[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
IRANIAN TERROR OPERATIONS ON
AMERICAN SOIL
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM
AND INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 26, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-54
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Janice Hahn, California
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Billy Long, Missouri, Vice Chair Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Dr. R. Nick Palarino, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Tamla Scott, Minority Subcommittee Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania, Chairman
Paul C. Broun, Georgia, Vice Chair Jackie Speier, California
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Loretta Sanchez, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Brian Higgins, New York
Ben Quayle, Arizona Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Janice Hahn, California
Billy Long, Missouri Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina (Ex Officio)
Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Officio)
Kevin Gundersen, Staff Director
Alan Carroll, Subcommittee Clerk
Hope Goins, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management...................... 1
The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management...... 6
The Honorable Patrick Meehan, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 4
The Honorable Jackie Speier, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism and Intelligence.............................. 3
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 8
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 9
Witnesses
General John M. Keane, United States Army (Retired):
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Reuel Marc Gerecht, Senior Fellow, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies.................................................... 14
Dr. Matthew Levitt, Director, Stein Program On Counterterrorism
And Intelligence, The Washington Institute For Near East
Policy:
Oral Statement................................................. 16
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Dr. Lawrence J. Korb, Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
Action Fund:
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty, United States Marine Corps
(Retired):
Oral Statement................................................. 31
Prepared Statement............................................. 34
For the Record
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Article........................................................ 46
IRANIAN TERROR OPERATIONS ON AMERICAN SOIL
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Wednesday, October 26, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence, and
Subcommittee on Subcommittee on Oversight,
Investigations, and Management,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
[Chairman of the Oversight, Investigations, and Management
subcommittee] presiding.
Present from the Counterterrorism and Intelligence
subcommittee: Representatives Meehan, Broun, Speier, Higgins,
and Hahn.
Present from the Oversight, Investigations, and Management
subcommittee: Representatives McCaul, Bilirakis, Duncan,
Marino, King, Keating, Clarke, Davis, Hochul, and Thompson.
Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
Mr. McCaul. Good morning. Excuse me, good morning. The
subcommittees will come to order.
Today, we have a joint subcommittee between the Oversight
Subcommittee and the Intelligence Subcommittee. We are meeting
today to hear testimony regarding the ``Iranian Terror
Operations on American Soil.''
The Iranian government is a threat to the international
community, building weapons of mass destruction. It is a threat
to the Middle East, dominating the region through intimidation
and support to terrorist organizations. Now, recent reports
indicate that the Iranian government is a threat to homeland
security by attempting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador on
our soil using drug cartels operating on our doorstep.
Enough is enough. In the past, we, and the international
community have attempted to use economic sanctions. It is
obvious these sanctions have not worked. Our message to Iran
should be simple--continue threatening the National security of
the United States, and there will be a punitive response.
Our hearing today examines the threats from the Iranian
government, the timid U.S. response, and the alternative
courses of action. In February, the International Atomic Agency
director agreed that Iranian leaders seemed very determined to
build a nuclear weapon.
Additionally, Iran has declared it has successfully
enriched uranium. Iran's growing arsenal of ballistic missiles
enhances its power projection, and there are reports Iran is
adapting one of its ballistic missiles to deliver a nuclear
warhead.
The U.S. Department of State considers Iran the world's
most active state sponsor of terrorism. Since its inception in
1979, the Islamic state has used terrorism as an integral part
of its foreign and military policies. It provides funding,
weapons, training, and sanctuary to numerous terrorist groups,
most notably those operating in Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and
other Middle Eastern countries.
Iranian-backed political violence has killed more than a
thousand people in over 200 terror attacks, including the 1983
suicide bombing of American and French military barracks in
Beirut, killing 299 people.
Most recently, the U.S. Department of Justice filed charges
of conspiracy to commit terrorism against Manssor Arbabsiar, a
naturalized U.S. citizen who holds an Iranian passport, and
Gholam Shakuri, who is identified as a member of the Qods
Force--a special covered unit of Iran's Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC).
Shakuri is still at large and thought to be in Iran. But
charges state that Mr. Manssor, who is living in Corpus Christi
and, at one point in time, in my district in Austin, Texas,
attempted to hire the Mexican drug cartel Los Zetas to
assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador in Washington, DC.
We should be concerned about a nexus between Iran,
Hezbollah, and the drug cartels. This plot indicates a
dangerous escalation of the Iranian government's role in the
sponsorship of terrorism. Remember that World War I started
because of an assassination of a foreign diplomat.
The Iranian government has established strong ties to Latin
America. Presidents Ahmadinejad and Chavez are allies. Iran is
focused on recruiting Venezuelan youth of Arab origin for use
as intelligence and militant operatives. Some are brought to
Iran for training. Sources claim that Hezbollah is involved in
this operation.
In addition, Iran Air operates a Tehran-to-Caracas flight
commonly referred to as Aero-Terror by intelligence officials
for allegedly transporting terror suspects, uranium shipments,
IRGC members, and Hezbollah operatives to South America. The
Venezuelan government shields passenger list from Interpol on
these flights.
Obviously, Iran is a rogue state which continues the work
towards acquiring nuclear weapons, building long-range
missiles, and supporting terrorism. Actions taken by the
administration are not working. We do not enforce sanctions
against Iran's Central Bank. Iran uses this bank to circumvent
sanctions. Additionally, this bank assists the Iranian Qods
Force in funneling money to terrorist groups such as Hezbollah
and Hamas.
Strict sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran must be
enforced sooner rather than later. If it turns out that this
Iranian assassination plot on U.S. soil was sanctioned at the
highest levels of the Iranian government, then I believe
military force should not be taken off the table.
I look forward to the witnesses' testimony. We have a
distinguished panel here today. I also look forward to see what
actions the Obama administration will take to demonstrate that
the Iranian government's actions are simply unacceptable.
With that, I now recognize the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, the
gentlelady from California, Ms. Jackie Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
holding this timely hearing on threats to the homeland from
Iran.
First, I would like to congratulate the people of Libya for
ending the reign of Muammar Gaddafi last week. It is now time
for the Libyan people to begin the long process of rebuilding
their country and regaining Libya's standing in the
international community.
I would also like to commend President Obama on yet another
major National security victory for helping to assembling the
coalition that supported the Libyans in deposing this dictator
all without placing any of our forces in harm's way.
Those developments in North Africa should hold some
relevance for today's topic as well, because it stands as yet
another example that in our increasingly interconnected world,
brutal regimes cannot continue to suppress their citizens'
desire for freedom and democracy.
I want to thank our distinguished witnesses for being here
with us today to discuss the Iranian threat, which is a
discussion that has grown in significance following the foiled
plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United
States by an Iranian-American man allegedly acting on behalf of
the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps--Qods Force.
But though this plot has refocused the debate on threats to
our security from Iran, we all know that Iran has been a
primary security concern for America for a long time. Earlier
this year, we held a subcommittee hearing on Hezbollah that
examined the close links between the Iranian government,
including the Qods Force and Hezbollah, a group responsible for
devastating attacks against the United States, including deadly
bombings of U.S. embassy and Marine Corps barracks in Lebanon.
Iran continues to provide support for Hezbollah and other
terrorist groups, including Hamas. Through some of these proxy
groups, Iran has been tied to attacks on U.S. troops in both
Iraq and Afghanistan, and Iranian-made weapons have caused the
deaths of many American service members.
Of course, the recently foiled plot--which was allegedly
authorized, funded, and planned by members of the Qods Force--
opens up a new dimension to the threat we face from Iran. If
the version of events laid out by the Justice Department and
its complaint is true, that this plot was authorized by members
of the Iranian government, what does it mean for the overall
threat we face from Iran?
Given that the target of this plot was not American, how
does this change our estimation of the Iranians' capabilities,
and intent to strike the United States? Does the alleged
attempts to partner with a Mexican drug cartel member indicate
a greater collusion between Iran and drug-trafficking
organizations? We still need to learn all the facts in this
troubling case.
But one thing is for sure. We need sober, reasoned
discussion of the foreign policy challenge we face with Iran,
not the inflammatory sound bites that have been characteristic
of the debate up until now.
The heated rhetoric from both sides over the past decade
brings back memories of the darkest days of the Cold War.
Before this recent plot was uncovered, the United States and
Iran have been contemplating a hotline between the two
countries to provide a direct line for top leaders to
communicate during a crisis, in the hopes that cooler heads
would prevail.
A similar solution was adopted by the United States and the
Soviet Union during the Cold War. With the arrest earlier this
month sparking a lot more heated rhetoric, I cannot help but
think that such a hotline could have helped. We must carefully
assess the most effective path forward for dealing with Iran.
America needs to send a message that Iran's leaders must be
held accountable for their actions. But we cannot take any
reckless actions which may lead to opening another front in the
war on terror, which the American people do not want and cannot
afford. We need to work with our international partners to find
the right balance in making Iran accountable. As we showed in
Libya, the best approach is to build a coalition and to avoid
unilateral actions.
Though many people have criticized our sanctions of Iran
for lacking teeth, just last week the Washington Post reported
that Iran's nuclear program faced major setbacks, in part due
to poorly-performing equipment and shortages of parts, as
global sanctions exert a mounting toll.
Even China has recently slowed oil and energy investments
in Iran to be more in compliance with the sanctions program,
greatly angering the Iranians. Working with our partners will
enhance our sanctions program and increase the pressure on
Iran, further isolating the regime and providing a path forward
that does not put our troops at risk.
I hope today to gain new insights into these and other
challenges in the hopes we can move forward, building a
strategy for dealing with Iran that is both effective and
responsible.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. McCaul. I thank the gentlelady.
The Chairman now recognizes the Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, the
gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Meehan.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our
distinguished panel for your presence here today.
Since the Iranian-sponsored assassination plot was revealed
to the public 2 weeks ago, I have been struck by much of the
commentary in the media that has underplayed the plot, with
some even suggesting that it would be impossible to pull off,
and questioning how Iran would ever use Mexican drug cartels
for a terrorist attack on American soil.
But I would note that the September 11 attacks, the 9/11
Commission pointedly stated, and I am holding it up. These were
their conclusions. Across the Government there were failures of
imagination, policy, capabilities, and management. The most
important was a failure of imagination. We do not believe
leaders understand the gravity of the threat, a failure of
imagination. Do our leaders completely understand the gravity
of threat? That is the essence of what we are trying to ask
today.
When it comes to the ambition of Iran to develop nuclear
weapons, an Iran that is willing to engineer terrorist attacks
on the United States soil, and an Iran that vowed to wipe
Israel off the map it appears to me that our government risks a
failure of imagination and may not fully be considering the
gravity of the Iranian threat. I hope we can analyze that.
Today's hearings address a critical homeland security
issue, Iran's terror operations on American soil. In my view,
this is a game changer and represents crossing of the red line
by Iran.
For many members of this committee it is not surprising.
This committee, in July, held a hearing on Hezbollah and Iran's
presence in Latin America, and its ramifications to United
States homeland. Witnesses testified that Iran, both directly
and through its proxy, Hezbollah, had its tentacles firmly
entrenched in Venezuela, throughout Latin America, and into
Mexico.
One witness even testified that the Hezbollah was sharing
underground tunnel technology with the drug cartels along the
Southern Border of the United States, the same technology used
by another Iran-supported terrorist group, Hamas, along the
Egyptian Gaza Strip border.
Those issue are alarming. I think there is a general
consensus among the witnesses, for many in the intelligence
community, that although Hezbollah has a presence in the United
States primarily for fundraising activity, Iran would not
attack the United States homeland unless provoked by the United
States or an attack by them on Israel or their nuclear
facilities, our nuclear facilities.
Does it now appear that that consensus is wrong? These are
among the questions I hope the principal purpose of this
hearing can be. A complaint unsealed in New York on October 11
has ramifications that are significant for homeland security in
the United States. The focus since 9/11 has rightly been on al-
Qaeda and affiliated terrorist groups. Debate about Iran's
intent and capability to strike on American soil has been
limited to the nuclear issue. That must change, and I hope
today's hearing is a constructive contribution to the debate.
While the United States and the international community
have issued sanctions against Iran in some forms since 1979, it
is obvious from the assassination attempt that Iran has not
been deterred. Some have theorized such an attempt might
actually signal some amount of desperation and dissention
within Iran, particularly as it relates to the relationship
between Ahmadinejad and the ruling theocracy. What are the
implications of that?
I do believe, regardless, that it is important for the
United States to get serious, sanction the Iranian Central
Bank, its oil refinery businesses, its shipping companies, and
its port operations. While Iran assassinating a foreign
ambassador in Washington, DC is a significant provocation, it
is not a plot considered in isolation. Iran is on a path toward
obtaining a nuclear weapon. We cannot allow that to happen.
If we cannot deter Iran's actions now--and the thought of
them with a nuclear weapon is unimaginable--simply taking him
at his word, President Ahmadinejad would use nuclear weapons to
literally wipe Israel off the map. It is my belief that we
should take him at his word and do everything we can as a
Nation to stop Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon, ensuring
both United States and Israeli security.
The United States and Israel share a common enemy in Iran
and, in Israel's case, a potential existential threat if Iran
attains a nuclear weapon. The United States must do everything
in its power to protect the state of Israel from an Iranian
attack.
Let me close my comments by saying I would like to call
special attention on one of today's witnesses, Retired Marine
Colonel Tim Geraghty. Colonel Geraghty was the commander of the
U.S. Multinational Peacekeeping Force in Beirut, Lebanon in
1983, when a Hezbollah suicide bomber killed 241 servicemen. As
we all know, this attack was planned, financed, and ordered by
the Iranian government.
This past Sunday was the 28th anniversary of the attacks,
and I know I speak for all Members of Congress when I say we
have never forgotten their sacrifice. I also want to highlight
that on this past Sunday there was a remembrance ceremony at
Arlington National Cemetary in Section 59, where many of
Colonel Geraghty's fallen Marines rest today in honor.
In what I believe to be a striking contrast, in 2004 a
monument was erected in Tehran commemorating the suicide
bombers that killed our 241 servicemen in that attack.
Organizers there held a registration drive, seeking martyrdom
volunteers. While just an anecdote, I think it tells us much of
an important story about the type of enemy Iran poses to the
United States.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the
Subcommittee on Oversight, the gentleman from Massachusetts,
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank
you for conducting this hearing. I would like to also
acknowledge a former D.A. colleague, Chairman Meehan, and
Ranking Member Speier.
I am pleased to be here and have the combined forces of our
subcommittee to join together to gain a greater insight on the
Iranian threat. For over 30 years, the relationship between
Iran and the United States has been tenuous at best.
Since 1995 the United States has had an embargo with Iran,
and this may seem like a long time, post-dating the Red Sox,
you know, version to the playoffs. But also, Iran's sponsorship
of the terrorist activities against the United States and other
countries spans those great three decades.
As I watch our young men and women return from the
battlefield in Iraq and Afghanistan, bearing both the physical
and the psychological wounds of war, what angers me the most is
their allegations of the extensive collaboration between Iran
and some of our most threatening enemies like the Taliban,
Afghan warlords, and al-Qaeda themselves.
For this very reason, our foreign policy with Iran should
not be a partisan issue. Iran's actions are wrong. As we focus
on the nuclear ambition, which are incredibly concerning, we
cannot turn a blind eye to the Revolutionary Guard's own
ambitions to stretch their tentacles even further across the
Middle East and perhaps, and I think likely, the Western
Hemisphere, as well.
There is no doubt that, following the failed Iranian
elections in June 2010, the Iranian regime has had its
legitimacy wounded. Their own paranoia has increased. They have
called on Islamic extremists in the region to increase their
violent posture, and yet again have advocated for the
annihilation of the Jewish state.
As if this were not enough to worry about, Israel--who is
our true democratic ally and trusted friend--Iran's nuclear
ambitions are moving swiftly towards the nuclear reality as the
world waits with a bit of apprehension.
Europe, Israel, and United States must undoubtedly prepare
for a more dangerous Iranian regime in the near term. Yet
nothing endangers peace more than a refusal to face and accept
the facts. So an examination of a way forward with Iran makes
sense.
While Iran's known and speculated alliances with terrorist
organizations pose an actual threat to the United States
homeland is a question that many have tried to answer, what we
do know is that members of the elite Qods and the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps were involved in a plot to
assassinate Saudi Arabia's ambassador of the United States. We
should ensure that the decision on how to proceed is grounded
in the best interests of the United States.
According to the complaint filed by the Department of
Justice, an Iranian-American working on behalf of an Iran-based
member of Iran's Qods Force attempted to hire a member of the
Mexican drug cartel to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the
United States. The cartel member, however, turned out to be an
informant for the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, who tipped off
U.S. officials and helped them build a case against
perpetrators who were subsequently arrested on September 29 in
New York.
Therefore, the focus of this hearing rightfully belongs on
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, an organization that has
been designated as a terrorist organization by the United
States, and whether the government of Iran or the entire IRGC
had knowledge of this scheme or not.
As I alluded to earlier, the evidence exists that the IRGC
is playing an active role to undermine Iraq by funneling funds
and arms to the Shiite militia, engaging directly in military
activity, and gathering intelligence.
Furthermore, the United States and the European Union both
agreed that the Qods Force are providing equipment and support
to help the Syrian regime suppress revolts in Syria. This
information alone is a cause for concern. Although I believe
President Obama's dual track of engagement and policy has had a
profound effect on Iran's capabilities, we must begin to weigh
other measures and prepare to counter the evolving threat of
Iran.
I look forward to this hearing. I look forward to what will
be discussed and the ideas coming from our witnesses. I thank
our witnesses for being here today, and look forward to hearing
their views on how we should counter this threat and exactly
how far along the threat lies within our borders.
Again, I want to thank the Chairman, the Ranking Members
for being here, and I look forward to the testimony.
Mr. McCaul. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes Chairman King for an opening
statement.
Mr. King. Thank you, Chairman McCaul.
Let me, at the outset, thank you and Chairman Meehan for
holding today's hearing. This is a vital issue. I think it is
very appropriate that the two subcommittees came together to
hold this hearing.
Much reference has been made this morning to the recent
indictment and the allegations regarding the plot against the
United States by Iran by elements within Iran. I have seen much
of the evidence, both in this committee and the Intelligence
Committee, and the totality of the evidence makes it clear that
this was a real plot. All of the various types of evidence
confirm how real it was. This to me is, as Chairman Meehan
said, a game-changer. This takes it to a new level.
Iran has been an enemy for many years. Some of the
statements this morning catalogued Iran's actions against the
United States. But to actually be contemplating what would have
been an active war against the United States, No. 1, showing a
foreign ambassador on American soil in our Nation's Capitol.
But also clear from the statements that were made, there was a
willingness to kill hundreds of Americans along with that.
So you have the assassination of a foreign ambassador, you
have the willingness to kill hundreds of Americans. This is an
act of war. So I do not think we can just do business as usual
or even carry on sanctions as usual. I think sanctions have
been somewhat effective in the past. But because of this red
line that was crossed, that was jumped across, I believe
further action is needed to make it clear how strongly we feel
about this.
Also not just to send a message for Iran, but also send a
message to other nations in the region about how seriously we
feel. I think, for instance, we should expel Iranian officials
both in New York at the United Nations and also here in
Washington. Many of them are working as spies.
In New York, we had a particular experience of people out
of the Iranian office at the United Nations. The United States
actually doing reconnaissance on the New York City subway
system, they were expelled from the country. I believe it is
fairly very clear a number of representatives of the Qods Force
who would be involved in Washington and also in New York. So I
think that is a clear signal, and a clear action should be
taken now.
Additionally, I heard Congressman Keating reference the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. I do not believe they have
been designated as a foreign terrorist organization. I think
the administration, our Government, should make that official
designation to designate them as a foreign terrorist
organization.
Also, as Chairman McCaul said, I think it is essential that
we begin to enforce sanctions against Iran's Central Bank.
These would send clear signals. Also I think it is important to
say that nothing should be taken off the table. Because once we
take anything off the table, that is only going to embolden
Iran. It is also going to cause concern among our allies in the
region and other countries that could be on the fence. So I do
not think anything should be taken off the table.
So I look forward to the hearing today. I look forward to
the witnesses. Let me particularly thank General Keane for
being here. He is from New York. We have had a number of
meetings over the years. I know of the particular work he did
in formulating the surge strategy in Iraq at a time when
everyone said that policy would not work.
I remember being at meetings with General Keane in late
2006, early 2007, and he, if anyone, was the architect of that
strategy. General Keane, I want to thank him for that today. I
want to thank all the witnesses for being here.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. McCaul. I thank Chairman King.
The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
We were recently made aware of an alleged attempt to
assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States
in Washington, DC. The U.S. Government has linked this
assassination attempt to high-ranking Iranian officials in the
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Qods Force. I commend the work of
our intelligence and law enforcement communities, and look
forward to seeing justice served in the case.
The United States and Iran have a long history. Even before
uncovering the alleged plot to kill the Saudi ambassador, the
United States had designated Iran as a terrorist country.
Reports that Iran is vigorously pursuing nuclear weapons and
has alleged ties to al-Qaeda are additional reasons why the
United States should pay close attention to Iranian activities.
However, recent remarks by some of my Republican
colleagues, as well as this morning, suggest that the alleged
assassination attempt represented the crossing of a red line by
the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism against the
United States and Israel, and claims that sanctions are not
working, may be premature, and could inflame an already fragile
climate.
