[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
PROTECTING THE HOMELAND: HOW CAN DHS USE DOD TECHNOLOGY TO SECURE THE
BORDER?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 15, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-56
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Janice Hahn, California
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Chairwoman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Henry Cuellar, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Ben Quayle, Arizona, Vice Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Paul Anstine, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security.......................................... 4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 9
Witnesses
Mr. Paul N. Stockton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland
Defense and America's Security Affairs, Office of Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
Mr. Mark S. Borkowski, Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Technology Innovation and Acquisition, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 17
Mr. Adam Cox, Deputy Director (Acting), Homeland Security
Advanced Research Projects Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 17
Mr. Michael Tangora, Deputy Assistant Commandant and Director of
Acquisition Services, United States Coast Guard, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 17
For the Record
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security:
Letter......................................................... 7
Appendix
Questions for Paul N. Stockton From Honorable Michael T. McCaul.. 47
Questions for the Department of Homeland Security From Honorable
Mike Rogers.................................................... 48
Questions for the Department of Homeland Security From Honorable
Michael T. McCaul.............................................. 48
PROTECTING THE HOMELAND: HOW CAN DHS USE DOD TECHNOLOGY TO SECURE THE
BORDER?
----------
Tuesday, November 15, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Miller, Rogers, McCaul, Duncan,
Cuellar, Sanchez, Jackson Lee, Clarke of Michigan, and
Thompson.
Mrs. Miller. Good morning, everyone. The Committee on
Homeland Security Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security
will come to order.
The subcommittee today is meeting to hear testimony from
Paul Stockton, the assistant secretary of defense for Homeland
Defense and America's Security Affairs; Mark Borkowski, who is
CBP's Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition chair;
Dr. Adam Cox, acting deputy director of the Homeland Security
Advanced Research Projects; and Michael Tangora, of the U.S.
Coast Guard--he is the deputy assistant commandant for
acquisition on the use of Department of Defense technology by
the Department of Homeland Security. So, fantastic witnesses
that we have here today.
Let me just recognize myself for an opening statement.
We think that three main tools have really been brought to
bear to help secure our Nation's porous border: Personnel, of
course; infrastructure; and technology. We have nearly doubled
the size of the U.S. Border Patrol since 2004, and we have
built nearly 650 miles of vehicle and pedestrian fence. We have
spent nearly $1 billion as a Nation on the now-cancelled Secure
Border Initiative, SBInet, and we have had a number of hearings
on that in this committee and our full committee, as well.
Today we are having this hearing. We have called it today
to examine how the Department of Homeland Security can use off-
the-shelf hardware, innovative Department of Defense technology
and hardware to address the needs of the men and women who are
charged with securing our Nation's border.
For years we have been trying the same basic technology on
the borders: Some variation of cameras mounted onto towers. The
SBInet was just the latest version of really a similar
technology that we have been using on the Southwest Border for
many years, starting with ISIS, and then P28, and of course,
the SBInet, and the successor, Integrated Fixed Towers.
GAO's recent report casts some doubt on CBP's ability to
accurately forecast the 10-year life-cycle cost for the
Integrated Fixed Towers, roughly estimated at $1.5 billion, and
add to that, of course, $1 billion, as I mentioned, already
spent on SBInet where we just have coverage for about 53 miles
of virtual fence, and this, of course, is a very serious
investment by the American taxpayer thus far.
Congress needs to be able to justify to the American people
that our border is tangibly more secure as a result of that
spending and other spending that we are doing, and I think that
the budget situation, obviously, that we face is--all of us are
painfully aware of what is happening at the Federal level here,
and Federal funding levels are heading in one direction--down--
and we need to be good stewards of very scarce taxpayer dollars
to provide the security the American people demand. Again,
keeping, in fact, in mind, being very cognizant of the fiscal
restraints that we currently are operating under.
My hope is that CBP will be listening to the concerns of
GAO and that we look at possibilities of cost overruns and
delays as we field the Integrated Fixed Towers and the mix of
technologies selected to replace SBInet. Although we face
challenges with the technology on the border, I am absolutely
convinced that America certainly needs a robust technology
solution for the border because we can't build enough fence or
afford thousands of additional agents to link arms to prevent
illegal crossings or do drug interdiction and other kinds of
things. Technology, if properly applied, can leverage the
Nation's previous investment in manpower and infrastructure to
more effectively secure our borders.
For some time myself, along with many of my colleagues here
on the dais, have been advocating for the use of the Department
of Defense--the DOD's technology to be tested and, where
appropriate, to be used where it has application along our
Nation's borders. Of course, again, we are thinking of this
because the American taxpayer has already spent their money--
they spent billions of dollars on R&D, on research and
development, to test, to prove, to field all kinds of various
types of equipment.
I think as our military is now drawing down in both Iraq
and Afghanistan we should, certainly at a minimum, consider
using DOD equipment to determine if it can fill a capabilities
gap right here at home instead of, perhaps, just putting it out
into a warehouse or looking at other uses for it. I think there
are some real applications for DOD in regards to DHS.
The Predator B, the drone, is perhaps the best example of
how DOD technology can be successfully utilized along the
border. It has literally revolutionized how we fight insurgents
in the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan and the
officials at the Department of Homeland rightly saw the
potential for its use here at home, and now we have eight
unmanned aerial vehicles patrolling the skies over the Northern
Border, the Southern Border, the Coastal Borders, as well.
Again, my colleagues and I have had a number of hearings on the
UAVs.
Aerostats are another surveillance platform that has been
used successfully in theater, being currently used along the
border, and I think if surplus aerostats come back from theater
that they could be used to increase our central awareness along
the Southwest Border. That was actually an amendment filed to
the reauthorization that this committee recently did by my
Ranking Member and Mr. McCaul, in regards to the aerostats.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine the process that
the Department of Homeland Security uses to locate--what they
call foraging--forage for technology that has application for
the homeland environment. Science and Technology has an
important role to play in helping the Department of Homeland
Security component understand what technology is available for
use and what technology is being developed to meet our
capability gaps.
DOD has some small-scale technology transfer programs for
the Nation's first responders, and I certainly commend them for
the work that they do through that program. But it is also our
intent to see what Congress can do to facilitate the transfer
of larger, more sophisticated technology solutions, as I
mentioned, like the Predator drone, tunnel detection, and a
wide area of surveillance platforms.
DOD is obviously a huge organization, and I think we are
somewhat concerned that there is not one single office that the
Department of Homeland Security can go to to find technology
solutions that may have applicability for our border security
efforts, and we will be asking some questions about that today.
Certainly not every piece of equipment within the DOD inventory
will work on the border or be affordable by the Department of
Homeland, but there should be some sort of a formal structure
to facilitate the testing and the evaluation of equipment to
see what works and what doesn't.
DHS should be constantly searching for technology already
purchased by the Government to help our agents better secure
the Nation, both at home and--at our borders and between the
ports of entry, as well. So I certainly look forward to the
testimony of all of our witnesses.
That really is the predicate for our hearing this morning,
as we keep thinking about an evolving world and less money at
the Federal level, and how we can actually utilize so many of
these various things that I say are sort of off-the-shelf
hardware from the Department of Defense that have application
for securing our border. I think we have a lot of fertile
territory there to till, and especially, as we have mentioned,
in light of the fact of the drawdown in theater in Iraq and
Afghanistan. How can we utilize some of these things very, very
effectively?
With that, I would recognize my Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, Mr. Cuellar, for his opening statements.
[The statement of Chairwoman Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairwoman Candice S. Miller
November 15, 2011
Three main tools have been brought to bear to help secure the
Nation's porous border: Personnel, infrastructure, and technology. We
have nearly doubled the size of the U.S. Border Patrol since 2004, we
have built nearly 650 miles of vehicle and pedestrian fence, and we
have spent nearly $1 billion on the now-cancelled Secure Border
Initiative. I have called this hearing today to examine how DHS can use
off-the-shelf, innovative Department of Defense technology and hardware
to address the needs of the men and women who are charged with securing
our border.
For years we have been using the same basic technology on the
borders--cameras mounted on towers. SBInet was just the latest version
of the same technology we have been using on the Southwest Border for
years starting with ISIS, P-28, SBInet, and the successor--Integrated
Fixed Towers. All of these high-technology solutions have a less than
stellar track record on the Southwest Border due to a combination of
mismanagement, poor planning, and a top-down approach that failed to
take into account the actual needs of the Border Patrol Agents on the
ground.
GAO's recent report casts some more doubt on CBP's ability to
accurately forecast the 10-year life-cycle cost for the Integrated
Fixed Towers--roughly estimated at $1.5 billion dollars. Add that to
the $1 billion already spent on SBInet for just 53 miles of virtual
fence and we are talking about a serious investment by the American
taxpayer. Congress needs to be able to justify to the American people
that our border is tangibly more secure as a result of that spending.
My hope is that CBP will listen to the concerns of GAO and will not
lead us down that same path with cost overruns and delays as we field
the Integrated Fixed Towers.
Although we have faced challenges with technology on the border,
America still needs a robust technological solution because we can't
build enough fence or afford thousands of additional agents to link
arms to prevent illegal crossings. Technology, if properly applied, can
leverage the Nation's previous investment in manpower and
infrastructure to more effectively secure our borders. However, let us
be under no illusion, the budget situation is dire, and we need to be
good stewards of scarce taxpayer dollars to provide the security the
American people demand, without breaking the bank.
For some time I, along with some of my colleagues here on the dais,
have been advocating for the use of Department of Defense technology to
be tested, and where appropriate, used along the Nation's borders. The
reason is simple, the American taxpayer has already spent billions of
research and development dollars to test, prove, and field such
equipment. As our military draws down in Iraq and Afghanistan we
should, at a minimum, consider using Department of Defense equipment to
determine if it can fill a capabilities gap here at home instead of
collecting dust on a shelf or in a warehouse.
The Predator B is perhaps the best example of how DOD technology
can be successfully used along the border. It has literally
revolutionized how we fight insurgents in the border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Officials at DHS rightly saw the potential
for its use here at home and now we have eight unmanned aerial vehicles
patrolling the skies over the Northern, Southern, and Coastal Borders.
Aerostats are another surveillance platform that has been used
successfully in theater, and should be tested along the border.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine the process that DHS uses
to locate technology that has application for the homeland environment.
I have no doubt there are other technologies waiting to be found and
applied to defend the homeland. The Science and Technology Directorate
has an important role to play in helping DHS components understand what
technology is available for use, and what technology is being developed
to meet our capability gaps.
I understand that DOD has some small-scale technology transfer
programs for the Nation's first responders, and I commend them for the
work they do through that program, but my intent is to see what
Congress can do to facilitate the transfer of sophisticated technology
solutions specifically for use by DHS.
DOD is a huge organization and I am concerned that there is not one
single office that DHS can go to and find technology solutions that may
have applicability for our border security efforts. Not every piece of
equipment within the DOD inventory will work on the border, but there
should be a formal structure to facilitate the testing and evaluation
of equipment to see what works, and what doesn't. DHS should be
constantly searching for technology already purchased by Government to
help our agents better secure the Nation both at and between the ports
of entry.
I look forward to the witness's testimony.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you for
holding this meeting today.
Thank you, Mr. Thompson.
Madam Chairwoman, if you would ask me just--I mean, allow
me just for a point I just noticed that my brother, who is a
sheriff on the border, Martin Cuellar, who served with DPS,
Narcotics, and Intelligence, I believe, for about 27 years,
just walked in. So if you don't mind, just to keep family
harmony together, I would ask my brother, and I think he has
got some of his deputies also here.
So, Martin Cuellar, up there. Just----
Mrs. Miller. Welcome. Welcome. We appreciate your service--
and your brother. Everyone in your family.
Mr. Cuellar. Let me, again, thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
As a Member of Congress representing a district along the
Southern Border I have had the opportunity to see first-hand
the benefits of the Department of Homeland Security's
collaboration with the Department of Defense, with the--working
with Mr. Borkowski, also, and other folks there, and of course
the Coast Guard, also, along on our border security technology.
Last year both Mr. McCaul and some of the Members who were down
there, and we saw a DHS-DOD operation on Laredo, Texas, where
technology was used to secure the border.
Mr. Borkowski, thank you, again, for being there with us at
that time.
DIA, I believe, was the other partner. Again, I think this
is something that, you know, we have been on it, as the
Chairwoman said. We have been asking the SBI and the Science
and Technology parts of DHS to look at what taxpayers have paid
already and see what the Department of Defense has so we can go
ahead and use that as much as possible along the Southern
Border.
I truly understand, some things we can use, some things we
can't use. But working together, I think, it will be important.
Along with, again, with my other colleagues from Texas, Mr.
McCaul and myself, we have been supporters of the DHS use of
unmanned aerial systems, the UAS, along the border. We just got
our second one down there. We will be working with General
Kostelnik on that one.
Again, this is another example of how technology developed
for the DOD has been a proven invaluable DHS border security
mission. Most recently, with Chairman McCaul, we traveled on a
Congressional delegation--Mr. Duncan, I believe--well, Mr.
Duncan was with us, also, and we traveled to the Middle East
down there, and when we were in Iraq and Afghanistan we saw
some of the technology that I think will have an application
for Homeland Security.
As the military drawdown in Iraq continues there may be
technology and equipment that is no longer needed there but may
be used through DHS, and I think the questions that I asked
there was, ``What are we going to do with the billions of
dollars of assets, which includes technology?'' The answer that
General Austin there gave us there, and the ambassador, was
that: No. 1, part of it will be transferred to Afghanistan; No.
2, some of it will be repositioned in Kuwait or wherever the
case might be; and No. 3, the rest will be--or the--part of it
will be coming down to the United States.
Of course, our question is: No. 1, how does DHS use that?
No. 2, how do we have State officials--for example, the Texas
National Guard has communicated both to McCaul and myself that
they are interested in some of the equipment resources that
they can certainly use for the border, and certainly in
California, Arizona, New Mexico, or other areas, and the
northern area, also, that can be used also.
One of the issues that came up--and I believe, Assistant
Secretary Stockton, you will address this issue--was how do we
pay for this? Because most of it is--for example, a sheriff or
police can get on a website and say, ``This is equipment that
we want.''
But the understanding, at least what they told us in Iraq,
and I think you gave us a--you are going to give us an answer,
was that, who is going to pay for this technology? I mean, you
are going to have a small town sheriff that is going to say,
``I want this technology, but how much would it cost to bring
it from Iraq all the way down to Arizona?'', for example, and
it might be prohibitive.
But my understanding is it might be where there is excess
space that they can put on, and we certainly would like for the
committee to hear this is something that the Northern Border,
the Southern Border can certainly use. Whether it is DHS, Mr.
Borkowski, whether it is a sheriff, or National Guard, I think
this is something that we certainly want to look at as to how
we can do that. Because I was talking to Mr. Norm Dicks about
putting some language there in the appropriation bill to see if
we can take care of it, but if it is something that you all
could handle, or it is something that we might have to follow
up, I would ask you to do that.
So again, I am also pleased that we also have the Coast
Guard present here. You know, when we talk about border
security technology that facilitates the interdiction, whether
it is narcotics, or undocumented aliens, or those who wish to
do harm to us, we know that people will take the route where
they perceive to offer the best opportunity to enter the
country. If we secure the land borders and the maritime borders
people will, you know, if we take care of the land they will go
through the maritime, or push on the maritime they will come
in. It is like a balloon that you press, and they will pop up
somewhere else.
So we have got to make sure that we are all working along,
and certainly the maritime, the Coast Guard, is something, and
certainly on the Texas border we have the Rio Grande. It is an
area of international waters. We had a little discussion with
Coast Guard, and I think you have, I think we are all on the
same page that it is international waters.
I think you all are doing some pulse--especially in Lake
Falcon, as you remember, Madam Chairwoman, that is where the
individual got killed, which happened 2\1/2\ miles on the
Mexican side--not on the U.S. side, for emphasis. Then you have
Lake Amistad, also, where you do some of that work, also,
there.
