[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THE LAST LINE OF DEFENSE: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL EFFORTS TO PREVENT
NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY,
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 26, 2011
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Serial No. 112-40
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND SECURITY
TECHNOLOGIES
Daniel E. Lungren, California, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Tim Walberg, Michigan, Vice Chair Laura Richardson, California
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Billy Long, Missouri William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Coley C. O'Brien, Staff Director
Alan Carroll, Subcommittee Clerk
Vacancy, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies................................................... 1
The Honorable Yvette D. Clarke, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies:
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
Mr. Warren M. Stern, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Mr. Carl S. Pavetto, Deputy Associate Administrator, Office of
Emergency Operations, National Nuclear Security Administration,
Department of Energy:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Richard Daddario, Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism,
New York City Police Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Mr. Mark Perez, Homeland Security Advisor, Florida Department of
Law Enforcement:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
Mr. David C. Maurer, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 26
Appendix
Questions From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren........................ 41
THE LAST LINE OF DEFENSE: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL EFFORTS TO PREVENT
NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
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Tuesday, July 26, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection,
and Security Technologies,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Daniel E. Lungren
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Lungren, Marino, Clarke,
Richardson, Richmond, and Keating.
Mr. Lungren. Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting
today to examine Federal, State, and local efforts to prevent
radiological and nuclear terrorism within the United States.
I would recognize myself for an opening statement. I
understand the Ranking Member will be here shortly. But with
the permission of the Minority side, we are going to go forward
at this time.
The Chairman is very pleased to have this hearing today. We
will have an opportunity for Members to ask questions after we
have had an opportunity to hear from our panelists.
The subject matter is a very serious one. The detonation of
a nuclear radiological device in a U.S. city is one of my
greatest fears. It would be a catastrophic event in the truest
sense of the word, causing enormous death and destruction, as
well as economic disruption.
Since 9/11 there is heightened concern the terrorist may
try to smuggle a radiological or nuclear materials or a nuclear
weapon into the United States, or acquire such materials within
our country. If terrorists smuggle nuclear weapons or materials
into the United States, there is no doubt they would attempt to
use them either to make an improvised nuclear device or a
radiological dispersal device or dirty bomb. The detonation of
such a device in an urban area could cause a tremendous number
of deaths, along with the destruction of long-term
contamination of buildings and critical infrastructure.
In 2005 the President called for the establishment of the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office in the Department of Homeland
Security. I responded by codifying this office in the SAFE Port
Act of 2006, which I introduced with then-Congresswoman Jane
Harman to address terrorist threats at our ports of entry.
The mission of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office was to
improve the Nation's capability to detect unauthorized attempts
to import, develop, or transport nuclear or radiological
materials for use against our Nation. DNDO was also directed to
develop in coordination with the Departments of Defense,
Energy, and State, and enhance global nuclear detection system
of radiation detection equipment and interdiction activities.
This system is called the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture.
I want to recognize the outstanding effort of Director
Stern in marshaling the first-ever strategic plan for the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture through the very
difficult interagency approval process. This office is
responsible for implementing the domestic portion of this
architecture at the U.S. border, and within the United States,
including the efforts of Federal, State, and local governments.
It is also responsible for developing and acquiring radiation
detection equipment to support the domestic efforts of DHS and
other Federal agencies.
Our hearing today will examine how our Nation's domestic
defenses under the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture will
detect and prevent such a nuclear event, and whether there are
Federal, State, and local gaps in the architecture.
Since it was established, this office has been examining
nuclear detection strategies along the usual pathways: Air,
land, and sea, for smuggling radiological or nuclear material.
Through these studies the office concluded that potential
smuggling pathways outside of traditional ports of entry, where
U.S. Government efforts have been focused, do represent
critical gaps in existing nuclear detection strategy. These
gaps include land, border areas between ports of entry,
international general aviation and small maritime crafts such
as recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels.
Reliable technology is essential to the overall success of
the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. Unfortunately, after
5 years of development, testing, and expense, we will be told
this morning the DNDO's premier, next generation radiation
detection technology, the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Monitor
Program has been terminated. The APS program started well
before Director Stern took office, has been very costly
failure, evidently, and left the office without the improved
radiation detection equipment needed to enhance the domestic
portion of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.
We look forward to hearing from our witnesses this morning
on how they will implement the domestic detection portion on
the GNDA, address identified gaps in the architecture--excuse
me--and what technology the office will pursue to replace ASP.
The gentlelady from New York is here. We will have an
opportunity for her opening statement.
At this time I would ask for unanimous consent to enter
State of California's testimony into the record, and their
radiological nuclear detection strategy and guide. Without
objection, so ordered.*
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* The information has been retained in committee files.
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All Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statements of Ranking Member Clarke and Ranking Member
Thompson follow:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke
July 26, 2011
Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing to discuss
developments in the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.
The enormous devastation that would result if terrorists use a
nuclear weapon or nuclear materials successfully in a terrorist act
requires us to do all we can to prevent them from entering or moving
through the United States.
The detection of special nuclear materials being smuggled or
otherwise transported into or through the United States is the main
mission of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and it has a
further function in the development of the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture. DNDO also plays a role in nuclear forensics and security
of radiological materials.
DNDO is one of the major directorates within the Department, and
the two key projects in the nuclear detection area are the deployment
of current generation Radiation Portal Monitors (RPM) and the
development of the next generations of detection devices. I understand
we are going to hear some new developments in today's testimony from
Mr. Stern, especially concerning the ASP program.
At the end of March of this year, DNDO met with its interagency
partners in the Department of Homeland Security and the Office of
National Intelligence, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and the
Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, and State, to conduct a joint
review of the performance goals identified in the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture Strategic Plan.
I commend Director Stern, for his energetic efforts to produce the
GNDA Strategy by the end of 2010, and for moving quickly on the Joint
Annual Interagency Review that was delivered to us just a few weeks
ago.
It was obvious we needed a strategy, and this subcommittee is glad
DNDO was able to put the very complex Interagency Review together
quickly and cooperatively.
DNDO now has responsibility for implementing the domestic portion
of the plan, and I am anxious to see progress on a rubber-meets-the-
road plan.
Additionally, I have noted that DNDO has revisited some past
assumptions that guided development of a global nuclear detection
strategy--particularly assumptions related to threat intelligence--
resulting in the concept that immobility is not a desirable
characteristic among nuclear and radiological detection devices.
It is important that this plan anticipate a new focus on State and
local resources, which become critical to providing ``surge''
capabilities in specific regions.
I understand that part of what we will hear today will give us
insight into this concept of ``surging large numbers of people and
devices,'' and communicating and synthesizing information very rapidly
in detecting nuclear material or weapons, and even more importantly,
that the Architecture Strategy involves reliance on a massive numbers
of State and local officials to address nuclear or radiological
threats.
My concern is how do we plan for a complex system like this when we
are anticipating a billion-dollar cut in the Department's budget, which
will drastically reduce the capabilities of State and local
authorities, who depend heavily on DHS grants, and are already stressed
under their own considerable State and local workloads.
I will be listening carefully to today's testimony for any
indication that planning for the GNDA is taking into consideration the
very real possibility that huge budget cuts proposed in this year's
appropriations would be approved in the House of Representatives.
Agencies, and especially DNDO, must be fully aware of what
implementation goals would look like under these proposed draconian
cuts to our National nuclear detection apparatus.
In conclusion, the production of the GNDA Strategic Plan has
afforded Members of the subcommittee and DHS leadership a new
opportunity to look at the ways DNDO could best fulfill its mission.
In order to prevent the unthinkable, we must deploy the best
technology, employ the best people, and do the best planning. I repeat,
in these times of severe budget cutbacks, our planning must reflect how
we propose to accomplish our National security goals in nuclear
detection with harshly restricted assistance to our State and local
partners.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
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Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
July 26, 2011
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on the
development of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.
I am pleased to see our witnesses today representing the Federal
components of this program, sitting next to the State and local folks
who will have responsibility for the day-to-day procedures of this
nuclear detection program.
We all know that our nuclear detection strategy and equipment at
the time of the 9/11 attacks was limited in its capability.
Radiation detectors could detect radiation but could not identify
isotopes.
Radiographic equipment could reveal dense objects, but it would be
difficult to pick out a small piece of Special Nuclear Material (SNM).
As technologies become more capable they can plug gaps in the
current architecture. For example, remote detection might offer a way
to monitor choke points in the United States that terrorists might pass
through in transporting weapons.
But we have to address more gaps in this portfolio. For example:
Several systems use helium-3 tubes for neutron detection, yet the
supply is limited.
Other gaps we need to fill include sensors that can detect Special
Nuclear Materials at long range, and sensors that can operate in
isolated areas.
Systems now under development have the potential to reduce false
positives, speed the flow of commerce, and reduce false negatives--all
of which improve security.
Congress has appropriated billions of dollars to deploy available
systems, and to support R&D on advanced technologies.
These refinements can make future technologies more effective, and
has created an R&D pipeline that is intended to generate a steady
stream of new technologies and systems.
But the engine of this pipeline is proper testing and certification
of these cutting-edge technologies. We have seen too many reports about
detection technologies being deployed without proper testing and
certification.
This committee needs to know how DNDO's Global Architecture will
relate to the Department's R&D process and any subsequent deployment of
new technologies.
It is imperative that the Secretary makes sure there is no more
wasted money spent on devices that cannot be tested and certified to
keep our citizens safe.
However, given the billion-dollar cut to DHS's budget being
considered in this year's appropriations, an emphasis must also be
placed on planning for the worst.
The hundreds of millions of dollars in cuts to grants for State and
local authorities will, without a doubt, affect their ability to fully
participate in the nuclear detection architecture and respond
accordingly.
Threats from terrorism persist and continue to evolve, and our
nuclear detection architecture must reflect flexibility and the ability
to respond quickly in its capabilities.
Mr. Chairman, I look forward to today's testimony, and I yield
back.
Mr. Lungren. We are pleased to have a very distinguished
panel of witnesses before us on this important topic.
Warren Stern, who was appointed by the President to lead
the Department of Homeland Security Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office in August 2010. In this position he is responsible for
countering nuclear and radiological terrorism, as well as
detecting nuclear and radiological threats and advancing
Federal capabilities for nuclear forensics.
Prior to joining the office, Mr. Stern served as the head
of the International Atomic Energy Agency's Instant and
Emergency Center from August 2006 to March 2010. He began his
career in 1985 at the Central Intelligence Agency, then serving
as the senior technical advisor to the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency. Later served in the office of Senator
Hillary Clinton as the Department of State's senior coordinator
for nuclear safety and deputy director of the Office of Nuclear
Energy, Safety, and Security.
Carl Pavetto serves as deputy associate administrator for
the Emergency Operations at the Department of Energy National
Nuclear Security Administration.
Prior to current position he spent 20 years in Federal
service at the United States Department of the Interior
National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, United
States Army, and United States Environmental Protection Agency.
In addition to his Federal Governmental experience he has
served as bureau chief of the Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection where he was in charge of air
pollution and radiation control programs.
Richard Daddario, a former assistant United States attorney
is New York City Police Department's deputy commissioner for
counterterrorism. Mr. Daddario is responsible for the NYPD's
Joint Terrorism Taskforce, the department's counterterrorism
training and programs, including lower Manhattan and midtown
Manhattan security initiatives and the Department of Homeland
Security's funded, Securing the Cities initiative. As assistant
United States attorney for the southern district of New York
since 1996, Mr. Daddario was the supervising or lead
prosecutor, investigation prosecution to various crimes
including domestic and international terrorism and terrorists'
financing cases.
Prior to joining the U.S. Justice Department, Mr. Daddario
served as the first deputy commissioner of the New York City
Department of Investigation. Before that as chief counsel at
the New York State Commission of Investigation. Early in his
career he served as assistant counsel of the U.S. House of
Representatives Ethics Committee.
Mark Perez serves as special agent in charge of the Florida
Department of Law Enforcement's Investigations and Forensic
Science Program Office. The office conducts independent and
multijurisdictional investigations, coordinates and directs
counterterrorism efforts for the State of Florida, and works to
implement Florida's domestic security strategy.
Mr. Perez also serves as Florida's Homeland Security
advisor, and is a member of the Florida Department of Law
Enforcement's Executive Policy Board. He has held various
positions while employed in the department. He began his career
as a law enforcement officer with the city of Winter Park,
Florida.
David Maurer is a director of the U.S. Government
Accountability Office Homeland Security and Justice team where
he leads GAO's work reviewing DHS and DOJ management issues.
His recent work in these areas include DHS management
integration, the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, Secret
Service financial management, DOJ grant management and Federal
prison system, and assessment of technologies for detecting
explosives in the passenger rail environment.
Mr. Maurer has previously worked as an acting director of
GAO's Natural Resources and Environmental team where he managed
work assessing U.S. global nuclear detection programs, and
managed work for GAO's International Affairs and Trade team,
where he reviewed U.S. efforts to combat international
terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as
well as U.S. assistance to the former Soviet Union,
peacekeeping in the Balkans, and several other international
issues. He was previously detailed to the House Committee on
Appropriations.
We thank all of you for being here. Under our rules we
would ask you to confine your comments to approximately 5
minutes. We will take your written testimony, and in each case
will be made a part of the record.
So, we will begin with Director Stern.
STATEMENT OF WARREN M. STERN, DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR
DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Stern. Good morning, Chairman Lungren, distinguished
Members of the subcommittee. I very much appreciate the
opportunity to testify before you today, to answer your
questions and to discuss any issues you wish to discuss. I am
particularly pleased that I am joined by my counterpart from
the General Accountability Office, from the great State of
Florida, the great city of New York, and of course the
Department of Energy, as we all work together in the field of
trying to make America safer.
It has been a year since I have started DNDO, and
approximately a year since I testified before you last. So, I
will use my 5 minutes to describe what we at DNDO have
accomplished in the past year. I want to discuss what we have
achieved; not just what is in process, but what we have
actually completed.
As you know, the architecture is a core element of what
DNDO is tasked with completing. So I am very pleased, and as
you mentioned it, this year by the end--within the past year,
by the end of last year we were able to complete an interagency
draft of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Strategic
Plan.
I recall during my last testimony that this was a
particular issue the committee wanted completed, and by the end
of last year, as we had promised, we were able to deliver this
document, agreed, again, among the seven relevant departments
to you.
In addition, just a few months ago, we completed our
assessment of the Global Architecture, and were able to deliver
to Congress our joint interagency review. Again, cleared and
coordinated among the seven departments that are involved in
the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. I am very pleased
that we were able to achieve this in the past 12 months.
In addition, we have developed new and innovative devices
in the past year. We have just finished and finalized two
handheld systems, both of them very advanced.
One is the advanced operation handheld device, which will
be available for special teams, specialized teams at the Coast
Guard and CBP. It is a very advanced device.
The second is our next generation handheld devices we call
the RAD-Seeker. This device uses a novel material that did not
exist until just several years ago. A very improved algorithm;
it is incredibly light and has much lower maintenance than the
existing system.
I am also pleased that people in the field are very much
waiting for this device to be rolled out. Our final large-scale
decision procurement will occur on this Thursday. We hope to
have these devices rolled out, which are more efficient and
more effective than the current generation of systems.
When I first testified before you last time I spoke a lot
about State and locals. A core part of our mission is to
improve the interior detection capability. In the interior the
core focus must be on supporting State and locals.
Consequently, I am very pleased that in the past year the
administration has reasserted its support for the STC, the
Securing the Cities program. As you know, New York is the one
city within the Securing the Cities program and we look forward
to expanding the program to an additional city next year.
This year, within the STC program New York held, with our
support, a major operational exercise that brought together
players throughout the field as well as Federal authorities. We
learned a lot through this exercise, and it will help us move
forward. I will not belabor the STC program because I imagine
Commissioner Daddario, who is the key leader in that area will
have more to say.
But I would like to point out in the State and local area
that one thing--one additional thing we have is create an
executive steering council. It is essential in developing the
domestic architecture that State and locals learn from each
other, that we in the Federal Government learn from State and
locals, and that State and locals learn from us, and are
integrated into the DHS, DNDO, and overall Federal structure.
So I have created a group called the Executive Steering Council
of senior members of State and locals so this type of exchange
could happen. We had our first meeting 3--2 months ago, which
was very useful and effective.
Finally, in my initial testimony, I must touch on the ASP,
the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal. I am very pleased that we as
a Department and as a Government have just recently made a
final decision on the pathway for the ASP program.
As you indicated, the ASP will not proceed as originally
envisioned. We will not seek certification or a large-scale
deployment of the ASP. We will deploy the existing systems. We
will learn from those systems. We will compensate for the
absence of the ASP with this new advanced handheld, which is
much cheaper. We will move over time to the approach
recommended by the National Academies, the technical approach
recommended by the National Academy of Science. We will look at
the commercial marketplace for devices that can help compensate
for the ASP moving forward.
In conclusion, in the year that I have been at DNDO we have
made substantial progress in enhancing America's ability to
prevent nuclear terrorism. I have listed several specific
examples this morning. Due to time limitations, I cannot go on.
But I would like to mention that we have made substantial
progress and substantial specific accomplishments in the area
of standards setting in the area of helium-3 replacements, in
the area of research and development, and in the area of
nuclear forensics. I would be happy to review those
developments in the question-and-answer period.
Looking to the future, we will build on these successes by
defining a new architecture, one that is based on surging
assets and that will integrate Federal, State, and local
capabilities.
Thank you, Chairman Lungren and distinguished Members of
the subcommittee. Again, I very much am honored by the
opportunity to speak before you today, and I am happy to answer
any questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Stern follows:]
Prepared Statement of Warren M. Stern
July 26, 2011
Good afternoon Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. As Director of the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO), I am pleased to testify today with distinguished
colleagues to discuss nuclear detection. Over the past year, DNDO has
made great strides in working with our partners and coordinating
development of a global nuclear detection architecture (GNDA). I will
also talk about the challenges we face at DNDO and our path forward for
enhancing and implementing the architecture domestically.
With assistance and participation from a variety of U.S. Government
(USG) departments and agencies, DNDO synchronizes and integrates
interagency efforts to develop technical nuclear detection
capabilities, measure detector system performance, ensure effective
response to detection alarms, advance and integrate nuclear forensics
efforts, and conduct transformational research and development for
advanced detection technologies. Countering nuclear terrorism is a
whole-of-government challenge, and DNDO works with Federal, State,
local, Tribal, international, and private sector partners to fulfill
this mission. Working with partners from across the administration,
including the Departments of Energy (DOE), State (DOS), Defense (DOD),
Justice (DOJ), the intelligence community (IC), and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC), DNDO also coordinates the development of
GNDA.
GNDA STRATEGIC PLAN AND JOINT INTERAGENCY ANNUAL REVIEW
In December 2010, DNDO delivered the GNDA Strategic Plan to
Congress. This interagency product is designed to guide the Nation's
nuclear terrorism detection capacity and capability development over
the next 5 years.
Recently, DNDO submitted the report on the ``Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture Joint Annual Interagency Review 2011'' (2011
GNDA Annual Report) to Congress. The 2011 report includes information
about the multiple USG programs that collectively seek to prevent
nuclear or radiological terrorism against the United States by means of
detection, analysis, and reporting on nuclear or radiological materials
out of regulatory control.\1\ This report fulfills a requirement of
Section 1907 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 101 et
seq.) as added by Section 1103 of the ``Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007'' (Pub. L. 110-53), which mandates a
Joint Annual Interagency Review of the GNDA. The report was jointly
prepared by interagency partners including DOD, DOS, DOE, and DOJ, the
Office of Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), and the NRC.
