred.
Furthermore, despite its management strides, the Department has yet
to fully address deficiencies in component operations that result in
wasted funds.
The Department's Federal Protective Service (FPS) has received over
$230 million from Federal agencies for risk assessments and security
services.
Yet, these agencies have not found the FPS's services adequate or
satisfactory, so they perform their own assessments, as well.
Mr. Chairman, I think that it is much more sound strategy to
eliminate or streamline bureaucratic programs that haven't been working
for years over preventing new programs and technologies with potential
from taking effect due to cost concerns.
Mr. McCaul. I thank the Ranking Member and his
bipartisanship. Other Members are reminded that they may submit
statements for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
March 8, 2012
Thank you, Chairman McCaul for holding this hearing.
These are very difficult financial times and every aspect of the
Government--Federal, State, and local--must do its part to eliminate
wasteful spending, weed out unnecessary duplication, and cut costs
where possible.
Reducing Government spending by eliminating overlapping and
duplicative programs is a common-sense approach to saving scarce
Federal funds and enhancing revenue.
This approach, however, should be achieved with a careful
examination of what works, what does not work, what should be
consolidated, and what should be left alone.
For example, it has been proposed that the Department of Homeland
Security reduce 16 individually-authorized preparedness grant programs
into a single pool of money.
This proposal causes me grave concern.
Although I recognize it is prudent to re-evaluate and streamline
programs to promote efficiency and reduce costs in the wake of the
current fiscal climate, I am concerned that the end result will be
hamstrung first responders facing unprecedented natural disasters.
As required by law, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has
conducted an examination of duplication, overlap, and fragmentation
across Federal Government programs and has recommended actions for
improvement.
The result of this examination is a 426-page report, the size of
which, is an indication that extensive work is required.
In the report, GAO identifies 51 areas where programs may be able
to achieve greater efficiencies or become more effective in providing
Government services and 32 areas with evidence of duplication, overlap,
or fragmentation.
Due to its size, mission, and inherent overlapping authority, the
Department of Homeland Security is named in more areas of overlap than
any other agency.
The report also contained 176 actions that either the Executive
Branch or Congress should take to improve this country's fiscal
outlook.
While it is convenient for my colleagues to point the finger at the
Executive Branch, in this instance, the numbers indicate that the
Executive Branch is ahead of the game while Congress, with a Republican
controlled House, lags behind.
In fact, in a follow-up status report on the 176 recommended
actions, GAO determined that nearly 80 percent of the issues identified
that required Executive Branch action have been addressed.
On the other hand, this Congress has addressed less than 40 percent
of the GAO recommendations that required Congressional action.
Many of the recommended Congressional actions could have been
achieved by now, if the Majority would stop putting politics first and
bring common-sense, cost-savings bills--even if introduced by
Democrats--to the House floor.
As the Ranking Member of a committee that shares its oversight
jurisdiction with over 100 Congressional committees and subcommittees,
watching my colleagues put politics first comes as no surprise.
To illustrate this point, the Homeland Security Authorization Act
that this committee ordered reported last October has yet to be
considered by the House because, in part, the report has been held up
due to jurisdictional challenges.
Of relevance to this hearing, that measure contains a section that
would require the Department to ``identify redundant, wasteful, or
unnecessary capabilities and capacities where resources can be
redirected.''
Unless we get our house in order and reduce duplicative homeland
security jurisdiction, good-intentioned provisions like this one that
would result in efficiencies at the Department of Homeland Security,
are unlikely to ever be enacted into law.
With that Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. McCaul. You, having served as a district attorney, and
I as a Federal prosecutor, I think we make a pretty good team.
I think our goal is not gotcha politics here, it is about how
we can better improve the Department, which is so important to
protect the lives of the American people.
So with that, I want to introduce our distinguished panel
of witnesses. First, the Honorable James Gilmore. He is a
former Governor of Virginia. When I lived in Virginia, at DOJ,
he was my Governor. He is Chairman of the Congressional
Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for
Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. Prior to
serving as Governor, he was Virginia's attorney general. He
also served in the U.S. Army as a counterintelligence agent. In
2009, he became president and CEO of the Free Congress
Foundation. He is also president of USA Secure.
Next we have Ms. Cathleen Berrick, the Managing Director of
Homeland Security and Justice Issues at the Government
Accountability Office. In this position she oversees GAO's
reviews of the Department of Homeland Security and Justice
programs. Prior to being named Managing Director by Comptroller
Gene Dodaro, she oversaw GAO's reviews of aviation and surface
transportation security matters, as well as Department of
Homeland Security management issues.
We also have next Mr. Charles Edwards, the Acting Inspector
General of the Department of Homeland Security. He assumed this
position in February 2011. Previously, Mr. Edwards served as
the Deputy Inspector General of the Department of Homeland
Security. He has served over 20 years in the Federal
Government, and has held leadership positions at several
Federal agencies, including TSA, United States Postal Service
Office of Inspector General, and the U.S. Postal Service. I
have two extra reporters from two of my new counties in my new
district that may want to talk to you about the Postal Service
after this hearing.
Mr. Scott Lilly is the senior fellow at the Center for
American Progress. He writes and researches on areas including
governance, Federal budgeting, National security, and the
economy. He joined the center in 2004 after 31 years of service
within the United States Congress. He served as a clerk and
staff director on the House Appropriations Committee, minority
staff director of that committee; executive director of the
House Democrat Study Group; executive director of the Joint
Economic Committee; and chief of staff in the office of
Congressman David Obey from Wisconsin.
It is good to have you here. You have a pretty extensive
background in this institution. It is good to have you.
So with that, I now recognize our first witness, the former
Governor Gilmore, for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES S. GILMORE, III, FORMER GOVERNOR OF
VIRGINIA, FORMER CHAIRMAN, CONGRESSIONAL ADVISORY PANEL TO
ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM INVOLVING
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Mr. Gilmore. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I thank you
for the invitation, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Keating, Members of the
subcommittee. My thanks also to Chairman Peter King for this
invitation as well. I would ask, Mr. Chairman, that the oral
remarks that I make today be extended in the record, with the
permission of the subcommittee.
Mr. McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Gilmore. Mr. Chairman, I am here today, I think, to
give you some sense of historical perspective of how we ended
up where we are today, which may give some insight as to where
we are really trying to go. I was approached in 1999--1998,
really--by the Congress through its representative the
Department of Defense, was delegated with the authority of
setting up the official Commission of the United States
Congress on Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction, and
asked to chair that Commission.
I want the Members to know about your Commission. This was
not a Commission of insiders. This was not a witch hunt. This
was not an effort to try to find blame. This was an effort,
instead, at a very early date, to investigate the state of
preparedness of the United States. It was not a Washington- or
Federal-centric Commission. The Congress, in its wisdom, put
onto the membership people--police, fire, rescue, emergency
services, people from across the States, as well as some
specialists in intelligence and other areas.
Jim Clapper, I asked him to serve as the Vice Chairman of
our Commission, which he did for many years until he left to go
back into the Government. As everyone is aware, General Clapper
is now the Director of National Intelligence of the United
States.
Ray Downey was our fire representative. He died in the
World Trade Center on 9/11. Paul Bremer was on the Commission.
But frankly, the work was aided a great deal by our
representatives from around the States in the various fields
that were important to homeland security.
We issued our first report in 1999. We issued our second
report in 2000. I brought a copy of that along with me here
today just to display to you. All the Congresspeople received
all five of our reports. We just did three reports before the
9/11 attack and two afterwards. The Congress extended the
Commission, the 3-year Commission, for 2 years afterwards.
This second report was issued December 15 in the year 2000,
fully a year before the attack. In the opening cover letter we
reported, ``We are impelled by the stark realization that a
terrorist attack on some level inside our borders is
inevitable, and the United States must be ready.'' This was not
the first warning, either by other people or even by our
Commission, as to the nature of things, but it was widely
ignored.
The second report, however, did address the issue of the
Department of Homeland Security, and we did not endorse the
Department. We investigated for a year the question of how you
address this issue. We believed that to create a Department of
Homeland Security would require at least 10 years to put
together, to straighten it all out, to figure out who was in
and who was out, what the chain of command would be, how the
management pieces would be put into place. We just didn't think
we had 10 years. So our recommendation, which is extensively
discussed in our reports, was a White House coordinating body.
Now, we did--in May 2010, General Clapper and I did brief
the new administration. We sat with Vice President Cheney at
length. We believed that the Bush administration was, in fact,
beginning to set up the internal White House committee in order
to coordinate all the different elements of the United States
Government that would deal with homeland security issues. But
sadly enough, we didn't have a year after the issuance of this
report. The 9/11 attack, of course, occurred before that time.
After the 9/11 attack, there was enormous political
pressure in both the Congress and the administration to take
decisive action. It didn't, I think, seem like the coordinating
recommendations we made looked decisive enough after the 9/11
attack. The Congress decided that they were going to move on
their own and set up a Department of Homeland Security and toss
these various agencies into one overarching department.
It seemed apparent that that was going to happen, and I
believe the Bush administration could fairly be said to be
resisting it. But after a while, they concluded that Congress
was going to act, and they wanted to be a part of shaping it,
and they, in fact, submitted their own bill.
Our position of the Gilmore Commission, even after all
these years, would be, and still is today, that while we did
not recommend this structure, nonetheless we wished them all
success, because after 10 years, that is what we got. So we
really ought to be going to work with these distinguished
colleagues to my left in order to polish this up and find ways
to eliminate duplication, and to work in order to make it a
great success, as indeed we believed that it can be.
Our review would indicate that of the initial reports that
have come out, we are concerned about the original report of
DHS of Homeland Security grants, fraudulent travel documents,
passenger aviation fees, and domestic disaster assistance. We
believe these areas are areas where duplication is realistic
and could be addressed.
We think much work has to be done. We believe that we still
haven't completely answered the question of who is in charge in
any particular area. The FBI is not in the Department. The CIA
is not in the Department. Locals and States are not in the
Department. Locals will always be the first responders, just as
they were at the World Trade Center and at the Pentagon. They
are not in the DHS structure, although there is some
communication.
We believe there has been woefully inadequate public
communication to the people of the United States as to what the
dangers are. We believe that there has been insufficient
attention and seriousness paid to the risk of the use of the
military in the homeland, one of our principal areas. The most
recent National Defense Authorization Act, for example, has
reckless language that authorizes, by construction, the
detention of American citizens indefinitely and without trial.
There is language in there that the Congress, I think, sought
to correct that, and I think they failed to correct it.
These are serious challenges as we see right now. We
believe there is no training of the military to play a law
enforcement role, nor should they play a law enforcement role.
We believe that the locals and the States are not being
sufficiently cut in, nor financed, in order to prepare for the
inevitable additional attacks.
You mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in closing, that I am now
president and CEO of the Free Congress Foundation. We have
several topics that we address. One of our topics that we are
about to do is to begin now the Center for National Security at
the Free Congress Foundation for the purpose of beginning to
follow up on this work, which has not been followed up on, in
our view, sufficiently. We would like to make a contribution to
the community and to the Congress, and we will do it through
the raising of private funds and through the use of a private
nonprofit. Hopefully we can make a contribution to your work,
Mr. Chairman, and that of your subcommittee, and that of the
full committee. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Gilmore follows:]
Prepared Statement of James S. Gilmore, III
March 8, 2012
introduction
Mr. Chairman it is honor to be here today. I commend you and House
Homeland Security Chairman Peter King for holding these forward-
thinking hearings on reviewing American Homeland Security policy as an
institution for the 21st Century. Communicating with the American
public about the realities of terrorism and how our country is prepared
is essential to keeping our liberty.
I have singled out a few items to consider as objectives to save
taxpayer dollars. I note that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
isn't the only agency with duplication problems. This is a Government-
wide problem--but four Government Accountability Office (GAO) report
items stand out.
Homeland Security Grants.--The Department of Homeland Security
needs better project information and coordination among four
overlapping grant programs (current reform is underway with grant
consolidation).
Information Technology Investment Management.--The Office of
Management and Budget, and the Departments of Defense and Energy need
to address potentially duplicative information technology investments
to avoid investing in unnecessary systems.
Passenger Aviation Security Fees.--Options for adjusting the
passenger aviation security fee could further offset billions of
dollars in civil aviation security costs.
Domestic Disaster Assistance.--The Federal Emergency Management
Agency could reduce the costs to the Federal Government related to
major disasters declared by the President by updating the principal
indicator on which disaster funding decisions are based and better
measuring a State's capacity to respond without Federal assistance.
history of gilmore commission before & after 9/11
After the fall of the Berlin Wall, Americans and most of the
civilized world looked ahead to the future with little fear--especially
of global war. A transcript of a Jan. 26, 1996 Bill Clinton
Presidential radio address delivered on a Saturday morning following
his recently delivered state of the union address sums up where he and
most of Americans were focused--Domestic Policy:
``These are the seven challenges I set forth Tuesday night--to
strengthen our families, to renew our schools, and expand educational
opportunity, to help every American who's willing to work for it
achieve economic security, to take our streets back from crime, to
protect our environment, to reinvent our government so that it serves
better and costs less, and to keep America the leading force for peace
and freedom throughout the world. We will meet these challenges, not
through big government. The era of big government is over, but we can't
go back to a time when our citizens were just left to fend for
themselves.''
Little did we know then that by 2003 a Republican President would
sign a bipartisan bill creating another Government cabinet agency
called the ``Department of Homeland Security.''
As a new Republican majority emerged in the mid-1990s in the House
and Senate--there was much talk of reinventing Government and President
Clinton and the Congress did balance the Federal budget for the first
time in three decades in 1998.
