[Senate Hearing 112-123]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-123
DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. DIPLOMACY
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HEARING
before the
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT,
THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 29, 2011
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JON TESTER, Montana RAND PAUL, Kentucky
MARK BEGICH, Alaska JERRY MORAN, Kansas
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Nicholas A. Rossi, Minority Staff Director
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Joyce Ward, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee
OVERSIGHT OF GOVERNMENT MANAGEMENT, THE FEDERAL WORKFORCE, AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SUBCOMMITTEE
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
MARK BEGICH, Alaska JERRY MORAN, Kansas
Lisa M. Powell, Staff Director, Majority
Jessica K. Nagasako, Professional Staff Member, Majority
Ray Ciarcia, Legislative Fellow, Majority
Rachel Weaver, Staff Director, Minority
Sean Kennedy, Professional Staff Member, Minority
Aaron H. Woolf, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statement:
Page
Senator Akaka................................................ 1
WITNESSES
Tuesday, June 21, 2011
Hon. Eric J. Boswell, Assistant Secretary for Diplomatic
Security, U.S. Department of State............................. 3
Jess T. Ford, Director, International Affairs and Trade, U.S.
Government Accountability Office............................... 5
Susan R. Johnson, President, American Foreign Service Association 20
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Hon. Boswell, Eric J.:
Testimony.................................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 27
Ford, Jess T.:
Testimony.................................................... 5
Prepared statement........................................... 37
Johnson, Susan R.:
Testimony.................................................... 20
Prepared statement........................................... 48
APPENDIX
Background....................................................... 52
Questions and responses submitted for the record from:
Mr. Boswell.................................................. 60
DIPLOMATIC SECURITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. DIPLOMACY
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 29, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government
Management, the Federal Workforce,
and the District of Columbia,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:30 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K.
Akaka, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senator Akaka.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. I call this hearing of the Subcommittee on
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and
the District of Columbia to order. I want to say aloha and
welcome to our witnesses. Thank you so much for being here
today.
This Subcommittee held a hearing in 2009 to examine
staffing and management challenges at the State Department's
Diplomatic Security Bureau (DS) which protects State Department
employees and property worldwide. Today's hearing will build on
the previous hearing, as well as examine the results of a
Government Accountability Office (GAO) review of diplomatic
security training challenges.
Since the 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa,
the Bureau's mission has expanded dramatically to meet the
State Department's evolving security needs. With our military
planning to withdraw its remaining 50,000 troops from Iraq by
the year's end, diplomatic security will face an unprecedented
challenge.
The Bureau will be responsible for many security and
protective functions now performed by the military such as
clearing improvised explosive devices and defending a U.S. post
against rocket and mortar attacks.
In addition, the Bureau is expected to implement a State
Department recommendation to provide high threat awareness
training to all employees in both high and critical threat
posts. This would require the Bureau to train 10,000 employees
per year, five times the number for 2010. The Bureau's
responsibilities will continue to expand with the planned troop
reductions in Afghanistan.
As we deploy more civilian Federal employees to support
democratic reform and self-governance in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
other high threat areas, it is very critical that Diplomatic
Security have the training, resources, and support needed to
protect them.
The Government Accountability Office report released today
makes clear that DS is doing a remarkable job preparing its
people to provide robust security in an unpredictable
environment. But I do want to highlight a major concern that
GAO raises.
GAO's report finds that diplomatic security training
facilities are inadequate. The Bureau is using 16 different
leased, rented, or borrowed facilities. In some of these sites,
the Bureau's training needs are not a priority, which increases
costs and leads to training delays. Also, some facilities are
too small or in need of repair. Although the Bureau is in the
process of selecting a site to build a consolidated training
facility, this will take years to complete.
Another significant concern that I have, which I asked the
Bureau to address today, is how it oversees its large
contractor workforce. As Diplomatic Security provides security
in more high threat areas, the Bureau grows increasingly
reliant on contract staff. Contractors make up about 90 percent
of its total workforce. This requires the Bureau to train its
workforce and contract oversight in addition to physical and
personal security.
The 2007 Blackwater shooting that killed 17 Iraqi civilians
while protecting a State convoy reminds us that DS contractors,
particularly those acting as bodyguards, must be held to the
highest standards for training and accountability because the
stakes are tremendously high.
I also look forward to hearing about what steps the Bureau
has taken to address key issues raised at the Subcommittee's
2009 hearing. I am particularly interested in the Bureau's
progress in addressing language proficiency shortfalls and
staffing gaps, balancing the need to provide strong security
with carrying out the diplomatic mission, and improving its
strategic planning, which is important for targeting limited
resources in this budget climate.
I know that Ambassador Boswell and his team are working
hard to address these challenges. I look forward to hearing
about the Bureau's efforts, as well as discussing ways we can
work together to move forward. I thank our witnesses for being
here today to discuss these critical issues.
I look forward to hearing from our first panel of witnesses
and welcome them here today. Ambassador Eric Boswell, the
Assistant Secretary of State for Diplomatic Security, and Jess
Ford, the Director of International Affairs and Trade at the
Government Accountability Office.
I understand that Mr. Ford is retiring on Friday after 38
years of Federal service, and this will be his last time
testifying before this Subcommittee. Over the years, Mr. Ford
has done extensive work on improving State Department
operations and management of American embassies, and we
certainly will miss him. The GAO informed us that you have
testified before this Subcommittee more than any other GAO
staffer.
This Subcommittee has placed great value and trust in your
work, and it is with great appreciation, Mr. Ford, that I say
mahalo nui loa, thank you very much for your years of valuable
service with GAO, and I wish you success in your future
endeavors.
As you know, it is the custom of this Subcommittee to swear
in all witnesses and I ask both of you to stand and raise your
right hand.
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to
give this Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Mr. Boswell. I do.
Mr. Ford. I do.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Let it be noted for the record
that the witnesses answered in the affirmative.
Before we start, I want you to know that your full written
statements will be made a part of the record, and I would also
like to remind you to please limit your oral remarks to 5
minutes.
Ambassador Boswell, it is always good to have you, please
proceed with your statement.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ERIC J. BOSWELL,\1\ ASSISTANT
SECRETARY FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Boswell. Thank you, Senator Akaka. I am honored to
appear before you today.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Boswell appears in the appendix
on page 27.
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I would like to thank you and the Subcommittee Members for
your continued support and interest in the Bureau of Diplomatic
Security's programs. This support enables Diplomatic Security
to safeguard American diplomats and facilities for the conduct
of U.S. foreign policy, while also maintaining our robust
investigative programs which serve to protect the U.S. borders
and our presence overseas.
DS's training program is at the core of our readiness to
fulfill these missions. So with your permission, I will make a
brief statement. As I have stated before this Subcommittee in
the past, DS continues to provide the most secure environment
possible for the conduct of America's foreign policy.
I must reiterate that the scope and scale of our
responsibilities and authorities have grown immensely in
response to emerging threats and security incidents.
Significant resources are necessary if we are to meet the
requirements of securing our diplomatic facilities in the
extremely high threat environments of Iraq, Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Sudan, Yemen, Mexico, as well as other dangerous
locations worldwide.
The Department now operates diplomatic missions in places
where, in the past, we likely would have closed the post and
evacuated all personnel when faced with similar threats.
However, the need to conduct diplomacy in the post-September
11, 2001 environment is essential to our Nation's security.
To meet our challenges now and in the future, DS personnel
and resources have grown and evolved. We are engaged in an
intensive recruitment campaign. We have increased our outreach
to colleges and universities with an eye toward building a
professional service that reflects America's diversity.
As a result of our ambitious recruitment efforts, we have
reduced our vacancy rate. This expansion has also changed the
requirements for training our people. DS training has
progressed tremendously in the past several years. The GAO
review of DS training accurately reflects the success of our
Training Directorate despite the challenges we face.
