[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11:
WHERE ARE WE TODAY?
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 8, 2011
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Serial No. 112-42
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Janice Hahn, California
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 3
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Witnesses
Hon. Lee Hamilton, Former Vice Chairman, The National Commission
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (The 9/11
Commission):
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Hon. Tom Ridge, Former Secretary of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Hon. Eugene L. Dodaro, Comptroller General of the United States:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
THE ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11:
WHERE ARE WE TODAY?
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Thursday, September 8, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King [Chairman
of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Smith, Rogers, McCaul,
Miller, Walberg, Cravaack, Meehan, Quayle, Duncan, Marino,
Thompson, Sanchez, Jackson Lee, Cuellar, Clarke of New York,
Richardson, Davis, Higgins, Speier, Richmond, Clarke of
Michigan, Keating, and Hahn.
Chairman King. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order. The Committee is meeting today to
hear testimony assessing the status of Homeland Security on the
occasion of the 10th anniversary of the September 11, 2001,
terrorist attacks. The Chairman wishes to remind our guests
today that demonstrations from the audience including the use
of signs, placards, and T-shirts, as well as verbal outbursts
are violations of the rules of the House. The Chair wishes to
thank our guests for their cooperation in maintaining order and
proper decorum.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement. I want to
welcome everyone to the hearing today. Let me especially thank
our witnesses for being here today. Chairman Lee Hamilton, who
had a truly outstanding career as a Member of the United States
Congress as chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee and
Intelligence Committee, a person who really personified the
very best of Congress. Then, of course, served as co-chairman
of the 9/11 Commission and somehow we are always get him to
come back. He has amazing stamina and dedication. Lee, it is
great to see you here again today.
I understand he is running late with travel today, but also
Secretary Tom Ridge will be testifying today. Tom Ridge was the
first Secretary of Homeland Security. Prior to that, he served
as Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and also
served 6 terms in the House of Representatives.
Our third witness this morning is Honorable Eugene Dodaro,
who is the comptroller general of the United States GAO.
All of us have personal stories of September 11; no one has
a monopoly on grief. My own case, I lost 150 constituents and
friends on that date. You can go to other districts where there
are as many if not more. I know many of us have spent much of
the last 10 years working with family members of the 9/11
victims, but it is important that we not be bogged down just in
grief, and that we look forward and that was really, I think,
what our country did starting September 12, 2001. We will never
forget what happened on September 11. We do all we can for the
families of those murdered that day, but we also do all that we
possibly can to make sure that these attacks are never
replicated.
There have been any number of measures taken after that
date; some worked, some worked very well, some not as well as
we wanted them to, but there was and is work in progress. The
bottom line is that we have not been successfully attacked in
this country for 10 years, this goes over 2 administrations,
Bush administration and the Obama administration. This is one
issue which is probably as close to being bipartisan as
possible. Obviously, there are some philosophical differences
and policy differences that we have. But the fact is certainly
when I was Chairman before and Ranking Member and Chairman now,
I believe I always had an excellent working relationship with
Ranking Member Thompson as we try to find common ground and try
to minimize the differences between us.
There have been other actions taken besides the creation of
the Department of Homeland Security, there is the Director of
National Intelligence, and, of course, this committee itself
was set up in response to the attacks of September 11, which
probably goes to one of the areas where Congress has not done
what was supposed to be done and what was recommended by the 9/
11 Commission, and that was to consolidate jurisdiction within
this committee as much as possible. There is still over 80, 90,
100, whatever number we want to use, subcommittees, committees,
and commissions that Department of Homeland Security has to
report to. This is not a turf battle. This is a fact. We are
sending mixed messages to the Department; we are sending mixed
signals as far as what Congress wants in the area of Homeland
Security and this fragmentation to me is just inviting, if not
disaster, certainly it is preventing law enforcement and
intelligence agencies from doing the job to the maximum by
sending so many mixed signals.
Again, this is an area where Ranking Member Thompson and I
fully agree. It is an area where Secretary Ridge, Secretary
Chertoff, and Secretary Napolitano fully agree. Just as I said,
overall, our policies have been bipartisan both in the Congress
and the Executive level. Also I would say the failure to
consolidate jurisdiction has been a bipartisan failure. We in
this committee, overall, have to do what we can to bring that
consolidation about.
Other areas where I have concerns have been in the area of
grants which I believe have been spread over too many areas
rather than focus on the areas that need them the most. I give
Secretary Napolitano credit for condensing that somewhat and
taking a very meaningful step in the right direction.
I should add that in view of the excellent work that the 9/
11 Commission did, and we are not trying to draft Lee Hamilton
back into duty, but Congressman Frank Wolf and I have
introduced legislation to reconstitute the 9/11 Commission 10
years after.
Other areas where I believe we have to move forward, one
certainly is on spectrum and D-Block. There has to be
communication specifically allocated to police firefighters,
first responders. No one wants to go through again what
happened on September 11 where there was a lack of
communication, inability to communicate and yet 10 years later,
we have still not taken the action.
In another regard, I would like to acknowledge in the
audience, Chief Dodd of the NYPD; Chief Gillespie, a fire chief
in the City of North Las Vegas; Chief Johnson of the Western
Fire Chiefs Association, and Sheriff Fitzgerald from Storey
County in Iowa who have really been in the forefront of
fighting for D-Block which I believe is absolutely essential.
We have made much progress against al-Qaeda over the past
10 years. We cannot allow ourselves to remain complacent, but
there is no doubt that al-Qaeda central has been tremendously
weakened. Their leadership has been devastated, certainly
beginning with Osama bin Laden, which was a tremendous victory
for the United States and all those who oppose terrorism.
At the same time, al-Qaeda has adapted its methods, it has
morphed, it has metastasized so that we no longer face just an
al-Qaeda central--which I believe would be very difficult for
them to ever attack the United States the way they did on
September 11, but now we have al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, we have al-Qaeda in Iraq, we have al-Shabaab, we
have al-Qaeda attempting to recruit within our own country,
which changes the whole nature of the struggle, attempting to
recruit people under the radar screen. So as we have scored
successes in one area, the enemy has adapted to it. We have to
continue to adapt along with it.
As we approach this weekend of September 11, I think it is
important for all of us to think back on how horrible that day
was, and how we told ourselves that day that we would never
allow that to happen again. My concern is that the further we
get from September 11, the more the horror of that day fades
into the recesses of peoples' memories. Maybe it is human
nature to try to put that behind us, but the further we put it
behind us, the more we, I believe, invite another attack.
Whether in Congress as far as the cuts we are making to
Homeland Security, whether it is the media which somehow, in
many ways, acts as if the struggle is over, or just the
American People who, and it is very understandable, want to put
this in their rearview mirror.
The fact is the enemy is still there, and the enemy is
still as dedicated as it was before. It has weakened, but it is
adapting. So we have to, I believe, stand as one in a
bipartisan way to do all we can to make sure that 9/11 never
again repeats itself.
So with that, I want to thank all the witness for joining
us here today. I am privileged to yield to the Ranking Member,
the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Most of
what you said I agree with. As you said, we clearly have had a
wonderful and positive relationship as we have switched chairs
from time to time.
I would also like to welcome our newest member on the
Democratic side, Ms. Janice Hahn of California, to the
committee. So we now have a full complement, and we look
forward to the debate.
Chairman King. We welcome you also, thank you.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, today we meet to hear testimony
on the Nation's progress in bringing about safety, security,
and resiliency against terrorism since the attacks of 9/11. But
before we look back, I want to acknowledge and remember all the
firefighters, police officers and ordinary people who lost
their lives that Tuesday morning. Remembering those who died
must inspire us to make this Nation better and safer.
Mr. Chairman there is no doubt that the events of September
11, 2001, brought about fundamental changes to this Nation. The
events of that morning changed just about everything we know
about aviation security, information sharing, and disaster
response and recovery. Over time, this Government has changed
its policies and practices, the American people have changed
their expectations. Today, most people regard many new security
measures as a reasonable price for security. But as we enter
the second 9/11 decade we must begin to question the price we
paid.
Between 2004 and 2010, the Department spent nearly $300
billion to secure our Nation. Several initiatives have improved
our security and eliminated many vulnerabilities we once faced.
Increases in the number of Border Patrol officers, the
establishment of Secure Flight and US-VISIT, the revitalization
of FEMA, and new attention to securing chemical and biological
materials have all improved our security posture. All of these
things have been good and necessary. But as we reflect on the
past 10 years, we cannot pretend that progress has been steady
and unimpeded. Many pointed the growth of Homeland Security
spending and reliance on outside contractors as the beginning
of a Homeland Security industrial complex, which may undermine
our security in the long run.
I cannot isolate the cause for this incredible increase in
spending, nor can I deny that Congress' inability to
consolidate jurisdiction is a contributing factor.
The splintering of the jurisdiction has fractured every
aspect of the Department's operation and decreased its ability
to operate effectively and efficiently. The inability of
Congress to provide the Department with one strong and steady
hand has created opportunities for the network of companies and
consultants who we may call the Beltway bandits.
I hope the Chairman will work with the leadership to ensure
that these jurisdictional hurdles are overcome. As the Chairman
already said in his opening comments, there is enough blame on
both sides for this jurisdictional morass that we face. This
committee must pursue strict legislative oversight jurisdiction
of the Department.
Mr. Chairman, as we recall 9/11 we must remember the
terrorist attacks of that day have caused us to fight a new
kind of war. The war on terrorism has not only been waged in
Afghanistan and Iraq, but has also been fought on our shores. A
recent study reports that nearly 200 terrorism cases have been
brought in U.S. courts since September 11. Nine out of 10 of
those cases have ended in convictions.
We should be proud of our success in engaging threats at
home. But our work in securing the Nation must also assure our
rights and freedoms. The 9/11 Commission understood this
necessity and recommended a Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board. Today that board is still not functional. I
hope my colleagues will join me in requesting that appointments
be made to this board immediately. So as I consider our
progress since 9/11 I would call it a mixed bag. We made
strides but still have miles to go before we can rest. I yield
back.
Chairman King. Thank you, Ranking Member Thompson. Other
Members of the committee are reminded that opening statements
may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Hon. Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Laura Richardson
September 8, 2011
I would like to thank Chairman King and Ranking Member Thompson for
holding this hearing today. It has been nearly 10 years since the
devastating terrorist attacks on our country. While our country is now
more secure, we must continue to remain vigilant against those who seek
to do us harm and teach hate. I look forward to hearing from our
distinguished panel of witnesses on both the successes we have had on
combating the global war on terror and what still needs to be done to
prevent another terrorist attack on American soil.
On Sept. 11, 2001, America and the world were forever changed.
Nineteen terrorists hijacked four commercial passenger jet airlines and
intentionally crashed two of them into the World Trade Center and one
into the Pentagon. The heroic actions of the passengers of United
Flight 93 prevented an additional catastrophic attack. In total, the
attacks of 9/11 resulted in a death toll of nearly 3,000 people and
were the deadliest attacks on American soil since Pearl Harbor.
September 11, 2001 will forever be burned into our memories. I was
a member of the Long Beach City Council. The events on that day renewed
my commitment to serve my country and work to ensure that we do
everything possible to prevent another terrorist attack.
One year after these attacks, President Bush and Congress
established the ``9/11 Commission'' to prepare a complete report
describing the circumstances that gave rise to the 9/11 attacks and
recommendations that could be adopted by our Nation's security agencies
to make sure a tragedy like this never happened again. Today, we are
going to review the status of the commission's recommendations, and
determine what still needs to be done.
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security and this
committee resulted from the attacks on 9/11. When I came to Congress, I
was honored to have the opportunity to join the Homeland Security
Committee.
Despite the significant steps the Congress and Federal agencies
have taken to deter and combat terrorist groups from attacking the
United States, the Bipartisan Policy Center's report shows that there
is still work to be done. I am particularly concerned about several
issues raised in the report.
First, the report shows that there is still a lack of a unified
command structure among multiple agencies when responding to a
disaster. We also still have not addressed the interoperability issue
raised in the initial report. It is simply not acceptable that our
first responders still do not have the ability to communicate with each
other across multiple agencies. We must overcome the barriers that have
developed delaying Nation-wide network dedication to public safety
during emergencies.
The 37th Congressional District and the State of California, of
which I have resided since birth, is no stranger to natural disasters
ranging from earthquakes to mudslides to wildfires. Southern
California, my area, is also home to many high-value terrorist targets,
such as the Port of Long Beach, oil refineries, gas treatment
facilities, and petrochemical facilities. That is why I am especially
committed to ensuring that my district and the Nation has the tools and
resources to keep our people safe.
In light of the continuing threats that exist, I cannot help but
point out that the shortsighted cuts to Homeland Security this year are
negligent and must be addressed. Paying homage to 9/11 and then
proposing to cut first responders and Homeland Security's ability to
stop the next attempt is an absence of duty in this 112th Congress.
I look forward to hearing the testimony from our distinguished
panel of witnesses, and I hope that we can work in a bipartisan fashion
in implementing the remaining recommendations from the 9/11 Commission.
Chairman King. Also, I would, at this time, ask unanimous
consent to insert into the record the 10th Anniversary Report
Card, the status of the 9/11 Commission recommendations
prepared by the Bipartisan Policy Center National Security
Preparedness Group. Without objection, so ordered.*
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* The information has been retained in committee files and is also
available at http://www.bipartisanpolicy.org/library/report/tenth-
anniversary-report-card-status-911-commission-recommendations.
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Now--oh, Secretary Ridge, how are you? Our first witness
this morning, as I mentioned, is Lee Hamilton, long-time
distinguished Member of Congress, vice chairman of the 9/11
Commission, former president of the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars. A true gentlemen in every
sense of the word, and if anyone serves in Congress and served
this Nation in a bipartisan, patriotic way it was Lee Hamilton.
Chairman Hamilton.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE LEE HAMILTON, FORMER VICE CHAIRMAN, THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES
(THE 9/11 COMMISSION)
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I ask
unanimous consent my statement be put in full in the record.
Chairman King. Without objection.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thompson,
Members of the committee, thank you very much for the
opportunity to appear with you today. This committee has
provided outstanding and enduring support for the
implementation of the 9/11 Commission recommendations. We are
most appreciative of the leadership and its members for your
support. By doing so, you are helping ensure our Nation takes
the difficult steps necessary to confront the terrorist threat
and protect the American people.
Today I am appearing in my capacity as a co-chair of the
Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security Preparedness
Group, which is a successor to the 9/11 Commission. Through the
NSPG, Governor Kean, who could not be here this morning,
Governor Ridge, and I, together with a bipartisan group of
National security experts, monitor the implementation of the 9/
11 Commission's recommendations and address emerging National
security issues. It is a very special pleasure, of course, to
appear with Governor Tom Ridge as well as the comptroller
general before you this morning.
Last week we released a report on the implementation of the
9/11 Commission's recommendations. The good news is that
substantial progress has been made in fulfilling many of the
recommendations. Among these importantly is the transformation
of the intelligence community in breaking down barriers and
information sharing. However, the unfulfilled recommendations
in our report indicate we are not as secure as we could or
should be. I will cover several of them now and allow Governor
Ridge to discuss the others.
First unity of effort. Unity of effort for the many actors
at a disaster scene is critical because a well-coordinated
response saves many lives. Our Nation was not fully prepared
for the size and complexity of the 9/11 attacks, or for that
matter, Hurricane Katrina. Many metropolitan areas where
multiple agencies respond to a disaster still have not solved
the problem of who is in charge. DHS and State and local
governments have to work together to resolve gaps in
establishing roles and responsibilities conducting catastrophic
disaster planning and exercising those plans. A unity of
command, knowing who is in charge is a no-brainer in terms of
what must be done to respond to a disaster. It is a source of
high frustration to me, and I think other members of the
Commission that we have not yet resolved that problem
satisfactorily across the Nation, although some communities
have made considerable progress.
Second, the civil liberties and Executive power. I spent a
good day yesterday listening, in good part, to the
extraordinary capabilities that we have today in Government to
surveil people and to keep track of what they are doing. I have
had that briefing before, but I must say every time I have it,
I am impressed over again. If you have not had the opportunity
to hear what our capabilities are today and what they will be 5
years, 10 years from today, I urge you, taking whatever steps
you can, to get that briefing. We recommended in the 9/11
Commission that a Privacy and Civil Liberties Board should be
established to address and monitor privacy and liberty, civil
liberty concerns across the Government.
You will not fail to be impressed by the potential of
Government and individuals now to intrude into the lives of
ordinary people. Although legislation was enacted to establish
this board it has been dormant for more than 3 years. To date,
only two of the board's five members have been nominated by the
President, a chairman has not been selected, the remaining
three should be appointed immediately.
Next, the Director of National Intelligence, the
establishment of the Director of National Intelligence and the
National Counterterrorism Center to coordinate the activities
of the intelligence community, represented major progress in
intelligence reform. However, there is some ambiguity about the
DNI's authorities over budget and personnel, and there have
been four DNIs in 6 years. Further clarity about that role is
needed and that clarity could come either from additional
legislation or by action of the President with repeated
declarations from him that the DNI is the unequivocal leader of
the intelligence community with regard to budget and personnel
and other matters.
Next, standardize secure IDs, 18 of the 19 9/11 hijackers
obtained 30 State-issued IDs amongst them that enabled them to
more easily board planes on that dreadful morning of 9/11.
Therefore, we recommended that the Federal Government sets
standards for the issuance of sources of identification. In
2008, DHS issued detailed regulations setting standards for
driver's license issuance. However, the States' compliance with
the regulations has been delayed until 2013. That delay in
compliance creates vulnerabilities and make us less safe. No
further delay should be authorized, and instead, from my point
of view, at least, the deadline should by accelerated.
Next, transportation security. With significant Federal
funding, TSA has deployed large numbers of enhanced screening
equipment used in explosives detection. Unfortunately,
explosives detection technology lacks reliability and lags in
its capability to automatically identify concealed weapons and
explosives. DHS must improve the way it sets screening
technology requirements, works with the private sector to
develop this equipment, and tests it in the field.
Finally, with regard to standards for terrorist detention,
I know this is not within the jurisdiction of this committee,
but it is an important matter, for too long, our Nation's
political leadership have delayed resolving the difficult
problem of reconciling the rule of law with indefinitely
detaining alleged terrorists, some of whom would no doubt
attempt to do the Nation grievous harm.
Congress and the President must enact a law, a
comprehensive approach for how to handle these detainees that
is grounded in the principles of fairness, due process, and
protecting the American people.
To conclude, while we have done much since the attacks 10
years ago we are safer than we were that day, all of us, I
think, agree there is still much more to do. Political
leadership from both parties at all levels of government should
renew their focus on completing implementation of the 9/11
Commission recommendations, thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Hamilton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Lee Hamilton
September 8, 2011
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
This committee has been at the center of defending the country from the
terrorist threat we face. You have provided sustained support for the
implementation of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations. By doing so,
you have done a great deal to ensure we are taking the difficult steps
necessary to confront this determined enemy and protect Americans, our
allies, and people throughout the world.
Today, I am appearing in my capacity as a co-chair of the
Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security Preparedness Group (NSPG),
a successor to the 9/11 Commission. Drawing on a strong roster of
National security professionals, the NSPG works as an independent,
bipartisan group to monitor the implementation of the
9/11 Commission's recommendations and address emerging National
security issues. The NSPG has the following members:
Governor Tom Kean, Former Governor of New Jersey, Chairman of the
9/11 Commission, and Co-Chair of the National Security
Preparedness Group;
The Honorable E. Spencer Abraham, Former U.S. Secretary of Energy
and U.S. Senator from Michigan, The Abraham Group;
Peter Bergen, Director, National Securities Program at the New
America Foundation;
Dr. Stephen Flynn, President, Center for National Policy;
Dr. John Gannon, BAE Systems, former CIA Deputy Director for
Intelligence, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council,
and U.S. House Homeland Security Staff Director;
The Honorable Dan Glickman, former Secretary of Agriculture and
U.S. Congressman;
Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Georgetown University terrorism specialist;
The Honorable Dave McCurdy, Former Congressman from Oklahoma and
Chairman of the U.S. House Intelligence Committee, President of
the American Gas Association;
The Honorable Edwin Meese III, Former U.S. Attorney General, Ronald
Reagan Distinguished Fellow in Public Policy and Chairman of
the Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at the Heritage
Foundation;
The Honorable Tom Ridge, Former Governor of Pennsylvania and U.S.
Secretary of Homeland Security, Senior Advisor at Deloitte
Global LLP, Ridge Global;
The Honorable Richard L. Thornburgh, former U.S. Attorney General,
Of Counsel at K&L Gates;
The Honorable Frances Townsend, Former Homeland Security Advisor
and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism;
The Honorable Jim Turner, Former Congressman from Texas and Ranking
Member of the U.S. House Homeland Security Committee, Arnold
and Porter, LLP.
Last week, we released a report assessing the 9/11 Commission's
recommendations, which I will discuss today.
i. response to 9/11 and the evolving terrorist threat
On September 11, 2001, violent Islamist extremists hijacked four
commercial airplanes and turned them into weapons, killing nearly 3,000
people, and altering our society forever. These attacks exacted a
devastating toll on so many families. Our Government, the private
sector, and daily lives have been profoundly transformed in the decade
since the attacks.
Indeed, it is difficult to comprehend all the ways that our Nation
has changed. The most visible reminders of these changes are the
airport screening protocols and being asked to report suspicious
activity in public places. Drone strikes that kill terrorist operatives
are front page news.
The less notorious changes that have occurred within the Federal
Government are even more dramatic. We have seen the largest
reorganization of the intelligence community since 1947. The
intelligence budget itself has doubled since 2001. The creation of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was also a massive
reconfiguration of Government, combining 22 agencies into a new
department, with a workforce of 230,000 people and an annual budget of
more than $50 billion. In total, some 263 organizations have been
established or redesigned.
The terrorist threat has changed as well. Today, unlike 2001, we
must be concerned about Americans, such as Anwar al-Awlaki, playing
prominent roles in al-Qaeda's global network. For example, in
Minneapolis, Minnesota, Muslim-American youth are being recruited in
Somali communities to fight for an al-Qaeda affiliate in Somalia.
We also have seen Americans recruited by Islamist extremists
through internet forums. Major Nidal Hasan, who killed 13 fellow
soldiers at Fort Hood in Texas, was radicalized on-line. This self-
radicalization is very difficult, if not impossible, for law
enforcement to detect.
Our terrorist adversaries and the tactics and techniques they
employ are evolving rapidly. We will see new attempts, and likely
successful attacks. One of our major deficiencies before the 9/11
attacks was a failure by National security agencies to change at the
accelerated rate required by a new and different kind of enemy. We must
not make that mistake again.
The terrorist threat will be with us far into the future, demanding
that we be ever vigilant. Changing circumstances require that we
regularly reassess our priorities and expenditures to determine what is
needed to defend our country and people.
ii. unfinished 9/11 commission recommendations
After a 20-month investigation, in July 2004, the 9/11 Commission
made 41 recommendations for improving the Nation's security. The vast
majority of these were endorsed by both Presidential candidates at the
time and almost every Member of Congress. On the tenth anniversary of
the attacks, it is appropriate to reflect and take stock of where we
are in National security reform--and what we have yet to achieve.
The good news is that substantial progress has been made in
fulfilling many of the Commission's recommendations. Among these is the
transformation of the intelligence community and breaking down barriers
in information sharing.