Last year's Coast Guard authorization I added some
language--authored some language that directed the Coast Guard
to prepare a mission requirement analysis for the navigable
parts of Rio Grande, which includes those two large lakes. We
finally got a copy, little late, but we finally got a copy of
this. Members, I am going to provide to you, for official use
only; this is not to be shared with the public, but for
official use, and this will be handed out to the committee
Members.
But I asked Coast Guard to put something out that we can
put out in public, so I would ask, Madam Chairwoman, that this
letter that is addressed to me from the Coast Guard to be made
part of the record.
Mrs. Miller. Without objection.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Cuellar. Basically there are, because we want to use
technology, and we will look at the risk, but the main thing
that came out of this--and this is important for you to note--
this is the Coast Guard saying this, this is no--this is the
Coast Guard. Let me just leave it like this.
But the main thing is, when they talked about the drug
cartels and what sort of violence they provide, they said on
the Mexican side the drug cartels it is a high threat; on the
U.S. side--and I emphasize this--on the U.S. side the Coast
Guard said that it was a moderate threat to the United States,
at least on the navigable part, on the lake part of it.
So when you look at the drug trafficking organizations and
what challenges they have--and as you know, they have a low, a
moderate, and I think it is a high one, there are about four of
them--just for the record, the Coast Guard said it was a
moderate threat on the U.S. side. When we asked them, also,
about smuggling of migrants, at least on the water side of it,
on the border Rio Grande and the lakes, they said that the
level of migrant activity has been relatively low compared to
other parts of the country itself.
So therefore, when we were asking--the reason I put this
assessment, because I wanted to get an assessment so we can get
the Coast Guard involved a lot more instead of a pulse--I think
you all go, like, every quarter, you do your fly-overs and put
your boats out there.
Based on this report, Members, they are saying, what we are
doing now, the pulse, is sufficient, and therefore, this is
what they are doing. So I would ask you to look at this report.
Finally, just to go ahead and conclude, we know that we are
in particularly tough budgetary times, but again, as the Madam
Chairwoman and a lot of us have been saying for a long time, if
there are taxpayers' dollars that are being used for Defense
let's use that for Homeland Security. So I certainly look
forward to listening to the witnesses, and I thank you all very
much.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman. The Chairwoman now
recognizes the Ranking Member of the full committee, the
gentleman from Mississippi, for his opening statement.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman, for
holding this hearing. I welcome and look forward to the
testimony of our witnesses.
This committee has a long history of oversight of the
Department of Homeland Security's efforts to deploy technology
along our Nation's border. Since the inception of DHS's
efforts, Department of Defense technology and expertise has
played an important role.
To the extent that the DoD has technology or equipment that
may be useful to DHS's mission to secure the homeland, it makes
sense that DHS take advantage of those sources whenever
possible. Particularly in the current budget environment, the
Federal Government must make taxpayers' dollars go further.
I hope to hear from our witnesses today about the existing
relationship between DoD and DHS regarding security
technologies. I would also like to hear whether the witnesses
believe a more formal, comprehensive process for technology
transfer between the agencies would be advantageous.
That being said, we should be mindful that there are
limitations to this approach to border security technology. DHS
and DoD have different missions, so it stands to reason their
technologies may differ. In some cases, a less elaborate, more
affordable technology may fully meet DHS's requirement, and
those kind of technologies should not be overlooked.
Even where the agencies' needs align, there are likely to
be obstacles. For example, just because a technology works in
Afghanistan does not mean it will work in Arizona. Technology
may have to be adapted due to differences in terrain and
climate, or it may simply be inappropriate for use in the
homeland.
Also, just because a technology fits within DoD's budget
does not necessarily mean it will fit within DHS's budget.
DoD's technology acquisition budget is orders of magnitude
greater than DHS's, so what is affordable for one agency may
not be for the other.
I hope to hear from our DHS witnesses about these
challenges and how they address them as they examine the array
of available security technologies.
Also, since we are here today to discuss border security
technology, I would be remiss if I did not address a report
released this month by GAO on Customs and Border Protection's
Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan. In short, GAO
found that DHS does not have the information necessary to fully
support and implement the estimated $1.5 billion plan, which is
the successor to the cancelled SBInet program.
More specifically, the report states that DHS does not yet
demonstrate the effectiveness and suitability of its new
approach for deploying surveillance technology in Arizona and
that it needs to document how, where, and why it plans to
deploy specific combinations of technology prior to its
acquisition and deployment. Also, GAO found that $1.5 billion
10-year cost estimate for the program may not be reliable.
I have said that the similarities GAO found between the
failed SBInet program and aspects of the planned Arizona Border
Surveillance Technology Plan are both striking and troubling.
There is still time for DHS to avoid another failed border
security technology project, but DHS must heed GAO's
recommendation by conducting a thorough and accurate cost
analysis and carefully planning the purchase and deployment of
technology.
I certainly hope CBP is following through on GAO's
recommendation, and I would ask Mr. Borkowski to speak to that
issue today.
I thank our witnesses for joining us, and I look forward to
their testimony.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman very much for his opening
statement.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that their
opening statements may be submitted for the record. Then what I
am going to do is go through the bios of each one of our
witnesses today, and then we will start with Mr. Stockton.
Paul Stockton is the assistant secretary of defense for
Homeland Defense and America's Security Affairs. In this
position he is responsible for the supervision of homeland
defense activities, defense support for civilian authorities,
and Western Hemisphere security affairs for the Department of
Defense. Prior to his confirmation, Assistant Secretary
Stockton was a senior research scholar at Stanford University's
Center for International Security and Cooperation.
Mark Borkowski became the assistant commissioner for the
Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition with U.S.
Customs and Border Protection in July 2010. He is responsible
for ensuring technology efforts are properly focused on mission
and well-integrated across CBP and for strengthening
effectiveness in acquisition and program management.
Prior to his appointment as the assistant commissioner Mr.
Borkowski was named executive director of the SBInet. As
executive director, he oversees the Department of Homeland
Security's implementation of SBI at U.S. Customs and Border
Protection and oversees the continued efforts to develop border
security resources that will provide enhanced situational
awareness for front-line CBP personnel.
Mr. Borkowski served over 23 years on active duty in the
United States Air Force, retiring at the rank of colonel.
Dr. Adam Cox is currently the acting deputy director of the
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency. Formerly,
he was the chief of staff for the Strategy, Policy, and Budget
Division. In this role he acted as a principal liaison with
Congressional staff and OMB and worked to align DHS S&T
programs with the priorities and goals of the administration,
Congress, and the Department.
Michael Tangora is the deputy assistant commandant for
acquisition and director of acquisition services for the United
States Coast Guard. Prior to assuming this role he served as
deputy program executive officer for the Coast Guard's
Integrated Deepwater System. A Level 3 acquisition and program
management professional, he came to the Coast Guard from the
Navy, where he served as the deputy program manager for the
Navy's aircraft carrier programs.
He was previously assigned as the assistant program manager
and technical director for surface mine warfare systems
programs, where he was responsible for the Navy's total mine
inventory, as well as all mine warfare sonar and autonomous
vehicles used to persecute enemy mines.
Very, very distinguished panel, so we appreciate all of you
coming today and look forward to your testimony and Q&A, as
well.
We will start with Mr. Stockton.
STATEMENT OF PAUL N. STOCKTON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR HOMELAND DEFENSE AND AMERICA'S SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Mr. Stockton. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar,
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, I am going to cut to
the chase right now: We have an historic opportunity with the
drawdown of operations outside the United States to continue to
press forward to find ways of supporting the Department of
Homeland Security, our other Federal partners, State and local
first responders, so the military technology that you pointed
out, Chairwoman, that the taxpayers already pay to develop,
that we find ways of transferring that technology at a time
when the budgets of our State and local first responders are
under incredible pressure.
This is a great opportunity. We have a one-stop shopping
opportunity for our Federal partners and for the State and
local first responders with whom we coordinate. That is me.
That is what I do. It is a responsibility I take very, very
seriously, and I will be happy to talk a little bit more about
how that process works a little bit later.
But first, let me take just a couple of moments to briefly
summarize the programs that we have underway, especially those
programs, Ranking Member Cuellar, that recognize the problem of
affordability. First of all, we have acquisition programs in
the Department of Defense to facilitate Federal, State, and
local agency acquisition of equipment from the Department of
Defense. So we, in summary, for certain scarce types of
technology and equipment, we make it possible to buy these
pieces of equipment from the Department of Defense.
I think more valuable, given the kind of budget crunch that
States and localities are in today, are our excess property
programs. We operate programs to transfer excess DoD equipment
to Federal, State, and local agencies. In 50 States and more
than 1,700 Federal, State, and local agencies they have
received over $2.6 billion worth of donated excess DoD
equipment for use in counterdrug, counterterrorism activities,
border security.
Let me emphasize that we are drastically ramping up the
pace at which we are able to provide this equipment that our
first responders and our Federal partners say they need. This
year alone we have gone--my testimony says $500 million--we
have just passed $600 million worth of equipment in this fiscal
year alone that is required by States and localities and our
Federal partners in order to do their jobs, including support
to border security.
Let me give you some examples: 27 light armored vehicles
provided to law enforcement organizations in 10 States; three
C-12 aircraft worth $4 million each to California's Department
of Forestry, fire protection; tactical vehicles and helicopters
worth $5 million that went to DHS Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; robots, radiological detection equipment. Lots and
lots of valuable equipment that DoD was able to acquire thanks
to the taxpayers we are now transferring to our Federal
partners and our State and local first responders, recognizing
the budget crunch that they are in.
We also have another way of transferring DoD equipment to
our partners that is low-cost, and that is equipment loan-lease
programs. So, for example, robotics for IEDs and other
explosive ordinance disposal--very, very expensive to have
these robots for local governments to purchase them; instead,
we loan these robots to local law enforcement agencies, other
public safety organizations.
We enable bomb squads to meet their certification
requirements. We have a night vision loan pool that provides
very expensive night vision equipment to local law enforcement
jurisdictions on a loan basis. We maintain the pool. We provide
it to those agencies in 48 States.
Then we have expertise-sharing. You pointed out, Chairman,
that the Department of Defense has acquired enormous expertise
in dealing with explosive ordinance disposal, other kinds of
challenges that we have faced abroad. Now we provide that kind
of training, for example, to the Hazardous Devices School, an
FBI investigation facility which is operated in Redstone
Arsenal, Alabama.
I will point out that I have had the honor of supporting
the Center for Domestic Preparedness in my past life. It is a
wonderful institution, and in my old job in the Department of
Defense we really enjoyed having an opportunity to support the
curriculum development and the very important work that CDP
continues to do.
We have dual-use technologies that I hope to be able to
speak to later. It is all in my testimony, and I see my time is
up. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stockton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Paul N. Stockton
November 15, 2011
introduction
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, distinguished Members of
the subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to address you today on
the Department of Defense's (DoD's) programs for transferring
capabilities and equipment to its Federal, State, and local partners.
DoD supports the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and other
Federal partners, as part of a whole-of-Government, whole-of-Nation
approach to both domestic security and domestic incident response. One
of the pillars of the Department's Strategy for Homeland Defense and
Civil Support is to promote the integrating and sharing of applicable
DoD capabilities, equipment, technologies, and technical expertise with
Federal, State, local, Tribal, and private sector partners. This
sharing arrangement strengthens the Nation's ability to respond to
threats and domestic emergencies. DoD continues to work closely with
its interagency partners, in particular DHS, to build capacity
vertically from the Federal level down to the local level, and
horizontally across the Federal Government. I want to thank Congress
for providing DoD with the tools that are absolutely essential to
making this possible.
In accordance with Section 1401 of the Bob Stump National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Pub. L. 107-314), I serve as
the senior DoD official responsible for coordinating ``all Department
of Defense efforts to identify, evaluate, deploy, and transfer to
Federal, State, and local first responders technology items and
equipment in support of homeland security.'' To this end, I established
what I call the ``DoD Domestic Preparedness Support Initiative.''
Through this program, I work closely with DHS, the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and our other Federal, State, and local partners.
The Domestic Preparedness Support Initiative focuses on five
approaches: Acquisition programs; excess property programs; equipment
loan-lease programs; expertise sharing; and the leveraging of dual-use
technologies developed by DoD.
acquisition programs
DoD operates several programs to facilitate Federal, State, and
local agency acquisition of equipment from DoD. For instance, in
September 1968, Congress authorized DoD to sell 2 suitable surplus
equipment to State and local law enforcement and firefighting
agencies.\1\ In 2010, DoD championed, and Congress passed, an expansion
of this authority to include homeland security and emergency management
agencies.\2\ In November 1993, Congress authorized State and local
governments to purchase law enforcement equipment suitable for counter-
drug activities through DoD.\3\ In 2008, DoD championed, and Congress
passed, an expansion of this authority to include equipment suitable
for homeland security and emergency response activities.\4\ In
September 1996, Congress authorized DoD to sell or donate to Federal
and State law enforcement agencies excess property suitable for use by
the agencies in law enforcement activities, including counter-drug and
counter-terrorism activities.\5\ In October 2000, Congress authorized
DoD to sell or donate to State firefighting agencies excess property
suitable for use in fire and emergency medical services.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 10 U.S.C. 2576, which was established by section 403(a) of an
Act to authorize appropriations for DoD for Fiscal Year 1969 (Pub. L.
90-500).
\2\ Section 1072 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Pub. L. 111-383).
\3\ 10 U.S.C. 381, which was established by section 1122 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 (Pub. L. 103-
160).
\4\ Section 885 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Pub. L. 110-417).
\5\ 10 U.S.C. 2576a, which was established by section 1033 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Pub. L. 104-
201).
\6\ 10 U.S.C. 2576b, which was established by section 1706 of
Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001
(Pub. L. 106-398).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
At least 43 States access DoD procurement contracts through these
programs, allowing law enforcement agencies to purchase weapons and
ammunition; chemical and biological defense equipment (e.g.,
decontamination, full body protection, shelter protection, and
respiration protection); aviation support equipment (e.g., aviation
parts and support items); and communications and electronics equipment
(e.g., early warning systems, tactical radios, and night vision
goggles).
excess property programs
DoD also operates programs to transfer excess DoD equipment to
Federal, State, and local agencies. For example, as noted above, in
September 1996, Congress authorized DoD to donate to Federal and State
law enforcement agencies excess property suitable for use in counter-
drug and counter-terrorism activities.\7\ Also, as noted above, in
October 2000, Congress authorized DoD to donate State firefighting
agencies excess property suitable for use in firefighting
activities.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ 10 U.S.C. 2576a, which was established by section 1033 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Pub. L. 104-
201).
\8\ 10 U.S.C. 2576b, which was established by section 1706 of
Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001
(Pub. L. 106-398).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All 50 States and more than 17,000 Federal, State, and local
agencies have received more than $2.6 billion \9\ worth of donated
excess DoD equipment for use in counter-drug and counter-terrorism
activities, almost $500 million of this in fiscal year 2011 alone. More
than 2,200 Fire Departments and State Forestry Departments in at least
32 States have received excess DoD equipment for use in firefighting
activities. From fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2010, these States
received more than $382 million worth of equipment, including more than
5,927 vehicles and trailers. Other donations included:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Original Acquisition Value.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Twenty-seven light armored vehicles (V-150s and V-300s),
worth $500,000 each, that went to 10 States (in 2007 and 2009).
Three C-12 aircraft, worth $4 million each, that went to
California's Department of Forestry and Fire Protection (in
2008).
Winches, hoists, and cranes; tents and tarps; guns up to .30
caliber; and field litters, worth approximately $638,000, that
went to DHS/Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (in 2010). In
addition, 34 snowmobiles to patrol the border, thereby saving
more than $150,000, also went to DHS/CBP (also in 2010).
Tactical vehicles and five helicopters, worth approximately
$5 million, that went to DHS/Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE).
An excess DoD Mark II robot, originally valued at $55,000,
that went to the Ashland County Bomb Squad in Ohio.