To ensure that the personnel we deploy are highly
qualified, we carefully evaluate our training programs. By
incorporating student feedback, we can offer the highest
quality instruction to new and existing DS personnel. This
evaluation process helps to verify that the training offered is
relevant to the new realities of the Department's mission.
It also ensures that DS personnel are prepared to assume
increasing security responsibilities in high threat and other
challenging environments. However, as noted in the recent GAO
report, existing DS training facilities and instructor
resources are now at maximum student capacity and capabilities.
A new Foreign Affairs Security Training Center (FASTC) would
expand and improve the delivery of DS training for U.S.
Government employees.
Personnel serving in contingency zones must not only be
trained and prepared to assume the increasing security
responsibilities, but also have the necessary support services
available to them both during and after their assignment to
high-stress posts.
The Department fully realizes that when one of its
employees serves in a high-threat environment, the employee's
whole family serves with him or her in one form or another. A
full array of services is available to these personnel and
their families from medical doctors, psychologists,
psychiatrists, and others. I want to assure the Subcommittee
that we are paying attention to all personnel who have been or
could be affected by Post Traumatic Stress Disorder(PTSD), and
addressing any issues early on to help those persons in need.
The Department uses private security contractors (PSCs), to
assist in meeting security staffing requirements in critical
threat and non-permissive environments such as Iraq and
Afghanistan. As a result of operational changes already
implemented and reviewed during the conduct of the Department's
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), the
Department is able to provide proper management, oversight, and
operational control of the PSCs it has deployed overseas.
The Worldwide Protective Services (WPS) contract awarded in
September 2010 incorporated essential lessons learned to ensure
that PSCs contracted by the Department perform their activities
in a professional, responsible, culturally sensitive, and cost-
effective manner.
DS continues to explore ways to provide innovative security
blueprints to help implement our national foreign policy
priorities. We must continue to develop a cadre of DS personnel
who can think creatively to propose solutions, who can speak
the language, and who can work closely and cooperatively with
their embassy colleagues to succeed without sacrificing safety
and security.
In conclusion, I want to assure the Subcommittee that DS is
fully prepared to provide the secure platform and environment
the Department of State needs to meet the challenging
diplomatic responsibilities we face in this ever-changing
world.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you. With your continued support, we will ensure that
diplomatic security remains a valuable and effective resource
for protecting our people, our information, and our
infrastructure around the world.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Ambassador, for your
statement. Mr. Ford, please proceed with your statement.
STATEMENT OF JESS T. FORD, DIRECTOR,\1\ INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
AND TRADE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Ford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to start by
thanking you for your kind comments regarding my lengthy career
at GAO. Thirty-eight years is a long time, but I am looking
forward to retirement.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Ford appears in the appendix on
page 37.
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I am pleased to be here today to discuss training efforts
of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security at the State Department.
My testimony is based on our report which is being released
today. Diplomatic Security is responsible for the protection of
people, information, and property at over 400 embassies,
consulates, and domestic locations.
And as we have reported in previous testimony, they have an
expanded mission and they have had a significant growth in
their budget and personnel over the last decade. Diplomatic
Security trains its workforce and others to address a variety
of threats, including crime, espionage, visa/passport fraud,
technological intrusions, political violence, and terrorism.
To meet its training needs, Diplomatic Security relies
primarily on its training center, which is part of its Training
Directorate, and it is the primary provider of diplomatic
security training activities. Diplomatic Security's training
budget has grown steadily from Fiscal Year 2006 to 2010 from
approximately $24 million to $70 million.
Today I am going to talk a little bit about the two main
issues in our report, the first having to do with the quality
of Diplomatic Security's training and the appropriateness of
its training and the extent to which it ensures that training
requirements are met; and second, I am going to talk a little
bit about the challenges currently facing Diplomatic Security.
We reported that DS has had to meet the challenge of
training more personnel to perform additional duties, while
still getting its agents, engineers, technicians, and other
staff into the field where they are needed. DS has largely met
this challenge by maintaining high standards for its training.
Specifically, DS incorporated Federal Law Enforcement
Training Accreditation (FLETA) standards into its operating
procedures, and is the first government organization to be
accredited by FLETA standards.
Certain issues, however, have constrained the effectiveness
of some DS training activities. In our report, we noted that DS
lacks a comprehensive system to evaluate the overall
effectiveness of some of its training, particularly online
training which is growing in significance in terms of activity
there.
Second, we said that DS has not been able to accurately
track the overall training of all the people who take training.
To some extent, this is an issue with non-State staff who have
been training in certain courses that are required when they
are stationed overseas in dangerous locations. We made a couple
of recommendations to improve the systems and State has agreed
with both of them.
Our report also identifies other challenges facing DS.
First, DS must train diplomatic security personnel to perform
new missions in Iraq as they take over responsibilities that
heretofore have been performed by the U.S. military.
DS has had little or no experience in providing certain
types of training activity that the military currently is
responsible for, such as how to deal with downed aircraft,
explosive ordnance disposal, and rocket and mortar
countermeasures, among others. Because of this increased
security responsibility, DS anticipates that it is going to
have to rely heavily on contractors to carry out these types of
responsibilities.
DS officials noted that the additional training that will
be needed will likely increase their need to put more people
into the field. Any delays in finalizing State's expanded
mission in Iraq could also affect DS's ability to develop and
deliver any types of additional training.
A second major challenge that we identified in our report
has to do with the increasing requirements laid out in the
State Department's Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development
Review. In essence, the review calls for DS to significantly
increase training for staff posted to more high threat and
critical posts.
The numbers in our report suggest that they would have to
increase training from 23 to 178 posts, and that the number of
students that might have to be trained for high-threat posts
could increase, as you noted in your opening statement, from
2,000 to 10,000. This would have significant implications for
DS in terms of its budget and its training requirements.
Finally, the issue that you identified in your statement
and our third challenge in our report has to do with DS's
training facilities. Currently, they have a highly
decentralized set of training facilities. You mentioned the 16
that we have in our report.
We found that many of these are substandard and have a
number of inadequacies. Our report details a number of examples
where DS is unable to effectively deliver realistic training
because of shortfalls in these facilities.
Recognizing that these existing facilities are inadequate,
DS has proposed establishing a consolidated training center.
They are currently looking at two potential sites. They have
been provided approximately $136 million to help develop these
sites. However, it is unclear what the total cost of building
such a site will be, and it is also uncertain when the site
might be available. So we have some concerns in the short term
about how DS is going to be able to meet this increasing
mission.
Mr. Chairman, I think I am going to stop here and answer
any questions you might have.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Ford. I thank both
of you for your statements.
Let me start with a question for Ambassador Boswell.
Ambassador, President Obama recently announced plans to
withdraw 33,000 troops from Afghanistan by next summer, and
fully transition security responsibilities to the Afghan people
by 2014. I support these plans and look forward to welcoming
home our brave troops.
As you know, many diplomats and Federal civilian employees
will continue to serve in Iraq and Afghanistan after the troop
withdrawals. I worry about the degree of risk we are asking
them to undertake.
What planning is underway to make sure that DS will be
fully prepared to protect diplomats and U.S. civilian personnel
in Iraq and Afghanistan as the military withdraws?
Mr. Boswell. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question. We
are engaged, we the Department of State and DS, are engaged in
a marathon of planning. I think that is the right way to
describe it. It is probably the planning for the transition in
Iraq is probably the most complex planning effort ever
undertaken by the State Department and perhaps one of the most
complicated civilian planning efforts ever taken by the U.S.
Government.
We have been working on it for years. We think we have a
very good planning structure set up and we think we have a good
plan, and the short answer to your question, sir, is that I
think we will be in a position to provide the security for our
people in Iraq after December 31st of this year when all U.S.
troops will be gone from the country.