However, Congress and the Clinton administration were uneasy about
the growing threat to the West which came in two major events--the
August 7, 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Africa and the October 12, 2000
bombing of the USS Cole.
We worked tirelessly to deliver our first report to the Congress on
Dec. 15, 1999. The Gilmore Commission was up and running by the time of
the USS Cole incident--and probably did our best work in the second
report--which was delivered to the Congress on Dec. 15, 2000. We kept
our focus and delivered our final report to Congress and President Bush
a week before September 11, 2001.
The Commission was extended another 2 years after 9/11.
From 1999 to 2003, I was proud to serve as Chairman of the
Congressional Advisory Panel to Assess the Capabilities for Domestic
Response to Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction--the
shortened name became known as ``The Gilmore Commission.'' To sum up
what we did in those 5 years prior and after 9/11 is this: Our
Commission was focused on local responders. One Gilmore Commission
member, Ray Downey, served as a representative from the New York City
Fire Department. Ray, unfortunately, died serving the people of his
city and Nation while responding and saving lives on September 11,
2001. Of our five reports--we delivered 164 recommendations. One
hundred forty-six have now been adopted by the Congress and the
Executive Branch.
Prior to the horrendous attacks on 9/11 our Commission (myself and
Gen. James Clapper) briefed former Vice President Dick Cheney at the
White House in May 2001 to address the growing terrorist threat to this
country and to begin to develop our counterterrorism office inside the
White House. This would become the Office of Homeland Security which
was announced by President Bush on September 20, 2001.
congressional mandate for the gilmore commission
The Advisory Panel was established by Section 1405 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Public Law 105-261
(H.R. 3616, 105th Congress, 2nd Session) (October 17, 1998). That Act
directed the Advisory Panel to accomplish several specific tasks.
It said: The panel shall----
1. Assess Federal agency efforts to enhance domestic preparedness
for incidents involving weapons of mass destruction;
2. Assess the progress of Federal training programs for local
emergency responses to incidents involving weapons of mass destruction;
3. Assess deficiencies in programs for response to incidents
involving weapons of mass destruction, including a review of unfunded
communications, equipment, and planning requirements, and the needs of
maritime regions;
4. Recommend strategies for ensuring effective coordination with
respect to Federal agency weapons of mass destruction response efforts,
and for ensuring fully effective local response capabilities for
weapons of mass destruction incidents; and
5. Assess the appropriate roles of State and local government in
funding effective local response capabilities.
That Act required the Advisory Panel to report its findings,
conclusions, and recommendations for improving Federal, State, and
local domestic emergency preparedness to respond to incidents involving
weapons of mass destruction to the President and the Congress three
times during the course of the Advisory Panel's deliberations--on
December 15 in 1999, 2000, and 2001. The Advisory Panel's tenure was
extended for 2 years in accordance with Section 1514 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (S. 1358, Public Law
107-107, 107th Congress, First Session), which was signed into law by
the President on December 28, 2001. By virtue of that legislation, the
panel was required to submit two additional reports--one on December
15, 2002, and one on December 15, 2003.
advisory panel composition (a unique membership focused on first
responders)
Mister Chairman, please allow me to pay special tribute to the men
and women who serve on our panel. This Advisory Panel is unique in one
very important way. It is not the typical National ``blue ribbon''
panel, which in most cases historically have been composed almost
exclusively of what I will refer to as ``Washington Insiders''--people
who have spent most of their professional careers inside the Beltway.
This panel has a sprinkling of that kind of experience--a former Member
of Congress and Secretary of the Army, a former State Department
Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism, a former senior executive
from the CIA and the FBI, a former senior member of the intelligence
community, the former head of a National academy on public health, two
retired flag-rank military officers, a former senior executive in a
non-governmental charitable organization, and the head of a National
law enforcement foundation. But what truly makes this panel special
and, therefore, causes its pronouncement to carry significantly more
weight, is the contribution from the members of the panel from the rest
of the country:
Three directors of State emergency management agencies, from
California, Iowa, and Indiana, two of whom now also serve their
Governors as Homeland Security Advisors;
The deputy director of a State homeland security agency;
A State epidemiologist and director of a State public health
agency;
A former city manager of a mid-size city;
The chief of police of a suburban city in a major
metropolitan area;
Senior professional and volunteer fire fighters;
A senior emergency medical services officer of a major
metropolitan area;
And, of course--in the person of your witness--a former
State governor.
These are representatives of the true ``first responders''--those
heroic men and women who put their lives on the line every day for the
public health and safety of all Americans. Moreover, so many of these
panel members are also National leaders in their professions: Our EMS
member is a past president of the national association of emergency
medical technicians; one of our emergency managers is the past
president of her national association; our law officer now is president
of the international association of chiefs of police; our
epidemiologist is past president of her professional organization; one
of our local firefighters is chair of the terrorism committee of the
international association of fire chiefs; the other is chair of the
prestigious national Interagency Board for Equipment Standardization
and InterOperability.
Those attacks continue to carry much poignancy for us, because of
the direct loss to the panel. Ray Downey, Department Deputy Chief and
chief-in-charge of Special Operations Command, Fire Department of the
City of New York, perished in the collapse of the second tower in the
September 11 attack on the New York World Trade Center.
panel reports
In the history of the Panel, we produced five advisory reports to
the Congress and to the President of the United State. The first report
in 1999 assessed threat. The second report in 2000 developed the
fundamentals of a National strategy for combating terrorism.
The third report, dedicated to Ray Downey who lost his life in the
World Trade Center, filled out a National strategy in five key subject
areas: State and local response capabilities, health and medical
capabilities, immigration and border control, cybersecurity, and use of
the military. Our fourth report in 2002, issued in the year following
the 9/11 attacks, further made recommendations on how to marshal the
National effort towards a National strategy. It paid special attention
to the needs of intelligence sharing and the proper structure for
counterterrorism activities inside the United States. Our last report
was issued on December 15, 2003. That final report sought to express
some end-vision and direction for the United States as it develops its
National strategy and makes the country safer.
fifth report (2003)--forging america's new normalcy: securing our
homeland, preserving our liberty
Mister Chairman, the Advisory Panel released its fifth and final
report on December 15, 2003. In that report, the strategic vision,
themes, and recommendations were motivated by the unanimous view of the
panel that its final report should attempt to define a future state of
security against terrorism--one that the panel has chosen to call
``America's New Normalcy.''
That strategic vision offered by the panel reflects the guiding
principles that the panel has consistently enumerated throughout its
reports:
It must be truly National in scope, not just Federal.
It should build on the existing emergency response system
within an all-hazards framework.
It should be fully resourced with priorities based on risk.
It should be based on measurable performance.
It should be truly comprehensive, encompassing the full
spectrum of awareness, prevention, preparedness, response, and
recovery against domestic and international threats against our
physical, economic, and societal well-being.
It should include psychological preparedness.
It should be institutionalized and sustained.
It should be responsive to requirements from and fully
coordinated with State and local officials and the private
sector as partners throughout the development, implementation,
and sustainment process.
It should include a clear process for strategic
communications and community involvement.
It must preserve civil liberties.
In developing the report, panel members all agreed at the outset
that it could not postulate, as part of its vision, a return to a pre-
September 11 ``normal.'' The threats from terrorism are now recognized
to be a condition must face far into the future. It was the panel's
firm intention to articulate a vision of the future that subjects
terrorism to a logical place in the array of threats from other sources
that the American people face every day--from natural diseases and
other illnesses to crime and traffic and other accidents, to mention a
few. The panel firmly believes that terrorism must be put in the
context of the other risks we face, and that resources should be
prioritized and allocated to that variety of risks in logical fashion.
In 2004 our panel proffered a view of the future--5 years hence--
that it believes offers a reasonable, measurable, and attainable
benchmark. It believes that, in the current absence of longer-term
measurable goals, this benchmark can provide Government at all levels,
the private sector, and our citizens a set of objectives for readiness
and preparedness. The panel did not claim that the objectives presented
in this future view are all-encompassing. Neither do they necessarily
reflect the full continuum of advances that America may accomplish or
the successes that its enemies may realize in the next 5 years. The
view is a snapshot in time for the purpose of guiding the actions of
today and a roadmap for the future.
The panel said that America's new normalcy by January 2009 should
reflect:
Both the sustainment and further empowerment of individual
freedoms in the context of measurable advances that secure the
homeland.
Consistent commitment of resources that improve the ability
of all levels of government, the private sector, and our
citizens to prevent terrorist attacks and, if warranted, to
respond and recover effectively to the full range of threats
faced by the Nation.
A standardized and effective process for sharing information
and intelligence among all stakeholders--one built on moving
actionable information to the broadest possible audience
rapidly, and allowing for heightened security with minimal
undesirable economic and societal consequences.
Strong preparedness and readiness across State and local
government and the private sector with corresponding processes
that provide an enterprise-wide National capacity to plan,
equip, train, and exercise against measurable standards.
Clear definition about the roles, responsibilities, and
acceptable uses of the military domestically--that strengthens
the role of the National Guard and Federal Reserve Components
for any domestic mission and ensures that America's leaders
will never be confronted with competing choices of using the
military to respond to a domestic emergency versus the need to
project our strength globally to defeat those who would seek to
do us harm.
Clear processes for engaging academia, business, all levels
of government, and others in rapidly developing and
implementing research, development, and standards across
technology, public policy, and other areas needed to secure the
homeland--a process that focuses efforts on real versus
perceived needs. Well-understood and shared process, plans, and
incentives for protecting the Nation's critical infrastructures
of Government and in the private sector--a unified approach to
managing our risks.
The panel's Future Vision back in 2009 included specifics details
involving:
State, Local, and Private Sector Empowerment;
Intelligence;
Information Sharing;
Training, Exercising, Equipping, and Related Standards;
Enhanced Critical Infrastructure Protection;
Research and Development, and Related Standards;
Role of the Military.
The GAO and DHS have prepared lengthy reports to enhance homeland
security of our Nation and the Congress is doing its due diligence.
Hearings like we are having today move forward the idea of making
progress happen, but we must always consider the role of the military
as we decide on our future homeland policy.
in conclusion
Civil liberties are the foundation of the Gilmore Commission. The
panel addressed the on-going debate in the United States about the
tradeoffs between security and civil liberties. It concluded that
history teaches, however, that the debate about finding the right
``balance'' between security and civil liberties is misleading, that
the traditional debate implies that security and liberty are competing
values and are mutually exclusive. It assumes that our liberties make
us vulnerable and if we will give up some of these liberties, at least
temporarily, we will be more secure.
It concluded that civil liberties and security are mutually
reinforcing. The panel said that we must, therefore, evaluate each
initiative along with the combined effect of all initiatives to combat
terrorism in terms of how well they preserve all of the ``unalienable
rights'' that the founders believed were essential to the strength and
security of our Nation--rights that have become so imbedded in our
society and ingrained in our psyche that we must take special
precautions, take extra steps, to ensure that we do not cross the line.
Mr. McCaul. Well, thank you, Governor. It is a real honor
to have somebody of your experience and magnitude appear before
this committee. Thank you for being here.
The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Berrick for her testimony.
STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, MANAGING DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Ms. Berrick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Keating, the Members of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be
here to discuss GAO's work assessing overlap, potential
duplication, and cost-saving opportunities at DHS, as well as
challenges that have affected the Department's implementation
efforts.
As you know, DHS is now the third-largest department in the
Federal Government. Given the significance of its mission, and
in a time of building fiscal pressures, it is critical that its
programs are operating effectively and efficiently, are
sustainable, and continue to mature to address pressing
security needs.
Last week, as you mentioned, GAO issued its second annual
report identifying areas across the Federal Government,
including DHS, that have duplicating goals or activities, as
well as opportunities to reduce costs or enhance revenue. Our
report identified 15 such areas across the Department.
For example, we found that the Department lacked oversight
to prevent unnecessary duplication, and four overlapping grant
programs which together constitute over $20 billion in grant
funding since 2002. As a result, DHS could not be assured that
it wasn't awarding multiple grants to the same recipients for
the same or similar purposes.
We also found that Federal agencies are paying for their
own security assessments, as you mentioned, while also paying
FPS within DHS for assessments that it is not conducting.
In the area of cost savings, we reported that deploying
more efficient, in-line baggage screening systems at airports
could result in about $450 million in savings over the next 5
years because of reduced staffing costs. They would need fewer
screeners to man this equipment.
Regarding border security, we found that delaying proposed
investments in border-surveillance technology until DHS better
defines the measures' benefits and estimates life-cycle costs
could help ensure their effective and efficient deployment.
In another example we found that DHS could reduce the
billions of Federal dollars spent on major disasters by
adjusting the indicator used for assistance awards to better
reflect a State's capability to respond.
In total, we recommended 40 actions that either DHS or the
Congress could take to address these issues and achieve
savings. Of the 22 actions GAO suggested in our report last
year, our first annual report, 2 have been fully implemented,
14 have been partially implemented, and 6 have not been
addressed. Moving forward, we will continue to monitor DHS's
efforts in these areas.
In a report we issued last year commemorating the 10th
anniversary of 9/11, we talked about a lot of the important
progress DHS has made across its mission since its
establishment. However, we also reported on work remaining
needed to strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of DHS's
operations, as well as themes that have impacted the
Department's progress. These themes were drawn from more than
1,200 reports we have issued studying DHS since its creation,
and over 1,600 recommendations we have made to strengthen their
operations.
For example, we reported that while DHS has enhanced its
management functions and has plans for further enhancement,
which we think are very positive, it has not always effectively
executed these functions for results. This, as you know, has
contributed to schedule delays, cost increases, and performance
issues in a number of major acquisitions that are aimed at
delivering important mission capabilities. A number of these
programs have had to be canceled as a result.