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\1\ The term ``out of regulatory control'' refers to materials that
are being imported, possessed, stored, transported, developed, or used
without authorization by the appropriate regulatory authority, either
inadvertently or deliberately.
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The Annual Report has enhancements in terms of structure and
content to provide additional insight into the development of the GNDA
as well as more analytical rigor. The revised definition of the GNDA
and the roles and responsibilities specified for each department or
agency in the GNDA Strategic Plan are reflected in this year's report.
Further, this report reflects a more thorough analysis and review of
the architecture. The report is better focused and is based on the GNDA
boundaries defined in the strategic plan. The Annual Report contains
extensive details and, for the first time, includes recommendations
that highlight areas where there currently are opportunities to
strengthen the GNDA.
I envision both the Strategic Plan and the Annual Report as part of
a series of projects that help to define the GNDA. The Strategic Plan
established the USG definition of the GNDA and established a framework
for nuclear detection efforts. In the Annual Report, departments and
agencies were asked to specifically report on the performance goals
identified in the GNDA Strategic Plan. Building upon these foundational
documents and internalizing the recommendations will pave the way for
our continued implementation of the architecture.
THE DOMESTIC ARCHITECTURE
DNDO is responsible for coordinating the GNDA and implementing, by
working with operational partners, the domestic portion of the GNDA.
On-going work on the GNDA emphasizes mobile or agile detection
components, which will increase our capability to respond to escalated
threat levels by focusing detection assets on effective interdiction.
The architecture must account for physical and technical limitation in
order to achieve the best strategies, systems, and operations for
nuclear detection. We will use existing capabilities and a variety of
operations and assets at the Federal, State, local, and Tribal levels
to surge our radiological and nuclear detection abilities in a
coordinated fashion in response to suspected threats. We have many
programs, assets, and capabilities that contribute to surge-related,
radiological, and nuclear detection response activities, and we must
work to enhance coordination and implementation mechanisms to ensure
that we make the best use of all available personnel, equipment, and
knowledge. A more flexible architecture will strategically bring
together the assets and capabilities for detection and search
operations into a unified effort for the domestic prevention of
radiological and nuclear terrorism.
PORTS OF ENTRY
Our current architecture reflects a layered defense with an
emphasis on static systems. DHS has made considerable progress at the
border to provide comprehensive radiation detection capabilities with
the majority of resources concentrated at ports of entry (POEs). The
Department has focused on these authorized pathways at POEs,
underscored by Section 121 of the SAFE Port Act, which requires that
``all containers entering the United States through the 22 ports
through which the greatest volume of containers enter the United States
by vessel shall be scanned for radiation.'' A key consideration is the
need to effectively detect threats without impeding the flow of
commerce across the border.
When DNDO was founded in 2005, there were a total of 552 radiation
portal monitors (RPMs) at our land and seaports of entry. Today, there
are a total of 1,462 RPMs. Our on-going work with U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) to facilitate container security has resulted
in the scanning of over 99 percent of all incoming containerized cargo
for radiological and nuclear threats at our land and seaports of entry.
As this work has matured over the last few years, DNDO has shifted its
focus to place a greater emphasis on our land borders between POEs, as
well as maritime and air pathways, and all pathways within our borders.
ADVANCED SPECTROSCOPIC PORTAL (ASP)
The ASP Program was established in 2004 to improve radiation and
nuclear detection capabilities at our seaports and land border
crossings and to address technical deficiencies in the existing
radiation portal program. Over the years, there have been many
challenges to the ASP program. In February 2010, the then Acting
Director of DNDO briefed Congress that we were limiting consideration
of certification of the ASP program to secondary scanning rather than
primary scanning due to technical challenges and cost.
Since then, there have been several important developments. The
most recent field validation revealed that the original design
specification for ASP, jointly developed by DNDO and CBP in 2007, does
not adequately reflect the operational needs in the field, particularly
truck speeds in secondary inspection. In addition, there are now
competing commercially-available portal radiation detection systems
that were not on the market when the ASP program began.
In order to most effectively strengthen radiological and nuclear
detection capabilities, DHS has concluded that the best course of
action is to not seek certification of the ASP system for full
deployment in either primary or secondary inspections. At my
recommendation and with concurrence from the Department's Acquisition
Review Board, Secretary Napolitano has directed DNDO and CBP to end the
ASP program as originally conceived and to instead utilize 13 of the
existing ASP systems at select ports of entry to facilitate operational
familiarity with the systems and gather data to support a future
acquisition program that will include competition from commercially-
available alternatives.
Secretary Napolitano has directed DNDO and CBP to work with the
Office of Management and Budget and the appropriations subcommittees to
make recommendations on redeploying the requested fiscal year 2012
resources, prioritizing handheld detection and identification systems.
CBP will also apply more rigorous concepts of operation for use in
secondary inspections with handheld detectors, as recommended by the
National Academies of Sciences.
Deploying advanced detection and identification systems that
provide security at our ports while facilitating commerce remains an
important objective. We will continue to pursue this in the most cost-
effective way possible and in the context of the overall nuclear
detection architecture. We are confident that this plan will result a
better linkage between operations and technology.
IMPLEMENTING A DOMESTIC ARCHITECTURE
Beyond the ASP program, DNDO is making significant progress in
implementing an operational architecture for threat detection. DNDO has
procured thousands of personal radiation detectors (PRDs), radiological
isotope identification devices (RIIDs), and backpack detectors for CBP,
United States Coast Guard (USCG), Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), and State, local, and Tribal law enforcement
across the country to scan cars, trucks, and other items and
conveyances for the presence of radiological and nuclear materials. All
TSA Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams and USCG
teams are now equipped with radiation detection capabilities, including
USCG personnel specifically trained to board and search vessels. DNDO
has also made radiological and nuclear detection training available to
over 15,000 State and local officers and first responders.
We have recently reached an important milestone in the development
of the next generation human-portable systems and will be deploying an
advanced handheld technology to support CBP, USCG, TSA, and other
emergency response officials on the front lines. Handheld detectors
have many applications and are used by nearly all operators, providing
radiological and nuclear detection and identification capabilities.
Following the success of our advanced handheld, the small area search
handheld system, RadSeeker, is scheduled for production and deployment
this year. This next-generation handheld uses a novel detection
material and is lightweight, enhancing detection capabilities and
providing for operational ease of use. Our work will continue to
enhance our Federal capabilities and build on these efforts so that the
pieces are linked together and can respond as needed. The fiscal year
2012 budget includes $20 million to procure human portable radiation
detection equipment including next-generation devices that provide
enhanced detection capability.
As I have said previously, State and local law enforcement and
public safety officials are our operational partners on the front lines
of responding to threats. DNDO has received an increasing number of
requests from these partners to assist them in assessing their extant
capabilities and operations, which supports our emphasis on
implementing the domestic architecture. Accordingly, DNDO will increase
the number of engagements with these partners to conduct covert
testing.
The President's fiscal year 2012 budget request includes funding
for a Radiological and Nuclear Challenge that will be initiated to
provide a forum for information sharing among the Federal, State,
local, and Tribal stakeholders, as well as a competition within the
radiological and nuclear detection community. We will invite industry
to provide product capability demonstrations, which will increase
awareness of detection products and how operators use these systems.
The budget request also includes investments for the upgrade of
three Mobile Detection Deployment Units (MDDU) systems to a larger
equipment set. DNDO maintains five MDDU systems that provide a surge
capability that can be readily deployed to support radiological and
nuclear detection operations for special events and intelligence-driven
searches. The systems offer a radiological and nuclear detection
package that can be utilized by a myriad of State and local public
safety and Federal agencies and provide a force multiplier capability
to USG Federal assets for special events or in response to threats.
The President's fiscal year 2012 budget request also proposes
expanding the Securing the Cities (STC) initiative to one additional
urban area, designed to enhance the Nation's ability to detect and
prevent a radiological or nuclear attack in the highest-risk cities, to
include additional Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) jurisdictions
while continuing to support efforts in the New York City region.
Expanding this program will provide DNDO assistance to more regional
partners for implementing self-supported sustainment of capabilities
and real-time sharing of data from fixed, mobile, maritime, and human-
portable radiation detection systems. Through STC, nearly 11,000
personnel in the region have been trained in radiological and nuclear
detection operations and nearly 6,000 pieces of radiological detection
equipment have been deployed. In April 2011, DNDO and the New York
Police Department (NYPD) collaborated with other STC partners to
conduct a very successful, full-scale exercise in the New York City
region to assess the ability of STC partners to detect radiological and
nuclear materials and deploy personnel, equipment, and special units in
accordance with established protocols and in response to threat-based
intelligence.
To further support State, local, and Tribal jurisdictions to
identify and develop targeted levels of radiological and nuclear
detection capability based on risk factors and increased likelihood of
encountering illicit material, DNDO has developed a Preventive
Radiological and Nuclear Detection (PRND) Capability Development
Framework (CDF). The PRND CDF aids State, local, and Tribal
jurisdictions in identifying their current levels of capability as well
as the targeted level of PRND capability that can then be used to
support grant applications. The framework was developed by DNDO with
the support of Federal, State, and local subject matter experts.
Working with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), DNDO
has finalized Preventive Radiological/Nuclear Detection (PRND) National
Incident Management System (NIMS) Resource Type Definitions. This
foundational National preparedness guidance supports our State, local,
and Tribal partners, enabling them to build their own radiological and
nuclear detection capabilities. PRND NIMS Resource Typing provides a
common definition of detection resources, including teams, equipment,
and personnel, to assist them in their planning and operations. This
initiative will support the creation of PRND programs and help identify
capability gaps, while increasing the effectiveness of interstate
mutual aid requests for special events or surge operations.
DNDO's outreach also includes a State and Local Stakeholder Working
Group with 25 States and territories meeting quarterly to bring the
Nation's radiological and nuclear detection community together, inform
participants on activities within DNDO and the nuclear detection
community, and obtain feedback on DNDO's programs and initiatives. DNDO
has conducted Nation-wide radiological and nuclear detection
situational awareness briefings with 52 UASI regions and metropolitan
area emergency responder and law enforcement agencies. This spring I
took DNDO's engagement one step further by establishing a State and
local Executive Steering Council. In conjunction with our State and
Local Stakeholder Working Group meetings, I invited State and local
leadership to meet with me personally and discuss strategic issues
related to radiological and nuclear detection programs, as well as
challenges and areas for future collaboration. The response to this
Executive Steering Council was very positive and leaders were able to
share details about their efforts and identify issues for partnerships,
as well as learn about the full range of DNDO activities that could
benefit their jurisdictions. DNDO is particularly interested in not
only developing capability through equipment, training, and program
assistance, but also making available the best and most reliable
information on equipment, practices, and technical expertise.
To address detection issues in the maritime pathway, DNDO has done
significant work with Federal, State, and local partners. We are
currently collaborating with the USCG and CBP Office of Air and Marine
to develop small vessel standoff radiation detection capabilities. USCG
detailees to DNDO are collaborating with DNDO employees and the
Homeland Security Studies & Analysis Institute to determine the best
system concept that fits the end user requirements. Through the
development of strong collaborative relationships with end-users and
the use of rigorous acquisition processes, we are creating the
conditions to deliver new capabilities to prevent nuclear terrorism.
DNDO has also recently completed the West Coast Maritime Pilot in
Puget Sound and San Diego. The pilot was coordinated through each of
the regions' Area Maritime Security Committees and successfully
developed and deployed adaptable small vessel detection capabilities
that are able to surge deployed assets when necessary. We are currently
in process of designing a maritime-focused program assistance mechanism
to assist other port areas in developing similar capabilities.
technology and crosscutting efforts to support the architecture
To fulfill its mandate to develop, acquire, and support the
deployment of radiological and nuclear detection technologies, DNDO has
embarked on ambitious research and development programs. Since its
inception, DNDO has initiated more than 250 research and development
projects with National laboratory, academic, and industrial partners to
advance detection technologies. These research and development projects
examine a variety of important areas that contribute to new and
improved detection capabilities to better support our front-line
operations.
Years before the recent helium-3 shortage was identified, DNDO was
exploring options for better, more cost-effective alternatives for
neutron detection. DNDO is currently independently testing eight
different alternative technologies for neutron detection at the Nevada
National Security Site. These systems reflect advancements in
developing neutron detectors that do not use helium-3 gas, which are
crucial in mitigating the current world-wide helium-3 shortfall. By
working with several vendors simultaneously to find a commercial
solution to an alternative technology to helium-3-based neutron
detectors, DNDO is encouraging competition which will lead to cost
reductions, increased availability, and an acceleration of the
replacement detectors to the commercial market.
Further out on the horizon, DNDO's research and development
programs have identified approximately 14 different technology
approaches in the pipeline that could be used as alternatives to
helium-3, including those based on boron or lithium. Some of these
technologies have been accelerated and have advanced to a point where
they can be tested with other, more near-term alternative neutron
detection technologies.
Over the years, DNDO's test program has grown and matured. To date,
DNDO has conducted more than 50 separate test and evaluation campaigns
at over 20 experimental and operational venues. These test campaigns
were planned and executed with interagency partners using rigorous,
reproducible, peer-reviewed processes. Tested detection systems include
pagers, handhelds, portals, backpacks, mobiles, boat- and spreader bar-
mounted detectors, and next generation radiography technologies. The
results from DNDO's test campaigns have informed Federal, State, local,
and Tribal operational users on the technical and operational
performance of radiological and nuclear detection systems, allowing
them to select the most suitable equipment and effective concepts of
operations to keep the Nation safe from nuclear terrorist threats.
Historically, we have focused on developing technology and
detection systems to address identified needs. Today, DNDO is
transitioning to a new approach to address detection needs, focusing on
commercially developed devices, developing Government standards, and
testing to those standards. Because industry has repeatedly
demonstrated the ability to rapidly improve detection technologies, we
have an opportunity to shift our approach to one that is more flexible
and adaptable and looks to the private sector--as well as other DHS
components and other Government agencies--to enhance existing products
and develop new devices. This technical transition will also include a
new approach at the systems level, which defines strategic interfaces
at various points in the detector/system architecture, allowing system
upgrades without wholesale changes. Utilizing a ``commercial first''
approach, we intend to leverage the important industry-led innovations
and developments.
We also have supported the development, publication, and adoption
of National consensus standards for radiation detection equipment.
Several such standards now exist for use in homeland security. In 2007,
DNDO collaborated with the National Institute of Standards and
Technology to conduct a review of all National and international
consensus standards for preventive radiological and nuclear detection
systems. This survey information was used to support the formation of
an interagency working group to draft Government-unique technical
capability standards (TCS) in April 2008. I am very pleased that we are
currently finalizing the TCS for handheld systems. We are also
coordinating two additional draft standards with the interagency.
The DNDO Graduated Radiological/Nuclear Detector Evaluation and
Reporting (GRaDERSM) Program is using available standards to
test and evaluate commercially developed systems. GRaDERSM
is a conformity assessment program that provides independent standards
compliance information for selected radiation detection equipment. The
program has created the infrastructure for voluntary, vendor testing of
commercial off-the-shelf radiological/nuclear detection equipment by
independent, accredited laboratories against National consensus
standards and Government-unique TCS. Final test results for our initial
GRaDERSM testing are expected this month. We anticipate that
the GRaDERSM Evaluated Equipment List--which is supported by
the FEMA's guidance for compliance in relation to their grants
program--will enable Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial
agencies to make more-informed radiological/nuclear detector
procurement decisions. Since we anticipate further testing facilitated
through the GRaDERSM program will be funded by the
technology vendors, the President's fiscal year 2012 budget request
includes minimal funding for initiating phase 2 of the program, which
will evaluate systems against Government TCS and maintain the
GRaDERSM Evaluated Equipment List. GRaDERSM
supports both DNDO's work with industry, by encouraging commercial
development of products that can be tested to published standards, as
well as by enhancing our outreach and engagement with State and local
partners who benefit from being able to access the verified equipment
performance reports.
Beyond our work with DHS Component and State and local partners,
DNDO's testing expertise and experience is sought by interagency
partners, such as DOE and DOD, and international partners such as the
United Kingdom, Canada, Israel, the European Union, and the
International Atomic Energy Agency. DNDO has an active partnership with
the European Commission's Joint Research Center to conduct the Illicit
Trafficking Radioactive Assessment Program+10 (ITRAP+10), an ambitious
3-year test program to evaluate nine classes of radiological/nuclear
detection systems in U.S. and European test facilities.
PATH FORWARD
Nearly a year into my tenure at DNDO, I feel we have accomplished
much and are on track to develop and implement an architecture that
will be better-able to address operational detection requirements. Our
approach at DNDO is evolving at every level to be more rigorous while
being more responsive to the needs of operators and inclusive of all
technologies that may improve capabilities. We are working with the IC
including DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis to develop
realistic threat scenarios that we can then map to existing and future
capabilities that we may need in order to appropriately respond to
various situations. This will guide our future development of the GNDA
and provide us with a framework for developing metrics that will
provide insight into the effectiveness of our assets and capabilities
for addressing threats. This work will help us better coordinate and
implement a nuclear detection architecture that integrates Federal,
State, and local efforts.
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, I thank you for this
opportunity to discuss the nuclear detection architecture and the
progress of DNDO. I am happy to answer any questions the subcommittee
may have.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Stern.
Before we continue with the other panelists, my Ranking
Member and Ranking Member of the subcommittee is present. I
would just like to give her a chance for any statement she
would like to make.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
the hearing to discuss developments in the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture.
Good morning to our panelists.
The enormous devastation that would result if terrorists
use a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials successfully in a
terrorist act requires us to do all we can to prevent them from
entering or moving through the United States. The detection of
special nuclear materials being smuggled or otherwise
transported into or through the United States is the main
mission of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DNDO, and it
has a further function in the development of the development of
the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.
DNDO also plays a role in nuclear forensics and security of
radiological materials. DNDO was one of the major directorates
within the Department, and the two key projects in the nuclear
diction area are the deployment of current generation radiation
portal monitors, RPM, and the development of the next
generations of detection devices.
I understand we are going to hear some new developments in
today's testimony from Mr. Stern, which we just heard,
especially concerning the ASP program. I will have a couple
questions about that a little bit later.
At the end of March of this year DNDO met with its
interagency partners in the Department of Homeland Security and
the Office of National Intelligence, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission, the Departments of Defense, Energy, Justice, and
State to conduct a joint review of the performance goals
identified in the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
Strategic Plan. I commend Director Stern for his energetic
efforts to produce the GNDA Strategic Strategy--excuse me--by
the end of 2010, and for moving quickly on the joint annual
interagency review that was delivered to us just a few weeks
ago.
It was obvious we needed a strategy, and this subcommittee
was glad DNDO was able to put the very complex interagency
review together quickly and cooperatively. DNDO now has
responsibility for implementing the domestic portion of the
plan, and I am anxious to see progress on the rubber-meets-the-
road plan.