Having said that, as I said, it is a very complex and
difficult task. We are going to be dramatically increasing the
number of security personnel at posts in Iraq, and we will be
increasing also the use of contractors, in part for some of the
things you mentioned and Mr. Ford mentioned, certain functions
and activities that are not mainstream Department of State
functions, and where we are taking over functions now provided
by the U.S. military.
We think we have the structure in place to do it. I should
make the point that combat operations in Iraq ceased over a
year ago. U.S. military combat operations in Iraq ceased over a
year ago. We have been providing security to our very large
U.S. embassy in Bagdad for over a year without any assistance
from the military beyond certain very specialized functions,
and we expect to be able to continue to do that.
You asked about Afghanistan, also, sir. Obviously, we are
not there yet. There is not a transition yet. The President has
just announced the beginning of a drawdown in Afghanistan. But
I can assure you that we have learned a lot in the planning
process for Iraq and we will apply those lessons in
Afghanistan.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Ambassador, as the military
withdraws from Iraq and later Afghanistan, DS will provide
certain security and protective services that the military is
performing now such as downed aircraft recovery and explosive
ordnance disposal. However, the military provides many services
such as intelligence collection and providing a visible
deterrence in ways that DS cannot.
How will the loss of these important capabilities affect
the way DS provides security in Iraq and Afghanistan? And is DS
equipped to handle all of the functions it will be asked to
assume?
Mr. Boswell. Mr. Chairman, I was in Iraq several years ago
and the security situation in Iraq now, I think it is fair to
say, is infinitely better than it was at the worst of times,
2005 to 2007. You are right, sir, in saying that certain key
functions of the U.S. military will be absent. They cannot be
replaced by DS, notably counter-rocket fire. There is not an
offensive unit in DS. Some intelligence functions as well.
As Iraq normalizes as a Nation, we are going to rely, as we
do in most countries, on the Iraqi forces and the Iraqi police
for these functions to the maximum extent that we can.
Senator Akaka. Mr. Ford, in 2009, GAO recommended that
State conduct a strategic review of Diplomatic Security's
mission, budget, and personnel as part of State's Quadrennial
Diplomacy and Development Review. While State agreed with the
recommendation, the QDDR did not include this strategic review.
Will you please discuss how inadequate strategic planning may
affect the DS operations?
Mr. Ford. Yes, Mr. Chairman, let me respond to that. First
of all, I can say that we were disappointed that the QDDR did
not take a more strategic look at DS operations. Our 2009
report noted that DS has been required to expand the number of
missions that it is asked to support by the Department overall
and that they are often put into what I would characterize as a
reactionary posture which we do not think is good from a
planning point of view, and our goal of that 2009 report was
that the Department would take a longer look at DS and come up
with a more strategic way of assessing needs, resources, and
requirements.
I think I can say that our current report, which is focused
on the training part of DS, suggests that there still seems, in
my mind, to be a gap here. DS is certainly trying to respond to
all the new missions that are laid on them.
We just discussed the Iraq and Afghanistan situations that
are coming up, and the fact that their training facilities are
not up to speed. How they are going to be able to, at least in
the short term, respond to the likely increased growth in
training capability that they are going to have to develop.
A lot of those kind of issues, in my mind, could have been
included in a strategic review. So I think from our
perspective, we still would like to see the Department take a
broader view of DS in order to give them a little more lead
time in figuring out what their needs are.
I think certainly the issue of human capital, the
capabilities of people to do contract oversight, those type of
issues are the kind of issues that DS is going to be faced with
over the next couple of years. The Department needs to, in our
view, do a more comprehensive review of what they need. So as
far as we are concerned, that recommendation has not been fully
enacted by the Department.
Senator Akaka. Let me followup with a question to
Ambassador Boswell. Ambassador, DS faces unprecedented
challenges as it takes on new responsibilities in Iraq and
Afghanistan while continuing to protect U.S. diplomats
worldwide. To meet these challenges, DS must use its limited
resources strategically. What steps has the Bureau taken to
develop a strategic plan?
Mr. Boswell. Mr. Chairman, as a result of the
recommendation in the GAO report--the GAO report of 2009 had
basically two recommendations on strategic planning. One was
the Department, as Mr. Ford has just said, should look at DS in
a strategic manner. And the second one was that DS should
improve its own strategic planning.
I certainly agree with that. We have put together a
strategic planning unit which is very closely linked to our
budget process, and which I meet with every 6 months, and my
senior leadership meets with much more often than that. It has
been extremely helpful, in various ways, to the way we do our
business and the way we look forward. And I think this is an
initiative that is working successfully.
In terms of the broader question that Mr. Ford just raised,
we will certainly take that back with us again to the
Department. The QDDR, which was Secretary Clinton's signature
initiative when she came to the Department, was a strategic
review, but it was not a strategic review at DS. It was a
strategic review overall and implementation of the various
recommendations, including a couple that have been mentioned in
testimony here, is ongoing.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador Boswell, DS performs many
important roles in addition to protecting State Department
employees and embassies, including providing protective details
to foreign dignitaries and supporting security at international
special events.
In November, Hawaii will be hosting the Asian-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leaders meeting. What plans does DS
have in place to provide security and protective services at
the APEC meeting?
Mr. Boswell. Sir, DS is very extensively involved in the
planning for APEC which, as you said, will take place this
fall. It has been designated as a national security special
event by the White House. The lead agency is the U.S. Secret
Service which is appropriate given the number of heads of State
that will be visiting.
But DS will also have a major presence in Honolulu. We have
a lot of protectees in association with the APEC meeting,
foreign ministers, for example, and others, and we will be
working--have been and will be working very, very closely with
the Secret Service and the local authorities and other Federal
agencies as well to have a good, successful, safe event.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Mr. Ford, as I mentioned in my statement, GAO found that DS
has inadequate training facilities. The Bureau currently uses
16 different facilities for training, some of which are
overcrowded or need repair. While DS has developed an interim
training facility, your report suggests that it is not adequate
to support all of the Bureau's training needs, especially with
the Iraq transition.
Would you please elaborate on the effects of these
inadequate training facilities?
Mr. Ford. Yes. There are several issues that we identified
in our report regarding the condition of the facilities. Some
of them have to do with access--whether or not the Department
can get access to certain types of training.
The one that we cited in our report had to do with heavy
firearms training that they currently provide down at Quantico
Marine Base, and the issue there is DS does not--because it is
a Marine Base, they have to kind of schedule their training
around the Marines' needs, which does not necessarily always
correspond to the needs and requirements of the Department. So
there is an access issue that they have to address.
Other facilities that we visited, they just are not
realistic in terms of the type of structures that are there to
carry out the type of training that DS is trying to provide to
staff. It is really, in this case, I would call it a realism
problem.
In the report, we cite a case where they are trying to
simulate conditions of entering a facility and how to enter it
in a secure manner, and their training space did not have walls
so they basically used tape on the floor to simulate where a
wall would be. That is not very realistic.
At other facilities where they train with light arms
firearms, we found that some of the firearms lanes were not
adequate to their needs. So there are some issues with regard
to just the physical infrastructure and whether they have the
capacity there to effectively carry out the type of training
they need to carry out.
And then the second issue, and the one I mentioned earlier,
has to do with whether or not the facilities that are currently
inadequate, whether they are going to be able to expand their
training mission with all the new people that they have to
train to do the Iraq and Afghanistan missions, and potentially
the QDDR requirement, if they have to implement that fully, it
is not clear to us whether the current facilities that they
have will allow them to have that capacity to even do the
training. So that is the second issue that we are concerned
about.
And then that third issue has to do with their goal of
creating a consolidated training center; it's years down the
road before that facility may be up and running. So there is an
interim period here where it is not clear to us whether DS will
have the capabilities, with the current facilities that they
have and the shortcomings they have, to be able to effectively
carry out all the training they need to do.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador Boswell, I would like to hear
from you on that issue as well. Will you please discuss how DS
is coping with these challenges and how the Bureau will meet
its expanding training needs until a consolidated facility is
operational?