Through a partnership with DHS, the Department of Energy
(DOE), and the Health Physics Society (the Homeland Defense
Equipment Reuse (HDER) Program), excess DoD radiological
detection instrumentation and other equipment, as well as no-
cost training and long-term technical support, that went to
emergency responders.
equipment loan-lease programs
DoD's equipment loan-lease program provides Federal, State, and
local agencies access to valuable capabilities. These agencies then
have an opportunity to use, evaluate, and experiment with these
capabilities in return for feedback on their effectiveness in the
field. For example, DoD's Robotics Loan Pool loaned robotic systems to
public safety organizations. Currently, five robots are on loan in
Massachusetts and Hawaii. Over the life of this program, more than 100
Government organizations, mostly State and local agencies, and 22
commercial entities participated in this program. In many cases,
Government organizations used this loan program to enable bomb squads
to meet their certification requirements. In general, commercial
entities used this program to develop new payloads for use by the
military and first responders. DoD's Night Vision Loan Pool provides
State law enforcement agencies with a low-cost (i.e., $300 annually),
low-maintenance alternative to purchasing night vision devices.
Currently, approximately 1,231 night vision devices are on loan to 429
agencies in 48 States.
expertise sharing
By sharing DoD's expertise with our Federal, State, and local
partners we help improve their capabilities. In return, DoD can readily
leverage the expertise and experience of its partners to improve DoD's
capabilities. The Hazardous Devices School (HDS), a Federal Bureau of
Investigation facility, which is operated by the Army's Ordnance
Munitions and Electronics Maintenance School at Redstone Arsenal,
Alabama, trains Federal, State, and local bomb squads. Since 1971, HDS
has trained and accredited thousands of technicians, including more
than 50 new bomb squads since September 11, 2011. The Domestic
Preparedness Equipment Technical Assistance Program (DPETAP), which is
executed by the Army's Pine Bluff Arsenal, Arkansas, provides mobile
teams to provide on-site technical assistance to first responders for
selecting, operating, and maintaining radiological, chemical, and
biological equipment. The Interoperable Communications Technical
Assistance Program (ICTAP), which is executed by the Space and Naval
Warfare Systems Center (SPAWAR) Pacific, has helped more than 75 States
and metropolitan areas to develop and implement regional communications
plans using the Communication Asset Survey and Mapping Tool (CASM).
ICTAP addresses interoperability issues, including governance and
planning, technical needs and solutions, and exercising and training.
dual-use technologies
DoD research and development has led to the production of many
items that are now routinely used by our Federal, State, and local
partners. DoD works closely with its partners to leverage potential
``dual-use technologies'' originally developed for military application
for civilian applications. As an example, DoD assisted the U.S. Coast
Guard in evaluating sensors and platforms that could enhance its
ability to conduct wide area surveillance to detect, identify, and
track vessels of interest. Likewise, in 2003, a Predator B Unmanned
Aerial Vehicle (UAV), scheduled for future delivery to DoD, operated in
support of DHS/ICE Operation SAFEGUARD, a joint humanitarian/law
enforcement effort along the Southwest Border. Operation SAFEGUARD
provided an opportunity for DoD to demonstrate UAV capabilities to
border authorities and also served to highlight the policy, legal, and
infrastructure issues that must be examined in tandem with technology
development. These include challenges associated with the use of UAVs
in controlled domestic airspace as well as the extensive infrastructure
(e.g., communications, exploitation tools, and imagery analysts)
required to process and exploit information collected by UAVs. In
addition, in 2008, DoD developed and installed a fiber optic-based
seismic acoustic sensor prototype system in the San Diego area. In
2009, DHS purchased this system and continues to support its
operational evaluation by the San Diego Tunnel Task Force. Also in
2009, DoD supported DHS's proof-of-concept demonstration for an
advanced ground penetrating radar technology for use in cross-border
tunnel detection. The results of this demonstration warranted continued
development and testing efforts in 2010 and 2011. Furthermore, DoD and
DHS are cosponsoring a ``Tunnel Detection'' Joint Capability Technology
Demonstration (JCTD). U.S. Northern Command is the DoD proponent for
this demonstration, and as the technologies mature, they are expected
to be fielded for use by DoD and DHS organizations at home and abroad.
DoD's Counterterrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO), which
oversees the interagency Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) (85
Federal agencies, including DHS, DOJ, DOE, and the Department of Health
and Human Services, work together to research and develop, test and
evaluate, and deliver combating terrorism capabilities to the National
interagency community rapidly),\10\ is currently developing
capabilities to detect, locate, monitor, and disrupt subterranean
operations in semi-permissive and non-permissive environments to allow
tactical forces to conduct operations and counter hostile and/or
criminal networks. Current, CTTSO counter-tunnel projects of interest
include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ The bulk of TSWG core funding is provided by DoD. Additional
funding is supplied by the Department of State, while other Federal
departments and agencies share the costs of selected projects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Portable Ground-Penetrating Radar.--Battery powered, man-
portable, ruggedized system to detect subterranean structures
(tunnels, bunkers, and caches) to a minimum depth of 15 feet,
with antenna configuration to allow for operation by one person
and be employable in any terrain.
Improved Underground Communications.--A planned proof-of-
concept involving multiple technology demonstrations, which is
currently investigating if further funding is warranted.
Remote Imaging and Detection of Underground Anomalies.--A
proven prototype that implements laser technology to identify
buried objects (e.g., caches and improvised explosive devices).
In fiscal year 2011, development of this prototype was expanded
to determine if the technology is capable of detecting voids.
Seismic-Acoustic Sensor Kit.--A mobile seismic acoustic
sensor system designed to detect underground activity with the
intent of easy deployment and operation in a temporary
environment (though permanent installation is also an option).
conclusion
At the signing of the Declaration of Independence, Benjamin
Franklin is reported to have said, ``We must, indeed, all hang
together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately.'' Similarly, as
we--Federal, State, and local government agencies, the public sector
and the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and individual
citizens--share the burden of the threats challenging our Nation, so
too must we share our strengths and capabilities to meet these
challenges more effectively. If we do not, assuredly we shall all hang
separately.
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, distinguished Members of
the subcommittee: I commend you for your leadership, continued
interest, efforts, and support in DoD's defense of the United States
and support to civil authorities here at home. I look forward to
working with you in the future.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Borkowski for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF MARK S. BORKOWSKI, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, OFFICE
OF TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND ACQUISITION, U.S. CUSTOMS AND
BORDER PROTECTION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Borkowski. Thank you.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, Ranking Member
Thompson, distinguished Members of the committee, it is a
pleasure to be here before you again to talk about CBP's plans
for technology and how we interact with DoD. My two colleagues
and I have submitted joint written testimony, but we will each
have brief opening remarks from our own perspective on this
issue.
If you do look at that written technology you will see that
what we did is we tried to cast a picture to show that we have
had a long and extensive and very broad relationship with the
Department of Defense, looking at a whole range of
technologies, and ability to evaluate them, and operational
concepts. In fact, from that relationship we have derived our
plan going forward--the plan that replaced--I am not so sure I
am prepared to say succeeds--replaced SBInet. Because that plan
itself is a plan that is based on existing technology, many
elements of which come from DoD.
Elements of that are, in fact, systems that Congressman
Cuellar, Congressman McCaul, and I went and looked and in
Laredo in November. So I think it is important to start with
that. This is a different technology approach.
When we talk about things like the GAO report, where we are
contrasted with SBInet, I would just call the committee's
attention to the fact that another contrast might be with the
way we bought remote video surveillance systems for the
Northern Border. Didn't hear a lot of problems with that
because we changed our method of buying them, and that method
we applied to the Northern Border is the method we are applying
now to the Southern Border.
Also, interestingly enough, what we bought on the Northern
Border are systems we are buying and estimated the cost for on
the Southern Border. So while it is true that we need to be
attentive to the risks in the plan going forward, it is a much
different plan, and it is a plan that is based on existing
available technologies. Even the IFT--the Integrated Fixed
Towers, which are one element of that plan--is not SBInet. It
is not a successor. It is not a development program. It is a
program that is based on available systems, including systems
that are available in the Department of Defense today.
So our whole approach to the initial deployment of
technology on the border is based very much with the kinds of
concepts that I think this committee is interested in, and we
will continue to do that.
It is interesting, because I have had a little trouble
explaining this, and perhaps I am not as eloquent, perhaps, as
General Schwartz, but I was reminded of something that General
Schwartz, the chief of staff of the Air Force, had said. I
thought, if I may, I--because this is our view--I would share
this. He said, although historically we have had more trade
space to advance the state-of-the-art we now must be more
calibrated in pushing the technological envelope. We must be
ruthlessly honest and disciplined when our operational
requirements allow for more modest, less exquisite, and higher
confidence acquisition programs.
He goes on to say, Government must ensure stable
requirements and reliable funding streams, while industry must
bid realistically and resist offering to sell more than what is
operationally required. In a time of robust funding we lost the
ability to differentiate what is essential and what is nice to
have.
That is exactly where we are. So I think we and the
Department of Defense also share a view of how best to proceed
in getting focused on what we need, not what is the shiniest
thing in the box. We are aware that many of those systems exist
today from DoD.
Going forward, there are systems that we are interested in,
going forward. We have flexibility in our planning that will
require additional evaluation and additional work, but it may
be worth it. We continue to evaluate those, and we will hear
more from the Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology because we rely on them to help us in that regard.
In my remaining minute I did--I think I have a remaining
minute--I did want to address the GAO report briefly, and I
will look forward to questions. But certainly when we look at
the GAO report I have two views of it. One is, it is actually
rather good. It is rather good in the sense that it identifies
and confirms risks that we ourselves had identified and,
frankly, believe we have managed.
It is probably less good in setting context. As you can
imagine, when you have a risk all kinds--there is a whole range
of things that can happen, from nothing bad to tremendously
bad, and the GAO report focuses on the range that is
tremendously bad. I will tell you that we don't think that it
is likely that we will be on that end of the risk.
I will give you, for example, in terms of cost--we
understood the issues that the GAO recognized in cost and we
provided for that. While we maybe didn't measure the risk, we
certainly did accommodate it, and to this point, what we are
actually finding--keep your fingers crossed--but what we are
actually finding is that the actual costs that we seem to be
incurring are likely to be less than we identified in those
rough order magnitude costs because we did accommodate the
risk.
So I will look forward to the questions. I do think that
the GAO did a nice job of identifying risks, but I would say
those were risks that we were aware of and we believe we have
plans in place that will minimize the likelihood that getting
that risk will get us to the far bad end of the spectrum.
With that, I will look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Borkowski, Mr. Benda,
and Mr. Tangora follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Mark S. Borkowski, Paul Benda, and Michael
Tangora
November 15, 2011
introduction
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished
Members of the committee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear
before you today to discuss the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
on-going collaboration with the Department of Defense (DoD) to secure
our Nation's borders and particularly the role U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's (CBP), the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), and
the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) have played in such cooperative efforts. I
am Mark Borkowski, Assistant Commissioner of CBP's Office of Technology
Innovation and Acquisition (OTIA) and the CBP Component Acquisition
Executive. I am pleased to offer this joint statement with my
colleagues Paul Benda, Chief of Staff for DHS S&T and Director of the
S&T Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency (HSARPA), and
Michael Tangora, Deputy Assistant Commandant for Acquisition in the
U.S. Coast Guard.
As America's front-line border agency, CBP's priority mission is to
protect the American public while facilitating lawful travel and trade.
To do this, CBP has deployed a multi-layered, risk-based approach to
enhance the security of our borders while facilitating the flow of
lawful people and goods entering the United States. This layered
approach to security reduces our reliance on any single point or
program that could be compromised. It also extends our zone of security
outward, ensuring that our physical border is not the first or last
line of defense, but one of many.
Technology plays a critical role in this layered approach. My role,
as assistant commissioner and CBP's component acquisition executive, is
to ensure our technology efforts are mission-oriented and well-
integrated across agencies and Departments. To support us in our
mission, we have developed extensive partnerships with DHS S&T and DoD.
overview of cbp, dhs, s&t, and dod interactions
CBP is one of many components within DHS that work with DoD on a
regular basis. In many cases, CBP partners with DHS S&T and together we
work with DoD to leverage their investments and experiences to help
identify potential solutions for CBP programs. DHS S&T plays a key role
in many CBP activities including funding, co-founding, and providing
technical expertise to many of the projects discussed throughout this
testimony.
Together, CBP and S&T enjoy a close working relationship with our
DoD counterparts. Many of the technologies CBP needs to support our
officers and agents in the field have already been put into practice by
DoD. There are many similarities, but also differences, between DoD and
CBP missions and objectives. Through our history of close
collaboration, we have been able to take advantage of what we have in
common.
There are also opportunities for us to further refine our
partnership with DoD. We look forward to continuing to work closely
with DoD to develop a comprehensive view of the opportunities and
technologies we can leverage together, while keeping in mind the
different missions, objectives, and needs for the two departments.
As we look back over our extensive history and relationship with
DoD, we have found four general types of collaboration. They are:
Joint Development and Demonstration;
Test Support;
Deployed Systems;
Joint Operations.
The following examples are testament to the breadth and depth of
our work with DoD. The examples are a snapshot in time; we find new
opportunities every day. We look forward to continuing to build these
relationships and seek new ones with those offices that have the
technology and capability to help us perform our critical missions.
joint development and demonstration
``Development and Demonstration'' is the creation of a technology
and the demonstration of the applicability of that technology in a
particular mission setting. We often work with DoD to tailor already-
existing technology (originally designed for a DoD application) to
CBP's mission. We also benefit from joint opportunities to evaluate
potential future technologies. In some cases, we work with an
acquisition command with specific expertise like the U.S. Army Night
Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate. In other instances, we work
with an OSD organization such as Rapid Reaction Technology Office, an
organization that coordinates across Service organizations. We also
conduct cooperative demonstrations to assess DoD technology in a joint
or CBP unique mission area. The examples listed below describe a
variety of projects and concepts that have arisen through
collaborations with DoD.
DoD Organization: OSD Rapid Reaction Technology Office (RRTO)
Joint Effort.--Due to RRTO's extensive history of demonstrating
technology for rapid deployment to the field, DHS has been able to
leverage RRTO's efforts instead of creating new demonstrations. For
example, knowledge we gained from RRTO research is currently informing
our acquisition strategy for the sensor systems we will be deploying as
part of our Arizona Technology Deployment Plan.
DoD Organization: Joint Project Manager Guardian (JPMG)
Joint Effort.--Joint Program Manager Guardian acts as a
clearinghouse for information about a wide range of technology systems,
including Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) detection, tunnel
detection, and monitoring technologies.
DoD Organization: U.S. Northern Command
Joint Effort.--The Rapid Reaction Tunnel Detection (R2TD) Joint
Capabilities Technology Demonstration (JCTD) is a DoD program to
evaluate a readily available technology for tunnel detection. Working
with Northern Command, we have been able to apply the system as a
demonstrator for tunnel detection at the border as well as to collect
data for DoD's purposes. The Border Tunnel Activity Detection System
(BTADS), part of the R2TD initiative, is a multi-sensor system
utilizing a combination of sensors and mobile equipment to detect
general tunnel activity and find its specific location. The system has
undergone extensive testing in the San Diego Sector and other locations
within and outside the United States. We continue to use it while we
complete our effectiveness evaluations. The result of those evaluations
will also help inform the development of requirements for future tunnel
detection projects.
DoD Organization: Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
Joint Effort.--Our experience with tunnel detection and unattended
ground sensors has shown that it is critical to understand the
geophysical characteristics of a particular area in order to design
effective detection systems. This on-going project with DTRA is
developing a detailed understanding of the subsurface geophysical
characteristics and their effect on seismic, acoustic, and electro-
magnetic signal sources. The result of this effort will be a 3-D
modeling program that will assist in the deployment and use of tunnel
detection technologies.
DoD Organization: Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO),
Technical Support Working Group (TSWG)
Joint Effort.--This is another on-going project focused on tunnel
detection. It will include evaluations of various technologies
including a portable seismic acoustic sensor kit, advanced ground
penetrating radar, thermal cameras, robot platforms for remote illicit
tunnel inspection, and 360-degree video systems.
