[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
TEXAS WILDFIRE REVIEW: DID BUREAUCRACY PREVENT A TIMELY RESPONSE?
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FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 17, 2011
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Serial No. 112-52
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Janice Hahn, California
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Robert L. Turner, New York
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Billy Long, Missouri, Vice Chair Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Dr. R. Nick Palarino, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Tamla Scott, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas............................................. 8
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. W. Nim Kidd, Assistant Director, Emergency Management, Texas
Department of Public Safety.................................... 11
Major General John F. Nichols, Adjutant General, Texas Military
Forces Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Kevin Starbuck, CEM Emergency Management Coordinator,
Amarillo/Potter/Randall Office of Emergency Management:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 18
Panel II
Mr. Tony Russell, Region VI Regional Administrator, Federal
Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
Mr. Tom Harbour, Director, Fire and Aviation Management, USDA
Forest Service:
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
TEXAS WILDFIRE REVIEW: DID BUREAUCRACY PREVENT A TIMELY RESPONSE?
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Monday, October 17, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and
Management,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Austin, TX.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:04 a.m., at
the Texas State Capitol, 100 Congress Avenue, Room E1.010,
Austin, Texas, Hon. Michael T. McCaul [Chairman of the
subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representative McCaul.
Also present: Representative Cuellar.
Mr. McCaul. Well, good morning. The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order. I first would like to thank my
good friend, Congressman Henry Cuellar, for agreeing to be the
Ranking Member of this committee's hearing. Let me just say at
the outset that this is an official Congressional hearing, and
so we will abide by the House rules that we abide by in the
Congress just the same as if we were having this hearing in
Washington, DC.
With that, I want to thank the witnesses for traveling to
Austin to participate. The purpose of this hearing is to
examine whether bureaucracy prevented a timely response to the
recent devastating wildfires experienced in our State. I
appreciate the effort taken on behalf of all those involved to
have this important field hearing.
The Chairman now recognizes himself for his opening
statement. That's how we talk in Washington. You have to
recognize yourself to talk, so I recognize myself. I want to
just say good morning again. Welcome to my home State of Texas,
for those of you who traveled outside the State. Unfortunately,
Texas has been the epicenter of a great natural disaster this
year. Anyone who lives here knows it's hot, and we experienced
our share of wildfires, but the summer of 2011 was off the
charts.
For many cities, it was the hottest summer on record. Here
in Austin, we had 90 days with temperatures over 100 degrees.
The worsening drought turned the State's vegetation into dry
tinder. The State was, indeed, a tinderbox and continues to be
so. This confluence of events set America's backyard ablaze,
and since January 1, according to the Texas Forest Services,
the State had over 3,000 wildfires, which have scorched almost
4 million acres, an area as large as the States of Connecticut
and Rhode Island combined.
Over Labor Day weekend, Tropical Storm Lee exacerbated the
spread of fire, delivering high winds instead of much-needed
rain. Just a few miles from where we sit today erupted,
arguably, the worst wildfire in Texas history, the Bastrop
fire.
As we look behind me, you see scenes from that fire. It
looked nothing short of a nuclear explosion going off. The
Bastrop fire was a daunting 16 miles long, 4 miles wide, and
scorched almost everything in its path. Nearly 35,000 acres of
pine trees, more than 1,500 homes destroyed, and thousands more
evacuated, and two people lost their lives.
Let me first say I commend the 800 local Texas
firefighters, many of them volunteers, who quickly answered the
call that, ``Texas is burning, and we need you.'' Burning it,
indeed, was. I remember traveling on that Monday at the very
beginning of the fire directly into these scenes, and I can
tell you I've never seen anything quite like it. I've been to
Afghanistan, to Pakistan, to Baghdad, and I've never seen
anything like this.
I wish I could also recognize and commend the Federal
Government, but these fires are a tragic example of what
appears to be a lack of planning and slow response because of
bureaucratic red tape. Let me first unravel the red tape. The
process to file a claim starts with the county filing a request
for assistance to the State. The State then files with the
Federal Emergency Management regional administrator, or FEMA.
The regional administrator then files a request with FEMA
headquarters in Washington, DC. FEMA assesses the request and
makes a recommendation to the White House. Finally, the
President has the last word and either approves or disapproves
the request.
In my judgment, help should be just a phone call away and
not a series of requests winding their way through a
bureaucratic maze at a time of enormous emergency. Texas
followed the process asking for relief in 252 of our 254
counties over an extended period of time. This is what the
people of Texas said they needed to fight these fires.
Upon FEMA's recommendation, the President only awarded 45
counties relief, and no immediate fire fighting aircraft
support. This inadequate funding wasn't even an immediate
directive. It took the President 13 days to sign the
declaration. During that period, the President made time to
assist Alabama's tornado disasters and even visit Alabama to
see the devastation. Meanwhile, Texas burned. This is
unacceptable. Help should be a phone call away.
So I would like to know here today from our witnesses: Why
was there a delay in deploying critical resources? Why did it
take weeks? What is the formula FEMA uses to decide how much
assistance to provide and what resources to send? How much
subjectivity is involved? Why does FEMA continue to use a
county-by-county assessment of relief rather than a regional
basis?
To ensure this situation does not happen again, FEMA must
streamline its application process for disaster declarations to
immediately start providing aid, cleanup, and rebuilding
process. Many Texas fire departments had to choose between
filling out paperwork to meet FEMA's deadlines and
firefighting--fighting fires that continued to burn. In other
words, they had to choose between fighting the fire, the
immediate emergency, or filling out paperwork.
I would submit that fighting the fire is the utmost
priority in a situation like that. In fact, this is the amount
of paperwork that is required to fill out to get reimbursement
for firefighter management assistance grants and for FEMA
reimbursement. So the firefighter has to choose between this
and putting out the fire. That's a choice we shouldn't put them
in.
Going forward, we must strategically pre-position Federal
fire fighting aviation assets in high-risk areas. Despite all
the warnings that Texas faced with it being the driest summer
in more than 100 years, there was no pre-positioned aircraft to
help. The lack of immediate response from these aircraft assets
caused significant delays in fighting the fires in Bastrop
County where more than 1,500 homes were destroyed and lives
lost.
FEMA must also change its defined jurisdictions for
declarations. FEMA must move to a regional-based program rather
than the current county-based program. This will lend
assistance to counties whose resources were depleted helping
neighboring communities.
What happened in Texas this year is inexcusable and
unacceptable. The homes of good Americans were scorched, and
lives were lost. The Federal Government stood by, taking almost
a week to assist the local efforts at firefighting--at fighting
the fires. Nearby assets that could have stopped the fire
sooner were tied up with red tape. My hope is that today we can
find some answers and start moving forward towards solutions.
So, with that, I expect we're going to have a very lively
discussion, a lively debate, one that's solution-oriented, one
that's looking forward. I just want to say when the DC-10
tanker finally did make its way in, that's what happened. My
constituents in Waller County on the Houston end of my district
said it was like the cavalry coming in. Unfortunately, we
didn't have the cavalry for Bastrop.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
Good morning and welcome to my home State of Texas, which has
unfortunately been the epicenter of a great natural disaster this year.
Anyone who lives here knows it's hot, and we experience our share
of wildfires. But the summer of 2011 was off the charts.
For many cities it was the hottest summer on record. Here in Austin
we experienced 90 days with temperatures above 100 degrees. A worsening
drought turned the State's vegetation into dry tinder. Texas was indeed
a tinderbox.
This confluence of events set America's backyard ablaze. Since
January 1, according to the Texas Forest Service, the State has
experienced 3,129 fires, which have scorched 3.8 million acres--an area
as large as the States of Connecticut and Rhode Island combined.
Over Labor Day weekend, Tropical Storm Lee exacerbated the spread
of fire delivering high winds instead of much-needed rain. Just a few
miles from where we sit today erupted arguably the worst wildfire in
Texas history.
The Bastrop fire was a daunting 16 miles long, 4 miles wide, and
scorched almost everything in its path.
Nearly 35,000 acres of pines, more than 1,500 homes destroyed and
thousands more evacuated. Four people lost their lives.
I commend the 800 local Texas fire fighters, many of them
volunteers, who quickly answered the call--``Texas is burning and we
need you.''
I wish I could also recognize and commend the Federal Government.
Unfortunately these fires are tragic examples of what appears to be a
lack of planning and slow response because of bureaucratic red tape.
Let me first unravel the red tape. The process to file a claim
starts with the county filing a request for assistance to the State.
The State then files with the Federal Emergency Management (FEMA)
Regional Administrator. The Regional Administrator then files a request
with FEMA headquarters in Washington, DC. FEMA assesses the request,
and makes a recommendation to the White House. Finally, the President
has the last word, and either approves or disapproves request.
Help should be a phone call away, not a series of requests winding
their way through a bureaucratic maze.
Texas followed the process, asking for relief for 252 of our 254
counties over an extended period of time. This is what the people of
Texas said they needed to fight these fires. Upon FEMA's
recommendation, the President only awarded 45 counties relief, and no
immediate firefighting aircraft support.
This inadequate funding wasn't even an immediate directive. It took
the President 13 days to sign the declaration. During that period the
President made time to assist Alabama's tornado disasters and even
visited Alabama to see its devastation.
Meanwhile, Texas burned. This is unacceptable.
Help should be a phone call away.
So today I would like to know:
1. Why was there a delay in deploying critical resources? Why did
it take weeks?
2. What is the formula FEMA uses to decide how much assistance to
provide and what resources to send? And how much subjectivity
is involved?
3. Why does FEMA continue to use a county-by-county assessment of
relief rather than a regional basis?
To ensure this situation does not happen again, FEMA must
streamline its application process for disaster declarations to
immediately start providing aid, cleanup, and the rebuilding process.
Many Texas fire departments had to choose between filling out paperwork
to meet FEMA deadlines and fighting fires that continued to burn.
Going forward we must strategically pre-position Federal
firefighting aviation assets in high-risk areas. Despite all the
meteorological warnings that Texas faced with it being the driest
summer in more than 100 years, there were no pre-positioned aircraft to
help. The lack of an immediate response from these aircraft assets
caused significant delays in fighting the fires in Bastrop County,
where more than 1,500 homes were destroyed, and lives lost.
FEMA must also change its defined jurisdictions for declarations.
FEMA must move to a regional-based program, rather than the current
county-based program. This will lend assistance to counties whose
resources were depleted helping neighboring communities.
What happened in Texas is inexcusable and unacceptable.
The homes of good Americans were scorched, and lives were lost. The
Federal Government stood by, taking almost a week to assist the local
efforts at fighting the blaze. Nearby assets that could have stopped
the fire sooner were tied up in red tape.
My hope is that today we can find some answers, and start moving
toward solutions.
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Mr. McCaul. So, with that, I recognize my very good friend,
Mr. Cuellar, who serves as Ranking Member of the Homeland
Security's Subcommittee on Border and Maritime.
Mr. Cuellar. Chairman, I want to thank you very much and
thank you for inviting me to be here with you. It's good to be
back in my hunting grounds. Back--I think I spent about 15
years in the State legislature. I had meetings here in this
particular hearing room, so it's always good to be back.
I want to thank the Chairman for convening this hearing in
our home State. Chairman McCaul and I have worked together in a
bipartisan basis on numerous issues facing Texas. We've gone
off to Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan. We've gone off to Mexico
together. We've gone down the border, also working together to
make sure that we secure the borders. So I certainly want to
thank him for all the work that he's done, and certainly I'm
happy to please--pleased to join forces with him to address
another issue that's vital to the concern of Texans, and that
is Texas wildfires that even now are still burning in our State
of Texas.
The purpose of this hearing is to examine the impact of
these tragic wildfires and determine what steps can be taken to
improve the process for receiving disaster assistance. Again,
I'm very, very interested--I would ask the witnesses, when
you're addressing us, to look at lessons learned, because I'm
one of those that certainly wants to look at lessons learned
and see what we can do to improve the process.
I would like to thank all the witnesses for participating
in this morning's hearing, and as we convene here today, my
thoughts and prayers are with those who have lost their lives,
their property during this tragic wildfire season. I know Mike
and I have--the Chairman and I have talked about this, and I
know it hit his district very, very hard, and that's why I'm
here--with him here today, to show my support to our Chairman.
Again, you know, people have lost their residences, their
livelihoods, and who have, in many ways, been affected by these
wildfires. I would like to thank, also, and express my
appreciation to those brave men and women who have worked
around the clock since the fires began to protect the lives and
property of our fellow--so I want to thank all of y'all for all
the work that y'all have done.