We also found that while DHS has made important strides in
coordinating efforts with its many, many stakeholders,
including State and local law enforcement, it needs to take
additional action to forge and leverage these partnerships and
share information, such as sharing information with private-
sector stakeholders on threats to critical infrastructure.
Moving forward, as declining budgets are likely to be a
reality, it will be important for DHS to address these issues
as well as take action to proactively identify areas to reduce
duplication and enhance cost savings throughout the Department.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify. I
look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Ms. Berrick follows:]
Prepared Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick
March 8, 2012
gao highlighths
Highlights of GAO-12-464T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management, Committee on Homeland
Security, House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led to profound
changes in Government agendas, policies, and structures to confront
homeland security threats facing the Nation. Most notably, DHS began
operations in 2003 with missions that included preventing terrorist
attacks in the United States, reducing the Nation's vulnerability to
terrorism, and minimizing damages from attacks. DHS is now the third-
largest Federal department, with more than 200,000 employees, and has
an annual budget of almost $60 billion. Since 2003, GAO has issued over
1,200 products on DHS's operations in such areas as transportation
security and emergency management, among others. Moreover, GAO has
reported that overlap and fragmentation among Government programs,
including DHS, can cause potential unnecessary duplication, and
reducing it could save billions of tax dollars annually and help
agencies provide more efficient and effective services. As requested,
this testimony addresses: (1) Opportunities for DHS to reduce potential
unnecessary duplication in its programs, save tax dollars, and enhance
revenue, and (2) crosscutting and management issues that have affected
DHS's implementation efforts. This testimony is based on GAO reports
issued from March 2011 through February 2012.
What GAO Recommends
While this testimony contains no new recommendations, GAO
previously made about 1,600 recommendations to DHS. The Department has
addressed about half of them, has efforts to address others, and has
taken action to strengthen its operations.
department of homeland security.--actions needed to reduce overlap and
potential unnecessary duplication, achieve cost savings, and strengthen
mission functions
What GAO Found
In March 2011 and February 2012, GAO reported on 6 areas where the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or Congress could take action to
reduce overlap and potential unnecessary duplication, and 9 areas to
achieve cost savings. Of the 22 actions GAO suggested be taken in March
2011 to address such issues, 2 were fully implemented, 14 were
partially implemented, and 6 have not been addressed. GAO's February
2012 report identified 18 additional actions to address overlap,
potential duplication, and costs savings, including the following
examples.
TABLE 1.--EXAMPLES OF OVERLAP, POTENTIAL DUPLICATION, AND COST SAVINGS
AREAS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Example
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Homeland security grants..... DHS lack of oversight contributed to the
risk of funding unnecessarily
duplicative projects among 4 overlapping
programs that in total constituted $20
billion in grants from fiscal years 2002
through 2011.
Immigration inspection fees.. Air passenger immigration inspection fees
should be reviewed and adjusted to fully
recover the cost of inspection
activities conducted by U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and CBP.
Border security technology... Delaying proposed border security
technology investments until DHS better
measures benefits and estimates life-
cycle costs could help ensure the most
effective use of program funding.
Domestic disaster assistance. DHS could reduce the billions of Federal
dollars spent on major disasters by
adjusting the indicator used for
disaster assistance awards and better
measuring a State's capacity to respond.
Federal facility risk Agencies are making duplicate payments by
assessments. funding their own assessments, and
paying the Federal Protective Service
millions for assessments it is not
performing.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis.
In September 2011, GAO reported on three key themes that should be
addressed to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of DHS's
operations.
Leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise.--DHS has
made important strides in providing leadership and coordinating efforts
among its stakeholders. However, DHS needs to take additional action to
forge effective partnerships and strengthen the sharing and utilization
of information, which has affected its ability to effectively satisfy
its missions, such as sharing information with private-sector
stakeholders on cyber-based threats to critical infrastructure.
Implementing and integrating management functions for results.--DHS
has enhanced its management functions, and has plans to further
strengthen the management of the Department. However, DHS has not
always effectively executed or integrated these functions, which has
contributed to schedule delays, cost increases, and performance issues
in a number of programs aimed at delivering important mission
capabilities, such as border security technologies.
Strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security
efforts.--While progress has been made, limited strategic and program
planning and limited assessment to inform approaches and investment
decisions have contributed to DHS programs not meeting strategic needs
in an efficient manner, such as the lack of risk-based plans for
deploying aviation security technologies.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on
opportunities for the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to reduce
overlap and potential unnecessary duplication in its programs, save tax
dollars, enhance revenue, and address crosscutting and management
issues that have affected its mission implementation efforts. Last
September, the Nation passed the 10-year anniversary of the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The events of that day led to profound
changes in Government agendas, policies, and structures to confront the
homeland security threats facing the Nation. Given DHS's significant
leadership responsibilities in homeland security, it is critical that
its programs are operating as efficiently and effectively as possible,
are sustainable, and continue to mature to address pressing security
needs.
DHS began operations in 2003 with key missions that include
preventing terrorist attacks from occurring within the United States,
reducing U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, minimizing resulting damages,
and helping the Nation recover from any attacks that may occur. DHS is
now the third-largest Federal department, with more than 200,000
employees, and has an annual budget of almost $60 billion. We have
evaluated numerous departmental programs and efforts since DHS began
its operations, and issued more than 1,200 reports and Congressional
testimonies in areas such as border security and immigration,
transportation security, and emergency management, among others. We
have made more than 1,600 recommendations to DHS designed to strengthen
its operations, such as to improve performance-measurement efforts,
strengthen management processes, enhance coordination and information
sharing, and increase the use of risk information in planning and
resource allocation decisions, as well as to address gaps and
challenges in its mission operations that have affected DHS's
implementation efforts. As of September 2011, DHS had implemented about
half of these recommendations, had actions underway to address others,
and had taken additional steps to strengthen its operations. However,
as we have previously reported, the Department has more to do to ensure
that it conducts its missions efficiently and effectively, while
simultaneously preparing to address future challenges that face the
Department and the Nation.
In March 2011 and February 2012, we reported on areas across the
Federal Government, including DHS, that had duplicative goals or
activities to inform Government policymakers as they address the
rapidly building fiscal pressures facing our National Government.\1\
These reports included more than 100 areas, some of which related to
homeland security, where agencies, offices, or initiatives had similar
or overlapping objectives or provided similar services to the same
populations; or where Government missions were fragmented across
multiple agencies or programs. We reported that overlap and
fragmentation among Government programs or activities that can be
harbingers of potential unneccessary duplication and that reducing or
eliminating potential unnecessary duplication, overlap, or
fragmentation could potentially save billions of tax dollars annually
and help agencies provide more efficient and effective services. These
reports also included opportunities for Federal departments, including
DHS, to consider taking action that could either reduce the cost of
Government operations or enhance revenue collections for the Treasury.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in
Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-
318SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 1, 2011); 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities
to Reduce Duplication, Overlap, and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and
Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, DC: Feb. 28, 2012); Follow-
up on 2011 Report: Status of Actions Taken to Reduce Duplication,
Overlap, and Fragmentation, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-
12-453SP (Washington, DC: Feb. 28, 2012).
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Moreover, in September 2011, we issued a report summarizing
progress made by DHS in implementing its homeland security missions 10
years after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.\2\ We reported
that DHS had implemented key homeland security operations and achieved
important goals in many areas to create and strengthen a foundation to
reach its potential. We also reported, however, that as DHS continues
to mature, more work remains for it to strengthen the efficiency and
effectiveness of those efforts to achieve its full potential. As part
of this work, we identified three key themes that affected DHS's
implementation efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work
Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/
11, GAO-11-881 (Washington, DC: Sept. 7, 2011).
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My statement today, as requested, is based on these reports and
addresses: (1) Opportunities for DHS to reduce overlap and potential
unnecessary duplication in its programs, save tax dollars, and enhance
revenue, and (2) crosscutting and management issues that have affected
DHS's program-implementation efforts.
For these past reports, among other things, we analyzed DHS
documents; reviewed and updated our past reports, supplemented by DHS
Office of Inspector General (IG) reports, issued since DHS began its
operations in March 2003; and interviewed DHS officials. We conducted
this work in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing
standards. More detailed information on the scope and methodology from
our previous work can be found within each specific report.
dhs could take actions to reduce overlap and potential unnecessary
duplication and achieve cost savings
Overlap and Potential Unnecessary Duplication at DHS
Our March 2011 and February 2012 reports identified 6 areas across
DHS where overlap or potential unnecessary duplication exists, and 17
specific actions that the Department or Congress could take to address
these areas. In our March 2011 report we suggested that DHS or Congress
take 11 actions to address the areas of overlap or potential
unnecessary duplication that we found. Of these 11 actions, 1 has been
fully addressed, 4 have been partially addressed, and the remaining 6
have not been addressed. In many cases, the existence of overlap,
potential unnecessary duplication, or fragmentation can be difficult to
determine with precision due to a lack of data on programs and
activities. Where information has not been available that would provide
conclusive evidence of overlap, duplication, or fragmentation, we often
refer to ``potential unnecessary duplication.'' In some cases, there is
sufficient information available to show that if actions are taken to
address individual issues, significant financial benefits may be
realized. In other cases, precise estimates of the extent of potential
unnecessary duplication, and the cost savings that can be achieved by
eliminating any such unnecessary duplication, are difficult to specify
in advance of Congressional and Executive Branch decision making.
However, given the range of areas we identified at DHS and the
magnitude of many of the programs, the cost savings associated with
addressing these issues could be significant. Tables 1 and 2 summarize
the areas of overlap and potential unnecessary duplication that we
identified at DHS, the actions we identified for DHS and Congress to
consider to address those areas, and the status of those actions.\3\
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\3\ For the purposes of our reports, we considered ``duplication``
to occur when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same
activities or provide the same services to the same beneficiaries. We
used the term ``overlap'' when multiple agencies or programs have
similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve
them, or target similar beneficiaries. We used the term
``fragmentation`` to refer to those circumstances in which more than
one Federal agency (or more than one organization within an agency) is
involved in the same broad area of National need. The presence of
fragmentation and overlap can suggest the need to look closer at the
potential for duplication. In certain instances in this statement, we
use the term ``potential duplication`` to include duplication, overlap,
or fragmentation.
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TABLE 2.--OVERLAP AND POTENTIAL UNNECESSARY DUPLICATION AREAS AT DHS
INCLUDED IN GAO'S FEBRUARY 2012 REPORT
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Areas of Overlap or Potential Unnecessary
Duplication Actions To Consider
------------------------------------------------------------------------
FEMA needs better project information and Action 1: FEMA should
coordination to identify and prevent take steps to ensure
potential unnecessary duplication among four that it collects project
overlapping grant programs.--Of the $37 information with the
billion in appropriated homeland security level of detail needed
preparedness grant programs from fiscal to better identify any
years 2002 through 2011, FEMA allocated potential unnecessary
about $20.3 billion to grant recipients duplication.
through four programs intended to enhance Action 2: FEMA should
the capacity of States, localities, and explore opportunities to
other entities to prevent, respond to, and enhance its internal
recover from a terrorism incident. However, coordination and
we found that the four FEMA grant programs administration of the
had multiple areas of overlap, including programs.
overlap among grant recipients, goals, and Action 3: Congress may
geographic locations, combined with the want to consider
limited project information FEMA had requiring DHS to report
available regarding grant funding levels, on the results of its
grant recipients, and grant purposes. efforts to identify and
Specifically, we found that 140 projects prevent unnecessary
constituting about $183 million in grant duplication and consider
funding lacked sufficient detail to these results in making
determine whether they were unnecessarily future funding decisions
duplicative or had involved coordination to for these programs.
prevent any unnecessary duplication. Upon
gathering additional information from State
and local grant recipients, however, we
determined that none of the projects were
duplicative. In its budget request for
fiscal year 2013, DHS proposed consolidating
most of FEMA's current preparedness grant
programs into one comprehensive program.
Agencies are making duplicate payments for Action 1: FPS should
facility risk assessments by completing develop interim
their own assessments, while also paying the solutions for completing
Federal Protective Service (FPS) for risk assessments while
assessments that it is not performing.--FPS addressing the risk
received $236 million from Federal agencies assessment tool's
for risk assessments and other security challenges.
services in fiscal year 2011, but multiple Action 2: FPS should make
agencies, including DHS, expend additional information about the
resources to assess their own facilities. estimated costs of key
Moreover, DHS has not taken actions to activities and the basis
address this unnecessary duplication. for these estimates
Further, it is not clear whether FEMA's available to affected
planned risk assessment tool that will be parties.
used to complete risk assessments will help Action 3: DHS should work
minimize the unnecessary duplication. In our with Federal agencies to
February 2012 report, we reiterated two determine their reasons
recommendations made in previous reports and for duplicating the
suggested additional action to further activities and identify
mitigate duplicative efforts. DHS agreed measures to reduce this
with our previous two recommendations and unnecessary duplication.
has begun action on both, but it did not
comment on the new suggested action.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO.