Additionally, I have noted that DNDO has revisited some
past assumptions that guided development of a global nuclear
detection strategy, particularly assumptions related to threat
intelligence resulting in the concept in immobility is not a
desirable characteristic among nuclear and radiological
detection devices. It is important that this plan anticipate a
new focus on State and local resources, which become critical
to providing surge capabilities in specific regions.
I understand that part of what we will hear today will give
us insight into this concept of surging large number of people
and devices, and communicating and synthesizing information
very rapidly, and detecting nuclear material or weapons, and
even more importantly, that the architecture strategy involves
reliance on massive numbers of State and local officials to
address nuclear or radiological threats.
My concern is how do we plan for a complex system like this
when we are anticipating a billion-dollar cut in the
Department's budget, which will drastically reduce the
capabilities of State and local authorities who depend heavily
on DHS grants, and are already stressed under their own
considerable State and local workloads?
I will be listening carefully to today's testimony for any
indication that planning for the GNDA is taking into
consideration the very real possibility that huge budget cuts
proposed in this year's appropriations would be approved in the
House of Representatives. Agencies, and especially DNDO, must
be fully aware of what implementation goals would look like
under these proposed Draconian cuts to our National nuclear
detection apparatus.
In conclusion, the production of the GNDA Strategic Plan
has afforded Members of the subcommittee and DHS leadership a
new opportunity to look at the way DNDO could best fulfill its
mission. In order to prevent the unthinkable, we must deploy
the best technology, employ the best people and do the best
planning. I repeat, in these times of severe budget cutbacks,
our planning must reflect how we propose to accomplish our
National security goals in nuclear detection with harshly
restricted assistance to our State and local partners.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much for your statement.
Now we will continue with the panel. We now recognize Mr.
Pavetto to testify.
STATEMENT OF CARL S. PAVETTO, DEPUTY ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR,
OFFICE OF EMERGENCY OPERATIONS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. Pavetto. Good morning, Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member
Clarke, and Members of the subcommittee. My name is Carl
Pavetto, and I am the deputy associate administrator for the
U.S. Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security
Administration. I am the deputy for the Office of Emergency
Operations.
First I would like to express my sincere appreciation for
the opportunity to speak to you today regarding the
contribution that DOE makes in preventing domestic radiological
and nuclear terrorist attacks through the conduct of detection
and search operations.
As you may know, the National Nuclear Security
Administration was established by Congress in 2000 as a
semiautonomous entity within DOE. The NNSA maintains the
safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons
stockpile. We accelerate efforts to reduce the global threat
posed by nuclear proliferation and terrorism. We provide safe
and effective nuclear propulsion systems for the U.S. Navy.
We also possess robust technical capabilities, and support
the world's top professional scientists, engineers, and other
leading nuclear experts that are resident in our National
laboratories. Within NNSA and the Office of Emergency
Operations we draw on these experts in order to execute our
mission and to maintain the U.S. Government's Federal response
capabilities for radiological consequence management, render-
safe, and the purpose of today's hearing, radiological and
nuclear detection and search.
The U.S. Government strategy for interdicting radiological
or nuclear materials or devices involves a multifaceted and
multiagency cooperative approach. To maintain our Nation's
capability to respond to specific nuclear and radiological
threats, staff from my office, the Office of Emergency
Operations, work cooperatively with the Departments of Homeland
Security and the FBI, the Department of Defense, specifically
DNDO, to develop the interagency domestic radiological nuclear
search operations plan, or the RNSOP.
This plan was a product of the Countering Nuclear Terrorism
Interagency Planning Committee and was approved by the National
security staff on May 27 of this year. Radiological and nuclear
search is a law enforcement function of the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture. It is led by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation. The plan defines a targeted response that
increases the probability for interdicting a credible
radiological or nuclear threat to prevent an attack within the
United States.
As the technical lead for the RNSOP and support of FBI as
the lead agency, personnel from my office support the bureau by
providing advanced technical capabilities needed to support
evaluation of the credibility of the threat and for planning
and conducting search operations in support of investigative or
tactical objectives. Specifically, our teams are ready to
respond and provide the technical expertise needed.
We--in addition we provide support for the Department of
Homeland Security's DNDO as it carries out its responsibilities
for implementation of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
or GNDA in two aspects. One is the day-to-day operations, the
steady state preventative radiological nuclear detection. The
other is the enhanced steady-state, and if there is an actual
terrorist threat or potential terrorist threat.
During the steady-state operations we provide technical
experts to our partners and lead agencies, including DNDO, to
develop and provide training to State and local first
responders. We work with DNDO in providing radiological and
nuclear detection and search training to a variety of groups,
in particular the National Guard civil support teams to enhance
the capability and have the--direct the resources to meet the
threat.
For the enhanced steady-state we support planning efforts
and detection operations associated with mass public gatherings
such as National Special Security Events, and we rely primarily
on our radiological assistance program teams, which are spread
throughout the country. These units are well-trained and
equipped to--with the search and detection capabilities.
I am pleased to report the roles and responsibilities of
DNDO--I am sorry, of NNSA in the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture, and that they are through the work led by Mr.
Stern. We are much--the responsibilities are much clearly--much
more clearly defined than before. We continue to make progress,
and are working to further clarify agency roles and
responsibilities.
It is our goal to continue to bring our unique technical
capabilities to bear to address radiological and nuclear
threats, and increase risk. Our top priority is to develop and
enhance our Federal capabilities with the architecture and
strategies.
Once again, thank you, Chairman Lungren and Ranking Member
Clarke and Members of the subcommittee for giving me this
opportunity. I look forward to answering any questions you may
have.
[The statement of Mr. Pavetto follows:]
Prepared Statement of Carl S. Pavetto
July 26, 2011
Good morning Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members
of this subcommittee. My name is Carl Pavetto, and I am the Deputy
Associate Administrator for the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE)
National Nuclear Security Administration's Office of Emergency
Operations. First, I would like to express my sincere appreciation for
the opportunity to speak to you today regarding the contribution DOE
makes in preventing domestic radiological and nuclear terrorist attacks
through the conduct of detection and search operations.
As you may know, the National Nuclear Security Administration, or
NNSA, was established by Congress in 2000 as a semi-autonomous entity
within DOE. The NNSA maintains the safety, security, and effectiveness
of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, accelerates efforts to reduce
the global threat posed by nuclear proliferation and terrorism, and
provides safe and effective nuclear propulsion systems for the U.S.
Navy. We also possess robust technical capabilities and support the
world's top professional scientists, engineers, and other leading
nuclear experts resident in our National Laboratories. Within NNSA, the
Office of Emergency Operations draws upon these experts to execute its
mission to maintain the U.S. Government's Federal response capabilities
for radiological consequence management, render-safe, and the purpose
of today's hearing, radiological and nuclear detection and search.
The U.S. Government's strategy for interdicting radiological or
nuclear materials or devices involves a multi-faceted and multi-agency
cooperative approach. To maintain our Nation's capability to respond to
specific nuclear and radiological threats, staff from my office--the
Office of Emergency Operations--works cooperatively with the Department
of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the
Department of Defense to develop the Interagency Domestic Radiological
Nuclear Search Operations Plan (RNSOP). This plan was a product of the
Countering Nuclear Terrorism Interagency Planning Committee, and was
approved by the National Security Staff on May 27, 2011. Radiological
and nuclear search is a law enforcement function of the global nuclear
detection architecture (GNDA) led by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). RNSOP defines a targeted response that increases
the probability for interdicting a credible radiological or nuclear
threat to prevent an attack within the United States.
DOE/NNSA is the technical lead for RNSOP in support of the FBI as
the lead agency. Personnel from the Office of Emergency Operations
support the Bureau by providing the advanced technical capabilities
needed to support evaluation of the credibility of the threat and for
planning and conducting search operations in support of investigative
or tactical objectives. Specifically, our teams are ready to respond
and provide technical expertise by:
assessing the technical and operational characteristics of a
radiological or nuclear threat;
integrating technical analysis into situational planning
efforts, such as calculating detection ranges and speed of
passage, identifying the appropriate detection equipment for
the assumed source, and issuing guidance on search techniques
for specific environments;
providing specialized assets capable of conducting and
tracking aerial, maritime, and land-based search operations to
locate and identify the threat;
interpreting the results of search operations while in
progress and conducting post-operational analysis that result
in data products that represent completed operations; and
performing rapid scientific evaluation of radiation spectral
data and final adjudication of special nuclear material through
DOE's Triage Program. (Triage, is DOE's system of reachback
capabilities to advanced scientific support for hazards and
risks assessments.)
In addition, DOE/NNSA provides support to the Department of
Homeland Security's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) as DNDO
carries out its responsibilities for the domestic implementation of the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) in two aspects: (1)
Steady-state Preventive Radiological Nuclear Detection, or PRND and (2)
enhanced steady-state PRND.
During steady-state PRND, we provide technical experts to our
partner departments and lead agencies, including the DNDO, to develop
and provide training to State and local first responders. Moreover, we
work with DNDO in providing radiological and nuclear detection and
search training to National Guard Civil Support Teams across the United
States and specialized Federal assets, such as the Transportation
Security Administration's Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
Teams. Another example of these efforts can be seen in our assistance
through DNDO to State and local planning for steady-state PRND in the
National Capital Region, and the cities of New York and Chicago.
For enhanced steady-state PRND, we support planning efforts and
detection operations associated with mass public gatherings, such as
National Special Security Events. Additionally, our regionally based
Radiological Assistance Program, or RAP teams, support the maintenance
and deployment of DNDO's Mobile Detection Deployment Units. These units
are used during planned mass public gatherings to provide training
delivered by RAP personnel to State and local responders. It should be
noted that steady-state or enhanced steady-state PRND can be executed
concurrently with targeted RNSOP operations.
I am pleased to report that the roles and responsibilities of DOE/
NNSA in the GNDA are now more clearly defined and articulated. We
continue to make progress and are working to further clarify agency
roles and responsibilities, in close coordination with our Federal
partners, during both steady-state and enhanced steady-state
operations. It is our goal to continue to bring our unique technical
capabilities to bear to address radiological and nuclear threats and
increased risk.
Once again, thank you Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and
Members of the subcommittee for affording me the opportunity to speak
with you today regarding the DOE/NNSA's capability to enhance our
National security by providing advanced technical support during
detection and search operations. I look forward to answering any
questions you may have.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Pavetto.
Now the Chairman will recognize Mr. Daddario to testify.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD DADDARIO, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
Mr. Daddario. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Clarke, and Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
invitation to represent the New York City Police Department
before this subcommittee.
The subject of this morning's hearing, preventing nuclear
and radiological terrorism within the United States, presents
enormous challenges to all of us. President Obama has often
expressed his concern about the threat of nuclear and
radiological terrorism.
He has said the greatest danger to the American people is
the threat of a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon and the
spread of nuclear weapons to dangerous regimes. We must ensure
that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This is the
most immediate and extreme threat to global security.
Congress, through the Bipartisan Commission on the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Proliferation and
Terrorism, has stated similar concerns in no uncertain terms.
In its 2008 report the commission said that it is more likely
than not that a weapon of mass destruction will be used
somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.
The threat of a nuclear or radiological weapon being used
against New York City is also among the foremost concerns of
Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly. Through the Securing the
Cities program the NYPD has committed significant resources to
guard against a nuclear radiological weapon, the use of which
might well overwhelm the capacity to recover of even so great
and resilient a city as New York.
The STC is a two-part Federally funded effort to protect
New York City from the threat of an improvised nuclear device
or a radiological dispersal device, in other words, dirty bomb.
The first part of the program involves equipping New York State
and local regional partners the state-of-the-art mobile
radiological detection equipment and training them in its
proper use.
The NYPD has 12 principal partners in New York, New Jersey,
and Connecticut. These 12 principal partners represent 150
local law enforcement and public safety agencies within a 40-
mile radius of New York City.
The STC funding dispersed to date has enabled the NYPD and
its regional partners to achieve several important
accomplishments. Among them are these.
The NYPD has taken delivery of over 4,200 personal
radiation detectors, 156 pack guide backpacks, 77 radiological
isotope identification devices and 15 mobile detection systems,
and completed distribution of this equipment to its regional
partners. We are now in the process of acquiring additional
equipment for us and our partners.
The NYPD has networked many of these radiological sensors
and enabled them to provide real-time radiation data into a
coordination center as part of the lower and midtown Manhattan
security initiatives. At the center officers can monitor real-
time radiation levels from equipment in the field installed on
vans, boats, and the rooftops of precincts.
The NYPD has also developed a Bluetooth gateway device that
we are in the process of procuring, which will enable real-time
transmission of radiation data from personal radiation
detectors on police officers' belts. We tested this device, and
it works perfectly.
The system is designed to alert officers in real-time to
potentially dangerous radiation levels in the field. To my
knowledge, this effort to network this type of sensor in one
system is unprecedented.
The NYPD and its regional partners have developed one
concept of operation for detection and interdiction of illicit
radioactive material. This concept of operations will enable
the regional partners to lock down and secure the region based
on 400 predetermined choke points in the face of an imminent
threat.
The NYPD and its regional partners have conducted land-
based, maritime, and transportation-based exercises involving
surreptitiously transported radiological substances. In April
the NYPD and its partners conducted a full-scale regional
exercise designed to evaluate our ability to detect and
interdict illicit radiological materials. The 5-day exercise,
which by all accounts was successful, involved choke points and
other activity in New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey both on
land, including rail and highways, and in the waterways of the
region.
The second part of the program involves putting in place a
permanent radiological defensive ring through the installation
of fixed radiological detection equipment to monitor traffic at
all bridges and tunnels that lead into New York City. We are
continuing to work with DNDO and Director Stern to put this
system in place.
The STC program is an extraordinary example of interagency
and intergovernmental collaboration. DHS, through DNDO provides
the technical expertise and funding for procurement, research,
and development. State and local regional partners provide
manpower, and in the case of the NYPD, various foundational
technical infrastructure systems.
From the outset, the STC program was developed--was
intended to develop an operationally viable regional
architecture for radiological and nuclear detection that can be
replicated in cities across the country. Both the mobile
detection and fixed-site detection portions of the STC program
require additional funding to achieve this goal. This
additional funding is required to achieve--if I could have a
few--1 more minute.
The additional funding is required to achieve wireless
connectivity. We are making great progress in this effort to
network the mobile radiation detection equipment so that the
data will be viewable in real time at the Lower Manhattan
Security Coordination Center.
We also need funding to enhance capability and
sustainability. We need to procure more advanced equipment that
will enhance land, air, and sea protection capabilities, and
enforce procedures and programs for inventory control,
standardization, maintenance, and calibration of equipment. We
also need to ensure usability to increase and continue
training, and to develop interdiction operations through the
conduct of advanced deployment on a regional scale.
I also want to note that in addition to administering the
Securing the Cities program, we recently entered into a
memorandum of understanding with the National Nuclear Security
Agency. As part of this agreement NNSA will install remote
monitoring systems in New York City medical, academic, and
commercial-industrial facilities that house radiotherapy and
radiation devices that contain highly radioactive isotopes,
which if removed by terrorists can be used to create a dirty
bomb. We will receive real-time video alarm from these remote
monitoring systems.
I thank you again for affording me as a representative of
the New York City Police Department the opportunity to appear
before you today, and I look forward to answering any questions
you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Daddario follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Daddario
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thompson, Members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation to represent the New York
City Police Department (NYPD) before the Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Protection, and Security Technologies. For the record,
my name is Richard Daddario, and I am the Police Department's Deputy
Commissioner of Counterterrorism.
The subject of this morning's hearing--preventing nuclear and
radiological terrorism within the United States--presents enormous
challenges to all of us. President Obama has often expressed his
concern about the threat of nuclear and radiological terrorism. He has
said:
``The gravest danger to the American people is the threat of a
terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon and the spread of nuclear
weapons to dangerous regimes.''
``The threat of global nuclear war has gone down, but the risk of
nuclear attack has gone up.''
``We must ensure that terrorists never acquire a nuclear weapon. This
is the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.''
Congress, through the bipartisan Commission on the Prevention of
Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, has stated
similar concerns in no uncertain terms. In its 2008 report, the
Commission staid that is ``more likely than not that a weapon of mass
destruction will be used somewhere in the world by the end of 2013.''
The threat of a nuclear or radiological weapon being used against
New York City is also among the foremost concerns of Police
Commissioner Raymond Kelly. Through the Securing the Cities Program
(STC), the NYPD has committed significant resources to guard against a
nuclear or radiological weapon, which might well overwhelm the capacity
to recover of even so great and resilient a city as New York.
The STC is a two-part Federally funded effort to protect New York
City from the threat of an improvised nuclear device or a radiological
dispersal device (dirty bomb).
The first part of the program involves equipping New York's State
and local regional partners with state-of-the-art mobile radiological
detection equipment and training them in its proper use. The NYPD has
12 principle partners in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut. These
12 principle partners represent 150 local law enforcement and public
safety agencies within a 40-mile radius of New York City.
The STC funding disbursed to date has enabled the NYPD and its
regional partners to achieve several important accomplishments, among
them:
The NYPD has taken delivery of over 4,200 personal radiation
detectors (PRDs), 156 PackEye backpacks, 77 radiological
isotope identification devices, and 15 mobile detection
systems; and completed distribution of this equipment to its
regional partners. The NYPD has already placed an additional
order for 1,000 PRDs, approximately 100 PackEye backpacks, and
five mobile platform vehicles.
The NYPD has networked many of these radiological sensors
and enabled them to provide real-time radiation data into a
Coordination Center, as part of the Lower and Midtown Manhattan
Security Initiatives. At the Center, officers can monitor real-
time radiation levels from equipment in the field installed on
vans, boats, and the rooftops of precincts. The NYPD has also
developed a Bluetooth gateway device that we are in the process
of procuring which will enable real-time transmission of
radiation data from personal radiation detectors on police
officers belts. The system is designed to alert officers in
real-time to potentially dangerous radiation levels in the
field. To my knowledge, this effort is unprecedented.
The NYPD and its regional partners have developed one
concept of operations for detection and interdiction of illicit
radioactive materials; this concept of operations will enable
the regional partners to lock down and secure the region based
on 400 pre-determined chokepoints in the face of an imminent
threat.
The NYPD and its regional partners have conducted land-
based, maritime, and transportation-based exercises involving
surreptitiously transported radiological substances. In April,
the NYPD and its STC partners conducted a full-scale, regional
exercise designed to evaluate our ability to detect and
interdict illicit radiological materials. The 5-day exercise,
which by all accounts was successful, involved chokepoints and
other activity in New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey both on
land, including rail and highways, and in the waterways of the
region.
The second part the program involves putting in place a permanent
radiological defensive ring through the installation of fixed
radiological detection equipment to monitor traffic at all bridges and
tunnels that lead into New York City.
The STC program is an extraordinary example of interagency and
intergovernmental collaboration. DHS, through the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO), provides the technical expertise and funding
for procurement research and development; State and local regional
partners provide manpower and, in the case of the NYPD, various
foundational technical infrastructure systems.
From the outset, the STC program was intended to develop an
operationally viable regional architecture for radiological and nuclear
detection that can be replicated in cities across the country. Both the
mobile detection and fixed-site detection portions of the STC program
require additional funding to achieve this goal.
This additional funding is required to:
Achieve wireless connectivity.--We want to network the
mobile radiation detection equipment purchased with STC program
funds so that the data will be viewable in real-time at the
Lower Manhattan Security Coordination Center.