Furthermore, the individual currently awaiting trial is
accused of attempting to enlist a Mexican drug cartel member to
assassinate the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States.
Although some have made a point to capitalize on the possible
alliance between Iranians and the Mexican drug cartels, the
facts indicate otherwise. We must be careful to stick to the
facts. We must not overstate, nor overreact to the threat we
currently face from Iran.
Some have criticized the sanctions we placed on Iran as too
soft, and have suggested taking actions that would lead us on a
path to escalation. But Iran is a nation that has already
isolated itself from the world community. It has long lost even
more credibility following its latest round of illegitimate
elections, and the Arab Spring that has swept the Middle East.
Let us not lend them the legitimacy they need by taking
reckless actions that would lead now the path to another war.
I thank the witnesses for being here today, and I look
forward to their testimony. I yield back.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Ranking Member.
Let me first say that I recently met with the FBI agents
and the DEA agents involved in this case. I want to personally
commend them, congratulate them, the U.S. attorney's offices,
the intelligence community. This was a true joint operation
that worked the way it is supposed to work, and I want to just
personally thank them on the record.
With that, we have a distinguished panel of witnesses here
today.
First, General Jack Keane is a four-star general. He
completed 37 years in public service in December 2003,
culminating as acting chief of staff and vice chief of staff of
the U.S. Army. He also serves as chairman of the Institute for
the Study of War.
General Keane, thank you for being here today.
Next, we have Reuel Marc Gerecht. He is a senior fellow
with the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies, where he
focuses on Iran, Afghanistan, and Iraq terrorism and
intelligence. He previously served as a specialist at the CIA
at their Directorate of Operations.
Next, we have Dr. Matt Levitt who founded and is the
director of the Stein Program on Counterterrorism and
Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
From 2005 to 2007, Dr. Levitt served as deputy assistant
secretary for Intelligence and Analysis at the Department of
the Treasury, and then as a State Department counterterrorism
adviser.
Dr. Lawrence Korb, a senior fellow at the Center for
American Progress and a senior adviser to the Center for
Defense Information. Previously, he was a director of National
Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. Korb
also served as an assistant secretary of Defense for Manpower,
Reserve Affairs, Installations, and Logistics.
Finally, we are very, very honored today to have Colonel
Timothy Geraghty. He entered the Marine Corps in 1959,
following graduation from Saint Louis University. He commanded
a reconnaissance company in Vietnam and, while a lieutenant
colonel, served in a special assignment with the Central
Intelligence Agency's Special Operations group. He commanded
the 24th Marine amphibious unit in Beirut in 1983 as part of
the Multinational Peacekeeping Force. Upon his retirement from
the Corps, he returned to the CIA to serve in the
Counterterrorism Center.
Colonel Geraghty, let me personally thank you for your
service and the brave actions on that fateful day in 1983 in
Beirut. I know we will never forget the Marines that died that
day.
With that, I will recognize General Keane for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL JOHN M. KEANE, UNITED STATES ARMY
(RETIRED)
General Keane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Minority
Member, the other Chairs who are present here today, and the
other Ranking Minority Members. I appreciate you inviting me to
share my views with you. I got to say this is probably one of
the most unique testimonies I have provided here, with bringing
these two committees together and also the number of Chairs and
Ranking Minority Members that are here. Also, I am also honored
to be on this panel with the distinguished colleagues that will
share their views with you, as well.
The Iranian bungled operation to use proxies to assassinate
the Saudi Arabian ambassador to the United States, and to
purposefully plan the operation inside the United States, is a
stunning rebuke to the Obama administration's policy of
negotiation and isolation with the Iranians. Indeed, Republican
and Democratic administrations, since 1980, have failed to deal
effectively with the harsh reality that Iran is our No. 1
strategic enemy in the world.
Frankly, the Iranians stated as much in 1980. That the
United States was the enemy of the Islamic Revolution, and
their intent was to drive the United States out of the region.
Therefore, they have been systematically killing us for over 30
years.
As mentioned, in 1983, their proxies, the Hezbollah, blew
up the American embassy, the Marine barracks in Lebanon, and
the embassy annex the following year, with a total of almost
500 lives lost. We not only had no response to this tragedy,
but we pulled our troops out of Lebanon.
In 1983, the Iranian-backed Al Dawa extremist groups blew
up the U.S. embassy in Kuwait and attacked Raytheon's
residential area, killing and wounding over 80.
In 1984, the CIA station chief in Lebanon, William Buckley,
was captured and eventually killed, which was the beginning of
an Iranian-backed campaign to take high-profile hostages over a
10-year period. This led to the poorly-conceived and ill-fated
operation by the Reagan administration to exchange arms for
hostages with the Iranians.
In 1985, TWA flight 847 was seized while en route to Rome
and was forced to land in Beirut, which led to the killing of a
U.S. Navy diver and dumping his body on the tarmac. Eventually,
the airplane hostages were released as the Israelis released
hundreds of extremist terrorists from Israeli jails.
In 1996, the U.S. Air Force Kobhar Towers barracks in Saudi
Arabia was blown up by the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, killing 19
and wounding almost 400. Again, although our intelligence
identified the culprits as Iranian-backed Hezbollah, we had no
response. Eventually we shut down the U.S. military bases in
Saudi Arabia.
Since 2003, in Iraq, the Iranians have provided rockets,
mortars, enhanced IEDs, and money to the Shia militia who were
directly involved in killing U.S. troops in Iraq. Moreover, the
Iraq Shia militia were trained by the Iranian special
operations force, the Qods force, assisted by the Hezbollah at
training bases in Iran.
While the Iranians were defeated politically and militarily
in Iraq in 2009, the President's recent decision to withdraw
all troops from Iraq puts our hard-fought gains in Iraq at risk
and plays right into the hands of the Iranians. Similarly, the
Iranians are supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan with money
and ammunition.
The action arm for Iran's state sponsorship of terrorism
outside of their borders is led by General Qassem Soleimani,
who has been in charge for over 15 years. General Soleimani has
no military or political boss. He answers to only one person--
the supreme leader in Iran, Khomeini. We must conclude that for
General Soleimani to plan an operation inside the United States
that would result in Americans being killed, surely the supreme
leader, at a minimum, approved the plan and may, in fact,
direct it.
Moreover, we must ask ourselves: Has U.S. policy with
respect to Iran been working? We appear to have a policy of
rhetorical condemnation when the Iranians engage in behavior
adverse to the United States interests. We also engage in
negotiations which are on-again, off-again, while the Iranians
continue to pursue nuclear weapons. We have imposed some
limited sanctions on the Iranians and attempt to isolate them
in the world which, as best as we can tell, also has had no
impact on their pursuit of nuclear weapons or their sponsorship
of terrorism.
We also must admit that the Iranians are not without their
own challenges. Having two fledgling democracies on their
borders in Iraq and Afghanistan is a huge geopolitical threat
to their tyrannical control of their own population and
preservation of their regime. The Arab Spring is a repudiation
of radical Islam. Indeed, the people in the streets are seeking
political reform, social justice, and economic opportunities,
which are the mainstream of Western democracies.
Certainly, the Iranians are attempting to take advantage of
the opportunities the social unrest of the Arab Spring
provides, but no one has demonstrated on behalf of their flawed
values. Losing a state-sponsored terrorist like Gaddafi is a
setback for them, to be sure, as is the upheaval in Syria,
their No. 1 ally in the region.
All that said, it is time to review our strategy for Iran
against the harsh reality that despite our rhetoric, attempts
to negotiate, isolate, and sanction, the fact is the Iranians
continue to use their proxies against U.S. interests and
continue to pursue nuclear weapons. Therefore, one must
conclude the obvious: That our policy has failed, and failed
miserably.
What can we do? First and foremost, begin to treat Iran as
the strategic enemy they truly are. As such, develop a
strategic competitive framework that counters every major
interest the Iranian regime engages in. Yes, of course, seek
international community support and cooperation. But regardless
of the amount of support that we are able to obtain, we must
act.
As an example, seize the financial assets which are outside
of Iran, much as we did with the al-Qaeda. Limit their ability
to trade by denying their ships entry to ports around the
world. Limit the ability of their central bank to operate
effectively. Conduct an offensive cyber campaign against
military and economic interests inside of Iran.
Conduct covert operations led by the CIA, in cooperation
with other agencies, to target the Qods Force and their
proxies. Provide money, information, and encouragement to the
dissident leaders inside Iran to use their population to put
pressure on the regime. In my view, these measures have a
realistic chance to compel a behavior change or, possibly, even
the regime to fall.
This much I do know: If we continue the half-measures of
the past, the Iranians will continue to kill us, will continue
to sponsor terrorism and use their proxies against our
interests, and will continue to pursue nuclear weapons. The
next nightmare the world is awaiting is around the corner, and
it is an unchecked Iran with nuclear weapons.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of General Keane follows:]
Prepared Statement of John M. Keane
26 October 11
The Iranian bungled operation to use proxies to assassinate the
Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States and to purposefully plan
the operation inside the United States is a stunning rebuke to the
Obama administration's policy of negotiation and isolation with the
Iranians.
Indeed, Republican and Democratic administrations since 1980 have
failed to deal effectively with the harsh reality that Iran is our No.
1 strategic enemy in the world. Frankly, the Iranians stated as much in
1980, that the United States was the enemy of the Islamic Revolution
and their intent was to drive the United States out of the region.
Therefore, they have been systematically killing us for over 30 years.
In 1983, their proxies the Hezbollah blew up the American Embassy,
the Marine Barracks in Lebanon and the Embassy Annex the following year
with a total of almost 500 lives lost. We not only had no response to
this tragedy but we pulled our troops out of Lebanon. In 1983 the
Iranian backed Al Dawa extremist groups blew up the U.S. Embassy in
Kuwait and attacked Raytheon's residential area killing and wounding
over 80.
In 1984, the CIA station chief in Lebanon, William Buckley, was
captured and eventually killed, which was the beginning of an Iranian-
backed campaign to take high-profile hostages over a 10-year period.
This led to the poorly conceived and ill-fated operation by the Reagan
administration to exchange arms for hostages with the Iranians. In 1985
TWA flight 847 was seized while en route to Rome and was forced to land
in Beirut, which led to the killing of a U.S. Navy diver and dumping
his body on the tarmac. Eventually the airplane hostages were released
as the Israelis released hundreds of extremist terrorists from Israeli
jails.
In 1996, the U.S. Air Force Kobhar Towers barracks in Saudi Arabia
was blown up by the Iranian-backed Hezbollah, killing 19 and wounding
almost 400. Again, although our intelligence identified the culprits as
Iranian-backed Hezbollah, we had no response and eventually shut down
the U.S. military bases in Saudi Arabia.
Since 2003 in Iraq the Iranians have provided rockets, mortars,
enhanced IED'S and money to the Shia Militia who were directly involved
in killing U.S. troops in Iraq. Moreover, the Iraq Shia Militia were
trained by the Iranian special operations force, the Qods force, at
training bases in Iran. While the Iranians were defeated politically
and militarily in Iraq in 2009, the President's recent decision to
withdraw all our troops from Iraq puts our hard-fought gains in Iraq at
risk and plays into the hands of the Iranians. Similarly, the Iranians
are supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan with money and ammunition.
The action arm for Iran's state sponsorship of terrorism outside of
their borders is led by General Qasim Soliemani, who has been in charge
for over 15 years. General Soliemani has no military or political boss,
he answers to only one person, the supreme leader in Iran, Khomeni. We
must conclude that for General Soliemani to plan an operation inside
the United States that would result in Americans being killed, surely,
the supreme leader at a minimum approved the plan and may in fact,
directed it.
Moreover we must ask ourselves: Has U.S. policy with respect to
Iran been working? We appear to have a policy of rhetorical
condemnation when the Iranians engage in behavior adverse to the U.S.
interests, we also engage in negotiations, which are on-again/off-
again, while the Iranians continue to pursue nuclear weapons. We have
imposed some limited sanctions on the Iranians and attempt to isolate
them in the world which as best as we can tell also has had no impact
on their pursuit of nuclear weapons or their sponsorship of terrorism.
We also must admit that the Iranians are not without their own
challenges. Having two fledgling democracies on their borders in Iraq
and Afghanistan is a huge geopolitical threat to their tyrannical
control of their own population and preservation of their regime. The
Arab Spring is a repudiation of radical Islam; indeed, the people in
the streets are seeking political reform, social justice, and economic
opportunities, which are the mainstream of western democracies.
Certainly the Iranians are attempting to take advantage of the
opportunities the social unrest of the Arab Spring provides but no one
is demonstrating on behalf of their flawed values. Losing a state-
sponsored terrorist like Ghadafi is a setback as is the upheaval in
Syria, their No. 1 ally in the region.
All that said, it is time to review our strategy for Iran against
the harsh reality that despite our rhetoric, attempts to negotiate,
isolate, and sanction, the fact is the Iranians continue to use their
proxies against U.S. interests and continue to pursue nuclear weapons.
Therefore, one must conclude the obvious, that our policy has failed,
and failed miserably.
What can we do? First and foremost begin to treat Iran as the
strategic enemy they truly are. And, as such, develop a strategic
competitive framework that counters every major interest the Iranian
regime engages in. For example, seize the financial assets which are
outside of Iran, much as we did with the al-Qaeda, limit their ability
to trade by denying their ships, entry to ports around the world, limit
the ability of their central bank to operate effectively, conduct an
offensive cyber campaign against military and economic interests inside
of Iran, conduct covert operations led by the CIA in cooperation with
other agencies to target the Qods force and their proxies. Provide
money, information and encouragement to the dissident leaders inside
Iran to use their population to put pressure on the regime.
In my view, these measures have a realistic chance to compel a
behavior change or possibly even the regime to fall. This much I do
know, if we continue the half-measures of the past the Iranians will
continue to kill us, will continue to sponsor terrorism and use their
proxies against our interests, and will continue to pursue nuclear
weapons.
The next nightmare for the world is around the corner, an unchecked
Iran with nuclear weapons.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, General, for that excellent
analysis.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Gerecht for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF REUEL MARC GERECHT, SENIOR FELLOW, FOUNDATION FOR
DEFENSE OF DEMOCRACIES
Mr. Gerecht. I just want to say it is a pleasure to be
here, to be invited by the subcommittees. Also, I must always
say it is a pleasure to sit next to General Keane. If one casts
one's mind back to the dark days of 2006, there were very few
individuals in this town on the Republican or Democratic aisle
or in the Pentagon who believed that Iraq could be turned
around. General Keane did, and we all owe him a great deal.
I am going to primarily talk about operations, about how I
have observed the Iranians over 20 years. To go back a little
bit in time to when I was an Iranian targets officer in the
Central Intelligence Agency.
Now, a great deal of conversation occurred after the plot
was revealed. Many quarters, many sensible quarters said they
could not really believe the Iranians were responsible, they
could not believe that al-Khomeini, who they described as being
a cautious man, could they have been involved in this. Most
importantly, they could not believe that the Iranians were
involved because the operation was so lame that the hiring of
someone like Mr. Arbabsiar could not have happened because this
is the A-Team.
Well let me tell you, the truth is that Iranian operations
are almost always sloppy. That is the way they have been. Do
not mix up the notion that an operation that was sloppy cannot
be lethal. I mean, when this first occurred it reminded me of
perhaps of my favorite Iranian bombing run, which was in Paris
in 1986, where the Iranians let loose against the French.
Probably, we know from commentary later by Iranian
officials in retaliation of French support of Iraq during the
Iran-Iraq war, they bombed Paris repeatedly, my favorite, that
culminated in the most lethal bombing of a place called Tati,
which was an inexpensive department store on the Rue de Rennes,
best known for its inexpensive women's underwear.
The individual who was responsible for that was a Tunisian.
Now, there were several people who were, but probably the
guiding light was the Tunisian Muslim who converted to Islam
and was taken back to Iran and was trained, who had been a
failed seller of vegetables and fruit in the streets of Paris.
Yet, the Hezbollah and the Iranians found him to be an ideal
candidate to bomb Paris. Within less than a fortnight, the DST,
the French Internal Security Service, had ripped the whole
thing apart. It was patently obvious the Iranians had done it.
I tracked Iranian operations all over the place in the
1980's and 1990's. Many of those operations succeeded. That is,
they killed individuals. Most of those operations again, it did
not take you very long to put all the pieces together. Again,
the Iranians really do not hide all that much. That is the real
truth.
I might make a slight digression, and just say all
intelligence services are not as good as you think they are and
the Iranians are no exception. They make a lot of mistakes. So
it is important to remember, when you think about the
Revolutionary Guard Corps, and the Qods Force, too is, that
these services largely reflect their domestic ethics.
Now, the way the IRGC works, the Pasdaran and the
Revolutionary Guard Corps works inside of Iran, is usually one
of brute force and coercion. They are not a subtle
organization. The ethos that you see inside the country is the
same ethos that you see outside of the country. They do not
have one body of very sophisticated folks who are the Persian
version of James Bond working outside of the country, and then
just the brutes, the thugs, inside. It is the brutes and the
thugs in both places.
So do not, for a moment, buy the argument from those who
said it cannot be because this is too sloppy. This is the
nature of the game. This is how it is done. You know, cast your
mind back again to something that obviously hurt us. If you go
back and you look at al-Qaeda's operations for the millennial
bombings and their attempt to go after the USS Sullivans in the
Port of Aden, it is positively comical. Yet, al-Qaeda was able
to recover in its consistently sloppy way, and they were almost
able to sink the USS Cole.
In the intelligence game, in this type of dark arts system,
the prize goes to those who just do--if you just persist at it.
What the Iranians do is, they persist. It is important to note
here that it is better than a 50/50 guess--in fact, it is more
like a 90/10 guess--that every single Iranian terrorist
operation since 1989, since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini,
has been approved by Khomeini.
He has been a somewhat cautious man, occasionally, inside
of Iran. I would argue that since the uproar of June 2009 and
the explosion of the--and its collapse, that actually even that
analysis is overrated. He has essentially turned a consensual
theocracy into a dictatorship. He has moved members of the
Guard Corps like they are musical chairs. He is in control of
that system.
Lord help Qassem Soleimani if he engaged in the operation
to kill Americans in Washington, DC without his approval. I
guarantee you he will be gone soon. He will most likely be dead
soon.
What we need to look at in the future--and I suspect this
is where the operational aspect of this is going to get
worrisome--is, what I think the Iranians are going to do--and I
would say the only reason the Iranians have not hit the United
States in the past is because they feared an American response.
They have had very active operations throughout the West,
except in the United States. The only incidence of that was
immediately after the revolution, in the assassination of a
former Iranian diplomat in Bethesda, a fellow by the name of
Tabatabai.
Since then, they have not engaged in lethal operations, so
far as we know, in the United States. I think the reason for
that is they have been scared. They have been scared of the
possible outrage coming from the United States. They have been
scared of American military.
I would emphasize to you that the reaction in Tehran in
2001, after the invasion of Afghanistan, and in 2003 after the
invasion of Iraq, was just dead silence and fear. It went away
because as Americans started talking about Afghanistan, and
more importantly, Iraq as a failure, the Iranians said, ``Oh,
it's a failure.'' Their attitude about what they could do to
Americans started to change, and they started to push, push,
push. If they think they can get away with it they will push
forward, and they did get away with it.
Now, even though it is very invidious to say this I think
it is crystal clear that they had the conception that now,
today, in Washington, DC they could have a terrorist operation
that could hit the two people that they detest most, the
Americans and the Saudis, and they could get away with it.
Now, the only way that I would argue that you are going to
stop that type of mentality and attitude is that you have to
convince them that you will escalate. You do not want to run
away from that word. You want to run towards it. You do not
want to say to them, ``We don't want to have another front in
the war on terror.'' Say you are more than willing to have
another front on the war on terror.
Mr. McCaul. Mr. Gerecht, this has been really fascinating.
But I would ask, in the interest of time, if you could wrap
your statement to give the Members time for question and
answer. You will have ample time to say some more.
Mr. Gerecht. I would just end with this. Operationally,
what I would suggest the committees look at is that they look
at Canada. I think that is where the Iranians have had much
more success in developing contacts, networks. I suspect what
they will try to do is move the type of operations they have in
Canada, move them south and all in there.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you for your insightful testimony.
The Chairman now recognizes Dr. Levitt.
STATEMENT OF MATTHEW LEVITT, DIRECTOR, STEIN PROGRAM ON
COUNTERTERRORISM AND INTELLIGENCE, THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR
NEAR EAST POLICY
Dr. Levitt. Thank you very much, Chairman, the Ranking
Members, the distinguished Members of the committee. It is an
honor and a privilege to testify before you today and to share
a panel with these distinguished speakers.
The fact that Iran uses brutal means to achieve its foreign
policy goals is nothing new. The fact that it decided to carry
out an attack in Washington, DC, an attack that would have
killed many more Americans, that they did not appear to have
any concern about the possibility of killing Senators, this
really is, indeed, something new.
There have been past plots in the United States, the one
that Reuel mentioned and a couple others possible since. I
include those in my written testimony. Many, many more abroad,
including the targeting of Saudi diplomats abroad. Of course,
one major instance in the past, Khobar Towers, where they tried
to hit U.S. and Saudi interests at once.
According to the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center,
Iran has been tied to at least 162 extrajudicial killings
around the world since 1979. But as several Members have noted,
questions have been raised about this plot, about its
unprofessionalism. Could have been a rogue operation? Why would
Iran decide to carry out an attack like this now?