Cost-Saving and Revenue Enhancing Areas
Our 2011 and 2012 annual reports also identified 9 areas describing
other opportunities for DHS or Congress to consider taking action that
could either reduce the cost of Government operations or enhance
revenue collection for the Treasury. We identified 23 specific actions
that the Department or Congress could take to address these areas. In
our March 2011 report, we suggested that DHS or Congress take 11
actions to either reduce the cost of Government operations or enhance
revenue collection. Of these 11 actions, 1 has been fully addressed and
10 have been partially addressed. In some cases, there is sufficient
information to estimate potential savings or other benefits if actions
are taken to address individual issues. In other cases, estimates of
cost savings or other benefits would depend upon what Congressional and
Executive Branch decisions were made, including how certain GAO
recommendations are implemented. Additionally, information on program
performance, the level of funding in agency budgets devoted to
overlapping or fragmented programs, and the implementation costs that
might be associated with program consolidations or terminations, are
factors that could impact actions to be taken as well as potential
savings. Tables 3 and 4 summarize the cost savings and revenue-
enhancing areas that we reported on in March 2011 and February 2012.
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TABLE 4.--NEW COST-SAVINGS AND REVENUE-ENHANCING AREAS AT DHS INCLUDED
IN GAO'S FEBRUARY 2012 REPORT
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cost Saving or Revenue-Enhancing Areas Actions to Consider
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Options for adjusting the passenger aviation Action 1: Congress,
security fee could further offset civil working with TSA, may
aviation security costs.--From fiscal years wish to consider
2002 through 2011, TSA collected about $18 increasing the passenger
billion in passenger and air carrier security fee according
security fees, compared to the approximately to one of the options we
$63 billion appropriated for aviation identified.
security activities over the same time
frame; thus, security fees offset about 29
percent of amounts appropriated. We found
that increasing the passenger security fee
could help further offset billions of
dollars in the Federal budget for aviation
security programs and activities in outlying
fiscal years. We identified options Congress
may wish to consider using to increase the
passenger security fee that could increase
fee collections from about $2 billion to $10
billion over 5 years. In addition, we
reported that TSA's fiscal year 2012 budget
proposal to incrementally increase the
passenger security fee by 2014 could reduce
total enplanements from fiscal years 2012
through 2014 by 1 percent. This would reduce
expected fee collections of $4.4 billion by
about $120 million over this 3-year period.
In its budget request for fiscal year 2013,
DHS included a proposal to gradually raise
the passenger security fee to $7.50 per one-
way trip by 2018 and devote $18 billion of
this fee increase for deficit reduction.
FEMA could reduce the costs to the Federal Action 1: FEMA should
Government related to major disasters reexamine the basis for
declared by the President.--From fiscal the Public Assistance
years 2004 through 2011, the President per capita indicator and
approved 539 major disaster declarations at determine whether it
a cost of $78.7 billion. We found that FEMA accurately reflects a
could reduce the costs to the Federal State's capacity to
Government related to major disasters respond to and recover
declared by the President by updating the from a disaster without
principal indicator on which disaster Federal assistance.
funding decisions are based and better Action 2: FEMA should
measuring a State's capacity to respond reexamine the method
without Federal assistance. We reported that used to update the per
we expected to reiterate two recommendations capita indicator to
from August 2001 related to the principle ensure that the
indicator and further recommend that the indicator accurately
Secretary of Homeland Security direct the reflects annual changes
FEMA Administrator to implement them. We in a State's capacity to
also expect to make a recommendation related respond to and recover
to the metrics to assess a State's disaster from a disaster.
preparedness and capabilities, so that it Action 3: FEMA should
can be used to better measure State capacity examine the usefulness
to respond to disasters. We are currently of supplementing or
conducting a review of the disaster replacing the per capita
declaration process and plan to report the damage indicator with
results in 2012. the metrics required by
both statute and
Presidential Policy
Directive to assess a
State's disaster
preparedness and
capabilities.\1\
Delaying proposed investments until DHS Action 1: CBP should
better defines and measures benefits and determine the mission
estimates life-cycle costs for future benefits to be derived
acquisitions of border surveillance from implementation of
technology could help ensure the most the plan.
effective use of future program funding.--We Action 2: CBP should
found that CBP's Arizona Border Surveillance develop and apply key
Technology Plan, the successor of CBP's attributes for metrics
nearly $1 billion Secure Border Initiative to assess program
Network (SBInet) technology program for implementation.
securing the border between points of entry, Action 3: CBP should
is at an increased risk of not cost- update its cost estimate
effectively accomplishing its goal in for the plan using best
support of Arizona border security because practices.
CBP has not provided support for its Action 4: Congress may
business case for investing in the plan. We wish to consider
made three recommendations in November 2011 limiting future program
to increase CBP's likelihood of successfully funding until CBP has
implementing the Arizona Border Surveillance more fully defined the
Technology Plan, minimize performance risks, benefits and costs of
help justify program funding, and increase its new plan for
the reliability of CBP's cost estimate. DHS Arizona.
concurred with our recommendations and
identified steps it planned to take to
implement them, along with estimated dates
for their completion, but not all actions
fully addressed our recommendations. In
addition, in February 2012, we reported that
Congress may wish to consider limiting
future program funding. The President's
fiscal year 2013 budget requests $91.8
million for Integrated Fixed Towers that are
part of the Arizona Border Surveillance
Technology Plan.
The air passenger immigration inspection user Action 1: Congress may
fee should be reviewed and adjusted to fully wish to direct DHS to
recover the cost of the air passenger require ICE and CBP to
immigration inspection activities conducted regularly report total
by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement cost of air passenger
(ICE) and CBP.--We estimated that fee immigration inspections
collections available to ICE and CBP to pay and the amount of
for costs incurred in providing inspection associated fee
services totaled about $600 million in collections.
fiscal year 2010. However, we found that air Action 2: Congress may
passenger immigration fee collections did wish to direct DHS to
not fully cover CBP's costs in fiscal years adjust the fee as needed
2009 and 2010. Although ICE does not track so that collections are
air passenger costs separately from sea aligned with total
passenger costs, ICE officials stated that inspection costs.
its portion of total air and sea passenger Action 3: Congress may
collections did not cover ICE's total air wish to require DHS to
and sea passenger costs in fiscal year 2007 direct ICE to amend its
through 2009. We reiterated in our February cost study methodology.
2012 report four items for Congressional Action 4: Congress may
consideration to allow ICE and CBP to better wish to require DHS to
align air passenger immigration inspection direct ICE and CBP to
fee revenue with the costs of providing establish a regular
these services and achieve cost savings by schedule to review and
reducing the reliance on general fund coordinate costs of
appropriations. inspection activities.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO.
\1\ See 6 U.S.C. 749 and Presidential Policy Directive--8 (PPD-8):
National Preparedness, March 30, 2011.
dhs can improve the efficiency and effectiveness of its operations by
continuing to address themes that have impacted its progress
Our work at DHS has identified three key themes--leading and
coordinating the homeland security enterprise, implementing and
integrating management functions for results, and strategically
managing risks and assessing homeland security efforts--that have
impacted the Department's progress since it began operations.\4\ As
these themes have contributed to challenges in the Department's
management and operations, addressing them can result in increased
efficiencies and effectiveness. For example, DHS can help reduce cost
overruns and performance shortfalls by strengthening the management of
its acquisitions, and reduce inefficiencies and costs for homeland
security by improving its R&D management. These themes provide insights
that can inform DHS's efforts, moving forward, as it works to implement
its missions within a dynamic and evolving homeland security
environment. DHS made progress and has had successes in all of these
areas, but our work found that these themes have been at the foundation
of DHS's implementation challenges, and need to be addressed from a
Department-wide perspective to effectively and efficiently position DHS
for the future and enable it to satisfy the expectations set forth by
the Congress, the administration, and the country.
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\4\ DHS defines the homeland security enterprise as the Federal,
State, local, Tribal, territorial, non-Governmental, and private-sector
entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities, who share
a common National interest in the safety and security of the United
States and the American population.
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Leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise.--While
DHS is one of a number of entities with a role in securing the
homeland, it has significant leadership and coordination
responsibilities for managing efforts across the homeland security
enterprise. To satisfy these responsibilities, it is critically
important that DHS develop, maintain, and leverage effective
partnerships with its stakeholders, while at the same time addressing
DHS-specific responsibilities in satisfying its missions. Before DHS
began operations, we reported that the quality and continuity of the
new department's leadership would be critical to building and
sustaining the long-term effectiveness of DHS and achieving homeland
security goals and objectives.\5\ We further reported that to secure
the Nation, DHS must form effective and sustained partnerships between
components and also with a range of other entities, including Federal
agencies, State and local governments, the private and nonprofit
sectors, and international partners.\6\
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\5\ GAO, Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation
Issues, GAO-02-957T (Washington, DC: July 17, 2002).
\6\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on
Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO-07-454
(Washington, DC: Aug. 17, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS has made important strides in providing leadership and
coordinating efforts. For example, it has improved coordination and
clarified roles with State and local governments for emergency
management. DHS also strengthened its partnerships and collaboration
with foreign governments to coordinate and standardize security
practices for aviation security. However, DHS needs to take additional
action to forge effective partnerships and strengthen the sharing and
utilization of information, which has affected its ability to
effectively satisfy its missions. For example, in July 2010, we
reported that the expectations of private-sector stakeholders have not
been met by DHS and its Federal partners in areas related to sharing
information about cyber-based threats to critical infrastructure.\7\ In
2005, we designated information-sharing for homeland security as high-
risk because the Federal Government faced serious challenges in
analyzing information and sharing it among partners in a timely,
accurate, and useful way.\8\ Gaps in sharing, such as agencies' failure
to link information about the individual who attempted to conduct the
December 25, 2009, airline bombing, prevented the individual from being
included on the Federal Government's consolidated terrorist watchlist,
a tool used by DHS to screen for persons who pose risks to the country.
The Federal Government and DHS have made progress, but more work
remains for DHS to streamline its information sharing mechanisms and
better meet partners' needs. Moving forward, it will be important that
DHS continue to enhance its focus and efforts to strengthen and
leverage the broader homeland security enterprise, and build off the
important progress that it has made thus far. In addressing ever-
changing and complex threats, and with the vast array of partners with
whom DHS must coordinate, continued leadership and stewardship will be
critical in achieving this end.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Key Private and Public
Cyber Expectations Need to Be Consistently Addressed, GAO-10-628
(Washington, DC: July 15, 2010).
\8\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, DC:
Jan. 2005).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Implementing and integrating management functions for results.--
Following its establishment, the Department focused its efforts
primarily on implementing its various missions to meet pressing
homeland security needs and threats, and less on creating and
integrating a fully and effectively functioning department from 22
disparate agencies. This initial focus on mission implementation was
understandable given the critical homeland security needs facing the
Nation after the Department's establishment, and the enormous challenge
posed by creating, integrating, and transforming a department as large
and complex as DHS. As the Department matured, it has put into place
management policies and processes and made a range of other
enhancements to its management functions, which include acquisition,
information technology, financial, and human capital management.
However, DHS has not always effectively executed or integrated these
functions. In 2003, we designated the transformation and integration of
DHS as high-risk because DHS had to transform 22 agencies into one
department, and failure to effectively address DHS's management and
mission risks could have serious consequences for U.S. National and
economic security. Nine years later, DHS remains on our high-risk
list.\9\ DHS has demonstrated strong leadership commitment to address
its management challenges and has begun to implement a strategy to do
so. Further, DHS developed various management policies, directives, and
governance structures, such as acquisition and information technology
management policies and controls, to provide enhanced guidance on
investment decision making. DHS also reduced its financial management
material weaknesses and developed strategies to strengthen human
capital management. For example, in fiscal year 2011, DHS moved from a
Disclaimer of Opinion to a Qualified Audit Opinion on its Balance Sheet
and Statement of Custodial Activity for the first time since 2003.
However, DHS has not been able to obtain an unqualified audit opinion
on its consolidated financial statements (i.e., prepare a set of
financial statements that are considered fairly presented) though its
current goal is to receive an unqualified, or clean opinion, on the
Department-wide consolidated financial statement for fiscal year 2013.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278, (Washington, DC:
Feb. 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS needs to continue to demonstrate sustainable progress in
addressing its challenges, as these issues have contributed to schedule
delays, cost increases, and performance problems in major programs
aimed at delivering important mission capabilities. For example, we
reported on numerous cost, schedule, and performance risks, and
concluded that DHS had not economically justified its investment in the
Secure Border Initiative Network, DHS's border security technology
program.\10\ More specifically, DHS did not adequately define
requirements, perform testing, or oversee contractors, delaying
security enhancements on the Southwest Border. After initiating a
Department-wide assessment of the program, the Secretary of Homeland
Security froze program funding and, at the completion of the assessment
in January 2011, the Secretary decided to end the Secure Border
Initiative Network as originally conceived after investing nearly $1
billion in the program. DHS also has not yet fully implemented its
roles and responsibilities for developing and implementing key homeland
security programs and initiatives. For example, FEMA has not yet
developed a set of target capabilities for disaster preparedness or
established metrics for assessing those capabilities to provide a
framework for evaluating preparedness, as required by the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006.\11\ Moreover, DHS does not yet
have enough personnel with required skills to carry out activities in
various areas, such as acquisition management; and is in the process of
modernizing its financial management system, impacting its ability to
have ready access to reliable information for informed decision making.
Moving forward, addressing these management challenges will be critical
for DHS's success, as will be the integration of these functions across
the Department to achieve efficiencies and effectiveness.
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\10\ See, for example, GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to
Strengthen Management and Oversight of Its Prime Contractor, GAO-11-6
(Washington, DC: Oct. 18, 2010); Department of Homeland Security:
Assessments of Selected Complex Acquisitions, GAO-10-588SP (Washington,
DC: June 30, 2010); Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider
Its Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program, GAO-10-340
(Washington, DC: May 5, 2010); Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced
Challenges Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border,
GAO-10-651T (Washington, DC: May 4, 2010); and Secure Border
Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Testing and Performance Limitations
That Place Key Technology Program at Risk, GAO-10-158 (Washington, DC:
Jan. 29, 2010).
