[Senate Hearing 112-222]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-222
CATASTROPHIC PREPAREDNESS: HOW READY IS FEMA FOR THE NEXT BIG DISASTER?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 17, 2011
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
67-118 WASHINGTON : 2012
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the
GPO Customer Contact Center, U.S. Government Printing Office.
Phone 202-512-1800, or 866-512-1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JON TESTER, Montana ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
MARK BEGICH, Alaska RAND PAUL, Kentucky
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Mary Beth Schultz, Associate Staff Director and Chief Council for
Homeland
Security Preparedness and Response
Jason T. Barnosky, Professional Staff Member
Elyse F. Greenwald, Professional Staff Member
Nicholas A. Rossi, Minority Staff Director
Robert L. Strayer, Minority Deputy Staff Director
Brendan P. Shields, Minority Director of Homeland Security Policy
Christopher J. Keach, Minority Professional Staff Member
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Patricia R. Hogan, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee
Laura W. Kilbride, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1
Senator Collins.............................................. 3
Senator Landrieu............................................. 5
Senator Brown................................................ 22
Senator Akaka................................................ 25
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman............................................ 39
Senator Collins.............................................. 42
Senator Landrieu............................................. 45
WITNESSES
Thursday, March 17, 2011
Hon. W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security................... 6
Hon. Richard L. Skinner, Former Inspector General of the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security................................ 10
William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, U.S. Government Accountability Office.................. 15
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Fugate, Hon. W. Craig:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 49
Jenkins, William O. Jr.:
Testimony.................................................... 15
Prepared statement........................................... 89
Skinner, Hon. Richard L.:
Testimony.................................................... 10
Prepared statement........................................... 66
APPENDIX
Chart titled ``Scorecare for Selected FEMA Preparedness Areas,''
submitted by Senator Lieberman................................. 41
Letter to President Obama, dated March 17, 2011, submitted by
Senator Landrieu............................................... 47
Report titled ``FEMA's Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic
Disaster--An Update,'' Department of Homeland Security, Office
of Inspector General, September 2010........................... 103
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
Mr. Fugate................................................... 185
CATASTROPHIC PREPAREDNESS: HOW READY IS FEMA FOR THE NEXT BIG DISASTER?
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 17, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:15 p.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Landrieu, Collins, and
Brown.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. The hearing will come to order. I thank
everyone for their patience. As you know, we had two votes on
the floor, so we delayed the start of the hearing. I welcome
everyone.
We convened this hearing, which had been long planned, long
scheduled on the ability of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) to respond to a major catastrophe against the
compelling backdrop of the tragically catastrophic events
unfolding in Japan, an earthquake and tsunami in rapid
succession that have already resulted in twice as many deaths
as al-Qaeda's attack on America on September 11, 2001. And, of
course, no one believes that the deaths and the finding of the
dead is over yet.
The earthquake and tsunami have also caused fires and
explosions at nuclear power plants that could have nightmarish
consequences for Japan and perhaps other countries as well.
Japan has been considered the gold standard of earthquake
preparedness because they have had repeated experience with
earthquakes, but this earthquake registered 9.0 on the Richter
scale.
When I say that, I remember that the great San Francisco
earthquake of 1906 was apparently 7.6 on the Richter scale, so
you can imagine the consequences here. The waves of disaster
set off by this earthquake in Japan have exceeded the country's
extraordinary preparations. So the events of the past week in
Japan lend a sense of urgency to our hearing today as we ask:
How well prepared is America for a catastrophe, perhaps one
equal to that occurring now in Japan?
Our Committee called its 2006 report about FEMA's response
to Hurricane Katrina, ``A Nation Still Unprepared,'' and we
were then unprepared. And that lack of preparedness shook the
confidence of the American people who naturally asked why their
government could not help some of their fellow citizens when
they needed it the most.
This Committee's extensive investigation into the failure
of all levels of government to prepare for and respond
effectively to Hurricane Katrina found a long and troubling
list of problems, not least of which was that FEMA, in our
opinion, was not and never had been capable of responding to a
catastrophe like Hurricane Katrina. And I learned that when it
comes to emergency preparedness and response, two words that I
thought meant the same do not: Disaster and catastrophe.
Preparedness for most disasters, which FEMA was and
certainly is capable of, is different from preparedness for
catastrophes like Hurricane Katrina. After our investigation,
the Committee drafted and Congress passed the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. Our aim was to rebuild
FEMA into a stronger, more capable agency. Five years later, I
am convinced that FEMA has, in fact, become stronger and more
capable.
But is it strong enough to respond adequately if a
catastrophe like the one currently in Japan struck the United
States? I think that is the question we want to ask our
witnesses today.
Last September, then-Inspector General (IG) of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Richard Skinner,
released a report on FEMA's transformation since Hurricane
Katrina. Mr. Skinner has since retired from public service
after a long and distinguished career, but he is fortunately
back with us to testify today. His report concluded last
September that FEMA has made some form of progress in almost
all areas where reform was needed, but that FEMA's management,
to speak broadly, still needed improvement.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The report referenced by Senator Lieberman can be found in the
Appendix on page 103.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While today's hearing is focused on FEMA, I think it is
important to say that response to and recovery from a disaster
or a catastrophe in the United States is the responsibility of
a lot of other agencies and other people besides FEMA. Other
Federal agencies, State and local government, the private
sector, and, in fact, in some sense, every affected American
have roles to play. And many of them also need to improve their
capabilities.
On a positive note, just recently, the Departments of
Defense and Homeland Security, and the congressionally-mandated
Council of Governors recently signed off on a very important
plan establishing clear rules for when both National Guard and
military forces can jointly respond after a disaster. This
means that in a large disaster or catastrophe we will have the
ability to call on the resources of the Department of Defense
in a more timely and effective manner.
Five years after Hurricane Katrina, again I conclude, we
are better prepared for a catastrophe than we have ever been.
But the epic disaster in Japan reminds us that FEMA must
continue to improve as both old and new threats loom, some from
nature like the earthquake and tsunami, others from human
enemies like the one we faced on September 11, 2001. I know
Administrator Fugate and the dedicated public servants with
whom he works at FEMA will continue to chart a successful path
forward. Thank you.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The earthquake
and tsunami that struck Japan last week destroyed entire
communities, killed thousands of people, and caused the release
of radiation at nuclear power plants. Our thoughts are with the
Japanese people and with the rescuers and responders, including
units from our own country. This horrific natural disaster
reminds us that we need to do our best to prepare for the
unpredictable, and that is the focus of today's hearing.
In the past year, we have witnessed three disasters
involving the development and use of emergency resources. The
proper word probably is catastrophes, as the Chairman has said.
First, the explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon oil rig last
spring led to economic and environmental damages that have yet
to be completely tallied. A West Virginia coal mine explosion
killed 29 people in August and was the worst in decades. And
now there is uncertainty and fear in Japan about the amounts of
radiation emitted from nuclear power plants in the area hit by
the tsunami.
In addition to the humanitarian crisis, the aftermath of
the earthquake has raised concerns about the safety of nuclear
power at a time when it is being revisited as an alternative to
fossil fuels and as a means of lowering greenhouse gas
emissions. Regardless of whether a disaster strikes our energy
supply or another sector of our economy or part of our Nation,
we need to be prepared.
We do not know when the next disaster will hit. We do know
that the U.S. Geological Survey estimates that within the next
30 years, the probability is 94 percent chance that an
earthquake of 7.0 magnitude, or greater, will occur in
California. We know that inevitably there will be hurricanes,
floods, and tornados, and we recognize that a terrorist attack
using a weapon of mass destruction in a large city would
certainly strain our capabilities.
Today, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses how
well-equipped the United States is for any catastrophic
disaster regardless of the cause. What is the level of our
preparedness to protect important energy sources? What are we
learning from the nuclear accidents in Japan and the Gulf Coast
oil spill in the past year? How well are we prepared for a
major earthquake in this country? Do we have the communication
and medical systems necessary to respond to the explosion of a
dirty bomb?
More than 4 years ago, Congress enacted the Post-Katrina
Emergency Management Reform Act which the Chairman and I
authored. That bill was designed to take the hard-learned
lessons of Hurricane Katrina and bring about improvements in
our Nation's overall emergency preparedness and response
systems.
Our law has indeed improved FEMA's disaster response
capabilities. From major floods to wildfires, we have witnessed
improvements throughout the country. In Maine, I saw firsthand
this progress in FEMA's responses to the Patriot's Day storm of
2007, the spring 2008 floods in Aroostook County, and other
disasters since then.
FEMA certainly has become a more effective, better led
agency during the past 4 years. But nevertheless, questions
remain about our ability to handle a mega-disaster. I also have
serious concerns about FEMA's stewardship of Federal funds. One
of those hard-learned lessons from the aftermath of Hurricane
Katrina was that FEMA's assistance programs were highly
vulnerable to fraud and improper payments.
Our Committee, with the assistance of the IG and the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), documented more than a
billion dollars in misspent funds. In some cases, these
taxpayer dollars were literally gambled away. Funds were also
spent on liquor, bail bonds, and diamond engagement rings. FEMA
also paid millions of dollars for housing assistance to
hundreds of applicants who apparently resided in State and
Federal prisons.
While victims certainly should receive prompt, appropriate
relief, FEMA needs to strike that careful balance between
expediting relief and ensuring that criminals do not defraud
the system, and that means having strong internal controls.
Unfortunately, safeguarding taxpayer dollars remains an
area in which FEMA has yet to achieve success. A December 2010
report by the Inspector General revealed that FEMA had stopped
attempting to recover improper disaster assistance payments
made after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and subsequent
disasters.
The IG identified approximately 160,000 applicants that had
received improper disaster assistance payments totaling more
than $643 million. Even more disturbing, FEMA's efforts to
recoup these improper payments ended in 2007 after a court
found that its recovery procedures were inadequate. More than 3
years later, a new process for recovering these payments has
only been initiated this week.
I do want to point out some bright spots in the September
2010 DHS Inspector General's report. In particular, the IG
found that FEMA had made substantial progress, and we see it on
the chart,\1\ in improving emergency communications. Ensuring
that first responders can communicate during a disaster is
vital. Indeed, when communications failed after September 11,
2001, and during Hurricane Katrina, it cost lives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The chart referenced by Senator Collins appears in the Appendix
on page 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The IG also highlights the effectiveness of the regional
emergency communications working groups in each of the 10 FEMA
regions. Since I pushed very hard for this reform, I am very
pleased to see the progress that has been made. This October
will mark the 5th anniversary of the Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act. By that time, I hope that FEMA will have
made significant progress in improving our Nation's
preparedness for the next catastrophe.
Finally I want to join the Chairman in thanking former
Inspector General Skinner for his extraordinary service, not
just to the department, but throughout his career to our
country. He has certainly been a valuable asset as our
Committee conducted its investigations and oversights of the
department, and I am grateful for his aggressive approach to
combating waste, fraud, and abuse, and helping to improve the
management of programs at DHS. So, Mr. Skinner, thank you for
your service. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Collins.
Senator Landrieu, you have been so involved in these
matters regarding FEMA, obviously, ever since Hurricane
Katrina, would you like to make an opening statement?
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR LANDRIEU
Senator Landrieu. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking
Member Collins. I really appreciate it because I have to get
back to the floor. I am managing a bill on the floor and unable
to stay for the remainder of the hearing, so I really
appreciate it and I will try to be very brief, but there are a
few important things that I would like to share.
First of all, I think the calling of this hearing is very
important and I thank the Chairman and Ranking Member. Their
attention after the Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike
disasters, and many other disasters, has been important to all
of us as we have tried to recover along the Gulf Coast and in
other States and communities. Your efforts have really
strengthened FEMA's response capabilities.
But I do want to point to a couple of things that I am
concerned about. Looking at the situation, Mr. Chairman, in
Japan reminds us again that disasters of large magnitudes,
catastrophic disasters, can and will occur. What concerns me is
right now in this Congress, there are efforts to significantly
reduce funding for the Department of Homeland Security to cover
an existing shortfall in FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund (DRF).
It does not make any sense to me that the House of
Representatives would cut funding from these important
programs, $1.5 billion in additional funding is needed just to
meet the cost of eligible projects for this year, and the House
has proposed that we pay for these projects from past disasters
by using money that we are supposed to be using to prepare for
future disasters.
I have sent a letter to the President.\1\ I thank the
Chairman for signing this letter and would ask the other
Members of this Committee to review it, if you could, because
we are going to find ourselves back in the same position we
were before Hurricane Katrina struck, which is under-funding
our preparedness for future disasters and not being ready when
it happens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The letter to President Obama referenced by Senator Landrieu
appears in the Appendix on page 47.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition, the House Continuing Resolution (CR) is
cutting $68 million for FEMA Management and Administration
including information technology (IT). To Senator Collins'
point, this is exactly the money that is necessary for FEMA to
keep up their computer software and reporting mechanisms to cut
down on fraud and abuse. So on one hand, we are asking them to
come down hard on fraud and abuse; on the other hand, we are
taking away their money that enables them to do that. That is
not right, and it is not fair.
In addition, it is projected that the FEMA Disaster Relief
Fund is going to run out of money 3 months before the fiscal
year ends. This happened last year, and, Mr. Chairman, if we do
not weigh in with the Administration and with our colleagues on
both sides of the aisle, it is going to happen again.
The only final thing I will say--and I am looking forward
to reading the details of the report--is that there is some
encouraging news and mostly because you and Senator Collins
have done such a good job of staying on point. I am proud that
as a Subcommittee chairman, I held literally dozens of hearings
in 4 years on this exact subject, and hopefully, some of the
hearings that we held contributed to some of the improvements
we will hear about today.
But on the issue of fraud and abuse--and I know that
Senator Collins is very concerned about this and I am, too. But
on behalf of many people on the Gulf Coast, I have to state for
the record that some people are being accused of fraud because
they could not provide the title to their home or insurance
documents.
In floods and in earthquakes, documents are lost. Some
people are being accused of fraud because they could not
provide free and clear title to their home. It has been in
generations for years. They simply do not have a clear title
after several generations.
There are some accused of receiving duplicate payments just
because there is a mixup or omission of names like junior
instead of senior or senior instead of junior or boulevard,
drive, or highway as opposed to what it is supposed to be, or
other data entry errors.
So I know that fraud is a serious issue. I join Senator
Jeff Sessions and others in clamping down, raising the fines,
increasing the penalties for people that would try to game the
system. It is particularly horrible, I think, for people to try
to game a system in the middle of a disaster. I mean, really,
their penalties should significantly be higher in that regard
and they are. But we have to be careful calling some of these
mis-classifications fraud when they really are not in my
definition of fraud.
And finally, when we go to collect this money back,
particularly, Senator Collins, I just want to say that I hope
that the money we put into collecting these funds back are
cost-effective, because some of these payments were $1,000 or
$2,000 and there are hundreds of thousands of people that we
may have to track down. I know letters went out this week for
5,500. But let us just be careful that when we seek to get the
money back, it is a good expenditure of taxpayer dollars and
not just throwing good money after bad.
I am going to submit the rest to the record. I thank the
Chairman and Ranking Member very much.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Landrieu, both for
coming off the floor while you are managing the Small Business
bill, but also for your leadership of the Subcommittee, and we
will continue to try to carry forward with your assistance.
Thank you.
Let us go to the witnesses. Again, I thank you for being
here, all three of you, and we will begin with the Hon. Craig
Fugate, Administrator of the Federal Emergency Management
Agency at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. Good
afternoon.
TESTIMONY OF HON. W. CRAIG FUGATE,\1\ ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Fugate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Collins, and Senator Landrieu. I am going to try to go through
my oral statement here and give more time for questions because
I think this is really a better setting for the questions that
you have in response, but I just want to give a summary.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Fugate appears in the Appendix on
page 49.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We have been looking at this since I have been at FEMA,
from the standpoint of planning and what do we do in a
catastrophic disaster response. As you pointed out, we respond
to a lot of disasters. We implement the Stafford Act to provide
assistance, but that is not the same thing as when it is a
response that requires a coordinated Federal agency where we
actually have a lot of different resources that have to go very
quickly to an area where we may not have a lot of information.
And so looking at the backdrop of what has happened in
Japan, and again, I cannot even imagine what my counterparts
are doing, how they are standing up to this because, again,
this is what we are in the business for. It is the most
challenging thing you can deal with. So not only the losses,
but our counterparts, knowing what they are going through now
and the challenges they are facing, and trying to step back
from that and go, ``What if it happened here and what would we
do?'' And so, the thrust of my comments will be from that
approach.
As you know, the lead for our international response is the
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We are in a
support role. Two of the teams that have gone to Japan to
assist in search and rescue are the Urban Search and Rescue
Teams that, again, are authorized as part of FEMA. There are 28
teams, two of which are dual supported by both us and USAID,
that are designated for the international response. These are
the teams that have been to Haiti, Christchurch, and now are in
Japan.
We also stand by to assist the USAID, but Japan is a very
industrialized country with many resources, so many of the
things that we could offer have not been needed, although we
stay in support of that. But the events there remind us that
disasters, as you point out, do not always give us warning, do
not always follow a season, and often do not happen where we
have expected to have the worst impacts.
So for that reason, a term we use at FEMA is, we cannot
plan for easy. We have to plan for real. We cannot look at what
we are merely capable of. We have to look at what the impacts
could be to our communities and then determine how we meet
those needs and change those outcomes.
We put a lot of emphasis on the first 72 hours. We think
this is a key area. We saw this in Hurricane Katrina. We have
seen it in other disasters. If aid is not reaching the people
that need it, if we are not safe and secure, if we are not able
to do the search and rescue, if we cannot get the commodities
there quickly enough, it becomes extremely difficult to change
the outcome for those survivors.
And so, from this you actually changed some of the
provisions of the Stafford Act when you amended the Homeland
Security Act with the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform
Act that very clearly stated it was the intent of Congress that
we would not merely operate in a pool system waiting for a
request for help or waiting for the situation to develop; that
FEMA and the Federal family could begin mobilizing and moving
resources when we determine that something has happened or
think it is about to happen, even prior to a formal request
from a governor.
We have used that provision numerous times since I have
been at FEMA from the American Samoa tsunami to the flooding in
Tennessee to, most recently, the tsunami warnings that were
issued for Hawaii and the West Coast, in moving and pre-
positioning supplies as you have directed us to do in these
situations.
Chairman Lieberman. Just talk a little bit more about that
because I think it will be interesting to people who are
listening or watching on TV.
Mr. Fugate. Well, previously, and this is one of the
findings and concerns you raised during Hurricane Katrina, it
was not always clear if FEMA could begin moving resources,
particularly in tasking our Federal family in moving supplies
such as food, generators, cots, and blankets, prior to a
request from a governor.
And in looking at that, you clarified that under the
Stafford Act, at the direction of the President, FEMA could
activate and use the DRF to begin sending missions to our
various Federal agencies as well as deploying resources.
Chairman Lieberman. Before anything happened.
Mr. Fugate. Before anything happened. So when the tsunami
warning centers in Hawaii and in Alaska began issuing tsunami
warnings----
Chairman Lieberman. Last weekend.
Mr. Fugate. Last weekend, last Friday. Actually, I got my
call about two o'clock in the morning. And this event occurred
a little after midnight our time. Our Region 9 office, which
covers the Pacific, was already stood up. We made a decision
that we would stand up fully FEMA's support to the West Coast
and to the islands and territories. We began moving supplies
out of our logistics centers, which you have also authorized
and provided additional funding so we have more supplies on
hand.
Chairman Lieberman. So you got the logistics centers
disbursed around the country?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir. They are strategically located around
the country so that we are closer to the areas that we need
assistance. We have a facility at Moffett Field in California,
and we began the process of getting supplies loaded up.
Chairman Lieberman. What kinds of supplies?
Mr. Fugate. In this case, we thought the primary event
would be destruction along the coast, people being displaced,
people possibly being in shelters. And so we have a
distribution center in Guam, a distribution center in Hawaii,
and then the distribution center we activated on the West Coast
to begin moving shelf-stable food.
But also one of the things that came out of the Commission
on Children and Disasters, we know if we just send the shelf-
stable meals but we do not send infant formula or baby food,
that it is not addressing the need of children. So we have
actually built that into our capability now and began moving
supplies closer to the California coast where historically they
have mapped their greatest risk from tsunamis, just like we do
for hurricanes and map the coastal areas.
Along the West Coast, they have actually mapped those areas
at greatest risk for tsunamis, so we know where the population
areas would be and what relative risk we could have. What we
did not know was how big the wave would be. But given the
magnitude of the earthquake, the size of it was one that
suggested that you could see as much as a two-meter, or almost
six-foot tsunami.
And again, this is not like a wave breaking on a beach. As
you saw the videos in Japan, you get that idea of a six-foot
wall of water that is literally rushing in and flowing in and
not going out and how devastating that could be. We also had
our folks in Hawaii that went into the Governor's emergency
operations center in Hawaii, as he was activating and
evacuating his coast, and had our supplies ready to go there.
So this process really comes back to, in the critical
moments when we think that there may be an event--we had this
triggering event. We knew a major earthquake had occurred, so
we knew the tsunami risk was there. We had the forecast, but we
did not know what the impact was going to be. We began moving
these supplies based upon what we projected, what we call our
maximum of maximum--what is the worst case impact we would see
along our coast--and began moving for that.
Again, it is a process that says that we have to understand
and be in close contact with our warning centers, we have to be
in close contact with our State partners, we have to be
communicating across the Federal family, and we are doing this
as a team. This just is not FEMA doing stuff. We are talking to
Admiral James Winnefeld at U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in
case we are going to need more resources there. We are talking
to our State counterparts, anything they are concerned about,
anything they need to adjust.
And so, this process really comes back to, I think, the
heart of what you tried to get to in the Post-Katrina Reform
Act, is FEMA had to be more agile, be able to build a better
team, recognizing there is a lot more capacity and capabilities
out there than just what we bring, but we have to move much
faster in these events.
But as Senator Collins points out, we also have to declare,
when are we stable and when do we need to engage the safeties
to make sure we are not just spending money or doing things
that are no longer necessary. So we define outcomes that we
want to achieve in this initial response such as life safety
and life sustaining activities.
I think this goes back to one of the heart of the issues.
When we cannot do that, we oftentimes defaulted back to the
monetary assistance programs because we could not get enough
supplies in to meet the basic needs, and found ourselves with
not many options.