DoD Organization: Army Communications Electronic Research Development
and Engineering Center (CERDEC)
Joint Effort.--Between 2009 and into the summer of 2011, DHS and
CERDEC (along with several other supporting DoD organizations)
evaluated the Vehicle and Dismount Exploitation Radar (VaDER) on both
fixed-wing and DHS's Predator drone aircraft. VaDER offers the
potential for an affordable sensor package that can detect small moving
objects on the ground. Its operation on the DHS Predator offered proof-
of-concept for both DoD and DHS. In addition, during the evaluation,
VaDER successfully supported the detection and interdiction of illicit
border incursions. The results to date have demonstrated the
significant potential of VaDER as applied to CBP's mission.
DoD Organization: Army Research Lab, Acoustic Signal Processing Branch
Joint Effort.--Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS) have long been a
staple of our border surveillance technology. Understanding how and
where they work, and what we can do to improve their performance, has
value to both DoD and DHS. We have worked with this laboratory since
2006 to expand our understanding and continue to gain useful insights
as a result of this collaboration.
DoD Organization: Naval Research Lab (NRL)
Joint Effort.--Since 2005, we have collaborated with NRL on
algorithm development to distinguish tripwire activity so that we are
able to differentiate among human, animals, and vehicle movement.
DoD Organization: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)
Joint Effort.--This on-going collaboration with the Defense
Intelligence Agency will develop sensor technology capable of
distinguishing between human, animal and vehicle traffic.
DoD Organization: Sandia National Lab
Joint Effort.--Sandia is a U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
laboratory with expertise in Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) technology.
NII systems help us detect hidden contraband quickly and effectively.
Both DHS and DoD use Sandia's expertise to support research,
development, and evaluation of the Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII)
technology and detector designs.
DoD Organization: OSD Rapid Reaction Technology Office (RRTO)
Joint Effort.--The Thunderstorm program was established to test
evolving intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)
architectures, emerging technologies, and transformational concepts.
The first generation testing of Thunderstorm included Border Patrol
using DoD sensor data to provide a more complete operational picture in
Southern Arizona. Future planning will include demonstration of two-way
communication capability to provide a common operational picture (and
improved, integrated command and control) among multiple agencies.
DoD Organization: Army Communications--Electronics Research and
Development Center--U.S. Army Night Vision and Electronic
Sensors Directorate (NVESD)
Joint Effort.--Radars are becoming increasingly important elements
of our border security technology suite. There are many types of radars
available so characterization of them in our border environment helps
us to select among them. This collaboration is assisting with
performance analysis and test and evaluation of radars and their
associated signal processing suite, and the integration and test and
evaluation of imagery sensors to include assessment of image
performance characteristics and life-cycle costs.
DoD Organization: Institute for Defense Analyses (an OSD Federally-
Funded Research and Development Center)
Joint Effort.--We depend on well-established and recognized experts
to advise us about existing and potential technologies for application
to our missions. Since 2007, the Institute for Defense Analyses has
provided subject matter expertise for market research, radar
recommendations, test site and test methodology planning, test support
and data analysis assistance on improving detection and tracking of
ground surveillance radars in challenging border environments.
DoD Organization: U.S. Naval Air Systems Command
Joint Effort.--Part of any technology deployment plan should be a
strong and effective logistics support strategy. DHS and CBP have
limited expertise in this area, so we have solicited assistance from
DoD experts. This effort is developing logistics and sustainment plans
and processes for SBInet Block 1 and other CBP acquisitions.
DoD Organization: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command
Joint Effort.--Many DoD organizations have tools and extensive
experience in Mission Analysis and Operations Research, which CBP has
leveraged to augment our own capabilities. Together, this collaboration
completed a study to determine the sensor mix that maximizes the
probability and efficiency of detecting existing tunnels and tunnel
construction activity on the U.S. border according to geographic
location, infrastructure, and historical data. Also addressed in the
study was a business model for illegal cross-border tunnels based on
production rates of interceded narcotic quantities.
DoD Organization: U.S. Northern Command, Department of State,
Government of Mexico
Joint Effort.--We have an on-going effort to develop a Cross-Border
Secure Communications Network (CBSCN) Project with Mexico. This project
is designed to enhance international cooperation and interoperability,
which in turn should enhance our overall border security. This
collaboration supports the installation of microwave equipment at 10
city pairs along the U.S.-Mexico border for the purpose of addressing
the need for a long-term solution to cross-border communications.
DoD Organization: U.S. Air Force (USAF)--Edwards Air Force Base (AFB),
in partnership with USAF Test Pilot School
Joint Effort.--Starting in 2010, the two agencies worked together
on a joint demonstration to determine the effectiveness of current CBP
air assets to detect and track small, dark aircraft. The demonstration
showed how CBP air assets could increase their ability to detect these
aircraft by changing their patrol strategies.
DoD Organization: USAF Edwards AFB, in partnership with USAF Test Pilot
School
Joint Effort.--This project is focused on developing innovative
technologies that can detect and track small dark aircraft along the
Northwest Border of the United States. To date, exercises/testing have/
has identified three promising, low-cost sensor technologies that can
detect these aircraft at significant standoff ranges.
DoD Organization: U.S. Northern Command
Joint Effort.--Low-flying aircraft are a concern for border
security because they are difficult to detect with existing radars. In
this collaboration, we studied the use of Sentinel DoD radars during
demonstrations along the Northern Border to evaluate their ability to
detect low-flying aircraft.
DoD Organization: Joint Interagency Task Force, South (JIATF-S), U.S.
Pacific Command, and U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) Maritime
Intelligence Fusion Center, Pacific
Joint Effort.--CBP's mission includes requirements to detect small
items of interest in large expanses of oceans--for example, to detect
potential drug smugglers. The Tipsheet Review and Correlation EnhanceR
(TRACER) is a software application that enables an intelligence imagery
analyst to quickly find and characterize small maritime vessels in an
image showing over 1,000 square miles of ocean. The value of TRACER
stems from the speed with which it finds small vessels in large areas
of ocean and shares critical information about those vessels.
DoD Organization: Naval Research Lab and Naval Systems Warfare Center
(NSWC)
Joint Effort.--The Small Vessel Tracking system consists of a
system to fuse and present multiple vessel information sources to law
enforcement operators, through a laptop, into real-time tracking and
mobile field kit software. This effort also evaluated RFID tags for
tracking small vessels in a port/coastal environment. The core
technology was developed by DoD to assist in mission planning for
interdiction efforts. NSWC program management continues to provide
support and technical expertise for the development of these sensor and
surveillance technologies; a Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
effort.
DoD Organization: Naval Research Lab (NRL)
Joint Effort.--This on-going effort began in 2010. Shipboard
Automated Automatic Identification System (AIS) Radar Contact Reporting
(SARCR) is a NRL Rapid Prototype System developed to deploy on-board
U.S.-flagged commercial vessels, USCG costal patrol boats, and select
naval support vessels with a feed to DoD and DHS operational components
including CBP. The purpose of the SARCR System is to capture and relay
vessel radar and AIS data from the ship to a land-based central
processing center for distribution to DoD/DHS operating agencies. SARCR
addresses the DHS maritime capability gap associated with wide-area
surveillance against illegal traffic which includes GO FAST boats,
chugs, yolas, and potentially self-propelled semi-submersibles (SPSS).
These non-radiating targets are often referred to as ``dark'' targets
and separation of AIS contacts from non-radiating targets is the first
level of filtering in determining suspicious behavior.
DoD Organization: Naval Research Lab and USAF Air Combat Command (ACC)
Joint Effort.--This collaboration conducted over the past year was
a demonstration of Tethered Aerostat System Adjunct Radar Processor
(TARP) by leveraging the existing USAF ACC Tethered Aerostat Radar
System (TARS) radar surveillance capability in the region (optimized to
detect low, slow-flying aircraft) to provide enhanced maritime surface
coverage and tracking capability. DHS adapted a new, highly-capable
maritime radar processor to function with L-band radar designed
specifically for detecting low- and slow-flying aircraft and making
that surface contact data available to the appropriate action agency
via the web-based radar display.
DoD Organization: Naval Research Lab and NSWC
Joint Effort.--The Modular Sensor System/Improved Imaging
Technology Project is a sensor and processing suite used for persistent
wide-area surveillance and target tracking for port, harbor, and
coastal environments. The Improved Imaging Technology (IIT) camera was
developed over the last year at NRL as an Office of Naval Research
(ONR) Future Naval Capability (FNC) program. This project integrated
the camera system into an established port/coastal surveillance system
used by the USCG, but also has applicability to the CBP maritime
mission area.
DoD Organization: Naval Research Lab (NRL)
Joint Effort.--This on-going effort is focused on leveraging
existing weather radars for ocean surveillance. The National High
Frequency (HF) Radar Network, component of U.S. Integrated Ocean
Observing System (IOOS) led by NOAA, provides beyond the horizon
surface current data. The HF radars are also capable of detecting the
speed and location of vessels at sea, using algorithms developed by
Rutgers. HF radar are currently monitoring approaches to New York
Harbor.
DoD Organization: Naval Underwater Warfare Center Newport (NUWC
Newport)
Joint Effort.--Between 2008 and 2010, The NUWC Newport conducted a
test and evaluation of an improved radar capability to enhance ocean
surveillance. The effort focused on the potential applicability and
effectiveness of low-cost, commercially available radars to the
detection and tracking of large and small vessels in port and coastal
regions.
test support
The Department of Defense has extensive test facilities, test
ranges, and subject matter experts that DHS can use for checkout,
demonstration, and operational evaluation of technology solutions and
tactics. Use of these DoD capabilities offers a ``try-before-buy''
opportunity that reduces the risk of technology acquisition and
increases the likelihood that selected technologies will be
operationally useful. The DoD has not only offered testing environments
for our new assets, but also provided experts to conduct the tests. The
use of DoD facilities for testing purposes will continue to support DHS
efforts to test and accredit technology as the following examples
demonstrate.
DoD Organization: U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC)
Joint Effort.--DHS solicited support from ATEC for the structured,
quantitative, and comprehensive operational test and evaluation of our
SBInet Block 1 effort. ATEC conducted the test in late 2010, performed
data analysis, summarized test results, and provided recommendations
for improved system effectiveness and suitability. In the process, DHS
also gained valuable experience in performing this type of robust
operational test and evaluation.
DoD Organization: Joint Technology Assessment Activity (JTAA), Naval
Systems Warfare Center (NSWC)
Joint Effort.--DHS has a continuing need for support to conduct
operational test and evaluation activities. NSWC signed a 5-year
Interagency Agreement that will provide Operational Test Agent support
so that we can better ensure our technology provides value to our law
enforcement personnel.
DoD Organization: Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force
(COMOPTEVFOR)
Joint Effort.--As we deploy the Integrated Fixed Towers (one of the
systems within the technology portfolio selected as part of the new
Arizona Technology Deployment Plan), we have asked and received support
from COMOPTEVFOR. COMPOMTEVFOR will serve as our formal ``Operational
Test Agent.''
DoD Organization.--U.S. Army's Joint Interoperability Test Command
(JITC)
Joint Effort.--We have a strong interest in maintaining awareness
of the capabilities and availabilities of sensor systems. This
awareness, in turn, advises our acquisition strategies and plans for
technology along the border. The JITC has provided facilities, ranges,
and personnel for several radar tests to characterize and compare
systems for their potential effectiveness along the border.
DoD Organization: Naval Facilities Engineering Support Center, Space
and Naval Warfare (SPAWAR) Systems Center Pacific
Joint Effort.--As part of our approach to secure the maritime
environment, we are interested in capabilities to detect small,
underwater targets. The Center supported test and evaluation of a Low-
Cost Underwater Swimmer/Diver Detection Systems [a Small Business
Innovative Research (SBIR) project] and provided field support for
testing of this technology and marine engineering technical support
including analysis and recommendations.
deployed systems
Many of the systems DHS currently uses for surveillance and
situational awareness along the border come directly from DoD
development and heritage. These systems include:
Predator Drone--MQ-9
Blackhawk--UH-60
Orion P-3
KingAir--Beechcraft
Mobile Surveillance System (MSS)
Agent Portable Sensor System (APSS)
Remote Video Surveillance System (legacy system)
Unattended Ground Sensors (Monitron, McQ Omnisense)
Night Vision Camera (FLIR Night Ranger)
SBInet Block 1 Laser Illuminator
SBInet Block 1 Radar
Other examples include:
DoD Organization: U.S. Navy Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command
(SPAWAR)
Joint Effort.--The Advanced Wireless System is an upgrade of our
CBP communications infrastructure to correct obsolescence and shift
frequencies. SPAWAR supports us by providing project management
expertise and support, especially for tower construction.
DoD Organization: SPAWAR
Joint Effort.--SPAWAR and CBP have entered an Interagency Agreement
with the Northern Border for the Law Enforcement Technical Collection
project.
DoD Organization: Biometric Identification Management Agency (BIMA)
Joint Effort.--This collaboration developed the Automated Biometric
Identification System (ABIS)--an application to process and identify
all apprehended subjects. As part of normal processing, the
fingerprints are searched against the FBI and DHS's biometric
databases. The Border Patrol now has the ability to automatically
search the fingerprints and facial images against the DoD's ABIS
database, which has resulted in positive identifications of apprehended
subjects.
DoD Organization: U.S. Army Night Vision and Electronic Sensors
Directorate
Joint Effort.--DoD developed the Agent Portable Sensor System
(APSS) and demonstrated its effectiveness during collaborative
operations along the border. Based on this collaboration, DHS selected
the APSS systems as part of the technology portfolio for the new
Arizona Technology Deployment Plan. The Directorate also supported DHS
by providing an Army contract for DHS procurements, which accelerated
deployment of this capability to the border.
joint operations
In addition to efforts that support development, evaluation, and
deployment of technology systems, DHS collaborates with DoD and other
agencies in direct support of the border security mission. DoD and
other agency resources and personnel operate alongside our DHS
personnel, providing expertise and support that increase our mission
effectiveness. Examples include:
DoD Organization: Joint Task Force North (JTFN)
Joint Effort.--DHS has an extensive history of operational
collaboration with JTFN. This collaboration provides a wide variety of
capabilities in operations, engineering, training, intelligence, and
application of technology. Some recent examples include:
Operations.--JTFN has aided CBP in operations dealing with
ground sensors, radar, aviation FLIR, and air reconnaissance.
Engineering.--JTFN has supported CBP in construction of
border tactical infrastructure such as roads, lights, bridges,
and barriers.
Training.--Mobile training teams have provided 92 classroom
instruction missions that have covered planning, intelligence
and field craft, and survival.
Intelligence.--JTFN has provided support in the form of
intelligence analysts, mapping, and imagery.
Technology.--JTFN has supported 10 missions relating to
tunnel detection. Currently, 62 JTFN support missions are
tentatively planned for execution in fiscal year 2012.
Other Organization: Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT)
Joint Effort.--This is an enforcement collaboration which leverages
the capabilities and resources of more than 60 Federal, State, local,
and Tribal agencies in Arizona, and the Mexican government, to combat
individuals and criminal organizations that pose a threat to
communities on either side of the border. This collaboration has
resulted in the seizure of more than 2.2 million pounds of marijuana,
8,200 pounds of cocaine, and 2,700 pounds of methamphetamine; the
seizure of more than $18 million in undeclared U.S. currency and 343
weapons; over 16,000 aliens denied entry to the United States at
Arizona ports of entry due to criminal background or other
disqualifying factors; and approximately 342,000 apprehensions between
ports of entry.
DoD/Other Organization: DHS, DoD, and DOJ
Joint Effort.--Within the El Paso Intelligence Center, the DHS
Office of Intelligence and Analysis established the Border Intelligence
Fusion Section (BIFS) as a collaborative effort among DHS, DOJ, and
DoD, which enables the integration and synthesis of all available
Southwest Border intelligence from Federal, State, local, and Tribal
partners. The result is a common intelligence picture that supports
enforcement activities on the Southwest Border.