Mr. Boswell. Yes, sir. Let me start by saying I completely
agree with everything that Mr. Ford said, and I welcome that
conclusion. In fact, I welcome all the conclusions of the GAO
report, but particularly that one because that is close to our
heart in DS. The problems he described are real.
We have long needed and long sought a Foreign Affairs
Security Training Center, as well call it. We have been in the
process for years of trying to obtain such a facility. We have
obtained startup funding for such a facility. We went through
an extensive process with the General Services Administration
(GSA), which is the U.S. Government's real estate czar, with
the General Services Administration to identify sites for such
a facility within a reasonable distance of Washington, DC.
We had a look of, I think, well over 40 possible--we
solicited first interest from other government agencies, the
private sector, et cetera, et cetera. We look at about 40
sites. I think it may have been a little bit more. We ended up,
after a very long process with the GSA, settling on one
particular site on the eastern shore of Maryland.
Unfortunately, last year, that came a cropper, came a
cropper because of local opposition to the site. It is one of
the problems that we have. To do all the facilities, to do all
the training that we have to do, we need a pretty large site
and it is hard to find a large site that is appropriately
configured within reasonable distance of Washington, DC. So we
basically had to go back to the beginning and start over.
This process is ongoing. We are closing in, I think you
could say, on a site. We have had to change our criteria a
little bit to permit us to look a little further out from
Washington.
That is a little bit of a problem for us because while it
makes the choice, the selection of sites a little bit easier,
it also means that since it is beyond simple driving range,
that our trainees will have to overnight and that means the
construction of dorms and other facilities, cafeterias, such
things, so that adds a little bit to the cost. But we are
closing in on a site and hope to have something to announce in
the coming months.
But we absolutely, absolutely require this site. As Mr.
Ford has said, we are spread out over a range of facilities
now, and the biggest problem we have with that, aside from the
dispersal, is that we do not own any of these facilities. So we
run into the problems that he described. These are joint use
facilities. We are sort of tenants in some way and it causes a
problem for us.
I am going on a little too long, Mr. Chairman, but I want
to cover the question. It is a long question. How do we do our
training in the interim? We are years ago, even if we get a
site. We are years ago from having a full-fledged training
facility. And we are going to have to continue to do what we
are doing and what Mr. Ford and the GAO saw. We are going to
have to continue to make do flexibly and with some imagination
with what we have.
Now, as for the requirement and the recommendation in the
QDDR, our Foreign Affairs Training Center be expanded well
beyond what is offered now, that is a real conundrum for us. We
would have to have a new facility to do that. We would simply
not be able to do it without a new facility.
There is a real question. The figure of expanding and the
number of trainees from 2,000 to 10,000 is sort of an outer-
outer figure. I cannot imagine that we would ever, even with a
new facility, be training 10,000 people a year. We are working
now with the Policy Planning staff of the State Department to
decide what high-threat posts really should get this kind of
training.
Right now we give the training going to the war zones,
Afghanistan and Pakistan--Afghanistan and Iraq, and we also
give it to people going to Pakistan, to Yemen, to Sudan, and
more recently, to the Mexican border posts which have become a
much more dangerous place to work than in the past. We will
certainly have to add some posts to that, which will bring up
the numbers, but I do not think we are ever going to get to
10,000.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Ambassador, in your testimony,
you mentioned the implementation of specialized security
immersion training costs for personnel assigned to Iraq. Will
you please describe what this cost entails, including whether
it involves foreign language training?
Mr. Boswell. Sir, the FACT course, which is what you are
talking about, is a course that is 5 days long. It does not
address language training. It is a course that provides some
skills to--it is not designed for DS agents. It is designed for
regular government employees, Foreign Service people and those
from other agencies who are going to high-threat areas.
And it goes into such things as first aid, primary first
aid. It goes into surveillance detection. It goes into how to
drive a car in a high-threat area. It goes into--basically, it
tries to prepare people for what they are going to encounter
when they are in Iraq or Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador Boswell, as you know, foreign
language skills are critical to carrying out the diplomatic
mission, including security operations. I am pleased that the
percent of regional security officers (RSOs) who fulfill the
language requirements for their positions has increased since
2009. Will you please discuss what actions State has taken or
still plans to take to continue increasing language proficiency
among RSOs?
Mr. Boswell. Mr. Chairman, I am very happy to answer that
question. By way of background, I had this same job 10 years
ago and 10 years ago, I can say that very, very few RSO
positions overseas were language designated, which means
required language training. I come back to the job after an
absence of 10 years and I find that two-thirds of RSO positions
are language designated, or something like two-thirds are
language designated, and I think that is a very, very positive
step in the right direction.
I cannot tell you how valuable it is to see RSOs speaking
the native language. I was just in Poland and watching my RSO
there yammer away with his Polish counterparts in very fluent
Polish. That is something we would not have seen 10 years ago.
So I completely support language training for DS agents.
GAO identified a problem a couple of years ago, as you
mentioned, which was that too low a proportion of language-
designated RSO positions overseas were filled by people who had
not tested up to the required level of that language.
As you said, Mr. Chairman, we are much improved in the
ensuing 2 years. I think in 2009, it was 47 percent of
positions were held by language qualified officers, which meant
53 percent were not. Now we are above 60 percent being filled.
We are being extremely tough on language waivers, which is the
way you go without the language, and we think those numbers are
going way up and are going to continue to go way up.
You have my personal commitment. I have made it to the
Director-General of the Foreign Service who holds the whip hand
over me on this, that we are going to do everything we possibly
can to make sure that we have full language compliance.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much for that commitment.
Mr. Ford, as you stated in your testimony, GAO found
weaknesses in the Bureau's training systems such as not
obtaining feedback from all training participants and not
tracking all individuals who receive training. Please elaborate
on why these weaknesses are important and how they may affect
the Bureau's training.
Mr. Ford. A couple issues here. Well, first of all, to
answer your question regarding why it is important to get
feedback on training, I mean, at the end of the day, one of
your quality assessments is whether or not the people that have
the training find it useful in their jobs.
You need to know that so when you design or make any
modifications to your training programs, you know what kind of
changes to make instead of just guessing what works and what
does not. So that is not unique to the State Department. That
is a requirement that any training program ought to have.
Our concern really had to do with the systems that DS and
the Department use to track feedback that they get on certain
types of training, and to also track training requirements of
people who have taken training to make sure that they have the
requirements and they are meeting them when they are supposed
to.
The current systems in place I would characterize as
relatively ad hoc in the sense that they are using sort of like
what I would personally use, spreadsheets to try to keep track
of people versus an actual training management system that can
track real time information, both in terms of getting feedback
and also tracking requirements.
The Department is aware of this. DS talked to us about some
efforts that they are currently discussing with the Foreign
Service Institute (FSI) to use their tracking system. At the
time we issued the report, I do not know if that had been
resolved yet, but there was the potential that the FSI system
could be a vehicle to help come up with a more systematic way
of tracking requirements.
On the feedback loop, the issue there is a little more
difficult because DS is increasingly using online training. It
is a little difficult to track people who are going online just
to know whether or not they have completed the training.
So it is an area in which we think some improvement could
be made in the systems, and in both of these cases, we
considered these recommendations to be management improvements
versus cases of major deficiency. We do not think that is the
case, but we do think that they need to have a more systematic
process.
Senator Akaka. Thank you.
Ambassador Boswell, you testified that DS is working with
State's Foreign Service Institute on a learning management
system to provide tracking and feedback collection for
training. Please elaborate on this plan. What capabilities do
you expect to obtain from this system, and when do you expect
these improvements to be completed?
