[Senate Hearing 112-370]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-370
THE U.S.-CARIBBEAN SHARED SECURITY PARTNERSHIP: RESPONDING TO THE
GROWTH OF TRAFFICKING AND NARCOTICS IN THE CARIBBEAN
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE
CORPS, AND GLOBAL NARCOTICS AFFAIRS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
DECEMBER 15, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey BOB CORKER, Tennessee
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho
ROBERT P. CASEY, Jr., Pennsylvania MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
TOM UDALL, New Mexico MIKE LEE, Utah
William C. Danvers, Staff Director
Kenneth A. Myers, Jr., Republican Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE
CORPS, AND GLOBAL NARCOTICS AFFAIRS
ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey, Chairman
BARBARA BOXER, California MARCO RUBIO, Florida
JIM WEBB, Virginia MIKE LEE, Utah
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JIM DeMINT, South Carolina
TOM UDALL, New Mexico JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia
JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming
(ii)
?
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Ayalde, Hon. Liliana, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator for
Latin America and the Caribbean, U.S. Agency for International
Development, Washington, DC.................................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 17
Benson, Rodney G., Chief of Intelligence, Drug Enforcement
Administration, Washington, DC................................. 9
Prepared statement........................................... 11
Brownfield, Hon. William R., Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S.
Department of State, Washington, DC............................ 5
Prepared statement........................................... 7
Farah, Douglas, scholar, International Assessment and Strategy
Center, Alexandria, VA......................................... 35
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Gamarra, Dr. Eduardo A., professor, Florida International
University, Department of Politics and International Relations,
Miami, FL...................................................... 29
Prepared statement........................................... 32
Menendez, Hon. Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey, opening
statement...................................................... 1
Rubio, Hon. Marco, U.S. Senator from Florida, opening statement.. 4
(iii)
THE U.S.-CARIBBEAN SHARED SECURITY PARTNERSHIP: RESPONDING TO THE
GROWTH OF TRAFFICKING AND NARCOTICS IN THE CARIBBEAN
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THURSDAY, DECEMBER 15, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere,
Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs,
Committee on Foreign Relations
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m., in
room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Robert
Menendez (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Senators Menendez and Rubio.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT MENENDEZ,
U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY
Senator Menendez. Good morning. This hearing of the Western
Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Global Narcotics Affairs
Subcommittee will come to order.
Welcome to our hearing on the U.S.-Caribbean Shared
Security Partnership: Responding to the Growth of Trafficking
in Narcotics in the Caribbean. I want to thank our panelists
for coming today. I look forward to hearing what they have to
say.
Let me begin by providing some historical context for
today's hearing.
In May 2010, after a number of regional meetings and a
substantial dialogue process, the United States and Caribbean
representatives held the inaugural Caribbean-U.S. Security
Cooperation Dialogue in Washington and approved a declaration
of principles based on three strategic priorities: one, to
substantially reduce illicit trafficking in the Caribbean; two,
to advance public safety and security; and three, to further
promote social justice.
On November 10 of this year, the second annual Caribbean-
U.S. Security Cooperation Dialogue was held in the Bahamas. The
keynote speech by Secretary of Homeland Secretary Janet
Napolitano and the joint declaration afterward both highlighted
a number of new initiatives designed to reinforce the original
strategic priorities: the creation of a fingerprint collection
system by the United States and Caribbean partners that will
help to combat terrorism and transnational criminals; better
sharing of information between the Caribbean and the United
States; implementation of a regional maritime and air control
strategy; and finally, developing a regional juvenile justice
policy.
While I applaud these initiatives and I know that 2 years
is not a very long time to stand up such ambitious initiative
like CBSI, I have to say, frankly, that I am neither satisfied
with the progress being made on the ground, nor the news and
information that I am receiving from the region.
For example, in the Bahamas, 104 people have been killed
this year, topping the record of 94 killings from last year.
But that pales in comparison to Jamaica, which has become the
murder capital of the Caribbean, with more than 1,400 people
killed this year. In fact, a 2011 U.N. report on homicides
worldwide reported that Caribbean homicide rates have been
increasing every year since 2006 and concludes that the region
exhibits some of the highest levels of lethal violence in the
world.
In September, President Obama certified four Caribbean
nations as major drug transit countries: the Bahamas, the
Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Jamaica. There is unquestionably
a direct correlation between the growth in narcotrafficking and
the total loss of security that we are seeing in the Caribbean.
In the Dominican Republic, one of the candidates for
President declared that the country is close to becoming ``a
narcostate'' and said the government is incapable of stopping
the drug traffickers.
The situation has gotten so bad in Trinidad and Tobago, the
government there has declared a state of emergency and imposed
a nightly curfew so the police can combat Venezuelan drug
smugglers.
And the drug violence does not stop at the U.S. border.
Puerto Rico has already seen 1,000 homicides this year, which
is a new record. It is estimated that at least half of these
murders involve drug trafficking organizations.
This situation is deplorable and unsustainable. Violence is
up throughout the region. Crime is increasing to the point that
some countries are almost under siege, and drug trafficking is
growing exponentially and drug use has hit alarming levels.
Meanwhile the drug cartels are using money and violence to
undermine the governments in the region by paying off corrupt
officials and killing the honest ones. Corruption has returned
to the region with a vengeance, making it almost impossible to
reform the security and justice sectors in many countries. CBSI
has little chance of working if the governments that we are
partnering with are themselves involved in illicit activities.
I am very troubled and concerned that when I talk to
Government officials here in Washington, there does not seem to
be a sense of urgency about the situation in the Caribbean. We
have sent National Guard troops to the Mexican border. We are
starting to see the Central America Regional Security
Initiative get more funding. Colombia continues to get a lot of
assistance.
But what about CBSI? What about the Caribbean? Why have we
not learned about the inherent ability of the traffickers to be
one step ahead of our counternarcotics initiatives? Total CBSI
funding is expected to drop next year, in fiscal year 2012, to
$73 million from this year's $77 million allotment. The
officials I talk with just do not seem to get that our
counternarcotics efforts in other parts of Latin American are
the reason that the cartels are moving into the Caribbean. And
if we do not pay attention to the Caribbean, we are going to
repeat history with our exclusive focus, for example, on
Colombia drove traffickers into Mexico and Central America.
And it is not just the scourge of drugs that is spiraling
out of control. Gun smuggling is a growing menace, with
firearms the most likely weapon used in a homicide in the
region. Money laundering operations are illegally moving large
quantities of cash throughout the region. Human trafficking has
reached appalling levels. So what will it take for Washington
officials to realize how bad the security situation is in the
Caribbean?
My other concern is that there does not seem to be a
comprehensive approach to tackling these problems in the
Caribbean. We have to make a thorough assessment of all the law
enforcement and development agencies in the initiative, both
domestic and foreign, to determine where there are redundancies
and also where we are not applying enough resources. We have
State, USAID, DEA, FBI, the Coast Guard and myriad other
agencies all working in the region, and we hope that that can
be in an even more coordinated fashion. Our commitment to share
responsibility with our Caribbean partners must also be shared
by our own Government, the bureaucracies that need to work
together to coordinate efforts to bring a whole-of-government
approach to the task.
In order to work, CBSI must take a holistic approach to
link the chains of land-based law enforcement from local to
national to international, while integrating the maritime
components, at the same time tying in the civil sector actors.
And if funding for CBSI is cut, then we will really have to
figure out how to make our efforts more effective, more
efficient, and more coordinated.
So I look forward to listening to where the leadership to
drive this coordination is going to come from. Can anyone tell
me what the administration's counternarcotics priorities in the
Caribbean are? Is it interdiction of supply? Is it targeted
eradication of production, because while cocaine originates in
South America, the Caribbean is a big producer of marijuana? Do
we just focus on coast guards and other maritime forces in the
region? Yes, better intelligence is a priority, but does that
entail more training of local police and vetting of those
police and military forces or placing more U.S. assets in the
region? Don't we need to enhance border control as well in
order to stop the gunrunning, money laundering, and human
trafficking? CBSI should be, could be, and I believe must be
the vehicle to coordinate our engagement and create the
synergies needed with our Caribbean partners to combat the twin
scourge of drugs and violence that is rocking the region.
To that end, in the last Congress, I worked with Senators
Kerry and Lugar on legislative vehicles that would rechannel
our efforts to address this issue, to create a comprehensive,
multiyear strategy for combating narcotics, taking into account
the demand and supply issues, the role of U.S. weapons flowing
south, and the balloon effect that has moved the problem from
one part of the hemisphere to another.
I plan to reintroduce legislation in this Congress that I
hope will refocus the administration's efforts on developing a
comprehensive strategy for the hemisphere that will bring
together all the pieces of the puzzle and truly commit us to
the promises of assistance and cooperation in the Caribbean, as
articulated by President Obama in April 2009 at the fifth
summit of the Americas.
So let me conclude my remarks by saying stopping the flow
of drugs through the Caribbean is one of America's top national
security interests, and CBSI deserves to have the resources
that our country can muster.
I often think about this in a very significant way in my
own home State because we know that some of those container
ships ladened with cocaine--when they leave the Dominican
Republic, where do they sail to? Well, they very often end up
in the Port of Newark and Elizabeth, which is the mega-port of
the east coast in my home State of New Jersey. From the port,
the drugs go to the street corners and the schools of New
Jersey and New York. All of us here today, whether sitting on
the dais or sitting in the witness chair, owe it to our
children and those who protect them to do everything in our
power to stop the flow of drugs in our country.
And so we look forward to hearing from our panelists.
And with that, let me turn to the distinguished ranking
member of the committee, Senator Rubio.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MARCO RUBIO,
U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
important hearing.
I want to thank our witnesses for their continued service
to our country, and I am pleased to see that Ambassador
Brownfield has returned, yet again, to the Hill for one of his
frequent visits. I want to welcome Professor Gamarra for being
here from FIU, and Mr. Farah who I understand recently returned
from Panama.
You know, as the gateway to the Americas, a prosperous and
secure Caribbean region is of utmost importance to my home
State of Florida and to my fellow Floridians. At the same time,
building a long-lasting partnership with our Caribbean partners
and getting them to buy into a sustainable commitment to combat
transnational criminal organizations is essential to our
Nation's security and to our prosperity.
The evolution of our counternarcotics strategies from
country-specific into a subregional approach has significantly
improved our chances of success in tackling the ever-changing
threats from transnational criminal organizations. According to
the March 2011 State Department International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report, cocaine flows through the Caribbean into the
United States have dramatically dropped in the last decade from
about 40 percent in 1999 of our total flows to about 5 percent
today. Yet, the Caribbean countries are suffering under
dramatically high rates of violent crime, while increasingly
becoming a transit zone for cocaine flows into Europe.
So we must ensure that the administration builds enough
resiliency into its Caribbean initiatives to withstand the
pressure that will come from our enhanced efforts with Mexico
and Central America. And in fact, very recently there is, I
think, increasing concern that as the pressure increases in the
Central American corridor, the balloon will expand back into
the Caribbean zone. And of course, we always are looking to
build on our successes in Colombia as well, but that also
potentially increases potential traffic in the future through
the Caribbean zone.
So I am looking forward to your testimonies today. Thank
you for being a part of this.
And again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this
hearing.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator.
Let me introduce our first panel. Ambassador William
Brownfield served as Ambassador to Venezuela and Chile before
becoming our Ambassador to Colombia where he was instrumental
in implementing Plan Colombia. He is currently charged with
coordinating the Department's worldwide efforts as Assistant
Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement, and
we certainly look forward to hearing from Ambassador Brownfield
on our efforts to coordinate our Nation's drug policy in the
Caribbean and in the hemisphere.
Mr. Rodney Benson is the Chief of Intelligence for the Drug
Enforcement Administration. He is the DEA's representative to
the U.S. intelligence community, oversees a global intelligence
gathering organization. He has worked in the DEA's
international operations, Mexico, Central America section where
he coordinated enforcement activities conducted by DEA officers
in Mexico and Central America, and at the DEA-led Special
Operations Division, he coordinated law enforcement strategies
and operations to dismantle major drug trafficking
organizations operating on a regional, national, and
international level. We appreciate very much your appearance
here today, your experience, and certainly we salute all the
members of your agency that engage in a singular, focused
mission every day.
Ambassador Liliana Ayalde is currently the senior Deputy
Assistant Administrator for Latin America and the Caribbean.
She recently served as Ambassador to Paraguay and before that
had been posted in numerous countries in Latin America with
USAID, including Guatemala, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Colombia. We
look forward to your testimony on the Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative, particularly how USAID plans to continue its CBSI
and other development programs in the region during the
difficult budget environment that we find ourselves in.
With that, let me ask Ambassador Brownfield to begin the
testimony, and then Mr. Benson and Ambassador Ayalde. We would
ask you to summarize your testimony in about 5 minutes. Your
full statements will be included in the record, without
objection. Ambassador Brownfield, welcome again to the
committee.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM R. BROWNFIELD, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Brownfield. I thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
Senator Rubio. I thank you both for the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss the U.S.-Caribbean Shared Security
Partnership. And I do, indeed, thank you for the opportunity to
enter my written statement into the record.
Mr. Chairman, I want to start by telling a story, and it is
the story of a crisis foretold. It begins in the year 2000 when
the international community began to apply pressure on the drug
cartels in Colombia and the drug nexus relocated to Mexico. In
2007, we began to apply pressure in Mexico, and they are even
today relocating to Central America. This year, we begin to
apply pressure in Central America that they will feel in 2012
and 2013.
Mr. Chairman, Senator Rubio, I predict that the criminal
organizations will not retire to run surfing cabanas on the
beach when they are driven out of Central America. They will
look to relocate again, and when they do, their old Caribbean
routes and networks from the 1980s will look very attractive.
Senators, I agree with both of your analyses. We see this
crisis coming. We even have some sense as to when it will
arrive. We have the opportunity and the obligation to prepare
and position ourselves for it.
I realize this is not the best time in our Nation's history
to come before Congress with a huge budget request for a crisis
that has not yet fully materialized, but through the
President's Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, we have
dramatically increased funding for the region, built a regional
coordination mechanism, and identified trafficking, public
security, and social justice as priorities in the region. And
while resources are limited, we know what we need to do.
First, we concentrate on building institutions and
capabilities. Equipment and operations give quick results, but
institutions are the logical targets of drug trafficking
organizations, and we strengthen them with regional
coordination, training, equipment, intelligence exchange, and
access to databases. We must fortify both law enforcement and
rule of law institutions.
Second, we integrate our Caribbean programs into a
comprehensive regional approach. We estimate our fiscal year
2011 funding for CBSI at $77 million, and we get to that number
by combining law enforcement, developmental, security, and
antiterrorism accounts. They are separate appropriations, and
some programs are inherently development or police or security,
but they are all mutually supportive.
Third, we work with and through partners. This is not a
time of surging foreign assistance budgets which makes it all
the more important that we work with other governments and
organizations. Canada and the United Kingdom have serious
programs in the Caribbean, and we coordinate well with them.
The EU, other European governments, the OAS, and the United
Nations are active. We need to leverage our impact by
coordinating with them. Caribbean governments must put their
own resources into these programs. We cannot do it for them.
And we must work as well through existing regional mechanisms.
The Caribbean states have longstanding coordination mechanisms
in CARICOM and the regional security system, and we get better
value for our investment if we work through them.
Mr. Chairman, this is not the first time we have addressed
security challenges in the Caribbean. We have learned some
lessons since the 1980s. We cannot rely on a single tool like
interdiction to address the threat. Coordination is essential.
Regional governments must participate in designing the programs
and invest their own resources in them. Our efforts must be
comprehensive and whole of government. We must be flexible
enough to adapt to the changing tactics of the drug trafficking
organizations themselves.
There are some who are already throwing their hands up in
despair. We heard the same thing in the 1980s. They were wrong
then, and I predict they will be wrong this time as well.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to your
comments and your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Brownfield follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ambassador William R. Brownfield
Chairman Menendez, Senator Rubio, and members of the Subcommittee,
I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the U.S.-Caribbean
Shared Security Partnership and the work the Department of State has
undertaken to address security issues in the region.
I would like to begin my remarks by highlighting the word
``partnership'' in your hearing title, which defines most succinctly
the fundamental underpinning of our hemispheric approach on security.
When President Obama announced the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative
(CBSI) in 2009, he pledged to create a relationship of ``equal
partners'' based on mutual interests and shared values. In the Western
Hemisphere, our major initiatives--Merida, the Central American
Regional Security Initiative (CARSI), the Colombian Strategic
Development Initiative (CSDI), and CBSI--are partnerships that provide
us with the framework to collaborate with other governments and jointly
pursue our overall strategic goal to improve citizen safety and
security. This focus on citizen safety and security partnerships draws
on important lessons learned from our experience with Plan Colombia
where, over time, it became clear that dismantling the drug cartels was
one, but not the only step necessary to reduce crime and strengthen
security. We recognize that only by extending the rule of law,
increasing the reach of the state, and reforming criminal justice
institutions could effective security take root in Colombia. We also
learned that U.S. resources alone would not get the job done, that
strong partners capable of providing the political will and leadership
to undertake the combined security, counternarcotics, rule of law, and
economic development programs are required.
introduction
CBSI is a critical component of our hemispheric approach to counter
a clear trend-line in the pattern of drug trafficking over the past
three decades. Our experience in the region has taught us that we must
apply constant pressure throughout the entire hemisphere in order to
effectively combat trafficking organizations. In the 1980s, traffickers
used the Caribbean as a launch pad to send drugs into Florida and the
gulf coast--until we forced them to retreat back to South America. In
the 1990s, Colombia became the epicenter of trafficking until Plan
Colombia forced a shift to Mexico. In the 2000s, the Merida Initiative
has, in turn, pushed the cartels increasingly into Central America.