I would like to answer some of those questions and, if
there is time, suggest some things we might be able to do right
now to be able to give Iran an answer. I agree with Reuel
wholeheartedly. We have to answer somehow now.
As to the unprofessionalism, I do not think anybody would
have said it was unprofessional had the person that they turned
to--I think that he was member of a cartel--not been a DEA
undercover. This was, in fact, a spectacular success of U.S.
law enforcement and intelligence. But had they not gone to that
individual, this could have been carried out. No one would have
pooh-poohed it then.
In fact, going to the Mexican cartel does not necessarily
suggest a formal nexus between Iran and the cartel. This would
have been a target of opportunity, perhaps, just as easily. But
it certainly would have been an effort to seek reasonable
deniability. That is a hallmark of Qods Force and Hezbollah
operations both.
You know, as tensions persisted between the United States
and Iran in the Gulf in the 1990's, the CIA assessed, in what
has now been declassified, that Iran would sponsor easily-
deniable attacks against U.S. targets, presumably mostly
abroad. So by reaching out to someone that they assume to have
been tied to Mexican drug cartels, using this foolish-looking
guy, Arbabsiar, as a cut-out, Qods Force planners may have
thought that they were indeed building for themselves some type
of reasonable deniability.
In my written testimony I also cite the case of Fouad Ali
Saleh, the Tunisian-Sunni convert to Shia Islam who sold
fruits, vegetables, and clothing, not with great success, in
the Paris subway as a precedent for the Qods Force using
individuals just like this.
Indeed, I would argue that the fact that the Qods Force has
suffered several recent failures suggests that they may not be
quite as vaunted as people assume that they have been. Consider
the foiled plot in Azerbaijan, where two Hezbollah operatives
were convicted and then released, but two other Qods Force
members were quickly captured and quietly released. Consider
reports of the joint Hezbollah Qods Force operation in Turkey,
again, where Qods Force operatives were quietly released. They
have had a series of failures. This is not the only one.
As for a rogue operation, I, too, agree that if the head of
the Qods Force did something like this without higher
authorization he is in for some very tough times. In the past--
Khobar Towers, the bombings in Argentina in 1992 and 1994--all
of these have, in time, been tied not only back to Iran and to
the Qods Force, but to very high levels of leadership and the
Iranian national security council both. I will go to that in
detail in my written testimony.
The fact is that U.S. intelligence assessed in August 1990
that Iran had been responsible for sponsoring numerous attacks
against Saudi interests over that past year, and assessed that
the Iranian terrorist attacks carried out in 1989-1990 were,
and I quote--``probably approved in advance by the president
and other senior Iranian leaders.'' We are likely going to find
something along those lines here, too.
Why would they want to carry out attacks now? Well, there
are all kinds of reasons. The Saudi ambassador reportedly was
quoted in Wikileaks that came out in the press as saying that
the Saudi king told U.S. officials that we should be doing
something against Iran. Tensions between the United States and
Iran are at least as high now as they were in the 1980s and
1990s. The revolutionary radical elements within Iran are in
ascent.
All the things that were going on then that led to
increased attacks are going on now. There is, in fact, a shadow
war going on. If you look at this from Iran's perspective--
Stuxnet virus, Qods Force people defecting, members of the
nuclear program suddenly disappearing--these are things that
they blame us and Israel, and every once in a while the Brits,
too, for doing. All of these maybe had an effect.
So what should be done? I would argue that especially while
the court case is on-going we would not want to do something
that would be prejudicial. I would also argue the fact is that
the country, Democrats and Republicans alike, does not have a
whole lot of stomach for a major military intervention now. It
should not be taken off the table.
My testimony is what can be done right now, and I will give
you a few examples. None of these are more than pinpricks, to
be sure. But if we were to do a bunch of pinpricks right now,
we could send a message, even before the trial is over, without
being prejudicial--and I do think we have to do something right
now.
I think that we should be working with allies--and the
Saudis were targeted here, they should carry some of the
water--to get some of the larger Iranian embassies, especially
in South America, brought down to size.
After the AMIA bombings in 1994, members of the U.S.
Government testified before Congress that this is something
that they were doing then. Instead, which we have seen is an
increase in the number of embassies, the size of those
embassies. We should also be pressing allies to P&G, to kick
out of the country known and suspected ministry of intelligence
and security operatives and IRGC operatives. We all have long
lists of people along those lines.
I think that we should restrict the movements of Iranian
diplomats--that is, press our allies to do that, we already
do--so that they cannot go outside capitol cities. Visiting
dignitaries cannot do anything more than what they came for.
Recently, Iranian officials went to Rome for a meeting. They
were allowed to go to that meeting, nothing else--no press, no
lectures, no meeting with the Pope, no meeting with Italian
officials.
I think that the GCC can be brought in here. Most GCC
members, for example, do support actions like targeting Bank
Merkazi, the central bank of Iran. I do think that is something
that should be done, and the Treasury Department has people in
Europe pressing that right now as we speak. But let us be
honest.
The major issue there is not that our European or Gulf
allies disagree with us that Bank Merkazi should be designated,
that it is a viable target, but rather the question of what
would happen to the international oil economy--and the larger
world economy, at a time when we, and right now especially the
Europeans, are facing some serious economic problems--that is
something that will have to be answered before we get people to
do that with us.
Iran sits on all kinds of international bodies. Their
memberships should be suspended so long as they engage in
activities that are completely beyond acceptable for
international norms. There are small types of military
pressures especially in Iraq. There is a lot that we are doing.
We could be publicizing some of that. There is more we could be
doing.
I would add just one last thing here. Aside from doing more
sanctions on the Qods Force, and there is a lot more we could
do there, Chairman King had asked if they were designated as an
FCO. They have not, but they have been designated by Treasury
as a specially-designated global terrorist entity.
One other thing that can be done, and DHS here can play a
role, is greater customs controls. We do have DHS officers in
Brussels working closely with FBI and others, doing yeoman's
work on dealing with Iran's procurement and customs violations.
There is precedent, within the European Union, for setting
up a small body that might share information in a timely manner
focused on one particular issue. After Kosovo, there was an
effort like this. We could do that on Iran and highlight Iran's
customs violations. That would help both on proliferation and
then argue terrorism as well.
There is a lot more detail in my written testimony. I will
leave that for that, and thank you for the opportunity.
[The statement of Dr. Levitt follows:]
Prepared Statement of Matthew Levitt
October 26, 2011
U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder's announcement on Oct. 11 that a
dual U.S.-Iranian citizen and a commander in Iran's Qods Force, the
special-operations unit of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC), had been charged in New York for their alleged roles in a plot
to murder the Saudi ambassador to the United States, Adel al-Jubeir,
represents a brazen escalation in Iran's struggle for regional
dominance. But Iran's willingness to use brutal means to achieve its
foreign policy goals is nothing new: Since the creation of the Islamic
Republic, U.S. intelligence agencies have repeatedly identified
terrorism as one of the regime's signature calling cards.
The plot developed quickly over just a few months, starting this
spring and culminating with the arrest of Manssor Arbabsiar, the
Iranian-American man, in September. According to a Justice Department
news release, Arbabsiar told a Drug Enforcement Administration
confidential source (CS-1) posing as an associate of an international
drug cartel that ``his associates in Iran had discussed a number of
violent missions for CS-1 and his associates to perform, including the
murder of the Ambassador.'' Later, after Arbabsiar was arrested and had
confessed to his role in the plots, he reportedly called Gholam
Shakuri, the member of the Qods Force who was also indicted, at the
direction of law enforcement. Shakuri again confirmed that the plot
should go forward and as soon as possible. ``Just do it quickly. It's
late,'' he said.
The timing of this plot suggests that Iran feels itself under
increasing pressure, both from the international community (led by the
United States) and from the regional alliance of Sunni states in the
region (led by Saudi Arabia). Intriguingly, the plot seems to have been
launched shortly after the Saudi-led military intervention in Bahrain
against Shiite protesters to which Iran objected loudly but was unable
to affect. According to press reports, a Saudi official alleged that
Gholam Shakuri was ``an important Qods Force case officer who had
helped organize militant Shiite protesters in Bahrain.'' According to
this Saudi official, ``Shakuri was among the Iranians who met Hasan
Mushaima, a radical Bahraini Shiite cleric, during a stopover in Beirut
last February, when Mushaima was on his way back home to lead protests
in Bahrain.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ David Ignatius, ``Intelligence Links Iran to Saudi Diplomat's
Murder,'' Washington Post's Post Partisan Blog, October 13, 2011,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/post/intelligence-
links-iran-to-saudi-diplomats-murder/2011/10/13/gIQAFzCPiL_blog.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
past plots
The fact that Iran plotted attacks in the United States is
surprising, and not only because Iranian agents have traditionally
carried out such attacks in Europe, South America, or the Middle East.
But the fact that Iranian agents engage in assassination plots abroad
is not itself news. Recall, for example, the assassinations of General
Gholam Ali Oveissi in Paris in February 1984; Amir Parviz, Ali
Tavakoli, and Nader Tavakoli in London in July 1987; Dr. Abdolrahman
Ghassemlou, Abdollah Ghaeri-Azar, and Fazil Rassoul in Vienna in July
1989; Kazem Radjavi in Switzerland in April 1990; and Sadegh
Sharafkandi and three of his colleagues at the Mykonos restaurant in
Berlin in September 1992. According to the Iran Human Rights
Documentation Center, Iran has been tied to at least 162 extrajudicial
killings around the world since 1979.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``No Safe Haven, Iran's Global Assassination Campaign'', Iran
Human Rights Documentation Center, Appendix 1 ``Chronological List of
those Killed during the Islamic Republic of Iran's Global Assassination
Campaign'', May 2008, http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/publications/
reports/3152-no-safe-haven-iran-s-global-assassination-campaign.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Indeed, some of these occurred in the United States. In 1980, Dawud
Salahuddin, an American convert to Islam, was recruited by the then
newly-formed Islamic Republic of Iran to assassinate Ali Akbar
Tabatabai, a former press attache at the Iranian Embassy in Washington
who became a vocal critic of Ayatollah Khomeini and founded the Iran
Freedom Foundation, an organization opposed the Islamic revolutionary
regime.\3\ In 1979, Salahuddin accepted a post as a security guard
offered by Ali Agha, the embassy's Charge d'Affaires. Salahuddin was
moved to a head security post at the Iranian Interest Section at the
Algerian Embassy after the United States and Iran severed diplomatic
relations in April 1980. While at this post, according to Salahuddin,
he was contracted and paid $5,000 to ``kill for the Iranian
Government.''\4\ Dressed as a U.S. Postal Service mail carrier,
Salahuddin carried a parcel concealing a handgun to Mr. Tabatabi's
front door on July 22, 1980. Salahuddin shot Mr. Tabatabi three times
when he answered the door to his Bethesda home.\5\ Following the
killing, Salahuddin fled to Canada and purchased a ticket to Paris.
Eventually, he arrived at the Iranian Embassy in Geneva and received a
visa to Iran where he was accorded a private meeting with Ayatollah
Khomeini.\6\ U.S. authorities have charged him with murder; he remains
a fugitive to this day.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``The Assassin--an American Who Killed For Iran'', ABC News 20/
20, January 19, 1996; ``Anti-Khomeini Iranian Slain at Bethesda Home'',
Washington Post, July 23, 1980; Dawud Salahuddin was originally known
as David Belfield. He changed his name to Dawud Salahuddin after
converting. Other known aliases include Hassan Tantai and Hassan
Abdulrahman.
\4\ David Ottaway, ``The Lone Assassin'', Washington Post, August
25, 1996; Ira Silverman, ``An American Terrorist'', The New Yorker,
August 5, 2002, http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2002/08/05/
020805fa_fact.
\5\ Ira Silverman,``An American Terrorist'', The New Yorker, August
5, 2002.
\6\ David Ottaway, ``The Lone Assassin'', Washington Post, August
25, 1996.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A 2008 report published by the Iranian Human Rights Documentation
Center notes a second assassination in the U.S. Nareh Rafizadeh, likely
targeted because her husband and brother-inlaw had been agents of the
Shah's intelligence service, was killed in New Jersey in 1992.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ ``No Safe Haven, Iran's Global Assassination Campaign'', Iran
Human Rights Documentation Center, Appendix 1 ``Chronological List of
those Killed during the Islamic Republic of Iran's Global Assassination
Campaign'', May 2008, http://www.iranhrdc.org/english/publications/
reports/3152-no-safe-haven-iran-s-global-assassination-campaign.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iranian intelligence operatives have also engaged in activity in
support of potential terrorist operations in the United States. In June
of 2004, two security guards working at Iran's mission to the United
Nations were kicked out of the country for conducting surveillance of
New York City landmarks in a manner ``incompatible with their stated
duties.'' A U.S. counterintelligence official said at the time, ``We
cannot think of any reason for this activity other than this was
reconnaissance for some kind of potential targeting for
terrorists.''\8\ This fits known Iranian modus operandi, as highlighted
by former FBI director Louis Freeh. Freeh would write in the 1990s, the
FBI wanted to photograph and fingerprint official Iranian delegations
visiting the United States because ``the MOIS was using these groups to
infiltrate its agents into the U.S.''\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Marry Weiss and Niles Lathen, ``2 `Tape' Worms Booted; Iran
Spies in N.Y.,'' The New York Post, June 30, 2004.
\9\ Louis J. Freeh, ``American Justice for Our Khobar Heroes,''
Wall Street Journal, May 20, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More recently, in July 2009, Mohammad Reza Sadeghnia, a naturalized
U.S. citizen of Iranian descent, was arrested in California for
carrying out preoperational surveillance for the Iranian government.
Sadeghnia was not a trained operative but a painter living in Michigan,
which helps explain why he was easily spotted by his targets, Jamshid
Sharmahd--a member of the Iranian opposition group Tondar, who made
radio broadcast from his California home--and Ali Reza Nourizadeh, a
Voice of America employee in London. Despite Sadeghnia's inexperience,
many factors support the belief that he was an agent of the Iranian
government. Not only did he plead guilty to the crime, but he traveled
abroad extensively. Moreover, he not only conducted surveillance on two
high-profile Iranian dissidents in both California and London, but he
recruited someone to murder one of his targets and, once on supervised
release, fled to Tehran.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Scott Stewart, ``Reflections on the Iranian Assassination
Plot,'' Stratfor Global Intelligence, 20 October 2011, http://
www.stratfor.com/weekly/20111019-reflections-iranian-assassination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Iran also has a history of targeting Saudi diplomats. During Iran's
worldwide assassination campaign targeting political dissidents,
Hezbollah in Saudi Arabia embarked on a campaign against Saudi
diplomats and officials. Attacks against Saudi officials abroad
occurred in Turkey, Pakistan, and Thailand. Indeed, commenting on one
of these assassinations, a CIA analysis issued in December 1988 noted
that ``Riyadh is concerned that the assassination of a Saudi diplomat
in Ankara on 25 October may be the opening round in a Shi'a terrorist
campaign targeting Saudi officials and facilities.''\11\ According to
U.S. intelligence, Iranian attacks targeting the Saudis continued even
under the presidency of the ``moderate'' President Rafsanjani. A CIA
analysis published in August 1990 assessed that Iran had been
responsible for ``sponsoring numerous attacks against Saudi interests''
over the past year. Moreover, the CIA assessed that Iranian terrorist
attacks carried out over the past year (1989-1990) ``were probably
approved in advance'' by the President and other senior Iranian
leaders.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ ``Terrorism Review,'' Directorate of Intelligence, Central
Intelligence Agency, December 1, 1988, approved for public release
March 1998, http://www.foia.cia.gov/.
\12\ ``Iranian Support for Terrorism: Rafsanjani's Report Card,''
Terrorism Review, Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence
Agency, August 9, 1990, Approved for Release June 1999, http://
www.foia.cia.gov/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
terror as a tool of foreign policy
One might assume Iran would behave more cautiously today, at a time
when it has come under increasing international pressure over its
rumored pursuit of nuclear weapons, its suppression of human rights at
home, and its support of terrorism abroad. Indeed, the U.S. Government
designated the Qods Force as a terrorist group in 2007 for providing
material support to the Taliban, Iraqi Shiite militants, and other
terrorist organizations. Most counterterrorism experts, myself
included, expected that future acts of Iranian terrorism would occur in
places like Europe, where Iranian agents have long targeted dissidents,
and not in the United States, where carrying out an attack would risk a
severe countermeasures, including the possibility of a U.S. military
reprisal had the attack been successfully executed and linked back to
Iran.
Iran's use of terrorism as a tool of foreign policy, however, goes
back as far as the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Writing in 1986, the CIA
assessed in a now declassified report titled ``Iranian Support for
International Terrorism'' that while Iran's support for terrorism was
meant to further its National interest, it also stemmed from the
clerical regime's perception ``that it has a religious duty to export
its Islamic revolution and to wage, by whatever means, a constant
struggle against the perceived oppressor states.''\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ ``Iranian Support for International Terrorism,'' Directorate
of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, November 22, 1986,
Approved for Release June 1999, http://www.foia.cia.
gov/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the early 1990s, these interests dictated an increase in
operational activities in the Gulf. Shiite extremist violence was
primarily the consequence of Iran's geopolitical calculus and its
continued enmity toward Sunni Gulf states. To that end, the CIA noted,
Iran not only supported and sometimes directed Hezbollah operations but
also ``smuggled explosives into Saudi Arabia and conducted terrorist
operations against Kuwaiti targets.''\14\ As tensions in the region
persisted, the CIA assessed in 1992 that ``for now, Iran will sponsor
easily deniable attacks on U.S. targets and allow Hizballah to
retaliate for [Hezbollah leader Abbas] Musawi's assassination.''\15\ By
reaching out to someone believed to be tied to Mexican drug cartels and
using Arbabsiar as a cut-out, Qods Forces planners likely believed they
were building for themselves the requisite ``reasonable deniability''
that is a central component of Iranian state sponsorship of terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ ``Terrorism Review,'' 22 October 1987, Directorate of
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Approved for Release June
1999, http://www.foia.cia.gov/.
\15\ ``Lebanon's Hizballah: Testing Political Waters, Keeping
Militant Agenda [redacted],'' Central Intelligence Agency, July 1992,
http://www.foia.cia.gov/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A 1989 CIA report highlights several factors that made Iran more
likely to take increased risks in support of terrorism--factors that
faded somewhat after the mid-1990s but that are now coming back with a
vengeance. The first was the dominance of radical elements within the
clerical leadership, which translated into significant Iranian
hostility toward the West. Then as now, there was little chance more
pragmatic leaders would come to the fore. Furthermore, igniting
tensions abroad could shift popular attention away from domestic
problems, while asymmetrical warfare provided Tehran with a potent
weapon at a time when its military and economy were weak.
Underlying Iranian grievances with the West exacerbated these
tensions in the late 1980s in much the same way that they have today.
In the late 1980s, Iranian anger was fed by the accidental 1988 downing
of an Iranian airliner by the USS Vincennes, as well as anger over the
publication of Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses, deemed by Iran to
be offensive to Islam. Now, the Iranian authorities' anger is fed by
increasing U.S. and European sanctions plus Tehran's conviction that
the West is pursuing a ``soft overthrow'' of the Islamic Republic by
use of modern communications to whip up protests. Tehran thinks that
the West caused the 2009 protests in Iran and is behind the protests
shaking Syria now.
According to CIA reporting in the late 1980s, ``Iranian leaders
view terrorism as an important instrument of foreign policy that they
use both to advance national goals and to export the regime's Islamic
revolutionary ideals.'' The CIA noted that Iran had already ``supported
and sometimes directed terrorist operations by Hezbollah'' described as
``a thriving Shia fundamentalist movement in Lebanon.'' Iran had also
``smuggled explosives into Saudi Arabia and conducted terrorist
operations against Kuwait targets.'' Iran, the CIA concluded, would
``keep the United States as a primary terrorist target'' for itself and
its surrogates for a variety of reasons, including the U.S. military
presence in the Gulf, the recent reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers, the
seizure of an Iranian ship laying mines in the Gulf, and an attack on
an Iranian oil platform used to support Iranian military
operations.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ [sic]
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iran under stress
Iran's competition for regional dominance with the United States
and Saudi Arabia is also at least as contentious as it was in the late
1980s and 1990s. Iran is under increasing international diplomatic and
economic sanctions, for which it holds both Saudi Arabia and the United
States responsible--and for good reason. From the Stuxnet virus to the
assassination of Iranian scientists and the defection of Iranian
agents, Iran feels increasingly targeted by Western intelligence
services. And Iran had reason to target Ambassador al-Jubeir in
particular: According to press reports, a 2008 State Department cable
made public by WikiLeaks quotes Ambassador Jubeir as telling American
officials that the king of Saudi Arabia said the United States should
``cut off the head of the snake,'' a likely reference to an attack on
Iran.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ ``WikiLeaks Cable Hints at Motive for Alleged Iran Plot,''
National Public Radio, October 15, 2011, http://www.npr.org/2011/10/15/
141364863/wikileaks-cable-hints-at-motive-for-alleged-iran-plot.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A few weeks ago, a Western intelligence official and I were mulling
over the string of attempted attacks by Hezbollah operatives targeting
Israeli interests over the past 3 years. From Azerbaijan to Turkey and
from Cyprus to Egypt, terrorist operations by Iran's terrorist proxy,
often operating jointly with members of the Qods Force, have been
foiled time and again. But while attacks in the past were widely seen
as acts of revenge for the 2008 assassination of Hezbollah's Imad
Mughniyeh, an attack today, this official mused, could just as likely
be an Iranian-driven plot in retaliation for the sabotage of Iran's
nuclear program. And Iran, he noted, attributes these setbacks to
Israel and the United States.
