[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ON A BUDGET: FINDING SMARTER APPROACHES TO SPUR
INNOVATION, IMPOSE DISCIPLINE, DRIVE JOB CREATION, AND STRENGTHEN
HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY,
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 17, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-57
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Janice Hahn, California
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND SECURITY
TECHNOLOGIES
Daniel E. Lungren, California, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Tim Walberg, Michigan, Vice Chair Laura Richardson, California
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Billy Long, Missouri William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Coley C. O'Brien, Staff Director
Alan Carroll, Subcommittee Clerk
Vacancy, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies................................................... 1
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California........................................ 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Dr. Tara O'Toole, Under Secretary, Science and Technology
Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Mr. David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Appendix
Questions for Tara O'Toole From Honorable Yvette D. Clarke....... 33
Questions for Tara O'Toole From Honorable Laura Richardson....... 33
Questions for Tara O'Toole From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren....... 34
Questions for David C. Maurer From Chairman Peter T. King........ 36
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ON A BUDGET: FINDING SMARTER APPROACHES TO SPUR
INNOVATION, IMPOSE DISCIPLINE, DRIVE JOB CREATION, AND STRENGTHEN
HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
Thursday, November 17, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection,
and Security Technologies,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Daniel E. Lungren
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Lungren, Walberg, Thompson, and
Richardson.
Mr. Lungren. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and
Security Technologies will come to order.
The subcommittee is meeting today to examine Science and
Technology Directorate and its operations in the current fiscal
climate. I want to begin this hearing by emphasizing my strong
support for science and technology research and development. I
think you will find that across both ends of the spectrum and
both sides of the aisle.
I believe scientific R&D generates innovation, cutting-edge
technologies, and new products to drive economic development
and job creation. R&D is also a critical element of the
Department's mission to strengthen America's security and
resiliency by providing knowledge products and innovative
technology solutions to bolster our homeland defenses.
The Homeland Security Act broadly authorizes the Under
Secretary for Science and Technology to conduct research,
development, testing, and evaluation activities for the
Department, utilizing National labs and Federally-funded
research and development centers.
In reviewing the Department's use of these authorities in
recent years, our Homeland Security Committee has determined
that accountability and internal procedures essential to the
Department's ability to perform its research and development
mission were insufficient. This conclusion was informed by a
2009 National Academy of Public Administration study that found
that S&T strategic planning process and organizational
structure created serious challenges across the agency.
So as a result, S&T experienced management challenges to
its multimillion-dollar technology, development, and
acquisition efforts in support of the Department's many
missions, including securing the border and screening airline
passengers and baggages for explosives.
Our committee had addressed these process and procedure
deficiencies in last year's S&T authorization bill, H.R. 4842,
and again in this year's DHS Authorization Act of 2012, H.R.
3116.
Our objective is to establish robust management in
administrative processes for identifying, prioritizing, and
funding R&D in order to enhance the long-term productivity and
effectiveness of the Directorate. The act also codifies S&T's
role in providing technical support throughout the acquisition
life-cycle, requires a 5-year research and development plan to
better inform expenditures for basic, advanced, and applied R&D
activities, and provides flexible hiring authority so S&T can
recruit skilled personnel into key scientific and engineering
positions.
In this new era of fiscal restraint, S&T must change the
way it does business and convince Congress and other
stakeholders that it knows how to be smarter and more efficient
by realigning its priorities and investments for its customers.
It accomplished this by developing a more robust technology to
determine how to prioritize research products, fund those
products, assess their progress, transition them into
acquisition programs and, finally, deploy them to the field.
In August 2010, Under Secretary O'Toole responded to these
deficiencies by reorganizing her S&T Directorate to better
align it with strategic goals, to allow for easier interaction
among senior leadership, and to reduce the number of direct
reports to the Secretary from 21 to 10. The realigned structure
consolidates the S&T Directorate into four primary entities
that address basic research through advanced technology,
development, and transition.
I also want to compliment the Under Secretary for
instituting an annual portfolio assessment of your R&D programs
to help identify those that are underperforming and find cost
savings, as well as for pursuing approaches such as technology
foraging that aim to improve S&T's return on investment and to
shorten development time.
When resources are constrained and unpredictable, it
behooves S&T to adopt a more deliberate and targeted foraging
effort, and I look forward to hearing how S&T will go about
implementing.
Under Secretary O'Toole, I am pleased that the Department
has taken these low-cost steps to improve your Directorate, and
I hope these changes quickly yield increased performance,
productivity, and efficiency. We are aware of the current
economic climate and the uncertainty that comes with it is
forcing you to make tough decisions.
A frugal man's approach to science and technology doesn't
mean you have to compromise on performance. It means we all
have been smarter about what we invest in and how we make it
count. As Chairman of the Congressional oversight committee for
this responsibility at DHS, we will monitor your progress to
ensure our Nation has the Homeland Security S&T capability we
all desire. Homeland Security investments in R&D should be
nonpartisan, and I look forward to working with you and the
administration to upgrade the critical security missions of the
Department.
Now I would recognize the gentlelady from California, who
is pinch-hitting for the Ranking Minority Member, the
gentlelady from New York.
Ms. Richardson is recognized for any statement she might
make.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Chairman Lungren, for convening
this hearing, and also Ranking Member Thompson for all of your
support in this effort, both in the past and continuing today.
S&T is an essential component of the Department's efforts,
and I know many of us are eager here today to hear about the
accomplishments and the priorities that have been set,
especially since we concluded our authorization hearing last
year.
Dr. O'Toole, it is good to see you back on to this
subcommittee, and Mr. Maurer--and I apologize if I butchered
your name there a little bit. Thank you, thank you for giving
us your perspective today, and we are pleased to have you here.
In 2009, spurred by the findings of several reports, this
committee and subcommittee initiated a comprehensive review, as
Chairman Lungren laid out. Our purpose was to identify areas
within the Directorate that could use a fresh set of eyes and
additional oversight or modifications to legislative
authorities.
In doing so, we reviewed the Homeland Security Act and the
Department's use of its authorities that Congress has vested in
it.
It might be said that with such a large and complex
portfolio, the Directorate has found it difficult to craft a
cohesive strategy, and we found the insularity that defines its
culture was reflected in the lack of mechanisms necessary to
assess its performance in a systematic way.
Our analysis also suggested that the Department had not
developed a clear risk-based methodology to determine what
research projects to fund, how much to fund them, and how to
evaluate the project's effectiveness and usefulness. Without
clearly-defined metrics, it becomes problematic for Congress to
justify increases in programmatic funding. I am anxious to hear
any of the strides that you have been able to make in regards
to these concerns that we have already laid out.
Additionally, the Majority in the House has passed a
proposed DHS budget, H.R. 2017, which radically cuts the
Department's S&T budget from $827 million down to $398 million.
Now, I believe in being frugal, but the question is really: Are
these adequate resources to protect our homeland? When you
consider S&T reductions are a part of the $1.1 billion
reductions in the DHS overall budget, the proposed DHS budget
is $1 billion lower than the full year 2011 funding level and
$3 billion lower than the President requested.
I have read that DHS officials say that the decrease in S&T
budget will wipe out dozens of programs, stalling the
development of technologies for our border protection,
detection, and biohazards; hinder our progress of where we are
trying to go with cargo screening, and leaving in doubt
research on IED detection; affecting our ability to assess
vulnerabilities for mass transit.
Striving to do more with less is always a hallmark that we
strive for, however, but doing that at the expense of failing
to protect citizens and this Nation with programs that are
backed, that cannot be fully funded, is of great concern.
Our serious concerns are ones that I will ask you today in
this hearing, is: What are the implications on the possible
deliverables that the Directorate is now facing due to
Congress' appropriation priorities? This committee needs a
realistic assessment on the record of those implications.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. Lungren. The Chairman will now recognize the Ranking
Member of the full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi,
Mr. Thompson, for any statement he might make.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and,
again, I thank you for holding this hearing on the Science and
Technology Directorate. I also join you in welcoming Under
Secretary O'Toole and Mr. Maurer and look forward to their
testimony.
Many of my concerns, however, about the Science and
Technology Directorate stem from my work on the committee last
year. During my Chairmanship, we all worked hard to pass a
science and technology authorization bill which sought to
provide much-needed direction for the research and development
efforts of the Department. Today we find ourselves at a new
crossroads, for several reasons.
First, I am concerned that the Department does not have
adequate training that would allow program managers to help
components identify capability gaps and write technical
requirements. I hope to learn how we can keep essential
personnel and train them in light of these severe budget cuts.
Second, it is still unclear to me whether there is a system
to monitor milestones and collect feedback from customers and
end-users on the effectiveness of the services delivered by the
Directorate. These milestones and feedback would allow our
committee to offer an objective assessment of the successes and
failures of agencies. Without effective measurement tools, I
question how S&T will be able to continue to develop security
solutions.
Third, I cannot tell you how many times a company, mainly
small businesses, comes to me and complains about how difficult
it is to work with S&T.
I hope our witnesses have some evidence to share on how
those relationships have been improved and the potential impact
of budget cuts on our outreach efforts, particularly in SBIR
for small business at the Department.
Finally, I believe we are at a new crossroads because the
Directorate will be challenged to prioritize or eliminate
programs that protect the American people today. With the
support of many of my Republican colleagues, extreme budget
cuts have now impacted the important work the Department has
been challenged to complete.
The fiscal year 2012 funding levels for the Department that
passed in the House, with no support from Democratic Members of
this panel, are harsh in anyone's reckoning. It manages to cut
S&T's budget 52 percent, from $827 million to $398 million.
These cuts have consequences, because if you have less money
for science and technology, you can only do less scientific and
technological research. On the surface, the S&T budget at the
level of the proposed cuts will eliminate over 1,400 science
and engineering jobs, wipe out dozens of programs, stall the
development of technologies for border protection, detection of
biohazards, cargo screening, and limit research in the domestic
IED detection that will leave mass transit vulnerable to
attack.
It is almost impossible to believe. Mr. Chairman, I hope
the committee will take these matters seriously as we learn how
the Directorate will carry out its strategic plan, management
directives, and operational programs going forward.
With that, I thank you for allowing me to give my opening
statement, and I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
November 17, 2011
Good Morning, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for holding this hearing
on the Science and Technology Directorate.
I join you in welcoming Under Secretary O'Toole and Mr. Maurer and
look forward to their testimony.
Many of my concerns about the Science and Technology Directorate
stem from our work in the committee last year.
During my Chairmanship, we all worked hard to pass a Science and
Technology authorization bill which sought to provide much-needed
direction for the research and development efforts of the Department.
Today, we find ourselves at a new crossroads for several reasons.
First, I am concerned that the Department does not have adequate
training that would allow program managers to help components identify
capability gaps and write technical requirements.
I hope to learn how we can keep essential personnel and train them
in light of severe budget cuts.
Second, it is still unclear to me whether there is a system to
monitor research milestones and collect feedback from customers and
end-users on the effectiveness of the services delivered by the
directorate.
These milestones and feedback would allow this committee to offer
an objective assessment of the successes and failures of the agency.
Without objective measurement tools, I question how S&T will be
able to continue to develop security solutions.
Third, I cannot tell you how many times a company, mainly small
businesses, comes to me and complains about how difficult it is to work
with S&T.
I hope our witnesses have some evidence to share on how those
relationships have been improved, and the potential impact of budget
cuts on our outreach efforts, particularly in SBIR for small business
at the Department.
Finally, I believe we are at a new crossroads because the
Directorate will be challenged to prioritize or eliminate programs that
protect the American people today.
With the support of many of my Republican colleagues, extreme
budget cuts now impact the important work the Department has been
challenged to complete.
The fiscal year 2012 funding levels for the Department that passed
in the House--with no support from the Democratic Members of this
panel--are harsh by anyone's reckoning.
The measure cuts the S&T budget by 52 percent--from $827 million to
$398 million.
The cuts will have consequences, because if you have less money for
science and technology, you can only do less scientific and
technological research.
On the surface, S&T's budget at the level of the proposed cuts
will:
eliminate 1,400 science and engineering jobs;
wipe out dozens of programs;
stall the development of technologies for border protection,
detection of bio-hazards, cargo screening; and
limit research into domestic IED detection that will leave
mass transit vulnerable to attacks.
It is almost impossible to believe.
Mr. Chairman, I hope the committee will take these matters
seriously as we learn how the directorate will carry out its strategic
plans, management directives, and operational programs going forward.
Thank you, and I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the Ranking Member.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Clarke of New York
follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke
november 17, 2011
Thank you Chairman Lungren for convening this hearing on the
Science and Technology Directorate. S&T is an essential component of
the Department's efforts, and I know many of us are eager to hear about
accomplishments and priorities at the directorate, especially since we
concluded our authorization hearings last year.
Dr. O'Toole, it is good to see you back before this subcommittee,
and Mr. Maurer, thank you for agreeing to give us your perspective, and
we are pleased to have you here today.
In 2009, spurred by the findings of several reports, this committee
and subcommittee initiated a comprehensive review of the Directorate.
Our purpose was to identify areas within the Directorate that could use
a fresh set of eyes and additional oversight or modifications to
legislative authorities. In doing so, we reviewed the Homeland Security
Act and the Department's use of the authorities the Congress has vested
in it.
With such a large and complex portfolio, the Directorate has found
it difficult to craft a cohesive strategy, and we found that the
insularity that defines its culture was reflected in the lack of
mechanisms necessary to assess its performance in a systematic way.
Our analysis suggested that the Department had not developed a
clear risk-based methodology to determine what research projects to
fund, how much to fund, and how to evaluate a project's effectiveness
or usefulness. Without clearly-defined metrics, it becomes problematic
for Congress to justify increases in programmatic funding.
In my opinion, the directorate will never achieve success unless
research rules and metrics are more fully established, and I am anxious
to hear of any strides that the Under Secretary may have made in these
areas of concern.
However, we have additional challenges facing the directorate
today.
