[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
FROM THE 9/11 HIJACKERS TO AMINE EL-KHALIFI: TERRORISTS AND THE VISA
OVERSTAY PROBLEM
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 6, 2012
__________
Serial No. 112-73
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] CONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Joe Walsh, Illinois Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Chairwoman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Henry Cuellar, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Ben Quayle, Arizona, Vice Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Paul Anstine, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security.......................................... 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Witnesses
Mr. John Cohen, Deputy Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 10
Mr. Peter T. Edge, Deputy Associate Director, Homeland Security
Investigations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 10
Mr. David T. Donahue, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Consular Affairs, U.S. Department of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
FROM THE 9/11 HIJACKERS TO AMINE EL-KHALIFI: TERRORISTS AND THE VISA
OVERSTAY PROBLEM
----------
Tuesday, March 6, 2012
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Miller, Rogers, Duncan, Cuellar,
and Clarke of Michigan.
Mrs. Miller. The Committee on Homeland Security, our
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security will come to
order. The subcommittee is meeting today to hear testimony from
John Cohen, deputy counter terrorism coordinator, the
Department of Homeland Security; Peter Edge, deputy executive
associate director for homeland security investigations within
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; and David Donahue,
the deputy assistant secretary of state for consular affairs,
on the vitally important topic of visa security. I would
recognize myself for an opening statement.
Since 9/11 our border security efforts have been very
focused on stopping illegal immigrants and illicit drugs from
entering our country, and we have really principally focused
much of our efforts on our Southwest Border. However,
estimates--some estimates as high as in the 40 percentile of
all illegal aliens that are in our country just don't sneak
across the border; they don't come in through the desert. They
actually come in through the front door, so to speak, by
obtaining a legitimate visa, and then they are here, they have
a visa overstay, and they just simply never leave.
To secure our Southwest Border we have spent literally
billions of dollars on agents, on fencing, on cameras, and
there is no question, of course, that many of these investments
have brought tangible security gains to the border and have
helped stem the tide of illegal aliens trying to cross the
border on the southern part of our Nation. There is an
important distinction to be made, I think, however, between
those who are crossing the border largely in search of a better
life and terrorists who abuse the visa process with the
ultimate goal of actually destroying our way of life.
To that end, I think that recent events should solidify in
our minds the need to take really a holistic approach of border
security and not view it as simply one-dimensional with all of
the emphasis on one region of the country or only about
security at the physical borders, whether that be the Southern
Border, the Northern Border, our coastal borders. Entering a
country and overstaying a visa has been the preferred method
for terrorists actually to enter our country. The recent case
of Amine el-Khalifi, who was a 29-year-old Moroccan citizen who
allegedly attempted to conduct a suicide attack on the U.S.
Capitol--that is not the first time that terrorists have
exploited our visa process.
In fact, el-Khalifi follows a long line of terrorists going
back to the first World Trade Center attack in 1993 and, as
this committee has noted many times, also includes several of
the 9/11 hijackers, these terrorists who overstayed their visas
and then went on to conduct or plan terrorist attacks. In fact,
more than 36 visa overstayers have been convicted of terrorism-
related charges since 2001.
I was going to have the staff put up a slide, if they can
get it up here. I think it is interesting to take a look at
these faces on this slide and think about the visa violations
of these high-profile figures and what has happened here.
Clearly, more needs to be done to ensure the integrity of
the visa system, including enhancements to Immigration and
Customs Enforcement's ability to identify and promptly remove
those who are overstaying their visas. Pushing out the border
and conducting more rigorous vetting of visa applicants
overseas through the Visa Security Program, which stations ICE
officers and agents overseas, as well as the inclusion of
fingerprints into the visa application process have made the
visa process more secure than it was, certainly, before 9/11.
However, I think we are all concerned with our ability to track
and to promptly remove overstays who remain in our country.
It is especially troubling that el-Khalifi lived illegally
in the United States for more than 13 years before being
identified by law enforcement. During that time he had several
run-ins with the law, but ICE really only identified him as an
overstay once a current terrorism investigation was underway by
the FBI agents who el-Khalifi thought, of course, were al-
Qaeda, actually.
How many more visa overstayers are there out there who
might pose a serious threat to the security of our homeland? We
are all very concerned that ICE does not have a way to identify
and track down overstays who entered the country prior to 2003,
before our US-VISIT program was created, and we are concerned
that we do not have a good enough handle on the number of
overstayers that are in the country right now.
ICE arrests and puts into removal proceedings only a small
fraction of those who overstay their visa who, for the most
part, are caught because they commit an additional crime and
are identified through Secure Communities, which is a fantastic
program. This committee has had a number of hearings about
Secure Communities. It is an excellent, excellent program with
tangible benefits.
However, the administration's insistence on administrative
amnesty through prosecutorial discretion, which el-Khalifi may
have been eligible for before the start of this investigation
due to his long presence in this country, certainly gives us
pause, and it is clear that administrative amnesty could result
in deferring action for some illegals who go on to commit more
serious crimes and perhaps even those who would go on to try to
commit a terrorist attack.
So I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on
progress made since the creation of US-VISIT in 2003 on
overstaying--identifying overstays, especially those who pose
National security and public safety threats, and how the
Department of Homeland Security plans to implement a
comprehensive visa exit system that will prevent terrorists
from successfully exploiting our visa system--a requirement, I
might add, that was first mandated by Congress in 1996.
Last September this committee held a hearing on the topic
of visa security, and so this is sort of a follow-on hearing to
that. Actually, it was during that hearing that we heard that
the Department was rolling out an enhanced biographic program
which would add an additional layer of security to the visa
process, and so we are interested today to hear about the
progress that we have made on that program as well as what the
plans are to develop an exit system.
More than 10 years ago on that day in September we learned
a very hard lesson, and as the 9/11 Commission has noted--this
is something they actually said in their recommendation in
their report--the 9/11 Commission said, ``For terrorists,
travel documents are as important as weapons.'' That, I think,
is an important statement for all of us to reflect upon. Four
of the 9/11 hijackers, as I mentioned, had overstayed visas--a
missed opportunity to prevent the attacks which caused the
deaths of nearly 3,000 people.
Without the hard work of the FBI and the bravery of their
undercover agents Amine el-Khalifi may have been successful in
carrying out his planned attack on the Nation's Capitol, so
obviously we would all like to offer our sincere thanks and
congratulations to the brave men and women--the agents who were
involved in that investigation. Great job on that.
You know, if we are serious about controlling who comes
into the Nation and preventing another attack we need to get
serious about an exit program. It has been more than 2 years
since the exit pilot program was in both Detroit and Atlanta,
and we are still waiting for the Department to really
articulate a plan to move forward with a comprehensive exit
plan in the air environment or elsewhere, for that matter. So
it is long overdue for a plan to move the Nation toward a
viable and cost-effective exit solution and we will be very
interested in the testimony of the witnesses today and we
appreciate them all coming.
But at this time, Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking
Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr.
Cuellar, for his opening statement.
[The statement of Chairwoman Miller follows:]
Statement of Chairwoman Candice S. Miller
March 6, 2012
Since 9/11 our border security efforts have been focused on
stopping illegal immigrants and illicit drugs from entering the
country; chiefly our Southwest Border.
However, some estimates are that 40 percent of all illegal aliens
do not sneak across the border; they come in through the front door by
obtaining a legitimate visa and simply never leave.
To secure our Southwest Border, we have spent billions of dollars
on agents, fencing, and cameras--there is no question that many of
these investments have brought tangible security gains to the border
and have helped stem the tide of illegal aliens attempting to cross the
border.
There is an important distinction to be made between those who
cross the border, largely in search of a better life, and terrorists
who abuse the visa process with the ultimate goal of destroying our way
of life.
To that end, I think recent events should solidify in our minds the
need to take a holistic view of border security and not view it as one-
dimensional with all of the emphasis on one region of the country, or
only about security at the physical borders.
Entering the country and overstaying a visa has been the preferred
method for terrorists to enter the country. The recent case of Amine
el-Khalifi, a Moroccan citizen, who allegedly attempted to conduct a
suicide attack at the U.S. Capitol, is not the first time terrorists
have exploited the visa process.
In fact, el-Khalifi, follows a long line of terrorists, going back
to the first World Trade Center attack in 1993 and includes several of
the 9/11 hijackers who overstayed their visas and went on to conduct or
plan terrorist attacks. In fact, more than 36 visa overstayers have
been convicted of terrorism-related charges since 2001.
Clearly, more must be done to ensure the integrity of the visa
system, including enhancements to Immigration and Customs Enforcement's
ability to identify and promptly remove those who overstay their visa.
Pushing out the border and conducting more rigorous vetting of visa
applicants overseas through the Visa Security Program which stations
ICE agents overseas, as well as the inclusion of fingerprints into the
visa application process have made the visa process more secure than it
was before September 11.
But I am also concerned with our ability to track and promptly
remove overstays who remain in the country.
It is especially troubling that el-Khalifi lived illegally in the
United States for more than 13 years before being identified by law
enforcement. During that time, he had several run-ins with the law, but
ICE only identified him as an overstay once the current terrorism
investigation was underway by the FBI.
How many more visa overstayers are out there who pose a serious
threat to the security of the homeland?
I remain concerned that ICE does not have a way to identify and
track down overstays who entered the country prior to 2003, before US-
VISIT was created and am concerned we do not even have a good handle on
the total number of overstayers in the country right now.
ICE arrests and puts into removal proceedings only a small fraction
of those who overstay their visa, who for the most part are caught
because they commit an additional crime and are identified through
Secure Communities--which I think is a fantastic program that helps
identify criminal aliens.
However, this administration's insistence on administrative amnesty
through prosecutorial discretion--which el-Khalifi may have been
eligible for before the start of this investigation, due to his long
presence in the country, gives me great pause and it is clear that
administrative amnesty will result in deferring action for some
illegals who go on to commit more serious crimes--and perhaps even
those who will go on to commit a terrorist attack.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on progress made
since the creation of US Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator
Technology (US-VISIT) in 2003 in indentifying overstays, especially
those that pose National security and public safety threats, and how
the Department of Homeland Security plans to implement a comprehensive
visa exit system that will prevent terrorists from successfully
exploiting the visa system--a requirement, I might add, that was first
mandated in 1996.
Last September this committee held a hearing on the topic of visa
security--and during that hearing we heard that the Department was
rolling out an enhanced biographic program to add a layer of security
to the visa process; I am very interested to hear about the progress
made on that program as well as what plans are in place to develop an
exit system.