The fact that the vaunted Qods Force has experienced several recent
failed attempts to carry out attacks abroad--most notably in Azerbaijan
and Turkey, both in cooperation with Hezbollah--suggests that the Force
may be lacking capability and may explain what some have described as
an unprofessional plot lacking the kind of tradecraft we have come to
expect from the Iran's IRGC and MOIS. In fact, Iran has relied on
fairly unskilled and simple operatives to carry out attacks in the
past. For example, Iran and Hezbollah relied on Fouad Ali Saleh to run
a cell of 20 operatives responsible for a series of bombings in Paris
in 1985 and 1986. Saleh, a Tunisian-born Frenchman (a convert from
Sunni to Shia Islam) who sold fruits, vegetables, and clothing in the
Paris subway, was as unskilled and unlikely an operative as Arbabsiar,
the Iranian-American car salesman arrested in the al-Jubeir
assassination plot.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Youssef M. Ibrahim, ``Trial of Accused Mastermind in Bombings
Begins in Paris,'' The New York Times, January 30, 1990.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All the evidence available suggests the attempted assassination of
Ambassador al-Jubeir was a high-level IRGC plot, though authorities
have been careful to describe it as ``directed by elements of the
Iranian government'' and not more than that. It is, however, noteworthy
that the Treasury Department designated IRGC Qods Force Commander
Qassem Suleimani as a global terrorist on Oct. 11 because, as commander
of the Force, he ``oversees the IRGC-QF officers who were involved in
this plot.'' In the past, major acts of Iranian state sponsorship of
terrorism have ultimately been linked back to the most senior elements
of the Iranian leadership.
Consider, for example, the June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers
housing complex that was home to American, Saudi, French, and British
service members in Saudi Arabia's Eastern Province--the last time
Iranian agents carried out an attack targeting both U.S. and Saudi
interests. In that case, Iranian agents teamed up with Saudi and
Lebanese Hezbollah operatives to carry out the attack. According to the
testimony of a former CIA official, arrangements for the Khobar Towers
attack began around 1994, including planning meetings likely held in
Tehran and operational meetings held at the Iranian embassy in
Damascus, Syria. It was in 1994, according to this account, that the
Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei, gave the order for the
attack on the Khobar Towers complex.\19\ While planning the attack on
Khobar Towers, Shia extremists continued to carry out other plots,
including the hijacking of a Saudi Airbus flight, also in 1994.\20\
According to former FBI Deputy Director for Counterterrorism Dale
Watson, evidence the FBI collected to determine Saudi Hezbollah carried
out the attack at Iran's behest included not only forensics and the
statements of detained conspirators but also ``a lot of other types of
information that I'm not at liberty to discuss.''\21\ According to
Watson, whose tenure at the FBI spanned 24 years and included a stint
as the Unit Chief for the Iran-Hezbollah unit at FBI Headquarters,
Hezbollah does not carry out terrorist attacks internationally on its
own. ``It must be sanctioned, it must be ordered, and it must be
approved and somebody has to fund it,'' Watson noted in explaining
Iran's role in the attack.\22\ According to former CIA officer Bruce
Tefft, the Khobar Towers attack was planned and overseen by Iran's
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence
and Security (MOIS) ``acting on the orders of the Supreme Leader of
Iran.''\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Testimony of Bruce D. Tefft, Paul A Blais v. Islamic Republic
of Iran et al, Civil Action No. 02-285, United States District Court
for the District of Columbia, May 26, 2006.
\20\ Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, Report of the
Assessment of the Khobar Towers Bombing, Downing Assessment Task Force,
August 30, www.fas.org/irp/threat/downing/report.pdf.
\21\ Testimony of Dale Watson, Heiser et al v The Islamic Republic
of Iran, Civil Action Nos. 00-2329, 01-2104, United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, December 18, 2003.
\22\ Testimony of Dale Watson, Heiser et al v The Islamic Republic
of Iran, Civil Action Nos. 00-2329, 01-2104, United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, December 18, 2003.
\23\ Testimony of Bruce Tefft, Blais et al v The Islamic Republic
of Iran, Civil Case No. 2003-285, United States District Court for the
District of Columbia, May 26, 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on evidence gathered in the investigation into the 1994
bombing of the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, including
the testimony of Iranian intelligence defector Abolghasem Mesbahi,
prosecutors would ultimately conclude that Iran's Supreme National
Security Council held a meeting in Mashhad on Saturday, August 14,
1993, where senior Iranian leaders approved the bombing plot and
selected the AMIA building as the target. The meeting, chaired by then-
President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, began promptly at 4:30 p.m. and
ran for 2 hours.\24\ According to the FBI, around the time of this
August meeting, intelligence reports indicated Hezbollah was ``planning
some sort of spectacular act against Western interests, probably
Israeli but perhaps against the United States.''\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Report by the Investigations Unit of the Office of the
Attorney General, ``AMIA Case'' signed by District Attorney Marcelo
Martinez Burgos, Attorney General Alberto Nisman, and Secretary of the
Office of the Attorney General Hernan Longo, October 25 2006, p. 92;
Larry Rohter, ``Defector Ties Iran to 1994 Bombing of Argentine Jewish
Center,'' New York Times, November 7, 2003.
\25\ ``International Radical Fundamentalism: An Analytical Overview
of Groups and Trends,'' Terrorist Research and Analytical Center,
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, November 1994,
declassified on November 20, 2008, http://www.investigativeproject.org/
documents/misc/469.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To be sure, an Iranian plot to assassinate a prominent diplomat in
the heart of Washington in an attack that would likely include
significant collateral damage marks a significant break with the
traditional modus operandi of Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and
Security and the IRGC Qods Force. The decision to engage in such a
brazen, risky, and desperate operation underscores reports of fissures
within Iranian decision-making circles and suggests powerful elements
of Iran's ruling elite are under significant pressure. Whatever the
reason, and despite Iran's apparent attempt to mask its role in the
plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador by employing a team of
assassins from Mexico tied to a violent drug cartel, the indictment--as
well as the parallel Treasury Department designations of several senior
Qods Force officers as specially designated global terrorists--exposes
Iran for the terrorist state it is. It is too early to tell what the
consequences of Iran's assassination plot may be, but there should be
no doubt the plot lays bare the myth that sufficient carrots--from
offers of dialogue to requests for an emergency hotline to reduce naval
tensions in the Gulf--can induce the regime in Tehran to abandon its
support for terrorism, part with its nuclear weapons program, or
respect human rights.
what should be done?
Pointing to the 1983 and 1984 Beirut bombings, the CIA reported in
1987 that ``many Iranian leaders use this precedent as proof that
terrorism can break U.S. resolve'' and view ``sabotage and terrorism as
an important option in its confrontation with the United States in the
Persian Gulf.''\26\ That calculus appears to remain intact among senior
Iranian decision makers. There are, however, several concrete steps
that could and should be taken in response to the planned assassination
of Ambassador al-Jubeir to signal the international community's resolve
to confront Iranian state sponsorship of terrorism. Authorities may
want to hold back on some more severe actions until after Arbabsiar's
trial runs its course for fear of acting prejudicially, but the
intelligence supporting the case appears to be especially strong. On
that basis, there are several things that could be done now:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ ``Terrorism Review,'' 22 October 1987, Directorate of
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, Approved for Release June
1999, http://www.foia.cia.gov/.
1. Diplomatic Pressure.--Press allies to restrict the size of
Iranian missions to the minimum needed to conduct official
business, to restrict visits by Iranian officials to official
business only (no meetings with sympathizers, no speeches,
etc.), and to exercise diligence about the possibility that
non-diplomatic Iranian travelers connected to the Iranian
government may be engaged in illegal activities. Iranian
diplomats should only be allowed to travel outside the city to
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
which they are assigned on official business.
Consider that Iran's intelligence penetration of South America has
expanded significantly since the AMIA bombing. Testifying
before Congress in the weeks following that 1994 attack, the
State Department's coordinator for counterterrorism expressed
concern that Iranian embassies in the region were stacked with
larger-than-necessary numbers of diplomats, some of whom were
believed to be intelligence agents and terrorist operatives:
``We are sharing information in our possession with other
States about Iranian diplomats,
Iranian terrorist leaders who are posing as diplomats, so that
nations will refuse to give them accreditation, or if they are
already accredited, to expel them. We have had some success in
that respect, but we have not always succeeded.''\27\ Another
witness recounted meeting with senior government officials in
Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina regarding overrepresentation at
Iranian embassies in the region in March 1995--8 months after
the AMIA bombing. Officials in Chile and Uruguay, the countries
of most concern regarding Iranian overrepresentation at the
time, indicated that ``the activities of those at the [Iranian]
embassy were being monitored and that this was very clearly a
concern.''\28\ Five years later, the commander of U.S. Southern
Command, which has responsibility for the U.S. military over
the southern half of the Western Hemisphere, indicated the
Iranian presence in the region had grown still larger by
expanding the number of embassies in the region from just a
handful a few years earlier to 12 missions by 2010. That, plus
Iran's traditional support for terrorism, had General Douglas
Fraser concerned. ``Transnational terrorists--Hezbollah,
Hamas--have organizations resident in the region,'' Fraser
noted.\29\ According to press reports, the Qods Force plot may
have also included plans to target Saudi or possibly Israeli
diplomats in Argentina.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Testimony of Ambassador Philip Wilcox, Testimony at Hearing on
``Terrorism in Latin America/AMIA Bombing in Argentina'' before the
Committee on International Relations, House of Representatives,
September 28, 1995.
\28\ Testimony of Mr. Tommy Baer, president of B'NAI BRITH,
Testimony at Hearing on ``Terrorism in Latin America/AMIA Bombing in
Argentina'' before the Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, September 28, 1995, page 34 of oral testimony.
\29\ Benjamin Birnbaum, ``General in Latin America Trains Eye on
Middle East,'' The Washington Times, July 29, 2010.
\30\ Kevi G. Hall, ``U.S. Says Iran Plot to Kill Saudi Ambassador
Hatched in Mexico,'' The Miami Herald (McClatchy Newspapers), October
11, 2001.
2. Press regional bodies, such as the Gulf Cooperation Council, the
Arab League, and other regional bodies to condemn the Iranian
plot to target one of their most prominent diplomats. Countries
in the region and beyond should be pressed to expel known IRGC
and MOIS operatives operating out of Iranian embassies; this
would send a coordinated message that the world is aware that
Iran is proactively engaged in illicit conduct based out of its
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
embassies and that such activities will no longer be tolerated.
3. Build international consensus and support for the suspension of
Iran's participation in international bodies until such time as
Iran is no longer acting in flagrant violation of its
international obligations. To date, Iran participates in
several such bodies, including:
The Commission on the Status of Women (UN);
Executive Board, United Nations Development Program;
Board Member, United Nation's World Food Program;
Member, International Olympic Committee;
Member, Interpol;
Member, United Nations World Tourism Organization;
Member, World Health Organization;
Member, The International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD-UN);
Member, World Customs Organization.
4. Military Pressure.--More overtly contest Iranian military
activities and support for insurgent elements in Iraq. For
example, U.S. unilateral raids or raids undertaken in
collaboration with Iraq's Counter Terrorism Service could be
accelerated.
Efforts to bolster Iraqi military tactical intelligence
capabilities could also be bolstered with additional training
and equipment, provided largely through embedded contractors.
Such assistance could allow divisional formations along the
Iraq-Iran border to undertake UAV operations, cellphone, and
document exploitation, ground-facing radar surveillance and
other border security sensors. This would require U.S.
Government to consider releasing new technologies to Iraq,
which obviously presents certain risks due to Iranian
penetration of Iraqi agencies.
The U.S. military should develop a concentrated program to develop
Iraqi Army counterintelligence capabilities. Washington should
also consider releasing further evidence demonstrating Iranian
complicity in mass casualty attacks in Iraq (Ansar al-Islam/
Katibat Ul-Kurdistan).\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ This section benefited from input from my colleague, Michael
Knights, who recently spent a period of 3 weeks embedded with Iraqi
Army headquarters in the south of Iraq.
5. Customs Controls.--In line with the May 2011 recommendations of
the U.N. Monitoring Committee, the United States should partner
with the European Union to press allies and U.N. Member States
``to provide information, expertise, and experience to States
whose export control regimes and capacities for effective
implementation could be strengthened.''\32\ States should be
pressed to allow authorities seeking to inspect the cargo of
Iranian ships, pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1929,
the ability to bring said ships to port in their countries for
full inspection.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ See leaked UN Panel of Experts Report on Iran Sanctions, May
2011, http://www.scribd.com/doc/55737041/Leaked-UN-Panel-of-Experts-
Report-on-Iran-Sanctions-May-2011.
\33\ See UNSCR 1929, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/
sc9948.doc.htm.
Also along these lines, the United States and the European Union
could emulate the European Union's Customs and Fiscal
Assistance Office program (CAFAO), launched in 1996 to promote
the development of a customs service in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The CAFAO was charged with assisting in the creation of more
efficient customs services in order to allow for better
management of border-crossings and customs checkpoints at
airports and naval ports. Further, it was tasked with
developing infrastructures to combat organized crime and
commercial fraud and to facilitate legitimate trade.\34\ A
concerted effort to develop similar infrastructures and build
the capacities of other states to combat Iran's illicit
financial and procurement activities would be welcome and could
be led by a joint USEU effort, perhaps based out of Brussels
where DHS and other U.S. agencies are already doing excellent
work on customs enforcement related to Iran.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ See ``Cooperation in the Field of Customs and Taxation: The
European Union and the Western Balkans,'' European Commission, 2005.
http://www.mathra.gr/files/CAFAO_en.pdf.
6. Financial Pressure.--Work with allies to sanction and target the
full array of IRGC business entities. The IRGC is deeply
involved in the suppression of human rights in Iran; it
controls the country's nuclear, missile, and other weapons
proliferation activities, and it maintains the Qods Forces as a
special branch to support terrorism. The plot to assassinate
Ambassador al-Jubeir is just the latest IRGC plot authorities
have uncovered in a long line of illicit activities the Corp
has been involved in from Iraq and Afghanistan to Europe, South
America and the United States. Nonbinding sections of U.N.
Security Council Resolutions already call on member states to
``exercise vigilance'' toward certain activities related to
Iran, particularly transactions involving Iranian banks or the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), among other business
dealings. While it appears clear a new U.N. resolution is
unlikely to pass in the near future, despite the U.N.
Monitoring Committee's list of further designations it
recommended, pressing allies to do more to enforce such
voluntary guidelines would be welcome.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\35\ See leaked UN Panel of Experts Report on Iran Sanctions, May
2011, http://www.scribd.com/doc/55737041/Leaked-UN-Panel-of-Experts-
Report-on-Iran-Sanctions-May-2011.
7. Coordinate with European and other allies to allay their fears
over the possible unintended consequences of designating Bank
Merkazi, the Central Bank of Iran (CBI), for its on-going
financial support of Iran's illicit conduct. (As of this
writing, Treasury Undersecretary David Cohen is reportedly in
Europe doing just this). For all those pressing for a non-
kinetic measure that would truly affect Iran's bottom line,
this is it. U.S. officials have apparently concluded that
sanctioning CBI would not throw the international oil economy
into a tailspin, and now they must convince key allies so as
not to lose their support and maintain a united front against
Iran (here, the Saudi's increasing oil production is very
useful). The time for such a push is now, as it would come on
the heels of this latest plot, a UN report on Iran's horrific
human rights record, and the expected IAEA report on Iran's
nuclear program. Indeed, in light of recent events most GCC
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
countries now reportedly support sanctioning CBI.
And there is no doubt that targeting the CBI would undermine Iran's
on-going effort to engage in illicit conduct. Iran disguises
its involvement in financing terrorist activities through an
array of deceptive practices. For example, the CBI and other
Iranian commercial banks have requested--in order to make it
more difficult for intermediary financial institutions to track
transitions--that their names be removed from global
transitions.\36\ The U.S. Treasury is concerned that CBI may
facilitate transactions for sanctioned Iranian banks much like
Iran's Bank of Industry and Mine (BIM) has provided financial
services to other designated Iranian banks.\37\ Additionally,
CBI continues to provide financial services to Iranian entities
designated by the U.N. Security Council.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ Bulletin, U.S. Department of the Treasury, ``Guidance to
Financial Institutions on the Continuing Money Laundering Threat
Involving Illicit Iranian Activity'', March 20, 2008, http://
www.occ.treas.gov/newsissuances/ bulletins/2008/bulletin-2008-13a.pdf.
\37\ David Cohen, ``Emerging Threats and Security in the Western
Hemisphere: Next Steps for U.S. Policy'', Testimony before the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, October 13, 2011.
\38\ Bulletin, U.S. Department of the Treasury, ``Guidance to
Financial Institutions on the Continuing Money Laundering Threat
Involving Illicit Iranian Activity'', March 20, 2008, http://
www.occ.treas.gov/newsissuances/ bulletins/2008/bulletin-2008-13a.pdf.
I thank you for your attention and look forward to answering any
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
questions you may have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Dr. Levitt.
The Chairman now recognizes Dr. Korb for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF LAWRENCE J. KORB, SENIOR FELLOW, CENTER FOR
AMERICAN PROGRESS ACTION FUND
Dr. Korb. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Like General
Keane, I have testified over 100 times. I have never seen so
many Chairmen and Ranking Members, so I am honored.
Yes, this is certainly a critical time for U.S.-Iranian
relations. I would like to begin by pointing out that the
success of the law enforcement people here playing a critical
role shows that in dealing with the threat from terrorists with
a global reach it does not have to be military. That, in fact,
we can work with our law enforcement agencies here at home.
There is no doubt that Iran sponsors terrorism and is
undertaking an illicit nuclear program. While it might be
emotionally satisfying to take military action, I think it
would be exactly the wrong step. You know, if you go back and
you look at our history, Chairman McCaul was talking about how
World War I started with an assassination. Everyone agrees that
that was an overreaction to the assassination and created
problems that plagued us for the rest of the 20th Century.
I remember in the Korean War, people wanted, General
McArthur wanted, us to bomb China. When I was in Vietnam,
people were talking about using nuclear weapons. Of course, in
the Cuban missile crisis people wanted us to invade Cuba. Any
of those steps would have been disastrous.
I think one example of us overreacting--in what the late
Ted Sorensen called the mindless, needless, senseless invasion
of Iraq--did strengthen Iran, and continues to strengthen them
in that part of the world. It undermined our image throughout
the world, and made people listen more to Iran.
My feeling is that this attack, or the alleged attack, is a
sign of desperation. It shows that the sanctions are working.
While we should not take anything off the table, I think that
what we need to do is use this occasion as an opportunity to
assemble the coalition to increase sanctions. Follow the advice
of Admiral Mullen, who recently said even in our darkest days
of the Cold War, we had direct relations with the Soviet Union.
We should follow that with Iran.
Now, when people talk about the sanctions not working, I am
reminded of what a man I had the privilege of serving President
Reagan used to call the misery index. Take a look at the misery
index in Iran. It is over 30, when you count both inflation and
unemployment.
There is political turmoil. You have had fraudulent
elections. You have had the fact that the ruling clerics are
trying to undermine the president. In fact, today there was a
report that the ruling clerics would like to do away with the
presidency.
The nuclear program is not working. David Albright, from
the Institute for Science and International Security, who is
the foremost expert on this, has recently argued that the
program is not working because of all the problems that we are
having.
Now, I think the key to the sanctions has got to be getting
international consensus. The sanctions that were adopted last
June had U.N. approval, and we had all other countries involved
with us. That is why they are working. I applaud President
Obama for freezing the assets of the Mahan Air. I think we
should begin to move toward getting sanctions on the Central
Bank, but do not do it unilaterally. It has to be done with the
rest of the world.
Let me conclude with this. Everybody talks about how
horrible Iran is, and they have done a lot of horrible things.
But let me tell you, they were the first Muslim country to
condemn the attacks of 9/11. At the Bonn Conference, in which
we set up the Karzai government, George Bush's Ambassador, Jim
Dobbins said without the support of Iran, the fact that the
Karzai government would not have been installed.
So I think you have to put things into perspective, and
recognize there have been times that they have worked with us.
Thank you very much.
[The statement of Dr. Korb follows:]
Prepared Statement of Lawrence J. Korb
October 26, 2011
Chairman Meehan, Ranking Member Speier, Chairman McCaul, Ranking
Member Keating, and distinguished Members of the subcommittees, thank
you for inviting me to testify about the Iranian government's alleged
plans to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States on
American soil. This event comes at a critical time in U.S.-Iranian
relations, and it is imperative that the United States not overreact
but respond rationally and effectively. In this testimony, I will
discuss how the United States can best respond to Iran in order to
protect and defend our National security and our interests in the
Middle East and across the globe in this age of terrorism, tyrants, and
weapons of mass destruction.
First, I would begin by congratulating our agents at the FBI and
Drug Enforcement Administration. This case is a victory for law
enforcement and a testament to the hard work done every day by the men
and women at these two agencies to keep our country safe from
terrorists with a global reach.