Legal, policy, and cultural barriers between agencies created
serious impediments to information sharing that prevented disruption of
the 9/11 attacks. Therefore, the 9/11 Commission made a number of
specific recommendations to improve information sharing across our
Government. Information sharing within the Federal Government, and
among Federal, State, and local authorities, and with allies, while not
perfect, has considerably improved since 9/11. Those changes
facilitated the successful capture of Osama bin Laden.
In our report last week, we highlighted nine unfinished 9/11
Commission recommendations. They demonstrate that we are not as secure
as we could or should be. We urge immediate action to complete their
implementation.
Unity of Effort.--Unity of effort for the many actors at a disaster
scene is critical because a well-coordinated response can save many
lives. Our Nation was not fully prepared for the size and complexity of
the 9/11 attacks or for Hurricane Katrina.
While training under a uniform command structure has taken place,
many metropolitan areas where multiple agencies respond to a disaster
still have not solved the problem of who is in charge. Our concern is
that the failure to resolve the basic building blocks of establishing
roles and responsibilities, conducting catastrophic disaster planning,
and exercising those plans would likely result in confusion at the
scene of a major disaster.
Radio Interoperability.--A prerequisite to establishing unity of
effort is providing first responders the ability to communicate with
each other directly, on demand, during an emergency. Incompatible and
inadequate communications led to needless loss of life on 9/11.
To remedy this failure, the Commission recommended additional
assignment of radio spectrum to improve radio interoperability for
first responders. Despite the lives at stake, this recommendation has
stalled in part because of a political fight over allocating 10 MHz of
radio spectrum--the D-Block--directly to public safety for a Nation-
wide interoperable network. I want to recognize the leadership that
Chairman King and Ranking Member Thompson and many Members of this
committee have shown in supporting a bill that would allocate the D-
Block to public safety.
Efforts to achieve unity of effort and interoperable emergency
communications must be dramatically accelerated. Congress needs to
allocate the radio spectrum by passing legislation, and DHS and State
and local governments must work together to address gaps in unity of
effort and interoperability planning.
Congressional Reform.--Congressional oversight of the Government's
homeland security and intelligence functions remains as dysfunctional
as it was when we released our 2004 report. At that time, we said that
strengthening Congressional oversight may be among the most difficult
and important recommendations. It still is.
Congress should immediately consolidate jurisdiction over the
Department of Homeland Security within the House and Senate homeland
security committees. This would avoid the duplication of having DHS
respond to more than 100 Congressional committees and subcommittees
that have overlapping jurisdiction over the Department. In 2009 and
2010, DHS provided more than 3,900 briefings and DHS witnesses
testified more than 285 times. This amounted to many thousands of hours
of work, often duplicating efforts, and cost taxpayers tens of millions
of dollars.
To improve intelligence oversight, the 9/11 Commission recommended
a joint, bicameral intelligence committee or intelligence committees in
each body with combined authorizing and appropriating authority. The
basic issue is that agencies listen to the people who control their
purse.
Currently, the House and Senate appropriations committees fund the
intelligence agencies through their defense subcommittees and the DoD
budget. At a minimum, separate intelligence subcommittees should be
established to fund the intelligence community.
The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence announced a
decision this year to include three Members of the House Appropriations
Committee to participate in Intelligence Committee hearings and
briefings. This is a positive step, but there is more to do here.
Civil Liberties and Executive Power.--We recommended in 2004 that a
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board should be established to
address and monitor privacy and liberty concerns across Government. All
five democrats and five republicans on the Commission felt strongly
about this recommendation.
Since 9/11, the Executive Branch has received expanded authorities
to collect information and to conduct surveillance. Even if these
powers are being employed in a careful way respectful of civil
liberties, the history of the abuse of such powers should give us pause
and make us commit to ensuring that mechanisms are in place to protect
our liberty. A robust and visible Board can help reassure Americans
that security programs are designed and executed with the preservation
of our core values in mind.
Although legislation was enacted to establish this Board, it has,
in fact, been dormant for more than 3 years. To date, only two of the
Board's five members have been nominated by the President and neither
has been confirmed by Congress. The remaining three should be appointed
immediately.
Director of National Intelligence.--The establishment of the
Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism
Center to coordinate the activities of the intelligence community
represented major progress in intelligence reform. In the last 6 years,
the DNI has increased information-sharing, improved coordination among
agencies, sharpened collection priorities, brought additional expertise
into the analysis of intelligence, and further integrated the FBI into
the overall intelligence effort.
But it still is not clear that the DNI is the driving force for
intelligence community integration that we had envisioned. There have
been four DNIs in 6 years. There also is ambiguity about the DNI's
authorities over budget and personnel. Further clarity about the DNI's
role is needed. This could be done through legislation or with repeated
declarations from the President that the DNI is the unequivocal leader
of the intelligence community.
Biometric Entry-Exit System.--In 2004, the 9/11 Commission
recommended that the Federal Government establish a comprehensive
biometric system to track foreign nationals that enter and leave the
country. DHS has deployed a system that checks all individuals who
arrive at U.S. borders, ensures they are who they say they are, and
helps prevent known terrorists from entering the country.
But the exit portion of the system has not been completed, so we do
not know with any certainty who has left the country or remains here on
an expired visa. Such a capability would have assisted law enforcement
and intelligence officials in August and September 2001 in conducting a
search for two of the 9/11 hijackers that were in the United States on
expired visas.
Standardized Secure IDs.--Eighteen of the 19 9/11 hijackers
obtained 30 State-issued IDs amongst them that enabled them to more
easily board planes on the morning of 9/11. Due to the ease with which
fraud was used to obtain legitimate IDs that helped the hijackers embed
and assimilate in the United States for the purpose of carrying out a
terrorist act, the 9/11 Commission recommended that ``the Federal
Government set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and
sources of identification, such as driver's licenses.''
In 2008, detailed regulations were issued, setting standards and
benchmarks for driver's license issuance. However, the States'
compliance with DHS regulations for more secure driver's licenses has
been delayed to 2013 by DHS. This delay in compliance creates
vulnerabilities and makes us less safe. No further delay should be
authorized, and instead the deadline should be accelerated.
Transportation Security.--With significant Federal funding, TSA has
deployed large numbers of enhanced screening equipment used in
passenger checkpoint explosives detection and checked bag screening.
Unfortunately, explosives detection technology lacks reliability and
lags in its capability to automatically identify concealed weapons and
explosives. The next generation whole body scanning machines also are
not effective at detecting explosives hidden within the body and raise
privacy and health concerns that DHS has not fully addressed.
Our conclusion is that despite 10 years of working on the problem,
the detection system still falls short in critical ways with respect to
detection. DHS must improve the way it sets screening technology
requirements, works with the private sector to develop this equipment,
and tests it in the field.
Standards for Terrorist Detention.--Within days of his
inauguration, President Obama signed a series of Executive Orders on
the treatment of detainees and barring the CIA from using any
interrogation methods not already authorized in the U.S. Army Field
Manual. By bringing the United States into compliance with the Geneva
Conventions and with international and customary law on the treatment
of prisoners, the Executive Orders have substantially fulfilled our
recommendation.
However, for too long, our Nation's political leadership have
delayed resolving the difficult problem of reconciling the rule of law
with indefinitely detaining alleged terrorists, some of whom would no
doubt attempt to do the Nation grievous harm. So Congress and the
President must decide on a comprehensive approach of how to handle
these detainees that is grounded in the principles of fairness, respect
for due process, and protecting the American people.
iii. conclusion
While we have done much since the attacks 10 years ago and are
safer than we were that day, there is much more to do. Political
leadership from both parties and at all levels of government should
renew their focus on completing implementation of the 9/11 Commission
recommendations.
Our National security departments require strong leadership and
attentive management at every level to ensure that all parts are
working well together. Their dedicated workforces enacted much change
and should be commended for their achievements in protecting the
American people. But there is a tendency toward inertia in all
bureaucracies. Vigorous Congressional oversight is imperative to ensure
sustained vigilance and continued reforms.
Chairman King. Thank you Chairman Hamilton.
Our next witness is an old friend; many people in the
Congress had the privilege of serving with him. Tom Ridge was a
Member of the Congress, he went on to become an outstanding
Governor of Pennsylvania, and he truly was present at the
creation when President Bush appointed him to be the first
assistant to the President for Homeland Security and first
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security.
He has a unique perspective on this, obviously having been
there at the start and being able to monitor the development,
both at the Department and of the Homeland Security mechanisms
in this country over the past 10 years. Tom was a college
graduate and law student who was drafted and served honorably
in Vietnam, received a bronze star, and again was a truly
outstanding Member of Congress. Again, like Chairman Hamilton,
has been dedicated to his country and in this issue in
particular. Tom Ridge, it is a privilege to have you here today
and you are recognized.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE TOM RIDGE, FORMER SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
SECURITY
Mr. Ridge. Thank you, Chairman King, Ranking Member
Thompson and Members of the committee. I join my colleagues in
expressing--thanking my colleagues to express my appreciation
for the opportunity to appear before you today as reflects upon
our Nation's security efforts 10 years after the attacks of
September 11, 2001, frankly, as we consider our priorities for
the future. I am very pleased to be joined at the witness table
by someone you recognize, we all recognize as a great patriot,
Lee Hamilton, and obviously we recognize the service and the
contribution.
Chairman King. Secretary Ridge, if would you pull the
microphone closer. I am having a hard time picking up on your
voice.
Mr. Ridge. Recognize the service of GAO comptroller,
General Gene Dodaro, who each bring, I think, distinguished
credentials and significant points of view to our conversation
today. As we look back over the last 10 years, it is abundantly
clear that America was, is, and will always be an undeniably
resilient country. In a decade's time, we have strengthened our
intelligence assets and we have partnered with allies and
friends. We have captured and killed terrorists and destroyed
safe havens in Afghanistan and around the globe.
We stood up a new department, the Department of Homeland
Security and repositioned as the country embraced and
emotionally charged, but I think strategically-driven National
mission. We improved preparedness and response capabilities and
established layers of security throughout our aviation system.
We embedded new technologies and security measures throughout
the public and private sectors. Individual citizens, I believe,
are more prepared and they are certainly more aware. With
public and private sector leadership in investment, we are more
secure, but we remain a target nonetheless.
Over the course of 10 years, the threat remains strong and
continues to change. We have thwarted some attacks, but we have
also been fortunate that a few others have simply failed. What
makes some uncomfortable we must acknowledge that no matter how
hard we try, another attack is likely. The onus is on us to
understand what to do and luck is not a strategy. As we close
one vulnerability, we should anticipate the terrorists will
adapt and seek out another, and be ready for that.
We must view security as an on-going process, not an
endpoint, a deliberative process. Not a breathless reaction to
all conceivable threats is required at all times. Terrorists do
not rest, so neither can we. We wear wristwatches, they have
time, the number of security measures await our attention. We
have strengthened information sharing in this country and among
allies and friends, but we still saw an attempted Christmas day
bomber come very close to his goals due to information not
being shared. I, for one, also believe that the failure to
share information and the failure to act lead to the horrible
tragedy associated with the deaths of people at Fort Hood.
We need to create a culture of intelligence sharing where
everyone feels empowered to hit the send button to share more,
not less. We have bolstered communication technologies, but an
inoperable broadband communication system remains undelivered.
If the tragedy of 9/11 the specific recommendations of the 9/11
Commission, and the sustained pleas of police, firemen, and
emergency service personnels cannot generate Federal support
for such a network, what will it take, ladies and gentlemen,
what will it take?
We have instituted an entry system to validate who comes
into the country, but have not created an exit system that
ensures the same visitors leave and do not exploit as yet an
unfinished system. It is likely, therefore, that we have people
among us who have overstayed their visas. Where are they now?
What are they doing? Why are they here? Respectfully, I say
this, the issue of Congressional oversight is a 9/11
recommendation that also goes unanswered.
You heard the statistics on numbers of hearings, briefings,
preparation time, and so forth. What is important is that these
numbers have increased across the tenure of three Secretaries,
and continue to cause significant distraction, overlap, and
bureaucracy, three characteristics that run counterintuitive to
the urgency and focus required of National security. My hope is
this issue and other concerns have addressed will receive our
urgent attention in successful resolution.
It is easy, I know, to cite all the vulnerabilities we have
yet to address in the 9/11 recommendations we have yet to meet.
The needs and wants are limitless, resources are not. So we
must manage the risk carefully and judiciously. The
responsibility is great, and it is complex. Ten years later, it
just doesn't get any easier. The killing of Osama bin Laden
illustrates this point quite well. The news about bin Laden
capped a decade of emotion. We all know that the threat would
remain long after the man was killed.
Ten years is not a lot of time, it is enough time to know
that in the next 10 years, the fight will be with us. It will
go on, but so will we. As a stronger and more secure country,
as resilient and freedom-loving people we have always been, and
as a Nation that will always remember those we lost one
September day. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Ridge follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Tom Ridge
September 8, 2011
Thank you, Representative King and Ranking Member Thompson, Members
of the committee.
I appreciate the opportunity to join you and your colleagues today
as we reflect upon our Nation's security efforts 10 years after the
attacks of September 11, 2001, and as we consider our priorities for
the future.
And I'm pleased to be joined today at the witness table by
Representative Lee Hamilton and GAO Comptroller General Gene Dodaro,
who each bring distinguished credentials and a significant point of
view to our conversation today.
As I look back over the last 10 years, it is abundantly clear that
America was, is, and always will be an undeniably resilient Nation.
In a decade's time, we strengthened our intelligence assets and
partnered with allies and friends. We captured and killed terrorists
and destroyed safe havens in Afghanistan and around the globe.
We stood up a new department, Homeland Security, and re-positioned
as the country embraced an emotionally charged and strategically driven
National mission.
We improved preparedness and response capabilities and established
layers of security throughout our aviation system.
We embedded new technologies and security measures throughout the
public and private sectors.
Individual citizens are more prepared and more aware.
With public and private sector leadership and investment, we are
more secure. But we remain a target nonetheless.
Over the course of 10 years, the threat remains strong and
continues to change. We have thwarted some attacks, but we have also
been fortunate that a few others have simply failed. While it makes
some uncomfortable, we must acknowledge that no matter how hard we try,
another attack is likely. The onus is on us then--to understand that
there's more to do--and that luck is not a strategy.
As we close one vulnerability, we should anticipate that terrorists
will adapt and seek out another--and be ready for that.
We must view security as an on-going process, not an endpoint. A
deliberative process, not a breathless reaction to all conceivable
threats, is required at all times.
Terrorists do not rest, so neither can we. We have wrist watches--
they have time. A number of security measures await our attention.
We have strengthened information-sharing in country and among
allies and friends, but we still saw an attempted Christmas day bomber
come very close to his goals due to overt and repeated information not
being shared. We need to create a culture of intelligence sharing where
everyone feels empowered to hit the send button, to share more, not
less.
We have bolstered communication technologies, but an interoperable
broadband communications system remains undelivered. If the tragedy of
9/11, the specific recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and the
sustained pleas of police, firemen, and emergency service professionals
cannot generate Federal support for such a network, then what will it
take?
We have instituted an entry system to validate who comes into the
country, but have not created an exit system that ensures these same
visitors leave and do not exploit an as-yet unfinished system. It is
likely therefore that we have people among us who have overstayed their
visas. Where are they now and what are they doing? Where is the sense
of urgency needed to address this?
Respectfully, the issue of Congressional oversight is a 9/11
recommendation that goes unanswered. You have heard the statistics on
numbers of hearings, briefings, preparation time, and so forth. What is
important is that these numbers have increased across the tenure of
three DHS secretaries, and continue to cause significant distraction,
overlap, and bureaucracy--three characteristics that run
counterintuitive to the urgency and focus required of National
security.
My hope is this issue and other concerns I've addressed will
receive our urgent attention and successful resolution.
It is easy, I know, to cite all of the vulnerabilities we have yet
to address and the 9/11 recommendations we have yet to meet. The needs
and wants are limitless. Resources are not. So we must manage the risk
carefully and judiciously. That responsibility is great and complex.
And 10 years later, it doesn't get any easier.
The killing of Osama bin Laden illustrates this point well. The
news about bin Laden capped a decade of emotion, but we all knew that
the threat would remain long after the man.
Ten years is not a lot of time, but it is enough time to know that
in the next 10 years, the fight will still be with us. It will go on.
But so will we, as a stronger and more secure country, as the resilient
and freedom-loving people we have always been, and as a Nation that
will always remember those we lost one September day.
Chairman King. Thank you, Secretary Ridge.
Our next witness is, this man's job is to keep everybody
honest, Comptroller General Gene Dodaro who has a more than 30-
year record of achievement. Served more than 9 years as chief
operating officer of GAO. With that, I look forward to your
testimony and its perspective we don't always hear. So I look
forward to your testimony this morning.
STATEMENT OF HONORABLE EUGENE L. DODARO, COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF
THE UNITED STATES
Mr. Dodaro. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, Ranking
Member Thompson, Members of the committee, I am very pleased to
be here today to discuss GAO's work on Homeland Security
issues. It is a privilege to appear with Chairman Hamilton and
Governor Ridge this morning.
Yesterday we issued a summary report of the work that we
have done over the past decade, looking at the Homeland
Security issues. We have made over 1,500 recommendations during
that period of time. We have adopted a constructive approach to
try to do our part to help in this quest to make our homeland
more secure. The Department has reacted favorably to many of
our recommendations and has implemented many, but many, as yet,
have not been fully implemented.
The bottom line message of our report was that progress
indeed has been made since 9/11, but much work remains on gaps
and weaknesses that the Department needs to address in order to
reach its full potential.
On the progress side, I point to several areas, one, secure
flight, we have a system now to check against terrorist watch
lists on passenger lists. We have a visa entry biometric
system, as Governor Ridge mentioned, to track people coming
into the country. We have a visa security program, where DHS is
now working with the Department of State officials in the
process of determining who gets a visa in order to come into
the country. There is also an automated verification,
authorization system for visa waiver countries where visas
aren't needed, that they are checked as they come in. We
bolstered the resources at ports of entry and equipment and
infrastructure there and at the borders across the country.
I am also pleased that there has been greater emphasis in
cybersecurity in the National infrastructure plan, and that
FEMA has issued National Response Framework and attended
documents to ensure emergency preparedness and better clarity
of rules and responsibilities.
Now on the work-remaining side, first, I would point to the
fact that we need to continuously improve the processes and
technologies for screening at the airports, particularly
including a plan to bring the equipment for screening check
baggage up to current levels for detecting explosive devices.
Second, I would echo the comments of my colleagues and that
we need an exit system for this country. Overstays remains a
significant problem, estimates are between 4 and 5 million
people, and as we all recall, five of the 19 hijackers on 9/11
had overstayed their visas, so having an exit strategy is
important.
I also think there are great opportunities to expand the
Visa Border Security Program. DHS is not working yet with State
Department in all critical high-risk issues. This could be done
by placing additional people overseas, or perhaps remotely
working within the United States. So that's an important issue
as well.
There is also a task to provide more timely and actionable
threat and alerts on cybersecurity issues to the private sector
and others and help them dealing with a growing problem of
cybersecurity and intrusions. There is also a need for FEMA to
come up with an assessment, metrics and assessment to assess
the capabilities and the readiness of individual jurisdiction.
We have framework and guidelines, but we have yet to have any
objective assessments of readiness and preparedness levels
across the country.
Also, there is a need to effectively implement the global
nuclear detection strategy, and we have made some
recommendations in this area. There is a need to strengthen our
efforts to detect biological agents and threats to our country.
Last, I would point to our report highlighting the need for
the Department to improve their management systems and
infrastructure to help support these very important missions.
The problems that have been occurring in the acquisition area,
there has been a number of failed acquisition attempts, a lot
of money is at stake, about 40 percent of the Department's
budget is on acquisitions and that needs to be improved, along
with their development and testing of technologies before they
are deployed. Also, their financial management systems need to
be strengthened to properly account for the funds that are
available. They are one of the few departments that are unable
to pass a clean audit opinion. Going forward in the austere
budget environment, it is very important that we make the best
and most efficient use out of the monies and manage wisely.
This concludes my opening statement, I look forward to
answering questions. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Dodaro follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Eugene L. Dodaro
September 8, 2011
gao-11-940t
Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on
progress made by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and work
remaining in implementing its homeland security missions since it began
operations in March 2003. The Nation is about to pass the 10-year
anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. The events of
that day led to profound changes in Government agendas, policies, and
structures to confront homeland security threats facing the Nation.
This milestone provides an opportunity to reflect on the progress DHS
has made since its establishment and challenges it has faced in
implementing its missions, as well as to identify issues that will be
important for the Department to address as it moves forward, based on
work we have completed on DHS programs and operations in key areas.
DHS was established with key missions that include preventing
terrorist attacks from occurring within the United States, reducing
U.S. vulnerability to terrorism, minimizing resulting damages, and
helping the Nation recover from any attacks that may occur. DHS is now
the third-largest Federal department, with more than 200,000 employees
and an annual budget of more than $50 billion. We have evaluated
numerous Departmental programs since DHS began its operations, and
issued more than 1,000 reports and Congressional testimonies in areas
such as border security and immigration, transportation security, and
emergency management, among others.
We have made approximately 1,500 recommendations to DHS designed to
strengthen its operations, such as to improve performance measurement
efforts, strengthen management processes, enhance coordination and
information sharing, and increase the use of risk information in
planning and resource allocation decisions, as well as to address gaps
and challenges in its mission operations that have affected DHS's
implementation efforts. DHS has implemented about half of these
recommendations, has actions underway to address others, and has taken
additional steps to strengthen its mission activities.
However, we reported that the Department has more to do to ensure
that it conducts its missions efficiently and effectively, while
simultaneously preparing to address future challenges that face the
Department and the Nation. Addressing these issues will likely become
increasingly complex as domestic and world events unfold, and will be
particularly challenging in light of the current fiscal environment and
constrained budgets.
In 2003, we designated the implementation and transformation of DHS
as high-risk because it represented an enormous undertaking that would
require time to achieve in an effective and efficient manner.\1\
Additionally, the components that merged to form DHS already faced a
wide array of existing challenges, and any DHS failure to effectively
carry out its mission could expose the Nation to potentially serious
consequences. The area has remained on our high-risk list since
2003.\2\ Our prior work on mergers and organizational transformations,
undertaken before the creation of DHS, found that successful
transformations of large organizations, even those faced with less
strenuous reorganizations than DHS, can take years to achieve.\3\
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\1\ GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-03-119 (Washington, DC:
January 2003). In addition to this high-risk area, DHS has
responsibility for other areas we have designated as high-risk.
Specifically, in 2005 we designated information sharing for homeland
security as high-risk, involving a number of Federal departments
including DHS, and in 2006, we identified the National Flood Insurance
Program as high-risk. Further, in 2003 we expanded the scope of the
high-risk area involving Federal information security, which was
initially designated as high-risk in 1997, to include the protection of
the Nation's computer-reliant critical infrastructure.
\2\ GAO, Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department
of Homeland Security, GAO-03-102 (Washington, DC: January 2003).
\3\ See GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and
Transformations: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security
and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, DC: Nov. 14,
2002), and Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, DC:
July 2, 2003).
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In 2007, we reported on progress made by DHS in implementing its
mission and management functions by assessing actions DHS took to
achieve performance expectations within each function.\4\ We reported
that DHS made progress in implementing all of its mission and
management functions since it began operations, but progress among the
areas varied significantly. For example, we reported that DHS made more
progress in implementing its mission functions than its management
functions. We also reported that DHS generally had not established
quantitative goals and measures for assessing its performance and, as a
result, we could not assess where along a spectrum of progress DHS
stood in achieving its missions. Subsequent to the issuance of this
report, DHS continued to take action to strengthen its operations and
the management of the Department, including enhancing its performance
measurement efforts. At the request of this committee, following the
issuance of our report, we provided DHS with feedback on the
Department's performance goals and measures as DHS worked to better
position itself to assess its results. Based on its internal review
efforts and our feedback, DHS took action to develop and revise its
performance goals and measures in an effort to strengthen its ability
to assess its outcomes and progress in key mission areas. For fiscal
year 2011, DHS identified 85 strategic measures for assessing its
progress in achieving its Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (QHSR)
missions and goals.\5\ The Department plans to report on its results in
meeting established targets for these new measures at the end of the
fiscal year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on
Implementation of Mission and Management Functions, GAO-07-454
(Washington, DC: Aug. 17, 2007). We defined performance expectations as
a composite of the responsibilities or functions--derived from
legislation, homeland security Presidential Directives and Executive
Orders, DHS planning documents, and other sources--that the Department
was to achieve or satisfy in implementing efforts in its mission and
management areas. The performance expectations were not intended to
represent performance goals or measures for the Department.
\5\ DHS, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic
Framework for a Secure Homeland (Washington, DC: February 2010). The
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act required that
beginning in 2009, and every 4 years thereafter, DHS conduct a
quadrennial review that provides a comprehensive examination of the
homeland security strategy of the United States. Pub. L. No. 110-53,
2401(a), 121 Stat. 266, 543-45 (2007) (codified at 6 U.S.C. 347).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In February 2010, DHS issued its first QHSR report, outlining a
strategic framework for homeland security to guide the activities of
the Department and its homeland security partners, including Federal,
State, local, and Tribal government agencies; the private sector; and
nongovernmental organizations. The report identified five homeland
security missions--Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security,
Securing and Managing Our Borders, Enforcing and Administering Our
Immigration Laws, Safeguarding and Securing Cyberspace, and Ensuring
Resilience to Disasters--and goals and objectives to be achieved within
each mission. In addition, in July 2010 DHS issued a report on the
results of its Bottom-Up Review (BUR), a Department-wide assessment to
align DHS's programmatic activities, such as investigating drug
smuggling and inspecting cargo at ports of entry, and its
organizational structure to the missions and goals identified in the
QHSR.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ DHS, Bottom-Up Review Report (Washington, DC: July 2010). As a
result of the BUR, DHS acknowledged that it had complementary
Department responsibilities and capabilities, which it subsequently
formalized in a sixth mission published in the fiscal year 2010-2012
Annual Performance Report--``Providing Essential Support to National
and Economic Security''--to fully capture the scope of DHS's missions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My statement is based on a report we issued in September 2011
assessing DHS's programs and operations.\7\ As requested, the report
and my statement address the progress made by DHS in implementing its
homeland security missions since it began operations, remaining work,
and crosscutting and management issues that have affected DHS's
implementation efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work
Remaining in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/
11, GAO-11-881 (Washington, DC: Sept. 7, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The report is based on our work on DHS since it began operations,
supplemented with work completed by the DHS Office of Inspector General
(IG), with an emphasis on work completed since 2008 to reflect recent
work, and updated information and documentation provided by the
department in July and August 2011. It is also based on our on-going
work on some DHS programs for various Congressional committees, as
noted throughout the report. For this on-going work, as well as updated
information provided by DHS, we examined program documentation and
interviewed agency officials, among other things. This statement
highlights key, recent work at DHS, but does not address all products
we and DHS IG issued related to the Department, nor does it address all
of DHS's homeland security-related activities and efforts. To determine
what progress DHS has made in implementing its mission functions and
what work, if any, remains, we identified 10 DHS functional areas,
which we define as categories or areas of DHS's homeland security
responsibilities. These functional areas are based on those areas we
identified for DHS in our August 2007 report on DHS's progress in
implementing its mission and management functions, and our analysis of
DHS's QHSR and budget documents, such as its Congressional budget
justifications.\8\ These areas include: (1) Aviation security; (2)
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats; (3)
critical infrastructure protection--physical assets; (4) surface
transportation security; (5) border security; (6) maritime security;
(7) immigration enforcement; (8) immigration services; (9); critical
infrastructure protection--cyber assets; and (10) emergency
preparedness and response.\9\ To identify sub-areas within these
functional areas, we identified performance expectations, which we
define as composites of the responsibilities or functions that the
Department is to achieve or satisfy based on our analysis of
requirements, responsibilities, and goals set for the Department by
Congress, the administration, and DHS itself and its components. In
particular, we used expectations identified in our August 2007 report
as a baseline, and updated, or added to, these expectations by
analyzing requirements and plans set forth in homeland security-related
laws, Presidential Directives and Executive Orders, National
strategies, and DHS's and components' strategic plans and documents. We
then aligned our functional areas to the five QHSR missions based on
our review of the QHSR and BUR reports and DHS's fiscal year 2012
budget documents.
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\8\ GAO-07-454.
\9\ We focused these mission areas primarily on DHS's homeland
security-related functions. We did not consider the Secret Service,
domestic counterterrorism, or intelligence activities because: (1) We
and the DHS IG have completed limited work in these areas; (2) there
are few, if any, requirements identified for the Secret Service's
mission and for DHS's role in domestic counterterrorism and
intelligence (the Department of Justice serves as the lead agency for
most counterterrorism initiatives); and (3) we address DHS actions that
could be considered part of domestic counterterrorism and intelligence
in other areas, such as aviation security, critical infrastructure
protection, and border security.
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To identify key areas of progress and work that remains in each
functional area, as well as crosscutting issues that have affected
DHS's implementation efforts, we examined our and the DHS IG's past
reports. We selected key work that we and the DHS IG have completed
related to the functional areas, sub-areas, and crosscutting issues. We
examined the methodologies used by the DHS IG in its reports, including
reviewing the scope, methodological steps, and limitations. We
determined that the DHS IG reports were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of our report to provide examples of, and to supplement our
work on, DHS's progress and work remaining. We identified crosscutting
issues based on analysis of our work in each functional mission area to
determine common themes that have affected DHS's implementation efforts
across the various mission areas. We conducted this performance audit
from April 2011 through September 2011, in accordance with generally
accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives.
In commenting on our September 2011 report, DHS acknowledged our
work to assess the progress the Department has made in enhancing the
Nation's security and the challenges that still exist. The Department
discussed its views of its accomplishments since 2001, such as the
creation and management of the Visa Security Program; the establishment
of fusion centers to serve as focal points for the analysis and sharing
on threat and vulnerability-related information; and passenger
screening and prescreening programs, among other things. We recognize
the Department's progress in these and other areas in the report, as
well as identify existing challenges that will be important for DHS to
address moving forward. DHS further noted that the report did not
address all of DHS's homeland security-related activities and efforts.
DHS also stated that the report's assessments of progress in each
homeland security mission area were not comprehensive because we and
the DHS IG completed varying degrees of work for each area. We reflect
in the report that it was primarily based on work we completed since
DHS began operations, supplemented with the work of the DHS IG, with an
emphasis on work completed since 2008 and updated information provided
by DHS in July and August 2011. As such, the report identified that our
work and that of the DHS IG did not cover all of DHS's homeland
security-related programs and activities, and that the report was not
intended to do so. Further, we noted in the report that because we and
the DHS IG have completed varying degrees of work (in terms of the
amount and scope of reviews completed) for each functional area, and
because different DHS components and offices provided us with different
amounts and types of information, the report's assessments of DHS's
progress in each area reflected the information available for our
review and analysis and were not necessarily equally comprehensive
across all 10 areas.
dhs continues to implement and strengthen its mission functions, but
key operational and management challenges remain
Since DHS began operations in March 2003, it has developed and
implemented key policies, programs, and activities for implementing its
homeland security missions and functions that have created and
strengthened a foundation for achieving its potential as it continues
to mature. However, the Department's efforts have been hindered by
challenges faced in leading and coordinating the homeland security
enterprise; implementing and integrating its management functions for
results; and strategically managing risk and assessing, and adjusting
as necessary, its homeland security efforts.\10\ DHS has made progress
in these three areas, but needs to take additional action, moving
forward, to help it achieve its full potential.
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\10\ DHS defines the homeland security enterprise as the Federal,
State, local, Tribal, territorial, nongovernmental, and private-sector
entities, as well as individuals, families, and communities, who share
a common National interest in the safety and security of the United
States and its population.
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DHS Has Made Progress in Implementing its Mission Functions, but
Program Weaknesses and Management Issues Have Hindered
Implementation Efforts
DHS has made important progress in implementing and strengthening
its mission functions over the past 8 years, including implementing key
homeland security operations and achieving important goals and
milestones in many areas. The Department's accomplishments include
developing strategic and operational plans across its range of
missions; hiring, deploying, and training workforces; establishing new,
or expanding existing, offices and programs; and developing and issuing
policies, procedures, and regulations to govern its homeland security
operations. For example:
DHS issued the QHSR, which provides a strategic framework
for homeland security, and the National Response Framework,
which outlines guiding principles for disaster response.
DHS successfully hired, trained, and deployed workforces,
such as a Federal screening workforce which assumed security
screening responsibilities at airports Nation-wide, and the
Department has about 20,000 agents to patrol U.S. land borders.
DHS created new programs and offices, or expanded existing
ones, to implement key homeland security responsibilities, such
as establishing the United States Computer Emergency Readiness
Team to, among other things, coordinate the Nation's efforts to
prepare for, prevent, and respond to cyber threats to systems
and communications networks. DHS also expanded programs for
identifying and removing aliens subject to removal from the
United States and for preventing unauthorized aliens from
entering the country.
DHS issued policies and procedures addressing, among other
things, the screening of passengers at airport checkpoints,
inspecting travelers seeking entry into the United States, and
assessing immigration benefit applications and processes for
detecting possible fraud.
Establishing these elements and others are important
accomplishments and have been critical for the Department to position
and equip itself for fulfilling its homeland security missions and
functions.
However, more work remains for DHS to address gaps and weaknesses
in its current operational and implementation efforts, and to
strengthen the efficiency and effectiveness of those efforts to achieve
its full potential. For example, we have reported that many DHS
programs and investments have experienced cost overruns, schedule
delays, and performance problems, including, for instance, DHS's
recently cancelled technology program for securing U.S. borders, known
as the Secure Border Initiative Network, and some technologies for
screening passengers at airport checkpoints. Further, with respect to
the cargo advanced automated radiography system to detect certain
nuclear materials in vehicles and containers at ports DHS pursued the
acquisition and deployment of the system without fully understanding
that it would not fit within existing inspection lanes at ports of
entry. DHS subsequently canceled the program. DHS also has not yet
fully implemented its roles and responsibilities for developing and
implementing key homeland security programs and initiatives. For
example, DHS has not yet developed a set of target capabilities for
disaster preparedness or established metrics for assessing those
capabilities to provide a framework for evaluating preparedness, as
required by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act.\11\ Our
work has shown that DHS should take additional action to improve the
efficiency and effectiveness of a number of its programs and activities
by, for example, improving program management and oversight, and better
assessing homeland security requirements, needs, costs, and benefits,
such as those for key acquisition and technology programs. Table 1
provides examples of key progress and work remaining in DHS's
functional mission areas, with an emphasis on work we completed since
2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See 6 U.S.C. 749.
TABLE 1.--EXAMPLES OF KEY PROGRESS AND WORK REMAINING IN DHS'S EFFORTS TO IMPLEMENT ITS HOMELAND SECURITY
MISSIONS ON WHICH WE AND THE DHS IG HAVE REPORTED
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
QHSR Mission Functional Area Summary of Key Progress and Work Remaining
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mission 1: Preventing Terrorism and Aviation security........ Key progress.--DHS enhanced aviation security
Enhancing Security. in key areas related to passenger
prescreening, passenger checkpoint
screening, checked baggage screening, and
air cargo security. For example, DHS
developed and implemented Secure Flight as a
passenger prescreening program to match
airline passenger information against
terrorist watch list records. DHS also
deployed technology to screen passengers and
checked baggage at airports. For example, in
response to the December 25, 2009, attempted
attack on Northwest flight 253, DHS revised
the advanced imaging technology procurement
and deployment strategy, increasing the
planned deployment of advanced imaging
technology from 878 to between 1,350 and
1,800 units.(1) Further, DHS is screening
passengers using staff trained in behavior
detection principles and deployed about
3,000 Behavior Detection Officers to 161
airports as part of its Screening of
Passengers by Observation Techniques
program. Moreover, DHS reported, as of
August 2010, that it had established a
system to screen 100 percent of domestic air
cargo (cargo transported within and outbound
from the United States) transported on
passenger aircraft by, among other things,
creating a voluntary program to facilitate
screening throughout the air cargo supply
chain and taking steps to test technologies
for screening air cargo.
What remains to be done.--DHS should take
additional action to strengthen its aviation
security efforts. For example, a risk-based
strategy and a cost-benefit analysis of
airport checkpoint technologies would
improve passenger checkpoint screening.
TSA's strategic plan to guide research,
development, and deployment of passenger
checkpoint screening technologies was not
risk-based and did not reflect some of the
key risk management principles, such as
conducting a risk assessment based on the
three elements of risk--threat,
vulnerability, and consequence--and did not
include a cost-benefit analysis and
performance measures. Further, in March
2010, we reported that it was unclear
whether the advanced imaging technology
would have detected the weapon used in the
December 25, 2009 attempted terrorist attack
based on the preliminary testing information
we received. DHS also had not validated the
science supporting its Screening of
Passengers by Observation Techniques
program, or determined if behavior detection
techniques could be successfully used across
the aviation system to detect threats before
deploying the program. DHS completed a
program validation study in April 2011 which
found that the program was more effective
than random screening, but that more work
was needed to determine whether the science
could be used for counterterrorism purposes
in the aviation environment. Moreover, DHS
does not yet have a plan and schedule for
deploying checked baggage screening
technologies to meet recently enhanced
explosive detection requirements. In
addition, DHS does not yet have a mechanism
to verify the accuracy of domestic and
inbound air cargo screening data to help
ensure that screening is being conducted at
reported levels, and DHS does not yet have
approved technology to screen cargo once it
is loaded onto a pallet or container--both
of which are common means of transporting
air cargo on passenger aircraft, thus
requiring that screening occur before
incorporation into pallets and containers.
CBRN threats............. Key progress.--DHS made progress in assessing
risks posed by CBRN threats, developing CBRN
detection capabilities, and planning for
nuclear detection. For example, DHS develops
risk assessments of CBRN threats and has
issued seven classified CBRN risk
assessments since 2006. DHS also assessed
the threat posed by specific CBRN agents in
order to determine which of those agents
pose a material threat to the United States,
known as material threat assessments. With
regard to CBRN detection capabilities, DHS
implemented the BioWatch program in more
than 30 metropolitan areas to detect
specific airborne biological threat agents.
Further, DHS established the National
Biosurveillance Integration Center to
enhance the Federal Government's capability
to identify and track biological events of
National concern. In addition, DHS
coordinated the development of a strategic
plan for the global nuclear detection
architecture--a multidepartment effort to
protect against terrorist attacks using
nuclear and radiological materials through
coordinated activities--and has deployed
radiation detection equipment.
What remains to be done.--More work remains
for DHS to strengthen its CBRN assessment,
detection, and mitigation capabilities. For
example, DHS should better coordinate with
the Department of Health and Human Services
in conducting CBRN risk assessments by
developing written policies and procedures
governing development of the assessments.
Moreover, the National Biosurveillance
Integration Center lacks resources necessary
for operations, such as data and personnel
from its partner agencies. Additionally,
work remains for DHS in its implementation
of the global nuclear detection
architecture. Specifically, the strategic
plan for the architecture did not include
some key components, such as funding needed
to achieve the strategic plan's objectives,
or monitoring mechanisms for determining
programmatic progress and identifying needed
improvements. DHS officials told us that
they will address these missing elements in
an implementation plan, which they plan to
issue by the end of 2011.
Critical infrastructure Key progress.--DHS expanded its efforts to
protection--physical conduct risk assessment and planning,
assets. provide for protection and resiliency, and
implement partnerships and coordination
mechanisms for physical critical assets. For
example, DHS updated the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan to include an
emphasis on resiliency (the capacity to
resist, absorb, or successfully adapt,
respond to, or recover from disasters), and
enhanced discussion about DHS risk
management. Moreover, DHS components with
responsibility for critical infrastructure
sectors, such as transportation security,
have begun to use risk-based assessments in
their critical infrastructure-related
planning and protection efforts. Further,
DHS has various voluntary programs in place
to conduct vulnerability assessments and
security surveys at and across facilities
from the 18 critical infrastructure sectors,
and uses these assessments to develop and
disseminate information on steps asset
owners and operators can take to protect
their facilities. In addition, DHS
coordinated with critical infrastructure
stakeholders, including other Federal
regulatory authorities to identify overlaps
and gaps in critical infrastructure security
activities.
What remains to be done.--Additional actions
are needed for DHS to strengthen its
critical infrastructure protection programs
and efforts. For example, DHS has not fully
implemented an approach to measure its
effectiveness in working with critical asset
owners and operators in their efforts to
adopt measures to mitigate resiliency gaps
identified during various vulnerability
assessments. Moreover, DHS components have
faced difficulties in incorporating risk-
based assessments in critical infrastructure
planning and protection efforts, such as in
planning for security in surface
transportation modes like highway
infrastructure. Further, DHS should
determine the feasibility of developing an
approach to disseminating information on
resiliency practices to its critical
infrastructure partners to better position
itself to help asset owners and operators
consider and adopt resiliency strategies,
and provide them with information on
potential security investments.
Surface transportation Key progress.--DHS expanded its efforts in
security. key surface transportation security areas,
such as risk assessments and strategic
planning; the surface transportation
inspector workforce; and information
sharing. For example, DHS conducted risk
assessments of surface transportation modes
and developed a transportation sector
security risk assessment that assessed risk
within and across the various modes.
Further, DHS more than doubled its surface
transportation inspector workforce and, as
of July 2011, reported that its surface
inspectors had conducted over 1,300 site
visits to mass transit and passenger rail
stations to complete station profiles, among
other things. Moreover, DHS allocates
transit grant funding based on risk
assessments and has taken steps to measure
performance of its Transit Security Grant
Program, which provides funds to owners and
operators of mass transit and passenger rail
systems. In addition, DHS expanded its
sharing of surface transportation security
information by establishing information
networks.
What remains to be done.--DHS should take
further action to strengthen its surface
transportation security programs and
operations. For example, DHS's efforts to
improve elements of risk assessments of
surface transportation modes are in the
early stages of implementation. Moreover,
DHS noted limitations in its transportation
sector security risk assessment--such as the
exclusion of threats from ``lone wolf''
operators--that could limit its usefulness
in guiding investment decisions across the
transportation sector as a whole. Further,
DHS has not yet completed a long-term
workforce plan that identifies future needs
for its surface transportation inspector
workforce. It also has not yet issued
regulations for a training program for mass
transit, rail, and bus employees, as
required by the Implementing Recommendations
of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.(2)
Additionally, DHS's information-sharing
efforts would benefit from improved
streamlining, coordination, and assessment
of the effectiveness of information-sharing
mechanisms.
Mission 2: Securing and Managing Our Border security.......... Key progress.--DHS expanded its efforts in
Borders. key border security areas, such as
inspection of travelers and cargo at ports
of entry, security of the border between
ports of entry, visa adjudication security,
and collaboration with stakeholders.
Specifically, DHS has undertaken efforts to
keep terrorists and other dangerous people
from entering the country. For example, DHS
implemented the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant
Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT)
program to verify the identities of foreign
visitors entering and exiting the United
States by storing and processing biometric
and biographic information. DHS established
plans for, and had begun to interact with
and involve stakeholders in, developing an
exit capability. DHS deployed technologies
and other infrastructure to secure the
border between ports of entry, including
more than 600 miles of tactical
infrastructure, such as fencing, along the
border. DHS also deployed the Visa Security
Program, in which DHS personnel review visa
applications to help prevent individuals who
pose a threat from entering the United
States, to 19 posts in 15 countries, and
developed a 5-year expansion plan for the
program. In addition, DHS improved
collaboration with Federal, State, local,
Tribal, and international partners on
Northern border security efforts through,
among other things, the establishment of
interagency forums.
What remains to be done.--More work remains
for DHS to strengthen its border security
programs and operations. For example,
although it has developed a plan, DHS has
not yet adopted an integrated approach to
scheduling, executing, and tracking the work
needed to be accomplished to deliver a
comprehensive biometric exit solution as
part of the US-VISIT program. Further, DHS
experienced schedule delays and performance
problems with its information technology
program for securing the border between
ports of entry--the Secure Border Initiative
Network--which led to its cancellation.
Because of the program's decreased scope,
uncertain timing, unclear costs, and limited
life cycle management, it was unclear
whether DHS's pursuit of the program was
cost-effective. DHS is transitioning to a
new approach for border technology, which we
are assessing. With regard to the Visa
Security Program, DHS did not fully follow
or update its 5-year expansion plan. For
instance, it did not establish 9 posts
identified for expansion in 2009 and 2010,
and had not taken steps to address visa risk
at posts that did not have a Visa Security
Program presence. Additionally, DHS should
strengthen its oversight of interagency
forums operating along the Northern border.
Maritime security........ Key progress.--DHS expanded its efforts in
key maritime security areas, such as port
facility and vessel security, maritime
security domain awareness and information
sharing, and international supply chain
security. For example, DHS strengthened risk
management through the development of a risk
assessment model, and addressed risks to
port facilities through annual inspections
in which DHS identified and corrected
deficiencies, such as facilities failing to
follow security plans for access control.
Further, DHS took action to address risks
posed by foreign seafarers entering U.S.
seaports by, for example, conducting advance-
screening before the arrival of vessels at
U.S. ports, inspections, and enforcement
operations. DHS developed the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential program to
manage the access of unescorted maritime
workers to secure areas of regulated
maritime facilities. DHS also implemented
measures to help secure passenger vessels
including cruise ships, ferries, and energy
commodity vessels such as tankers, such as
assessing risks to these types of vessels.
Moreover, for tracking vessels at sea, the
Coast Guard uses a long-range identification
and tracking system, and a commercially
provided long-range automatic identification
system. For tracking vessels in U.S. coastal
areas, inland waterways, and ports, the
Coast Guard operates a land-based automatic
identification system, and also either
operates, or has access to, radar and
cameras in some ports. DHS also developed a
layered security strategy for cargo
container security, including deploying
screening technologies and partnering with
foreign governments.
What remains to be done.--DHS should take
additional action to strengthen its maritime
security efforts. For example, because of a
lack of technology capability, DHS did not
electronically verify identity and
immigration status of foreign seafarers, as
part of its on-board admissibility
inspections of cargo vessels, thus limiting
the assurance that fraud could be identified
among documents presented by them. In
addition, the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential program's controls
were not designed to provide reasonable
assurance that only qualified applicants
acquire credentials. For example, during
covert tests of the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential at several
selected ports, our investigators were
successful in accessing ports using
counterfeit credentials and authentic
credentials acquired through fraudulent
means. Moreover, DHS has not assessed the
costs and benefits of requiring cruise lines
to provide passenger reservation data for
screening, which could help improve
identification and targeting of potential
terrorists. Further, the vessel tracking
systems used in U.S. coastal areas, inland
waterways, and ports had more difficulty
tracking smaller and noncommercial vessels
because these vessels were not generally
required to carry automatic identification
system equipment, and because of the
technical limitations of radar and cameras.