Enhance capability and sustainability.--We need to procure
more advanced equipment that will enhance land, air, and sea
detection capabilities; and enforce procedures and programs for
inventory control, standardization, maintenance, and
calibration of equipment purchased with STC program funds
across the region.
Ensure usability.--We need to continue equipment training
and exercises with the regional partners; and
Develop interdiction operations.--It is vitally important to
conduct advanced radiation detection and interdiction
deployments on a regional scale.
I should note that in addition to administering the Securing the
Cities Program, the NYPD recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding
with the National Nuclear Security Agency as part of its Global Threat
Reduction Initiative. As part of this Agreement, NNSA will install
remote monitoring systems at New York City medical, academic, and
commercial/industrial facilities that house radiotherapy and
irradiation devices that contain highly radioactive isotopes, which, if
removed by terrorists, can be used to create dirty bombs. The NYPD will
receive real-time video alarms from these remote monitoring systems.
Thank you once again for affording me, as a representative of the New
York City Police Department, the opportunity to appear before you
today. I would be happy to answer any of your questions.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, Mr. Daddario. I will refrain from
asking you whether it has been easier to work with all of the
Government agencies here in the United States than it was when
you were liaison to Russian law enforcement at the embassy in
Moscow.
But Mr. Perez, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARK PEREZ, HOMELAND SECURITY ADVISOR, FLORIDA
DEPARTMENT OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
Mr. Perez. Good morning, Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member
Clarke, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for allowing me the opportunity to present my testimony
before you today on Florida's State-wide PRND capabilities.
I have the distinct honor of serving as Florida's homeland
security advisor. When Florida created its domestic security
and governance structure, it took into account the diverse
cultures and landscape that shape our great State. An inclusive
structure was formed that encouraged and facilitated
multijurisdictional and multidisciplinary participation at all
levels of government. The main components of our State
structure include seven regional domestic security taskforces
who collectively support our State's strategic plan and form
the critical link between policymakers at the State level and
boots-on-the-ground partners.
The State working group, led by an executive board and
supported by multidisciplinary subject matter experts from each
regional taskforce affords the opportunity for State-wide
consistency in plain development, planning, and delivery of
training and exercise, and equipment recommendations. Finally,
our Domestic Security Oversight Council, which provides
executive direction and leadership, and serves as an advisory
council, providing guidance to the regional taskforces and
State working group.
In 2006 Florida began partnering with DHS' DNDO when our
State Department of Transportation and Department of Health
worked on the Southeast Transportation Corridor Pilot
installing fixed radiological portal monitors at weigh station
facilities. The DNDO further assisted our efforts by helping
our State develop a mobile detector capable of being deployed
at weigh stations, special event venues, intelligence-driven
locations, and using control operations.
In addition, the DNDO assisted our Florida Fish and
Wildlife Conservation Commission by developing a small craft
initiative used to interdict waterborne radiological nuclear
threats in our State.
In 2007, our Domestic Security Oversight Council recognized
these efforts and moved to further build out our State's PRND
capabilities. A collaborative effort was forged between
Federal, State, and local partners. This group became the focus
of the DNDO's program assistance pilot, facilitating the
development of a State-wide PRND enterprise model which could
be implemented in other States and territories.
Some of the early challenges identified in the development
of the State-wide PRND strategy were the procurement, training,
and use of scientific equipment not previously used by law
enforcement. As this activity was relatively new to law
enforcement in our State, a concept of operations had to be
created, and we sought guidance from DNDO and other entities
which have been engaged in PRND operations.
The other important factors were the identification of
resources related to budget and staffing, as well as a State-
wide equipment acquisition strategy ensuring that all regional
PRND needs were identified and met with common equipment in
order to simplify logistical support, operational sustainment,
and training and requirements. The acquisition strategy was
defined and implemented to meet basic and specialized
capabilities, as well as defining requirements to provide for
future technological insertion and upgrades to existing
equipment.
Training officers in the operation of specialized equipment
was also a factor. Historically, this was accomplished by
attending courses offered by DHS. However, once trained, the
individual jurisdictions had to provide the training and the
concept of operations, as well as the policy and procedures for
a specific jurisdiction.
Furthermore, due to the high demand for the training and
limited availability of the courses offered, we developed our
own capabilities so that the training needs of Florida agencies
could be promptly met. A training model was created utilizing
the Florida college system, and the State public-private
workforce system.
Currently Florida has a cadre of instructors certified by
DHS who have successfully trained hundreds of our officers
throughout the State. Florida has a strong, State-wide PRND
strategy built upon the foundation of our State's strategic
plan and structure that encourages and facilitates
multijurisdictional and multidisciplinary participation at all
levels. We have shared our PRND strategy with other States and
territories to assist with their build-out efforts, as well as
soliciting feedback on how it can be improved upon.
In closing, I take a statement from the Greek playwright
Sophocles, ``success is dependent on effort.'' Without the
combined efforts from our Federal, State, and local and
territorial partners, we cannot be successful with ensuring the
continued successes of our PRND mission. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Perez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark Perez
July 25, 2011
Good morning Mr. Chairman and committee Members, thank you for
allowing me the opportunity to present my testimony before you today on
Florida's State-wide PRND capabilities.
My name is Mark Perez and I am a special agent in charge with the
Florida Department of Law Enforcement; I also have the honor of serving
as Florida's Homeland Security Advisor. Florida is heralded as one of
the top tourist destinations in the world; it has the second-longest
coastline in our country; and is the fourth-most populated State in our
great Nation; home to nearly 19 million Floridians, who cultures are as
unique and diverse as our State's landscape. These are some of the same
influences that formed the basis for Florida's Domestic Security
Strategic Plan and Governance Structure into an inclusive structure
designed to encourage and facilitate multi-jurisdictional and multi-
disciplinary participation at all levels of government. The structure
has three main components:
(1) Our seven Regional Domestic Security Task Forces (RDSTF) serve
as the foundation of our State's domestic security structure.
Each RDSTF consists of local, multidisciplinary representatives
who collectively support our State's strategic plan and form
the critical link between policy makers at the State level and
local ``boots-on-the-ground'' partners faced with the daily
challenges of protecting our communities.
(2) Our State Working Group on Domestic Preparedness (SWG), which
is headed by an Executive Board, is made up of multi-
disciplinary subject matter experts from each RDSTFs and
designated urban areas, as well as other key agency liaisons.
The SWG structure affords the opportunity for State-wide
consistency in plan development, planning and delivery of
training and exercises, and equipment recommendations.
(3) Our Domestic Security Oversight Council (DSOC) provides
executive direction and leadership with respect to Florida's
strategic plan and serves as an advisory council by providing
guidance to the RDSTFs and SWG. The DSOC also make
recommendations to the Governor and the Legislature related to
Florida's counter-terrorism and domestic security efforts.
In February 2006, Florida began partnering with the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) when
the State's Department of Transportation's Office of Motor Carrier
Compliance (OMCC), in conjunction with the Florida Department of
Health's Bureau of Radiation Control (BRC) worked on the Southeast
Transportation Corridor Pilot (SETCP). The project installed fixed
radiological portal monitors at weigh station facilities, however, due
to the limitations of the fixed portal monitors, DNDO agreed to develop
a mobile detector which was capable of being deployed at weigh
stations, special event venues, intelligence driven locations, as well
as used in patrol operations.
In addition, the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission
(FWCC) Division of Law Enforcement also worked with the DNDO in
developing a Small Craft Initiative in an attempt to interdict
waterborne radiological/nuclear threats.
In the fall of 2007, the DSOC recognized these efforts and created
the Preventative Radiological/Nuclear Detection (PRND) Sub-Committee of
the State Working Group's Operations and Plans Committee. In a
collaborative effort between various Federal, State, and local
partners, this group became the focus of the DNDO's Program Assistance
pilot. The purpose of this pilot was to facilitate the development of a
State-wide PRND Enterprise Model which would then be implemented in
other States and territories.
Over the next 2 years this group worked tirelessly to create
Florida's PRND Strategy; its mission,`` . . . to protect the people,
economy, and natural resources of Florida against threats posed by the
unauthorized use of radiological and nuclear materials.''
Some of the early challenges identified in the development of a
State-wide PRND strategy were the procurement, training, and use of
scientific equipment not previously used by law enforcement. If the
procurement and cost associated with the acquisition of this
specialized equipment wasn't enough of a challenge; maintaining the
proficiency of officers assigned to use the equipment certainly was.
Because this type of activity was relatively new to law enforcement
in our State, a well-defined Concept of Operations (CONOPS) and
operating and policies and procedures had to be created. We received
input from DNDO and other entities which had been engaged in PRND
operations and created a deeper integration of Florida's law
enforcement, fire/rescue, emergency management, and Florida National
Guard efforts to ensure that the PRND Program Goals would be met.
Other important factors related to the development of a State-wide
PRND strategy was the identification of resources, related to budget
and staffing; as well as a State-wide equipment acquisition strategy.
This ensured that all regional PRND needs were identified and met with
common equipment in order to simplify logistical support, operational
sustainment and training requirements. The acquisition strategy was
defined and implemented to meet basic and specialized capabilities as
well as defining requirements to provide for future technological
insertion/upgrades to existing equipment.
Training officers in the operation of specialized equipment has
always been a factor when dealing with PRND capabilities. Historically
this has been accomplished by having officers attend courses offered by
the DHS. However, the individual jurisdictions must provide the
training in the concept of operations (CONOPS) as well as the policies
and procedures for a specific jurisdiction. Due to the high demand for
the training and limited availability of courses offered, Florida's
PRND Strategy identified and developed its own capabilities so that the
training needs of Florida's agencies could be met promptly and with
minimal travel required by the attendees. A training model was created
utilizing the Florida College System in conjunction with the State's
public-private workforce system; the DNDO and the Florida Department of
Health's Bureau of Radiation Control provided assistance with the
development of the training program and curricula integrity. Currently,
Florida has a cadre of instructors certified by DHS, who have
successfully trained hundreds of our officers throughout the State.
Florida has a strong State-wide PRND strategy, built upon the
foundation of our State's strategic plan and structure that encourages
and facilitates multi-jurisdictional and multidisciplinary
participation at all levels. We have shared our PRND strategy with
other States and territories, to assist with their build-out efforts
and solicit feedback on how it can be improved upon.
As the Greek playwright Sophocles stated, ``Success is dependent on
effort.'' Without the combined efforts, from our Federal, State, local,
and territorial partners we cannot be successful with ensuring the
continued success of our PRND mission.
Thank you.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Perez.
Now Mr. Maurer, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DAVID C. MAURER, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Maurer. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Lungren,
Ranking Member Clarke, and other Members and staff. I am
pleased to be here today to discuss our prior work examining
DHS' efforts to combat nuclear smuggling.
As you well know, preventing terrorists from carrying out a
nuclear attack in the United States is a top National priority.
To address this threat, DNDO has the lead in coordinating the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture or GNDA. This is a
multidepartment effort to detect nuclear material in foreign
countries, at the U.S. border and inside the United States
before it can be used in an attack.
Given the global span of this effort and the number of
agencies involved, we have previously recommended that DHS
develop a strategic plan that clearly spells out overall
objectives, roles, and responsibilities, the resources
necessary to meet those objectives, and mechanisms to assess
progress along the way. My comments today are based on
previously issued GAO work and focus on three key issues: DHS'
efforts to develop a strategic approach, DHS' progress in
deploying radiation detection equipment, and DHS' challenges in
developing new technologies to detect radiation.
On the first point there is encouraging news. In response
to our prior work, DHS has developed a strategic plan for the
GNDA. In December 2010 DNDO issued its plan, which defines the
overall objectives and assigns missions to the various Federal
entities. Earlier this year DNDO also issued its
Congressionally-mandated annual review of GNDA activities. In
tandem these documents show clear progress in addressing our
prior recommendations.
However, DNDO's plans to date do not discuss key elements
for addressing gaps. Neither document clearly establishes the
resources needed to meet the objectives. They also do not
discuss strategies or time frames for addressing previously
identified gaps in the domestic portion of the GNDA such as the
land border areas between ports of entry and small maritime
vessels.
DNDO tells us they are working on an implementation plan
that will address these key missing elements, and hopes to have
that plan completed by the end of this year.
On the second point, DHS' efforts to deploy radiation
detection technology, the news is generally good. As we
reported in June 2010, DHS has made significant progress and
now scans nearly all cargo and vehicles entering the United
States through ports of entry. Having the capability to detect
radiation at the most commonly used official points into the
United States is a major accomplishment.
However, there are remaining gaps that still need to be
addressed. DHS has made less progress scanning international
rail, air cargo, and commercial aviation. Going forward it
would be reasonable to expect DHS will pay greater attention to
addressing these gaps, in part by developing and acquiring new
technologies.
Which brings me to my third point: DHS' efforts to develop
new technologies. The news here has been bad for years. As we
have reported numerous times, DNDO's efforts to develop
enhanced technology to detect radiation have floundered.
The ASP in CAARS program in particular have been plagued
with significant problems with cost, performance, and lack of
rigor and testing. Further, DNDO's focus on areas where the
threat was already being addressed distracted them from
addressing gaps in other portions of the GNDA.
But that was the past. Director Stern's announcement this
morning about the ASP program is encouraging, and hopefully
sets the stage for mid-course corrections in the strategic
direction of the GNDA.
In addition, as I testified earlier this month, the
problems with ASP in cars are symptomatic of broader DHS
challenges in developing and acquiring new technologies to meet
homeland security needs. DHS leadership is currently taking its
steps to address the numerous problems we recorded in our prior
work. But the key is execution. DHS needs to turn its plan into
action to ensure that systems are delivered on time, within
budget, and capable of meeting critical mission needs.
This same theme applies to DNDO's recent strategic plan and
promised implementation plan. Words on paper need to become
concrete action to ensure priorities are identified, tasked,
resourced, and executed.
We are encouraged by DNDO's efforts to revamp a strategic
approach, and hopefully it will take action to address all of
our recommendations from our prior work. In doing so, DNDO will
enhance the U.S. ability to address the critical threat of
nuclear terrorism.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify this
morning. I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Maurer follows:]
Prepared Statement of David C. Maurer
July 26, 2011
COMBATING NUCLEAR SMUGGLING.--DHS HAS DEVELOPED A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR
ITS GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION ARCHITECTURE, BUT GAPS REMAIN
GAO-11-869T
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the
subcommittee: We are pleased to be here today to discuss our past work
examining the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress and
efforts in planning, developing, and deploying its global nuclear
detection architecture (GNDA). The overall mission of the GNDA is to
use an integrated system of radiation detection equipment and
interdiction activities to combat nuclear smuggling in foreign
countries, at the U.S. border, and inside the United States. Terrorists
smuggling nuclear or radiological material into the United States could
use these materials to make an improvised nuclear device or a
radiological dispersal device (also called a ``dirty bomb''). The
detonation of a nuclear device in an urban setting could cause hundreds
of thousands of deaths and devastate buildings and physical
infrastructure for miles. While not as damaging, a radiological
dispersal device could nonetheless cause hundreds of millions of
dollars in socioeconomic costs as a large part of a city would have to
be evacuated--and possibly remain inaccessible--until an extensive
radiological decontamination effort was completed. Accordingly, the
GNDA remains our country's principal strategy in protecting the
homeland from the consequences of nuclear terrorism.
The GNDA is a multi-departmental effort coordinated by DHS's
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO).\1\ DNDO is also responsible
for developing, acquiring, and deploying radiation detection equipment
to support the efforts of DHS and other Federal agencies. Federal
efforts to combat nuclear smuggling have largely focused on established
ports of entry, such as seaports and land border crossings. However,
DNDO has also been examining nuclear detection strategies along other
potential pathways and has identified several gaps in the GNDA,
including: (1) Land border areas between ports of entry into the United
States; (2) international general aviation; and (3) small maritime
craft, such as recreational boats and commercial fishing vessels.
Developing strategies, technologies, and resources to address these
gaps remains one of the key challenges in deploying the GNDA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Other departments and agencies contributing to the GNDA include
the Departments of Energy, State, Defense, and Justice; the Office of
the Director of National Intelligence; and the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even before DNDO's inception in 2005,\2\ we were highlighting the
need for a more comprehensive strategy for nuclear detection. In 2002,
we reported on the need for a comprehensive plan for installing
radiation detection equipment, such as radiation portal monitors, at
all U.S. border crossings and ports of entry.\3\ We reported that this
plan should: (1) Address vulnerabilities and risks; (2) identify the
complement of radiation detection equipment that should be used at each
type of border entry point--air, rail, land, and sea--and whether
equipment could be immediately deployed; (3) identify longer-term
radiation detection needs; and (4) develop measures to ensure that the
equipment is adequately maintained. More recently, in July 2008, we
testified that DNDO had not developed an overarching strategic plan and
recommended that DHS coordinate with the Departments of Defense,
Energy, and State to develop one.\4\ In January 2009, we recommended
that the Secretary of Homeland Security develop a strategic plan for
the domestic part of the global nuclear detection strategy to help
ensure the success of initiatives aimed at closing gaps and
vulnerabilities in the United States.\5\ We stated that this plan
should focus on, among other things, establishing time frames and costs
for the three gaps DNDO had identified--land border areas between ports
of entry, aviation, and small maritime vessels. DHS agreed with the
recommendation that we made in our 2008 testimony on the need for an
overarching strategic plan to guide future efforts to combat nuclear
smuggling and move toward a more comprehensive global nuclear detection
strategy. DHS did not comment on our 2009 recommendation to develop a
plan for the domestic portion of the GNDA but noted that it aligned
with DNDO's past, present, and future actions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ National Security Presidential Directive 43/Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 14, Domestic Nuclear Detection, April 15, 2005.
DNDO was established in statute by the Security and Accountability for
Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port) Act, Pub. L. No. 109-347, 501
(codified at 6 U.S.C. 591-596a).
\3\ GAO, Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation
Detection Equipment, GAO-03-235T (Washington, DC: Oct. 17, 2002).
\4\ GAO, Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office?'s Efforts to Develop a Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture, GAO-08-999T (Washington, DC: July 16,
2008).
\5\ GAO, Nuclear Detection: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
Should Improve Planning to Better Address Gaps and Vulnerabilities,
GAO-09-257 (Washington, DC: Jan. 29, 2009).
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As we will discuss today, some progress has been made, but DHS and
other Federal agencies have yet to fully address gaps in the global
nuclear detection architecture. Specifically, this testimony discusses
DHS's efforts to: (1) Address our prior recommendations to develop a
strategic plan for the GNDA, including developing strategies to prevent
smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials via the critical gaps
DNDO identified, (2) complete the deployment of radiation detection
equipment to scan all cargo and conveyances entering the United States
at ports of entry, and (3) develop new technologies to detect nuclear
or radioactive materials.
This testimony is based on our prior work on U.S. Government
efforts to detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological
materials issued from October 2002 through September 2010. We updated
this information in July 2011 to reflect DHS's efforts to address our
prior recommendations by meeting with DNDO officials and reviewing
recent DNDO documents, such as the 2010 GNDA Strategic Plan and the
2011 GNDA Joint Annual Interagency Review.\6\ Our comments on DNDO's
efforts to develop new technologies to detect nuclear material are
based on our prior work on DHS's progress and challenges developing and
acquiring new technologies issued from May 2009 through July 2011.