\11\ See 6 U.S.C. 749.
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Strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security
efforts.--Forming a new department while working to implement
statutorily-mandated and Department-initiated programs and responding
to evolving threats, was, and is, a significant challenge facing DHS.
Key threats, such as attempted attacks against the aviation sector,
have impacted and altered DHS's approaches and investments, such as
changes DHS made to its processes and technology investments for
screening passengers and baggage at airports. It is understandable that
these threats had to be addressed immediately as they arose. However,
limited strategic and program planning by DHS, as well as assessment to
inform approaches and investment decisions, have contributed to
programs not meeting strategic needs or doing so in an efficient
manner. For example, we previously reported that TSA's program for
research, development, and deployment of passenger checkpoint screening
technologies was not risk-based and did not reflect some of the key
risk-management principles, such as conducting a risk assessment based
on the three elements of risk--threat, vulnerability, and consequence--
and including a cost-benefit analysis and performance measures.\12\ As
a result, TSA had limited assurance that its strategy targeted the
most-critical risks and that it was investing in the most cost-
effective new technologies or other protective measures. In addition,
we reported that DHS coordinated the development of a strategic plan
for the global nuclear detection architecture--a multidepartment effort
to protect against terrorist attacks using nuclear and radiological
materials through coordinated activities.\13\ However, the strategic
plan for the architecture did not include some key components, such as
funding needed to achieve the strategic plan's objectives, or
monitoring mechanisms for determining programmatic progress and
identifying needed improvements.
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\12\ GAO, Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched,
Developed, and Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening
Technologies, but Continue to Face Challenges, GAO-10-128 (Washington,
DC: Oct. 7, 2009).
\13\ GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed a
Strategic Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps
Remain, GAO-11-869T (Washington, DC: July 26, 2011).
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Further, DHS has made important progress in analyzing risk across
sectors, but it has more work to do in using this information to inform
planning and resource-allocation decisions. Risk management has been
widely supported by Congress and DHS as a management approach for
homeland security, enhancing the Department's ability to make informed
decisions and prioritize resource investments. Since DHS does not have
unlimited resources and cannot protect the Nation from every
conceivable threat, it must make risk-informed decisions regarding its
homeland security approaches and strategies.
Moreover, we have reported on the need for enhanced performance
assessment, that is, evaluating existing programs and operations to
determine whether they are operating as intended or are in need of
change, across DHS's missions.\14\ Information on the performance of
programs is critical for helping the Department, Congress, and other
stakeholders more systematically assess strengths and weaknesses and
inform decision making. In recent years, DHS has placed an increased
emphasis on strengthening its mechanisms for assessing the performance
and effectiveness of its homeland security programs. For example, DHS
established new performance measures, and modified existing ones, to
better assess many of its programs and efforts. However, our work has
found that DHS continues to miss opportunities to optimize performance
across its missions due to a lack of reliable performance information
or assessment of existing information; evaluation among possible
alternatives; and, as appropriate, adjustment of programs or operations
that are not meeting mission needs. For example, we reported that CBP
had invested $2.4 billion in tactical infrastructure (fencing, roads,
and lighting) along the Southwest Border, but could not measure the
impact of this investment in tactical infrastructure on border
security.\15\ As the Department further matures and seeks to optimize
its operations, DHS will need to look beyond immediate requirements;
assess programs' sustainability across the long term, particularly in
light of constrained budgets; and evaluate trade-offs within and among
programs across the homeland security enterprise. Doing so should
better equip DHS to adapt and respond to new threats in a sustainable
manner as it works to address existing ones.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ For a list of GAO reports related to performance assessment,
see GAO-11-881.
\15\ GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays
Persist and the Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO-09-
896 (Washington, DC: Sept. 9, 2009).
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concluding observations
Given DHS's significant leadership responsibilities in securing the
homeland, it is critical that the Department's programs and activities
are operating as efficiently and effectively as possible, are
sustainable, and that they continue to mature, evolve, and adapt to
address pressing security needs. Since it began operations in 2003, DHS
has implemented key homeland security operations and achieved important
goals and milestones in many areas. These accomplishments are
especially noteworthy given that the Department has had to work to
transform itself into a fully functioning cabinet department while
implementing its missions--a difficult undertaking for any organization
and one that can take years to achieve even under less-daunting
circumstances. However, our work has shown that DHS can take actions to
reduce overlap and potential unnecessary duplication to improve the
efficiency of its operations and achieve cost-savings in several areas.
Further, while DHS has made progress, additional actions are needed to
strengthen partnerships with stakeholders, improve its management
processes and share information, and enhance its risk management and
performance-measurement efforts to enhance effectiveness and achieve
efficiencies throughout the Department.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared testimony. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that Members of the subcommittee may have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Ms. Berrick.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Edwards for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF CHARLES K. EDWARDS, ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Edwards. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Keating, and Members of the committee. Thank you for inviting
me to discuss waste, fraud, abuse, and duplication at DHS.
Since its inception in 2003, the Department has made
strides toward establishing, building, and maintaining a
cohesive, effective, and efficient organization. While the
Department is taking positive steps, it still faces significant
challenges in achieving effective and economic operations.
Today I will discuss the results of recent audits that
underscore the need for continued improvement in three areas:
Acquisition management, disaster response, and transportation
security.
Acquisition management, including adequate planning,
oversight, and controls, is critical to the Department's effort
to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. Our recent review of CBP's
purchase and storage of steel for fence construction under the
Secure Border Initiative illustrates what can happen without
adequate planning and oversight. CBP purchased steel based on
needs it estimated before legally acquiring land or meeting
treaty obligations. Then it did not provide effective contract
oversight; for example, not paying invoices on time, and not
thoroughly reviewing and documenting selection of the
subcontractor. As a result, CBP purchased more steel than
needed, incurred additional storage costs, paid interest on
late payments, and approved a high-priced subcontractor, all of
which led to additional expenditures. We estimate that CBP
could have avoided about $69 million in costs if it had managed
this acquisition more effectively.
We also conducted an audit that looked into DHS oversight
of acquisition programs managed by the components. Although DHS
generally had management oversight and controls over component
acquisition programs, it needed to further refine some policies
and strengthen oversight. Some components were subjecting
acquisitions to increased regulatory requirements because the
DHS acquisition management directive was not clearly
understood. These requirements may have resulted in increased
costs.
Additionally we found the Department could benefit from
more use of strategic sourcing. Specifically, DHS had eight
different procurement officers purchasing detection equipment,
was not facilitating strategic sourcing, and was using multiple
equipment models to meet similar missions. The Department could
decrease acquisition costs by strategically sourcing this
equipment.
We also recently reviewed OneNet, an information technology
infrastructure platform designed to consolidate DHS's component
networks. The goal of OneNet is to allow DHS's components to
share data in support of cross-organizational missions. DHS has
made some progress, but needs to make a number of improvements
in order to ensure transition to OneNet.
As a result of our review, we made recommendations to the
Department's Chief Information Officer that we believe will
help ensure this transition.
FEMA's Individuals and Households Program, which is used to
quickly disburse money to disaster survivors, is at risk to
fraud, waste, and abuse, and therefore requires fiscal
responsibility and program integrity. We looked at the progress
FEMA has made in preventing fraudulent losses of Federal funds.
The agency still needs to increase fraud prevention awareness,
and develop, establish, and enhance internal controls,
including the checking of the validity of data. The process of
recouping improper payments, which had been halted, has been
restarted, and should continue until all cases are resolved.
Another critical mission of DHS is transportation security.
As part of this mission, TSA must provide sufficient oversight
to ensure that individuals working at airport locations are
properly screened before receiving a badge, giving them
unfettered access to secure areas. We determined that TSA had
limited oversight of the badging process. Badges were issued
despite inaccurate or omitted application data or improper
vetting. Airport employees were not always trained how to use
the available tools to detect fraud. TSA did not require
airports to conduct recurrent criminal history checks. As a
result, TSA has no assurance that individuals who pose threats
could not obtain badges to access secure areas.
In closing, I would like to note that DHS and its
components concurred with the majority of our report
recommendations, and in most cases have already begun
implementing them. I commend the Department for continuing to
meet and work on these management challenges and improve its
operations and performance.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared remarks, and I
would be happy to answer any questions that you or other
Members may have.
[The statement of Mr. Edwards follows:]
Prepared Statement of Charles K. Edwards
March 8, 2012
Good morning Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and
distinguished Members of the committee: I am Charles K. Edwards, Acting
Inspector General of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Thank
you for the opportunity to testify today on our on-going efforts to
identify and eliminate waste, fraud, abuse, and duplication in the
Department.
As you know, the DHS Office of Inspector General (OIG) was
established in January 2003 by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by
amendment to the Inspector General Act of 1978. The DHS OIG seeks to
promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in DHS programs and
operations and reports directly to both the DHS Secretary and the
Congress. We fulfill our mission primarily by issuing audit,
inspection, and investigative reports that include recommendations for
corrective action, and by referring cases to the United States Attorney
General for prosecution.
I would like to begin by noting the strides DHS has taken toward
building a cohesive agency that addresses its key mission objectives to
protect our borders, improve our response to manmade and natural
threats, and implement transportation and trade security. DHS, by
virtue of the breadth and importance of its mission, the scope of its
activities, and the number of employees, must overcome some especially
difficult challenges.
Each year we publish a report on the most significant management
challenges facing the Department including acquisition management,
grants management, and transportation security. Today, my testimony
will highlight important issues in those three areas.
I am pleased to report that not only did DHS and its components
concur with majority of our recommendations in these areas; in most
cases they are already taking steps to implement these recommendations.
acquisition management
The Department continues to streamline its management of
acquisitions, but is still challenged by their magnitude and
complexity. Good acquisition management is critical to the Department's
efforts to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse, particularly good
acquisition planning and adequate oversight and controls, as well as
best practices such as strategic sourcing of common equipment. I would
like to highlight four of our 2011 reports focusing on these issues.
In our report, U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Management of
the Purchase and Storage of Steel in Support of the Secure Border
Initiative (OIG-12-05), we determined that U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) did not effectively manage the purchase and storage of
steel in support of the Secure Border Initiative. Since 2008, CBP spent
approximately $1.2 billion to construct physical barriers along the
Southwest Border as part of this initiative. About $310 million of the
cost was to purchase and store steel in support of fence construction.
CBP purchased steel based on an estimate before legally acquiring land
or meeting international treaty obligations. In addition, it did not
provide effective contract oversight during the project: It paid
invoices late, did not reconcile invoices with receiving documents, and
did not perform a thorough review of the contractor's selection of a
higher-priced subcontractor or document the reasons for its approval of
the subcontractor. As a result, CBP purchased more steel than needed,
incurred additional storage costs, paid interest on late payments, and
approved a higher-priced subcontractor, with additional expenditures of
about $69 million that could have been put to better use.
CBP did not efficiently plan the purchase and storage of steel for
the Supply and Supply Chain Management (SSCM) task order. It purchased
27,557 tons of extra steel, with a value of about $44 million, which
remained in storage at the end of the task order. Additionally, CBP did
not obtain necessary approval to build all planned fence segments
before acquiring the steel. In September 2009, CBP purchased 34 tons of
steel for $23,000, even though it had significant quantities of the
same steel already in storage. CBP was not proactive and did not
efficiently plan for the storage of steel remaining from the task
order. Instead of moving the extra steel to a cost-efficient location,
CBP extended the original contract and awarded a supplemental storage
contract. CBP's decision to extend the storage contracts for 2 years
resulted in $9.8 million in avoidable storage costs.
CBP did not reconcile or promptly pay invoices from the SSCM task
order. The cost of the task order increased because CBP paid invoices
late, which resulted in late payment interest charges. Furthermore, CBP
could not guarantee the Government received what it paid for under the
task order. CBP did not have policies and procedures for submitting and
reviewing invoices. There was no clear guidance on the proper office to
route invoices to, no time line for the review process, and no
notification process to remind offices of invoices coming due.
CBP did not perform a thorough review of the consent to subcontract
documentation and did not document the reasons for its approval of the
higher-price subcontractor. Its approval of a subcontractor may have
added about $13.5 million to the project. The DHS Office of the Chief
Procurement Officer recognized the importance of component oversight of
subcontractor selection and issued an acquisition alert in April 2011
to DHS heads of contracting activities.
We noted that CBP should ensure it applied lessons learned from
this project to future projects. To that end, we made five
recommendations to improve CBP's management of future fence
construction and contract oversight. CBP concurred with four
recommendations, and DHS proposed an alternative to the fifth
recommendation that met the intent of that recommendation. CBP was
acting to implement the recommendations.
In DHS Oversight of Component Acquisition Programs (OIG-11-71), we
reported that DHS generally had management oversight and controls over
components' acquisition programs, but needed to further refine some
policies and strengthen oversight in some areas.
The Department had made progress in its acquisition oversight
processes and controls by implementing a revised Acquisition Management
Directive (Directive 102-01) and accompanying Acquisition Instruction
Guidebook (102-01-001). The directive and guidebook addressed many
previously identified oversight and control problems related to
acquisition management. However, the guidance needed further refining
to provide additional details and improve controls in some areas.
The Department had not fully defined for its components what
constituted an acquisition program, and had not developed consistent
guidance for reporting the three levels of acquisition programs in its
standard reporting system. Components were not completing and reporting
all key information into the next Generation Periodic Reporting System
(nPRS), and were thus distorting the acquisition portfolio position
through inconsistent reporting of programs. In July 2010, data from
nPRS showed progress in entering level 3 acquisition program
components, but the system still only reflected half the total number
of level 3 programs that components were reporting outside nPRS. By
mandating use of nPRS for all acquisition programs, the Department
would have visibility into components' acquisition programs and could
provide better oversight of its acquisition portfolio.