Earlier this year, the Majority in the House passed a proposed DHS
budget--H.R. 2017--which radically cuts the Department's S&T budget
from $827 million to $398 million, and the S&T reductions are part of a
$1.1 billion reduction in DHS's overall budget. The proposed DHS budget
is $1 billion lower than the fiscal year 2011 funding level, and $3
billion lower than the President's request.
I have read that DHS officials say the decrease in S&T's budget
will wipe out dozens of programs, stalling the development of
technologies for border protection, detection of bio-hazards, cargo
screening; and leaving in doubt research on IED detection, affecting
our ability to assess vulnerabilities for mass transit.
Striving to do more with less is always the hallmark of an
efficiently run effort--of any type--but trying to protect our citizens
and Nation with programs that are backed by underfunded and depleted
science and technology research assets is another matter. There are
serious concerns about what the directorate would have to give up as a
result of the budget voted for by the Majority.
I look forward to the testimony of the Under Secretary and Mr.
Maurer, especially to hear what strides she has made since our efforts
last year, and I expect we'll have questions on how she will work to
keep the Directorate moving forward during these challenging times.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. We are pleased to have two very distinguished
witnesses before us today on this important topic.
Dr. Tara O'Toole was sworn in as the Under Secretary of
Science and Technology Directorate at the Department of
Homeland Security in November 2009. She is internationally
known for her work in biosecurity and on health and safety
issues relating to the U.S. nuclear weapons complex.
Prior to serving at S&T, Dr. O'Toole was CEO and Director
of the Center for Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh
Medical Center, and Professor of Medicine and of Public Health
at the University of Pittsburgh from 2003 to 2009.
Prior to founding the University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center, Dr. O'Toole was one of the original members of the
Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategy, serving
as its director from 2001 to 2003. At both centers, she created
independent organizations dedicated to improving the country's
resilience to major biological threats.
From 1993 to 1997, Dr. O'Toole served as the Assistant
Secretary of Energy for Environment, Safety, and Health. In
this position, she is the principal adviser to the Secretary of
Energy on environmental protection, on the health and safety of
the approximately 100,000 workers in the U.S. nuclear weapons
complex in the Department of Energy laboratories.
Dr. David Maurer is a Director in the U.S. Government
Accountability Office's Homeland Security and Justice team,
where he leads GAO's work reviewing DHS' and DOJ's management
issues. His recent work in these areas includes DHS management
integration, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Secret
Service financial management, DOJ, grant management, the
Federal prison system, and an assessment of technologies for
directing explosives in the passenger rail environment.
I want to thank both of you for being here today. As you
both know, having testified before, your prepared remarks will
be included in the record in its entirety. We ask that you
attempt to summarize that within 5 minutes, and then we will
have questions from the panel.
So the Chairman recognizes Dr. O'Toole.
STATEMENT OF TARA O'TOOLE, UNDER SECRETARY, SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Dr. O'Toole. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished Members
of the committee. I am very pleased to be here today to talk
about the progress made in the Science and Technology
Directorate.
Our mission, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, is to strengthen
America's security and resiliency by providing innovative
technologies and technologic analyses and assessments,
knowledge products in other words, for the Homeland Security
enterprise.
Since I became Under Secretary, the Directorate has
undertaken a number of initiatives to enable us to work smarter
and increase taxpayers' return on investment.
I believe we have answered and closed virtually all of the
recommendations made by the NAPA committee in 2009, which I
have closely studied. These initiatives aim to further our
three top goals, which are: First of all, to rapidly transition
successful technologies to use in the field; second, to
identify and meet, again rapidly, the top needs of the U.S.
first responder communities; and, third, to leverage the
technical and scientific capacity of S&T scientists and
engineers in ways that assist DHS components in their efforts
to improve operational effectiveness, gain efficiencies, and
carry out the selection and acquisition of new technologies.
One of the first initiatives of my tenure was the adoption
of a portfolio review process that is used by other very
successful Governmental and private-sector labs, including ERDC
in Mississippi. Every project in S&T now undergoes an R&D
portfolio review. Each project is evaluated by a panel of
outside experts, including representatives from the components,
and scored against specific criteria to ensure that we are
investing in projects that have high impact, that are
technically sound, that are desired by and are aligned with our
customers' priorities, are appropriately funded, and are
progressing in the research queue adequately.
It was clear from the first portfolio review--we have done
three of these now--that S&T was investing in far too many
projects given our limited funding. So even when we had a
successful prototype developed, very often it didn't go
anywhere either because S&T didn't have the money to do pilot
field tests and training, or because the components' priorities
had shifted where they didn't have money or were prepared to
move it into an acquisition phase. So we have now reduced the
number of projects in our portfolio from 283 in 2010 to 158
today, a decrease of nearly 60 percent. I would point out this
is before the fiscal year 2012 budget cuts hit.
This reduction in projects ensures that there is a clear
focus to what we are doing, we have strategies worked out with
each of the components as to what we are going to pursue. It
also ensures that we have adequate resources on each project to
ensure that they are funded through successful transition to
use, whether that is from commercial adoption or adoption by
the components.
The portfolio scoring scheme also ensures that we are
pursuing the right mix of projects, based, again, on intense
discussions with the component leadership and the operators. As
a result of these and other changes, the number of projects in
our portfolio, now deemed to be both high-impact and highly
feasible--that is, likely to succeed--has almost doubled in the
past 2 years from 38 to 63 percent.
This is, in the reckoning of the independent contractor who
runs this process, a benchmark, a very high level of
performance comparing to all of the other 50 or so R&D labs who
used this particular portfolio review process.
Another initiative is our Apex projects, which were
designed to enhance our contributions to strategic high-level
problems identified by component leaders. They demonstrate a
new model of working based upon multidisciplinary teams, very
strong collaborative partnerships with the operators, and top-
level commitment to the projects.
We have two of these underway. One is for the U.S. Secret
Service and aims to strengthen their remote protective
operations. It is proving very successful. Unfortunately, much
of it is classified. A second one, called the Secure Transit
Corridor, with CBT, which aims essentially to build an easy
pass, a green lane that allows us to ship goods from Canada
through the United States to Mexico and back very rapidly.
A key lesson that we learned in the Apex projects was that
forging a true partnership between the technical team and the
operators is really a key to success. An innovation throughout
the world demonstrates this. If you have a deep, very clear
understanding of the problem to be solved, which is best gotten
by the people who have the problem--the operators--and a very
lucid and comprehensive understanding of the technical options
for solutions, that is when you get to success.
So we have tried to repeat that lesson in all of our work.
In the future, S&T will be much more likely to invest our
resources in an area where the operators--that is, components
and first responder communities--are willing to actively
collaborate with us from the beginning to the end of the
project.
We have also adopted two approaches to increasing return on
investment of our R&D initiatives. These two initiatives,
referred to as technology foraging and collaboration with
others--tech foraging refers to a very complex process of
scanning the entire horizon of research and development going
on across the global R&D community, including other Federal
agencies, the private sector, universities, and international
partners.
The point is to identify technologies which could be
adopted or adapted to new environmental conditions, new
purposes or at new scales, and applied to DHS needs. It
leverages investments made by others and can also rapidly--it
can increase the rapidity with which it can transfer new
solutions to use in the field.
Let me just note two examples. One is the blackboard
cover--I am sorry, the backboard cover. The backboards are the
devices that emergency medical responders use to carry people
out of an accident scene. A problem, which was identified by a
first responder on our website, is that they get messy and
contaminated with blood and other body fluids and there is no
really fast, assured way to clean them off.
We went out and we found that Tyvex fibers, the stuff that
you wrap houses in, are impermeable, cheap, and light. For
$60,000, in 8 months we had a product in the field, which is a
very disposable, lightweight, cheap cover that is now in wide
use.
A second example of tech foraging involves the repurposing
of NOAA weather radars to track unidentified vessels entering
our ports. We discovered that there is an existing radar
system, which can be reprogrammed using software that allows a
different processing of the radar signals so that we can ID and
track boats that do not have inherent tracking and tagging
systems, and we are doing this now with the U.S. Coast Guard.
Very low-cost, again, and very rapid creation of a new
capability for DHS.
The second initiative, which is quite important, is
collaboration with others, which refers to joining as partners
with other R&D organizations, whether the Federal Government,
agencies, or universities, or the private sector, to create new
technologies of use to DHS. There are many examples of this in
my testimony, and I would be happy to elaborate further.
We have many very strong partnerships with the private
sector, as evidenced by the fact that they are sharing the cost
of R&D in many instances, and we have taken a lot of steps to
make it easier for them to work with the S&T Directorate,
although I must say the private sector is always amazed by how
difficult it is to work with the U.S. Government, no matter
what we do.
I would like to turn now in closing just to make a few
observations about the proposed budget cuts. I think we have
implemented smart, disciplined, cost-effective measures in our
R&D program, and we have offered invaluable assistance and
acquisition procurements to DHS.
The fiscal year 2012 House funding level for the
Directorate's R&D account now, not taking out management and
administration, was $398 million, as was noted. This is a
record low investment for R&D in Homeland Security.
Of this amount, more than half must be spent to maintain
laboratory operations and on other mandatory spending such as
the SAFETY Act, university programs, and so forth. This leaves
$106 million for discretionary R&D, and an 80 percent cut in
R&D compared to our fiscal year 2010 levels.
Mr. Lungren. Dr. O'Toole, I don't want to interrupt you on
this subject, but you have gone into 10 minutes now in your
opening statement.
Dr. O'Toole. One sentence?
Mr. Lungren. Yes, sure.
Dr. O'Toole. Okay. Half of this amount would be needed to
pay existing commitments and shut down projects we could no
longer afford. In the end, with the fiscal year 2012 House
budget, we are left with $45 million to support all R&D
investments for all of DHS and all of the first responders.
This would be a very dire set of circumstances for DHS and
would leave us, essentially, funding only R&D and aviation
security and nothing else.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. O'Toole follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tara O'Toole
November 17, 2011
INTRODUCTION
Good morning Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and
distinguished Members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify before you today on behalf of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate (S&T). My testimony
will describe the Directorate's strategic direction and top priorities
of our directorate while highlighting some of our successes in support
of the third-largest Federal agency in a time of austere budgets. Over
the past 2 years, the Directorate has built on the achievements of the
initial years of DHS to create an organization with a growing ability
to help the Homeland Security Enterprise achieve its missions. S&T is
building stronger partnerships with first responders and DHS Components
to gain a deeper understanding of their top needs and operational
environments. We have focused our technology development process to
rapidly deliver technologies to use in the field. We have expanded the
application of the technical talent of S&T's engineers and scientists
to include assessments of operational problems and acquisition
requirements. We have embarked on an ambitious effort to make the best
possible use of taxpayers' dollars through identifying technology
investments made by others which might meet homeland security needs
through collaborations with others in the Federal Government,
universities, the private sector, and abroad.
MISSION OF THE DHS S&T DIRECTORATE IS BROAD, VARIED, AND SERVES MANY
PARTNERS
The mission of DHS S&T is to strengthen America's security and
resiliency by providing knowledge products and innovative technology
solutions for the Homeland Security Enterprise. Congress created the
S&T Directorate as part of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, to
``conduct basic and applied research, development, demonstration,
testing, and evaluation activities relevant to any or all elements of
the Department.''\1\ S&T also has a statutory responsibility to
transfer useful technologies and information to first responder
communities, State, and local governments, and to the private sector.
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\1\ 6 U.S.C. Sec. 182(4).
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In the past 8 years, S&T has undergone many changes and continues
to evolve. The extraordinary breadth and diversity of DHS's missions
requires S&T to address a wide range of programs including Components'
near-term needs for new operational capabilities and improved
operational effectiveness, efficiency, and safety. S&T also has
responsibilities related to understanding and creating solutions to
biological and chemical threats, and to conducting the research and
development (R&D) required to meet homeland cybersecurity needs.
Investments in near-term, incremental solutions must be balanced
against investments in potentially game-changing technologies that will
take longer to mature. DHS S&T's work is usually identified with
technology development, but equally as important are the Directorate's
contributions to homeland security in the form of analyses or
``knowledge products.'' These include analyses of alternative
technological options; assessments of complex issues such as the
relative risk of different biological or chemical threat agents;
operational testing and evaluation of technologies proposed for
acquisition; and the creation of consensus standards which enable cost-
effective progress across many fields. Additionally, over the past
year, S&T has begun a major strategic effort, in collaboration with the
Under Secretary for Management, to improve DHS acquisition processes.
INVESTING S&T'S RESOURCES: MAXIMIZING BENEFIT, BALANCING RISK
S&T fully recognizes the need to be a responsible steward of
taxpayers' dollars and to clearly demonstrate the value the S&T
Directorate brings to the Homeland Security Enterprise (HSE). This is
particularly important in R&D endeavors, where the time between initial
research investments and useable products is typically measured in
years or even decades, and where risk--and the possibility of failure--
is necessarily part of the picture. New technological capabilities and
the design of sound analytical processes and acquisition decisions
offer solutions to many of the challenges confronting the Department
and are also essential, potentially powerful cost-saving tools.
Moreover, the scope of the HSE's need for technologies and technical
assistance requires that we make careful judgments about where to
invest S&T's limited resources. My predecessor as Under Secretary
established Integrated Product Teams consisting of representatives from
DHS Components, whose purpose was to select and rank ``capability
gaps'' which S&T then tried to address through technology development.
This was an important step in linking S&T activities to Components'
needs, but the selected projects sometimes failed to reflect the
strategic priorities of the leadership. In addition, some projects
yielded successful prototypes but failed to transition to actual use in
the field, sometimes because research efforts in S&T were not paired
with Component acquisition programs, sometimes because Components'
priorities had shifted, and sometimes because there were no funds to
support realistic pilots and training programs. Due to these
shortcomings, S&T has established the goal of transitioning R&D
products to use as a top priority. To achieve this end, we made several
changes to the process for selecting R&D projects.