So part of this is really working in partnership with also
the private sector because this is the other thing we never
really did. We always came up with what I call a government-
centered response to disasters and we never realized that
before that disaster happened, in every community, there were
grocery stores, hardware stores, gas stations, pharmacies, and
we would oftentimes plan our response irregardless of what they
were doing.
We now have representatives of the private sector actually
part of the FEMA team in our Response Center here in Washington
helping us coordinate with them so that we do not compete with
the private sector. We go where they are not, where they have
the difficulties or they have destruction so that we can focus
our response on those areas of heaviest devastation, but also
in those unique populations, as you pointed out, Mr. Chairman,
and I know that Senator Collins has talked about this before.
We talk about this as it is one of our responsibilities,
but I want to make sure people understand why we tell people to
be prepared. There are going to be heavily-impacted areas that
should not have to compete with those of us who could have been
prepared and should have been ready. They should not get in
line behind us. Those people that do not have the resources,
that do not have the ability to do these things should not get
in line behind us because we did not get ready. This is a
shared responsibility.
In these types of catastrophic disasters, government needs
to focus on the safety and security, the search and rescue, and
the most vulnerable populations, working with the rest of the
team including our volunteer organizations and our businesses.
But it is important that the public recognizes the ability that
they can prepare so that those first critical days, they are
not competing with the most vulnerable, heaviest-impacted
populations, is key to our success.
And so, as we talk about, are we prepared for a
catastrophic disaster, we have made, I think, significant
improvements with the tools we have. We have much work to be
done. And as the IG has pointed out, there are many of what we
would look at inside the procedural controls and processes that
still need strengthening to ensure that not only can we be
rapid and fast, like I say, we want to be fast, we want speed.
We do not want haste where we have waste and abuse to the
system. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Administrator Fugate. That is a
very good beginning. We look forward to the question and answer
period.
Richard Skinner, thanks so much for returning to Capitol
Hill once more. It is your report of last September of FEMA's
Preparedness for the Next Catastrophic Disaster, An Update,
that led us to plan this hearing a long time ago. It comes,
obviously, in the immediate context of the tragedy in Japan, so
it is just inevitable that we will be looking at the report
based on what is happening there now. But it is a great piece
of work, typical of the high standards that you reached
throughout your career in public service, and we welcome your
testimony on the report now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. RICHARD L. SKINNER,\1\ FORMER INSPECTOR
GENERAL OF THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Skinner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Collins. It is a pleasure to be here again this afternoon. I do
not really feel like I have retired yet, as I have been
spending a considerable amount of time actually preparing for
this hearing. But it is my pleasure and honor to be here. I
cannot agree with you more. The tragic events that are
unfolding today in Japan are a stark reminder of how important
catastrophic preparedness is. It can and will happen here. It
is just a matter of when.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Skinner appears in the Appendix
on page 66.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If you asked me if we, as a Nation, are better prepared
than we were 20 years ago, 10 years ago, or even 5 years ago,
the answer to that is yes, of course we are. We have made
tremendous strides, particularly, Senator Collins, like you
pointed out, over the last 4 years since Hurricane Katrina. But
if you ask, are we as prepared as we can be or should be, then
the answer to that is no, we are not.
While FEMA has made notable progress to improve its
preparedness capabilities over the years, it is doing so, at
least in my opinion, at a snail's pace. After 32 years in
existence and with the many lessons learned from past disasters
such as Hurricane Hugo back in the late 1980s, and Hurricane
Andrew in the early 1990s, and, of course, Hurricane Katrina
and the Northridge earthquake, and the September 11, 2001,
attacks, we as a Nation should be much better prepared than we
are today.
There does not appear to be, in my opinion, a sense of
urgency within FEMA to turn words and plans into action. FEMA
is an agency that always seems, in my opinion, to be an agency
that is always in a constant state of flux, at least during the
20 years that I have been working with them.
Many of the concerns that the Office of the Inspector
General (OIG), GAO, and FEMA itself identified after Hurricane
Andrew in 1992, nearly 20 years ago, are the same concerns that
the OIG identified in its September 2010 update of FEMA's
catastrophic disaster preparedness capabilities.
Over the years, FEMA has created multiple task forces,
working groups, panels, and councils to develop remedial action
plans to address these issues. They produced libraries full of
lessons learned, draft plans, draft guidelines, and draft
documents, many of which were shelved or took a back seat to
the urgency of its mission demands; that is, to respond to the
latest disaster. Consequently, momentum towards finalization
and the implementation of key initiatives is either slowed or
lost altogether.
The four issues that I will talk about today that concern
me the most are one, the failure of FEMA to build a strong
management support infrastructure to sustain its disaster
operations. This includes information technology development
and integration, financial management, acquisition management,
grants management, and human resource management.
These functions are absolutely critical to the success of
FEMA's programs and operations. Yet, whenever there is a major
disaster or whenever FEMA is required to reduce its budget,
these are the first activities to be cut, as evidenced by the
President's 2012 budget to Congress and the many budget cuts
imposed by Congress itself over the years.
This is short-sighted and in the long term will increase
the costs of disaster operations and disaster programs. It will
also increase FEMA's vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, and
abuse, and will adversely affect the quality of services to
individuals and communities affected by disasters.
In January of this year, the DHS OIG reported--
incidentally, I was still the IG at that time--that FEMA's
existing IT systems were not integrated, do not meet user needs
and are cumbersome to operate, and do not provide the IT
capabilities needed by users to carry out disaster response and
recovery operations, in a timely, efficient, and effective
manner.
Furthermore, FEMA does not even have a complete documented
inventory of its system to support disasters, nor does it have
a comprehensive IT strategic plan with clearly defined goals
for its components. Program and field offices, we found, are
continuing to develop IT systems independently of the office of
the Chief Information Officer (CIO) and have been slow to adopt
FEMA's standard IT development approach.
Without modern integrated systems, FEMA is hard-pressed to
perform at its best, as evidenced by the fraud, waste, and
abuse that has plagued the agency since its inception. It
cannot prepare timely and reliable financial reports from which
to make informed financial management decisions.
It cannot readily share critical information within its own
ranks, or with its Federal partners at the Federal, State, and
local levels. It cannot track its disaster work force, the
status of its mission assignments, or work being performed by
its contractors and grantees, at least not with any reasonable
degree of reliability.
Until these issues are addressed, FEMA's programs and
taxpayer dollars will continue to be vulnerable to fraud,
wasteful spending, and poor performance, similar to the
wasteful spending for unneeded travel trailers after Hurricane
Katrina or the millions paid to ineligible disaster assistance
applicants, or the millions paid to unscrupulous contractors.
Granted, FEMA recognizes and is attempting to remedy many
of these problems and weaknesses, and has actually made some
headway, as you can see and have heard from the Administrator
today. However, does FEMA have the resolve and wherewithal to
sustain those efforts?
The ability of FEMA to do so is fragile, not only because
of the early stage of development that these initiatives are
in, but also because of the Nation's economic environment and
the constant disruptions caused by the inordinate number of
disasters that FEMA must service each year.
Unless there is a sustained commitment and continuing
investment of resources, there is a good chance, if history is
to serve as an indicator, that we will be talking about these
same problems 5 or 10 years from now.
The second issue that concerns me is the lack of
performance standards and metrics to measure the level of
disaster preparedness at all levels of government, Federal,
State, and local. In July 1993, 18 years ago, GAO reported that
FEMA had neither established performance standards nor
developed a program for evaluating Federal, State, and local
preparedness for catastrophic disaster response.
Until that is accomplished, according to GAO, FEMA will not
be able to judge the Nation's readiness, nor will it be able to
hold itself or its State and local partners accountable. In
1998, 13 years ago, FEMA claimed to be in the process of
developing a methodology for assessing hazard risk and disaster
response capabilities. Yet, to this day, FEMA has not finalized
its methodology, nor has it finalized the systems and
performance metrics and processes necessary to track and
measure emergency management capabilities and performance.
State and local governments have received billions of
dollars over the past 8 years and are estimated to receive
billions more over the years to come. However, without a bona
fide performance measurement system, it is impossible to
determine whether these annual investments are actually
improving our Nation's disaster preparedness posture.
Furthermore, without clear, meaningful performance
standards, FEMA lacks the tools necessary to make informed
funding decisions. In today's economic climate, it is critical
that FEMA concentrate its limited resources on those hazards
that pose the greatest risk to the country.
The third issue that concerns me is the lack of
transparency and accountability in the use of disaster relief
funds and to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of those funds.
Literally hundreds and hundreds of OIG audits and
investigations over the years have demonstrated that FEMA
programs are extremely vulnerable to fraud, waste, and abuse.
Yet, FEMA still has not developed a robust program to
curtail fraud, waste, and abuse within its programs. The extent
of the fraud and abuse that the OIG uncovers every year, year
after year for the past 20 years, at least since I have been
associated with FEMA, is unacceptable and it needs to be
addressed and it needs to be addressed aggressively.
Unfortunately, there is a long-standing mindset within the
FEMA rank and file that fraud prevention is the exclusive
responsibility of the OIG. Many believe that FEMA's
responsibility is simply to dole out funds to individuals and
communities affected by a disaster, and it is the OIG's
responsibility to catch those who have received those funds
through fraudulent means.
This flawed mindset is costing the American taxpayer
millions of dollars each and every year. Fraud prevention is a
shared responsibility. In 2007, in response to an OIG proposal,
FEMA created a Fraud Prevention Unit to address the complaints
of widespread fraudulent activity after four disasters struck
Florida in 2004.
Since then, the unit has been renamed and placed in FEMA's
Office of the Chief Security Officer. Although the concept
behind the fraud unit is sound, it is under-staffed, under-
funded, and lacks the latest in fraud prevention technology to
be effective. Furthermore, organizationally, it is buried in
the bowels of the agency with very little, if any, visibility
within the rank and file.
Consequently, its utility has not been fully utilized. FEMA
needs to increase the visibility of the fraud unit, expand its
scope of responsibility to include all disaster relief programs
nationwide, and mandate fraud prevention training for all of
its employees. This should help strike a balance between
providing assistance and ensuring fiscal responsibility.
A good model that FEMA may want to emulate is the one
developed by the Recovery, Accountability, and Transparency
Board, which was created by Congress in 2009 to promote
transparency and accountability and to prevent fraud, waste,
and abuse for nearly $800 billion in economic stimulus recovery
programs. Within 9 months of its creation, the board developed
and put into place government-wide systems to provide
transparency and accountability and to identify and prevent
fraud, waste, and abuse.
As a result of that initiative, fraud, waste, and abuse of
economic stimulus funds have been kept to an absolute minimum.
There is no reason why a small agency such as FEMA cannot do
the same. We as taxpayers deserve to know that our tax dollars
are not being wasted or spent on fraudulent activities. To that
end, I believe that FEMA should review and incorporate many of
the precedent-setting measures used by the Recovery Board in
order to ensure proper stewardship of taxpayer dollars.
Finally, I am concerned about the diminished emphasis being
placed on community outreach and awareness to improve hazard
mitigation strategies and projects and outcomes. Mitigation is
considered the cornerstone of emergency management. It attempts
to prevent hazards from developing into disasters or to reduce
the effects of disasters when they do occur.