Mr. Boswell. Senator, Mr. Chairman, let me say first that
we are grateful to the GAO for pointing out these things. I
think both recommendations regarding followup and feedback are
good recommendations, and as Mr. Ford said, we are working on
them.
But let me say also, right from the top, that we do get
feedback. We do constantly evaluate our training, particularly
our high-threat training or the training for the combat zones.
We could do better, but we do it. For example, our FACT
training course which we were just discussing, the 5-day
course, has been modified several times in response to
suggestions from people going through it, suggestions from the
field.
We send a team from training every year to the combat zones
with the sole mission of evaluating the training by
interviewing the people that do get trained and are now at
posts. We have made a number of significant changes since then
as a result of that.
We are working with the Foreign Service Institute to
resolve some of the systematic tracking problems and feedback
problems. The feedback problems, largely, have to do with
problems getting feedback from folks, as Mr. Ford said, I think
in his statement, folks from other agencies that cannot feed
into our systems easily.
We are looking to find a way around that and we are still
working on it. I am sure we are going to be able to resolve it.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Ambassador, DS relies heavily on
contractors to conduct its mission. Contractors represent over
92 percent of its workforce. Has DS conducted strategic
workforce planning to determine whether the current workforce
balance is appropriate? And will DS reassess this balance as
its mission changes and expands?
Mr. Boswell. Sir, if I could clarify? The contractors you
are talking about are largely, largely static guards at U.S.
embassies overseas. We use contracts for static guards at every
embassy. They are almost, without exception, contracts with
local firms or direct hire of contractors that are local
nationals.
The part of our contracting that has been controversial has
been the use of contractors in the war zones where they are not
largely local hires. We have had to go to third country and
Americans because of difficulties vetting the local population
in the war zones.
So of the contractor population that you just mentioned,
the vast majority are in Paris or Cape Verde protecting our
embassies. That is appropriate. It has been the way we have
protected our embassies for years and I do not think we are
going to change that.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, we have not been able to go with
that model for the reasons that I mentioned. The use of
contractors, security contractors, and let us specify that we
are talking about security contractors. The use of security
contractors in those zones has been reviewed both internally in
the Department extremely extensively, and also by outside
organizations, notably the Commission on Wartime Contracting,
which has been meeting continuous, which is a congressional
commission which has been meeting for a year-and-a-half, at
least.
I went to Iraq myself years ago, in 2007, in the wake of
the horrible incident involving Blackwater contractors at
Nisour Square which resulted in the deaths of a large number of
innocent Iraqi civilians. I was sent not to investigate that. I
was not a State Department employee at the time. I was part of
a small group of so-called experts, outside experts that was
brought in to look at how the State Department provides
security in the war zone.
And one of the things we looked at was whether the use of
contractors was the appropriate way to deal with it given all
the circumstances, and we determined that there really was no
reasonable alternative to the use of contractors, and every
commission that I have ever heard of and every outside expert
that we have ever consulted has come to the same conclusion. So
I do not see a radical change in that.
What I do hope, what I sincerely hope, Mr. Chairman, is
that as things become more normal in Iraq over the years, and
as things eventually, hopefully become more normal in
Afghanistan, that we can revert to the use of local nationals
for these functions.
We have started doing that in Iraq and we are being careful
about doing it. We have Iraqi nationals integrated into our
security forces in the north, in Erbil. That is the Kurdish
area in the north, and we hope, ultimately, to be able to
continue to do that and expand that to other sections.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador, two separate 2009 reports by
State's Inspector General (IG) revealed that regional security
officers were not receiving adequate training to prepare them
for their contract oversight responsibilities. The IG also
reported that contract oversight may not receive sufficient
attention among the many responsibilities RSOs must fulfill.
What is DS doing to address these issues?
Mr. Boswell. Sir, before I answer that question, let me
correct something or clarify something I said in response to
your last question, which is, I said contractors are used for
local guard functions, static guard functions around the world,
which is true. We also have a much smaller number of directly
locally engaged staff, in other words, not contractors, that do
that function. But it is a minority. Let us put it that way.
In terms of contract oversight, I think it is fair to say
that if DS agents were not aware when they joined Diplomatic
Security that they were going to become experts on contract
oversight, they are now aware of it. It is a major function of
our agents overseas.
I think out of, for example, the hundred-and-some-plus DS
agents that will be in Iraq at the beginning of 2012 when
security responsibilities transfer over to us or when the
military responsibilities transfer over to us, I think about 80
of them will be doing contract oversight. They will be
overseeing the contract forces, the contract guards and the
bodyguards.
I should explain. There are two kinds of guards. One is the
static guards and the other are what we call protective
security details (PSD). These are the bodyguards, the movement
people that travel in the motorcades, in fact, run the
motorcades.
Our agents are getting extensive in-service training on
contract oversight. Agents are contracting officer
representatives at post overseas. They are assisted by other
agents who are assistant contracting officer representatives.
We also have another category of oversight of government
technical monitors, which essentially are co-located with the
guard camps, either physically co-located or visit them
constantly and irregularly to make sure that things are well on
the guard camps, and to assist the contracting officer's
representatives in oversight of the contract.
The training is, as I say, very extensive and continuous
and the on-the-job training is also very important.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. Ambassador, in response to
shortcomings in contractor oversight, DS has created a new
cadre of security protective specialists. What policies and
training are in place to make sure that these specialists can
conduct effective oversight of security contractors?
Mr. Boswell. Sir, that is closely linked to the answer I
gave you to the previous question. Our security protective
specialists are a new kind of specialist in DS, in the State
Department. They were started as a pilot program and rapidly
evolved into a very significant DS--rapidly evolved away from a
pilot to a full-fledged functioning DS program.
Special Protective Specialist (SPS), as they are called,
are not full-fledged DS agents. DS agents are law enforcement
people and they had 4 years of training, or largely 4 years of
training, before they ever go overseas. And they do not only
protective functions that we have been talking about here, but
law enforcement functions, criminal investigations. They have
badges, they have arrest powers, this sort of thing.
Security protective specialists are there solely to
exercise direction and oversight of the contract guards during
movements. In the wake of the Nisour Square incident, the
commission that I was part of, or the committee that I was part
of, we made 30 or 40 recommendations, almost all of which--I
think all but one--were adopted by the State Department.
And one of the most important ones was that every
motorcade--and nobody moves in Iraq without being in a
motorcade of some sort. Every motorcade which is manned by
contractors would have a DS agent in operational control of the
motorcade.
All of a sudden it required the Department to hire a bunch
more DS agents. It caused some of the other problems that you
have touched on in the past, including the gaps in language
training and things like that, because we had to get agents, a
large number of agents, to Iraq and Afghanistan as well, to do
this function.
Now we have hired or we have created this specialty so that
it is not DS agents themselves, in many cases, that are doing
this oversight. It is the security protective specialist
contractors--not contractors--security protective specialists
that do the operational direction.
Now, I have to clarify. They have nothing to do with
contract administration. They are directing the motorcades.
They are not contracting officer representatives or anything
like that. They are simply in charge of the movements.
Senator Akaka. Thank you Ambassador.
Mr. Ford, I would like to give you an opportunity as well
to comment on the steps DS is taking to strengthen contract
oversight. In your view, what best practices should DS consider
to effectively manage a large contractor workforce?
Mr. Ford. Mr. Chairman, I have a couple of comments I would
like to make. First, GAO currently has an ongoing engagement
specifically looking at this issue with regard to contract
oversight in Iraq. That team is in the early stages of the
review, so I am not in a position to comment directly about
what we are finding there.
I can comment a little bit more generically about the types
of elements that should be considered in overseeing contractors
in general, particularly in this area. Most of these are pretty
well known, the first one having to do with having a strategic
planning concept of how you are going to use these contractors,
whether or not you have the right skill sets, making a decision
between whether or not these should be government positions
verus non-government positions.