Since late August, a record 3.8 million acres, an area
roughly the size of Connecticut, has burned and continues to
burn even as we meet here right now. In fact, almost half of
all the acreage burned in the United States in 2011 was burned
here in Texas. Just yesterday, the Texas Forest Services
responded to four fires occurring over 7 acres, and 230 of the
254 Texas counties reported burn bans.
In the past 7 days alone, the Texas Forest Service has
responded to 40 fires over 1,456 acres, and fire departments
reported 37 fires over 77 acres, with over 1,300 homes
destroyed, 5,000 people displaced, possibly up to $5 billion in
damages to our State agricultural industries. Wildfires have
once again shown that they're a deadly threat to people living
here in the State of Texas.
That's the bad news. The good news is that in addition to
the State and local aid, Federal assistance is now working in a
coordinated way. In less than 5 years since the last
Presidential disaster declaration for the State wildfires,
Federal assistance has topped $16.4 million, and we need to do
more. I'll be the first one to say we need to do a lot more.
The only thing is, you know, there are some debates up
there in Washington--we have the deficit debate, as you know,
and there have been some cuts, and it's going to affect
everybody. A couple of years ago, we heard people say loud
across the State of Texas, including here in Austin, ``We've
got to cut the Federal Government. The Federal Government is
getting in our way.'' Now when a disaster hits, who are the
first people they look at? It's the Federal Government on that.
So again, I'm one of those that feels we ought to work
together to do this. Currently, there was another debate issue
in Washington, DC, and FEMA was in the center of the budget
process and threatened Federal Government shutdown when the
majority took the position that Federal funding for disaster
relief, including the current wildlife fires we're having,
should be offset by equal cuts from other programs. Do we put
money towards the fires so we can cut education? I think the
Joint Committee on Higher Ed is meeting right now.
We've never done that before. We have never done that
before. We take care of the disasters. Then we worry about how
we pay them later. An emergency should be taken care of instead
of having a Washington debate as to how we pay for this.
But, nevertheless, you know, we've got to make sure, when
something like this happens, there's coordination at all
levels, at the--at all levels of government; State, local, and
Federal. I'm pleased to see representatives of the Federal,
State, and local level will testify before us so we can talk
about lessons learned here.
To the extent that there's red tape--and I'll be the first
one to join my friend Michael McCaul. If that's a barrier to
responsive recovery, then we must address it. You know, what do
we need to do to break down those bureaucratic responses if
there's one.
But I'd like to note one thing. I used to be the Ranking
Member of the Subcommittee on Border and Maritime, and I served
as the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Emergency Communications
preparing this response. So I'm very, very familiar with these
issues, FEMA. That used to be my subcommittee that I used to
chair before I moved over to the Border Committee.
It's important to note that the Stafford Act--and I've been
one of those that have been asking that we make changes to it.
I think it's outdated. The Stafford Act, which governs disaster
response, recognizes that the States and local communities and
not the Federal Government--I emphasize, not the Federal
Government--have the primary responsibility to address
disasters and emergencies. The Federal Government, when called
upon, acts to supplement these efforts and provide resources to
State and local government when the resources are exhausted.
So, again, I'm one of those that have always said, ``We
ought to change the Stafford Act,'' but it's so hard to do
that, but I need--I think we need to continue to look at that.
So I appreciate the multiple moving parts that must work
together on the Federal, the State, the local level to
formulate a response that's effective, that's timely, that
serves the needs of those affected by disasters.
Again, I look forward to see how we can work on this
together. I certainly--the wildfires have really, you know,
cost us lives and damages to property and livelihood, and I'm
interested in what we need to do to improve the process, and I
think this will be a unique teaching moment to learn on how we
better prepare to respond to disasters.
So I thank my Chairman for allowing me to be here with him,
and I look forward to working with him to find solutions to the
problems that we have. I yield back the balance of my time.
Mr. McCaul. I think the gentleman--and I agree. I think
this is a forward-looking, solution-oriented type of hearing,
but you don't know how to fix something if you can't, at first,
look at what went wrong. So--I assume this is on.
We have a distinguished panel of witnesses I'd like to go
ahead and introduce now. The first is Mr. Nim Kidd. He's the
Assistant Director of Emergency Management for the State of
Texas, Department of Public Safety. Mr. Kidd previously served
as San Antonio's Homeland Security Director and Emergency
Manager. He has served as a San Antonio firefighter, as well as
Lieutenant Captain and District Fire Chief. He has also served
as a member of the Texas Task Force 1: Urban Search and Rescue
Team since 1997, responding to State and National disasters,
including the World Trade Center attack on September 11. I want
the thank you for your service and thank you for being here
today, Mr. Kidd.
Next we have Major General John Nichols. General Nichols is
the 51st Adjutant General of the State of Texas. He is
responsible to the Governor for providing ready-trained forces
of the Texas Army Guard, the Texas Air Guard, and the Adjutant
General's Department, better known as the Texas Military
Forces, in support of State operations. He is also responsible
to the President for providing Texas Army Guard and Air Guard
Forces in support of Federal missions. Thank you for your
service as well.
Next we have Mr. Kevin Starbuck. He is the Emergency
Management Coordinator for Amarillo, Potter, Randall Office of
Emergency Management. He's a certified Emergency Manager
through the International Association of Emergency Managers. He
serves as the Potter and Randall County Local Emergency
Planning Committee Chairperson and is a member of the Panhandle
Regional Emergency Management Advisory committee.
Then we have our two Federal witnesses that I would like to
introduce. Mr. Tony Russell, who was appointed as the Regional
Administrator for Region 4 at FEMA in December 2009. Mr.
Russell is responsible for all FEMA operational decisions and
policy implementation in Texas, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Arkansas,
and Louisiana. He previously served as the Federal Coordinating
Officer with Region 8 from 2003 to 2009, and he also assumed
the role of acting director of the FEMA Louisiana Recovery
Office for Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike. You have
a great deal of experience, sir, and I do appreciate the
personal phone calls that you gave to me during this fire
disaster in Bastrop.
Finally, we have a long-standing, many generations Texan,
Mr. Tom Harbour, who can link his ancestors all the way back to
the Stephen F. Austin colony, which is in my district. It's
great to have you here with that type of lineage. He is the
Director for Fire and Aviation Management at the U.S. Forest
Service. Mr. Harbour has been involved in wildland fire
management for decades, beginning with service in California.
He has served as the area and incident commander for a wide
range of disasters, including fires, hurricanes, earthquakes,
and floods.
With that, the Chair now recognizes Mr. Kidd for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF W. NIM KIDD, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT, TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY
Mr. Kidd. Thank you, sir, and good morning. I would also
like to start by thanking the thousands of Texas and National
firefighters that came to assist; the paid, the volunteers, the
first responders. The work that they have done this fire season
is nothing short of a miracle and is nothing short of stellar,
and we would be very much remiss if we didn't take every
opportunity to thank them for the service.
I'd also like to thank you for your service. We spent time
together in Bastrop, many phone calls back and forth trying to
make sure that what we were doing was the right thing to do, so
thank you for your leadership.
Congressman, I also thank you for the years that we spent
in San Antonio working together. I know tomorrow will be a
rough day in your district as the elevated fire weather will be
there, so thank you for your leadership in being here as well.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
Mr. Kidd. Before I move on, I think we would also be remiss
if we didn't recognize the Director of the Texas Forest
Services, who is here with us, Tom Boggus, who may help us with
some of the questions and answers that we have as well.
Texas started its wildfire season on November 15, 2010. On
December 21, 2010, Governor Perry issued the first of what
would be continuing disaster declarations, noting that we were
in a state of drought and in a state of responding to
magnificent wildfires.
In the last 10 months, the State of Texas has responded to
24,258 wildfires. I think that's important to know that that
does not count the hundreds of thousands of local 9-1-1 calls
that urban fire departments respond to on a daily basis. This
isn't trash fires. This isn't house fires. These are wildland
fires. It's my understanding that this 21,000 is roughly a
third of what the U.S. Forest Service responds to on a National
average in 1 year.
It's also important to know that 3.8 million acres have
burnt so far, as we've talked about already, that 2,862 homes
have been lost. What we sometimes fail to mention is that
36,204 homes have been saved by the work of the firefighters
out there on the front lines.
We will talk more in depth, I'm sure, about the Fire
Management Assistance Grant process, FMAGs, in which Texas has
received 55 FMAGs since December--actually, since February 27,
2011, and 51 of those have been funded based on some criteria
that need to be met.
As we break down the number of fires and FMAGs in acreage,
we should remember that 1.2 million acres have been covered by
a Fire Management Assistance Grant. That leaves 2.6 million
acres with zero Federal funding coming in to assist. We're
working through the process with FEMA to get public assistance
under the Stafford Act to help with that. That also equates to
13,967 homes saved on the Fire Management Assistance Grants
fires, but 22,237 homes saved on non-FMAG fires.
The cost to Texans so far is $304 million, and the FMAGs
allow for $52 million, but at a 75/25 percent split, we will
really only see $39 million of the $304 million returning to
Texas to cover the cost of the fires. I think we will have to
dance carefully around the difference between personnel and
resources that responded to assist Texans and the Federal money
that comes in after that to assist Texans.
So on the response and recovery side, I will submit that
the U.S. Forest Service and FEMA have been here from very early
days with their personnel and with their equipment to help us.
At this point, the prime danger to Texas is the $304 million
that we have spent that we are working through the recovery
process to see what is eligible and what's a non-eligible
expense.
The Stafford Act and Title 44 of the Code of Federal
Regulations are cumbersome. I totally agree with you. To figure
out a safer, smarter way to do that should be in all of our
best interests, and I hope that will be the focus that we work
through.
We also know that through the FMAGs, there is much room for
improvement, because the standardized definition of a Fire
Management Assistance Grant award is very subjective. You will
not find a National definition of what constitutes an FMAG fire
other than ``any fire in and of itself with the capability of
becoming a major disaster.'' There is no minimum acreage. There
is no minimum homes lost. There is no evacuations in process.
Those are thumb rules or policies that I would suggest are
different by FEMA region.
We talk a lot about FEMA not being here to help or the Feds
not being here to help, and I would say that that, in most
cases, is not necessarily true. I do believe that they've been
here working with us from Day 1. The big difference is they are
not loaning us their resources. They're selling us their
resources.
Remember, this is a process for recovery as we work through
the public assistance and the individual assistance grants, and
as we work through those together, all of those processes are
very time-consuming. I understand that it does take a large
amount of paperwork to defend and justify the expenses that we
have. We would all like to see that reduced, and we are very
much looking forward to ways that we can do that together.
Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Kidd.
The Chairman now recognizes General Nichols for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL JOHN F. NICHOLS, ADJUTANT GENERAL,
TEXAS MILITARY FORCES, TEXAS
General Nichols. Mr. Chairman, Congressman Cuellar, thanks
for inviting me today. I'd like to talk about what the Texas
National Guard has been doing to help Texas in the last quite a
few months--way too many months.
As you stated before, we have--we're dual role. We support
the President and the Constitution against enemies, usually
foreign, and we protect the Governor and the State of Texas,
against any natural disaster, and we would be his primary
military force if called upon if we needed that.
The mission of the National Guard--Texas National Guard is
to provide manpower and resources and equipment to help the
Texas Department of Emergency Management in responding to State
and local emergencies, and we've done that for decades now. Our
role is as a supporting agency to TDEM, and we're the single
point of contact with TDEM for execution. It allows us to
respond quickly in response to whatever happens in Texas.
Additionally, we continue to coordinate with the planners
and the first responders to improve what we've done in the
past; as mentioned before, lessons learned. Every fire season,
every hurricane season, every flood season, every time we have
snows up north, we come back and refine what our response was
from the past to the present, all the time trying to improve
our response to the needs of the citizens of Texas.
We've been supporting TDEM and Texans in the fights against
the fires since--the Texas National Guard started February 14.
Since then, we've flown 82 missions. It doesn't sound like
much, but a mission is one day's flying, so--and that could be
all of our helicopters flying on one day. So that's all counted
as a mission.
We've dropped 5,745 buckets of water for a total of almost
5 million gallons of water dropped this year just since
February. Then our fire break team has cut 162 miles of fire.
When you consider a D7 dozer is a pretty big bulldozer that
doesn't go very fast, we've been busy. Our folks have been--the
fire break teams have been working since the April and May time
frame.