DoD Organization: DoD Central Command (CENTCOM)
Joint Effort.--Where DoD and DHS have a shared interest in Port
Security, we can combine our resources to increase our effectiveness.
For example, in 2008 CBP and CENTCOM entered an agreement to scan all
U.S.-bound DoD containers at Port Shuaiba, Kuwait prior to landing in
the United States.
DoD Organization: U.S. Northern Command and JTFN
Joint Effort.--CBP recognizes that we can increase our mission
effectiveness by better operational integration among our front-line
law enforcement components. While the concept is relatively new to us,
DoD has extensive experience in designing and leveraging joint, multi-
service capabilities. This collaboration has provided CBP's Joint
Operations Directorate (JOD) Joint Field Command (JFC) DoD's experience
with unification efforts to ensure CBP has a joint and integrated
approach to border security, commercial enforcement, and trade
facilitation missions in the Arizona area of responsibility. As a
result of working together, CBP has benefited with assistance in
processes, procedures, technology solutions, and received support.
DoD Organization: U.S. Navy Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape
(SERE)
Joint Effort.--Conducted intermittently since 2009 and continuing
today, this effort has provided personnel of the Rangeley Station in
Houlton Sector with cold weather survival training and detection and
interdiction of Special Interest Targets using Advance Evasive Tactics
training.
DoD Organization: U.S. Southern Command and JIATF-S
Joint Effort.--The groups have worked closely with the Homeland
Security Task Force--Southeast (HSTF-SE) in coordinating multi-
component/multi-agency prevention of potential or full-scale Caribbean
mass migration, achieved through supporting criminal prosecutions and
maintaining an active air, land, and sea presence.
Other Organization: JTFN, New York and Vermont National Guard
Joint Effort.--The first of three operations, Operation Maple Guard
I (conducted in 2008), combined CBP and DoD's assets in a concentrated
interdiction effort. Ground-based radar sensors were deployed at two
locations within Border Patrol's Swanton Sector in order to gather
intelligence on aircraft incursions. Interdiction aircraft and crews
were deployed as a means of apprehending any identified incursions.
Other Organization: Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
Joint Effort.--Operation Maple Guard II (conducted in 2008)
supported CBP in an initiative aimed at identifying, limiting, and
disrupting the ability of terrorists, traffickers, and immigration law
violators to smuggle in the Swanton Sector area of responsibility using
low-flying non-commercial aircraft.
Other Organization: RCMP, JTFN, Vermont National Guard and State Police
Joint Effort.--Operation Maple Guard III (conducted in 2010)
facilitated collaboration and synchronization of assets from Canada,
DoD, and CBP assets. Ground-based radar was deployed at 5 locations to
gather intelligence on aircraft incursions. Interdiction aircraft and
crews were on stand-by as a means of apprehending the identified
incursions.
Other Organization: RCMP, Canadian Armed Forces, and the Canadian
Network Operation Center (NOC)
Joint Effort.--This collaboration combined CBP and Canadian assets
in a concentrated interdiction effort. A ground-based radar sensor was
deployed in Canada in order to gather intelligence on aircraft
incursions. Interdiction aircraft and crews were deployed as a means of
apprehending any identified incursions.
Other Organization: DoD and National Guard
Joint Effort.--This collaboration provided assets and sensors
towards Operation Southeast Watch, a multi-agency coordination effort
to detect and interdict suspect targets of interests seeking to
penetrate the border of the United States.
Other Organization: Washington National Guard Counter Drug Task Force
(CDTF) and the Washington Air Guard CDTF
Joint Effort.--This collaboration, conducted between 2007 and 2010,
provided additional personnel and deployed the DoD Beechcraft ``Big
Crow'' to Spokane Sector, greatly enhancing the Sector's situational
awareness and overall detection capabilities.
Other Organization: JTFN, Northeast Counterdrug Training Center (NCTC),
and Wisconsin National Guard
Joint Effort.--As a result of working together, DHS received
training courses during fiscal year 2011 including courses in Interview
and Interrogation, Intelligence and Link Analysis, and Intelligence and
Preparation of the Operational Environment.
Other Organization: Vermont National Guard Civil Support Team (CST)
Joint Effort.--In 2011, the CST provided training to Border Patrol
Agents stationed in Vermont, as well as local law enforcement agents.
Courses covered WMD awareness, Officer Safety, Basic Combat Medic, and
CST Awareness and Capabilities.
Other Organization: California National Guard (CALGUARD)
Joint Effort.--CALGUARD supports the engineering missions of Border
Patrol's San Diego Sector. They have supported the construction of
border tactical infrastructure and facilities, such as drainage
structure installation, landing mat fence, vehicle maintenance
facility, two heavy equipment loading docks, and maintenance on over 90
miles of border road. Between 2006 and 2010, CALGUARD conducted 26
missions with us.
Other Organization: National Guard
Joint Effort.--DHS (including CBP) and the various elements of the
National Guard often collaborate in responding to natural disasters. As
one recent example, the North Dakota Army National Guard provided
mutual support and engagement response to natural disasters in North
Dakota.
DoD Organization: Army National Guard 1-188th Air Defense Artillery
Battalion (North Dakota)
Joint Effort.--The battalion provided support through the use of
their facilities. There is potential for expansion into an operational
role if the unit's Avenger GBASR is viable and utilized for short-term
border security missions.
Other Organization: Minnesota Air National Guard
Joint Effort.--This collaboration provided an established
operational intelligence-sharing environment between the Duluth Border
Patrol Station and the 148th Fighter Wing. Duluth Station provides law
enforcement support to wing Security Forces conducting immigration and
criminal record checks for entrance via the Duluth International
Airport. This venture has led to the arrest of undocumented aliens and
one U.S. Citizen on an extraditable warrant.
Other Organization: Maine Army National Guard (ARNG)
Joint Effort.--Between 2006 and 2007, the Maine ARNG Counterdrug
Program aircraft supported the sector's counterdrug operations with
aerial observation, interagency communications, and other capabilities
using rotary-wing assets.
Other Organization: Puerto Rican National Guard
Joint Effort.--The Puerto Rican National Guard assigned a radio
technician to Border Patrol's Ramey Sector. They have supported
Operation Southeast Watch (2009) in eastern Puerto Rico with an Athena
maritime radar platform, and Operation Island Hopper III (2011).
Additionally, they have provided sniper training and use of their
firing range to BORTAC agents.
overview of uscg and dod interactions
The Coast Guard has long partnered with the Department of Defense,
the U.S. Navy and the other military services to develop joint systems
and capabilities for its cutters, aircraft, and information and
communications systems. These partnerships are vital to the Coast
Guard's ability to meet its defense readiness mission requirements and
deploy in support of Combatant Commanders. In addition, the Coast Guard
is working with other DHS agencies to develop assets and capabilities
that have applications across shared areas of responsibility such as
border security and other law enforcement operations. In order to
support these partnerships, the Coast Guard employs Coast Guard
liaisons in the Department of Defense and other partner organizations.
The purpose of the Coast Guard's Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDT&E) Program is to support Coast Guard operational,
regulatory, and acquisition activities by leveraging innovative
scientific and technological solutions. The primary organization that
performs RDT&E in support of Coast Guard programs is the Research and
Development Center (RDC), located in New London, Connecticut. The Coast
Guard also works in close cooperation with the other military services
and DHS. These partnerships are providing the Coast Guard with
additional capabilities to meet its RDT&E needs.
conclusion
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, we thank you for this opportunity to
testify about the work of U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the
U.S. Coast Guard and our collaboration with DoD--across nearly 40
agencies and organizations--to help secure our borders.
We look forward to finding new ways to collaborate in the coming
months and years. CBP and the USCG recognize the importance of
eliminating redundancies and increasing efficiency within the
Government, and collaboration is paramount to our overall success. The
complexity and shared interests of the Northern, Southern, and Coastal
Borders have spurred many long-standing partnerships and such
initiatives strengthen manpower, technology, and intelligence.
We look forward to answering your questions at this time.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Dr. Cox, for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF ADAM COX, DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ACTING), HOMELAND
SECURITY ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Cox. Thank you.
Good morning, Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar,
Ranking Member Thompson, and the rest of the distinguished
Members of the committee. The director, of course, regrets he
couldn't be here today as he is celebrating the birth of his
first child, Quinn Isabella Benda, who was born yesterday
morning.
As you know, S&T strives to strengthen American security
and resiliency by providing innovative technology solutions and
knowledge products to the homeland security enterprise. HSARPA
is the primary R&D entity within S&T and it includes six
technical divisions, one of which is our borders and maritime
division, whose primary focus is the technology needs of CBP,
the Coast Guard, and ICE in their missions to secure our border
at and between the ports of entry.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear today before you,
and I would like to use the remainder of my time to quickly
cover three topics: Our close working relationship with CBP's
Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition, the formal
mechanisms with which we coordinate R&D and collaborate with
DoD, and why transitioning technology from the battlefield to
the border is not simply plug-and-play.
The collaboration and interaction we have at S&T with OTIA
is strong and getting stronger. We are both young, maturing
organizations and we are building upon the strong working
relationship S&T has enjoyed and established with CBP over the
last 8 years.
First, S&T has established a permanent liaison position
within OTIA. This person currently serves as the director of
technology management and is responsible for building the CBP
technology roadmap that will drive the future S&T-OTIA R&D
activities.
We also co-fund and collaborate on many projects across the
TRL spectrum. We share funding, resources, and subject matter
expertise.
Finally, we are establishing a formal set of roles and
responsibilities for S&T and OTIA through an MOA on the
evaluation of cost technology for use in CBP operations.
Since the formation of DHS, S&T has always looked to DoD as
a source of technology and to partner in R&D, and in this
environment and this budget climate this is especially
critical. We use the multiple formal interactions we have with
R&D agencies across DoD to coordinate and collaborate to--
excuse me--our future plans and our R&D activities.
The majority of these interactions are through interagency
working groups and committees, where we have shared mission
space, such as chem and bio defense, explosives detection,
cybersecurity, and of course, physical security. Participation
on these committees and the working groups ranges from our
under secretary to individual program managers.
For example, Under Secretary O'Toole co-chairs the National
Science and Technology Council's Committee on Homeland and
National Security, along with our counterparts at DoD and OSTP.
Other examples include the DoD-DHS capability development
working group, TSWG, and a laundry list of policy coordinating
committees and working groups across those shared DoD-DHS
mission spaces.
DHS, and specifically CBP, rely on S&T to be the transition
path for DoD technology. We evaluate DoD technologies and adapt
them, when applicable, to homeland mission.
While the interaction between DoD and DHS is robust in many
areas and the terrains do look similar in Arizona and
Afghanistan, the transition of technology from battlefield to
border is not as simple as it looks. DHS is primarily a law
enforcement and public safety agency, and our cops and needs
can be very different from those of soldiers in a war zone.
Then when technology from DoD does appear to be directly
applicable there are several steps required to move that
technology between the two agencies. DoD technologies are
designed to work within DoD systems, within DoD operations, and
DoD has the resources to dedicate support personnel to operate
technology systems that DHS typically does not or is not able
to afford.
These differences all require additional development for
DHS to deploy DoD technology. So as much as we would like to
pick up those systems and--that appear to meet our technology
needs we must ensure that we have done our due diligence and
determined that they are effective for our mission and not only
meet our needs but make operational and financial sense, as
well.
To that end, we are currently evaluating and leveraging
multiple DoD technologies and R&D investments, including sensor
management systems that we are using in the Port of L.A.-Long
Beach and are soon to be deployed along the Northern Border;
airborne border monitoring technologies; unmanned aerial
systems; and detection technologies for semi-submersible
maritime vessels. The list goes on, but uncertain budgets are
also detrimental to our relationships with DoD. When we do
collaborate on R&D projects they need to be able to depend on
our investment commitments that we made.
In closing, I would like to thank you, again, for the
opportunity to join this conversation today. This is a critical
topic. I believe that S&T is providing the much-needed
technology development and evaluation services needed to
leverage DoD and other interagency technologies and bring them
to bear on the DHS mission.
Thank you, and I am happy to answer any further questions.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Dr. Cox.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Tangora for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL TANGORA, DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMANDANT AND
DIRECTOR OF ACQUISITION SERVICES, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Tangora. Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar,
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the Coast Guard's close relationship with the
Department of Defense and our on-going utilization of DoD's
capabilities and programs in support of Coast Guard acquisition
and research and development.
The Coast Guard operates at all times as both an armed
force and a component of Department of Homeland Security. Our
statutory authorities under Titles 10 and 14 provide the Coast
Guard with extensive security, law enforcement, and regulatory
responsibilities throughout the maritime domain.
The Coast Guard has developed strategies to meet its
mission requirements, including arrangements with the other
military services in support of our acquisition projects.
Additionally, our R&D program provides critical support across
the Coast Guard's unique mission set.
The Coast Guard's Acquisition Directorate, where our
research and development efforts are managed, is addressing its
mission requirements through a multi-billion dollar
recapitalization of Coast Guard's cutters, boats, aircraft, and
command-and-control systems. In the process of carrying out
more than 20 major and non-major acquisition programs we are
using a wide variety of organic and external resources to
provide oversight and assistance at all points throughout the
acquisition life-cycle of our projects.
In the past 5 years we have entered into 62 different
interagency agreements with DoD activities, and nine with our
partners in Department of Homeland Security. These agreements
facilitate development, testing, evaluation, and certification
of Coast Guard assets. These partnerships are an integral
component of our strategy to establish effective governance and
cost efficiency over all aspects of our acquisition programs.
In addition to our agreements and memoranda of
understanding the Coast Guard has placed liaison officers
throughout the DHS and DoD enterprises. Our liaison officers
provide the Coast Guard with information on new and on-going
acquisition and research and development initiatives.
We use this information to determine whether or not the
Coast Guard has equities that can be capitalized, and if they
are identified early enough, whether we can work with DoD and
DHS activities to tailor the research initiative to address the
specific Coast Guard requirement. Leveraging DoD research and
development programs has enabled the Coast Guard to assess
technologies for potential applicability for a fraction of the
cost that a Coast Guard-unique R&D effort would entail.
Coast Guard liaison officers are currently placed in
strategic locations, including the Pentagon, DHS Science and
Technology Directorate, Customs and Border Protection, the
Unified Combatant Commands, U.S. Navy System Commands, and
others. These liaisons officers have had a significant and
positive benefit to the Coast Guard.
In addition to our extensive engagement with DoD research
and development programs the Coast Guard maintains an internal
R&D program as part of the Acquisition Directorate. The program
directly supports Coast Guard's specific needs across its full
range of operational, regulatory, and acquisition activities.
Our R&D projects are designed to minimize risk and maximize
mission effectiveness across the Coast Guard activities by
leveraging and applying innovative, scientific, and
technological solutions.
One such partnership with the Office of Naval Research has
resulted in the development of numerous mission-enabling
technologies, including running gear entanglement systems
designed to foul and ultimately stop non-compliant vessels.
Through our collective efforts we are effectively meeting our
requirements for continued development of enhanced technologies
and capabilities.
Our recent research and development efforts build on the
long-standing relationships and partnerships that we have with
our fellow sea service, the U.S. Navy, and other military
services to develop joint systems and capabilities for Coast
Guard platforms to maintain readiness in the event that the
Coast Guard is required to operate jointly with or under the
direction of the U.S. Navy.
We continue to partner with the Navy to install common
sensors, weapons, intelligence collection, and processing
systems aboard our major cutters. Today approximately half of
our command and control and communication capabilities
installed aboard Coast Guard platforms are Navy-type, which
enables us to interoperate under a joint operational
conditions.
We are also collaborating with DoD and DHS to align our
biometrics concept of operations and assess biometrics
capabilities currently used by U.S. Coast Guard boarding teams
in the Persian Gulf and the Caribbean Sea for potential use
across a wider scope of DHS homeland security missions. The
Coast Guard is working to translate our experience gained from
our on-going work with DoD's services to support expanding
efforts under the lead of Science and Technology Directorate of
the Department of Homeland Security.