There are some situations when you really do not want to
have a contractor acting in a governmental role. GAO has
reported on that in several instances in the past.
The issue of oversight capacity is one that comes up
frequently in GAO reviews, in general, and in relation to
contractors. Risk management principles, we frequently have
commented on the need to ensure that we are making the right
kind of decisions in terms of the environments that we are
going to be asking contractors to work in, and also that we
have oversight mechanisms to deal with them. The issue
regarding mobility in a dangerous place, obviously, it would be
a risk mitigation issue that needs to be examined.
And then finally, I think the issue of having adequate
staff resources to effectively oversee a large contracting
contingent is critical. If you do not have enough people to
conduct the oversight function, oftentimes the problems crop
up. We find that time and again in the work we do on
contracting.
So those type of elements need to be put in place. I think
the Ambassador has touched on many of them in his comments. And
so, the real issue is whether those elements are going to be
all put in place in a timely basis, because the military is
going to be out by the end of the year. I think that is a
critical issue that we hope will be addressed, and our team is
currently studying this issue. Hopefully we will be able to
share more details on how the Department is responding to this
problem.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador, in 2009, GAO found that
approximately one-third of Diplomatic Security's domestic
officers were operating with a vacancy rate of 25 percent or
even higher. What are the current vacancy rates within DS for
both domestic officers and overseas posts? And what steps is DS
taking to address its staffing shortfall?
Mr. Boswell. Mr. Chairman, we are very grateful to the
Congress for the support that we have had over the years, and
particularly since September 11, 2001 and the great expand at
the beginning of the intervention in Iraq. The support we have
had from the Congress on a budgetary side, as all the testimony
has shown so far, DS has dramatically expanded in size,
dramatically expanded in size to go with dramatically expanded
responsibilities.
We have an active recruiting campaign going on. We are
going to be able to meet our recruiting goals for DS agents. We
have never really had a problem with that. This is an
attractive career to many people, a prestigious career to many
people, and so we do not have problems attracting recruits.
In fact, one of the strong impressions I have from having
been away for 10 years is the quality of the agents is even
higher than it was. And I am very, very pleased with that.
We also had some recruiting shortfalls in certain areas. We
have largely, I think, resolved them. The SPS area, which I was
just talking about, I really, frankly, I was very worried that
we would be able to attract the number of people to that
specialty. These are limited career appointments that we are
talking about. But we expect to be able to fulfill our quota,
if you like.
We also had some shortfalls on the engineering side. That
is a very important part of DS. And we think we are going to be
up to speed on that one as well. There is a sub-category of
engineering called security technical specialist. We still have
some work to do on that.
Our overall vacancy rate is 9 percent, which I think is an
entirely defensible rate. I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman,
that anybody that goes to our field offices in the States is
often struck by the number of empty desks in those field
offices. That is not due to a vacancy rate.
That is because our agents are in the field and really
represent--I mean, we tell all agents when they come into DS
not to have the wedding anniversary in September, not to have
any children born in September, because everybody is going to
be at the U.N. General Assembly, everybody in DS, by the
hundreds, is going to be at the U.N. General Assembly and that
is just what we do for that month.
So they come out of the field offices and you see a lot of
empty desks. But we are rather satisfied with our--I think we
are satisfied with our vacancy rate right now.
Senator Akaka. Ambassador, I am pleased that State and DS
are taking steps to better support employees and their families
when officers serve in high-threat posts, such as raising
awareness of psychological health issues and establishing peer
support groups.
This will be especially important as more employees serve
in so-called conflict zones. How is State and DS assessing the
effectiveness of these efforts to make sure they meet the needs
of employees and their families?
Mr. Boswell. Sir, this is an assessment that is done by DS
and the Office of Medical Services and the Director-General of
the Foreign Service as well. We have only been in combat zones
since 2003, but in those 7 years, we have acquired a
considerable amount of experience with employees working in
zones of conflict.
As I mentioned in my opening statement, we have learned a
lot from the military who do this extremely well, as you know,
sir. And we provide our employees with, I would say, a full
menu of services, medical, doctors, psychologists,
psychiatrists, and other qualified medical personnel providing
support. But we go well beyond that.
We have, for example, in DS, a peer support group, a peer
to peer support group, agents working with agents to provide
support for those coming out of the combat zones. We have a
program--we the Department--has a program that mandates a high-
threat out-brief, if you like, of anybody coming out of the
combat zones, at which problems can be flagged and dealt with.
It is a very different experience for a Diplomatic Security
agent to serve in Iraq supervising a motorcade, and then going
on to be an RSO in Finland. So there is a cultural and
emotional and job-type shift that goes on, and those folks have
to adjust to a very different kind of environment and we help
them to do that.
We also give a heads-up to the embassies that are gaining
these folks, that they have to be aware of certain issues, and
I think we do a good job of that. We include it as part of
Ambassadors' training, that they will be having people that
come out of the war zones and they need to be aware of that. So
I think we do everything that we can in that regard.
Senator Akaka. I certainly appreciate all of your
responses. I have a final question for you, Ambassador Boswell,
and then I will give Mr. Ford an opportunity to make final
comments.
Ambassador, providing a secure environment for the
diplomatic mission, especially in high-threat areas, requires
significant resources. However, the current funding environment
has created a great deal of uncertainty. What risks and
tradeoffs would DS have to make if the Bureau were not provided
consistent funding?
Mr. Boswell. That is a crucial question, Mr. Chairman. It
certainly is. And you are absolutely right that funding has not
been certain or secure. We are in an extremely difficult
funding environment now in the United States, a financial
environment in the United States, and the discussion in the
Congress about our budget have been extremely active, to put it
mildly.
But the point I want to make, I think, is that we have been
looking at our numbers extremely carefully. The people that sit
behind me here are part of that, in fact, the backbone of that
team. And we have scrubbed our numbers very carefully and we
are confident, with the budget numbers that we have put
forward.
If we do not get the kind of funding from the Congress that
we need to do what we have to do in Iraq, or what we would like
to do in Iraq, we will simply have to do less in Iraq. The
point I want to make here is that nobody in the State
Department, nobody in the leadership in the State Department,
has ever asked me to compromise on security. They have asked me
to look at my numbers, but they have never asked me to do with
less security than I feel comfortable with.
In other words, if we get less funding, we will do fewer
things. We had originally planned, for example, to open four
consulates in Iraq. That is down to two. The other ones are
still in sort of a suspended animation depending on where the
funding comes from. I have never been asked to compromise on
the security I provide to any of those.
Senator Akaka. Thank you so much for your response.
Mr. Ford, would you like to make any final statements?
Mr. Ford. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think your last question is
a good one because I think the government, as a whole, is going
to be having to address this issue of the fiscal problems in
this country and our ability to conduct missions that we are
asking all agencies to conduct overseas.
I think I would echo the concerns raised by the Ambassador,
that there is a tradeoff. When you are talking about security,
DS's role is really protecting other U.S. officials overseas in
these countries. And so, to the extent that resources may not
be available to conduct their security, it really has a major
impact on our ability to conduct foreign policy and foreign
affairs.
So I think that is the challenge that the Department of
State is, I guess, trying to come to grips with now and is
likely going to have to come to grips with in the next couple
of years. We would like to see a little more strategic thinking
on this issue versus reaction. I do not think it is fair to DS
to have to react to a situation when it could have maybe been
pre-planned in advance so that they can come up with
contingencies.
I am sure that they have to deal with this every day and I
am sure they do a fine job of it, but the Department as a
whole, in my mind, needs to be more forthright, I guess, in
coming up with what the contingencies are going to be if we do
not get the resources. So I think this is going to be a
challenge that the Department is going to be faced with in the
next several years along with the rest of the Federal
Government.
I am hopeful that they will take it seriously because the
security, as the Ambassador has mentioned, is probably the most
important mission that DS has in these dangerous environments
that we are asking our people to work in.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Ford. Again, I want
to wish you well in your future.
Ambassador, thank you so much for your work. Your service
to our country has been great. I want to be as helpful as I can
supporting the Bureau to fulfil its mission. Again, I thank you
both for being here today. Your testimony, your responses have
been valuable and will certainly help us in our work here in
the U.S. Senate. So thank you and aloha to you.
Now I would like to call our second panel. I want to
welcome Susan Johnson, President of the American Foreign
Service Association (AFSA). It is the custom, as you know, to
swear in our witnesses, so will you please rise and raise your
right hand?
Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to
give the Subcommittee is the truth, the whole truth, and
nothing but the truth, so help you, God?
Ms. Johnson. I do.
Senator Akaka. Thank you. It will be noted in the record
that the witness answered in the affirmative.
Before I start, I want you to know that your full statement
will be made part of the record, and I would also like to
remind you to please limit your oral remarks to 5 minutes. Ms.
Johnson, please proceed with your statement.
STATEMENT OF SUSAN JOHNSON,\1\ PRESIDENT, AMERICAN FOREIGN
SERVICE ASSOCIATION
Ms. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The American Foreign
Service Association (AFSA) welcomes the opportunity to speak
before this Subcommittee on the subject of diplomatic security
and its implications for U.S. diplomacy. And let me say at the
outset that the diplomatic security agents that I have had the
privilege to work with in my postings have been highly
professional and competent and AFSA has high regard for the
dedication of DS and their record on security issues.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson appears in the appendix
on page 48.
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In an increasingly complex and dangerous global environment
in which foreign policy and the Foreign Service are required to
operate as our Nation's first line of defense, the need to
ensure the safety and security of our Foreign Service personnel
cannot be over-emphasized. The challenge assumes particular
gravity with the expanding requirement for Foreign Service
missions, personnel, and programs in conflict zones.
The June 2011 Government Accountability Office report on
Diplomatic Security and critical challenges to its training
efforts identifying some systemic weaknesses or gaps in the
structure and substance of our Diplomatic Security training,
particularly looking forward, recommended that the Department
of State enhance Diplomatic Security training center course
evaluation and tracking capabilities, and develop an action
plan to address proposed increases in high-threat training.
It is not clear to us whether the current training programs
are well designed to meet the challenges of the expanded
mission, especially in Iraq, or whether Diplomatic Security
will have the flexibility it needs to deal with poorly
performing security contracts or other problems, and to respond
quickly and creatively to unpredictable developments or new
situations on the ground.
The January 31 Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on
Iraq, the Transition from a Military Mission to a Civilian-Led
Effort, addresses the challenges of this expanded mission.
Given the unprecedented size and complexity of the diplomatic
mission in Iraq, currently projected to encompass some 17,000
individuals at 15 different sites, the report raises questions
about the availability of resources and whether the mission in
Iraq can be implemented without the support of the U.S.
military.
In addition, the recent OIG report on Department of State
planning for the transition to a civilian-led mission in Iraq
notes that while effective planning mechanisms are in place,
key decisions remain unresolved and some plans are not
finalized. It also points to the problematic security
environment, poor contractor performance, and Iraqi government
reluctance at all levels to assume responsibility for
reconstruction projects.
AFSA does not currently have sufficient information about
the scope of the U.S. mission in Iraq, but both as a
professional association and the union representing the Foreign
Service, it is our responsibility to seek answers to many of
the fundamental questions that have been raised.
According to GAO figures, the total number of Diplomatic
Security agents deployed worldwide is about 720. Does DS have
adequate resources and numbers to manage the approximately
39,000 security contractors worldwide effectively, including
those for Iraq? As U.S. forces draw down in Iraq, does the
transition plan assume that the Iraqi government and its
military forces are ready, able, or even willing to support and
protect the U.S. civilian mission?
Given that December 31, 2011 is the hard deadline for the
withdrawal of all U.S. forces, is transition planning
sufficiently advanced and adequately prepared? Are the Federal
law enforcement training standards adhered to by the Diplomatic
Security training center sufficient to meet the risks and
dangers in Iraq? Is the course content of DS training for DS
agents and other Foreign Service personnel being adapted to
changing realities of how diplomacy is being conducted today in
dangerous environments?
Finally, is the Iraq transition plan right sized? Are its
various elements correctly balanced for maximum effectiveness?
Simply put, is this plan realistic and sustainable, and if so,
are the preparations in place, including training?
The American Foreign Service has a long and honorable
tradition of serving wherever and whenever it is called upon to
do so whatever the conditions. However, our political and
Department of State leadership are responsible for providing
security for those we send into harm's way to carry out our
diplomatic missions. We hope that the Subcommittee will examine
the Iraq plan closely and ask hard questions about the
assumptions upon which it is based.
I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to
testify today. AFSA greatly values your long-standing support
of initiatives to enhance diplomatic readiness of our civilian
foreign affairs agencies. Thank you, sir.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Ms. Johnson, for your
statement. Ms. Johnson, as the military withdraws from Iraq,
and later Afghanistan, State's presence is growing. DS will
provide an unprecedented level of security and protective
services that the military is performing now such as downed
aircraft recovery and explosive ordnance disposal. You raised
concerns about whether the mission is compatible with the
resources available.
What resources and personnel are needed, and what more
should State be doing to prepare to effectively address this
security environment?
Ms. Johnson. Thank you for that question, sir. Based on
what AFSA has been told, the State Department is doing its best
to plan and prepare in a context of uncertainties at home and
in Iraq and Afghanistan and have undertaken an unprecedented
planning effort. That said, because of these uncertainties,
both at home and on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, AFSA is
concerned in two broad areas. You have asked many questions
about them and they have been addressed to a certain extent
already.
One of them is in the area of contracting and the need for
more what I will call contracting training across the board in
all of our foreign affairs agencies, not just in the oversight,
but from negotiating the initial contracts to administering,
managing, and overseeing them, and not just for DS, but also
for other parts of the State Department that would be
responsible for overseeing and managing contracts for life
support systems and other things that we are now contracting
out when we undertake missions of this size and scope and
complexity.
As has been noted, I think, followed in the press and in
many reports, there have been a number of weaknesses identified
in contracting overall and the performance. So we believe that
a great deal more training has to take place in this area, but
that calls for resources and that gets us back to the problem
that we have focused in on.
Another area that we think is important would be
contingency planning in the event that the host governments
cannot or will not deliver as expected. In our planning for
Iraq, we are expecting the Iraqi government to provide a number
of functions that the U.S. military provided in the past and
that DS has said they will not be undertaking. What happens if
the Iraqi government cannot or will not deliver those services?
What is our Plan B?
Senator Akaka. Let me followup with this question, Ms.
Johnson. Do you believe all of the tasks being transferred from
the U.S. military to DS's law enforcement and security core are
appropriate? In other words, are there tasks that DS is being
asked to undertake that should be performed by non-combat
military troops?
Ms. Johnson. Well, I was pleased to hear Assistant
Secretary Boswell, Ambassador Boswell testify about some of the
things that DS is doing to meet the requirements of this vastly
expanded mission, and I certainly give them all credit for the
efforts that they are making.
However, AFSA would like to hear more open discussion about
the pros and cons and the implications of the State
Department's taking on security responsibilities for large
scale civilian diplomatic and development missions in conflict
zones where the capabilities of the host government remain
unclear. We think this is an area that really needs to have
more attention, so we certainly welcome your efforts in this
area, and those of other parts of Congress and other
organizations to look at this question.