Regarding the Bastrop fires, we had eight Blackhawks
flying. They put in 67 hours of flying time, and they dropped
456,000 gallons of water on the fire. We also had three Chinook
helicopters flying. They flew 80 hours, and they dropped
913,000 gallons of water. A Blackhawk can drop 600 gallons of
water. A Chinook can drop 2,000 gallons of water. If you--I'm
sure you saw them going back and forth during the Bastrop fire.
They were just going over to the Colorado River, picking up
water, and going. One time they took water out of a family's
pool to put out their house, so I think that was a fair trade
that day.
One of the Chinook Bambi buckets was provided by Fort Hood.
Fort Hood was fighting their own fire at the time, and they had
one Bambi bucket that--and they only have one. Ours went out
for maintenance, so we asked for that, and they provided it to
us just about immediately. Just for that effort right there,
just in Bastrop County, we had 181 personnel supporting the
effort.
We had one dozer team, which is comprised of four
bulldozers, and the team teamed up with the Texas Forestry
Service and the U.S. Forest Service. They're the fire boss.
They led us through there, and we cut--I think it was--it ended
up being 5 miles of fire break. That sounds not much, but when
you think about Highway 71 in Bastrop and how the fire jumped
across the shoulder, the lanes--the median strip, the lanes,
the shoulder, it takes a while to cut something wide enough to
have any effect. They're not fighting in that kind of
environment. They're fighting more around where the retardant
is dropped. It's not uncommon for them to come back covered in
orange when they're finished fighting the fire, because they're
right there right with that team.
We also had 60 Texas State Guard soldiers helping Bastrop
set up shelters for the displaced families that had time and
need. We brought communications packages. We put liaison
officers out there. We also supported 600 firefighters at Camp
Swift, which is very close to Bastrop, north and west of
Bastrop. There weren't 600 firefighters there at any time. They
were doing a thing called hot bunking. Three hundred were
sleeping while 300 were fighting, and then they'd have a shift
change, 300 would sleep while 300 fought. So the firefighters
were working 24/7 during that whole period of time. We supplied
bunking and life support essentials for them in concert with
the Texas Forestry Service.
I thank you for the opportunity to talk today, to let you
know that also we've been partnered up with TDEM since we were
first tasked to come to the fire, and throughout that--the
whole fire season, we've been on alert and ready to go whenever
asked and whenever called. Thank you for your time.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, General.
[The statement of General Nichols follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Nichols
October 17, 2011
Mr. Chairmen, Members, thank you for having me here today.
As you know the National Guard is unique in that we serve dual
missions: First, to provide the President and the country with ready
and trained combat forces in support of the defense of the Nation;
second, we provide the Governor and the citizens of Texas with a
mission-ready force in support of civil authorities.
The mission of the Texas National Guard is to provide the manpower
and equipment to support the Texas Department of Emergency Management
in responding to State and local emergencies. Our role as a supporting
agency to TDEM, which is the single point of contact for planning and
execution, allows Texas to act quickly in response to any need.
Additionally, we continue to coordinate with the planners and first
responders to improve our capability through training and enhanced
infrastructure to respond to the emergency needs of the citizens of
Texas.
Regarding the Central Texas fires in Bastrop the Texas National
Guard provided:
Eight Blackhawk helicopters which flew a total of 67.2 hours and
dropped 456,060 gallons of water.
Three Chinook helicopters flew a total of 80.4 hours and dropped
913,000 gallons of water.
One Chinook Bambi Bucket was provided by Fort Hood to replace a
TXNG Bambi Bucket damaged during the fire.
A total of 181 personnel supported this effort.
One Ground Wildfire Suppression Force Package composed of four D7
Bulldozers with supporting vehicles and equipment was employed on the
fire and cut 5 miles of fire break. All 16 personnel were on State
Active Duty during the event. In addition, one Liaison Officer
supported the Incident Command Post.
Texas State Guard provided 60 Soldiers to establish shelters and
support civilians displaced by the Bastrop County Complex Fire. All
personnel were in a State Active Duty status.
Two Texas Interoperable Communication Package trailers supported
the Incident Command Post. Personnel were in a State Active Duty
status.
Four Texas State Guard Soldiers of the Resource Team were assigned
to the Logistics Section of the State Operations Center.
One Aviation Liaison Officer served in Merkel, TX, to assist the
Texas Forest Service in coordinating TXMF Aviation assets supporting
the Texas Forest Service throughout the State.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
how the Texas National Guard will continue to support the Texas
Department of Emergency Management in working to keep Texans safe by
ensuring our readiness at the time of need.
Mr. McCaul. Let me say thank you for your efforts on behalf
of the State of Texas. I think the response at the highest
levels of the State and the volunteer fire departments was
really phenomenal, and so thank you for that.
Next, the Chairman recognizes Mr. Starbuck.
STATEMENT OF KEVIN STARBUCK, CEM EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
COORDINATOR, AMARILLO/POTTER/RANDALL OFFICE OF EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
Mr. Starbuck. Thank you, Chairman, Congressman. I
appreciate being invited to represent one of many local
jurisdictions in the State of Texas who have had to actively
deal with this wildfire season on the front lines.
I would be remiss without bringing up that jurisdictions
such as Possum Kingdom, the Wichita Falls area, the Bastrop
area, the Davis Mountains area all had significant wildfire
threats throughout the year, including other locations
throughout the State of the Texas, and each one of them has
their own story to tell that could help bring this picture to
light and maybe make it a more whole picture for each of you to
consider.
As a Local Emergency Manager, our primary task is to be
proactive as we possibly can, coordinating our local resources
to ensure that we can address all hazards that impact our
jurisdictions in as rapidly and efficiently a manner as we
possibly can. We take this very seriously in the city of
Amarillo, and over the year--over the course of this year have
been very active in standing up fire weather operations in
advance of wildfire outbreaks.
Some of the major wildfires that we had in Potter and
Randall Counties starting on February 27, the first of the
major wildfires in Texas, involved standing up our emergency
operation center as early as 9:00 in the morning, calling in
additional resources, additional firefighters, public works
personnel with their motor graders, and coordinating
extensively with our Disaster District Committee personnel that
represent the State of Texas and with the National Weather
Service to get a good picture of what the threat truly was on
that particular day and in subsequent days throughout the year.
As wildfires outbroke in our community and throughout the
western--West Texas and throughout the State of Texas, our job
is to coordinate the resources that we have at our disposal
from a local side and, as we identify needs, communicate those
to the State of Texas. There truly isn't a mechanism, nor
should there be a mechanism, where I contact or speak directly
with FEMA or Federal responders. I leave that to the State of
Texas to work through those issues and to make those
determinations about whether they have the resource to meet our
needs or need to call upon others to assist.
Bureaucracy did not prevent a timely response from local
jurisdictions or the State of Texas. We had people in place. We
aggressively attacked the issues when they presented themselves
and worked to minimize the impact on our communities to the
extent possible.
Our frustration was more founded in the recovery process
where we were looked upon to provide information, often on very
short notice, and requiring extensive efforts on our parts to
put together cost estimates of what it cost to respond to these
wildfires in order to be considered for eligibility for Federal
disaster reimbursement funds.
Both of the FMAG fires, of which four have been declared in
Potter and Randall Counties, the jurisdictions I represent, and
the major disaster declaration that has been considered for the
State of Texas have required us to put in extensive time and
effort in order to make determinations on whether we would be
eligible for reimbursement funding or not.
As a city department, I would honestly say that we are
geared to handle it in our budgetary processes. We work through
those issues.
My concern is for the many volunteer fire departments who
have put forward extensive effort, extensive wear and tear on
equipment. It's been characterized to me that the wildfire
season that we have experienced this year and the pace of
operations that they have had to work through equates to 3 to 5
years of wear and tear on the equipment that they normally
would see.
When a volunteer fire department that is basically working
off of bake sales to buy fire trucks sees 3 to 5 years of wear
and tear on their front-line equipment, there's going to be a
long-term impact on their ability to continue to be a
serviceable response entity.
That's where FEMA reimbursement funds come into play, to
assist us in making those departments whole and to help them
continue the fight for the long term related to wildfire
threats.
There are a number of different things that I think need to
be looked at in relation to both the FMAG process, the
paperwork that was submitted as part of the FMAG process, and
then also the major disaster declaration determination process.
It seems that in years past, a disaster summary outline
providing basic estimates of costs that local jurisdiction
incurred in response to a major disaster was enough to make
those determinations. This year, we were required to submit
extensive paperwork well beyond that in order to help make
those determinations, which, as of today, continue to remain
unfunded or unsubstantiated for at least our local jurisdiction
and many jurisdictions throughout the State of Texas.
There's an understanding that FEMA must have mechanisms in
place to make those determinations, and we'll be the first to
admit that the--at least in Potter and Randall Counties--that
the wildfire threat and the costs that were associated were
marginal in terms of what would be considered a Federal
disaster declaration. But when considered in the scope and
magnitude of the overall wildfire threat throughout the State
of Texas, throughout West Texas, throughout my particular
jurisdiction this year, I think that that needs to be
reconsidered on how those determinations are made.
Further, our concern remains that while this year's
wildfires continue, the long-term forecast that we see and that
we have to deal with are not showing any relief in sight for
the State of Texas well into next year. So the extent of
impacts that we've had this year, the extent of equipment being
used up in response to these fires is not just a short-term
issue, but will remain a long-term issue as we continue to see
extensive wildfires.
As Chief Kidd has already alluded, we're already seeing red
flag warnings for the Austin area this week, and I'm sure that
over the course of this winter, spring, and summer of next
year, we'll continue to see additional issues.
I appreciate your time, and I appreciate you looking into
this issue, looking at the overall scope, and I appreciate the
opportunity to come speak before the committee today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Starbuck follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kevin Starbuck
October 17, 2011
The Texas Panhandle is experiencing an unprecedented wildfire and
drought impact in 2011. Per National Weather Service records (dating
back to 1892), 2011 is the driest year on record for the Amarillo area.
These dry conditions combined with record heat and extreme winds
created a fire weather threat on a scale never before experienced in
the Texas Panhandle and throughout much of the State of Texas.
Starting in December 2010, the emergency management program began
coordinating pro-active fire weather operations with area fire
departments, law enforcement, and public works due to the extreme
conditions. With each Red Flag Warning issued by the National Weather
Service, the Amarillo/Potter/Randall Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
activated to a heightened readiness level with additional emergency
response agency staffing to ensure maximum readiness to respond to any
wildfire that started in the two county jurisdiction and support the
needs of neighboring jurisdictions throughout the Texas Panhandle.
These efforts were coordinated with the State of Texas Disaster
District Committee personnel located in the Amarillo area. State of
Texas response assets located in the region are available to all local
jurisdictions in an effort to maximize response resources as wildfires
threaten communities with a strong working relationship existing
between local jurisdictions and State partners. The primary wildfire
response asset that was deployed to the Amarillo area was Texas Forest
Service-contracted single engine air tanker firefighting aircraft.
Unfortunately, very few Texas Forest Service ground assets were
deployed to the Texas Panhandle region when significant wildfire
activity in the Texas Panhandle began in late February 2011.
On February 27, 2011, the National Weather Service Amarillo
forecast indicated extreme Red Flag fire weather conditions with
critically dry fuel moisture, single-digit relative humidity values,
and high wind warnings based on forecasted sustained winds of 40+ mph
with gusts exceeding 60 mph. The extreme weather conditions centered on
the Amarillo area mirrored a fire weather phenomenon found by local
National Weather Service and Texas Forest Service researchers conducive
for large wildfire outbreaks.
While multiple fires broke out throughout West Texas, the most
devastating wildfires in terms of property damage occurred in Amarillo
area. The Willowcreek South Complex wildfire located just north of
Amarillo in Potter County forced the evacuation of approximately 1,250
residents, consumed 24,310 acres, and destroyed 37 residences and 70
outbuildings with an estimated property value loss of $7,035,547. At
nearly the same time, the Tanglewood Complex wildfire located just
south of Amarillo in Randall County forced the evacuation of
approximately 1,539 residents, consumed 1,224 acres, and destroyed 33
residences and 40 outbuildings with an estimated property value loss of
$5,965,880.
With multiple incidents occurring in the Amarillo/Potter/Randall
interjurisdictional emergency management program area, local officials
issued a local disaster declaration for the City of Amarillo, Potter
County, and Randall County. The disaster declaration requested
emergency response assistance from the State of Texas and consideration
from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) for the issuance of
a Fire Management Assistance Grant (FMAG) and other Federal disaster
recovery assistance to offset the extensive response and recovery costs
that were being incurred. A request for a FEMA FMAG is required to be
completed while major response operations are on-going per FEMA policy.
