[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
H.R. 2356, THE WMD PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS ACT OF 2011
=======================================================================
JOINT HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY,
INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION,
AND SECURITY TECHNOLOGIES
and the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY
PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE,
AND COMMUNICATIONS
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 23, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-32
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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72-252 PDF WASHINGTON : 2011
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY, INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION, AND SECURITY
TECHNOLOGIES
Daniel E. Lungren, California, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Tim Walberg, Michigan, Vice Chair Laura Richardson, California
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Billy Long, Missouri William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Coley C. O'Brien, Staff Director
Alan Carroll, Subcommittee Clerk
Chris Schepis, Minority Senior Professional Staff Member
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida, Chairman
Joe Walsh, Illinois Laura Richardson, California
Scott Rigell, Virginia Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania, Vice Vacancy
Chair Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Blake Farenthold, Texas (Ex Officio)
Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Officio)
Kerry A. Kinirons, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Curtis Brown, Minority Professional Staff Member
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies................................................... 1
The Honorable Yvette D. Clark, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 12
The Honorable Gus M. Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency
Preparedness, Response, and Communications..................... 3
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
WITNESSES
Panel I
Hon. William J. Pascrell, Jr., a Representative in Congress From
the State of New Jersey:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Panel II
Senator Jim Talent, Vice Chairman, WMD Center:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Joint Prepared Statement of Senator Jim Talent and Senator Bob
Gra- ham..................................................... 16
Dr. Robert P. Kadlec, Former Special Assistant to the President
for Biodefense:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Mr. Richard H. Berdnik, Sheriff, Passaic County, New Jersey:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
H.R. 2356, THE WMD PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS ACT OF 2011
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Thursday, June 23, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Cybersecurity,
Infrastructure Protection, and Security
Technologies, and
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 10:11 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Daniel E. Lungren
[Chairman of the Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and
Security Technologies subcommittee] presiding.
Present from the Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection,
and Security Technologies subcommittee: Representatives
Lungren, Meehan, Clarke of New York, and Richardson.
Present from the Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications subcommittee: Bilirakis, Marino, Farenthold,
Richardson, and Clarke of Michigan.
Mr. Lungren. The joint hearing of the Committee on Homeland
Security's Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure
Protection, and Security Technologies and the Subcommittee on
Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications will come
to order.
Subcommittees are meeting today for a legislative hearing
on the bill entitled the ``WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act
of 2011,'' and I would recognize myself for an opening
statement.
It is now 2\1/2\ years since the Commission on the
Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and
Terrorism issued its report entitled, ``World at Risk.''
Congress had asked the commission to recommend ways to prevent
proliferation of WMDs and their use in acts of terrorism.
Commissioners provided their guidance, and we are close to
enacting their recommendations and eliminating the remaining
gaps in our preparedness posture. The prediction of the
commission that it is more likely than not that there will be a
weapon of mass destruction used somewhere on Earth by a
terrorist group before the end of the year 2013, is a startling
reminder of the danger that we face as a Nation.
Weapons of mass destruction create a risk of catastrophic
consequence, but they are of low probability. In such
circumstances, perhaps it is not surprising that complacency
and inactivity are our biggest vulnerabilities. We cannot
forget that we have already faced biological terrorism on our
soil.
Al-Qaeda is a dedicated and, in their minds, religiously
inspired enemy who would use weapons of mass destruction to
attack the United States whenever the opportunity presents
itself. According to recent reports, Iran may be as close to 2
months away from producing a viable nuclear weapon.
We cannot allow the emergence of a nuclear Iran, and we
must continue our non-proliferation efforts to prevent that
possibility. