[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
PREVENTING AN ECONOMIC SHOCK WAVE:
SECURING THE PORT OF HOUSTON FROM A TERRORIST ATTACK
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FIELD HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
AUGUST 24, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-41
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Janice Hahn, California
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Billy Long, Missouri, Vice Chair Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Dr. R. Nick Palarino, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Tamla Scott, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management...... 6
The Honorable Gene Green, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Witnesses
Mr. Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Maritime and Coast Guard
Issues, Homeland Security and Justice Team, Government
Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Captain James H. Whitehead III, Sector Commander, Sector Houston-
Galveston, U.S. Coast Guard:
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
Sheriff Adrian Garcia, Harris County, Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 30
Prepared Statement............................................. 31
Mr. James T. Edmonds, Chairman, Port of Houston Authority:
Oral Statement................................................. 33
Prepared Statement............................................. 36
Captain William J. Diehl (United States Coast Guard, Ret.),
President, Greater Houston Port Bureau, Inc.:
Oral Statement................................................. 38
Prepared Statement............................................. 39
PREVENTING AN ECONOMIC SHOCK WAVE: SECURING THE PORT OF HOUSTON FROM A
TERRORIST ATTACK
----------
Wednesday, August 24, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and
Management,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Houston, TX.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., at
Port of Houston Authority, 111 East Loop North, Houston, Texas,
Hon. Michael T. McCaul [Chairman of the subcommittee]
presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul and Keating.
Also Present: Representatives Jackson Lee and Green.
Mr. McCaul. The committee will come to order. Let me first
thank the Houston Port Authority and all the people here who
have made this happen. I want to thank the witnesses for being
here today, and I also want to thank the Ranking Member for a
yeoman's effort coming all the way down from beautiful Cape Cod
and Nantucket, Massachusetts, where the weather is about 80
degrees and beautiful to 110 degrees Houston, and so thank you
very much for being here today.
I want to thank my colleague Gene Green for being here as
well and I know he will have a statement as well.
With that, this is an official Congressional hearing. It is
not a town hall meeting. We have to abide by the House rules,
the House of Representatives, and I just want to, again, thank
everybody again for being here today. I now recognize myself
for an opening statement.
Osama bin Laden's ``war of a thousand cuts'' on the U.S.
economy has always been a key facet of his strategy. His
personal files found in his lair at Abbottabad, Pakistan,
revealed a brazen idea to blow up oil tankers. By doing so, he
hoped to damage not only the United States, but the world's
economy. The picture of an oil tanker ablaze, like this one off
the coast of Yemen, would indeed add fuel to our financial
crisis.
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates have a history of attacking
ships. In January 2000, there was an attack on the USS
Sullivan. In October of 2000, a small boat with explosives blew
a hole in the side of the USS Cole, killing 17 of our sailors.
In October 2002, a French oil tanker was set ablaze, killing
and injuring several crew members in the Straits of Hormuz. In
2005, there was an attack against the USS Ashland. In July of
2010, there was a terrorist attack on a Japanese oil tanker.
The Government Accountability Office, or GAO, in its report
on terrorist attacks targeting energy tankers states the supply
chain faces three types of threats: Suicide attacks with
explosive-laden boats similar to the one used against the USS
Cole in the Gulf of Aden; standoff attacks with weapons
launched from a distance, such as rocket-propelled grenades
and; third, an armed assault used by pirates off the coast of
Africa.
Not only would a successful attack result in the loss of
life and have a detrimental effect on the economy, it would
also be a psychological blow and would have environmental
consequences.
The Port of Houston is the energy capital of the United
States, and it is a target-rich environment. The port stretches
from Galveston Bay, past Texas City, across the Gulf
Intercoastal Waterway, past Bayport and the San Jacinto
Monument, and deep into the City of Houston. The port includes
a ship channel, a 52-mile highway for shipping. It has a wide
range of businesses and is not just one of the physically
largest ports in America, but also a leader in the movement of
cargo.
Houston brings in more imports than any other U.S. harbor.
Houston has the second-highest level of exports and the second-
highest level of maritime tonnage. More than 7,800 vessels
arrive and 150,000 large movements are registered annually.
Most importantly, roughly 25 percent of the oil imports for
America flow through the Port of Houston. Each day, 25 to 30
oil and chemical tankers move along the Houston Ship Channel,
and 31 percent of America's crude oil refining capacity takes
place right here in this harbor. If catastrophe struck the
port, there is little spare capacity to import and refine crude
oil elsewhere in the country. In short, an attack on the
Houston port could cripple this.
A 2007 study by the Houston Port Authority estimated that
the port directly leads to $285 billion in National economic
activity, 1.5 million jobs, and $16.2 million in Nation-wide
tax revenues. The U.S. Coast Guard estimates that if the
Houston Ship Channel were closed, it would have a direct
negative impact on the economy of approximately $406 million
per day.
Americans are now paying nearly $4 for a gallon of gas.
Even an attack causing little damage could raise prices at the
pump by a dollar or more. The Port of Houston is integral to
America's economy. We must ensure there are no gaps in our
security at this port and ensure that terrorists do not wound
our economy or harm our citizens by successfully carrying out
an attack in Houston.
The U.S. Coast Guard, Texas State and county officials, and
industry stakeholders associated with the Port of Houston, have
done a great deal to protect this port and its shipping from a
terrorist attack. The U.S. Coast Guard, who is present here
today, and local police, as the Sheriff is here today, have
access to a real-time satellite tracking system that pinpoints
the exact size and location of every ship in and around
Houston. The Coast Guard has heavily armed vessels patrolling
the channel along with the Harris County Sheriff boats. Equally
important, Texas established the Houston Ship Channel Security
District, a unique industry-Government partnership, to assist
protecting the facilities surrounding the ship channel.
The GAO has made several recommendations to mitigate
terrorist attacks at ports. It recommends that all participants
should plan for meeting the growing security workload as
liquefied natural gas shipments increase; that ports should
plan for dealing with the economic consequences of an attack;
that terrorism and oil spill response plans at the National and
local level should be integrated; and that performance metrics
should be developed for an emergency response. All agencies
agree with these recommendations.
I do want to point out another issue, and that is that once
the Panama Canal, which I recently visited, its project is
complete in 2004 to deepen the Canal, they will be able to
accommodate vessels with drafts up to 50 feet. Unfortunately,
the Houston Ship Channel cannot accommodate such large ships
because it only is dredged to 45 feet. Larger ships will not be
able to enter the Houston Ship Channel. Additionally, it is
notable that if a ship were sunk in the middle of the Channel,
it would effectively cut off commercial traffic in the port
until the ship could be refloated and moved. The cost of a
shutdown would damage this economy extremely.
So, today, we examine whether the GAO recommendations have
been instituted, what needs to be done to enlarge the Houston
Ship Channel, and whether we need to do more to prevent--what
we need to do more to prevent al-Qaeda and its affiliates from,
again, wounding our economy as they did on September 11.
Again, I want to thank the witnesses for being here and
especially my great thanks to the Ranking Member for making a
long journey from a very nice place in America down to
beautiful Houston, Texas, and with that, I recognize him.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
August 24, 2011
Osama bin Laden's ``war of a thousand cuts'' on the U.S. economy
has always been a key facet of his strategy. His personal files, found
in his lair at Abbottabad, Pakistan, revealed a brazen idea to blow up
oil tankers. By doing so he hoped to damage, not only the United
States, but the world's economy. The picture of an oil tanker ablaze
would indeed add fuel to our financial crisis. Al-Qaeda and its
affiliates have a history of attacking ships:
In January 2000 there was an attack on the USS Sullivan;
In October 2000, a small boat with explosives blew a hole in
the side of the USS Cole, killing 17 of our sailors;
In October 2002 a French oil tanker was set ablaze, killing
and injuring several crewmembers;
In 2005 there was an attack against the USS Ashland and
Kearsarge; and
In July 2010 there was a terrorist attack on a Japanese oil
tanker.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) in its report on
terrorist attacks targeting energy tankers states the supply chain
faces three types of threats:
Suicide attacks with explosive-laden boats, similar to the
one used against the USS Cole in the Gulf of Aden;
Standoff attacks with weapons launched from a distance, such
as rocket-propelled grenades; and
An armed assault, as used by pirates off the coast of
Africa.
Not only would a successful attack result in loss of lives and have
a detrimental effect on the economy, it would also be a psychological
blow and may have environmental consequences.
The Port of Houston is the energy capitol of the United States, and
a target-rich environment. The port stretches from Galveston Bay, past
Texas City, across the Gulf Intercoastal Waterway, past Bayport and the
San Jacinto Monument, and deep into the City of Houston. The port
includes the Houston Ship Channel; a 52-mile highway for shipping.
It has a wide range of businesses and is not just one of the
physically largest ports in America, but also a leader in the movement
of cargo.
Houston brings in more imports than any other U.S. harbor
(88.2 million tons valued at $60.1 billion in 2010).
Houston has the second-highest level of exports (73.2
million tons valued at $70.8 billion in 2010), and the second-
highest level of total maritime tonnage (220 million tons in
2010) in the United States.
More than 7,800 vessels arrive and 150,000 barge movements
are registered annually.
Most importantly roughly 25% of the oil imports for America
flow through the Port of Houston. Each day 25-30 oil and
chemical tankers move along the Houston ship channel. And 31%
of America's crude oil refining capacity is in this harbor. If
catastrophe struck the port, there is little spare capacity to
import and refine crude oil elsewhere in the country.
A 2007 study by the Houston Port Authority estimated that the port
directly leads to $285 billion in National economic activity, 1.5
million jobs and $16.2 million in Nation-wide tax revenues. The U.S.
Coast Guard estimates that if the Houston Ship Channel was closed, it
would have a direct negative impact on the economy of approximately
$406 million per day.
Americans are now paying nearly $4.00 for a gallon of gas. Even an
attack causing little damage could raise prices at the pump by a dollar
or more. The Port of Houston is integral to America's economy. We must
ensure there are no gaps in our security at this port, and ensure that
terrorists do not wound our economy or harm our citizens by
successfully carrying out an attack in Houston.
The U.S. Coast Guard, Texas State and County officials, and
industry stakeholders associated with the Port of Houston have done a
great deal to protect the port and its shipping from a terrorist
attack. The U.S. Coast Guard and local police have access to a real-
time satellite tracking system that pinpoints the exact size and
location of every ship in and around Houston. The Coast Guard has
heavily armed vessels patrolling the channel, and along with Harris
County Sheriff boats, stand ready to respond. Equally important, Texas
established the Houston Ship Channel Security District, a unique
industry-government partnership to assist protecting the facilities
surrounding the ship channel.
The GAO has made several recommendations to mitigate terrorist
attacks at ports. It recommends:
All participants should plan for meeting the growing
security workload as liquefied natural gas shipments increase;
Ports should plan for dealing with the economic consequences
of an attack;
Terrorism and oil spill response plans at the National and
local level should be integrated; and
Performance metrics should be developed for an emergency
response.
All agencies generally agreed with the GAO recommendations.
I would be remiss if we did not consider one other major point.
Once the Panama Canal's deepening project is complete in 2014, the
Canal will be able to accommodate vessels with drafts up to 50 feet.
Houston cannot accommodate such large ships because it is only dredged
to 45 feet. Larger ships will not be able to enter the Houston Channel.
Additionally, it is notable that if a ship were sunk in the middle of
the channel, it would effectively cut off commercial traffic in the
port until the ship could be refloated and moved. The cost of a
shutdown would damage the U.S. economy.
Today we examine whether the GAO recommendations have been
instituted, what needs to be done to enlarge the Houston Ship
Channel and whether we need to do more to prevent al-Qaeda and
its affiliates from again wounding our economy as they did on
9/11.
I thank the witnesses for being here and I especially want to thank
the Ranking Member of the subcommittee, the gentleman from
Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, for being with us today and recognize him
for 5 minutes for the purpose of making an opening statement.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Keating. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
for having what I think is an extremely important hearing.
Where my house is, I can view the Cape Cod Canal because it
is right there on the water, and so I see the Cape Cod Canal,
and I will tell you, having the view of this canal just dwarfs
that so much, and this is an extraordinary site and very
important in terms of our economic input. So I would like to
thank you for having the hearing.
I would like to also acknowledge my colleagues that are
here, Representative Gene Green. It is great to allow, you
know, an outsider to come into your area like that. I
appreciate it.
We will be joined at some point by Representative Sheila
Jackson Lee, who is also on the committee.
I will tell you, both Chairman McCaul and I realize that
you cannot conduct proper oversight in a vacuum, which means
that you must go into the field and see first-hand the security
measures mandated by Congress and do our best to make sure that
things are running smoothly and determine what else may have to
be done to provide help, and we are here in Houston just to do
that.
It gives me a great pleasure to be here in Texas, and I
look forward to hosting Chairman McCaul in Boston when we
conduct a field hearing there to examine the aviation security
procedures at Logan Airport which is also a port as well.
Today, however, we are going to examine the Port of Houston
which links the city of Houston with over 1,053 ports in 203
countries and is, therefore, an excellent location to determine
exactly what the best practices are in maritime security.
The Port of Houston, as the Chairman mentioned, is one of
the largest ports in the world, and it is home to the world's
largest concentration, as Representative Green knows, of
petroleum facilities and $15 billion in petrochemical complex,
which is ranked second in the entire world.
Although much attention is given to aviation security since
9/11, and rightly so, we cannot ignore the very real potential
of threats that exist in the maritime sector and the steps that
must be taken to protect our ports and waterways from the
threat of terrorist activity.
In my district, it sits right on the water and includes
parts of the South Shore and, as the Chairman mentioned, Cape
Cod and the islands, but my district is also near the Port of
Boston, which is the oldest running port in the Western
hemisphere. So I am no stranger to the maritime environment,
and I look forward to examining the similarities and
differences between security measures here in Houston and those
in the Port of Boston which supplies 90 percent of the
Massachusetts heating and fossil fuels.
Both the Port of Houston and Boston house tankers carrying
liquefied natural gas, liquefied petroleum gas, and oil. If a
terrorist attack occurred at a port like that and resulted in
the explosion of any of these volatile materials, the result
would truly be catastrophic.
Unfortunately, terrorists overseas have demonstrated that,
indeed, they have the ability to carry out these type of
attacks, and the fact that they haven't occurred here in our
country should mean nothing to us. We should be vigilant and
ready.
We could have said the same thing about aviation security
before 9/11 and Logan Airport, where that terrible day
initiated, which we will be looking at the anniversary quite
soon of 10 years.
The Chairman mentioned the very real possibility in terms
of the suicide boat attacks of the tanker Limburg off the coast
of Yemen that killed one person, injured 17, and spilled 90,000
barrels of oil. In 2010, the Coast Guard approved shipments of
liquefied natural gas from Yemen to our home area within 50
feet of residential neighborhoods, despite concerns that the
cargo was coming from a country that has been identified as a
terrorist safe haven and has previously experienced terrorist
attack of their own.
The economic impact of the Limburg attack included a short-
term collapse in international shipping in the Gulf of Aden
and, ultimately, cost Yemen $3.8 million a month. If that type
of attack ever occurred here and caused a massive oil spill,
even larger than the one that occurred in Yemen, we may, once
again, experience the type of economic damage that occurred in
the aftermath of Deepwater Horizon and its oil spill.
According to Dun and Bradstreet, Deepwater Horizon's oil
spill negatively impacted 7.3 million active businesses in 5
Gulf States, 85 percent of which were small businesses with
less than 10 employees. So this just isn't a big corporation or
big business concern, economically it affects even our small
businesspeople. It also affected 34 million jobs, $5.2 trillion
in sales, and as we all remember what happened, the price of
oil went up.
So even though I am here sharing a concern about maritime
security, each and every American should be concerned about the
security of this Houston port. Any major stoppage in that, any
interruption will affect them drastically in all their economic
endeavors and cripple our country.
Given the upcoming anniversary of September 11 and its
attacks, coupled with our current economic climate, we need to
make sure that any additional damage to the job market is
protected, and the cost in terms of jobs of such an attack
would be incredible.
So I look forward to the hearing. I look forward to hearing
from our witnesses, and I thank the Chairman, again, in
bringing to the attention at this important time this National
security necessity.
Mr. McCaul. I thank the Ranking Member.
The Chairman asks unanimous consent that the gentleman, Mr.
Green, be allowed to participate in this hearing and provide an
opening statement, and without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be very brief.
First, I want to welcome you to the Port of Houston, both
Chairman McCaul and also my colleague from Massachusetts, and I
actually had the opportunity a few years ago to watch that LNG
tanker go through the Boston Harbor to the facility there and
the security protections that are provided for it.
But I represent most of the Port of Houston. I also share
the Port of Houston with Congressman Ted Poe and Pete Olson to
the east, but where you are standing or sitting today is in our
district. As you know, it is the No. 1 foreign tonnage port in
the country. It is the lifeblood of the economy in southeast
Texas, but I think in the whole country, because of what we
produce in refined products and other products in our
community.
Best example I know is that when we first started using the
transport worker identification card, the TWIC card, it was
estimated we would have 50- or 60,000 people who work on the
port who would need those cards. The last time I checked--and
our port chair may tell us--we had over 250,000 of those cards
issued at the Port of Houston. So 250,000 people, a quarter of
a million people, come to the port to work and have to use that
TWIC card to get on the site unless they are escorted.
So it is such an economic generator. We have five
refineries and more chemical plants than I can count. Without
the port, they wouldn't be here. In fact, we are working on an
historic designation, if we can ever get it through the House.
Buffalo Bayou, which is the Port of Houston's historical name,
to be a National heritage area, not just based on the San
Jacinto battleground and some of the historic things we have,
but how did the biggest petrochemical complex in the country,
second-largest in the world, develop here on the port, and how
did this port 50 miles inland become developed? So we are
working on that with the support of the Port of Houston and all
of our local communities.
But I want to welcome you. There has been some great
successes here, and I know we will hear about them from our
panel today. I welcome our panel, particularly our sheriff, who
is a constituent and also a long-time friend, and our port is
safer today than it was after 9/11 but we can still do
improvements. I think if you compare our port security to every
other port that I know of in the country, we have done so much
more because, again, of the volatility of the products we
produce.
But again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for being here and
thank you, Bill.
[The statement of Hon. Green follows:]
Prepared Statement of Honorable Gene Green
August 24, 2011
Thank you Chairman McCaul for holding this important hearing and
inviting me to participate. Ensuring the security of our Nation's ports
is a top priority in Congress and we have all worked together to secure
these key assets that are critical to our economy. Here in Houston and
East Harris County, we rely on the safety and security of our port and
the facility operators directly surrounding the port live this every
single day.
The Port of Houston is the largest foreign tonnage port and the
largest petrochemical port in the country. In fact, it moves the
second-largest amount of cargo in the country, as 8.5% of our Nation's
cargo moves through the Port of Houston. The commerce that occurs at
our port is critical to our Nation's energy and chemical sectors and to
our country's ability to trade and move goods throughout our country.
It is a port of National significance. We must ensure the security and
safety of the people who work at and near the port, the community
surrounding the port and the facilities here.
Whether the threat is from nature or it is manmade, preparedness is
the key to maintaining our security and safety. The Federal Government
has partnered with the Port of Houston Authority, facilities at the
port and along the ship channel, as well as State and local government
agencies. This partnership, the Houston Ship Channel Security District,
is critical to maintaining a high level of security.
Forming the Houston Ship Channel Security District was a major
accomplishment that increases the area's emergency preparedness and
disaster response capabilities. This important partnership takes
advantage of the long tradition of cooperation among companies and
governmental entities working in the ship channel area.
Since fiscal year 2002, the port has received nearly $19 million
from the Federal Port Security Grant Program, which is part of over $30
million in Federal homeland security funds that are providing the
latest in technology, detection, and oversight for security purposes.
These funds are crucial to keeping our country safe and protecting the
communities and workers at our Nation's ports.
I look forward to working with my friend Chairman McCaul and our
colleagues to identify the needs of the Port of Houston and ports
across the country and to address them as we move forward to strengthen
our country and our economy.
Mr. McCaul. Let me thank you for being here as well and
participating in this important hearing.