In the late 1990s, FEMA launched an aggressive community
outreach and awareness campaign to educate the public about the
importance of mitigation and to create a network of mitigation
partners, both in the public and private sectors, to
collaborate on the development and implementation of risk-
based, all hazards mitigation strategies and projects.
In fact, this campaign was the impetus for the Disaster
Mitigation Act of 2000. Unfortunately, this initiative lost its
momentum due to the change in administrations and the tragic
events of September 11, 2001. America's attention turned to
fighting and preventing terrorism and mitigation faded into the
background as an emergency management priority. As a result,
FEMA is now struggling to coordinate the mitigation efforts of
its stakeholders and develop a national hazard mitigation
strategy.
To lessen the impact of a catastrophic disaster, mitigation
needs to be elevated again as a top emergency management
priority. And FEMA needs to relaunch its campaign to educate
the public and its mitigation partners about the importance of
developing and implementing mitigation strategies and programs.
In conclusion, notwithstanding the many initiatives
underway, many of them very good, I remain concerned about
FEMA's capability and resolve to sustain an effective and
efficient catastrophic disaster preparedness strategy and
program.
FEMA's increased involvement in routine disasters, coupled
with the recent economic downturn and the impact that it is
having on government budgets at all levels, could easily derail
the many initiatives currently underway, which is unfortunate.
In this day and age, it is more important than ever that FEMA
be prepared to assist State and local governments.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Collins, that concludes my
statement. I will be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Skinner. That was direct,
as we expect from you. Maybe I would call it the tough love
that we expect from a great inspector general. When we get to
the questions, I will ask Mr. Fugate if he wants to respond.
Our final witness is William O. Jenkins, Jr., Director of
Homeland Security and Justice Issues at the U.S. Government
Accountability Office, known and loved as GAO.
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM O. JENKINS, JR.,\1\ DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Mr. Jenkins. Chairman Lieberman and Ranking Member Collins,
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today to discuss FEMA's
efforts to measure and assess national capabilities to respond
to a catastrophic disaster. So some of my comments will echo
those of Mr. Skinner.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins appears in the Appendix
on page 89.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The horrifying and heart-wrenching photos and videos from
Japan vividly illustrate one of the key characteristics of a
catastrophic disaster. The response capabilities of the
affected areas are almost immediately overwhelmed, and
substantial outside assistance is quickly needed. Effective
response requires the resources and coordinated action of a
wide array of government and non-governmental entities. The
Hurricane Katrina response drew on resources from almost every
State in the lower 48.
Basically preparing for disasters requires identifying what
needs to be done, by whom, and how well it should be done. More
specifically, this includes identifying: One, the nature of the
risks faced in specific geographic areas; two, the types and
scale of the potential disaster consequences arising from these
risks; three, the desired outcomes in addressing these
consequences; four, the capabilities needed to achieve the
desired outcomes; five, who should fund, develop, and maintain
specific needed capabilities; and six, metrics for assessing
the extent to which needed capabilities are available for
deployment.
Detailed operational plans are the blueprint for who should
do what and how the activities of the many players will be
managed and coordinated. Training to perform assigned roles and
capabilities should be coupled with exercises to test and
assess the operational plan and identify areas of strength and
gaps that need to be addressed.
The Federal Government has provided more than $34 billion
to States, localities, and some non-governmental organizations
to enhance their capabilities to protect, prevent, respond, and
recover from major disasters. The Post-Katrina Emergency
Management Reform Act gave FEMA responsibility for leading the
Nation in developing a national preparedness system, developing
measures of desire capabilities, and assessing those
capabilities and the resources needed to achieve them.
This is a complex and daunting task. As Mr. Fugate notes in
many public presentations, it is a task that FEMA may lead, but
whose success requires the effective partnership of numerous
government and non-governmental entities, as well as the
American public.
In September 2010, the Local, State, Tribal, and Federal
Task Force on Preparedness reported there was no agreed-upon
method of assessing disaster preparedness or the extent to
which Federal grants have enhanced disaster capabilities and
preparedness. They suggested a 3-year time line with associated
annual tasks for developing capability metrics.
FEMA has initiated a number of efforts over the years to
develop a method of defining and measuring preparedness. FEMA
has characterized most of the assessment methodologies it has
developed as guidance or tools that non-Federal entities can
choose to use or not. One result of this approach is that
available data are largely self-reported, difficult to
validate, and not necessarily comparable across reporting
jurisdictions and entities, thus making it difficult to get a
picture of national preparedness.
Each of the efforts to date has partially advanced the
ability to define and measure disaster preparedness. However,
they have not been integrated into a comprehensive approach
with metrics that enables FEMA and its partners to assess
national preparedness as envisioned by the Post-Katrina Act.
Until it does have an integrated approach, FEMA will not
have a basis to operationalize and implement an assessment of
disaster preparedness across the Nation, nor will it be able to
effectively target grant resources to the areas of greatest
need and potential benefit. It is essential that there be a
useful, reliable way of comparing capability levels across
entities and jurisdictions with catastrophic response roles and
responsibilities.
FEMA has embarked on a new initiative called Whole of
Community which incorporates 13 core response capabilities with
an emphasis on stabilizing a catastrophic disaster's effect in
the first 72 hours. This approach will be tested in the
National Level Exercise this year using a major earthquake on
the New Madrid fault. This new effort is in its early stages,
and it is too early to assess its success.
Whatever approach is eventually used, it is essential that
there be a defined end state we want to achieve; a reliable
means of assessing where we are in our ability to achieve that
end state; that roles and responsibilities are clear; and that
we rigorously test and periodically re-evaluate the assumptions
on which disaster planning is based.
According to news accounts, Japan experienced a
significantly bigger earthquake and tsunami than the one for
which it had planned and prepared for the geographic area hit
by the disaster. It has faced the cumulative effects of three
quickly succeeding disasters, any one of which would have been
considered a major disaster.
All disasters represent opportunities for learning and
assessment, and this one is no different. A careful assessment
of the Japanese experience can be useful to our own future
disaster planning and preparation. That concludes my statement,
Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to respond to questions you or
the Ranking Member may have.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Mr. Jenkins. It was a
very helpful statement. We will do 7-minute rounds at the
beginning.
Administrator Fugate, I want to give you a chance to at
least begin a response to the testimonies of Mr. Skinner and
Mr. Jenkins. I want to offer you also the opportunity to file a
written response for the Committee's record because we want to
get to other questions. But I thought you should have a chance,
particularly on the various elements of management, to respond
to what Mr. Skinner said.
Mr. Fugate. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Much of what is
in the IG's report we are not disagreeing with, but I think,
again, that is not to say that we are not taking steps, we are.
And to say it is not a priority, I would beg to differ. The
results may not be there yet in the IG's report. But I will
give you an example, Mr. Chairman, and again, we will respond
in writing.
But I will give you a sense of when I got to FEMA, the
Disaster Relief Fund was basically a piggy bank that was used,
oftentimes, in ways that it was not intented for. We found
ourselves funding positions that were not directly tied to
disasters. It was oftentimes used as, if something was not
going right, we would go look at the DRF when it was not a
disaster.
One of our first steps was to identify all the positions
that were no longer doing primary disaster work, that were
still being funded, particularly from the Hurricane Katrina
era, that had become something that you had already funded in
positions. We worked with the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) and staff to eliminate all the positions that were being
funded out of DRF and move them into our budgets. We had a 2-
year transition period, and we were successful in doing that.
The other thing we looked at was the cost of administering
disasters. In many cases, we were setting up and mobilizing
large numbers of folks to administer disasters, and we asked
the question, Can we do this without necessarily setting up a
facility? So we introduced and had built upon a concept that
was already there, what we call a virtual joint field office.
Instead of going out and setting up an office, can we work this
from the region and avoid that cost? It does not slow down our
response and recovery, but it does reduce the overall cost of
how we administer the disaster itself.
For fraud and waste, we have been working to make sure that
we have the acquisition staff we need. A large percentage of
our acquisition staff are contractors doing those conversions
over and getting them certified; requiring that not only those
people that, by law, are required to have ethics training do,
but require all FEMA employees to take ethics training
annually. As was pointed out, this was a huge issue in the
response in Hurricane Katrina, not having a strong acquisition
force and people that can go out and utilize contracts that
were already bid appropriately that we could use in a disaster.
And if we do have to do acquisition, having the acquisition
specialist to go in the field to support the joint field
office. These are things we had not done before that we are
implementing.
Again, I think many of these things we take to heart. Our
implementation of it is not as swift as you would like or as
the IG would like, but I think these are areas we are moving
forward.
A big part of this was getting the staff hired, getting
them trained, and as the IG has pointed out, both in his
reports and his testimony, is maintaining and getting staff
trained and in those positions so that as we deal with
disasters, we are not always pulling from staff that are
responsible for the day-to-day management.
And again, as part of that was looking at our management
structure and putting a higher priority on these backbone
systems that are required to do the day-to-day business, but
also support disaster response.
So while I will not disagree with the findings of the IG, I
would state that it is not a lack of effort, but those results
may not be necessarily showing up yet as we continue to work to
build that capability.
Chairman Lieberman. We will continue to monitor, obviously,
and after some period of time come back and do another
oversight hearing, hopefully not in the shadow of a
catastrophic disaster somewhere in the world.
Let me go to some questions that come off of what is
happening in Japan now. To state the obvious to you, FEMA is
not responsible for the safety of the operation of nuclear
power plants. That is the purview of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). FEMA has responsibility, along with other
entities, for being prepared to respond to an accident at a
nuclear power plant, the effect of weather, earthquakes, or a
terrorist attack on the nuclear power plant.
I am interested, since we have all, unfortunately, learned
a lot about types of nuclear reactors, whether the plans for a
response that you have are affected by the particular designs
of nuclear power plants, or whether that gets to a level of
detail and nuance that is hard for you to get to. In other
words, whether you evaluate the resiliency of a particular
nuclear power plant as you plan a preparedness strategy for an
event at that plant.
Mr. Fugate. Mr. Chairman, this goes back to the findings
from Three Mile Island that required, at that time, the new
FEMA that was created in the reorganization that President
Carter signed; that under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
regulations, FEMA was responsible for administering what is
called the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program, which
was to work with local and State governments.
In this particular program, the determination as to what
level we prepared to is based upon those regulations that were
established by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission based upon the
findings after Three Mile Island. They are not specific to the
reactor. They are specific to the regulations, and the
regulations require that planning for individuals is based upon
a 10-mile planning zone around the facilities with an
additional 50-mile emergency planning zone for what is
determined to be ingestion or the possibility of food pathway
risk.
These plans and the exercises that are done and required to
be certified for those plants are conducted on a recurring
basis against the standards in the regulations. So it would be
something where the Nuclear Regulatory Commission would make
determinations as to modifications to the distances or actions
taken.
Our job is to make sure that we work as a team with local
and State government, that they can execute those protective
measures, which may include evacuation, decontamination of
vehicles traveling through the area, sheltering, the warning
systems, and other protective actions that local and State
officials would take in the event that an accident occurred.
Chairman Lieberman. So let me ask you the baseline
question, maybe the circumstance is answered, but if a
combination of events like the ones that have occurred in Japan
occurred here in the United States, would FEMA be prepared to
respond?