The Department did not ensure that components were using all
available acquisition tools, including nPRS and the Strategic Sourcing
Program Office (SSPO). Component personnel had developed or were
developing their own data tracking systems because the Department had
not consistently mandated use of nPRS or its tools. The Department also
did not ensure that components were using the SSPO to manage
acquisition programs, which would have created transparency and
efficiency in their acquisition programs. As a result, components may
have awarded contracts without considering the SSPO, and the Department
may have incurred increased costs for procurements. In addition,
components may have conducted duplicative market research for
procurements that had already been done by the SSPO. The Department
should ensure components were at least considering the use of the SSPO
before awarding contracts.
DHS did not ensure that all components had developed adequate
policies and procedures to manage and oversee acquisition programs. The
Department's Acquisition Management Directive 102-01 states that
components are authorized to establish internal acquisition processes
and procedures consistent with the Directive. However, not all
components had created such processes and procedures. Others had
created program management offices to manage simple procurements, were
not properly reporting programs into the standard system, or were not
applying strategic sourcing strategies to support program development.
The Department had not ensured the adequacy of the processes and
procedures that components developed. As a result, some components
unnecessarily created acquisition programs, which potentially increased
administrative costs without adding value to the programs. In addition,
the Department did not always know what is in its acquisition
portfolio.
We made four recommendations to the Chief Procurement Officer to
strengthen the Department's management oversight and controls over
component acquisition programs, including requiring reporting of
acquisitions in nPRS, implementing a plan of action or deadline to
finalize acquisition management policies and procedures, and requiring
components to consider using the SSPO and other resources in planning
acquisitions. The Chief Procurement Officer agreed with our
recommendations, and DHS initiated corrective actions.
The report, DHS Continues to Face Challenges in the Implementation
of Its OneNet Project (OIG-11-116), presented the results of our audit
of DHS' efforts to consolidate its components' networks into a single
wide-area network, OneNet. In 2005, DHS began to consolidate and
transform existing individual component networks into a single, world-
class information technology (IT) infrastructure. As part of an IT
Infrastructure Transformation Program, OneNet's goal was to provide a
reliable, cost-effective IT platform for data sharing among components
in support of cross-organizational missions.
DHS had made some progress toward consolidating the existing
components' IT infrastructures into OneNet. The Department had
established a centralized Network Operations Center/Security Operations
Center to manage and oversee OneNet and to monitor, detect, and respond
to IT security incidents. All but three components were signing
memorandums of agreement with CBP to obtain network and security
services; as the OneNet steward, CBP had elected not to prepare an
agreement. All components had converted their sites to Multiple
Protocol Label Switching architecture to read and access audit trails
captured on firewall and intrusion detection devices. The Department
had also established a redundant trusted internet connection (RTIC) to
provide a redundant network infrastructure and essential OneNet
services (e.g., internet, extranet, and application hosting) to all DHS
components.
At the time of our review, the Department needed to improve its
implementation of OneNet. DHS needed to establish component connections
(peering) to OneNet and ensure that all components transitioned to the
RTIC. At the time of our audit, only two components had peered all
their sites to OneNet; the remaining seven components identified the
lack of Policy Enforcement Points (PEP), which support controlled
cross-communication among component Trust Zones, as the primary reason
for their delayed transition to OneNet. DHS components had established
different and unique levels of IT security policies, as well as
different PEPs, to enforce these policies. Not all DHS components had
completely transitioned to the RTIC. As of February 2011, two
components had completed their transition. Three of the remaining seven
components had signed waivers with extension dates until 2012 to defer
their transition to the RTIC. Finally, DHS had not completed required
OneNet management documents, such as the Concept of Operations, which
describes how to use desired capabilities to carry out operations.
Three components did not have required interconnection security
agreements, and three other such agreements had expired.
We recommended that the DHS Chief Information Officer complete the
transition and connection (peering) of components and develop and
implement key planning documents, network service agreements, and
interconnection security agreements for OneNet. DHS generally agreed
with our findings and recommendations.
In DHS Department-wide Management of Detection Equipment (OIG 11-
47), we found the Department could better manage acquisition of
detection equipment by developing processes to standardize equipment
purchases and identifying common mission requirements among components.
DHS had eight different procurement offices purchasing detection
equipment and did not have a process to facilitate strategic sourcing.
The Department was using multiple models to meet similar missions, and
thus, was incurring higher administrative, logistical support, and
maintenance costs. We identified about $170 million worth of small X-
ray machines, metal detectors, and personal and hand-held radiation
detectors that DHS could acquire through strategic sourcing strategies.
To strategically source, DHS would need to standardize purchases of
explosive, metal, and radiation detection equipment; and identify
common mission requirements among components. Limiting the models and
types of equipment would increase procurement, maintenance, and
personnel efficiencies.
Components were also maintaining separate inventories, and the
inventory systems were not based on standard inventory data elements
and standard nomenclature for similar detection equipment. Without a
dictionary of common data elements and nomenclature, the Department did
not have timely visibility over on-hand balances of equipment and could
not be sure inventory data was complete and accurate.
We made two recommendations to the Deputy Under Secretary for
Management. First, we recommended that DHS establish a standard data
dictionary, consolidate data descriptions, and make sure components use
consistent inventory terms; second, we recommended that DHS re-
establish a Joint Requirements Council to identify cross-cutting
opportunities and common requirements. DHS concurred with both
recommendations and reported it was developing standard data elements
to manage its inventory accounts and was planning to revive the Joint
Requirements Council.
disaster assistance fraud
The report, Assessment of FEMA's Fraud Prevention Efforts (OIG-11-
84), included results of our review of FEMA's Individuals and
Households Program (IHP), through which the agency quickly disburses
billions of dollars to disaster survivors. The program's vulnerability
to fraud, waste, and abuse requires FEMA to implement procedures
designed to ensure assistance is provided in proper amounts and only to
eligible recipients. While FEMA had made progress in preventing
fraudulent losses of Federal funds, challenges remained in reporting
and identifying fraud; increasing fraud prevention awareness;
developing and maintaining proper internal controls; and recouping
improper disaster assistance payments.
The report highlighted the fact that FEMA had not established an
environment in which employees understand that fraud prevention is
integral to the agency's mission. This is partially caused by FEMA not
training disaster assistance employees how to prevent and detect fraud,
waste, and abuse. Rather, FEMA offered non-mandatory ad hoc training to
those employees who wanted to take the training. FEMA's leaders must
continually demonstrate the importance of fiscal responsibility and
program integrity. Mandating fraud prevention training for all
employees would increase the agency's attention to fraud prevention and
deterrence.
The agency had improved its internal controls since Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. However, OIG and Government Accountability Office
reviews, as well as agency assessments, continued to identify needed
improvements in internal controls over its assistance programs. For
example, in September 2009, we reported that FEMA substantially
improved internal control weaknesses that existed during Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita. While these changes resulted in fewer instances of
payments made to registrations with duplicate and invalid key data,
FEMA does not always use all of its validity checks for key
registration data. Consequently, FEMA continued to make improper
disaster assistance payments that should have been avoided. FEMA needs
to consistently apply its existing business rules, and monitor payment
activities to update its internal controls when it indentifies new
vulnerabilities.
The goal of the Fraud Prevention and Investigation Branch (FPIB) is
to assist in identifying, mitigating, and preventing fraud in FEMA
programs through fraud awareness training and, in partnership with DHS,
recoupment of losses. FEMA should issue a management directive
establishing FPIB as an agency-wide entity with authority to review all
FEMA-funded programs and recommend improvements to internal controls to
deter and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. FEMA needs also to provide
additional staffing to enable the FPIB to achieve that goal and adopt
measures used by the Recovery Accountability and Transparency Board,
such as the fraud-mapping tool, to foster accountability and
transparency of FEMA programs and improve internal controls. Finally,
FPIB's visibility would be enhanced if it reported directly to the FEMA
Office of the Administrator, or one of his direct reports.
transportation security
Transportation security is one of the critical missions for which
DHS was created. Since its inception, the Department has invested
considerable resources to establish a secure transportation
environment, particularly at our Nation's airports. We have audited
many of the layers of security established or overseen by TSA. One of
our recent reports, TSA's Oversight of the Airport Badging Process
Needs Improvement, examined TSA's controls over the issuance of airport
badges to individuals.
Individuals who pose threats may obtain airport badges and gain
access to secured airport areas, endangering the safety of airport
workers, passengers, and aircraft. We identified badges issued to
individuals with one or more omissions or inaccuracies in key applicant
data used for vetting. For example, badges were issued to individuals
without a complete security threat assessment (STA). Individuals were
not always properly vetted, and badges were issued without the required
information such as STA status, birthdate, and birthplace. Airport
operators and local TSA officials were not fully aware of the details
of the complex vetting process and the ramifications of entering
inaccurate biographical data.
TSA had designed and implemented only limited oversight of the
badge application process. Specifically, the agency did not ensure that
airport operators had quality assurance procedures to safeguard the
completeness and accuracy of the data used for vetting. Despite its
reliance on designated airport operator employees, TSA did not always
ensure that airports were properly training these employees. Only one
airport had a formalized training program focused on airport operator
employees' duties and responsibilities. TSA also did not ensure that
airport operator employees were using available tools to perform their
assigned duties.
In addition, TSA did not require its inspectors to verify airport
data during interviews. TSA inspectors reviewed the airport badging
process during inspections; however, this limited coverage did not
ensure that vetting information was complete and accurate. Inspectors
did not always have direct access to the Transportation Security
Clearinghouse database and were not required to compare or cross-
reference records. Therefore, inspections of badging office records may
have been insufficient to determine the airports' level of compliance
with vetting process requirements. Direct access to clearinghouse data
would enable inspectors to verify records for approved STAs in a timely
manner and take immediate corrective action if necessary.
TSA did not require airports to conduct recurrent Criminal History
Records Checks (CHRC) to ensure that badge holders maintained their
reputable status. According to airport and TSA officials, these checks
should be conducted on a recurrent basis. These officials also
indicated the self-reporting policy was ineffective because most
employees would not report themselves for fear of losing their job.
Some airports were proactive in mitigating risk in the CHRC process.
According to TSA officials, the agency recognized the need for more
frequent criminal checks. The Transportation Threat Assessment and
Credentialing office, in cooperation with the agency's Office of Chief
Council, was exploring implementation of a requirement to conduct
recurrent CHRCs.
Some sites we visited had best practices that could be implemented
at other airports to ensure authenticity of documentation and data
accuracy. In addition, in response to our preliminary findings, the
Airports Council International--North America established a task force
of its member airports to identify and evaluate best practices for
airport identification badging. Some practices included conducting
badging application audits to identify common errors to incorporate
into training classes, providing advanced training on fraudulent
document identification and document handling procedures, establishing
checks to prevent duplicate records, and establishing a quality control
process to review applicant information before it is submitted for an
STA.
We presented our findings to the airport operators, local TSA
officials, and inspectors. Our analysis generated 101 updates, which
airport operators sent to the Transportation Security Clearinghouse. We
made recommendations to establish and implement quality assurance
procedures for the badging process, ensure that airport operator
employees receive proper training and tools to perform their assigned
duties, require independent verification of approved applications,
provide real-time reports on active badge holders, and conduct
recurrent CHRCs. TSA concurred with all but one recommendation--on
real-time reporting--with which it partially concurred.
In closing, I would like to commend the Department for acting
quickly on our recommendations in an effort to improve its operations
and performance. The Office of Inspector General remains committed to
performing audits and inspections, identifying issues, and making
recommendations to assist DHS in carrying out its mission effectively
and efficiently.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. Thank you for
the opportunity to testify, and I welcome any questions from you or
Members of the committee.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Edwards.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Lilly for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF SCOTT LILLY, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR AMERICAN
PROGRESS
Mr. Lilly. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
congratulate this subcommittee. I have felt that over the past
decade we have seen a general degradation in the capability of
the Federal Government to do the things it needs to do, and I
think one reason for that is a decline in effective oversight
by the Congress. The Congress has the capability of breaking
down walls within bureaucracies, forcing the bureaucracy to
share information with itself, as well as help the American
people understand what the people who are paid with their tax
dollars are doing. I think this hearing is a very good step in
the right direction.
Of all the departments in the Federal Government that I
think need oversight, the Department of Homeland Security is
the most, and that is for a number of reasons. I would say,
first of all, I would like to very strongly agree with Governor
Gilmore with respect to the mistake that I believe the Congress
and the President made in creating this Department. There is a
very good reason that the United States did not combine the
Departments of Navy and War before World War II, but did so
afterwards. I think after
9/11 was the worst time we could have tried to combine 20
disparate agencies with little background.
There is an important lesson to be learned here, and that
is politicians very often want to do the easiest and most
visible thing when there is a problem, and that is to rearrange
the boxes. But in fact, rearranging the boxes is almost always
the wrong thing to do. If you had looked at the entire Federal
Government and tried to identify the most troubled agencies,
certainly the Immigration and Naturalization Service in the
Department of Justice would have been among them on September
11, 2001. Those problems should have been dealt with directly
within the Justice Department at that time rather than trying
to deal with the failings of that agency after combining it
into a large and largely out-of-control Department. So I think
that gives us some context as to why we have the problems we
have.
I think we also had serious leadership problems in the
early days of the Department. I think a lot of less effective
staff from other agencies were transferred to the Department,
which compounded those problems. I think the Department
developed a culture of excluding one another and the Congress
from information that has to be shared within departments in
order to make the Department work better.