More than 10 years ago on that day in September, we learned a hard
lesson--as the 9/11 Commission noted, ``For terrorists, travel
documents are as important as weapons.''
Four of the 9/11 hijackers had overstayed visas--a missed
opportunity to prevent the attacks which caused the death of nearly
3,000 people.
Without the hard work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and
the bravery of their undercover agents Amine el-Khalifi might have been
successful in carrying out an attack on the Nation's Capitol, so I
would like to offer my sincere thanks to those agents involved in this
investigation.
If we are serious about controlling who comes into the Nation and
preventing another attack, we need to get serious about an exit
program.
It has been more than 2 years since the exit pilot in Detroit and
Atlanta and the Department has yet to articulate a plan to move forward
with a comprehensive exit plan in the air environment or elsewhere.
It's long overdue for a plan to move this Nation toward a viable
and cost-effective exit solution. With that I'd like to recognize the
gentlemen from Texas.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I am pleased that
this subcommittee is meeting today to examine the issue of
immigration overstay.
Cases such as the 9/11 hijackers and more recently the
Capitol Hill bomber have underscored the potential homeland
security threat posed by individuals who enter this country on
visas but overstay the authorized--or should I say the
authorized period of time in the United States. Of the
approximate 11.5 million to 12 million unauthorized resident
alien population that was mentioned a few minutes ago, an
estimated 33 to 48 percent are overstayed. Not everybody
crossed the river; not everybody swam across the Rio Grande, as
some people think. But there are actually 33 to 48 percent of
them are--got here through a legal method.
Of course, the overwhelming majority of individuals who
enter this country do so for legitimate purposes. Even of those
who enter the United States illegally or enter legally but
overstay, the majority pose no threat. However, a small handful
of people seek to enter this country for evil purposes.
Since 2001 the Department of Homeland and the Department of
State, with the direction from Congress, have taken important
steps to identify, locate, and address overstays, particularly
those that may pose a security or a safety risk to our
communities. Within the Immigration and Customs Enforcement,
ICE, and the Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit
they are primarily responsible for overstay enforcement.
However, the CTCEU is not the only entity within ICE that
removes overstay. Indeed, the primary responsibility for
apprehending and removing overstays and other aliens who do not
have lawful immigration status rests with ICE Enforcement and
Removal Operation--Removal Operations--the ERO.
Various programs, from the Secure Communities to the
Criminal Alien Programs--Program, identify and remove overstays
from this country every day. However, more remains to be done.
I was encouraged to hear that at our last hearing that we
had DHS had reduced the backlog of overstay cases by half, and
I hope to hear on that, and congratulations on that effort that
you are doing. I look forward to hearing where DHS has
continued to make strides in this particular area and what else
can we do to try to help you continue those strides. I also
hope to hear about how the administration's plan to move U.S.
visas functions to ICE and CBP will help those agencies fulfill
their respective missions more effectively.
At the subcommittee's September 2011 hearing on visa
security I also expressed my concern about the so-called
recalcitrant countries. These countries refuse to accept the
return of their nationals or use of lengthy delay tactics to
avoid taking these nationals back that are unlawfully in the
United States.
Again, just as an illustration, the--this is only an
example of this recalcitrant countries: Pakistan has an average
travel document issuance time of 149 days; China has a time of
148 days; India has a time of 267 days; Bangladesh has a time
of 434 days; Cambodia has 277 days; Vietnam has a time of 285
days; Iraq has 594 days. When you look at--and I emphasize to
my friends, since I live on the border--everybody thinks that
everything is coming from Mexico and South America, but for my
friends, let me give you some days. The average time for
documents from those countries: Guatemala, Honduras, El
Salvador, Dominican Republic, Columbia, Mexico, and Ecuador
takes an average of--going down that order--9 days, 5 days, 23
days, 22 days, 13 days, 36 days, 34 days, respectfully. You
compare it to 594 days, 285 days, 277 days, 434 days, 267 days,
148 days, 149 days, that shows you why I think we need to put
an emphasis to make sure that we use our resources in a better
way.
I know I have talked to John Morton about this several
times. I will see him again tomorrow.
Again, Mr. Edge, Mr. Cohen, I ask you to continue working,
and Mr. Donahue, with the State Department. I understand
diplomatic relations; I understand all that. But I think we
need to put a little bit more pressure on those countries to
get them to do that, because it is costing the taxpayers a lot
of money, and I have the costs as to how much it costs for some
of those countries.
So I would like to hear more details from our witnesses
today about why visas continue to be issued to individuals from
those countries, and at what rate, and as well as recommended
steps for improving actions. Again, so again, if we are still
giving those visas out to those countries, we understand they
are very difficult in taking those folks back when they need to
take them back. I think we need to rechange our--and--and look
at the steps in addressing that.
So, Madam Chairwoman, I thank you for holding this hearing
and I thank all the witnesses for being here today.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman for his comments.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that their
opening statements could be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
March 6, 2011
Some in Congress seem to believe that securing America's Southwest
Border is the answer to our Nation's illegal immigration concerns.
But an estimated 40 percent of individuals unlawfully present in
the United States actually entered this country legally and have simply
overstayed.
Among those millions of people may be a handful who seek to do us
harm.
Addressing this so-called ``overstay'' issue is essential not only
to immigration control, but also to homeland security.
Certainly, the 9/11 attacks focused the Federal Government on the
importance of securing the visa process and addressing the potential
threat posed by certain individuals who remain in the United States
after their visas expire.
Under Democratic leadership in the 110th and 111th Congresses, this
committee held hearings on the issue of visa overstays.
I am pleased the subcommittee is also examining the issue today.
I would like to hear from our DHS witnesses about what tools they
need to be more successful at locating and addressing individuals who
have overstayed their visas in the United States--particularly those
who may pose a safety or security threat to this country.
I also hope to hear from our State Department witness about what
they are doing to prevent individuals who are likely to overstay from
receiving visas in the first place.
As part of the effort to address the overstay issue and in
accordance with a
9/11 Commission recommendation, Congress has repeatedly required the
Department of Homeland Security to deploy a biometric entry-exit system
under US-VISIT.
Such a system would help DHS determine whether an individual has
departed the United States or has remained in this country.
Yet more than a decade after September 11, 2001, DHS is still
without a biometric exit system.
The lack of significant progress toward this mandate has been
troubling to those of us who believe a biometric entry-exit system is
essential to border security.
However, last year DHS made significant strides by eliminating
about half of the 1.6 million record backlog in US-VISIT.
Much more remains to be done, however.
I hope to hear from our DHS witnesses today about how they are
working to resolve the remaining backlog cases, as well as how the
Department is moving forward to identify cost-effective technology for
implementing biometric exit at ports of entry.
Finally, I would note that I was pleased to see the
administration's proposal in the fiscal year 2013 budget request to
transfer US-VISIT's functions to CBP and ICE.
US-VISIT in its current configuration has so far failed to meet its
mandate.
By moving the program's functions to CBP and ICE, it will be more
closely aligned with the operational components that work with and rely
on the program on a day-to-day basis.
The transfer should bring efficiencies, and hopefully more progress
toward implementing the mandated biometric exit system.
I look forward to discussion about that transfer here today.
In closing, I would note that while the issue before the
subcommittee today is of great importance, I was dismayed to learn that
``Part II'' of last month's hearing on maritime cargo security hearing
would not being held today as planned.
It is my hope that the subcommittee will complete its work on that
hearing in the near future.
I thank the witnesses for being here today and I yield back the
balance of my time.
Mrs. Miller. I will just introduce, now, all three of our
witnesses at the same time, and then we will start with Mr.
Cohen.
John Cohen serves as the principal deputy coordinator for
counterterrorism at the United States Department of Homeland
Security and as a senior advisor on counterterrorism, law
enforcement, and information sharing. He has also served as the
senior advisor to the program manager for the information
sharing environment in the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
Peter Edge began his law enforcement career in 1986 with
the Essex County, New Jersey prosecutor's office before his
selection as a special agent with the U.S. Customs Service in
Newark, New Jersey. In 2005 Mr. Edge was promoted to the
position of assistant special agent in charge in the New York
office where he led high-profile investigative components, such
as the New York High Intensity Financial Crime Area, JFK
International Airport, and the Immigration Division. Today he
serves as the deputy executive associate director for homeland
security investigations within the U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement.
David Donahue is the deputy assistant secretary for visa
services, Bureau of Consular Affairs. He has previously served
as minister counselor for consular affairs in Mexico City and
was the consul general in both Manila and Islamabad.
So we certainly appreciate all of the witnesses coming. We
have an excellent panel here today. We look forward to your
testimony.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Cohen.
STATEMENT OF JOHN COHEN, DEPUTY COUNTER-TERRORISM COORDINATOR,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member
Cuellar, and distinguished Members of the committee--the
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to participate in
this very, very important hearing.
Madam Chairwoman, I have submitted written testimony and
request that it be included as part of the record.
Mrs. Miller. Without objection.
Mr. Cohen. In your opening statements you and the Ranking
Member both expressed concerns that terrorists and others who
pose a risk to the National security of the United States seek
to exploit the visa and visa waiver programs and travel to and
remain illegally in the United States. The Department of
Homeland Security certainly shares your concern, which is why,
as you pointed out, over this past summer, at the direction of
Secretary Napolitano, we began an intensive effort to address
gaps to these programs by integrating and interlinking key law
enforcement and National security information repositories with
our immigration and travel systems.
This effort began, as I described when I last met with you,
as a very tactical effort intended to vet approximately 1.6
million records that were commonly referred to as the
overstayed backlog. I would note that these records, under past
regimes, would not have been vetted from a National security
and public safety perspective. But for very obvious reasons
that you have pointed out the Secretary instructed that they be
so vetted.
But through this effort, which included the efforts of ICE,
CBP, US-VISIT, the National Counterterrorism Center, and others
in the Federal Government, it led the Department to a better
understanding and the development of a way forward for a more
expansive overstay vetting system and a path forward for
establishing an enhanced entry-exit capability. We continue to
implement this effort, allocating $4.1 million from fiscal year
2011 funds and identifying an additional $10.9 million in
fiscal year 2012 funds to pay for a series of system and
operational enhancements.
The result, today, leveraging the technical and operational
capabilities of US-VISIT, ICE, and CBP, and our strong
relationship with other Federal entities like the Department of
State and NCTC, we recurrently vet all visa applicants, all
visa holders, and potential overstays from a National security
and public safety perspective. This recurrent vetting ensures
that as new intelligence and new derogatory information is
acquired by the Federal Government we can quickly and
effectively target those individuals for enforcement actions,
whether it be an FBI investigation or whether it be for some
other type of immigration enforcement.