The Amarillo/Potter/Randall EOC was notified on February 27, 2011 that
FEMA had declared the Willowcreek South Complex wildfire in Potter
County and the Tanglewood Complex wildfire in Randall County eligible
for the FMAG program.
On the day following the wildfire outbreak, emergency management
officials completed a local initial damage assessment and a Disaster
Summary Outline (4-page form) used to determine the scope and magnitude
of a disaster and the jurisdictions eligibility for Federal assistance.
This information was submitted to the Texas Division of Emergency
Management (TDEM) by close of business on February 28, 2011. Based on
the information provided, TDEM and U.S. Small Business Administration
officials came to Amarillo to perform a preliminary damage assessment.
The combined State and Federal preliminary damage assessment resulted
in a U.S. Small Business Administration Disaster Declaration for Potter
County and Randall County.
Concurrently, TDEM officials conducted an initial briefing on the
FMAG program, requesting Potter County and Randall County officials to
compile response cost information for the two wildfires using FEMA
disaster recovery paperwork. TDEM officials provided information to the
local jurisdictions that while the Willowcreek South Complex and
Tanglewood Complex wildfires were declared FMAG wildfires, the State of
Texas had not exceeded the FEMA threshold for suppression costs, and
thus the jurisdictions were not eligible for FMAG funding. TDEM
officials briefed that the FEMA suppression cost threshold of
approximately $4,000,000 in calendar year 2011 was a moving target as
additional suppression cost information was being gathered from
throughout the State of Texas for wildfires that had occurred prior to
February 27, 2011. Should it be determined that the State-wide wildfire
suppression costs prior to February 27, 2011 exceeded the eligibility
threshold, then the FMAG declared wildfires in Potter County and
Randall County would be eligible for Federal reimbursement funding.
Based on this information, the City of Amarillo, Potter County, and
Randall County compiled the response cost information using the FEMA
disaster recovery paperwork. The result was extensive staff hours used
to generate 5" thick of FEMA project worksheets outlining the
suppression costs for the local jurisdictions. To date, the Willowcreek
South Complex and Tanglewood Complex wildfires remain unfunded. TDEM
has provided that the State of Texas suppression cost threshold of
approximately $4,000,000 was exceeded sometime in the early March 2011
time frame, leaving the wildfires of February 27, 2011 ineligible for
FMAG funding by a mere few days per the FEMA policy.
Fire weather conditions continued to deteriorate in the Texas
Panhandle region throughout the spring months. On May 24, 2011, the
region was once again facing critically extreme wildfire conditions
leading local officials to once again increase readiness levels and
pre-deploy response assets throughout the jurisdictions. Multiple major
wildfires occurred south of the City of Amarillo in Deaf Smith County,
Swisher County, and Randall County. The largest of these wildfires was
the Cemetery Road wildfire that began in the late afternoon of May 24,
2011 in central Randall County. The initial response to the wildfire
resulted in the evacuation of approximately 60 residents in the Sunday
Canyon area and the evacuation and closure of the Palo Duro Canyon
State Park, which at the time of the evacuation order had approximately
140 elementary students in the bottom of the canyon on a field day to
the State Park.
The Amarillo/Potter/Randall EOC contacted the TDEM Regional Liaison
Officer providing information on the Cemetery Road wildfire and the
response actions being taken in Sunday Canyon and Palo Duro State Park.
A request was made for a FEMA FMAG declaration for the Cemetery Road
wildfire, which was forwarded up the chain of command by the TDEM
Regional Liaison Officer. Approximately 60 minutes into the initial
response to the Cemetery Road wildfire, the Incident Commander received
a direct call from a FEMA representative stating that the Cemetery Road
wildfire was not significant enough to justify an FEMA FMAG
declaration. The Incident Commander forwarded this information to
Amarillo/Potter/Randall EOC, which contacted the TDEM Regional Liaison
Officer for clarification and an explanation of the FEMA FMAG denial,
especially given that the response to this major incident was just in
the beginning stages. No explanation was provided to the local
jurisdiction.
The Cemetery Road wildfire continued to burn for 4 days, consuming
16,373 acres, tying up extensive local emergency response resources and
nearly every State and Federal firefighting response asset deployed to
West Texas. The fire forced the continuous evacuation of the Sunday
Canyon area (approximately 300 residents) and the Palo Duro Canyon
State Park until the fire was declared under control.
On May 29, 2011, the Amarillo area was once again the center point
for critically extreme fire weather. In the afternoon hours, the Pitt
Road wildfire started in Randall County followed shortly by the Stone
Ridge wildfire in Potter County. The Pitt Road wildfire in Randall
County forced the evacuation of approximately 200 residents, consumed
180 acres, and destroyed 4 residences and 11 outbuildings with an
estimated property value loss of $109,284. The Stone Ridge wildfire in
Potter County forced the evacuation of approximately 3,000 residents,
consumed 1,556 acres, and destroyed 8 residences and 21 outbuildings
with an estimated property value loss of $2,561,035.
Once again, the Amarillo/Potter/Randall EOC contacted the TDEM
Regional Liaison Officer relating information on the scope and
magnitude of the unfolding wildfires and requesting FEMA FMAG
consideration. Both the Pitt Road and Stone Ridge wildfires were
declared FEMA FMAG wildfires and are reportedly eligible for
reimbursement funding for suppression costs. To date, the City of
Amarillo, Potter County, and Randall County are continuing to compile
the required FEMA disaster recovery paperwork to submit for FMAG
reimbursement.
Additional information outlining the wildfire threat in the
Amarillo/Potter/Randall area is outlined in the attached ``2011
Amarillo/Potter/Randall Wildfire Threat Summary'' last revised on
September 11, 2011 (attachment 1).
In July 2011, Potter County Judge Arthur Ware received a letter
from TDEM Chief Nim Kidd, dated July 7, 2011 outlining that Potter
County was not approved for Public Assistance in the Federally-declared
DR-1999 wildfires that occurred between April 6, 2011 and May 3, 2011
(attachment 2). The letter requested that Potter County submit a
Disaster Summary Outline to TDEM outlining the Public Assistance
expenses for the county.
TDEM was contacted requesting clarification of the requested
information given that no major wildfires had occurred during the April
6, 2011 to May 3, 2011 time frame in the Amarillo/Potter/Randall area.
TDEM provided the explanation that the State of Texas had requested a
major disaster declaration for 252 counties in Texas for the time frame
of December 21, 2010 thru August 31, 2011. The DR-1999 Federal major
disaster declaration was issued by FEMA to include only 45 counties and
limited to the April 6, 2011 through May 3, 2011 time frame. Specific
information requirements for reconsideration of undeclared counties was
still being determined, but TDEM indicated that a TDEM/FEMA meeting
would be scheduled in the coming weeks to gather information on all
wildfire response costs from December 21, 2010 through the current
date.
On July 28, 2011, the Amarillo/Potter/Randall Office of Emergency
Management (OEM) met with TDEM and FEMA representatives. At this
meeting, FEMA requested that OEM submit all non-FMAG-declared wildfire
response costs using FEMA disaster recovery paperwork broken down for
Potter County and Randall County into three time frames: December 21,
2010 through April 5, 2011; April 6, 2011 through May 3, 2011; and May
4, 2011 through the current date. The indication was that this
information would be used to determine the jurisdictions eligibility
within the currently declared period of the DR-1999 disaster
declaration and would provide a basis along with information from other
jurisdictions for FEMA to reconsider the State of Texas request to
expand the disaster declaration period.
Three elements were discussed: First, that the request for
completed FEMA disaster recovery paperwork was overly burdensome given
the short turnaround time requested by FEMA. Second, that given that
the February 27, 2011 Willowcreek South Complex wildfire in Potter
County and the Tanglewood Complex wildfire in Randall County were
declared, but unfunded FMAG wildfires, that their exclusion from
consideration was not fair to the jurisdictions. And third, a more
detailed explanation of what portions of response could be considered
(i.e. equipment rates, overtime vs. straight time, volunteer
consideration). The FEMA representative allowed that the full extent of
FEMA disaster recovery paperwork would not be needed, but that the
local jurisdiction needed to provide background information on how it
arrived at the response cost estimate. In addition, the FEMA
representative allowed that the February 27, 2011 Willowcreek South
Complex and Tanglewood Complex wildfires could be included in the cost
estimated due to the lack of FMAG funding.
OEM spent extensive staff hours compiling the requested FEMA
information, especially given the level of detail requested beyond the
customary disaster summary information typically used to determine
eligibility for Federal assistance.
The submittal to FEMA provided the required breakdown outlining the
FEMA allowable response costs for the period of December 21, 2010
through July 23, 2011 (attachment 3 & 4). In Potter County, an
estimated 211 wildfires were responded to with an estimated FEMA
allowable response cost of $412,077. In Randall County, an estimated
128 wildfires were responded to with an estimated FEMA allowable
response cost of $429,871. Based on the FEMA per capita thresholds, it
was indicated that the jurisdictions would need to exceed approximately
$375,000 in FEMA allowable response costs in each county to be
reconsidered for eligibility, assuming FEMA expanded the disaster
period. No additional feedback was provided by TDEM or FEMA following
submittal of the information.
In late September 2011, a copy of a letter from FEMA to Governor
Perry and a second letter from FEMA to TDEM dated September 21, 2011
were forwarded to OEM outlining the denial of TDEMs request to expand
the DR-1999 disaster declaration (attachment 5 & 6). It was noted in
the letter that, ``it was not demonstrated that the prior or subsequent
fire activity is part of the same extraordinary incident as the major
disaster declaration''. Given the extreme extended nature of the
wildfire threat in 2011 coupled with the extensive impact on
communities throughout Texas during the entirety of 2011, the
explanation does not appear to be based in the experiences of local
jurisdictions throughout the State of Texas.
In conclusion, did bureaucracy prevent a timely response . . . No,
the interjurisdictional emergency management program in the City of
Amarillo, Potter County, and Randall County leverage all available
local, regional, and State resources to maximize response to incidents
and minimize the impact of the wildfire threat on our community with
limited external assistance. However, frustrations experienced in
navigating the recovery process and assistance programs were
tremendous. It is understood that FEMA must put in place mechanisms to
ensure that Federal assistance is limited to truly catastrophic
incidents. And based on this, it is recognized that the response to the
wildfire threat in Potter County and Randall County is a marginal
incident in relation to Federal disaster consideration. However, the
process employed by FEMA to make those determinations is convoluted,
time-consuming, and in need of improvement.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The declaration of an FMAG for wildfire incidents should not
require determination while in the midst of response to the
incident. Requesting emergency management and/or incident
command personnel to deviate attention from response efforts to
bureaucratic determinations creates the potential for public
safety to be threatened further. Declaration of an FMAG should
be made once incident stabilization has been established and
should be based on clearly published criteria versus subjective
determinations.
Once a State has exceeded the FMAG suppression cost
threshold, all FMAG declared fires for that calendar year
should be eligible for FMAG funding.
FEMA disaster recovery paperwork must be simplified and
should take into consideration jurisdictional accounting
systems that can already produce reports on equipment and labor
cost information. Requiring jurisdictions to transfer
information from established accounting systems to FEMA forms
is a duplication of effort.
Based on the requirements of the National Incident
Management System (NIMS), jurisdictions are required to
identify the FEMA ``kind & type'' for all response equipment.
However, equipment reimbursement is based on a FEMA equipment
rate schedule that does not correlate the NIMS equipment
``types''. Equipment rates should be based on the NIMS
equipment ``typing'' verse an alternative equipment rate
schedule to improve determination of equipment cost rates.
Determinations of eligibility for a major disaster
declaration must be simplified with improved transparency and
less subjectivity. To date, OEM has not directly received any
feedback from TDEM or FEMA as to our status in the process.
Given that the local jurisdictions provided information
demonstrating response costs in excess of eligibility
thresholds, a more detailed explanation of the denial of the
expansion of the Federal major disaster declaration would
assist local jurisdictions in understanding the process.*
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* Attachments have been retained in committee files.
Mr. McCaul. We want to thank you, Mr. Starbuck, and thank
you for your great service. You're a County Judge. You're also
the Emergency Manager. You're pretty much everything out there.
I also--I agree with your warning that it's far from over. The
State of Texas remains to be a tinderbox, and I think it's very
foreseeable, as it has been this past year, that we'll have
many more fires, unfortunately.