In addition, DHS has made limited progress
in scanning containers at the initial ports
participating in the Secure Freight
Initiative, a program at selected ports with
the intent of scanning 100 percent of U.S.-
bound container cargo for nuclear and
radiological materials overseas, leaving the
feasibility of 100 percent scanning largely
unproven. CBP has not yet developed a plan
for full implementation of a statutory
requirement that 100 percent of U.S.-bound
container cargo be scanned by 2012.(3)
Mission 3: Enforcing and Administering Immigration enforcement.. Key progress.--DHS expanded its immigration
Our Immigration Laws. and customs enforcement programs and
activities in key areas such as overstay
enforcement, compliance with workplace
immigration laws, alien smuggling, and
firearms trafficking. For example, DHS
increased its resources for investigating
overstays (unauthorized immigrants who
entered the United States legally on a
temporary basis then overstayed their
authorized periods of admission) and alien
smuggling operations, and deployed border
enforcement task forces to investigate
illicit smuggling of people and goods,
including firearms. In addition, DHS took
action to improve the E-Verify program,
which provides employers a voluntary tool
for verifying an employee's authorization to
work in the United States, by, for example,
increasing the program's accuracy by
expanding the number of databases it can
query. Further, DHS expanded its programs
and activities to identify and remove
criminal aliens in Federal, State, and local
custody who are eligible for removal from
the United States by, for example, entering
into agreements with State and local law
enforcement agencies to train officers to
assist in identifying those individuals who
are in the United States illegally.
What remains to be done.--Key weaknesses
remain in DHS's immigration and customs
enforcement efforts. For example, DHS took
action to address a small portion of the
estimated overstay population in the United
States, and lacks measures for assessing its
progress in addressing overstays. In
particular, DHS field offices had closed
about 34,700 overstay investigations
assigned to them from fiscal year 2004
through 2010, as of October 2010; these
cases resulted in approximately 8,100
arrests, relative to a total estimated
overstay population of 4 million to 5.5
million.(4) Additionally, we reported that
since fiscal year 2006, U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement within DHS allocated
about 3 percent of its investigative work
hours to overstay investigations. Moreover,
DHS should better leverage opportunities to
strengthen its alien smuggling enforcement
efforts by assessing the possible use of
various investigative techniques, such as
those to follow cash transactions flowing
through money transmitters that serve as the
primary method of payment to those
individuals responsible for smuggling
aliens. Further, weaknesses with the E-
Verify program, including challenges in
accurately estimating E-Verify costs, put
DHS at an increased risk of not making
informed investment decisions.
Immigration services..... Key progress.--DHS improved the quality and
efficiency of the immigration benefit
administration process, and expanded its
efforts to detect and deter immigration
fraud. For example, DHS initiated efforts to
modernize its immigration benefit
administration infrastructure; improve the
efficiency and timeliness of its application
intake process; and ensure quality in its
benefit adjudication processes. Further, DHS
designed training programs and quality
reviews to help ensure the integrity of
asylum adjudications. Moreover, in 2004 DHS
established the Office of Fraud Detection
and National Security, now a directorate, to
lead immigration fraud detection and
deterrence efforts, and this directorate has
since developed and implemented strategies
for this purpose.
What remains to be done.--More work remains
in DHS's efforts to improve its
administration of immigration benefits. For
example, DHS's program for transforming its
immigration benefit processing
infrastructure and business practices from
paper-based to digital systems missed its
planned milestones by more than 2 years, and
has been hampered by management challenges,
such as insufficient planning and not
adhering to DHS acquisition guidance before
selecting a contractor to assist with
implementation of the transformation
program. Additionally, while the Fraud
Detection and National Security Directorate
put in place strategies for detecting and
deterring immigration fraud, DHS should take
additional action to address vulnerabilities
identified in its assessments intended to
determine the extent and nature of fraud in
certain applications. Further, despite
mechanisms DHS had designed to help asylum
officers assess the authenticity of asylum
claims, such as identity and security checks
and fraud prevention teams, asylum officers
we surveyed cited challenges in identifying
fraud as a key factor affecting their
adjudications. For example, 73 percent of
asylum officer survey respondents reported
it was moderately or very difficult to
identify document fraud.
Mission 4: Safeguarding and Securing Critical infrastructure Key progress.--DHS expanded its efforts to
Cyberspace. protection--cyber assets. conduct cybersecurity risk assessments and
planning, provide for the protection and
resilience of cyber assets, and implement
cybersecurity partnerships and coordination
mechanisms. For example, DHS developed the
first National Cyber Incident Response Plan
in September 2010 to coordinate the response
of multiple Federal agencies, State and
local governments, and hundreds of private
firms, to incidents at all levels. DHS also
took steps to secure external network
connections in use by the Federal Government
by establishing the National Cybersecurity
Protection System, operationally known as
Einstein, to analyze computer network
traffic information to and from agencies. In
2008, DHS developed Einstein 2, which
incorporated network intrusion detection
technology into the capabilities of the
initial version of the system. Additionally,
the Department made progress in enhancing
its cyber analysis and incident warning
capabilities through the establishment of
the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team,
which, among other things, coordinates the
Nation's efforts to prepare for, prevent,
and respond to cyber threats to systems and
communications networks. Moreover, since
conducting a major cyber attack exercise,
called Cyber Storm, DHS demonstrated
progress in addressing lessons it had
learned from this exercise to strengthen
public and private incident response
capabilities.
What remains to be done.--Key challenges
remain in DHS's cybersecurity efforts. For
example, to expand its protection and
resiliency efforts, DHS needs to lead a
concerted effort to consolidate and better
secure internet connections at Federal
agencies. Further, DHS faced challenges
regarding deploying Einstein 2, including
understanding the extent to which its
objective was being met because the
Department lacked performance measures that
addressed whether agencies report whether
the alerts represent actual incidents. DHS
also faces challenges in fully establishing
a comprehensive National cyber analysis and
warning capability. For example, the U.S.
Computer Emergency Readiness Team did not
fully address 15 key attributes of cyber
analysis and warning capabilities. These
attributes are related to: (1) Monitoring
network activity to detect anomalies, (2)
analyzing information and investigating
anomalies to determine whether they are
threats, (3) warning appropriate officials
with timely and actionable threat and
mitigation information, and (4) responding
to the threat. For example, the U.S.
Computer Emergency Readiness Team provided
warnings by developing and distributing a
wide array of notifications; however, these
notifications were not consistently
actionable or timely. Additionally,
expectations of private sector stakeholders
are not being met by their Federal partners
in areas related to sharing information
about cyber-based threats to critical
infrastructure.
Mission 5: Ensuring Resilience to Emergency preparedness Key progress.--DHS expanded its efforts to
Disasters. and response. improve National emergency preparedness and
response planning; improved its emergency
assistance services; and enhanced emergency
communications. For example, DHS developed
various plans for disaster preparedness and
response. In particular, in 2004 DHS issued
the National Response Plan and subsequently
made revisions to it, culminating in the
issuance of the National Response Framework
in January 2008, which outlines the guiding
principles and major roles and
responsibilities of Government,
nongovernmental organizations, and private
sector entities for response to disasters of
all sizes and causes. Further, DHS issued
the National Preparedness Guidelines that
describe a National framework for
capabilities-based preparedness, and a
Target Capabilities List, designed to
provide a National-level generic model of
capabilities defining all-hazards
preparedness. DHS also assisted local
communities with developing long-term
disaster recovery plans as part of its post-
disaster assistance. For example, DHS
assisted Iowa City's recovery from major
floods in 2008 by, among other things,
identifying possible Federal funding sources
for specific projects in the city's recovery
plan, and advising the city on how to
prepare effective project proposals. DHS is
also finalizing a National Disaster Recovery
Framework, intended to provide a model to
identify and address challenges that arise
during the disaster recovery process.
Moreover, DHS issued the National Emergency
Communications Plan--the first strategic
document for improving emergency
communications Nation-wide.
What remains to be done.--More work remains
in DHS's efforts to assess capabilities for
all-hazards preparedness and provide long-
term disaster recovery assistance. For
example, DHS has not yet developed National
preparedness capability requirements based
on established metrics to provide a
framework for assessing preparedness.
Further, the data DHS collected to measure
National preparedness were limited by
reliability and measurement issues related
to the lack of standardization. Until a
framework for assessing preparedness is in
place, DHS will not have a basis on which to
operationalize and implement its conceptual
approach for assessing local, State, and
Federal preparedness capabilities against
capability requirements and identify
capability gaps for prioritizing investments
in National preparedness. Moreover, with
regard to long-term disaster recovery
assistance, DHS's criteria for when to
provide the assistance were vague, and, in
some cases, DHS provided assistance before
State and local governments had the capacity
to work effectively with DHS. Additionally,
DHS should improve the efficacy of the grant
application and review process by mitigating
duplication or redundancy within the various
preparedness grant programs. Until DHS
evaluates grant applications across grant
programs, DHS cannot ascertain whether or to
what extent multiple funding requests are
being submitted for similar purposes.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO analysis based on the areas included in our September 2011 report.
(1) Advanced imaging technology units produce an image of a passenger's body that DHS personnel use to look for
anomalies, such as explosives or other prohibited items.
(2) The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act requires TSA to issue regulations for a training
program to prepare mass transit, rail, and over-the-road bus employees for potential security threats and
conditions. 6 U.S.C. 1137, 1167, 1184.
(3) See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1701(a), 121 Stat. 266, 489-490 (2007) (amending 6 U.S.C. 982(b)).
(4) According to our April 2011 report, the most recent estimates from the Pew Hispanic Center approximated
that, in 2006, out of an unauthorized resident alien population of 11.5 million to 12 million in the United
States, about 4 million to 5.5 million were overstays. Pew Hispanic Center, Modes of Entry for the
Unauthorized Migrant Population (Washington, DC: May 22, 2006).
Impacting the Department's ability to efficiently and effectively
satisfy its missions are: (1) The need to integrate and strengthen its
management functions; (2) the need for increased utilization of
performance assessments; (3) the need for an enhanced use of risk
information to inform planning, programming, and investment decision-
making; (4) limitations in effective sharing and use of terrorism-
related information; (5) partnerships that are not sustained or fully
leveraged; and (6) limitations in developing and deploying technologies
to meet mission needs. DHS made progress in addressing these areas, but
more work is needed, going forward, to further mitigate these
challenges and their impact on DHS's mission implementation.
For instance, DHS strengthened its performance measures in recent
years and linked its measures to the QHSR's missions and goals.
However, DHS and its components have not yet developed measures for
assessing the effectiveness of key homeland security programs, such as
programs for securing the border and preparing the Nation for emergency
incidents. For example, with regard to checkpoints DHS operates on U.S.
roads to screen vehicles for unauthorized aliens and contraband, DHS
established three performance measures to report the results of
checkpoint operations. However, the measures did not indicate if
checkpoints were operating efficiently and effectively and data
reporting and collection challenges hindered the use of results to
inform Congress and the public on checkpoint performance. Moreover, DHS
has not yet established performance measures to assess the
effectiveness of its programs for investigating alien smuggling
operations and foreign nationals who overstay their authorized periods
of admission to the United States, making it difficult for these
agencies to determine progress made in these areas and evaluate
possible improvements.
Further, DHS and its component agencies developed strategies and
tools for conducting risk assessments. For example, DHS has conducted
risk assessments of various surface transportation modes, such as
freight rail, passenger rail, and pipelines. However, the Department
needs to strengthen its use of risk information to inform its planning
and investment decision-making. For example, DHS could better use risk
information to plan and prioritize security measures and investments
within and across its mission areas, as the Department cannot secure
the Nation against every conceivable threat.
In addition, DHS took action to develop and deploy new technologies
to help meet its homeland security missions. However, in a number of
instances DHS pursued acquisitions without ensuring that the
technologies met defined requirements, conducting and documenting
appropriate testing and evaluation, and performing cost-benefit
analyses, resulting in important technology programs not meeting
performance expectations. For example, in 2006, we recommended that
DHS's decision to deploy next-generation radiation-detection equipment,
or advanced spectroscopic portals, used to detect smuggled nuclear or
radiological materials, be based on an analysis of both the benefits
and costs and a determination of whether any additional detection
capability provided by the portals was worth their additional cost. DHS
subsequently issued a cost-benefit analysis, but we reported that this
analysis did not provide a sound analytical basis for DHS's decision to
deploy the portals. In June 2009, we also reported that an updated
cost-benefit analysis might show that DHS's plan to replace existing
equipment with advanced spectroscopic portals was not justified,
particularly given the marginal improvement in detection of certain
nuclear materials required of advanced spectroscopic portals and the
potential to improve the current-generation portal monitors'
sensitivity to nuclear materials, most likely at a lower cost. In July
2011, DHS announced that it would end the advanced spectroscopic portal
project as originally conceived given the challenges the program faced.
As we have previously reported, while it is important that DHS
continue to work to strengthen each of its functional areas, it is
equally important that these areas be addressed from a comprehensive,
Department-wide perspective to help mitigate longstanding issues that
have impacted the Department's progress.
Key Themes Have Impacted DHS's Progress in Implementing Its Mission
Functions
Our work at DHS has identified several key themes--leading and
coordinating the homeland security enterprise, implementing and
integrating management functions for results, and strategically
managing risks and assessing homeland security efforts--that have
impacted the Department's progress since it began operations. These
themes provide insights that can inform DHS's efforts, moving forward,
as it works to implement its missions within a dynamic and evolving
homeland security environment. DHS made progress and has had successes
in all of these areas, but our work found that these themes have been
at the foundation of DHS's implementation challenges, and need to be
addressed from a Department-wide perspective to position DHS for the
future and enable it to satisfy the expectations set for it by the
Congress, the administration, and the country.
Leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise.--While
DHS is one of a number of entities with a role in securing the
homeland, it has significant leadership and coordination
responsibilities for managing efforts across the homeland security
enterprise. To satisfy these responsibilities, it is critically
important that DHS develop, maintain, and leverage effective
partnerships with its stakeholders, while at the same time addressing
DHS-specific responsibilities in satisfying its missions. Before DHS
began operations, we reported that the quality and continuity of the
new Department's leadership would be critical to building and
sustaining the long-term effectiveness of DHS and achieving homeland
security goals and objectives. We further reported that to secure the
Nation, DHS must form effective and sustained partnerships between
components and also with a range of other entities, including Federal
agencies, State and local governments, the private and nonprofit
sectors, and international partners.
DHS has made important strides in providing leadership and
coordinating efforts. For example, it has improved coordination and
clarified roles with State and local governments for emergency
management. DHS also strengthened its partnerships and collaboration
with foreign governments to coordinate and standardize security
practices for aviation security. However, DHS needs to take additional
action to forge effective partnerships and strengthen the sharing and
utilization of information, which has affected its ability to
effectively satisfy its missions. For example, we reported that the
expectations of private sector stakeholders have not been met by DHS
and its Federal partners in areas related to sharing information about
cyber-based threats to critical infrastructure. Without improvements in
meeting private and public sector expectations for sharing cyber threat
information, private-public partnerships will remain less than optimal,
and there is a risk that owners of critical infrastructure will not
have the information and mechanisms needed to thwart sophisticated
cyber attacks that could have catastrophic effects on our Nation's
cyber-reliant critical infrastructure. Moreover, we reported that DHS
needs to continue to streamline its mechanisms for sharing information
with public transit agencies to reduce the volume of similar
information these agencies receive from DHS, making it easier for them
to discern relevant information and take appropriate actions to enhance
security.
In 2005, we designated information sharing for homeland security as
high-risk because the Federal Government faced serious challenges in
analyzing information and sharing it among partners in a timely,
accurate, and useful way. Gaps in sharing, such as agencies' failure to
link information about the individual who attempted to conduct the
December 25, 2009, airline bombing, prevented the individual from being
included on the Federal Government's consolidated terrorist watch list,
a tool used by DHS to screen for persons who pose a security risk. The
Federal Government and DHS have made progress, but more work remains
for DHS to streamline its information sharing mechanisms and better
meet partners' needs. Moving forward, it will be important that DHS
continue to enhance its focus and efforts to strengthen and leverage
the broader homeland security enterprise, and build off the important
progress that it has made thus far. In addressing ever-changing and
complex threats, and with the vast array of partners with which DHS
must coordinate, continued leadership and stewardship will be critical
in achieving this end.
Implementing and integrating management functions for results.--
Following its establishment, the Department focused its efforts
primarily on implementing its various missions to meet pressing
homeland security needs and threats, and less on creating and
integrating a fully and effectively functioning department from 22
disparate agencies. This initial focus on mission implementation was
understandable given the critical homeland security needs facing the
Nation after the Department's establishment, and the enormous challenge
posed by creating, integrating, and transforming a Department as large
and complex as DHS. As the Department matured, it has put into place
management policies and processes and made a range of other
enhancements to its management functions--acquisition, information
technology, financial, and human capital management. However, DHS has
not always effectively executed or integrated these functions. In 2003,
we designated the transformation and integration of DHS as high-risk
because DHS had to transform 22 agencies into one Department, and
failure to effectively address DHS's management and mission risks could
have serious consequences for U.S. National and economic security.
Eight years later, DHS remains on our high-risk list. DHS has
demonstrated strong leadership commitment to addressing its management
challenges and has begun to implement a strategy to do so. Further, DHS
developed various management policies, directives, and governance
structures, such as acquisition and information technology management
policies and controls, to provide enhanced guidance on investment
decision-making. DHS also reduced its financial management material
weaknesses in internal control over financial reporting and developed
strategies to strengthen human capital management, such as its
Workforce Strategy for Fiscal Years 2011-2016.
However, DHS needs to continue to demonstrate sustainable progress
in addressing its challenges, as these issues have contributed to
schedule delays, cost increases, and performance problems in major
programs aimed at delivering important mission capabilities. For
example, in September 2010, we reported that the Science and Technology
Directorate's master plans for conducting operational testing of
container security technologies did not reflect all of the operational
scenarios that U.S. Customs and Border Protection was considering for
implementation. In addition, when it developed the US-VISIT program,
DHS did not sufficiently define what capabilities and benefits would be
delivered, by when, and at what cost, and the Department has not yet
determined how to deploy a biometric exit capability under the program.
Moreover, DHS does not yet have enough skilled personnel to carry out
activities in various areas, such as acquisition management; and has
not yet implemented an integrated financial management system,
impacting its ability to have ready access to reliable, useful, and
timely information for informed decision making. Moving forward,
addressing these management challenges will be critical for DHS's
success, as will be the integration of these functions across the
Department to achieve efficiencies and effectiveness.
Strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security
efforts.--Forming a new department while working to implement
statutorily mandated and Department-initiated programs and responding
to evolving threats, was, and is, a significant challenge facing DHS.
Key threats, such as attempted attacks against the aviation sector,
have impacted and altered DHS's approaches and investments, such as
changes DHS made to its processes and technology investments for
screening passengers and baggage at airports. It is understandable that
these threats had to be addressed immediately as they arose. However,
limited strategic and program planning by DHS and limited assessment to
inform approaches and investment decisions have contributed to programs
not meeting strategic needs or not doing so in an efficient manner. For
example, as we reported in July 2011, the Coast Guard's planned
acquisitions through its Deepwater Program, which began before DHS's
creation and includes efforts to build or modernize ships and aircraft
and supporting capabilities that are critical to meeting the Coast
Guard's core missions in the future, is unachievable due to cost
growth, schedule delays, and affordability issues. In addition, because
FEMA has not yet developed a set of target disaster preparedness
capabilities and a systematic means of assessing those capabilities, as
required by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act and
Presidential Policy Directive 8, it cannot effectively evaluate and
identify key capability gaps and target limited resources to fill those
gaps.
Further, DHS has made important progress in analyzing risk across
sectors, but it has more work to do in using this information to inform
planning and resource allocation decisions. Risk management has been
widely supported by Congress and DHS as a management approach for
homeland security, enhancing the Department's ability to make informed
decisions and prioritize resource investments. Since DHS does not have
unlimited resources and cannot protect the Nation from every
conceivable threat, it must make risk-informed decisions regarding its
homeland security approaches and strategies. Moreover, we have reported
on the need for enhanced performance assessment, that is, evaluating
existing programs and operations to determine whether they are
operating as intended or are in need of change, across DHS's missions.
Information on the performance of programs is critical for helping the
Department, Congress, and other stakeholders more systematically assess
strengths and weaknesses and inform decision-making. In recent years,
DHS has placed an increased emphasis on strengthening its mechanisms
for assessing the performance and effectiveness of its homeland
security programs. For example, DHS established new performance
measures, and modified existing ones, to better assess many of its
programs and efforts.
However, our work has found that DHS continues to miss
opportunities to optimize performance across its missions because of a
lack of reliable performance information or assessment of existing
information; evaluation among feasible alternatives; and, as
appropriate, adjustment of programs or operations that are not meeting
mission needs. For example, DHS's program for research, development,
and deployment of passenger checkpoint screening technologies lacked a
risk-based plan and performance measures to assess the extent to which
checkpoint screening technologies were achieving the program's security
goals, and thereby reducing or mitigating the risk of terrorist
attacks. As a result, DHS had limited assurance that its strategy
targeted the most critical risks and that it was investing in the most
cost-effective new technologies or other protective measures. As the
Department further matures and seeks to optimize its operations, DHS
will need to look beyond immediate requirements; assess programs'
sustainability across the long term, particularly in light of
constrained budgets; and evaluate tradeoffs within and among programs
across the homeland security enterprise. Doing so should better equip
DHS to adapt and respond to new threats in a sustainable manner as it
works to address existing ones.
concluding observations
Given DHS's role and leadership responsibilities in securing the
homeland, it is critical that the Department's programs and activities
are operating as efficiently and effectively as possible, are
sustainable, and continue to mature, evolve, and adapt to address
pressing security needs. DHS has made significant progress throughout
its missions since its creation, but more work is needed to further
transform the Department into a more integrated and effective
organization. DHS has also made important progress in strengthening
partnerships with stakeholders, improving its management processes and
sharing of information, and enhancing its risk management and
performance measurement efforts. These accomplishments are especially
noteworthy given that the Department has had to work to transform
itself into a fully functioning cabinet department while implementing
its missions--a difficult undertaking for any organization and one that
can take years to achieve even under less daunting circumstances.
Impacting the Department's efforts have been a variety of factors
and events, such as attempted terrorist attacks and natural disasters,
as well as new responsibilities and authorities provided by Congress
and the administration. These events collectively have forced DHS to
continually reassess its priorities and reallocate resources as needed,
and have impacted its continued integration and transformation. Given
the nature of DHS's mission, the need to remain nimble and adaptable to
respond to evolving threats, as well as to work to anticipate new ones,
will not change and may become even more complex and challenging as
domestic and world events unfold, particularly in light of reduced
budgets and constrained resources. To better position itself to address
these challenges, our work has shown that DHS should place an increased
emphasis and take additional action in supporting and leveraging the
homeland security enterprise, managing its operations to achieve needed
results, and strategically planning for the future while assessing and
adjusting, as needed, what exists today. Addressing these issues will
be critically important for the Department to strengthen its homeland
security programs and operations. Eight years after its establishment
and 10 years after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, DHS has
indeed made significant strides in protecting the Nation, but has yet
to reach its full potential.
Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to
respond to any questions you may have at this time.
Chairman King. Thank you, Comptroller General Dodaro.
My first question, I guess, would be to Secretary Ridge and
Chairman Hamilton. I am on this committee, and also the
Intelligence Committee, and I still haven't figured out what
the role of Director of National Intelligence is. I don't mean
that in a sarcastic way; under two administrations, there seems
to be no defined role, and if anything, the position seems to
be weakening. Chairman Hamilton, you mentioned that it may take
action by a President to firm up his responsibilities. I would
say the fact that we have had two heavyweights as head of the
CIA, Leon Panetta and General Petraeus, I don't see much
likelihood that you are going to see this President or any
President in the immediate future, cutting back on the powers
of the CIA and giving more to the DNI. So as a practical
matter, where do we stand with the DNI, do you think?
Mr. Hamilton. I think it is very important to understand
where we were before 9/11. At that time, you had the so-called
leader of the intelligence community, the Director of the CIA,
who didn't have power over the budget and most of the personnel
in the intelligence community. So all of the CIA Directors
focused on the CIA and not the other 14 or 15 elements of the
intelligence community.
Our principle recommendation in the 9/11 Commission report
was that you had to get away from stovepiping information from
conducting an agency on the basis of need-to-know and conduct
the agency on the basis of responsibility to share, because we
lost lives because we did not connect the dots and we did not
share information.
We recommended that you needed someone overseeing the
entire intelligence community with considerable power with
respect to personnel and budget. You passed a law saying that
the director of national intelligence had that power, but in
the same law, there was wordage that kind of weakened the power
so that you made it somewhat ambiguous.
So the Directors 4 and 6 years had a tough time in that
job. I think the Directors have performed very well and they
have been very able people. It is a tough spot, even with the
statutory power because you are dealing with very big players
in any administration, Secretary of Defense, CIA Director. So
regardless of the statutory powers you may have, you have to
exercise that power with a great deal of diplomacy and
discretion in order to make it work effectively. Personalities
are very, very important. I think the DNI has done tremendously
good work in forcing, if I my use the word, of the sharing of
information. No better example of that than what Tom Ridge
referred to, removal of Osama bin Laden, when we had a
marvelous example of sharing of information, coordination,
integration of military civilians components of our Government.
So I think, Mr. Chairman, the DNI is a work in progress. I
think he or several of them have made very significant progress
over a period of time. We are not there yet, you do not have
the seamless sharing of information that you would like to
have, but it seems to me a lot of progress has been made.
My personal preference would be to see a law enacted making
it unambiguously clear that this man is in charge because
somebody has to knock heads, to be blunt about it, within the
intelligence community to get them to coordinate and integrate
their activities. I think almost the same thing could be
accomplished if the President made very, very clear repeatedly
of his support for the DNI. I think President Bush and
President Obama have both done that, but not as forcefully and
repeatedly as I think the job requires.
So a work in progress, a lot of progress made, still a lot
to do in improving intelligence sharing in the Government.
Chairman King. Secretary Ridge, do you have anything to add
to that?
Mr. Ridge. Just one comment, I appreciate Lee Hamilton's
perspective on that and I share it. The role of the DNI, if you
look at it loosely, might be to coordinate activity. Well, this
is a tough town to coordinate activity between agencies that
have a mindset that are led by very strong personalities. So to
the extent that we could clarify with great specificity the
role of the DNI, is it strictly oversight? Does he have
budgetary control? It is one thing to control in this town, or
at least to have the opportunity to coordinate activity, but I
think it would be well stated if you really want to get
someone's attention, you control the purse strings.
So I think the men who have served us as DNI have done a
remarkable job. I think it is a very difficult task, given the
institutional mindset of all the agencies over which he has
that has that oversight responsibility and coordination
responsibility. I dare say obviously I was not privy to some of
the conversations that the DNIs have had with respect to
intelligence community leaders, but it is pretty difficult for
them, and I think as Congressman Lee Hamilton has pointed out,
perhaps further clarification with greater specificity as to
who is in charge might be helpful.
Chairman King. My time is running over. I would like to ask
one very important question to Chairman Hamilton and Secretary
Ridge, this is an issue that the Ranking Member and I fully
agree on: Can you just emphasize, if you would, the importance
of radio interoperability and allocation spectrum, Lee or Tom?
Mr. Hamilton. Look, this is another no-brainer. The people
of responsibility at the scene of a disaster must have the
ability to communicate with one another, not just verbally, but
exchanging all kinds of data and information that can be
helpful to the first responder. This is a source of enormous
frustration to me--why we can't solve this problem 10 years
after the fact.
I know there are two bills pending in the Congress. You can
argue it round, you can argue it flat, I don't really want to
get into that this morning. I think it is less important which
of these approaches is taken than it is to get it done. We
cannot permit delay of this, we lost lives at 9/11, we lost
lives at Katrina, because we were not able to get good
communication.
One thing you know when you study these disaster events is
that communications under the best of circumstances are going
to fail. It is a chaotic situation, but going into the event,
you want to have the best communications you can, so my plea to
you is get this thing resolved. I think it is an urgent
question. Shame on us, shame on us if we have not solved that
problem when the next disaster strikes.
Chairman King. Secretary Ridge.
Mr. Ridge. Once again, I find myself joined at the hip with
Lee Hamilton, to put it simply, ladies and gentlemen, the
technology exists, where is the political will to get it done?
By the way, there are competing measures before the House and
Senate, but I will tell you this: Policemen and firemen,
emergency responders want you to make a choice, all they want
is a system. The opportunity to get voice and data and video
over the broadband, not just in response to a terrorist attack,
but a natural disaster or horrible accident or incident. I
mean, what it will do for this country, although it is an
investment based upon the reality and the horror and the
tragedy associated with 9/11 would dramatically improve public
safety across the board. To repeat again, it is not a matter of
the technology that exists, I guess it is somebody's charge to
pull together the political will in order to execute on the
commitment and the recommendation of the 9/11 Commission.
Mr. Hamilton. I want to commend the Chairman and the
Ranking Member for the bill they have introduced here; that is
excellent leadership.
Chairman King. Thank you. I thank the Ranking Member for
his indulgence and the Ranking Member is recognized for as much
time as he wants.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. For Mr.
Hamilton, jurisdiction is the heart and soul of a committee's
ability to get things done. As you know, that's an issue we
tried when Democrats were in charge, we tried when Republicans
are in charge to get the jurisdiction of the committee
consolidated. Your testimony, as well as Secretary Ridge's,
have both indicated that it is, again, another one of those no-
brainers for us not to get done. Can you just for the umpteenth
time repeat how important consolidated jurisdiction is.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, I think both the Chairman and you, Mr.
Thompson, have articulated it very well in your opening
statements. I don't know how many committees and subcommittees
are now involved, I think close to 100 in oversight in both
Houses in oversight of the DHS. Governor Ridge, Secretary Ridge
can speak to that better than I, but it is an enormous burden
to put on a Secretary to come running up here all the time, as
important as that is on occasion, and to answer all the
questions in the reports so that the fragmented jurisdiction
becomes a real hindrance to the effective performance of the
Department of DHS, and they have enough problems without an
additional one here.
Now, I served, I think, on every Congressional reform
effort we had in this Congress during my years in the Congress,
and I think our results were less than spectacular, but I know
something about how difficult it is to change jurisdictions. I
think what has to be done here is for Members of Congress, and
particularly the leadership of the Congress, to recognize that
in setting up these jurisdictions, they are not just moving
boxes around to placate members of their caucus; they are
dealing with the lives of the American people. The
jurisdiction, an integrated jurisdiction of oversight
committees is essential to the effective performance of the
Homeland Security Department.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Secretary, do you want to take a shot at
it?
Mr. Ridge. Thank you, Congressman. I can remember very
proudly and happily the 12 years that I served in the Congress
of the United States. I must say sitting down at this level, I
think I probably enjoy asking questions more than answering
them, but that is another story, I am certainly enjoying this
conversation we are having today.
But I remember time and time again, with colleagues on both
sides of the aisle, walking over to get a vote and we would be
scampering from a committee or subcommittee, and we would all
lament, ugh, we are so overscheduled, we don't get a chance to
spend an hour or two in committee, because there is so much
jurisdiction that has been shared, and there aren't too many
people that stay focused on one or two committees, because the
diversity of assignments is really a burden, even on the
Members of Congress.
I believe that the Department still is evolving, still
trying to integrate the business line formalities associated
with procurement reform and budget reform and finance and HR
and IT, and you still have the responsibility to develop and
execute on policies, your partnership, the partnership of the
Congress of the United States, the strategic partnership that
is absolutely essential to the success of the Department in
enhancing security of the United States is enhanced if you can
compress the number of committees and subcommittees so that
there is a certain level of broad-based expertise among a
smaller group of Members, of House and Senate Members, to help
oversee the continued evolution of the Department.
Again, that responsibility falls on leadership, and we are
hopeful that one of these days we create that true strategic
relationship in partnership by integrating some of these
committees so that there is not as much oversight. I can
recall, in my own experience, we had a conducting war in
Afghanistan and Iraq, and I appeared before the House and the
Senate more often than Secretary Rumsfeld did. That is not just
yours truly, that is the Under Secretary and the Deputy
Secretaries.
By the way, everybody takes their responsibility to appear
before you seriously. There are briefing books, there are
boards that we sit in front of our colleagues and ask questions
that we might anticipate from you, and obviously there are
questions from the record. You would be a much stronger
strategic partner if you would consolidate the jurisdiction. I
think the DHS, regardless of administration and who is in
charge would benefit from it and certainly appreciate it.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Dodaro, there is a question about resilience in
spending. You have looked at what the Department is doing well,
and what they need to improve on, but there are some people who
say we have invested several hundred billion dollars in DHS,
can we look at that investment and say that there is a level of
security that we can reach that won't guarantee that nothing
bad will happen, but we need to also prepare the public for
when something bad happens, how we come back as a Nation,
whether it is a county, city, or State. Have you looked at that
issue from an investment of dollars standpoint and see whether
we should be also preparing for something to happen?
Mr. Dodaro. Yeah, we basically looked at the concept of
resiliency and the fact that it needed to be built better into
the planning efforts of the Department along with the response
plan. We focused a lot on the initial recovery from an event,
or excuse me--I got it backwards. The initial response, but the
recovery efforts have been ones that take longer, and still go
on over a period of time. So we have looked at it conceptually.
We haven't, I don't believe, looked at it in terms of how
many dollars are going to that area versus the other areas.
What we have looked at, though, is a lot of the investments
that have been made over the years. I do think the Department
greatly needs to expand its capabilities to make those
investments more wisely and prudently.
We made many recommendations, they developed better plans
but they have to implement those plans in order to make sure
that whatever investments they are making, whether through
initial response or recovery or resiliency are going to provide
a good return on the investment for the American People. I
think they have had some major problems right now on their IT
portfolio; there are 46 projects over $3 billion that are in
need of serious management attention by their own accounts on
the board. So this is a broad-based problem, Congressman, it is
not one just focused on resiliency versus----
Mr. Thompson. The point I am trying to get at is: Do we
continue to throw good money after situations? Or is there a
point where we have to, from a policy standpoint, prepare this
country to be able to come back after an occurrence,
notwithstanding doing the best job you can.
I think the resiliency aspect of the Department is
something we need to put front and center, because every
situation that occurs historically, we throw millions and
sometimes billions of dollars after it. In the Christmas day
bombing instance, we bought machines for airports that people
already said will not detect other items that we already know
that will be coming through airports. So is that good money
after--that is what I am trying----
Mr. Dodaro. Basically, I agree there is a need to make more
prudent investments. We have said many times in our reports
that the technologies need to be tested in operating
environments before they are deployed, and we made many
recommendations to make sure that they strengthen their ability
to do that. There is the initial reaction that people want to
do something quickly. You know, we have suggested they need to
put better processes in place to make sure whatever they do
when they make those investments, they actually work in
practice, and so I agree completely with you. I know we made
many recommendations. I think the Department's trying to
improve their acquisition processes and their investment
policies. We are going to stay focused on that issue to help
make sure that they do.
We have the managing transforming implementing the
Department of Homeland Security on our high-risk list that we
keep for the Congress. One of the main reasons it is on the
high-risk list is because of management practices that support
these provisions haven't been implemented using best practices.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. I thank the Ranking Member, and I now
recognize the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms. Miller, for 5
minutes.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate all the witnesses coming today and your service to
the Nation. Just a quick observation before I ask my question,
and I will pick up on something Secretary Ridge said when you
mention about the underwear bomber, the Christmas bomber in
lack of sharing information. You know, this particular incident
has sort of fallen off the National radar screen, but I tell
you, it sure hasn't for us that are in the Detroit area,
because it is crazy watching this guy go through the Federal
court system. He is now representing himself. Of course, we had
to give him his Miranda rights, we sent him to University of
Michigan, the best burn place in the entire Nation. Here is a
guy who, in my mind, should have been tried as an enemy
combatant in GITMO or a military tribunal, and it makes me
nuts.
I know you are a Vietnam veteran, my husband as well. I am
pretty sure when you were in Vietnam and you were looking at
the enemy, you didn't think about giving them the Miranda
rights or what have you, and letting them go through the
Federal court system. We are facing a different kind of enemy.
Every time I look at the poster in the back showing the Twin
Towers, I think about the cockroaches, these murderers, these
terrorists that are after us now.
That particular day, that guy saw the battlefield in an
asymmetrical term, and the battlefield in his mind that day was
on seat 19-A on that Northwest flight. I think it is outrageous
that this administration does not treat these terrorists as
enemy combatants; that is what they are. We need to have a very
clear view of the enemy that we are facing if we are going to
be successful, I believe, in securing our borders and securing
our homeland.
I would like to ask a question about the visa issue that
both the Secretary and Mr. Dodaro mentioned as well. I am the
chair of the Border Subcommittee, Border and Maritime. My
Ranking Member, Mr. Cuellar and I are going to have a hearing
next week actually focusing on this entire visa situation,
which is of great consternation, as pointed out in the 9/11
Commission recommendation. Continues to be obviously something
of great consternation. It has been advanced that about half of
all the illegal aliens that are in our country actually did not
come here across the border, they actually are here because
they overstayed their visas. As was mentioned, four of the nine
terrorists on 9/11 were here on expired visas. The Department
of Homeland Security right now has a backlog that they are
vetting, 757,000 expired visas that they are trying to vet
right now that have been overstayed.
I know you mentioned about the entrance vehicles that we
have for visa, but the exit strategy the exit program that we
have is sorely lacking. There has been a lot of talk about the
expense of whether it is biometrics or whether it is iris scan,
whatever we would do for that. Perhaps you could flesh out--I
haven't read all of your 1,500 recommendations yet, I will try
to do that. But in regards to the visa, is there anything you
could tell us pre our hearing?
Mr. Dodaro. Yes, first I mentioned the visa security
program, this is where DHS is working with State Department in
the initial screening before the visas are given. Right now,
there is only, I think, about--they are not fully deployed in
all high-risk areas. I can provide the statistics for the
record, but our basic point there is that having DHS work more
with the State Department can enhance that initial screening
process, and that is particularly important because of this
overstay issue and it will take us a while to deal with that
issue. So we think DHS can either be deployed more to work with
the State Department, but also can work with remotely here to
work with them, to screen them and communicate electronically.
The main point there is that all high-risk countries should
be covered and can be covered. Right now they are not covered.
Also, on the visa waiver countries, the electronic notification
system, that is working fairly well and about 98 percent of the
people are authorized using the electric system, but 2 percent
are not, and that is over 600,000 people. So those are trying
to--we made a recommendation to the Department that they figure
out why they were allowed to enter even though the electronic
notification did not work properly in that area. Then there is
the exit system and strategy. There have been a number of
pilots and tests, but they haven't provided satisfactory
answers. That is one of the things I wanted us to do more work
on to see if we can help identify some means to do this. It is
a huge issue, but it is very important. Until we have all three
of those initial--screening in countries that are not in a
visa--that are required to have a visa that are not in a visa
waiver, those that in visa waiver, and have an exit system, you
won't have a complete system of protection.
Mr. Hamilton. Can I just add in response? A biometric
system is required today by law, it is in the law. The DHS will
tell you that it costs too much to implement. Well, if that is
the case, then they should come back to the Congress and give
us a plan as to how they are going to deal with it and ask you
for the money. But like anything that is complex, the thing to
do here under the present circumstances is to phase it in, and
that might take a period of a few years. You can start with the
vast majority of travelers who go by air, and you can have a
biometric exit system today incorporated into our current
airline operations without much difficulty, very similar to the
way that you get a seat upgrade in a reservation situation. You
can do it with one fingerprint per passenger.
So what I am saying is that it is a tough problem, it is
not easy, it is expensive. But the law is the law and it is
vitally important to the security of the country that we have a
biometric exit system. If you can't do it all at once, which
you probably cannot, at the very least we ought to phase it in.
The next stop, the Canadian border, you are right up there
with the Canadian border, you could make that land border entry
to Canada an exit of the United States and new technology could
play a role into making exit a reality there at a reasonable
cost. I want to see us move ahead on this.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
Chairman King. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez,
is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, gentlemen,
thank you for your service to our country and for being before
us today. I wanted to comment a little bit on the whole issue
of jurisdiction, because you all have no problem with us up
here wanting to solidify the jurisdiction of this committee. It
is very frustrating on our part to put so much time and effort
into understanding the issues that the Department is dealing
with, to doing our oversight to it, to trying and to going
along and drafting legislation and to trying to pass it,
passing it up committee in many cases, and then having it
stymied because it has got to have another jurisdiction, it has
got to go to another committee, and they never take it up or
they--they really never take it up. So when you look at the
actual legislation that comes out of this committee it has been
very little in the 5 or 6 or 7 years we have been around now
because we are stymied by those jurisdictional issues. So
anything you can do to continue to sort of push the Congress to
get it all in one place, or at least in less than the 88
subcommittees, committees both on the Senate and this side,
that I last counted that have some piece of jurisdiction would
be important for us here to be able to actually follow through
on a lot of the work that we do.
I am also very concerned with the US-VISIT program. Before
Mr. Cuellar I was the chairman of, when the Democrats
controlled, the chairman, of the Maritime Border Committee, and
that was a very big issue for us. In fact when Secretary
Napolitano was before our committee this year I asked her
specifically about the exit part of the US-VISIT program, and
she said basically that the Department was not going to
continue to work on that exit piece and instead would prefer to
put monies into ICE and that there was really no way that--the
Department has stopped working on the back end of that. So in a
minute if you could give a comment to that, whether you think
that is wise or whether we should continue, as my good friend
Mr. Hamilton said, to at least begin to implement it in the
airport situation.
I also want to ask you about the TWIC program, if any of
you are familiar with it. That is a transportation worker
identification card. In particular maybe to our Secretary over
there. Because we have had so many problems in putting this
together. It is a biometric card, it is a card that is supposed
to be read by a reader, there are no readers yet. It is just--
and it is a big, big problem in particular for people who--for
workers who have to go every day and who have to take time
away.
Do you think a mail-in system to renew, we are almost
coming on the fifth year of the renewal of this TWIC card for
many of our workers and they are going to be facing some of the
very same problems they faced 5 years ago when we started into
this program of how do I get it, where do I go, do I have to
drive 2 hours to go to a station to pick it up? As you know,
right now it is just a flash card rather than a reader card.
So if you could comment to that. The last thing is the
issue of the continuity of the Congress, in particular as it
relates to the House of Representatives. We really have done
nothing to ensure--and as you know, in the House of
Representatives if something should happen to a majority of us
there would need to be special elections in order to put
someone forward and be able to constitute the House back. That
might be a laborious process. If you could comment at all to
whether the Congress should or this House should really be
concerned about doing something about the continuity of the
Congress. Any of you who would like to.
Mr. Dodaro. I will start. On the TWIC card, and I would be
happy to submit our report on this card for the record, we find
a lot of control problems with the card in terms of how DHS
enrolls people to use the card, the fact that they don't
require updates as to whether people still need the card or
not. We actually had undercover investigators gain access to
ports with fake TWIC cards and false documents. So there is a
lot of control problems in order to make it work effectively
under the current program. We have made a number of
recommendations. I will submit that report for the record.
With regard to trying to address the overstay issue with
ICE resources, basically that would be helpful, but that is
really not going to address the problem in our opinion. ICE
basically has about 1,000 cases a year where they identify
overstays. That is compared with estimates of 4 to 5 million
people in the country. So I think the exit system is very
important. It needs to be implemented, whether it is in phases
or not. The volume is too big. It is always more difficult to
find people after they are here than to make sure you know when
they are leaving.
So those are my comments on those two issues.
Mr. Hamilton. On the continuity of Congress question, I
have not looked into that in great detail, but obviously you
ought to--we ought to be very sympathetic to that. The airplane
that came down in Pennsylvania we think was headed for the
Capitol building. Had it struck at the right time and the right
place you could have had a high number of casualties among
Members of Congress. So I think it is a serious matter. It is a
few years back probably not so serious, but becoming more
serious. The technology that is becoming increasingly available
to the terrorists, including anthrax, and we saw the effort to
acquire castor beans for the production of this ricin, a very
toxic poison. Those kinds of things could strike on Capitol
Hill very quickly. So I am quite sympathetic to efforts, and I
don't know the detail of them on the continuity of the
Congress.
On the committee jurisdiction question, I have wrestled
with that one. It seems to me that if it is going to be done it
has to be done at the beginning of a session, because that is
when you consider the structure of the Congress, and it has to
be done by a bipartisan agreement among the leadership. It
could not possibly be done by the leadership of a single party.
The perspective that has to be taken is that this is a National
security matter, lives of Americans are at stake on the basis
of the quality of oversight of the Congress, and this is not a
matter of placating members of your party caucus, this is a
National security matter.
Now, we all know that the leadership wrestles with an awful
lot of problems, and they tend to solve those problems, my
experience would be, on the basis of their caucus, a leader's
report to the caucus and follow the will of the caucus. I have
suggested to the Executive Branch that they--and incidentally
the Executive Branch is enormously frustrated by this, really
frustrated. Director of Intelligence, DHS, and Tom has--
Governor Ridge has expressed that very well. I suggested the
other day to some of the Executive Branch people that maybe
what should be done is to put together kind of a super
committee, if you would, of past National security people who
have great stature, Republican and Democrat, and go to the
leadership prior to the beginning of a new Congress and just
try to explain to them how important this matter is, that this
is really critical for the National security of the United
States. All of them would say that, I have had no doubt about
it, because I have talked to all of them. Try to get the
leadership to see this problem in terms of a National security
problem rather than helping particular Members retain
jurisdiction of the DHS. It is a very tough problem, and I am
very open to other suggestions on it, but maybe this is worth a
crack. Bipartisan leadership action will be necessary to get it
done.
Chairman King. Thank you. The next person in line to ask
questions is Congressman Walberg, but Congressman Marino has
been called back to his district on an emergency and
Congressman Walberg has agreed to let Mr. Marino go. The
gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Marino. Thank you so much. I appreciate it. Mr. Dodaro,
being a former prosecutor, a district attorney, a U.S.
attorney, I know the importance of trying to be able to
communicate with agencies, whether it is a terrorist attack,
whether it is an automobile accident or a drug raid. I am all
for coming up with a system and implementing it whereby if we
needed to someone in Pennsylvania could be talking to someone
in Florida via some type of direct communication.