The Coast Guard is committed to continuing with our
departmental partners and other military services to support
complex projects with the potential application across military
and government. The approach maximizes the limited resources
that we have to address the research and development priorities
of the U.S. Coast Guard.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss the Coast Guard's
effort and association with our partners in DHS and DoD, and I
am ready to answer your questions.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much. We are ready to ask you
some questions, as well.
So we appreciate all the testimony.
You know, I have been sort of on this thing for--ever since
I came to Congress, quite frankly, because as somebody said, we
have an historic opportunity now, with the drawdown in Iraq and
Afghanistan, et cetera, to really look at how we can best
utilize so much of this equipment that has been used very
effectively in theater. I always remind myself that the first
and foremost responsibility of the Federal Government is to
provide for the common defense.
That is actually in the preamble of the Constitution. It
doesn't say that we are to be doing a lot of other things that
we do, not that they are not priorities, but the common
defense, in my opinion, is National defense, is National
security, homeland security, and a big part of that is securing
our border, and that is what this committee's mission is.
So, how can we think about all of this DoD equipment that
might be able to be utilized? You know, as well, of course, we
all have copies of the 9/11 Commission recommendations. I have
a copy right on my desk; I try to make sure it doesn't become
just shelfware and collect dust, but we look at it all the
time. One of the principal recommendations of the 9/11
Commission recommendation was that we need to move from the
need-to-know to the need-to-share. I think whether that is
intel or equipment, whatever, the taxpayer is not always making
the assumption that we are in these silos that we all do here
on Capitol Hill. So I think it is for us to look at how we can
actually share some of these things.
In fact, that is my thought about having this committee
hearing today. Actually, when we did the recent DoD defense
reauthorization bill I actually had an amendment that I offered
that I was delighted passed that required the DoD and the DHS
to look at these kinds of things and what each agency may be
able to bring to bear to the best utilization of the taxpayers'
bang for the buck. So I am glad about all of that.
You know, I say a historic time and an opportunity that
could be missed here because in my mind we missed an
opportunity as a Congress when we did the last BRAC--the base
realignment and closure commission. Quite frankly, as we were
looking at how we could best utilize inventory domestically, in
particular--military inventory--and I am not sure exactly the
wiring diagram with the Department of Homeland Security as far
as looking out regionally and renting office space and
everything else, I think we should be using military
facilities, quite frankly, as a physical footprint for a lot of
DHS, as well.
We have that, just for a moment, in my area--Mr. Borkowski
is well aware of--where we have recently stood up the Great
Lakes branch of the Northern Border wing, and as we look at, on
the Northern Border security that is more personnel from CBP,
air assets, both fixed-wings and rotor, it is water assets, as
we have the unique circumstances and dynamics of a long liquid
border there.
It is also something we call an OIC, which is an
operational integration center pilot program for the Northern
Border that can be replicated along the Southern Border, as
well, where we had, actually, very good success with the SBInet
in our area, but this thing is state-of-the-art data analyzing
feed by all of the various stakeholders.
Again, it is the need-to-know, the need-to-share, where you
have got the Federal Government, the State government, even the
emergency management directors of our local counties, marine
divisions all feeding in assessments of a threat that can be
then used. The Coast Guard is there, as well, but the Coast
Guard Air Station Detroit is there, as Mr. Tangora knows, all
feeding their information in that can be utilized by our brave
men and women out in the field to assess the threat.
So I guess I sort of want to know how--and I suppose this
is for Mr. Stockton and Mr. Borkowski, as well--the DHS sort-of
calls this foraging, which I thought was an interesting term,
sort of reminds you of an animal out in the woods foraging for
nuts, I guess. But you are sort of foraging through DoD to see
what kind of technology can be utilized, and if you have a one-
stop shop how does it all work? Is there a necessity for a
stronger structural system throughout the wiring diagram so
that it can be used--because it is such a huge department--DoD,
and now DHS, as well. How can this be utilized most
effectively? So I throw that question out--either gentleman.
Mr. Stockton. I will be happy to speak to it first. The
Domestic Preparedness Support Initiative is the program that we
have put together in order to provide for that one-stop
shopping. Let me tell you how it works.
We work in two directions, both to identify capabilities
that we can transfer to our DHS partners in response to their
requests for assistance, but also to State and local public
safety organizations who work very closely with the armed
services and other components of the Department of Defense to
find out which kinds of articles are likely to be declared to
be excess that might actually be needed by our partners. So we
work that very, very closely with our lead partners, the
Defense Logistics Agency.
Let me just add my praise to an organization that doesn't
get enough. DLA does a great job in this regard.
So we look at the supply. Then we work very closely with
DHS, CBP, all of our partners, and also aggressive outreach to
State and local first responders to find out what are their
highest priority requirements. We have built a web-based system
to identify what they need, and with the help of DLA, match
that up to the capabilities that are acquired in excess
property.
That is the way that we work, but with TSWG and a variety
of other opportunities to be in support of DHS in ways that
make sense for the taxpayer, that add great value at marginal
cost to the Department of Defense----
Mrs. Miller. So, if I might, you are not advocating any
change. You are saying that what you are doing right now is
adequate?
If that is the case, let me just ask you this: What is the
criteria, for instance, when you go to local first responders,
or through the State coordinators, or however you are
determining how you are giving some of this excess to first
responders, as an example? Because our Congress has had a huge
debate, for instance, about firefighters' assistance grants and
whether or not we should be sending it to New York, or
Nebraska, or who gets it--or what is the criteria, et cetera?
Mr. Stockton. The specific criteria I would be happy to
provide for the record----
Mrs. Miller. Okay.
Mr. Stockton [continuing]. But what I do, for example, is
last week I met with Jim Schwartz, the fire chief for
Arlington, and we talked about what his priority needs were in
that jurisdiction. I have a team of folks who conduct this
aggressive outreach. We rack and stack their prioritized
requests for assistance, and then we, with the help of the
Defense Logistics Agency, try to match up their requirements
with what we have.
I will say this, though, that there are some assets that
are very scarce and very expensive, such as night vision
devices. That is why we have this pool of equipment to lend
out, to loan, to lease, again, at very low cost, because we
know that demand for this equipment vastly outstrips the supply
that we have available. That is why we have had this particular
program.
Mrs. Miller. In the interest of time, just one follow-up
question to that: One of the things I have a huge interest in,
as we mentioned, about the Predator drones, which is a great
technology that has application for DoD and DHS, have you
looked at land systems, some of these land systems? You look at
these robots that they are using on the border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan. Again, you know, you get somebody
sitting in a cubicle drinking a Starbucks that are running
these things. Too bad if they get knocked off, but the--if the
robot gets shot, but we didn't lose a person so it is wonderful
technology.
But these have the ability to, again, send back the
information to the individual about assessing the threat, what
the environment is, et cetera, et cetera, and if we can utilize
those kinds of things in theater certainly we could use that on
the Southern Border, as well, and the Northern Border, for that
matter. Is there any movement in regard, specifically, to land
systems?
Mr. Stockton. There is, but I would defer to my friends
from CBP to talk about that, and then I will also follow up as
needed.
Mr. Borkowski. Part of the issue with connectivity, by the
way, is on our side of the equation. One of the reasons that my
office was created a little more than a year ago was because we
needed to collect to come up with a single point of entry into
CBP, and we are still evolving that. So part of the--there is
an issue on our side. I don't think everybody really
understands all the time that DHS Science and Technology is a
key part of that, so I think we have some marketing to do on
our----
But the challenge that I have is that I do understand that
there are these points of contact in the Department of Defense,
but I have things that come to me outside of those chains.
Often they are interesting, and I don't think that it would be
appropriate to try to shut that dialogue down. So I am a little
skeptical about the likelihood of success of defining rigidly,
you know, an infrastructure that connects DHS and DoD because I
think it would shut down--the best I can do is make it clear
that I am willing to receive as much as someone is willing to
offer.
Just so you know, I am probably up to, like, 1,000
meetings, and some of those are DoD, and some of those are
industry, including, by the way, ground systems that you talk
about, which we are interested in. The question for us is going
to be, what do I do first?
Those are the kinds of trays that we have going forward,
but we do have capacity to pilot things. We have included
within CBP the capacity to pilot, so we take things like ground
systems that are available to us, or identified to us, show
them to the Border Patrol, show them to the Office of Field
Operations, show them to Air and Marine, and say, is this
something you would like us to check out as one of our first
priorities?
If it is we will go do it, but we do have that dialogue
with ground systems; we have that dialogue with the
communications systems; we have that dialogue with aerostats.
I would also say that at a lower level than some of the
discussions that we are talking about here we have tried to
create some networks. For example, Joint Program Manager
Guardian is a clearinghouse of sorts for the Department of
Defense for systems. So I have co-chaired with them some
conferences to bring in--by the way, not just DoD and DHS; we
have had FBI--other Federal agencies with common technology
interests to at least start the dialogue of what is available.
So I think we need a little more structure, but I am a
little skeptical that we can make it too structured. The best
approach that I have found is let people know that we are
willing to hear what is available and then invite those
discussions and expose them to our operational users.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
I am over my time here, but I would just say, we also had
discussion between Mr. Clarke, who is a Member of the full
committee and this subcommittee, as well, from Detroit, and
myself, and he was offering an amendment. We decided not to do
it, but we are going to pursue it in the reauthorization on the
floor, about test bedding, whether or not--and I don't know if
that maybe gets in the way of your structure, or if it is a--an
assist for the Department to be able to test bed in various
locales, whether it is the Southern Border or the Northern
Border, on these kinds of things. I would like to talk to you,
maybe, after the committee hearing a little bit more about
that, if that is something that is of value to you.
At this time I would recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Assistant Secretary Stockton, let me follow up on what the
Chairwoman said. Since the Southern Border, as you know, is the
emphasis of a lot of the Members I would ask you, first of all,
would you be willing to go down there and meet--if I can put
border sheriffs and border policemen, DPS, and other folks from
me, would you be willing to travel down to the border to go
meet with them?
Mr. Stockton. It would be an honor. I have been there
before, but the facts on the ground continue to evolve, and so
a chance to go down there, listen to local law enforcement,
listen to our CBP partners, it would be an honor.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. What we will do is we will have, of
course--Homeland Security, we will have the Coast Guard, also,
since they have a presence there on the border, and certainly,
you know, we will bring border sheriffs and border police at
some place there where we would love to have you there, No. 1,
so thank you for that, No. 1.
No. 2, give me--and following what the Chairwoman said,
let's say that I am a policeman in Mission, Texas, border
county--I mean, border area. Where do I start? If you were me--
I didn't know you until now, and I was looking that you have
the--under the defense authorization you are the key person to
share with the State and local folks and Federal folks on
homeland security assets and technology.
If I was a police commissioner in a border area, where do I
get started? Could you give us a one, two, three, because I am
sure if a police chief tried to get ahold of you it might be a
little difficult, might be different lines before they can get
ahold of you. Tell me, what is--how does somebody get started?
Mr. Stockton. Well, I meet as many police chiefs and
sheriffs as I can. We have an aggressive outreach effort. We
bring people here to the National Capitol region by the
thousands. I also travel.
But web-based outreach is especially effective. We have
done a very aggressive job of trying to make it easy to get to
my team so that we can then engage with DLA, engage with the
services, and match up the supply of excess defense articles
with what is required by our DHS partners, but also,
ultimately, cops on the beat.
In the State of Texas I am proud to say that thus far this
fiscal year we have already transferred almost $16 million
worth of equipment--tactical vehicles--62 vehicles this year,
almost 1,200 weapons--specialized weapons for law enforcement,
watercraft. These are coming to the State of Texas based on
requests that we get from local law enforcement and the State
interloculars that we have in the great State of Texas.
We have got a system that is working well. It has gone from
$200 million in transfer of excess materials to almost $600
million thus far this fiscal year, compared to last. We are
ramping up.
That gets back to the question of whether structurally we
need help. I don't believe we do. We need continued, dedicated
focus of the Department of Defense to be in support of our DHS
partners and the State and local public safety organizations,
ultimately whom we are in support of, at no cost to the
Department of Defense or marginal cost, because that is--we are
in a very difficult budget situation, as well, and so we are
looking to maximize the efficiency and the effectiveness of
this program rather than adding burdens on the American
taxpayer.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Do you know what
cities they went to when you mentioned Texas, just out of----
Mr. Stockton. I do not know, but I would be happy to
provide that material for the record.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Okay. I mean, I am just--you know, Texas
is a large State----
Mr. Stockton. Yes.
Mr. Cuellar [continuing]. And I know that when we provide
homeland security dollars in the millions of dollars and people
emphasize the border, what is it, 9, 10, 11 percent only goes
to the border, and everything goes--and again, I support the
whole State of Texas, but--so I am just wondering if that is
going to border, or it is going to the Dallas, Fort Worth,
Houston areas, and I would be just curious. But I certainly
want to--there is a lot of emphasis on the border, and I
certainly want to do my job in representing the whole border in
the State of Texas.
So we are going to follow up on that meeting, and we will
get you border sheriffs and police, and other folks, and
certainly the other partners here, because we are very
interested in your work. Especially, the more I look at this
sentence, your, you know, your authorization and you are key--I
think you are going to be very key to the Northern Border, and
to the Southern Border, and we are going to have to get out the
word on what you do in our own way.
So we thank you.
So, Madam Chairwoman, I don't have any questions. I just
want to thank the Secretary for being here, and of course, the
other Members here that are present here today.
Mrs. Miller. Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from
Mississippi.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. Good
hearing.
I wanted to move it a little bit from the 1401 arena, which
is good, but let's talk about accessing DoD technology, okay?
The equipment is fine, absolutely. I have seen it rust on
military bases for years.
But how--what is a formal process that a border sheriff or
somebody who is looking for a specific technology--what will
they have to do with DoD?
Mr. Stockton. For technology outreach, much of what we do
is in support of our Federal partners through the TSWG and for
the other kinds of Federal partner support, for DHS, above all,
that then they can provide to the emergency managers in States
and localities. So our primary technology support is for our
Federal partners.
But I would say that for wound treatment, for many of the
other capabilities that we have built to win our wars abroad,
that technology then does get applied for support for our first
responders.
Mr. Thompson. So is that a formalized process for this
technology access?
Mr. Stockton. It is, and I would invite my partners from
the Department of Homeland Security to talk about that process,
and then I will have a specific example, also, to offer.
Mr. Borkowski. Well, I would just offer that we are aware
that--I think what you are talking about is when equipment
might be excess and might be available, and there is a formal
process. I believe the acronym is DRMO, the defense
reutilization----
Mr. Thompson. Yes. No, I am not talking about----
Mr. Borkowski. Oh, okay. All right.
Mr. Thompson. We understand the hardware piece. But this
hearing is to talk about DoD technology and how we can use it
to secure the border, and we have kind of moved toward the
equipment side of the conversation rather than the technology
side.
I am trying to figure out how--what is the process by which
a local official makes a request for a specific technology, if
we have that process defined, and if so, what is it?
Mr. Stockton. That may be an opportunity to make further
progress, because to the best of my knowledge most of the
technology focus that we have is in direct support and
partnership with the Department of Homeland Security and other
Federal department partners, as opposed to providing technology
directly to local law enforcement. Equipment goes to law
enforcement; our technology partnership--and I take your
point--is primarily with our Federal partners, as opposed to
building that same two-way system that exists for equipment
with State and locals for technology.
Mr. Thompson. Okay. Well, is there a formal process for DoD
to use that technology with CBP, for instance? What is the
process?
Mr. Stockton. Well, on the Southwest Border, above all, we
have Joint Task Force North that provides technical expertise
in support to CBP. So that involves demonstration projects that
enable the CBP to understand how to use Predators effectively,
ground-based radars, tunnel detection technology, both acoustic
and non-acoustic. So we have intensive technology sharing
between the Department of Defense and our partners at CBP, ICE,
and DHS as a whole. That is very robust.
Mr. Thompson. Right.
So, Mr. Borkowski, the process is you define a technology
that you, for whatever reason, need. Do you make that formal
request to DoD? What do you do?