With that, the Chairman recognizes Mr. Russell for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF TONY RUSSELL, REGION VI REGIONAL ADMINISTRATOR,
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Russell. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, and good
morning, Congressman Cuellar. I want to thank you again for
being able to come speak with you today.
First of all, Chairman McCaul, I want to thank you for our
phone calls before and during the fires. I think they were very
good for us to talk to make sure that we were on the same page,
and they were very helpful. Also I had phone calls with the
Texas Congressional Delegations, a call at 1:00 p.m., before
and during the fires, and just make sure that all the staff
were on-line and make sure that we knew what we were doing. We
were totally transparent, and to me that was my goal, to make
sure that we were doing exactly that.
I want to comment now on FEMA's role during the fires.
First of all, I am very pleased with the way that we were able
to pre-position assets. We were able to ensure that we pre-
deployed folks and to make sure that we were in support of the
Governor and the Governor's team. That's my primary focus, to
make sure that FEMA does exactly that.
Since the declaration in Bastrop County for individual
assistance, we have added 22 more counties to the declaration.
That allows the survivors to be eligible for housing needs. We
have 15 counties that have been declared for public assistance.
That is to help the local governments and the communities
rebuild their infrastructure. The State also expects an
additional 15 counties for PA, and so that will give us a total
of 30 counties that are going to be eligible for some form of
Federal assistance, including IA and PA.
I've had my Federal coordinating officer, Kevin Hanks--he's
been in Texas for a long time. In fact, in July, he was down
working on the DR 1999. When this fire happened, I sent him
over as my FEMA liaison to interface with Chief Kidd, and at
that time they began to take a look at the wildland fires in
September.
As they talked, they decided we had to have an IMAT Team,
which is an Incident Management Assistance Team. That team was
deployed on September 6. They got here to Austin. They began to
plan for our response. Now, during this time, there was not a
declaration yet, so we were in the process of the declaration.
At this juncture, what happened is we sent out our PDA
Team. That's the Preliminary Damage Assessment Teams, and those
teams were geared to work with the State and to work with the
locals to take a look at the amount of damage. The key, when we
look at the damage, is we take a look at what is the uninsured
losses. That's very, very key. Because, of course, if it's
insured, then it's going to be paid for by a different source.
So we looked at the uninsured losses.
Those teams traveled almost right to the fireline, and my
task to them was, ``I want this thing done quickly, but you
guys have got to be safe.'' So safety came first. So they did
that. So I'm pretty pleased with that and the way that we
interfaced with Chief Kidd and his team.
So some of the successes from all of this has been within
the first 2 weeks of the declaration, we have--more than $6
million of assistance has reached the survivors, and to date
we're up to about $10 million. We have the Transitional Shelter
Assistance Program that was approved for Bastrop County within
6 hours after the declaration, and right now we have more than
250 survivors who are involved in that program.
We had a mobile registration intake center open on
September 11, and that was to be able to get folks to quickly
be able to register for their assistance. We had community
relations teams that were in Austin before the event, and they
were in the streets within 12 hours, making sure that we had
face-to-face contact with those who were affected.
We also reached out to folks with functional needs and
disabilities to make sure that no one was left behind. We had
sign language over at the DRCs, which are the Disaster Recovery
Centers, and we also took a look at folks with limited English
proficiency to make sure that we had translators there. We had
folks there to make sure, again, that no one would be left
behind as we moved forward.
Now, to date, sir, we've had about 4,400 visitors to the
disaster recovery centers that have been across the State.
Also, to date, we've had--about 3,800 people have registered
for Federal assistance. As we--as we move forward, I think
those are just a few examples of exactly how we are going to be
forward-thinking. We're going to make sure that the folks who
are affected do, in fact, get the services that they need, and
we at FEMA are committed to doing exactly that, to support the
Governor and the Governor's team respond to this disaster.
Sir, I thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Russell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tony Russell
October 17, 2011
I. INTRODUCTION
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, my name is Tony Russell and I am the Regional
Administrator for the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA)
Region VI Office. It is an honor to appear before you today on behalf
of FEMA to discuss the Federal disaster process and the recent fires in
Texas. In my testimony today, I will describe the Federal disaster
declaration process, FEMA's response and recovery programs, and how
these programs and assistance have been applied to the recent
wildfires.
II. ASSISTANCE FOR THE TEXAS WILDFIRES
This year, Texas has been battling its worst fire season in State
history, and has experienced unprecedented heat and drought. The
severity of the disaster intensified greatly over the Labor Day weekend
when numerous wildfires began to spread.
On July 1, 2011, the President issued a major disaster declaration
for wildfires occurring between April 6, 2011, and May 3, 2011 (DR-
1999-TX). Currently, 52 Texas counties are designated for Public
Assistance for emergency protective measures and debris removal, as
well as repairs to roads and bridges, water control facilities, public
buildings, publicly-owned utilities, and parks and recreation. FEMA is
working with applicants to write up all eligible project worksheets so
they can be reimbursed for eligible expenditures at a 75 percent
Federal cost share.
In response to the elevated fire conditions in September, the
President also issued a major disaster declaration for Bastrop County
(DR-4029-TX) on September 9--the same day the request was received from
the Governor. That declaration, which covers fires occurring on August
30, 2011 and continuing, has subsequently been amended to authorize
Individual Assistance for 22 counties, Public Assistance for Bastrop,
Colorado, Leon, and Walker Counties, and the Hazard Mitigation Grant
Program State-wide.
FEMA continues to engage with our local, State, and Federal
partners as the wildfire response and recovery efforts in Texas have
moved forward. With respect to DR-4029-TX, FEMA Region 6 staff were on
the ground in the Austin area and Bastrop County days in advance of the
major disaster declaration to ensure they were ready to support the
State in the wildfire response and recovery efforts. We held daily
calls with the Texas Congressional delegation to keep Representatives
informed about the on-going wildfire response efforts. I personally
traveled to the Bastrop County area a few weeks ago, where I met with
local officials. I also participated in an aerial tour of the damage
and visited the Disaster Recovery Center (DRC) in Bastrop County.
Our goal has been to move as quickly as possible in response to the
situation. Joint FEMA-State Individual Assistance Preliminary Damage
Assessments were conducted in Bastrop County while the fires were still
burning. Prior to a declaration, FEMA sent an Incident Management
Assistance Team to Texas to develop a plan to expedite response, and
immediate response and recovery capabilities were pre-positioned.
Transitional Sheltering Assistance was approved for Bastrop County 6
hours after the declaration and a Mobile Disaster Registration Intake
Center opened on September 11. In the first 2 weeks following the
declaration, $5.8 million in Individual Assistance has been provided to
those impacted by this disaster.
Community Relations teams were on the ground within 12 hours of the
declaration, with State approval, to Assess, Inform, and Report (AIR).
The teams were in the affected communities talking to survivors and
providing information on how to contact FEMA and apply for Federal
disaster assistance. As of October 12 (34 days after the President
declared the event a major disaster), there have already been more than
3,600 visits by disaster survivors to the Mobile Disaster Registration
Intake Centers (MDRICs) and Disaster Recovery Centers (DRCs). As of
October 6, 2011, there were 3,699 registrations for Individual
Assistance, $7,001,522 approved for housing assistance, and $1,708,919
provided as Other Needs Assistance. Numerous housing inspections were
completed, and more than 2,240 individuals were eligible for
transitional sheltering. In partnership with the State, FEMA identified
the recovery efforts will also require 50-100 temporary housing units.
III. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT THE DECLARATION PROCESS AND DISASTER
PROGRAMS
The Disaster Declaration Process and Federal Disaster Assistance
Although communities can make every effort to prepare for an
emergency, disasters can strike at any time. Local and State
governments are the first to respond, but when they become overwhelmed
by the need, the Federal Government is ready to provide support where
needed.
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act
(Stafford Act) establishes a process for requesting Presidential
emergency and major disaster declarations, as well as declarations
specifically designed to assist States affected by major wildfires,
known as Fire Management Assistance Grants. It also defines the type
and scope of assistance available from the Federal Government and sets
specific conditions for obtaining that assistance. FEMA coordinates
Federal response activities per the Stafford Act and the Homeland
Security Act of 2002, and may provide direct or grant assistance as
authorized by the Stafford Act and FEMA's implementing regulations.
There are two main types of declarations provided for in the
Stafford Act: Emergency declarations and major disaster declarations.
Both declaration types authorize the President to provide supplemental
Federal disaster assistance when State and local capabilities are
overwhelmed.
An emergency declaration may be issued for any occasion or instance
for which the President determines Federal assistance is needed to
supplement State and local efforts and capabilities to save lives and
to protect property and public health and safety, or to lessen or avert
the threat of a catastrophe in any part of the United States. A major
disaster declaration may be issued in response to any natural
catastrophe including any hurricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-
driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earthquake, volcanic eruption,
landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought or, regardless of cause, any
fire, flood, or explosion in the United States which, as determined by
the President, causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to
warrant supplemental major disaster assistance.
Although the types of events which are eligible for an emergency
declaration are broader, the amount of assistance that may be provided
under an emergency declaration is more limited in scope than that
available under a major disaster declaration. Generally, Federal
assistance and funding are provided under an emergency declaration to
meet specific emergency needs or to help prevent a major disaster from
occurring. Emergency declarations supplement State and local efforts in
providing emergency services, such as debris removal; assisting with
the distribution of medicine, food, and other consumable supplies, and
emergency assistance; directing other Federal agencies to use their
authorities and resources, and providing technical and advisory
assistance to save lives, protect property and public health and
safety, and lessen or avert the threat of a catastrophe. The total
amount of assistance provided under a single emergency declaration is
limited to $5 million, but that amount may be exceeded in certain
circumstances established in section 503 of the Stafford Act.
A major disaster declaration can result from a natural disaster or
other threat, in which the President determines that supplemental
Federal aid is warranted. In addition to the types of work eligible
under an emergency declaration, permanent work to repair, restore, and
replace damaged public and certain private non-profit facilities is
eligible under a major disaster declaration.
To receive either an emergency or major disaster declaration, the
event must clearly exceed the capability of State or local governments
to respond to and/or recover from the disaster. If declared, funding
comes from FEMA's Disaster Relief Fund and disaster aid programs of
other participating Federal agencies.
To receive a disaster declaration, the Governor of the affected
State must submit a letter of request to the President. The Governor's
request must explain that the State took all appropriate actions under
State law and executed the State's existing emergency plan. In reacting
to the emergency, the State must explain that although it utilized
every existing resource, the severity and magnitude of the event
overwhelmed the State and affected local government's ability to
respond, such that Federal assistance is necessary. A disaster
assistance request explains that the severity of the disaster is such
that the resources of the Federal Government can provide the level of
aid needed.
The Stafford Act requires that the Governor's request for
assistance include detailed information about the damage and impacts to
the State from the event. To collect that data, the State requests
Joint Preliminary Damage Assessments (PDAs--damage assessment surveys
conducted by FEMA and State officials to examine the level of damage
after an event). The PDA teams consist of personnel from FEMA, State
emergency management, county and local officials, and sometimes staff
from the U.S. Small Business Administration. They jointly survey damage
locations at the direction of the State. The teams review damage and
estimate the costs of assistance to the affected areas, including the
impacts to individuals, infrastructure, and critical facilities, such
as public utilities. The teams note the levels of damage, the number of
people displaced, and the remaining threat to health and safety caused
by the event.
If a major disaster is declared by the President, there are three
possible programs that may be activated for any disaster. The
determination of which programs are activated is based on the needs
found during damage assessment and any subsequent information that may
be discovered. The three main programs are: Individual Assistance,
which provides assistance to individuals and households; Public
Assistance, which provides assistance to State and local governments,
Tribal governments, and certain private non-profit organizations for
emergency work and facility restoration; and Hazard Mitigation
Assistance, which provides Federal funding for measures designed to
reduce future losses to public and private property.
The Disaster Response Process Including Support for Wildfires
Emergency and major disaster declarations are designed to support
communities overwhelmed by a variety of events. For major wildfires,
the Stafford Act has established a specific type of declaration that
may be issued by FEMA for a separate grant program only available for
fires, known as Fire Management Assistance Grants, or FMAGs. These
grants provide Federal financial assistance to States, local, and
Tribal governments for the mitigation, management, and control of any
fire on public or private forest land or grassland that threatens such
destruction as to constitute a major disaster.