Mr. Fugate. Given what we are seeing there, it would go, I
think, far beyond what we currently have in our Radiological
Emergency Preparedness Program. But fortunately, we built a lot
of capability within the National Guard, within the Department
of Defense, but also within the local hazardous material teams
that have received these grant fundings, particularly when we
look at the threat of improvised nuclear devices or
radiological dispersal devices.
So with the civil support teams that have been built within
the National Guard or the Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
Nuclear, and High Yield Explosives (CBRNE) capabilities that
NORTHCOM has to respond in support of these teams, we have, I
think, for this type of event--again, we would not speak to the
reactor. That would be really the lead of the NRC. But if there
were consequences off sites, the ability to monitor that is a
team effort, the ability to do the decontamination and support
the evacuations, I think there is a lot more capability that
even goes beyond what we have in our commercial reactor safety
programs that could be brought to bear, mainly because of the
additional preparedness we do for improvised devices or
dispersal devices.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, that is an important answer, and
I hope people who are listening find it reassuring. One is, we
live in a world with a lot of risks. But the capabilities to
respond to a terrorist attack involving a radiological device
or, at worst, a nuclear weapon here in the United States, those
capabilities also, obviously, can be brought to bear in the
case of an accident or a natural disaster such as the one we
are watching in Japan now, which already is, but may have
significant radiological consequences.
I think it is very important to state that since September
11, 2001, and, of course, intensely since Hurricane Katrina, we
have developed extra capacities that FEMA can bring to bear,
particularly within the Defense Department on, as you say, the
response teams and the National Guards, which are right there
and will probably be the first responders--apart from local law
enforcement--on the site.
And second, very specialized skills in specialized units
that are stood up at the national level within the Defense
Department, to come in and deal with the radiological
consequences of such an event. I guess my question is, have I
got it right?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir. It is what we call a multi-layer,
all-hazard approach that many of these teams that were
originally designed for commercial nuclear power plants
actually give locals the capability to respond to other
threats. And conversely, the funds and the building of the
teams to respond to the threat of a dispersal device gives us
more capability to respond to any event that could occur as an
accident.
So in the area of all-hazard, this is one of the things we
really try to emphasize, when we build these capabilities,
oftentimes we are building them against known threats or in the
case of terrorism. But the ability to use them for those things
that you did not expect, or were greater than what your plans
were for, really come back to the heart of what we are trying
to get to, is planning for these likely maximum events and
realize that it really takes the ability to leverage all of our
resources, not necessarily as originally planned, but how they
could be utilized as part of the team if we saw this type of
event.
Chairman Lieberman. And again, just finally--and then I
will yield, I am over my time--under Northern Command, which is
a command of our military which has responsibility now for
Homeland Security, we have these two units, 4,500 people in
each one, one active duty, one reserve, that are specially
trained to respond to events of this kind and to get there as
quickly as possible, certainly within the 72-hour window that
you have talked about. Thanks, Administrator. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Administrator, you have pointed out that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission would be the lead agency if the United
States were to experience the kind of accident or level of
damage at a commercial nuclear reactor that is occurring now in
Japan. But FEMA, under the national planning scenarios, is
responsible for the operational planning under a number of
scenarios, one of which is a major earthquake, another is a
nuclear attack, and another is essentially a dirty bomb.
Has FEMA completed the operational planning for those 15
scenarios that clearly outlines the roles and responsibilities
of all of your partners? In other words, is it really clear who
is responsible for what if, God forbid, we had the kind of
multiple catastrophe that Japan is experiencing right now?
Mr. Fugate. In looking at the 15 planning scenarios, and I
think we are collapsing some of this down into what are the
things that we respond to that are similar and what are the
unique authorities that are different across those?
And this comes back to, when we are doing the all-hazard
planning and looking at the catastrophic, we are actually
looking at an improvised nuclear device, the earthquake
scenarios, particularly in California, and the Category 5
hurricanes, and looking at the possible total number of
casualties, the impacts, and response to support that, and then
going back through the authorities of which Federal agencies
would have different pieces of that.
One of the things that you will note is that the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, as a regulatory agency, is responsible
for the power plants. But if an event occurs outside of that
that is not a regulated facility, it is actually the Department
of Energy that has the lead on the radiological response.
And so, it is our ability to go through these and look at
and de-conflict where we have the authorities, make sure they
are clear, and part of this is through the exercises that we do
to look at this. We, most recently, conducted exercises looking
at nuclear power plants and looking at whose authorities are
there and what we would operate under.
So as we go through these scenarios, that is what we are
doing. The status of that, I will go back and submit that in
writing because each one of those scenarios has various
components that are being completed or have been completed for
the planning scenarios.
Senator Collins. Mr. Skinner and Mr. Jenkins, are the roles
and responsibilities clear, in your judgment, under the 15
disaster scenarios that should be operational planning is not
yet completed for? I mean, I am sort of answering my own
question because if it is not completed, it is unlikely to be
clear. But what is your assessment? I will start with you, Mr.
Skinner.
Mr. Skinner. First, I would like to say that we have not
done a study to determine the clarity of the individual roles.
But during the course of our work, we were able to determine
that the responsibilities are becoming clearer, and this is a
direct result, I think, of the confusion that we witnessed
after Hurricane Katrina. People sat down in the room and
started more clearly defining who is on first, who has the
operational responsibilities, and who is in charge.
So in that regard, after Hurricane Katrina, we feel
comfortable that the clarity of the roles are becoming clearer.
But again, a lot of these things are not complete. So we are
really trying to use a crystal ball to predict how is it going
to play out in the future.
But with regards to earthquakes that Administrator Fugate
referred to, and as well as nuclear detonation and major
hurricanes, Category 5 hurricanes, as a result of that work, we
feel that the roles are relatively clear.
Senator Collins. Mr. Jenkins, do you agree?
Mr. Jenkins. Yes, I do agree with that. I think there has
definitely been progress made, but I think one of the issues
that we are concerned about is, until you get these plans
completed, one of the things that is important for State,
local, or other officials that are involved, it is the totality
of the roles and responsibilities that we have across these
scenarios, and then what are the capabilities we need to be
able to carry out those roles and responsibilities effectively.
So it is really important to know the totality of that so
you know, this is what I am responsible for, these are the kind
of capabilities I need to build.
Senator Collins. Mr. Skinner, you put out a report in
December that revealed that FEMA had stopped attempting to
recover improper disaster assistance payments that were made
after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, and you identified
approximately 160,000 applicants that have received improper
payments totaling more than $643 million.
Is this in addition to the improper uses of the $2,000
debit cards that were given out in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina?
Mr. Skinner. Yes, it is. Also, it does not include those
cases of fraudulent activity that we investigated. I would like
to make clear something that Senator Landrieu made reference
to, that is, simply because you have filed an incomplete
application or have unclear data on your application, does not
automatically put you in a bucket as a fraudulent applicant. It
puts you in a bucket as a potential ineligible applicant.
Senator Collins. And there is a difference.
Mr. Skinner. There is a very big difference.
Senator Collins. Absolutely.
Mr. Skinner. And I would like to make that clarification.
Senator Collins. I am pleased that you did because I was
going to ask you that very question. I want to ask you a series
of questions about that, but since my time on this round is
almost expired, I will wait for the next round.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
Senator Brown, welcome. Thanks for being here.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BROWN
Senator Brown. I would not miss it. I do not think I have,
actually, so happy to be here, obviously. I appreciate you
holding this hearing.
A report published in a Boston paper indicates that the Bay
State Nuclear Power Plant is the second highest in the Nation
for the potential of suffering core damage from an earthquake.
Are any of you familiar with that report at all?
Mr. Jenkins. No, I am not.
Mr. Skinner. No.
Senator Brown. No?
Mr. Fugate. Mr. Chairman, Senator, I think I am familiar
with the--is this the ranking of the power plant?
Senator Brown. Right.
Mr. Fugate. Was this the one done by the NRC that went back
and re-ranked the probability of the events?
Senator Brown. Yes.
Mr. Fugate. I have seen that report, sir.
Senator Brown. So in light of that, they were number two
apparently. Have there been any efforts by any of you at all to
reach out and make sure that we are squared away?
Mr. Fugate. Senator, what is going on inside of the plant
and the regulatory part of that is the purview of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. But around each one of the licensed
nuclear power plants, FEMA supports State and local governments
to do the exercises that they do for certification and
exercises and drills for those plants.
The report is from the NRC, but what we do at FEMA and have
been doing prior to this report is based upon the regulatory
guidance and requirements to do the exercises and the things we
exercise against. That is an ongoing program. So I am not sure
what the NRC, with this report, what, if anything, would change
from that regarding the plant.
Senator Brown. So if I wanted to find that out, I would
have to reach out to them?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir.
Senator Brown. We will do that.
Also, let me just backtrack for a second. God forbid
anything like this happens, so I will just take this particular
plant. It is near the ocean, very similar situation, apparently
is No. 2 at risk in the country. How confident are you that if
something like this happens in the United States, that you will
have the ability--and I understand, apparently, from some of
the testimony and what I have read is, apparently you guys are
in charge in terms of implementing. You are the go-to people
now. Is that accurate in terms of dictating who does what and
who is in charge?
Is it an ongoing plan that is developing?
Mr. Fugate. In response to a nuclear power plant, inside of
the facility is regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Outside of the plant is actually the local and State responders
with FEMA supporting them. And if you had a scenario that
resulted in a release, the most important thing to occur would
be to successfully evacuate people away from that plant.
Those are the type of things that the exercise plans work
on. These are the things that local and State officials train
against. And our role at the Federal Government would be to
support them with additional resources, if required, in the
event that an evacuation had to take place.
But those are the things that I think, from the standpoint
of your questions--if you would like, Senators, to have our
staff reach out with the State and give your staff an update on
what those plans are so you can take a look at that and get a
better idea what----
Senator Brown. Yes, that would be great because I am
concerned about who is in charge. Listening and doing, some of
the work on it, I have a great concern. It is like the left
hand--very similar to a Hurricane Katrina situation. There is
going to be a lot of breakdowns. I know there has been a lot of
improvement. I want to, obviously, make that well-known.
But now we are getting to the point where we always seem to
be reactionary instead of, obviously, keeping ahead of the ball
game.
I do not want to take the thunder from Senator Collins's
comments about the $643 million and the difference between
fraudulent and ineligible, and I am just going to make a
statement, which is, I find it amazing that we just give away
millions and millions of dollars with really no accountability.
And if, in fact, we have improperly paid somebody, that we
go after it. We get a collection agency, we go after it, we get
our money, give them a third, collect whatever we have to do. I
was in a Medicare/Medicaid hearing the other day, and they were
talking about $76 billion that were just given out, whether it
is through ineligible or fraudulent. But the bottom line is,
there is a breakdown somewhere and being one of the newer
people here, still over a year away, I am just flabbergasted at
the amount of just--it is a million here, a million there. We
are fighting for millions.
My State could use millions, whether it is Low Income Home
Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) money, Head Start programs,
or the fishing industry.
I have to run to another hearing, but I would love to hear,
like Senator Collins, where is the money, is it coming back,
and why did they give up? So I do not want to take away from
that, but I do have time for one or two more questions.
When you talk about the all-hazard approach, and I think it
is an extension of what I was just asking, and if you could
maybe follow up again with my office and how we can do it
offline. With everything that is happening, and I have been
following it, what happened in Japan, like everybody else. It
is just so devastating. I cannot imagine that there is going to
be one agency in Massachusetts who would just say, ``OK, you go
here, you go here.''