Details on the scope and methodology for those reviews are available in
our published reports.\7\ We conducted this work in accordance with
generally accepted Government auditing standards.
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\6\ The Global Nuclear Detection Architecture Joint Annual
Interagency Review 2011 was produced by DNDO in response to Section
1103 of the ``Implementing Recommendations of the
9/11 Commission Act of 2007'' (Pub. L. No. 110-53), which mandates a
Joint Annual Interagency Review of the GNDA and the joint submission of
a report on that review to the President and specified Congressional
Committees by the Secretaries of Homeland Security, State, Defense,
Energy; the Attorney General; and the Director of National
Intelligence.
\7\ See a list of related GAO products at the end of this
statement.
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In summary, since December 2010, DNDO has issued both a strategic
plan to guide the development of the GNDA and an annual report on the
current status of the GNDA. The new strategic plan addressed some key
components of what we previously recommended be included in a strategic
plan, such as identifying the roles and responsibilities for meeting
strategic objectives. However, neither the plan nor the annual report
identifies funding needed to achieve the strategic plan's objectives or
employs monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic progress and
identify needed improvements. DHS officials informed us that they will
address these missing elements in an implementation plan, which they
plan to issue before the end of this year.
As we reported in September 2010, DHS has made progress in
deploying both radiation detection equipment and developing procedures
to scan cargo entering the United States through land and sea ports of
entry for nuclear and radiological materials.\8\ For example, according
to DHS officials, the Department scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo
and conveyances entering the United States through land borders and
major seaports. However, as we reported in July 2011, DHS has
experienced challenges in developing new technologies to detect nuclear
and radiological materials, such as developing and meeting key
performance requirements.\9\ DHS has plans to enhance its development
and acquisition of new technologies, although it is still too early to
assess their impact on addressing the challenges we identified in our
past work.
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\8\ GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate Communication and
Oversight Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced Radiography
System to Detect Nuclear Materials, GAO-10-1041T (Washington, DC: Sept.
15, 2010).
\9\ GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and
Development of New Technologies, GAO-11-829T (Washington, DC: July 15,
2011).
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DHS HAS DEVELOPED A STRATEGIC PLAN FOR GNDA, BUT IT DOES NOT YET
DISCUSS KEY ELEMENTS FOR ADDRESSING GAPS
In our past work on GNDA, we made recommendations about the need
for a strategic plan to guide the development of the GDNA. Among other
things, in July 2008, we recommended that DHS develop an overall
strategic plan for the GNDA that: (1) Clearly defines the objectives to
be accomplished, (2) identifies the roles and responsibilities for
meeting each objective, (3) identifies the funding necessary to achieve
those objectives, and (4) employs monitoring mechanisms to determine
programmatic progress and identify needed improvements.\10\ In January
2009, we also recommended that DHS develop strategies to guide the
domestic aspects of the GNDA including establishing time frames and
costs for addressing previously identified gaps in the GNDA--land
border areas between ports of entry, international general aviation,
and small maritime vessels.\11\ DHS concurred with our 2008
recommendation to develop an overall strategic plan and did not comment
on our 2009 recommendation to develop a plan for the domestic portion
of the GNDA, but noted that it aligned with DNDO's past, present, and
future actions.
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\10\ GAO-08-999T.
\11\ GAO-09-257.
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In December 2010, DNDO issued a strategic plan for the GNDA. The
strategic plan establishes a broad vision for the GNDA, identifies
cross-cutting issues, defines several objectives, and assigns mission
roles and responsibilities to the various Federal entities that
contribute to the GNDA. For example, the Department of Energy has the
lead for several aspects of enhancing international capabilities for
detecting nuclear materials abroad, DHS has the lead for detecting
nuclear materials as they cross the border into the United States, and
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has the lead on reporting and sharing
information on lost or stolen domestic radiological material. In
addition, earlier this year, DNDO released the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture Joint Annual Interagency Review 2011. This review
describes the current status of GNDA and includes information about the
multiple Federal programs that collectively seek to prevent nuclear
terrorism in the United States.
However, neither the strategic plan nor the 2011 interagency review
identifies funding needed to achieve the strategic plan's objectives
nor establishes monitoring mechanisms to determine programmatic
progress and identify needed improvements--key elements of a strategic
plan that we previously identified in our recommendations. Furthermore,
while the plan and the 2011 interagency review discuss previously
identified gaps in the domestic portion of the architecture, neither
discusses strategies, priorities, time frames, or costs for addressing
these gaps.
In our view, one of the key benefits of a strategic plan is that it
is a comprehensive means of establishing priorities, and using these
priorities to allocate resources so that the greatest needs are being
addressed. In times of tight budgets, allocating resources to address
the highest priorities becomes even more important. Accordingly, while
DNDO's new strategic plan represents an important step forward in
guiding the development of the GNDA, DNDO could do more to articulate
strategies, priorities, time frames and costs in addressing gaps and
further deploying the GNDA in order to protect the homeland from the
consequences of nuclear terrorism. In discussing these issues with DHS
officials, they indicated that they will be producing a GNDA
implementation plan later this year that will address several of these
issues.
DHS CONTINUES TO MAKE PROGRESS IN DEPLOYING RADIATION DETECTION
EQUIPMENT
As we reported in June 2010, DHS has made significant progress in
deploying both radiation detection equipment and developing procedures
to scan cargo and conveyances entering the United States through fixed
land and sea ports of entry for nuclear and radiological materials,
deploying nearly two-thirds of the radiation portal monitors identified
in its deployment plan. According to DHS officials, the Department
scans nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the
United States through land borders and major seaports. However, as we
reported, DHS has made less progress scanning for radiation in: (1)
Railcars entering the United States from Canada and Mexico; (2)
international air cargo; and (3) international commercial aviation
aircraft, passengers, or baggage.
Fixed Land and Sea Ports of Entry
According to DHS officials, since November 2009, almost all non-
rail land ports of entry have been equipped with one or more radiation
detection portal monitors and 100 percent of all cargo, conveyances,
drivers, and passengers driving into the United States through
commercial lanes at land borders are scanned for radiation, as are more
than 99 percent of all personally operated vehicles (non commercial
passenger cars and light trucks), drivers, and passengers. Similarly,
at major seaports, according to DHS officials, the Department scans
nearly all containerized cargo entering U.S. seaports for nuclear and
radiological materials. DHS has deployed radiation portal monitors to
major American seaports that account for the majority of cargo entering
the United States. However, some smaller seaports that receive cargo
may not be equipped with these portal monitors. DHS officials stated
that current deployment plans have been in place to address all the
remaining gaps in the deployment of portal monitors to seaports but
that current and future budget realities require a re-planning of the
deployment schedule.
International Rail
DHS has made much less progress scanning international rail. As we
reported in June 2010, there is limited systematic radiation scanning
of the roughly 4,800 loaded railcars entering the United States each
day from Canada and Mexico. Much of the scanning for radioactive
materials that takes place at these ports of entry is conducted with
portable, handheld radioactive isotope identification devices.
According to DHS officials, international rail traffic represents one
of the most difficult challenges for radiation detection systems due to
the nature of trains and the need to develop close cooperation with
officials in Mexico and Canada. In addition, DHS officials told us that
rail companies resist doing things that might slow down rail traffic
and typically own the land where DHS would need to establish stations
for primary and secondary screening. DHS is in the early stages of
developing procedures and technology to feasibly scan international
rail traffic.
International Air Cargo and Commercial Aviation
As we reported in 2010, DHS is in the early stages of addressing
the challenges of scanning for radioactive materials presented by air
cargo and commercial aviation. DHS officials are also developing plans
to increase their capacity to scan for radioactive materials in
international air cargo conveyed on commercial airlines. DHS officials
stated that their experience in scanning air cargo at a few major
international airports in the United States has helped them develop
scanning procedures and inform current and future deployment strategies
for both fixed and mobile radiation detection equipment. These
officials said that they believe that further operational experience
and research is necessary before they can develop practical mobile
scanning strategies and procedures. DHS is also developing plans to
effectively scan commercial aviation aircraft, passengers, and baggage
for radioactive materials.
DHS HAS HAD DIFFICULTY IN DEVELOPING NEW TECHNOLOGIES TO DETECT NUCLEAR
MATERIALS
Since 2006, we have reported that DHS faces difficulties in
developing new technologies to detect nuclear and radiological
materials. Specifically, we have reported on long-standing problems
with DNDO's efforts to deploy advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP)
radiation detection monitors. The ASP is a more advanced and
significantly more expensive type of radiation detection portal monitor
to replace the polyvinyl toluene (PVT) portal monitors in many
locations that the Customs and Border Protection (CBP), an agency
within DHS, currently uses to screen cargo at ports of entry. We have
issued numerous reports regarding problems with the cost and
performance of the ASPs and the lack of rigor in testing this
equipment. For example, we found that tests DNDO conducted in early
2007 used biased test methods that enhanced the apparent performance of
ASPs and did not use critical CBP operating procedures that are
fundamental to the performance of current radiation detectors.\12\ In
addition, in 2008 we estimated the life cycle cost of each standard
cargo version of the ASP (including deployment costs) to be about
$822,000, compared with about $308,000 for the PVT portal monitor, and
the total program cost for DNDO's latest plan for deploying radiation
portal monitors to be about $2 billion.\13\ Based in part on our work,
DHS informed this committee in February 2010, after spending over $280
million, that the Department had scaled back its plans for the
development and use of ASP technology.
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\12\ GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional Actions Needed to
Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation Detection
Equipment, GAO-07-1247T (Washington, DC: Sept. 18, 2007).
\13\ GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS's Program to Procure and
Deploy Advanced Radiation Detection Portal Monitors Is Likely to Exceed
the Department's Previous Cost Estimates, GAO-08-1108R (Washington, DC:
Sept 22, 2008).
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In September 2010, we also reported that DNDO was simultaneously
engaged in the research and development phase while planning for the
acquisition phase of its cargo advanced automated radiography system
(CAARS) to detect certain nuclear materials in vehicles and containers
at CBP ports of entry.\14\ DNDO pursued the deployment of CAARS without
fully understanding that it would not fit within existing inspection
lanes at ports of entry and would slow down the flow of commerce
through these lanes, causing significant delays. DHS spent $113 million
on the program since 2005 and cancelled the acquisition phase of the
program in 2007. As we reported in September 2010, no CAARS machines
had been deployed, and CAARS machines from various vendors were either
disassembled or sitting idle without being tested in a port
environment.
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\14\ GAO-10-1041T.
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DNDO's problems developing the ASP and CAARS technologies are
examples of broader challenges DHS faces in developing and acquiring
new technologies to meet homeland security needs. Earlier this month,
we testified that DHS has experienced challenges managing its multi-
billion-dollar acquisition efforts, including implementing technologies
that did not meet intended requirements and were not appropriately
tested and evaluated, and has not consistently completed analysis of
costs and benefits before technologies were implemented.\15\ In June
2011, DHS reported to us that it is taking steps to strengthen its
investment and acquisition management processes across the Department.
For example, DHS plans to establish a new model for managing
Department-wide investments, establish new councils and boards to help
ensure that test and evaluation methods are appropriately considered,
and is working to improve the quality and accuracy of program cost
estimates. As we testified, we believe these are positive steps and, if
implemented effectively, could help the Department address many of its
acquisition challenges. However, it is still too early to assess the
impact of DHS's efforts to address these challenges. Going forward, we
believe DHS will need to demonstrate measurable, sustained progress in
effectively implementing these actions.
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\15\ GAO-11-829T.
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Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, and Members of the
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Maurer.
Thank all of you for your testimony. We appreciate not only
the testimony, but the work that it reveals.
I will now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions and
then we will proceed with other panelists.
Mr. Stern, the ASP program, you mentioned that it does not
seem to work very well. Yet we have 13 of the systems that you
are going to put out there. If it does not work, why are we
putting it out there? Are you telling us it works for a limited
purpose?
Also you mentioned the handheld utilizing new material that
was not available until very recently. Is there any adaptation
of that material to the larger monitors such that you know
trucks can go through them as opposed to handheld? Because we
have all talked about the labor-intensive nature of the
handheld, the difficulty in getting around and checking the
entire cargo and so forth.
Mr. Stern. Yes. Thank you. I appreciate the question.
The decision on ASP was a very difficult one. As you know
over the years a significant amount of money has been invested
in the ASP.
When I came to be director of DNDO I looked at the ASP
program and since then two key things have occurred. One is we
have our National Academies of Science report that suggests
that our testing in the past was not optimum. The second is in
working in field validation with the user, we discovered that
the requirement that had been agreed at the beginning for the
speed passing through it is no longer valid. So, we had to make
a course correction.
Now, that course correction involves many elements. Your
specific question is about the 13 ASP systems that we have and
whether we are testing them. The answer is no, we are not
testing them for the purpose of going forward.
We have these 13 systems billed and paid for. Four of them
are already in the field. We are using them so that we can
learn from them so that users in the field can understand what
a spectroscopic portal can do for them generically. They can
help define their requirements for some future commercial
competition.
For us at the technical level, there is a big need if we
are going to move to the model-test-model approach recommended
by the National Academies of Science. There is a big need for
being able to model the stream of commerce and the radiation
that is in the environment.
So, again, these systems have been paid for. There is some
additional cost in actually deploying them. But the benefit to
making the best use of the money that we have invested, of
learning technically from them that the data will go forward,
as well as users defining their need, I think are worthwhile
applications for the existing systems.
Mr. Lungren. The whole reason we were developing the ASP is
that we thought that the PVT program was not sufficient. Have
we discovered ways to make the PVT programs more efficient? How
do we sort of integrate that with the secondary screening? Are
there inefficiencies that we have been able to work ourselves
through?
Even though with the handheld that you have there, we still
have the question of the labor-intensiveness of that. So how do
you integrate that with the existing PVTs?
Mr. Stern. Yes. Well, thank you for the question. This is
right on target.
The ways we are going to mitigate the loss of the ASP
include an enhanced program for improving the PVTs. Now, the
PVTs can do some degree of efficient analysis of radiation
environment, but not nearly as much as spectroscopic portals.
So, we have an on-going program to improve the ability of
the PVT to effectively identify radiation that is in the stream
of commerce. That is actually going quite well. But I do not
want to mislead you. A PVT is never going to be as effective in
identifying nuclear material as a spectroscopic portal.
The handheld with the advanced concept of operation will
help to identify new nuclear material. It obviously will not be
as, again, effective as the large portal because size matters.
But the--with the enhanced material we think we are making
America safer by putting these out, but they are next.
I wanted to respond to your first question of whether we
could make a portal out of the material that is in this device.
In theory you can. I mean, there are challenges in building--in
making large crystals. But the fundamental answer is when we
go, when we are ready and when Congress is ready for us to look
at commercial portals, spectroscopic portals, this material may
be part of that portal structure in the commercial sector, or
it may not be. We will have to see.
Right now spectroscopic portals are really made of one or
two different materials, and not the materials in this device.
But you know when we put out our requirements that will be
well-defined over the next year. It may be that the commercial
sector may decide that this material is--lanthanum bromide is
an effective portal material. But we will have to see. It is
the marketplace.
Mr. Lungren. Do we still have problems with false
positives?
Mr. Stern. False positives will always be an issue. The
more efficient a detector and effective a detector and the
larger the detector you have, the less you will have.
Mr. Lungren. Was that not one of the reasons we thought ASP
would be better than the PVT?
Mr. Stern. Yes. It is.
Mr. Lungren. Okay.
The Chairman recognizes Ms. Clarke for questions.
Ms. Clarke. Good morning. Mr. Stern, I just wanted to do a
little follow-up on the whole issue of the ASP. With the 13
systems out there are you making an additional budget request
to Secretary Napolitano to continue the use of these 13
systems? Were there any types of contractual obligations of the
vendor to recoup any of the funds paid in the event that the
systems were not working?
Mr. Stern. I will have to check back on the contractual
obligations. Our contract with the vendor has expired as of
this month. Of last month, I am sorry. So, I do not believe
there are any on-going contractual obligations.
Again, we will put the 13 systems in use that we have
already paid for, and learn from them for the future.
Ms. Clarke. Okay. Had there been a budgetary request of the
Secretary for the maintenance of the deployment of the 13?
Mr. Stern. Yes. There has not yet been a budgetary request.
That will be in the future, and we will need to work with OMB
to examine exactly how that maintenance will be--or the data
collection will be funded.
Relative to the cost of this program, it will be quite
small. Again, the costs of this program have primarily been
invested prior to 2009.
Ms. Clarke. Okay.
Mr. Maurer, as a follow-up, your agency has done extensive
investigation into the ASP systems. What is your initial
reaction to this news? What questions would you have from GAO's
perspective?
Mr. Maurer. Sure. Thank you.
I think my initial reaction to it was it helps turn the
page for DNDO and the Department. This has been a troubling
chapter for them for many years. It is good to see that they
are sort of moving on.
It gives them also the opportunity to focus more broadly on
the GNDA as a whole, rather than become fixated on ASP. So, I
think it is good from that perspective.
More specifically, the plan to potentially deploy 13 of
these systems to allow them to be used in real-world settings,
we think that that sounds like a reasonable approach. I mean,
obviously we have not looked into all the details.
But it does seem to address one of the fundamental concerns
we have had over the years with DHS in that they have struggled
sometimes in defining clear requirements for acquisition
systems, including ASPs, as with many others. So, they can get
better real-world information how this kind of system could be
used, it could help make better decisions later down the road
for future technologies.
Obviously the key caveat there is we would not want to see
the continued fixation on the ASP program to the detriment of
all the other aspects of the GNDA.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
Mr. Pavetto and Mr. Stern, the Advanced Research Initiative
is a joint DNDO-National Science Foundation program that seeks
novel cross-cutting research.
I read recently that researchers at Fisk University and
Wake Forest University have partnered to develop certain
crystals that can be used to detect nuclear threats, and this
research came through a $900,000 grant from the Office of
Nuclear Proliferation R&D of the National Security--National
Nuclear Security Administration. Can you explain the importance
of promoting research of this kind throughout our Nation's
universities?
Mr. Stern. Sure. I will start. Fundamentally we are at a
state in detector technology that is a little bit ahead of
where we were 40 years ago. Detectors are bigger, they are more
efficient, they are better able to identify threats. But they
are nowhere as near the physical limits of where they can be.
To move in that direction in a serious way we need
dedication, discipline, and focus. We need basic research. Some
of that basic research has to be done at laboratories.
We at DNDO--I mean at the universities and laboratories
using the ARI program and other programs in DNDO we have
already produced new material that can help move forward into
the future that, for example, can help first responders and
policemen and firemen by allowing them to identify and detect
certain types of radiation you know with handheld devices they
could not have a few years ago.
So, supporting basic research as well as more advanced
research and development is an essential part of making America
safer and preventing a nuclear attack.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you.
Mr. Pavetto, just quickly.
Mr. Pavetto. Thank you for the question. Yes, I will be
very quick.
In addition to developing new technologies, in part because
of the aging nature of our technical capability what we are
doing is training the next--you know the next generation of
scientists, engineers, and folks who can lend their expertise
and their creative abilities to solving the problems that come
up in the future.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. Gentlelady yields back.
Now the baseball ringer for the Democratic Party, the one
who hit his arm until he got out on the field, Mr. Richmond, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Every once in a
while somebody gets lucky, so I just had a lucky day.