We have a related question, which is not clear to us yet
and that relates to what specific tasks that the U.S. military
was performing and that DS will not be performing. Do we now
expect the Iraqi government, police, or armed forces to perform
these tasks? Do we believe that they are ready, willing, and
able to do so, and if so, on what evidence do we base that
belief? That is a question that we have that we would like to
see and hear answers to.
Senator Akaka. Yes. Well----
Ms. Johnson. So I guess the short answer is, I do not know,
but we are a little bit skeptical and we would like to be
reassured.
Senator Akaka. Yes. Well, I hope so as well. Ms. Johnson,
the State Department is operating in extremely complex and
dangerous environments, situations where in the past State
Department would have evacuated. What additional steps should
DS take to make sure it is well-positioned to meet current and
future training needs for evolving security threats?
Ms. Johnson. Well, from AFSA's perspective, there are two
elements here. One is the need that the GAO and I think your
Committee has focused on for some time along with some other
Committees, which is the need for more and better strategic
planning by the State Department as a whole and by its various
sub-elements, if you want to put it that way. And we certainly
support that and would like to see it.
For that reason, we certainly welcome Secretary Clinton's
initiative of the QDDR, and we hope that now that we have been
through the first iteration of that process that will continue
to be refined and adjusted and provide a framework for better
and more consistent strategic planning as a whole by the
Department of State, and also bringing its various parts more
into--synchronize them better.
But to do all this, and a big part of all this, is that we
need the resources to have the people required and we need more
and better training, professional education and training that
focuses on some over-the-horizon-issues, and that means a
``training float'' sufficient personnel to have people in
training without undermining the capacity of our embassies and
missions overseas to meet their responsibilities.
We talk a great deal about training and we have policies
that put forward training objectives. But if we do not have the
personnel required for a training float, which would allow us
to send people to training without negatively impacting on
those vacancy rates and other things that you were mentioning,
and on real needs in the field, a great deal of that training
does not happen.
The other part of that, in addition to a float, is that our
training and professional education needs to be tied more
closely to assignment and particularly promotion. There have to
be real incentives built in and real requirements built in for
people to do training. So it comes back to a resource question
and we have talked about the very tight fiscal, financial, and
resource environment that we are in. So it is a challenge.
Senator Akaka. Yes. Ms. Johnson, GAO's report on DS
identified the challenges of balancing security with State's
diplomatic mission. Do you believe progress has been made to
achieve this balance?
Ms. Johnson. I think the security mission balance issue is,
and has been, a very important one for AFSA, and the issue goes
far beyond DS itself. They are only one party involved in
finding this balance. DS's mission is security. They are
dedicated to it and I think they try to lay out what their
needs and requirements are.
Diplomatic leadership needs to address the diplomatic goals
and what is or is not achievable under different levels of
security constraints, and be realistic and open about this. So
the QDDR has identified the security mission balance as an
issue that needs more attention and discussion. We have not yet
seen that process get underway, or if it has, we have not been
privy to it.
But it remains a continuing issue of concern for AFSA and
we are not convinced that the right balance has been achieved
yet.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Johnson, as more DS officers serve in
conflict zones, State must be prepared to address the risk of
post-traumatic stress disorder and other challenges associated
with hazardous and high-stress tours of duty. What steps should
State take to support DS's officers who return from service at
high-threat posts?
Ms. Johnson. Well, that is a difficult question and I am
glad that you asked it also of Assistant Secretary Boswell and
I certainly defer to him on several of the things that DS is
doing. I do know that State is well-aware of this problem, not
just for DS agents, but for other Foreign Service personnel
serving, particularly repeatedly, in high-threat posts.
It is not easy to resolve. All of our people are exposed to
danger. So far, with the exception of the mandatory out-brief,
it depends on the individual. It is up to the individual to
voluntarily seek out help, and that means some do, but many do
not for various reasons. In particular, for DS agents, the
perceived costs of doing so, in seeking out help, may be high,
such as the suspension or temporary suspension of their
credentials, their LEAP pay and other things.
So there may be a number of built-in reasons why people are
reluctant to seek out the help. But in the Department, as
Ambassador Boswell mentioned, DS has a peer support group which
supports fellow agents and we welcome that and commend it. And
the Department has an active employee counseling service and a
contract with Life Care to provide a range of support services
for all State Department personnel.
But we are venturing into new territory here and I think we
are trying to explore, together with other elements of our
Federal Government, military, National Guard, what is the
answer and how can these problems be addressed.
Senator Akaka. Ms. Johnson, the families of DS officers
deployed to dangerous locations also face stress and hardships
associated with having a loved one in harm's way. What services
should State provide to support the families of DS officers
deployed to high-threat posts?
Ms. Johnson. From AFSA's perspective, all of our people and
members, DS and non-DS, are exposed to dangers, and when it
comes to Department support for families who are very much
affected by this, we believe that all families should have
access to the same support. As I mentioned earlier, the
Department is well aware of this and is trying to grapple with
it.
I think the fundamental issue right now is to find a way of
encouraging more people to voluntarily reach out. There may be
some ways that the Department could get the resources to
proactively reach out to families, as well as employees, at
least to offer them counseling or other services that might
help them cope with the hardships and the dangers and the
stresses involved with these kinds of situations.
So we would favor that, if the Department could do it, but
we do not have the answer to that. We would like to see, and I
believe we are working with the Department to try to come up
with, effective ways of providing support for people who are
under stress from service in high-threat posts.
Senator Akaka. Yes. Well, Ms. Johnson, would you like to
provide any final thoughts on what we have discussed?
Ms. Johnson. Well, there was one element that I mentioned
and I will just offer another thought on it. It has to do with
more flexibility for DS to deal with unforeseen circumstances
that might arise.
I think this is just coming from our sense, as we have
watched this now over the years for our military as well as our
diplomatic personnel, that when called upon to operate in
uncertain, dangerous, high-risk environments, agility,
nimbleness, flexibility become critical, and that means having
contingency funding or resources; Plan B and Plan C.
We are not clear on what short-term options DS has if a
contractor who is providing critical security is not
performing. Then I suppose the Iraqi government is the Plan B.
But what if that is not forthcoming? The military had a depth
of resource for emergency that it could call upon, but in this
new situation that might not be there. So what is the plan?
Senator Akaka. Yes. Well, these are some of the challenges
that we have to work on. Through this hearing we are trying to
determine weaknesses that we can strengthen that will help our
mission. As discussed earlier there have been so many changes
and so many things that remain uncertain, so it is important
that we conduct strategic planning, and have contingency plans
to deal with potential changes.
Ms. Johnson. Yes, sir.
Senator Akaka. I appreciate you being here today Ms.
Johnson. The reason why we wanted to hear from you is to hear
from those who have had experience in this area and who may see
it from a different view and give us a different slant of
possible solutions that may help us in providing the security
our country needs.
So I thank you very much for being here and helping us with
your valuable information and look forward to continuing to
work with you.
Ms. Johnson. Thank you, sir, and we appreciate the
opportunity to, as you say, bring a different perspective
because our perspective is from where we sit, each of us, and
we are seeing a different angle on this than our colleagues in
the State Department. We think both are valuable to you. So we
certainly appreciate the work that you and your Subcommittee
are doing and your staff.
Senator Akaka. Well, thank you very much.
I would like to thank you and our other witnesses here. It
is clear to me that the Diplomatic Security Bureau has made
great progress in meeting the demands of its expanding
responsibilities. However, more work remains. Many of the
concerns and recommendations discussed today are dependent on
making sure that the resources provided to DS match the scope
of the vital mission.
The success of U.S. foreign policy and the lives of the
brave men and women who promote it in some of the world's most
dangerous places depends on a robust Diplomatic Security
committed to working with State and stakeholders like AFSA to
enhance diplomatic security readiness. We hope we can provide
some solutions toward these uncertainties.
The hearing record will be open for 2 weeks for additional
statements or questions that Members may have. So this hearing
is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:19 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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