These enhancements make it harder for individuals to
overstay their visas and avoid detection, and conversely, make
it easier for the Department to confirm when someone is an
overstay and target them for enforcement action. I should note
that this includes increasing the Department's ability to take
administrative action against confirmed overstays that are not
public safety or National security risks.
These enhancements will also result in greater efficiencies
to our Visa Security Program and they will provide the core
components of an enhanced entry-exit system. They will also,
Madam Chairwoman, ensure that we can more accurately track
overstay rates by country.
Specifically, through these efforts DHS will be better able
to validate documents presented during the visa application
process or prior to an individual traveling to the United
States, increasing our capacity to detect and prevent the use
of fraudulent passports and other travel documents. We will
also be able to ensure that fingerprints and other biometric
data captured prior to travel to the United States is
accurately matched with biographic records, improving our
ability to accurately identify those traveling to the United
States and further identify those biometrics with multiple
identities in our systems.
We are vetting visa applicants and those traveling from
visa waiver countries against a broader array of law
enforcement and National security information, enhancing our
current capacity to ensure that those who pose a risk to the
United States are identified prior to their travel to the
United States. We are automating database queries that today
require time-consuming manual database checks, thereby
improving operational efficiencies and ensuring that we never
again have a backlog of unvetted potential overstay records.
Through the use of name-matching algorithms we are ensuring
that departure data collected at U.S. air and sea ports more
accurately match data collected upon a person's entry to the
United States. As Secretary Napolitano has communicated to
Congress, the technology and process enhancements that are
currently underway will provide the foundation for a biometric
air exit program. They will also immediately improve the
ability of DHS operational components to identify and take
action against those who have overstayed their lawful status.
For this reason, it is critical that the Department
continue to fully implement these improvements described to the
subcommittee when I appeared before you last September, and
with your support we will continue to do so. Thank you, and I
will be happy to answer any questions.
[The joint statement of Mr. Cohen and Mr. Edge follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Cohen and Peter T. Edge
March 6, 2012
introduction
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee: On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and Director
Morton, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the efforts of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to prevent the exploitation of
our visa system by terrorists and criminals. Visa overstays and other
forms of immigration status violation bring together critical areas of
DHS's mission--National security and immigration enforcement, and the
determination of whom to allow entry into the United States.
Joint Anti-Fraud Strategy
We recognize that those who pose National security threats may seek
to commit immigration benefit fraud in order to enter or remain in the
United States. For that reason, we work hard to detect and deter
immigration fraud and to continually enhance our anti-fraud efforts.
ICE exercises criminal authority in the detection and deterrence of
immigration fraud, while USCIS exercises administrative authority. This
strategy allows ICE to concentrate its efforts on major fraud
conspiracies and other cases of National security or public safety
interest, while allowing USCIS to address the bulk of immigration
benefit fraud cases administratively.
Through ICE Document and Benefit Fraud Task Forces (DBFTFs), we
focus our efforts on detecting, deterring, and disrupting document and
benefit fraud. DBFTFs bring together the joint expertise of Federal,
State, and local law enforcement partners to formulate a comprehensive
approach in targeting the criminal organizations and the beneficiaries
committing immigration fraud.
The Visa Security Program
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 directs the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to assist in the identification of visa
applicants who seek to enter the United States for illegitimate
purposes, including criminal offenses and terrorism-related activities.
The visa adjudication process often presents the first opportunity to
assess whether a potential non-immigrant visitor or immigrant poses a
threat to the United States. The Visa Security Program (VSP) is one of
several ICE programs focused on minimizing global risks.
Through the Visa Security Program (VSP), ICE deploys trained
special agents overseas to high-risk visa activity posts in order to
identify potential terrorist and criminal threats before they reach the
United States. ICE special agents conduct targeted, in-depth reviews of
individual visa applications and applicants prior to issuance, and
recommend to consular officers refusal or revocation of applications
when warranted. DHS actions complement the consular officers' initial
screenings, applicant interviews, and reviews of applications and
supporting documentation.
ICE now conducts visa security investigations at 19 high-risk visa
adjudication posts in 15 countries. In fiscal year 2012 to date, VSP
has screened 452,352 visa applicants and, in collaboration with DOS
colleagues, determined that 121,139 required further review. Following
the review of these 121,139 applications, ICE identified derogatory
information on more than 4,777 applicants.
In March 2010, the National Targeting Center (NTC) within U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) implemented a program to conduct
continuous vetting of U.S. non-immigrant visas that have been recently
issued. Recurrent vetting ensures that changes in a traveler's visa
status are identified in near-real-time, allowing CBP to immediately
determine whether to provide a ``no board recommendation'' to a
carrier, to recommend revocation of the visa to DOS, or to notify ICE
regarding individuals determined to be within the United States. Since
the program's inception, DOS has revoked more than 900 visas based on
requests from CBP on information uncovered after a visa was issued.
ICE, CBP, and DOS have partnered to modernize DHS visa screening
efforts. These efforts automate the flow of on-line visa information to
DHS systems and provide the ability to send information back to DOS
using an automated interface. ICE personnel currently deployed to the
NTC will partner with CBP officers to expand current VSP efforts to
enhance screening of visa applicants against DHS data world-wide. This
screening will be conducted prior to the visa interview and complements
DHS efforts to streamline the Security Advisory Opinion process of
third agency checks on the highest-risk visa applicants world-wide,
which has resulted in significant delays in visa issuance for some
individuals.
The Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit
The Counterterrorism and Criminal Exploitation Unit (CTCEU) is the
first National program dedicated to the enforcement of non-immigrant
visa violations. Today, through the CTCEU, ICE proactively develops
cases for investigation in cooperation with the Student and Exchange
Visitor Program (SEVP) and the United States Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program. These programs enable
ICE to access information about the millions of students, tourists, and
temporary workers present in the United States at any given time, and
to identify those who have overstayed or otherwise violated the terms
and conditions of their admission.
Each year, the CTCEU analyzes records of hundreds of thousands of
potential status violators after preliminary analysis of data from the
Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) and US-VISIT,
along with other information. After this analysis, CTCEU determines
potential violations that warrant field investigations and/or
establishes compliance or departure dates from the United States.
Between 15,000 and 20,000 of these records are analyzed in-house each
month. Since the creation of the CTCEU in 2003, nearly 2 million such
records using automated and manual review techniques have been
analyzed. On average, ICE initiates approximately 6,000 investigative
cases annually and assigns them to our special agents in the field for
further investigation, resulting in over 1,800 administrative arrests
per year.
ICE special agents and analysts monitor the latest threat reports
and proactively address emergent issues. This practice has contributed
to ICE's counterterrorism mission by initiating or supporting high-
priority National security initiatives based on specific intelligence.
The practice is designed to detect and identify individuals exhibiting
specific risk factors based on intelligence reporting, including travel
patterns, and in-depth criminal research and analysis.
In order to ensure that the potential violators who pose the
greatest threats to National security are given priority, ICE uses
intelligence-based criteria, developed in close consultation with the
intelligence and law enforcement communities. ICE assembles the
Compliance Enforcement Advisory Panel (CEAP), which is comprised of
subject matter experts from other law enforcement agencies and members
of the intelligence community, who assist the CTCEU in keeping
targeting methods in-line with the most current threat information. The
CEAP is convened on a tri-annual basis to discuss recent intelligence
developments and update the CTCEU's targeting framework, in order to
ensure that the non-immigrant overstays and status violators who pose
the gravest threats to National security are targeted.
A recent ICE investigation in Los Angeles, California exemplifies
how the CTCEU operates. In March 2011, the CTCEU received an INTERPOL
blue notice concerning a person who traveled to the United States as a
tourist. The person had an arrest warrant in connection to child
pornography charges in Colombia. A week later, ICE special agents
arrested the person who was admitted as a visitor and violated their
terms of admission by working in the adult film industry. A similar
example occurred in July 2011, when the CTCEU received an INTERPOL red
notice for an El Salvadorian national wanted for murder. As a result of
CTCEU data analysis and field investigation, ICE special agents
arrested the subject in Baltimore, Maryland.
More recently in January 2012, ICE Special Agents from the
Washington, DC office arrested a Saudi Arabian national who was
admitted as an F-1 nonimmigrant student and violated the terms and
conditions of his admission. The individual was referred for
investigation after his status was terminated in SEVIS for failure to
maintain student status, as well as for possessing several indicators
of National security concerns, including threatening to blow up the
White House and the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission to the United
States.
Likewise, in May 2010, ICE's Counterterrorism and Criminal
Exploitation Group in San Francisco, initiated an investigation into
Tri-Valley University (TVU) in Pleasanton, California. The criminal
investigation led to the indictment and arrest of the organization's
owner and four workers for visa fraud violations. The owner and
employees were issuing immigration documents containing false
statements and forged signatures, which falsely certified that the
school's students were attending a full course of study. ICE Special
Agents effected five criminal arrests and over 300 student violators
were administratively arrested, consisting mostly of Indian nationals.
In addition, ICE Special Agents seized one vehicle, filed lis pendens
on five properties valued at approximately $3.2 million, and seized
numerous bank accounts totaling almost $2 million that represented
proceeds derived related to the illicit scheme.
Similarly, in November 2011, the CTCEU Group in Los Angeles
arrested Karena Chuang of Wright Aviation Academy (formerly Blue
Diamond aviation) for encouraging the illegal entry of aliens for
private financial gain. Wright Aviation Academy/Blue Diamond Aviation
(BDA), a non-SEVP accredited flight school, was suspected by ICE's Visa
Security Program of fraudulently recruiting and training foreign flight
students from Egypt. The investigation revealed that Chuang applied to
SEVP accredited schools, often without the student's knowledge, for the
sole purpose of obtaining valid Forms I-20 (student visas). The
students, in turn, used the Forms I-20 to get M-1 (vocational) visas to
enter the United States to attend BDA. This investigation successfully
upheld the integrity of the SEVP program through ICE's layered
enforcement approach--identifying and disrupting visa fraud overseas,
dismantling the transnational organization, and prosecuting the
perpetrators in the United States.