[The statement of Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Sheila Jackson Lee
Thank you Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member Keating for convening
this very important field hearing to examine the programs, policies,
procedures, and implementation of maritime security efforts at the Port
of Houston with an emphasis on protecting the port and the supply chain
from a terrorist attack. I would like to welcome our witnesses today:
Mr. Stephen L. Caldwell, Director of Maritime and Coast Guard Issues,
Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office;
Captain James Whitehead, Sector Commander, Sector Houston-Galveston,
U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Department of Homeland Security; my friend,
Sheriff Adrian Garcia, Harris County Sheriffs Office, Texas; Mr. James
T. Edmonds, Chairman, The Port of Houston Authority; and Captain
William Diehl (USCG Ret.), President, Greater Houston Port Bureau, Inc.
Thank you for participating in this very important field hearing.
The Port of Houston is home of the second-largest petrochemical
complex.
The country's largest refinery is located on the Houston Ship
Channel, where refined energy products are transported by way of an
infrastructure made up of pipelines, rails, and our roadways.
The infrastructure utilized through these transportation resources
includes the Colonial Pipeline system, which is the largest petroleum
product pipeline system in the Nation and is vital to the demands of
energy throughout the Southern part of our Nation and the East Coast.
The Nation's economy and security are heavily dependent on oil, natural
gas, and other energy commodities. Bolstering port security in Houston
and throughout the country is of paramount concern. The Port of Houston
is a 25-mile-long complex of public and private facilities located just
a few hours' sailing time from the Gulf of Mexico. The port is ranked
first in the United States in foreign waterborne commerce, second in
total tonnage, and sixth in the world.
More than 220 million tons of cargo moved through the Port of
Houston in 2009. More than 7,700 vessel calls were recorded at the Port
of Houston during the year 2009.
Economic studies reveal that ship channel-related businesses
support more than 287,000 direct and indirect jobs throughout Texas
while generating nearly $11 billion in economic impact. Additionally,
more than $649 million in State and local tax revenues are generated by
business activities related to the port. Approximately 87,000 jobs are
connected with the Port of Houston itself, and over 80% of those people
live in the Houston Metropolitan area.
Centrally located on the Gulf Coast, Houston is a strategic gateway
for cargo originating in or destined for the U.S. West and Midwest.
Houston lies within close reach of one of the Nation's largest
concentrations of consumers. More than 17 million people live within
300 miles of the city, and approximately 60 million live within 700
miles.
Safe and secure seaports are an essential element in building
efficient and technologically advanced supply chains that move cargo
quickly to distribution centers, stores, and factories around the
world.
Although we have made progress since the 9/11 attacks in enhancing
the security of the Nation's ports, we cannot afford to be complacent.
The danger is very real that we may be escorting a weapon of mass
destruction to its target. For every mile along the Houston Ship
Channel that dangerous cargo passes, an additional 2,000 people are at
risk. Clearly, once the cargo reaches the city, the risk is at its
greatest.
I will continue to support strong efforts that make the movement of
cargo through the global supply chain as secure as possible, and I am
committed to doing everything feasible to ensure the security of the
Nation's ports.
I am interested to hear from our witnesses on all aspects of
securing the offshore energy infrastructure, including security
inspections in place and other measures to better secure Outer
Continental Shelf facilities and deepwater ports. How the United States
Coast Guard assesses the offshore infrastructure as we look to our
ports is critical.
The findings from the National Commission on the BP Deepwater
Horizon Oil Spill incident illustrated how examining the role that the
industry and Government sectors played in assessing vulnerabilities and
the impact the incident had on the economic, social, and environmental
systems. The quality of information shared from this unfortunate event
could improve the quality of information that informs Congress on the
most appropriate programs and budget decisions to best ensure security
for our ports and how to utilize scarce resources in a constrained
fiscal environment.
From reviewing your testimonies, please know that I share your
concerns about achieving a balance between securing our ports and
maintaining our viable business options. As such, I would like to
assure all of you that in my capacity as Ranking Member of the Homeland
Security Subcommittee on Transportation Security, it has been my
priority to see a vibrant and secure America, where people and trade
are safe and secure to move throughout this great Nation.
I am aware of the increased demands of security and the allocation
of Federal funds, as a result, I am committed to doing everything in my
power to ensure that transportation and port security grants are
allocated in a timely and targeted manner.
Today's hearing is most important at the Port of Houston for
Houston is home to hundreds of energy companies and many of these
companies are involved in exploring for and producing oil and natural
gas in the Gulf of Mexico and transporting it from sea to shore.
Furthermore, energy tankers sail through Houston Ship Channel, and
major facilities for refining oil are located along or the Ship
Channel.
As a Member of Homeland Security, I am glad that Chairman McCaul
and Ranking Member Keating have called this issue to the forefront. I
would like to welcome everyone to the 18th Congressional District of
Houston, Texas, and thank you for your strong initiative in making our
seas and ports more secure.
Mr. McCaul. With that, I will introduce the witnesses. We
have, first, Mr. Steve Caldwell, director in GAO's Homeland
Security and Justice Team. His recent GAO reports and testimony
have covered issues related to protecting critical
infrastructure, particularly in the ports, including the
implementation of the Maritime Transportation Security Act, or
SAFE Port Act.
He has an extensive international experience having spent
almost a third of his career overseas visiting 27 countries as
part of his work on homeland security and other issues. Thank
you for being here.
Next, we have Captain James Whitehead, who currently serves
as commander of the U.S. Coast Guard Sector Houston-Galveston,
after serving for 2 years as deputy commander. He serves as the
Officer in Charge of Marine Inspections, or OCMI, Captain of
the Port, Federal Maritime Security Coordinator, Search and
Rescue Mission Coordinator, and Federal On-Scene Coordinator
for an area spanning from Matagorda Bay, Texas, to Lake
Charles, Louisiana. Captain Whitehead is a graduate of the
Coast Guard Officer Candidate School and the U.S. Naval War
College. Captain, thank you for being here today.
Next, we have your constituent and my friend as well,
Sheriff Adrian Garcia who heads the largest sheriff's office in
Texas and the third-largest in the United States. Sheriff
Garcia is a native Houstonian. He became an officer with the
Houston Police Department in 1980. In 1999, Mayor Lee Brown
promoted him to director of the mayor's Anti-Gang Office, where
he served until 2003. Sheriff Garcia was elected to the Houston
City Council in 2003, and he chaired the council's Public
Safety and Homeland Security Committee before being elected to
sheriff. Sheriff, thank you so much for being here today.
Next, another friend, Mr. Jim Edmonds, was appointed
chairman of the Board of Commissioners of the Port of Houston
Authority in June 2000. He was first appointed to the Port
Commission in October 1996, representing Harris County, and
under Chairman Edmonds' leadership, the Port of Houston
Authority has been able to expand its business opportunities.
In addition to his responsibilities with the Port of Houston,
Chairman Edmonds serves as a member of the Board of Pilots
Commissioners and on the board of Memorial Hermann Healthcare
System, the I-69 TxDOT Advisory Committee, and the Gulf Coast
Rail District. Thank you, Jim, for being here today as well.
Finally, we have Captain Bill Diehl, the U.S. Coast Guard.
He is president of the Greater Houston Port Bureau, a maritime
trade organization of 125 companies. Captain Diehl became
president of the Port Bureau after retiring from the Coast
Guard in 2009 where he served in a variety of challenging jobs,
including being the senior U.S. diplomat at the Panama Canal.
Captain Diehl is a graduate of the Coast Guard Academy. Mr.
Diehl, thank you also for being here as well.
With that, we will begin our opening statements and the
Chairman now recognizes Mr. Caldwell for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN L. CALDWELL, DIRECTOR, MARITIME AND COAST
GUARD ISSUES, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE TEAM, GOVERNMENT
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Caldwell. Thank you very much, Chairman McCaul and Mr.
Keating and Mr. Green. I also want to thank the other witnesses
for what they do every day to protect this port and the other
ports in our country.
While my written statement today doesn't focus that much on
tankers, I do want to point out the report we did in 2007,
which was a comprehensive report with a lot of detail on the
threats to tankers, the tankers that arrive every day to supply
our refineries and to power our economy. Mr. McCaul and Mr.
Keating have already talked a little bit about the different
kinds of attacks that can occur on a tanker and the
consequences of those attacks. So I will skip on to some of the
other things here.
One of the areas that we have been particularly concerned
about is the attacks on tankers at maritime choke points, and
these could be international straits, major transit canals, or
channels within a port such as the Houston Ship Channel we have
here, and our concerns do appear validated by the recent
revelations about al-Qaeda's intentions, as well as the attack
on the MV Star in the Straits of Hormuz.
While our previous report on tankers only touched briefly
on the issue of piracy, that has actually become a bigger
threat than terrorist threats to tankers. Specifically, there
were 48 attacks on tankers in 2006, 149 in 2010, and it is
trending even higher in 2011. Those are pirate attacks, and
then from the pirate perspective, they have a very successful
business model with ransoms for tankers going from about $3
million in 2009 up to $12 million in 2011.
To date, these terrorist attacks and these pirate attacks
have occurred far from Houston, thankfully, where United States
has limited control over the security situation. But now, I
will turn my attention to U.S. ports and the waters where there
is a lot we can do to prevent and respond to these type of
attacks.
Our previous report, as has been mentioned, had five
recommendations specific to planning for, and responding to, a
terrorist attack on a tanker within a U.S. port. Two of our
recommendations do remain unaddressed. One related to the
integration of operational plans, and the other related to
performance measures.
Moving beyond Houston and touching on some of the areas
that Mr. Keating talked about, let's go offshore. There are
over 4,000 offshore platforms and related infrastructure within
the Gulf of Mexico, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill showed
just what the consequences of an explosion on such a platform
can be. I suspect that those that wish us harm could not help
but notice the difficulties the Nation faced in capping an oil
spill deep on the seabed. We all remember the media count day
after day for the 84 days it took to cap that well and for the
4 million barrels of oil that were spilled into the Gulf.
Now, we can imagine another explosion or even multiple
explosions done on purpose. In addition to the response to
protect the environment that we already saw, we would have to
add to the complexity of that by putting on a law enforcement
and a security response as well.
Now, with this testimony, another thing that we are doing,
based on work we are doing for the subcommittee, is reporting
on Coast Guard security assessments of such offshore
infrastructure. We found that the Coast Guard was not
addressing about one-quarter of the assessments it should have
been doing. We also found that the Coast Guard was--I am
sorry--the Coast Guard was not doing these assessments. Based
on that, we are making recommendations to the Coast Guard which
they have accepted which will improve their internal controls
so that they can identify all of those facilities that do
require such assessments.
One of the Coast Guard's other big challenges in doing
these kinds of offshore assessments harkens back to the
Deepwater Horizon in that such facilities are actually vessels
called MODU's, mobile offshore drilling units, do not fall
under the Coast Guard's current regulations for security; thus,
the Coast Guard is not conducting the same kinds of security
assessments on MODU's that it is in doing in terms of an oil
platform or production facility.
In closing, we will continue with our other work for the
committee, continuing to look at Coast Guard work at offshore
facilities, both oil production platforms and deepwater ports
such as LOOP and some others that are in Massachusetts Bay.
I will be happy to respond to any questions. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Caldwell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen L. Caldwell
August 24, 2011
GAO Highlights
Highlights of GAO-11-883T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management; Committee on Homeland
Security; House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
The Nation's economy and security are heavily dependent on oil,
natural gas, and other energy commodities. Al-Qaeda and other groups
with malevolent intent have targeted energy tankers and offshore energy
infrastructure because of their importance to the Nation's economy and
National security. The U.S. Coast Guard--a component of the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS)--is the lead Federal agency for maritime
security, including the security of energy tankers and offshore energy
infrastructure. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) also has
responsibilities for preventing and responding to terrorist incidents.
This testimony discusses the extent to which: (1) The Coast Guard and
the FBI have taken actions to address GAO's prior recommendations to
prevent and respond to a terrorist incident involving energy tankers,
and (2) the Coast Guard has taken actions to assess the security risks
to offshore energy infrastructure and related challenges. This
testimony is based on products issued from December 2007 through March
2011 and recently completed work on the Coast Guard's actions to assess
security risks. GAO reviewed documents from the Coast Guard's risk
model and relevant laws, regulations, policies, and procedures; and
interviewed Coast Guard officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is recommending that the Coast Guard revise policies and
procedures to ensure its analysts receive the annual updated list of
regulated offshore energy facilities to ensure risk assessments are
conducted on those facilities. The Coast Guard concurred with this
recommendation.
maritime security.--progress made, but further actions needed to secure
the maritime energy supply
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard and the FBI have made progress implementing prior
recommendations GAO made to enhance energy tanker security. In 2007,
GAO made five recommendations to address challenges in ensuring the
effectiveness of Federal agencies' actions to protect energy tankers
and implement response plans. The Coast Guard and the FBI have
implemented two recommendations, specifically: (1) The Coast Guard, in
coordination with U.S. Customs and Border Protection, developed
protocols for facilitating the recovery and resumption of trade
following a disruption to the maritime transportation system, and (2)
the Coast Guard and the FBI participated in local port exercises that
executed multiple response plans simultaneously. The Coast Guard has
made progress on a third recommendation through work on a National
strategy for the security of certain dangerous cargoes. It also plans
to develop a resource allocation plan, starting in April 2012, which
may help address the need to balance security responsibilities.
However, the Coast Guard and the FBI have not yet taken action on a
fourth recommendation to develop an operational plan to integrate the
National spill and terrorism response plans. According to DHS, it plans
to revise the National Response Framework, but no decision has been
made regarding whether the separate response plans will be integrated.
Also, DHS has not yet taken action on the final recommendation to
develop explicit performance measures for emergency response
capabilities and use them in risk-based analyses to set priorities for
acquiring needed response resources. According to DHS, it is revising
its emergency response grant programs, but does not have specific plans
to develop performance measures as part of this effort.
The Coast Guard has taken actions to assess the security risks to
offshore energy infrastructure, which includes Outer Continental Shelf
(OCS) facilities (facilities that are involved in producing oil or
natural gas) and deepwater ports (facilities used to transfer oil and
natural gas from tankers to shore), but improvements are needed. The
Coast Guard has used its Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM)
to examine the security risks to OCS facilities and deepwater ports. To
do so, the Coast Guard has coordinated with the intelligence community
and stakeholders, such as the Department of the Interior's Bureau of
Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement. However, the
Coast Guard faces complex and technical challenges in assessing risks.
For example, the Coast Guard does not have data on the ability of an
OCS facility to withstand an attack. The Coast Guard generally
recognizes these challenges and has actions underway to study or
address them. Further, GAO determined that as of May 2011, the Coast
Guard had not assessed security risks for 12 of the 50 security-
regulated OCS facilities that are to be subjected to such assessments.
Coast Guard officials later determined that they needed to add these
OCS facilities to MSRAM for assessment and have completed the required
assessments. However, while the list of security-regulated facilities
may change each year based on factors such as production volume, the
Coast Guard's current policies and procedures do not call for Coast
Guard officials to provide an annual updated list of regulated OCS
facilities to MSRAM analysts. Given the continuing threat to such
offshore facilities, revising its procedures could help ensure that the
Coast Guard carries out its risk assessment requirements for security-
regulated OCS facilities.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss Federal efforts
to ensure the security of energy tankers and the offshore energy
infrastructure that produces, transports, or receives oil and natural
gas. The Nation's economy and security are heavily dependent on oil,
natural gas, and other energy commodities. Further, it is fitting that
today's hearing is in Houston because the city and the surrounding area
play a central role in the maritime energy sector. Houston is home to
hundreds of energy companies and many of these companies are involved
in exploring for and producing oil and natural gas in the Gulf of
Mexico and transporting it from sea to shore. In addition, energy
tankers sail through the Houston Ship Channel, and major facilities for
refining oil are located along or near the channel.
Al-Qaeda and other groups with malevolent intent continue to target
energy tankers and offshore energy infrastructure because of their
importance to the Nation's economy and National security. In May 2011,
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a press statement that
intelligence information showed that throughout 2010 there was
continuing interest by members of al-Qaeda in targeting oil tankers and
commercial oil infrastructure at sea. While a terrorist attack on
energy tankers or offshore energy infrastructure has not occurred in
the United States, other countries have experienced such attacks.
Additionally, while it was not the result of an attack, the
Deepwater Horizon explosion in April 2010 showed that the consequences
of an incident on offshore energy infrastructure could be significant.
The explosion resulted in 11 deaths, serious injuries, and the largest
oil spill in the history of the United States. The response to the
incident encountered numerous challenges, and by the time the well was
sealed nearly 3 months later, over 4 million barrels of oil had spilled
into the Gulf. The spill created significant environmental damage and
had an adverse impact on workers and businesses, with an estimated cost
to compensate for these damages totaling billions of dollars.
The U.S. Coast Guard--a component of DHS--is the lead Federal
agency for maritime security, including security of energy tankers and
offshore energy infrastructure. The FBI--an agency in the Department of
Justice (DOJ)--shares responsibility with the Coast Guard for
preventing and responding to terrorist incidents in the maritime
environment, including incidents involving energy tankers. In December
2007, we issued a report that examined Coast Guard and FBI efforts to
prevent and respond to an incident involving energy tankers and we made
several recommendations to the Coast Guard and the FBI to improve
efforts in these areas.\1\
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\1\ GAO, Maritime Security: Federal Efforts Needed to Address
Challenges in Preventing and Responding to Terrorist Attacks on Energy
Commodity Tankers, GAO-08-141 (Washington, DC: Dec. 10, 2007).
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My testimony today will address two main objectives:
the extent to which the Coast Guard and the FBI have taken
actions to address our prior recommendations to prevent and
respond to terrorist incidents involving energy tankers; and,
the extent to which the Coast Guard has taken actions to
assess the security risks to offshore energy infrastructure and
the challenges, if any, in conducting such assessments.
My statement is based on our past work on energy tankers issued in
December 2007 and recently completed work on actions the Coast Guard
has taken to assess security risks in the maritime environment.\2\ To
obtain information on the first objective, we reviewed our prior
reports on energy tankers, and asked the Coast Guard and the FBI to
provide us an update, along with supporting documentation, on any
actions that they have taken to address our recommendations from the
December 2007 report. To provide additional information on threats to
energy tankers, we also reviewed our recent work on piracy.\3\ More
detailed information on the scope and methodology used for our past
reviews appears in those reports.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO-08-141.
\3\ GAO, Maritime Security: Actions Needed to Assess and Update
Plan and Enhance Collaboration Among Partners Involved in Countering
Piracy off the Horn of Africa, GAO-10-856 (Washington, DC: Sept. 24,
2010); and Maritime Security: Updating U.S. Counterpiracy Action Plan
Gains Urgency as Piracy Escalates off the Horn of Africa, GAO-11-449T
(Washington, DC: Mar. 15, 2011).
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To address the second objective, we interviewed officials in Coast
Guard headquarters and field offices in New Orleans, Louisiana and
Boston, Massachusetts because these officials were knowledgeable about
how the Coast Guard uses the Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model
(MSRAM)--a tool that the Coast Guard uses to assess the security risks
to vessels and offshore energy infrastructure.\4\ Moreover, the New
Orleans and Boston field offices are the only offices presently
conducting assessments of offshore energy infrastructure. We also
reviewed Coast Guard documents on MSRAM, such as Coast Guard guidance
to its field units and the MSRAM training manual. In addition, we
reviewed relevant laws and regulations, policies and procedures, and
other documents related to security risk assessments. For example, we
reviewed the DHS Quadrennial Review,\5\ the National Infrastructure
Protection Plan,\6\ and a National Research Council report on risk
assessments at DHS.\7\ We also reviewed our prior report on risk
assessment efforts carried out by the Coast Guard.\8\ In addition, we
compared the Coast Guard's policies and procedures regarding security
actions with criteria in Standards for Internal Control in the Federal
Government.\9\ Further, we interviewed representatives from two
companies that together operate 18 of the 50 Outer Continental Shelf
facilities, a type of offshore energy infrastructure, regulated for
security in 2011. While the information obtained from these interviews
is not generalizable to the offshore energy industry as a whole, it
provided insights into owners' and operators' concerns regarding
security and actions they have taken to address such concerns. This
testimony concludes our work on Coast Guard efforts to assess security
risks for offshore energy infrastructure.\10\
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\4\ In looking at the Coast Guard's assessments of risks, we
focused on security risks--risks emanating from terrorists or others
that would purposely attack or sabotage offshore energy infrastructure.