On-going Review of the R&D Portfolio
All individual R&D projects, including proposed ``new starts,''
undergo evaluation using a ``portfolio review'' process to ensure that
they are supported by operational partners (i.e. one or more DHS
Component or First Responder communities), are technically sound, have
the potential to make a meaningful mission impact, and are progressing
adequately. Each project is judged against specific metrics, determined
by S&T with input from the Components, designed to address elements
essential to programmatic success in the context of DHS's Quadrennial
Homeland Security Review (QHSR) missions. These metrics assess the
project against six strategic imperatives, namely:
Impact.--Is our portfolio making a significant impact on our
customer's mission?
Transition.--Are we transitioning relevant products to the
field?
Technical Positioning.--Is our investment positioning the
organization for the future?
Customer Alignment.--Are our projects aligned with well-
understood customer requirements?
Customer Involvement.--Do we have the appropriate level of
customer interaction?
Innovation.--Are we sufficiently innovative in the way we
approach our challenges?
Measuring all of our projects against this framework provides a
transparent and ``shareable'' view of all R&D within S&T; enables more
strategic, longer-term budget decisions; ensures efficient delivery to
the component or end-user; and nurtures effective communication
throughout the process. This particular review model has been used by
both Federal and private R&D organizations, including the prize-winning
Army Engineering, Research, and Development Laboratory in Mississippi.
A major observation stemming from the first review of the R&D
portfolio in 2009 was that S&T was pursuing a much larger number of
projects than could be adequately supported within our budget. Many
projects were failing or languishing for years because they lacked the
resources needed to succeed. Thus we decided to reduce the number of
projects, instill annual reviews of budget adequacy and progress, and
fund each selected project through to ``use in the field'', whether it
was transition to a commercial venture or a DHS pilot operation. This
strategy resulted in some projects receiving more funds, while others
were eliminated or significantly reformulated. Additionally, we placed
a greater emphasis on integration of projects with the DHS Component
partners' operational needs and acquisition planning cycles because
even the highest-impact project is of little utility without the
Components' ability to procure it. We have already begun to see the
fruit of these decisions.
Apex Projects Demonstrate the Importance of Strong Partnerships Between
S&T and Operators
Apex projects are intended to solve problems of strategic
operational importance identified by a Component leader. The Apex model
is designed to demonstrate a new framework for working with Components,
based on top-level commitment to the project, collaborative
partnerships, and multidisciplinary teams. Each Apex project is
codified in a signed charter agreement between the head of a DHS
Component and the Under Secretary for S&T. Together, we approve the
project's goals and approach, providing a leadership imprimatur which
energizes both S&T and the partner organization. The S&T team is then
mirrored by an equally able, multidisciplinary team from the partner
Component. The first Apex effort focused on improving the remote
protective operations of the U.S. Secret Service (USSS) and has proven
very successful. Another Apex initiative, which began in March 2011, is
a partnership with U.S. Customs and Border Protection to develop a
secure transit corridor for goods shipped between Mexico, the United
States, and Canada.
A key lesson of the Apex experience is that forging a true
partnership between the technical team and the operators is essential
to success. Going forward, S&T will be more likely to invest its
resources in areas where operators--whether they are DHS Components or
first responders--are willing to actively collaborate on the project.
Innovation requires a deep, precise understanding of the problem to be
solved. This requires insights from operators, who best know the needs
and constraints of the operational reality, and technical experts who
have a grasp of the range of available solutions and how to analyze
possible trade-offs. Equally as important is the imperative to
integrate new technologies or analytical approaches into the whole
``system'' that makes up the operational reality. For example,
technologies which are extremely expensive, require constant care and
feeding, or intensive training are not suitable to many DHS operations.
S&T Resource Allocation Strategy: Creating a Balanced, High-impact R&D
Portfolio
To better support the entire Homeland Security Enterprise, we are
developing an S&T Resource Allocation Strategy (STRAS) which reflects
lessons learned from our Apex experience and reviews of our R&D
portfolio as well as dialogue among representatives from the
Components, the first responder community, and S&T.
STRAS is highly collaborative and based on focused interactions
with partner organizations coupled with a rigorous examination of the
problems at hand. STRAS begins with an understanding of S&T's current
research and development efforts on behalf of Components as well as on-
going internal, Component-sponsored R&D efforts. The systems analysis
explicitly maps how the operational process functions and highlights
potential capability gaps. Based on this systems analysis and
understanding of the on-going R&D efforts, a strategic plan will be
jointly developed and agreed to by the Component and S&T. A formal
written agreement will codify the joint effort; periodic updates will
ensure that projects are progressing and will ultimately lead to
fielding of an operational capability, including, if appropriate, the
transition of research products and prototype technologies into field
pilots and acquisition plans. This strategic approach to S&T resourcing
allows for development of a managed, balanced portfolio, but retains
the inherent flexibility to support ``out-of-cycle'' or emergent
Component requests for assistance.
S&T uses a modified version of the STRAS process to identify
efforts for the first responder community. S&T's First Responder Group,
which was created during the 2010 strategic realignment, is entirely
focused on connecting with and addressing the needs of first
responders. We use a variety of Nation-wide outreach methods to examine
and identify appropriate local, State, and Federal roles and
responsibilities for developing response capabilities. These groups
further ensure that technology, training, and policy investments by S&T
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency are aligned with these
capabilities and best support the priorities of the first response
community. Key partners such as the InterAgency Board for Equipment
Standardization and Interoperability and S&T's First Responder Resource
Group help us capture the diverse voice of the emergency response
community's needs and goals for policy, operational doctrine, and
technology--with the ultimate goal of meeting the challenges of
catastrophic mission response. S&T analyzes these practitioner-
identified gaps to select projects for investment. Multiple
jurisdictions across the country have partnered with S&T to host pilots
and operational demonstrations of research products to field
commercially viable, operationally tested technologies.
Beyond R&D: Using S&T's Technical Expertise to Provide Analytical
Support to DHS
S&T's work extends beyond technology development. Component support
also includes operational analysis, requirements generation, test and
evaluation, and acquisition support. Through the leadership of our
Acquisition Support and Operations Analysis (ASOA) group, S&T has been
formally incorporated into DHS's new integrated investment life-cycle--
we will be working on the ``front end'' of the acquisition process
assisting in the development of technically specific and feasible
requirements. Getting requirements right on the ``front end'' greatly
improves the odds of a successful transition at the end of the program.
S&T provides systems engineering support throughout the ``middle'' of
the investment life-cycle to assist Components with items such as risk
management and ConOps development.
Additionally, S&T has a statutory responsibility on the ``back
end'' of acquisition in testing and evaluation. S&T has been at the
forefront of improving the Department's overall acquisition process
through the establishment of DHS' operational test and evaluation
(OT&E) process. The OT&E process ensures that programs that come before
the Acquisition Review Board have been thoroughly and appropriately
vetted. This is the final step before the Department makes significant
investment into final production and fielding of the acquired system
ensures that the system meets its documented operational requirements
and provides the required capability.
A MODEL FOR HIGH IMPACT: LEVERAGING INVESTMENTS BY OTHERS AND CREATING
PRODUCTIVE COLLABORATIONS
Wherever possible, S&T attempts to identify R&D activities in which
others have already invested and then adopt, adapt, or further develop
these investments to satisfy the needs of the HSE. The austere budget
realities facing the United States and our allies will likely encourage
collaboration as organizations seek to augment their own R&D
investments with outside resources.
Technology Foraging: Higher ROI, Faster Transitions
S&T is committed to getting as high of a return on investment (ROI)
of resources as possible. To this end, and to meet our goal of rapidly
delivering products to use, we are establishing ``technology foraging''
as part of every technology development project. Technology foraging
refers to a complex process of scanning the horizon for technologies
that are already in use or being developed, and adopting these
technologies for new purposes, new environmental conditions, or at new
scales. Technology foraging leverages the work being done by industry,
in other Federal agencies, at universities, and by our international
partners, against possible applications to DHS's needs. It is an
extremely challenging task because of the vast and continuously
shifting body of R&D unfolding in public and private sectors around the
world. However, when done correctly, technology foraging can have a
large impact on S&T's efficiency and effectiveness. S&T is moving to a
more disciplined and comprehensive approach to technology foraging
which requires all project managers to review investments by others in
technologies we might adapt or adopt.
For example, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has identified a need to
be able to track small vessels approaching a seaport. While most large
vessels have communication and tracking devices, along with tagging
systems for identification, many small vessels, including those that
may be used for illicit activities, called ``dark boats'' do not. S&T,
in partnership with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) and USCG, has developed software that relies on currently
deployed coastal NOAA weather radar systems to process the radar signal
differently, enabling the USCG to identify and track small vessels.
Private Sector Partnerships: Finding and Importing Good Ideas
Partnering with the private sector is one of S&T's highest
priorities. Small business is an important engine of innovation and job
creation and S&T utilizes a variety of approaches to engage the private
sector. Under my tenure, S&T established the position of Chief
Commercialization Officer, which leads engagement with industry. As a
result, S&T's coordinated outreach to the private sector has grown
considerably. In 2010, S&T interacted with over 6,500 companies
informing them on how to work with DHS and soliciting their ideas.
Furthermore, better integration and promotion of our research efforts
with the private sector has resulted in companies investing their own
internal research and development funds to bring S&T-developed
technology to the market. One example is Honeywell, Inc.'s investment
in S&T's Geo-spatial Location Accountability and Navigation System for
Emergency Responders (GLANSER), a tool which allows incident commanders
to locate and track personnel inside enclosed areas. Honeywell, Inc.
committed over 25 percent of the project's total cost to develop and
commercialize GLANSER. Also, Raytheon, Inc. invested 40 percent of the
total costs for the Controlled Impact Rescue Tool, a technology that
enables first responders to quickly cut through cement to rescue people
from collapsed structures.
S&T's Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) Program actively
works to develop technology solutions to homeland security issues that
are innovative and accelerate transition into the marketplace. Since
its inception in 2004, 316 companies in 43 States received S&T SBIR
Phase I awards to demonstrate concept feasibility and one-third of
these received Phase II awards, which often culminate in a prototype.
Our SBIR program has resulted in 26 patents with 11 more in process.
Additionally, 17 products are on the market, including 10 commercial or
open-source cybersecurity-related products. Not only is S&T finding
solutions to homeland security needs, but we are creating new jobs.
Fifty-six companies responded to our July 2010 survey and reported that
359 net jobs have been created through SBIR funding.
Collaboration with Other Federal Agencies
DHS S&T staff have been highly active participants and leaders in
numerous, on-going Federal Interagency efforts at both policy and
programmatic levels. I co-chair the National Science and Technology
Council's Committee on Homeland and National Security, along with Mr.
Zack Lemnios of the Department of Defense (DoD) and Mr. Phil Coyle,
Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs of
the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. This committee
has a comprehensive membership involving key Executive branch agencies
such as DoD, the Department of Energy, the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS), the Department of Justice, and the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) and many others. Coordination on this committee
enables S&T to form and maintain relationships with other science and
technology organizations that can be translated into collaborative
programs that maximize and leverage available expertise and resources.
Additionally, our scientists serve on 32 Committees and Working Groups
across the Interagency. These Working Groups and Committees examine the
full range of homeland security issues, such as chemical, biological,
radiological/nuclear and explosives (CBRNE) detection and recovery,
infrastructure protection, and homeland security policy.
S&T collaboration with other Federal agencies also includes a rich
array of joint projects to advance mutual goals. To highlight a few
examples of S&T partnering with other Federal agencies:
S&T has been working with the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA), EPA, and HHS on several interagency efforts that
will increase resilience and recovery following a biological
weapons attack, whether the attack targets civilian or military
assets.
S&T and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) are collaborating on an effort that is investigating
lightweight, blast-resistant materials that will provide
enhanced security in shipping air cargo, again benefiting both
military and civilian security.
Working with DoD, DOJ, and the intelligence community, we're
focusing on the development of two different approaches to
verify familial linkages for refugee and asylum and adoption
applications. S&T expects to transition this to the U.S.
Customs and Immigration Service (USCIS). Our Federal partners
have contributed $23.5 million to the effort.
We've partnered with DARPA to leverage their $25 million
basic research investment in advanced data collection and
analysis methods to develop the next generation of automated
target recognition software for explosive detection systems.
Working in partnership with DoD and the DOE National
Laboratories, we have begun an effort to develop a rapid
clinical diagnostic capability that can detect whether someone
has been exposed to a range of biothreat agents before symptoms
appear.
S&T has also begun engaging with the private sector via investments
through In-Q-Tel. In 1999, the Central Intelligence Agency supported
the establishment of In-Q-Tel as a not-for-profit strategic investment
firm designed to bridge the gap between new advances in commercial
technology and the technology needs of the U.S. intelligence and
security communities. Most In-Q-Tel investments combine funds from more
than one partner agency, allowing S&T to leverage significant
investments from the intelligence community.
S&T's first project via In-Q-Tel was just announced with a company
called Genia Photonics. This company developed a tunable laser source
for the medical community and S&T is investigating the feasibility of
this technology to perform non-contact, trace explosives detection. S&T
expects to close four more In-Q-Tel deals in the next few months. All
of these projects are expected to produce transition-ready technologies
in the next 12 to 24 months. S&T's total investment of $6.7 million is
leveraging $11.5 million in investments by other Government agencies.
In addition, In-Q-Tel reports that $1 of Government investment can
attract $10 in private sector funding.
S&T's collaborations with other agencies at both the policy and
programmatic level enable us to reach beyond the resources of DHS alone
in order to better provide capabilities that strengthen our homeland
security efforts.
University Partnerships
Leveraging the investment and expertise of academia is a key part
of S&T's strategy to meet the needs of the Department. To this end, S&T
is supporting nine university-based Centers of Excellence (COEs). These
consortia of colleges, universities, and private sector partners pursue
a mixed portfolio of basic and applied research addressing both short-
and long-term homeland security needs. DHS Components can directly
engage the COEs for specific research; to date, Components have
invested a total of $21.9 million in the Centers. The COEs estimate
that they've attracted an additional $46 million in funding from non-
DHS sources including Federal, State, and local agencies, and private
sector partners in 2010.