Mr. Lungren. For nine innings?
Mr. Richmond. Extremely lucky day.
I just have--and to Mr. Stern, just a quick question. As we
look at this, and I am trying to look at it from a
comprehensive level as a Congressman who represents an area
that has five of the largest 15 cargo ports in the United
States, and the largest port complex in the world.
What we heard from our city and our leaders in New Orleans
was that we were just cut from I believe it was the UASI grant
program to help us in security. So, how do I reconcile the fact
that we get cut on one hand, and then read your testimony and
listen to the testimony where we talk about how important ports
are in making sure that radioactive and nuclear devices do not
come into our country?
So, I am having a hard time reconciling that. Not to
mention that with three trade agreements on tap for sometime
this year that could also increase the number of cargo that
comes into the Port of New Orleans. It is kind of hard to do
that. Maybe you can help me do that.
Mr. Stern. Yes. I cannot speak in detail to the UASI grant
process as it is not within DNDO's focus. But, I mean
fundamentally, we are being cut in many places. That presents
challenges, which forces us to prioritize. This is actually one
of the key reasons I think that in my testimony and in other
times have talked about a new form of architecture, a surge
architecture that is more economically, financially efficient.
It is unfortunate that we have to make certain cuts. At
DNDO we work with State and locals to try and make sure that
they understand the threats and the risks and how to approach
grant applications and things like that. So, we try and bring
the greatest force possible and the greatest forces available
to nuclear detection. But there are sometimes bigger forces
that affect all of us.
Mr. Richmond. In terms of risk assessment or probability of
where a device or products or ingredients would come from,
where does ports or seawater, where does that rank in terms of
the likelihood of being used to get one of these devices into
the United States?
Mr. Stern. Yes. There are various models that look at this.
We have what is called the rentra process to examine different
pathways into the United States.
Ports will always be an important element because they are
an opportunity to constrain your adversary. So, the best that
we can do at ports, and perhaps what we are doing now, is to
ensure that they are good enough to deter the adversary from
using those ports.
I think even on a smaller scale, and for example at New
York City they use a similar approach in the sense that the
best you can do is make that pathway more difficult than any
other pathway. I think we are accomplishing that at ports.
Mr. Richmond. If anyone else wanted to comment on it, you
very well can because I would be interested in hearing your
information.
If not, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you.
Okay. We have time for a second round.
I want to--I do not want to just focus on the ports, but if
you know anything about the ports, if anybody knows anything
about the ports you realize the tremendous challenge that is
there with the--I mean the size of our cargo ships. I think you
have--I think if I am not mistaken--I hope I do not get this
wrong. I think it is like 8,000 cargo equivalents can be--units
can be on a single ship. I mean it is enormous.
So the challenge of course is with all those opportunities
for someone to do mischief, both bringing something into the
port by way of truck, but also when it is delivered from
overseas, the importance of being able to scan these things, to
screen these things in an efficient manner is huge. That is why
I keep coming back to the handheld.
That is great that we have the new material and that it can
be used and so forth. But when you look at the magnitude of the
challenge with these thousands of cargo units coming in, it
just seems to me that while we do not want to fixate on the
ASP, the program that has just been cancelled. I call it
canceled; I realize you still got the 13.
The efficiency would require us to come up with something
which allows us to do something more effectively with those
that are not handheld. Is it that we just do not have the
technology to do that? That the technological challenge has
proven to be too much?
I guess I would ask you what is the fundamental problem
with the program that we spent so much money and time on that
you have now basically cancelled?
Mr. Stern. Okay. Thank you for the question.
The fundamental problem, if it is a problem, is that we
have had a number of setbacks. In the interim in the commercial
sector companies have developed a number of portals that again
are commercially available. With that, and the challenges that
I described earlier, it is my view and the Department's view
that it does not make sense to proceed as we have been
proceeding, but instead to take a step back and say the world
has changed.
The amount of money that were invested many years ago were
invested and there is nothing we can do about that. But we need
to show leadership and make a core decision that makes the best
use of American dollars----
Mr. Lungren. So, you are not giving up on the idea of
portal monitors being something that we can improve in the
future. But perhaps there is alternative ways of solving that
problem.
Mr. Stern. Exactly. No question that I believe that at some
point in the future America will have a next generation
spectroscopic system. I think the decision today is that it
does not have to be a system that--the specific system we have
been working on.
Now, it may be when we open this up to commercial
competition, it may be that that company will decide to
compete, and it may be that they win.
Mr. Lungren. Okay.
Mr. Stern. We cannot prejudge that. But--and eventually we
will have to replace the PVTs also.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Daddario, especially for the interior
layer, the local and State agencies do much that the GNDA would
rely on in terms of detecting the movement of smuggling nuclear
radiological materials. Yet, as I understand it the GNDA
Strategic Plan addresses only the activities of the Federal
agencies, unless I am mistaken on that.
Did your agency--city--police department participate in the
development of the GNDA Strategic Plan? How have any of the
Federal agencies with which you work solicited your comment on
input on the role and responsibilities identified within the
GNDA Strategic Plan?
Mr. Daddario. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that we
participated in the development of the plan. However, we do
work closely with DNDO as part of Securing the Cities to create
a strategy or an architecture, to use the word I think that
commonly employed, for the protection of local areas, in our
case New York City and the surrounding communities. But we were
not involved in the development of the GNDA itself.
Mr. Lungren. Does that cause you any concern? In other
words, do you think there is something that you and your
department could contribute to the implementation, if not the
development of the GNDA?
Mr. Daddario. We always think we can offer something
useful. I would be concerned, except for the fact that we are
working so closely and I think effectively now with DNDO on the
Securing the Cities program that the fact that there is the
plan, the GNDA plan that was created separately is really not
of concern to me.
My--our concern at the police department is: Do we have the
assistance of the Federal Government in supporting our
objectives? I think we do have that.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
At this time I recognize the gentlelady from California,
Ms. Richardson, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, everyone, and thank you for being here in
your service. Just a couple of questions that I would like to
focus on; it seems as if we are still continuing to have
problems with international air cargo. Our progress has not
been as great as we would like.
Why has not DHS simply deployed sufficient PVTs and RIIDs
to scan baggage and passengers at airports as you already do at
land border crossings?
Mr. Stern. I am assuming that question is for me. Yes, we
do have challenges in international air cargo. Each airport,
unlike ports, is defined--are created very differently.
So, it is very hard to come up with a generic approach. Of
course we have to find where a PVT effectively fit. So, we have
not yet gotten to the point where we can define a localized
architecture for an airport for commercial cargo.
I will take this just quickly as an opportunity to state,
the way I am looking at the architecture, and the way we are
looking at the architecture now is very differently than we
looked at the architecture a year ago. When I came in we were
looking at a very static architecture.
But as an engineer and a physicist I know that technically
and financially that is not achievable. So we are looking at
the ability to surge assets in response to specific threats. We
will be looking at air cargo in the same way.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
My next question is both the Chairman and I happen to come
by way of California. My question is: Why has DHS made so
little progress on systematically scanning railcars entering
the United States from Mexico and Canada for nuclear and
radiological materials?
You have told GAO that the rail companies can be difficult
to deal with, and that this is a part of the reason for the
lack of progress. What exactly are the rail companies'
concerns? Is there anything this committee can do to help
resolve the problem?
Mr. Stern. I have to say I am not familiar with that
particular statement regarding the rail companies. But rail, as
air cargo, does present a particular issue on a day-to-day
basis because of the way trains operate.
In a sense, in an approach that relies on looking at trains
on a day-to-day basis. On a day-to-day basis it is going to be
very difficult to convince companies that are making a profit
to stop their trains, for example, so that we can effectively
measure their radiation.
But again, if we look at this new surge concept that when
there is intelligence, when there is a threat, when there is a
reason to act, we will have greater flexibility in the steps
that we take to scan, for example, trains or air cargo. I think
we will come up with a very different solution and approach.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. Let me be more specific. Do you have
a process with screening at the railcars currently?
Mr. Stern. No----
Ms. Richardson. With the various----
Mr. Stern. We have a program called IRAIL to try and find a
solution to the problem. We do not have yet a process to scan
railcars.
Ms. Richardson. When do you expect to have that?
Mr. Stern. When do--I cannot give you a date right now
because, again, we are reevaluating the way that we look at the
architecture. The scanning that we do on a day-to-day basis
will be different from the scanning that we do when there is a
high-end threat.
Ms. Richardson. Sir, are we talking about a year? Two
years? Five years?
Mr. Stern. Years.
Ms. Richardson. Years.
Mr. Stern. Not months, if that is the question.
Ms. Richardson. Are you working with the industry
themselves at this point?
Mr. Stern. I do not know. I will have to get back to you on
that.
Ms. Richardson. Who handles this area?
Mr. Stern. It is an element within DNDO.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. But who is responsible?
Mr. Stern. I am.
Ms. Richardson. Okay. So, you will get back to the
committee on this information.
Mr. Stern. Yes, I will provide full detail.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. Gentlelady yields back.
The Ranking Member's recognized for 5 minutes, second
round.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just ask that you also get back with us regarding
the contract on the ASP and whether there is anyway to recoup
any dollars. We are just trying to find money wherever we can.
Let me say that as a native New Yorker how proud I am, Mr.
Daddario, of the work that the New York City Police Department
has been doing with its partners. Certainly this development of
the wireless technology capability that you have talked about
is extraordinary. You are to be commended for your pursuit of
various technologies that could help not only our city, but
cities across the Nation.
I have been a fervent supporter of the Securing the Cities
Initiative along with our full Chairman, Mr. Thompson. We have
worked very closely to preserve as much as we can the funding
because we think that, as you have been able to demonstrate,
with a focused support we can provide other municipalities and
areas around the Nation with technologies that can be of
assistance to them as well in protecting our Nation.
Let me ask: How successful as the STC program been in the
New York City region? How much of that success depends upon
coordination and cooperation between State and local partners?
I am concerned about the partnership aspect of this.
Mr. Stern, if you could add also.
Mr. Daddario. First, Congresswoman, thank you for your kind
remarks about the police department and your support for the
STC program.
Coordination is essential for the success of this program.
I think that what the police department and its partners have
been able to do here is really unprecedented. We have put
together really a community of law enforcement and public
safety agencies working toward a common purpose, and I think
very effectively is borne out in the April exercise.
But there is more to it than that. It is the way we have
developed the system is to use at its core a network, and that
is the--which Lower Manhattan Security Initiative and the
control center. I would like to invite any member of the
committee who would like to come and visit it to do so.
The network allows data from all kinds of sensors including
cameras and radiation detectors to come to a common point and
to be reviewed and the data to be collected and be subject to
analysis. I think there is no other system like that anywhere.
With the development and the rolling out of the wireless
capability we will be able to get enormous amounts of data,
which I think will be useful to DNDO to assess the
effectiveness of equipment, and to help figure out ways to both
improve it and to improve the way in which it is deployed.
There may be solutions, innovative solutions to the detection
of radiological sources moving through time and space that will
become apparent once this data is analyzed.
So, that is something we really want to be able to work
closely with Dr. Stern and his people on. I know Dr. Stern has
invited us to meet with his researchers, and I think that is a
very good step and a strong sign of the good partnership we
have with the Federal Government.
Mr. Stern. Yes, just to echo quickly what Deputy
Commissioner said, coordination is one of the primary benefits
of the STC program. Within which 13 local organizations led by
the NYPD have acted together. This was demonstrated, of course,
in the exercise this spring.
I think there is good cooperation and coordination between
the STC program and Federal entities. But I think as part of
this surge concept we need to move forward and enhance that.
That, of course, is one of the key elements of the next phase
of the STC program.
So, overall there is incredible amount of cooperation and
coordination on the local and State level, and with the Federal
level. But in terms of moving the program forward I think we
need to put this together into one big surge concept where when
there is a threat we are all ready to act.
Ms. Clarke. So, having that construct in place already
makes that surge capability more likely and certainly enables
it to happen more fluidly. Would not you say?
Mr. Stern. No question. You are completely correct. State
and local authorities have to be the cornerstone of the surge
because they are the only ones that have control on the ground
with the capabilities and the manpower. So.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much. Gentlelady yields back.
I want to thank the witnesses for the valuable testimony,
and the Members for their questions. The Members of the
committee may have some additional questions for you. If we do,
we will submit those to you in writing. We would ask that you
would respond to these in writing.
This hearing record will be held open for 10 days. Thank
you, not only for your testimony, but for the service that you
are rendering this Nation in your particular responsibilities.
This subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Questions for Warren M. Stern From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren
advanced spectroscopic portal (asp) program
Question 1a. Given the news in your testimony that after 5 years,
you will be ending the ASP program, can you please explain: How the
Department came to this decision now?
Answer. The ASP Program was established in 2004 to improve
radiation and nuclear detection capabilities at our seaports and land
border crossings and to address technical deficiencies in the existing
radiation portal program. Over the years, the program has faced many
operational and technical challenges. In February 2010, the then-Acting
Director of DNDO briefed Congress that we were limiting consideration
of certification of the ASP program to secondary scanning rather than
primary scanning due to technical challenges and cost.
Since then, there has been an important development. The most
recent field validation revealed that the original design specification
for ASP, jointly developed by CBP and DNDO in 2007, does not adequately
reflect the operational needs in the field, particularly truck speeds
for secondary inspection.
Question 1b. Why will you be deploying 13 ASP systems?
Answer. We will immediately begin to utilize a total of 13 existing
ASP Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) systems at select ports of entry
to facilitate operational familiarity with the systems and gather data
to support future acquisition programs.
Question 1c. Where are the funds to deploy the 13 ASP systems
coming from?
Answer. DNDO will use Radiation Portal Monitor Program (RPMP) funds
to deploy 9 of the 13 ASP LRIP units to ports of entry and to move the
4 currently deployed units to new positions at ports of entry.
Secretary Napolitano has directed DNDO and CBP to work with the Office
of Management and Budget and the Appropriations subcommittees to make
recommendations on redeploying the requested fiscal year 2012
resources, prioritizing the procurement of next-generation handheld
detection and identification systems.
Question 1d. What is the anticipated time frame for initiating a
future acquisition program of advanced radiological and nuclear
detection systems to replace the ASP effort?
Answer. We anticipate that a new acquisition program, incorporating
revised operational requirements and the model-test-model approach
recommended by the National Academy of Sciences to detector evaluation
will be initiated based on the data collected from the ASP LRIP units.
Question 2. It has been reported by GAO that energy windowing might
improve the ability of the current PVT radiation portal monitors to
detect certain nuclear materials and be more cost-effective than ASPs.
Have you completed this energy windowing research and updated this
capability of the currently deployed PVTs? If not, when will this be
complete?
Answer. We are developing methods for improving the current
generation of polyvinyl toluene (PVT)-based portal monitors, including
studies on energy windowing. We expect to evaluate these projects for
PVT improvements and make a determination on deployments in fiscal year
2012. Please note that PVT systems are equipped with current energy
windowing algorithms that were upgraded previously. Additionally,
improved material detection, while laudable, is not a satisfactory
substitute for material identification, and PVT systems with energy
windowing will not be capable of identifying nuclear material.
HELIUM-3 SHORTAGE
Question 3a. I understand that DNDO is developing alternative
neutron detection technologies to replace Helium-3 detectors in
radiation portal monitors because of the shortage. But the validation
process appears to be moving slowly.
What is the status of this effort for near-term alternatives?
Answer. Boron-lined tube alternative to 3He The Alternate Neutron
Detector Module (ANDM) has been integrated into an RPM and the system
was successfully installed at the Port of Oakland for field validation
that was recently completed.
DNDO also sponsored the Neutron Detector Replacement Program
(NDRP). By working with several vendors simultaneously to find a
commercial solution to an alternative technology to helium-3 based
neutron detectors, DNDO is encouraging competition that we expect will
lead to cost reductions, increased availability, and an acceleration of
the replacement detectors to the commercial market. DNDO tested a total
of 11 near-commercial-ready systems at the Nevada National Security
Site this summer. (Please see table below.) Testing recently concluded
and we are analyzing the results.
Four of the 11 systems were provided in response to a DNDO-issued
request for proposal.
MODULES TESTED AT NNSS
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Item No.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
1......................................... \6\LiF/ZnS(Ag) Wavelength-
Shifting Fibers
2......................................... 5"x60" LiF/ZnS(Ag)
Wavelength-Shifting Fibers
3......................................... Boron-lined copper tube
proportional counters
(straws)
4......................................... PVT Wavelength-Shifting
Light Guide
5......................................... NeuSand Neutron Detector
Module
6......................................... Boron Tri-Fluoride (BF3)
Design
7......................................... n-Gamma PVT detector for
both gamma-ray and neutron
detection (test against
neutron sources only)
8......................................... Gas Avalanche Neutron
Detector (GAND)
9......................................... Neutron Reference Detection
System (NRDS) (formerly
referred to as the R3D)*
10........................................ HPGe spectrometer (ground
truth)*
11........................................ Shielded Neutron Assay Probe
(SNAP)*
------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Numbers 9, 10, and 11 are reference detectors (i.e., used to analyze)
that were not tested but were utilized to provide measurement
information.
Question 3b. When do you plan to resume production and deployment
of radiation portal monitors with the new technology?
Answer. At the end of July 2011 DNDO completed its evaluation of
the boron lined tube alternative to helium-3. Although the alternative
passed all the functional requirements, the has demonstrated that there
are other more cost-effective technologies available that should be
considered before the final selection is made. Furthermore, by
evaluating the other alternative technologies to replace the helium-3-
based neutron detectors, DNDO is encouraging competition in the
commercial sector, reducing the overall cost, and improving
manufacturability of the new technologies. The current plan is to
complete the evaluation process against possible alternatives to
helium-3 neutron detection and procure the new systems in the last
fiscal quarter of fiscal year 2012.
Question 4. What are your top three priorities with respect to
implementation of the domestic GNDA?
Answer. Priority No. 1: Domain awareness remains the No. 1 GNDA
priority. The ability to detect, identify, and encounter conveyances
and people in land, air, and sea pathways as they cross U.S. borders
establishes the foundation for the prevention of radiological and
nuclear threats being transported into the United States.
Priority No. 2: The development of advanced technology that
increases the ability of the United States to detect and identify
radiological/nuclear threats, particularly the more difficult to detect
nuclear weapons, component parts, or special nuclear materials.
Priority No. 3: Reinforcing nuclear detection capabilities within
the interior by increasing State and local nuclear detection programs
and partnerships. State and local agencies serve as a force multiplier,
significantly augmenting Federal nuclear detection capabilities within
the U.S. interior. Efforts such as the Securing the Cities Initiative
establish a baseline nuclear detection capability for State and local
agencies, which can be mobilized in the event of actionable
intelligence in addition to providing a deterrence effect in day-to-day
operations.
Question 5a. Although the DHS strategic plan for the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture issued in December 2010 is a very positive
development, the plan is very short on the specific information that
might give this committee some indication on whether acceptable
progress in developing and deploying the architecture is being made.
How do you measure progress and sufficiency in implementation of
the GNDA?