Coordination with US-VISIT and Other DHS Components
CTCEU also works in close collaboration with US-VISIT. US-VISIT
supports DHS's mission to protect our Nation by providing biometric
identification services to Federal, State, and local government
decision makers to help them accurately identify the people they
encounter, and determine whether those people pose a risk to the United
States. DHS's use of biometrics under the US-VISIT program is a
powerful tool in preventing identity fraud and ensuring that DHS is
able to rapidly identify criminals and immigration violators who apply
for visas, try to enter the United States, or apply for immigration
benefits.
Biometric information sharing between the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's Criminal Justice Information Services (FBI-CJIS) and
US-VISIT is the foundation of Secure Communities' use of Automated
Biometric Identification System (IDENT)/Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) interoperability.
Through Secure Communities' use of IDENT/IAFIS interoperability,
aliens--including those who have overstayed or otherwise violated their
immigration status--who are encountered by law enforcement may be
identified as immigration violators when fingerprints are submitted to
the FBI-CJIS's biometric database, IAFIS, and then to DHS/US-VISIT's
biometric database, IDENT. Once individuals are identified, ICE
officials determine what enforcement action is appropriate, consistent
with ICE's enforcement priorities. Currently, Secure Communities' use
of this technology is deployed in over 2,300 jurisdictions in 46 States
and territories.
US-VISIT also analyzes biographical entry and exit records stored
in its Arrival and Departure Information System to further support
DHS's ability to identify international travelers who have remained in
the United States beyond their periods of admission.
ICE receives or coordinates non-immigrant overstay and status
violation referrals from US-VISIT Mission Support Services from three
unique sources, which include: the typical overstay violation; a
biometric watch list notification; and a CTCEU Visa Waiver Enforcement
Program (VWEP) nomination. The first type, Non-immigrant Overstay
Leads, is used by the CTCEU to generate field investigations by
identifying foreign visitors who violate the terms of their admission
by remaining in the United States past the date of their required
departure.
A second type of lead is generated from biometric data collected by
US-VISIT. US-VISIT routinely receives fingerprint records from a
variety of Governmental sources and adds them to a biometric watch list
of individuals of National security concern. These new watch list
records are checked against all fingerprints in IDENT to determine if
DHS has previously encountered the individual. If US-VISIT identifies a
prior encounter, such as admission to the United States, the
information is forwarded to ICE for review and possible field
assignment. Similarly, US-VISIT monitors records for individuals who,
at the time of admission to the United States, were the subject of
watch list records that did not render the individuals inadmissible to
the United States. Therefore, if such individuals overstay their terms
of admission, information on the subjects is forwarded to ICE for
review and possible referral to investigative field offices for follow-
up.
The third type of lead pertains to the CTCEU's Visa Waiver
Enforcement Program (VWEP). The VWP currently allows eligible nationals
of 36 countries to travel to the United States without a visa and, if
admitted, to remain in our country for a maximum of 90 days for tourist
or business purposes. The Visa Waiver Program (VWP) is the primary
source of non-immigrant visitors from countries other than Canada and
Mexico. Visa-free travel to the United States builds on our close
bilateral relationships and fosters commercial and personal ties among
tourist and business travelers in the United States and abroad.
Although the overstay rate from this population is less than 1
percent, ICE created a program dedicated to overstays arising from this
VWP population, given the large number of individuals in this category.
Prior to the implementation of the VWEP in 2008, there was no National
program dedicated to addressing overstays within this population. CTCEU
provides a refined weekly list of individuals to US-VISIT for
additional scrutiny, who have been identified as potential overstays
who entered the United States under the VWP. In accord with its
intelligence-based criteria, a relevant portion of this report is then
imported into the CTCEU's internal lead tracking system for review and
possible field assignment. One of the goals of this program is to
identify those subjects that attempt to circumvent the U.S. immigration
system by obtaining travel documents from Visa Waiver Countries.
Enhanced Biographic Exit
In May 2011, at the direction of Secretary Napolitano, DHS's CT
Coordinator organized an effort to ensure that all overstays,
regardless of priority, receive enhanced National security and public
safety vetting by the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) and CBP.
As part of Phase 1 of this effort, Department components reviewed a
backlog of 1.6 million unvetted potential overstay records based on
National security and public safety priorities.
As of last summer, DHS had a backlog of ``unreviewed overstays,''
comprised of system-identified overstay leads that did not meet
criteria set by ICE for expedited high-priority review. Before this
summer, these records would not have been examined, except in instances
when the workload allowed it.
The DHS ``overstay initiative'', begun over the summer of 2011 at
the direction of the Secretary, reformed this effort. By leveraging
capabilities within Customs and Border Protection's Automated Targeting
System (ATS-P), as well as DHS's relationship with NCTC, DHS was able
to conduct richer, more thorough vetting for National security and
public safety concerns. This generated new leads for ICE, which
previously would not have been uncovered.
A beneficial by-product of this effort was the identification of
efficiencies and cost savings gained through automation. Through this
new automated approach, we can match and integrate relevant information
from multiple systems in order to quickly and accurately identify
overstays.
Today, DHS has integrated these enhancements to its process for
reviewing system-identified overstay leads and prioritizing them for
review and targeted enforcement. Now, ALL overstay records are reviewed
for National security and public safety concerns, and DHS is also
leveraging existing automated capabilities to conduct automated reviews
of all overstays (both normal priority and high-priority). All of this
is done on a recurrent basis.
Overall, what I have described constitutes the first phase of DHS's
enhanced biographic exit capability. This ``enhanced exit'' plan
improves DHS's ability to calculate overstays and reduce their
occurrence in the future. It uses resources from a variety of DHS
components and will provide benefits to several of these components, as
well the DOS, as adjudicators of visa applications. When fully
implemented, this enhanced exit program will eliminate any future
backlog of unreviewed overstays, and allow DHS to prioritize and take
action on overstays, focusing on National security and public safety.
We have identified carry-over funding, and allocated it toward
Phase II of this effort, which includes automating connections between
data sources, and refining ICE's ability to more effectively target and
prioritize overstay leads of concern. We expect to see these
enhancements come on-line this summer.
DHS has also identified its top priorities within Phase III of the
enhanced biographic exit plan. This includes database modernization,
further investments in targeting and prioritization capabilities,
increased functionality between biometric and biographic repositories,
as well as document validation. As investments in the future phases of
this capability come on line, DHS will have increased its ability to
``close out'' overstay records using automated means.
The Department will have also increased its data quality and
expanded its data sources, both of which will increase its ability to
``close'' records before they are referred to an investigator.
Finally, these upgrades will have enhanced DHS's ability to draw on
capabilities across the Department for further manual review and
targeting for enforcement action.
DHS also remains committed to introducing a biometric component to
the exit process. The enhanced exit plan also incorporates biometric
elements, allowing DHS personnel to more efficiently connect biometric
identifiers (fingerprints and photographs) with biographic information
residing within intelligence community and law enforcement databases.
DHS has directed the Science and Technology Directorate to establish
criteria and promote research for emerging technologies that would
provide the ability to capture biometrics at a significantly lower
operational cost.
In the mean time, the Department is taking action to secure our
borders today, by making strategic security investment decisions that
prioritize those capabilities needed for the implementation of a future
biometric exit system while providing security value now.
This entire process has illustrated something fundamental, which is
that dealing with the overstay population is a challenge that confronts
all of DHS, not just any one component. US-VISIT tracks the overstay
population through ADIS. CBP, as the custodian of our borders, taps
into information about traveler movements, and is increasingly at the
center of DHS's vetting and targeting activities. ICE bears the burden
of taking enforcement action.
Left up to any one component, DHS action would be incomplete, but
by harmonizing efforts across the Department and by taking advantage of
unique skills and capabilities, we are able to put together a plan that
enhances the integrity of our immigration system.
ICE's Presence Overseas and Coordination with DOS
Stopping a threat before it reaches our shores is an important
priority that ICE supports internationally. Through our Office of
International Affairs, we have personnel in 70 offices in 47 countries.
ICE personnel in these offices collaborate with our foreign
counterparts and Federal partner agencies in joint efforts to disrupt
and dismantle transnational criminal organizations engaged in money
laundering, non-drug contraband smuggling, weapons proliferation,
forced child labor, human rights violations, intellectual property
rights violations, child exploitation, human smuggling and trafficking,
and many other violations. Additionally, ICE facilitates the
repatriation of individuals with final orders of removal, returning
violators to their home countries.
Effective border security requires broad information sharing and
cooperation among U.S. agencies. On January 11, 2011, ICE signed a
memorandum of understanding (MOU) outlining roles, responsibilities,
and collaboration between ICE and the DOS Bureaus of Consular Affairs
and Diplomatic Security. The MOU governs the day-to-day operations of
ICE agents conducting visa security operations at U.S. embassies and
consulates abroad. To facilitate information sharing and reduce
duplication of efforts, ICE and DOS conduct collaborative training and
orientation prior to overseas deployments. Once they are deployed to
overseas posts, ICE and DOS personnel work closely together in working
groups, meetings, training, and briefings, and engage in regular and
timely information sharing. The VSP's presence at U.S. embassies and
consulates brings an important law enforcement element to the visa
review process. Additionally, this relationship serves as an avenue for
VSP personnel to assist Consular Officers and other U.S. Government
personnel in recognizing potential security threats in the visa
process.
We are engaged with our counterparts at DOS in determining a common
strategic approach to the broader question of how best to collectively
secure the visa issuance process. We look forward to continuing to
report back to you with updates on this process.
conclusion
DHS has made significant progress in preventing terrorists from
exploiting the visa process. We will continue to work closely with our
international, Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners to combat
visa fraud and protect the integrity of our visa security system.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today and for your
continued support of DHS and its law enforcement mission.
We would be pleased to answer any questions at this time.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Edge for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF PETER T. EDGE, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Edge. Good morning, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member
Cuellar, and other distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
Thank you for inviting me to appear before you today along with
my counterparts, Mr. Cohen and Mr. Donahue, to discuss our
collective efforts to prevent the exploitation of our visa
system by terrorists and criminals.
I would also ask that my complete testimony be accepted
into the record.
Mrs. Miller. Without objection.
Mr. Edge. Visa overstays and other forms of immigration
status violations bring together critical areas of my agency's
mission, National security, and immigration enforcement. We
recognize that those who pose National security threats may
seek to commit immigration benefit fraud to enter or remain in
the United States. For that reason, we work hard to detect and
deter immigration fraud and to continually enhance our anti-
fraud efforts.
ICE exercises criminal authority in the detection and
deterrence of immigration fraud while our partner agency,
USCIS, exercises administrative authority. This strategy
essentially allows us to concentrate our efforts on major fraud
conspiracies and other cases of National security or public
safety interest, which allows USCIS to address the majority of
immigration benefit fraud cases administratively.