The COEs have been successful because they've built a reputation
for delivering high-impact work with direct, practical application. For
example, investigators from the Coastal Hazards COE (CHC) at the
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill assisted the USCG by tracking
the likely storm surge/wave impact of Hurricane Irene. CHC's
information led the USCG to relocate a Command Center, just before its
previous location was damaged by the hurricane. The expertise and
foresight of CHC minimized the hurricane's disruptions to USCG's rescue
and response operations and the Center has received commendations from
the USCG's senior leadership.
International Collaborations
S&T has bilateral agreements with 12 international partners, which
enable DHS and other agencies in the HSE to leverage funds, manpower,
and facilities in support of our mission. In fiscal year 2011, we had
134 active bilateral projects, including $15 million in contributions
from our international partners. Examples include $11 million from The
Netherlands for a Levee Integrity Monitoring project, $1.5 million from
Singapore to build and test a Hybrid Composite Container, and $1.2
million from Sweden for the International Submillimeter-Wave Standoff
Imager Project, an effort aimed at increasing the capacity to scan
large, unstructured crowds for concealed objects, as opposed to
conventional checkpoints. Our international projects provide a cost-
effective, collaborative approach to common homeland security problem
sets, capitalizing on our international partners' expertise and
resources.
SELECTED ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE S&T DIRECTORATE
Since I assumed this role, we have made many changes and have
achieved some notable successes, even in the face of significant budget
constraints. A hallmark of the past 2 years in S&T has been the
unrelenting focus we've placed on transitioning our R&D efforts to use
in the field. Commercialization of successful R&D projects is one
important means of accomplishing this goal. We have significantly
improved our ability to work with private sector partners to
commercialize our investments. Another approach to transitioning to use
is to closely partner with users throughout the development process to
ensure that final products meet users' end needs and are incorporated
into Component acquisition plans.
I will briefly enumerate a few of our success stories highlighting
the transition to use in the field as well as our analytical and
technical capabilities.
Transition to Use in the Field
S&T partnered with Mine Safety Appliance (MSA) to integrate
and certify S&T's lighter and smaller profile, self-contained
breathing apparatus (SCBA) cylinder array into a full SCBA
ensemble that could be National Fire Protection Association
(NFPA) and National Institute for Occupational Safety and
Health (NIOSH) tested/certified for use by firefighters. MSA
invested its own money for this effort; its financial
commitment was equal to 65% of the project's total cost. This
will be the first major redesign in decades of this critical
piece of first responder safety equipment.
Consolidated Edison provided almost half of the total
project costs to partner with S&T on a new superconducting
cable that can join multiple power substations in an
interconnected web. This resilient electric grid will help
protect against the type of power surges that took down the
power grid in the entire Northeast in 2003. Consolidated Edison
is installing the S&T technology for testing at its facility in
2013.
S&T has developed a next generation explosives trace
detection device that is ten times more sensitive than existing
systems, can detect narcotics as well as explosives, and is
similarly priced as existing machines. The FLIR Systems, Inc.
device will soon complete TSA qualification testing. S&T
anticipates that the device will be commercially available
within 1 year.
On the cyber front, DHS is responsible for protecting the
``.com'' and ``.gov'' cyber-networks. S&T's Domain Name System
Security (DNSSEC) project protects the public by preventing
internet users from being covertly redirected to malicious
websites that look like legitimate sites, such as banks, but
attempt to steal personal information. DNSSEC has been and is
in wide use by 32 top level domains (such as ``.com'',
``.gov'', ``.uk'', etc.) S&T won the 2011 National
Cybersecurity Innovation award for DNSSEC in the category of
``Building a Federal Cybersecurity Research Program that
Results in Substantial Cyber Risk Reduction''.
S&T, working with the U.S. Department of Agriculture, has
developed a next generation vaccine against a strain of Foot
and Mouth Disease (FMD). This year the vaccine passed a major
milestone and entered live animal trials; it holds the promise
of eliminating the billion-dollar threat that FMD poses against
our Nation's agricultural sector. Finally, S&T has had great
success in the past 2 years in improving information sharing
for first responders across all levels of government through
its Virtual USA (vUSA) program. vUSA is a blend of process and
technology that provides a virtual pipeline to allow data, such
as the operational status of critical infrastructure, emergency
vehicle locations, weather and traffic conditions, and
evacuation routes, to be shared by different systems and
operating platforms with no changes to current systems. vUSA
was chosen as a White House Open Government Initiative and has
been used across the country to provide situational awareness
and decision support for the DeepWater Horizon oil spill and
this year's Mississippi River flooding. States in the Southeast
(11 States), Pacific Northwest (4 States), and the Central U.S.
Earthquake Consortium (8 States) are currently using vUSA. The
network will continue to expand to other State agencies,
businesses, and non-profit groups.
Technical and Analytical Capabilities
S&T teamed with CBP and the S&T-managed Federally Funded
Research and Development Center, the Homeland Security Studies
and Analysis Institute (HSSAI), to conduct an analysis of
alternatives for the Southern Border's virtual fence. The
result was a recommendation to discontinue the SBInet program
and focus on other approaches.
S&T has worked closely with U.S. Secret Service (USSS) on
the Apex Science and Technology for Operational Research
Enhancement (STORE) program to deliver needed technologies, and
more importantly, help them develop a systems-based approach to
show the impact and cost-versus-benefit of technology
enhancements on their protective mission. This aspect of the
program was essential to USSS's basis for their technology
acquisition planning and budgeting process.
CONCLUSION
The people of S&T constitute the core source of technical expertise
available to the Homeland Security Enterprise. In the past 2 years we
have realigned the Directorate's structure, and revised many of the
processes by which we choose and pursue our work, and formed valuable
partnerships with other R&D organizations, universities, the private
sector, and abroad--all with the intent of more effectively and
efficiently advancing the missions of the Homeland Security Enterprise.
We have made it our first priority to achieve rapid transition of
research and development projects to use in the field. We have also
expanded the reach of S&T's technical talent to improve DHS project
management and acquisition processes.
To these ends, S&T has revamped project selection processes to
ensure we are investing in problems of highest importance to HSE
operators. We have established Apex projects to enable us to invent and
implement solutions to large, complex, high-priority problems. We have
demonstrated the power of intensive collaboration and devised processes
to make such partnerships a cornerstone of our work, whether with our
HSE partners or in collaboration with partner R&D organizations. We are
placing a strong emphasis on technology foraging--on seeking and using
technology investments by others both to improve S&T's return on
investment and to reduce development time. We have reduced the number
of projects we pursue, improving the likelihood that chosen efforts
have sufficient resources to succeed in a timely way and are carefully
tracked throughout development. We have restructured our organization
to dedicate significant resources to analysis of operational and
acquisition needs and to instill a more systems-oriented approach
throughout DHS activities.
Throughout American history, much of the country's wealth, and many
of our successes, have come from our ability to forge practical
solutions to difficult problems. We have excelled at harnessing science
to serve human purposes and to produce innovative technologies which
create new capacities that transform once impossible, costly, or
dangerous goals into feasible activities. Congress designed S&T to
continue this tradition of innovative problem-solving in the service of
protecting homeland security. I believe the S&T Directorate is making
significant contributions to these ends and is becoming increasingly
better prepared to make such contributions. This progress is due to the
hard work of S&T's people, to our deepening understanding of the
precise problems confronting our operational partners, and to the
Directorate's increasing capacity to identify and make use of the
innovation of others in the private sector, in universities, in the
National labs and around the world. I am honored to lead the DHS S&T
Directorate and look forward to your questions.
Mr. Lungren. Now, Mr. Maurer, you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF DAVID C. MAURER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Maurer. Good morning, Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member
Thompson, and other Members and staff. I am pleased to be here
today to discuss the findings from our prior work looking at
research and development at the Department of Homeland Security
and other departments and agencies.
As you know, R&D is the front end of a long, complex
process that translates good ideas into systems that enhance
Homeland Security. It is important to recognize and practice
how difficult it is to do this. Managing R&D requires accepting
risk and some degree of failure while still ensuring new and
innovative technologies make the leap from labs to real-world
use. Getting this balance right ensures a steady flow of new
technologies to help front-line operators carry out their
missions. S&T has laid responsibility for this within DHS. S&T
also plays a key role in evaluating and overseeing DHS testing
and evaluation.
Over the past 2 years, S&T has reorganized to better
achieve its goals and work more closely with DHS components. At
the same time, DHS has--S&T is managing a decline in budget
resources, requiring the Directorate to reprioritize its
efforts. This is not the first time a Federal agency has faced
these challenges. In the past we have reported on the
transformation of R&D efforts in the Federal Government
stemming from changing priorities and reduced resources.
My testimony today focuses on three topics: The findings
from our prior work related to S&T's test and evaluation
efforts; S&T's recent reorganization; and key findings from our
past work on managing Federal R&D. I will briefly summarize the
key points from all three of these areas.
First, in June of this year, we reported that S&T was, for
the most part, properly executing its oversight requirements
for testing and evaluation of acquisition programs. However,
additional steps were needed to ensure that all requirements
were met. Specifically, S&T did not consistently document its
review and approval during key portions of the acquisition
process. DHS agreed with our recommendations and is taking
actions to address them.
Second, since 2009, S&T has conducted a reorganization,
underwent a new strategic planning process, crafted new
strategic goals, and has developed a draft strategic plan which
is currently in the process of being finalized. S&T is also
committed to an annual review of its portfolio of basic and
applied R&D projects.
In sum, these efforts represent a comprehensive attempt by
S&T to re-look at the way it carries out its R&D mission. We
are currently assessing these issues as part of an on-going
review of R&D at DHS for the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs. We will report on our
findings next year.
Finally, our prior work on R&D at other Federal agencies
could provide insight for S&T as it moves forward. For example,
during the 1990s, we issued a series of reports on Federal
efforts to restructure R&D in the wake of the end of the Cold
War, and efforts to balance the Federal budget. More recently,
we have issued reports on R&D at the Departments of Defense,
Energy, and DHS, as well as at the Environmental Protection
Agency. The key findings across this body of work could
potentially help S&T's efforts to meet DHS' R&D needs.
For example, we have reported that developing comprehensive
R&D strategies with clear roles, responsibilities, and
visibility over the full range of R&D efforts mitigates the
risk of duplication and overlap.
Organizations that have successfully restructured R&D
aligned R&D activities with the needs of the eventual users,
determined what was needed to support these activities and
collected reliable data on the costs involved. Department-wide
R&D efforts should have systems in place to ensure success in
meeting objectives, and monitor and report on progress.
Individual programs should have clearly-defined missions that
align and collectively build through achieving broader
Departmental and National priorities.
Since our assessment of research and development at DHS is
currently underway, we are not in a position today to comment
on whether DHS has successfully addressed all of these issues.
However, we believe that the findings from our prior work can
provide valuable insights for both DHS and the Congress.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. Thank you for
the opportunity to testify. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maurer follows:]
Prepared Statement of David C. Maurer
November 17, 2011
DHS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY DIRECTORATE'S TEST
AND EVALUATION AND REORGANIZATION EFFORTS
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our prior work
examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Science and
Technology Directorate (S&T) and Research and Development (R&D)
efforts. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 created DHS and, within it,
established S&T with the responsibility for conducting National
research, development, test, and evaluation (T&E) of technology and
systems for, among other things, detecting, preventing, protecting
against, and responding to terrorist attacks.\1\ Since its creation in
2003, DHS, through both S&T and its components, has spent billions of
dollars researching and developing technologies used to support a wide
range of missions including securing the border, detecting nuclear
devices, and screening airline passengers and baggage for explosives,
among others. S&T has a wide-ranging mission, which includes conducting
basic and applied research of technologies,\2\ and overseeing the
testing and evaluation of component acquisitions and technologies to
ensure that they meet DHS acquisition requirements before
implementation in the field.\3\ In recent years, we have reported that
DHS has experienced challenges in managing its multibillion-dollar
technology development and acquisition efforts, including implementing
technologies that did not meet intended requirements and were not
appropriately tested and evaluated. These problems highlight the
important role that S&T plays in overseeing DHS testing and evaluation.
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\1\ Pub. L. No. 107-296, 302(5), 116 Stat. 2135, 2163 (2002).
\2\ According to S&T, basic research includes scientific efforts
and experimentation directed toward increasing knowledge and
understanding in the fields of physical, engineering, environmental,
social, and life sciences related to long-term National needs. Applied
research includes efforts directed toward solving specific problems
with a view toward developing and evaluating the feasibility of
proposed solutions.
\3\ S&T's Test & Evaluation and Standards office is responsible for
overseeing key requirements that DHS components are required to follow
in DHS's Test and Evaluation directive.
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S&T has reorganized to better achieve its goals and provide better
assistance to DHS components in developing technologies. In addition to
the challenge of implementing its varied mission, S&T is also managing
a decline in available R&D resources. S&T's fiscal year 2011
appropriation decreased 20 percent from fiscal year 2010 and, while its
fiscal year 2012 appropriation has not yet been enacted, both the House
and Senate marks for the agency are lower than what was appropriated in
fiscal year 2011.\4\ As a result, S&T has had to adjust resources and
re-prioritize its efforts. In the past, we have reported on issues
related to the transformation and reorganization of R&D efforts in the
Federal Government, particularly related to shifting of priorities and
managing a reduction in resources.\5\ In addition, we identified DHS
R&D as an area for potential costs savings in our March 2011 report
regarding opportunities to reduce potential duplication in Government
programs, save tax dollars, and enhance revenue.\6\ Specifically, we
reported that DHS could take further actions to improve its management
of R&D and reduce costs by ensuring that testing efforts are completed
before making acquisition decisions and cost-benefit analyses are
conducted to reduce R&D inefficiencies and costs.
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\4\ The fiscal year 2012 appropriations bill passed by the House of
Representatives would appropriate about 42 percent less for S&T than
what was appropriated in fiscal year 2011, while the bill passed by the
Senate appropriations committee would provide almost 5 percent less.