We did not focus on accidental risks to such infrastructure. However,
we have on-going work to assess industry plans for developing new
methods or technologies to control and contain blowouts occurring in
subsea environments. We are conducting this work at the request of the
Ranking Member of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce. We expect
to issue this related report in the winter of 2012. We are also
conducting broader work examining the Coast Guard's use of MSRAM for
the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation; the Ranking Member of the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs; and the Chairwoman of the House
Homeland Security Committee, Subcommittee on Border and Maritime
Security. We expect to issue this report later in 2011.
\5\ The DHS Quadrennial Review outlines a strategic framework for
stakeholders, including Federal, State, local, Tribal, territorial,
nongovernmental, and private-sector entities, in responding to security
threats. For more information about the DHS Quadrennial Review, see
GAO, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review: 2010 Reports Addressed Many
Required Elements, but Budget Planning Not Yet Completed, GAO-11-153R
(Washington, DC: Dec. 16, 2010).
\6\ The National Infrastructure Protection Plan represents a
strategy for protecting critical infrastructure and key resources, and
it offers a framework for assessing risk. For more information about
the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, see GAO, Critical
Infrastructure Protection: Update to National Infrastructure Protection
Plan Includes Increased Emphasis on Risk Management and Resilience,
GAO-10-296 (Washington, DC: Mar. 5, 2010).
\7\ National Research Council: Review of the Department of Homeland
Security's Approach to Risk Analysis (Washington, DC: 2010).
\8\ GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess
Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical
Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, DC: Dec. 15, 2005) and Maritime
Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Key Areas of Port Security,
GAO-10-940T (Washington, DC: July 21, 2010).
\9\ GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government,
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, DC: November 1999).
\10\ We will continue our broader work looking at the security of
offshore energy infrastructure, including Coast Guard security
inspections and other challenges.
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We conducted this performance audit from October 2010 through
August 2011 in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
background
The Nation's economy and security are heavily dependent on oil,
natural gas, and other energy commodities. Nearly half of the Nation's
oil is transported from overseas by tankers. For example, about 49
percent of the Nation's crude oil supply--one of the main sources of
gasoline, jet fuel, heating oil, and many other petroleum products--was
transported by tanker into the United States in 2009.\11\ The remaining
oil and natural gas used in the United States comes from Canada by
pipeline or is produced from domestic sources in areas such as offshore
facilities in the Gulf of Mexico. With regard to these domestic
sources, the area of Federal jurisdiction--called the Outer Continental
Shelf (OCS)\12\--contains an estimated 85 million barrels of oil, more
than all onshore resources and those in shallower State waters
combined.\13\ In addition, the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port (LOOP), a
deepwater port, is responsible for transporting about 10 percent of
imported oil into the United States.
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\11\ This figure is based on the most recently available data for a
full year from the U.S. Energy Information Administration.
\12\ The OCS is a designation for all submerged lands of which the
subsoil and seabed are outside the territorial jurisdiction of a U.S.
State, but within U.S. jurisdiction and control.
\13\ Based on an estimate from the National Commission on the BP
Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf
Oil Disaster and the Future of Offshore Drilling (Washington, DC:
January 2011).
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Federal Agency Roles
As the lead Federal agency for maritime security, the Coast Guard
seeks to mitigate many kinds of security challenges in the maritime
environment. Doing so is a key part of its overall security mission and
a starting point for identifying security gaps and taking actions to
address them. Carrying out these responsibilities is a difficult and
challenging task because energy tankers often depart from foreign ports
and are registered in countries other than the United States, which
means the United States has limited authority to oversee the security
of such vessels until they enter U.S. waters. Offshore energy
infrastructure also presents its own set of security challenges because
some of this infrastructure is located many miles from shore. The FBI
shares responsibility with the Coast Guard for preventing and
responding to terrorist incidents in the maritime environment,
including incidents involving energy tankers.
Risks to Energy Tankers
Energy tankers face risks from various types of attack. We
identified three primary types of attack methods against energy tankers
in our 2007 report, including suicide attacks, armed assaults by
terrorists or armed bands, and launching a ``standoff'' missile attack
using a rocket or some other weapon fired from a distance. In recent
years, we have issued reports that discussed risks energy tankers face
from terrorist attacks and attacks from other criminals, such as
pirates. Terrorists have attempted--and in some cases carried out--
attacks on energy tankers since September 11, 2001. To date, these
attacks have included attempts to damage tankers or their related
infrastructure at overseas ports. For example, in 2002, terrorists
conducted a suicide boat attack against the French supertanker Limburg
off the coast of Yemen, and in 2010, an incident involving another
supertanker, the M/V M. Star, in the Strait of Hormuz is suspected to
have been a terrorist attack. Our work on energy tankers identified
three main places in which tankers may be at risk of an attack: (1) At
foreign ports; (2) in transit, especially at narrow channels, or
chokepoints; and (3) at U.S. ports. For example, foreign ports, where
commodities are loaded onto tankers, may vary in their levels of
security, and the Coast Guard is limited in the degree to which it can
bring about improvements abroad when security is substandard, in part
because its activities are limited by conditions set by host nations.
In addition, while tankers are in transit, they face risks because they
travel on direct routes that are known in advance and, for part of
their journey, they may have to travel through waters that do not allow
them to maneuver away from possible attacks. According to the Energy
Information Administration, chokepoints along a route make tankers
susceptible to attacks. Further, tankers remain at risk upon arrival in
the United States because of the inherent risks to port facilities. For
example, port facilities are generally accessible by land and sea and
are sprawling installations often close to population centers.
Beyond the relatively rare threat of terrorist attacks against
tankers, the threat of piracy has become relatively common.\14\ In
particular, piracy threatens tankers transiting one of the world's
busiest shipping lanes near key energy corridors and the route through
the Suez Canal. The vast areas at risk for piracy off the Horn of
Africa, combined with the small number of military ships available for
patrolling them, make protecting energy tankers difficult. According to
the International Maritime Bureau, 30 percent (490 of 1,650) of vessels
reporting pirate attacks worldwide from 2006 through 2010 were
identified as tankers.\15\ See table 1 for a summary of tankers
attacked by pirates during 2006 through 2010.
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\14\ The motivation behind an attack may distinguish piracy from
terrorism. For example, the motivation for piracy is often monetary,
whereas terrorism is politically motivated.
\15\ The International Chamber of Commerce's International Maritime
Bureau operates a Piracy Reporting Center that collects data on pirate
attacks worldwide.
TABLE 1.--NUMBER OF TANKERS ATTACKED BY PIRATES, 2006-2010
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Type of Commodity Transported 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bitumen*................................................. 0 1 0 2 2
Chemical/Product**....................................... 35 52 55 69 96
Crude Oil................................................ 9 25 30 41 43
Liquefied Natural Gas.................................... 0 1 0 1 1
Liquefied Petroleum Gas.................................. 4 5 6 5 7
------------------------------------------------------
Totals............................................. 48 84 91 118 149
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: International Maritime Bureau, Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Annual Report (United Kingdom,
2010).
* Bitumen is a heavy black viscous oil often used in paving materials and sealants.
** This category includes tankers that transport chemicals or oil products other than crude oil.
As shown in the table, pirate attacks against tankers have tripled
in the last 5 years, and the incidence of piracy against tankers
continues to rise. From January through June 2011, 100 tankers were
attacked, an increase of 37 percent compared to tankers attacked from
January through June 2010. Figure 1 shows one of the recent suspected
pirate attacks. In addition, tankers are fetching increasing ransom
demands from Somali pirates. Media reports indicate a steady increase
in ransoms for tankers, from $3 million in January 2009 for the Saudi
tanker Sirius Star, to $9.5 million in November 2010 for the South
Korean tanker Samho Dream, to $12 million in June 2011 for the Kuwaiti
tanker MV Zirku. The U.S. Maritime Administration and the Coast Guard
have issued guidance for commercial vessels to stay 200 miles away from
the Somali coast. However, pirates have adapted and increased their
capability to attack and hijack vessels to more than 1,000 miles from
Somalia using mother ships, from which they launch smaller boats to
conduct the attacks.\16\ To address the growing concern over piracy,
the Coast Guard has issued a directive with guidelines for U.S. vessels
operating in high-risk waters. This directive provides vessel owners
and operators with direction for responding to emerging security risks.
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\16\ For more information on U.S. Government efforts to combat
piracy, see GAO-10-856, which discusses the Coast Guard's and other
agencies' progress in implementing efforts to prevent piracy attacks.
This report contains recommendations to improve U.S. Government efforts
to combat piracy.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Risks to Offshore Energy Infrastructure
Offshore energy infrastructure also faces risks from various types
of attacks. For example, in 2004, a terrorist attacked an offshore oil
terminal in Iraq using speedboats packed with explosives, killing two
U.S. Navy sailors and a U.S. Coast Guardsman. Potential attack methods
against offshore energy infrastructure identified by the Coast Guard or
owners and operators include crashing an aircraft into it; using a
submarine vessel, diver, or other means of attacking it underwater;
ramming it with a vessel; and sabotage by an employee. Offshore energy
infrastructure may face security risks because this infrastructure is
located in open waters and generally many miles away from Coast Guard
assets and personnel.
In addition to our work on energy tankers, we have recently
completed work involving Coast Guard efforts to assess security risks
and ensure the security of offshore energy infrastructure.
Specifically, our work focused on two main types of offshore energy
infrastructure that the Coast Guard oversees for security. The first
type are facilities that operate on the OCS and are generally described
as facilities temporarily or permanently attached to the subsoil or
seabed of the OCS that engage in exploration, development, or
production of oil, natural gas, or mineral resources.\17\ As of
September 2010, there were about 3,900 such facilities, and if a
facility of this type meets or exceeds any one of three thresholds for
production or personnel, it is subject to 33 C.F.R. part 106 security
requirements.\18\ In this testimony, we focus on the 50 facilities
that, in 2011, are regulated for security because they meet or exceed
the threshold criteria. We refer to these security-regulated facilities
as OCS facilities. The second type of offshore energy infrastructure
are deepwater ports, which are fixed or floating manmade structures
used or intended for use as a port or terminal for the transportation,
storage, or handling of oil or natural gas to any State and includes
the transportation of oil or natural gas from the United States'
OCS.\19\ There are currently four licensed deepwater ports--two in the
Gulf of Mexico and two in Massachusetts Bay.\20\ Unlike OCS facilities,
which are involved in the production of oil or natural gas, deepwater
ports enable tankers to offload oil or liquefied natural gas for
transport to land by underwater pipelines.
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\17\ See 33 C.F.R. 106.105.
\18\ Facilities meeting any of the threshold criteria are often
referred to as Maritime Transportation and Security Act (MTSA)-
regulated facilities. The production or personnel thresholds for
determining whether an OCS facility will be subject to security
requirements in accordance with 33 C.F.R. part 106 are: (1) Producing
greater than 100,000 barrels of oil a day, (2) producing more than 200
million cubic feet of natural gas per day, or (3) hosting more than 150
persons for 12 hours or more in each 24-hour period continuously for 30
days or more. According to 33 C.F.R. 140.10, production means those
activities which take place after the successful completion of any
means for the removal of minerals, including, but not limited to, such
removal, field operations, transfer of minerals to shore, operation
monitoring, maintenance, and workover. According to the Coast Guard,
the statement; ``transfer of minerals to shore'' encompasses fixed
facilities that operate as ``Transmission Facilities.'' Production
quantities shall be calculated as the sum of all sources of production
from wells on the primary and any attending platform(s), including the
throughput of other pipelines transferring product across the same
platform(s).
\19\ See 33 C.F.R. 148.5. Although deepwater ports are generally
not regulated for security in accordance with MTSA, owners and
operators generally carry out similar measures to those carried out for
OCS facilities by, among other things, developing security plans
comparable to those implemented by OCS facilities pursuant to part 106.
See 33 C.F.R. 150.15(x).
\20\ According to the Coast Guard, one of the Gulf of Mexico
deepwater ports is expected to be decommissioned in the near future.
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progress made addressing our recommendations, but additional actions
could help improve tanker security
In 2007, we assessed Coast Guard and FBI efforts to ensure the
security of energy tankers and respond to terrorist incidents involving
energy tankers.\21\ We found that actions were being taken,
internationally and domestically, to protect tankers and port
facilities at which tankers would be present. For example, the Coast
Guard visits foreign exporting ports to assess the effectiveness of the
anti-terrorism measures in place. Additionally, port stakeholders in
the United States have taken steps to address vulnerabilities at
domestic ports. For example, the Houston Ship Channel Security District
is a public-private partnership that was established to increase
preparedness and response capabilities with the goal of improving
security and safety for facilities, employees, and communities
surrounding the Houston Ship Channel. The security district has
installed technology, such as night vision and motion-activated
detection equipment, and conducts patrols on land and in the water.
However, we also reported on challenges that remained in: (1) Making
Federal agencies' protective actions more effective, and (2)
implementing plans for a response to an attack, if a terrorist attack
were to succeed despite the protective measures in place.
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\21\ GAO-08-141.
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We made five recommendations in our 2007 report, three of which
were directed to the Secretary of Homeland Security and two of which
were directed jointly to the Secretary of Homeland Security and the
Attorney General. The departments concurred or partially concurred with
all of the recommendations. The Coast Guard and the FBI have made
progress in implementing these recommendations--two have been
implemented, and the Coast Guard is in the process of implementing a
third--but actions have not yet been taken to address the remaining two
recommendations. See table 2 for a summary of our findings,
recommendations, and the current status of agency efforts to implement
our recommendations.
TABLE 2.--STATUS OF GAO RECOMMENDATIONS ON TANKER SECURITY FROM GAO-08-
141
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Findings Recommendation and Status
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Resource allocation.--Based on Coast Recommendation.--We recommended
Guard records, we found that Coast that the Coast Guard develop a
Guard field units in several energy- National resource allocation
related ports had been unable to plan that would balance the need
accomplish many of the port security to meet new LNG security
responsibilities called for in Coast responsibilities with existing
Guard guidance. According to the security responsibilities and
data we obtained and our discussions other Coast Guard missions.
with field unit officials, we Status.--In progress. The Coast
determined that resource shortfalls Guard has begun work on a
were the primary reasons for not National strategy for reducing
meeting these responsibilities. the maritime security risks
Furthermore, the Coast Guard had not present in the bulk
yet developed a plan for addressing transportation and transfer of
new liquefied natural gas (LNG) certain dangerous cargoes,
security resource demands. including LNG. Coast Guard
officials expect to finalize the
strategy in April 2012 at which
point they expect to develop a
resource allocation plan to
implement the strategy. In the
interim, the Coast Guard has
published guidance to clarify
the timing and scope of the
process that is necessary to
ensure full consideration is
given to safety and security of
the port, the facility, and the
vessels transporting LNG.
Guidance for helping to mitigate Recommendation.--We recommended
economic consequences.--We reported that the Coast Guard develop
that the economic consequences of a guidance that ports could use to
terrorist attack on a tanker could plan for helping to mitigate
be significant, particularly if one economic consequences,
or more ports are closed. We particularly in the case of port
identified some ports that, on their closures.
own initiative, were incorporating Status.--Implemented. The Coast
economic recovery considerations Guard and U.S. Customs and
into their port-level plans, but at Border Protection (CBP) have
the time of our review in 2007, developed Joint Protocols for
there was no National-level guidance the Expeditious Recovery of
for use by local ports. Trade. These protocols establish
a communications process and
describe how the Coast Guard and
CBP will coordinate with other
Federal agencies and the
maritime industry to facilitate
recovery and resumption of trade
following an event that causes a
major disruption to the maritime
transportation system.
Integration of spill and terrorism Recommendation.--We recommended
response at the National level.--We that the Coast Guard and the FBI
found that while National- and port- coordinate at the National level
level plans exist to address spill to help ensure that a detailed
response or terrorism response, operational plan be developed
Federal agencies and ports could that integrates the different
face challenges in using them spill and terrorism sections of
effectively. We reported that the the National Response Plan.
separate spill and terrorism Status.--Not implemented. The
response plans should be integrated different spill and terrorism
for responding to an attack on an response sections of the
energy commodities tanker. National Response Plan remain
separate annexes in the renamed
National Response Framework.
According to the Coast Guard,
the National Response Framework
is currently under revision, but
no decision has been made
regarding the spill and
terrorism response annexes.
Pending that decision, the FBI
has not taken any action to
implement this recommendation.
Integration of spill and terrorism Recommendation.--We recommended
response at the local level.--In that the Coast Guard and FBI
addition to the need for operational coordinate at the local level to
plans as noted above, we reported help ensure that spill and
that agencies should conduct joint terrorism response activities
exercises that simulate an attack are integrated for the best
and the agencies' responses. Without possible response by maximizing
such exercises, it would be the integration of spill and
questionable whether joint Coast terrorism response planning and
Guard and FBI activities would exercises at ports that receive
proceed as planned. energy commodities where attacks
on tankers pose a significant
threat.
Status.--Implemented. In April
2008, the Coast Guard updated
guidance which states that the
ability to simultaneously
execute multiple plans,
including Federal, State, and
local response and recovery
plans, should be part of an
overall exercise and
preparedness program. In
accordance with this guidance,
the Coast Guard, along with the
FBI and other stakeholders, has
conducted exercises that address
an integrated spill and
terrorism response.
Performance measures for emergency Recommendation.--We recommended
response.--We found that some ports that the Secretary of Homeland
had reported difficulty in securing Security work with Federal,
response resources to carry out State, and local stakeholders to
planned actions and decisions about develop explicit performance
the need for more response measures for emergency response
capabilities were hindered by a lack capabilities and use them in
of performance measures tying risk-based analyses to set
resource needs to effectiveness in priorities for acquiring needed
response. response resources.
Status.--Not implemented.--DHS
has not yet developed explicit
performance measures for
emergency response capabilities.
According to DHS, it is revising
its grant programs, but
performance measures have not
yet been developed as part of
this effort.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: GAO.
Regarding our recommendation that the Coast Guard and the FBI
coordinate to help ensure that a detailed operational plan be developed
that integrates the different spill and terrorism sections of the
National Response Framework, DHS is in the process of revising this
document and did not have further information regarding whether or how
the spill and terrorism response annexes may be revised. Further, the
FBI has not taken independent action to implement this recommendation,
in part because it did not concur with the need to develop a separate
operational plan. In the event of a successful attack on an energy
tanker, ports would need to provide an effective, integrated response
to: (1) Protect public safety and the environment, (2) conduct an
investigation, and (3) restore shipping operations in a timely manner.
Consequently, clearly defined and understood roles and responsibilities
for all essential stakeholders are needed to ensure an effective
response, and operational plans for the response should be explicitly
linked. Regarding our recommendation that DHS develop performance
measures for emergency response capabilities, DHS has begun to revise
its grant programs, but it is too early in that process to determine
whether and how performance measures will be incorporated into those
revisions. Performance measures would allow DHS to set priorities for
funding on the basis of reducing overall risk, thereby helping ports
obtain resources necessary to respond. We continue to believe that the
recommendations not yet addressed have merit and should be fully
implemented.
coast guard had not assessed risks to all ocs facilities
In accordance with Federal statutes and Presidential directives,
the Coast Guard assesses security risks as part of its responsibilities
for ensuring the security of OCS facilities and deepwater ports. In
doing so, the Coast Guard, among other things, uses a tool called the
Maritime Security Risk Analysis Model (MSRAM). Coast Guard units
throughout the country use this tool to assess security risks to about
28,000 key infrastructure in and around the Nation's ports and
waterways. For example, MSRAM examines security risks to National
monuments, bridges, and oil and gas terminals.
The Coast Guard's efforts to assess security risks to OCS
facilities and deepwater ports are part of a broader effort by DHS to
protect critical infrastructure and key resources.\22\ To further guide
this effort, in 2009 DHS issued an updated version of the 2006 National
Infrastructure Protection Plan which describes the Department's
strategic approach to infrastructure protection.\23\ The plan placed an
increased emphasis on risk management and it centered attention on
going beyond assessments of individual assets by extending the scope of
risk assessments to systems or networks.\24\ For example, while the
2006 plan focused on assessing the vulnerability of facilities, the
2009 plan discussed efforts to conduct systemwide vulnerability
assessments.