As you all know, in recent years, Iran has repeatedly worked
against the interests of the United States and the international
community. In addition to this most recent plot--Iran's boldest but
also most poorly executed effort to harm the United States and its
allies--Iran is a known sponsor of terrorism and has pursued an illicit
nuclear program in defiance of the international community. For
example, just last spring, the Treasury Department announced it had
uncovered evidence that Iran was funneling money and recruits to al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Additionally, Iran's decision to
enrich uranium to 20 percent--far more than the 3.5 percent necessary
to produce nuclear energy--as well as its decision to store this fuel
in an underground bunker suggests that its nuclear program is not
designed solely for peaceful purposes. In short, the planned
assassination of the Saudi ambassador is merely the latest example of
hostile behavior by Iran.
The question now facing the United States is how best to respond.
Over the past 2 weeks, it has been gratifying to hear warnings from
both sides of the aisle about the perils of reckless military action.
Political leaders from Sen. John McCain (R-AZ), Ranking Member of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, to Sen. Diane Feinstein (D-CA),
Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, to Sen. Joe Lieberman
(I-CT), Chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental
Affairs Committee, have urged restraint.
In the past, unthinking military action by the United States has
strengthened Iran's hand. Iran is perhaps the clearest winner from our
mindless, needless, senseless invasion and occupation of Iraq. The war
allowed Iran to capitalize on the overwhelming anti-American sentiment
generated throughout the Arab and Muslim world by our invasion of Iraq
under false pretenses.
Moreover, because Iran owns one of the strongest militaries in the
Middle East, any conflict with Iran would likely be drawn-out and
costly in both blood and treasure, even greater than the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
On the surface, the Iranian plot to conduct a terrorist attack on
American soil may give the illusion of a strengthened, emboldened Iran.
In reality, the opposite is true. Iran has been tremendously weakened
over the past 2 years by the Obama administration's successful efforts
to muster international support for increased sanctions against the
country. The Iranian government is divided, widely viewed as
illegitimate by its people, and isolated internationally. Moreover,
Iran's economy is in shambles and its nuclear program has stalled,
partly as a result of the sanctions.
The clumsy and, frankly, bizarre plot to assassinate the Saudi
ambassador is a symptom of Iran's desperation. It shows a country
resorting to asymmetrical methods because it has been weakened
economically and militarily and divided politically.
While the United States should not take any options off the table
in responding to Iranian aggression, a military strike would likely be
counterproductive. Iran is plagued by internal unrest, and an American
attack would no doubt unify the country.
Instead, the United States should further focus its energy on the
initiatives that have so successfully defrayed Iranian power and
influence over the past 2 years:
1. Assembling a unified international coalition that condemns
Iranian bad behavior, imposes sanctions, and isolates the
country internationally;
2. And as Admiral Mullen recently noted, reaching out to engage the
Iranian government in order to deny Iran's leaders their most
effective method of uniting their people: The specter of an
``evil America.''
a weakened iran
Sanctions
Numerous nations and multinational entities have imposed sanctions
against Iran including the United Nations, the European Union, Canada,
Australia, South Korea, Japan, Switzerland, India, Israel, and the
United States. The sanctions have had significant adverse effects on
the Iranian nuclear program as well as the Iranian economy. More
specifically, the sanctions have resulted in many oil companies
withdrawing from Iran as well as a decline in oil production and
reduced access to technologies needed to improve their efficiency.
Additionally, many international companies have been reluctant to do
business with Iran for fear of losing access to larger Western markets.
Last June, the U.N. Security Council adopted its toughest set of
sanctions yet and the United States, European Union, Australia, Japan,
South Korea, and Norway followed up with sanctions of their own. The
goal is to restrict Iran's access to the global financial system,
especially major banks. There are provisions in the resolution that
prohibit any financial services--meaning banking, insurance, re-
insurance--to Iran if there is reason to believe that those services
could assist Iran's nuclear missile firms. The implementation of the
financial provisions contained within the Security Council resolution
has been very powerful--more so than people expected. The sanctions
have had particularly tangible effects on Iran's oil industry and
associated sectors.
Economic Turmoil
Iran's economy has stagnated in recent months, partly because of
the country's growing isolation from the world economy, partly as a
result of dipping oil prices, and partly because of the Government's
statist policies that limit private enterprise. The Islamic Republic is
beset by high levels of inflation (17.3 percent) and unemployment (13.5
percent) and low levels of foreign investment.
Iran cut energy and food subsidies in 2010 which resulted in a
four-fold rise in the price of petrol and reduced subsidies for bread.
Subsidy cuts threaten strikes and civil unrest (in 2007 protestors set
dozens of fuel stations on fire after the system for fuel rationing was
implemented). Frustration over a lack of economic opportunities--
especially jobs for young people--is widespread among the population.
Domestic political unrest and the 2009 election
The Iranian ruling elite are widely viewed as corrupt by the
populace, a dangerous situation given the Arab Spring protests that
have deposed dictators across the Middle East.
The 2009 Presidential election ignited popular frustrations about
government corruption and led to the Iranian Green Movement. The
official election results had President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad winning
with a large majority, but opposition candidates challenged that result
as fradulent. Street protests erupted as voter skepticism rose in
response to Ahmadinejad's declared victory. Supporters of opposition
candidate Mir Hussein Moussavi took to the street in protest over the
election results, and other countries around the world including the
United States and Canada voiced concern over claims of voter
irregularities and human rights abuses as the government put down the
protests. The Ahmadinejad government was able to stay in power only by
violently cracking down on its own people.
Intra-government tensions
The Iranian political elite are divided by internal strife between
President Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. For
months the ruling theocracy has been clashing with Ahmadinejad and his
allies for attempting to challenge the near-absolute authority of the
cleric-ruled system that has controlled Iran since the 1979 revolution.
Khamenei and his supporters are expected to continue their attempts to
push the president further into the political margins by undermining
his attempts to reach out to the United States and have begun
assembling a caretaker cabinet in case Ahmadinejad resigns or has to be
removed. This internal power struggle dilutes Iran's influence
internationally and calls into question the long-term survivability of
the regime.
The Arab Awakening
The Arab uprisings threaten Iran's strongest ally, Syria, and its
leader Bashar al-Assad. Syria is Tehran's only ally and its partner in
backing and strengthening the terrorist groups Hezbollah and Hamas. If
Assad loses control over Syria, new forms of less fundamentalist Muslim
political expression may emerge into the greater Middle East, making
the Iranian model less attractive. In Syria, the political balance
between the minority Alawi Shia regime in Damascus and the Sunni
majority has shifted irreversibly to Iran's disadvantage. Additionally,
if Assad is toppled, Syria is likely to be ruled by a Sunni-dominated
regime that will not be friendly with Iran.
Iran's nuclear program
Iran enriches its uranium to 20 percent purity, far more than is
necessary for nuclear energy production, and stores this fuel in an
underground bunker. These facts suggest that Iran's nuclear ambitions
are not purely peaceful in nature.
Last spring, a U.N. report found that the international sanctions
pushed through in 2010 by the Obama administration were significantly
hindering the progress of Iran's nuclear program. An article last week
in the Washington Post echoed these findings, noting that even in the
wake of the Stuxnet virus Iran's nuclear program continues to be
stymied by equipment shortages.
the u.s. response
Let me be clear: I do not believe that the United States should do
nothing and simply wait for Iran to implode. An attempted terrorist
attack on U.S. soil, no matter how clumsy, cannot be tolerated, and the
United States should respond strongly and effectively. In responding,
however, the United States should keep in mind what has made its
efforts to contain Iran so effective over the past 2 years:
International consensus.
The Obama administration should use the Iranian plot to convince
our allies to recommit themselves to enforcing the current sanctions on
Iran. This plot provides evidence of continued hostile Iranian
behavior, evidence that should be used to bolster the international
coalition against Iran.
Moreover, the United States should strengthen its own sanctions
regime and press for stronger international sanctions that can garner
the support of our allies in this coalition. The sanctions on Iran draw
legitimacy from the fact that they have been approved by the United
Nations and even involve some of Iran's former allies, such as Russia
and China. Maintaining the support of this robust coalition should be
one of the primary goals of the U.S. response.
Simultaneously, the United States should continue its efforts to
engage with the Iranian government. As Admiral Michael Mullen, the
former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, noted last month, ``even
in the darkest days of the Cold War, we had links to the Soviet Union.
We are not talking to Iran, so we don't understand each other.''
Talking to Iran promotes stability in the U.S.-Iran relationship and,
to the greatest extent possible, denies the Iranian government the
ability to use the specter of ``evil America'' as a means of unifying
the Iranian people.
Following the Iranian assassination plot against the Saudi
ambassador, President Obama vowed for the ``toughest sanctions'' yet
against the Islamic Republic. Thus far, the administration has frozen
the U.S. assets of Iran's Mahan Air and barred U.S. firms from doing
business with the airline. In a statement released by the Treasury,
Mahan Air is accused of closely coordinating with Iran's Qods Force,
which allegedly was behind the planned assassination. This is a wise
and measured response by the administration, and the United States
should continue to press for sanctions on companies that aid Iran's
nuclear or military ambitions.
The administration is also said to be ``actively'' considering
sanctioning Iran's Bank Markazi, or central bank, limiting Iran's
ability to sell its crude oil and thereby isolating it from the world
economic system. The success of this endeavor will depend on garnering
the support of other countries, a challenging but not impossible task
given the potential that such restrictive sanctions on the central bank
could harm ordinary Iranians and negatively affect the oil market. I
applaud the overwhelming support in the Senate for this measure, with
90 Senators calling for sanctions on the central bank this past August,
including Senators Feinstein (D-CA) and Kirk (R-IL) in recent days.
Iranian aggression towards the United States cannot be tolerated.
But it is important that the U.S. response to the Iranian plot furthers
our long-term goals: Deterring Iranian aggression and protecting U.S.
National security. Doing so will require us to work multilaterally with
our allies. Military action would be counterproductive.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Dr. Korb.
Colonel Geraghty is recognized.
STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY J. GERAGHTY, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
(RETIRED)
Colonel Geraghty. Last Sunday was the 20th anniversary, as
mentioned previously, of the beginning of an asymmetrical war
raised by radical Islamists against the United States and our
allies. It was on that day where this coordinated suicide truck
bombing killed 241 peacekeepers under my command, as well as 58
French peacekeepers. Those atrocities lead to the withdrawal of
the U.S. National peacekeeping force from Lebanon, and major
changes in U.S. National policy.
Since then, radical Islamism has evolved into the major
National security threat of the 21st Century. Perhaps the most
significant development that came out of the Beirut mission was
the ascent of Iran as a major player not only in the region,
but globally. Since Iran does not have a border with Lebanon or
Israel, in the early 1980s it deployed, through Syria, through
Damascus, a contingent of the Revolutionary Guard into
Lebanon's Bakaa Valley.
I might add that that was during the height of the Iranian-
Iraqi War. The Iranians established an operational and training
base, which remains an active hub of activity today. They
founded, financed, and trained Hezbollah, as mentioned
previously, and used those Shiite surrogates to attack the
peacekeepers that Sunday morning in Beirut.
We can see today that Iran's entity into Lebanon was a
game-changer and continues to destabilize Lebanon, attack
Israel indirectly, while raising its stature and popularity and
influence throughout the Arab world. Iran has the capability
today, and uses it to cause havoc on several fronts, on its own
schedule, that provides convenient distractions while its
nuclear centrifuges spin.
The Iranian mullahs waging a radical war, an aggressive
campaign, support al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Palestinian
Islamic Jihad, three of whom are Sunni. They support the
Taliban, as mentioned previously by the general, in Afghanistan
against NATO forces, and use the Qods Force in Iraq to finance
and equip both Sunni and Shia militias.
Some key leaders who are implementing the Iranian mullahs'
policies are worthy of closer scrutiny, and harken back to the
Beirut days. Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar, veteran commander of the
IRGC, the 150,000-man IRGC, was named minister of defense in
2005. In 1983, he was the commander of the IRGC Lebanon
contingent, and was directly responsible for the Beirut truck
bombing.
Today, he is the minister of interior in Iran, and they
have redeployed IRGC forces around the major capitols in there,
and why you are not hearing any of the protests coming out of
Iran with the Arab Spring protests throughout the Middle East.
Ahmadinejad's fiercely-disputed re-election in 2009 reveals
another connection with Lebanon. His selection--incidentally,
to put down that those protests in Iran at that time--they
imported some of his Falah thugs from Lebanon that they had
trained. His selection as the new defense minister, and
current, is General Ahmad Vahidi, who also participated in the
1983 peacekeepers bombings and later succeeded Najjar as the
commander of the Lebanon contingent.
He is the one who founded the Qods Force, serving as its
first commander. He is currently on Interpol's most-wanted
list, the Red Notices, for the bombings in Buenos Aires of the
Israeli Embassy in 1992, killing 29, and the Jewish Community
Cultural Center in 1994, killing 86.
Vahidi was linked by the European Union in 2008 for Iran's
nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapons
delivery systems, while overseeing the research and development
of weapons of mass destruction. Vahidi's assignment and
background is why Iran retains the dubious distinction, for
over a quarter of a century, of being the world's leading state
sponsor of terrorism.
The expanding relationship between Iran President
Ahmadinejad and Venezuela President Hugo Chavez requires closer
vigilance by the United States and our allies. Their open boast
to oppose world hegemony is clear propaganda to provide cover
for other activities. Plans include Russia building an arms
plant in Venezuela to produce AK-103 automatic weapons and to
send 53 helicopters, military helicopters.
Besides having major operating bases in the tri-border
regions of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, they have also
established another one on Venezuela's Margarita Island.
Mentioned previously, the weekly flights from Iran to
Venezuela are not monitored, which bring back memories of my
multinational peacekeeping headquarters in Beirut at Beirut
International Airport, which later evolved, in the late 1980s,
as a terrorist hub. The U.S. Southern Command has expressed
concern on the growing connections between Iran and Hezbollah.
All this is happening--is not happening without a purpose.
The DEA chief of operations has confirmed Hezbollah
operations have formed a partnership with major Mexican drug
cartels. They have been using the smuggling routes to smuggle
both people and contraband into the United States. These
developments should cause red flags to fly, and I know a lot of
attention is being paid across the intelligence, defense,
diplomatic, and home security communities.
We have to presume that Hezbollah cells are in the United
States and being fortified, awaiting Iranian orders. To
discount this threat and their capabilities would be an
invitation to disaster. Reports from the Homeland Security
documents, that earlier revealed that over 180,000 illegal
aliens from countries ``Other Than Mexico'' were apprehended
between 2007 and 2010, question how many we missed.
The recent Iranian-backed plot to assassinate Saudi
Arabia's ambassador to the United States involving a key Qods
Force commander linked to the killing of U.S. troops in Iraq
should come again as no surprise. The leader of that group
operated within the Iraqi militia of cleric Sadr, dressed as
U.S. and Iraqi soldiers in assault in Karbala, which killed
five Americans. According to a Treasury report, he supplied
Sadr's group also with the weaponries.
The cousin that was arrested is a co-conspirator with
Manssor Arbabsiar, an Iranian-American living in Texas. The
bizarre plot involving using Mexican drug traffickers to bomb
the restaurant in Washington which the ambassador frequented,
when you stop and realize using that bizarre plot--that is
like, in sales lingo, not a cold call--why you would use that
link unless there is a lot of previous activity.
The uniqueness of the plot provides some insight to the
nature of the asymmetrical threat we face. The plotters also
discussed bombing Saudi and Israeli embassies in Washington. My
question is the modus operandi that was considered: Did it
involve a Beirut truck-bombing model used by them against the
U.S. Embassy in Beirut and the peacekeepers in 1983, or the two
U.S. embassies in West Africa, Tanzania, and Kenya in 1998, or
the Israeli embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992?
In closing, I believe Iran is intent on attacking us in the
homeland. All one needs to do is to review their strategy,
their behavior, their attacks and their targets of the past 3
decades. Their ideology, mixed with their obsessive hatred of
America, makes us a prime target. The use of proxies have
proven to be successful, while avoiding any retribution for the
carnage they have wrought as the leading state sponsor of
terrorism.
One of the questions we should ponder in our timid response
to Iranian carnage in the last 3 decades is if they feel they
could go nuclear with impunity. The commendable work being
performed daily across the defense, intelligence, and domestic
law enforcement agencies is a matter of record. Our National
unity and eternal vigilance is required now more than ever.
Thank you.
[The statement of Colonel Geraghty follows:]
Prepared Statement of Colonel Timothy J. Geraghty
October 26, 2011
October 23, 2011 marked the twenty-eighth anniversary of the
beginning of an asymmetrical war waged by radical Islamists against the
United States and its allies. It was on that day in 1983 during the
Lebanese civil war that coordinated suicide truck bombings in Beirut,
killed 241 American peacekeepers under my command, as well as 58 French
peacekeepers. These atrocities lead to the withdrawal of the
Multinational Force from Lebanon and to major changes in U.S. National
policy. Since then, radical Islamism has evolved into the major
National security threat to Western civilization.
Perhaps the most significant development that grew out of the
Beirut peacekeeping mission was the ascent of Iran into becoming a
major player, not only in the region but also globally. Since Iran does
not share a border with Lebanon (or Israel), in the early 1980's it
deployed through Syria a contingent of its Islamic Revolutionary Guard
Corps (IRGC) into Lebanon's Bakaa Valley. The Iranians established an
operational and training base that remains active to this day. They
founded, financed, trained, and equipped Hezbollah to operate as a
proxy army and used these Shiite surrogates to attack the U.S. and
French peacekeepers early that October morning. We can see today that
Iran's entry into Lebanon was a game-changer while continuing to
destabilize Lebanon and attack Israel indirectly, which raises its
stature, popularity, and influence throughout the Arab region and
globally. Iran's capability to cause havoc on several fronts and on its
own schedule provides convenient distractions while its nuclear
centrifuges continue to spin.
Iranian mullahs, while waging a radically aggressive campaign,
support al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad,
three of whom are Sunni. They also support the Taliban in Afghanistan
against NATO forces and use the IRGC's elite Qods Force to train,
finance, and equip Sunni and Shiite militias in Iraq.
Some of the key leaders who are implementing the Iranian mullahs'
aggressive policies are worth closer scrutiny. Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar,
a veteran commander of the 150,000-man IRGC, was named minister of
defense in August 2005. In 1983, he was commander of the IRGC
contingent in Lebanon and was directly responsible for the Beirut truck
bombings.
Ahmadinejad's fiercely disputed reelection in 2009 also reveals
another connection with IRGC in Lebanon. His selection as the new
minister of defense, Gen. Ahmad Vahidi, also participated in the 1983
Beirut bombings and later succeeded Najjar as commander of the IRGC
contingent. He founded the elite Qods Force of the IRGC, serving as its
first commander. He currently is on Interpol's most-wanted list, the
Red Notices, for the bombings in Buenos Aires of the Israeli Embassy in
1992 killing 29 and the Jewish Community Cultural Center in 1994
killing 86. Vahidi was linked by the European Union to Iran's nuclear
activities and its development of nuclear weapons delivery systems
while overseeing the research and development of WMDs. Vahidi's
assignment and background lays out a bloody roadmap of Iranian
intentions. It also provides a deeper understanding as to why Iran has
retained the dubious distinction for over a quarter-century of being
the world's leading state-sponsor of terrorism.
The expanding relationship between Iranian President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad and Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez requires close
vigilance by the United States and our allies. Their open boast to
``oppose world hegemony'' is clear propaganda to provide cover for
other activities. Plans include Russia to build an arms plant in
Venezuela to produce AK-103 automatic rifles and to send 53 military
helicopters. Besides having a major operating base in the tri-border
areas of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, they have also established
another one on Venezuela's Margarita Island. Weekly flights between
Iran and Venezuela are not monitored which brings back memories of my
U.S. Multinational Peacekeepers headquarters at Beirut International
Airport in 1983 and which evolved into a terrorist hub in the late
1980's. The U.S. Southern Command has expressed concern of the
connections between state sponsor of terrorism Iran and Hezbollah. All
this is not happening without a purpose.
The former Drug Enforcement Agency Chief of Operations Mike Braun,
confirmed that Hezbollah operatives have formed a partnership with the
Mexican drug cartels. They have been using cartel smuggling routes to
get people and contraband into the United States. These developments
should cause many red flags to fly for the intelligence, defense,
diplomatic, and Homeland Security communities. We have to presume that
Hezbollah cells are present and being fortified while awaiting orders
from Iran. To discount this threat and their capabilities would be an
invitation to disaster. Reports from DHS documents reveal that over
180,000 illegal aliens from countries Other Than Mexico were
apprehended from 2007 and mid-March 2010 which begs the question of how
many we missed.
The recent Iranian-backed plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia's
Ambassador to the United States involved a key Qods Force commander
linked to the killings of U.S. troops in Iraq. This should come as no
surprise. Abdul Reza Shahlai led a group of the Qods Force, within the
Iraqi militia of cleric Moqtada al Sadr, dressed as U.S. and Iraqi
soldiers, in an assault in Karbala which killed 5 Americans. According
to a U.S. Treasury report, he supplied Sadr's group with weapons.