Although 90-95 percent of the cocaine from South America now transits
the Central America/Mexico corridor, it is likely that the combined
efforts of Merida and CARSI will force the traffickers to once again
use the Caribbean as a conduit to the U.S. market.
The Caribbean is already suffering from deteriorations in public
safety that cannot be ignored. Rising homicide and crime rates are the
subject of almost daily press reports and have become hot political
issues. According to the UNODC's 2011 Global Study on Homicide, murder
rates in the Caribbean and Central America have increased since 1995,
and are among the highest in the world. Data from 2011 indicates that
Jamaica's murder rate of 50/100,000 is the highest in the Caribbean
followed by St. Kitts and Nevis at 40/100,000 and Trinidad and Tobago
at 35/100,000. The same data indicate that Honduras leads Central
America with an 80/100,000 homicide rate followed by El Salvador at 65/
100,000. By contrast, the U.S. homicide rate for the same year is 5/
100,000. Just as the Caribbean cannot ignore rising crime and violence,
the United States cannot afford to ignore what is happening very close
to our borders. Drug-related crime and violence in the hemisphere
inevitably impacts U.S. security--whether it is youth gangs from
Central America or traffickers from the Dominican Republic--and we have
learned from experience that we need to address the problem at its
source.
the cbsi partnership
CBSI is a partnership that takes a comprehensive approach to
improving citizen security. However, its emphasis on strengthening the
capacity of the Caribbean to respond as a region to the transnational
crime threat makes it unique. Unlike Central America, the Caribbean has
a tradition of pooling limited resources through institutions such as
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the Regional Security System in
the Eastern Caribbean. CBSI is also exceptional in that it is the
product of a cooperative dialogue process between CARICOM, the United
States and the Dominican Republic that began with year-long discussions
that led to an agreement on a framework for cooperation linked to three
CBSI objectives or pillars:
Substantially Reduce Illicit Trafficking;
Increase Public Safety and Security; and
Promote Social Justice.
The framework for cooperation called for the establishment of an
annual high-level Dialogue, a Commission to oversee the implementation
of CBSI and Technical Working Groups to develop projects designed to
meet its objectives. The Technical Working Groups met during the first
6 months of 2011 and brought together our Caribbean partners as well as
the broader international community to collectively reach agreement on
specific projects and to identify priorities going forward. The
dialogue process has proven to be an effective mechanism in creating
and reinforcing the sense of partnership that is critical to the
success of CBSI. At the Second Annual CBSI Dialogue held in Nassau on
November 10, Caribbean nations, in a joint declaration with the United
States, publicly affirmed their commitment to strengthening their
regional institutions and developing and sustaining a coordinated
approach to citizen security. They also expressed appreciation for the
$139 million Congress appropriated in FY10 and FY11 to support
activities in the following areas:
Maritime and Aerial Security Cooperation: Maritime interdiction
operational capacity is a necessary tool for Caribbean nations to
counter narcotics trafficking. As a result of a capacity deficiency,
the United States provided specific interceptor boats and training to
support interdiction operations. Absent the ability to detect
traffickers, interdiction operations are for naught. CBSI is also
supporting the development of the Caribbean Sensor and Information
Integration (CSII) initiative to improve domain awareness and
coordination in the Caribbean by integrating partner nations and U.S.
data into a regional, Web-based network for sharing a common operating
picture on air, maritime, and land activity. As part of this effort,
coastal radars will be installed at strategic locations to provide
greater visibility into illicit trafficking patterns to our partners
through the Joint Task Force-South. The U.S. Coast Guard's Technical
Assist Field team (TAFT), which is based in Puerto Rico and includes
engineers and logistical experts, will also expand to bolster the
maintenance and logistics capabilities of Caribbean maritime forces
under the initiative. What's more, maritime surveillance aircraft from
the RSS in the Eastern Caribbean will be overhauled and upgraded with
new sensors.
Law Enforcement Capacity Building: Many Caribbean nations have
demonstrated the will to expand their capacity to administer justice
under the rule of law, but most do not have the resources or expertise
to train their police and security services. Under CBSI, we plan to
provide training in community-based policing, investigation of money
laundering and financial crimes, and the interdiction of trafficking of
drugs, arms, and bulk cash to Caribbean police managers. To counter
drug trafficking organizations, CBSI provides DEA-led vetted police
units in The Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica with training
equipment and operational support. In addition to specialized training,
our assistance in the region provides specific anticrime technologies
to investigate and apprehend illicit actors. For example, assistance
already provided includes forensics equipment for the collection and
sharing of digital fingerprints and ballistics information. And
building on past efforts by the Royal Canadian Mounted police to train
polygraph examiners, we will partner with Canada to establish a
regional center capable of certifying examiners to international
standards. Anticorruption efforts include the development of policies
and standard operation procedures for internal affairs investigations.
For example, the success of the anticorruption efforts of the Jamaican
Constabulary Force (JCF) will serve as a model for dealing with police
corruption. The JCF has conducted investigations that resulted in the
dismissal of more than 300 police officers on charges of corruption
since the initiative was launched in 2008.
Border/Port Security and Firearms Interdiction: Technology for
inspection and interdiction operations is important, but not effective
without the appropriate training. CBSI provides specific advanced
training on techniques for intercepting smuggled narcotics, weapons,
and other contraband at ports of entry to the very law enforcement and
customs officers who will be responsible for this task. What's more, in
the area of passenger screening we are working to enhance the capacity
of Caribbean nations to identify high-risk travelers and execute
coordinated interdiction operations utilizing the CARICOM Advance
Passenger Information System that was developed in partnership with
DHS. Training and assistance also supports the policing efforts to
seize firearms and secure weapons and ammunition stockpiles for
judicial handling and court procedures.
Justice Sector Reform: At their request, we are helping to reform
and further develop Caribbean criminal justice institutions through our
deployment of regional legal advisors with the Department of Justice.
We are jointly funding a prosecutor from the United Kingdom based in
the Eastern Caribbean who provides technical assistance and training to
judges and prosecutors. And we plan to facilitate the deployment of a
U.S. Department of Justice lawyer to advise selected jurisdictions on
establishing a task force to coordinate efforts on reducing homicides
and violent crime. Separately, through prison assessments and training,
the State Department is helping Caribbean governments reduce
overcrowding and improve prison management strategies.
Crime Prevention and At-risk Youth: Programming in this area
focuses on developing a sustainable approach to juvenile crime by
targeting first-time offenders. We are helping the Caribbean design
education and workforce development services for at-risk youth to
provide an alternative to crime and other harmful behavior. Separate
programming supports drug demand reduction through the training of
treatment and rehabilitation professionals.
cbsi implementation
To assist in the implementation of CBSI, the Department of State
has drawn upon the expertise of our colleagues at U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (Department of Homeland Security), the Office of
Technical Assistance (Department of the Treasury), and the Office of
Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (Department
of Justice) to contribute technical assistance focusing on border
control, antimoney laundering, and criminal justice reform. We have
also secured cooperation with international donors to an unprecedented
level. Through cooperative arrangements with the United Kingdom and
Canada to jointly fund CBSI projects, we are leveraging available tools
to enhance priority capability needs in the Caribbean together. This
coordinated approach ensures that our governments and other
international donors avoid duplication and reduce redtape to deliver
professional skills more quickly. Our arrangement with Canada, which
currently supports the creation of a regional ballistics information
sharing network, will also serve as the vehicle to jointly impart law
enforcement professionalization projects in Jamaica and the Regional
Security System described earlier. We will use our current arrangement
with the United Kingdom to expand our cooperation into additional
criminal justice reform activities.
conclusion
Citizen safety and security in the hemisphere continues to be
threatened by a wide range of criminal organizations; drug related
crime, violence and corruption; and youth gangs. Nevertheless, I am
confident that our focus on strengthening law enforcement and judicial
institutions in the region has put us on the right track toward a
sustainable response. The concept of ``partnership'' is critical to the
success of our efforts to improve citizen security in the hemisphere,
and while CBSI is in the early stages of its implementation, I am
confident that we have created a framework for cooperation that will
serve to strengthen the working relationships we have with the
Caribbean nations to counter the violence that threatens their
communities.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Mr. Benson.
STATEMENT OF RODNEY G. BENSON, CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE, DRUG
ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, WASHINGTON, DC
Mr. Benson. Good morning, Chairman, Ranking Member Rubio.
Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today on DEA's
assessment of illicit drug trends in the Caribbean region. On
behalf of Administrator Leonhart and the men and women of the
Drug Enforcement Administration, thank you for your support.
The Caribbean region continues to be a focus of U.S.
counterdrug efforts. The principal drug threat in the region is
cocaine trafficking. The smuggling and abuse of heroin,
marijuana, and MDMA are also of concern, as is the diversion of
prescription drugs in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.
As the lead U.S. counternarcotics agency, DEA is actively
engaged in addressing all these drug threats.
I understand that the committee is particularly concerned
about the role of the Dominican Republic in the drug trade and
rightly so as the Dominican Republic is the primary Caribbean
transit point for South American cocaine. Through Operation
Broken Bridge initiated in August 2007, DEA successfully
assisted the Dominican Government in its interdiction efforts
against drug-ladened aircraft arriving in Hispaniola from
Venezuela. As a result, traffickers increasingly shifted toward
maritime operations, transporting cocaine loads of 500 to 2,000
kilograms in go-fast boats.
Today, DEA is working closely with our Dominican
counterparts under Operation Seawall to target and disrupt go-
fast activity in the Dominican Republic and the secondary flow
of cocaine from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico.
The Dominican Republic is certainly not the only Caribbean
transit point that traffickers use. They also send cocaine
loads through Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas, Puerto Rico,
and other Caribbean islands.
As for the other drugs of concern in the region, Jamaica is
the primary marijuana producer for the Caribbean, and heroin is
transported from Colombia and Venezuela through the eastern
Caribbean to Puerto Rico and onward to the United States.
Finally, MDMA is transported from Europe through the Caribbean
for either local consumption or for the export to the United
States.
Drug trafficking organizations from Mexico and South
America are attracted to the Caribbean due to its proximity to
both South America and the southern coast of the United States
to include the U.S. territories of Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands. A joint DEA and Dominican operation this past
July led to the arrest of a Mexican national and member of the
Sinaloa Cartel in the Dominican Republic. This trafficker
coordinated cocaine shipped by air from Venezuela to the
Dominican Republic. After the arrest of this individual and his
Dominican associates, several execution style murders took
place in the Dominican Republic, further highlighting concern
over rising rates of violence. Certainly over the past decade,
violence has increased in the region. There have also been very
notable recent spikes of violence. For example, there have been
over 1,050 reported homicides this year alone in Puerto Rico,
many of which are believed to be related to the illicit drug
trade on the island.
Despite the importance of the Caribbean, it is critical to
remember that the vast majority of drugs destined for the
United States still transit Mexico and Central America. DEA
does not see current indications of a large-scale trafficking
shipped back to the Caribbean, but we remain alert and engaged
for such a possibility, particularly as enforcement operations
in Mexico and Central America become increasingly effective.
Our engagement in the Caribbean is a regional one that
takes into account drug flow through the entire hemisphere. The
U.S. Government's counternarcotics strategy is the Drug Flow
Attack Strategy, an innovative multiagency strategy designed to
disrupt the flow of drugs, money, and chemicals between source
zones in the United States. This strategy calls for aggressive
and coordinated enforcement operations in cooperation with host
nation counterparts. DEA is committed to working with our U.S.
agency partners, host nation counterparts, and others in order
to reduce this drug trafficking threat.
I thank you very much for the opportunity to be here today
and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Benson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Rodney G. Benson
introduction
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Rubio, and distinguished members
of the subcommittee, on behalf of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
Administrator Michele M. Leonhart, I want to thank you for your
continued support of the men and women of DEA and the opportunity to
testify about what our Administration is seeing with regard to the
current drug trafficking situation in the Caribbean, counterdrug
operations, and DEA's regional engagement moving forward.
dea in the caribbean
The Drug Enforcement Administration has a unique and challenging
problem set in the Caribbean with both foreign and domestic offices
covering thousands of square miles with hundreds of islands that speak
multiple languages. DEA's Caribbean Field Division, headquartered in
San Juan, has oversight of the island of Puerto Rico, the United States
Virgin Islands (USVI), 27 island nations throughout the Caribbean, and
the countries of Guyana and Suriname in South America. Seven DEA
Caribbean Island Country Offices are located in Barbados, Curacao,
Dominican Republic, Haiti, Jamaica, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago.
DEA's Miami Field Division has oversight of The Bahamas, with the
country office located in Nassau, and a resident office located in
Freeport, Bahamas.
background: the scope of drug trafficking in the caribbean
Given their geographic locations, the Caribbean Islands are
extremely vulnerable to drug trafficking. Historically, significant
quantities of cocaine destined for the United States transited the
Caribbean. Counterdrug successes in the region, coupled with a changing
dynamic between Colombian and Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations
(DTOs), led traffickers to shift transit routes increasingly toward
Mexico and Central America. While the vast majority of drugs destined
for the United States still transit Mexico/Central America, enforcement
action and rising violence in Mexico have begun to lure some
traffickers back to the Caribbean. The illegal drug trade remains a
menace to the public welfare and represents a serious threat to the
rule of law in many Caribbean island nations.
The principal drug threat in the Caribbean region today continues
to be cocaine; however, the smuggling and abuse of heroin, marijuana,
and methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, otherwise known as Ecstasy)
are also of concern. In addition, the diversion, unlawful sale, and
abuse of prescription drugs are a growing threat in Puerto Rico and the
USVI. The increasing levels of drug-related violence in Puerto Rico,
the USVI, and many Caribbean nations is one of the most pressing issues
currently facing regional law enforcement and public officials.
DTOs from Mexico (particularly the Sinaloa Cartel) and South
America are attracted to the Caribbean region due to its proximity to
South America, the southern coast of the United States, and the U.S.
Territories of Puerto Rico and the USVI. Additionally, traffickers take
advantage of the vast Atlantic Ocean for unfettered movement to West
Africa and Europe. Established ties with Caribbean DTOs provide South
American and Mexican traffickers with transportation, security, stash
sites, and other logistical support necessary to manage drug
trafficking operations in the Caribbean.
Cocaine
Cocaine is the primary drug threat in the Caribbean region. The
Caribbean serves as a major transshipment and storage location for
cocaine originating primarily in Colombia (frequently traversing
Venezuela) and destined for the United States, Canada, and Europe.
Cocaine departing South America through the Caribbean follows three
distinct trafficking corridors: (1) the Central Caribbean Corridor,
which includes the islands of Jamaica, The Bahamas, Haiti, the
Dominican Republic, and Cuban territorial waters; (2) the Eastern
Caribbean Corridor which starts in Trinidad and Tobago and moves north
through the Leeward Islands; and (3) the ABC Corridor which includes
the islands of Aruba, Bonaire, and Curacao.
The Dominican Republic remains the main Caribbean transit point of
South American cocaine, although at much lower levels than those
witnessed in 2009 due to a significant disruption of air transportation
activity into Hispaniola. Nonetheless, over half of the cocaine that
currently transits the Caribbean is estimated to flow through the
Dominican Republic.
While drug traffickers use every means at their disposal to move
drugs through these corridors, maritime transportation is the most
commonly used conveyance in the Caribbean Basin. The use of go-fast
boats, capable of carrying 500-2,000 kilograms per trip, is the primary
method used to move loads quickly from South America through the
Central Corridor and between the Caribbean islands. Containerized
cargo--with loads ranging from 50 kilograms up to multitons--is another
maritime trafficking conveyance, as DTOs are able to hide large
quantities of drugs amid legitimate container traffic, making
interdiction extremely difficult without specific intelligence. In
addition, traffickers have recently begun to affix torpedo-shaped tubes
or metal boxes carrying cocaine, heroin, marijuana, MDMA, and bulk cash
to the underside of maritime cargo vessels. Once the vessels arrive at
their destination, divers retrieve the parasitic devices and their
contraband contents. Additional maritime conveyances include local and
commercial fishing vessels, luxury vessels, ferries, and cruise ships.
Finally, due to recent self-propelled 3 semisubmersible (SPSS) seizures
that occurred in 2011 off the coast of Honduras, it is expected that
traffickers will begin exploring this option to carry multiton loads of
cocaine through the Eastern Caribbean.
Traffickers also use commercial and noncommercial aircraft to
smuggle cocaine through the Caribbean. Most notably, departures via
noncommercial aircraft--in both twin and single engine planes--from
Apure, Venezuela, have increased in recent years. Loads are either
airdropped, or traffickers land the planes on clandestine airstrips.
This trend has led to a rise in subsequent cocaine transshipment
through the neighboring Caribbean islands of Aruba and Curacao, the
northern Leeward Islands, and Trinidad and Tobago. Couriers on
commercial aircraft, air cargo, and parcel services are also used to
smuggle cocaine.
Once in the Caribbean, cocaine is repackaged and sent to the United
States or Europe by both air and maritime conveyances. In the Central
Corridor, traffickers send loads through Dominican Republic, Haiti,
Jamaica, and The Bahamas for entry into Puerto Rico and the USVI and
the southeastern portion of the United States. In the Eastern Corridor,
traffickers move loads into Puerto Rico via the USVI, British Virgin
Islands (BVI) and St. Maarten, or directly to Europe. There is also a
threat through the western coastal area of Puerto Rico where drug
shipments are smuggled via maritime conveyances from the Dominican
Republic. Puerto Rico's western and eastern coastal areas continue to
be dominant sites for drug operations. Antigua, in the Leeward Island
chain, has also emerged as a major command and control center for drug
movement.