Have you ever calculated or estimated what the cost of
something like that would be, because I know in my area of
northeastern and north central Pennsylvania the mountains cause
a great many problems, so we are probably talking about
satellite. Do you have any idea what that would cost us?
Mr. Dodaro. As a Pennsylvanian native myself I understand
the mountains.
Mr. Marino. I am a graduate of Lycoming.
Mr. Dodaro. All right. Very good. I don't believe we have.
I know we have done a lot of work looking at the development of
standards to ensure that the interoperable communications could
take place. I will go back and I will check with my team, and
if we have anything on that I will give it to you. But I can't
think of anything off the top of my head where we have done the
calculation that you are requesting. It would be an interesting
exercise.
Mr. Marino. This is one area where I am leaning in the
direction of it would pay for itself 10 times over. But thank
you, I appreciate that.
Mr. Hamilton. The CBO has made estimates on this and it is
expensive, there isn't any doubt about it. To put a D-Block
network construction in place the estimates run between $11
billion and $24 billion that I have seen. Now, you are going to
have to do all you can of course to control costs. The auction
of some of the spectrum can be used. I know that is a very
complicated matter, difficult matter. But like all tough
decisions in Government it is a matter of priorities here. The
capacity of the first responders to talk to one another is so
important it seems to me the costs have to be worked out. It is
a very high priority. We lose hundreds of lives because of
this.
Mr. Marino. I have experienced that myself.
Mr. Ridge. Congressman, if I might, being familiar a little
bit with Pennsylvania myself, I dare say it would be a long
time I suspect before we have the kind of technology that will
reach into every community in every State, I suspect, as good
as the wireless is and as good as the technology and the
dramatic improvements within the private sector on a regular
basis to expand the reach. But I don't think we ought to make
the perfect the enemy of the good. I think it is also--it is
like the mindset you bring to homeland security, you manage the
risk. What do you do to reduce the risk in this instance, you
say to yourself. You say to yourselves: What do we do to bring
the maximum best communication capability with existing
technology to as many people, communities, and States as we
can? It already exists. I think you probably, with the existing
infrastructure and technology we have, you probably cover 90,
95 percent of America. I think we ought to move as quickly as
possible.
Mr. Marino. Congressman Hamilton and Governor Ridge, this
final question. There has been some talk among colleagues,
among people out in the field, that do you think at this point
there should be at least a discussion as to combining
Department of Homeland Security as a department with another
department? Would there be any efficiency in that? For example,
Defense.
Mr. Hamilton. Creating a new department of Government is
arduous work. Once you have created it the work is just
beginning in a sense. I was around here when we created the
Department of Energy back in 1976, and sometimes I wonder
whether we have got an integrated department there even today.
DHS has had very good leadership. Tom Ridge, a good example of
that.
Mr. Marino. That wasn't my intent at all. I just want to
make that clear.
Mr. Hamilton. No, no. But getting, what was it, 22 agencies
or something like that, that were brought together, it has now
got a budget of $50 billion, or whatever the figure is. And if
you suddenly move to a new reorganization I would be quite
skeptical of that at this time. I think the focus at this point
should be on getting the DHS to work and to work much better.
Because when you reorganize a major department of government in
the Federal Government you have really got a formidable task on
your hand.
Mr. Marino. Governor, I have 8 seconds.
Mr. Ridge. Well, I recall the days where we were actually
trying to identify the units of Government that we would pull
together to aggregate them to create the Department of Homeland
Security, and there was much discussion as to other entities
that would be pulled in or not. I believe that the Congress,
and working with the Executive Branch at that time, assimilated
the right number in the right groups. The Congress and think
tanks have been looking for a border-centric agency long before
9/11. All those reports, like a lot of others, just kind of
gathered dust. So I think we need to remind ourselves that they
weren't new individuals, that most of these were men and women
working in existing agencies. That assimilation process
continues, No. 1.
We also need to remind ourselves that in addition to
Homeland Security, whether you are Customs and Border
Protection, FEMA, the Secret Service, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, Coast Guard, they all have traditional missions as
well, and on top of those missions we layered on additional
responsibilities with Homeland Security. So I think if you want
to integrate anything to make homeland security more effective
and more efficient, you integrate Congressional jurisdiction
because it is a National security issue. You don't need to
integrate it with anything else, you just really need to
integrate committee oversight so Congress can truly become the
strategic partner that DHS needs.
Mr. Marino. Gentlemen, thank you. Chairman, thank you. I am
sorry, what Congressperson gave me their time?
Chairman King. Mr. Walberg.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, sir.
Chairman King. The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee,
is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I
believe it is appropriate during these days prior to the tenth
anniversary that conjures emotions amongst many of us is to
really cite the patriotism of the three witnesses and the value
that they have given to the necessity of securing the homeland.
I pay tribute to each of you in your own responsibilities and
ways that you have led, and thank you so very much for that
service. I want to acknowledge as well our Chairman and Ranking
Member because they are accurate that we have worked together.
The one thing that we have not done on this committee is
challenge Members' patriotism. We have disagreed on policy, but
we have not challenged the patriotism. I consider each of the
Members and myself a lover of this Nation and a patriot. I am
so grateful that even though we critique studies that the 9/11
Commission will find its place in history along with Secretary
Ridge, who had to feel your way after the aftermath of 9/11,
but the 9/11 Commission report, Congressman Hamilton, will be a
book that we will continue to learn from. I think it is
important and would like to join the legislation of Mr. Wolf
and Mr. King of reinitiating I think the 9/11 Commission, if I
am correct. I think that is important.
I believe that it will be important for us to make two
commitments. One, 10 years later we should have the ability to
communicate amongst the first responders and of course anyone
that is addressing a natural disaster or a man-made disaster.
The second commitment is the combination of jurisdiction. The,
if you will, combining, so that we have an efficiency of scale.
I would like to put it at the level of saving lives.
The last point, as I approach a question, is to thank our
first responders, but to add to that our rescuers, because
there are those who came unlabeled at the World Tower. In
Pennsylvania obviously there was devastation and lack of the
possibility of anyone who would survive, but no one knew that
in the Towers and there were a lot of those who were discovered
and found. Let me thank all of those individuals. If I might
say, I had hoped that maybe in these next hours the New York
celebration will find a way to add our first responders and add
those who may not have been able to find space. Get a big PA
system and just put them all up in Manhattan and I think they
would all be happy.
The reason why I lay that groundwork is because I don't
think there is a more important task than what we have before
us. I wanted to probe, Mr. Hamilton, the comment that you made
about the inability to detect explosives and the comment in our
memorandum that says that aviation in airports still remain
vulnerable. Can you expand on your point about the inability to
detect explosives and my belief that this is still, aviation in
airports is still one of the more attractive targets for
terrorists?
Mr. Hamilton. I think a lot of effort has been made in the
area of technology to develop a device that can detect
immediately various kinds of explosives that may be hidden on
your body or in your body. This is a problem that precedes 9/
11. This too has been a great concern that over the years, and
having spent a lot of money and having a lot of I guess very
able scientists looking into it, we have not succeeded yet.
The GAO I think has issued a report on this, and I am sure
the Comptroller General may want to comment. But I think we
have to accelerate this effort as best we can and get our act
together because this is a huge vulnerability in our air
traffic system today. The Detroit incident has already been
referred to here, but I think DHS really has to bear down on
this. Governor Ridge, Secretary Ridge may be able to comment on
it as well, to develop the technology to the point that we can
make the detection of all kinds of explosives. All of us
recognize the vulnerability.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you for your service and add
these questions, if I might, Mr. Chairman, to let Secretary
Ridge and----
Chairman King. The time of the gentlelady has expired, so
unless Mr. Ridge wants to answer the questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, if I can put these questions on the
record.
Chairman King. On the record, sure.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Since other Members went over, let me just
ask this question that falls under----
Chairman King. Well, no one asked a question beyond the 5
minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, it falls under my committee.
Chairman King. Well, the gentlelady can ask questions. They
won't be answered. They can be answered in writing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If you would comment in the course of
answering the one about exposure of the value of a passenger
fee for security and not privatizing TSA.
Chairman King. I would ask if the answer would be given in
writing to that question. The gentleman from Michigan, Mr.
Walberg, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panelists
for being here today and for your service. Being a new Member
on the Cybersecurity Subcommittee, it has been an eye-opener
for me beyond just my normal thought that the light switch
works when I turn it on and off and the computer screen comes
on and I have the necessary protections on my computer that I
can purchase for various things. But as I have got into this
committee it has been amazing to think of what has to be done
in an age when a small cell of terrorists can spend very little
money to purchase resources that can break into and in fact can
destroy infrastructure very quickly. Thinking of CMS Energy in
my district and Detroit Edison and going through some of the
processes that they do, amazing processes that deal with these
cyber attacks that come in on a regular basis, and then hearing
talk about from our own Government level of the need to have a
public-private partnership in dealing with these concerns for
our energy infrastructure, our computer communications
infrastructure.
I guess my question would go along this line, specifically
to Governor Ridge and Congressman Hamilton. What is the best
way to address this threat to our critical infrastructure from
those that don't even need to set a foot in our land, and also
what can be done to improve this partnership, this public-
private partnership that everybody talks about but at this
point in time, at least to my understanding, doesn't seem to be
implemented to a great degree yet and is always seemingly
performing below expectations? Any solutions to this that you
could address, Governor Ridge and Congressman Hamilton?
Mr. Ridge. Well, first of all, I think the administration
has clearly begun the decision with a piece of legislation that
has invited a great deal of scrutiny and some criticism that as
I have been participating in a couple of public forums it is
pretty clear that at least initially they understand that it is
something that they actually need to engage the private sector
in in the discussion, as I said, standards and the like. But I
think you have got a long way to go. I mean, take a look at the
cyber infrastructure just in the Executive Branch or even
within the White House. I think you have the CTO, a CIO, and
the cyber czar, so who is really in charge of overseeing it
all. Then you have the disparate elements. The different
agencies have their own cyber responsibilities and commitments.
The second challenge I think we have in the digital world
is attribution, we are getting better at, but then
accountability. What is our strategy once we identify a
perpetrator, how do we hold them accountable? That is worthy of
a separate and independent discussion.
Then finally, and I have enormous regard for the men and
women who serve their Government in unelected capacities, and
we attract lawyers and scientists and cyber experts. But make
no mistake about it, the great capacity of knowledge and
information on this issue lies outside of Government. If there
was ever an issue where Republicans and Democrats, both of whom
talk frequently about public-private sector collaboration, if
there was ever an issue where you might want to think of some
of your standards and the regulations around attracting and
inviting and creating a public, a true public-private
partnership where you bring in a series of experts to work
within the departments and then collaborate system-wide, this
would be the issue. This is the issue that I think lends itself
to the kind of holistic, deep collaboration between all the
expertise you have in the private sector along with a well-
intentioned expert, experts within the Federal Government, but
just don't have the reach.
One final comment. When I tried to attract just an advisory
board, nonpaying, to assist the Secretary of Homeland Security
to deal with several issues, the requirements for the public
sector and the kind of information they have to share with the
Congress or regulators discouraged a lot of well-intentioned
people to participate in the advisory board. I understand there
is screening. But I do think on this issue and some other
issues we have to get beyond the mindset that people with the
expertise in the private sector somehow would seek to simply
feather their own nest if we invited them in to work in a
collaborative fashion with the public sector, with the Congress
of the United States. I really think on this issue perhaps more
than any, but at some point in time we have got to start
trusting Americans to help America. When you create regulatory
barriers and impediments to well-intentioned people who wanted
to give me executives, to loan executives to participate on a
day-to-day basis, I think we really frustrate the value of a
true public-private sector collaboration. This is one that I
think really needs to be done and needs to be done now.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you.
Mr. Hamilton. I appreciate the question. I think we are
beginning in the Nation to seriously address it, but we are
only beginning to. You are quite right to point out the
vulnerability. We are exceedingly vulnerable to a cyber attack
in this country, both in Government and in the private sector,
because the private sector controls an awful lot of the
infrastructure.
Second, when you have an attack it is very difficult to
know where it comes from and it is very hard to hold someone or
some entity, some State, responsible. Not impossible, but not
always easily done. Having said that, one of the things I think
we need to do is to make very clear that an--a warning really--
an attack on this country's infrastructure by cyber attack we
will take exceedingly serious and we will respond, we will
respond in the most appropriate way possible. We can't predict
exactly how that would be. But if we can identify the
perpetrator then we will go after them. We will go after them
with whatever means are necessary to wipe them out. We cannot
tolerate this kind of an attack.
Now, the next point is organization. Here I am a little
fuzzy, to be blunt about it. But I think the Government, I hope
the Government is beginning to get its organizational structure
in mind to deal with cyber attacks. The line of responsibility
between NSA and DHS is not all that clear to me, but I think it
is moving, although not as fast as I would like to see. The
technology expertise on this within the Government, so far as I
know, rests largely with the NSA, and they are developing both
offensive and defensive means of dealing with a cyber attack,
and that needs to be encouraged.
I do think, and you make the point very well I think in
your question, that we have to strengthen DHS's ability to work
with the private sector. My judgment at this point on my
experience is the private sector is quite uneven here. There
are many people in the private sector who are very plugged in
on this and know the vulnerabilities and are taking steps to
deal with it and are consulting with Government, but there are
also many areas of the private sector, tending to be not the
huge companies, that are not so plugged in. So I think there
has to be a lot more communication, as Governor Ridge has
suggested, between the private sector and the Government to
sharpen our defenses.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Cuellar, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I want to
thank you and the Ranking Member for having this meeting and
the work that both of you have done to improve homeland
security. Certainly I want to thank the witnesses, also
Chairman Hamilton, Secretary Ridge, and of course the
Comptroller. Thank you for all the work that GAO has done, all
three of you, all the valuable information and resources you
provided for homeland security.
Let me ask you this question. It has to do with aviation.
In the wake of 9/11 we made sweeping changes to our Nation's
aviation security system, including strengthening security
measures related to flight schools. I know, as all three of you
mentioned, a lot of progress, but there is still a lot more
work to do. However, as recently as 2 weeks ago we had a
situation down close to my district in south Texas. Several
Mexican nationals were discovered receiving flight training in
south Texas without the proper visas. As you recall, the 9/11
involved aviation flight schools and visas also. Those are the
three major--well, three major factors that were involved. In
this case, while there is no indication of terrorist intent on
this particular case, we know that the aircraft remains a
highly attractive target for terrorists. It is troubling that
even 10 years after the 9/11 we still have foreign nationals
taking flight training in the United States without the
requisite vetting or oversight. In fact just a few days ago the
FBI and the Homeland Security issued a Nation-wide warning
about al-Qaeda threats to small training--I mean, to small
aircraft just a few days ago.
Let me just give you briefly the facts the way I understand
them. You had a pilot from Mexico that was accused of bussing a
trio of boats in Fort Mansfield. That is how this got started.
He was bussing some of the boaters out there. This person was
taking flight lessons. He was one of several Mexican foreign
nationals who traveled to the valley to get the pilot's
license. Homeland Security went up there after the fact and
deported three of them. Because I think the problem was that
instead of using a proper M-1 student visa, because they were
getting training, they were actually operating under a
nonimmigrant B-1/B-2 visitor visa. So instead of using a
student visa they were using tourist visas to get that
training. Eventually FAA was asked and they said, look, Praat,
which is a Mexican-based company that comes over to the United
States to do the training, was leasing the aircraft to the
pilots to train. Again, FAA's rule is basically the pilot is
ultimately responsible for the use of the aircraft itself.
So the issue that I have is after 9/11 when you had
aircrafts, you had flight school training, you had visa issues,
here we are 10 years later, what does this incident suggest
about our progress on the broader issues of aviation security,
visa security, 10 years after 9/11? Secretary, since you were
there with my friend President Bush, Governor Bush, do you want
to go ahead and get started on that? Then the other gentlemen,
if you can answer that.
Mr. Ridge. The details are first made known to me today by
your explanation on it. Thank you for that. My first reaction
suggests that it points, the incident points to the lack of a
broader infrastructure associated with not the question of
getting access to the airports and flying lessons, but the
broader infrastructure that seems still to be woefully
inadequate with regard to the issuance of visas and the
identification relative to the individuals who get the visas,
their nationality and the reason they have been extended the
visa. It just seems it would be problematic to me, and I don't
know how this came to the attention of the Department of
Homeland Security, but if there was a biometric card associated
with this, that these were here lawfully but still on a visa,
that I could check that they were here on a tourist visa, I am
just not sure that as a proprietor I would have been inclined,
one, to give them flying lessons, at least not until after I
checked with Homeland Security to give us some more background
information. So I think it speaks to a broader challenge that
we have. I know this is not the place to deal with it all, but
the broader challenge of immigration reform, and frankly the
21st Century infrastructure to identify and then monitor the
activities of those who we grant the privilege of crossing our
borders as guests on a visa.
Mr. Cuellar. Secretary, this is only one flight school.
Imagine what is happening or could be happening across the
Nation. You are right.
Mr. Dodaro. Congressman, we did work in 2004 and 2005
looking at the flight schools and TSA's oversight over the
flight schools and found that there was need for improvement in
that area and made some recommendations. We will be starting
work soon following up on TSA's oversight over the flight
schools.
The other comment I would have is as it relates to general
aviation, we have a lot of aviation on commercial airports,
there aren't the same level of regulations and requirements for
general aviation. We have just issued a report on that. I would
be happy to provide it for the record highlighting some issues
there.
With regard to the visas I would just reiterate my previous
points that there is a need for the exit approach. Whether or
not in this particular case these individuals actually were
overstaying their visa or not I am not familiar, as Governor
Ridge mentioned, with the details. But that system still needs
to be strict.
Chairman King. Chairman Hamilton.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, I just simply observe everybody. Every
one of you have flown on private aircraft in general aviation,
and you have all been impressed with how convenient it is as
compared to the commercial airports and how easy it is. I have
thought a hundred times as I have done that, boy, oh, boy, this
is a vulnerability for us. I am glad to see now that the
authorities are beginning to look into the small aircraft
problem, because it is a hugely potential problem for us. I
can't add to what the others have said.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. Mr. Cuellar. The Chairman now recognizes the
gentleman from Pennsylvania, the Chairman of the
Counterterrorism Subcommittee, Mr. Meehan.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for this
very distinguished panel for your, not just your presentation
here today, but your, I would actually say at the zenith of
your career, your commitment to these issues. Each of you has
taken on a remarkable role in this. I appreciate the fact that
you have looked back and taken the time to analyze what hasn't
been done on the recommendations you had previously made. So I
want to focus a question with respect to that.
Mr. Hamilton, I have had the opportunity to go back and
revisit a site in which a terrorist incident was averted. It
related to the situation in which there was a cartridge that
was attempted to be detonated on an air carrier plane, a UPS
plane. In the after-action review I got a chance to participate
in, it was a case study of the point that you made about the
lack of somebody really being in control at that facility at
that period of time. From the perspective of the people who are
trying to participate in helping, they are getting different
demands from different agencies at the same time about the same
information. How do we get it right in that critical moment
when, as you have stated, decisions are being made that can be
life or death choices? What do we need to do to get better at
that at the point of incident?
Mr. Hamilton. You are speaking about the first responders
and the unity of effort at the site?
Mr. Meehan. Yes. Incident command, I think. You identified
this in your report, which is why I am going back to that
point.
Mr. Hamilton. It is critically important. I don't want to
suggest that nothing has been done, because I think a lot of
some pilot programs have been run, some attention has been
given to it, but I don't think it is a resolved question.
Politically it is difficult to resolve. If you have a disaster
at a site of any consequence, you almost certainly have a
number of contending authorities. You have a governor, you have
a mayor, you have a port authority, you have county officials,
you have the President and Federal officials. Politicians don't
like to address these kinds of problems ahead of time because
they are difficult to deal with, who is in charge. But our
whole effort was to encourage that decision to be made in every
metropolitan area, if not the country.
At the time of Katrina the Governor of Louisiana was very
heavily criticized, and I don't know a lot of the details of
that, but she had four helicopters at her command. She needed
150. So I have come to the conclusion that if you have a major
disaster in an area of multiple jurisdictions the Federal
Government has to step in. The reason they have to is because
they are the only one that has the wherewithal, the resources,
to respond. You need water, you need housing, you need food,
you need--hundreds of decisions have to be made fairly quickly
about the response.
So I think we just have to keep encouraging local, State,
and Federal officials to plan and to exercise their plans. It
is not enough to have a plan. It is important to have a plan,
but it is not enough. You have got to--like the military does,
they constantly have maneuvers and exercises, you have got to
have exercises in a given community, it seems to me, to get
through this problem.
So those are some random thoughts on a very, very difficult
problem.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you. I do want to see that we follow up
on that.
Governor Ridge, this has to be sort of a remarkable moment
that we are sitting here now 10 years later and you served in
the Congress, you were Governor of a major State, but you were
on the ground floor in the beginning of the creation of one of
our most critical agencies responding to this issue. I think
more significantly you were there every day sitting with the
President as we were making decisions in real time. As you look
back now 10 years later, what is it that still keeps you up at
night about what we can be doing or doing better, or is there
an observation you are making now say, boy, if we could do this
now this is the way that I would do it?
Mr. Ridge. Someone asked me in the first couple of months,
actually while I was in the White House, before we even created
the Department of Homeland Security, if I slept at night. I
said I don't sleep much, but I sleep well. They were kind of
astonished by the answer. The answer was that obviously the
duties of the day required vigilance throughout the day and
evening. But I knew that there were literally thousands if not
hundreds of thousands of Americans working in the Government at
all levels of Government and the private sector that were
working together to make America more secure. I still feel that
way today.
At the heart of combating--but there are two matters that I
think we need to really embrace as we look at the next 10
years. First, it is a risk that we have to admit to ourselves
that we can only manage, we cannot eliminate. The political
world, the world of the private sector, the public sector, we
can't guarantee ultimate safety, and we have to accept that. I
think Chairman Thompson, or Ranking Member Thompson asked about
resiliency. We have proven we are resistant. We are coming into
a time of limited resources, reduced resources. Let's be smart,
let's be judicious, let's target them, let's not fight the last
war, but let's understand that we can only manage the risk. I
think John Pistole in TSA is starting to move in that direction
with its experimental program with people who frequently fly,
they are dealing with background checks, we may deal with them
differently so that the remaining TSA employees can focus on
people they don't know and the baggage that belongs to people
they don't know. But we have got to development a mindset I
think politically around the country and I think we have. We
shouldn't be breathless about the risk. It is manageable and we
need to manage it very, very effectively. I still can't believe
after 10 years, we talked a little bit about the infrastructure
and the no broadband communications, but I still can't believe
that incidents like the Detroit incident and Fort Hood would
occur when people within Government, within the Federal
Government, had information I think that was substantial enough
to act.
I mean, there is a lot of criticism because we weren't
adequately prepared for Katrina. You have to be in this day and
age with the new norm of terrorism, you have to be a little
less cautious, you have to act. When we had, as I understand it
from public information, that the FBI was aware that Hasan was
emailing to a radical cleric in Yemen and this individual was
an active duty soldier, who and when they talked to the
Department of Defense I will never know, but we talk about
that. We use a euphemism to connect the dots. Every once in a
while there is a dot, a big one, and I like the euphemism. It
just flashes off an on, you got to act. The same thing with the
father coming in to talk to the State Department I believe
who--I mean, we ask for human intelligence. A father comes in
to tell the State Department that he believes his son has been
radicalized, and oh, by the way, I think my son is in Yemen.