Of all the things that we could look at to try to improve
the Department, I am not sure that duplication would be at the
top of my list. We certainly need to be mindful of duplication.
With respect to the local grants, it is a program that is
declining in budget already. I think largely local governments
don't want to spend even Federal money to solve the same
problem twice.
I am concerned about duplication, and we should look for
opportunities--we should always be mindful of it and check for
it, but I am much more concerned about the general lack of
managerial talent within the Department, and within the
Government generally, to make the large-type procurements that
we are talking about with the Arizona border. This is obviously
a project that takes a huge amount of skill. It has never been
done. We need the best management the country has, and you
can't always hire those on contract. If you don't have some of
them working for the Government, you are going to have a
problem.
I want to say one other thing that I think this committee
should look at. It is not directly in your jurisdiction, but I
think it is an enormous problem. We talked about weapons of
mass destruction. I think there is one area where we are
failing pretty dramatically in that regard, and that is with
respect to biological weapons.
The threshold for nuclear weapons is quite high, as the
efforts that Iran is making today show. The efforts for
biological weapons are much lower. The ability to track them
and the expertise necessary to produce them is far more
difficult. The efforts that we are making in terms of producing
antidotes or helping defend the American people or first
responders I think have fallen completely flat.
So with that I will conclude my testimony and am happy to
take questions.
[The statement of Mr. Lilly follows:]
Prepared Statement of Scott Lilly
I want to congratulate the committee on their work in overseeing
the operations of the Department of Homeland Security. The Department
was created during my tenure as Minority Staff Director of the House
Appropriations Committee and I have watched it struggle for more than 8
years now. I must say that I have never witnessed greater chaos in
Government than in the early years of this Department.
There was an extended period in which they could not produce a
directory of the names and phone numbers of their key employees. I did
a report in 2005 detailing the data from an Office of Personnel
Management study which showed that DHS employees ranked the performance
of their Department dramatically lower than employees of other Federal
agencies. During that period we had Departmental IG reports indicating
that leaders of the deeply troubled Transportation Security
Administration had awarded themselves $1.5 million in year-end
bonuses--amounts one-third higher than handed out by any other Federal
agency. TSA also spent $462,000 on an awards ceremony including nearly
$2,000 for seven sheet cakes.
In 2006, that same IG told ABC News that he had not been
reappointed because the Secretary of the Department had labeled him a
``traitor and a turn coat'' for his effort.
We are finally seeing some improvement but DHS continues to need
all of the oversight that the Congress can give it and it needs the
support and understanding of Congress in mutual efforts to solve some
of its most intractable and enduring problems.
Having said that, I do not see the first issue raised by the
General Accountability Office in their February 28 report, the
potential for duplicative projects resulting in DHS local grants, as a
particularly something that merits a lot of time and attention. We
should be mindful of the possibility of duplication and agencies have a
responsibility to get sufficient information about projects for which
Federal funds are being requested to know whether they are likely to
duplicate efforts in the same or neighboring jurisdictions.
On the other hand, one would have to expect that local governments,
having far greater planning resources to address local needs than the
Federal Government, would also be concerned about using their Federal
funds wisely and in a way that does not provide two solutions to the
same problem. Frankly, I would be more concerned about local
governments using funds requested under the banner of counterterrorism
and security as a means of solving other problems not associated with
that purpose. Ultimately GAO did not find duplication but simply a lack
of optimal reporting.
Federal Facilities Risk Assessment by the Federal Protective
Service is different problem and a more troubling one. FPS is currently
expected to make these assessments for about 2,300 facilities a year.
They charge agencies occupying these facilities for the cost of the
assessments at a rate that appears to be somewhere between $80,000 and
$100,000 per facility. One problem is that at least some agencies seem
to lack confidence in FPS to competently perform this work. In
addition, there appears to be a problem with FPS being able to simply
execute these assessments at all. Finally, the question has been raised
as to whether FPS is charging an unreasonable price for such services.
The committee should get to the bottom of these problems. There are
at least two sides to every problem. It would strike me as entirely
plausible that FPS simply lacks the expertise and management
capabilities to effectively perform this function. It is also plausible
that other agencies are unwilling to give up turf to a central provider
of services even thought that would be a more logical and less costly
approach. It is also plausible that both of those scenarios are
accurate. The amount of money involved is not small but the importance
of protecting Federal facilities is even bigger. The committee should
insure that the facilities are protected and at a reasonable cost to
the taxpayer. It may take a lot of time and patience but that is what
good oversight is all about.
Finally, I noticed that an issue not in the latest GAO report was
mentioned in the Chairman's comments about this hearing on the
committee website. Those comments involved the Arizona Border
Surveillance Technology Plan which is simply the latest iteration of
efforts that now date back 15 years and previously known as Secure
Border Initiative Network. Over time we have spent close to a billion
dollars on these efforts and they have yet to demonstrate anything like
the capability we had all hoped for.
It is tempting in a political season to assign blame for such
failure. I could point out that this particular contract was crafted in
2005 and signed in 2006. But I don't think that accomplishes much if we
want to solve the problem. Good oversight is not about who does the
best job of playing ``gotcha'' but finding out why bureaucracies fail
to perform. Is this problem simply lacking the managerial competence in
DHS to organize a task of this dimension? Is it that smart people were
sold on technologies that were still not mature enough to work in the
real world? Is poor contract performance to blame? Is this a problem
that will simply take a lot of time, money, and patience to solve? Is
it some portion of all of these?
The answers to these questions are important and this committee can
play a vital role in forcing out the truth--but only if it truly seeks
the truth and unfortunately that is sometimes not the real objective of
oversight investigation.
Again, I congratulate you on holding this hearing and would be
happy to answer any questions the subcommittee may choose to ask.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Lilly. We appreciate your
remarks about oversight. You of all people know how important
it is for the Congress to provide oversight. You know, we
legislate, we pass laws, but through oversight we can make the
Executive Branch more effective. I think a lot of times we
introduce bills that go nowhere, and particularly in this
Congress we see a lot of gridlock. I think oversight, and what
we are doing here today, we can make changes for the better. As
you mentioned, this Department probably needs more oversight
than any other. So thank you for your testimony.
My first question has to do with--you know, when I got the
information from the IG report and GAO, I was very alarmed by
the corruption within the Border Patrol, Customs and Border
Patrol, particularly the case involving the agent who 19, 20
different times facilitated cartels with drug transactions,
bringing cash and weapons into the airports, getting past
screening with a badge, and taking those cash and weapons out
of this country to groups I consider to be terrorists. Then I
saw there were over 200 active investigations, cases.
I guess, Mr. Edwards and Ms. Berrick, I mean, how extensive
is this problem? How can we stop it? Because as a former public
corruption prosecutor, I see nothing more offensive than
somebody that has sworn an oath to our country and our
Constitution then betraying our country and our Constitution by
these acts.
Mr. Edwards. Mr. Chairman, preventing employee corruption
is a difficult task, especially the value a corrupt employee
brings to the criminal enterprise, mainly involving the drug
trade. The Department uses pre-employment screening, CBP uses
polygraphs, and they also do a periodic background
investigation to help address the corrupt employees and to
identify infiltrators. But that alone is not enough.
We, along with the components, do integrity briefing and
training to alert employees on signs of corruption and the
consequences of corruption, and also invite employees to come
to us and let us know if they see corruption that exists. We
also work with law enforcement entities and components to
detect and to arrest corrupt employees. Besides civil rights
violations, this is our highest domestic priority. Last year,
in fiscal year 2011, we arrested 403 employees.
But to answer your question, we need to have effective,
strong internal controls, which is critical to detecting,
deterring, and preventing these type of incidents.
Mr. McCaul. Well, over 400 arrests?
Mr. Edwards. Four hundred and three, sir.
Mr. McCaul. Border Patrol agents?
Mr. Edwards. All arrests per fiscal year 2011.
Mr. McCaul. I mean, this is sort of like an enemy within
that we need to pay attention to. I was not aware of the
extensive nature of this corruption within the Department, and
thank you for calling that to our attention.
Ms. Berrick, do you have anything to add to that?
Ms. Berrick. Mr. Chairman, while the IG does criminal
investigations of these cases, GAO's role is more to look at
what controls the agencies have in place to detect and prevent
this prior to some criminal act happening. We actually have
some on-going work now looking into these issues. There is more
Congressional interest in this.
For example, we are looking at the integrity of border
agents and what controls DHS has in place to ensure that. We
are going to be reporting out this summer. We have some similar
work at TSA as well. We would be happy to brief you and your
staff when that work is completed.
Mr. McCaul. I am also concerned about some of these
employees that work in fast-food restaurants in the airport,
and they have these badges to get in without screening. You
often wonder what kind of background checks are done on these
individuals as well.
When I was working counterterrorism, we initially did a
sweep of all the airports of illegals who were working within
the airports who had these badges because they can be
compromised.
So the other issue that is so important to me being from
Texas is the border, and what are we doing to better secure the
border? In the technology piece, you know, we have done a lot
with the fencing and all that, and added more agents, but the
technology piece is the piece that has not been completed. When
I hear the Secretary say it is going to be another 10 years
before that can be done, you know, a lot of my constituents get
very frustrated about that.
So SBInet in the Arizona Tucson sector was a colossal
failure to the tune of almost $1 billion. What is the
Department doing now? I know, Ms. Berrick, you have called into
question the technology piece in the Tucson sector today in
terms of they are not doing it the right way.
Ms. Berrick. Right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
With respect to SBInet deployed along 53 miles of the
highest-risk area within Arizona, we found that Border Patrol
generally thinks it is providing value. They are happy with the
increased support it is providing. However, the Army Test and
Evaluation Command did a study that actually found SBInet is
only providing a marginal improvement in interdiction
capability when you compare it to what was already on the
ground, ground sensors and other things.
So we actually recommended that DHS do a post-
implementation review, because they are spending money
maintaining that system, as you mentioned, along the 53 miles,
to really see is it worth the investment that we are paying for
this?
The second piece to this is DHS's new strategy for securing
the Southwest Border, starting in Arizona. They are calling it
the Arizona Technology Plan. There is a lot of similar
technologies that they are planning on using that they were
going to be using for the failed SBInet. We have called into
question the need for CBP to do better planning, to make sure
that they can justify the specific technologies, the locations,
the numbers that they are going to pursue so that Congress can
make informed decisions about those and also have better life-
cycle cost estimates. We found that the estimates were a very
rough order of magnitude. We think there is a potential for
significant more funds being needed to roll this out as DHS has
envisioned it. So we think they need more rigor in how they go
about pursuing this part two of securing the border.
Mr. McCaul. In this time of budgetary constraints as well,
Congressman Cuellar and I--he is from Laredo, and I am from
Austin--we talked a lot about leveraging existing technologies
within the Federal Government. I mean, too often we are
stovepiped. So the DOD has some great sensor surveillance
technology that already exists, and the private sector has a
lot of this already. We don't need to start from scratch. As we
draw down our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, I think that
we ought to be reallocating those technologies to the Southwest
Border. In fact, on a recent trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan
and Iraq, we talked to the generals about that. I think that
would be an effective use of the Federal Government's
resources.
The final question, because my time--well, I am about 2,
almost 3 minutes over, but, Governor, I just wanted to, with
all of your vast experience in this issue--to some extent I
agree with you, you know, merging 22 agencies. I mean, what a
difficult task. I don't envy any Secretary of this Department.
It is a monumental task they have. What, in your opinion--just
a very general question: What do we need to do to fix this
Department?
Mr. Gilmore. Mr. Chairman, I think that this is a good
time, 10 years on after the 9/11 attack, to simply do a
management assessment of whether or not the structure of the
Department of Homeland Security is the best way to carry out
the mission of protecting the Nation. There are other
alternatives that we offered and that other people have
offered.
We do not wish this Department any ill. We wish it success,
particularly because the security of the Nation depends on it.
But an overall management assessment, particularly the work
that is being done by the GAO and the inspector general, we
think are productive. But I would be cautious about only
looking at the granular issues that have been addressed here
this morning, this person or that person, or the badge is not
right, or you can't get into the fast food areas. I think an
overall management look at the Department and the mission that
needs to be carried out 10 years on would be a very healthy
thing. The Congress, of course, could lead in that way and make
that happen.
Mr. Chairman, if I might add one more thought about this,
we believe at Free Congress that there are several serious
threats to the Nation. We think that the lack of growth and the
economic downturn is the greatest challenge to our National
security that exists. But also the threat to the Southern
Border is very serious, in our view. I don't think that any
consistent policy has been articulated yet as to what we are
trying to do down there other than build fences and perhaps
capture people in the desert.
At the end of the day, people are corrupt because of money,
because of the great deal of money that can be offered to
people, which means that I believe that a public statement from
the Congress would be very healthy to say that it isn't just a
matter of taking money and being publicly corrupt in violation
of the criminal laws. I myself was a prosecutor. The public
statement really ought to be that people who take money from
drug people in order to smuggle and set up abilities to be
corrupt are actually betraying their country.
In fact, the people who are using these products that are
being offered in the United States of America, when they use
them, they aren't just breaking the criminal law, they are
betraying their country, because they are setting up an
opportunity here for insecurity. These corruptions and
methodologies that are going on along the Southern Border, you
wait until we get into another major conflict in this country
and people want to strike inside this country. The vehicles and
methods and routes to do damage to this country exist on that
Southern Border.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you. I couldn't agree with you more. I
have been talking a lot, this is my fourth term, 8 years, about
that border and the threat that is posed from the Southern
Border. You know, just recently with what is going on in Iran,
with Israel, the Iranian operative thinking he is contracting
with Los Zetas, the drug cartels, to take out the Saudi
Ambassador in Washington, they are becoming more operational.