Marijuana
A secondary threat in the Caribbean is the cultivation and
smuggling of marijuana. Jamaica is the primary marijuana producer for
the Caribbean, and large amounts of marijuana are smuggled out of
Jamaica via go-fast vessels, cargo containers, couriers, and parasitic
devices attached to the hulls of vessels. Marijuana is also smuggled
through overnight and express mail delivery services, such as Federal
Express, DHL, United Parcel Service, and the U.S. Postal Service. While
it may seem counterintuitive, most of the marijuana consumed in Puerto
Rico originates in Mexico. The Mexican marijuana is smuggled into the
United States via the Southwest border and then transported to Puerto
Rico by couriers on commercial airline flights or through commercial
parcel services.
Heroin
Traffickers primarily transport Colombian heroin (often transiting
Venezuela) to Puerto Rico for onward shipment to U.S. cities such as
Miami, New York, and Houston. There are two distinct heroin
transportation routes through the Caribbean: (1) Colombia through the
eastern Caribbean nations of St. Maarten and the Dutch Antilles to
Puerto Rico where loads are broken down prior to being shipped to the
United States; and (2) Venezuela to Aruba and Curacao, a route which
has seen a marked increase in recent usage. Aruba has become an
important transit point for heroin destined to the United States. Like
cocaine, heroin is transported via both air-drop operations and
maritime vessels, including go-fast boats and cruise ships. In some
instances, heroin is comingled with cocaine shipments.
MDMA
Most MDMA transported through the Caribbean is imported from Europe
(particularly the Netherlands and France), Canada, and the Caribbean
island of Guadeloupe via airports, seaports, and mail parcels. Aruba
and Curacao are particularly significant MDMA and precursor chemical
transshipment points in the Caribbean. In addition, MDMA trafficking
through the Dominican Republic has increased during the past 2 years.
MDMA is used for local consumption among tourists and wealthy Dominican
families as well as for export to the United States.
current highlights in the caribbean
In addition to the general drug trafficking trends through the
Caribbean, there are a few specific related factors that merit
particular consideration:
Violence in the Caribbean. While there are many factors
contributing to the rate of violence in the Caribbean, drug
trafficking is one factor of particular concern to DEA.
Puerto Rico. There have been over 1,050 homicides in Puerto Rico
between January and early December 2011. Homicide rates in
Puerto Rico, on average, rank among the highest in the nation.
DTOs, money laundering organizations, and street gangs
habitually use intimidation, violence, and murder to gain or
retain control of the drug markets within the region.
Furthermore, firearms transported into Puerto Rico and the USVI
from the United States, particularly from Florida, are a
significant threat to stability in the region.
Dominican Republic. The Dominican Republic is a popular
transshipment location in the Caribbean for South American and
Mexican cartels. After the arrest of a Sinaloa Cartel member
and his Dominican associates in August 2011, several execution-
style murders took place, intensifying local concern over
rising rates of drug-related violence. The overall homicide
rate in the Dominican Republic has steadily increased, reaching
25 homicides per 100,000 people.
U.S. Virgin Islands. The USVI has also experienced an increase in
violence. The USVI has a higher per capita homicide rate than
most U.S. states, reaching more than 10 times the national
average. The increasing importance of the USVI to drug
traffickers as entry points to the United States, and as
transshipment points to Europe, may facilitate this trend of
drug-related violence.
Trinidad and Tobago. In August 2011, the Prime Minister of
Trinidad and Tobago declared a limited state of emergency
following the murder of 11 people in 4 days. The Prime Minister
attributed these murders to recent drug seizures. Trinidad and
Tobago is a major transshipment point for South American
cocaine destined for Europe and the United States and is also a
significant hub for arms smuggling and money laundering.
Trinidad and Tobago's close proximity to Venezuela and its
well-developed banking and transportation infrastructure make
it a convenient destination for all manner of illegal activity.
The small Caribbean nation has experienced a dramatic rise in
crime over the last few years--although violence this year has
decreased from last year--and is struggling to combat drug-
related violence. A lack of resources and effective laws
continues to hamper counterdrug efforts. The rising crime rate
has become a political issue, as the country's two major
political parties focus on the government's commitment to crime
reduction.
Presence of Mexican Cartels in the Dominican Republic.
Mexican drug trafficking organizations, particularly members of
the Sinaloa Cartel, have established a limited presence in the
Dominican Republic. A recent operation in the Dominican
Republic led to the arrests of Dominican Republic and Mexican
nationals responsible for facilitating drug movement from
Colombia through the Caribbean to Mexico on behalf of the
Sinaloa Cartel. DEA believes the Mexican cartel's presence
within the Caribbean indicates a desire to expand the Mexican
DTOs' market, gain greater control over drug movements, and
avoid the turf wars currently plaguing Mexico and Central
America.
Bulk Currency Smuggling. Bulk currency smuggling through the
Caribbean is the primary method for returning illicit proceeds
to the source zones. Traffickers conceal bulk cash in parcels,
luggage, and via courier, using the same smuggling routes that
are used to move drug loads; i.e., containers, maritime and
noncommercial air shipments. Traffickers also launder illicit
proceeds in order to avoid the risk of moving large amounts of
bulk currency. Preferred money laundering methods in the
Caribbean include purchasing real estate and other tangible
goods like high-end vehicles and jewelry, money remitters,
structured bank deposits, and the black market peso exchange.
dea programs in the caribbean
As in other regions, the U.S. Government's strategy in the
Caribbean is the Drug Flow Attack Strategy, an innovative strategy
leveraging DEA, Department of Defense, other U.S. law enforcement, and
host-nation resources, to combat the illicit trafficking of drugs,
money, and chemicals in the region. This strategy supports the
Caribbean Basin Security Initiative's aims of strengthening maritime/
aerial security, building law enforcement capacity, and strengthening
border/port security. Under the umbrella of this overall strategy, DEA
maintains many effective enforcement programs in the Caribbean, several
of which are highlighted below:
Operation All-Inclusive is a combination of sequential and
simultaneous land, air, maritime, and financial attacks
targeted by DEA intelligence. It involves synchronized
interagency counterdrug operations designed to influence
illicit trafficking patterns and increase disruptions of DTOs.
The Sensitive Investigative Unit (SIU) Program is the
foundation for building effective and trustworthy partner-
nation units capable of conducting complex drug investigations.
There is a DEA-sponsored SIU in the Dominican Republic, as well
as five additional DEA-supported vetted units in the Dominican
Republic dedicated to various facets of investigative and
interdiction activities. In addition, there are also DEA
supported vetted units in several other Caribbean nations. In
lieu of an SIU, DEA is working with the U.S. State Department
to reconfigure the Haitian National Police's antinarcotics unit
as a vetted narcotics task force trained and equipped to
function as a capable counterdrug partner.
Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos (OPBAT) is a DEA-led,
multiagency, multilateral operation for disrupting the flow of
illegal drugs through The Bahamas and Turks and Caicos to the
United States. OPBAT operates under the Three Part (TRIPART)
Agreement among the United States, The Bahamas, and the United
Kingdom; this agreement authorizes OPBAT helicopters and
personnel to conduct counterdrug operations in The Bahamas and
the Turks and Caicos Islands.
Operations Broken Bridge and Seawall. Operation Broken
Bridge, initiated in August 2007, successfully assisted the
Dominican Republic Government in its interdiction efforts
against drug-laden aircraft. This operation served as a
response to the increased number of drug air shipments
transported from Venezuela into Hispaniola. Although this
operation curtailed the aviation threat in the Dominican
Republic, maritime smuggling remains a threat. As a result,
Operation Seawall was initiated in October 2011 as a Dominican
Republic-led operation to target go-fast activity in the
Dominican Republic and the secondary flow of cocaine smuggling
from the Dominican Republic to Puerto Rico.
Judicial Intercept Programs. Communication interception and
exploitation abilities are another great asset that DEA employs
in coordination with several host-nation countries in the
Caribbean.
The Caribbean Corridor OCDETF Strike Force (CCSF) is a
federal multiagency strike force focused on the disruption of
maritime drug trafficking in the Caribbean. The CCSF targets
South American-based DTOs and is located in DEA's San Juan
office.
conclusion: dea's regional engagement moving forward
DEA recognizes that interagency and international collaboration and
coordination are fundamental to our success. We remain committed to
working with our U.S. law enforcement and intelligence partners as well
as with our host-nation counterparts in order to disrupt drug
transportation routes through the Caribbean. Bringing to the criminal
and civil justice systems of the United States, or any other competent
jurisdiction, those organizations and principal members of
organizations involved in the cultivation, manufacture, and
distribution of controlled substances appearing in or destined for
illicit trafficking in the United States remains the core of our focus.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
this important issue. I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Ambassador Ayalde.
STATEMENT OF HON. LILIANA AYALDE, SENIOR DEPUTY
ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN,
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, WASHINGTON, DC
Ambassador Ayalde. Mr. Chairman, Senator Rubio, thank you
for the opportunity to testify today. I appreciate and welcome
this opportunity to share what the U.S. Agency for
International Development is doing to advance citizen security
in the Caribbean. It is an honor to complement the testimony of
my colleagues.
Mr. Chairman, during my tenure working for USAID in the
hemisphere and most recently as U.S. Ambassador to Paraguay, I
have observed with great concern the security situation in this
region. The problem is exacerbated in the Caribbean where very
small economies are confronting frightening levels of drug-
fueled crime and the associated violence.
Over the last 10 years, there has been an alarming
escalation of the homicides in the region. In some countries,
the murder rates doubled or tripled, and Jamaica has one of the
highest murder rates in the hemisphere.
We are especially concerned about the situation of
Caribbean youth who, like their peers in Latin America,
struggle with the high levels of unemployment and are
disproportionate victims and perpetrators of crime. In Jamaica,
for example, 70 percent of homicides are committed by youth
under the age of 30, and in the Dominican Republic, 70 percent
of drug-related arrests, or 17,000 people, are young offenders.
Our mission in the Caribbean and Latin America is to
strengthen the capacity of the region's governments, civil
society, and private sector to improve citizen security,
governance, and economic growth. We recognize that we will not
be successful in advancing these development goals if we do not
help our neighbors get a handle on the security problem.
So through the President's Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative, USAID is working with our Caribbean partners and
other donors on youth-focused crime prevention programs. These
are designed to get at the root causes of crime and to generate
long-term solutions to juvenile crime in the Caribbean.
We are doing so alongside our colleagues from INL, DEA, and
other U.S. Government agencies. Evidence from successful
anticrime strategies implemented in cities like L.A., New York,
and Rio and the improvements I have personally witnessed in
cities Medellin during my tenure in Colombia tells us that
effective crime reduction happens when law enforcement actions
are paired with community-based crime prevention, workforce
development, and violence reduction programs.
Our investments build stronger and safer communities where
youth and their families can live in peace and have access to
greater educational and job opportunities. With our support,
youth in Antigua and Barbuda receive relevant job training and
internships with local businesses. The poor inner-city
communities in Jamaica are working closely with the police to
improve security, and at-risk youth in Santiago and Santo
Domingo are tapping into informal education and job training
opportunities.
We are already having success with these interventions. For
instance, USAID's A Ganar project, a sports-based, workforce
development program cofunded by Nike and Microsoft, has
successfully placed eastern Caribbean youth in internships and
jobs. In 2011, 85 percent of the students who completed the
program obtained a job, went to school, or started a business.
We embrace this model for youth development because it creates
employment for youth and leverages the private sector resources
to supplement our investments.
We also collaborate with local governments and civil
society to reform juvenile justice systems in the Caribbean and
craft policies to address youth crime in the long term. For
example, we are helping Caribbean legal authorities to
introduce early intervention for at-risk youth, alternative
sentencing for young offenders, and the separation of juveniles
from adults in correctional facilities.
CBSI not only enables USAID to ramp up our crime prevention
investment, it also helps target all our programs in a country
toward preventing crime. In fact, I witnessed this firsthand
during my recent visit to the Dominican Republic. Our bilateral
programs to train teachers and link small producers to
lucrative markets contribute to building stronger communities
that offer youth viable alternatives to crime.
In addition, CBSI has helped the members of the Caribbean
Community, CARICOM, and the Dominican Republic work together
with support from USAID and other donors to draft and implement
a regional security strategy, share best practices, coordinate
implementation, and refine priorities. This regional
cooperation is crucial because no one island can take on this
region's well-armed and well-organized criminal outfits on
their own.
Nor can a single subregion make headway in the absence of
complementary efforts underway in other parts of our
hemisphere. That is why our investments in the Caribbean are
matched by the work being done in CARSI in Central America and
Mexico's Merida Initiative.
Just as no one country or region can solve the citizen
security challenge on their own, neither can a single donor.
The United States Government can help, but the primary
responsibility lies with the national governments.
CBSI's success is in the interest of the United States.
The Caribbean Basin, with its open seas and porous island
borders, is a major transit route for illegal trafficking of
all sorts. And given our geographical and cultural ties, the
crime that afflicts those countries eventually flows to us.
Finally, CBSI helps deter the illegal activity and violence
that saps the resources, creativity, and dynamism of youth and
the communities on both sides of the Caribbean Sea, whether
they be in Jamaica, the country, or Jamaica, Queens in New
York.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the committee's
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Ayalde follows:]
Prepared Statement Ambassador Liliana Ayalde
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
invitation to testify today. I appreciate and welcome this opportunity
to share what the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is
doing to advance security and citizen safety in the Caribbean. It is an
honor to testify with my colleagues, Ambassador William Brownfield of
the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs and Rodney Benson of the Drug Enforcement
Administration.
Mr. Chairman, during my experience working for USAID in the
hemisphere for the last 30 years, and most recently serving as the U.S.
Ambassador to Paraguay, I have observed with great concern the security
situation in this region. The problem is exacerbated in the Caribbean,
where very small economies are confronting frightening levels of drug-
fueled crime and the associated violence.
Over the last 10 years, there has been an alarming escalation of
homicides in the region: in St. Kitts and Nevis, increasing from 5 to
40 per 100,000 inhabitants in the period 2001-2011, in Trinidad and
Tobago, increasing from 9 to 35 per 100,000 in the same period; and
Jamaica has the highest rate in the region with 50 murders per 100,000
inhabitants. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
calculates that the high homicide rate in Jamaica has decreased GDP per
capita by 5.4 percent.
To complicate the picture, in Jamaica, 70 percent of homicides are
committed by youth under the age of 30. And in the Dominican Republic,
70 percent of drug-related arrests (or 17,000 people) are young
offenders.
We at USAID are especially concerned about the situation of
Caribbean youth, who like their peers in Latin America, are struggling
with high levels of unemployment, are disproportionate victims and
perpetrators of crime, and are increasingly anxious about their future.
These statistics highlight the need to target youth and young adults
with programs that can prepare them for life.
Our mission in the Caribbean and Latin America is to strengthen the
capacity of the region's governments, civil society, and private sector
to improve citizen security, governance, and economic growth. We
recognize that we will not be successful in advancing this development
goal if we do not help our neighbors get a handle on the security
problem.
Our agency's citizen security programs in the Caribbean focus,
therefore, on addressing the development challenges posed by the
escalating crime and violence. We know that crime erodes citizens'
confidence in government and weakens public institutions; violence
deters investment and economic opportunity; and citizens are left with
few licit alternatives.
So through the Obama administration's Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative (CBSI), USAID is working with our Caribbean partners and
other donors on youth-focused crime prevention programs, designed to
get at the root causes of crime and lead to long-term solutions to
juvenile crime in the Caribbean.
And we are doing so alongside our colleagues from INL, DEA, and
other U.S. Government agencies. Because the evidence from the
successful anticrime strategies implemented in cities like Los Angeles,
Chicago, New York, and Rio de Janeiro--and the improvements I witnessed
personally in cities like Medellin during my time as Mission Director
in Colombia (2005-2008)--tells us that effective crime reduction
happens when law enforcement actions are paired with community-based
crime prevention, workforce development, and violence reduction
programs.
Our investments through CBSI are helping build stronger and safer
communities where youth can live in peace and have access to greater
educational and job opportunities. With our support, the youth at the
Gilbert Agricultural Rural Development Centre (GARDC) in Antigua and
Barbuda receive relevant job training and internships with local
businesses; the Grants Pen community in Kingston, Jamaica, is working
closely with the police to identify and address safety and security
problems; and out-of-school children and at-risk youth in Santiago, the
Dominican Republic, are being provided with informal education
opportunities and job skills training.
These kinds of interventions have been previously tested and proven
to address the vulnerabilities of youth in the Caribbean. USAID's ``A
Ganar,'' a public-private alliance which is a sports-based workforce
development program, has been successful in placing vulnerable youth in
jobs and other productive activities. In 2011, 85 percent of students
who completed the ``A Ganar'' program obtained a job, went back to
school, or started a business. The best aspect of this initiative is
that by working in collaboration with the private sector, we can
leverage resources and develop sustainable models for youth
development.
In the area of juvenile justice, USAID is working closely with
national and municipal governments and civil society to promote
juvenile justice reform and craft policies that can address youth crime
in the long term. Examples include working with the relevant legal
authorities to introduce early interventions with at-risk youth and
alternative sentencing for young offenders, as well as separating
juveniles from adults within a country's correctional system.
Our Caribbean programs have always sought to create more
opportunities for the poor and the vulnerable, and CBSI has allowed
USAID to replicate and expand successful activities that prevent crime
by building stronger communities and supporting at-risk youth.
CBSI has helped target our programs, not just those that fall under
the rubric of ``citizen security,'' toward strengthening communities
and improving alternatives for youth. In fact, during my recent visit
to the Dominican Republic I witnessed first-hand how USAID's entire
portfolio supports local efforts to prevent crime. Our bilateral
programs to train teachers provide out-of-school youth with conflict
resolution techniques, link small producers to lucrative markets and
support the development of a fully operational and politically
independent national Office of the Public Defender with representation
in 22 out of 31 provinces; all contribute to building more resilient
communities. All of our missions have been instructed to make sure that
they are orienting large portions of their portfolios to addressing
this pressing challenge.