As you know, DHS is charged with assisting in the
identification of visa applicants who seek to enter the United
States for illegitimate purposes, including criminal offenses
and terrorism-related activities. The visa adjudication process
often presents the first opportunity to assess whether a
potential nonimmigrant visitor or immigrant poses a threat to
our Nation.
ICE's Visa Security Program is one of--program focused on
minimizing these global risks. Through the Visa Security
Program ICE employs trained special agents overseas to high-
risk visa activity posts to identify potential terrorists and
criminal threats before they reach the United States. These
agents conduct targeted, in-depth interviews of individual visa
applications and applicants prior to issuance and recommend
refusal or revocation of applications, when warranted, to
consular officers.
ICE now conducts Visa Security investigations at 19 high-
risk visa adjudication posts in 15 countries. In fiscal year
2012 to date, the Visa Security Program has screened over
452,000 visa applicants and, in collaboration with our State
Department colleagues, determined that over 121,000 required
further review. After reviewing these applications ICE
identified derogatory information on more than 4,700
applicants.
Another program at ICE dedicated to enforcing non-immigrant
visa violations is the Counterterrorism and Criminal
Exploitation Unit, or CTCEU. Through the CTCEU, ICE proactively
develops cases for investigation in cooperation with the
Student and Exchange Visitor Program and the US-VISIT Program.
Both programs enable ICE to access information about the
millions of students, tourists, and temporary workers present
in this country at any given time and to identify those who
have overstayed or otherwise violated the terms and conditions
of their admission.
Each year the CTCEU analyzes records of hundreds of
thousands of potential status violators after preliminary
analysis of data from the Student and Exchange Visitor
Information System, also known as SEVIS, as well as from US-
VISIT. After this analysis, the CTCEU determines potential
violations that warranted field investigations and/or
establishes compliance or departure dates from the United
States.
Since the unit's creation in 2003, nearly 2 million such
records using automated and manual review techniques have been
analyzed. On average, ICE initiated approximately 6,000
investigative cases annually and assigns them to our special
agents in the field for further investigation. This has
resulted in over 1,800 administrative arrests per year.
In January 2012, for example, ICE special agents from our
Washington, DC office arrested a Saudi Arabian national who was
admitted as an F-1 nonimmigrant student and violated the term
and condition of his admission. The individual was referred for
investigation after his status was terminated in SEVIS for
failure to maintain student status as well as for possessing
indicators of National security concerns, including threatening
to blow up the White House and the Saudi Arabian Cultural
Mission to the United States.
ICE has made significant progress in preventing terrorists
from exploiting the visa process. We will continue to work
closely with our law enforcement partners to combat visa fraud
and protect the integrity of our visa security system.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I
would be pleased to answer any questions that you may have.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Donahue for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF DAVID T. DONAHUE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Donahue. Good morning, Madam Chairwoman, Ranking Member
Cuellar, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I have
been involved as a--with visas for the majority of my 29-year
career with the State Department and I appreciate this chance
to testify here today, and I have submitted written comments
for the record.
The Department of State is dedicated to the protection of
our borders through a layered approach to border security. This
approach enables us and our partners in DHS to track and review
the visa eligibility and status of foreign visitors from their
visa applications throughout their travel to, sojourn in, and
departure from the United States.
We are constantly refining and updating the technology that
supports the adjudication and production of U.S. visas. The
Department has developed and implemented an intensive visa
application and screening process requiring personal interviews
in most cases, employing analytic interview techniques, and
incorporating multiple biographic and biometric checks. This is
all supported by a sophisticated global information technology
network that shares data among the Department and Federal law
enforcement and intelligence agencies.
Security remains our primary mission. Every visa decision
is a National security decision.
Our new on-line visa application forms provide consular
officers and fraud prevention officers, and soon our
intelligence and law enforcement partners, the opportunity to
analyze data in advance of the visa interview, including the
detection of potential non-biographical links to derogatory
information. We have ambitious plans to screen more of this
data with our partners in the law enforcement and intelligence
communities to make the visa system even more secure.
In addition to biographic checks the Department performs
checks on two biometric identifiers. Most visa applicants'
fingerprints are screened against DHS and FBI databases. We
also use facial recognition technology to screen visa
applicants against a watch list of photos obtained from the
Terrorist Screening Center as well as visa applicant photos
contained in the Consular Consolidated Database.
Our vast database of visa information is fully available to
other agencies. It is specifically designed to facilitate fast,
accurate, and comprehensive sharing to meet the needs of a 24/7
global screening environment. In return, we have unprecedented
levels of cooperation with law enforcement and intelligence
agencies and benefit from their capabilities and resources in
ways that were not possible at the time of 9/11.
Let me turn to our coordination with DHS to address the
overstay issue. Consular officers at posts abroad use arrival
and departure data from--for non-U.S. citizen travelers
contained in the DHS Arrival and Departure Information System,
ADIS, to help determine whether an applicant who visited the
United States previously departed by the end of his or her
authorized period of stay and whether the applicant qualifies
for a visa. The consular officer also use their knowledge of
the local language, culture, and conditions as part of their
evaluation of an applicant's eligibility for a U.S. visa.
ADIS overstay information is also included in the
revocation recommendations the Department receives daily from
CBP's National Targeting Center and our consular sections
abroad. Whether the overstay information exists in isolation or
as one of multiple factors, the Department considers the
information as part of our visa revocation process. If a
subject whose visa has been revoked is in the United States our
colleagues from DHS are responsible for removal. As Mr. Cuellar
mentioned, we are working very closely with the--with ICE and
Director Morton to do everything we can to help with those
removal processes.
Consular officers have detailed instructions on visa
revocation procedures and reinforce standing guidance on their
discretionary authority to deny visas under 214-B of the
Immigration and Nationality Act with specific reference to
cases that raise security and other serious concerns. We have
created a dedicated revocations unit in Washington that focuses
exclusively on ensuring that any derogatory information on a
U.S. visa holder is rapidly evaluated and acted on.
Distinguished Members of the committee, our current layered
approach to security screening, in which each agency applies
its particular strengths and expertise, best serves our border
security agenda while furthering traditional U.S. interests in
legitimate travel, trade promotion, and the exchange of ideas.
The United States must meet both goals to guarantee our long-
term security.
Thank you, and I am ready to answer your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Donahue follows:]
Prepared Statement of David T. Donahue
March 6, 2012
Good afternoon Madam Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I thank you for this
opportunity to update you on the steps we have taken to increase the
security of the visa process.
The Department of State (the Department) is dedicated to the
protection of our borders, and has no higher priority than the safety
of our fellow citizens. We are the first line of defense in border
security because the Department is often the first Government agency to
have contact with foreign nationals wishing to visit the United States.
We are committed, along with our partner agencies, to a layered
approach to border security that will enable the U.S. Government to
track and review the visa eligibility and status of foreign visitors
from their visa applications throughout their travel to, sojourn in,
and departure from, the United States. We are equally committed to
facilitating legitimate travel, and providing efficient and courteous
visa adjudication. The Bureau of Consular Affairs is successfully
meeting the challenge of increasing world-wide demand for U.S. visas
without compromising the security of our Nation's borders.
At 222 visa-adjudicating embassies and consulates around the world,
a highly-trained corps of consular officers and support staff processes
millions of visa applications each year, facilitating legitimate travel
while protecting our borders. Consular officers adjudicated 8.8 million
applications and issued more than 7.5 million visas in fiscal year
2011, up 16 percent from the 6.4 million visas issued in fiscal year
2010. We have experienced tremendous increases in demand for visas in
some of the world's fastest-growing economies. We are issuing as many
visas as we did in 2000, even though nine more countries have joined
the Visa Waiver Program since then.
data sharing leads to a more secure visa adjudication process
The Department has developed and implemented an intensive visa
application and screening process, requiring personal interviews in
most cases; employing analytic interview techniques; and incorporating
multiple biographic and biometric checks, all supported by a
sophisticated global information technology network that shares data
among the Department and Federal law enforcement and intelligence
agencies. Security remains our primary mission--every visa decision is
a National security decision.
We constantly refine and update the technology that supports the
adjudication and production of U.S. visas. The world-wide rollout of
our on-line non-immigrant visa application form is complete, and we are
currently piloting the on-line immigrant visa application form. These
new on-line forms provide consular officers, as well as intelligence
and law enforcement agencies, the opportunity to analyze data before
applicants appear for their interviews. While the forms offer foreign
language support, applicants are required to answer in English, to
facilitate data searches and information sharing between the Department
and other Government agencies. The new application forms are ``smart,''
meaning that certain answers to questions will trigger subsequent
questions. The system will not accept applications if the security-
related questions have not been answered completely, and inappropriate
or unacceptable answers are flagged to ensure that consular officers
address them in the interview.
The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) requires our consular
officers to interview first-time visa applicants aged 14 through 79 in
person. We may waive the interview requirement for diplomatic and
official staff of foreign governments, as well as for certain other
applicants in very limited circumstances. In addition, we employ
strong, sophisticated name-searching algorithms to ensure matches
between names of visa applicants and any derogatory information
contained in the 42.5 million records found in the Consular Lookout and
Support System (CLASS), our on-line database of visa lookout records.
CLASS has grown more than 400 percent since 2001. Almost 70 percent
of CLASS records come from other agencies, including DHS, the FBI, and
the DEA. CLASS also includes unclassified records regarding known or
suspected terrorists (KSTs) from the Terrorist Screening Database
(TSDB), which is maintained by the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center
(TSC) and contains data on KSTs nominated by all U.S. Government
sources.
We also screen visa applicants' names against the historical visa
records in our Consular Consolidated Database (CCD). A system-specific
version of the automated CLASS search algorithm runs the names of all
visa applicants against the CCD to check for any prior visa
applications, refusals, or issuances. DHS and other Federal agencies
have broad access to the CCD, which contains more than 151 million
immigrant and non-immigrant visa records covering the last 13 years. We
make our visa information available to other U.S. Government agencies
for law enforcement and counterterrorism purposes, we specifically
designed our systems to facilitate comprehensive data sharing with
these entities, and they use this access extensively. For example, in
January 2012, more than 20,000 officers from DHS, the FBI, and the
Departments of Defense, Justice, and Commerce submitted more than 2
million visa record queries in the course of conducting law enforcement
and/or counterterrorism investigations.