Shahlai is the cousin of the arrested co-conspirator Manssor Arabsiar,
an Iranian American living in Texas. The bizarre plot involved using
Mexican drug traffickers to bomb a restaurant in Washington, DC which
the Ambassador frequented. The uniqueness of the plot provides some
insight to the nature of the asymmetrical threat we face. The plotters
also discussed bombing the Saudi and Israeli Embassies in Washington. I
wonder if the modus operandi considered involved the Beirut truck-
bombing model used against the U.S. Embassy in Beirut and the U.S. and
French Peacekeepers headquarters (both 1983); the two U.S. Embassies in
Tanzania and Kenya (1998) and the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires
(1992).
In closing, I believe that Iran is intent in attacking us in our
homeland. All one needs to do is review their strategy, behavior,
attacks, and targets the past 3 decades. Their ideology mixed with
their obsessive hatred of America makes us a prime target. Their use of
proxies has proven successful while avoiding any retribution for the
carnage they have wrought as the leading state-sponsor of terrorism.
The commendable work performed daily across our defense, intelligence,
and domestic law enforcement agencies is a matter of record. Our
National unity and eternal vigilance is needed more than ever.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Colonel. Let me thank you again for
your service, particularly on that tragic day in Beirut.
The Chairman now recognizes himself for 5 minutes for
questions. Colonel, I agree with you that we have had a timid
response to Iran since 1979.
General Keane, you outlined, I thought, very masterfully
all the attacks and attempted attacks on the interests of the
United States since 1979. The failure of both parties, either
parties and administrations prior, to adequately respond to the
threat. Now we have an attempted assassination attempt on a
foreign official in our Nation's Capitol.
Fortunately, it was foiled. But according to your
testimony, General Keane, this goes to the highest levels, when
you said that the Ayatollah Khomeini, at a minimum, approved
the plan and may have directed it. That is very bold and, if
true, I think deserves a proper response. You mentioned our
policy has failed. We have had sanctions on and off since 1979.
That we are still faced with this threat that continues.
I think you mentioned we need to treat Iran as a strategic
enemy. I agree with that. So to both the general and the
colonel, what do you think should be the proper response to
deal with Iran?
General Keane. Well, as I said in my remarks, step one is
to recognize them as our strategic enemy, and therefore, use
only elements of National power, as such, to push against that
enemy. I am not suggesting that the first push should be a
military one--quite the contrary.
But let us face it, I mean, even the sanctions we use have
never had any major impact on these guys because they are not
tough enough. Lay down every single interest that they have,
and then counter that interest. We know that when they took
power they took all the shah's business interests around the
world, many of them in Europe and some of them in the Middle
East. They have those business interests. They are billionaires
because of it. Let us go get them. Why do we tolerate that?
There are so many other things that we can do, and people
on this panel have outlined those things. Let us not wring our
hands. If the international community does not want to step up
to it we go without them. If we do not take measures, serious
measures, and introduce fear to them, they are going to keep
killing us until they eventually get a weapon that can truly
hurt us. So I am suggesting that we get comprehensive and
holistic about what we are doing.
I am not suggesting for a minute that we start with some
small things and then lead up to larger things. I am saying we
put our hand around that throat right now in every interest
that they have. We have a significant offensive cyber
capability in this country that no one else in the world has.
Some are close. We can do limited cyber attacks. That takes a
Presidential finding. But why are we not doing that? That would
have a rather dramatic impact.
Why are we permitting the Qods Force leaders who have been
organized in this killing of us for 30 years to go around,
still walking around? Why do we not kill them? We kill other
people who are running terrorist organizations against the
United States. These guys have killed almost a thousand of us.
Why do not we kill them? Why do we not conduct espionage
against them?
We have people in our Government who know how to do this. I
am not suggesting a military action. I am suggesting covert
action that has a degree of deniability to it. My partner to my
left here knows more about this than I could possibly ever
know, but I am suggesting that----
Mr. McCaul. Unfortunately, I only have a minute left. Let
me just say this. I agree. I do not think anybody wants to go
to war with Iran. But I do think we need a tougher response,
particularly in light of this assassination attempt, you know,
in the Nation's capitol.
Colonel, I want to give you the last word in my little bit
of time left. You discussed quite extensively a connection
between Tehran and Caracas, between Iran and Venezuela--and
Latin America, the fact that Hezbollah forces are in Latin
America, the fact that Hezbollah forces may actually be working
with drug cartels. I think, in your words, this probably was
not a ``cold call.'' They may have been connected with them
previously.
Could you expand upon that?
Colonel Geraghty. Well, it is almost like a play I have
seen before, establishing a base in Lebanon and using that.
Look what they have expanded that to today, where really it is
preventing any kind of the larger issues, preventing any kind
of accommodation, between the Palestinian and the Israelis that
went to Hamas. They have expanded that. They have become a
major player and a major threat that they never had before
that.
That is why I say the Iranian Revolutionary Guard moving to
Lebanon at the time we were there on a peacekeeping mission was
a game-changer. Because they brought capabilities with them
that certainly were not there before. I mean, the bomb that we
faced was not put together by any Shias. It was not put
together, you know, in a weekend over a garage. It was the
largest non-nuclear explosion ever recorded, still retains
that. The magnitude of the bomb really predetermined mass
casualties, and the removal, really the destruction, of the
mission at the same time.
Moving that to Venezuela and so on, I would state that the
Qods commander connection with the assassination plot here is
the fellow that I pin, has to be, one of the key guys in the
planning and control of the Qods Force, is the founder that was
in Beirut, is the current minister of defense, Vahidi.
He is the one that founded it. Just look at the jobs he has
had before he has been the minister of defense. It is all key
jobs that lays out, like I mentioned, a roadmap. He was in
Venezuela earlier this year. He was expelled from Bolivia after
Interpol came because he is on their Red Notice, too. But he
travels under diplomatic cover.
The point is, he is probably the key guy that is
orchestrating all this, not only the use of the Qods Force but
specific missions, I would think, and has that kind of
influence with the mullahs.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Colonel.
Let me also echo Dr. Levitt's testimony. The Qods should be
designated as a foreign terrorist organization. I think that
would be helpful. These flights going between Caracas and
Tehran, they cannot be checked by Interpol. The international
community cannot check these flights. I have had Bolivian
lawmakers tell me that there is uranium on these flights going
to Iran. I think it is time, as General Keane mentioned, to
start stepping up to the plate and responding.
So with that, I now recognize the gentlelady from
California, Ms. Speier.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you again to all of our witnesses. I do not think we
could say often enough to General Keane and Colonel Geraghty
the great service that you have provided to our country. It is
very commendable.
Let me start with you, Dr. Korb. You testified about a few
of the successes the various sanction programs have achieved.
Can you describe the U.N. sanctions that are designed to
restrict Iran's access to global financial systems?
Dr. Korb. Last June, the U.N. Security Council adopted its
toughest set of sanctions. The United States, the European
Union, Australia, Japan, South Korea, and Norway followed up
with sanctions of their own. The goal is to restrict Iran's
access to the global financial system, especially major banks.
There are provisions in the resolution that prohibit any
financial services, meaning banking, insurance, reinsurance to
Iran if there is reason to believe those services could assist
Iran's nuclear firms.
These sanctions have been very powerful, I think more
powerful than most people expected. They have had particularly
tangible effects on Iran's oil industry and associated sectors.
That is why I mentioned what President Regan used to call the
misery index is beginning to create problems for Iran
internally.
Ms. Speier. You referenced in your comments, as well, that
the plots may indeed be a sign of Iran's weakness and
desperation. Can you expand upon that a little bit for us?
Dr. Korb. Well, I think if you take a look at the fact that
the government now is in chaos, they are concerned about the
Arab Spring. Because this is undermining the Iranian narrative,
you know, that the Islamic Republic should be the future of the
Arab and Muslim world. We know that when President Ahmadinejad
accepted some of our offers about enriching nuclear energy, and
asked for us giving him nuclear materials that they could use
for additional purposes, he was undermined by the ruling
clerics.
As I mentioned this morning, the ruling clerics are now
basically saying that they do not want to have a president
anymore. We know what happened, of course, in the 2009
election. So with their influence declining, with them having
economic problems, this was--as some people talked about if, in
fact, it is true--a potential game-changer to show that they
are still relevant.
I think the very fact that they allowed this renegade--I
mean, this was the Keystone Kops if you take a look at the way
this was done--the very fact that they would allow that to
happen shows that the country is in disarray and they are
becoming desperate.
Ms. Speier. The movement of the money is something that
still kind of perplexes me. Do any of you have any knowledge of
how this money could have been moved and masked so that we
would not know about it?
Dr. Levitt. None of us know exactly how it happened. It has
not been made public yet. But when I was deputy assistant
secretary for intelligence at Treasury, this is the type of
thing we looked at very closely. Clearly, it could not be sent
directly from an Iranian account directly to an American
account.
But there are many, many ways it could have been sent and
masked either through formal banking channels, through informal
banking channels, or a combination of both--meaning bank
transfers, Hawala deals. But bottom line is, it probably was
sent--and the indictment says it came from Iran--in some way
that was able to be traced through at least one other third
country.
But with one cut-out you can pretty easily send those
funds.
Ms. Speier. Dr. Korb, back to you. You said the nuclear
program is not working. Can you elaborate on that somewhat?
Dr. Korb. Yes. As you mentioned in your opening statement
here, the report in the Washington Post quoted high-level
Government officials in the intelligence community--and also
David Albright, who had monitored this closely--saying that as
a result of the so-called computer virus, Stuxnet, and also
with the sanctions that have happened, that their nuclear
program is not where they would like it to be.
They do not have access to all the materials that they
would like in order to move in the direction that they would
like. So what has happened is, this program has stalled. You
know, it is very interesting. You can go back, and I can show
you statements from people going back to 2004, saying in 6
months they are going to have a nuclear weapon, then 6 months
and 6 months.
They do not have it yet. I think what has happened is, this
shows that the international community, acting together, has
made it difficult for them. You know, we talk about Russia
actually backed off a deal they had made to send them, you
know, missiles as a result of these sanctions. So I think what
has happened is, they are no further along than they were a
couple of years ago.
Ms. Speier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
Mr. McCaul. The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Meehan.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this
distinguished panel, who has really opened our eyes.
I go back again to the commentary that I made at the
beginning about what we have been through before. Colonel, you
discussed this. We are looking at the past, and when we had
analyzed the past after 9/11 we talked about the failure of
imagination. Today, each of you has identified, at various
points, the concept of red flags.
Now, our committee has worked on the issue of this. We are
aware of the Iranian nuclear ambitions. We are aware of their
animosity towards Israel. What we begin to study more is the
use of these proxies outside of the Middle East and now
increasingly closer to our homeland.
We have heard testimony today about the activity inside the
Margarita Islands, where Chavez has worked and created a
stepping-off point. We have now seen the creation of
relationships with Mexican drug cartels. But the significance
to me there is the reality that this cartel could create the
opening, or opportunity, for terrorists to get into our country
much easier than we may perhaps anticipate.
We have heard testimony today about an Iranian presence in
Canada. My real question here is: Is this a red-flag moment?
Have we seen a time in which we have seen Iran cross the line?
We have a window, Dr. Korb, as you have said, perhaps right
now. We have got some desperation on the part--and this is
showing a sense of inability.
But we have also heard testimony about persistence, and
sloppiness, but still having results. It is clear in
everybody's mind that the game remarkably changes if Iran ever
gets a nuclear weapon.
As a result, this appears to be a remarkable moment of
opportunity. Should we be concerned about the ability, however,
of Iranian influence, proxies or otherwise, to use the
groundwork that they have laid as the ability to penetrate our
homeland and to use that as leverage against any kind of more
proactive stands against Iran?
We have discussed a series of sanctions, but we also see
the realistic capability for Iran to strike back. What are the
implications of our continuing efforts to try to tighten the
screws on Iran? I ask the panel, each of you, to answer that
particular question. What should we be doing next?
Mr. Gerecht. I guess I could go first there. I mean, again,
I have nothing against sanctions. I think there are lots of
sanctions the United States should tighten. I am in favor of
most of what we might call Central Bank sanctions, the Iran
oil-free zone. There are lots of different things you can do.
But again, I just emphasize. The people who rule Iran rose
up essentially through killing people. All right? They have
maintained a coercive system. It has become more coercive with
time, not less. They do not respond in the same rational
economic ways that we do. Iran would not look like the country
than it is today if they were concerned about the bottom line.
So I do not think that you are going to really intimidate
these people, get their attention, unless you shoot somebody. I
do not know. It is pretty blunt, but I do not think you get to
get around it. I think, for example, if we believe that the
Guard Corps is responsible for this operation, then you should
hold Qassem Soleimani responsible. Qassem Soleimani travels a
lot. He is all over the place. Go get him. Either try to
capture him or kill him.
But I think you have to send a pretty powerful message to
those who have undertaken this, or I think down the road you
are asking for it. They will read this not as a response of
someone who is strong, but as a response of someone who is----
Mr. Meehan. There has been a totality of things identified
today that could be pretty significant. Do we have to get to
the point of some kind of an actual aggressive military
response to still be able to accomplish significant inroads in
interfering with Iran's ability to carry out this proxy
terrorism, as well as move towards a nuclear capability?
Mr. Gerecht. Well, you could aggressively harass many of
their operations overseas. There is no doubt about that. But
you would have to have a consensus to do that. I mean, needless
to say, the White House, the CIA would have to be on-board to
do that. You would have to have the approval to do that. We all
know it is Washington, DC. These things are difficult to do.
So, you may find out that this type of covert action is
actually much more difficult to do than going after, say,
Qassem Soleimani when he travels.
Dr. Levitt. If I may add, and I agree, there has to be
something clear that is done. You know, in 1987, referring back
to the 1983 and 1984 Beirut bombings, the CIA reported that
many Iranian leaders, and I am quoting--``use this precedent as
proof that terrorism can break U.S. resolve, and the use of
sabotage and terrorism is an important option in its
confrontation with the United States in the Persian Gulf.''
I agree that something like this really is a red flag, in
the sense that they have decided to carry out an operation in
the United States. The question is how to respond. I do not
think we necessarily have to put a bullet in someone's head. I
do think that if we are not--and I hope we are already--that
there should be a significant covert action program in place to
deal with these types of things, sometimes sophisticated,
sometimes not so much.
In fact, sometimes the Iranians, just to make sure that we
know that they know what is going on, would surveil our
diplomats in different places using Iranian diplomatic vehicles
with tags just so that we know they are there. Even just that
type of thing, together with other things, can be very
effective. I have listed out a bunch.
I just want to say one thing about sanctions, as someone
who is a Treasury official at one point. I said this was in
Government, I say it all the time now. I think the sanctions
have been tremendously, tremendously effective. But let us be
clear, they were never intended, and they never will, solve
your problem--not the counterterrorism sanctions, not the North
Korea sanctions, not the Iran sanctions.
Where they are most effective, and where they have been
effective and will continue to be effective, though there is a
lot more that could be done, is in disruption. They have slowed
down the program. They have not ended it. Iran is actually much
further along than it was. But, you know, if every 6 months we
think they are about to get a bomb and they do not--if 10 years
from now we are still having this conversation--that is a level
of victory, but it is not a policy.
It does not get us where we want to be. So it has to be
used in tandem with other things. Military options, diplomatic
options, covert action, customs enforcement, enforcements of
current sanctions, all of these have to be done in a way that
will send a message to Iran that we are serious about this. But
these one-off designations do not help.
I will give you one recent example. Right after this plot
was revealed, Treasury designated several individuals to reveal
a little more information, clearly based on intelligence, about
the nature of the plot, including re-designating Qassem
Soleimani, the head of the Qods Force, this time on a terrorism
basis.
He had already been designated twice--once in a
proliferation executive order, once in a human rights executive
order for his actions supporting the Syrian regime's
suppression of its people there. On the one hand, that is great
because we use this as a vehicle to get out to the public that
we believe that this was not a rogue operation. That this was
done at the very highest levels of the Qods Force.
But in the other hand, if I am Qassem Soleimani and I am
sitting at my desk and I say. ``Okay, so the U.S. Government
designated me a third time,'' now I am worried.
So there are different reasons to use these tools, but I do
not think we are using them enough, in tandem with others,
aggressively enough to make Iran care. We are risk-averse, and
frankly afraid of our shadow, when it comes to dealing with
Iran. They are extremely aggressive. It is not a combination
that is going to work for us.
Dr. Korb. Let me say something I think is very important.
Mr. McCaul. I am sorry----
Dr. Korb. We----
Mr. McCaul. Well, I will let you respond, but we are
running over the time. I want the other Members to ask
questions.
Dr. Korb. No, go ahead.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, in fairness to Dr. Korb he did
not use his entire 5 minutes. So maybe we can give him a
minute.
Mr. McCaul. Okay, fair enough.
Dr. Korb. Thank you. Okay. I think we Americans like to
solve problems right away. But I think we have to be patient.
In the long run, time is on our side. If we overreact, you
know, by using military force, this will unite them. I think if
we are patient and we continue to do these things, some of
which have been mentioned by my colleagues, eventually this
regime is going to have to change its character.
If you had told Americans back when President Truman came
up with the Marshall Plan that the Cold War was going to last
another 40 years or something, the people would say, ``No, we
can't wait that long.'' You had President Eisenhower have to
stop people from the Rollback Strategy.
I think you need to be patient, need to keep taking the
steps. The more contentious you get from the international
community, the more effective they are going to be.
Mr. McCaul. Thanks, Dr. Korb.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to try
something because my time is limited. I am going to give a
comment, and then ask three different questions and ask you all
to just jump in.
First the comment. Is my recollection--correct me if I am
wrong--that the President of the United States has not ruled
out military action in terms of Iran? I have heard his
statements. So my comment is: What more can he do in terms of
what he says?
Now the three questions. One of them, a little real
provocative, I think. I was in Pakistan fairly recently, and I
was astounded when I saw three different officials in Pakistan
tell me that they did not believe the United States killed
Osama bin Laden.
I asked them how they came to that conclusion. I was
incredulous actually. Even al-Qaeda admitted that. I asked them
where they came to that conclusion, and they all cited the
information and propaganda coming from Iran. So my question is:
I think that their propaganda machine is being pretty effective
if they could ever come to that conclusion--what can we do to
conquer it?
No. 2, I think it has been touched on, but it is a common
thread. Mr. Gerecht mentioned, I think, Canada. Dr. Levitt
mentioned Latin America. Colonel Geraghty mentioned the
homeland threat. What are the threats in the Western Hemisphere
that we should be really vigilant about? Because I find that to
be a common thread.
The third thing, there is an axiom about the enemy of your
enemy is your friend. It is my belief that within Iran there is
an internal conflict historically, and I think it still exists
with the Ayatollah and Ahmadinejad. There is a conflict with
them. Is the United States, non-intentionally, acting in a way
that we are inhibiting that internal conflict that is there
from incubating and maybe causing problems within Iran itself?
So those are the three questions, and I will throw it open
to anyone that wants to answer those things. First being
propaganda, second being Western Hemisphere threat, third is
are we doing things unintentionally to maybe not let the
percolation of their internal conflict grow?
Dr. Korb. If you take the first one, the propaganda, I
think we have to recognize that because we invaded Iraq under
false pretenses people do not trust a lot of the things that we
say in that part of the world. Also, during the 1990s we cut
back what I call our U.S. information agency and we really have
not got it up to where it stands now.
I think one thing that has been missing here in terms of
Iran's internal conflict, remember, they had a democracy. We
overthrew it. We allowed the shah to begin developing nuclear
weapons. So when we say you cannot do it they say, ``Well, wait
a second. You did not mind when the shah had it.''
Basically, after they helped us in Afghanistan, okay, and
got the Northern Alliance, which is their allies, to support
the Karzai government, President Bush put him on the Axis of
Evil. You know, they said, ``Well, what do you expect from
us?'' Therefore, they went back to some of their, you know,
aggressive behavior.
Mr. Gerecht. Yes, I am going to let pass Larry's odd
rendition of history and go to the discussion of internal
events. I just say this. I mean, when President Obama came into
office--and he had a very aggressive policy of engagement, he
was writing letters to Khomeini--that did have a profound
effect, I think. It spooked the hell out of Khomeini.
It did the opposite of what the President thought would
happen. He sends that letter, and Khomeini gives a speech
later, very shortly thereafter, and he refers to the United
States as Sheik Tanti Mujasem, Satan incarnate.
President Obama actually fed his fear of the United States,
of the Western cultural invasion. When the pro-democracy
dissidents in the Green Movement started shouting in Persian,
``Ooh-ba-ma,'' which is a shortened version of ``he is with
us,'' that had a catalytic effect, actually, I think, on
demonstrations. Because the people in the streets actually
thought that Obama was standing with them with the pro-
democracy movement.
Now the President actually was not. He was actually trying
to have a dialogue directly with Khomeini and his focus was on
them, not on what was to come later with the Green Movement.
But the United States can have an internal effect. I would
suggest, and argue, that that incident should tell you that if
the United States actually does talk about democracy in Iran,
if it actually uses its bully pulpit to challenge the regime,
to challenge the regime on its internal oppression, it actually
can encourage dissent, it can encourage change, and it
reinforces the people inside psychologically.
When we do not do that, I think we send signals to the
regime that we do not really care. Some Iranian diplomats who
defected have made it crystal clear to folks that, you know,
when they would write their cables back home to Tehran the
Americans and Europeans would come and see them. They talk only
about one thing. They talk about the nuclear program.
So what did those diplomats write back home? They do not
care about anything else. That is a mistake.