In addition, CBSI has helped the islands of the Caribbean Community
(CARICOM) and the Dominican Republic work together to draft and
implement a regional security strategy.
Regional coordination under CBSI includes a USAID-led technical
working group focused on crime prevention efforts, which has provided a
forum for our Caribbean partners to share best practices, coordinate
implementation, and refine priorities. This coming year, we hope to use
the CBSI working groups to further engage civil society and strengthen
public-private partnerships targeting these issues. This kind of
regional cooperation is a crucial component of CBSI because no one
island can take on the region's well-armed and well-organized criminal
outfits on their own.
Nor can a single subregion make headway in the absence of
complementary efforts underway in other parts of our hemisphere. That
is why the Obama administration's investments in the Caribbean are
being matched by the work being done in Central America through the
Central American Regional Security Initiative (known as CARSI) and
Mexico's Merida Initiative.
Moreover, other donors are currently complementing USAID's citizen
security investments in the Caribbean. For instance, UNICEF is funding
juvenile justice programming in the Eastern Caribbean; and the European
Union is supporting poverty reduction in Jamaica.
Just as no one country or region can solve the citizen security
challenge on their own, neither can a single donor. The U.S. Government
can help, but the primary responsibility lies with national
governments.
The CBSI is not charity. The Caribbean and the United States
security challenges are intertwined. The Caribbean Basin with its open
seas and porous island borders is a major transit route for illegal
trafficking of all sorts. The crime and violence that afflict those
islands eventually flows northward to the United States. And the drug
trade and associated violence drain the resources and dynamism out of
communities on both sides of the Caribbean--whether they be Jamaica the
country, or Jamaica, Queens, in New York.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the committee's
questions.
Senator Menendez. Thank you very much, Ambassador. Thank
you all.
There are a lot of questions here, so let me start off with
Ambassador Brownfield.
Do you believe that we have a comprehensive, multiagency,
hemispheric-wide counternarcotics policy to address the
challenges and threats from the different regions within the
hemisphere? And if your answer to that is yes, then I would
like to know who is formulating this policy and who is in
charge of carrying it out.
Ambassador Brownfield. That is an absolute----
Senator Menendez. If you put the microphone on, I would
appreciate it.
Ambassador Brownfield. My loud and annoying voice often
carries, Mr. Chairman, even without the assistance of a
microphone. I hear that from my spouse with considerable
regularity.
Mr. Chairman, my answer to your question, as usual, will be
two-part. I will say, first, I believe we have a
comprehensive--comprehensible, multiagency approach and process
for addressing this issue. That, of course, was not your
question.
Your question was, do we have a policy, and I would say on
that, this is a work in progress. We have a structure that we
have put together. It is a structure whereby at least once a
year we meet at ministerial level with each of the governments
in the region, us and the other international players in this.
More than once a year, we meet at the next level down, the
commission, which is what they would call the permanent
secretary level, to set the agenda, if you will, for the
ministerial meeting. And below that, we meet as often as
necessary, and frequently three or four times a year, in
technical working groups to address these issues among
ourselves.
Within the U.S. Government itself, we have an interagency
process whereby we prepare for each level of those
international meetings. We operate on the basis of the three
core principles that you described in your own opening
statement that drive our participation in CBSI, addressing
illicit trafficking, addressing citizen security, and
addressing social justice.
So we have an umbrella policy, and we have, I think, an
unusually successful process to try to put meat on the bones of
that policy. But I do assert, claim, and accept in response to
your probable followup question that we still owe you greater
detail and greater specificity in terms of what this policy is.
Senator Menendez. Well, Ambassador, I appreciate your
answer, but I take it to say we do not quite have a hemispheric
policy because it is a work in progress, which means we do not
have any policy that is final. Is that a fair statement?
Ambassador Brownfield. That would be a fair summary.
Senator Menendez. And therefore, if we do not have a policy
that is final, we do not have a policy yet. The question is,
who is working to develop that policy? When will we expect a
policy to exist? And who is the individual who is going to be
in charge of carrying out that policy?
Ambassador Brownfield. Fair enough.
First, within the executive branch, as you know, we have an
interagency process that is managed or at least coordinated out
of the White House and the National Security staff. Their
principal players in terms of working toward a single,
coherent, comprehensive Caribbean policy would be your beloved
Assistant Secretary of State for INL attempting to manage the
foreign assistance side of drugs and law enforcement, the
Western Hemisphere Bureau of the Department of State managing
the overall policy side of the approach. The distinguished lady
seated two seats to my right obviously handles the
developmental side: social, economic, and other elements that
we traditionally associate with developmental. Not present with
us today are the representatives of the armed forces and
specifically the U.S. Southern Command who has a piece of this.
Our counterterrorism colleagues have a piece of this in terms
of the NADR funding which goes into certain areas such as
firearms which are important in the region. That is the process
by which we are getting there. It is coordinated at the top by
the National Security staff.
Senator Menendez. Well, that sounds to me like a recipe
where we are not going to get to where we need to be anytime
soon.
Let me ask you this. You know, we talk about the Caribbean
as a transit flow, maybe not as great as it once was, but I am
fearful of what is and what could be again. A lot of this
transit is from Venezuela. Do you think the Venezuelan
Government is doing anything to prevent drug trafficking? They
seem to be using Trinidad and Tobago with impunity, also using
the Dominican Republic for overflights. And we have seen recent
reports of Hezbollah working with drug cartels in the region.
So as the starting point, of which a lot of this comes through,
what can you tell me about that?
Ambassador Brownfield. Mr. Chairman, you are going to tease
a headline out of me, but I will try to use my words and select
my words judiciously.
When I look at the air tracks that are provided to us by
that part of the U.S. Government, the Joint Interagency Task
Force South, headquartered in Key West, FL, that attempts to
track the movement both maritime and air of illicit product
coming up from South America, the overwhelming majority of the
air tracks do come out of Venezuela. It would not, I think, be
a surprise to you to learn that we have at this stage very
minimal cooperation between the United States Government and
its constituent parts and the Government of the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela. There are a few case-specific areas
where we have cooperated, but that relationship has in
practical terms not worked probably for about 4 or 5 years. It
is a challenge. It is a problem.
The approach we have attempted to take in a strategic sense
is to build work-arounds to strengthen the periphery around
Venezuela in an effort to control, monitor, and if possible
reduce the flow of product that----
Senator Menendez. So if I asked the Venezuelan Government
if it was doing anything to prevent drug trafficking, your
answer would be yes, no, not very much, somewhat. What would be
the answer?
Ambassador Brownfield. My answer would be they are doing
very little in terms of cooperating with us to reduce flow.
They assert they are doing great things. I am not in a position
to express a view on that. I have an inherent bit of skepticism
on the point.
Senator Menendez. Well, if you had worldwide for the State
Department and our Government this issue, surely you would have
a view as to their cooperation. Your cooperation is nonexistent
with us. The question is, are they doing anything on their own
to actually impede this. And I would like to turn to Mr. Benson
for an answer before I turn to Senator Rubio. If all of or a
very large number of these flights laden with drugs are coming
out of Venezuela, I've got to believe the Venezuelans are not
doing very much in this regard.
Ambassador Brownfield. I would agree with you 100 percent.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Benson, could you give us some
insights from DEA's perspective?
Mr. Benson. Senator, clearly Venezuela is evolving into a
major transshipment point for cocaine moving into Central
America and also moving into the Caribbean. As the Ambassador
noted, the cooperation that we have with the Venezuelan
Government is limited. And our strategy is to look at those
criminal organizations that are operating in Venezuela and
Central America, as well as Colombia and the region, and target
them and dismantle them. But clearly, the role of Venezuela as
a transshipment point is growing in significance by the week.
Senator Menendez. I have several other questions, but I
will turn to Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think the first question maybe is of Ambassador
Brownfield, but it could be of all three of you really. You
note in your testimony that the violence is among the highest
in the world. The murder rates are high in Jamaica, St. Kitt's,
Nevis, Trinidad and Tobago, even Puerto Rico. We will talk
about that in a moment. But drug trafficking in the United
States or the Caribbean has decreased over the last 10 years.
And I think you touched upon it a little bit in all of your
testimonies. But how do we coincide the rise in violence but
lower in the amount of drugs being shipped through the region?
What is it that is driving the increase in the murder rate and
then the violent crime in conjunction with this decline in the
flow that is coming through the area? How do you coincide the
two things?
Ambassador Ayalde. There has been the recession in the
region, and the economy has certainly had an impact in the
unemployment. That is precisely why we are focusing on the
youth because those are the ones that have been impacted by
this economic situation. Obviously, the tourism has been
affected, and all of that has a way of decreasing job
opportunities.
Ambassador Brownfield. I will add to that, Senator, at
least a little bit. My testimony, which in fact I completely
and utterly believe, is one, that we are correct. Over the last
20 years and certainly over the last 10 years the amount of
illicit drugs that are transiting through the Caribbean have
gone down. They have gone down dramatically, and I would add
they have gone down dramatically because of our efforts, those
of the U.S. Government, to control this flow.
Second, I also genuinely believe that the handwriting is on
the wall. We can see the train. It is coming down the tracks.
They will return. And they have left some structure and some
infrastructure behind. Some of that is what is driving things
such as homicide rates today. In other words, the same people,
the same organizations, the same businesses, and to a certain
extent, the same officials who were corrupted in the 1980s and
the 1990s are still there. They are still capable of doing the
same sort of things they were doing back then. Among those
would be homicide and general violent crimes. And that is why
my own conclusion is we know we are going to have to deal with
this crisis again. It is in our interest. In fact, it would be
the height of folly and stupidity for us not to prepare for it
now and in advance.
Senator Rubio. I want to turn my attention to Puerto Rico
because that is a domestic security obligation that we have. I
was there earlier in the year and I heard about this, and
obviously the situation has continued. I think it is over 1,000
homicides this year.
What is our strategic partnership? What are our efforts?
Describe to me that situation and what we are doing in
conjunction with the government there and the governor and his
office to tackle this. First of all, is the increase in the
homicide rate there and the violence directly linked to drug-
related violence?
And second, what is our comprehensive approach to that? Are
we reexamining that situation? You know, this is a domestic
obligation of ours. This is not another country. This is under
our jurisdiction, and these are American citizens. And so what
is our plan there? How are we working that? How is that
developing? Are we looking at some new things that we can do?
Mr. Benson. Senator, we see a lot of that violence
occurring in San Juan and a lot of the murders that I mentioned
occurring in those housing projects, and it is drug-related,
street-level distribution. Our best way to tackle that, working
with our partners in Puerto Rico, is to attack the organization
responsible for distributing drugs, bringing in those loads
into Puerto Rico, and then looking at that distribution chain
and building cases against them and then attacking the
organization.
Senator Rubio. I am sorry to interrupt you. What I wanted
to find out, because you touched on it and I will forget to ask
you, is Puerto Rico both a domestic consumption issue and a
distribution point? Does it have both of these elements?
Because at the street level, they are probably distributing to
domestic consumption. Right?
Mr. Benson. We see organizations bringing in larger loads
of cocaine and heroin into Puerto Rico. Some of that is for
domestic consumption there, and then----
Senator Rubio. How serious of a domestic problem do they
have consumption-wise?
Mr. Benson [continuing]. Consumption is----
Senator Rubio. Similar to the rest of the country?
Mr. Benson [continuing]. Is significant. That as a U.S.
territory, I would say it needs to address. But then also we
see a lot of that cocaine and heroin then moving into the
United States up the eastern seaboard.
Senator Rubio. Their consumption problem is comparable to
other--like San Juan's to other major U.S. cities, comparable
to what I would see in Miami or----
Mr. Benson. I do not have the consumption statistics, but
consumption is occurring and there is street-level distribution
in the projects there and there is a lot of violence.
Senator Rubio. I guess my point is cocaine comes into Miami
where I live. Right? And then it is distributed to street-level
organizations that sell it to people there. It is kind of the
same process that we are seeing in San Juan, for example. And
then in addition to that, it is also a transit point. Correct?
Mr. Benson. Yes, Senator. We see then cocaine and heroin
leaving Puerto Rico and then getting moved into the United
States into south Florida all the way up the eastern seaboard
into New York and other cities.
Senator Rubio. So what they face in Puerto Rico today is
similar to what we saw in south Florida in the 1980s in terms
of a transit point, an entry point from the Caribbean on. What
is the route that that usually services? From Puerto Rico, the
route is toward the eastern seaboard?
Mr. Benson. Primarily. Primarily we see those loads of
cocaine and heroin then moving up into south Florida. So it
does serve as a transit area, a transshipment point, but then
also there is that local distribution as well.
Senator Rubio. Is there a resource problem in Puerto Rico?
Do their law enforcement agencies have a resource problem in
terms of dealing with the complexity of this? I thought I read
somewhere there was even submarine activity. Is that correct?
Submersible vehicles?
Mr. Benson. We have seen the trafficking organizations
shift. We have seen them use air. We have addressed that
threat. Then we see go-fast boat activity. We have seen as well
innovative approaches such as semisubmersible submarines.
Senator Rubio. I guess my point is they are not using
Jacksonville, FL, or other places, nor do I want them to, by
the way. But my point is that they are not using these places
for a reason. Is there some specific vulnerability in Puerto
Rico's capabilities that they are exploiting? And at the end of
the day, is that a resource problem that needs to be addressed?
Do they just not have good resources on the island to deal with
some of these law enforcement----
Mr. Benson. I mean, I could get back to you with a number
on the staffing level of the Puerto Rican state police.
Senator Rubio. Yes, please.
Mr. Benson. Our staffing has been constant over the last
several years. So that really has not--we have kept our full
complement of resources throughout the Caribbean.
Senator Rubio. I guess the last point I would make is if
this criminal activity were happening in Jacksonville people
would be screaming about it right now. I just want to make sure
from not just the administration but from the congressional
perspective that we are paying just as much attention to it
because Puerto Rico is a domestic responsibility of ours. It is
not another country. And so I want to make sure that we are
giving it the attention it deserves both resourcewise and
publicly. So I look forward to exploring with your office what
we can do on our end on the congressional level to ensure that
we are providing them the resources they need to address this
problem.
Thank you.
Senator Menendez. Thank you, Senator Rubio.
I have another round of questions here.
I am particularly concerned within the context of the
Caribbean about the Dominican Republic, and I would like to ask
Mr. Benson to help us understand what is happening. I am
particularly concerned about the substantial increase in
narcotics consumption and trafficking in the DR, as well as the
presence of international crime syndicates reportedly,
including Mexican and Colombian cartels, as well as mafia-
affiliated entities from Venezuela, Russia, and even Albania.
In just the last few weeks, there have been reports from France
and Puerto Rico documenting significant finds of narcotics
coming from the DR.
Can you comment for the committee on the growth in the
narcotics trade in the DR, how it is entering and leaving the
country, what effect corruption has on our ability to address
this growing problem and reform the police? So let us start
with an oversight on the Dominican Republic.
Mr. Benson. Senator, the Dominican Republic, as we look at
it from a targeting point of view, plays a major role as a
transshipment point for those drug trafficking organizations.
We see loads of cocaine and heroin moving up into the Dominican
Republic. We saw utilization of aircraft. We see go-fast boat
activity bringing loads of cocaine. We see containerized cargo
moving up into the DR. It is still probably the most
significant transit point for criminal organizations to take
those loads of cocaine and then we see it move from that point
to the United States. We see also significant loads of cocaine
leave the Dominican Republic and also then move to Europe as
well. So it is a critical spot for us to work with our
counterparts in the Dominican Republic from a targeting
strategy point of view, and we do that every day.
There are issues of corruption in the Dominican Republic,
and then there is also great partnerships and counterparts that
we work with every day to get the job done.
Our targeting strategy there is effective. One thing we are
trying to do is build throughout the Caribbean additional
information and intelligence exchange with all of the nations
there in Caribbean to build that more robust targeting
approach, and that is how we see us going forward in the future
from DEA looking at the Dominican Republic, Haiti as well, with
the overall goal of dismantling those criminal organizations.
Senator Menendez. When you and I spoke--and you mentioned
this in your response to Senator Rubio's previous question--you
talked about submersibles. Could you expound upon that? It
seems to be a relatively new but growing mechanism that they
are using to try to ship drugs to the United States.
Mr. Benson. We clearly see drug trafficking organizations
changing their tactics in response to the successful operations
that we have. So they have, over the period of the last few
years, begun to utilize semisubmersible submarines, fully
submersible submarines as well, to transport larger quantities
of cocaine being constructed in South America and then being
utilized to move narcotics up into Central America and Mexico.
Senator Menendez. Now, I read just a few days ago the
statements of one of the Presidential candidates in the
Dominican Republic who stated, ``We are at the risk of
converting ourselves into a narcostate,'' and then went on to
cite a series of cases which are pretty alarming if they, in
fact, are true, and maybe, Ambassador Brownfield, you can help
us with this as well as Mr. Benson. He cites the cases of
former army captain, Quirino Ernesto Paulino Castillo, who
operated within the military structure, recalling that the navy
had guided and transported drug shipments instead of protecting
the marine frontier.
He also spoke about someone--and maybe, Mr. Benson, you
could help us with this, as well as Ambassador Brownfield--Jose
David Figueroa Agosto having an ID card from DNA, which is
Dominican National Intelligence, and was supposedly guarded by
police colonels, as well as having official license plates.
Those are just some of a series of examples that have existed.
Could you talk about those individuals and/or challenges?
Mr. Benson. There is clearly, as you noted, Senator,
corruption, but our approach is to work with those members of
the Dominican police forces that we have a history of working
with. As you know, we do have a very robust, sensitive
investigation unit that has achieved many operational
successes. So as we look from a targeting and intelligence-
sharing point of view, we are always cognizant that corruption
does exist there, as well as other places, but we approach it
in a way where we still are able to put very significant
operations and cases together to achieve those results that we
need to achieve.