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\22\ The Homeland Security Act of 2002, enacted the same day as
MTSA (November 25, 2002), established DHS and gave the Department wide-
ranging responsibilities for, among other things, leading and
coordinating the overall National critical infrastructure protection
effort. Title II of the Homeland Security Act, as amended, primarily
addresses the Department's responsibilities for critical infrastructure
protection. According to DHS, there are thousands of facilities in the
United States that if degraded or destroyed by a manmade or natural
disaster could cause some combination of significant casualties, major
economic losses, or widespread and long-term disruptions to National
well-being and governance capacity.
\23\ DHS, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Partnering to
Enhance Protection and Resiliency (Washington, DC: January 2009). This
plan represents a strategy for protecting critical infrastructure and
key resources and it offers a framework for assessing risk. DHS issued
the original plan in June 2006.
\24\ Network effects involve the ripple effect of an incident or
simultaneous incidents on key sectors of the economy. For example,
production facilities, pipelines, transfer stations, and refineries are
part of the oil and natural gas network in and around the Gulf of New
Mexico. Assessing network effects could involve determining whether a
terrorist attack on a few key assets would have a disproportionate
effect on the performance of this network. Such an assessment could
examine the degree to which such an incident could disrupt the flow of
oil or natural gas to industries that use these types of energy as
inputs to their production functions.
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Progress Made Assessing Offshore Security Risks
The Coast Guard has taken a number of actions in assessing security
risks to OCS facilities and deepwater ports. The Coast Guard has used
MSRAM to, among other things, examine security risks to OCS facilities
and deepwater ports by assessing three main factors--threats,
vulnerabilities, and consequences.\25\ First, Coast Guard analysts use
MSRAM to assess security risks against such energy infrastructure by
examining potential scenarios terrorists may use to attack OCS
facilities or deepwater ports. For example, MSRAM assesses attack
scenarios, such as an attack by a hijacked vessel, a small boat attack,
sabotage, or an attack by a swimmer or diver. Second, the analysts use
MSRAM to evaluate vulnerabilities of OCS facilities and deepwater ports
by examining the probability of a successful attack by assessing
factors such as the ability of key stakeholders, including the owner,
operator, or law enforcement, to interdict an attack and the ability of
a target to withstand an attack. Third, the analysts use MSRAM to
evaluate potential consequences of an attack, such as deaths or
injuries and economic and environmental impacts.\26\ MSRAM's output
produces a risk index number for each maritime target--such as an OCS
facility or deepwater port--that allows Coast Guard officials at the
local, regional, and National levels to compare and rank critical
infrastructure for the purpose of informing security decisions.
According to Coast Guard officials, based on MSRAM's output, which is a
relative risk ranking, OCS facilities are not considered to be high-
risk targets.
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\25\ DHS defines threat as a natural or manmade occurrence,
individual, entity, or action that has or indicates the potential to
harm life, information, operations, the environment, and/or property.
For the purpose of calculating risk, the threat of an intentional
hazard is generally estimated as the likelihood of an attack being
attempted by an adversary; for other hazards, threat is generally
estimated as the likelihood that a hazard will manifest itself. In the
case of terrorist attacks, the threat likelihood is estimated based on
the intent and capability of the adversary. DHS defines vulnerability
as a physical feature or operational attribute that renders an entity
open to exploitation or susceptible to a given hazard. In calculating
the risk of an intentional hazard, a measure of vulnerability is the
likelihood that an attack is successful, given that it is attempted.
DHS defines consequence as the effect of an event, incident, or
occurrence; reflects the level, duration, and nature of the loss
resulting from the incident. For the purposes of the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan, consequences are divided into four main
categories: Public health and safety (i.e., loss of life and illness);
economic (direct and indirect); psychological; and governance/mission
impacts.
\26\ MSRAM assesses consequences of six factors: (1) Deaths and
injuries, (2) primary economic impact, (3) environmental impact, (4)
National security impacts, (5) symbolic impacts, and (6) secondary
economic impacts.
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To inform analysts' inputs into MSRAM, the Coast Guard has
coordinated efforts with the intelligence community and key
stakeholders. For example, the Coast Guard's Intelligence Coordination
Center inputs threat assessment data into MSRAM. Coast Guard analysts
also use information from other stakeholders, such as reports produced
by the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Ocean Energy Management,
Regulation, and Enforcement (BOEMRE), which contain oil and gas
production data, to inform their evaluations of vulnerabilities and
consequences. Based on the assessments of threats, vulnerabilities, and
consequences, MSRAM produces a risk index number for each OCS facility
and deepwater port. The Coast Guard has also taken actions to
supplement MSRAM by, among other things: (1) Including new data fields
on the frequency with which tankers visit a port and (2) adding
additional threat scenarios, such as a threat involving a cyber attack,
to its data set.
While MSRAM has been applied to deepwater ports, Coast Guard
officials have also used an independent risk assessment to assess
security risks as part of the application process for recently
constructed deepwater ports. For example, in December 2006, as part of
the application process for a proposed deepwater port in the
Massachusetts Bay, the Coast Guard, the owner and operator, and other
stakeholders collectively identified and assessed threat scenarios as
well as the potential consequences and vulnerabilities of each
scenario. Based on this assessment, stakeholders identified and agreed
to carry out security measures to mitigate the risks, such as
installing camera systems and increasing radar coverage.
Challenges in Data and Scope Hinder Risk Assessments
The Coast Guard faces complex and technical challenges in assessing
security risks. The Coast Guard recognizes these challenges and
generally has actions underway to study or address them. Coast Guard
officials noted that some of these challenges are not unique to the
Coast Guard's risk assessment model and that these challenges are faced
by others in the homeland security community involved in conducting
risk assessments. Specific challenges are detailed below.
Challenges in Data
Vulnerability-related data.--The Coast Guard does not have
data on the ability of an OCS facility to withstand an attack,
which is defined in MSRAM as target hardness. The Coast Guard
recognizes that target hardness is an important consideration
in assessing the vulnerability of OCS facilities. However,
MSRAM analysts described challenges in assessing target
hardness because empirical data are not available or research
has not been conducted to do so. For example, research on
whether a hijacked boat or an underwater attack could sink an
offshore oil or natural gas platform would give the Coast Guard
and owners and operators a clearer sense of whether this attack
scenario could result in major consequences. Coast Guard
officials and corporate security officers with whom we spoke
indicated that such research would advance knowledge about the
vulnerabilities of OCS facilities and deepwater ports. Gaining
a better understanding of target hardness of these and other
threat scenarios could improve the quality of the output from
MSRAM. According to Coast Guard's MSRAM Program Manager, the
Coast Guard may recommend conducting more research on the
vulnerability to and consequences of attack scenarios as a
result of a study it is currently conducting on OCS facilities
in the Gulf of Mexico. The Coast Guard initiated this study in
the fall of 2010 after the Deepwater Horizon incident. The
study initially reviewed the ``lessons learned'' from Deepwater
Horizon and how those lessons could be used to improve MSRAM.
During the course of our review, Coast Guard officials stated
that the scope of the study has been expanded to include OCS
facilities and that the Coast Guard expects to issue its report
in the fall of 2011.
Consequences-related data.--The input for secondary economic
impacts \27\ can have a substantial effect on how MSRAM's
output ranks a facility relative to other potential targets.
Undervaluing secondary economic impacts could result in a lower
relative risk ranking that underestimates the security risk to
a facility, or inversely, overvaluing secondary economic
impacts could result in overestimating the security risk to a
facility. However, the Coast Guard has limited data for
assessing secondary economic impacts from an attack on OCS
facilities or deepwater ports. Coast Guard analysts stated that
gathering these data is a challenge because there are few
models or guidance available for doing so. During the course of
our review, the Coast Guard started using a tool, called
``IMPLAN,'' that helps inform judgments of secondary economic
impacts by showing what the impact could be for different
terrorist scenarios.\28\ The tool, however, has limits in that
it should not be used where the consequences of a terrorist
attack are mainly interruption to land or water transportation.
Enhancing DHS's and the Coast Guard's ability to assess
secondary economic impacts could improve a MSRAM analyst's
accuracy in assessing the relative risk of a particular target.
Coast Guard officials added that they are working with DHS's
Office of Risk Management and Analysis in studying ways to
improve how it assesses secondary economic impacts.
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\27\ According to the Coast Guard, secondary economic impacts are a
factor representing a description of follow-on economic effects of a
successful attack.
\28\ IMPLAN stands for IMpact Analysis for PLANning. It is a tool
that assesses economic relationships between primary economic impacts
and secondary economic impacts.
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Challenges in Scope
Challenges in assessing security risks to OCS facilities.--
We determined that the Coast Guard did not conduct MSRAM
assessments for all 50 of the OCS facilities that are subject
to Federal security requirements in 2011. Coast Guard guidance
calls for MSRAM analysts to identify and assess all significant
targets that fall within a unit's area of responsibility, which
includes all security-regulated OCS facilities. Specifically,
as of May 2011, we found that MSRAM did not include 12 of the
50 OCS facilities operating at that time. Coast Guard officials
generally agreed with our finding and they have since
incorporated these 12 facilities into MSRAM and completed the
required risk assessments. While the Coast Guard plans to
update its policies and procedures for inspecting and ensuring
the security of OCS facilities in the future, the current set
of policies and procedures do not call for an updated list of
OCS facilities to be provided to MSRAM analysts to assess the
security risks to such facilities annually. Coast Guard
officials acknowledged that their policies and procedures did
not include this requirement. Revising policies and procedures
to include such a requirement is important in that the number
of OCS facilities could change each year. For example, some
facilities may drop below the production or personnel
thresholds described earlier in this statement, thereby falling
outside the scope of 33 C.F.R. part 106, or other facilities
could meet or exceed such thresholds, thereby rendering them
subject to part 106. Standards for Internal Control in the
Federal Government state that policies and procedures enforce
management directives and help ensure that actions are taken to
address risks.\29\ In addition, internal control standards
state that such control activities are an integral part of an
entity's planning, implementing, reviewing, and accountability
for stewardship of Government resources and for achieving
effective results. Developing such procedures could help ensure
that the Coast Guard carries out its risk assessment
requirements for such security-regulated OCS facilities.
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\29\ GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1.
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Challenges in assessing security risks to offshore energy
infrastructure that is not subject to security requirements.--
With respect to OCS facilities, analysts only use MSRAM to
assess security risks associated with those OCS facilities that
are regulated for security under 33 C.F.R. part 106. For
example, the Deepwater Horizon did not meet the threshold
criteria subjecting it to regulation under part 106, and
therefore, MSRAM was not used to assess its security risks (see
figure 2 for a photo of the Deepwater Horizon explosion).
According to Coast Guard officials, mobile offshore drilling
units (MODUs), such as the Deepwater Horizon, do not generally
pose a risk of a terrorist attack since there is little chance
of an oil spill when these units are drilling and have not
struck oil.\30\ However, the officials noted that there is a
brief period of time when a drilling unit strikes a well, but
the well has yet to be sealed prior to connecting it to a
production facility. The Deepwater Horizon was in this stage
when it resulted in such a large oil spill. During that period
of time, MODUs could be at risk of a terrorist attack that
could have significant consequences despite a facility not
meeting the production or personnel thresholds. For example,
such risks could involve the reliability of blowout preventer
valves--specialized valves that prevent a well from spewing oil
in the case of a blowout. Gaining a fuller understanding of the
security risks associated with MODUs, such as the Deepwater
Horizon, could improve the quality of program decisions made by
Coast Guard managers on whether actions may be needed to ensure
the security of this type of facility. According to Coast Guard
officials, they are studying the ``lessons learned'' from the
Deepwater Horizon incident and part of the study involves
examining whether analysts should use MSRAM to assess MODUs in
the future.
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\30\ MODUs engage in drilling rather than production.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Challenges in assessing systemic or network risks.--MSRAM
does not assess systemic or network risks because, according to
Coast Guard officials, these types of assessments are beyond
the intended use of MSRAM. The 2009 National Infrastructure
Protection Plan, 2010 DHS Quadrennial Review,\31\ and a
National Research Council evaluation of DHS risk assessment
efforts \32\ have determined that gaining a better
understanding of network risks would help to understand
multiplying consequences of a terrorist attack or simultaneous
attacks on key facilities. Understanding ``network'' risks
involves gaining a greater understanding of how a network is
vulnerable to a diverse range of threats. Examining how such
vulnerabilities create strategic opportunities for intelligent
adversaries with malevolent intent is central to this
understanding. For example, knowing what damage a malicious
adversary could achieve by exploiting weaknesses in an oil-
distribution network offers opportunities for improving the
resiliency of the network within a given budget.\33\
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\31\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security: Quadrennial Homeland
Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure Homeland
(Washington, DC: February 2010).
\32\ National Research Council: Review of the Department of
Homeland Security's Approach to Risk Analysis (Washington, DC: 2010).
\33\ See Gerald G. Brown, W. Matthew Carlyle, Javier Salmeron, and
Kevin Wood, Operations Research Department, Naval Postgraduate School:
Analyzing the Vulnerability of Critical Infrastructure to Attack and
Planning Defenses (Monterrey, California: 2005). According to DHS,
resiliency is the ability to resist, absorb, recover from, or
successfully adapt to adversity or a change in conditions.
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How the Coast Guard assesses offshore infrastructure within the
broader set of networks is important. The findings of the National
Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill incident illustrate
how examining networks or systems from a safety or engineering
perspective can bring greater knowledge of how single facilities
intersect with broader systems.\34\ The report noted that ``complex
systems almost always fail in complex ways'' and cautioned that
attempting to identify a single cause for the Deepwater Horizon
incident would provide a dangerously incomplete picture of what
happened. As a result, the report examined the Deepwater Horizon
incident with an expansive view toward the role that industry and
Government sectors played in assessing vulnerabilities and the impact
the incident had on economic, social, and environmental systems.
Enhancing knowledge about the vulnerabilities of networks or systems
with which OCS facilities and deepwater ports intersect could improve
the quality of information that informs program and budget decisions on
how to best ensure security and use scarce resources in a constrained
fiscal environment. Doing so would also be consistent with DHS's
Quadrennial Review and other DHS guidance and would provide information
to decision makers that could minimize the likelihood of being
unprepared for a potential attack. Coast Guard officials agreed that
assessing ``network effects'' is a challenge and they are examining
ways to meet this challenge. However, the Coast Guard's work is this
area is in its infancy and there is uncertainty regarding the way in
which the Coast Guard will move forward in measuring ``network
effects.''
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\34\ National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and
Offshore Drilling, Deep Water: The Gulf Oil Disaster and the Future of
Offshore Drilling (Washington, DC: January 2011).
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conclusions
The threat of terrorism against energy tankers and offshore energy
infrastructure highlights the importance of the Coast Guard having
policies and procedures in place to better ensure the security of
energy tankers, OCS facilities, and deepwater ports. The Coast Guard
has taken steps to implement prior GAO recommendations to enhance
energy tanker security, and it continues to work towards implementing
the three outstanding recommendations. Improvements in security could
help to prevent a terrorist attack against this infrastructure, which
could have significant consequences, such as those resulting from the
Deepwater Horizon incident. While the Coast Guard does not consider OCS
facilities that it has assessed in MSRAM to be high-risk, it is
important to assess all OCS facilities as required by Coast Guard
guidance. Since May 2011, when we determined that some OCS facilities
were not assessed, the Coast Guard has completed its assessments for
the previously omitted facilities. However, given that the list of
security-regulated facilities may change each year based on factors
such as production volume, it is important to ensure that any
facilities added to the list in the future will be assessed for
security risks in MSRAM. By revising policies and procedures to help
ensure that an updated list of OCS facilities is provided to MSRAM
analysts on an annual basis, the Coast Guard would be better positioned
to ensure that all risk assessments for facilities requiring such
assessments be conducted in a manner consistent with the law and
Presidential directive.
recommendations for executive action
To strengthen the Coast Guard's efforts to assess security risks
and ensure the security of OCS facilities, we recommend that the
Commandant of the Coast Guard revise policies and procedures to ensure
that MSRAM analysts receive the annual updated list of security-
regulated OCS facilities to ensure that risk assessments have been
conducted on all such OCS facilities.
agency comments and our evaluation
We provided a draft of this testimony to DHS and DOJ for comment.
The Coast Guard concurred with our recommendation to revise policies
and procedures to ensure that MSRAM analysts receive the annual updated
list of security-regulated OCS facilities. DHS and DOJ provided oral
and technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. This testimony
concludes our work on Coast Guard efforts to assess security risks for
offshore energy infrastructure. However, we will continue our broader
work looking at the security of offshore energy infrastructure,
including Coast Guard security inspections and other challenges. Our
evaluation will focus on Coast Guard security inspections and other
measures to better secure OCS facilities and deepwater ports.\35\ We
will continue to work with the Coast Guard to develop solutions to
ensure that inspections of OCS facilities are completed as required.
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\35\ We are conducting this work for the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation; the Ranking Member
of the Senate Committee of Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs;
the House Committee on Energy and Commerce; the Chairman of the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure; the Ranking Member of
the House Committee on Homeland Security; and the Ranking Member of the
House Committee on Natural Resources; and the Chairman of the House
Homeland Security Committee's Subcommittee on Oversight,
Investigations, and Management.
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I would be happy to respond to any questions you may have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Caldwell.
The Chairman now recognizes Captain Whitehead for his
testimony.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN JAMES H. WHITEHEAD III, SECTOR COMMANDER,
SECTOR HOUSTON-GALVESTON, U.S. COAST GUARD
Captain Whitehead. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Green, Congressman Keating. Thank you for the opportunity to
appear before you and discuss port security in the Houston-
Galveston area.
Mr. Chairman, you mentioned many of the titles so I will
skip all those that I hold. But I would like you to know that
the Sector focuses on three fundamental roles, and it is
maritime safety, security, and stewardship. As the Commandant,
Admiral Robert Papp, has stated, ``We protect those on the sea;
we protect America from threats delivered by sea; and we
protect the sea itself.''
These primary roles are accomplished in cooperation with
our maritime partners through three committees in this area:
Houston-Galveston Navigation Safety Advisory Committee, Area
Maritime Security Committee, and the Central Texas Coastal Area
Committee. These committees represent robust, active
collaborations of a wide range of Federal, State, local
stakeholders from law enforcement, industry, port authorities,
shippers, agents, and educational institutions, and others.
Members from all three meet, train, exercise together regularly
to develop and refine plans, address issues of concern,
disseminate information, and share ideas and best practices in
pursuit of continuous improvement in all three fundamental
roles. The largest of the three is the Area Maritime Security
Committee chartered in 2004, now comprising over 400 members
at-large.
In Houston, we routinely conduct integrated operations with
our city, county, State, and Federal law enforcement partners.
The joint agency, Houston Area Maritime Operations Center, is a
prime example of the type of coordination directed in the
Maritime Operations Coordination Plan recently signed by the
U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. These operations typically
involve the Harris County's Sheriff Office and local police
department marine divisions as well as CBP, ICE, FBI, Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives and other partners.
We also rely heavily on our port partners to be our ``eyes
on the water.'' With an average of 350 tow and 700 deep draft
ship movements daily in the Houston Ship Channel in over 100
waterfront facilities with a vigilant security presence, we
have a valuable resource of maritime industry stakeholders who
are best positioned to recognize when things are out of the
ordinary and who diligently report on breaches of security and
suspicious activity.
We also receive reports on fraudulent use of the
Transportation Worker Identification Card and work closely with
our local law enforcement and legal agencies, such as the
Harris County District Attorney, to ensure these cases are
prosecuted.
The Ship Channel Security District, as has been mentioned,
represents a unique private-public partnership formed to
improve security and safety for facilities, employees, and
communities surrounding the Houston Ship Channel. The Coast
Guard played an important role in the formation of the district
and continues to work closely with them to ensure alignment of
our priorities and unity of effort. As Sector commander, I am a
member of the Security District Advisory Council and regularly
sit on that.