In addition to biographic checks, the Department also performs
checks on two biometric identifiers. Visa applicants' fingerprints are
screened against DHS and FBI systems, which between them contain the
available fingerprint records of terrorists, wanted persons,
immigration law violators, and criminals. In 2011, consular posts
transmitted more than 8.6 million fingerprint submissions to these
systems, and received from them more than 221,000 derogatory and
criminal history records. We transmit the fingerprints taken during the
visa interview process to U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
officers at ports of entry, to enable them to match the fingerprints of
persons entering the United States and confirm their identity.
We use facial recognition technology to screen visa applicants
against a watch list of photos of known and suspected terrorists
obtained from the TSC, as well as the entire gallery of visa applicant
photos contained in our CCD. Facial recognition screening has proven to
be another effective way to combat identity fraud.
Data sharing requires intense, on-going cooperation from other
agencies. We have successfully forged and continue to foster
partnerships that recognize the need to supply accurate and speedy
screening in a 24/7 global environment. As we implement process and
policy changes, we are always striving to add value in both border
security and operational results. Both dimensions are important in
supporting the visa process.
overstay information
In April 2008, consular officers at posts abroad obtained access to
arrival and departure data for non-U.S. citizen travelers contained in
the DHS Arrival Departure Information System (ADIS). We began running
automated ADIS checks for every visa applicant in June 2011. Officers
in the field use ADIS data to help determine whether an applicant who
visited the United States previously departed by the end of his or her
authorized period of stay. If ADIS indicates a traveler departed after
this period, or there is no departure shown at all, the officer works
to confirm whether the individual overstayed his or her previous period
of admission. Since land border departures are not usually recorded in
ADIS, and airlines have not always provided departure manifests, ADIS
information alone does not confirm or refute an overstay.
If a consular officer confirms a prior overstay of any duration,
the applicant may be unable to overcome the presumption of immigrant
intent. Overstays of 181 to 364 days may make an applicant ineligible
to reenter the United States for 3 years. Overstays of 365 days or more
may make an applicant ineligible to reenter the United States for 10
years.
security advisory opinions and the visa security program
In coordination with Federal law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, the Department has instituted particular measures to process
higher-risk visa applications. Our Security Advisory Opinion (SAO)
mechanism provides consular officers input from Washington on security-
related issues relating to pending visa applications. Department
guidance explains when a consular officer must request an SAO. Most are
triggered by a CLASS watch list hit; others are required as a matter of
policy or submitted by the consular officer per his or her discretion.
Consular officers receive extensive training on the SAO process, which
requires them to suspend visa processing pending interagency review of
the case and additional guidance. SAO requests are routed
electronically to relevant Federal intelligence and law enforcement
agencies. Consular officers submitted more than 366,000 SAO requests in
fiscal year 2011.
The Visa Security Program (VSP), under which DHS deploys U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) special agents to conduct
visa security screening and investigations at certain overseas consular
posts, is a valuable component of the U.S. Government's overall policy
of protecting our borders. We have a close and productive partnership
with DHS, which has authority for visa policy under section 428 of the
Homeland Security Act, and are fully supportive of the mission and
future of the VSP. ICE/VSP is present at 19 visa-issuing posts in 15
countries.
visa revocation
DHS is responsible for removing subjects of visa revocations who
are present in the United States, whether or not they have overstayed
the period of legal presence. The Department has broad and flexible
authority to revoke visas and we use that authority widely to protect
our borders. Since 2001, the Department has revoked approximately
60,000 visas for a variety of reasons, including nearly 5,000 for
suspected links to terrorism. Cases for revocation consideration are
forwarded to the Department by our consular offices overseas, NTC, and
other entities. As soon as information is established to support a
revocation (i.e., information that could lead to an inadmissibility
determination), a ``VRVK'' entry code showing the visa revocation is
added to CLASS, as well as to biometric identity systems, and then
shared in near-real time (within about 15 minutes) with the DHS lookout
systems used for border screening. As part of its enhanced ``Pre-
Departure'' initiative, CBP uses these VRVK records, among other
lookout codes, to recommend that airlines should not board certain
passengers on flights bound for the United States. Almost every day, we
receive requests to review and, if warranted, revoke any outstanding
visas for aliens for whom new derogatory information has been
discovered since the visa was issued. Our Operations Center is staffed
24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to address urgent requests, such as when
a potentially dangerous person is about to board a plane. In those
circumstances, the State Department can and does use its authority to
revoke the visa, and thus prevent boarding. ADIS overstay information
is also included in the visa revocation recommendations the Department
receives daily from the NTC and our consular sections abroad. Whether
the overstay information exists in isolation or as one among multiple
factors, the Department considers the information as part of our visa
revocation process.
Most revocations are based on new information that has come to
light after visa issuance. Because individuals' circumstances change
over time, and people who once posed no threat to the United States can
become threats, revocation is an important tool. We use our authority
to revoke a visa immediately in circumstances where we believe there is
an immediate threat. At the same time, we believe it is important not
to act unilaterally, but to coordinate expeditiously with our National
security partners in order to avoid possibly disrupting important
investigations.
conclusion
We believe that U.S. interests in legitimate travel, trade
promotion, and educational exchange are not in conflict with our border
security agenda and, in fact, further that agenda in the long term. Our
long-term interests are served by continuing the flow of commerce and
ideas that are the foundations of prosperity and security. Acquainting
people with American culture and perspectives remains the surest way to
reduce misperceptions about the United States. Fostering academic and
professional exchanges keeps our universities and research institutions
at the forefront of scientific and technological change. We believe the
United States must meet both goals to guarantee our long-term security.
Our global presence, foreign policy mission, and personnel
structure give us singular advantages in executing the visa function
throughout the world. Our authorities and responsibilities enable us to
provide a global perspective to the visa process and its impact on U.S.
National interests. The issuance and refusal of visas has a direct
impact on our foreign relations. Visa policy quickly can become a
significant bilateral problem that harms broader U.S. interests if
handled without consideration for foreign policy equities. The conduct
of U.S. visa policy has a direct and significant impact on the
treatment of U.S. citizens abroad. The Department of State is in a
position to anticipate and weigh all those factors, while ensuring
border security as our first priority.
The Department has developed and implemented an intensive visa
application and screening process supported by a sophisticated global
information technology network. We have visa offices in virtually every
country of the world, staffed by consular officers drawn from the
Department's professional, mobile, and multilingual cadre of Foreign
Service Officers. These officials are dedicated to a career of
worldwide service, and provide the cultural awareness, knowledge, and
objectivity to ensure that the visa function remains the front line of
border security. Each officer's experience and individual skill set are
enhanced by an overall understanding of the political, legal, economic,
and cultural development of foreign countries in a way that gives the
Department of State a special expertise over matters directly relevant
to the full range of visa ineligibilities.
This concludes my testimony today. I will be pleased to take your
questions.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman.
I thank all of the witnesses for your testimony today.
I guess I would start with Mr. Edge. As we were talking
about Khalifi, this individual that apparently had some run-ins
with law enforcement, I think in 2005--we were looking through
some of the various information before we had our hearing
here--and as we mentioned during the testimony, what a great
program Secure Communities is. Do you think if Secure
Communities was in place that it would have flagged this
individual, you know, if he was to be picked up by just--in a
regular line of law enforcement during the course of everyday
duties? Do you think that the Secure Communities would have
picked this individual up, and are you finding that Secure
Communities is really having a fantastic impact now on your
ability to do so?
Mr. Edge. Well, I think when----
Mrs. Miller. Just press the button there.
Mr. Edge. Yes. When Mr. Khalifi was arrested in the early
part of 2000 we did not have a mechanism in place to be able to
communicate once somebody's fingerprints were rolled when
someone was arrested, but we are working towards that these
days with US-VISIT and our ability to run fingerprints and get
information from those who are arrested at the State and local
level. This isn't something that would have risen to the
Federal level at the time of his first arrest. I believe they
were even misdemeanor charges in a State system in Virginia.
So I think that as we move forward the level of
communication between our State and local counterparts, whether
it is through Secure Communities or just by the various
programs we have and our databases that are connected, we will
be able to at least identify those people who are connected
into the immigration system.
Mrs. Miller. No. That is really something that, again,
referencing the 9/11 Commission, one of their recommendations--
excuse me--that we keep in mind all the time is when they talk
about how--we need to move from the need to know to the need to
share information with the various agencies, and at every level
of government, whether it is the Federal level, the State
level, the county level, the local level, et cetera, with all
of these kinds of things.
But one of the things that we are focusing on, obviously,
in this subcommittee hearing is how we try to bring more
attention to the fact that, as I mentioned, over 40 percent of
all of the illegals that are in the country are here on visa
overstays, and as we have talked about, didn't come across the
desert and the southern edge of our border, which is where
everybody seems to think that all of the illegals came from.
So you have all of these visa overstays and it really is
for the Congress, I think, to try to prioritize our funding and
focus the funding that we have, understanding the constrictions
that we have with the financial crisis that is facing our
Nation, but we are looking through your budget, for instance,
with ICE, and I am not sure if this is true--maybe you can tell
me what percentage of your--of the budget that ICE has that you
are focusing on visa, for instance. You probably don't have
those exact numbers, but we were sort of trying to figure it
out and it looks like it is a small percentage--maybe 3 to 5
percent of the budget that is even focused on visa overstays.
So I guess I would ask you to try to answer that the best
if you could, or how do you identify overstays that have been
in the country for over 13 years, like this particular
individual? Do you consider the country of origin? What is your
matrix, actually, for looking at these things?
Mr. Edge. Well, Madam Chairwoman, that is a complicated
question in that our investigative responsibilities are very
vast. We have a lot of disciplines that we are empowered to
investigate, from human trafficking, document and benefit
fraud, narcotics smuggling, a wide variety of different
investigative areas that we are responsible for. Through
conducting those investigations we do and we are able to
identify visa overstays.
If it is someone who is not in contact with our
investigative process and homeland security investigations it
is certainly possible that we would not come in contact with
them if they had been in the country for a very long time. But
certainly, given the communication that we have and the various
databases that we are working with today, and through our CTCEU
process, as Ranking Member Cuellar mentioned earlier, we are
certainly in a better position to identify these overstays in
the normal course of business.
Mrs. Miller. Mr. Cohen, I took some notes when you were
talking there. You were saying that your new system that you
have that you now have the ability to track by countries, and
as you are vetting sort of the backlog that you testified to
the committee--subcommittee for previously back in September,
how many overstays do you think you have from special interest
countries, or how are you doing with identifying from
particular countries?