Senator Menendez. Well, I appreciate that the DEA is
working as best it can in this environment with vetted entities
and units or individuals. My question, however, is to try to
get to a broader understanding. Maybe, Ambassador Brownfield,
you can help us with this because at the end of the day, do you
know who Jose Figueroa Agosto is?
Ambassador Brownfield. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to
offer a specific view on a specific case. I have heard the
name, but in my case I have heard it mostly through media
reporting. But I do not question in any way what you have just
read.
You asked earlier about a policy, and let me give you a
sense of the four core elements of INL's counternarcotics
approach and policy.
Senator Menendez. With all due respect, we covered that
ground before. I want to discuss specifics about what is
happening in the Dominican Republic.
Do you know Jose Figueroa Agosto?
Ambassador Brownfield. I do not, no.
Senator Menendez. I mean, do you know----
Ambassador Brownfield. I mean, I do not know him.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Not personally know him, but
do you know of his case?
Ambassador Brownfield. No.
Senator Menendez. Is it fair to say, Mr. Benson, that he
has ties? Clearly is he not under our arrest and in the midst
of prosecution?
Mr. Benson. What I know about Mr. Figueroa, Senator, was he
was a drug trafficker. He was ultimately arrested back in July
of 2010 in Puerto Rico and is awaiting trial.
Senator Menendez. Did he not act within the Dominican
Republic before he was caught in Puerto Rico?
Mr. Benson. He was in the Dominican Republic as a
trafficker, and there were attempts to apprehend him, and then
ultimately he was arrested in Puerto Rico.
Senator Menendez. And let me ask you, Ambassador
Brownfield. Are you familiar with the fact that we have
canceled a series of visas of persons from the Dominican
Republic, as well as officials from the Dominican Republic,
because of issues of corruption and narcotrafficking?
Ambassador Brownfield. Yes. I mean, most of them would have
been canceled as a result of decisions made within the INL's
crime office in terms of the corruption provision in the
statute.
Senator Menendez. And do you know that specifically in the
context of the Dominican Republic that we have, in fact,
canceled a series of visas because of those concerns?
Ambassador Brownfield. Yes.
Senator Menendez. Because I note that there is an article
where the United States Ambassador in the Dominican Republic,
while not referring to a specific case, talks about a series of
visas that have been canceled.
So my concern is that we can make all the efforts we want.
I am using the Dominican Republic by way of example. But it
sounds like in the case of DEA's challenge, enormous as it is,
in some cases you have to work around these governmental
entities where some of the highest levels of the government
seem to be corrupted by the drug traffickers, and that is a
huge challenge. Is that fair to say?
Ambassador Brownfield. It is very fair to say and it is a
core element. The corruption element is a core part of what we
are trying to do in the DR.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Benson, let me ask you, using again
the Dominican Republic by way of example. It is a major
shipping, normal shipping, port. It has two major, significant
ports. A lot of shipping goes to Europe. A lot of shipping
comes to the United States to my home port in New Jersey.
I have read a series of articles and concerns in which the
basis of the cargo inspection, the basis of some of those ports
being used where there is no inspection, or after an inspection
takes place, the door is changed where the seal has been
issued, which is sort of like our guarantee that in fact what
has been inspected there is legitimate and able to come to the
United States. And then the door is changed and moved to
another container where ultimately what is in there is illicit
drugs. There may be other items as well.
Can you talk to the committee a little bit about that?
Mr. Benson. Well, clearly the drug trafficking
organizations have recognized that the ports are a place where
they can move shipments of drugs to the United States and
Europe.
The major port there, the Dominican port, Casedo--and then
there are 15 or so other smaller ports. We clearly have
investigations tied to activity there. We work with our
sensitive investigative units at targeting what is moving
through those ports. There are issues, Senator, as you
mentioned, with port security that needs to be looked at. But
we continue to work with those trusted partners at targeting
those organizations responsible for movement of drugs through
the ports there.
Senator Menendez. And finally, yesterday a Dominican paper
reported on the visit to the United States of the Dominican
drug czar, Rolando Rosado, to discuss the creation of what he
described as a maritime wall. Can you comment on that?
Mr. Benson. We have an operation called Operation Seawall
that is looking at maritime activity both from the interdiction
focus, but in every piece of this, as the Ambassador mentioned,
it is not just interdiction. We are looking at the entire
organization, those responsible for movement, those
transportation specialists, but then also targeting the
leadership responsible in tracing those loads of cocaine all
the way back down to Colombia because that is what we have to
do, Senator. We have to look at the source zone, the transit
zone, and the arrival zone in places like New Jersey and many,
many other places that are negatively being impacted by these
shipments of cocaine and heroin. So it is a broad-ranging
approach, but it is looking at the source, transit, and
arrival.
Senator Menendez. And finally, Ambassador Brownfield, I
want to talk about funding. I see the administration asking for
less funding for CBSI in fiscal year 2012. The question is why.
And then I see overall INL funding significantly lower, from
$565 million versus $701 million. I recognize Merida may be
part of that decrease attributed to the decrease in Merida
funding for large equipment purposes, but I see our challenge
growing beyond the Caribbean. Can you give the committee a
sense as to why we are headed in the opposite direction when
our challenge is growing?
Ambassador Brownfield. Yes, Mr. Chairman. That said, I am a
team player and I accept that I am part of a larger team and I
am not the quarterback of that team and I do not call the
plays.
What we have asked for is what has finally been approved in
a complicated budgetary process, managed first within the
Department of State and then in a larger sense from the White
House in terms of the administration's and the President's
budget request to you.
I have been led to believe that we are operating in an
environment where the expectation is we will take an absolute
cut in our core budgets and we must get to that cut. I am
operating in an environment where each of the regions where I
am called upon to support programs take a percentage cut. So my
global budget number is driven down, and then I have to get
within a region-by-region or geographic region-by-region number
as well. This is driving the number that has been brought
before you.
You have not asked, but if you were to ask would I in a
more perfect world like and be able to make excellent use of a
larger budget, of course I would. That said, I go back to my
starting point. I am a team player. I will accept the number
that the quarterback finally tells me or the coach calls in in
terms of the play. And that is the best answer I can give you
right now.
Senator Menendez. Well, I appreciate being a team player. I
appreciate, more importantly, however, the role in informing
Congress of the underlying decisions for public policy. Is it
fair to say that the reductions that we are seeing here are
going to have consequences in terms of the fight that we need
to continue?
It seems to me we are spending an enormous amount of money
along the border between the United States and Mexico just to
intercede people who would come over, but yet the underlying
challenge is there in Central America, in the Caribbean which,
while reduced in terms of transiting, can easily be the place
that it goes back to when we squeeze. At the end of the day, it
is along Central America. We squeeze there and now we see the
Caribbean which is very porous, has water frontiers versus land
frontiers. That challenge is, at the end of the day, going to
be one that is not fully met. Is that fair to say?
I am not asking you whether you are a team player or not. I
appreciate that you are. But I want to know as the chair of
this subcommittee that, in fact, is it not going to be more
difficult for us to meet our challenges with the reductions
that we are seeing taking place.
Ambassador Brownfield. Mr. Chairman, as I said in my
statement, I see a crisis coming and I believe our challenge is
going to get greater in the coming years. It is my view right
now that Congress has been generous over the last 2 years. We
actually do have a substantial amount of funding in the
pipeline. You have a reasonable expectation that I should be
able to deliver concrete, measurable results in the course of
this coming year in that regard. You have an equal right to
expect from me an explanation as to how much more I truly and
genuinely need for the post-2012 timeframe. I am trying to work
four initiatives at the same time: Plan Colombia, Merida in
Mexico, CARSI in Central America, and CBSI. You have a right to
expect me to offer you my best possible judgment in terms of
how we can work those four initiatives simultaneously and
within realistic expectations of what the U.S. Senate and
Congress can offer us by way of resources.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Benson, if we had greater resources,
could you not deploy them effectively in your singular mission?
Mr. Benson. Senator, we have a strong footprint in the
Caribbean, but if we had additional resources, we could always
deploy those resources to target that threat.
Senator Menendez. And here is my point. There is no
question that we have to cut our national debt. There is no
question that we have to meet our challenges. We have to do
that intelligently while still meeting what I perceive as
national security challenges. I unfortunately have seen too
many families in which a child becomes addicted to a drug, and
that is devastating for not only that child but that family. I
see too many murders take place on the streets of the cities
that I have the privilege of representing, and a fair number of
that is related to drug trafficking.
So I do not want to be obfuscated by the fog of ``let us
cut at any cost'' when in fact there are some things for which
the national interest and security of the United States still
calls for. And I believe this is a field. It is a field that I
intend to work very vigorously on in our jurisdiction of global
narcotics and to try to help build so that we can meet that
challenge. And I will appreciate honest answers to what it is
that we need in order to get there.
So with that, I understand Senator Rubio does not have any
other questions.
Senator Rubio. I do not. I want to just take off on what
you are saying. I too take the national debt very seriously. It
was a cornerstone of the reason why I ran.
On the other hand, I would love to see an analysis of how
much money we would spend domestically if we do not address
these issues. It sounds like we are going to spend the money
either way. The question is whether we are going to spend it on
the front end or we are going to spend it on the back end and
at a higher human cost. So that would probably be something
interesting to look at. There may be studies out there already.
But the money is going to be spent because if people are
addicted, if you have got crime here domestically, if in fact
this emerging crisis that Mr. Brownfield has outlined hits us,
the costs of that are going to be pretty high as well, and we
are going to have to deal with those. So we will work on that.
That is interesting.
Senator Menendez. Well, with my thanks to this panel for
all of your insights and for all of your missions and
particularly, Mr. Benson, to you and the men and women of the
DEA, thank you very much. We look forward to working with you
to build our capacity and our ability to meet the challenge.
With that, this panel is dismissed. Thank you very much for
your testimony.
Let me, as we bring up the second panel, introduce them.
Dr. Eduardo Gamarra is a professor of politics and
international relations at Florida International University
where he has also served as the director of the Latin American
and Caribbean Center. I will yield to Senator Rubio since----
Senator Rubio. Just he is a member of the political science
faculty there as well, which is, I believe, the finest
political science faculty in the southeastern United States,
not just because I coteach there. [Laughter.]
Senator Menendez. And you are so diplomatic. You limited it
to the southeast so you would not have a problem with the
chair. I appreciate that.
Senator Rubio. A big State.
Senator Menendez. Yes.
Dr. Gamarra has written and edited a number of books on the
Caribbean and Central America. He has worked in a consulting
capacity on counternarcotics with police organizations and
Federal agencies throughout Latin America with a particular
emphasis on counternarcotics efforts in the Dominican Republic.
So we appreciate his presence here.
Douglas Farah is a senior fellow at the International
Assessment and Strategy Center where he is a renowned national
security consultant and analyst. For close to two decades, he
was a foreign correspondent, investigative reporter for the
Washington Post, and freelanced for other publications such as
the Boston Globe, the Financial Times, and Mother Jones
covering Latin America and West Africa. He has worked in
Colombia and Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia. He chronicled the
rise and fall of the Medellin Cartel and its leader, Pablo
Escobar, and we appreciate his insights here today.
So with that, Dr. Gamarra, we will start with you. If you
each would summarize your testimony for about 5 minutes and
then we will have your full testimony entered into the record
and we will have a discussion after that.
STATEMENT OF DR. EDUARDO A. GAMARRA, PROFESSOR, FLORIDA
INTERNATIONAL UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, MIAMI, FL
Dr. Gamarra. Thank you very much, Senator Menendez and
Senator Rubio, for the opportunity to provide this testimony
about the overall situation of violence primarily in the
Dominican Republic and the Caribbean more broadly.
As you noted, over the past decade, I have been working
with the Government of the Dominican Republic in addressing
some of these problems and the impact particularly on democracy
there. I have worked primarily as a consultant for a firm based
in Miami called Newlink Research which in 2004 was asked by
President Fernandez to design a comprehensive plan aimed at
trying to address the trends that we were seeing at the moment
of increased drug trafficking organization presence, drug
consumption and, of course, violence.
The Plan de Seguridad Democratica, or Democratic Security
Plan, was a comprehensive plan that included the development of
a subprogram called Safe Neighborhood which targeted the most
violence-prone neighborhoods particularly in Santiago and in
Santo Domingo. In addition to a police component, the plan
included a battery of social programs that, for the most part,
were applied in up to 110 neighborhoods throughout the country.
Initially the PSD had some very promising results. Violent
death rates in the most violent neighborhoods of the country
declined and the national death rate, which had almost reached
30 per 100,000, reached 17 per 100,000 in the year 2006. Our
conclusion at the time was that the combined presence of the
police and the implementation of this battery of social
programs was responsible for restoring the rights of citizens
to organize and participate actively in communal activities
without fear of crime. In my view, it was a good faith effort
to address a problem that was, unfortunately, larger than the
Dominican Republic and, in essence, the changing security
situation throughout the Caribbean.
Following its initial success, unfortunately, violent death
rates began to climb again and other forms of crime, especially
muggings, robberies, and the like, exploded, in particular
outside of the Barrio Seguro neighborhoods. Our own evaluations
concluded that the problems were both domestic on the one hand,
and domestic in particular, Senator Menendez, had to do with
the resistance of the national police which resisted some of
the programs that we attempted to introduce to change the
structure of that institution, and that involves corruption to
a series of problems related to lack of training and lack of
resources. Another issue was lack of coordination between what
certain outfits were doing in government and the national
police and the judicial system.
But in my view, the major problem was the lack of
international support for the PSD. The U.S. Embassy, for
example, provided very small and largely, in my view,
insignificant efforts to promote community policing and to
strengthen the prosecutor's office. I am not talking about DOD
or DEA support.
Over the course of the past 8 years, I believe that U.S.
support for President Fernandez's initiatives has been
extraordinarily limited, and I would argue that even some of
the State Department reports about what the United States is
doing in community policing and in strengthening the
prosecutors' offices are highly exaggerated. The U.S. impact,
in fact, is quite small. At times I would say that Embassy
officials in Santo Domingo saw the PSD with great skepticism
and even suspicion, and in my view, the narrow focus of the
very limited assistance projects that conspired against the
more comprehensive approach that the PSD tried to initiate.
The same can be said for other international funding, the
Inter American Development Bank and the World Bank and others.
Now, by 2007, our research confirmed what has been said
here already, the enormous presence of transnational criminal
organizations that were using the island, not just the
Dominican Republic but certainly Haiti, to traffic drugs to
both the United States and to Europe. I conducted focus groups
throughout the Dominican Republic basically in very small
communities, which basically talked about bombardments in very
small communities. These drugs that fell from the sky had a
very significant multiplier impact.
First, drug use became a problem not just in Santo Domingo
but around the country.
Second, as we have said, drug busts in the Dominican
Republic today are transnational as well. It is not Dominicans
alone that are being arrested, but you have multiple
nationalities that are involved.
And third, most importantly, the Dominican Republic in
large measure is becoming the place where numerous drug
trafficking transnational organizations are settling their
scores.
In the 1990s some analysts, including myself, predicted
that the Dominican Republic would become the command and
control center for drug trafficking in the Caribbean. My sense
is that today perhaps the Dominican Republic is close to that.
In 2011, the situation is much more serious than in 2004.
Today the State Department report and the U.N. World Drug
Report coincide that about 7 percent of all cocaine that enters
the United States passes through Hispaniola and about 11
percent of all cocaine that goes to Europe passes through the
Dominican Republic. And they are coming through diverse areas:
air, land, and sea.
Now, in my view, the Dominican Republic with these very
scarce resources has been trying to do certain things that are
quite important. For example, something that was not mentioned
in the first panel, President Fernandez purchased eight Super
Tucano airplanes from Brazil, in fact, trying to shut down the
air drops, and the results, at least in this first year, have
been quite positive. The United States looked somewhat askance
at that initiative; in my view, the Dominican Republic has had
to do that because the bombardment had reached epidemic
proportions and foreign support to help end this trend was
conspicuously absent.
The purchase of those planes demonstrates the resolve of
governments in the region to spend and even indebt themselves
to counter a problem that is undermining their democracies.
Passing very quickly here to the American efforts and
particularly to CBSI, my view is that this is an enormously
important program because it is targeting the grave situation
facing the region. This situation in the Dominican Republic is
affecting in particular young Dominicans, the most vulnerable
sector. This has been amply documented through the studies
conducted by Newlink Research. They are the main victims of
violence. They lack educational and job opportunities and they
face extraordinary discrimination. Few who live in these
neighborhoods are able to obtain employment outside of the most
affected neighborhoods. And they, of course, are not only
victims but they are also victimizers; in that sense, young
Dominicans are essentially being condemned to lives of
violence, poor education, unemployment, and exclusion.
The CBSI initiatives are a worthwhile effort but in my view
are insufficient. The three dimensions, which include
regionwide assessments, complementary education alternatives,
and training and basic employment and vocational skills, are
very important, but $5 million does not go very far.
In conclusion, I would say, based on my experience in the
Dominican Republic, that these underfunded programs have no
real impact and contribute instead to deepening the gap between
the promise and performance that plagues all democracies in the
Caribbean and in the hemisphere.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Gamarra follows:]
Prepared Statement of Dr. Eduardo A. Gamarra
Thank you very much for the opportunity to provide testimony today
about the overall situation with crime and violence in the Dominican
Republic specifically and the Caribbean more broadly. Over the course
of the past decade I have been working directly with the Government of
the Dominican Republic in addressing these problems and their impact on
development and democracy. As a consultant for Newlink Research, a
Miami based firm, I was asked in the fall of 2004 by President Leonel
Fernandez to develop a comprehensive plan that would address what was
already a visible trend: the increased presence of drug trafficking
organizations, an increase in drug consumption, and a rise in violent
crime.