The Sector also makes excellent use of our robust vessel
traffic service. The VTS' primary role is facilitating the safe
transit of vessels in the waterways and ports along the Houston
Ship Channel. The VTS' cameras, automatic identification system
feeds, remote radar observation capability, and radio
communications also provide an additional layer of security. In
addition to the VTS resources in the Houston Ship Channel
Sector, Houston-Galveston has access to feeds from three AIS
receivers mounted on offshore oil platforms which provide
heightened awareness of activities in the maritime domain.
Mr. Chairman, threats and vulnerabilities will always
exist, but through the active involvement of hundreds of
partners who are directly involved with or impacted by the
maritime industry in the Houston-Galveston area, this Sector is
committed to deterring incidents before they happen, well-
prepared to respond to them should they occur, and has a
resiliency to rebound quickly in the aftermath.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today.
I am happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Captain.
[The statement of Captain Whitehead follows:]
Prepared Statement of Captain James H. Whitehead III
August 24, 2011
Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and distinguished guests, I want to
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
port security in the Houston-Galveston area.
As the Sector Commander and Captain of the Port in Houston-
Galveston, I serve as the region's Federal Maritime Security
Coordinator, the Federal On-Scene Coordinator, and the Officer-in-
Charge Marine Inspection. The Sector focuses on two major operational
processes--PREVENTION and RESPONSE--in support of three fundamental
roles: Maritime Safety; Maritime Security; and Maritime Stewardship. As
the Commandant, ADM Robert Papp, has stated, ``We protect those on the
sea; we protect America from threats delivered by sea; and we protect
the sea itself.''
We accomplish these fundamental roles by cooperating with our
maritime partners through three committees: The Houston-Galveston
Navigation Safety Advisory Committee; the Area Maritime Security
Committee; and the Central Texas Coastal Area Committee.
These committees represent robust, active collaboration between a
wide range of Federal, State, and local stakeholders from law
enforcement, industry, port authorities, shippers, agents, and
educational institutions, among others. Members from all three
committees meet, train, and exercise together regularly to develop and
refine plans, address issues of concern, disseminate information, and
share ideas and best practices. The largest of the three committees is
the Area Maritime Security Committee which was chartered in 2004 and
now includes over 400 members-at-large. The committee has active
working groups in the areas of facility security, intelligence, law
enforcement, grants, public affairs/outreach, and joint training and
exercises. The work is continuous, and progress in the various areas is
reported to the membership during quarterly meetings.
In Houston, we routinely conduct integrated operations with our
city, county, State, and Federal Law Enforcement partners. The joint
agency Houston Area Maritime Operations Center is a prime example of
the type of coordination directed in the Maritime Operations
Coordination Plan recently signed by the U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE). These operations typically involve the Harris County
Sheriff's Office and local city Police Department marine divisions as
well as CBP, ICE, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives and other Federal partners.
This concept will continue to grow and expand across the entire
Sector in the coming months, as our implementation plan takes effect.
Efforts are also underway with our neighboring Sectors to align and
streamline our operations across all jurisdictional boundaries.
We also rely heavily on our port partners to be the ``eyes on the
water.'' With an average of 350 daily tow movements in the Houston Ship
Channel and more than 100 waterfront facilities with a vigilant
security presence, marine industry stakeholders are well-positioned to
recognize when things are out of the ordinary and serve as a valuable
resource by diligently reporting breaches of security and suspicious
activity. We also receive reports on fraudulent use of the
Transportation Worker Identification Card, and work closely with our
local enforcement and legal agencies such as the Harris County District
Attorney to ensure these cases are prosecuted.
In terms of maritime traffic and cargo, the Port of Houston ranks
first in the United States for number of ship arrivals and second in
total cargo tonnage. Houston handles over 50 percent of all
containerized cargo arriving at Gulf of Mexico ports. Additionally,
more than 50 percent of the gasoline used in the United States is
refined in this area. With more than 100 petrochemical waterfront
facilities, Houston is the second-largest such complex in the world.
Major corporations such as Exxon-Mobil, Shell, Saudi ARAMCO, Stolt
Nielson, Odfjell USA Inc., Sea River and Kirby Marine have National or
international headquarters in Houston.
In recognition of the significance of Houston's shipping activity,
the State of Texas formally established the Houston Ship Channel
Security District (HSCSD) in 2010. The HSCSD represents a unique
public-private partnership formed to improve security and safety for
facilities, employees, and communities surrounding the Houston Ship
Channel. The Coast Guard played an instrumental role in the formation
of the HSCSD, and continues to work closely with the HSCSD to ensure
alignment of priorities and unity of effort. As Sector Commander, I am
a member of the HSCSD Advisory Council and Sector Port Security
specialists attend HSCSD board meetings. The district provides
oversight of comprehensive and cost-effective security solutions,
leveraging more than $30 million in Federal Port Security grants along
with $4 million in annual member assessments to install technology and
security infrastructure and provide funds for specific security
projects, maintenance, and operational services.
The Port of Houston accommodates a large number of tankers carrying
crude oil, refined products and chemical cargoes. With approximately
9,600 deep draft ship arrivals each year, the Coast Guard maintains a
very extensive Port State Control program in the Houston-Galveston
area. The Port State Control program ensures the safe carriage of
hazardous materials in bulk. Because over 90 percent of cargo bound for
the United States is carried by foreign-flagged ships, this National
program prevents operation of substandard foreign ships in U.S. waters.
The Sector also makes excellent use of its robust Vessel Traffic
Service (VTS). The VTS's primary role is facilitating safe vessel
transits in the waterways and ports along the Houston Ship Channel. The
VTS cameras, Automatic Identification System (AIS) feeds, remote radar
observation capability, and radio communications, also provide an
additional layer of security. In addition to the VTS resources in the
Houston Ship Channel, Sector Houston-Galveston has access to feeds from
three AIS receivers mounted on off-shore oil platforms, which provide
heightened awareness of activities in the maritime domain.
Mr. Chairman, threats and vulnerabilities will always exist. But
through the active involvement of hundreds of partners who are directly
involved with or impacted by the maritime industry in the Houston-
Galveston area of responsibility, this Sector is committed to deterring
incidents before they happen and is well-prepared to respond to them
should they occur.
In 1787, Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist Paper Number 12 laid the
foundation for the modern Coast Guard when he noted that ``[a] few
armed vessels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports,
might at a small expense, be made useful sentinels of our laws.'' We're
proud of that legacy and our role in continued national strategy to
keep our homeland secure. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
before you today. I will be happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. McCaul. The Chairman now recognizes Sheriff Garcia for
his testimony.
STATEMENT OF SHERIFF ADRIAN GARCIA, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
Sheriff Garcia. Thank you, distinguished Members of the
subcommittee, and thank you, my friend Congressman McCaul.
Thank you all for bringing much-needed attention to our good
work here at the Port of Houston and the Houston Ship Channel.
I would like to think that we are demonstrating to Washington
how we can work in a bipartisan, nonpartisan way to make sure
that all stays well and healthy for our communities.
You have heard from others today already about how this
port and this ship channel is growing and how it is serving
this incredible community and how it is one of America's most
important lifelines to the world. You have at your fingertips
all the facts and figures about the essential raw materials and
products that move along the Houston Ship Channel, enabling us
to live our everyday lives in the modern world.
As you have mentioned, Congressman McCaul, we have learned
about Osama bin Laden, how he had some of the same information
showing how important the ship channel is and the Port of
Houston is. No doubt would-be terrorists in the United States
and foreign countries know this, too. Next time they scheme to
kill Americans and disrupt the energy supply of Planet Earth,
they may think about targeting the very ground that we are on
today.
I am here as the person in charge of local law enforcement
that has been chosen to coordinate the protection of the ship
channel and all of its crucial assets. There is no mission more
important to me than preventing a terrorist attack on Harris
County. I assure you that our partners and I, Coast Guard, CBP,
and others, are actively working to pursue this mission every
day. We patrol the waterway in boats and in air with our fixed-
wing aircraft, and I have been working to add an airborne drone
to our surveillance arsenal so we can exploit the latest
advances in such technologies.
We keep our electronic eyes trained on the ship channel 24/
7 with camera sensors, radar, and other technology. Data from
these high technology devices is fed into a monitoring center
that we operate on the other side of town 24/7. We help the
Coast Guard escort high-value asset vessels. We join the Coast
Guard and CBP in boarding ships and scanning ship hulls, and
although several operations are highly sensitive, I can tell
you that our patrols on land and water have responded to calls
for service such as suspicious persons in vehicles, security
zone breaches by personal water craft, sunken boats, downed
power lines, industrial accidents, security card violations at
plant gates, and others.
In addition, we have helped industry sites evaluate their
own security efforts and equipment to point out any
vulnerabilities because prevention is job No. 1. We also have
to prepare for disaster, man-made or not. We work hand-in-hand
with Federal, State, and local authorities not only to share
intelligence, but also to conduct emergency response exercises.
I would like to recognize Major Michael Wong and Captain
Cordova, Deputy Hidorga as some of the key folks in these
efforts that handle these matters on a day-to-day basis.
We are also in touch with pipeline companies, railroads,
and emergency planners.
In a very different kind of pioneering outreach, I have
established what we call the Incidence Response Forum. We use
it to engage the widespread Middle Eastern and South Asian
communities in the Houston area. This is a two-way
communication pathway for law enforcement to share information
with key civic and religious leaders. The spirit in which we
started this program several months ago was expressed very well
in a Homeland Security memo issued by the Federal Government
within the last 3 weeks. It is titled, ``Empowering Local
Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism In The U.S.'' Here is a
brief excerpt that refers to the attempts by terrorist groups
to recruit American residents: ``Countering radicalization to
violence is frequently best achieved by engaging and empowering
individuals and groups at the local level to build resilience
against violent extremism. Law enforcement plays an essential
role in keeping us safe, but so too does engagement and
partnership with communities.''
But our Incident Response Forum has other uses. By sharing
information with these constituents, we help protect them
against misguided attacks that may stem from terrorist acts
anywhere in the world. These leaders can also report hate
crimes, help calm tensions that may arise in ethnic communities
and provide feedback about the effectiveness of law enforcement
by the Harris County Sheriff's Office. We are conducting crisis
response exercises with this group.
Overall, in Harris County, there is no deficit of will,
dedication, cooperation, coordination, or maximization of
resources when it comes to protecting the Houston Ship Channel,
but we do need additional funding, as I have stated in my
previous testimony in Washington, to hire the necessary
personnel to fulfill all the responsibilities that we want. We
would also like to encourage funding for the type of community
engagements as I just mentioned regarding the Incident Response
Forum.
I just will close by saying this: Congressman, you
mentioned that international polls indicate that folks in other
parts of the world may not see America as strong. The Harris
County Sheriff's Office is ready to work alongside our partners
and you to prove to domestic and international terrorists that
they are mistaken about America's strength and determination.
Thank you.
[The statement of Sheriff Garcia follows:]
Prepared Statement of Adrian Garcia
August 24, 2011
Thank you, distinguished Members of the subcommittee, and thank you
to my friend, the gentleman from Texas, Congressman McCaul, for
inviting me to provide testimony about Harris County. I'm glad you
represent part of our county. I'm glad you and I have been able to work
together on several pressing issues involving the well-being and safety
of our constituents. I'd like to think we're showing Washington how to
work in harmony on a bi-partisan and non-partisan basis.
You have heard from others today about how this growing, bustling,
sprawling community is one of America's most important lifelines to the
world. You have at your fingertips all the facts and figures about the
essential raw materials and products that move along the Houston Ship
Channel, enabling us to live our everyday lives in a modern world.
We have learned that Osama bin Laden had some of the same
information showing how important this lifeline is. No doubt, would-be
terrorists in the United States and foreign countries know this, too.
Next time they scheme to kill Americans and disrupt the energy supply
of planet Earth, they may think about targeting the ground we are on
today. Obviously, oil tankers, refineries, and petrochemical plants are
potential targets because they have huge physical profiles, and most of
them contain highly flammable substances.
I'm here as the person in charge of the law enforcement agency that
has been chosen to coordinate the protection of the Ship Channel and
all of its crucial assets. This may surprise some of our local
audience, because the Sheriff's Office is known more for running the
Nation's third-largest jail and patrolling an unincorporated area with
the same number of residents as the city of Philadelphia. But there is
no mission more important to me than preventing a terrorist attack on
Harris County.
I assure you, we actively pursue this mission every day. We patrol
the waterway in boats. Sometimes we patrol from the air with our fixed-
wing craft, and I have been looking into adding an airborne drone to
our surveillance arsenal so we can exploit the latest advances in such
technology. We keep our electronic eyes trained on the Ship Channel
area 24/7 with cameras, sensors, radar, and other technology. Data from
these high-technology devices is fed into a monitoring center that we
operate on the other side of town, safe from any damage that would be
caused in this zone.
We help the Coast Guard escort ``High Value Asset'' vessels. We
join the Coast Guard and Customs in boarding ships and scanning ship
hulls. We've even acquired technology from at least one other security-
minded nation to help keep our eyes on the situation underwater.
Although much of our operations are highly sensitive, I can tell
you that our patrols on land and on the water have responded to calls
for service such as these:
Suspicious persons and vehicles
Security zone breaches by personal watercraft
Sunken boats and downed power lines
Industrial accidents
Security card violations at plant gates.
Fortunately, none of these incidents stemmed from a plot to bring
us massive harm.
In addition, we have helped industrial sites evaluate their own
security efforts and equipment to point out any vulnerabilities.
Prevention is Job One, after all.
But we also have to prepare for a disaster, man-made or not. We
work hand-in-hand with Federal, State, and local authorities not only
to share intelligence, but also to conduct emergency response
exercises. We're in touch with pipeline companies, railroads, and
emergency planners.
In a very different kind of pioneering outreach, I have established
what we call the Incidence Response Forum. We use it to engage the
widespread Middle Eastern and South Asian communities in the Houston
area. This is a two-way communications pathway for law enforcement to
share information with key civic and religious leaders.
The spirit in which we started this program several months ago was
expressed very well in a homeland security memo issued by the Federal
Government within the last 3 weeks. It's titled ``Empowering Local
Partners To Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States.'' Here is a
brief excerpt that refers to attempts by terrorist groups to recruit
American residents:
``Countering radicalization to violence is frequently best achieved by
engaging and empowering individuals and groups at the local level to
build resilience against violent extremism. Law enforcement plays an
essential role in keeping us safe, but so too does engagement and
partnership with communities.''
But our Incidence Response Forum has other uses. By sharing
information with these constituents, we help protect them against
misguided attacks that may stem from terrorist acts anywhere in the
world. These leaders can also help report hate crimes, help calm
tensions that may arise in ethnic communities, and provide feedback
about the effectiveness of law enforcement by the Harris County
Sheriff's Office. We are conducting crisis response exercises with this
group.
Overall: In Harris County, there is no deficit of will, dedication,
cooperation, coordination, and maximization of resources when it comes
to protecting the Houston Ship Channel. But we do need additional
funding so we can stay ahead of domestic and international terrorism
threats.
A few weeks ago in Washington, I testified to one of your sister
subcommittees about the bottom line in Harris County: We are not yet
able to deploy personnel to the extent that this type of responsibility
demands.
We received $30 million in Homeland Security grants from the
Federal Government for new security hardware. But the grants do not
allow for investment into the most critical of resources; and that is
the full-time deputies and the necessary training they need to be
effective in policing a unique environment like the Ship Channel. We'd
also like to see Federal funding for the kind of community engagement
programs I described moments ago. We appreciate the Federal
Government's direction on this; we'd also appreciate more resources
that address the Federal Government's root mission of protecting the
homeland.
Another financial challenge is local. The Ship Channel Security
District collects assessment fees from its 100 or so private industry
members and pays the money to county government in return for security
services and enhancements. But the National economy has harmed property
values in the Houston area, and these values are the foundation of the
tax base the county uses to fund all of its operations, including my
agency. The county cut its overall spending by forcing a hiring freeze.
I have lost several hundred employees as a result since October 2009,
with more than 125 just from our Patrol Bureau. All of my crime-
fighting programs are strained; I have had to pay an exorbitant amount
of overtime just to staff my jail at required State standards.
And yet, we have not been awarded any COPS grants from the Justice
Department, apparently because law enforcement agencies that have had
to lay off employees got first priority. I hope Congress and the
administration will recognize that a forced hiring freeze--not even
replacing attrition--is in fact a layoff--especially when it prevents
us from deploying more crime-fighters to the National security asset
known as the Houston Ship Channel. We'd welcome any kind of assistance
from Washington, whether it comes from COPS grants or elsewhere.
If you will invest in us, one of the things we can give you in
return is a National model for cooperation among Government agencies
and the business community. Eight cities border the Ship Channel
Security District. Other partners in the security district include the
Texas Department of Transportation, the Metropolitan Transit Authority,
the county's Office of Emergency Management and its other agencies, and
the University of Houston. The security district has an 11-member
board, eight of whose members come from private industry.
The Coast Guard, Merchant Marine, and Customs and Border Patrol
play major roles here. We also fall under the Area Maritime Security
Council, which takes a regional approach to maritime and border
security in Houston and nearby Galveston, Freeport, and Texas City,
Texas. Of course our port authority is another major partner. In your
National research, you will probably find it difficult to find another
locale where the job of combining private industry interests with the
operations of efficient Government has been carried out so
successfully.
We all want to meet the highest expectations of our community, of
the Nation, and of the world. And we need your help.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Sheriff, and let me--appreciate the
good work that you do and we certainly support our local
sheriff as well.
So, with that, Mr. Edmonds, you are recognized for
testimony.
STATEMENT OF JAMES T. EDMONDS, CHAIRMAN, PORT OF HOUSTON
AUTHORITY
Mr. Edmonds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members. I
appreciate very much the opportunity to speak to you today
about how security and emergency preparedness is handled at the
Port of Houston.
I believe that we have a good story to tell. As you know
and as has been pointed out, the Port of Houston is one of the
busiest ports in the country. As has been pointed out, it is
the second-largest petrochemical complex in the world. There
are more than 150 distinct maritime entities along the upper
Houston Ship Channel, which includes, of course, the Port
Authority, and each of us has a different business model, and
we all have different security risks.
But I am proud to say that when it comes to security and
emergency preparedness, the industrial community at the Port of
Houston has a strong tradition of effective collaboration and
communication, but before I talk about security, and at the
risk of being redundant, let me provide you with a brief
overview of the port. Specifically, how the port is organized
and its various pieces will help you understand how security is
handled here.
There is a saying in the port business if you have seen one
port you have seen one port. In fact, they are all different,
one way or another. The Port of Houston is a 25-mile complex
comprised of 150 private companies as well as the public
facilities that the Port Authority operates. The Port Authority
is the public entity, and we operate eight terminals. As I
mentioned to Congressman Keating, we operate some of those for
ourselves. We have others that know better than we do, operate
those kind of facilities.
While the Port Authority does have the overall
responsibility as the local partner with the Federal Government
in maintaining the Houston Ship Channel, in practical terms, we
really are just one of many players that make up the greater
Port of Houston.
As you know, the Federal Government has the primary
responsibility at the port regarding security and emergency
response. We have obviously a number of Federal partners, but
it is primarily the U.S. Coast Guard that will provide
direction and coordination in any kind of all-hazard event. The
Coast Guard's mission, as you have heard, is also to protect
the waterway and to regulate the security of vessels into
maritime facilities.
While the Federal Government provides the overall guidance
and authority on large incidents, each of us along the Houston
Ship Channel has developed emergency response plans that
conform to standards in Federal law. I can speak, of course, to
the Authority's eight terminals. Our plan is on-going,
coordinated by the Port Security Emergency Operations
Department to respond to any security or emergency situation.
On a regular basis, the Port Authority works closely with the
U.S. Coast Guard, Harris County Sheriff, and Houston Police
Department, other Federal and local agencies, as well as a
broad spectrum of external industry stakeholders to provide a
coordinated response to any kind of a security situation that
may arise.
The Port Authority has an internal committee that meets
regularly to review and revise our emergency operations plans
which includes the National Incident Management System
procedures. We are also the first port in the United States to
be certified as obtaining the International Organization of
Standardization, the ISO, 28000.2007 security standard, and I
am pleased to say that we were just recertified in March of
this year for another 3 years.