A request for an FMAG declaration begins while a fire is still
uncontrolled, and addresses specific criteria that are used to evaluate
whether Federal assistance is warranted. These criteria include: The
immediate threat to lives and property, including critical
infrastructure or watershed areas; the availability of firefighting
resources; high fire danger conditions per the National Fire Danger
Ratings System; and the risk of potential major economic impact.
The Governor submits the request to the FEMA Regional
Administrator, who assesses the need with expert advisors, then
approves or denies the declaration request. The decision to approve or
deny the request takes into account the conditions that existed at the
time of the State's request, such as the extreme drought in Texas, and
whether the fire is likely to cause, or may have already caused, a
level of destruction constituting a major disaster. FMAGs are intended
to supplement State and local efforts and costs to mitigate, manage,
and control active wildfires.
The threshold for a FMAG disaster declaration is considerably lower
than for a major disaster declaration. Because of this, reimbursement
funds for an FMAG declaration are limited to the response phase of the
disaster, and are not intended to finance long-term recovery projects.
The FMAG is designed to provide most of what a State or municipality
may need to replace the items used or damaged during the response phase
of a severe wildfire.
This year, the State of Texas has received 55 FMAG designations.
The eligible costs for reimbursement under an FMAG include:
Costs for equipment and supplies (less insurance proceeds);
Costs for emergency work (evacuations and sheltering, police
barricading and traffic control, arson investigation);
Costs for a State emergency operations center (when used as
a Unified Command Center);
Costs for the pre-positioning of Federal, out-of-State, and
international resources for up to 21 days;
Cost of safety items for firefighter health and safety;
Costs for field camps and meals in lieu of per diem;
Costs for mobilization and demobilization costs;
Costs for the temporary repair of damage cause by
firefighting activities;
Costs for the mitigation, management, and control of
declared fires burning on co-mingled Federal land, when such
costs are not reimbursable by another Federal agency.
FMAGs do not authorize the traditional programs which are available
under a Presidential major disaster declaration. The Individual
Assistance and Public Assistance Programs, and Hazard Mitigation Grants
are not authorized as part of an FMAG declaration. FMAGs are designed
specifically to support only the community's response needs during a
severe wildfire.
The Disaster Recovery Process
After the initial response to a Presidentially-declared event, the
community, State, and Federal partners transfer into the recovery
phase. Collaboration with our many partners is critical to FEMA's
ability to assist communities and individuals in the recovery process.
Texas is well-versed in the collaborative recovery process following
the large-scale efforts required after Hurricanes Katrina, Rita,
Gustav, and Ike in recent years. Successful recovery also depends on
all stakeholders having a clear understanding of pre- and post-disaster
roles and responsibilities. FEMA is just one part of the team, and the
success and speed of recovery depends heavily on the whole community's
involvement.
For FEMA, the recovery phase of a Presidentially-declared event may
involve the implementation of our Individual Assistance, Public
Assistance, and Hazard Mitigation Grant programs. These programs
provide support to individuals, families, and State, Tribal, and local
governments to help them rebuild and reduce the recurrence of loss from
future events.
Individual Assistance provides assistance to individuals and
families after a disaster, including emergency assistance, the
Individuals and Households Program (IHP), Crisis Counseling Program,
and the Disaster Case Management Program. FEMA's Individual Assistance
programs are not intended to restore the disaster survivor to his or
her pre-disaster standard of living. Instead, they are intended to
supplement remaining eligible costs after the application of private
insurance that is designed to make the survivor ``whole'' following a
disaster. In particular, FEMA's housing programs provide a bridge
between short-term shelter and long-term sustainable permanent housing.
Disaster housing programs reflect the varying needs of disaster-
affected communities and individuals.
Rental assistance is the most common form of housing assistance
provided by FEMA and is used wherever possible in order to enable
individuals and families to rent a housing unit while they locate and
secure long-term permanent and sustainable housing. FEMA's Rental
Resources Hotline and Housing Portal website provides a searchable
database of available rental resources and provided tens of thousands
of Houston-area options for Galveston families to seek shelter
following Hurricane Ike. Another form of temporary housing provided
under IHP is the Temporary Housing Unit (THU), which may be provided to
survivors directly by FEMA when their residences have been rendered
uninhabitable or destroyed by the declared event and there is
insufficient rental housing available in the community.
In addition to housing assistance, FEMA partners with the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to provide short-term
counseling services and disaster case management following a disaster
declaration. The Crisis Counseling Program is an interagency Federal
partnership between FEMA and the Center for Mental Health within HHS's
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration. These
services are funded through grants given to the States by FEMA and
provide counseling services for up to 9 months after the date of grant
award. Outreach services under this program include public information,
community networking, and education services.
Another Individual Assistance program, the Direct Federal Disaster
Case Management Program, is maintained through a Memorandum of
Agreement signed in 2010 by FEMA and the HHS Administration for
Children and Families. If a State requests and is approved for the
Direct Federal Disaster Case Management Program, FEMA notifies the
Administration for Children and Families to initiate the rapid
deployment of disaster case management assistance to individuals and
families in the affected disaster area. The second prong of the State
Disaster Case Management Program is a State-administered program funded
through a direct grant from FEMA. The State Disaster Case Management
Program ensures that the State is an essential partner in the delivery
of on-going disaster case management services and that the use of local
service providers in the recovery for disaster survivors and their
surrounding communities is maximized.
FEMA's Public Assistance (PA) program provides Federal disaster
grants to eligible State, Tribal, and local governments, as well as
certain private nonprofit entities for certain eligible costs incurred
to respond to the declared event as well as the repair, replacement, or
restoration of publicly-owned facilities and infrastructure damage
during a disaster. One form of assistance that the Public Assistance
program provides is debris removal operations. In order to aid
communities in faster recovery, recently the Public Assistance program
piloted Operation Clean Sweep, also known as the Expedited Debris
Removal Program, which uses geospatial imagery to make rapid
assessments and identify the areas with the most catastrophic damage.
This allowed FEMA to focus on the hardest-hit areas and combine direct
Federal assistance and local government contracting to quickly remove
debris. This pilot has been used with great success by local
governments in Mississippi, Alabama, and Missouri in response to the
spring storms to quickly remove debris. FEMA also funds temporary
facilities like fire stations and schools as part of the PA program,
which enables communities to quickly restore critical public
infrastructure functions.
IV. CONCLUSION
This administration is committed to doing all we can to assist
Texans as they begin to recover from these devastating fires. This
year, FEMA has approved a record 55 Fire Assistance Management Grants
for Texas and the President has issued two major disaster declarations.
Assistance is flowing to disaster survivors. FEMA is here to support
the State of Texas and the Texas Division of Emergency Management
(TDEM) in the wildfire response and recovery efforts. We will continue
to stand with the people of Texas for as long as it takes to recover
from these fires.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
am happy to answer any questions the subcommittee may have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Russell.
Just for the record, you know, I was at the Bastrop fire on
Monday, and I believe we called and talked--I called you, and
we talked to each other. By the next day, FEMA was on the
ground. So I thank you for that.
Mr. Russell. Thank you, sir.
Mr. McCaul. Next we recognize Mr. Harbour for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF TOM HARBOUR, DIRECTOR, FIRE AND AVIATION
MANAGEMENT, USDA FOREST SERVICE
Mr. Harbour. Thank you, Chairman McCaul and Congressman
Cuellar. It really is an honor for me to be here and to testify
and to answer questions.
My name is Tom Harbour. I've had over 40 years of
experience in the Wildland Fire Program. I started as a
firefighter, boots-on-the-ground, and have been able to work my
way up through a variety of positions, including Incident
Commander at the highest complexity level and Area Commander at
the highest complexity level.
It was in that capacity that in 1998 I first came to Texas
to assist the folks in the great State of Texas with their
fires, and I first became acquainted with the folks in the
Texas Forest Service and with the predecessors of Mr. Kidd's
folks.
I do have to tell you, as I start off, that over these last
many years as I've worked with the Texas Forest Service folks,
you've got some of the best in the business here. Mr. Boggus,
your State forester, is rightfully proud of the accomplishments
of the State of Texas folks.
It really is, as the previous panel members have said,
those local firefighters and those local boots-on-the-ground
who are our heros during these events. The U.S. Forest Service
contributes to those boots-on-the-ground, but we have very
limited direct protection responsibilities here in Texas.
Except for six small areas totaling about 675,000 acres, we are
here at the request of and under the command of the good folks
in the State of Texas.
We are a partner, a cooperator. Based on how conditions are
elsewhere in the country and the assets that we have guarding
National Forest System lands in those 44 States, we are able,
at times, to offer significant reinforcements to our partners.
Over the last several months, we've been proud to do that,
honored to do that.
Over the last 6 months, especially, we've filled orders for
over 90 firefighting crews. These are crews of 20 men and women
who are utilizing axes and chainsaws to build a fireline. We've
filled orders for over 100 helicopters that have come into the
State. We've filled orders for 87 different air tankers who
have accomplished hundreds of sorties. We've sent nearly 100
other types of aircraft to assist in the fight, filled orders
for nearly 400 firefighting engines, over 70 bulldozers, 140
watertenders, and a dozen Incident Management Teams, the folks
who were actually there on the ground managing and directing
the efforts.
Generally, the U.S. Forest Service has had about 1,000
people in the great State of Texas during this fire siege. As I
said, we are pleased to be here. When we are in Texas, we are
under the command in the locations at the strength specified by
these good folks in Texas, who, as I've indicated, are amongst
the best in the business.
If you've been out there--and I'm sure both of you have--to
the fireline, you see how we dress in the--in the same type of
dress when we're out there doing the work, and you can't tell
the organizational affiliation. That's the way we work. That's
what we do. We're proud to stand with the folks who have been
here and will remain here. With that I'm glad to answer any
questions.
[The statement of Mr. Harbour follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tom Harbour
October 17, 2011
Chairman McCaul and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Forest Service's
role in the Federal response to wildfires in Texas. The State has been
experiencing unprecedented fire behavior this fire season due to
prolonged drought combined with dry, windy conditions. Between January
1 and October 4, 2011, over 3,500 fires have burned nearly 3 million
acres in Texas. Drought is forecast to persist or worsen across the
south and southwest parts of the Nation for the near future.
The U.S. Department of Agriculture Forest Service's mission is to
sustain the health, diversity, and productivity of the Nation's forests
and grasslands to meet the needs of present and future generations. The
Forest Service manages 155 National Forests and 20 National Grasslands
in 44 States and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. Because of these
management responsibilities, the wildland fire organization within the
Forest Service is the largest in the United States. We have been
managing wildland fire for more than 100 years. We respond to thousands
of wildfires and conduct thousands of controlled burns per year.
Because wildland fire knows no boundaries, teamwork is essential in
managing a coordinated response. Local, State, Tribal, and Federal
firefighters all work together in partnership. We all take seriously
our role in protecting people, property, and valuable natural resources
from wildland fire. Pooling our strengths and resources helps us to
maintain our operational excellence and to continually improve the
safety and effectiveness of fire management.
The Forest Service is proud to be a part of this unique
partnership. Congress and the President have given the Forest Service
authorities that have allowed us to develop a seamless wildland fire
response network across the United States. We developed the incident
management system, which has evolved and been adopted across the United
States for the management of all emergencies, including fire. We
respond to requests from partners to come and assist by providing
resources to State or local governments through cooperative agreements.
In preparing for the 2011 fire season, the Forest Service (along
with the Department of the Interior) worked along with the States and
Tribes to ensure we had adequate National firefighting resources
prepared and positioned. The National Interagency Coordination Center
(NICC), located at the National Interagency Fire Center in Boise,
Idaho, oversees coordinated wildland firefighting responses throughout
the Nation. When fire resources in one geographic area are in short
supply, the NICC prioritizes, allocates, and, if necessary, re-
allocates resources. Prioritization ensures firefighting forces are
positioned where they are needed most. Fire resources such as
personnel, equipment, aircraft, vehicles, and supplies are dispatched
and tracked through an integrated National system also developed by the
Forest Service.
While the Forest Service does have direct protection responsibility
for 675,000 acres of National Forest System land and grasslands in
Texas, we are a relatively small player in the State. Of the total
acreage burned during this fire season, 174 fires have burned 3,651
acres of the National Forest System land in Texas; 165 fires have
burned 13,823 acres of land managed by the Department of the Interior
in Texas; however, 3,194 fires have burned 2,876,126 acres of State and
private land. We are here because our friends in the Texas Forest
Service (TFS) asked us to help. We are pleased to be able to do so.