Now, you put those pieces together in a post-9/11 world with
what we know about al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula, and
somebody has got to yank his visa to come into the United
States until you sort it out.
So I think this information sharing is the heart of
everything we do is still probably the most difficult and
challenging, and by the way, as my colleague and friend Lee
Hamilton said, the most difficult and complex characteristic or
quality of combating terrorism. But you would think after 10
years we would be a little less cautious. I am not saying we
are being politically correct, but there is some things that
require action and we need to get into that mindset.
Mr. Hamilton. May I suggest you visit your fusion center?
We have 72 fusion centers around the country. Maybe you have
already done it. They are of mixed, varied capacities. But they
do bring together the right people in an area, State, local,
and Federal. It is in that center I think where you can see
what has been done, what has not been done in a given area. I
visited the fusion center in my State of Indiana, I have done
it in a couple of other areas. I think they represent probably
the best help for giving you the kind of response you want on
unity of effort in any given crisis.
Chairman King. The gentlelady from New York, my colleague,
Ms. Clarke--I am sorry, Mr. Clarke from Michigan.
Mr. Clarke from Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My
question to the entire panel is how can the Department of
Homeland Security best judge an urban area's risk of an attack
based on the assessments that it uses now? I represent
metropolitan Detroit. We have a large international airport
hub. That airport was the destination of the plane that the
Christmas day bomber attempted to blow up. So there is a strong
likelihood that our region could be the target of another
attack.
Now, in addition to the likelihood of an attack, the
Department also needs to look at the consequences of an attack.
Metropolitan Detroit, I will use that as an example, we have a
large population center, we have a border that is water, that
is also the busiest international border crossing in terms of
trade in North America, we also have a large regional drinking
water system. My concern is that many metro Detroiters are at
risk of being poisoned if a terrorist decides to dump a bunch
of biological agents in that drinking water system.
So essentially it is this. The GAO report mentioned
concerns about how the Department assessed risk. Any of you
three gentlemen have any comments on how we can improve the
accuracy of the risk of threat of attack to certain urban areas
like metropolitan Detroit? Ten years later my people I
represent, they are still at risk of an attack. I want to
protect them the best I can.
Mr. Hamilton. Look, there is no way we can give you
certitude because we don't know the mind of the terrorist. But
they have given us some two--two big hints. One is they are
going to do as much damage to us as they can. The second is
that they want to hit symbolic targets. So every community has
to sit down and analyze what in this community is most
vulnerable and they have to prioritize those vulnerabilities.
You know your community better than the DHS Secretary or the
President or anybody else. It is the local community that has
to make the analysis of what are the targets in my community
that are most likely to be hit given the standards that the
terrorists have repeatedly given to us. They want to do as much
damage. So you protect wherever people gather in large numbers,
that is obvious. You protect iconic symbols and so forth. But
it is a question of establishing priorities within the
community.
So the leaders of Indianapolis, Indiana, or Detroit,
Michigan have to come together and say, okay, we have got the
following facilities, and there may be 100, there may be 200 of
them that need protection. You have got to prioritize them, you
can't do it all. That is a tough decision to prioritize, but it
has to be made in order to reduce the risk. There is no 100
percent guarantee that you have got it figured out right, but
that is the way you have to do it.
Mr. Dodaro. I would say that in that framework that Mr.
Hamilton just outlined DHS does do a lot of risk assessments by
different sectors, water sector, transportation sector, et
cetera. Our comments though have been that the information in
these threat assessments and risk assessments should be shared
more and used more in decision-making purposes.
So I think that is the issue. Governor Ridge kind of
mentioned too acting on certain threat information or certain
information. So I think the real challenge is how do we use the
information that is now being collected more, both at a
National level and at a regional and a metropolitan level? That
is something we will be continuing to take a look at.
Mr. Ridge. I don't know, Congressman, if you are referring
to the methodology associated with urban area grants for
homeland security. I can recall----
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Yes. Definitely including that.
Mr. Ridge. I thought that is what you were referring to. I
think that process clearly has evolved I think in a very
positive way over the past 8 years. I can recall since we were
there after Congress directed that the Department create a
model, an assessment model for that very purpose that we went
through a couple of iterations that were challenging and the
like, but at the end of the day, and I have no idea the
evolution since I left, but at the end of the day a significant
portion of that calculation was based upon threat information
gleaned over the periods, over the previous years, not just
from the FBI but the broader intelligence community. I can
recall getting a, let me call it a call of disappointment, from
a Member of Congress that the city that they happened to
represent was no longer viewed as a potential target and
therefore wasn't eligible that year for the funding that it had
received the year before.
So it continues to be one of the big challenges of Homeland
Security. Generally it is probably one of the only departments
where you have probably more political interest in engagement
than any place else and you try to--you don't want to make
those political decisions, but it is subject to political
influence and you want to avoid that at all cost. I think at
this instance relying on threat assessments from the
intelligence community is probably the most effective way to
channel those dollars.
Chairman King. The gentleman from South Carolina is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to personally
thank you for rehanging the pictures that are surrounding the
room here to remind us of the tragic events that happened 10
years ago this weekend. I want to thank each of the gentlemen
on the panel today for your service to our country in your very
own capacities.
I want to take an opportunity, because I am near the end,
most the groovy questions have been asked. Just to thank the
firemen that are in the room today and the police officers, and
Capitol Hill police officers. They are here defending us in
what you do every day. Firemen and police officers and military
personnel all around this great land for what they do to keep
me and my family and our constituents safe. So thank you guys
for your work on the 9/11 Commission report. I have got a copy
of it with me, and I want to talk about that in just a minute.
But I noticed, I have talked about this numerous times in
this committee, the 9/11 Commission report has identified a
number of threats to the country and you use the terms to
identify those threats such as Jihad 126 times; Muslim
Brotherhood, 5 times; religious, 65; Hamas, Hezbollah, al-
Qaeda, Khalif, Sharia, enemy, violent extremism, numerous times
in the 9/11 Commission report. But if we look at the FBI
counterterrorism lexicon of 2008, they use the word Jihad zero
times, Islamism zero times, Muslim Brotherhood zero times,
Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, zero times.
The National intelligence strategy of 2009 uses those same
terms zero times. The lessons from Fort Hood uses those terms
zero times. I think it is important that we understand and can
identify the threats of this country and discuss it openly
without fear of using those terms, if that's a real threat to
this country. So what I would like since you guys developed
that report and you use those terms that many times, Mr.
Secretary, I will let you start. Why do you see that we are not
talking about on enemy or threats to this country in those
terms anymore?
Mr. Ridge. Well, I am not going to--first of all I respect
and truly understand the question. I think----
Mr. Walberg [presiding]. The mic please, Governor.
Mr. Ridge. I appreciate the thoughtfulness of the question.
I do think the more appropriate communicant in response would
be the Attorney General. Having said that, I think there is a,
depending on the mind-set that you want to bring to the work to
combat terrorism it continues to be a discussion whether they
should be treated and viewed as criminals, as I think the
administration generally does and the Attorney General
generally does, and I think that is reflected in probably the
language that they use.
I don't agree with it. I did enough criminal defense work
and prosecution work to appreciate the fact that most criminals
that I ever either prosecuted or defended chose not to--
preferred not to be caught and certainly didn't want to
surrender their lives in the furtherance of their criminal
endeavor. So I do think that language probably reflects a mind-
set that is more appropriate to how the Attorney General
believes this country should deal with the terrorists once we
apprehend them.
I don't think there is any question in the Attorney
General's mind that the fundamental problem is with those who
within the Muslim community who have taken a traditional
religion and wrapped themselves around a perverted and
distorted version of it to justify the killing of innocents,
but I think the language reflects his preference as the
Attorney General of the country to treat them more as
criminals. I don't share that point of view.
Mr. Duncan. Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, I believe the greatest current
terrorist threat to the United States is from Islamist
extremists. Whether or not they are part of the core al-Qaeda,
or one of their affiliates, or ideologically affiliated, they
represent the greatest threat. We have also had the addition of
homegrown threats. Likewise, I think, Islamic extremists. I
think it is very important that you make a distinction between
the Islamists terrorists, the extremists and benign Islamists.
I think the country has done that very well.
I still remember as I thought was an excellent example of
what we should do. I remember President Bush soon after 9/11,
it was a matter of days, I think, he went to a mosque and made
that point. Think it was it was exactly the right thing to do,
because he was drawing a distinction between the extremists and
the good, if you would, Islamists. So I think we have to
actively and aggressively counter the range of the ideologies
that are violent advocates and do what we can to remove them.
I am not here to speak for others with regard to
terminology. We said in the Commission Report, we had two
enemies, one, al-Qaeda, and two, Islamic extremists. We thought
quite a bit about what terminology to use. I am comfortable
with the terminology we set out in that report.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you. My time's up.
Mr. Walberg. Thank the gentleman. Recognize now the
gentleman now from Massachusetts, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all the
panel members for their service. You know, about less than 10
months ago as a District Attorney I was investigating a death
of a young man, 16-year old young man whose mutilated body
showed up in the Town of Milton, Massachusetts. Our
investigation took us to North Carolina, where this young man
had hid himself in the wheel well of a 737 commercial airliner,
and he had dropped out of the plane as the landing gear went
down as he was approaching Boston.
Now, much has been said about transportation security this
morning, and certainly about the screening checkpoints and the
need to look at explosives there. The TSA has said that every
commercial airport in the United States receives a security
assessment every year, including an evaluation of perimeter
security and access controls. However, in 2009, the GAO when
they were reviewing this, said 87 percent of the Nation's
commercial airports had not conducted any consequence
assessments or those perimeter checks.
With so much attention on the gate and on the checkpoints
there, it seems to me we are wide open on perimeter security.
In this major airport, North Carolina, there had been, since
this occurred, repeated breaches on perimeter security that we
are aware of there. I can't imagine that airport alone.
How would you assess our ability to dealing with perimeter
security around our airports? They could have easily--if he put
his own body in that wheel well, he could have easily placed
explosives there if he was a person--it was a tragedy of the
young man and this family, but what if this person had a
different intent? What if they were able to put explosives in
there? It seems we are focused so much on that, and it is
important at the gate. What about what is going on as we look
out from that gate and the perimeters. I think that is a
serious problem, and can you address how seriously that has
been? GAO has commented, but I don't see much actions, frankly.
Mr. Dodaro. Our recommendations have been more that TSA
needs to do a joint vulnerability assessment with the FBI on
the perimeter security issues, but that this hasn't been done
in a lot of cases, and we made recommendations along those
lines. The other issue is the screening of workers who have
access to the facilities on a regular basis. We believe that
that issue needs to be addressed as well. I will be happy to
provide our specifics for the record.
Mr. Keating. Any other analysts comment on that?
Mr. Hamilton. I am very pleased to hear your remarks. My
general impression would be that you are right, perimeter
security is still a great vulnerability, so I would be
supportive of efforts to make more inspections and bulk up our
efforts at perimeter security.
You know, there is so many areas of vulnerability and we
have concentrated a lot on the ones that we think are the
greatest risk, but others keeping popping up, and you have put
your finger on an important one.
Mr. Ridge. I think aviation, to the best of my knowledge,
is a target area, I suspect that still comes up on reports that
the intelligence community has as a potential target. I think
the--should never said we have eliminated it, but the notion
that someone or a group could hijack a plane and take a
commercial airliner and turn it into a missile, I think that
threat has been managed quite well. But I think we would be
kidding ourselves if we didn't think that aircraft generally as
a target remains a vulnerability and remains a continuing
interest, a target of interest for those would bring us harm.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. What is more frightening is we went
back and looked at the videotape and even knowing it, he had
done it, they still couldn't see him do it afterwards.
A quick question, maybe a yes or a no, since my time is
limited. Secretary Napolitano, just a few months ago, told this
committee that since 9/11, she considers the current period the
most dangerous since 9/11 that we are in now, and she think it
is at its most heightened state, would you agree?
Mr. Ridge. Well, certainly the Secretary has access to more
intelligence information than I do at the present time, but I
think there is a new dimension that complicates her world and
the challenges associated with this country and that is the
homegrown terrorists. In the past 18 months, we have seen the
arrest and involvement of 70 or 80 citizens or naturalized
citizens are here with visas, so I think the world is a little
more complicated for her and for this country.
Mr. Hamilton. I am not aware of any immediate specific
warnings, but of course, we found in the trove of information
we got from Osama bin Laden's raid, their interest in doing
something on the anniversary of 9/11.
So I understand that our security officials have ratcheted
up the security levels quite a bit for the next few days, that
seems to me to be entirely appropriate because the intent here
has been expressed, it has been expressed in the information we
got from Osama bin Laden's hideout.
Chairman King [presiding]. The gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
Quayle, is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
this hearing and thanks to the witnesses for being here.
Governor Ridge and Congressman Hamilton, my question is
about what your thoughts are and the threats with our Southern
border. With the drag cartels, the continuous battles between
Sinaloa and the Gulf cartel and the Zetas and the level of
violence that continues to escalate along our Southern borders
and the sophistication of the weaponry continues to advance.
I was down earlier this spring at a port of entry in
Douglas, Arizona, and one of the things we saw in video was the
night before was one of the drug cartel agencies was took a
stolen or made-up police vehicle and drove right by the port of
entry, about a 100 yards from our border, entered into a
restaurant, unloaded about 300 rounds of ammunition killing a
number of people and wounding scores of people.
I just want to ask you, what do you think the level of
threat to our homeland based on the level of violent activity
being pursued by the drag cartels in Mexico, and how that
affects our threat assessment from that area?
Mr. Ridge. Well, first of all, I think the past 2 years and
the attendant public awareness of the narco threat that our
borders clearly demonstrate that areas of lawlessness adjacent
to our Southern border that we all should be concerned about.
But it is just a manifestation of a threat that has existed for
decades, and we still haven't gotten our arms around it is that
is the importation of drugs. I mean, we talk about weapons of
mass destruction. Well, long before 9/11, this country was
dealing with a weapon of mass destruction and it was called
``drugs,'' that had been coming into this country from multiple
sources around the world. We still haven't gotten our arms
around that.
So my sense is, again, not privy to the kind of information
frankly that I didn't enjoy knowing but I was glad I was part
of the group that knew it and could potentially act upon it, is
that there is still a greater need for us to develop trusted
relationships with our counterparts in Mexico. There is
probably a greater need within that arena of trust for
information sharing, and frankly, we don't have--and I say this
with great respect to friends and colleagues of mine with whom
I worked in Mexico, we still don't have that decades-long,
mature, trusted relationship with all the agencies of
government down there, particularly within the law enforcement
community generally.
So it is a real complicated--it is an enormous challenge to
this country. I think we are up to the challenge, but it is
going to take us a long time to deal just with the violence,
let alone inescapable conclusion. It is just simply a
manifestation of the greater problem, that is the importation
of drugs. Someone who appreciates a supply but wouldn't be
coming in if there wasn't a demand, so it is a little more
complicated than arresting the supply.
Mr. Quayle. Congressman Hamilton.
Mr. Hamilton. I am not sure I can add much, and I know your
experience would be more immediate than mine. I am a long way
away from the border. But I have been impressed over the period
of years how difficult this has been for this country to deal
with. I think we have increased the number of border guards
every few years around here for a good many years. I am sure
that has been helpful. I know they do a lot of good work. I
know we have built a fence, I don't know what the miles are,
but an extended fence, which I think has had some impact, you
would know that better than I.
We put into place a lot of new technology with mixed
results, I think. I think all of those things have to be
continued and strengthened to deal with the problem. I think
the threat is very, very significant to the country. We have
probably not focused enough on it, those of us who have dealt
with Homeland Security. That is about all I can say.
I obviously agree with what Governor Ridge said. There are
a lot of problems in this world that we can't solve by
ourselves. I don't think we can solve this problem by
ourselves. I think we are going need a lot of cooperation with
the Mexican government as well.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I
yield back.
Chairman King. I thank the gentleman. I now recognize for
the first round of questions a Member of the committee, the
gentlelady from California, Ms. Hahn, recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you very much, Chairman, and Ranking Member
Thompson, for welcoming me to this committee. I look forward to
representing my constituents in the 36th Congressional district
on this committee.
You know, I remember very well on September 11 as we all
do, where we were, what our first thoughts were. I had just
been elected to the city council of Los Angeles, and my council
district includes the Port of Los Angeles and I represent over
100,000 people that just physically, you know, sit right next
to the Port of Los Angeles. While the September 11 attacks were
aviation-related, my first thought was the vulnerability of the
Port of Los Angeles.
Ten years later, I am now representing those same
constituents in Congress. I am still concerned about the Port
of Los Angeles. Between the ports of Los Angeles and Long
Beach, we account for about 44 percent of the trade that comes
into this country. We have about 5,000 men and women who
actually work on those docks on a daily basis. I think it is
our seaports that are still probably the most vulnerable
entryway into this country.
While you talk about how we have evolved in granting these
Homeland Security grants to more represent threat,
vulnerability and consequence, and Honorable Hamilton, as you
say, they have given us a roadmap, the target will be something
that does great damage and is symbolic. I think an attack on
America's ports in Long Beach and Los Angeles could create a
significant impact to our National economy and our global
economy.
So I have spent 10 years on the city council working with
my predecessor, Jane Harman, in improving the security of both
L.A. International Airport and the Port of Los Angeles, but I
would like to know from the panel what you think we in Congress
should be doing, can do to improve the security at our ports?
Mr. Hamilton. My judgment would be that we have not focused
enough on the ports. I think the enormous vulnerability would
be an inadequate inspection of cargo probably would be a major
problem. I am not up to date on what has been done on that.
I do recall being disappointed again at the state of our
technology with regard to detection. You have these massive
amounts of materials coming into the country in ships and our
ability to identify dangerous materials, I think, is lacking,
at least that is my understanding at this point. So I think you
play an important role by bringing up the question of the
vulnerability of the ports.
Mr. Ridge. I might add, all those it is a time of concern
about the fiscal situation in this country in dealing with the
deficit and the debt, I must admit that early on, being very
much someone who believes that during my tenure and subsequent
to my tenure, that the United States Coast Guard is one of the
most overstressed, multi-tasked, under-appreciated institutions
of this Federal Government. I think they are grossly, grossly
inadequately funded for the multiple tasks they bring in their
primary responsibility to this country.
These men and women for years--no, for decades literally
get pretty much what is left over when it is divided among the
rest of the agencies. They have multiple tasks and they never--
they just don't--I dare say, the generals and admirals in the
other branches of the service would be up here en masse if they
received as little funding on strategic needs that the Coast
Guard does.
For whatever reason, there is this mindset that we can do.
If you want to do one thing to improve maritime security in
this country, you go back and take a look at the Coast Guard's
budget and bring in not just the incumbent commandant, but the
three or four that have preceded him. I can recall flying in a
helicopter, overseeing the G8 exercise at one time, and the
pilot asked me if I wanted to grab the control.
So as an infantry soldier, I was really reluctant but I
will pretend like I am flying like the TV commercial. I said to
the pilot, is this one of those helicopters that has a failure
rate, an engine failure rate, that the FAA would have grounded
had it been flying commercially? He said, yes, it is. One of
the passengers in the back seat said: Can we change the
conversation?
I remember going, as Secretary, to appeal--you opened the
door for me and I have to take advantage of it, I rarely do
budget secretary's appeal--budget decisions to the highest
level. Well, I took the Coast Guard's budget number from--up to
the appeal board, and I brought in a piece of steel, a metal
plate on one of their 20- or 30-year old ships that had been
bent because of the use, because it is a multi-tasked vehicle,
ship.
So if you want to do something really significant to
improve maritime security, I think you go back and give the
Coast Guard the money they need to do their job more
effectively.
Mr. Dodaro. I would say, Congressman, we have done a lot of
work on maritime security looking at the process, looking at
vessels, people, and cargo issues. We find some progress being
made in these areas, but it is very difficult to determine yet
what the degree of progress and readiness really is at the
ports.
You have also, have mentioned already the Transportation
Worker Identification Card and the problems associated with
that. That has a lot of problems and needs to be addressed.
Also, the key issue regarding technology and how different
technologies could be used to help scan cargo and containers.
We have done work, which I will provide to the committee,
looking at the emerging technologies to really address that.
The volume of activity really has to entail some technological
solution.
Ms. Hahn. Thank you very much, my time is up. I will say,
until we are screening 100 percent of our cargo, I think we
have got a problem.
Chairman King. I will say to the gentlelady on that, there
is a bipartisan concern on this committee. I would suggest
actually meeting with the Secretary if she takes this issue
very seriously. As a practical matter, the 100 percent is going
to be difficult, but they are improving it, and they are trying
do it on threat-basised analysis, but we actually passed back
in 2006, I know it has been continued since, legislation
sponsored by your predecessor and also by Mr. Lungren.
Again, in a bipartisan way, we are concerned and we realize
the vulnerability. I remember just when there was a strike
against the Port of Long Beach, the billions of dollars that
were lost just in a brief period of time. Imagine what that
would be if there was a dirty bomb attack. So we share your
concern. Thank you.
The gentlelady from California, Ms. Richardson, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I
would like to talk about the cuts that the House of
Representatives supported and actually many colleagues here. I
don't know if you gentleman are aware, but actually of the
appropriations bill we--not we, I didn't actually support
this--$2.7 billion was removed, about 6 percent less than what
was originally requested by the administration. Specifically,
within Customs and Border Protection, $89 million was cut, 1
percent less than requested; Transportation Security
Administration, $292 million, 4 percent less; Coast Guard,
something that you were just talking about, $37 million was
cut, 0.4 less than requested; and then within FEMA, the most
dramatically cut $1.4 billion, which was 21 percent less than
requested.
What would you say the Members of the Congress and the
Senate who, despite your efforts in your reports, seem to not
value these services to the level that you say that we need to
have them, what would your response be?
Mr. Hamilton. You were suggesting a number of cuts that
have been made on Homeland Security in general?
Ms. Richardson. That is correct. My question, was
specifically, what advice would you give to Members of Congress
who actually supported those cuts and what would you urge us to
do?
Mr. Hamilton. Look, I am no expert on the budget of
Homeland Security Department. But having said that, I would
look with great skepticism on any cuts in this area because you
are dealing with Homeland Security. You are dealing with the
protection of the lives of the American People. So budgeting is
always a question of priorities, and I know how difficult it is
to make judgments with regard to priorities, but I am very
skeptical and probably would oppose cuts on Homeland Security.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Mr. Dodaro, I am going to pause and
ask you my second question because I think that is about all
the time that I will have. You know, I was really surprised
with the exchange with the previous Member, because I am sure
the Ranking Member will recall that we have asked the current
Secretary twice what is her intentions of implementing 100
percent scanning of cargo. Actually, the response hasn't been
supportive. In fact, the response has been really there is
absolutely no intention, what I have gotten from those
hearings, to actually implement 100 percent screening of cargo.
In fact, what the Secretary has said for the record, the
Secretary has said is that they are exploring other means,
which you, sir, reference in your report, for example, doing
screening by paper and looking at continual shippers and things
that might be of concern, and really getting away from the
agreement, if, in fact, they are going to be able to do
screening.
So first of all, I thought we needed to clarify for the
record what the current Secretary has said and what so far her
intentions are.