Our port security and emergency operations team is led by
Captain Marcus Woodring, right behind me. Captain Woodring
joined the port team in July after retiring from 28 years of
service with the U.S. Coast Guard, the last 5 years here in
Houston as both the captain of the port and as deputy
commander. He is the certified emergency manager and oversees
our port police and our marine departments, encompassing
approximately 150 professional responders. We are very pleased
that he has joined us, and I think that he will bring a serious
upgrade to our operations and we are excited about that.
As you can see, there are many players involved in security
at the port. As I mentioned, there is 150 private industries,
as well as all of our partners at the Federal and State and
local levels. It is, indeed, a complex mix, and the stakes are
high, but altogether the port is, as has been pointed out by
you, a significant economic engine.
I will give you another statistic. According to a recent
economic impact study, marine cargo activity at the public and
private terminals at the Port of Houston along the Houston Ship
Channel generates $118 billion of local economic activity in
Texas. This activity produces $3.7 billion in tax revenue and
is responsible for more than 785,000 direct and indirect jobs.
To give you some magnitude of the activity in 2010, there
were 7,800 vessel calls at the Port of Houston, and as the
Chairman mentioned, there is over 150,000 barge movements
annually. So this activity makes the overall port the largest
in the Nation in foreign water-borne tonnage and second in
total tonnage.
The port is critical to our Nation's energy security. As I
mentioned earlier and as has been mentioned, the port is home
to the largest petrochemical complex in the United States and
second in the world. The Port of Houston is ranked as the
largest importer and exporter of petroleum and petroleum
products in the United States. The country's largest refinery
with a refining capacity of 567,000 barrels of oil a day is
located on the channel.
From Houston, refined energy products are delivered over
the infrastructure that transports them to every market east of
the Rocky Mountains through a network of roads, rails, and
pipelines that originate along the Houston Ship Channel, and
this includes the 5,519-mile long colonial pipe system, which
is the largest petroleum product pipeline system in the Nation
and is vital to the energy for the south and the east coast of
the United States.
Despite the inherent challenges of this many people and
interests, the Port of Houston has demonstrated that we
effectively collaborate on security issues. Our assets have
been recognized in that we have been called a model for the
Nation. A quote from the 2009 report by the U.S. Coast Guard on
port Interagency information sharing states that: ``Port
partnerships are predictably strongest, most collegial and most
proactive where major calamities have necessitated life-and-
death relationships of trust. This was most evident in the
partner interviews in Sectors New York and Houston.''
One of our significant efforts that helped us earn this
accolade is an initiative that was passed by the Texas
legislature. As has been mentioned, the State of Texas provided
great leadership and foresight in the creation and usage of the
Houston Ship Channel Security District. Captain Diehl will
speak more to that in his testimony, but I want to take just a
minute to highlight the importance of this recently-appointed
entity.
The security district was created to complement the Federal
port security programs. The Federal dollars given to ports for
security allow for great improvements through purchasing
equipment or supporting training exercises, but they did not
include money for operation and maintenance. In our case, that
is about $4 million annually. So Harris County, the Port
Authority, and Houston Ship Channel industries worked together
with the legislature to create the management district around
the port, and the district assesses the industries within a
certain boundary, and these funds then are used for the O&M of
the district.
I would say to you that I am very pleased to be a small
part of that. I think former Secretary Chertoff saw that as a
model for this country, in fact, during the legislative process
wrote letters of support for us, but he saw immediately the
viability of this concept. I believe that I am correct in
saying that I think other ports have looked at that model for
their own security needs, and so we are very pleased that it is
here, and I am very pleased that Captain Diehl and his
organization basically administer that entity.
So I, like the other gentlemen, am pleased to answer any
questions that you may have when that is appropriate.
[The statement of Mr. Edmonds follows:]
Prepared Statement of James T. Edmonds
August 24, 2011
Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members. Thank you for this
opportunity to appear before your panel to talk about how security and
emergency preparedness is handled at the Port of Houston. I believe
that we have a good story to tell. As you may know, the Port of Houston
is one of the busiest ports in the country and is home to the second-
largest petrochemical complex in the world. There are more than 150
distinct maritime entities along the upper Houston Ship Channel,
including the port authority, and each of us has different business
models and security risks. But I am proud to say that when it comes to
security and emergency preparedness, the industrial community at the
Port of Houston has a strong tradition of effective collaboration and
communication. I hope that my participation, along with my colleagues
here on this panel, that you will have a better understanding of our
challenges and successes.
Before talking about security, it is important to provide you with
an overview of the Port of Houston. Specifically, how the port is
organized and its various pieces will provide the fundamental
understanding of how security is handled. There is a saying that if you
have seen one port, you have seen one port. The Port of Houston is a
25-mile-long complex comprised of these 150-plus private companies, as
well as the public facilities operated by the Port of Houston
Authority.
The port authority, which I represent, is the public entity along
the ship channel and it owns or operates eight terminals. While the
port authority does have the overall responsibility as the local
partner with the Federal Government in maintaining the Houston Ship
Channel, in practical terms, we are one of many players that make up
the greater Port of Houston.
As you may know, the Federal Government has the primary authority
at the port regarding security and emergency response. We have several
Federal partners, but it is primarily the U.S. Coast Guard that would
provide direction and coordination in any all-hazard event. The Coast
Guard's mission is also to protect the waterway and regulate the
security of vessels and maritime facilities.
While the Federal Government provides the overall guidance and
authority on large incidents, each of us along the Houston Ship Channel
has developed emergency response plans that conform to standards in
Federal law. I can speak, of course, to the port authority's plan for
our eight terminals. Our plan is an on-going, coordinated effort by the
Port Security and Emergency Operations Department to respond to any
security or emergency situation. On a regular basis, the port authority
works closely with the U.S. Coast Guard, Harris County Sheriff's
Office, Houston Police Department, Federal and local agencies as well
as a broad spectrum of external industry stakeholders to provide a
coordinated response to security situations.
The port authority has an internal committee that meets regularly
to review and revise our Emergency Operations plan, which includes
National Incident Management System (NIMS) procedures. We also are the
first port in the United States to be certified as obtaining the
International Organization of Standardization (ISO) 28000:2007 security
standard, and were just recertified in March, 2011, for another 3
years.
Our Port Security and Emergency Operations Team is led by Captain
Marcus Woodring, who joined the Port Authority team in July after
retiring from 28 years of service in the U.S. Coast Guard, the last 5
years here in Houston as both the Captain of the Port and Deputy
Commander. He is a Certified Emergency Manager and oversees our Port
Police and Marine Departments, encompassing approximately 150
professional responders. He is here with me today, and has the
responsibility of directing and monitoring the port authority's
security and emergency program while meeting Federal, State, U.S. Coast
Guard, and other regulatory requirements.
As you can see, there are many players involved in security at the
Port of Houston. There is the port authority, 150 private industries,
as well as partners or authorities at the Federal, State, and local
levels. It is a complex mix. And the stakes are high. Altogether, the
Port of Houston is a significant economic engine. According to a third-
party economic impact study, marine cargo activity at the public and
private terminals of the Port of Houston and along the Houston Ship
Channel generates nearly $118 billion in economic activity in the State
of Texas. This activity produces $3.7 billion in tax revenue and is
responsible for more than 785,000 direct and indirect jobs. In 2010,
there were 7,800 vessel calls at the Port of Houston and over 150,000
barge movements. This activity makes our overall port the largest in
the Nation in foreign waterborne tonnage and second in total tonnage.
This port is also critical to our Nation's energy security. As I
mentioned earlier, the port is also home to the largest petrochemical
complex in the United States. The Port of Houston is ranked as largest
importer and exporter of petroleum and petroleum products in the United
States. The country's largest refinery, with a refining capacity of
567,000 barrels a day, is located on the channel. From Houston, refined
energy products are delivered over the infrastructure that transports
them to every market east of the Rocky Mountains through the networks
of roads, rails, and pipelines originating in Houston. This includes
the 5,519-mile Colonial Pipeline system, which is the largest petroleum
product pipeline system in the Nation and is a vital energy artery for
the South and East Coast.
But, despite the inherent challenges of this many people and
interests, the Port of Houston has demonstrated that we effectively
collaborate on security issues. Our successes have been recognized in
that we have been called a model for the Nation. A quote from a 2009
report by the U.S. Coast Guard on Port Interagency Information Sharing
states:
``Port partnerships are predictably strongest, most collegial and most
proactive where major calamities have necessitated life-and-death
relationships of trust. This was most evident in the partner interviews
in Sectors New York and Houston . . .''.
One of the significant efforts that helped us earn this accolade is
an initiative that was passed by the Texas Legislature. The State of
Texas provided great leadership and foresight in the creation of the
Houston Ship Channel Security District. Captain Bill Diehl, who is also
a part of your panel will speak more about the district and its role in
more detail, but I want to spend a few moments and highlight the
importance of this recently formed entity. The security district was
created to complement the Federal port security programs. The Federal
dollars given to ports for security allowed for great improvements
through purchasing equipment or supporting training exercises, but it
did not include money for operation and maintenance, personnel, or any
matching requirement. Harris County, the port authority, and private
industry worked together with the legislature to create a management
district around the port. The district assesses the industries within
its boundaries and these funds will be used in concert with the Federal
funds to implement regional and port-wide security solutions.
Thank you for the opportunity to host your committee hearing here
today. I'm happy to answer any questions you may have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Edmonds. I agree with you, the
security district is a model for the Nation, and I applaud
everybody who has participated in it.
With that, I recognize Captain Diehl for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN WILLIAM J. DIEHL (UNITED STATES COAST
GUARD, RET.), PRESIDENT, GREATER HOUSTON PORT BUREAU, INC.
Captain Diehl. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of
the committee. Thank you.
I appreciate the opportunity you have provided me today to
discuss port security from an industry perspective. I represent
businesses that depend on the ship channel, and we have a very
vested interest in keeping it safe, secure, efficient, and
operational. Currently, the lack of dredging funding is a big
issue for us, as discussed in my submitted testimony, but in
the interest of time I will focus my verbal comments on the
Houston Ship Channel Security District.
After 9/11, a group of industry leaders from East Harris
County Manufacturers Association sat down with law enforcement
officers from Harris County, the city, Coast Guard, the Port of
Houston Authority, and others to discuss ways to help. Because
of the inherent nature of security, that is, you need weapons
and jurisdiction, industry-backed several large security
initiatives sponsored by Harris County. With industry, State,
and local authority support, legislation was passed forming the
Ship Channel Security District, which gave the district
authority to assess its members.
The security district concept of industry assessing
themselves and then decide how to allocate the funding works
because it is run by industry. Of the 11 members of the Houston
Ship Channel Security District board of directors, eight are
industry representatives who work as senior plant managers. If
Government were to assess significant security tariffs on
industry and then allocate the funding without industry
prioritization, I doubt that it would be as well supported as
it is. When a board member is obligated to interact with their
fellow plant managers and justify their decisions, you get
better industry participation and support on security
initiatives.
As a result of this work, we now have a unique public-
private partnership that improves security for facilities,
employees, and communities by providing increased preparedness
and response capabilities. The district's infrastructure
improvements include wireless and fiber optic wire
communication systems with integrated analytical and
intelligence video software, surveillance and detection
cameras, night vision, motion detection technology, and
additional technology components such as radar, sonar, and
sensor packages. We have already added 112 cameras, 69 handheld
radiation detectors, two marine side-scan sonar units, four
patrol boats, seven patrol trucks, five radar sites, and an
underwater remotely-operated vehicle to our regional security
picture.
I do have one suggestion that will help us in utilizing
grant fundings more efficiently. We need the grant process to
be either faster or more flexible. Because of the lag between
grant approval and receipt of funds, we have a situation where
agencies that several years ago needed boats and cameras now
have different infrastructures or are unable to staff, due to
budget cuts, previous rounds' equipment.
Business allocates large sums of money for long-term
projects, but as they move forward towards completion they
don't put them on auto pilot. They are continually modifying
and completely changing them to give them the best return for
investment. That is sort of the industry model, but we lose
that with these Federal grants because of the slow, rigid grant
funding process.
In summary, the security district is a learn-as-you-go
process, no different than what all of us experience as we grow
in this 9/11 security world. We know that working together we
move more ships in this port than any other port in the United
States. Moreover, we know the main reason this industry-led
security district works is because, at the end of the day, we
are all focused on keeping the ship channel open. Our security
district decisions must complement our effective, productive
businesses and keep traffic moving. Industry wants to be
involved and wants to be part of this solution. We understand
security's expensive. We think that by bonding together, by
using this model, we get better security at less cost.
I want to close by emphasizing industry is not looking to
supplant the responsibility of DHS, but rather, to work with
them to gain the maximum security practical for our part.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to appear before
you today, and I look forward to any questions that you or the
committee Members may have.
[The statement of Captain Diehl follows:]
Prepared Statement of William J. Diehl
August 24, 2011
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee: I appreciate the
opportunity you have provided me today to discuss port security in
Houston from an industry perspective.
As President of the Greater Houston Port Bureau I work with our 130
member companies to facilitate commerce in the maritime community.
These companies include the ports, terminals, longshoremen, line
handlers, agents, and others. The Port Bureau also provides
administrative services to the Houston Customhouse Brokers and Freight
Forwarders Association (roughly 100 companies), and to the Houston Ship
Channel Security District (124 companies). This means we work a lot
with the companies who depend on the Houston Ship Channel.
Chairman Edmonds discussed the significance of the port and I agree
it has huge value to our Nation and economy. I may be biased, but I see
maritime transportation as the most important mode of transportation to
our country. Think about it, roughly one-third of our GDP is tied to
global trade and 95% of that tonnage moves through our Nation's ports,
so keeping commerce flowing is critical to us as a Nation. President
Obama set a goal of doubling U.S. exports by 2015. The only way we are
going to get there is through our ports. To keep our ports vibrant we
need trade agreements, reliable intermodal transportation (i.e., roads,
rail, & barge infrastructure) and dredging. Of these three, dredging is
the most pressing. We are choking our global competitiveness by not
maintaining our ship channels. Currently 8 of our 10 largest ports are
not at their authorized width or depths. We can talk today about
securing our ports, but if we cannot get ships in or out, then that
conversation will not mean much. Needless to say, at the Port Bureau,
we are dedicated advocates for the immediate passage of the Realize
America's Maritime Promise (RAMP) Act (H.R. 104) and the corresponding
Senate bill S. 412.
As I transition to my security comments I want to be very clear
from the start that industry is not looking to supplant the
responsibility of DHS, but rather to work with them to gain the maximum
security practical for our port. Houston is the busiest port in the
Nation and the centers of the petrochemical and break bulk industries
for the United States. Our speed and efficiency are what make us
successful. What we like as industry is a stable, predictable business
environment. This can sometimes be a challenge along a ship channel:
Ship collisions, allisions, and groundings, hurricanes, oil spills and
now security incidents can threaten our ability to conduct business.
Like any liability to a business, one puts plans and procedures into
place to reduce the risk and to mitigate the effects when these
incidents do occur.
When I was with the Coast Guard we talked about Safety, Security,
and Environmental Stewardship; I can tell you that industry gets it,
for without an operating ship channel we go out of business. For safety
and environmental response, most companies found co-ops as an effective
way to pool resources, and utilize more expertise at less cost than
going it on their own. When 9/11 happened they looked to this
successful co-op approach. However in this case, forming co-ops turned
out to be a bit more challenging because of the inherent law
enforcement framework of security. Private security guards have no
jurisdiction on the channel. Put simply: When an event occurs, you need
someone on scene with a weapon and the authority (badge) to take action
and resolve the situation.
To address this post-9/11 security liability a group of industry
leaders from the East Harris County Manufacturers Association sat down
with the law enforcement officers from Harris County, the City, Coast
Guard, the Port of Houston Authority and others to discuss ways to
help. Under the Area Maritime Security Committee they furthered
communications and prioritization of the port security grant process to
maximize the benefits to the entire community. This successful
interaction grew and besides elevating their own facility security,
these leaders, with the guidance of Pat Bellamy from the University of
Houston, pushed the idea of using technology to coordinate a regional
security approach to protecting the ship channel. Because a
Governmental agency could best deliver security across many facilities,
Harris County stepped forward to be the sponsor for the project. When
large matching funds were required industry backed the plan by
championing the formation of the Houston Ship Channel Security
District. With industry, State, and local authority support,
legislation was passed, so that the District could assess its members.
The Security District concept of industry assessing themselves and
then deciding how to allocate the funding works because it is run by
industry. Of the eleven members of the Houston Ship Channel Security
District Board of Directors, eight are industry representatives who
work as senior plant managers. The other three Board members represent
local municipalities, Harris County and the Port of Houston Authority,
comprising a governing body in which everyone is vested in stimulating
cargo movement and protecting commerce. If Government were to assess a
significant security tariff on industry and then allocate that funding
without industry prioritization, I doubt that it would be as well
supported as it is. When board members are obligated to interact with
their fellow plant managers and justify their decisions you get better
industry participation and support of the security initiatives.
As a result of this work, we now have a unique public-private
partnership that improves security for facilities, employees, and
communities by providing increased preparedness and response
capability. The first year's assessment raised over $4.5 million
dollars in support of the Harris County Security Project which has had
an immediate impact on local law enforcement. The District's
infrastructure improvements include wireless and fiber-optic wired
communication systems with integrated analytics and intelligent video
software, surveillance and detection cameras, night vision, motion
detection technology and additional detection components such as radar,
sonar, and security sensors. With specially trained law enforcement
personnel using marked cars, patrol boats, and enhanced communications
systems, the district not only works to deter terrorism, but is able to
impact theft and aid with other safety and security issues. We have
added 112 cameras, 69 handheld radiation detectors, 2 marine side-scan
sonar units, 4 patrol boats, 7 patrol trucks, 5 radar sites, and an
underwater remote operated vehicle to our regional security picture. We
have another patrol boat, 14 land vehicles, and communications
infrastructure under construction.
We've seen two dividends emerge from the Security District:
Resiliency and coordination. Bolstering resiliency, this equipment will
help mitigate disruption of business during events such as hurricanes,
evacuations, or plant upsets, and help district members recover and
restore normal operations quicker. For coordination, we know that
during a security incident, everyone in the area will be called upon to
contribute. What we're doing now is ramping up so that during an
incident, our response is brought to bear seamlessly and coherently.
I do have one suggestion that would help us utilize grant funding
more efficiently. We need the grant process to either be faster or more
flexible. Right now, the grant process only generates money several
years after it has been awarded. This time delay is aggravated by the
substantial constraints on the way funds are spent. Because of the lag
between grant approval and receipt of funds, we have a situation where
agencies that, several years ago may have needed boats and cameras, now
have different infrastructure or are unable to staff (due to budget
cuts) previous rounds' equipment. If we have the ability to address our
needs when we receive the grants instead of after years of wading
through a bureaucratic process, we can use the money more efficiently
by addressing current concerns. Businesses allocate large sums of money
for long-term projects, but as they move towards the completion they
don't put them on autopilot. They are continually modifying or
completely changing them to give them the best return for the
investment. Currently, we lose that with this slow and rigid grant
funding process.
I will close by saying that we see the Security District as a
learn-as-you-go process, no different than what all of us are
experiencing as we grow into this post-
9/11 security world. We know that by working together we move more
ships in this port than any other port in the United States. Moreover,
we know the main reason that this industry-led Security District works
is because at the end of the day, we're all focused on keeping the ship
channel open. Our Security District decisions must complement our
effective, productive businesses and keep traffic moving. Industry
wants to be involved and wants to be a part of the solution. We
understand security is expensive. We think that by bonding together--by
using this model--we are getting better security with less cost.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me to appear before you today,
and I look forward to any questions that you or the committee Members
may have.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Captain.
The Chairman now recognizes himself for questions.
As I stated, the recent killing of Osama bin Laden revealed
a lot of things in a treasure trove of documents, one relating
to a spectacular, potential attack on the 10-year anniversary
of 9/11; the other, targeting oil tankers at ports such as the
Houston Port Ship Channel. That obviously got my attention as
one of the main reasons I am having this hearing today.
When you look at the past, they have done it before. I
mean, this is a picture of the oil tanker attacked and targeted
by al-Qaeda off the coast of Yemen. So it is nothing new these
tactics. This is the kind of scenario we want to prevent, and
that is the purpose of the hearing today.