So I am really concerned, not only in Massachusetts but
throughout the country if something like this happens. I am not
confident yet, and I am hopeful that someone can give me the
information to make sure that we all know what to do. Is it
evacuation? Is it command and control? Is it military? I think
it is a combination of everything. Can you shed any light on my
thoughts?
Mr. Fugate. In the time we have, I can start and then I
would like to have an opportunity, Senator Brown----
Senator Brown. Well, we can do that, because I do not want
to take Senator Akaka's time.
Mr. Fugate. Well, I just want to make this one point.
Chairman Lieberman. I think you are asking an important
question so I would urge Administrator Fugate to give you a
response.
Mr. Fugate. In many of our disasters, and we always start
with who is going to be the closest responders no matter how
big the disaster, it is always the local responders. And in
some cases, as we saw in this, they can be destroyed in the
disaster itself. We saw this in Hurricane Katrina, we saw this
in the tsunami. The next layer is the governor and their team,
including the un-impacted communities and the National Guard
responding. And then the next level is the Federal Government.
I think one of the things that is a little bit different
that this Committee saw was the fact that previously FEMA would
have to wait for somebody to call for help before we could
begin mobilizing the Federal resources, including the
Department of Defense. This Committee changed the law so that
no longer do we have to wait until a State is overwhelmed. But
even if there is the appearance that they may need that help,
we can start mobilizing resources.
But one of the key things is it is done as a coordinated
effort with the local officials, the governor and their team,
and then the President's team as directed under the Homeland
Security Act and the Stafford Act to coordinate Federal
assistance so that governors do not have to go shopping the
Federal agencies to figure out who is coming or who does what.
I think this is the one thing this Committee really focused
on after Hurricane Katrina was, you had to make sure that the
governor, who is then responsible for coordinating the response
in their State, has that one place that is going to coordinate
on behalf of the President, all the Federal resources including
the Department of Defense, in their disaster.
Senator Brown. I would love to talk to you about this some
more, maybe someone from your staff, we can connect.
Mr. Fugate. Yes.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Brown.
Administrator, am I not right that once a year, FEMA and
the NRC, and perhaps local officials, go through a dry run
about a disaster at every nuclear plant in the country? Is that
right?
Mr. Fugate. It is actually a little bit more than that. We
do a formal, evaluated exercise where we actually grade the
operator and the local governments and State governments, and
every 2 years they actually have to be certified and any
deficiencies or areas requiring correction have to be
addressed.
They perform about four drills a year. Those could be
anything from a decontamination exercise where we are actually
taking vehicles and how you would wash them down and monitor,
or the warning systems, or other parts of the plan.
And generally, they also have practice exercises built into
that cycle. So rather than just every 2 years you do one
exercise, there is a series of drills and exercises, and then
the evaluated exercise is where they are actually graded on
their ability to perform those functions.
Again, it is done against those regulatory functions that
say, you have to warn the population in this amount of time
from the time the event escalates. You have to be able to
shelter and evacuate the populations within these time frames.
You have to be able to do all these things against a population
at risk. So it is actually based on who lives there, what is
that population?
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fugate. And it is adjusted to that particular community
and that local and State government response.
Chairman Lieberman. So in the case the power plant in
Massachusetts, there is a plan if something should happen?
Mr. Fugate. I would imagine if you went to the local phone
books, you could actually find a map. This is generally how we
do stuff, get the information out so people know if you live
inside of that zone, that this may be an evacuation zone. You
will generally find that you have outdoor warning systems,
sirens, or telephone notification systems that are enhancing
our emergency alert system tied to that area.
You will find that the local responders have a lot more
equipment for radiological monitoring and detection than you
would normally find. These are kind of the things, again,
because these are point-specific hazards, that we plan against
and you exercise against. They are very well-known to the local
officials and the State officials who do that planning.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you. Senator Akaka, welcome.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and
Senator Collins. Thank you for holding this hearing. I also
want to extend my thank you to the witnesses for being here
today.
I would like to recognize FEMA, particularly Region 9
Administrator Nancy Ward, for collaborating extensively with
Hawaii's civil defense and joint catastrophic planning. She
does a great job. My home State of Hawaii and the Pacific
territories face unique challenges, as you know very well,
because of their remote locations and a limited logistics base
in Hawaii. There is still much for us to do, and I am glad that
we are having this hearing.
Administrator Fugate, as you know, States rely on
neighboring States to provide critical assistance in the event
of a disaster. However, Hawaii is over 2,000 miles from the
mainland, so other States may not be able to provide timely
support. FEMA has a disaster supply warehouse in west Oahu and
one in Guam. Should a major disaster strike Hawaii, either
damaging the warehouse or overwhelming our supplies, what plans
does FEMA have to quickly resupply Hawaii?
Mr. Fugate. Well, thank you for that question, Senator, and
also I have to thank the State of Hawaii and the Hawaiian
National Guard who helped us respond to American Samoa when the
tsunami hit there. The challenges, again as we know in the
Pacific, the distances, require us to both leverage what we
have in the FEMA warehouses, but also our local coordination
with Pacific Command (PACOM), and their resources.
When Nancy Ward, as you pointed out, one of our regional
administrators, starts to talk with her counterparts there in
Hawaii or in the territories in the event that we see something
coming--again, we know the distances, we know we cannot wait--
we are oftentimes starting to look at how we will start to ship
or fly resources in.
This is the close coordination that we have, both with our
ability to charter aircraft, but also work with the Department
of Defense for those most critical supplies. As you remember in
American Samoa, one of the key issues the governor had was for
generators, and he could not wait for them to come by barge
because he had to get his critical systems back up. So we were
able to task, initially, DOD and later contractors, to fly
those generators in there.
So again, it goes back to the authorities this Committee
has vested. When we know we have these tremendous distances, we
oftentimes have to make decisions before we have requests or
before we have all the information to start moving,
particularly in the most critical life saving supplies because
we will not have time to make up.
So those are the continency plans, again as in Guam and in
Hawaii. We base those supplies on the time it would take to
ship supplies, but recognize that if they are impacted, we
would actually be flying supplies as soon as airfields were
available.
Senator Akaka. Yes. I agree that coordination relationship
with the military really makes a difference. Administrator
Fugate, as was evident in the recent events, Hawaii and Pacific
Coast States and territories face the greatest tsunami hazard
in the United States. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) manages Federal tsunami detection and
warning efforts, and partners with Federal agencies to reduce
tsunami risks.
How is FEMA working with NOAA to coordinate tsunami
preparedness and response plans?
Mr. Fugate. We work very closely, as they are the subject
matter experts on the hazard, and in supporting the States and
territories as they map their innundation zones. One of the
areas that we help them in their tsunami-ready programs is in
the warning systems. This is an area that we are currently
working with the governor of American Samoa who did not have a
tsunami warning system prior to the last event, particularly
the outdoor notification systems, which we saw work very
effectively in Hawaii during this last crisis.
So we continue to work with NOAA as they give us the
warnings to activate through our national warning systems, was
how we originally got those calls out to the States and
territories that we did have a tsunami warning. And then
working with the grant programs we provide, for them to build
and develop those warning systems. This is the other part of,
again, looking at where we are making progress with these
homeland security funds, is building warning systems for these
types of events.
Fortunately, we had a lot more warning in this one, but as
we saw with American Samoa, you can very often have the
earthquake occur and the tsunami occur right after that. So the
warning piece of this, the mapping, and the understanding of
those hazards are key so that local officials have the
information about who and where and how far you need to
evacuate. Then we need to support them through the Integrated
Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) and the other warning
tools that we have enhancing the emergency alert system and
outdoor warning systems so we can warn that population in time.
Senator Akaka. Administrator Fugate, according to census
data, nearly 25 million adults in the United States do not
speak English well. FEMA must communicate effectively during
disaster response and recovery with a large and diverse
population of non-English speakers. What steps has FEMA taken
to make sure that it can do so?
Mr. Fugate. We continue to look at our populations, and one
of the concepts that is not new--it is actually, I thought,
pretty much a reflection of what this Committee was trying to
drive at. We needed to quit planning for easy and plan for
real.
English does not cut it if I am deaf and hard of hearing
and all I know is American sign language and all you gave me is
closed caption and that is not my first language. Or if my
primary language and the language that I was born with is not
English, and in a crisis, I cannot understand what you are
trying to tell me to do and I do not get the information I
need.
So we work very closely back with our State and local
partners to look at the languages and the needs and recognize
that we have to make sure that we are providing information in
a way that people need it, not what is convenient to us. So we
have worked to provide more and more of our preparedness
information in multiple languages.
We have created, in addition to our Ready.gov Web site, a
Listo.gov, which is a full site in Spanish, as well as ensuring
that in the various languages in our States where they have
identified significant populations, that we provide
preparedness information in those languages, that we have those
language skills available to back up our registration centers.
But most importantly, we understand that American sign
language is also a language that we have to be able to
communicate in, and we cannot depend just upon text messaging
or text crawls to reach that population.
Senator Akaka. Yes. Well, I thank you very much for the
work that you are doing, and I wish you well.
Mr. Fugate. Thank you, sir.
Senator Akaka. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Akaka.
The reports that I have seen, Administrator Fugate,
indicate that as a result of the earthquake and tsunami in
Japan, there are more than 400,000 people who have been forced
from their homes and they are living in emergency shelters or
with relatives. Apparently another 24,000 or 25,000 are
stranded. Obviously these are the nightmarish memories we have
of Hurricane Katrina with people pushed out of their homes and
not an adequate system to give them shelter.
I know that FEMA recently signed an agreement with the
American Red Cross to co-lead efforts for mass care and
sheltering after a disaster, including what we call today a
catastrophic disaster. What will be the capacity in most parts
of the country? In other words, I know 430,000 is an enormous
number, but how many people, under FEMA's current organization,
will we be able to shelter who have been made homeless by a
catastrophe?
Mr. Fugate. Mr. Chairman, that, a lot of times, is going to
be based upon the State and the types of hazards they have. In
the State of Florida where I came from, we had shelter capacity
getting up to over 800,000, but we would not expect to use that
because very rarely would a hurricane produce that big of an
evacuation.
But this is what we are doing. I think this comes back to
what the IG and GAO have really come back on. When we are
trying to talk about preparedness, unless we are planning
against a number, it is hard. It is about how you get traction
because everything is always localized or state-based.
So in our strategic plan, when we said we were going to do
all this stuff, I said, well, put a number against it because I
cannot measure it.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fugate. So we started looking at, if you looked at what
we call the maximum-maximum, you look at an improvised nuclear
device, the most catastrophic thing we could think of in a
metropolitan area, if we looked at our worst Category 5
hurricane hitting in the most populated areas, if we look at
these large earthquakes, what are these upper end numbers?
And we start finding that the numbers actually look,
primarily at the numbers we are seeing from Japan, we were
actually looking at these types of numbers.
Chairman Lieberman. So it would potentially be over 400,000
or in that range?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir. We have actually looked at, for
casualties requiring medical assistance, several hundred
thousand. This is why we were trying to plan our logistics and
ability to move to those areas. We know we have the risk, but
also where we did not see it coming, but all of a sudden it is
there. For about a million-and-a-half. We need to see if we get
enough supplies and provide enough capacity.