As you also mentioned, the Secretary, when she was
testifying here earlier, said that the system that they--that
you are operating under right now is a good bridge to what
ultimately all of our mutual goal is, to have a really robust
biometric system. So I guess I am just, again, trying to get a
feel for what your matrix is for what you are looking at with
the various special countries. As my colleague was mentioning,
all of the various countries and the days it is rather
startling to look at some of those kind of things, and
obviously that is an indicator that we all need to be looking
at.
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
So it is a work in progress still, so we are continuing to
implement these improvements that I referenced in my opening
statement. I will get back to the subcommittee with regard to
specific numbers on the special interest countries, but your
previous question to Mr. Edge and your question to me raises
sort of the key issue here, which is up until this effort there
was no systematic effort by the Department to integrate all of
these various repositories of information, in which information
vital to determining whether someone had actually departed the
country, had changed their status, was in custody for another
crime, or was actually an overstay, and they weren't linked
together so it made it very difficult.
So in the case of Mr. Khalifi, the information--and others
that went into overstay status in the late 1990s and early
2000, prior to the development of US-VISIT--the information
repository which reflected that they were potentially overstay
was TECS--Treasury Enforcement Communication System. TECS
system was a system that part of the data it collected were
border crossings, so we could tell when somebody came into the
country and we could also tell if they left the country; that
was in TECS. However, most local police departments during that
time didn't have access to TECS, and unless they had some
reason to believe that an individual detained for some other
offense was, in fact, an immigration violator, it would be rare
that they would call INS and ask them to do a--what we would
call a TECS check.
Through the system enhancements that I described earlier we
are automating that process, so today if someone is arrested
for any type of offense part of the query that will take place
through both the Secure Communities program and through the
enhancements that I have been describing will be an automatic
check of immigration systems, will be a check of TECS, as well.
So the chances are greatly enhanced that today if somebody were
to be booked in for a minor drug offense--or a serious traffic
violation, even, the person's immigration status would come to
our attention.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
Chairwoman recognizes the Ranking Member.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Without going over the numbers over those countries that
are a little bit less cooperative in working with us, you know,
you have--I believe the last time your managing director of
visa services was back here with us, and I think it was in
November 2011, he said that there are some countries like
Brazil and China that there is increase--there is an increase
in demand for visas--travel visas.
Let's talk about China, since it is one of those countries
that has not been very--what incentives--or does it make sense
that if a country is not taking back those folks that they are
supposed to be taking back and they are delaying, why are we
going to be increasing their visas? I understand travel, and
business, and--I understand all that. But just specifically in
this issue, why are we increasing the number of visas but at
the same time, at the back end, for the folks that they are
supposed to be taking back, they are still delaying them by
large numbers itself.
I guess--and I can understand--I can already guess what you
are going to say and I understand all that, but what
suggestions do you have? Because I am specifically looking at--
to be quite honest, we brought this up--I mean, there have been
some steps--we are looking at putting some appropriation
language, and hopefully that will direct you all to those
particular countries.
Do you have any suggestions as to what we can look at to
specifically help you do that? I know the State Department
might be in a difficult position to work with those countries,
but what can we do? What sort of language would be appropriate,
understanding it is going up but understand at the back end
those countries--why have we provided that incentive to them?
Mr. Donahue. Well, first of all, let me say that we agree
with you entirely that the wait times for these documents are
unacceptable and we have been working very closely with
Director Morton, at ICE. Our assistant secretary--they have
formed a group; they go out and meet with the ambassadors.
Also, in our capitals overseas we are meeting with these senior
officials there. Our ambassador in China, and we have a new
ambassador going out to India, hopefully, if confirmed. These
are all opportunities to make it clear to those governments how
important this is to our bilateral relationship and to their
obligations to do this.
We do have authority, as you know, under the INA, to
address this, also, and we feel like that is the last step we
want to exhaust, as we have discussed in your office, all the
diplomatic ways to get countries to cooperate with us on this.
On the countries that are sending large numbers of travelers to
the United States we--it is a delicate balance. I don't have
any answer.
These are real jobs that they are creating in the United
States when they come here. They stay in the hotels. Chinese,
they say, spend $6,000 a day in the United States while they
are here. They buy our goods and services. So it is very
difficult to do things--and for China it is very hard to put
any more--make it more difficult because they only receive 1-
year visas. Their country doesn't care whether their citizens
come here; it is more that we care that they come here and
visit our great places, attend our universities paying full
tuition, they buy our goods and services, our tractors, all
those things. So they have very little incentive to change
their ways and we have all good reasons for our economy to
attract them here.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes. I understand, and I--you know, I
appreciate the visits that we had and I understand all of that.
But there has got to be something we can do. I mean, we just
can't--and I--again, I appreciate--I am complimenting all three
of you all and your--the men and women that work for all of you
all. You are all doing a good job. I am not criticizing you.
Is there anything we can try to help you? Really, the only
way I am looking at this, because I don't know about
reauthorization or any bill that is moving, but the
appropriation bill, one way or the other, is going to pass.
Mr. Donahue. Right.
Mr. Cuellar. So we can talk about it later, but I am asking
all three of you all if you all want to talk later, or, you
know, with the Chairwoman or myself. We have got to put some
language there, but I don't want to put some language that will
be counterproductive. But I just--you know, I just don't see
why we keep feeding what they have biting on the other hand on
that.
But I understand international education; I understand and
I appreciate all that. I know it is very, very difficult, but
there has got to be something. You know, China might be a
special situation. What about Bangladesh? What about the other
countries? I mean, not everybody is on the same level as China.
But anyway, I would look forward to working with you on
some language, and again, I am not being critical. I really
appreciate the prioritization work that both the State
Department and Homeland is doing. But I am asking you to give
me some suggestions.
Mr. Donahue. All right. We will see what we can suggest to
you and we will continue working on this. This is a top
priority for Assistant Secretary Jacobs.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay.
Thank you to all three of you. I appreciate the work that
you all are doing.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from South
Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Appreciate the work you guys are doing and I thank the
Chairwoman for having this very valuable hearing today.
Mr. Edge, what does ICE stand for?
Mr. Edge. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. I am going to leave customs out of this
because we are talking about immigration. Immigration
enforcement. Immigration enforcement.
At what point is someone unlawfully present in the United
States?
Mr. Edge. When they enter the country illegally, sir.
Mr. Duncan. So if they overstayed their visa that is not
unlawful?
Mr. Edge. That is unlawful.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. So if you cross the Southern Border
without coming through a natural port of entry you illegally
enter into the country, you are unlawfully in the country. If
you overstay your visa you are unlawfully in the country, based
on what you just said.
So Chairwoman asked a question or maybe made a statement--
how many visa overstays do we have present in the country at
any given time?
Mr. Edge. I don't have an exact number on how many are
presently in the country at this time.
Mr. Duncan. Is there a percentage of the illegal aliens,
would you say--50 percent, 30 percent, 10 percent?
Mr. Edge. I will be able to give you a number of--between
2009 and 2011 37,000 both criminal and non-criminal aliens have
been removed and those were overstays.
Mr. Duncan. How many have been removed. Okay.
It would seem to me that if you were going to think about
committing a terrorist act in this country that--and you were a
foreign national you would apply for a visa, and if you kept
your nose clean and you didn't have a criminal record in the
country, you weren't a person of interest that would pop up on
some sort of prescreening that you would be able to get a visa
to come to this country and then you could just overstay it and
work on the terrorist act, like we saw recently with the D.C.
bomber.
So I want to commend the State Department, Mr. Donahue, for
your process of prescreening applicants for visas. That is
really where your testimony stayed.
But in 1996 Congress said, ``You know, we are going to
create a biometric screening for exit and entry into this
country so we will know when folks enter and we will know when
they leave.'' I have traveled around the world in a lot of
different countries where you have to give biometric data--
fingerprints, whether it is just one finger or a complete hand.
So 1996, that has been about 16 years that we have had this
focus. The 9/11 Commission Report revisited that.
So you all do a good job prescreening applicants for visas
if that person is a person of interest or may have a background
in that country that raises suspicions, or whatever, they would
be denied a visa. But if they haven't had that background they
would probably be given a visa.
So the problem, I think, is us having a reliable system in
place for knowing when foreign nationals exit this country that
have come on visas. So, after 16 years and this instance from
Congress, I ask the State Department, when are we going to
complete this process of an entry and exit biometric screening?
Mr. Donahue. The----
Mr. Duncan. Which I think begins with the State Department.
Mr. Donahue. It begins with the State Department and we
collect biometrics on almost all applicants who are coming to
the United States. Those are immediately transmitted to the
Department of Homeland Security and are used for each and every
person who enters the United States--not each and every, but
almost all people who enter the United States then submit, as
you have seen and as you have done overseas, people coming into
the United States, including those legal residents, including
other travelers--visitors.
Mr. Duncan. How is that information used? You are gathering
that information from them as they come to the United States--
--
Mr. Donahue. That is right.
Mr. Duncan [continuing]. But we are not gathering that
information as they exit.
Mr. Donahue. That is correct. I would defer to Department
of Homeland Security on that because that is a Department of
Homeland Security program--departure.
Mr. Duncan. I will refer to them.
Mr. Cohen.
Mr. Cohen. Mr. Duncan, thank you. As you pointed out, there
are three elements of an effective entry-exit system: It is the
collection of information and biometrics upon application and
entry, it is the feeding those biometrics into a information
lair that connects not only that data with other immigration
data but that data with other law enforcement data and
intelligence data, and then there is the collection of
information upon departure.
The Department is finalizing its plan for a comprehensive
biometric exit system. We expect to have it to Congress
shortly. As required by our recent appropriations bill, it will
lay out not only the details of how we will link those three
levels of activity together but how we will also achieve
immediate benefit to your other point, which is making sure
that we are better able to identify those visa overstays who
are actually visa overstays and still in this country who
aren't National security or public safety threats.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. You determine that someone has overstayed
their visa; they haven't left on the date they were supposed
to. A little period of time goes through, you check your
records.
At what point in time do you all start implementing the
process of finding the address where they said they were going
to be, researching where that person may be, and trying to
enforce removing them from the country? At what time does that
kick in?
Mr. Cohen. I believe it is 30 days after the point of
overstay. But if I may point out, because the process today
requires so many manual database checks and is so resource-
intensive ICE prioritizes for enforcement actions those visa
overstays that are National security or public safety risks.