Answer. DNDO uses a number of mechanisms to measure progress and
effectiveness of various elements of the GNDA. Examples include, but
are not limited to, exercises, pilot-programs, stake-holder working
groups, and red team assessments. In addition, DNDO, in partnership
with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), has started a project to
develop metrics for the GNDA. With the help of the NAS, DNDO will be
developing quantitative and qualitative metrics to measure
effectiveness of the GNDA. These metrics will be incorporated into the
GNDA Implementation Plan, currently in development and expected to be
completed by the end of this calendar year.
Question 5b. How would you rate overall progress in implementing
the GNDA, as well as the performance of the various agencies within it?
Answer. As reported in Section 6 of the GNDA Annual Report 2011,
there have been substantial improvements to the GNDA in the past 5
years. While quantitative ratings are difficult to generate, overall
progress in deploying systems and establishing detection capabilities
has been very good. Additionally, significant progress has been made in
the past year on coordination and reporting.
Question 6. How is the GNDA being used to inform program planning
and prioritization?
Answer. The GNDA is used throughout the solutions development
process to prioritize and plan all DNDO programs. In particular, the
GNDA is used in the first stage of the process to identify and
prioritize needs in the GNDA that must be addressed by U.S. Government
programs. From this analysis, DNDO prioritizes its programs to address
the gaps within DNDO's area of responsibility. The GNDA is used later
in the process to evaluate effectiveness of DNDO programs and to
refocus resources to ensure DNDO continually targets its resources to
the highest priority gaps.
Question 7. Does DNDO provide any GNDA analysis support to other
Federal, State, and local agencies to help inform planning and
prioritization of their activities?
Answer. DNDO's GNDA analysis, created with its the stakeholders,
can serve as a useful data point to help inform planning and
prioritization of activities, identify gaps and vulnerabilities, and
offer potential solutions to address weaknesses.
DNDO has also developed a Preventive Radiological and Nuclear
Detection Capability Development Framework for use by State, local, and
Tribal agencies in determining targeted levels of radiological and
nuclear detection capability based on risk factors and increased
likelihood of encountering illicit radiological and nuclear material.
The CDF serves as a tool for users to determine targeted levels of
assets and capabilities for nuclear detection.
Additionally, DNDO's Joint Analysis Center examines radiological/
nuclear-related information from detectors, the intelligence community,
law enforcement, and other sources to help develop, improve, and
operate the GNDA. This information and related analyses are provided to
stakeholders/decision makers in a timely manner to help them plan and
prioritize their activities.
Question 8. What mechanisms are in place to harmonize efforts among
agencies involved in the GNDA so that their programs all work together
toward the GNDA strategic goals?
Answer. DNDO is in the process of formalizing the interagency
governance structure leveraged for the development of the GNDA
Strategic Plan and the Joint Interagency Annual Review. This
coordinating body will include representatives from the DHS Nuclear
Terrorism Working Group and Nuclear Terrorism Sub Group, as well as
representatives from the interagency.
Question 9a. The GNDA strategic plan identifies Federal agency
roles and responsibilities within the GNDA. While State and local
radiological and nuclear detection capabilities are key to the success
of the GNDA, especially in the interior layer, the GNDA strategic plan
does not attempt to assign roles or responsibilities to State or local
officials.
What input did DNDO gather from State and local agencies during the
development of the GNDA strategic plan?
Answer. DNDO did not expressly solicit input from State and local
agencies for the GNDA strategic plan during its development; however,
DNDO personnel have had extensive interaction with the State and local
community over the past several years, and insights gleaned from those
interactions significantly contributed to the development of the
strategic plan.
Question 9b. How are the Federal roles and responsibilities
communicated to State and local participants?
Answer. Since the release of the GNDA Strategic Plan in December
2010, DNDO has shared the GNDA Strategic Plan with State and locals
through outreach forums such as DNDO's State and Local Executive
Steering Council, the State and Local Stakeholder Working Group
meeting, and the Community of Interest website.
Question 10a. While the GNDA strategic plan is complete, no plan
yet exists to implement this plan.
What are your plans to develop a domestic implementation plan?
Answer. DNDO currently is coordinating development of a DHS
Domestic Implementation Plan, which is expected to be completed by the
end of calendar year 2011.
Question 10b. Will this plan reflect only DHS roles and
responsibilities or will it include other Federal, State, and local
domestic efforts?
Answer. The current plan will address DHS roles and
responsibilities within the domestic portion of the GNDA and will
address other Federal, State, and local efforts as related to DHS's
programs and efforts.
Question 10c. When will a Federal domestic implementation plan
including all participating agencies be complete?
Answer. The current plan is for DNDO to coordinate a Government-
wide domestic implementation plan immediately after completion of the
DHS Domestic Implementation Plan. We expect that effort to begin in
calendar year 2012.
Question 11a. The Federal approach to the GNDA appears to have
shifted from being highly technology-focused to a ``surge
architecture,'' in which intelligence information and other factors
play a more prominent role.
What prompted this philosophical change?
Answer. The change emphasizes the importance of having the ability
to surge GNDA assets and capabilities in response to specific
intelligence information. Much of the GNDA is designed to conduct
steady-state (day-to-day) operations. However, the systems that
comprise the GNDA also need the ability to adjust to information and
intelligence. Given the physical limitations of detection and the
current fiscal environment, in order to respond to warnings or advance
information about threats we will need to operate in ways that we could
not sustain on a day-to-day basis, and will need to surge capabilities,
thus the term ``surge architecture.'' Ensuring that those plans,
procedures, and capabilities exist and can be executed on short notice
when needed is the thrust of this new focus. Notwithstanding, both
steady-state and ``surge'' operations are vital to ensuring a holistic
approach to combating the threat.
Question 11b. Can you give a couple of examples of how the
architecture would surge?
Answer. Surge means to augment or introduce additional nuclear and
radiological detection or search assets and capabilities into a
geographic area or pathway for a limited time to address a potential
threat or heightened vulnerability, increase deterrence, or respond to
a credible threat.
For example, if information is received that indicates a threat is
inbound to a target, the components of the architecture can ``surge''
(through the augmentation or introduction of additional assets and
capabilities) to a specific area to address the threat.
A second example would be a major public event (NSSE or SEAR level)
in which additional assets and capabilities can be introduced to a
venue during the event.
Question 11c. Has this conceptual shift altered existing programs
in terms of deployments and budgets?
Answer. The impact of surge to date has been more focused on
ensuring that existing programs and systems have the ability to surge
if needed, although future year budget requests include small shifts to
focus on the development of additional ``surge-able'' Federal assets.
Question 11d. Would DNDO's ``surge'' concept apply globally, as
well as domestically?
Answer. The concept would apply both globally and domestically.
Question 12. DNDO appears to be making progress in developing
standards for nuclear detection systems. How are these standards
applied to equipment used at the Federal, State, and local level?
Answer. DNDO has two primary standards programs: A program to
support voluntary consensus standards development and a program to
support the development of Government-unique technical capability
standards.
DNDO works with the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) to support working groups including representation from vendors,
users, customers, Government, and academia. The working groups identify
standards requirements and develop consensus standards to satisfy those
requirements. Existing consensus standards are also periodically
reviewed to determine when updates are required. These identify the
basic criteria for performance, functionality, and operability and are
used across Government and the private sector for equipment development
and design. These voluntary standards are applicable to equipment in
use at the Federal, State, and local level.
DNDO has also created the Graduated Radiological/Nuclear Detector
Evaluation and Reporting (GRaDERSM) program to facilitate
vendor-funded testing of commercial-off-the-shelf (nuclear detection
and identification equipment, against consensus standards. DNDO is
working with NIST National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program
to accredit laboratories to test vendor equipment against the consensus
standards at any time, in addition to DNDO-funded testing. Test results
may be made available, with vendor permission, to appropriate Federal,
State, and local entities through the FEMA Responder Knowledge Base
website. GRaDERSM tests equipment in a uniform way against
the consensus standards and makes sure that results are presented in a
standardized format.
The Government unique standards program is threat-informed and
supports the development of technical capability standards (TCS) for
radiological and nuclear detection. The SAFE Port Act of 2006 directed
the Secretary, through the Director of DNDO, in collaboration with
NIST, to develop TCS for non-intrusive imaging and radiation detection
equipment in the United States. The TCS Working Group is an interagency
group also supported by several National laboratories. The TCS will be
used to define testing requirements in addition to those contained in
existing voluntary consensus standards. This additional testing will
assist Federal, State, and local agencies in identifying the particular
equipment best suited to their needs.
Question 13a. Can you briefly explain progress being made to
address gaps in the architecture that DHS and GAO have raised in the
past? Specifically:
Scanning railcars entering the U.S. from Mexico and Canada?
Answer. DNDO is collaborating with CBP on the International Rail
(IRAIL) program to identify solutions to address the operational and
technical challenges of scanning railcars. Actions completed include:
Mission Needs Statement (MNS), signed by both CBP and DNDO.
Preliminary CONOPS (P-CONOPS)--Fiscal year 2011.
Capability Development Plan (CDP)--Fiscal year 2011. The CDP
sets the framework for an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) which
leverages other work activities including the International
Rail Threat and Gap Study. The AoA, which is anticipated to
begin at the end of fiscal year 2011, and assess potential
scanning solutions and their associated tradeoffs.
Completed a study on International Rail threats and have
consolidated findings that will guide further program
implementation. DNDO is evaluating responses to a Request for
Information issued in 2010 to inform the AoA.
DNDO has also engaged in discussions with Second Line of
Defense (SLD) to leverage lessons learned from SLD's deployment
of radiation detectors in foreign countries.
Question 13b. Scanning international air cargo? (e.g., Why can't
DHS deploy the current PVT technology in combination with RIIDs to scan
baggage and passengers at airports as you already do at land border
crossings?)
Answer. Fixed RPMs are currently installed at three airports to
scan inbound air cargo. Since the fall of 2010, significant efforts
have been made to characterize air port of entry (APOE) environments to
support planning and evaluation activities, leading to an appropriate
deployment of fixed, mobile, relocatable, and human portable systems to
scan inbound international air cargo. DNDO is currently working closely
with CBP to develop a mission needs statement, capability development
plan, and preliminary-CONOPs based on findings from the APOE
characterization efforts. The culmination of these efforts will inform
the selection of radiological and nuclear detection systems at APOEs in
the future.
Regarding passengers and baggage, in early 2011 radiological and
nuclear scanning systems for commercial passenger/baggage were
commissioned at two pre-clearance sites. DNDO and CBP also completed a
pilot program to determine operational feasibility of scanning
international passengers/baggage at APOEs. DNDO is currently conducting
a cost/benefit analysis to assist in determining the relative
prioritization of international passenger/bag scanning. Depending on
results of this cost/benefit analysis; DNDO will engage CBP on options
for future capability development within that pathway.
Question 13c. Scanning for radiation in the maritime environment?
What has DHS learned from the pilot projects in San Diego and Puget
Sound and how does the Department plan to act in response to this
experience?
Answer. The following are the key lessons learned from the West
Coast Maritime Pilot (WCMP) effort in the San Diego and Puget Sound
regions:
State, local, and Tribal maritime law enforcement and first
responder assets are a proven force multiplier and can greatly
increase the number of vessels screened during routine
operations. In Puget Sound, training and equipping State,
local, and Tribal maritime forces will potentially increase
nuclear detection screening substantially.
USCG leadership is key to establishing an effective regional
nuclear detection framework. During the exercise (highlighted
again during the STC maritime exercise) USCG provided the
command, control, and coordination when establishing security
zones.
The Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC), led by the USCG
Captain of the port, provides an ideal framework for
establishing a regionally-based small vessel nuclear detection
program. In accordance with the Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002 and 33 CFR Part 103, the AMSC is required
to coordinate Federal, State, and local actions to enhance the
security of the Maritime Transportation System.
Most regions will likely require support from existing
State, local, and Tribal maritime agencies or from other
agencies outside of the region to establish a maritime nuclear
detection security zone.
Nuclear detection is a perishable skill, requiring frequent
refresher training and drill training to stay proficient.
The pilot was beneficial in other mission areas outside of
nuclear detection because it brought together agency
representatives on a regular basis, and gave them the
opportunity to interact one-on-one, and as small regional
groups. The benefits of collaboration were echoed by the
majority of agency representatives who participated in the
pilot.
These lessons learned, CONOPs and SOPs, equipment selection guide,
training guidance, and other supporting documentation produced for the
WCMP are being consolidated and will form the basis for nuclear
detection capabilities in other regions, significantly reducing the
amount of time and resources needed to establish additional
capabilities. DNDO's Maritime Program Assistance will work through the
regional AMSCs to provide guidance in developing a regional approach to
maritime nuclear detection and take advantage of existing coordination
mechanisms already established in the maritime region.
Question 14. During a site visit to New York several years ago, the
committee was informed of the risks and security issues associated with
radiological sources used in many of our major hospitals. Is DNDO still
involved in addressing this security gap? If so, what progress has been
made in this area? Can you explain the decision that was made to
exclude source security activities from the GNDA?
Answer. Source security is vitally important to radiological
terrorism defense overall, and the notification of the loss of security
for radioactive sources should serve as a trigger for the GNDA.
However, DNDO has determined to focus on its core responsibility--which
is to find nuclear and radiological material out of regulatory control
rather than focus on efforts that are being covered by other USG
partners' efforts. DNDO remains engaged on source security issued
through interagency trilateral meetings with DOE, NRC, and DHS. The STC
program in NYC includes a subcommittee focused on source security
issues in the NYC region, as well.
Question 15. Can you address the degree to which alarm resolution
protocols are established and shared across Federal, State, and local
levels to ensure that alarms lead to timely and effective response to
include notification of appropriate authorities?
Answer. DNDO established standardized alarm adjudication protocols
for Federal alarms in the classified annex to NSPD 43/HSPD 14.
Protocols for the National level reachback are communicated with
Federal, State, and local mission partners, including triggers for
escalation to higher levels. The annex also covers notifications when
alarms reach certain levels. State and local protocols vary from State
to State and among organizations within a State, but the Joint Analysis
Center collects these various protocols to maintain awareness of how
alarms progress through the S&L level into the Federal system.
Question 16. According to the Homeland Security Act, DHS has
operational control of the Nuclear Incident Response Team (NIRT) in
connection with an actual or threatened WMD attack. The Act also makes
DHS responsible for setting standards for the NIRT and certifying when
those standards are met. How is this implemented?
Answer. This question should be directed to the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), which is responsible for implementing the
NIRT.
Question 17. The FBI has emerged from the strategic planning
process with more responsibility within the GNDA than it previously
had. As the coordinator of the strategic planning process, can you
describe how the FBI rose to this prominent role?
Answer. DNDO is a National-level that includes personnel detailed
from the FBI. Both NSPD-43/HSPD-14 and the SAFE Port Act of 2006
articulate responsibilities for the Attorney General relative to the
GNDA, and the FBI has played an active role in DNDO from the early days
of its existence. Execution of the GNDA requires substantial law
enforcement efforts--at Federal, State, local, and Tribal levels--so it
is quite appropriate for the FBI to have such a prominent role. In
addition, in the event of a nuclear or radiological incident, the FBI,
as the lead Federal agency for criminal investigation, will need to
work closely with others with preventive, GNDA responsibilities,
providing intelligence and other information in order to prevent
further attacks.
Question 18a. According to DHS policy, the S&T Directorate is
responsible for reviewing mission need statements, concept of
operations documents, and operational requirements documents.
Can you describe DNDO's interaction with S&T in this regard?
Question 18b. Have these interactions changed over the last couple
of years and how important are they for the effectiveness of the GNDA?
Answer. The GNDA outlines the requirements needed to secure the
borders of the United States whether the detection function is
performed domestically or abroad. The S&T Directorate responsibility
within the Department to review the mission need statement, concept of
operations documents, and the operational requirements documents in
order to ensure that appropriate testing and acquisition procedures are
being applied to large acquisition progams (DHS Level 1 and Level 2
programs). By having an independent organization like S&T review these
documents and weigh in on the technical merit ensures good technical
judgment and sound principals will be used in the field.
Question 19. What lessons have been learned from STC implementation
in the New York City region, specifically from the recent full-scale
exercise in NY?
Answer. DNDO has recorded lessons learned from the STC Program
since its inception. These lessons have been incorporated into program
guiding documents such as the funding opportunity announcements and in
the draft program plan that will be provided to Congress later this
year. These lessons are further documented in assessment reports
produced by DNDO's Red Team and Net Assessment's Directorate and an
external assessment of the program that have been previously provided
to Congress.
DNDO is currently finalizing an assessment report detailing lessons
learned from the April 2011 STC full-scale exercise. Some initial
observations include:
Full-scale exercise demonstrated nuclear detection readiness
by the vast majority of law enforcement personnel involved.
Most participants had equipment ready, were familiar with
its use (from training), and showed an acceptable level of
experience.
Although not an element of the STC CONOPs, the Emergency
Operations Center (EOC) facilitated the flow of information and
event visibility throughout the STC region. NYPD and the STC
CONOPs committee will incorporate an EOC into the CONOPs, based
upon the exercise.
The DNDO JAC was utilized for reachback support extensively
during the 5-day event.
Question 20. Are you helping NY develop metrics by which progress
of the STC initiative can be measured and to help determine when NY has
achieved a level of capability that is sufficient and would require
sustainment?
Answer. DNDO is establishing measures to evaluate the degree to
which STC meets program goals and objectives and is working with its
STC partners to collect quarterly information to gauge progress toward
meeting these program goals and objectives.
DNDO has provided tools to assist State, local, and Tribal partners
(including STC NYC partners) to help determine sufficient capability.
The PRND Capabilities Development Framework (CDF) assists State, local,
and Tribal jurisdictions to identify and develop targeted levels of
radiological and nuclear detection capability based on risk factors and
increased likelihood of encountering illicit radiological and nuclear
material.
DNDO will require the STC NYC partners to deliver a regional
sustainment plan detailing each partner's plans to maintain equipment
and personnel proficiency. The STC partners must be prepared to
sustain/support radiological and nuclear detection capabilities beyond
DNDO direct financial assistance.
Question 21. This committee often hears about issues associated
with sustaining and upgrading existing capabilities at the State and
local level. How will DNDO support States and locals in this effort?
Answer. STC provides funding to establish an initial nuclear
detection capability in the STC region. This initial capability also
includes funding to maintain equipment and maintain proficiency of
operators during Phases I and II of implementation. The STC partners
must be prepared to sustain/support radiological and nuclear detection
capabilities beyond DNDO direct financial assistance.
Questions for Carl Pavetto From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren
GLOBAL NUCLEAR DETECTION ARCHITECTURE
Question 1. What are the DOE's three priorities with respect to
implementation of the domestic GNDA?
Answer. NNSA works closely with the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO) in planning and implementation of the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture (GNDA). The Office of Emergency Operations
operates primarily within the U.S. Target Vicinity and the U.S. Target
Layers of the GNDA. The top priority for the Office of Emergency
Operations is the development and implementation of the Interagency
Domestic Radiological/Nuclear Search Plan (IADRNSP). This plan is a
joint effort of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the DNDO,
and the Department of Defense (DoD). The plan was formally approved by
the four partnering agencies and the White House National Security
Staff on May 27, 2011. Implementation of the GNDA is the DOE's
priority. Accordingly, the Office of Emergency Operations has the lead
in developing the DOE-specific tactical guidelines for IADRNSP. This
work is on-going.
Question 2. Are you working on a domestic implementation plan with
DNDO or separately?