And what may happen is you may not be able to shelter
people in the surrounding areas, because if the devastation is
that great----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fugate [continuing]. What you may end up having to do
is move people to where you could shelter them.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fugate. And that is one of the advantages of working
with the Red Cross and other volunteer organizations, as we saw
in Hurricane Katrina when we had to actually start moving
people out of there, is to move them to areas outside of that
area and provide that. And then this is, again, in the short-
term shelter phase of getting people where we are meeting the
most basic needs of medical care, food, water, and a roof over
their heads, until we can see what is next.
Is this some place we can get back to, or in the case we
are seeing there, this devastation will not be repaired
quickly. You are not going to be doing temporary housing there.
You are going to have to find a longer-term housing solution as
people make a decision about what is the next step.
Chairman Lieberman. So are we prepared now to temporarily
house that number of people?
Mr. Fugate. I think we could say it would not be in any one
area. We would have to distribute those folks across the
country.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fugate. But these are the things we are planning
against, and I think this is where we are looking at. What does
it take to get there and how do we build that capacity based
upon the local and State, but where do we fill those gaps? And
so, if you go to certain parts of the country, yes, they have
that capability because of the threats they face. But what if
it occurs somewhere we were not expecting that?
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fugate. We do not have a hazard they planned against,
but we still have to meet that need. So this is where we are
trying to go on national preparedness, looking at these events,
add them up, and determining the upper number. Can you move
enough supplies in to provide emergency food, medical care, and
basic sheltering for that population? And if you cannot bring
it to them, can you take them from that area and get them to
where they can? This really becomes, I think, critical when we
are talking about housing. So this is what we are planning
against, and also looking at the time frames to do it.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Skinner, did you have a response
you wanted to offer for that?
Mr. Skinner. I agree. FEMA, from the lessons learned in
Hurricane Katrina, has actually taken some very positive steps
towards sheltering and short-term housing----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Skinner. And they are also experimenting with different
types of housing. It can be a very complex issue. One of the
concerns that we have, what we are witnessing now after
Hurricane Katrina and as well as the disasters in Florida, is
not sheltering or short-term housing, but it is long-term
housing. And that is an issue that I think still needs to be
addressed.
There are still some thorny relationships that have to be
built to accommodate the population for its long-term housing
because these things will oftentimes last 2, 3, or 4 years
before you can move back home.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. Thanks. One of the things our
Committee has done, we feel at various times that we have to
ask extreme questions, and we have done some hearings and work
on what our preparedness would be to respond to, as I mentioned
earlier, the explosion of a radiological device by a terrorist,
or a nuclear weapon.
And one of the striking conclusions is how people behave in
response to that can actually save tens of thousands of lives.
In some cases, a decision not to run, to evacuate, will save
your life. And we heard expert testimony that is what
particularly critical, and, of course, it would be critical in
the case of an event at a nuclear power plant as well, is
public messaging.
So I wanted to ask you, Administrator Fugate, if you could
give us kind of a status report about where FEMA is now on
effective messaging to the public in the case of a radiological
incident.
Mr. Fugate. Mr. Chairman, the first thing people have to
understand is that, surprising as it may be and this is what
the experts told you, a nuclear detonation is actually more
survivable than people realize if they know those important
steps.
This was actually done and it got overshadowed by the
situation in Japan, but we were already scheduled to do this--
we did what we call a webinar with our Citizen Corps Program
with the Department of Energy and their experts to start
talking about messaging and sheltering in place and working
with our Citizen Corps Councils.
So we did this as part of a webinar to really start
bringing up these topics that have historically been so
difficult to talk about if this does happen, these are the
things people need to do. So this was a webinar that was
actually done this week where we brought people in, and it
allows us to bring people very cost-effectively into an
environment where we can have subject matter experts briefing
them.
But starting this process using our Citizen Corps Councils
as the locals to start thinking about how you message this
locally, what is going to be effective--and again, there is
actually a book with this title, ``How do you Think About the
Unthinkable''--and communicate that in a way that is not based
upon fear, but of the actions you could take to survive.
So we are working with Department of Energy experts. Their
national laboratories are really who are the experts in these
areas, and actually we are conducting this webinar this week on
how we work with our Citizen Corps Councils and talk about
something that is very difficult to talk about.
Chairman Lieberman. So, that is a work in progress now?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. But obviously, you are working on it. I
presume that you train all the local areas around the country
to use both existing communication systems, public ones like
radio and television, but also, obviously, now you use Internet
and cellphone and the like?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir. Again, this is what I really
challenged our team on, there is this tendency that we make
people communicate the way we are set up to communicate----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fugate [continuing]. But not always recognizing that
there are different tools and the people are not using the same
tools we are. So how do you start incorporating that in and
look at how people communicate versus the way we are prepared
to do it?
So looking at things in social media and other tools. I
will give you a really short example because I know that you
want to ask more questions. But we provide information to the
public on Web pages. Well, most disasters, if I am evacuated in
a shelter, do I have a computer and a Web page I can get to?
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fugate. But I may have a smartphone.
Chairman Lieberman. Correct.
Mr. Fugate. And we have seen in many of our events, the
phones are actually working, even in Haiti after the
earthquake, surprisingly. So we went back and said, ``Let us
quit making people go to a Web page when, if they are going to
be on a mobile phone, let us change our delivery.
So we created a mobile FEMA page--it is www.m.FEMA.gov--
that works well on a cellphone, because you do not need to see
our organization charts, you do not need to see any of our
pretty pictures and graphs. What you need is the information
about what is happening. And so, we have been really trying to
look at how people are using these tools, what makes sense, how
are they going to get information, and trying to put it in a
way that is useful to them, not what was convenient for us.
Chairman Lieberman. Good work. That is very sensible.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Skinner, in your testimony you gave us the depressing
news that fraud and improper payments have plagued FEMA for a
very long time. I remember when I was Chairman of this
Committee back in the good old days, that I held a hearing to
look at fraud after Hurricane Andrew, and we found improper
payments. It was Senator Bill Nelson who suggested that we have
those hearings.
Then Hurricane Katrina hit and we found just terrible,
hundreds of millions of dollars in improper payments, fraud,
and abuse. It is troubling to me that you can go back decades,
apparently, and there still is a lack of attention to this
problem.
I was thinking about the fact that the President's budget
cuts FEMA's budget, and it cuts it in ways that may actually be
harmful because it cuts some IT projects out. But what is even
more disturbing to me is perhaps these cuts would not be
necessary if we had not lost more than a billion dollars over
the years in improper payments. Certainly that money could be
put to better use.
Could you help guide us on what we should be asking FEMA to
do? What kind of controls should be put in place so when the
next catastrophe inevitably hits, we do not see a repetition of
widespread fraud, waste, and abuse? You referred to the work
that was done with the stimulus bill, and I agree with you that
the transparency and accountability was much better. But what
specifically would you recommend be done?
Mr. Skinner. I think, first, Administrator Fugate coined it
very concisely, and that is, FEMA needs to act fast, but not
act hastely. With regards to their individual assistance
programs, there is a mindset that FEMA has to have the money
out on the street within hours. Therefore, FEMA will make a
blanket payment and worry about the fraud later. Unfortunately,
FEMA does not have the resources or the wherewithal to go back
and try to recoup payments that were improperly distributed.
With improved internal controls, it may slow the process up
a few hours, but not days or weeks or, like the old days in
Hurricane Hugo where it took months to make payments, or
Hurricane Andrew, where it took weeks to make payments, or the
Northridge earthquare, where it took weeks. We can still make
timely payments to those that are deserving, that are in need,
but at the same time be able to offer a screening process and
has the internal controls and red flags in place to put aside
those applications that are in question, whether they be just
because of poor information or because it is a fraudulent
application. That is one thing.
The second thing is, I think, with the public assistance
programs, we can do a better job there as well with regards to
providing better oversight. The Recovery Board, responsible for
the oversight of close to $800 billion, were able to produce
expenditure reports. The board requires anyone that is
receiving any funds, State or local governments, or primary
contractor at the sub-grantee level, to report to the Recovery
Board.
The system is already in place. Anyone can use this system.
The Department of Energy introduced this system years ago and
it is something, I think, FEMA might want to consider because I
believe that transparency drives accountability.
What you do not have is just one IG looking at you. You
have millions of IGs looking at you, because when the local
citizens see where the money is going, how it has been spent,
then they can report that there is something amiss, that the
money is not going where it should, or that contractors are
receiving preferential treatment or are not performing as they
should. And that is what drives the accountability.
We can produce that type of reporting after a disaster and
train the State and locals, it is not difficult. Everyone
thought it would be. Everyone thought it would drive costs up
at State and local budgets. It did not.
The technology today now allows you to take that
information and transform it into very usable formats that can
be manipulated to permit your own personal assessments.
Reporters may want to take the data and manipulate it to
determine what type of demographics certain funds are going to.
State and local governments could take it to see what type of
projects we are spending money on. Education versus highways or
airports, things of that nature. It can be manipulated to meet
your individual needs.
At the same time, the Recovery Board developed a screening
process to assist program managers. When contracts or grants
are awarded, the board can run them through open-source
information systems as well as law enforcement information
systems, and give advise--whether those recipients have
associations with anyone that may have tried to defraud the
government in the past.
And, as a result, the board is able to stop those grants,
those contracts, early on before money was spent. Because once
the money is spent, it is very difficult to get it back.
Senator Collins. Do you not think there is also a deterrent
effect when you announce that there is going to be an
aggressive effort to prevent waste, fraud, abuse,
mismanagement, and improper payments? I think one reason that
the Recovery Board was successful, largely, is it was set up
from the beginning. It was very well publicized. There were Web
sites to track spending, and as you said, that enlisted the
public to help be the eyes and ears.
But I would also argue that there is a deterrent impact if
you go after some of the fraud. I know FEMA has argued that it
is too expensive to go after some of this, ``small dollar
fraud'' that, in a cumulative sense, is huge amounts of money.
But, in fact, I think it is worth the money of going after it
because of the message it sends that it is not going to be
tolerated.
Mr. Skinner. Absolutely, and I personally witnessed that
after Hurricanes Andrew and Katrina, and after the Northridge
earthquake. A good example is in Northridge. Early on, we made
somewhere between a dozen to two dozen arrests within the first
2 weeks after FEMA checks went out. When we made those arrests,
we publicized them on the radio, on the television, in the
newspaper, every media outlet that we could. Within days, $20
million, $30 million was voluntarily returned to FEMA.
I witnessed the same thing after Hurricane Andrew. After we
made four arrests, the following day, $11 million was returned
to FEMA. It does have a deterrent effect.
Also, a contractor or grantee is less inclined to steal
funds because of the transparency that exists. We know where
the funds are going, we are watching how it is being spent.
Those contractors or grantees who intend to steal, will
oftentimes back off knowing that it is just too risky.
Senator Collins. Mr. Fugate, you have heard what Mr.
Skinner has said, that it is worth going after this money. I
realize you were not Administrator at the time of Hurricane
Katrina, but, in fact, there has been a new process that the
Chief Counsel has for recouping improper payments that has been
languishing since late 2008. Yesterday we received word that
FEMA is going to start implementing the new process.
That is a long gap that really sends the wrong message. So
I guess I am asking for you to give a commitment to put in
those internal controls. I think it is a false choice between
providing the money quickly enough and providing it in a way
that guards against fraud. In today's world with the technology
we have, it is not an either/or proposition. So I want to
encourage you. I am going to ask you, are you going to go after
some of these improper payments?