We know that the Qods Forces and Hezbollah have a presence now
in this hemisphere. That Southern Border, I think, poses a
serious threat. Thank you for identifying that.
I am well over my time. With that, I recognize Ranking
Member Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank Mr. Lilly for recognizing that Congress has a role
in viewing this, but I have got to tell you I think we are
going to be here time and time again--it is like shining a
sneaker--trying to see what DHS can do. Until we address the
fundamental issues, there is going to be inherent waste and
duplication.
I think there is an estimate, Mr. Lilly, that Homeland
Security is subject to one of the most fractured jurisdictions
in terms of responsibility. It is estimated it reports to over
100 Congressional committees and subcommittees. How has this
disjointed jurisdiction affected this duplication? Until we can
start to--how can Congress approach this if things are so
fractured? What do we have to do ourselves on these
jurisdictional issues? Because I will tell you, we are going to
be here long after I am gone talking about the same thing until
we do some fundamental restructuring.
Mr. Lilly. Well, I think Congress plays a role in this. I
really prepared my remarks with respect to the Executive Branch
issues. But a number of agencies, or a number of departments
have multiple jurisdictions in the Congress. But I don't think
there is any example that is as divided as this is. Even where
there is multiple jurisdictions, for instance--well, the
jurisdictions split pretty cleanly within the organization of
the executive department, so it is clear which agency or which
committee of the Congress has jurisdiction over what. You
normally end up with one authorizing committee that plays the
lead role and one appropriations subcommittee, and I think that
can work quite effectively.
I think that there needs to be more coordination between
the authorizing committees and the Appropriations Committee,
because I think you can dig into things a lot more deeply than
the Appropriations Committee can. But certainly if the Congress
would clean up its act and try to streamline jurisdictions,
that would be a big assistance to oversight.
Mr. Keating. I don't think I can do my job with the current
situation as effectively as I can. I don't think DHS can do
their job with the current situation.
Mr. Lilly. I will give you an example of an issue that I
don't think is being addressed right now, and that is the flood
insurance under FEMA, which is not under the control of this
committee, but the banking committee. We are paying insurance
companies about 8 percent in order to basically do the
paperwork on this. They have no risk at all. I think the price
that we are paying is way out of line. Somebody needs to be
looking at that. As far as I can tell, the banking committee
isn't.
Mr. Keating. Most of us were in Philadelphia just a few
days ago. You know, there is a perimeter breach that was there.
Yet when we had our hearing at Logan Airport in Boston earlier
this year, we found out that that is just a local
responsibility. There is no Federal responsibility at all on
those issues the way it is set up.
Governor Gilmore, I mean, we could be here forever dealing
with this, but those jurisdictional lines have to be combined.
We are asking an agency that has day-to-day responsibility with
our safety on one hand to be over here, and there is just a
myriad of different agencies they have to deal with. No one
could do their job as efficiently as they could unless we get
that resolved.
Mr. Gilmore. Congressman Keating, I think you are right,
and I appreciate your leadership on that. You will find that
our Commission reports, all five of them, are replete with
recommendations to the Congress that they simplify their
oversight capabilities by reducing the number of committees
that the Department and that the Homeland Security authorities
have to respond to. That has not been done. Why not? Because
territorial--because the Congresspeople want to protect their
territory, and their authority, and so on. So in order to
protect that territory inside the Congress, they are
sacrificing the National security of the United States. It is a
simple trade-off. In fact, this report right here on page 16
starting on that is an admonition to the Congress to simplify
their oversight capabilities by reducing the number of
committees. Actually, this committee and this subcommittee
exist today because of those reforms, but they didn't undo all
the other oversight as well.
Mr. Keating. Ms. Berrick, would you like to comment on
that?
Ms. Berrick. Thank you, Representative Keating.
I can certainly see it causing challenges for the
Department day in and day out working with them, with reporting
to multiple committees. GAO is sometimes asked this question
directly since, of course, we work for the Congress.
I think that the key issue is how well the committees work
together and coordinate. Frankly, we are not doing any more
investigations at DHS; we are not being asked by Congress to do
any more than we are doing for similar-sized organizations. Our
experience has been that the committees generally have worked
together well, usually have multiple requesters on engagements
that GAO is asked to do.
So I think the key, again, is how well those committees
work together, but certainly can sympathize with DHS on the
multiple reporting requirements and oversight.
Mr. Keating. I will just close and say that we are looking
at duplication, we should look at ourselves first right here in
Congress.
Thank you. With that, I yield back.
Mr. McCaul. I associate myself with the Ranking Member's
remarks. We talked about how the Federal Government is
stovepiped and doesn't work well together, and yet on this very
issue--and it was a recommendation of the 9/11 Commission--was
that the Congress consolidate under one committee oversight and
authorizing of the Department, and yet you have got so many
other committees that have that responsibility as well. It
should be consolidated.
With that, I recognize the gentleman from Missouri, former
auctioneer, Mr. Long.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Gilmore, in February, the DHS Under Secretary of
Management told the subcommittee that some of the existing
contracting offices within DHS and its components may be
duplicative and unnecessary, which, from your testimony, I am
sure you agree with. How might DHS restructure its contracting
offices to maximize the efficiency and then eliminate
duplication?
Mr. Gilmore. Congressman, the way I would approach it would
be to ask: What is the mission? What are we trying to
accomplish? The various components need to harmonize and work
together in order to complete the mission. Procurement within
those different agencies needs to be directed towards the
accomplishment of the overarching mission. There is no reason
why you couldn't simply have the ability to combine much of the
procurement into one place with one's ability to oversee the
procurement so that instead of a mission for each individual
agency, as disparate as they may be, they could be combined to
carry out the overarching Homeland Security mission. So in
other words, there could be a combination of this in a
consolidation.
Mr. Long. Is the turf battles why you see so much
duplication, you think?
Mr. Gilmore. No. Well, as I have said, I think there is a
turf battle in Congress. I don't know whether there is a turf
battle----
Mr. Long. I am talking about within the----
Mr. Gilmore. I do know that. I think that within the
Department itself, the Secretary would have a feel for whether
or not she is obstructed by turf battles within the different
agencies. I think it is more likely that each of the agencies
came in, 10 years ago, into the Department with disparate
missions and different structures and different ideas about how
to carry things out, and they are trying to do all of that. Now
the question is whether that combines into the overall mission
of the Department of Homeland Security. That will be a good
study, I think, for GAO.
Mr. Long. Thank you.
Mr. Lilly, you have said that you are not as concerned
about duplication, or at least duplication would not be No. 1
on your priority list. If you are just going to name three
things that we should be the most concerned with, what would be
your top three priorities?
Mr. Lilly. Well, I think the first thing is just attracting
the caliber of management to the Department, to the Federal
Government.
Mr. Long. Okay. You have mentioned that a couple of times.
Where are we falling short on that? What caused the current
morass?
Mr. Lilly. Well, I think there are a number of things that
have happened. One is I think we had a pretty talented
generation of managers that came into the Government in the
1960s and 1970s, and they came in in a bunch, and they are
leaving in a bunch. So you have got kind of a vacuum as a
result of that.
Also, I know there are people up here that are wanting to
talk about how much Federal employees are overpaid, and there
may be some levels where that is true. The recent CBO study
showed that for employees with less than a college degree, the
Federal Government pays more. But at the very top end, when you
are talking about program managers and contract officers, we
don't pay enough to hold them.
You can go to any department, and you can see our best
people in Government are being hired by the contractors that
work for the Government and paid $20,000, $30,000, $50,000 more
than they are making working for the Government. So we just
have a continuous system of dumbing down our best talent
because we are not competitive at that level.
If you wanted a project officer that is going to be able to
figure out how to use information technology to protect the
border, you are talking about a very high-priced piece of
talent, and if you are not willing to pay for it, you won't get
it. I don't think we do have it.
Mr. Long. Okay.
Ms. Berrick, why does DHS maintain three separate
information-sharing mechanisms for the public transit agencies?
Ms. Berrick. Thank you. This was an issue we reported on
last year. I think the reason is in DHS's early years, they
were very focused on getting out as much security information
as possible to stakeholders, so they used many different
methods to do that, which is understandable wanting to get that
information out. They paid less attention to are these systems
duplicating each other and also, frankly, how useful the
information is to the recipients.
Now that DHS is maturing, we have been looking at this
issue and have made a number of recommendations that DHS
streamline these information-sharing mechanisms, and also
solicit feedback from the recipients of this information to
make sure it is, in fact, what they need, because what we have
heard in a number of cases--one example is in the
transportation security area--is stakeholders, you know, rail
operators are getting information from so many different
sources that they tend to stop looking at it because they are
getting overwhelmed.
Mr. Long. Right.
Ms. Berrick. So I think that is the reason. Again, DHS is
moving in the right direction, I think. They have already taken
action to consolidate some of these information-sharing
networks for transit operators, for example. But I still think
that there is more that can be done.
Mr. Long. Okay. Thank you.
I thank you all for your testimony. I yield back.
Mr. McCaul. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Duncan from South Carolina.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I ask any questions, I want to talk about a comment
that was just made about turf battles, and related to a hearing
we had on border and maritime security this week dealing with
these overstays. During the testimony and questioning, it was
brought up that the agencies involved, whether it is CBP or ICE
and even the Department of State, aren't communicating. I hear
the word ``turf battles,'' and I think about the 9/11
Commission report and the fact that they revealed that these
agencies that were charged with protecting our great land--the
FBI, and the CIA, and NCIS, and all these others--weren't
communicating; that there were walls often put up between
agencies.
It alarms me, Governor Gilmore, that we are talking about
turf battles. We shouldn't have turf battles. The battle that
we are fighting is for American turf and American liberty here
in this country. The 9/11 Commission report clearly indicated
that agencies needed to communicate in order to keep this
country safe.
So, Mr. Chairman, I ask that we have an oversight hearing
on this particular issue, of agencies communicating, because I
think we are charged with--in this whole committee and
subcommittee--with doing that. So I appeal to you.
A question I have is a question that I brought up with
Secretary Napolitano, and it is an area of duplication. One
area of possible duplication seems to be the International
Affairs Division. The President's fiscal year 2013 request
seeks to realign the DHS Office of International Affairs as an
independent office responsible directly only to the Secretary.
In addition to the DHS' office, the components, such as CBP,
ICE, and TSA, all run their own international affairs offices.
So I guess for Ms. Berrick, has GAO investigated whether there
is duplication and overlap in this area? If so, what did you
find?
Ms. Berrick. We haven't looked at the specific issue of the
nine offices within DHS, our international affairs offices.
However, in our report that we issued last week, we did look at
duplication among different agencies' internal affairs offices
and delivering training to foreign posts in other countries and
found that just among the internal affairs offices among
multiple agencies, there was a lack of coordination on what
this training should be. So as a result, these foreign posts,
the CBP officers and others, were getting similar training from
multiple sources. So I think there is certainly a potential
there, since we found that on a broader scale, but we haven't
specifically looked at that within DHS.
Mr. Duncan. I think at a time when we need to streamline
Government, and that is what I think this Congress is trying to
do--I understand Customs and Border Patrol is basically looking
at protecting folks coming into our borders and our ports; and
TSA, transportation, making sure that the terrorists aren't
flying into this country with weapons of mass destruction. Then
ICE, if we do have an immigration or customs issue, they are
going to enforce that. Hopefully they are going to remove that
element and enforce the laws on the books.
So I get that they are all different missions. I guess what
I am looking at is an international office under the DHS
necessary to streamline that, or is there true duplication?
So I will ask Mr. Lilly there if he wants to answer.
Mr. Lilly. I would just say I think what you are talking
about there is--the goal would be to consolidate all of this so
there is one voice for the Department of Homeland Security. But
I think you have to recognize that you still have these
different cultures operating within the Department. The
immigration people are competent to deal with their
counterparts overseas, and that is very important because we
have a lot of expectations with foreign governments in terms of
the way they deal with this.
But the sharing of information is something that is a
process that takes time. So your goal is to get to one DHS
office in an embassy in Rome, or wherever, but right now you
may have to sacrifice that in order to make sure that you are
communicating agency by agency with your foreign counterparts.
Mr. Duncan. Well, I guess I am looking at--the NCTC was
created after 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security was
created after 9/11, and with the intent purpose of making sure
that all of our agencies charged with security are
communicating and are doing the mission to defend this great
country. I think we have grown Government so much that we are
actually--it seems to me we are working counter to that
original 9/11 Commission report that charged us and created
this agency.
So I am alarmed that information sharing isn't happening,
and that we are so large that maybe we are cumbersome and not
able to fulfill the mission. Sometimes simple and smaller is
more efficient and better.
So I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. McCaul. I appreciate the gentleman's comments. I think,
you know, when each of the 22 have their own procurement
officer, acquisition, Mr. Lilly, One DHS really is the goal,
and I think that hopefully we will get to that point. I think
the gentleman from South Carolina is correct. We have created
so many different organizations--now the DNI, for instance--I
mean, it just, I think, complicated things.
I just want to close by saying on the public corruption
issue, to me, it is appalling that we have Federal officers,
Federal agents facilitating working with drug cartels or
terrorists. That, to me, is unacceptable. That is no different
than Hanssen within the FBI or Aldrich Ames in the CIA
betraying their countries, as Governor Gilmore stated.
So with that, I want to thank the witnesses for their
testimony. This has been an outstanding hearing. With that,
this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:18 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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