So, sir, I would like to ask you in regards to your report
on page 114, you talk about this whole issue and my question to
you would be you said, you know, the Secretary, the
administration are preparing this report, it doesn't look like
they are really going to follow through on what the commission
asked of 100 percent inspection. Could you expand more on where
you plan on going further in your evaluation?
Mr. Dodaro. Basically, what we have recommended, as I
recall, is that the Department do a feasibility study on the
100 percent requirements. As part of that study to look at
different alternatives. So, that is our recommendation on that.
Now we are taking about cargo to be screened outside the United
States before it arrives, because there is other different
types of cargo to screen once it arrives on our ports. But as
it relates to that type of cargo screening, we have recommended
a feasibility study. There are a lot of practical problems that
we identified in our work about reaching 100 percent
requirements. But there needs to be a study and alternatives
developed.
Ms. Richardson. I have 30 seconds left. Mr. Hamilton and
Mr. Ridge, what do you think of the Secretary, not only this
current Secretary, but the previous Secretary's non-commitment
to meet your requests in your recommendation of 100 percent
inspection of cargo?
Mr. Ridge. Well, I think, again, I can't speak to them, I
truly believe that it is in--literally speaking, it is probably
physically impossible to do, if you really think about the
volume of the cargo in this country, within each one of those
containers, there are containers within containers and the
like. Having said that, I do--I am familiar with some
technology of detection that will enable, I think, if it proves
to be successful, enable us to become--get much, much closer to
reaching that goal.
Again, it is managing the risk and are there venues and are
there ports of call around the world through which cargo might
go that we would want to do, make our best efforts to inspect
all 100 percent? I dare say, yes. Again, it is managing the
risk, I am still one who believes as difficult as it may be,
empirically, to get to 100 percent, we encourage the research
and development in detection technology, we can get very close
to it.
Mr. Hamilton. I do not recall that the 9/11 Commission
recommended 100 percent screening for the reasons of the
difficulty achieving it. But we certainly supported the idea
that Secretary Ridge has indicated, and that is risk
management.
I think in dealing with the bulk of cargo that comes into
this country on a daily basis is a practical matter. You
obviously want to improve the technology to the highest degree
that you can achieve. But even after you do that, you are going
to go have to make judgments about cargo coming from different
ports of the world and that involves a risk management
decision.
Chairman King. The gentlelady's time has expired. The
gentleman from New York, Mr. Higgins, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to get back to
the purpose of hearing, which was the progress we have made in
the past 10 years and the security gaps that still exist and
the management and operational improvements that still are
needed.
Last December, The Washington Post reported that the top
secret world of counterterrorism has become so large, so
unwieldly, so secretive, that no one knows how much money it
costs, how many people it employs, how many programs exist
within it, or exactly how many agencies do this work.
A new book out by Dana Priest called Top Secret America,
The Rise of New American Security State, characterizes this as
the terrorism industrial complex. We have 800,000 people who
now hold top security clearances.
We have 51 Federal organizations and military organizations
that are involved in tracking the flow of money inside and out
of terrorist organizations; we have 2,000 private companies;
and 1,200 organizations and intelligence agencies that are
involved in counterterrorism.
It seems as though this hearing and the information that
has been presented by both the panel and ancillary information
is very disconcerting. What the American people should have
expected in the aftermath of 9/11 is a bureaucratic response
that is lean, muscular, transparent, and effective. It seems as
though what we have is a bureaucratic response that is bloated,
immobile, ineffective, and not doing the very things that the
9/11 Commission said was most important. That was to remove the
barriers that existed between Federal law enforcement agencies
toward the goal of sharing good information, because that was
most effective in thwarting preempting terrorist activity.
Lawrence Wright's book, The Looming Tower, recounts--there
is a passage in there that an FBI agent got physically sick
because after he realized what had occurred, he said that the
intelligence existed to stop that very incident on 9/11.
So, you know, the American people have been misled. I think
what we did in the aftermath of 9/11 was said, we got attacked,
we don't know specifically who it is, here is a bunch of money,
go out and do something about it. We created a bureaucracy that
is not meeting its moral and operational objective.
So I just ask all of you, who have committed yourselves, to
try and improve this situation to comment on the information
that has been presented here.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, I think you raise a question that
probably would not have been raised a few years ago. You are,
of course, right when you indicate the figures that show
enormous expansion of Homeland Security activities, and we have
not much focused on the matter of cost effectiveness. Up until
this time, until fairly recently, every--the security people
win every argument, because they come in and say if you don't
do this, your vulnerability is going to be much greater. In the
aftermath of 9/11, we tended not to worry too much about cost.
Therefore, you get an $80 billion budget for the intelligence
community.
I chaired the Intelligence Committee back a good many years
ago when the budgets were, I think, in the range of $10
billion. I am not precise about that but roughly. So we have
had an explosion of cost here without any doubt about it. The
question of cost effectiveness needs to be brought much more
into the debate than it has been thus far.
Having said that, may I go back to the point of oversight?
This is why you need a Congressional intelligence oversight
which is focused, in my view, should be in an Appropriation
Subcommittee on Intelligence, and on--and as well as having
effective oversight of Homeland Security.
In effect, you have a very fractured oversight of Homeland
Security and, in effect, you have an inadequate oversight of
the intelligence budget and in both areas, you have had an
explosion of cost. One of the reasons oversight is necessary is
to keep your eye on exploding costs.
So I do not think Members of Congress can say you are
innocent on this, you folks haven't done the job with regard to
oversight. That is part of the answer, not the entire answer.
But I like to see questions of your kind coming forward because
I think we need some push-back on the explosive growth that we
have had in these areas. That is a fairly typical response by
the American Government, I guess, to increase things very
rapidly in Homeland Security.
Mr. Higgins. Reclaiming the time that I don't have. Mr.
Chairman, can I just make a final point? This is my concern,
this is my concern, we had a hearing in this committee a couple
of months ago on Hezbollah. Hezbollah committed to violent
Jihad. They act as a proxy for Iran, Syria, and Venezuela. The
information that was presented to this committee indicated that
Hezbollah had a presence in North America, including five
cities in the United States, and four cities in Canada, so as
to have close proximity to the United States.
One of the cities in Canada was Toronto, 90 minutes from my
hometown of Buffalo, New York. We have Niagara Falls which is a
huge tourist attraction. We have the Niagara Power Project,
which produces the cheapest, cleanest electricity in all of New
York State. We have The Peace Bridge, the busiest Northern
border crossing for passenger vehicles. My concern is that we
are so preoccupied with this bureaucracy and so immersed in it,
that we are not agile. We can't adjust to changes in the
ground. That the terrorist threat today is very different from
the one that existed 10 years ago. At the younger, it is more
aggressive, it is more vicious, and it is technologically
savvy. So we are preoccupied with this false sense of security
that we built up within this bureaucracy. The terrorists are
way ahead of us because they are smaller, they are mobile and
they are able to move and that is a major concern that every
American, regardless of whether you live in western New York or
throughout this Nation, should be very, very concerned about.
Chairman King. I would ask if the witnesses have responses,
do it in writing.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you.
Chairman King. I recognize the gentleman from Louisiana for
5 minutes.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking
Member. Thank you for the witnesses today.
In evaluating where we are today compared to where we were,
I would like to shift away from preventing the attack and talk
a little bit about a response to a terrorist attack. Just
grading 9/11 in terms of resources provided, in terms of
unified command in terms of money appropriated, how would you
grade the U.S. Government's response after the attacks of 9/11
to the city of New York and to the other places that were
affected? If you just had to rank in terms of poor, fair, good,
or excellent, how would you characterize it?
Mr. Hamilton. At the time of 9/11?
Mr. Richmond. Yes.
Mr. Hamilton. It was very poor, very poor.
Mr. Richmond. The resources provided on the ground in New
York?
Mr. Hamilton. There was a great deal of confusion within
our Government, we weren't prepared at many levels to deal with
it, both in terms of the emergency response, and in terms of
the defense of the country. Multiple mistakes were made from
the ticket taker in Logan Airport in Boston to the President of
the United States. Nine-eleven, we said, look, we were not
charged with responsibility of accountability and didn't we did
not get into it, but we said there was a systemic failure. That
failure was literally scores, hundreds, maybe thousands of
people in the country, it was a very poor response, it was a
major failure of Government. We failed to protect our people.
Mr. Richmond. Governor Ridge.
Mr. Ridge. I think there is evidence to suggest that for
years and years, at least within a small group of men and women
within the intelligence community, it was greater and greater
sensitivity to a potential attack, the nature of which we were
still quite unaware, but the rise of these Jihadists was known
to a few. I think the decisions made probably not just when
President Bush became President or decisions that were not
made, but even prior to previous administrations set us up so
that clearly we weren't as prepared as we would like to think
as Americans we would be for such a catastrophic event. Again,
I am not--I know the 9/11 Commission didn't look into that. I
thought that--I know individually that people at FEMA and
everybody associated with the recovery efforts did everything
they could, but this was a--I am not sure anyone's imagination
was so expansive as they thought about preparing even for a
potential terrorist attack that they could envision commercial
airplanes being turned into missiles or that the Twin Towers
would fall.
So while we certainly proved ourselves--we became more
aware of our vulnerabilities, we are not more vulnerable
because of it. Even on our best days, I don't think whether you
are Republican or Democrat in the President Bush administration
or President Clinton administration you could have ever seen
even those within the intelligence community thinking about the
Jihadists and extremists and a terrorist attack it being at
that level. We need to understand there is a blame game we
often play, but I don't think anybody anticipated an attack at
that level.
Mr. Richmond. I represent New Orleans, Louisiana, which in
the aftermath of Katrina the Government response was very, very
poor in terms of getting resources there quickly unified
command and all of those things. My question now would be if,
in fact, position of the House, we have a pay-for for disaster
response, how is that going to affect our response to the next
big disaster or terrorist attack? If it means us coming in and
cutting our agreeing on cuts in order to provide funding, how
would that hamper the response to a future terrorist attack?
Mr. Ridge. If I might, Mr. Chairman, I will take a little
extra time. I think it is a really pivotal question here.
Katrina--as you look back and reflect on Katrina, I think there
were a lot of lessons learned, and there probably more
painfully aware than most Members of Congress since this
affects your constituents in the city and the people for whom
you are responsible. There we saw, I think, the failure of the
local and the State and the Federal Government to coordinate
its activity and to err on the side of preparation. You don't
need to be a meteorologist to see that a Cat 4 or 5 heading to
a city that needs a pump to keep it above--14 feet above--below
sea level anyhow. So, I think there was plenty of blame to go
around. I am not here to revisit that.
Since that time I believe that, frankly, I think right now
FEMA has got one of the strongest and best administrators we
have ever had in this country, Craig Fugate. We worked with him
when he was running the operation down in Florida. The year
before Katrina he had four hurricanes bouncing around ad he
took care of every one them. Collectively they weren't
Katrinas.
So I think the lessons learned were painful, but I do think
they are far, far better prepared than they have ever been
before to deal with a major disaster.
One final comment. Never in the history of the country have
we worried about budget around emergency appropriations for
natural disasters and frankly, in my view, we shouldn't be
worried about it now. I realize you have fiscal problems as a
real challenge, but we are all in it as a country. When Mother
Nature devastates a community we may need emergency
appropriations. We just ought to deal with it and deal with the
fiscal issue later on.
Mr. Hamilton. One of the ways to look at this is the
progress that has been made. If you look at the response of 9/
11, very poor; response of Katrina, as you said, very poor;
response to the oil spill, better; response to Irene, better.
We are learning the progress, they may not be as rapid as we
would like but we are getting better to responding to
disasters, even though there are some gaps.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you to the witnesses. Thank you Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman has expired. Now
my second chance at getting Ms. Clarke for 5 minutes, my friend
from New York.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Thank you very much, Chairman. I
thank the Ranking Member as well and I thank our panelists. On
the eve of the 10th anniversary of 9/11 terrorist attacks on
our Nation, the possibility of another attack still casts an
ominous shadow over the United States. I believe that we are
definitely safer; however, safety is a relative term in an
effort involving threat environment against our Nation and her
people.
These changes may, in the transportation industry, and in
the intelligence community, have definitely prevented another
successful attack for this moment. Even with the death of Osama
bin Laden, we must continue our vigilance and the build-out of
a robust defense as well strengthen our capacity to be
resilient.
On behalf of the people of the 11th Congressional district
New York, I would like to express to those who lost a family
member, a loved one or friend on September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, that their loss will never be forgotten.
As a Member of this committee, and a New Yorker, I would
like to emphasize the importance of fully implementing the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission. We must partner with
local, State, and private sector partners to keep our Nation
safe.
After witnessing first-hand the inability of first
responders to communicate on September 11, 2001, and the
excessive loss of life as a result, I fully support efforts
that would give first responders specific portion of the
spectrum known as D-Block for a resilient state-of-the-art
communications network. Our first responders definitely need to
be able to communicate with one another in times of crisis. So
my question is what are your thoughts on a set-aside of the
dedication of the D-Block spectrum for first responders?
Mr. Hamilton. Well, I favor it and I am pleased to know
that the Chairman and Ranking Member here and a good many
Members of the committee favor it.
I think it is the most expeditious and surest way to get
reliability of the communication. Now once you set aside the D-
Block, you are not through. There is a lot of more work that
has to be done. But it is essential, I believe, to make it
possible for the first responders to talk with one another. The
best way to do that is to set aside a portion of the radio
spectrum, the so-called D-Block, directly allocate that to the
first responders. I favor that. I think it's very important.
Mr. Ridge. I would hope the balance of the Congress would
take the lead from the Chairman and Ranking Member of this
committee and get about the business of dedicating the D-Block
that, let the private sector begin embedding the technology
that we need. There may be political differences, but I think
the first responders community is just generally saying work it
out, we need the technology and we need it now. So I hope
Congress follows your lead, Congresswoman.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Thank you. My next question is
about how we deal with enhanced security, while at the same
time, preserving our very cherished civil liberties.
Representative Hamilton, would you expand on the ideas you
mentioned in your testimony regarding the privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, I am impressed with the capacity of
Government to intrude on the lives of people. I mentioned
earlier in the hearing today that I had a briefing on this
yesterday and it is just absolutely incredible what these
sophisticated devices can do with regard to intruding on your
privacy and civil liberties.
Now, even if you take the position that under present
circumstances, the civil liberties and privacy are being
reasonably protected, I simply didn't know enough about that,
but for sake of argument, say they are being reasonably
protected, the history of abuse of Government power is enough
to give us pause here. To try to set in force, in place, some
kind of counterpressure, if you would, to the people who want
more and more intrusive measures. I think all the members of
the Commission felt that you needed a robust civil liberties
board to push back and to try to protect our liberties and our
core values and our privacy.
I am very disappointed that we have not put such a board in
place. I don't think the job of the board is easy, I think will
be very, very difficult. But you need some counterpressure,
some pushback to the security agencies which press for more and
more power, more and more ability to intrude into the lives of
Americans.
Now, I have to say that most of us think that the powers
that have been expanded are probably appropriate, in many cases
at least. But at the very least, you need a rigorous oversight
of that in order to protect our core values. So I think it is
terribly important that that board be created. I haven't fully
understood why it hadn't been created, but it has not, and
let's get about the business of getting it in functioning
order.
Mr. Ridge. I might just add very briefly I certainly want
to associate myself with my colleagues' remarks. But when
Congress passed the enabling legislation creating the
Department of Homeland Security in its wisdom, and frankly
foresight, it anticipated the challenges associated with a
department that may be using information. They certainly wanted
to use it in an appropriate way to protect America, but the
Congress mandated, I think was the first privacy officer
mandated by Congress in any of our cabinet agencies. I think
that mindset, the appreciation, liberty and privacy is very
much a part of how the Congress thought about that any agency
that I think my colleague has pointed out, you take that
concept and enshrine it in broader oversight community, over
the intelligence community generally.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Did you want to share anything?
Mr. Dodaro. Yes, setting aside the board recommendation, I
think that has already been commented on. We looked at how the
privacy officers and agencies have implemented their
responsibilities. DHS is doing more in this area to do as
privacy assessments. Our recommendations have been that they
need to be embedded in all the decisions that are made when new
systems are put in place that collect information that this
concern needs to be addressed up front. We think that will help
further solidify the balance between security and civil
liberties protections.
Ms. Clarke of New York. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. The time of the gentlelady has expired. I
thank the gentlelady and I yield to the gentleman from
Illinois, Mr. Davis, for 5 minutes. We are coming up against
votes, but we have more than enough time for your question.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank
you and the Ranking Member for holding this hearing. I also
want to thank our witnesses for their expertise in this arena
and also for the tremendous services that they have all
provided to the country and continue to do so.
I think all of us can reflect on September 11, 2001. I
happen to have been in Tel Aviv, Israel, at the moment. Of
course, we were there for a week because we couldn't leave. So,
I have had the opportunity to reflect upon the tremendous
impact, not only to our country and our way of life, but what
has happened internationally around the world.
I am also reminded, and I am pleased that the last few
minutes we have had some discussion of budgets, of priorities,
of the economy and its impact. I am always reminded of
something Frederick Douglass said when we talk about what we
need and what we want. He often said you can't have the rain
without the thunder and the lightning, meaning that priorities
are very important, and you have to determine what you are
willing to give in order to get what it is that you are trying
to get.
We have now had almost a decade of spending money in the
Homeland Security arena. My colleagues have mentioned cuts and
cutbacks. I guess my question, as I have listened, would be:
What have we really learned since 9/11 about what spending
works and what does not work? What seemed to work best? How do
we adequately prepare or make the best use of the resources
that we are willing to spend? What areas have we been most
successful in, which ones we have been perhaps least successful
in? How do we prepare to the best of our ability for the
future? If each of you would just respond to that question, I
would thank you very much.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, it is a very, very broad question. You
can look at our response in terms of the cup being half-full
and the cup being half-empty. We have really made a very great
deal of progress, I think, at all levels. When you get on an
airplane today you are safer than when you got on it prior to
9/11. I think that the sharing of information in the
intelligence community is much, much better than it used to be.
In all aspects of preventing attack, we have made some
progress. We spent the morning talking about areas where we
think more progress needs to be made, that would be in your
category, I think, where we have been less successful, in terms
of unity of effort, whose in charge at the site, the
communication problem and many other areas that have come up
today.
So I think you have to think of Homeland Security in terms
of a work in progress, a lot of progress having been made, but
it takes constant effort to make the American people as secure
as they ought to be and could be. That is why oversight is
terribly important. So that is a quick, quick summary. I think
we are safer today than they were, but we are not as safe as we
could be and that would be my summary of where we are after 10
years.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Ridge. I thought your question highlights an issue that
we addressed during the course of this hearing, and that is the
need for a much smaller group in the Congress of the United
States to take a far more holistic approach towards its
oversight over still this relatively new agency to set in a
very thoughtful and judicious way, the kinds of priorities that
you need, because there are plenty of wants that you need to
address that the priority should be the needs first, and you
have highlighted that.
I think in a couple of areas we have decided we have erred
when we thought more was better. That article that one of your
colleagues referred to about the explosion of the
infrastructure around the counterterrorism was a perfect
example where we thought if we employed now thousands and
thousands of more analysts and private sector contractors we
would be safer, but in spite of all of that, we had Fort Hood
and a few other instances that we were lucky that things didn't
happen.
So I think we have learned that perhaps more judicious
identification of priorities, and candidly and respectively
with more aggressive oversight on the part of the Congress of
the United States, which, again, is very difficult to do when
it is dispersed throughout the entire Legislative Branch.
So I think it is a very appropriate question. I am not in a
position to assess basic outcomes. In balance, I think the
Congress has identified and funded some of the most immediate
needs. I do think there have been dollars that have not been
expended very appropriately. I think Congress, along the way,
lost sight of the admonition that was involved in the enabling
legislation, that is, take commercial off-the-shelf technology
and apply it. I think we are still in search for the perfect
technology. I don't think we are going to find it at the
border, I don't think we are going to find it at the airport. I
think we might want to be able to be a little bit more
judicious in encouraging and review kind of the procurement and
the testing process about these technologies within the
Department. But I think as someone who is privileged, and I
have served and worked in--served in Congress and worked with
my colleagues during those first couple of years. I think they
did a remarkable job. Remember, there was no architecture,
there was no plan. No one was prepared for that attack, the
nature of attack, and frankly what this country endured after
where, as I have said before and I say again, we went from
unprecedented grief to unprecedented guard. We found solidarity
at the outset, we made some mistakes along the way, but as my
colleague, Lee Hamilton, has said, and one of the reasons we
are safer in our country is because of the work he and Tom Kean
and the 9/11 Commission accomplished. We made a great deal of
progress. Let's not be reckless about the threat. America can
manage this threat. Let's just be smart about how we go about
dealing with it in the future.
To that end, would just love to see there being a broader
role for a smaller group of Congressmen in the House and the
Senate to help to continue to build on the success and enhance
the maturity and the effectiveness of the Department. But your
question was very well stated. I am sorry I gave you a long-
winded response to it.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Dodaro. I would say, Congressman, the other panelists
have talked more broadly about this, and I agree that we have
spent a lot on addressing the aviation area and maritime
security. The chemical, biological, and nuclear area and cyber
area really needs more attention going forward as the threats
evolve. As it relates to resource investments narrowly, I think
what we have learned is that you can't rush deployment of
untested technologies. That has not worked effectively. There
are the airport so-called puffer machines, the SBInet virtual
fence, the advanced spectroscopic radiation monitors all have
failed because they haven't had adequate testing. Also, on the
secure flight area was on a success side. I think they took
their time. Congress enumerated specific areas that needed to
be met. GAO had a monitoring role, including the protection of
civil liberties and privacy in that system. I think that was a
good effort on that side.
So I think going forward there really needs to be risk-
based approaches to investment decisions. Funds are not
unlimited. There also has to be careful application of good
management practices in testing and deploying technologies.
Mr. Davis. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you and
the Ranking Member for your leadership, as well as the
witnesses. I personally feel much safer now than I did then.
Chairman King. Thank you, Mr. Davis. Let me thank the
witnesses. The Ranking Member and I were discussing, you know,
listening to your testimony. The depth of knowledge you have
about such a complex issue and how unfortunate it is that too
often a political debate, especially on the issue of homeland
security, there are so many cheap sound bites that are out
there. They take the most complex issue--too many people in
politics today in both parties take the most complex issue and
try to reduce it to a 10-second sound bite. While there are
specific answers which we are looking for or definite actions
that should be taken, I think the three of you have
demonstrated today, none of this is easy, all of this is
complex, and there are many people who are well-intentioned
trying to do the right thing. Actually no one has done more
than the three of you.
So I want to thank you for your service, especially thank
you for your testimony today. I will yield to the Ranking
Member for any final remarks he has.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to
support your comments. We have a lot of people who come before
this committee who consider themselves experts, but I have not
had integrated depth of knowledge presented here this morning
by the three of you on a very complex subject. That depth goes
beyond just the high point. I think it is a tribute to what you
do every day. I want to personally, just as the Chairman said,
thank you for your service and thank you for hopefully getting
this committee where we need to be as the Committee on Homeland
Security. Your leadership in getting us there and this
testimony will go a long ways toward accomplishing that. I
thank you.
Chairman King. I thank the Ranking Member. In conclusion, I
would just say, as Chairman Hamilton and Secretary Ridge well
known for their experience, Members of the committee may have
some additional questions, and we will ask you to respond to
those in writing. The hearing record will be held open for 10
days. Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:10 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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