Mr. Fugate. The answer is yes, particularly those
recoupments where we know that we had duplication of benefits.
And again, if it was fraud, I think the IG would agree that
since I have been there, if I find fraud, I have been pretty
aggressive about referring it as soon as we know it. And that I
also agree that those that have done this willfully needed to
be treated as fraud.
But where we have had those that have oftentimes, either a
lack of information, duplication of benefits, or were not
eligible, is to seek that reimbursement. We are doing it. I
would also like to point out that the IG was also correct in
that it has got to be speed, not haste. So the question is, why
are we giving them money? What is the need we are having to
meet that we are not meeting otherwise?
I think it is not the size of scale to reassure you that it
would scale up in a catastrophic disaster, but in the floods in
Tennessee where we believe it was about $100 million--it was
bigger than this--but the $100 million in assistance in the
first 30 days, nobody got a check unless they registered, had
their home inspection, and they received their funds.
Again, we were working on speed. We got the inspectors in
there. Oftentimes, the turn-around time was in several days, so
we did not create the demand to bypass that system. And we also
worked very aggressively with the Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) to go into the shelters because these
people that were in shelters were going to need disaster
housing assistance, and get them into those Disaster Housing
Assistance Programs (DHAP).
It was not to the scale we saw in Hurricane Katrina, but we
want to have a positive verification that you were actually
living where you say you were, that we actually had the
inspector get there, verify the damages, and again, as we go
through this and look at the recoupments on that disaster, did
we drive that error rate down through that process and with
those controls?
And the other piece of this is, again in responding, if we
can achieve the goal of meeting those basic needs and decrease
the need to default to financial assistance, which generally is
a sign that you cannot get supplies in, you are not able to get
enough critical infrastructure up, and you are not meeting
basic needs, so what you are going to do is basically give
money to people and say, ``Go figure it out yourself.''
That, I think, comes back to that aggressive response at
the front end. And then look at the financial assistance, not
as the primary tool we use, but to help them as we start
getting stabilized and move into those first steps of recovery.
Senator Collins. And were not those $2,000 debit cards just
an invitation to improper spending? I mean, look what they were
used for: Firearms, bail bonds, diamond rings, entertainment.
They were not used for food, water, medical supplies in far too
many cases. Should we be giving out $2,000 debit cards with few
questions asked? You were not there at the time.
Mr. Fugate. Yes. I think the Senator makes the point that--
again, I think this is something the IG can go back and say in
Hurricanes Hugo and Andrew, in Loma Prieta, and other cases, if
you are not meeting the basic needs, and the response that
oftentimes is the fallback and it does invite a lot of
challenges to administer.
Senator Collins. I want to say, here and now, that we are
not going to give out $2,000 debit cards.
Mr. Fugate. We are not doing debit cards anymore, and that
program went away. But I have to be cautious--an example would
be the tsunami itself. We may not be able to get in there and
do home inspections, so we may have to look at other ways to
verify that people lived there.
This is where the IG is giving us recommendations to use
tools like using the type of things you could do if anybody was
applying for a loan, getting the background information,
utility bills, other information to verify, versus what has
happened before where you just go and say, everybody in this
ZIP code is going to get assistance.
So again, as people register, we may not be able to go do
an inspection. Are there other ways to minimize the number of
people applying for assistance by showing us some way that they
were in that area without necessarily doing a home inspection?
But where we can, it makes it very, I think, efficient to be
able to have an inspector go to where you were living, verify
it was damaged, it was in a disaster.
I think that is a huge step to reduce the level of fraud.
And then oftentimes, we will see if it was ineligible or
duplication of benefits because of insurance, not because we
were in such haste we were not able to take those steps.
Senator Collins. Thank you. I realize I have gone way over
my time and I apologize.
Chairman Lieberman. No, not at all. It was important, and
the answer was no about the debit card program.
As I look back to Hurricane Katrina, to make a long and
complicated story too short, first off, we had an extraordinary
natural disaster event, as, of course, has happened now in
Japan.
But part of what happened is that all levels of government,
including the Federal Government and FEMA, did not act quickly
and preventably, and as it became clear that was so,
particularly with the television coverage, everybody became
horrified about how people were being treated or not taken care
of on the Gulf Coast. In some sense, the government overreacted
and started to kind of throw out assistance in a way that was
just--it was terribly wasteful and was also inviting fraud.
That is just what we got.
Mr. Skinner, do you want to comment on that at all?
Mr. Skinner. I think that is exactly what happened, and it
was the same thing after Hurricane Andrew because the cavalry
was slow to arrive----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Skinner [continuing]. And the best way to treat the
situation was to get funds out on the street as fast as
possible whether you were eligible or not.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. And that is where--something you
said earlier, Mr. Fugate, about getting supplies out there,
meeting the needs, and once you do that, you do not have to
start throwing debit cards or money or anything else around.
Mr. Fugate. Well, the other issue for both you and the
Ranking Member is, because the amount of funds that we provide
are really not designed to make people whole----
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fugate [continuing]. The less money that we give them,
incrementally that takes away from the total amount, because
again, it comes back to the issue of, if they have lost
everything and do not have insurance, which is why they are
eligible for these funds, they do not qualify for a Small
Business Administration (SBA) loan, you want as much of that
money going towards their recovery, not their immediate needs.
And so again, this also comes back to the preservation of
what the intention of these funds were. It has never been the
intent of Congress to make you whole after a disaster. These
funds were to help you start recovery. And so, if we are
putting these funds out ahead of time and they are not really
getting to that point, it actually decreases the ability to
support people when they really should start now to manage
things on their own and being able to use these funds to start
that recovery process, versus these funds going out in the
emergency phase.
And, as the IG has pointed out, if the basic needs are not
being met and we are in this situation, we go from being fast
to a lot of haste and then that, in turn, leads to fraud,
waste, and the inability to really make sure we are good
stewards of the funds. And so, we put a high premium on this
idea of stabilization and speed to support this and drive,
then, the next steps of that initial recovery with these funds
so they are going towards the intended purposes.
Chairman Lieberman. Right. Do you want to respond to that?
I want to ask you, Administrator, just one more factual
question which may be of interest to people watching relating
to Japan.
There has been concern, and I think a certain amount of
confusion, about what the potential danger is to the United
States from the nuclear plant problems in Japan. And
particularly, as the media has been following it the last few
days and the sense that the possibility of a meltdown at one of
the plants or an explosion, if the emission of a large amount
of radioactivity goes up, people have been worried about the
extent to which the West Coast of the United States,
particularly Hawaii, and obviously Guam and the Mariana
Islands, are maybe subject to some danger. I wonder if you
would give us your current sense of what that possibility is.
Mr. Fugate. I will refer back to the statement made by the
Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In looking at
all these scenarios, they do not see any radiation reaching the
United States that would be a danger or require protective
actions. But in anticipation of this, FEMA in support of the
Department of Energy--they have a system called RadNet, which
is an existing system, that 24 hours a day, 7 days a week,
monitors various elements--air, water, and other types of
things across the country.
And so, if we were to detect anything, we may detect things
that are well below any levels that require action.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fugate. This happened during Chernobyl. But we did not
currently have any monitors in our territories, particularly
Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands. So
we were in a support role again. The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) is in the lead role. They deployed monitors out to
augment that network they already have, as well as supporting
Alaska with additional monitors, particularly out in the
Aleutian Islands.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Fugate. So this is two-part, one, based upon the
scenario that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission does not see
this reaching the U.S. territories or the West Coast. But we
also have an active monitoring system that EPA expanded to be
able to do active monitoring to verify that and provide that
information. And the EPA is, again, looking at this, not that
we think we are going to get something, but we need to be able
to answer the question, Well, are you testing, are you
monitoring, are you sure?
And so, this was the decision, to send these monitors out
to Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands,
as well as in the Aleutian Islands where we did not currently
have existing monitors.
Chairman Lieberman. As I understand it, we have more than
100 existing monitors along the West Coast----
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir.
Chairman Lieberman [continuing]. Measuring radiation.
Mr. Fugate. In fact, this is a public Web site that EPA
operates, that you can go to their Web page and take a look at
where these sites are and their current activities, what they
monitor and the purpose and the history of the program.
Chairman Lieberman. So I presume that, just trying to be
helpful, that people, including on the West Coast, should not
yet be taking potassium iodine pills as a preventive of any
kind because right now there is no risk, and there is some
slight risk of side effects from those pills for some people?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman. As I understand it, the
State Department of Health for both the State of Hawaii and for
the State of California are telling people that this is
something they should not be doing. There is no indicator to do
this. And their recommendation is that people not take
potassium iodine in this event. It is not warranted, and, as
you point out, there may be other concerns.
So both of those State health offices are telling people
that they do not recommend this and that they would not want
you to take this based upon this event because they do not see
where there would be any need in this event, and we do have the
active monitoring that is taking place now.
Chairman Lieberman. I appreciate those answers. I hope they
are helpful to people. I thank the three witnesses. Senator
Collins and I were commenting to each other here that in a
sense, we were conducting two hearings at once, one on the IG's
report and on the management of FEMA, and then the other on
what has happened in Japan. We tried to bring them together.
I appreciate the patience of the witnesses as we did that.
I appreciate the work of the witnesses. All of your statements,
of course, will be included in the record in full. We are going
to keep the record of this hearing open for 15 days for any
additional statements you would like to put in the record and
any questions that our colleagues or we may have of you.
Senator Collins, do you have anything more?
Senator Collins. No.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much. With that, the
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:27 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.001
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.002
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.003
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.004
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.005
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.006
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.007
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.008
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.009
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.010
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.012
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.014
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.015
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.016
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.017
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.018
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.019
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.020
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.021
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.022
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.023
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.024
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.025
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.026
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.027
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.028
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.029
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.030
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.031
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.032
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.033
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.034
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.035
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.036
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.037
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.038
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.039
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.040
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.041
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.042
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.043
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.044
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.045
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.046
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.047
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.048
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.049
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.050
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.051
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.052
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.053
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.054
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.055
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.056
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.057
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.058
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.059
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.060
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.061
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.062
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.063
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.064
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.065
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.066
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.067
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.068
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.069
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.070
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.071
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.072
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.073
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.074
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.075
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.076
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.077
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.078
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.079
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.080
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.081
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.082
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.083
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.084
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.085
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.086
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.087
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.088
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.089
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.090
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.091
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.092
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.093
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.094
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.095
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.096
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.097
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.098
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.099
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.100
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.101
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.102
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.103
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.104
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.105
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.106
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.107
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.108
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.109
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.110
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.111
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.112
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.113
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.114
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.115
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.116
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.117
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.118
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.119
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.120
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.121
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.122
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.123
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.124
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.125
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.126
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.127
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.128
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.129
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.130
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.131
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.132
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.133
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.134
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.135
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.136
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.137
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.138
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.139
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.140
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.141
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.142
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.143
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.144
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.145
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.146
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.147
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.148
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.149
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.150
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.151
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.152
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.153
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.154
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.155
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.156
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.157
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.158
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.159
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.160
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.161
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.162
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.163
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.164
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.165
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.166
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.167
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.168
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.169
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.170
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.171
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.172
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T7118.173
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