The GAO I think did a very good study and analysis of
security concerns and what needs to be done to make sure that
something like this never happens at this port in Texas.
However, there was a picture taken of the Houston Ship Channel
with a very small vessel going into the port, into the ship
channel, which did raise some concern.
So my first question is to Mr. Caldwell: How often does
this type of scenario occur where a small vessel, kind of like
what attacked the USS Cole, has come into the ship channel
undetected?
Mr. Caldwell. It is a hard question. I don't want to
exaggerate an antidote because, when I took that picture, I had
been to the ship channel area several times down here in my
maritime security work, but I am not always on the channel that
often, but I am on the channel and took that picture. So I
think some of the things that have been talked about like
cameras and patrols may help reduce that, but it is my
understanding this is a prohibited zone. So I was quite
concerned actually to see that boat when I took that picture.
Mr. McCaul. Is this a frequent occurrence or just a rare
occurrence?
Mr. Caldwell. Well, I have been to--it has happened twice--
of the two times, I have been on the channel, it has happened
that one time.
Mr. McCaul. That is something obviously--and let me just
first say, though, that the Coast Guard, Harris County
Sheriff's Office, Port Authority have done a fantastic job I
think securing this. We can never emphasize hardening our
security more, and I think that is one point of this hearing.
My next question is to Mr. Edmonds and Captain Diehl. This
is basically an illustration of the energy supply for the
Nation, and when you look at this map, it really brings out the
fact that the majority of the energy for the Nation comes right
out of here. I know the ExxonMobil refinery refines about 31
percent of the Nation's energy. If that was taken out by a
small vessel like this one, you can imagine the long-term
consequences, economic. It could cripple this Nation from an
energy standpoint and an economic standpoint.
Can both of you speak to that issue in terms of how
important this port really is?
Mr. Edmonds. Well, the numbers that I use in my speeches--
and these gentlemen can help me if I am wrong--but something in
the neighborhood of 49 percent of the refined products used in
this country every day come from the Houston Ship Channel
industries and an eighth of the gasoline consumed every day. So
it would be devastating to the economy of the country.
The tragedy is you don't even have to blow up an Exxon. You
can just shut off access to the waterway and you shut down all
that refining capability. There is something leaving this port
24 hours a day through a pipeline or railcar or truck. So there
is all kinds of arteries of movement, and you damage any one of
those and that has a devastating economic impact.
The one thing I would say, Captain Diehl mentioned the East
Harris County Manufacturers Association. That is organization
of the ship channel--the big producers along the Houston Ship
Channel. They are very effective people. They have their own
security systems and plans, and I think that I can sit here
with a degree of confidence and say to you that an Exxon or
Shell or those people, they are sophisticated. They know what
they are doing. They are very well-protected in their own
right. What we try to do is overlay that protection to help
them, support whatever systems that they have in place to make
sure that the entire channel is safe. I go to sleep pretty much
every night not worrying about that.
But I have to say to you that it could sure happen, and it
could quickly and easily. But, that said, I think we are
vigilant and I think that the ship channel on the whole
cooperates very well. Nine-eleven brought us all together, and
since then we have had a lot of port-wide security systems and
committees and approaches and sharing of information and
cooperation that has made this, for what it is and for the 25
miles of it, about as safe and secure as I think we can make
it.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Captain Diehl.
Captain Diehl. Yes. Thank you.
I won't repeat the numbers that the Chairman put in his
statement, but I would just summarize it this way for you.
One-third of our economy is associated with global trade,
and that trade comes and goes through our ports. Ninety-five
percent, 99 percent of it by tonnage probably comes in and out
of our ports by ships. So it is not only the Port of Houston,
but it is all our major ports are key to our economy. You shut
it down; we are going to start heading towards a recession.
What makes us unique as Houston is these refineries. You
can shut down a container port and move up the coast to the
next container port to deliver those boxes. You can't package
up the refinery and move it. You can't take those pipelines and
pull them out of the ground and shift them over to New Orleans.
That is what is unique.
But I will tell you, though, when we look at it from the
industry point of view, we look at security as a liability, the
same as we look at safety and environmental response. Those are
all liabilities. We want to keep it safe, secure,
environmentally sound, and we want to make money. That is the
liabilities we look at. So any one of these is sort of key for
us, and I think what you see out of it, we form these groups,
these partnerships to address those.
We have great safety partnerships. We now have--with the
security district, we have a very solid security partnership.
We have environmental co-ops and things like that to ensure
that we can respond. It has proven to work in a big natural
disaster such as when Hurricane Ike came through here that
everyone was able to get this thing back up and running in
short order.
Mr. McCaul. Yeah, let me just take a moment to commend you
and Mr. Edmonds and Sheriff Garcia for your great work on the
security district and Captain Whitehead with the Coast Guard. I
think that it really is a model for the Nation, and it was so
successful that it moved us up in terms of the port security
grants from No. 3 to No. 2 in the Nation, which I think was
fantastic.
One area of funding I am concerned with--and I think,
Captain Diehl, you talked about it--is with respect to
dredging. The Port of Houston contributes, as you know, about
$120 million into this trust fund for maintenance, and yet we
only get back about $20 million or $22 million. The
administration sent back about $20 million. The Army Corps of
Engineers is recommending somewhere between $40- to $80 million
for dredging purposes. With the canal the way it is at 50 feet,
we won't be able to accept some of those ships coming from the
canal into the Houston Ship Channel if we don't have the
funding to dredge. Can you speak to that issue?
Mr. Edmonds. You are right, and the channel maintenance is
one of the biggest priorities we have.
From the sea buoy to shale is about 45 feet. We have
received three 8,100 TEU ships so far. I did not believe--none
of us believed that we would receive a ship that large this
soon. We thought we would wait until 2014.
The first priority that we have is to dredge the channel
from the main channel into Bayport. It is about $150 million.
To be candid with you, for us to go through the normal Federal
Government process, it would be 10 to 12 years before we could
even get started, and we would lose our customer base if we do
that. So we are going to fund the $150 million ourselves to
make sure that that happens so we don't lose any of that
business opportunity.
But I think at the end of the day about an 8,500 TEU ship
will be the large ship that will call on Houston. That is a lot
of cargo movement, and you get six or seven of those in here
every day or 2 days, it is a lot of product that will come.
But the biggest on-going, No. 1 priority in my mind, other
than the construction of Bayport and those things to have the
appropriate dock and moorage capability--is that channel
maintenance, and we are losing every year a significant amount
of the depth that we were granted in the last widening and
deepening project.
Mr. McCaul. I hope that, Mr. Green, you and I and the
Ranking Member would like to do this as well, to work on this
effort to get more of the funding back.
Mr. Edmonds. Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. I am not sure about the Ranking Member. I know
Mr. Green and I have co-sponsored the RAMP Act, which
essentially says that 100 percent of the money sent to the
trust fund come back for harbor maintenance, and I think that
is----
Mr. Edmonds. We don't even need the whole 120. If we could
just get 80 or 40 or 50 of it, that would be fine--take care of
our own needs.
Mr. McCaul. We will work on that one.
Mr. Edmonds. Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Finally, I know I have taken more than my time,
but I want to ask Mr. Caldwell and the Sheriff, in terms of
your recommendations on what needs to be done to ensure that
the type of tanker explosion I showed earlier does not occur in
the Houston Ship Channel, what more can we do in terms of
security at the port?
Mr. Caldwell. Well, one of the things that we have noted
is, you know, one of our recommendations is that they do more
local exercises and integrate both the law enforcement and the
spill response. Coast Guard did provide us some information on
those exercises. There was one that met our criteria in Port
Arthur, but we had not seen one for Houston. So that would be
one that I would want Houston to do, given it is important, as
we talked about today. We have closed that recommendation
because the Coast Guard is doing those exercises. It is just I
would like to see one in Houston.
Mr. McCaul. Captain Whitehead, do you have any
recommendations?
Captain Whitehead. I can say we have done exercises where
we have combined it in Houston. So I am not sure how the
information flowed, but it is important. Many of the terrorist
exercises will have an aspect of oil spill along with it, so we
combine those together, realizing that, you know, the
likelihood of those occurring together would be high.
Mr. McCaul. Sheriff.
Sheriff Garcia. Congressman, I think that, as we have been
talking, unfortunately, when it comes to effective security of
such a critical asset like the Port of Houston, the ship
channel, funding and funding to accomplish a variety of these
initiatives always seems to be the common thread. We are using
technology. We are very grateful for all the work that the
security district has accomplished for us and the various
technologies that we have, but with that comes the cost of
operations and maintenance. All the technology is great if you
can have a body to turn it on and to monitor. So personnel and
ability to fund those boots on the ground in a tight economy,
like what we are currently in, is important to look at.
So a recommendation that I would bring forth is that--I
know that there is debate about the COPS--the state of the COPS
program from the Department of Justice, but I would urge this
body to look at a COPS program for ports. I think that is an
area that seriously needs to be considered so that you can
accomplish support to local communities, involving Federal and
National security assets like the port, but that you help local
law enforcement meet those goals and work effectively alongside
our partners.
So I would urge a COPS program for ports, as well as, you
know, in a significant area like Harris County and maybe a few
other places in the country. UASI plays a very critical role,
but then we still have the challenges of drug cartels and
transnational gangs and organized crime and all those
challenges. So I would also urge that maybe a UASI for ports be
considered in addition to that.
Mr. McCaul. I think that is an excellent recommendation. I
have consistently supported the COPS program. You and I have
discussed it personally, and I sent letters to the Department
of Justice to get that funding for your office and for Harris
County, and I want to thank you for your testimony.
With that, I recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just a quick question because of the concerns I have
regionally as well. So, Mr. Edmonds, specifically on LNG and
LNG tankers themselves, can you just comment on some of your
experience, what you learned, what you are doing, you think is
the most vital, you know, type of approach to LNG and LNG
tanker security?
Mr. Edmonds. I am not prepared to answer that question,
sir, because the Port Authority is the public side of this. The
private side operates itself, and we have no authority or
control over it.
Having said that, though, Captain Whitehead can respond as
the captain of the port.
Captain Whitehead. Yes, Congressman. In fact, 2 days from
now we have a Yemeni--you mentioned earlier a Yemeni LNG
tanker. We have one coming into the Port Arthur area. Although
we don't have any LNG tankers come into this area, the Houston
Ship Channel, but we do have them come into both Freeport, Lake
Charles, and Port Arthur. With those, we do take additional
measures. We utilize our MSSTs. Our maritime security safety
teams assist us in securing the--as well as we work with our
port partners when they come in as well to secure the port,
make sure that we board the vessel before it even comes in, do
security sweep, escort the vessel in. So we take additional
security measures with LNG tankers that come into port.
Mr. Keating. That really prompts another question I had,
Captain. There has been an estimate of as many as 15 countries
that aren't maintaining effective anti-terrorism measures in
their port facilities. So it is not just a question of keeping
our own port safe. These are coming in from other countries,
and the Coast Guard has the authority to deny them access, if
necessary, from doing this, which is a very strong potential
tool to get those countries to cooperate. What can we do more
from your vantage point? Because you can enforce it. You have
that ability. What can we do more to make those countries do a
better job on the front end of this with the anti-terrorism
kind of securities that should be in place before they ever
leave their port?
Captain Whitehead. I would have to take that one for the
record. It is better answered from our Coast Guard
headquarter's perspective.
What we can do, in general as a Coast Guard, I can tell you
we have--in my time here, we have denied entry to a few vessels
based on the countries they were coming from inadequate
security measures, as well as delayed the ships from coming in
until--because if they don't have adequate security measures,
we board the ships, hold them offshore, board the ships, and do
those additional security sweeps.
Mr. Keating. I think that--just from our own vantage point,
I think that is a tremendous tool we should use to make sure
those countries are doing their part on their end to make our
job easier and make everyone safer.
So thank you. I am interested in maybe taking that up with
headquarters in that regard.
Sheriff, you mentioned the woeful state of financing--I
think if I am paraphrasing for you. You know, some of this is
penny-wise and pound-foolish. Because if you look at the
economic impact that we have here and one of the largest, right
here, in the country and having, you know, the inadequate
funding resources to do this is something that really doesn't
seem to be very wise on my part. Because the impact of even at
choke points, even sinking vessels, even using the vessels as a
missile, even doing damage to bridge and infrastructure, what
that could do to just shut everything down is a great concern.
So what would you do and where do you see that translating
into your not being able to do your job as well as possible and
what other things would you do if you had more resources?
Sheriff Garcia. Thank you for the question, Congressman. I
will tell you that there is probably no other responsibility
that I have that keeps me up at night and as a part of my daily
conversation and part of what I regularly challenge my major,
who is over our homeland security emergency preparedness
responsibilities, and it is frustrating for us not to have the
personnel to be able to be on point at all places and present
and visible so that we can provide all the deterrence
necessary.
So, first of all, I would say that if we had additional
resources it would be to make sure that we have the personnel
available to provide all the levels of monitoring, patrol--both
on land and water and in air--and resources to provide
dedicated air support for the port, dedicated air surveillance
for the port, and then also investment in other forms of
technology that would help us create a greater zone of
protection around the port and in the respective community.
I had the opportunity to visit Haifa--the Port of Haifa as
an example. You don't go near that place or move around that
place without somebody knowing about it. Doesn't matter whether
you are coming off a neighborhood street or major thoroughfare
or the entry into the port area, people know about it, and that
is the way this area should be, and it should be secured. So
finding other forms of technology to accomplish that level of
security is critical.
Then, you know, higher levels of training with private
industry, higher levels of coordination and information sharing
would be areas where I would invest as well.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
I think that segues to another question that I had, Captain
Diehl and maybe all of you can take a shot at this, but it is
the idea that you have got so many resources here and you seem
to be ahead of the curve in terms of sharing those resources
and dealing with it. But are the sophisticated technological
equipment, the monitoring, the videotapes in the private
sector, are they at the disposal and shared all the time with
local law enforcement, with the Coast Guard?
Captain Diehl. The idea--the concept of the Ship Channel
Security District, as we say, is to create this ring of steel
where there will be nodes to the Coast Guard, to the Port
Authority, to the Sheriff, to the city, to all the
municipalities' law enforcement, Pasadena, Deer Park, and all
those people would have access to this information. That is the
vision that we have for growing into it. Right now, we are in
the--as we come on-line, we are turning it on for different
places and letting them look at it.
I just want to sort of go back to what the sheriff said
about it, though. We do have some good technology that makes us
more efficient. Without the manning, though, it becomes a
concern for us. As industry people, you know, we can't just
hire security guards and send them down. You have to have
jurisdiction. You have got to have the ability to use weapons
in this thing. So we really want to back--and that is why the
partnership works for the security district is we look to local
law enforcement, the Coast Guard, Sheriff, and the city and
others that have badges to operate and know what they are doing
on the thing.
The bottom line, though, comes--and this is what concerns
us a little bit as we go forward--knowing that the deficit,
things coming off the Hill and things like that is people say,
okay, when are we going to be done with the Ship Channel
Security District. It would be the same as going to your local
police department and saying, hey, by the end of the year we
want crime solved, because next year it is not going to be in
the budget. That is sort of what my members tell me. Hey,
security is not going away. It is a liability for us that we
have got to address, and we know we are in it for the long
term, and the long term means that we have got to have bodies,
bullets, boats and all that--buildings and things like that to
take us to the next level.
Mr. Keating. So we have the technology. We don't have the
manpower to monitor it?
Captain Diehl. We have technology that we are implementing.
We are not quite where we want to be on it. As I said, we put
this thing together. We look at it and go, that works, that
doesn't work. As we grow into it, it is sort of like the best
practices you see that normally go into the area of maritime
security. We are actually heavily involved in looking at and
saying that doesn't work for the Sheriff to get that
information to respond appropriately.
So they give us that feedback, and then we are adjusting.
So we are learning as we go. We are not perfect, but we are
further along than what we were many years ago.
Mr. Keating. So you have the feed that can go directly to
the Sheriff's office----
Captain Diehl. Yes.
Mr. Keating. That is a great partnership you have got going
there.
Certainly I think your point is well made. I mean, when you
look at--we do have needs as a country, and we are in a deficit
situation. However, two of our biggest issues besides--putting
today's hearing aside in terms of our own security--are jobs
and our economy, and if we are investing in that area, it makes
sense to me that that is an area where we are going to get
multiple effect back.
I just had one other question to Mr. Caldwell, and then I
will yield my time back.
Again, in terms of integration, we have got a sense with
the captain in terms of what is done, but I think the two
things that--you know, your initiative the GAO recommended for
the FBI working with the Coast Guard for spills and for
terrorist threats, working together, how is that integration
going with the FBI and--what is the state of that?
Mr. Caldwell. I mean, unfortunately, it has been somewhat
of a moving target. I mean, when we made that recommendation,
DHS was basically reorganizing what had been called the Federal
response plan into the National response framework, and you
need kind of that big picture in place to figure out where your
detailed operational plans would be. Now, they are under
another revision to that. So, unfortunately, some of that big-
picture stuff has to be taken care of.
But certainly from a Coast Guard perspective they have been
pretty active in exercises; FBI less so.
Mr. Keating. Sheriff, how is your interaction with the FBI?
Sheriff Garcia. Excellent. We have a great working
relationship with the Bureau; and every time we have had a
change in SACs, we have a discussion soon thereafter
introducing one another. I have called on them on a number of
occasions for a variety of things, including public corruption,
and so we have an outstanding working relationship with them.
I did want to go back to one other area of investment on
your question, Congressman, if I may, and that is as you see
this law enforcement and private and public industry
relationship, an important investment, if I had the resources,
would be in public engagement. Having the relationship with the
community, with the great diverse community that we have in
this area is critical. You know, if folks don't have the
confidence and trust to come forward with anything they may be
aware about, then, you know, our technology isn't going to
light up. Because, ultimately, some tip, some information
starts with a human being, and we have got to make sure that
local law enforcement and our Federal partners have that
relationship and the ability to build and strengthen those
relationships.
So going back to the Incident Response Forum, that is a
critical area that we have to also look at. It is not
technology, but it is an important investment to make in terms
of building active and human relationships.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Sheriff. I yield my time.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Bill.
Now, the Chairman recognizes Mr. Green for his questions.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you for the courtesy of not being on the
committee in allowing me to both make a statement and ask
questions.
First of all, I don't want to take anything away.
Obviously, we need dredging money. Because that 250,000 folks
that have those transport worker cards would probably not be
here unless we keep that dredging going and, of course, for the
growth; and I know a lot of other ports are having the same
problem. So that is an issue.
Sheriff and Captain, I was out on a Coast Guard helicopter
right after 9/11 when we had joint boardings of Coast Guard
personnel and Navy personnel. Obviously, the Navy for the
defense and Coast Guard because of the law enforcement
capability. I don't think we do that anymore, but it is still
available if needed simply because we have a better
intelligence network and if there is a ship coming in from an
unusual location that we don't feel comfortable with that is
still available, whether it is in the Port of Houston or
elsewhere I know.
But I also know that since 9/11 and having our Sheriff with
us today, I am fortunate to represent a lot of cities along the
Houston Ship Channel; and they all have law enforcement. At one
time, there wasn't any coordinated effort. But the Sheriff is a
designated State law enforcement--and the city of Houston, the
city of Deer Park, Pasadena, you name it, all the way out to
Baytown and La Porte.
So that is the benefit we have. We have one Sheriff. I have
to admit, we did have some problems between Federal and State
after 9/11, the coordination effort there, but that was dealt
with. Because, like the Sheriff said, our deputy ISAC, about 2
years into 9/11, the FBI told me they had been on every plant
along the channel to give them an assessment of their
vulnerability.
The Houston area and the port and the businesses in the
area that form the port security district by State law that was
supposed to come up with some of the maintenance money--and
this is industry who is going to tax themselves based on, you
know, the grants that the port gets and the area gets for
security apparatus. So that is important.
I am real familiar with LNG, though. We don't have an LNG
facility in the Port of Houston. That is why we don't get the
LNG tankers. We have a great pipeline network that comes in. I
am familiar with the one that comes into Boston Harbor, and I
don't know if Captain Whitehead, Captain Diehl, the agreement
on that from Yemen--and I don't know if this is true for every
cargo from Yemen--but I know going into Boston Harbor they
actually go to the Island of Malta and are inspected. Are
either of you familiar with that? That was a Coast Guard
arrangement?