We have a long and successful partnership with our friends in the
TFS. We actively assisted TFS with wildfire and support for events in
the past, most recently Hurricane Ike in 2008 and the wildfires in West
Texas in 2008 and 2009. We have also taken many actions over the last
few months of this year to assist TFS with fire suppression efforts on
State and private lands. To date we have provided approximately 9,908
fire resources. Specifically, we sent 92 firefighting crews, as well as
support staff and skilled members of interagency incident management
teams; a variety of aircraft--104 helicopters, 87 airtankers, 98 other
aircraft; 387 firefighting engines; 71 dozers; and 140 water tenders.
Additionally, TFS has established cooperative forest management
programs, which receive funding from Forest Service, primarily through
authorities in the Cooperative Forestry Assistance Act of 1978 (Act).
This Act provides several cooperative grant programs to the State, such
as:
State Fire Assistance
Volunteer Fire Assistance
Federal Excess Personal Property Program
Firefighter Property
Forest Stewardship
Forest Health
Urban and Community Forestry.
Forest Service uses its State Fire Assistance authority to provide
funds to support TFS's fire management capacity. The Forest Service has
also provided dozens of wildfire intelligence specialists to TFS. These
resources provide fire weather forecasts, predict fire behavior,
analyze wildland fuel conditions, study National Fire Danger Rating
indices and components, and model wildfire growth and potential.
The Texas Forest Service is one of the most highly skilled and
experienced wildland firefighting agencies in the United States. The
Forest Service will continue to be a strong partner and assist with
fire suppression efforts on State and private lands as the State faces
challenging wildfire conditions in the months ahead.
This concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any
questions you have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Harbour.
Let me echo your sentiments about the local volunteer
firefighters. They really were the heroes of this story.
You know, having been out there, particularly in the
Bastrop fire, right next to them--and I'll never forget,
looking at, you know, house by house burnt to the ground. The
only thing left were the chimneys or any sort of columned
structure that--any sort of stone left in the house. I'll never
forget the image of seeing one of these homes where still a
flagpole was out front with the American flag and the Texas
flag still waving. Unbelievable. I don't know how they--how it
survived the fire, but it certainly--it demonstrated a lot to
me, that we are going to prevail.
I'd like to start off by saying, you know, I went all over
the State to study this. We were in Amarillo. We were in
Abilene. I was at Possum Kingdom, you know, where a lot of
these fires first started at the beginning of this year. Then I
was in East Texas, which had a bout of wildfires, and then
finally ended up--ended up back in Bastrop.
The stories--you know, we talked to a lot of the County
Judges, the Emergency Managers, and the stories were very, very
similar, and very much the same. By and large, I think the
locals are very pleased with the State's efforts, Mr. Kidd, the
way you responded, and you have great respect.
The complaints I heard were several, and that's what I
wanted to sort of address today. First, pre-positioning of
assets. You know, it wasn't until Bastrop hits, you know, after
a year of having fires, very foreseeable, that finally the
State gets four C-130s and a DC-10 tanker into Austin. That's--
I believe the fire starts Sunday night. Monday, we're out
there. Wednesday, they arrive from California. They cannot
deploy until Friday.
By that time, Bastrop's gone. The Bastrop fire has done its
damage, and it's near containment. To me, I think that's
something that could have been avoided had we had more of these
assets pre-positioned, the ones from California.
Now, the good news is, as you see in that poster there,
that--that was on Friday. The DC-10 tanker went to Waller
County, Montgomery, and put it out. My constituents said it was
like the cavalry coming in. The good news is for any future
fires, I do believe we have these assets that can be rapidly
deployed. But I guess my first question to you, Mr. Harbour, is
why--why--why did it take a year to get those kind of assets in
the State of Texas?
Mr. Harbour. Actually, sir, on the 2nd of September,
knowing your interest, I went back, and we looked. We did have
three large air tankers, three water-scooping fixed-wing air
tankers, 11 air attack fixed-wing aircraft, 12 helicopters, and
15 single-engine air tankers. So we had a significant number of
assets here at the request of the Texas Forest Service.
Obviously, any loss in our business is too much loss, but
we did have assets here. We were fighting fire all across the
west at the time. We had assets in other places with active
fire also, but we did have several assets here in the State.
Mr. McCaul. Well, I think we--I just think we could have
had more. You know, the DC-10 tanker alone, if that had been
under contract, could have been deployed. Then when it gets
here, that Wednesday, there's a 2-day downtime because of
crest--the crew has to rest. So you have 2 days--you know, 2
more days of fires going on, and every hour counts in these
fires. You have the crew rest, you know, for, you know, about 2
days.
So that--to me, that's--I think a lot of people were very
angry and upset about that when they got that news. They didn't
quite understand why it took so long to get the plane, and then
when you finally got it, you couldn't even deploy it for
another 2 days. Do you have any response to that?
Mr. Harbour. Yes, sir. As you and Mr. Cuellar said, we are
interested in lessons learned. We're certainly going to be
taking a look at what we did. We speak--State Forester Boggus
and I speak frequently about ways we can improve and be better.
We certainly will look to the future and see what we might do.
In the particular case of the DC-10, that aircraft was
engaged in community protection in California previously to its
being deployed here to Texas. Because of crew rest cycles,
because of the intensity and danger of those kinds of low-level
drops, we do insist on crew rest. But we are going to be taking
a look at it, sir. You bet.
Mr. McCaul. Well, I think that's--that's a clear lesson
learned we ought to be taking from this, that, you know--and I
know you and I talked maybe on Tuesday. I mean, I was reporting
this, what I was seeing, and all you had to do was turn the TV
on to see it. You know, it takes until Friday to get the
requisite aviation assets.
In addition, there were some P-3s--or eight P-3s that were
sitting on a runway in California. I think we all saw that
picture. I don't have it with us here today, but--and the
answer with respect to those was that they were not airworthy.
Under the regulations, they were not airworthy; and so,
therefore, even though the Governor requested these assets, he
relied on--I believe it was your representation that they were
not safe to fly.
Yet, when we looked through some of the documents, I found
an aircraft approval certificate for these airplanes, that they
were airworthy, that these could have been deployed from
California. So what is the truth here?
Mr. Harbour. You'll notice, sir, on the last page of that
card, the first item, that there is a specific notation that
there was a portion of the contract that we were attempting to
work through with that particular contractor. They ultimately
didn't supply the kind of documentation that we needed after
working with them for years. We could not be assured of their
safety.
Fundamentally, they didn't comply with the contract. So
without that assurance of their safety, and with them not
complying with the contract, those--that contract was
terminated with that contractor.
Mr. McCaul. That's unfortunate. So--I mean, it says
``aircraft approval.'' So they are approved as airworthy.
You're just saying the contract was terminated?
Mr. Harbour. Yes, sir. There is another side of that card
there. I don't know if you actually have it, but there were
four corrective items listed on that particular card that you
have there. I can show it to you later or to your staff. But it
did reference that we were in an on-going discussion with that
particular contractor as we hoped they would comply with the
terms of the contract.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. Let me--let me shift now to the--getting
a Federal disaster recommendation. Now, this is something the
Governor's office, you know, I think on nine separate occasions
had requested a Federal disaster declaration. I believe only on
one occasion was it granted for, I think, 30 days, and then it
expired.
Then, of course, you know, Bastrop hits, and that became,
you know, the eye opener, even though--I believe, Mr. Kidd, you
said we've had, how many, 21,000 fires, you said?
Mr. Kidd. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCaul. Twenty-one thousand fires, and it takes this
type of explosion to finally get the attention of the President
that, you know, perhaps we need to declare this a disaster when
the warning signs have been there all along.
Why is this so cumbersome? Why can't the President just
call--why can't the Governor call the President of the United
States on the phone and say, ``Have you seen what's going on on
the television? I've got a problem. I've got a real disaster
going on. Will you please declare this a Federal disaster?''
Mr. Russell. Yes, sir. You know, as we take a look at the
Stafford Act, and the Stafford Act tells us that the--a
Governor makes that request, and from that request it goes from
the Governor to the Regional Administrator. In that case, it
would be me. Then I do an analysis of the area and of the
situation. From that, then it goes further toward the President
making the declaration. I think a key behind some of this is it
has to be, amongst other things, uninsured losses.
I can recall in Oklahoma they had a large tornado. It went
through. You know, a great deal of damage was there. As we
began to do the assessment, it was all insured losses, so there
was no need for a declaration. That only is an example of an
event that is large that sometimes does not lead to a
declaration.
In this case here, our goal was to support the Governor and
the Governor's team to make sure that we sent up to Washington
the prescribed items that were required for us to move forward
toward the decision for that declaration.
Mr. McCaul. Well, Mr. Kidd, was the administration
responsive to your request to declare this a Federal disaster?
Mr. Kidd. I'd like to go back and make sure that I
articulated correctly. I mentioned earlier that we had nine
gubernatorial disaster declarations. Not all nine of those were
sent to FEMA. In fact, for the last 20 years, Texas has had
over 240 local and State-wide disasters, but only 40 of those
have been sent to the Feds for assistance.
During this wildfire season, we asked for our first
disaster declaration for the entire season for 252 counties on
April 16. We were told on May 3 that it was denied because we
didn't have enough damage meeting--leading up to that point.
As--as Regional Administrator Russell says, Texas is a large
State. It takes $34 million of uninsured loss to meet what I
refer to as our family deductible.
Each county then has to have their individual deductible
met before that county is eligible. So counties right next to
each other, based on population, have different deductibles. So
if both don't meet--one does and one doesn't--only one gets it
and the other doesn't. We believed that we had met our $32.5
million, at the time, now $34 million threshold of uninsured
loss back in April when we asked.
Again, I want to point out--because I think it's very easy
to get concerned and confused between the difference in--in
assistance with personnel and equipment versus the Federal
reimbursement assistance, which is primarily what we're seeking
at this point.
So we did get the Federal resources--the people and the
equipment that we asked for--when they were available to assist
us with fighting the fires. The biggest struggle right now is
getting the $304 million in money returned to us that we spent
fighting fires.
I think that answered your question, but I'm not real sure.
Mr. McCaul. Well, and let me--let me touch on that issue.
The $304 million--and I believe the split is, what, 75/25
percent?
Mr. Kidd. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCaul. So the Feds should pay 75 percent of that, and
the State has to pay 25 percent?
Mr. Kidd. Yes, sir.
Mr. McCaul. You put that request in?
Mr. Kidd. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Mr. McCaul. This goes back to FEMA. When I traveled around
the State, they said, you know, whether it was the hurricane
season or--many times these requests take 2 to 3 years to get
reimbursed. A lot of the smaller counties, they can't afford--
their budgets can't afford that, that type of projection where
they have to wait 2 to 3 years to get reimbursed by FEMA.
Why does--why does this take so long?
Mr. Russell. Sir, I think that when it comes to our
reimbursement, that is a collaboration with FEMA and the State
and the applicant. The way that it works is that the--the cost
and the bills are basically brought from the individual, from
the applicant, up to the State and FEMA, and then we come
together, and then, from there, those bills are paid.
At times, it takes a lot of time for the--the applicant to
collect the bills and to collect the information that is
required to move forward. A key part is that FEMA--we deal with
the grantee, and the grantee, for us, is my State partner. So
that's our linkage there.
When it comes to the applicant or the sub-grantee, for
instance, you know, that money is sent from the State down--
from the grantee down to the sub-grantee. So there's time in
that whole process there, but I find a lot of times it's the
ability to get all the information in order to properly
validate what they are requesting.
Mr. McCaul. Well, and I understand, you know, doing it
accurately so you don't have, you know, fraud, waste, and
abuse.
Mr. Russell. Right.
Mr. McCaul. But, I mean, 3 years? I just think we can
streamline--it's way too bureaucratic. I think we can
streamline the process so that reimbursement can take place
more in real-time, because, again, these local counties can't
afford it. They're concerned about people leaving their
counties now because of the lack of reimbursement and
assistance.
So one last point. This one was sort of classic Federal
Government. Perhaps you can explain it to me. But I'm meeting
with the local County Judge who is also the Emergency Manager
in a small county, who is also a volunteer firefighter, and
he's got another job. You know, when these fires hit, they come
out of nowhere, and they--they're fast. They move--particularly
the grass fires. Of course, what we saw in East Texas and
Bastrop, these pine trees explode.
Their first priority is to put out the emergency, put out
the fire, as it should be. So when FEMA comes in and says,
``You know, you've got to fill this paperwork out here,'' and
you have to make your application for these grants prior to
containment, this is what I don't understand.