Mr. Borkowski. Yes. We have a process where we have a
frequent dialogue--and in fact, in some cases it is an
organized meeting--with JTF North, Joint Task Force North, and
Joint Task Force North and our folks on the border get together
and say, what have you got? What are you interested in? So they
have a little bit back and forth, these are the technologies we
could bring to bear; these are the operations we would like to
conduct.
Joint Task Force North will reach out to the rest of the
Department of Defense. Many times this becomes part of a
training exercise for an element of the Department of Defense.
In fact, the technologies that Representative McCaul and
Ranking Member Cuellar and I went and saw at Laredo were part
of one of those operations. It was an agreement reached between
JTF North and, in that case, the Border Patrol to conduct an
operation with technology in support of Border Patrol
operations in Laredo.
So there is a process. We have that dialogue routinely, and
then JTF North will schedule operations in support of those
discussions.
Mr. Thompson. If I might, so if you do that----
Mr. Borkowski. Yes.
Mr. Thompson [continuing]. Do you shift the cost of that
operation to CBP or is it still within the budget of DoD?
Mr. Borkowski. Typically we do not, and I want to get
specific answers to you so let me double-check. But I believe
the answer is no; DoD does this as part of a DoD then training
exercise, so it usually gets covered under a training exercise
for DoD that we are able to take advantage of operationally. So
for the most part I believe we do not pick up the cost of that.
I would like to confirm that, but I am pretty sure that is
true.
Mr. Thompson. Beyond the training, does it become an on-
going integral part of CBP or is it just for the training?
Mr. Borkowski. It is training for the military. There is a
continuing relationship. So we don't have the same operations
all the time with the same technology and the same units of the
military all the time, but we do have a continuing relationship
with Joint Task Force North, which we have come to depend and
rely on. Joint Task Force North will apply different resources,
different units, different technologies based on those
discussions. So there is a continuing relationship but the
specific thing we might be doing will change over time.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from
South Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I want to commend
you for making the comments about the 9/11 Commission report.
Some of my own thoughts of integration and sharing of
information--and let me remind the panelists and the committee,
we are all in this together. Whether you are working for DHS or
DoD or are Members of Congress, we are all in this together to
protect the sovereignty of this great Nation, to enforce the
laws that we have here, to stop illegal and illicit drugs from
coming in, and other things that could possibly come and cross
the border. So I hope that the information sharing does take
place, that the equipment, technology, research, all that is
shared across agency lines, because that is how it should be
done and that is what the American people expect.
I just came back from a trip over to Afghanistan, Iraq, and
Pakistan where the border situation was a topic of discussion
many, many times, whether we were meeting with the military
folks coming out of Iraq, with folks charged with securing and
enforcing the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, or Mr.
Cuellar asking the Pakistani president about the border, and
the question back and forth--Pakistan--the Pakistan president
asked Mr. Cuellar how much we spend on securing our border.
So it is an interesting opportunity today to have this
hearing following up on that, and I want to commend the
Chairman McCaul for inviting me to go on that trip that was
very worthwhile.
So having come back from talking with the military leaders
that are coming out of Iraq and understanding there is a lot of
technology, a lot of lessons learned in that theater--lessons
learned every day in Afghanistan--and many Members of this
committee continue to advocate the acquisition of proven
technologies used by the DoD and learning from those lessons in
those theaters, and also hearing today of the deployment of
some of those technologies on the Southwest Border as we wind
down those operations.
While I understand DoD has a much larger budget for
researching and developing new technologies and a large group
of personnel who are trained using certain technologies, I
guess, Mr. Borkowski, can you describe some of DHS's challenges
in transferring or receiving some of those technologies from
DoD?
Mr. Borkowski. Sure. In terms of technologies that are
fairly self-contained, like the--what we call the agent
portable sensor systems are the things that we looked at in
Laredo and that we are actually buying, there isn't too much of
a challenge. We do have to train our agents to use that, but
that is typically not terribly difficult. We can do that.
The difficulty comes when I bring in a DoD system that I
have to plug into my command-and-control system. Typically DoD
systems, for example, will use satellite communications fairly
routinely. Satellite communications are expensive for us if
done on a persistent basis. We also need to plug that into our
command-and-control system, which may not be the same as DoD's
command-and-control system, and that can be a challenging
technical development activity.
If it is an extensive technology, something like
aerostats--which, by the way, look very promising to us--but
they require crews. They have significant operational costs
associated with them, and that is often missed in here. So I
also have to be able to absorb the cost to operate and maintain
the systems, which, again, I have a different budget threshold
for that than maybe the Department of Defense does.
So the challenges are if they are not self-contained and I
have to plug them into my current operational system I will
have engineering development that I will have to do, which can
be expensive. I do have to be sensitive to the operations and
support costs of the systems.
For very--relatively, not very--relatively complex systems
I do have to worry about the training and the development of
crews to operate them as I bring them in. Having----
Mr. Duncan. Along that line, though, we have got a huge
number of personnel coming out of the military. As the
deployments transition and we wind down the theater in Iraq,
there is an opportunity there to hire already-trained DoD
personnel to run these systems.
Are you all looking into that? What are the hiring
guidelines and practices that you are putting in place?
Mr. Borkowski. We haven't quite gotten to the point where
we are buying the systems yet, but I think you are absolutely
right. If we get to that situation we would need to look at
that opportunity to bring in these trained people if, in fact,
they are available. We would need allocation of funds to pay
their salaries and we would probably need some kind of
expedited authorities to hire them, but that is something we
would be very interested in talking to you about.
Mr. Duncan. Okay.
I don't have any further questions, Madam Chairwoman. I
yield back.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from Texas.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and Ranking
Member, for holding the hearing on this issue. I think it is
one we have been focused on for a while. I think it makes a lot
of sense.
Mr. Borkowski, you mentioned previously our trip down to
the border and we were looking at that time the Defense
Intelligence Agency technology. Can you tell me where we are
today with deploying that technology on the Southwest Border?
Mr. Borkowski. Yes, sir. In the Arizona Technology Plan,
which, as you know, is kind of a down-payment for the Southwest
Border, we are buying 15 of those systems. We are actually
buying them from the Army. I believe four are already
delivered, and all of them should be delivered by December.
We are also developing plans, obviously, for the rest of
the border, which will include future procurements of those, as
well, but that is the current status.
Mr. McCaul. You know, we are always talking about securing
the border. I think the physical infrastructure has been put in
place, for the most part; it is the technology piece that has
been lacking.
Where do you--I mean, UAVs, you know, we have been working
hard to get those down there, these fixed towers, sensor
surveillance equipment. Can you tell me kind of where you are
with your game plan and how long it is going to take before we
can say, you know, that the technology piece has been
fulfilled?
Mr. Borkowski. Well, first of all, it is going to be many
years at the current, you know, funding profile. But in terms
of the plan, we have shown you in the past the lay down,
essentially a map of Arizona and what we intend to put in
Arizona. These are, again, available systems, many of which
leverage DoD.
We have built at my level--that is important to
understand--that map for the whole Southwest Border. We are
currently in the process of, you know, reviewing that with the
senior management in the Department, but we are well along in
having a map along the whole Southwest Border.
The next element--we are also going to do the Northern
Border, and we have done the early process of the Northern
Border, but if I could start with the Southwest Border, because
I want to talk about things like UAVs and such--the analysis
that we did, which followed from SBInet answer to sort of the
question that said, if we want something to replace SBInet what
should it be? But that ``if we want something to replace
SBInet'' is a very important kind of predicate to that
discussion, right?
The next thing we need to do is test that, ``if we want.''
That is where things like UAV or aerostats come into play,
because there may be areas of the border where it makes less
sense to put in persistent fixed infrastructure and more sense
to put intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance assets that
can assess whether things are changing, and in response to
those changes adjust our technology plans.
So over the next probably 9 months we will baseline that
map of the Southwest Border, but then we will test that map
against the--test the ``if'' question, if it makes sense to do
this, against things like more persistent use of UAVs,
aerostats, fixed-wing ISR kind of capabilities, so that is what
we will be doing for about the next 9 months.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Mr. Stockton, we, as I think the Ranking Member mentioned,
we had a very interesting trip to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and
Iraq. General Austin, in Iraq, pledged his support through our
delegation to assist in any way the DoD can with assets as we
wind down those operations overseas towards the Southwest
Border and Northern, as well.
Where do you see--you are sitting down with General Austin,
what would you say that we need, and what is available to
transfer to the border?
Mr. Stockton. Let me talk about both sides of those
equations in turn. First of all, when we analyze what the
requirements are we depend on our partners in CBP and the
Department of Homeland Security, our other lead Federal agency
departments, to specify what their requirements are. Border
security is a law enforcement mission, not a military mission,
and this is an opportunity to be in support of our closest
partners.
So we listen hard to Commissioner Bersin, all of our
friends at CBP and at DHS as a whole, so that we can make sure
that scarce DoD resources are used in a way that has the
biggest bang for the buck, but also fits the integrated vision
that CBP is developing for the future. That is their vision. We
are in support, although the scarcity of DoD resources, of
course, is very much in our minds.
Turning to the other side of the question, how do we source
these potential requirements that we get from our lead Federal
partners, there we work very closely with the armed forces,
with the military departments, with the Defense Logistics
Agency to understand what are the priority demands on equipment
that may be coming back, and what could be most useful that is
available to support Department of Homeland Security?
So the challenge, of course, as you were to understand, is
there is only so many assets to go around, and it is a harsh
process of prioritization that we have to go through at levels
above mine, frankly, to decide where some of these scarce
assets are going to go.
Mr. McCaul. Well, I think this committee would like to be a
part of that decision-making process, and I think the idea of
bringing you all down to the border is actually a very good
one, and I hope we can follow up on that with the Chairwoman
and Ranking Member. I think a visit to the Joint Task Force
North, which seems to be the plug-in between the DoD and the
Southwest Border and DHS, would be very productive.
With that, I yield back. Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman.
Chairwoman now recognizes the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Appreciate your
leadership on this.
Mr. Tangora, given the growing risks of pirates and other
interdiction efforts that are going on by our Coast Guard--for
example, semi-submersibles, and other things--I believe that
our Coast Guard's men and women need a quick way to identify
who they have got on their hands when they have stopped them,
for example, to see if those individuals are on watch lists and
to take whatever appropriate action that they need to do.
I am also a Member of the Armed Services Committee, and I
am very familiar with DoD's biometric efforts, their
technologies that they are using in particular in the remote
areas of Afghanistan to--the technologies that they use to
biometrically identify high--and look at and enroll high-risk
individuals they have picked up.
So my question to you would be: Have you been looking at
some of the technology that DoD has that you might be able to
leverage, and where would you see--I mean, I am thinking in
particular of people that we catch as they are trying to land
on our beaches, et cetera, but where else might that be
applied? What are the constraints in your ability to be able to
get that technology and use it for the Department of Homeland?
Mr. Tangora. Thank you, Congresswoman.
The biometrics initiative that we have been now doing for
approximately 8 years have been yielding outstanding success. I
mean, we have cut down immigration in the Mona Pass with
biometrics--two-print biometrics--by 80 percent. You know, we
are being able to spread our assets a lot further in the
Caribbean because of the success of that. We are able to get
the right people identified and prosecuted--I think we have
prosecuted over 400 people in the last 6 years in migrant
interdiction based primarily upon what we are getting out of
the biometrics.
The challenge is we have very small cutters that are
interdicting these boats in the Caribbean, and we do not have a
large pipe or a large satellite feed down to these small units,
and so we go with a two-print, but we want to get further into
what the DoD uses, which is--and the FBI uses--which is the 10-
print. We are going to be able to use that technology to better
aid our men and women being able to quickly identify exactly
that people have known criminal backgrounds when we interdict
them, especially in the Caribbean.
We use the technology in the Persian Gulf, also. It is
absolutely a game-changer, and it is a force-multiplier.
Ms. Sanchez. If you gentlemen would talk to me about, I
know one of the things that we saw--I was the Chairwoman of the
Border, Counterterrorism Subcommittee of this committee when
the Democrats were in charge, and under that fell SBInet. One
of the issues that we had was the cellular towers that we had
up, and the sabotaging of that technology by coyotes or
whomever--drug dealers, let's say. Talk to me about
communications for these systems, and what are the
difficulties?
I mean, I can think, wouldn't it be great if we had this
biometric handheld thing that, you know, when we have found
somebody out in international waters, or what have you, and we
thought they were drug dealers, and we wanted to scan them, is
there a technology--what cell towers, how are we going to get
that done and what are the drawbacks to having that technology
based on that?
Mr. Cox. Thank you for the question. We actually have been
working for several years now with DoD and the Department of
Justice to bring biometrics to the field. A lot of the issue is
actually getting the heavy prisms and other collection methods
to get beyond the two-print into the field and make it sort of
man-portable and ruggedized for deployment along the border or
in a maritime environment.
Then we will have to address the complicated nature of
having these systems transmit their information to all of the
databases that contain--please----
Ms. Sanchez. But the ruggedized is done in the DoD, isn't
it? I mean, that is what we have. They are actually in remote
areas in Afghanistan with handheld rugged.
Why aren't we moving that technology or those instruments--
--
Mr. Cox. We are.
Ms. Sanchez [continuing]. Over to DHS?
Mr. Cox. We are. We are--those investments, but it is also
the marinization, everything--making it affordable for our
mission and making the connection to the multiple databases
across law enforcement agencies that have this information that
you are asking about.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from Detroit, Mr.
Clarke.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and
thank you for acknowledging the city that I am born and raised
and currently represent.
Also, I want to thank you for holding this hearing because,
you know, as you are aware, the region that I represent is at
high risk of an attack, or the economic consequences of any
type of natural disaster impacting that region could be great,
and by looking at the possible synergy of DoD technology to
protect that region and that border, wanted to get your
opinions on if you feel that this could create an opportunity
to build the capacity of local businesses in metro Detroit, and
thereby creating jobs. Let me just give you an example.
First, just to share with you my view of the risk of an
attack at that border: We have the busiest international border
crossing of North America, so our bridge, our tunnel, they are
targets; our drinking water plant there could be vulnerable to
a bioterrorism attack; as a matter of fact, our international
regional airport has already been a target of an attempted
bombing. The infamous Christmas day bomber attempted to bring
down a plane that landed in the Detroit Metropolitan Airport.
While we have that risk, that region also has the capacity,
I believe, to respond. We have DoD contractors in the region,
primarily in the area that the Chairwoman represents.
This is Detroit. We still have the manufacturing know-how.
We also have some of the best-trained engineers in the country.
We also have strong research universities. As a matter of
fact, right within the heart of the city we have Wayne State
University, and in Detroit we have large parcels of vacant land
that are ready to develop--it already has the infrastructure
needed to serve a facility there.
So my question is: Do you see the possibility of the city
of Detroit being a site for testing and evaluating homeland
security technology or DoD technology that could have an
application to homeland security uses, such as--let me give an
example--video surveillance to monitor our borders,
cybersecurity, as well, and preparing--preparedness against a
bioterrorist attack? That is No. 1, and then if I have time I
have a follow-up related to that question.
Mr. Borkowski. Yes. Thank you for that question,
Congressman Clarke.
The short answer to your question is, do we see Detroit as
a potential--yes, we do. Now, to be fair, as a member of the
Executive branch I can't, you know, be--favor one part of the
country as opposed to another, so to be fair we have often
asked the same question about other parts of the border.
We do see that Detroit has some unique characteristics,
including the fact that it has got the largest port of entry,
and that makes it attractive in some ways, compared to some
other places, for particular parts of the mission. So to the
degree we are able to look at tailoring that--because it is
also true we have test beds in a lot of other areas.
We don't want to be overly redundant, but we recognize the
characteristics of Detroit; we recognize the existence of heavy
industry there that perhaps is unique; we recognize that it is
the largest port of entry. We think those things taken together
make it worth at least having a dialogue about whether or not
we ought to put something in Detroit.
But again, there is a lot more homework to be done on that,
and to be fair, there are similar situations with
characteristics on other parts of the border that we also have
to be sensitive to.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Well, thank you. I would be willing
to work directly with you to help you better see those
opportunities there.