General Keane. The thing that I would add is, we know how
to do this propaganda. We have got a history of having done it
effectively. We did it somewhat effectively with Soviet Union
propaganda. But it does take authorities, it takes resources,
and perseverance to do it.
Mr. Keating. May I suggest it is easier these days because
of social networking to even be more effective.
General Keane. Very much so. In my statement I said that we
certainly should be targeting Iran with this kind of effort in
terms of making an impact on those people. I think one of the
low points of American history, when over a million people were
in the streets of Tehran in 2009 in July, we had no moral
response to that movement.
This is one of the most repressive regimes that we have,
and we did not respond and side with them, much as we have
responded to the Polish movement, to the Ukrainian movement,
and to others around the world when people get in to the
streets fighting against a dictatorship.
So yes, we can. There is much that we can do. It should be
one of the other things in our kit bag.
Mr. Keating. The final comment I have, and then I will have
to relinquish my time, it is over.
But let me just say this. That there are things we cannot
talk about that are classified, obviously. But many of the
things you have suggested that this Government should be doing,
I would suggest that perhaps we are already doing those things
but we just cannot talk about them.
Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Bilirakis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today. I have a couple
of questions.
This is with regard to the cartels, and this is for the
general and also colonel. Does it stand to reason that the
Iranians would not have approached the cartels, for the first
time, with a task as delicate, important, and sensitive as
assassinating an ambassador? Does it not suggest a level of
trust indicative of a pre-existing relationship?
Whoever would like to address that, the general or the
colonel.
Colonel Geraghty. After you, General.
[Laughter.]
General Keane. Well, I think the answer is obvious that,
from my perspective of course it suggests to take on something
as vital as conducting an attack inside the United States there
has got to be a relationship there. There has got to be some
trust in that relationship.
Let me just say something. I want to associate my remarks
with Reuel, and totally disagree with Dr. Korb that this is
somehow an act of desperation. That a strategic decision is
made to attack the United States because of a sense of
frustration and they are involved in chaos. I totally dismiss
that theory that they would come to the United States.
They came to the United States to do this because they
believe it is going to advantage them in their part of the
world. They are trying to get the influence of the United
States and the West out of their region. They fundamentally
believe, and Reuel is totally right about this, that they would
get away with it.
When bin Laden took the two embassies down in Africa in
1998, we lost 400 people dead. I think bin Laden makes the
decision. What we did in terms of our response to that is, we
threw some missiles up into their training base in Afghanistan.
I think bin Laden concludes, ``I just killed 400 of them, and
they won't even come for us. I think we can come for them
because they are weak.''
That is why they are here, because we are weak. That is
what they believe. They are here because they believe we are
weak and we are not going to respond.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
This question is for Mr. Gerecht: Is it true that some of
the car bombs recently being used by the cartels in Mexico are
technically very similar to the car bomb designs used in Iraq
by Iran's terrorist proxies there? Does this indicate possible
collusion or training between the cartels and the terror
groups?
Mr. Gerecht. Oh, I am not a wiring expert. I doubt it. I
mean, I think the knowledge of bombs sort of gets around. I
mean, proliferation not only occurs with high technology, it
also occurs with low technology. So, I am not sure that you
need to see links in car bombs to suggest that you got active
engagement.
You might. I am not denying it. I am just saying that this
type of knowledge is fairly ubiquitous, and it spreads easily.
Mr. Bilirakis. Anyone else want to comment on that?
Dr. Levitt. I will just add generally that we should be
wary of jumping too quickly to the conclusion that in order for
there to have been this type of cooperation it has to be
institutionalized with lots of trust. DEA has found, many
times, that what you have are the same types of facilitators, a
gray area of people who work in the illicit industries, and for
money they will work with all types.
That is clearly happening in Mexico, where the same people
who will move things will move guns or money or people.
Sometimes it is just an opportunity. If, in fact, Arbabsiar, as
is reported, had all kinds of business in Mexico, maybe some
illicit business--apparently had a contact with this individual
who we thought was a member of the drug cartel, it turns out to
have been a source of ours--it may just have been that.
That a relative in the Qods Force sees an opportunity to
leverage a relative who is living here, who has connections
south of the border and might be able to do this just for
money. Sometimes it really is just that simple. It is still
telling, because there are these opportunities to leverage
those types of relationships. But it does not necessarily mean
that these are institutionalized.
We are just going to have to wait to see how the
investigation pans out, and as information is made public, to
really draw firm conclusions.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you.
I yield back my time. Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
The Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member, Mr.
Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me say
from the beginning that while there might have been some acts
perpetrated before the last 3 years of this administration, it
might have been characterized, from a response standpoint, as
weak.
I am very comfortable that under the Obama administration
we have taken some very, very bad people out. There is no
question about it, the record is clear. So this notion that
somehow as a country we are weak, from my standpoint, I want to
make sure that there is some who disagree with that.
But that being said, given the situation we face now with
the drawdown in Iraq and the situation with Iran, I want to ask
unanimous consent, Mr. Chairman, to enter into the record an
article about U.S. Ambassador Susan Rice.
[The information follows:]
Article Submitted by Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
diplomacy, not military force, should be our track with iran,
conservatives beat the war drum harder after assassination attempt
By Matthew Duss--October 20, 2011.
Questions remain about the Iranian government's alleged plot to
assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the United States in Washington,
DC. Still, it clearly augurs even greater tension between Iran and the
United States in the immediate future. But while the plot as described
might create the illusion of an emboldened Iran, the reality is that
Iran is much weaker and more isolated now than when President Barack
Obama took office.
First, the administration's successful efforts to constrain Iran's
nuclear development are undeniable. According to an article in
Tuesday's Washington Post, ``Iran's nuclear program, which stumbled
badly after a reported cyber attack last year, appears beset by poorly
performing equipment, shortages of parts and other woes as global
sanctions exert a mounting toll.''
This echoes the findings of a special panel of U.N. experts, which
reported in May that the multilateral sanctions adopted under June
2010's U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929--sanctions that the Obama
administration worked hard to pass--were having a significant impact on
Iran's ability to proceed with its nuclear program.
According to the report, those measures were ``constraining Iran's
procurement of items related to prohibited nuclear and ballistic
missile activity and thus slowing development of these programs.''
This isn't all, however. Last month, Reuters reported that China,
one of Iran's most important backers, ``has put the brakes on oil and
gas investments in Iran, drawing ire from Tehran over a pullback that
officials and executives said reflected Beijing's efforts to appease
Washington and avoid U.S. sanctions on its big energy firms.''
Israeli Iran analyst Meir Javedanfar wrote, ``The Chinese
government has made it much more difficult and expensive for Iran to
extract and export its oil and gas, meaning less of such commodities to
sell at a higher production cost in the future.'' This ``should be
particularly worrisome for Iran's leaders.''
In addition to the costs to Iran's economy and the significantly
greater constraints on Iran's nuclear program, the Obama
administration's diplomacy also resulted in increased international
pressure over Iran's human rights abuses, including the creation of a
United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Iran. The Iranian
regime itself certainly doesn't regard these measures lightly as
demonstrated both by their public statements and by their intensive
U.N. lobbying efforts to defeat these efforts.
It's worth remembering that Iran was on a roll when President Obama
took office. This was thanks to precisely the sort of military
solutions that many of the President's conservative critics are now
calling for again.
Iran was the biggest strategic beneficiary of the Iraq war. It
capitalized effectively on the removal of its greatest enemy, Saddam
Hussein, and it successfully exploited the massive anti-American
sentiment that resulted in the Middle East from the U.S. invasion and
occupation of Iraq.
Iran looks far worse 2\1/2\ years later. The Arab awakening
sidelined Iran's efforts to sell itself as the standard bearer of
resistance against the West. Its key ally Syria is on the edge of
collapse.
Iran itself is also in a state of significant internal turmoil.
President Obama's efforts to reach out to the Iranian people damaged
the Iranian leadership's ability to rally the country around the United
States as an enemy, and it exposed the regime to popular protest and
regime in-fighting.
But though the United States today faces a weaker Iran, the
revelation last week predictably resulted in the usual calls for war
against Iran-from the same people who brought us the war in Iraq.
Writing in the Weekly Standard, Bill Kristol--who has been calling
for war with Iran since 2006--wrote, ``It's long since been time for
the United States to speak to this regime in the language it
understands--force. And now we have an engraved invitation to do so.''
Reuel Marc Gerecht, another long-time fan of bombing Iran, wrote in
The Wall Street Journal, ``The White House needs to respond militarily
to this outrage. If we don't, we are asking for it.''
The neoconservative Foreign Policy Initiative's Jamie Fly also
wrote in National Review that ``Developments this week make abundantly
clear, our disgraceful attempts to `engage' the despotic regime in
Tehran . . . have failed.''
Fly concluded, ``It is time to take military action against the
Iranian government elements that support terrorism and its nuclear
program. More diplomacy is not an adequate response.''
Such calls for a military option may be emotionally satisfying to
their authors and attractive as a quick fix to a complex problem. But
they dramatically fail to understand the way the Obama administration
successfully used diplomacy to isolate the Iranian government and
undercut its influence.
This inability to understand American power in terms other than
military strength is a key reason why conservative foreign policy is in
such a shambles these days.
After surveying the foreign policy positions of the current
Republican primary candidates, the Philadelphia Inquirer's Trudy Rubin
remarked, ``We're left with a GOP pack that insists on American
superiority and saber-rattling while our country is crumbling
internally. From such self-delusion, the next American century won't
grow.''
The impressively clumsy assassination plot--if in fact it did
originate inside the Iranian regime--should be seen as a sign of just
how much weaker and desperate Iran is today than it was in 2008. The
Obama administration put Iran on its back foot, diminished its regional
importance, and severely curtailed its options through the skillful and
effective use of American diplomacy and leadership--not through saber
rattling.
In conclusion, the revelation of the Iranian assassination plot
should bolster the international consensus against Iran's behavior
rather than serve as an excuse for another needless war. And it should
strengthen the U.S. effort to constrain and change that behavior
through a variety of methods. Given that the American people clearly
have no interest in undertaking yet another costly and
counterproductive military adventure in the Middle East, the
administration would be wise to ignore the calls for one.
Mr. McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Thompson. Going forward, Dr. Korb. Can you give some of
us on the committee how you think diplomacy, from the U.S.
standpoint going forward, would be important? Some have talked
about expelling any Iranian official from this country and
going to other levels.
But I would like you--and I will ask a couple of the other
gentlemen also--where does diplomacy fit in this situation
where we are today?
Dr. Korb. Well, as I mentioned in my testimony, I support
what Admiral Mullen, who recently stepped down as chairman of
the joint chiefs of staff, says, you know, ``We are not talking
to Iran so we don't understand each other.'' I think you ought
to keep the contacts open to the extent that you can.
I agree with the President basically--reaching out to them,
wanting to negotiate--that it demonstrates to people in Iran
that we are not the enemy and are completely against them.
General Keane mentioned, you know, if you go back and take a
look, Iraq attacked Iran. We, and I was in Government then,
supported Iraq by given them photos that they used to drop
chemical weapons on Iran.
So when you say, well, they are terrible people, there are
things that we have done that I think by reaching out and
talking to them and using diplomatic channels, be willing to
negotiate, I think will undermine that narrative of some people
in Iran that we are just out to harm them and we do not agree
with their role in the world.
So, I am all for, you know, keeping contacts open and
talking to them to the extent that we can. As Admiral Mullen
mentioned, the darkest days of the Cold War were not just--you
know, some U.S. interests were involved, but U.S. existence was
involved. We kept channels open with the Soviet Union.
Mr. Thompson. General Keane, given your 37 years of
military experience, what role do you see the military having
with respect to Iran, where we are today? Dr. Korb talked about
diplomacy, but I want to talk a little bit about the military.
General Keane. Yes, certainly. Let me just respond to
something you already said. When I used the term ``weak,'' I
was using Iran's perception of us. I was not using my
perception of our country, just to clarify that. I believe bin
Laden, when he believed we were weak, he totally underestimated
the United States of America and the character of our people. I
think he found that out, obviously.
The role the military plays right now with Iran primarily
is planning. I mean, the United States military has been asked
to put together a plan to conduct war with this country on a
different basis. This is not unusual for us. You know, we have
to do that sort of planning in the event we have strategic
surprise and the unpredictable takes place.
In this case, we plan for all-out war with them, to include
a ground war. Or we deal with very limited action to deal with
a violation--mining of the Straits of Hormuz, or to deal with a
very limited action against their nuclear capability. So there
is a whole scale of response that the United States military
has planned, and those plans have been briefed all the way to
this President of the United States. They are approved as
plans.
So that is what the United States military does. Then it
goes out and educates and trains officers and leaders in the
military on how to do this, and conducts exercises. I have been
participating when I was a division commander and a corps
commander in simulation exercises and conducting war in Iran
maybe a dozen times.
You would want us to do that. So that if this event happens
that we do not want to happen, then we do it professionally and
very capably with a minimum loss of life. So that is primarily
the function the United States military is serving. Now, they
have pushback against the Iranian proxies in Iraq. So we are
directly involved in that activity, and still are to some
degree today.
But obviously that is going to be minimized dramatically,
and we push it back against the proxies that they are using
with the Taliban. They are providing the Taliban with
ammunition and with resources, and obviously we are pushing
back against those. But the primary mission is the one that I
just stated.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady, Ms. Speier, for
unanimous consent request.
Ms. Speier. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I would like to ask
unanimous consent that the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson
Lee, be seated and allowed to ask questions.
Mr. McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First off, I want to
thank the general and the colonel for their service to the
United States military. Specifically I want to thank the
colonel for his role, so to speak, in Beirut in 1983.
I would like to enter into the record a friend of mine from
high school, from Morrisville, North Carolina, Lance Corporal
Timothy ``Tim'' McNealy, who played football with my brother,
who I knew personally, who died in the Marine Corps barracks
there in 1983.
It is not lost on a lot of us that have been following this
situation that the Qods Force and the terrorist arm of Iran
Hezbollah has been involved with the Mexican drug cartel for
quite awhile. We have raised awareness, Mr. Chairman, a number
of times about this over my short 10 months being in Congress.
I want to encourage the Members of the committee that have
not signed on to Resolution 429, which Mr. Higgins and I have
sent a ``Dear Colleague'' letter around on. That resolution
basically urges the administration to include the Western
Hemisphere in the administration's 2012 National strategy for
counterterrorism area of focus.
Because we are aware of the tri-border region, we are aware
of Venezuela, we are now aware of a stronger working
relationship between Hezbollah and the Mexican drug cartel and
Qods Force and the drug cartels. So I would urge you to co-
sponsor that and I appreciate the Members that have.
I ask the colonel, knowing our porous Southern Border--the
comments that you made in your testimony, knowing that there is
a working relationship that has been revealed--what could we be
doing differently as a sovereign nation, on our Southern
Border, to keep any infiltration of personnel or weapons into
this country? Colonel?
Colonel Geraghty. I live in Arizona. It has gotten better,
there is no question about it, through the efforts of a lot of
dedicated people. But I have to look back, from a historical
standpoint, on how these things develop and what we can do and
what impact they have. They are all very hard to measure,
particularly in real time. There is delayed reaction that
usually is after an attack.
I use, as a sample of that from personal history, the
mission in Beirut, the blowing up of our embassy, the attacks
on the two embassies in East Africa that the general had talked
about earlier that essentially went by with no response. Al-
Qaeda never had the capability for the suicide, coordinated,
attacks that Hezbollah pulled off during the Beirut mission
that killed us.
They did not have that expertise. Bin Laden took
inspiration from the success of those attacks. Particularly, a
part of that was our non-response. Until there was a meeting
between him and Ahmad Muneer who was the point man for the
Shi'a, who is part of Iranian intelligence, later as the point
of attack for us in Beirut. They had a meeting in Sudan in
1996.
Al-Qaeda's first coordinated simultaneous suicide bombing,
first mission, were the two U.S. embassies in East Africa. They
expanded that same Beirut model for the four commercial airline
hijackings--simultaneous, coordinated attacks--for us here on
9/11. So I use that.
With all the activity that is going on--what we know about
and, more importantly, what we do not know about--is building
operational bases in Venezuela, in Margarita Island, the
contact. Remember, too, that Hezbollah has been operating drug
trafficking in the tri-border regions for a long time.
So that is what I am saying. When they talk about using
drug cartels down there in Mexico and so on, it is not a cold
call. They are familiar with this, and I am sure have very good
contacts with the different ones. They are shopping, probably,
and all this.
So when they say this is sort of a bumbling attack that
should not be taken seriously and all this, I think it is at
our own risk if we ignore that. That is part of the problem
with this. Our freedoms are our vulnerabilities, and they know
how to play this every which way.
I could not agree more that when you have a link to an
assassination in this country, in our Capitol, of the Saudi
ambassador, the chutzpah that they have, and to try, and the
Qods commander connection with that--and just walk that back,
and the current minister of defense, and what is their
background and so on--I would take this threat very seriously.
Again, the whole threat, I think, ties into what we do not
know as much as what we do know. I know that the FBI and the
intelligence community, there is a lot of great work on one of
the reasons that we have not been attacked here.
But I will guarantee you that the Iranians and this current
crowd that runs them, they are driven, they are obsessed. It is
the ideology and so on. That we are on their schedule, I mean
on their target list. Primarily. That when it does happen it
will probably be as they have key targets and a spectacular--
coast-to-coast or whatever, even a Mumbai-style attack, just to
carry it out. Because hate and humiliation go along with their
obsession against the Western world, and the United States in
particular.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Colonel, I agree with you. I think the potential
combination between Iran, Hezbollah, and the drug cartels is
very powerful and very dangerous.
With that, the Chairman now recognizes, let us see, Mr.
Davis.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank the witnesses for very enlightening discussion.
Mr. Gerecht, let me ask if I understood you to imply, or
suggest, that the governance of Iran is such that you do not
necessarily get the same response that you might get from the
use of sanctions with another country? That maybe there is a
distance between the governing bodies and the people, to the
extent that sanctions may not play the same role that they play
in another country?
Mr. Gerecht. Yes. I mean, I think that sanctions in Iran
have been effective in many ways. But if you just take the
Guards Corps, for example, the Guards Corps has gotten richer
and more powerful as sanctions have gotten tougher. So for
them, the last 5 years have been pretty good years.
So I think you always have to try to see it the way they
see it. The thing about the Guards Corps, actually, is they
have lots of publications. They have their own world. It is
actually not that hard to read the Guards Corp. I met a few
Guardsmen. In addition to that, it is not hard to actually get
a grasp of how they see the world because they are fairly
forthright in telling you.
Now there have been nuances and variations between
individuals in the bottom of the Guards Corps and individuals
at the top of the Guards Corps, family histories, et cetera.
All these things come in into play. But I do not think, when
Khomeini, the supreme leader, tells you that he is not scared
of sanctions he is telling you the truth. He is not.
Now, that is not to say that sanctions have not hurt them,
and that the bureaucracy and the business community is not
aware of the damage that they have done to Iran. But I think
you have to be very, very careful in believing that sanctions
that would make us stand up and take notice do the same to
them.
I would just make one other little quick comment. It is
natural that the Iranians would gravitate to, and not be
spooked by, any drug cartels. Because the Revolutionary Guards
Corps is responsible for the movement of the vast majority of
all opiates that come out of Afghanistan and go to Turkey. It
is one of their major income-producers.
So they would gravitate towards that. It is natural. It is
not something that would be uncomfortable for them.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Recognizing that sanctions have been used as a diplomatic
tool for a long time--I mean, it is kind of a normal reaction,
oftentimes ultimately, where we get--Dr. Levitt, how do we make
the assessment of how impactful the use of sanctions might be?
I mean, how do we determine whether it is doing what we
want it to do, or whether it is something that we are doing but
the value is not there and we are not getting the kind of
responses that we might be looking for?
Dr. Levitt. The pithy but most honest answer is, with
difficulty. But it comes down to, at its core, determining and
admitting--and there is no one answer to this across
Government, not this administration nor the prior
administration--what is it you are trying to achieve with
sanctions.
Again, if you are trying to achieve disruption, sanctions
have been tremendously effective. I know nobody who knows
anything about them who disrupts that. There are ways that it
can be done better. I think there are things that we should be
doing more. But it has been tremendously successful there.
Now do you also think or expect or hope, anywhere along
that spectrum, that you will put enough sanction and economic
misery on either the revolutionary regime or maybe even at some
point the people--though the sanctions regimes we have now are
mostly affecting those involved in illicit conduct, they are
not the kind of shotgun regime-wide sanctions that we have in
Iraq that affected people, as well--do you expect that some
combination of sanctions like that would alter the calculus of
this regime?
Make it decide, for example, that perhaps a nuclear program
is not a guarantor of its survival, but perhaps an inhibitor,
something that might cost them their survival? I do not think
that is the case. I agree with Reuel there. I do not think that
we will be able to do that.
But we can do enough sanctions that will be increasingly
disruptive, buy us more time. Also do things, as I think a
designation of the Central Bank would do, that would have more
impact on the country. I have also argued in the House and the
Senate, banking, finance, in and out of Government, that what
we need to do now, I believe--and I think I am still a minority
on this, but I believe sincerely--what we need to do is get a
better mix, the cocktail of sanctions.
For multilateral engagement purposes and other reasons, we
have focused on sanctions that are graduated, targeted on those
most involved in the illicit conduct. We can target--three
times, three more times, a dozen times. It is only going to be
so effective.