When we implement the enhancements that I described earlier
we will be better able to identify those other visa overstays,
provide that information into law enforcement systems so upon
next encounter their overstay status will be identified, ensure
that information gets to State Department so if they have
departed the country and they seek to come back from a visa
waiver country or through a visa process again State Department
can take appropriate actions.
So we are going in the direction that you are suggesting.
The problem is all of these systems that we need to make these
determinations are disconnected and they use different
language.
Mr. Duncan. I am out of time and I will look for a second
round of questions, but I would just make a point--they are
disconnected. The 9/11 Commission Report pointed to the fact
that the disconnect of agencies talking to one another wasn't
there. You had walls of separation. That is the problem, and I
am afraid that we have got to correct that if we are going
forward.
I will yield back.
Mrs. Miller. We probably aren't going to have a second
round of questions, so if you would like to ask one more
question, please, I will yield to you.
Mr. Duncan. Okay. Thank you.
I want to continue going down this path because--we see,
based on the--number of visa overstays that were involved in
terrorist activity, at what point of time is someone that is
stopped for a traffic violation or misdemeanor, as we saw with
the gentleman on Capitol Hill, at what point in time do you
say, ``Well, they are a visa overstay; they are unlawfully
present in the United States of America,'' and they are
returned to their country?
Americans are scratching their head looking at the data
that is provided--and this is real data, actual cases. They are
scratching their head going, ``Why isn't America--these are the
low-hanging fruit. Why isn't America dealing with this?''
Because I am--they are scratching their head. Answer that for
me, someone, please.
Mr. Cohen. So I would answer your question, Congressman, by
saying we are dealing with it and we have finally begun the
process of linking those disparate systems that you identified
earlier together so that when a police officer arrests somebody
and books that individual into jail they are quickly identified
as being in violation of their immigration status so that ICE
can be notified and appropriate enforcement actions can take
place. That is the very capability that we are beginning--we
have begun the process of putting into place.
Again, we expect to have the detailed plan to Congress
shortly that will lay out what we are doing, but it has already
begun, as I testified earlier, and we have already seen
dramatic improvements in our ability to identify those visa
overstays that represent National security or public safety
threats. Again, this is from a pool of individuals that would
not have been vetted before.
So progress is being achieved. To your very point, we
absolutely agree with you. These systems have to be linked
together and they have to be linked together to support the
operational activities of ICE and CBP and the other enforcement
agencies that are responsible for enforcing our immigration
laws.
Mr. Duncan. You shouldn't have to keep coming back to
Congress because the law is the law of the land right now.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement--immigration enforcement
means that you enforce the immigration laws of the United
States of America, and if you do that then folks that are
caught on misdemeanors that have been here for 13 years over
their visa deadline are picked up and they are deported from
this country. That is what America expects from you, to enforce
immigration laws that are on the books today and not keep
having to come back to Congress for more and more and more.
Integration--I get that. But customs enforcement and
immigration enforcement is your responsibility. I charge you
guys with doing your job.
With that, Madam Chairwoman, I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from
the great State of Michigan, Mr. Clarke.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
While we realize it is very important to track those
individuals who are overstaying their visas, especially those
who are likely to be terrorists, I also think it is important
for this Congress and Department of Homeland Security to focus
on preventing terrorists from entering our country in the first
place. So to that end, I want to thank the advocacy of our
Chairwoman who has been focusing on how we can get more
resources to better secure our Northern Border to prevent these
criminals, terrorists, and drug traffickers from coming across
the border into our country, especially securing our border
between Canada and Michigan. We do need the resources to better
monitor that border and apprehend these folks in case they do
come over.
To that same end, my question is this: How can we better
secure the visa process to prevent terrorists from coming into
our country in the first place--better secure that process but
yet tailor it in such a way that we don't discourage but even
encourage the immigration that we do need in this country? You
know, I represent the city of Detroit, a metropolitan area that
needs more economic investment. Capital is global. We want to
encourage more international investors and entrepreneurs to
come to this country to get a green card, especially when then
invest in distressed areas like Detroit, or Pontiac, or Flint,
in Michigan.
How can we have a process that balances the security that
we need to prevent these folks that want to do us harm from
even getting into this country but encouraging investors,
entrepreneurs, encouraging those international graduates,
especially in science and engineering and mathematics to
actually stay in the United States to promote more innovation
that will create more jobs for our country?
Mr. Edge. Thank you very much for your question, Mr.
Clarke. As far as ICE is concerned, we have our Visa Security
Program, and what we are trying to do to encourage the
expedited process of--and vetting of visa applicants is to do a
lot of that on the domestic side through technology. We have
many offices overseas--approximately 71 in 47 countries, and
what we would like to do and what we have begun to do is to use
our technological capabilities to vet these applicants in
conjunction with our friends at the Department of State to
enhance the process, to encourage people to want to come to
this country, and they will know that the process will be a
little faster than it has been in the past.
So that is one of the things that, through the Visa
Security Program, we are doing. This will also allow our people
who are in those other countries working and representing the
United States in homeland security investigations to focus more
on investigative work. But we are actively working on those
technological enhancements right now.
Mr. Cohen. If I may add, Congressman, I think you raised an
excellent point, and part of the answer includes extensively
pre-vetting to the greatest degree possible either those
individuals or those corporate entries seeking to cross the
border. So the auto industry in Michigan and Detroit area rely
on just-in-time deliveries. If those deliveries of parts and
goods do not make it to those factories cars are not going to
be produced.
People travel from Windsor to Detroit every day to enjoy
restaurants and enjoy other elements. So what we are moving
towards is an environment where to the greatest degree possible
we can validate those people who have a legal--who legally can
enter this country, whether they are doing it for business or
for pleasure, and vet those people against the broadest array
of intelligence and law enforcement systems so we can weed out
initially, before they come to this country, those people who
represent a danger to this country, thereby enabling those who
don't represent a danger who can help our economy grow can
travel more effectively and efficiently to this country.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Cohen.
Thank you, Mr. Edge.
Mr. Donahue. Let me just mention that the prevention of
issuance to these--of visas to persons like the overstay is one
of our key goals in all of our visa adjudications. We do a lot
of training but we also do a lot of what we call validation
studies. We will take a group of people, using information
from--the ADIS records from the Departure and Information
Service, and we will look to see if a person--if this group of
persons--it could be a group of elderly people coming for
vacations or to see their family members--are they likely to
overstay in the United States, or students? We will do this by
groups, and we do it from a number of--from all countries
around the world and check to see how our officers are doing.
We also make sure that they understand what the culture is,
what is the likelihood that people will return? We refuse about
a million visas a year, and yet we find in our validation
studies more and more that we are getting very close to finding
that almost everyone--we would like it to be everyone--uses
their visa appropriately and comes back in many of the
countries where we have been doing these validation studies.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Donahue.
I yield back my time.
Mrs. Miller. Chairwoman recognizes the Ranking Member.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Couple questions. It is concurrent--that is, Mr. Cohen, two
questions real quickly--in its current configuration the U.S.
visa program has failed to fulfill its statutory requirement
regarding deploying a biometric exit system to track visitors
to the United States and better identify overstays. The
administration's fiscal year 2013 budget request proposes that
we transfer the US-VISIT's functions from NPPD to CBP and ICE.
Some have expressed concerns that this transfer will be
detrimental to the U.S. visa mission but others argue that
aligning this mission with the relevant components makes more
sense.
Can you please explain how aligning US-VISIT with CBP and
ICE would strengthen the program and help DHS get an exit
system done?
Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Congressman. You know, the Secretary
isn't a big fan of moving boxes around and it is--it--she has
rarely come to Congress and sought an organizational change
such as this, but the rationale behind the change is much if
not all of what US-VISIT does ties directly to the enforcement
and operational activities of either ICE or CBP.
So from an efficiency perspective and from a financial
perspective, in order to avoid duplicative efforts, it just
made sense to place those functions of US-VISIT that most
support ICE's operational mission into ICE and those parts of
the US-VISIT mission that best support CBP's operational issues
or operational functions into CBP.
The only other thing I would add is that as we learned
through this initiative from the beginning, that the effective
management and enforcement of our visa and immigration laws, of
our counterterrorism responsibilities occurs best when the
different elements of the Department are working closely
together. So the movement of US-VISIT into CBP and ICE should
not be viewed as a taking a step back, that the Department is
going to continue to enhance its operational coordination
across all of its components.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Cohen.
Finally, you say that DHS will soon transmit to Congress
your plan for deploying the biometric exit. How soon is soon?
Mr. Cohen. Without giving a specific date, it is going to
be within weeks, not months, not years. We are putting the
finishing touches on the report as we speak.
Mr. Cuellar. Weeks, so that is within the next 30 days?
Mr. Cohen. That would be our intention.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. All right.
Thank you to all three of you all.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, for having this meeting today.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
I certainly want to thank all the witnesses, as well.
Mr. Cohen, I was going to ask that question so I am glad my
colleague did, as well. We are certainly interested to see what
you described as a work in progress. I think it is hopefully
clear from all of the Members here that this issue is something
that this subcommittee is very, very focused on--and I really
don't think that enough attention has been paid in the past, as
I say, because--we seem to be so focused on what is going on
with securing--our Southern Border, in particular. Believe me,
I am not minimizing the challenges that we have down there,
certainly with the drug cartels, and the violence, and the
spillover, et cetera, and illegals that are coming across. I
think this Nation certainly wants this Congress and all the
agencies that are under our umbrella to exercise the political
will that we need to to secure our borders--all of our borders.
But I think this visa overstay issue, again, is something
that we have just not paid enough attention to. Certainly we
want to work with all of your agencies on making sure that
Congress is, through the appropriations process, et cetera, is
assisting where we need to to prioritize our spending.
Again, I always thank our Chairman of this--of the full
committee for putting those posters--will you--turn around you
see the posters on the back of the wall there, which are of the
burning towers on 9/11 and why the Department of Homeland
Security was even put together. Again, four of those cowards--
those terrorists that attacked innocent--and murdered innocents
that day were here on visa overstays.
So we don't want to be in any way an adversarial position
with any of your agencies. We do commend you for all of the
work that you have done and are doing on this issue and we
certainly want to be a conduit--to be a success in making sure
that we do have a very comprehensive--not just the entry but
the exit system, really a robust biometric system.
So again, we thank the witnesses for all of your testimony
and look forward to working with you shoulder-to-shoulder to
solve this problem.
With that, I would mention that if any Members of the
subcommittee have any other additional questions the hearing
record will remain open for 10 days. With that, the
subcommittee will be adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:05 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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