President Fernandez made fighting crime one of the most important
components of his new government. Thus, rather than waiting for the
international community to help him address the problem, he devoted
Dominican resources from the outset. This showed both the will and the
resolve to address a problem that was achieving significant
proportions. As President Fernandez told me at the time of the
launching of his anticrime plan, his objective was to prevent the
Dominican Republic from following the pattern of the DR-CAFTA
countries.
The Plan de Seguridad Democratica (Democratic Security Plan-PSD)
was a comprehensive plan aimed specifically to bring down the violent
death and crime rates that had been steadily rising since the year
2002, in part, as a result of an unprecedented economic crisis. More
broadly, the PSD included the development of a program dubbed Barrio
Seguro (Safe Neighborhood) through which the most violence prone
neighborhoods were targeted not only for increased police presence but
also for the development of a battery of social programs aimed
primarily at youth at risk.
Based on the results of intensive qualitative and quantitative
data gathered by Newlink Research in dozens of neighborhoods throughout
the larger cities of the Dominican Republic, the PSD initially had some
very promising results. Violent death rates in some of the worst
neighborhoods dropped dramatically and evaluations showed that in a few
of these neighborhoods the Barrio Seguro program helped jump-start
citizen participation.\1\ Our conclusion was that the combined presence
of the police and the implementation of a variety of social programs
were responsible for restoring the rights of citizens to organize and
participate actively in communal activities without fear of crime
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The violent death rate in 2004 was 30 per 100,000 inhabitants.
In 2006 the violent death rate dropped to 17 per 100,000. In 2010 the
violent death rate had climbed to 24 per 100,000.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is fair to say that the PSD and Barrio Seguro were a good faith
effort to address a problem that unfortunately was larger than the
Dominican Republic and the changing security situation throughout the
Caribbean. Following its initial success, violent death rates began to
climb again and other forms of crime, especially muggings, robbery, and
the like exploded especially outside of the Barrio Seguro
neighborhoods. Our own evaluations identified the factors that
transformed the security situation in the Dominican Republic. These are
factors common to other countries facing the same issue.
On the domestic front, the most serious problem facing the PSD was
its failure to overhaul the National Police, which continues to be an
institution that resists change for reasons that range from corruption
to a severe lack of training and resources. A second major issue was
the politicization of the PSD as those who were charged with carrying
out the plan saw it is as an important tool to seek higher political
office. Another issue involved the lack of coordination between those
institutions charged with implementing the PSD; in particular, the Plan
suffered from a very serious lack of coordinated efforts between the
National Police and the Ministry of Interior.
A final major problem was the lack of international support for
the PSD. The U.S. Embassy provided funding for very small and largely
insignificant efforts to promote community policing and to strengthen
the prosecutor's office. In my view, over the course of past 8 years
U.S. support for President Fernandez's initiatives has been limited.
Moreover, I would argue that in its yearly INCSR reports, the impact of
U.S. assistance programs is highly exaggerated. U.S. assistance has
been limited in size and scope and often it duplicates or contradicts
ongoing local efforts. At times, Embassy officials saw the Dominican
President's anticrime initiatives with great skepticism and suspicion.
The narrow focus of the very limited assistance programs--aimed mainly
at the police and the prosecutor's office--conspired against the more
comprehensive security plan that President Fernandez pursued.
Funding from the Inter American Development Bank (IADB) and World
Bank was also very limited and did not directly fund the PSD. In 2008,
however, the IADB sent a team headed by Rafael Pardo, Colombia's former
Minister of Defense to evaluate the PSD; its final report lavished
extensive praise and urged the Bank to fund some of its components,
especially in the prosecutor's office.
While the PSD's success was affected by these domestic and funding
constraints, the reality is that the situation in the Caribbean
(including Venezuela, Colombia, and Mexico) had also changed
dramatically during this period and was having an enormous impact on
the Dominican Republic. By 2007, our research confirmed the presence of
transnational criminal organizations that were increasingly using the
entire island of Hispaniola to traffic drugs to both the United States
and Europe. We conducted focus groups in remote areas of the country
where villagers reported continuous ``bombardments'' of drugs from the
sky.
The drugs that fell from the sky had a multiplier impact on the
country. First, drug use became an issue even in small towns where
traffickers were paying villagers in kind for turning over the drugs
they collected. This produced not only violence but also contributed to
drug consumption problems among young Dominicans. Second, increasingly
drug busts were netting individuals from a variety of countries
including Colombians, Venezuelans, Central Americans, Mexicans, and
Haitians. Third, this trend suggested that the Dominican Republic was
fast becoming not only an important transshipment point but also a
place where traffickers of all nationalities were violently settling
scores. In 2011, the Dominican Republic appeared to have fulfilled the
prediction by some analysts in the 1990s that it was becoming the
command and control center of the Caribbean drug trafficking industry.
According to Dominican sociologist Lilian Bobea,
In recent years the surge of drug trafficking toward and from
the Dominican Republic and the emergence of internal
microtrafficking have become a complex, expansive, and harmful
phenomena for Dominican society. Given their importance, both
constitute a development engine for many sectors of the urban
and rural economy of the country. Progressively and owing to
its resilience, the ties of this industry strengthen an
integrated vertical and horizontal transnational criminal
structure that involves a network of social and political
organizations. These dynamics affect the quality of life in the
Dominican Republic and they undermine trust in institutions and
democratic governance . . .\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Lilian Bobea, ``Vinculos y Estructuras del Narcotrafico en
Republica Dominicana,'' in Eduardo A. Gamarra and Diana Pardo,
``Aciertos y Errores de la lucha contra el trafico de drogas ilicitas:
Lecciones de las experiencias nacionales de America Latina y el
Caribe,'' (Santo Domingo, FUNGLODE, forthcoming 2011).
In 2011, more drugs are entering and exiting the Dominican Republic
than ever. The Dominican National Directorate for Drug Control (DNCD)
routinely confiscates cocaine, heroin, marihuana, and synthetic drugs.
And these drugs are coming into the country through diverse air, land,
and sea routes. Within the country the distribution and
commercialization routes have also become more complex and diverse and
they increasingly involve a larger number of Dominicans and foreigners
at every level. Not surprisingly this evolving and increasingly complex
structure has contributed to a significant expansion of violent crime,
especially in the largest urban centers of the country. At the same
time drugs are passing through the Dominican Republic at a faster rate
than ever before. According to the 2011 INCSR and the U.N.'s World Drug
Report, 7 percent of all cocaine that enters the United States passes
through the island of Hispaniola and 11 percent of all the cocaine that
reaches Europe is transshipped from the Dominican Republic.
As the UNODC 2011 Global Study on Homicide shows, homicide rates
experienced a sharp increase in Central America and the Caribbean. This
trend is the result of multiple factors, such as a rapid urbanization,
the easy availability of guns, high-income inequality, a high
proportion of youth, local gang structures, and organized crime and
drug trafficking. A decade ago homicide rates in the Caribbean were
significantly lower than in Central America. But they have recently
increased, most notably in Jamaica (52.1 deaths per 100,000
inhabitants), Trinidad and Tobago (35.2), Puerto Rico (26.2), St. Kitts
and Nevis (38.2), and the Dominican Republic (24.9).\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ``Global Study on
Homicide 2011,'' (Vienna, UNODC, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Unfortunately, most of the Caribbean countries faced this dramatic
transformation with their own meager resources. Despite the launching
of Plan Merida in the latter days of the Bush administration, very few
U.S. resources were available. The diagnoses of the problem were amply
documented by the research commissioned by the Dominican Government.
While the PSD was aimed at controlling the situation in the
neighborhoods, the government opted to purchase eight A-29 Tucano
planes from Brazil to shut down the drug bombardments. At this date,
the presence of these aircraft has had a significant impact, yet it is
still insufficient to prevent the flow of drugs from South America
through air, land, and sea. The purchase of these planes reveals,
however, the resolve of some governments in the region to spend--and
even indebt themselves--to address a problem that is undermining their
countries.
Despite the best efforts under the PSD, the reality is that today
the Dominican Republic is facing a more serious challenge than in 2004.
And, public perception of the lack of safety has skyrocketed leading
the average Dominican not only to complain about the ineffectiveness of
the PSD but to also demand a much stronger and violent response by the
government. My research has found that Dominicans are not as concerned
about police human rights violations as are organizations such as
Amnesty International.
This sentiment, which found echo among some of the most
conservative politicians contributed to the whittling down of basic
habeas corpus guarantees found in the Code of Criminal Procedure. USAID
funding in the 1990s led to the passage of this important Code and some
funding is still available to help in its implementation. The Dominican
Congress recently adopted modifications that are likely to send younger
kids to adult prisons and will provide police with the right to hold
suspects indefinitely.
The reality of this situation is being felt daily by young
Dominicans, the most vulnerable sector to the growing threat posed by
transnational trafficking and the deterioration of citizen security.
Since 2004, Newlink Research has amply documented the plight of at-risk
youth especially in the aforementioned Barrio Seguro neighborhoods.
They are not only the main victims of violence, they also lack
educational and job opportunities and face extreme discrimination
outside of their neighborhoods. Few are able to obtain formal
employment if they list one of these neighborhoods as their home
address. While young men are the main victims and also victimizers,
young women are the main victims of intrafamily violence and early
pregnancy further limits already scarce opportunities to success. As a
result, most young Dominicans are condemned to a life in the vast
informal sector of the Dominican economy. Similar results have been
obtained by evaluations of USAID programs aimed at young Dominicans.
For this reason, I believe that the CBSI initiatives are a
worthwhile--albeit insufficient--effort to address the problems of
young Dominicans. According to USAID, the $5 million for programs in
the Dominican Republic over promise to provide:
Regionwide assessments aimed at improving ongoing programs
focused on first offenders and other at-risk youth, good
governance, anticorruption, community policing, and youth
education;
Complementary education alternatives for Dominican youth,
including flexible learning models and literacy campaigns;
Training in basic employment and vocational skills in the
areas of tourism, agriculture, and the computer sciences for
at-risk youth.
While some of these programs were already underway mainly as a
result of World Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, and Dominican
funding, the sad reality is that these are perhaps too little and too
late to be effective. Moreover, these programs provide a long-term
solution to a very limited number of young people. In the meantime the
majority will continue to face the daily problems of violence, drug
abuse, and lack of opportunity.
Based on my long-term experience in the Dominican Republic, I am
convinced that any future engagement should not suffer from the
piecemeal approach of U.S. assistance. USAID programs should not
duplicate and undermine local Caribbean efforts but seek serious
partnerships instead so that it can more effectively shape their
content and long-term course. Underfunded programs have no real impact
and instead contribute to deepening the gap between promise and
performance that plagues all democracies in the Caribbean and elsewhere
in this hemisphere.
Senator Menendez. Thank you very much.
Mr. Farah.
STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS FARAH, SCHOLAR, INTERNATIONAL ASSESSMENT
AND STRATEGY CENTER, ALEXANDRIA, VA
Mr. Farah. Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Rubio,
thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
As many others have said, drug trafficking routes and
networks are like water running downhill: they will always seek
the path of least resistance.
The CBSI program, in anticipation of the pressure being
applied in Mexico and Colombia, is aimed at making it
simultaneously more difficult to traffic cocaine and other
illicit drugs through the Caribbean. The goals are laudable and
these areas of cooperation are necessary in the small and
generally underresourced countries of the Caribbean, and the
program correctly anticipates the region's growing importance
as a transnational shipping route not only for drugs but for
human smuggling and other transnational organized criminal
activities. But there are several significant roadblocks for
CBSI achieving these goals.
The first is the growing political and economic influence
of Venezuela in the region, a significant drawback given that
Venezuela is the growing and primary gateway for the flow of
illicit narcotics into the Caribbean and that senior members of
its government have been sanctioned by the United States for
their involvement in drug trafficking and working with
designated terrorist entities.
The second is the continuing existence of large offshore
financial centers offering multiple services to a broad array
of transnational criminal organizations, both regional and
extra-regional, thereby allowing the profits of illicit
activities to flow back to criminal organizations.
In 2004, Presidents Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Fidel
Castro of Cuba announced the formation of the Bolivarian
Alliance for the Peoples of Our America, ALBA; an alliance
aimed at creating a political, economic, and military structure
that explicitly excludes the United States but allies with Iran
and other regimes hostile to the United States.
The two authoritarian governments were soon joined by the
leaders of Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua, all espousing 21st
century socialism. The leaders have one thing in common or many
things in common, among them offering material support to the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, the FARC, a designated
terrorist organization by both the United States and the
European Union. And there are senior leaders in all of these
countries who are deeply corrupted and involved in the drug
trade. In 2008, the nation of Dominica joined ALBA, and in
2009, St. Vincent and the Grenadines and Antigua and Barbuda
also joined the alliance.
This is worrisome on multiple fronts. If they were simply
democracies seeking a different democratic path, it would not
be so troublesome. But when the most authoritarian governments
in the region form an alliance that consistently utilizes the
drug trade as an instrument of statecraft, allies itself with
and facilitates the expansion of the influence of nations
hostile to both the United States and its democratic allies,
and systematically reduces freedom of expression, political
freedom, and the rule of law, this alliance cannot be viewed as
benign.
Most of the Caribbean nations that have joined ALBA, or are
considering joining, because of the cheap oil subsidies
provided by Venezuela, which is a real economic boon. But as
the Congressional Research Service found, this has considerable
risks. As they wrote in their recent report, ``As United States
counternarcotics cooperation with Venezuela has diminished
since 2005, Venezuela has become a major transit point for drug
flights through the Caribbean, particularly Haiti and the
Dominican Republic, into the United States.''
In addition to the sea-lanes to the Caribbean islands and
the westbound flights over the eastern Caribbean, significant
drug traffic transits the Caribbean through the airspace
between Venezuela and Colombia to the eastern Atlantic and
Caribbean coast of Central America. Particularly hard hit are
Honduras, Belize, and Nicaragua.
The Chavez government aids and protects drug traffickers at
the highest levels. Perhaps the strongest public evidence of
the importance of Venezuela to the FARC, which produces 90
percent of the cocaine consumed in the United States, is the
public designation of three of Chavez's closest advisors and
senior government officials by our U.S. Treasury's Office of
Foreign Assets Control. As legendary District Attorney Robert
Morgenthau warned as he left public service in Manhattan after
40 years, ``Let there be no doubt that Hugo Chavez leads not
only a corrupt government but one staffed by terrorist
sympathizers. The government has strong ties to
narcotrafficking and money laundering, and reportedly plays an
active role in the transshipment of narcotics and the
laundering of narcotics proceeds in exchange for payments to
corrupt government officials.''
One of the primary areas also not addressed by CBSI is the
extensive use of offshore banking and corporate registries that
are part of the lifeblood of drug cartels and the ability to
move their money. Again, our own Government has documented the
anomalies of these anonymous jurisdictions. For example,
according to the State Department, in the British Virgin
Islands with 22,000 people, as of September 2010, there were
456,547 active companies, 237 licensed banks, and 2,951 mutual
funds. BVI's unique share structure does not require a
statement of authorized capital, as well as the lack of
mandatory filing of ownership which poses a significant money
laundering risk. That can be said for virtually any country in
the Caribbean. Almost all of them have the same incredibly weak
laws.
And this again ties back to Venezuela which is now acting
as a broker in the money laundering services for the cartels.
As the State Department noted, ``Money laundering occurs
through Venezuela's commercial banks, exchange houses, gambling
sites, fraudulently invoiced foreign trade transactions,
smuggling, real estate, agriculture and livestock businesses.''
Venezuela is not a regional financial center and does not have
an offshore financial sector, but many of its local banks have
offshore affiliates in the Caribbean and that is one of the key
gateways into the money laundering world.
I would say that the blind trusts are particularly
unnoticed in the region, although my own research in recent
years has documented that the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as
the bin Laden family, maintained dozens of companies in Panama
and elsewhere in the Caribbean where the true ownerships of the
accounts were hidden and difficult to find.
This summer, the International Investment Corporation of
the Gulf-Bahamas, a wholly owned subsidiary of the Dar al Maal
Al Islami Bank, an Islamist banking institution linked to the
Muslim Brotherhood, reached a nonprosecution agreement with the
U.S. Department of Justice where they agreed to pay more than
$30 million in fines and penalties for significant tax
violations in the United States.
In conclusion, I would say CBSI could be a useful tool for
helping Caribbean partners combat drug trafficking, endemic
corruption, violence, and the erosion of the rule of law that
transnational organized criminal groups bring. However, the
initiative in my view will have little impact as long as
Venezuela and ALBA nations in Latin America and the Caribbean
continue to criminalize and use transnational organized crime
as part of their statecraft, giving support and protection to
drug trafficking and designated terrorist organizations such as
the FARC. With Venezuela and its allies opening key corridors
for drug trafficking to the United States, as well as providing
sophisticated aid in laundering hundreds of millions of dollars
in illicit programs, any program, especially one as
comparatively small as this one, which does not deal with the
source of the drugs flowing through them will do little to
mitigate the problem.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:]
Prepared Statement Douglas Farah
Honorable Chairman Menendez and Ranking Member Rubio, thank you for
the opportunity to testify today on the Caribbean Basin Security
Initiative and the increasing flow of illicit drugs through the
Caribbean region.
As many others have said, drug trafficking routes and networks are
like water running downhill, they will always seek the path of least
resistance. And, like a balloon, when pressure is applied in one area
the displaced operations pop up in another. The $139 million, 2-year
CBSI program, in anticipation of the pressure being applied in Mexico
and Colombia, is aimed at making it simultaneously more difficult to
traffic cocaine and other illicit drugs through the Caribbean.
According to the State Department the purpose of the CSBI money
flowing into the Caribbean is to aid in:
Maritime and Aerial Security Cooperation;
Law enforcement capacity-building;
Border/Port Security and Firearms Interdiction;
Justice sector reform;
Crime prevention and at-risk youth.