\5\ GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE's
Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Detection and Response Technologies, GAO-04-653 (Washington, DC: May
24, 2004); Department of Energy: Uncertain Progress in Implementing
National Laboratory Reforms, RCED-98-197 (Washington, DC: Sept. 10,
1998); Best Practices: Elements Critical to Successfully Reducing
Unneeded RDT&E Infrastructure, RCED-98-23 (Washington, DC: Jan. 8,
1998).
\6\ GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in
Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-
318SP (Washington, DC: Mar. 2011). See also related GAO products at the
end of this statement.
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My testimony today focuses on the key findings from our prior work
related to S&T's test and evaluation efforts, S&T's recent
reorganization efforts, and key findings from our past work related to
Federal R&D. Specifically, this statement will address:
the extent to which S&T oversees T&E of major DHS
acquisitions and what challenges, if any, S&T officials report
facing in overseeing T&E across DHS; and:
S&T's recent reorganization efforts and how key findings
from our prior work on R&D in the Federal Government can inform
how S&T moves forward.
This statement is based on reports and testimonies we issued from
March 1995 to July 2011 related to DHS's efforts to manage, test, and
deploy various technology programs; transformation of Federal R&D; and
selected updates conducted from July 2011 to the present related to
S&T's reorganization efforts.\7\ For the updates, we reviewed recent
S&T testimonies and documentation related to the reorganization as well
as information on annual S&T appropriations and budget requests from
fiscal years 2009 to 2012. For our past work, we reviewed DHS
directives and testing plans, interviewed DHS, Department of Energy,
Department of Defense, Environmental Protection Agency, and other
agency officials, reviewed documentation from these agencies, visited
laboratory facilities, and examined agency databases, among other
things. We conducted this work in accordance with generally accepted
Government auditing standards. More detailed information on the scope
and methodology from our previous work can be found within each
specific report.
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\7\ See related GAO products list at the end of this statement.
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S&T COULD TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS TO ENSURE THAT DHS T&E REQUIREMENTS ARE
MET; OFFICIALS CITED CHALLENGES TO OVERSEEING T&E ACROSS DHS
S&T Oversight of DHS Testing and Evaluation
In June 2011, we reported that S&T met some of its oversight
requirements for T&E of acquisition programs we reviewed, but
additional steps were needed to ensure that all requirements were
met.\8\ Specifically, since DHS issued the T&E directive in May 2009,
S&T reviewed or approved T&E documents and plans for programs
undergoing testing, and conducted independent assessments for the
programs that completed operational testing during this time period.
S&T officials told us that they also provided input and reviewed other
T&E documentation, such as components' documents describing the
programs' performance requirements, as required by the T&E directive.
DHS senior-level officials considered S&T's T&E assessments and input
in deciding whether programs were ready to proceed to the next
acquisition phase. However, S&T did not consistently document its
review and approval of components' test agents--a Government entity or
independent contractor carrying out independent operational testing for
a major acquisition--or document its review of other component
acquisition documents, such as those establishing programs' operational
requirements, as required by the T&E directive. For example, 8 of the
11 acquisition programs we reviewed had hired test agents, but
documentation of S&T approval of these agents existed for only 3 of
these 8 programs. We reported that approving test agents is important
to ensure that they are independent of the program and that they meet
requirements of the T&E directive.
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\8\ GAO, DHS Science and Technology: Additional Steps Needed to
Ensure Test and Evaluation Requirements Are Met, GAO-11-596
(Washington, DC: June 15, 2011).
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S&T officials agreed that they did not have a mechanism in place
requiring a consistent method for documenting their review or approval
and the extent to which the review or approval criteria were met. We
reported that without mechanisms in place for documenting its review or
approval of acquisition documents and T&E requirements, such as
approving test agents, it is difficult for DHS or a third party to
review and validate S&T's decision-making process and ensure that it is
overseeing components' T&E efforts in accordance with acquisition and
T&E directives and internal control standards for the Federal
Government. As a result, we recommended that S&T develop a mechanism to
document both its approval of operational test agents and component
acquisitions documentation to ensure that these meet the requirements
of the DHS T&E directive. S&T concurred and reported that the agency
has since developed internal procedures to ensure that the approval of
test agents and component acquisition documents are documented.
Challenges in Coordinating and Overseeing T&E Across DHS
We also reported in June 2011 that S&T and DHS component officials
stated that they face challenges in overseeing T&E across DHS
components which fell into 4 categories: (1) Ensuring that a program's
operational requirements--the key performance requirements that must be
met for a program to achieve its intended goals--can be effectively
tested; (2) working with DHS component program staff who have limited
T&E expertise and experience; (3) using existing T&E directives and
guidance to oversee complex information technology acquisitions; and
(4) ensuring that components allow sufficient time for T&E while
remaining within program cost and schedule estimates.
Both S&T and DHS, more broadly, have begun initiatives to address
some of these challenges, such as establishing a T&E council to
disseminate best practices to component program managers, and
developing specific guidance for testing and evaluating information
technology acquisitions. In addition, as part of S&T's recent
reorganization, the agency has developed a new division specifically
geared toward assisting components in developing requirements that can
be tested, among other things. However, since these efforts have only
recently been initiated to address these DHS-wide challenges, it is too
soon to determine their effectiveness.
S&T RECENTLY REORGANIZED AND OUR PRIOR R&D WORK COULD INFORM HOW S&T
MOVES FORWARD
Since 2009, S&T has undertaken a series of efforts related to its
organizational structure. S&T underwent a new strategic planning
process, developed new strategic goals, and conducted a reorganization
intended to better achieve its strategic goals. These efforts were
implemented after a 2009 National Academy of Public Administration
study found that S&T's organizational structure posed communication
challenges across the agency and that the agency lacked a cohesive
strategic plan and mechanisms to assess performance in a systematic
way, among other things.\9\ In August 2010, S&T reorganized to align
its structure with its top strategic goals, allow for easier
interaction among senior leadership, and reduce the number of personnel
directly reporting to the Under Secretary of S&T. Additionally, after
the Under Secretary was confirmed in November 2009, S&T instituted a
new strategic planning process which helped inform the development of
new strategic goals. The new strategic goals announced in August 2010
include:
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\9\ National Academy of Public Administration, Department of
Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate: Developing
Technology to Protect America (Washington, DC: June 2009).
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rapidly developing and delivering knowledge, analyses, and
innovative solutions that advance the mission of DHS;
leveraging its expertise to assist DHS components' efforts
to establish operational requirements, and select and acquire
needed technologies;
strengthening the Homeland Security Enterprise and First
Responders' capabilities to protect the homeland and respond to
disasters;
conducting, catalyzing, and surveying scientific discoveries
and inventions relevant to existing and emerging homeland
security challenges; and,
fostering a culture of innovation and learning in S&T and
across DHS that addresses mission needs with scientific,
analytic, and technical rigor.
According to S&T, the agency has developed a draft strategic plan
that provides its overall approach to meeting these strategic goals,
which is currently in the process of being finalized.
Moreover, according to testimony by the Under Secretary of S&T in
March 2011, to ensure that individual R&D projects are meeting their
goals, S&T has committed to an annual review of its portfolio of basic
and applied R&D and all proposed ``new start'' projects. According to
S&T, the review process uses metrics determined by S&T, with input from
DHS components, that are aligned with DHS priorities. These metrics
consider:
the impact on the customer's mission;
the ability to transition these products to the field;
whether the investment positions S&T for the future;
whether the projects are aligned with customer requirements;
whether S&T has the appropriate level of customer
interaction; and,
whether S&T is sufficiently innovative in the way it is
approaching its challenges.
We are currently reviewing DHS and S&T's processes for
prioritizing, coordinating, and measuring the results of its R&D
efforts for the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and we will report on this issue next year.
Our prior work related to R&D at other Federal agencies could
provide insight for S&T as it moves forward with new structures and
processes operating within potential fiscal constraints. During the
1990s, we issued a series of reports on Federal efforts to restructure
R&D in the wake of changing priorities and efforts to balance the
Federal budget. More recently, we have issued reports on R&D issues at
the Department of Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and DHS. Although the specific
recommendations and issues vary from department to department, there
are key findings across this body of work that could potentially help
inform S&T's efforts to meet DHS's R&D needs, as well as Congressional
oversight of these activities. Since our assessment of R&D efforts at
DHS is currently under way, we have not determined the extent to which
these key findings from our prior work are applicable to DHS's R&D
efforts or the extent to which DHS already has similar efforts under
way. However, our prior work could provide valuable insights into how
DHS could leverage the private sector to help conduct R&D, restructure
R&D efforts in response to fiscal constraints, and develop
comprehensive strategies to mitigate the risk of duplication and
overlap. For example:
We reported on Federal agencies that have restructured their
research and development efforts in response to fiscal
constraints. For example, in January 1998, we reported on
efforts by Federal agencies, such as DOD, the DOE National
Laboratories, and NASA, to streamline their R&D activities and
infrastructure. We reported that restructuring research,
development, testing, and evaluation to meet current and future
needs required interagency agreements and cross-agency efforts,
in addition to on-going individual efforts.\10\ Additionally,
we reported on five elements that were useful in the successful
restructuring of R&D in corporate and foreign government
organizations. For example, we found that successful
restructuring of R&D activities included having a core mission
that supports overall goals and strategies, clear definitions
of those responsible for supporting that mission, and accurate
data on total costs of the organization's activities.
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\10\ GAO, Best Practices: Elements Critical to Successfully
Reducing Unneeded RDT&E Infrastructure, RCED-98-23 (Washington, DC:
Jan. 8, 1998).
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In addition, we have reported that comprehensive strategies
mitigate risk of duplication and overlap.\11\ For example, we
reported in March 2011 that DOD did not have a comprehensive
approach to manage and oversee the breadth of its activities
for developing new capabilities in response to urgent
warfighter needs, including entities engaged in experimentation
and rapid prototyping to accelerate the transition of
technologies to the warfighter, and lacked visibility over the
full range of its efforts.\12\ As a result, we recommended that
DOD issue guidance that defined roles, responsibilities, and
authorities across the Department to lead its efforts. DOD
agreed with this recommendation.
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\11\ GAO-11-318SP.
\12\ GAO, Warfighter Support: DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a
More Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation,
GAO-11-273 (Washington, DC: Mar. 1, 2011).
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Within DHS itself, we reported in May 2004 that DHS did not
have a strategic plan to guide its R&D efforts. We recommended
that DHS complete a strategic R&D plan and ensure that the plan
was integrated with homeland security R&D conducted by other
Federal agencies.\13\ We also recommended that DHS develop
criteria for distributing annual funding and for making long-
term investments in laboratory capabilities, as well as develop
guidelines that detailed how DOE's laboratories would compete
for funding with private sector and academic entities. DHS
agreed with our recommendations. While S&T developed a 5-year
R&D plan in 2008 to guide its efforts and is currently
finalizing a new strategic plan to align its own R&D
investments and goals, DHS has not yet completed a strategic
plan to align all R&D efforts across the Department, as we
previously recommended.
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\13\ GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE's
Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Detection and Response Technologies, GAO-04-653 (Washington, DC: May
24, 2004).
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Our work on DOE National Laboratories provides additional
insights related to oversight of R&D efforts that could be
useful for DHS S&T. In 1995, we reported that DOE's National
laboratories did not have clearly-defined missions focused on
accomplishing DOE's changing objectives and National
priorities.\14\ DOE, at that time, managed the National
laboratories on a program-by-program basis which inhibited
cooperation across programs and hindered DOE's ability to use
the laboratories to meet Departmental missions. We recommended,
among other things, that DOE develop a strategy that maximized
the laboratories' resources. In responding, DOE said that it
had undertaken a new strategic planning process which resulted
in a strategic plan. Though DOE developed a strategic plan
intended to integrate its missions and programs, in 1998 we
reported that the laboratories did not function as an
integrated National research and development system and
recommended that DOE develop a comprehensive strategy to be
used to assess success in meeting objectives, monitor progress,
and report on that progress.\15\ DOE acknowledged that it
needed to better focus the laboratories' missions and tie them
to the annual budget process, but that it would take time to
accomplish.
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\14\ GAO, Department of Energy: National Laboratories Need Clearer
Missions and Better Management, RCED-95-10 (Washington, DC: Jan. 27,
1995).
\15\ GAO, Department of Energy: Uncertain Progress in Implementing
National Laboratory Reforms, RCED-98-197 (Washington, DC: Sept. 10,
1998).
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More recently, we reported in June 2009 that DOE could not
determine the effectiveness of its laboratories' technology
transfer efforts because it has not yet defined its overarching
strategic goals for technology transfer and lacks reliable
performance data.\16\ Instead, individual DOE programs such as
the National Nuclear Security Administration and DOE's Office
of Science articulated their own goals for technology transfer
at the National laboratories. We recommended, among other
things, that DOE articulate Department-wide priorities and
develop clear goals, objectives, and performance measures. DOE
generally agreed with our findings.
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\16\ GAO, Technology Transfer: Clearer Priorities and Greater Use
of Innovative Approaches Could Increase the Effectiveness of Technology
Transfer at Department of Energy Laboratories, GAO-09-548 (Washington,
DC: June 16, 2009).
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Lastly, our work on Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
laboratory facilities also offers insights into the importance
of planning and coordination in managing R&D.\17\ Specifically,
we reported in July 2011 that EPA has yet to fully address the
findings of numerous past studies that have examined EPA's
science activities. These past evaluations noted the need for
EPA to improve long-term planning, priority setting, and
coordination of laboratory activities, establish leadership for
agency-wide scientific oversight and decision making, and
better manage the laboratories' workforce and infrastructure.
We recommended, among other things, that EPA develop a
coordinated planning process for its scientific activities and
appoint a top-level official with authority over all the
laboratories, improve physical and real property planning
decisions, and develop a workforce planning process for all
laboratories that reflects current and future needs of
laboratory facilities. EPA generally agreed with our findings
and recommendations.