I think we need to fold into the mix some sanctions that
will have some impact on people in the ground, as well. That
sends a message through domestic Iranian channels to the
regime, and that is a different way of threatening their level
of comfort. Ultimately this is a tool, not a policy. It is a
tool which, if used in tandem with other tools, can be
effective.
But my problem is--and I used to complain about this all
the time when I was in Government--that often not because it is
the right tool, but because we have no better answers in
difficult problems, we want to use this tool so we can say we
have done something.
That is the worst time to use the tool. When I was a
Treasury official I would argue vehemently against using
Treasury authorities just because there is nothing else to do.
It can undermine those authorities. I think there are ways that
we can target the RGC better. I think we should be pursuing
Central Bank of Iran. I would hope that this will be done
multilaterally because of the potential impact on the
international economy, which is fragile at the moment.
That is not something that I would necessarily say we
should do unilaterally, though, because it would have an
international impact because of the way banks world-wide react
to reputational risk issues. But on the flipside, much more
aggressive designations over a period of time targeting all
kinds of Qods Force entities. Exposing them, even if it is not
seizing assets, is the type of thing we can certainly be doing
unilaterally with zero cost.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman for your indulgence.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Davis.
The Chairman now recognizes, in the order of appearance
before the gavel, Ms. Hahn.
Ms. Hahn. This has been really a fascinating hearing this
morning, and I thank the witnesses for being here. Certainly we
have a wide range of experience and we certainly have a wide
range of opinions on what we need to do, when we need to do it,
and how we need to carry it out.
Certainly, you know, I believe that the comments about
Iran's hate and obsession for us is really what drives their
actions against us, I think, even more than the fact that they
might perceive us as being weak. I was interested, a couple of
hours ago, in General Keane's testimony and Mr. Gerecht's
testimony.
General Keane, you certainly believe that, so far, it
sounds like the sanctions which we have been using have been
not as effective as they could be. You used the term we ought
to, you know, be grabbing them by their throats and really
ramping up the sanctions--everything from seizing their assets
to denying them entry to ports around the world.
Mr. Gerecht feels that until we shoot somebody they are not
going to pay attention.
Sitting here 2 hours later, is that still your view,
General Keane, that the ramped-up version of the sanctions is
really where we ought to be going now? Or do you feel like the
only way to get their attention is to use military action and
actually shoot someone?
General Keane. Yes. I do think the fact that they made this
decision to come inside the United States and conduct this
attack is something that we should not walk away from. We
should not treat it like other terrorist arracks in the region,
even though many of those were against us, as well.
I am suggesting that they have been killing us for 30
years, and we all know that. Until we get more effective with
the response, they will continue to kill us and they will
continue to work against our interests in the region. Remember,
their objective is to drive us out of the region. That is
clearly what they want.
So to date, on the merits of it, we have not been effective
in stopping them from, No. 1, killing us; No. 2, sponsoring
terrorism; and No. 3, a continued program to develop nuclear
weapons, which I am convinced they have not given up on.
So I want a re-look at the whole issue. No. 1, admit to us
that they are our strategic enemy. Use all the elements of
National power, hold the military element in check and, as I
said, figuratively get our hands around their throat using all
those elements of National power. Do it comprehensively and as
much near-simultaneous as we possibly can.
I agree with Reuel that yes, we should target them. I mean,
my God, we have got other terrorist organizations and the
leaders of them who have killed us, and we have targeted them
and we have killed them. Why do these guys get a pass? They
should not get one. They should feel that kind of pressure.
I am not suggesting that we bring in military forces and
conduct operations inside Iran. I am not suggesting that at
all. I am suggesting that we conduct covert operations. I am
suggesting we conduct espionage that is covert, as well. They
have to feel some of this pressure. If we do not recognize
that, I am convinced it is just going to continue.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you. Anyone else want to answer that? You
are backing down on shooting someone?
You know, obviously, being low on the totem pole here, most
of my questions have already been asked and answered. But one
of the things that maybe just I will ask the entire panel, none
of you really mentioned it or suggested it. But, you know, over
the years I think a lot of these attempts have been thwarted
thanks in large part to our law enforcement officials on the
ground.
Of course, Congress is in the middle of some tough debates
on our budget. Our super committee is looking at cuts to our
defense. Many of our homeland security grants are looking to be
pared down, and some eliminated altogether. I know I have been
pushing for our port security grants to continue for another
year because I still feel like our ports are a vulnerable
entryway into this country.
I would like to hear some thoughts on, you know, the
importance of continuing to fund programs that directly help to
secure our local law enforcement efforts on the ground as a way
to continue to attempt to thwart what we may not be able to
stop another way.
Dr. Korb. I think the way that you need to do this is to
look at National security in a holistic way. Whatever you
decide to spend on the Department of Defense, Homeland
Security, State and all of these things, recognize they all
contribute.
Now you mentioned the fact that you are concerned about
port security. Well, do you realize we spend more on one
program in the Department of Defense, missile defense, than we
do on the entire Coast Guard? If you looked at it in a holistic
way you could say where is it likely that somebody is going to
shoot a nuclear weapon at us with a return address or try and
smuggle it in. I would say the latter.
So I would give more priority to that. But the reason you
cannot is because you have a stovepipe when we do the budgets
in the Executive branch and you do it over here. So what I
would urge you to the extent that whatever number you decide
you are going to have to, you know, reduce to deal with the
deficit you look at it in a holistic way.
For years we have been putting out a program called unified
National security budget that assesses some of those trade-
offs. We take the amount the administration--Bush, and then
Obama--has, and we took a look at how you could get, if you
will, more bang for the buck.
Ms. Hahn. Any other comments?
Dr. Levitt. Well, as the former FBI guy here I should
probably say that I completely concur this is an amazing
example of what we can do. I mentioned earlier a DHS program on
customs enforcements--it is not only here, but it is abroad--
people, DHS people, in Brussels for example, doing tremendous
work.
Sometimes I am concerned that we minimize the importance
and the role of law enforcement. It gets politicized sometimes.
These are not either/or sanctions, are not an either/or. The
military is not an either/or. It is getting the cocktail right,
it is getting the mix right.
I think this case just demonstrates that what we are doing
at home--and to be perfectly blunt, what we were doing abroad--
this plot was not thwarted at home. This was thwarted abroad,
in Mexico, because DEA was doing what it does exceptionally
well every day.
We need to be able to maintain that vigilance. I think that
that is clear. That money needs to be cut is also clear. So I
am glad it is you, not me.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you.
I yield my time.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you. I agree, Dr. Levitt. As I indicated
earlier, meeting with these agents who pulled this thing off
and the intelligence community they just did a magnificent job.
With that, the Chairman recognizes Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In Iranian political and terror ethos, there is the near
enemy, Israel. But there is also the far enemy, the United
States of America. The topic of this hearing is Iranian terror
operations on the American soil. So I commend my colleague,
Jeff Duncan, for his bipartisan resolution to include as an
area of focus the Western Hemisphere in our Nation's
counterterrorism efforts. I think it is very, very important.
Hezbollah, the Party of God, is a Shi'a terrorist group
highly committed to violent jihad. Hezbollah acts as a proxy,
as a pawn, as a tool for Venezuela, Syria, and Iran. Hezbollah
has a presence estimated to be between a few hundred to a few
thousand in the 16-country region of Latin America. Hezbollah
also has a presence in 15 American cities, including four major
cities in Canada.
We were told at previous hearings that while the
confirmation of Hezbollah's presence in North America is
indisputable, that we should not worry. That they are just here
for fundraising activities. Hezbollah, a terror group committed
to violent jihad. I do not make the distinction between
fundraising and terrorist activity. Fundraising for terrorist
activity is a terrorist activity.
I represent Buffalo, New York, and I know from terrorist
history terrorist cowards look for high-impact targets. We have
the Peace Bridge that connects Buffalo and Southern Ontario--
the busiest Northern Border crossing for passenger vehicles in
North America, third-busiest for commercial vehicles. We have
Niagara Falls, a destination of millions of people every single
year.
We have 90 miles away, Toronto, a multicultural,
fascinating international city. We also have, in close
proximity, the Niagara Power Project, which produces the
cheapest, cleanest, and most electricity in all of New York
State.
I would like you to comment, consistent with the hearing's
topic, ``Iranian Terror Operations on the American Soil''--be
it Iran directly, or their proxies who do their dirty work for
them: What more can we be doing about their presence, their
direct presence, in 15 American cities and four major Canadian
cities generally in North America?
Dr. Levitt. Well I, in particular, am grateful for the
question because I am completing a book on Hezbollah's global
presence which has several chapters on Hezbollah in South
America and North America. So I know at least one person will
now read it.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Levitt. I am going to take that giggle as a--now you
got to buy it too. It is more than 15 cities in the United
States and more than four in Canada.
Several years ago, in written answers to follow-up
questions in Congressional testimony, FBI officials conceded
that they see Hezbollah doing more than fundraising in this
country. They see Hezbollah doing pre-operational surveillance
in this country. They believe that that is primarily done for
the purpose of vetting new recruits.
But if I were a terrorist mastermind vetting a new recruit
here whose primary responsibility would be fundraising and
logistics, there would be other ways to make sure that this
person was a capable fundraiser other than having them surveil
U.S. Federal buildings.
I think one of the greatest surprises about this Arbabsiar
plot is that the Qods Force was doing this apparently on their
own, whereas usually they are doing things together with
Lebanese Hezbollah. That certainly has been the M.O. in the
Western Hemisphere, in Argentina. It was the M.O. earlier in
1994, a few months before the AMIA bombing in Thailand in an
attempted bombing of the Israeli embassy there that was
thwarted, not because of anything counterterrorism officials
did, but because the bomber got into a car accident, and in
many, many other cases.
That may suggest that their current capabilities here are
not so high. Again, as I noted in my testimony, Qods Force and
Hezbollah both have faced a series of failures since 2008 when
they tried to resurrect Hezbollah. That is, tried to resurrect
what had been a nascent foreign terrorist operations capability
in the wake of the assassination of Imad Mugniyah.
But we do need to be concerned about this, and we do need
to be concerned about the crossings not just to our self but to
our north. In one case we know of, Kurani, a Hezbollah guy who
had actual training who was smuggled across the border from
Mexico, then had connections in Canada as well--Fauzi Ayu, who
was arrested trying to carry out a bombing in Israel had
Canadian citizenship and traveled on a false U.S. passport,
married an American woman. An indictment was recently released
for him, in the Dearborn area, which was his last known
address.
There is a lot of movement across the bridges, more in the
Michigan area but, I am sure, in yours as well. This is
something we need to be cognizant of. The good news is--and I
say this not just because I came originally, when I came to
this town, working for FBI, but based on the research I have
done for the book--I have been tremendously impressed.
I have gone out and met with field offices and local police
and others--FBI, DEA, JTTS. The work that they are doing,
focused in Hezbollah in particular, is impressive.
Mr. Gerecht. I will just make a very quick comment. The
Hezbollah is vastly more comfortable with the expatriate
Lebanese Shi'a population than the Iranians are with their
expatriate population.
The interesting exception to that might be in Canada.
Because in Canada you have what I would call the second
generation of Iranian immigration. You have much more devout
communities, communities which are much closer to the folks
back home. They exist almost in ghettos in Canada, which is
something you do not see almost anywhere else with the Iranian
expatriate communities.
So, the Iranians are naturally going there. That is why
they sent someone like Sadech Larijani, one of the brothers of
perhaps the most famous family in Iran, there to be, ``a
cultural attache.'' The Hezbollah, and there is no way around
it, has had a certain prestige amongst the Lebanese Shi'a
community. Even with Lebanese Shi'a who, ideologically, are not
in sympathy with the Hezbollah.
It is a problem, and it is just a problem that you have to
be aware of. That is why the Hezbollah is much more effective
maneuvering overseas than Iranians are.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. The Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from
Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you to all of the
Chairpersons and Ranking Members. Thank you for your courtesy
but, more importantly, let me congratulate you for the topic of
this hearing. I think if there is ever a time of unanimity on
perspectives dealing with Iran it is certainly on the point
that they never stop and that we have concerns that need to be
addressed.
So let me start with you, Dr. Korb, on a maybe far-
stretched inquiry. Since my time runs quickly, why did the Arab
Spring miss Iran? Even though I think it was about a year ago
they even might have proceeded, but they did not succeed.
But I remember Iranian/Americans in great emotion when the
people of Iran rose up, stood on mountains. We will never
forget that insightful picture of a young woman bleeding. Dr.
Korb?
Dr. Korb. I think the reason it had not is very similar to
what has happened in Syria, Bahrain. That, in fact, people use
force or the threat of force to make sure it does not happen.
Remember, in Egypt the Arab Spring succeeded because the
military refused to continue to back the Mubarak government----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right.
Dr. Korb. Of course in Libya, once the rebels got a
stronghold, the international community was able to come in.
You just do not have those circumstances. People like General
Zinni, Admiral Mullen, the former head of Mossad, all said the
last thing you want to do is, you know put military
involvement.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Why would they say that?
Dr. Korb. Well, basically because it will be
counterproductive. It would unify the country against, you
know, the threat from outside. Also, basically, then they would
step up, I think, the activities that have been described here
in other parts of the region.
But I cannot emphasize too much, in my own personal view
time is on our side. They cannot keep on doing what they are
doing. Whatever happens in Syria, they are no longer going to
be able to use the Syrians the way that they used to.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me put on the record before I
ask Colonel--is it Geraghty? Am I almost----
Colonel Geraghty. Geraghty.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Geraghty. Thank you, sir, very much.
Colonel Geraghty. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I have no friendship for the Iranian
government. I do believe the people there--there is a body
politic who want freedom. I am also concerned as, in reference
to a war that I did oppose--and though I respect all of those
who served ably in Iraq. Because I fear that we have left
Malawki in the hands of the Iranian government. He seems to not
have not the ability to be independent.
But I would like to build on what Dr. Korb said. Do you
agree that terrorism today is franchised to a certain extent,
meaning individual actors are engaged in terrorism?
Colonel Geraghty. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Did you make a point that we were
preparing for war against Iran? Was that your comment that I
heard. That military makes plans?
Colonel Geraghty. No. My comment was talking about the
sanctions and so on, and the sanctions that we have had for
what, 25 years against Iran. As sanctions are increased and so
on, one of the major purposes for the sanctions are what is the
response of the one you are sanctioning against, which is Iran.
We have seen a steady pattern that continues of them
expanding their terrorist activities. When we just step back--
not that the sanctions have not had some effect--they are very
hard to have any kind of measurements of effectiveness. They
have some and all this, but as Dr. Levitt said they are more a
tool than a policy.
But the point that I was getting with the sanctions is that
you look back and what have they accomplished. Iran, throughout
this whole period, has not only retained but expanded their
terrorist activities as the No. 1 world-sponsored terrorism.
Then the question is, right in the middle of that, when you
look, they decided to go nuclear in open defiance against a
united world against this, not only in the region but world-
wide. How they are fighting that in your face and continuing
that. Yes, the current sanctions are disrupting that.
But at some point in time, are these going to be effective
enough in order to have Iran change the behavior? So that is
constantly being looked at. It is not going to war with them.
But the other thing in Iran is, I refer people to read the book
by the Iranian--it is a pseudonym, Kahlili--called ``A Time to
Betray'' that was a CIA agent inside the IRGC during this whole
period for the CIA.
It gives insights of the mindset and how brutal they are in
suppressing any kind of protesting within Iran. You saw it
bubble up at the 2009 election, re-election, of Ahmadinejad.
But the focus was just so severe. The fellow that is doing that
is the minister of interior that is suppressing all that. So
that is why you do not hear a lot or any of the protest within
Iran.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Dr. Levitt, I wanted to ask you a
question. But thank you, Colonel. I just want to follow up on
this point.
Following on the colonel, I think he clarified that as we
accelerate in the frustration with Iran, obviously as it might
be with any country, the military in the United States always
are engaged in planning and preparation. It does not mean they
are engaged in moving on a country. I think that is the
interpretation.
But I noticed in your testimony, you indicated that the
Saudis had, at one point, asked that the head of the snake
should be cut off. My question to you on this whole issue of
terrorism as it circulates around this horrific and horrendous
potential assassination that wrapped the United States and
Iran--excuse me, Iran and Saudi--in the mix, we have the
responsibility, I believe, that if we act in any way, one, it
should be collaborative, one it should be based on facts.
We should be very consistent with protecting the homeland.
So do you have a response on how you generate those three
points that is something short of saying that we are going to
allegedly attack this sovereign nation that potentially has
nuclear capacity?
Dr. Levitt. Thank you for the question. I think that it is
important, as you have heard basically everyone on the panel
describe in one way or another, that this be an all elements of
national power approach. It is not sanctions or something else,
it is not law enforcement or something else, it is not covert
action or something else.
It is all of these things in tandem at the same time. I
think that it is at the same time in tandem, in a concerted
effort, over a relatively short period of time that would be
what is new. We have done a lot of these things, then we pause
and we wait. What we need, I think, in response to this is a
clear message.
The clear message need not be military action. It should be
a lot of different types of action now, at the same time, that
can send a clear message. Someone earlier asked something about
creating or promoting or undermining fissures within the
regime. As you were asking about the Arab Spring, this came to
mind. One of the things that Treasury I know has tried to do is
to try and target sanctions, when it is doing sanctions, in
ways when it can that will promote fissures within the regime.
That is one of the reasons that the administration came up
with human rights executive orders. It is the Qods Force,
again, and the besieged militia that are responsible for
cracking down on peaceful protests. It is the Qods Force that
is in large part responsible for the missile program. Of
course, with responses to terrorism it is often the very same
people.
In that sense, the re-designation of Qassem Soleimani three
times does send a message. We can be targeting these to have
multiple end-purposes, not only in terms of trying to shut down
the next Qods Force front that is trying to procure some
material or prevent somebody from traveling, but also send
messages to the Iranian people that we are promoting their
efforts at peaceful protest. I think that is really important.
If you do all these things in tandem you can send your
message. We talked much earlier--much, much earlier--about
messaging. You can promote security in the homeland. You can
even disrupt their activities abroad. I think we need to be
doing all these things.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Dr. Levitt.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Meehan for his closing
comments.
Mr. Meehan. I want to thank the panel for a remarkable
presentation to us today, in addition to the response to the
questions. We have heard everything from bumbling and disarray,
but we also hear lethal and persistent. I think the one
consistent thing we hear is that they are here and, as a
result, we have to come together with some appropriate
response.
I want to thank you for taking the time to raise the red
flags that we have discussed have not been seen or watched
before. I certainly hope that that failure of imagination that
was discussed at the end of the 9/11 report, clearly, your kind
of study of this current moment allows us to anticipate. I hope
that we are able to respond in an appropriate fashion.
Thank you for the work that you do, what you have done and
what you continue to do, to help us protect our country.
Mr. McCaul. The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Speier for her
closing comments.
Ms. Speier. I would like to associate myself with the
comments made by my Chairman. I also want to say thank you,
again, for your presentations.
I want to underscore the fact that many of you, in further
questioning, recognized that immediate military action is not
what we should be looking at. But it is very clear that
anything we do look at needs to be multilateral, that our
vigilance needs to be heightened, and that we need to do
everything we can to nurture the Arab Spring that is
percolating within Iran as well.
So I thank you again for your testimony.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, may I----
Mr. McCaul. It is getting late.
Ms. Jackson Lee. May I put a question on the record,
please?
Mr. McCaul. You can pose it on the record.
Ms. Jackson Lee. At least pose the question to you?
Mr. McCaul. Okay.
Ms. Jackson Lee. This will be in the record? You might not
answer it, and I appreciate that.
But I think one of our difficulties for those of us who
have engaged with the Iranian resistance that is here in the
United States and in Europe is that we need to delineate and
declare whether this group can move forward in a non-terrorist
label.
They may be, in fact, individuals that could encourage the
democratic movement in Iran. They have been in limbo. They are
here in the United States. They are viewed as good citizens.
They are asking this Nation to address the question.
This hearing asks about terrorist activities that generate
from Iran. I hope that we can get an answer from Iranian-
Americans who are supporting the Iranian resistance once and
for all, including a response to Cam Ashraf which I know you
are familiar with.
I yield back.
Mr. McCaul. The gentlelady raises an excellent point.
In closing, let me thank the witnesses for being here
today. I think it was very compelling testimony. Particularly
the fact that this assassination attempt in this country, in
Washington, was sanctioned at the highest levels of the Iranian
government. I think that sends a message to us. But we need to
send a clear message to Iran, and we need to respond
effectively to Iran. But we have failed to do that since 1979.
I think the takeaways I get, all elements of National power
we treat Iran as a strategic enemy. We need to seize their
financial assets. We need an offensive cyber campaign against
them. We need sanctions, for the first time, to enforce the
sanctions against their Central Bank.
We need more aggressive designations. We need the expulsion
of Iranian and Hezbollah operatives in this country. We need a
significant covert action against Iran. Finally, we need to
support this resistance of movement within Iran, this youthful
secular movement to finally overthrow the Ayatollah Khomeini.
So with that, Mr. Meehan and I are going to submit a
letter, a letter to the President, with the findings of this
hearing. I would hope that our Ranking Members would also join
us in that letter to the President. This had been a very, very
productive hearing. Thank you for being here
This hearing is now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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