These are laudable and necessary areas of cooperation with the
small and generally underresourced countries of the Caribbean, and the
program correctly anticipates the region's growing importance as a
transnational shipping route not only for drugs, but for human
smuggling and other transnational organized criminal activities.
Of the 16 nations in the Caribbean, the U.S. Government has
identified four (the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Bahamas, and Jamaica)
as major transit countries, while many others, particularly in the
Eastern Caribbean, continue to serve as significant transit points.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Clare Ribando Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler, June S. Beittel, and
Mark P. Sullivan, ``Latin America and the Caribbean: Illicit Drug
Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrug Programs,'' Congressional Research
Service, May 12, 2011, p. 1.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
But there are several significant roadblocks for the CBSI achieving
its goals, in addition to the traditional issues of corruption, weak
institutions, lack of rule of law, and lack of resources to fight
traffickers who are well-resourced, and have multiple unguarded points
of entry across the region. I would like to address these in particular
today, and also to stress they cannot be addressed outside of the
broader regional context of Latin America. The two most significant
roadblocks, in my opinion are:
1. The growing political and economic influence of Venezuela
in the region, a significant drawback given that Venezuela is a
growing and primary gateway for the flow of illicit narcotics
into the Caribbean, and that senior members of its government
have been sanctioned for their involvement with drug
trafficking and designated terrorist entities;
2. The continuing existence of large offshore financial
centers offering multiple services to a broad array of
transnational criminal organizations, both regional and extra-
regional, thereby allowing the profits of illicit activities to
flow back to criminal organizations. As you are well aware,
some of these TOC groups, particularly those operating out of
Mexico, pose a significant national security challenge to the
United States.
venezuela's growing role in the region
In 2004, Presidents Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and Fidel Castro of
Cuba announced the formation of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples
of Our America (Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra
America-ALBA), an alliance aimed at creating a political, economic, and
military structure that explicitly excludes the United States, but
allies with Iran and other regimes hostile to the United States.
The two authoritarian governments were soon joined by the leaders
of Bolivia, Ecuador, and Nicaragua, all espousing 21st century
socialism. The leaders have other commonalities: they all offering
material support to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia-FARC), a designated terrorist
organization by both the United States and European Union; and, there
are senior leaders in all the countries who are deeply corrupted and
involved in the drug trade. In 2008, the nation of Dominica joined ALBA
and, in 2009, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Antigua and Barbuda
joined Alliance.
The political intent of the union was made clear in a statement
when the Caribbean nations joined, where the final declaration stated
that, ``[We recognize] the strengthening of the ALBA and its
consolidation as a political, economic, and social alliance in defense
of the independence, sovereignty, self-determination, and identity of
member countries and the interests and aspirations of the peoples of
the South, in the face of attempts at political and economic
domination.'' \2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ James Suggett, ``ALBA Block Grows by Three New Member Countries
At Summit,'' Venezuelanalysis, June 26, 2009, accessed at: http://
venezuelanalysis.com/news/4547.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This is worrisome on multiple fronts. If these were simply
democracies seeking a different democratic path, it would not be
troublesome. But when the most authoritarian governments in the region
form an alliance that consistently utilizes the drug trade as an
instrument of statecraft; allies itself with and facilitates the
expansion of the influence of nations hostile to both the United States
and its democratic allies; and, systematically reduces freedom of
expression, political freedom, and the rule of law, the alliance cannot
by viewed as benign.
Most of the Caribbean nations that have joined ALBA, or are
considering joining, are in it for the cheap oil subsidies provided by
Venezuela, a very real economic boon, particularly in a time when--
except for the small amount of money for each country in the CBSI, and
the humanitarian aid to Haiti--U.S. aid in the region is shrinking, as
is its regional diplomatic presence.
The reality is that the relationships with Venezuela in the region
are dangerous and facilitate drug trafficking. As the most recent State
Department report on drug trafficking patterns noted ``Venezuela is a
major drug-transit country. A porous western border with Colombia, a
weak judicial system, inconsistent international counternarcotics
cooperation, and a generally permissive and corrupt environment have
made Venezuela one of the preferred trafficking routes out of South
America to the Eastern Caribbean, Central America, the United States,
Europe, and western Africa.'' \3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
``International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2011,'' Department
of State, March 2011, accessed at: http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/
nrcrpt/2011/vol1/156363.htm#venezuela.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Congressional Research Service also found that ``As U.S.
counternarcotics cooperation with Venezuela has diminished since 2005,
Venezuela has become a major transit point for drug flights through the
Caribbean--particularly Haiti and the Dominican Republic--into the
United States as well as to Europe. Elsewhere in the Caribbean, the
Bahamas continues to serve as a major transit country for both Jamaican
marijuana and South American cocaine.'' \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Seelke, Wyler, et al, op cit p. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Declassified U.S. and Colombian reports on drug movements from the
traditional drug producing countries such as Colombia, Peru, and
Bolivia show that the Caribbean is becoming a more important transport
route, especially for those drugs that pass through the region to West
Africa and then northward to Europe. The transshipment of drugs through
West Africa is now several years established, but as U.S., U.N., and
West African drug experts can attest, the vast majority of the cocaine
reaching those shores arrives on flights that originate in Venezuela.
In addition to the sea-lanes to the Caribbean islands and the west
bound flights over the Eastern Caribbean, significant drug traffic
transits the Caribbean through the air space between the Venezuela-
Colombia corridor and the eastern Atlantic/Caribbean coast of Central
America. Particularly hard hit are Honduras, Belize, and Nicaragua.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
0As demonstrated by the extensive connectivity among the producing
and transit regions, the concept of initiating a productive Caribbean
Basin security initiative without having some strategy for closing the
main door through which the drugs enter the region (Venezuela), is
likely to be untenable. While the Caribbean is also a transit zone for
cocaine leaving Colombia, there is a fundamental difference. The
Colombia Government, at great cost in life and national treasure,
actively works to combat the trafficking and to drive it from its
national territory.
The Chavez government in Venezuela, in contrast, aids and protects
drug traffickers at the highest level. Perhaps the strongest public
evidence of the importance of Venezuela to the FARC, which produces
some 90 percent of the cocaine consumed in the United States, is the
public designations of three of Chavez's closest advisers and senior
government officials by the U.S Treasury Department's Office of Foreign
Assets Control (OFAC).
OFAC said the three--Hugo Armando Carvajal, director of Venezuelan
Military Intelligence; Henry de Jesus Rangel, director of the
Venezuelan Directorate of Intelligence and Prevention Services; and,
Ramon Emilio Rodriguez Chacin, former Minister of Justice and former
Minister of Interior--were responsible for ``materially supporting the
FARC, a narcoterrorist organization.''
OFAC specifically accused Carvajal and Rangel of protecting FARC
cocaine shipments moving through Venezuela, and said Rodriguez Chacin,
who resigned his government position just a few days before the
designations, was the ``Venezuelan Government's main weapons contact
for the FARC.'' \5\ In November 2010, Rangel was promoted to the
overall commander of the Venezuelan Armed Forces.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``Treasury Targets Venezuelan Government Officials Support of
the FARC,'' U.S. Treasury Department Office of Public Affairs,
September 12, 2008. The designations came on the heels of the decision
of the Bolivian Government of Evo Morales to expel the U.S. Ambassador,
allegedly for supporting armed movements against the Morales
government. In solidarity, Chavez then expelled the U.S. Ambassador to
Venezuela. In addition to the designations of the Venezuelan officials,
the United States also expelled the Venezuelan and Bolivian Ambassadors
to Washington.
\6\ ``Chavez Shores up Military Support,'' Stratfor, November 12,
2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As legendary Manhattan district attorney Robert M. Morgenthau
warned, as he left public service in 2009 after decades of prosecuting
financial fraud cases, ``And let there be no doubt that Hugo Chavez
leads not only a corrupt government but one staffed by terrorist
sympathizers. The government has strong ties to narcotrafficking and
money laundering, and reportedly plays an active role in the
transshipment of narcotics and the laundering of narcotics proceeds in
exchange for payments to corrupt government officials.'' \7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Robert M. Morgenthau, ``The Link Between Iran and Venezuela: A
Crisis in the Making,'' speech at the Brookings Institution, September
8, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One effect of this state tolerance for, if not sponsorship of, the
FARC, is a broad network of FARC activities in the Caribbean,
particularly in the Dominican Republic, in addition to Cuba and other
ALBA nations. Among the most well-known of the FARC political faces in
the region is Narciso Isa Conde, a Dominican national who publicly
admits he has befriended the FARC for 40 years.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Narciso Isa Conde, ``Pronunciamiento del Dominicano Narciso Isa
Conde, Citado por el Colombiano Hoyos en la OEA,'' published on the
FARC-friendly Web site apporrea.org, July 22, 2010, accessed at: http:/
/www.aporrea.org/actualidad/n161889.html.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The existence of this network, integrated into the Continental
Bolivarian Movement (Movimiento Continental Bolivariano-MCB) directly
ties into the drug trafficking flows through the Dominican Republic and
elsewhere, routes the FARC is working actively to exploit and expand.
While Cuba is not listed as a major drug transshipment center or
money laundering haven, it also plays a crucial role with ALBA nations,
providing growing support for intelligence and counterintelligence,
primarily aimed at the internal opposition to the ALBA governments.
Through its close ties to, and control of, parts of the Venezuelan
intelligence apparatus, Cuban operatives enjoy greater access in the
region than they have for at least two decades.
One of the reasons this is significant, additional to creating an
environment in the Caribbean that is increasingly favorable to U.S.
enemies (Iran) or potential enemies (China and Russia) is the strategic
importance of the region to the United States.
Most of the crude oil the U.S. imports is transported by sea. About
64 percent of U.S. energy imports are transported through the Caribbean
before reaching the gulf coast. According to DOE data, ``Nine out of
every fourteen barrels of U.S. imported oil--from suppliers including
Angola, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Chad, Russia, Kuwait, and Ecuador--must
pass through at least one of four principal sea passages in the
Caribbean to reach U.S. refineries.'' \9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ ``Venezuela Plays The Russia Card,'' Investor's Business Daily,
September 11, 2008, accessed at: http://www.ibdeditorial.com/
IBDArticles.aspx?id=305766737761086.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This open oil traffic pattern has several important vulnerabilities
because there are only a few safe lanes for the ships to move their
cargo. According to a recent report, about 14 million barrels of oil a
week arrive at the U.S. gulf coast refineries through the Windward
Passage between Cuba and Hispaniola; the Mona Passage between
Hispaniola and Puerto Rico; the Florida straits north of Cuba; and, the
Yucatan Channel between Cuba and Mexico, because those are the safest,
calmest sea-lanes. ``Independent of the gulf destination, nearly 2,000
tankers crossed the Panama Canal in 2007, or 16.9 percent of its
traffic, Panama Canal Authority data show. Most went to U.S. ports.
These tankers ship oil from places such as Saudi Arabia to refineries
in places such as Long Beach, Calif., making the canal a critical--and
vulnerable--choke point. Even some of Alaska's oil has been known to
cross the Panama Canal through the Caribbean on its way to the East
Coast. Going both ways, 31 million long tons of petroleum and products
were transported to the U.S. in 2007. With the widening of the canal by
2014, more traffic still is expected to pass.'' \10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ IBD, op cit.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
the offshore financial havens of the caribbean
One of the primary areas not addressed explicitly in the CBSI is
the extensive use of offshore banking and corporate registries that are
part of the lifeblood of drug trafficking organizations in particular,
and of TOC groups in general. Terrorist groups also can and do use the
anonymous accounts and registries to move money and avoid detection.
One can correctly assume that the driving force of most, if not
all, of the TOC activity one observes is the desire to make profits and
securely accumulate wealth. As ``know your customer'' rules have grown
more stringent in much of the world, many parts of the Caribbean
continue to offer facilities that make hiding and moving ill-gotten
gains relatively easy.
As Morgenthau noted, ``For years I have stressed the importance of
transparency in financial transactions. In the realm of preventing
money laundering and terror financing, the concept of `know your
customer' is the starting point in any scheme designed to detect
suspicious transactions.'' \11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Robert M. Morgenthau, ``The Link Between Iran and Venezuela: A
Crisis in the Making,'' speech at the Brookings Institution, September
8, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Again, our own government has documented the anomalies that these
anonymous jurisdictions continue to present. For example, according to
the State Department, in the British Virgin Islands (BVI), with 22,00
people, as of September 2010, ``there were 456,547 active companies,
237 licensed banks and 2,951 mutual funds registered with the BVI
Financial Services Commission (FSC). BVI's unique share structure that
does not require a statement of authorized capital as well as the lack
of mandatory filing of ownership, pose significant money laundering
risks.'' \12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
``Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, 2011,'' Volume 2, Department
of State, March 2011, accessed at: http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/
nrcrpt/2011/vol2/156374.htm#britishvirginislands.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As stated initially, on both the transportation side and money
laundering sides of the illicit drug world, water will follow the path
of least resistance. The lack of such basic standards as mandatory
filing of ownership, and overall bank secrecy, is an open invitation to
abuse by those who use these services to advance TOC activity.
The same basic scenario is played out across the Caribbean. Again
the State Department notes that, ``Antigua and Barbuda is a significant
offshore center that despite recent improvements remains susceptible to
money laundering due to its offshore financial sector and Internet
gaming industry. Illicit proceeds from the transshipment of narcotics
and from financial crimes occurring in the U.S. also are laundered in
Antigua and Barbuda.'' \13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
``Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, 2011,'' Volume 2, Department
of State, March 2011, accessed at: http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/
nrcrpt/2011/vol2/156374.htm#antiguaandbarbuda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While these havens have long existed, and efforts to curtail their
most egregious activities have been underway for decades, there is now
a new factor aggravating an already dangerous situation--the presence
of the Chavez government in Venezuela and its negligible enforcement
efforts, both on interdicting cocaine and in the flow of money.
Venezuela continues to operate in the global financial market on
behalf of Iran, Cuba and other nations that face U.S. and international
sanctions. In addition, due to the endemic corruption in an economy
that is orders of magnitude larger than its Caribbean neighbors,
Venezuela offers multiple advantages to money launderers, some of which
were enumerated in this year's State Department report on money
laundering:
Venezuela is one of the principal drug-transit countries in
the Western Hemisphere. Cocaine produced in Colombia is
trafficked through Venezuela to the Eastern Caribbean, Central
America, the United States, Europe, and western Africa. In
2010, Mexican drug trafficking organizations gained an
increased presence in Venezuela. Venezuela's proximity to drug
producing countries, weaknesses in its antimoney laundering
regime, limited bilateral cooperation, and alleged substantial
corruption in law enforcement and other relevant sectors
continue to make Venezuela vulnerable to money laundering. The
main sources of money laundering are proceeds generated by drug
trafficking organizations and illegal transactions that exploit
Venezuela's currency controls and its various exchange rates.
Money laundering occurs through commercial banks, exchange
houses, gambling sites, fraudulently invoiced foreign trade
transactions, smuggling, real estate (in the tourist industry),
agriculture and livestock businesses, securities transactions,
and trade in precious metals. Venezuela is not a regional
financial center and does not have an offshore financial
sector, although many local banks have offshore affiliates in
the Caribbean.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
``Money Laundering and Financial Crimes, 2011, Volume 2, Department of
State, March 2011, accessed at: http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/
2011/vol2/156376.htm#venezuela.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
radical islamist networks in the caribbean
No successful terrorist attacks against the United States have
originated in Caribbean. Yet there is a significant history of radical
Islamist movements there, both organizationally and financially.
Trinidad, one of the principal suppliers of liquefied natural gas
for the U.S. market, has a small but vocal Islamist community. In 1990,
the Islamist group Jama'at al Muslimeen under the control of Imam Yasin
Abu Bakr, attempted to establish the first Islamic state in the Western
hemisphere. The coup failed, but the group remains active. In 2002
another Islamist group on the island, Waajihatul Islaamiyyah, openly
supported Osama Bin Laden, al-Qaeda and Jemmah Islamiyyah, the
organization behind the Bali beachfront bombing that killed close to
200 people. A 2002 press release showed a keen awareness of the need to
attack critical infrastructure, saying: ``With our weapons we are going
to reach you. We will reach you where you sleep, we will reach you
where you take your baths, we will reach you where you take your meals
and have your drinks, and even a glass of water you hold in your hand
to drink may not be safe.'' \15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ For a more comprehensive look at this, as well as links to the
communiques, see Candyce Kelshall, ``Radical Islam and LNG in Trinidad
and Tobago,'' Institute for the Analysis of Global Security, Nov. 14,
2005, viewable at: www.iags.org/n1115045.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Jama'at al Muslimeen was largely viewed as a fringe group of
little importance, its leader, Bakr has been implicated in advising
those plotting the June 2007 failed attempt to blow up fuel tanks and
buildings at JFK International Airport in New York. Two of those
arrested in the plot were natives of Trinidad, and court documents said
at least one of the men, Kareem Ibrhaim, was a member of Jama'at. He
was arrested on an airplane bound from Trinidad to Venezuela, and said
he was flying to Caracas to catch another flight to Tehran.\16\ His
flight to Iran was apparently arranged by Abdul Kadir, also convicted
and sentenced to life in prison in the plot.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Francis Joseph, ``Trini Held in JFK Bomb Plot,'' Newsday, June
3, 2007,accessed at: http://www.newsday.co.tt/news/0,58214.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As the prosecution said after winning the case, ``The evidence at
trial established that Russell Defreitas, a naturalized United States
citizen from Guyana, originated the idea to attack JFK Airport and its
fuel tanks and pipelines by drawing on his prior experience working at
the airport as a cargo handler. In 2006 and 2007, Defreitas recruited
Kadir and others to join the plot during multiple trips to Guyana and
Trinidad. Between trips, Defreitas engaged in video surveillance of JFK
Airport and transported the footage back to Guyana to show Kadir and
their coconspirators. Kadir, a trained engineer with connections to
militant groups in Iran and Venezuela, provided the conspirators with
links to individuals with terrorist experience, advice on explosive
materials, and a bank account through which to finance the terrorist
attack.'' \17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ ``Russell Defreitas Sentenced to Life in Prison for Conspiring
to Commit Terrorist Acts at Airport,'' Eastern District of New York,
Press Release, February 17, 2011, accessed at: http://www.justice.gov/
usao/nye/pr/2011/2011feb17.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Such a series of connections would not necessarily have been cause
for deep concern if Latin America and the Caribbean were flourishing
economically and moving toward the rule of law in democratic societies.