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\17\ GAO, Environmental Protection Agency: To Better Fulfill Its
Mission, EPA Needs a More Coordinated Approach to Managing Its
Laboratories, GAO-11-347 (Washington, DC: July 25, 2011).
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Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have.
Mr. Lungren. I thank you both for your testimony, and I
would now start the questioning. Each Member will have 5
minutes, and if we have time we might go into a second round.
Dr. O'Toole, this is something that you referred to in your
written testimony at the very end, and maybe you will have to
submit a response after today, but something has come up
yesterday when we were having a hearing over on the Judiciary
Committee with respect to a fix on the problem of intellectual
property theft via the internet. This has to do with movies,
downloads of music, and so forth.
The fix, which I can't describe in great detail--and that
is why I say I may ask you to answer it later--that was
presented in the bill that was before us has alarmed some
engineers in the internet space that it would in some ways
undercut what you have been doing with the Domain Name System
Security Project.
There was some sense that was raised with me that that
project, while it is going forward, has not fully developed and
needs to have buy-in from a number of elements in the private
sector. There was some concern that if the legislation we are
considering in the other committee were to go forward, it would
undercut this particular response.
First of all, where do you see the maturity of the DNS
project today, and is there a problem with buy-in from the
private sector on that; and have you heard anything about a
worry about legislation attempting to deal with that problem of
the theft of intellectual property interfering with the
project?
Dr. O'Toole. Well, on your third question, Mr. Chairman,
no, I haven't. But I am happy to look into it and get back to
you.
DNSSEC is quite mature. This is an initiative meant to
protect the internet and, in particular, meant to protect users
of the internet from being highjacked to illicit sites where
you can steal your password, you know, your money, your
identity, and so forth. It has been adopted by over 30 of the
largest domains, including dot-com, dot-gov, dot-org, dot-UK,
so it is quite mature. It is just that the internet is a huge
universe, so getting all of the dot-whatsits on-board takes
time.
Mr. Lungren. Sure.
Dr. O'Toole. But we have made a lot of progress. It would
be a shame to undermine it, but I am sure there is some kind of
solution here and I am happy to get back with you on it.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. I know that Stewart Baker publicly
stated that he was fearful that this project, which is a good
project that has received, I think, support from all
administrations----
Dr. O'Toole. Yes.
Mr. Lungren [continuing]. That had been in charge at the
time could be undone by this.
Dr. O'Toole. Yes.
Mr. Lungren. So that concerns me when he says that, and
some other folks come to me, and I am just trying to hash it
out. This is not a partisan issue. This is not even a question
of jurisdiction among committees, although it could be. It,
rather, is a concern that was expressed, frankly, when we had
witnesses yesterday, and no one had the technical knowledge on
it. So if you could help us on that, if we could pursue that
further, I would really appreciate it.
Dr. O'Toole. Be happy to.
Mr. Lungren. All right. On the question of the Apex
projects, as you outline it, it sounds great and it sounds like
it allows you to focus on a means by which you can--I will use
the word ``make judgments'' at an earlier stage as to how
successful something is going to be, and then make some
commitments towards it, strategic importance, et cetera.
I guess my question would be: What you outlined sounds
terrific; why would that not apply to all projects that would
be brought before you?
Dr. O'Toole. Many of the elements of Apex projects will be
applied to all projects. Frankly, when we began this, I was
using it as a stalking horse to model two things. One was
multidisciplinary team approach, and second was a new way
wherein S&T works with the components. That starts with an
agreement between me and the component head.
In the past, we were doing a lot of technology, at the
request of the components, that turned out to be very tactical.
Some operator wanted it, but it wasn't necessarily a top
priority of the people leading the component, and it never made
it into their acquisition cycle.
So the Apex projects are very highly resourced. We can't do
every project this way, but those two elements, we are going to
solve the problem, not just create a gizmo. We are going to
have buy-in from the operators from the beginning, and we are
going to work in multidisciplinary teams, not just S&T's team,
but we are going to be matched by a team on the operator side.
Those elements are going to be part--already are part of our
R&D efforts.
Mr. Lungren. Very good. My time has expired, but when I get
to the second round I want to ask you about how that applies to
the BioWatch issue.
The Ranking Member of the full committee is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. O'Toole, I understand that you looked at the effects of
the proposed budget cuts across the board. Can you share with
me the effect that that would have on the Small Business
Innovative Research Awards if the cuts go forward?
Dr. O'Toole. Certainly. We currently have 60 small business
awards. It would go down to four. We have created almost 3
dozen patents under the small business awards and have involved
businesses in 43 States over the years. We have been very
successful with our SIBR efforts, and we would lose a lot of
momentum under this budget.
Mr. Thompson. Is your testimony that these small
businesses, probably going from 60 to 4, would not be able to
produce a real product--well, obviously the numerical number
would go, but could they really go anywhere else and get
resources to do what they do?
Dr. O'Toole. A number of them would go out of business,
there is no doubt about that. You know, there is a vicious
cycle at work here. In this economic climate, as the Chairman
said, what we need is more innovation to create more jobs and
more opportunity. But there is not that much money around for
innovation, and R&D does require an up-front investment. It has
to be prudent, it has to be well-targeted, it has to be well-
managed. But you have to start with something to get something,
and the small businesses in particular are having a hard time
getting over that hump.
Mr. Thompson. The other part of the budgetary crisis that I
am concerned about if it goes forward is the retention of
people over time that we put an awful lot of investment in.
Have you made some analysis of professional personnel, if the
cuts go forward, that we might lose in the Department?
Dr. O'Toole. Well, in the Department as a whole, we already
have a deficit of engineers and technical experts. That is why
S&T's expertise is so important to the components to do
operational analyses.
A lot of the big acquisition problems in the Department
have been the result of the absence of S&T involvement. In
SBInet, for example, we were not involved until we suggested
that CBP do an AOA, which resulted in the elimination of the
virtual fence. So that would be a problem across DHS. We would
not be hiring those people, as is now contemplated.
In S&T, what I have been trying to do is take those program
managers who no longer have money to manage, and make them part
of the team in order to drive the existing projects forward
faster to completion and success.
At some point, you know, in our budget cuts, that does not
become manageable and people will be let go. But I am hoping
not to reach that point immediately. The M&A account for S&T
has not changed.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Maurer, as you indicated, you reviewed three areas:
Funding; the recent reorganization; and some of the R&D
efforts. I pretty much took from your review that GAO was
reasonably satisfied with what they saw in those areas. Am I
kind of summarizing the results?
Mr. Maurer. Yes. The report that we issued back in June was
looking at the role that S&T was playing in overseeing testing
and evaluation across the Department as part of the acquisition
process. By and large, we were satisfied with the role that S&T
was playing, particularly compared to some of the past
acquisition processes and practices within DHS.
You know, we found that it was basically a compliance
review. We were looking at whether the testing and evaluation
specialists within S&T were doing what they were supposed to be
doing under DHS directives, and we found that for the most part
they were. They were interacting with the components, they were
providing advice on a major multibillion-dollar acquisition
system, so that was good for us to see.
The areas where S&T needed to improve more was just in
documenting and showing that that had actually taken place, and
so they have taken action to address those recommendations. We
are satisfied about that.
Our on-going work that we are doing for your colleagues in
the Senate is getting at the more central issue of how R&D is
being managed across the entire Department, so that is looking
at how the resources are being aligned relative to strategic
priorities, not just in S&T but in other components that
conduct research and development in the Department.
We are also going to be looking at how well that is being
coordinated between S&T and the various components, as well as
the extent to which DHS has a good handle on understanding the
progress that they are making towards the goals they have set
out in the R&D realm.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. All right, the gentleman, Mr. Walberg, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the
panelists for being here today. Director O'Toole, following up
on the previous discussion, GAO testified that S&T has
developed a draft strategic plan to meet the strategic goals
outlined by you in August 2010.
It is difficult for us to assess whether S&T's investments
address Homeland Security's strategic goals and objectives
without a strategic plan. It has been more than a year since
these goals were released. When can we expect to see this plan
finalized?
Dr. O'Toole. Congressman, I appreciate your impatience and
share it. It is finalized. This is a matter of formatting the
report so that it is in accordance with OMB practices. It is a
formatting issue, but it should be out very shortly. The
essence of the plan has been documented in previous testimony
and in shortened versions of the plan.
We have also changed a few things because the world has
changed since we first wrote the plan, and so some of our
specific goals under our large strategies have shifted
somewhat, but it is essentially done. I will make sure you have
an early copy.
Mr. Walberg. Yes, before the world changes too much more.
Dr. O'Toole. Well, that I can't promise.
Mr. Walberg. None of us can, that is for certain. You have
stated as well that the S&T Directorate engaged with the Office
of Science and Technology Policy to develop a Federal Homeland
Security R&D strategy. What is the status of that strategy?
Dr. O'Toole. I expect that to be finished towards the first
of the year, though it does have to go through interagency
approval which--who knows?
But it is very--it is in draft at this point. It is well
underway. We are looking at the cross-agency strategy for
management, chemical, biological, and nuclear R&D, as well as
R&D related to domestic IEDs.
Mr. Walberg. Okay, okay. Well, we encourage that as well.
Data, data, data are helpful to us also in making decisions
here.
Moving over to cybersecurity issues, who else in the
Government is funding cybersecurity R&D, and how do you
collaborate and assure that the minimal conflicts take place in
this R&D?
Dr. O'Toole. Many National security agencies are funding
R&D. DHS is the only entity doing R&D for the dot-gov and the
civilian sector per se. We are in close contact and
collaboration with many of these other agencies, with most of
them I believe, and we participate in a monthly classified
meeting with the security agencies on the classified aspects of
R&D relevant to us.
We have very deep and on-going collaborations, for example,
with DARPA. They are using our test bed and, in fact, supplying
the hardware to expand that test bed. We are working with the
intelligence community. We, for example, are taking advantage
of IQT, the entity invented by the IC that allows us to connect
with the commercial sector, and we have a deal underway that
involves a classified cyber fix.
So we are very much engaged with the other agencies, but
DHS does have the primary responsibility of creating fixes for
the civilian sector.
Mr. Walberg. Okay. Do you have any examples of successful
interactions with the private sector that you could share with
us----
Dr. O'Toole. Yes.
Mr. Walberg [continuing]. That you could share with us
without having to fill us in afterwards?
Dr. O'Toole. Sure. We, for example, have convened a group
from the financial sector to talk about how we might solve some
of their problems, which I probably shouldn't articulate in
open session.
We have done the same with SCADA systems, for example, the
process operating controls that govern everything from chemical
plant operations to dam operations. They have been very
successful.
We have created many solutions from the private sector that
have already been adopted by the likes of Microsoft and McAfee,
and we recently put out a broad area announcement that
collected a thousand responses, several hundred of which we are
going to fund. We are also getting resources from Australia and
Great Britain to help fund some of those very good ideas from
the private sector that have come in.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, I appreciate that.
Mr. Lungren. The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady
from California, Ms. Richardson, for questions.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. O'Toole, I view this hearing really as two important
points that we needed to uncover. One was: What improvements
and mechanisms have you put in place to ensure the
effectiveness of our dollars? No. 2, I think, is to have a real
clear understanding of the budget implications.
Unfortunately, we are glad with all the information that
you have prepared for us, but we didn't have enough time. I am
willing to give you 2 minutes of my time if you would like to
go back and look at your notes too, really, because I think it
is very important for this committee for you to be able to
summarize and clearly say the implications of these budget cuts
upon your Department.
Dr. O'Toole. Thank you. Well, I mean the essence has been
outlined. The House budget is an 80 percent cut in our
discretionary R&D, and it would leave us with this $45 million,
which is about what we are spending today on explosive
detection in aviation security and other behavior-based efforts
related to securing the airways.
Everything else would go away. I mean, we can list, you
know, borders, border security, cargo security, biodefense,
cybersecurity. There would be no money for any of that. We
would have to spend some of the fiscal year 2012 money in
shutting down commitments that we couldn't continue. Again, our
laboratory expenses are almost $200 million.
The Senate mark leaves us in a slightly better condition;
it is $657 million. Again, half of that would have to go to
operating costs and essential commitments. It would leave us as
a viable R&D organization, but barely. Even at that level, we
would be forced to focus on only four priority areas. There is
a point in R&D where you can't just peanut-butter your efforts.
You have to achieve a critical mass of intellectual capital and
investment in an area in order to succeed. In that instance we
would be forced to concentrate on the four priority areas of
aviation security, cybersecurity, biodefense, and first
responder needs. Everything else would go away.
In neither scenario does Congress provide adequate funding
to build the National Bio-Agro Facility, which would leave the
country without a high-containment laboratory capable of
handling contagious foreign animal diseases. This incurs a real
risk to the country. We would have no way, in the event of an
outbreak of these diseases, to handle them safely. We would be
dependent upon work done by Australia or Canada or others,
leaving at risk 10 percent of our economy.
So, again, I think we are doing a credible job of managing
our budget. I think that we in S&T leverage our skills and
capability against the needs of DHS in ways that helps them
work more efficiently.
Certainly, I think we have already been a big help in
ensuring that acquisitions start out with the right
requirements, are appropriately handled, and come out on time,
under budget, and deliver the technology you intended to get.
We would have a very hard time maintaining our people under
these budgets, which would, again, decrement the skill set that
we have to use, even in an advisory mode, against the needs of
DHS. So it is basically a decision not to have an S&T
Directorate.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you for your frank layout of the
current situation that we are facing.
Mr. Maurer, you had mentioned that you expected to have a
report ready next year. Could you give us, the committee, a
sense of when that report will be ready?
Mr. Maurer. We just actually started to work on that last
month. We had our entrance conference with the folks at S&T
back in October. We are still in the early stages. We haven't
negotiated a committed issue date for that product for our
signed clients, but at this point I would anticipate having
final results available sometime in the summer or early fall of
next year. We will keep you posted on that as we are conducting
the work.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you. Then, Dr. O'Toole, what impact
will the proposed cuts to S&T have on first responders and
their ability to respond to emergencies? Let me give you an
example of something I am working on in the district.