Captain Whitehead. I am somewhat familiar with it. I know
they have it for the tankers going into Boston. I don't want to
speak for Boston, but I know they did do some pre-boardings of
it in the Malta area.
Mr. Green. I know the company. There is a Houston company
that actually has that contract, and that has been the
agreement. They would check that Yemen cargo, although
previously that were actually coming in from Algeria, and I
understand now they are probably going to come in from--because
of the problems in Yemen, they will come in from Trinidad for
the LNG for the Boston area.
So there are ways we can deal with that and still have
imported LNG or, in our case, we are looking at exporting LNG,
which can be the same volatile product if it is on a ship. That
is important.
Let me ask the Sheriff, though, briefly, the Homeland
Security appropriations bill passed by the House would cut
numerous Homeland Security grant programs to State and local
entities. The bill would cut local and State grant programs
about 55 percent when compared to fiscal year 2011 enacted and
67 percent compared to the President's request. Your local law
enforcement depends on these grant dollars to help fund the
maritime security missions and prepare needed maritime assets
our ports depend on. Can you talk about if you don't have those
up-front grants, at least can have the apparatus?
Also I wonder if you could share about the port security
district and what it has been doing and on the technology side
to make literally a wireless and fiber optic communications
between not only law enforcement agencies, the plant, the port
plants, and the port to make sure we have that capability.
But also mainly we talk about money, and if you don't have
that up-front money, it doesn't do any good to worry about
maintaining it, because we just don't have the infrastructure.
Sheriff Garcia. Well, Congressman, thank you for your very
pointed question. The fact is, without the support of the
Federal Government in regards to the local mission that we have
as it relates to a National security interest, we can't get it
done; and so it is imperative that your colleagues hear the
value of that support and what it means to the local community
and local agencies like myself, and so we have to maintain that
funding.
A 50 percent cut in what we are currently getting, which
isn't enough, equals to dire circumstances and tremendously
reduced capacity and ability to respond effectively to National
and international threats to our local communities. So that is
scary, and so it is imperative that that be heard.
Second, as Captain Diehl has said, thanks to a variety of
resources and collaborations and to the security district, we
have a true ring of steel. It is so--we are light years in
front of many people. We are a model for other communities in
terms of how tying in technology systems has been effective and
has gotten us to the point that we are at.
But it all goes back to it is great technology. We are
truly a model. We are contemporary. We are very futuristic in
many senses. But at the end of the day, we need, you know,
blood, sweat, and tears to be able to monitor those systems.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is all my
questions, but, again, I appreciate the courtesies of both of
you having the hearing here but also allowing me to weigh on
the committee.
Mr. McCaul. Absolutely. It is great to see you over the
August recess as well.
With that, the Chairman now recognizes the gentlelady from
Houston, who arrived just in the nick of time before
adjournment, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you so very much. To
my colleagues, it is a pleasure to be with Congressman Gene
Green. We work very hard and together on great assets of this
whole community and one that is in his Congressional district
that he shares but has really been a focused leader on the
issues necessary in support of the port.
Congressman Keating, please feel welcomed. We knew that you
had enough cool breezes in Massachusetts, and we wanted to make
sure that you could appreciate the diversity of this great land
by coming here to Houston, Texas. We welcome you to our
multiple Congressional districts, and we hope that you have
benefited from coming to this great asset.
To all of you, and certainly to be at the port is one of my
chief, if I might say, joys. Because as I have traveled and
represented this area and traveled internationally and been on
the Homeland Security Committee, it takes all of the witnesses
collectively in their respective responsibilities to really
ensure that this economic engine is protected and that it
continues to achieve as it has done.
Chairman McCaul, thank you as well. You recognized a very,
very important topic, and if I might just say a few opening
words that may have already been said, but I think it is
important to just note that this port has really been the basis
for some 287,000 direct and indirect jobs, generating $11
billion in economic impact and more than $649 million in State
and local tax revenues and approximately 17,000 jobs that are
connected with the Port of Houston.
I was the convener and leader of a conference on
international investments, which is why I was delayed with a
number of out-of-town guests, and I thank you for your
indulgence. But it also allowed me to receive one or two more
briefings on the occurrence yesterday in the eastern region
that impacted cities coming from Canada into New York and into
Washington, DC, and beyond, starting in Mineral, Virginia. I
think it is important, as I ask a series of questions, to focus
on the importance of preparedness.
We saw a 5.9 on the Richter scale earthquake. People in New
York thought it was a terrorist attack. People in Washington,
DC, as I was keeping up with staff and getting reports, were
not aware of what it might be, and in that city were probably
millions or at least hundreds of thousands of tourists, along
with our remaining staff, certainly some Members of Congress
and others, and, frankly, it was the seat of Government and
then many, many other places.
I think this hearing, although it is focusing on the port,
it really has to raise the question of preparedness. I don't
mind adding to the record, Chairman McCaul, because we might
likely have a hearing on this issue when we return, is the
level of preparedness, and it is clear that we are not
prepared, that information did not segue into the population as
it should have. The evacuation might have been incorrect. I
need to be corrected, but I am told that earthquakes require
one to go into places, as opposed to go out of places, and
everybody was evacuated out of the building, and there may be
some question.
But I think this hearing points to being prepared in order
to confront the aftermath of not being prepared, and I am
grateful that it was a 5.9 earthquake that did not see, to our
knowledge--reports may still be coming in--a loss of lives, and
of course, we not have yet assessed the damage.
But just imagine that kind of impact, without the
preparedness that is necessary, which really includes
resources. I want us to get to the point where we feel
comfortable with preparedness for a natural disaster and a man-
made disaster, which is what we are speaking of today.
So I am going to first pose questions to Mr. Caldwell of
the GAO because I think integration of our law enforcement and
preparedness agencies--I know that you did a report in 2007
trying to encourage the transfer of information, the
integration of information between our local and State, but I
assume our other law enforcement agencies--and we now have a
multiple number of agencies dealing with terrorism after 9/11.
Could you respond more in depth to that question and tell us
exactly in 2011 where we are in making progress on that
integration?
Mr. Caldwell. We had five recommendations in our earlier
report, and three of those have been either closed or they are
in progress of being closed. Two that were not closed, one had
to do with exactly the issue you are talking about, the
integration of operational plans. So that one is still being
done; and, at this point, we don't have a commitment from DHS
or FEMA about how low--to what operational level of planning
they are going to take that integration.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Why don't you pause for a moment and just
tell us what that would be like? Maybe you want to give an
example of an incident or what does that mean when you have the
integration of operational plans?
Mr. Caldwell. So, in our report that we did, we found that
there was separate operational response plans for an oil spill
or an environmental response and separate plans for a law
enforcement response and terrorist attack on a tanker. You
would have to integrate those two at the same time. The report
has detailed comparison of the plans and how they have to be
integrated, and so we were asking for exercises, which have
been done, as well as integration of those operational plans so
everyone knows their role when something actually happens.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you believe that, if we reached that
goal, this very question that we are asking about, potential
economic impact, if a port like the Port of Houston was
actually subjected to a terrorist attack, we would be better
prepared and better able to address it? So it really has to do
with saving lives and dollars?
Mr. Caldwell. It has to do with making sure everybody knows
what they want to do to maximize protection of lives and the
economy, things like that.
Also leads to the other recommendation which is still open
which was on performance measures. We have talked a lot about
money and resources that are needed, but we still don't really
have a clear path of measuring either DHS or FEMA in terms of
some of these response assets, which ones work, which ones are
going to actually help us be more prepared. So that is still a
very open question. It is a very difficult thing to do. How do
you measure preparedness of a lot of systems? It is not just of
an individual program. It is how these things fit together.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think that is key. Because I guess I
would interpret it as one hand knowing what the other hand is
doing, either to jump immediately into action or to use all the
necessary principles that needed to be involved if there was a
terrorist act. The question I raise for the earthquake was
whether or not we had everyone involved that needed to be
involved as we looked at this up and down the East Coast.
Mr. Edmonds, there is another captain at the table, but you
are the administrative captain of this very large area. First,
I would like you to give me, if you have the acreage of what
you supervise in the Houston port for people to get the
magnitude of how large it is. Again, focus on the responsible
use of resources, the moneys that you could use and have used.
We have been very glad to provide you with a number of funding.
I have been very glad to be a supporter of that for the port
for terrorist prevention, if you will. I don't think that is
something that necessarily can be, but tell me how additional
resources would be helpful in managing this very huge entity
that you have supervision over.
Mr. Edmonds. First, I don't know the acreage size. Does
anyone know the acreage size? We will get that for you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Just the magnitude, if somebody knows how
many city blocks.
Mr. Edmonds. It is pretty good size. By Texas standards, it
is pretty good size, but we will get that for you in a minute.
Ms. Jackson Lee. It is big.
Mr. Edmonds. It is big.
But let me go back to something that I think speaks to the
baseline of your question.
Because of our geography and because of weather patterns,
as you well know, we are hurricane prone. So for many, many
years we have had a very sophisticated hurricane plan. After 9/
11, that was our baseline to begin to build off of to try to
apply security issues to that plan because they are very much
interrelated.
I will say to you that in the most recent situation with
Ike, I think the hurricane plan worked very, very well. Not to
get into the detail of it, but it is a port-wide committee
chaired by captain of the port or NOAA, one of those two
agencies. All the stakeholders in the port are involved in it.
There is a schedule that, as a storm begins to come, we begin
to get ships out of the channel, begin to batten down
everything until basically everything is secured, including
container of wharf grains. Everything is secured and everything
is gone or tied down, and it worked very well for us in Ike.
But, after 9/11, we took that baseline and said, okay, we
will try to now apply that to different security issues. We
have been the recipient I think of some $45 million roughly of
security grants since 9/11, thanks very much to you,
Congressman and all of you, but we have used those for gate and
fence and different kind of hardware security improvements to
make sure that we can secure our properties.
The security district, the quick history on that was a
former county judge was approached by a bunch of ship channel
industries to apply for a grant for a port-wide security
communications capability. They didn't feel like they qualified
under the grant program. So the county judge applied for that
and got $26 million from the original grant. The problem was
the $4 million of O&M money. So that is how we came together to
supply that.
So we have been an active participant. We have been fairly
successful, but we have used those moneys for programs and for
integration of programs to make sure that we all communicate
with each other, that we try to act as one family looking after
each other to make sure that everyone is secure and as safe as
we can be.
One of the concerns that I have about the security district
is--if I am correct in this, Captain Diehl, help me--I don't
believe there is replacement dollars. One of the beauties of
this country is technology is evolving every day. That is going
to become stale technology in short order. So we are going to
have to start all over in the grant process to get another
grant to upgrade the technology. So that is something that you
all might think about as you deliberate the funding programs.
Well, she asked me the acreage----
Ms. Jackson Lee. It is big.
Mr. Edmonds. Eleven thousand five hundred acres of
developed and undeveloped property.
Ms. Jackson Lee. It is big. Thank you.
Mr. Edmonds. That is just the authority. There is 25 miles,
as you know----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Coast line.
Mr. Edmonds. As the crow flies.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, I just have some follow-up.
I am trying to read that clock, but with distance and your
generosity--I can feel your generosity as I am sitting here.
Mr. McCaul. I didn't know you could feel that.
Mr. Edmonds. It has been there for a long time, as you
know.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I want to focus on Sheriff Garcia. I
happen to believe that personnel are key to terrorist
prevention or terrorist acts prevention, in addition to
technology with Mr. Edmonds. So I guess I am a fan of people
working with technology and keeping up with the latest
technology.
There is a possibility--and I don't think I am giving
anyone any ideas--that the huge cargo ships represent enormous
targets, either by bypassing the scrutiny when the ships were
loaded with some sort of uranium--some nuclear capacity that is
triggered once entering this port. The port, interestingly
enough, is located in a populated area. We should be very
clear. We thank the port for its hugeness, but it is--and it
has been a good neighbor, but it is in an area of residential
communities.
I want you to be pointed in your response about the
difficulty of shortchanging trained personnel where you are a
partner with Federal funding. Because my belief is that even in
this time of debt reduction, we should be prioritizing what we
have to spend money for, and I think homeland security is
important. I am going to ask my last two questions of Captain
Whitehead and retired Captain Diehl as just to say: What would
be the most important element that you would want this hearing
to know in terms of the prevention or the need for increased
security at this port that we take away and back to Washington?
But, Sheriff Garcia, if you can focus on the elements of
preventing a cargo ship coming in or a seaman determined to
perform a terroristic act who has managed to get through and be
a seaman on one of the many cargo ships that are coming in from
international waters.
Sheriff Garcia. Congresswoman, thank you for your question
and your leadership on this issue, because it is imperative
that I do get the message out that I need flesh and blood to
carry out my mission. Going back to the old adage that cops on
patrol do prevent crime, well, the deputies on patrol on water
and land, around the port, can prevent acts of terrorism or
criminal operations that can lead to terrorism.
So it is imperative, and as I have said it before at a
Congressional testimony that you and I were at, you know, I am
a fan of the COPS program. I am a fan of, you know, that we are
participating in a joint Federal operation here in patrolling
of the Port of Houston and the Houston Ship Channel. So, thus,
I do believe that justifies the need for the Federal Government
to support a local law enforcement agency like myself.
But also let me be very pointed. When the Sheriff's office
got into this relationship with the ship channel and the Port
of Houston in regards to being the lead agency, we made
commitments. We made commitments, and at this point because of
current economic situations, we are not living up to those
commitments. I want to live up to those commitments. I want to
exceed those expectations.
I want to be a good partner to my partners with the Coast
Guard and the CBP and other agencies, but I want to make sure
that we don't look back to days like today where we are making
it clear that we do need support to provide all of the presence
of patrol, water, land, monitoring of technologies, community
relationship building, all those issues that would work to keep
us safe but weren't able to do it because we didn't have the
salary dollars to do that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So cutting funds would have a negative
impact?
Sheriff Garcia. It would have a catastrophic impact.
Ms. Jackson Lee. On this port and its surrounding area?
Sheriff Garcia. Yes, yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Captain Whitehead, something vital we need
to focus on.
Captain Whitehead. I would say--I mentioned it earlier--the
partnerships are key and that is done through people.
Technology certainly enhances that and facilitates that, but
the people are key, as you mentioned, Congresswoman, to
exercise, train together, work together continuously. So those
people and interacting together and having the ability to, you
know, day in and day out work together I think are key to
preventing terrorist attacks here.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Captain.
Captain.
Captain Diehl. Good morning.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Good morning.
Captain Diehl. If you measured how many law enforcement
people are on the ship channel--let's say, the number is 1,000,
if you are going across DHS and you are going across the local
authorities and things like that. What you have the ability to
do is gather in what Congressman Green talked about, 250,000
people with TWIC cards, and that is the industry that works
here, and that speaks back to what you heard earlier is the
partnerships are key. As industry here, we realize if this
thing isn't safe, secure, and environmentally working, we don't
make a profit as industry. We want to keep cargo moving.
Speaking for the Ship Channel Security District, the
concerns that we have is we have stepped up and said, you know
what, we are going to help, we are going to supplement, we are
going to tell you what works without hindering our movement of
efficiency of cargo. It is a great dovetail between industry
and those that are protecting us, and that works.
What the fear is in preparing for this testimony was, okay,
with the budget cuts, they are going to start giving us less.
They are going to say, oh, you are a good model down there; you
guys can shoulder a little bit more of it. That wasn't really
the plan. The plan was to work together more to support them to
come to the table and help them.
So if we are going to be penalized with less port security
grants because we are actually assessing ourselves, we are
going to lose a lot of support among the ship channel security
industries that are saying, so we rogered up for, you know, in
some cases, to pay $250,000 a year in assessments to support
the security so that DHS can pull back? That is not going to go
over very well with the people I represent.
Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. In conclusion, let me just say that is a
very, very important point here, you establish yourself as a
model really for other ports to emulate, and in order to keep
up at that level of perfection, you need the resources that
might be missing because someone highlights and says, boy, they
are doing great; let's let them to do great with less.
I just want to put on the record I am constantly looking at
ways to improve the TWIC card process, and I know the Coast
Guard is working very hard. Captain, I am well aware of it. But
one of the things the TWIC card is supposed to do is provide
protection, but it also sometimes denies opportunity for work
for people who are in no way a terrorist threat. I would like
to see the TWIC card process streamlined, move faster, and for
the many men and some women who have asked about why their
process is 6 months, 1 year, sometimes we know that there is
some concerns that we have to engage. We need resources for
that to make sure the TWIC card----
My last final point is cargo inspection for the inbound
cargo carriers is crucial. We must keep the international
connection where cargo is being inspected at a high level so
that we can protect America as those ships are coming in, and I
am still not comfortable at where we are on all of the
inspections of major cargo coming into the United States, and
certainly the Houston port is one of those recipients.
So I think this is an important hearing, but I would offer
to say that I am looking at legislation around this issue, and
I would say to the Chairman that this is an important
bipartisan effort, and I look forward to working with this
committee as we go forward.
Mr. McCaul. I thank the gentlelady for recognizing my
generosity and being bipartisan. I think that we do have a debt
crisis, but we also have an obligation under the Constitution
to provide for a common defense as well. This committee will be
having an authorization bill I believe coming up in the fall.
That will give us an opportunity I think to address some of
these funding issues.
Sheriff, you and I have spoken about the COPS grant program
that I fully support, and I would hope the whole Harris County
delegation would join me in my letter supporting your efforts
for that.
The security district, the success of that is you moved
from No. 3 to No. 2 on the port security grant program. I think
that is certainly good news for Harris County.
Then, finally, I think as my colleague Mr. Green pointed
out, on the dredging issue--and I hope the gentlelady from
Houston will join me on this one as well--when we send $120
million to Washington and only get $20 million back----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Absolutely.
Mr. McCaul [continuing]. That is one of the largest ports
in the world with one of the biggest risks in the world.
When you have got the Panama Canal having 50 feet and we
only have 40 to 45 feet, that is going to be a serious problem
in terms of trade and the ships coming down the channel. So I
would hope that we have an opportunity I think to work together
on that effort as well in a bipartisan effort in the Harris
County delegation.
So, with that, I just want to thank all the witnesses.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Will the gentleman yield for a moment?
I just want to answer ``yes'' on the record to join you on
the dredging issue and on the COPS grant, and I ask for
bipartisan support as we come up on the appropriations for 2012
and the zeroing out----
There are those of us, bipartisan, by the way, Chairman
McCaul will be submitting an amendment to restore the COPS
funds for the upcoming fiscal year. I think if we can secure
the bipartisan support that we have secured before, everyone
will understand that the re-funding of the COPS grant is what
you call a maximizing of your investment with the trained law
enforcement officers that will benefit from it. So I would like
to call upon your support for the restoring of those funds for
2012.
Mr. McCaul. Yes, I would also like to point out, let's not
offset it with NASA.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Not at all.
Mr. McCaul. We have to find an offset, and we are not going
to hurt NASA.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Not at all.
Mr. McCaul. I know the gentlelady agrees with that as well.
The Chairman recognizes for a final statement the Ranking
Member.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thanks for having
this hearing. I learned a lot.
We are just days away from the 10th anniversary of 9/11.
This testimony today indicated that we are light years--we have
moved light years in our understanding and anticipating and
preparing for all kinds of terrorist threats.
What this hearing also underscores, too, is that, you know,
even with the ring of steel, even with the model programs, the
role of security is a Government role; and so as we come away
from this hearing, we understand our obligation, particularly
being Members of the Homeland Security Committee, to do this,
to protect our citizens, to make sure our commerce is clear and
protect our economy and our jobs.
We have an enormous obligation right here in this area, and
I have learned a lot from being here, and I want to thank
everyone for giving me that opportunity.
Mr. McCaul. We certainly appreciate you coming all the way
down from the beautiful bay area of Cape Cod and Nantucket to
beautiful Houston and the port.
With that, let me thank the witnesses and everybody for
being here today. I know we have some Coast Guard vessels out
standing, that we are going to take a little ride to the ship
channel.
Without objection, the hearing record will remain open for
10 days; and so, with that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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