One thing I will say is that, you know, Detroit has been
very hard-hit. We have lost more jobs and more homes, more
capital over the last 10 years than virtually any other
metropolitan city in the country.
But here is the difference, though: Our region has the best
potential, though, for job growth, just because of the capacity
that we have in manufacturing, and the universities, and the
vacant land, and the trained engineers, and also with the DoD
contractors that are there.
So the second part of my question is: Do any of you see a
way that our current DoD contractors in metro Detroit or other
businesses could benefit from some type of a procurement or
acquisition preference, especially since those businesses are
located in areas that have high unemployment rates, like
Oakland County, Macomb, Wayne County, and the city of Detroit--
so some type of acquisition preference that would give them an
edge in getting work with the Department of Defense or with the
Department of Homeland Security, you know, considering all
things equal?
They have got to have the capability to do the job and they
have got to be scored, you know, well in the evaluation
process, but especially if they are going to be delivering the
technology right there in metropolitan Detroit, it would be
great to have a metro Detroit company hiring metro Detroit
employees to actually help protect our country.
Mr. Borkowski. Certainly, Congress has the capability to
develop acquisition and procurement preferences, and subject to
the fact that the systems actually meet the needs, we are sort
of, frankly, agnostic to that. That is a policy decision that
we are perfectly comfortable and prepared to execute as long as
we can get the products that we need.
So I don't think it is appropriate for us to comment on
that determination, but clearly, if there are preferences they
do have--they do tend to affect the way that we buy things, and
our only real interest is in making sure that what we ask for
gets delivered to us.
Mr. Tangora. If I could add, I mean, there is socioeconomic
goals that we do, and the Coast Guard hit every one of them--
all of our hub zone, all of our small, disadvantaged
businesses, all of our women-owned businesses. All of those
different socioeconomic goals that the Department lays on us,
you know, we try and do that.
So, you know, looking at Detroit, it is a--in parts of
Detroit it is a perfect hub zone type of thing, and I would
think you would be able to exploit that and--in a lot of
different Federal contracting initiatives.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas,
Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
More than just protocol, I want to stress my appreciation for
this hearing, to the Ranking Member, as well, for his insight
and very constructive letter that I know you must have written
to get a response that we have gotten from the Coast Guard.
Thank you for that leadership.
I have always said that the role of--even in this quiet
room, the role of this committee and its counterpart on the
other--in the other body, and the Department, and all of you
who are sitting here is to ensure with every fiber in our body,
if possible, that another attack on the homeland does not
occur. Many times we sit in quiet hearing rooms away from the
thunderous cloud of fear and potential threats that many of our
soldiers see on the battlefield, it looks as if we are doing
mundane work. I think that this is crucial work, and I am very
concerned that we are confronting it the way we should.
I am going to start with Secretary Stockton, on the return
home of--and how are you? Return home of throngs of soldiers
from Iraq, with the pending return of those from Afghanistan--
some of us would ask for them to come home earlier than they
are. They will be coming home with a great degree of expertise.
I would like to know the Defense Department's thoughts and
plans for taking that expertise and cross-pollinating with
departments such as the Department of Homeland Security, which
is the closest partner to that, a possibility of DOJ, so that
these resources can be used.
I am not so apt--I am a big believer in small businesses,
but I am not so inclined to ignore this talent, use of
technology, and let it dissipate when we are confronting
threats unknown.
Secretary.
Mr. Stockton. That is a terrific question. Portions of the
answer go beyond my portfolio, but some of it is right on.
First of all, I want to talk about the benefit of having
these returning soldiers, sailors, and airmen continue to serve
the Nation, continue to serve States and localities by virtue
of joining the National Guard and the Title 10 Reserves,
because Mother Nature is going to continue to confront the
United States with severe hazards; as you pointed out,
Congresswoman, the threat of attack is always there. So to have
the terrific expertise that our forces have gained abroad and
be able to serve in the homeland, for me that is an extremely
important opportunity.
But also, to have these returning soldiers be able to serve
in public safety organizations in States and localities, again,
to leverage the expertise, the leadership skills they have
provided. We are building programs to facilitate that as well
as into related industry. I know this is a priority for the
First Lady, for the Vice President, and for the President, and
it is a priority for my boss and all of us in the Department of
Defense.
It is a terrific opportunity. Let's not miss it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you.
I ask the Chairwoman my indulgence. I see my time is almost
running, and I have a couple of more questions, but I will--do
want to say this: I come from the largest--fourth-largest city
in the Nation with a lot of influence in the energy industry,
which crippled, would be a terrible blow for this country. I
would like to extend an invitation for you to visit Houston and
to talk to many of our leaders in the security area on just
some of the ways of collaboration. So I would like to extend
that invitation to you and work with your office.
Mr. Stockton. It would be an honor to visit your district
and get to know your community better.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Let me go quickly to Mr. Borkowski, quickly. Would you tell
me how a collaboration with the DoD would be helpful to Customs
and Border Protection?
Could I get the Coast Guard--I am going to ask these
questions, and then if you would just answer them--to indicate
what the cuts in budget--the proposed budget cuts would do to
your operations? I do want to thank you for helping us find a
domestic abuser who killed his wife and who was out on the
waters off of the Atlantic Ocean. Thank you for the kind of
work that you do.
Mr. Borkowski.
Mr. Borkowski. Very quickly, and there are multiple ways
that we collaborate with DoD that add value to us. One is in
helping us to learn how to operate as an integrated force. One
is in using their test facilities to test out the capabilities
of various systems for our purposes, and one is actually to
have developed systems and technologies that are fairly
immediately transportable to our use.
But one last that I would like to add is we do conduct
joint operations, and we talked about that to some degree
earlier with Joint Task Force North. That is another way that
we collaborate, and those things actually operate to support
surge capability and support border security activities.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Very good.
Mr. Tangora.
Mr. Tangora. I stand with my commandant, who has been on
record saying that the President's budget in fiscal year 2012
is adequate for the Coast Guard, and we recognize that there
are a lot of discussions about looming budget cuts, and----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So, that is the question. The further
budget cuts, how would that impact your operations? Having seen
you operate off the coast--the Pacific Coast, or off the coast
of some of our Central American countries, dealing with drug
interdiction?
Mr. Tangora. Right. It becomes a matter of capacity. I
mean, you pay for what you are going to get, and at this point
in time it would be purely speculative, you know, based on what
we know, what the cuts would be and what that impact would be
to the Coast Guard.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Madam Chairwoman, let me just inquire to
you or comment as I close, thanking you for your kindness. I
think there is much room for the combined witnesses that
represent the different organizations to collaborate.
I hope this hearing will encourage further collaboration
and I hope it will be noted that cuts to the Coast Guard
budget, I think, would be severe. I have seen it in operation,
and I see what would happen if they were cut even more than
they have already been cut.
With that, I thank the Chairwoman and I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much. Thank the gentlelady.
Thank all the Members that were here today, and all of
their questions, and certainly the testimony from all of our
witnesses, as well, which I think was very, very enlightening
for all of us here. Again, when I started thinking about this
hearing it was because of the historic opportunity that is
staring us right in the face, and sometimes we don't recognize
these opportunities as readily as we should, or certainly
advantage ourselves as we should with them.
So because of that, I think many of the questions today,
and sort of getting right at the heart of the matter,
specifically of what we need to be able to do jointly, and the
total force concept is something that the military looks at and
the Department of Homeland Security needs to continue to look
at, as well. It is for those of us in Congress as we exercise
our role in the whole overall, with oversight and having
hearings such as this and asking questions that we all start
thinking about better ways to do what is our joint mission.
So I thank all of you.
I appreciate your question, as well, about the budgetary
constraints and what it would do to the Coast Guard, or anybody
else, for that matter.
We are all painfully aware, as I say, of the economic
transition that has occurred in our country and what it means
to every level of government, and which is one of the principal
drivers of the impetus for this hearing, again, is how can we
do a better job with the existing resources, those that have
already been paid for, to secure our Nation? That is our common
goal and our common mission, certainly.
I would just mention for the other Members that the hearing
record will be held open for 10 days, and if they have any
additional questions they can submit them for the record, and
we will have the witnesses answer those questions as they can,
and we will appreciate it, and without--now recognize the
Ranking Member.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, ma'am. Mr. Thompson, who had to leave,
asked me if I can introduce into the records the Arizona Border
Surveillance Technology GAO report that he was referring to.
Mrs. Miller. Very well. Without objection.*
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* The document has been retained in committee files and is
available at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-22.
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Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions for Paul N. Stockton From Honorable Michael T. McCaul
laws and regulations
Question 1. Are there any changes to laws or regulations that would
make it easier for DHS to receive transfers of DoD technology or make
it easier for DHS to leverage DoD research? How can this process be
made smoother?
Answer. As noted in my statement for the record, DoD has proposed,
and the administration and Congress have supported, expanding the laws
permitting State and local law enforcement and firefighting agencies,
including State and local homeland security and emergency management
agencies, to receive excess DoD equipment or to purchase DoD equipment.
DoD donated almost $500 million worth of excess equipment to Federal,
State, and local agencies for use in counter-drug and counter-terrorism
activities in fiscal year 2011. Additionally, DoD donated $1.7 million
worth of excess equipment to DHS during that same period. To the extent
that any such laws remain that have not been similarly expanded, DoD
would support changes to these laws to expand them.
DoD continues to work closely with its interagency partners, in
particular DHS, to build capacity vertically from the Federal level
down to the local level, and horizontally across the Federal
Government. Pursuant to my responsibilities as the Secretary of
Defense-designated senior DoD official responsible for coordinating
``all Department of Defense efforts to identify, evaluate, deploy, and
transfer to Federal, State, and local first responders technology items
and equipment in support of homeland security,'' in accordance with
section 1401 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2003 (Pub. L. 107-314), I established the DoD Domestic
Preparedness Support Initiative to facilitate Federal, State, and local
awareness of the availability of DoD technology and equipment, as well
as DoD research initiatives. I would appreciate continued support from
Congress for the DoD Domestic Preparedness Support Initiative.
assistance from congress
Question 2. What can Congress do to further assist DHS in
leveraging DoD research and development?
Answer. As illustrated in my statement, and those of my colleagues
from DHS, DHS has been very successful at leveraging DoD research and
development, as well as working cooperatively with DoD on research and
the development, testing, and evaluation of technologies. At this time,
I cannot identify any additional assistance that DoD or DHS require
beyond the already vital leadership and support we have received from
the Congress.
expedited hiring authority
Question 3. Would it be helpful to give DHS an expedited hiring
authority for returning armed services members to operate DoD equipment
that has been transferred from use in the Middle East to the DHS
components? How would this hiring authority work?
Answer. It would be best to ask DHS whether it requires an
expedited hiring authority. My understanding is that DHS has sufficient
authorities to hire members of the Armed Forces, who are retiring or
separating from military service.
As for members of the Armed Forces returning from operations in
Iraq and Afghanistan, it is important to note that most of these
members remain in the Armed Forces after their return. DoD would not
support any change in law that would diminish the retention of members
of the Armed Forces. Such a change would seriously threaten the
military preparedness of the Armed Forces.
Questions for the Department of Homeland Security From Honorable Mike
Rogers
Question 1. Has DHS coordinated with DoD to identify existing
command-and-control technologies or techniques that allow for large-
scale data integration and processing from ground sensors, video
cameras, radar arrays, and other devices?
Answer. The response, containing sensitive information, is retained
in the committee files.
Question 2. Has DHS explored integrating more advanced imaging
systems onto its current manned and unmanned air assets?
Answer. The response, containing sensitive information, is retained
in the committee files.
Question 3. Has DHS fully reviewed DoD's use of unmanned airships
as persistent sensor platforms and communications relays? Has DHS
conducted a cost comparison between various types of unmanned air
platforms?
Answer. The response, containing sensitive information, is retained
in the committee files.
Questions for the Department of Homeland Security From Honorable
Michael T. McCaul
Question 1a. Are there any changes to laws or regulations that
would make it easier for DHS to receive transfers of DoD technology or
make it easier for DHS to leverage DoD research?
Question 1b. How can this process be made smoother?
Question 2. What can Congress do to further assist DHS in
leveraging DoD research and development?
Question 4a. Would it be helpful to give DHS an expedited hiring
authority for returning armed services members to operate DoD equipment
that has been transferred from use in the Middle East to the DHS
components?
Question 4b. How would this hiring authority work?
Answer. DHS is a key partner in the President's Export Control
Reform Initiative, of which the cornerstone of the effort is the
rebuilding of the export control lists. The administration is currently
in the process of publishing proposed regulations to solicit input on
the draft rebuilt control lists, which prioritize those defense
articles that should remain controlled on the U.S. Munitions List
(USML) administered by State and those that should be moved to the more
flexible authorities of the Commerce Control List (CCL) administered by
Commerce. Once all the proposed rebuilt categories of the control lists
are published for public input, State and Commerce will publish these
regulations in final throughout the course of 2012. DHS supports this
effort, as the prioritization of U.S. export controls will facilitate
DHS use of controlled items and technologies.
DHS appreciates the interest of the committee in ensuring that the
Department has the authorities and mechanisms necessary to accomplish
its mission. However, sufficient authorities exist allowing for the
transfer of technologies, the sharing of research, and the hiring of
veterans to fulfill critical needs. Section 1401, Pub. L. 107-314,
along with other laws regarding government use rights and disposed
equipment, already allow DHS access to newly developed technology and
retired military hardware that it deems appropriate to the mission. DoD
has established the ``Domestic Preparedness Support Initiative'' which
addresses the requirements set forth in section 1401 and the formal
relationships between DHS Science and Technology and DoD provide the
interagency mechanisms needed to ensure DHS is aware of technologies
and that they are shared. Additionally, existing hiring authorities and
preferences for veterans, in conjunction with the specialized
experience required to perform duties in this arena, are sufficient to
attract and appoint the talent with the requisite knowledge, skills,
and abilities.
Question 3. DHS S&T and the Department generally rely heavily upon
personal relationships, the individual experiences of its workforce,
many of whom previously worked at DoD, and a reliance on detailed
employees to liaison between components and DoD. Should the process be
more formalized, in the event that the people retire, move on, and are
replaced, in order to maximize collaboration, technology transfers, and
research and development investment between DoD and DHS?
Answer. Since the formation of the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), DHS's Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) has looked to the
Department of Defense (DoD) as a source of technology and partner in
research and development, and formal interactions to do so are
especially critical in this budget climate. S&T currently uses an
established and formalized mechanism for these interagency
relationships. These formalized relationships include established
Memoranda of Understanding with other Federal agencies; working groups,
and committees established through the Office of Science and Technology
Policy (OSTP); and joint programmatic investments and reviews with
organizations such as the Technical Support Working Group, the Joint
Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization, and the United States
Special Operations Command.
The majority of these interactions are conducted through formal
interagency working groups and committees in areas of shared mission
space such as chemical and biological defense, explosives detection,
cybersecurity, and physical security. Participation on these committees
and working groups ranges from the Under Secretary to individual
program managers. Under Secretary O'Toole currently co-chairs the
National Science and Technology Council's Committee on Homeland and
National Security, along with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Research and Engineering and the Associate Director for National
Security and International Affairs within OSTP. In particular cases,
such as port and coastal security, S&T is the lead organization of
these larger agency working groups that include DoD and their
subsequent areas of interest.
S&T has worked with the United States Visitor and Immigrant Status
Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) Program, the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST), and the Naval Postgraduate School to
test new technologies. That includes facial and iris recognition in
both laboratory and field settings and testing on how to successfully
link these technologies to fingerprint biometrics stored in US-VISIT's
Automated Biometric Identification System (IDENT).
S&T has successfully leveraged multiple DoD technologies over the
years in the biometric, chemical/biological, and explosives fields and
S&T has established a formal technology foraging office that leverages
opportunities from other agencies, universities, the private sector,
etc. to increase the field of view and ensure confidence that all
potential possibilities are explored.
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