Last week I had an opportunity to go to Beverly Hills
Police Department that has really been on the forefront of the
ISIS system, and then I know we are bringing back forward the
proposal on the L.A. RIK system, which is a regional system for
first responders.
Could you share with us what you think some of these
implications would be. Is it--I have now gone into my--okay, if
you could give us a sense of that.
Dr. O'Toole. Well, under the House mark, first responder
work goes away. Under the Senate mark, I would retain it, but
we would have far fewer resources.
You know, again, S&T is the only entity in the U.S.
Government dedicated to working with first responders,
technology and R&D needs, amazingly. They have far more needs
than we can meet as it is. We have established, again in
response to the NAPA report, a very robust process for trying
to gather and understand those needs and set priorities with
the first responder communities.
They have 11 top needs now that were established last
summer, and we probably can't address more than two or three of
them. So all of these programs and the support that they are
being given would go away under the House mark, and they would
would be a little better off under the Senate mark, but
certainly decremented.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my
questions.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. I am going to start a second round.
Dr. O'Toole, when you were talking about how you were using
the Apex program, it prompted me to think of the BioWatch
program. The S&T invested millions of dollars in coming up with
a candidate, contender, whatever you want to call it, for a
system of biological detectors. But when the Office of Health
Affairs moved forward with its plan to test and ultimately
procure a next-generation system, the one that came out of S&T
was taken off the table.
Can you explain to the committee the disconnect that
occurred between S&T and one of the component parts? Is that
the kind of thing you are trying to avoid with Apex, or might
we see the same sort of thing? In these days when we are
talking about millions being taken away, and then we find a
program where we invested millions, and it just seemed to be
taken off the table, was it just one of the things we thought
looked good and it just turned out not to be, that happens
sometimes, or what?
Dr. O'Toole. Well, as David said, R&D is risky. The
BioWatch program, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, is now operated
by OHA. These questions about what the next-generation
technology will be are part of a procurement procedure. So I am
limited in what I can say. Let me just clarify that----
Mr. Lungren. Well, am I wrong in my articulation of the
facts, that I thought----
Dr. O'Toole. No.
Mr. Lungren [continuing]. S&T had developed tens----
Dr. O'Toole. No, you are correct.
Mr. Lungren [continuing]. Of millions of dollars towards
developing something, and then that was not part of what is
being considered?
Dr. O'Toole. Yes. We supported a number of performers in
developing biodetection technologies that could very rapidly
identify bioweapons in aerosol form. One such technology that
we had supported entered into the Phase I testing that OHA did,
and failed that testing. I think that is about as much as I can
say. I would be happy to go back for the record and put this in
writing.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. Let me ask you a hypothetical: With the
Apex approach that you have now, are there certain measurement
points at which you might, because of your closer cooperation
with the component, you might be able to make a decision sooner
rather than later that, well, we spent $8 million, we are not
going to go spend another $10 million because it doesn't appear
that what we have been projecting fits in what the component is
going to need?
Dr. O'Toole. Yeah. You certainly aim to do that in all
well-managed R&D projects.
Mr. Lungren. Right. Is there anything about Apex that makes
it different than what has happened before?
Dr. O'Toole. Yes. You would have a--well, Apex and the
portfolio review, okay.
Mr. Lungren. Okay.
Dr. O'Toole. We are aiming to have, you know, clear process
controls on what projects we move forward on. But let me point
out that the testing that OHA is doing is of the same ilk. They
are doing now, testing to see if these technologies perform
according to their requirements. So though from one
perspective, which I certainly understand, it looks like S&T
has spent a lot of money on a technology that apparently
failed, OHA is trying to responsibly test these technologies
against each other before it makes an even bigger investment in
procuring the systems and putting them in the field.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Maurer, would you have any comments on
that?
Mr. Maurer. Yeah, absolutely. I think as a general
proposition, we have testified and reported in the past on
problems that DHS has had in prior programs where they hadn't
adequately tested technology before making big multibillion-
dollar decisions on what to buy. So from that perspective, it
is a very good idea, indeed, to make sure things are properly
tested before you move too far down the road on the acquisition
and procurement side of the house.
Mr. Lungren. What about the connection between S&T and the
component parts and the coordination earlier on, so that
maybe--and again hypothetically----
Mr. Maurer. Sure. Sure.
Mr. Lungren [continuing]. Maybe before you continue to go
down the spending path, you realize that the ultimate decision-
maker in terms of the component might be setting up a criteria
that would make it less likely that that which you have been
putting your money in would qualify for?
Mr. Maurer. As a general proposition, absolutely. You want
to have as close collaboration as you can get between the folks
that are developing the technology and the people that are
actually going to be using it.
Mr. Lungren. Are you seeing improvement in that in S&T?
Mr. Maurer. That is part of our on-going work. That is
certainly something we can report out on next year. We are
encouraged by our discussions with S&T at this point, and the
things that they have talked about. But as you know, part of
what GAO does is, we have heard sort of the first line of
arguments, the discussions with the Under Secretary and her
staff. It sounds very promising. But as part of our work, we
are going to be verifying. We are going to see if that is what
is actually taking place. So stay tuned on that front.
Mr. Lungren. Trust but verify.
Mr. Maurer. Yeah.
Mr. Lungren. All right. I believe that will conclude our
hearing. I want to thank both of you for being here. I want to
thank both of you for the work that you are doing and continue
to do. Thank you for your valuable testimony, and the Members
for their participation.
The Members of the committee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses. We would ask you, if you receive
them, to respond to us in a timely fashion in writing. The
hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
This subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions for Tara O'Toole From Honorable Yvette D. Clarke
Question 1a. Dr. O'Toole, in the fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year
2012 budgets, the administration proposed transferring the
Transformational R&D program from the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
(DNDO) to the S&T Directorate, explaining that this move will further
consolidate R&D across the Department. You have testified in other
hearings that moving this program to the S&T Directorate would reduce
duplicative efforts in program management and ``create a better
environment for R&D coordination in support of the DHS mission.'' In
contrast, DNDO Director Warren Stern testified that the decision had
``pluses and minuses.'' While the House-passed appropriations act
rejects this transfer, the Senate appropriations act supports it. Now,
the Department states that it has ``reconsidered'' the proposed
transfer and prefers to keep the Transformational R&D program within
DNDO. I have a list of questions that I will probably follow up on
after the hearing, but initially:
What is the Department's current position regarding the requested
transfer?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. Are all DHS components in agreement regarding this
transfer?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1c. What tangible, quantifiable benefits would
consolidating the Transformational R&D program from DNDO to the S&T
Directorate have?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1d. What are the potential negatives?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1e. What additional documentation will the administration
be sending to Congress regarding its position and fiscal year 2012
appropriations?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1f. Why should Congress approve the administration's
request?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. In your planning for fiscal year 2012, which areas will
your investment in basic research yield the greatest results? How will
you prioritize basic research with the proposed sharply reduced R&D
budget?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Dr. O'Toole: Does S&T have the capability to perform
rapid business and technical reviews to screen unsolicited homeland
security technology proposals submitted to the Secretary? If not, is
this a function that you believe S&T would be able to do if authorized?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. Dr. O'Toole, many of us believe that S&T struggles to
work with Department components because DHS hasn't established clear
guidelines and requirements for funding research. Most say, the
Integrated Product Team (IPT) process is a good way of bringing
components to the table, but it's an extremely informal mechanism to
hand out millions of dollars in research. Please explain any steps you
have taken to make sure basic and applied homeland security research is
identified, prioritized, funded, and evaluated by S&T.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions for Tara O'Toole From Honorable Laura Richardson
Question 1a. The DHS Science and Technology Directorate is
responsible for developing technologies for other DHS components'
programs and is specifically tasked by the Homeland Security Act of
2002 to perform testing and evaluation of anti-terrorism technology. An
example of a DHS component program is the Office of Health Affairs
(OHA), BioWatch Generation-3 system that is being developed to detect
the presence of airborne biological pathogens. S&T spent tens of
millions of dollars on the development, validation, and transition of a
next-generation assay technology for OHA's BioWatch Generation-3
program. Under Phase I of the Gen 3 program the S&T technology was
rejected by OHA claiming the technology did not meet system testing
requirements. In August a draft Request for Proposals for Phase II was
published and involves full rate production of as many as 2,500 units.
Dr. O'Toole, as one of the Federal Government's top experts on the
prevention and effects of bio-terrorism, I would like to understand
exactly how involved you were, personally, in the evaluation of
BioWatch Gen 3, Phase 1 technology tests.
Did you concur with the decision to stop testing in Phase I?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. To what extent have you been engaged in the
anticipated RFP for BioWatch Gen 3, Phase II thus far?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1c. Does the Secretary of DHS support you and/or your
office having a formal and substantial coordinating role with OHA on
Phase II to ensure the testing and evaluation of the Gen 3 technology
is validated by scientists capable of interpreting complex data on this
biothreat detection threat technology?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1d. In previous testimony before the House Appropriations
Committee in February 2010, you said that a company S&T funded to
develop an autonomous bio-detection sensor for Biowatch Gen 3 was a
real ``success story'' for how S&T supports industry, including small
businesses, in bringing new technologies to the homeland security
mission. It is my understanding that this technology was tested along
with one other technology by the Office of Health Affairs and in the
middle of the tests OHA stopped testing the S&T-funded detector but
kept paying for testing for technology of the other company. How can
industry, be it a small business or a large company, be persuaded to
develop new technologies if they are not permitted to complete the
testing phase?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1e. Do you have an opinion regarding if it is wise to
award to a single supplier when the threats are still evolving and the
complex instruments to detect them are still in development?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions for Tara O'Toole From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren
PRIORITIZATION & PROGRAM REVIEW
Question 1. Dr. O'Toole's testimony indicated that she is reducing
the number of projects that are funded, instilling annual reviews of
on-going work, and funding each project through to use in the field.
She also indicated that S&T is starting to see this effort bear fruit.
What percentage of S&T's R&D efforts have resulted in deployment of
a new, improved technology?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Are the Apex projects superseding the IPT process in
serving as the major mechanism for obtaining and prioritizing the needs
of DHS operational components?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. Considering the Apex projects are one-on-one efforts
between S&T and another component or end-user, what mechanism exists to
prioritize R&D across disciplines (e.g., who decides and how is it
decided whether a border security project is higher or lower priority
than an aviation security project?), as well as to find synergies
across the needs of the components to get more bang for the buck?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4. What is the status of plans to replace or improve the
IPT process? What improvements have been made or plan to be made? What
funding lines (e.g. HSARPA R&D, Centers of Excellence, etc.) are under
the purview of the IPT process?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. How does S&T track or measure whether its R&D results
are meeting homeland security objectives?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6a. The S&T Directorate has established a portfolio review
process that it uses to assess the impact and feasibility of its R&D
activities.
Why does the S&T Directorate not employ a more traditional peer
review process using other scientists to judge the scientific merit of
proposed research?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6b. How are the views of customers, such as first
responders and DHS operational components, incorporated in the
portfolio review process?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7a. To what extent do the other components of DHS use the
HSSAI and HSSEDI and is that work funded by S&T or the component?
Do they primarily support the activities of the S&T Directorate or
others?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7b. How do these FFRDCs affect the S&T Directorate's
activities, such as its prioritization of R&D activities?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8. How is S&T improving the performance of its University
Centers of Excellence and their alignment with homeland security needs?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
R&D COORDINATION
Question 9a. What actions is S&T undertaking to coordinate R&D
among its peers within the Department?
How does this coordination manifest itself?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 9b. What written documents support these coordinative
efforts?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 9c. How is S&T institutionalizing this coordination so
that it can continue into future years?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 10. Please describe how S&T coordinates its R&D agenda
with those of other departments to ensure that unnecessary duplication
of effort is avoided and gaps do not exist between the efforts of the
various homeland security R&D conducting agencies?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
balance between s&t's missions--r&d, t&e, and acquisition support
Question 11a. Dr. O'Toole has stated that S&T is focused on getting
technologies out within 18 months. Who is looking farther out in time
to ensure DHS will have the ability to address adaptive adversaries?
Are there other entities S&T is relying on to invest in long-term
R&D or does this present a gap?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 11b. If S&T maintains some core capability to address
emerging threats, what proportion of S&T's budget is dedicated to this
effort as opposed to focusing on current threats?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12a. The focus of the Homeland Security Advanced Research
Projects Agency (HSARPA) has shifted several times since its creation.
Currently HSARPA contains all of the technical divisions and receives
the bulk of S&T's funding.
What is the proper role for HSARPA, i.e., should it focus on
prototyping and near-term technology development, high-risk/high-reward
R&D, or some other role?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12b. What proportion of S&T's resources should be devoted
to HSARPA in future years?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 12c. If HSARPA invests in high-risk, high-reward projects,
what proportion of funding do you expect to be dedicated to this effort
and what is the optimal success rate or tolerable failure rate to
ensure that sufficiently challenging projects are undertaken?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 13a. Currently, the S&T Directorate provides oversight of
testing and evaluation (T&E) activities conducted by other DHS
entities. Other agencies, such as the Department of Defense, have
independent testing and evaluation entities.
How would establishing an independent testing and evaluation entity
within DHS, outside of S&T, change the current state of testing and
evaluation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 13b. How does S&T in its current form ensure there are no
conflicts of interest since it has responsibility as both the developer
of technology and the test and evaluation authority?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 13c. What additional authorities does S&T require?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 14. When will all major acquisitions be fully compliant
with S&T's T&E policies?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 15a. Please describe how S&T views the roles of the DOE
National laboratories versus S&T's other FFRDCs versus the private
sector.