Answer. NNSA's Offices of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and
Emergency Operations work together with DNDO (and other Federal
agencies including FBI and DoD) to develop a Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture (GNDA) implementation plan. This joint work is being
conducted through the same Interagency Working Group that led to the
development of the Joint Annual Interagency Review 2011, GNDA Strategic
Plan 2010, and the Joint Annual Interagency Review 2011 GNDA Annual
Report. DNDO has indicated that it will initially develop a DHS
domestic implementation plan before proceeding to an interagency
implementation plan. Although NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative
(GTRI) is not a component of the GNDA, GTRI has made a concerted effort
to coordinate its implementation plans and progress with DNDO and
others in the interagency.
Question 3. What mechanisms do you have to coordinate or interact
with DNDO with respect to the GNDA?
Answer. NNSA's Offices of Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation and
Emergency Operations participate in several working groups with DNDO on
the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA) and participated in
the Policy Working Group that developed the GNDA Strategic Plan and
produced the GNDA Joint Interagency Annual Report.
The Office of Emergency Operations is a party to several
interagency agreements that allow DNDO to leverage DOE's technical and
operational resources. For example, the Office develops and carries out
training and exercise programs in a collaborative effort with DNDO that
ultimately leads to synergies in the Nation's response capabilities and
capacity. Specifically, the Office of Emergency Operations supports
DNDO's Securing the Cities Initiative (STC), provides training pursuant
to the Preventative Radiological Nuclear Detection (PRND) training
program, provides training under the TSA Visible Intermodal Protection
and Response (VIPR) training program, and provides equipment and
technical support to DNDO for its Mobile Detection Deployment Program
(MDDP).
The Office of Emergency Operations provides National Reachback for
spectral analysis of radiological and nuclear material through two
pathways--through radiological Triage whereby international, Federal,
State, Tribal, and local officials can obtain spectral analysis at no
cost, and, through providing technical assistance to DNDO's Secondary
Reachback (SRB) program.
DOE/NNSA and DNDO have been and will continue to cooperate on
procedures for data submission, analysis, and reporting to provide
consistent, high quality, responses and information to the National
leadership in the event of a nuclear or radiological incident.
NNSA's Second Line of Defense (SLD) program works with DNDO as part
of the Border Monitoring Working Group to coordinate international
cooperation on detection monitoring activities at borders related to
nuclear security.
SLD also participates in the equipment test and evaluation
campaign, ITRAP+10, an effort managed by DNDO and the European
Commission Joint Research Centre. Additionally, SLD participates in the
development of guidance documents related to the prevention of global
illicit trafficking organized by DNDO under the auspices of the Global
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT).
NNSA's Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) participated in
the Policy Working Group contributing to the GNDA Strategic Plan and
Annual Report. Additional on-going coordination occurs through frequent
meetings with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), including
DNDO, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). GTRI and DNDO also both participate in the 13-
agency Interagency Task Force on Radiation Source Protection and
Security, which includes representation from the Organization of
Agreement States and the Conference of Radiation Control Program
Directors. Similarly, DNDO and GTRI participate as members of the
Nuclear Government Coordinating Council (NGCC) that consists of Federal
and State government entities with a role and responsibility in nuclear
security as well as radiological emergency preparedness and response
activities. Also, GTRI has shared its threat reduction studies with
DNDO and has provided internationally recognized National laboratory
subject matter experts to participate in DNDO's studies.
NNSA, through its nuclear counterterrorism program, is working
closely with DNDO, the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST), and the interagency to develop standards for the various types
of detectors. These standards will include minimum detection levels and
capabilities as well as testing and verification procedures for portal,
backpack, mobile detector, and radioisotopic identification systems.
The Office of Science and Technology Policy/National Science and
Technology Council's Committee on Homeland and National Security
sponsors a subcommittee on standards, the goal of which is to develop
National consensus on the standards and a National test and
infrastructure for Chemical Biological Radiation Nuclear Explosive
(CBRNE) technologies.
NNSA also supports DNDO's mandate regarding the GNDA by providing
an employee as a detailee to DNDO.
All of these efforts are in addition to the interagency work on the
GNDA Strategic Plan 2010 which included representatives from a number
of DOE/NNSA organizations and the Joint Annual Interagency Review 2011
to which NNSA fully contributes.
Question 4a. The GNDA strategic goals may differ from the goals of
specific NNSA programs. As a result, GNDA priorities, viewed separately
from other NNSA priorities may suggest increased or decreased
investment in existing programs.
How does NNSA consider the GNDA strategic goals when prioritizing
NNSA programs and developing budgets?
Answer. The GNDA strategic goals are accounted for in NNSA's
planning, programming, budgeting, and evaluation (PPBE) process.
Integral to this process is the creation of an integrated priority list
(IPL), which is a successful mechanism for program managers to conduct
internal trade-off analyses within a defined budget target. NNSA has an
exemplary track record of supporting interagency needs that can be met
through its programs and the array of capabilities available throughout
its nuclear security enterprise.
Question 4b. How does NNSA evaluate programmatic progress or
success in context of the GNDA?
Answer. Most work undertaken in partnership with, or on behalf of,
an interagency partner is accompanied by a memorandum of understanding
and a program plan. Program plans often include performance metrics and
key milestones against which performance is measured.
Question 5a. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 110-53) requires that each agency in
the GNDA annually assess its participation in and implementation of the
GNDA and jointly report to Congress.
What have been the results of NNSA's assessments?
Question 5b. What steps has NNSA taken to build upon these
assessments in order to help inform NNSA's future investments?
Answer. NNSA's role is limited to submitting input to DNDO for the
use in preparing the GNDA joint interagency annual report. NNSA and
DNDO collaboratively perform planning reviews, program assessments, and
prepare plans. As a result of this cooperation between the two
agencies, NNSA and DNDO are able to jointly identify priorities.
Question 6. NNSA programs deploy a variety of radiation detection
technologies such as backpacks, mobile detectors, and radio-isotope
identifiers. These programs are all included in the GNDA. When
considering technologies for use in the GNDA, do you coordinate with
DNDO and other agencies acquiring similar technologies or requirements?
Do you use the same design basis threat standards?
Answer. NNSA's Office of Emergency Operations and DNDO have worked
and continue to work in a cooperative effort. Together, these two
organizations have established a Technology Integration Committee that,
among other things, evaluates proposals for radiation detection
technological enhancements and conducts joint testing of equipment.
The detection technologies used by the interagency are dictated by
the physics of radiation interactions with matter. Further improvements
to radiation detection require scientific and engineering developments
that are on the forefront of our understanding of the underlying
physics of radiation detection and materials science. Improvements to
currently available technology are necessitated by the details of the
physical implementation and the concept of operations of the teams
involved. These details can differ significantly for these teams and
can define the optimal technologies used. Government research programs
for radiation detection are coordinated through the Office of Science
and Technology Policy (OSTP), which sponsors the Nuclear Defense
Research and Development subcommittee of the National Science and
Technology Council.
NNSA routinely exchanges technical threat information with DNDO and
the interagency. It does so in order to maximize the potential for
radiation detection systems to detect existing and potential nuclear
devices while maintaining the high levels of security that this
extremely sensitive threat information requires. These potential
threats include the full range of both improvised nuclear devices and
State-built nuclear weapons. Both DNDO and the NNSA use this
information to inform the standards for designing nuclear threat
detection systems.
NNSA's Second Line of Defense (SLD) program coordinates and
exchanges technical and operational information concerning nuclear
security detection monitoring equipment with DNDO through a variety of
formal and informal mechanisms. As part of this coordination, SLD
experts have served as key participants in the Technical Capability
Standards Working Group, created as a result of the requirements of the
Safe Port Act of 2006, to publish technical capability standards for
radiation detection equipment in the United States. The initial result,
Technical Capability Standard for Hand-held Instruments Used for the
Detection and Identification of Radionuclides is near completion and
will provide an agreed-upon standard for U.S. deployed equipment. SLD
utilizes research and deployment experience from multiple agencies,
including other components of the Department of Energy, as well as the
Departments of Homeland Security and Defense, determine what types of
equipment to deploy. For example, the research and testing of handheld
radiation detection equipment conducted by DoD and DHS have been
reviewed by SLD in order to determine what type of handheld is most
suited to carrying out its international mission.
Questions for Richard Daddario From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren
Question 1. What are a few key lessons that have been learned from
STC implementation in the New York City region, specifically from the
recent full-scale exercise?
Answer. The STC exercise showed that the STC Concept of Operations
(CONOPS) is an effective tool in the detection and interdiction of
Radiological or Nuclear materials that may be a threat to the NYC
region; it provides an effective framework for deployments and is
reviewed periodically to ensure that it continues to effectively
address evolving strategies and current terrorist tactics and threats.
During the recent full-scale exercise (FSE), it enabled the STC
partners to deploy in a coordinated manner utilizing equipment
purchased through the STC program to address a notional threat.
However, a few key lessons have been learned from the overall
implementation of the STC program and as a result of the recent FSE.
During the planning stages of the FSE it was determined that
an Emergency Operations Center (EOC) would be needed to manage
exercise activities. This EOC concept was not part of the
original CONOPS; therefore, an EOC was setup for the exercise
and will now formally be incorporated into a revised CONOPS.
The STC partners had representatives present in the EOC
for the duration of the exercise. Having tactical and
strategic planners, intelligence analysts, and
counterterrorism and radiological subject-matter experts
present in the EOC was effective and resulted in an
efficient, coordinated decision-making process.
This in turn, led to the successful interdiction of
all radiological materials, including many which were not
part of the exercise, such as real-life interdictions of
medical and industrial sources of radiological materials.
It was also determined that having a Health Department
representative in attendance provided the incident
commander with information needed to make important
decisions regarding deployment strategies.
During the exercise STC partners were able to staff
checkpoints and chokepoints with properly trained operators and
supervisory personnel.
The STC NYC Region does not have a standard set of
information management systems to facilitate and improve
information sharing across the region and with the Joint
Analysis Center down in Washington, DC. Solutions to this are
being investigated by the STC information sharing working group
in conjunction with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
(DNDO). However, the NYPD has made great strides in networking
the mobile radiation detection equipment purchased with STC
program funds so that the data will be viewable in real-time at
the Lower Manhattan Security Coordination Center. At the
Center, officers monitor real-time events from equipment in the
field that has been installed on vans, boats, and other mobile
detection platforms. Continuing this effort for the region is
of utmost importance to the overall effectiveness of this
initiative.
During the exercise there were isolated incidents of
equipment failure or operators not sufficiently proficient in
their use.
This demonstrates the importance of maintenance and
calibration of equipment as well as the need for scheduled
refresher training.
Drills and smaller-scale exercises will allow the STC
region to continually evaluate the usefulness of equipment
and allow operators to continue to hone their skills.
Question 2. This committee often hears about issues associated with
sustaining and upgrading existing capabilities at the State and local
level. Can you please describe some of the issues you face with
sustaining the radiological and nuclear detection capabilities being
developed in NYC?
Answer. Sustaining radiological and nuclear detection capabilities
at the local and regional level faces many challenges, both unique to
NYC as well as with a more broad application across the region.
Equipment capabilities:
The NYPD and the STC partners must continue to increase the
numbers of officers who carry personal radiation detectors.
This will greatly enhance the ability to interdict materials
during either routine patrol activity or targeted deployments.
Having to take detectors off-line for calibration or
maintenance is time-consuming and diminishes the overall
detection capability of the region. Having a substantial
reserve cache would minimize the impact of properly maintaining
the detection equipment.
It has been difficult to calibrate and repair older
equipment that was purchased without extended warranties.
Identifying funding sources has been difficult and time-
consuming. DNDO determined that older ``legacy'' equipment
could not be maintained with STC funding; therefore, the
Department and the regional partners had to seek out alternate
sources of funding in the effort of putting a contract in place
to repair and maintain this older equipment.
Additionally, some of the radiological detection equipment
is several years old and may be near the end of its effective
life cycle. Plans need to be put in place not only to increase
the overall number of detectors but to replace older equipment
that becomes obsolete, just to maintain current detection
levels.
Some of the older devices may require relatively
inexpensive repairs. The current guidance seems to
encourage the purchase of new units; however, the repair of
devices currently in inventory may be a more cost-effective
way of maintaining detection capability throughout the
region.
Manufacturers of radiological detection equipment often
charge a substantial fee for diagnosing the problem when a
device is not properly functioning. This high cost makes it
difficult for agencies to determine if the malfunction is a
minor fix or an expensive repair.
Finally, radiological detection technology is constantly
evolving and improving. Emerging technologies in this area
should be explored, and, when appropriate, older devices should
be replaced with new, improved devices. These technologies will
enhance our land, air, and sea detection capabilities.
Personnel capabilities:
Proficiency in the use of radiological detection equipment
is a perishable skill; operators need to maintain their skills
in an effort to detect and interdict these materials. Refresher
training, drills, and exercises are effective ways to hone
these skills. (Training)
In order to allow members to participate in these training
efforts it is often required to backfill members to maintain
minimum staffing levels throughout the region so that normal
operating levels do not suffer as a result. (Overtime/backfill)
Having the capability to detect and interdict illicit
materials is not enough. Operational deployments are essential
to protect New York City and the region from an attack. Funding
to support these deployments is required as an efficient way to
maintain proficiency and to increase the possibility of
detecting illicit materials. Funding of operational deployments
is currently not authorized. (Deployments)
As the STC program expands to other areas of the country, funding
must be continued for the New York City region to ensure that the
detection capabilities already established remain in place. Continued
funding for the STC program has a broad appeal across the NYC region
due to the recent economic stresses now facing most local and State
governments. Without continued Federal funding, it will be extremely
difficult to sustain the current level of operational capabilities and
impossible to continue expanding the program to reach the full security
potential of the initiative.
Questions for Mark Perez From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren
Question 1a. While a nuclear or radiological attack is a high-
consequence event, it is also on the lower end of probability if you
consider the more conventional threats we face day-to-day. Maintaining
preparedness for such an event can be a challenge given the large
number of more likely threats.
At the State and local level, has it been difficult to build
capabilities within the interior layer given competing priorities?
Answer.
Question 1b. How have budget constraints affected your approach to
countering nuclear and radiological threats and your contribution to
the GNDA?
Answer.
Question 1c. If Federal support for such efforts was reduced, would
this capability be maintained?
Answer.
Question 1d. What priority do you place on maintaining a
radiological or nuclear detection capability?
Answer.
Questions for David C. Maurer From Chairman Daniel E. Lungren
Question 1. GAO has previously testified that efforts to develop
the ASP distracted DNDO from developing a GNDA strategic plan. What do
you think of DNDO's current plan to end the ASP program but deploy 13
of the existing ASP systems to gain more experience with them? Do you
think this will continue to distract DNDO from activities that should
be higher priorities or will this be helpful to future efforts to
procure advanced technology?
Answer. In our view, deploying the existing 13 ASPs to various CBP
field locations is likely a good thing because it is small enough of an
effort to not distract DNDO from higher priorities of its mission, and
it gives a few CBP ports an additional resource that may be useful in
adjudicating radiation alarms. In addition, this limited deployment
will give CBP more ``hands-on'' experience in operating and maintaining
the ASP which could prove valuable should the ASP technology improve
enough to be considered for future deployments.
Question 2a. A GAO Report issued last month discussed DHS policies
and procedures regarding technology development and acquisition.
To your knowledge, how are technology needs and requirements across
the GNDA harmonized?
Answer. In July 2008, we testified that DNDO had developed an
initial GNDA after coordinating with, among others, the Department of
Defense, Department of Energy, and the Department of State, to identify
74 Federal programs that combat smuggling of nuclear or radiological
material. Many of these programs predate the establishment of DNDO.
These programs cover all of the layers of detection, including securing
special nuclear and radiological materials at their source in foreign
countries and in the United States as well as detecting these
materials. DNDO has also collaborated with these and other Federal
agencies to: (1) Identify gaps in the initial architecture, such as
land borders between ports of entry, small maritime vessels, and
international general aviation, and (2) develop programs to address
these gaps. To address the gaps identified in the domestic portions of
the architecture, DNDO worked closely with:
CBP in studying the feasibility of equipping border patrol
agents with portable radiological and nuclear detection
equipment along the U.S. border.
Coast Guard to develop and expand the coverage of
radiological and nuclear detection capabilities that can be
specifically applied in a maritime environment.
CBP, the Transportation Security Administration, and other
agencies to develop nuclear detection capabilities that can be
applied in aviation.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Nuclear Detection: Preliminary Observations on the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's Efforts to Develop a Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture, GAO-08-999T (Washington, DC: Jul. 16, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Question 2b. What mechanisms are in place to reduce duplication and
waste in procuring and deploying technologies throughout the GNDA?
Answer. Our work over the past several years has consistently
pointed to the challenges DNDO has faced in developing a GNDA while
also acknowledging the progress made by DNDO and DHS related to GNDA.
For example:
In January 2009, we recommended that DHS develop a plan for
the domestic part of the global strategy and engage with other
stakeholders to develop broader strategic efforts to combat
nuclear smuggling. In December 2010, DNDO issued a strategic
plan for the GNDA. The strategic plan establishes a broad
vision for the GNDA, identifies cross-cutting issues, defines
several objectives, and assigns mission roles and
responsibilities to the various Federal entities that
contribute to the GNDA. For example, the DOE has the lead for
several aspects of enhancing international capabilities for
detecting nuclear materials abroad, DHS has the lead for
detecting nuclear materials as they cross the border into the
United States, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission has the
lead on reporting and sharing information on lost or stolen
domestic radiological material.
In addition, earlier this year, DNDO released the Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture Joint Annual Interagency Review
2011. This review describes the current status of GNDA and
includes information about the multiple Federal programs that
collectively seek to prevent nuclear terrorism in the United
States. However, neither the strategic plan nor the 2011
interagency review identifies funding needed to achieve the
strategic plan's objectives nor establishes monitoring
mechanisms to determine programmatic progress and identify
needed improvements--key elements of a strategic plan that we
previously identified in our recommendations. Furthermore,
while the plan and the 2011 interagency review discuss
previously identified gaps in the domestic portion of the
architecture, neither discusses strategies, priorities, time
frames, nor costs for addressing these gaps.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed a Strategic
Plan for its Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain,
GAO-11-869T (Washington, DC: Jul. 26, 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS continues to develop its acquisition oversight function
and has implemented a revised acquisition management directive
that includes more detailed guidance for programs to use when
informing component and Departmental decisionmaking. The
senior-level Acquisition Review Board (ARB) has met more
frequently and has provided programs acquisition decision
memorandums to document the ARB discussion and outline action
items to improve program performance.\3\ For example, in April
2011, the ARB met to discuss the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal
(ASP) program, a part of the GNDA, progress in meeting its
programmatic objectives. The ARB determined that the ASP
program faced difficulties with meeting its requirements and
performance objectives. As a result, the ARB instructed DNDO
and CBP to refine its requirements, develop an operational test
strategy, prepare an acquisition strategy, and develop a
briefing memo to the DHS Secretary on ways to move forward with
the program.\4\ In July 2011, the director of DNDO testified
before Congress that DHS would not continue the ASP program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected
Complex Acquisitions, GAO-10-588SP (Washington, DC: June 30, 2010).
\4\ DHS Acquisition Decision Memorandum, June 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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