But in the past 5 years the regional posture toward the United States
has shifted significantly, growing increasingly hostile.
Registries (corporate, shipping, or company) are valuable sources
of information, when they are available. The more transparent the
registry procedure, the less likely it is that the networks will seek
to use it. Because of this, the more obscure registries are often
preferred.
For example, many leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood (Al Ikwan al
Musulman),\18\ as well as the Bin Laden family, have maintained dozens
of companies in Panama, where true ownership of accounts and companies
are easy to hide and secrecy strictly enforced.\19\ Many changed
ownership, at least on paper, following the 9/11 attacks, making it
impossible to know the true ownership structures at this point because
Panama allows bearer shares, and lawyers can register the companies and
serve on the boards without disclosing the true ownership structure.
There are dozens of havens around the world that offer this service,
including Liberia, where the bin Laden family also has maintained
companies.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ The Brotherhood, formed in 1928, espouses the creation of
theocratic states ruled by Shari'a law and the reestablishment of the
Muslim Caliphate, or empire. Many of the radical Sunni terrorists and
theologians of today passed through Muslim Brotherhood structures in
their radicalization process, including Osama bin Laden and Khalid
Sheik Mohammed. Most Brotherhood statements today call for a political
takeover of the West that is not explicitly violent. However, Hamas, a
designated terrorist organization, identifies itself in its
constitution, as an armed branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. The motto
of the Brotherhood, in use today, is: ``Allah is our objective; the
Koran is our constitution; the Prophet is our leader; jihad is our way;
death for the sake of Allah is our highest aspiration.'' The
Brotherhood is unique in that it is the only transnational Islamist
organization that bridges the Sunni-Shi'ite divide. While primarily
Sunni, its leaders have maintained close relations with Iran,
particularly in the immediate aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution.
For a more complete look at the Brotherhood see: Douglas Farah, ``The
Challenge of Failed States, the Muslim Brotherhood and Radical Islam,''
International Assessment and Strategy Center, adaptation of
presentation to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA),
July 11, 2007, accessed at http://www.strategycenter.net/research/
pubID.168/pub_detail.asp.
\19\ The NEFA Foundation has obtained many of these corporate
registry records, and has them on file.
\20\ The NEFA Foundation has not been able to obtain these
documents but knows of their existence from numerous reliable sources.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is worth noting that the Brotherhood, whose legacy groups inside
the United States have been convicted of supporting Hamas, for more
than three decades has controlled a large Islamist banking structure in
the Bahamas, and an offshore business structure based in Panama,
indicating that radical Islamist groups were more familiar with
operating in Latin America than is often understood.
Many of the banking structures were shut down in the immediate
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The Treasury Department's designation of
the banks stated that one of the Bahamas' institutions, Bank al Taqwa,
was a shell bank, with no real physical installations. The Treasury
Department stated that the bank was used to funnel money to al-Qaeda,
even after the attacks on U.S. soil. The bank also allegedly
facilitated secure communications among al-Qaeda cells, as well as the
transportation of weapons. The key leaders of the bank, Yousef Nada,
Ghalib Himmat, and Idriss Nasreddin, were designated as terrorist
financiers by the U.S. Government and the United Nations.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ U.S. Treasury Department Statement on Terrorist Designations,
Aug. 12, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to working with al-Qaeda, the banks were also the
primary financial institution for Hamas, even after the organization
had been declared a terrorist group by the United States. At one point
the bank reportedly held more than US$60 million in Hamas funds.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ U.S. Treasury Department Statement on Terrorist Designations,
Aug. 12, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This summer, the International Investment Corporation of the Gulf-
Bahamas (IICG-B), a wholly owned subsidiary of Dar al Maal Al Islami
(DMI), an Islamist banking structure heavily influenced by the
Brotherhood, reached a nonprosecution agreement with the U.S.
Department of Justice. In the agreement, IICG-B agreed to pay more than
$30 million in fines and penalties for significant tax violations in
the United States.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ U.S. Department of Justice, Tax Division, Islamic Investment
Company of the Gulf (Bahamas) Limited Non-Prosecution Agreement, August
12, 2011. Accessed at: http://www.
investigativeproject.org/3200/doj-releases-islamic-bank-agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion
The CBSI could be a useful tool in helping Caribbean partners
combat drug trafficking and the endemic corruption, violence and
erosion of the rule of law that inevitably accompanies the emergence of
TOC groups.
However, the Initiative, in my view, will have little impact as
long as Venezuela and the ALBA nations in Latin America and the
Caribbean continue to criminalize, and use TOC and drug trafficking as
part of their statecraft, giving support and protection to drug
trafficking, and designated terrorist organizations such as the FARC.
With Venezuela and its allies opening key corridors for drug
trafficking to the United States and Europe (via West Africa), as well
providing sophisticated aid in laundering the hundreds of millions of
dollars in illicit proceeds, any program--especially one this
comparatively small--which does not deal with the source of the drug
flow will likely do little to mitigate the problem.
Senator Menendez. Well, thank you all for your testimony.
Let me start, Mr. Farah, with you. We have seen clearly
Iran seeking to use Venezuela as a foothold in Latin America.
We also know that Iran has been the biggest supporter of
Hezbollah, and we see that Hezbollah is active in the region.
Do you have any sense from your history reporting in the
region, whether Hezbollah is working with drug cartels in the
region? We saw some reports very recently of a whole host of
banking-related issues, all emanating out of this relationship
in Venezuela. What can you tell us about that?
Mr. Farah. Well, I think one of the key objectives of Iran
in the region, not just the Caribbean but in Latin America, is
to break out of its international isolation and move and break
out of the banking sanctions particularly which I think makes
the Caribbean particularly attractive to them.
I think that there is little history of radical Islamist
activities in the region that come to the open, but one of the
really notable ones was the 2007 attempt to bomb JFK and the
gas lines there where you had members of the Caribbean. And one
of the persons, who was fleeing who has been arrested and is
now sentenced to life in prison, was on his way out of--I think
it was out of Guyana into Venezuela to catch a flight to Iran.
And that was set up, as the United States court documents show,
by a Guyanan who had been an Iranian agent for many years and
was facilitating the flight after what was supposed to be a
very significant terrorist attack. So I think you have a
footprint there.
I think that they have done a great deal to disguise it,
and I think what is useful and what is to me most concerning
about the ALBA relationships in the Caribbean is that Iran is
using Venezuela to hide its financial transactions, and the
more they can diffuse that into the other banking jurisdictions
where it is very difficult to track money anyway, the better
off Iran is.
Senator Menendez. Dr. Gamarra, I appreciate your very
balanced review particularly of the Dominican Republic and some
of the initiatives there. In my personal view it was good that
President Fernandez and the Dominican Government were seeking
to try to control their airspace, so I looked at the purchase
of that aircraft in a different way than maybe others within
the government did.
Having said that, on one dimension you see that and in
another dimension you see all of the challenges within the
Dominican Republic's defense forces, the Dominican Republic's
security force, elements of the Dominican Government that have
been denied despite the fact that we do not deny visas very
easily, particularly to officials in other governments. Yet,
there have been a slew of denials from our Government of visas
to the United States by Dominican Government officials. That
seems to undermine the fact that we are buying aircraft to
control Dominican airspace and intercede the fight. At another
level, we have all of these different governmental entities
that undermine the very essence of the fight on the ground. So
it is almost a contrast. We are trying to control airspace, but
on the ground we are doing a whole host of different things or
not vigorously pursuing the cleansing of those entities.
And then maybe that gives rise to your observation, which I
found very interesting and want to pursue, that there has
actually been, in real terms, very little financial assistance
by the United States toward the initiative in the Dominican
Republic. So that is incredibly important as well. But maybe it
gives rise to say, well, we cannot be spending money if we do
not have a governmental structure that is responsive to these
things.
Help me through some of that.
Dr. Gamarra. Right. First, Senator Menendez, I think your
final observation is something that the United States has found
historically everywhere throughout the region. This is not the
first time that somebody has called a country a narcostate. I
think we have to be cautious about that especially because this
is done in the context of an electoral campaign and it is said
by a candidate who probably has no chance of winning the
Presidency. In my opinion the Dominican Republic is far from a
narcostate. And the two cases mentioned are Quirino who is
serving in prison in New York and Jose Figueroa Agosto who is
under arrest in Puerto Rico, and that organization was largely
dismantled. And just last week the successors were arrested in
the Dominican Republic as well. In other words the Dominican
Republic has arrested, convicted, and also deported major drug
lords.
But in the main, many, many things were tried with the
police and they continue to be tried. Very good results have
also been obtained. We argued very much for a purging of the
institution. And there were occasional purges and significant
purges, and yet the structures of organized crime seem to be
able to reproduce themselves almost instantaneously within the
organization. And so I think you have a very, very interesting
contrast here between the will of the President and the
institutional capacity to carry things forth.
Senator Menendez. No. please go ahead. Finish your thought.
Dr. Gamarra. And at the same time as there is an absence of
funds to carry out a significant process of police reform
international factors, such as the explosion of the situation
in Mexico and what is happening, as described by Doug Farah,
right now in Venezuela had an enormous impact on the well-
intentioned efforts of the Dominican Republic. Owing to the
international situation, and despite the best efforts of the
Dominican Government the situation which was already bad in
2004 when this program was designed, is probably worse in 2011.
Senator Menendez. Actually, is it not true that the
Dominican country was not a consuming country? It has been a
transshipment point.
Dr. Gamarra. That is right.
Senator Menendez. But it has become now more of a consuming
country because the cartels and the traffickers are----
Dr. Gamarra. Paying in kind, yes.
Senator Menendez [continuing]. Paying in product.
Dr. Gamarra. Right.
Senator Menendez. And that has addicted people.
And I appreciate your observation--certainly I was not
suggesting the Dominican Republic is a narcostate. I was
reading the comments of the candidate. And maybe he is not
going to have any chance to win, but sometimes when you do not
have a chance to win, you say things that either can be
outrageous or can be very honest.
Dr. Gamarra. Right.
Senator Menendez. I looked at the link of all the people
Jose Figueroa Agosto had access to, and for a long time he
worked with impunity within the Dominican Republic. Would that
not be fair to say?
Dr. Gamarra. Yes, absolutely fair to say and, in fact, in
three successive administrations because it started out in the
early 2000s when he fled Puerto Rico, came into the Dominican
Republic and used multiple personalities. You know, his front
was as a business person and became really a very, very public
and significant figure with great access to the police, to the
DNI, and to even very prominent politicians. I think the
fortunate thing was--and I think largely as a result of
Dominican police cooperation with DEA--that organization was
dismantled. But as we know from experience in Bolivia and Peru
and Colombia and elsewhere, these organizations very, very
rapidly reorganize or are replaced by others. And I think part
of what is happening in the Dominican Republic, because of a
magnitude of the threat, is that we already have replacements
in place.
Senator Menendez. Senator Rubio.
Senator Rubio. Thank you.
Just briefly for both of you, Mr. Farah, the gist of your
testimony is all of this stuff is great, but as long as
Venezuela is out there, true success is going to be very
difficult to accomplish. In essence, all these other things
that we are doing are important, but to ultimately see them
come to fruition and really bring about the kind of level of
stability out there, as long as Venezuela is using drug
trafficking as a part of statecraft, it will be very difficult
for us. That is the root of the problem and how serious the
problem is. Is that an accurate summary of what you are here to
tell us today?
Mr. Farah. Absolutely.
I would like to correct my previous answer just briefly
before I answer that. The person leaving from Trinidad to
Venezuela to get on the Iran flight as he left the JFK bombing
incident.
Yes, I think that is absolutely right. To me it is like
leaving the front door open while you are trying to lock the
back door. There is no point in trying to keep the stuff out.
And I think one of the things that Eduardo was saying with how
much worse the situation for the Dominican Republic is is
because there is more stuff now being channeled directly to
them. Before, there was a range of places. You go to Central
America.
But the difference between Colombia and Venezuela, if you
look at the air corridors, is Colombia is actually trying to
stop them whereas Venezuela is giving them active protection.
And when you have a state protection of illicit activities, it
becomes much more difficult to combat.
So, yes, I think that is an exactly fair statement.
Senator Rubio. And then related to that--and Dr. Gamarra is
here. What is your view, as we head toward 2012 and the
upcoming elections or lack thereof in Venezuela, whatever is
going to happen there? Additionally, how what happened in
Nicaragua a few weeks ago could ultimately impact the direction
that leaders there may or may not take. I know it is kind of an
open-ended question with only a few minutes left, but what is
your view of the situation in Venezuela, the political
situation as the opposition seems to hopefully be able to
coalesce behind somebody, in my opinion anyway, and how does
that play out?
Dr. Gamarra. Yes. It is a very interesting process. The
opposition will have its elections in early February and will
elect a candidate. There are, at least in my opinion, two or
three very good candidates on the opposition side.
But it is kind of interesting what is happening on the side
of the government. And this is probably one of the more
difficult things I think the United States has been largely
unable to explain: the continued popularity of President Chavez
both abroad and domestically. And part of it is evident in
public opinion polls. President Chavez's popularity has shot
right back up in part because of his battle with cancer. And
you know, just this month in December, he has actually given
five salaries to public employees. So if you are a public
employee and you are getting five salaries at the end of the
year, I would vote for him too probably. So I think his
popularity, if he survives, will guarantee him the Presidency
next year. I do not see the opposition really putting forth the
capacity to win an electoral battle.
And I think what you were asking me is whether there will
be fraud, given what happened in Nicaragua. Again, given
President Chavez's popularity, he probably will not need fraud,
but he has a record of not conducting the cleanest of elections
either.
Senator Rubio. Do you have any doubt there was fraud in
Nicaragua?
Dr. Gamarra. No, I do not. No, not at all.
Senator Rubio. Thank you both.
Senator Menendez. Thank you.
Let me just follow up on Senator Rubio's question because
you said something that I found very interesting. It has been
my observation and I would love to hear your opinion, that Hugo
Chavez is using the national patrimony of Venezuela to buy both
influence in the hemisphere and, of course, in his own
election. So if you spend enormously, as you suggested, I do
not know if it is bonuses or salaries, whatever it is.
Dr. Gamarra. The equivalent of five salaries.
Senator Menendez. The equivalent of it. And you spend the
national patrimony by giving out oil that is subsidized or free
throughout the hemisphere, of course, that is all resources
that could go to the Venezuelan people for education, for
health care, for food, for a variety of purposes. Is that not
fair to say, that to a large degree he is using the nation's
resources for his own political aggrandizement?
Dr. Gamarra. Yes, I think so, Senator. The reality is that
given Venezuela's wealth, while poverty in Venezuela has
decreased, it has not decreased to the extent that one would
expect one of the wealthiest nations on earth to have a poverty
rate of almost 30 percent, where you have poverty declines in
the rest of the region using very different policy designs and
without Venezuela's natural wealth.
By the same token--and this was addressed a little earlier,
the reality is that some countries that benefit from the oil
largesse are countries that are largely dependent on the
subsidies that they receive from Venezuela. And it is an
expensive subsidy, because while they are getting short-term
access to oil, this is a long-term investment that makes these
countries financially dependent because they will inevitably
have to repay these subsidies.
Senator Menendez. Mr. Farah, last observation.
Mr. Farah. Can I just briefly say one of the really
interesting things with Venezuela is that essentially every
time it goes broke, it manages to find a donor, particularly
China? If you noticed last year when China came in with $20
billion, it is being paid back in petroleum at a price of $18 a
barrel. So that is a very good deal for China, but it is enough
to keep the Chavez government alive.
And I think one of the things you see in the
criminalization or the state of the increased drug trafficking
there is that they need other resources to maintain the loyalty
of the military, civil servants, and others, and as other
legitimate resources run out, then they turn increasingly to
drug profits to fill that void. And I think that is one of the
great benefits they receive from their relationship with FARC,
is the ability to receive extra-budgetary infusions of cash
that allow them to then dispense largesse.
Senator Menendez. But taking your point, this is what I see
on the horizon for the people of Venezuela. To sell to the
Chinese at $18 a barrel when oil is hovering somewhere--I have
not seen the latest price in the last couple days, but
somewhere in the 90-some odd dollar range--is in essence giving
it away to have a temporary flow of money. But in the process,
you are taking the nation's--it is not Mr. Chavez's money. It
is the nation's money. So if you think about it, both what he
is doing throughout the hemisphere and what he is doing in this
transaction, which is a very interesting one for you to note,
is undermining the long-term national interest of the people of
Venezuela. You can imagine if, instead of those subsidies, that
money was being used to create greater upward mobility, that
you would not have that 30 percent of poverty in a country that
is so wealthy. So it is ironic that he is seen as the populist
when at the same time, it is almost like a Roman circus. You
keep people temporarily entertained, but at the end of the day,
you are dramatically undermining their ability for social
mobility within their own country.
Well, thank you very much. I think you have added greatly
to our conversation here. We appreciate your testimony.
The record will remain open for 2 days for members who may
have questions. If any questions are submitted to any of the
witnesses, we urge them to answer them expeditiously.
And with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
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