What factors determine whether S&T expends funds through a National
lab, other FFRDC, or in the private sector?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 15b. What is the appropriate balance for S&T between
funding work in Government laboratories versus open competition in the
private sector?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
TECHNOLOGY FORAGING
Question 16. What is S&T's approach to ``technology foraging'' and
how does it differ from S&T's normal way of doing business such as
market research, Requests for Information, reading technical journals,
attending scientific conferences, and conducting internet searches?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 17. Is there dedicated funding for the technology foraging
effort? In what budget line item does it appear? Will external
contractors be used?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 18. How formal is the technology foraging process within
S&T? Is S&T incorporating technology foraging into all new program
starts and does S&T plan to incorporate technology foraging as part of
the acquisition support S&T provides to the components?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
the national biodefense and analysis countermeasures center (nbacc)
Question 19. Is the NBACC fully up and running? If not, why not?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 20. The NBACC is maintained at about $30 million per year.
However, we understand there is currently unused space at the lab. Can
the laboratory space that is complete but vacant be leased to other
Federal entities that may be looking for upgraded facilities?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 21a. This committee has learned that severe corrosion of
the pipes in several areas of the laboratory was discovered, in places
where the pipes had never even been used.
Can you please explain how this could have happened in a brand-new,
unused laboratory?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 21b. Please provide the precise cost of remediation and
how far back, in terms of time until full operational capability, these
problems have set the lab.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 22a. I understand that approximately $76,000 is spent
annually on casework at the NBFAC, but annual costs to maintain the
capability to do that casework total about $3.1 million, not including
overhead.
Please provide a detailed breakdown of the activities associated
with the costs to maintain the casework capability.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 22b. What results have been generated by the NBFAC that
have enabled cases to be tried successfully in a court of law?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 23. Is the NBACC leveraging historical knowledge and
understanding of biothreat agents that exists within the Department of
Defense and U.S. allies, such as the United Kingdom, to the maximum
extent possible, including the threat from dual agents?
How is S&T facilitating NBACC's ability to access such information?
(Submit classified information as necessary to the committee under
separate cover.)
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions for David C. Maurer From Chairman Peter T. King
Question 1a. The S&T Directorate provides oversight of testing and
evaluation (T&E) activities conducted in other DHS entities. Other
agencies, such as the Department of Defense (DOD), have independent
testing and evaluation entities.
Do you think it would be beneficial for DHS to similarly have an
independent OT&E authority outside of S&T?
Question 1b. Could there be potential conflicts because S&T is
currently both the developer and the T&E authority?
Question 1c. How would establishing an independent testing and
evaluation entity within DHS change the current state of testing and
evaluation?
Answer. We believe it is necessary for DHS's T&E oversight
authority to be independent of the programs it oversees to ensure that
DHS has non-biased information when making decisions about acquiring
new technologies. We reported in June 2011 that the Director of
Operational Test and Evaluation within S&T's Test & Evaluation and
Standards Division (TES) oversees T&E of components' acquisition
programs to ensure that they meet the requirements of DHS's T&E
directive.\1\ As a separate office within S&T, we reported that TES is
independent of the component acquisition program management offices
that it oversees and is separate from the offices within S&T that
conduct R&D. We reported that TES met some of its oversight
requirements for T&E of acquisition programs we reviewed, but we
recommended that S&T better document its review and approval of
component documentation to ensure that the requirements of the DHS T&E
directive are met. S&T agreed and reported that it has since developed
internal procedures to ensure that their review and approvals are
documented. We did identify one case in which TES was serving as the
operational test agent for a DHS program--the Advanced Spectroscopic
Portal--and, as a result, was not in a position to independently assess
the results of operational testing as required by the T&E directive. We
recommended that DHS arrange for an independent assessment of this
program's test results. DHS agreed and stated that it has since
identified another entity to serve as the test agent instead of TES.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, DHS Science and Technology: Additional Steps Needed to
Ensure Test and Evaluation Requirements Are Met, GAO-11-596
(Washington, DC: June 15, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our work did not specifically assess where the T&E oversight
function should be placed within DHS and did not compare DHS's
structure with that of DOD. However, the purpose and organization of
DOD T&E activities underscores the importance of independent T&E
efforts. We have reported that developmental testers help reduce
program risk by evaluating performance at progressively higher levels
of component and subsystem levels, thus allowing program officials to
identify problems early in the acquisition process.\2\ Within DOD, the
operational testing organization provides information regarding the
operational effectiveness and suitability of weapon systems and can
assist in managing program risk. DOD developmental testing and
operational testing activities were under one organization--the
Director of Test and Evaluation--prior to 1983. In 1983, Federal law
established the position of the Director, Operational Test and
Evaluation, who is appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. The Director is required by law to submit to the Secretary of
Defense and the Congress annual reports summarizing DOD's operational
test and evaluation activities.\3\ In 2009, the developmental testing
organization began reporting to the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics through the Director, Defense
Research and Engineering.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: DOD Needs to Develop Performance
Criteria to Gauge Impact of Reform Act Changes and Address Workforce
Issues, GAO-10-774 (Washington, DC: July 29, 2010).
\3\ 10 U.S.C. 139.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2a. GAO's prior work in 1995 on DOE National Laboratories
showed the labs did not have clearly-defined missions focused on
accomplishing DOE's changing objectives and National priorities.
Given S&T's changing focus today, how do you think S&T could go
about creating a tighter linkage between the labs and S&T's mission and
goals to maximize the labs as a resource?
Question 2b. Do you have any thoughts on how a potential
consolidation of DOE's National labs that the recent DOE IG report
suggested would affect S&T and how S&T could go about ensuring homeland
security needs are factored into any decisions made by DOE?
Answer. We reported on DHS's use of the DOE National Laboratories
for R&D purposes in May 2004--1 year after DHS and S&T had begun
operations.\4\ In that report, we recommended that S&T develop and
better communicate to DOE's laboratories and other potential
contributors to homeland security R&D efforts criteria for distributing
annual project funding and for making long-term investments in
laboratory capabilities for homeland security R&D. We also recommended
that DHS develop specific guidelines that detail the circumstances
under which DOE laboratories and other Federal R&D programs would
compete for contracts with private sector and academic entities. We are
currently reviewing DHS and S&T's processes for prioritizing,
coordinating, and measuring the results of its R&D efforts for the
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and we
will report on our results next year. While we are not focusing
specifically on S&T's use of National labs, we will assess how S&T
prioritizes its R&D activities, how it selects projects, and what
entities conduct R&D.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Needs a Strategy to Use DOE's
Laboratories for Research on Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Detection and Response Technologies, GAO-04-653 (Washington, DC: May
24, 2004).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The findings of DOE's Office of Inspector General in its recent
report on management challenges in the Department of Energy are
generally consistent with our prior work.\5\ For example, the DOE IG
report questioned whether the laboratories' missions are clear, well-
understood, and properly coordinated and whether the laboratory complex
was appropriately sized. This is consistent with our 1995 report that
found that DOE's National laboratories did not have clearly-defined
missions focused on accomplishing DOE's changing objectives and
National priorities.\6\ This inhibited cooperation across DOE programs
and hindered DOE's ability to use the laboratories to meet Departmental
missions. In addition, DOE's IG raised doubts about whether the
significant proportion of scarce science resources that are being
diverted to administrative, overhead, and indirect costs for each
laboratory are sustainable in the current budget environment. This
complements findings from two of our reports. In September 2005, we
reported that it is difficult to compare indirect costs across
laboratories because laboratory contractors define indirect costs
differently. In June 2010, we found that the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) could not accurately identify the total costs to
operate and maintain facilities and infrastructure for three National
laboratories because of differences in sites' cost accounting
practices.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ DOE Office of Inspector General, Special Report: Management
Challenges at the Department of Energy, DOE/IG-0858 (Washington, DC:
Nov. 10, 2011).
\6\ GAO, Department of Energy: National Laboratories Need Clearer
Missions and Better Management, GAO/RCED-95-10 (Washington, DC: Jan.
27, 1995).
\7\ GAO, Department of Energy: Additional Opportunities Exist for
Reducing Laboratory Contractors' Support Costs, GAO-05-897 (Washington,
DC: Sept. 9, 2005) and GAO, Nuclear Weapons: Actions Needed to Identify
Total Costs of Weapons Complex Infrastructure and Research and
Production Capabilities, GAO-10-582 (Washington, DC: June 21, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In any consolidation of the laboratories, the research requirements
of all of DOE's customers would need to be considered in any decision-
making process. This is particularly important for the DHS-directed
work at the DOE National laboratories because, under a 2003 memorandum
of agreement between DHS and DOE, research for DHS is given the same
priority at the DOE National laboratories as DOE-directed research.
However, in 1998 we reported that the laboratories did not function as
part of an integrated National research and development system.
Therefore, an independent panel, as recommended by DOE's IG, that
would, among other things, comprehensively examine alternatives for
realigning DOE's laboratory complex, may be a useful step to better
defining overall Governmental research objectives. This may also help
in developing performance measures to assist the National laboratories
to accomplish the broad array of research requirements across the
Federal Government.
Question 3. Given all of S&T's recent changes, including in its
organizational and management practices and the shifting scope of its
mission, do you believe S&T would benefit from updating its last 5-year
R&D plan (fiscal year 2008-2013) and if so, please explain some of the
benefits.
Answer. We believe that strategic planning is important to help
ensure that an agency's efforts and resources are aligned with their
mission and goals. As I noted in my testimony, we reported in May 2004
that DHS did not have a strategic plan to guide its R&D efforts and
recommended that it complete such a plan and ensure that it was
integrated with homeland security R&D conducted by other Federal
agencies.\8\ DHS agreed with our recommendation and while S&T developed
a 5-year R&D plan in 2008 to guide its efforts and is currently
finalizing a new strategic plan to align its own R&D investments and
goals, DHS has not yet completed a strategic plan to align all R&D
efforts across the Department. Moreover, as noted in my testimony, our
prior work on Federal R&D efforts could provide valuable insights into
how DHS could develop comprehensive strategies. For example, we
reported in June 2009 that DOE could not determine the effectiveness of
its laboratories' technology transfer efforts because it has not yet
defined its overarching strategic goals for technology transfer and
lacks reliable performance data.\9\ We recommended that DOE explicitly
articulate Department-wide priorities for technology transfer efforts
and develop clear goals, objectives, and performance measures in line
with identified priorities. We have also reported that leading private
companies have strong strategic planning practices to identify the
right technologies to pursue and prioritize resources. Strategic
planning is an important early step in a company's ability to
eventually deliver the highest-priority technologies to various product
lines.\10\ The leading private companies we visited underwent strategic
planning at least annually, and this process enabled corporate
management to conduct portfolio analysis, determine which projects
appeared to be relevant and feasible, and identify new thrust areas as
new ideas come to light. Projects that were no longer relevant or
feasible were eventually terminated. This type of strategic planning
was critical to ensuring that the right technologies were ultimately
transitioned to the right product line in an economical and timely way.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ GAO-04-653.
\9\ GAO, Technology Transfer: Clearer Priorities and Greater Use of
Innovative Approaches Could Increase the Effectiveness of Technology
Transfer at Department of Energy Laboratories, GAO-09-548 (Washington,
DC: June 16, 2009).
\10\ GAO, Best Practices: Stronger Practices Needed to Improve DOD
Technology Transition Processes, GAO-06-883 (Washington, DC: Sept. 14,
2006).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are currently reviewing DHS and S&T's processes for
prioritizing, coordinating, and measuring the results of its R&D
efforts for the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs and we will report on our results next year. As part of this
work, we will review the 5-year R&D plan that S&T developed in 2008 and
assess DHS and S&T's efforts to develop an R&D strategic plan for the
department.
Question 4. Do you see a role for S&T beyond being the T&E
authority in the Department's acquisition of technology? For one,
should S&T be conducting Technology Readiness Assessments to ensure a
technology is sufficiently mature before proceeding through major
acquisition gates?
Answer. We believe that the technical knowledge and expertise
within S&T should be leveraged to the greatest extent possible to help
DHS in the development and acquisition of new technologies to ensure
that they work most effectively when implemented. S&T recently
reorganized and established new strategic goals, one of which is to
leverage its expertise to assist DHS components' efforts to establish
operational requirements, and select and acquire needed technologies.
As part of this reorganization, S&T established the Acquisition Support
and Operations Analysis Group to help provide this assistance to
components. In Under Secretary O'Toole's testimony, she noted that S&T
has now been incorporated into DHS's new integrated investment life
cycle and will be working on the ``front end'' of the acquisition
process assisting in the development of program requirements, which
greatly improves the odds of a successful transition at the end of the
program. She also noted that S&T will provide systems engineering
support throughout the ``middle'' of the investment life cycle to
assist components with items such as risk management and developing
concepts of operation. Additionally, S&T has responsibility for
conducting oversight of T&E requirements on the ``back end'' of the
acquisition process, which helps to ensure that technologies have been
appropriately tested prior to acquiring and deploying them.
Our work has not specifically assessed S&T's role in conducting
technology readiness assessments (TRA) and has not compared DHS with
DOD. However, we can provide some information about how DOD conducts
TRAs that may be useful. In DOD, the program manager, in conjunction
with an independent team of subject matter experts, are responsible for
conducting a TRA, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research
and Engineering provides the Milestone Decision Authority, an
independent assessment and review concerning whether the technology in
the program has been demonstrated in a relevant environment. Although
we have not evaluated the effectiveness of this process, it appears to
be working well. We have recently reported that DOD weapons acquisition
programs are now beginning with much higher levels of technology
readiness than when we first started reporting this information in
2003.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon
Programs, GAO-10-388SP (Washington, DC: March 30, 2010).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the recent changes at S&T seem promising, it is too soon to
assess what impact S&T's reorganization and focus on assisting
components will have until DHS programs have been subjected to these
new processes over time. The extent to which DHS leverages expertise
within S&T will determine S&T's impact on the development and
acquisition of new technologies across the Department. We are currently
reviewing DHS and S&T's processes for prioritizing, coordinating, and
measuring the results of its R&D efforts for the Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and we will report on our
results next year. As part of this review, we will review S&T's recent
reorganization, its focus on providing technical assistance to
components, and the associated impact on DHS components. We are also
currently assessing DHS's acquisition management activities for the
same committee and will report on our results next year as well.
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