Because you're putting the firefighter in the position of
trying to decide, ``Okay. Am I going to try to put out the
immediate emergency, putting out the fire, or do I have to sit
down at night-time--by the way, I've got another job--and fill
out all this paperwork?''
Why in the world--why is that? Why can't you wait? Why
can't they put out the fire first, have it contained, and then
sit down and fill out the paperwork? It's a competing interest
that doesn't make sense.
Mr. Russell. Sir, I would say this. When it comes for the
FMAG, that Fire Management Grant, that's a 1-pager that I get.
I get this 1-pager. What it does, it basically defines for me
the parameters of the event.
Then I get a phone call, and the phone call can come any
time of the night. I get them at 1:00 a.m., 2:00 a.m., 3:00
a.m., and then myself and the staff, we take a look at what's
going on per the request from the State, and then from there we
say, ``Yes, this requires an FMAG to move forward with.''
So I think that that initial request is only 1--1 page, and
then from there there may be other things depending on the
complexity of the situation, but I am going to take a look at
ways we can do a more--better job to streamline. Because I,
like you--you know, I don't like to put a lot of complexities
on the local responders. I want to make sure that we're there
to help them and not to be a hindrance.
Mr. McCaul. Well, and I appreciate that. I think--this is
not--this is not me spinning this. I went and talked all across
the State, particularly the smaller counties. They don't have
staffs. I mean, the bigger cities, they have staff that can
fill a lot of this stuff out.
I was told that prior to containment, though--maybe you
have your 1-pager in the beginning, but then--but then prior to
it actually being contained, that the application had to be
submitted. So maybe it would make sense and some places it
would work better with FEMA, where FEMA would position
themselves with the county and help them with this paperwork. I
know maybe that's not--you don't consider that to be your job,
but it seems to me, particularly in counties that are smaller
that need that kind of help, you could have one of your guys
maybe sit down with them and say, ``Here is what we need to
fill out, and let me help you do this.''
Mr. Russell. Yes, sir. In fact, I think anything that can
make this more simpler for the counties is my--is my job, and I
will work with the State to ensure that we do that.
Mr. McCaul. I think that's a--that's a good note for me to
end on. I--you know, look, what happened happened, and I wish
it hadn't. There will be more of these across the State. I
think we should have had more assets pre-positioned to handle
the Bastrop and others.
The good news is we have them now. I think we've learned
some lessons, but I want to continue to work with this
distinguished panel to make sure, first and foremost, that
Texans are protected and that the assistance that Texas
deserves goes to the State.
With that, I will recognize my good friend and Ranking
Member, Congressman Cuellar, who apparently had a couple of
emergencies as he got up from his chair and walked away.
Mr. Cuellar. Actually, I wanted--I wanted to get the
correct numbers on the cuts that were done to FEMA and the
firefighters. I just wanted to get the correct things.
Look, two things. I think we need to talk about money, and
then we need to talk about whether there was a problem on the
response and recovery.
Again, all this is controlled by the Stafford. As I said, I
used to chair the budget when we started with what I call the
old FEMA and the new FEMA. I think the new FEMA is certainly a
lot better than what we saw in Katrina and a lot of places, and
I think the State and the local folks can say that. We still
need to do a lot in streamlining. I agree with my--my friend,
Michael, that we need to streamline paperwork, and I'm for
that.
But let me--let me--let me get this correctly. Mr. Kidd,
you and I have been around for a while, and I believe, as you
mentioned, there's a difference between response and recovery.
So let's talk about the response.
First--well, let's start with--well, let's start with the
response. Then we'll talk about the recovery. I believe both
you and Mr. Starbuck both said that FEMA was there from the
very beginning, and they provided the resources that you needed
in the response. Not the recovery part of it. I want to make
sure that we're brutally honest with each other, and if there's
a problem with FEMA, certainly, as the former Chairman, I want
to hear about it. But, you know, I want to know what we need to
do.
Your--you said a few minutes ago that FEMA was there from
the very beginning, and the problem was not with the response.
It was with the recovery part. So just--just for now talk about
the response part of it.
Mr. Kidd. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Starbuck, I believe you said the same
thing--basically the same thing.
Mr. Kidd. Yes, sir. Thank you for that. It's important that
we all remember, especially me, that when FEMA responds, it's
generally for Incident Management Assistance Teams, which are
highly trained people that help us put together the response
around the organization. FEMA doesn't come in as incident
commanders.
A lot of people get confused whenever a Federal Type 1
Incident Management Team comes in, which is generally Chief
Harbour's folks, which are Federal partners and State partners
that form an Incident Management Team that can become incident
commanders of a fire. So two different groups there, although a
lot of times we paint them with the same Federal brush.
Mr. Cuellar. Right.
Mr. Kidd. From--from Tony Russell's position, his teams--
his Incident Management Teams help us get our hands wrapped
around the organization to respond to the recovery side of the
House, and Tony brings with him a big stick of making sure that
the Federal agencies that come together are playing by the same
playbook.
I can say with certainty that that portion of our response
has happened. I mean, Tony has helped to bring everybody to the
table on the Federal side, much like I do as a State
coordinator. As a State coordinator, my job is to make sure
that the directors of the State agencies are playing well with
each other and responding to the incident in a unified fashion.
I'll say that that did happen.
Mr. Cuellar. It did happen. Mr. Starbuck--then I want to
ask you, Mr. Kidd, because I know you've got a vast experience,
and I'm going to ask you one other question. Because I think
we're on the same page about the Stafford Act needs to be
changed.
Mr. Starbuck, you said the same thing, did you not? Again,
we've got to be brutally honest with each other about--about
the FEMA role in this on the response part of it. Just the
response.
Mr. Starbuck. Correct. First of all, Congressman McCaul, I
just want to correct that I'm not the County Judge. I'm sure
Judge Houdashell and Judge Ware in Potter and Randall Counties
would appreciate that I'm their Emergency Management
Coordinator and not the County Judge.
Mr. Cuellar. Tell them you got a new promotion when you
came to Washington.
Mr. McCaul. You just got promoted.
Mr. Starbuck. I will say this. That, once again, from a
local perspective, our role is to deploy all local assets and
then, as we recognize that our assets are--that the response to
the incident is beyond our capabilities, we request assistance
from the State. There is not a mechanism for me to call FEMA
directly unless I am circumventing the system.
So those requests go to our local Disaster District
Committee that starts the ball rolling for State and Federal
assistance. In the February 27 wildfires, the State assets that
were in the area of Amarillo, Texas, were rapidly deployed to
us to assist us.
Again, in the wildfires that occurred in May--May 24 and
May 29--State and, in the case of the May 24 wildfire, U.S.
Forest Service assets that were in the region were deployed to
our wildfires and assisted our local responders with bringing
those fires under--under containment.
So from that perspective, I agree wholeheartedly with Chief
Kidd that the assistance that we were requesting was being
provided from a response perspective as far as assets that were
deployed to the wildfires.
Mr. Cuellar. Now, the recovery part for both of y'all, that
is something where we've got to get the--what is it, $300-plus
million back from--from FEMA. Is that correct?
Mr. Starbuck. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. That--that's the second part. Maybe that's
what we need to talk about, streamlining the process itself.
But that's the recovery. I was talking about the response.
Both of y'all, do you disagree with my interpretation of
the Stafford Act, which governs disaster response, that it
recognizes that State and local--not the Federal Government--
have the primary responsibility to address disaster
emergencies?
Mr. Kidd. Yes, sir, I agree with you.
Mr. Cuellar. Do you agree with me that the Stafford Act
needs to be updated?
Mr. Kidd. Yes, sir, I agree with you.
Mr. Cuellar. If you--and this is to all panel members. If
you have any ideas that you can give the Chairman and I, I'd be
happy to work with you, because it gets a little--it's not only
Homeland, but then you've got the Transportation Infrastructure
Committee that comes in, and it becomes a jurisdiction
question. But we would like to see if--at least what's within
our area that we can, I'd like to update the Stafford Act
because I think it needs to be updated.
Now, the reason I got up there a few minutes ago was to
double-check some numbers. This summer, there was a vote on
Homeland. As you know, both Mike and I serve in the Homeland.
But the Homeland Appropriations Bill was put on the House
floor. I voted no. I usually vote yes for the Homeland
Appropriations Bill.
I voted no because it cut FEMA, State, and local programs
by a staggering amount of 55 percent below the enacted level
and 70 percent below the fiscal year 2010.
Similarly, the bill cuts 57 percent from the Firefighter
Assistance Grants compared to 2010 and 2011. There were some
cuts to FEMA management also. I believe it was--I think the CR
cut first responders by $783 million, $24.3 million from FEMA
management, which will affect you.
There was an amendment on the floor which I voted in favor
that increased funding by $320 million to the Firefighter
Assistance Grants, and we had to upset that. So it was cut. The
reason I voted no--and I usually vote for the Homeland
Appropriations--is that we can't be here complaining about the
Federal Government while we cut FEMA funding.
Again, the general statement I said at the beginning--you
know, a couple of years ago, people were complaining about the
Federal Government. Now we're saying, ``Hey, where is the
Federal Government in this role?''
The Federal Government has a role, and we have to be very
careful what our core mission is up there. We can't do
everything, but I certainly feel that response--or should I say
emergencies is a core part of it, border security, which Mike
and I support all the way. But emergency is one part that we
can't cut and then complain that there's not enough money to
address this, or we can't complain about the Federal Government
and say that there's no role of it. But when it affects us
directly, ``Where is the Federal Government on this thing?''
Mr. Russell, can you tell us about some of the cuts and how
that affects you in your response and recovery part of it?
Mr. Russell. Well, sir, I can say this, you know. When it
comes to our response and recovery on the ground, we have that
Disaster Relief Fund. From that fund is how we are able to
respond and recover.
On the response side, Mr. Fugate has already said there
would be no issues with----
Mr. Cuellar. By the way, let me interrupt.
Mr. Russell. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Fugate from Florida--and I got to deal
with him when I was the Chairman----
Mr. Russell. Yes.
Mr. Cuellar [continuing]. Is a State-trained person.
Mr. Russell. Yes.
Mr. Cuellar. When he's State-trained, I think that's--
again, nothing against Washington bureaucrats, but when you get
somebody from the State who has been involved, like you, Mr.
Kidd, at the State level and you put him in charge of FEMA, he
has brought in new ideas and I think has broken this
bureaucracy that we've been talking about, and he brings a
State perspective and a local perspective that I think has been
good for FEMA. So I've just got to say that about Mr. Fugate.
Mr. Russell. Yes, sir. You're absolutely right. You know,
we leaned forward in any response, and we are sure to make--to
deal with the survivors and make sure that we are proactive.
The impact was with the recovery. We had that immediate
needs funding to where we could only fund Category A and B,
which is things for the emergency, and so all of those brick-
and-mortar type projects were put on hold. To me, that was the
biggest impact. But now we're back on track now, but I can say
that that was the impact was on the recovery, on being able to
move forward to build things.
Mr. Cuellar. All right. Again, the Super Committee is going
to be hopefully coming up with some recollections. As you know,
we cut $1 billion already, and we're supposed to come up with
another $1.5 billion. If the Super Committee doesn't come up
with any suggestion, which I hope they do, then there's going
to be a sequester, which means that everybody is going to be
cutting.
In fact, money coming to the States, money to the USDA,
money to FEMA, military, everybody is going to be cut, and it's
certainly--at the local level, it's going to be impacted. So
again, we're all for cutting the deficit, but we have to set
certain priorities, and I think emergencies, border security,
our military should be some of the priorities that we have.
So I want to thank you, and I don't know if Mike is going
to have another round of questions, but I'll be happy to----
Mr. McCaul. Not unless you do.
Mr. Cuellar. No.
Mr. McCaul. Yeah. Just let me--and we did pass, you know, a
short-term continuing resolution, which does fund FEMA. It's a
clean funding bill, which I supported, particularly given
what's happened in the State of Texas.
So with that, let me just--just thank all the witnesses for
being here today. This will probably be not the last time we'll
be speaking, but I--you know, with--Tony, with you and Mr.
Harbour and Nim, General--I mean, we've--we've worked pretty
hard over the last couple of months on this. I will continue to
work closely with you and with Mr. Cuellar if there are ways we
can improve the response--improve the response and recovery
efforts.
I do think that we should have had more in terms of
aviation assets pre-positioned. Having said that, we are
fortunate that they're here now. When it comes to reimbursing
the State of Texas, I think that it should be done more
efficiently and not take 3 years to do that.
So with that, we again thank the witnesses for being here,
and this committee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:22 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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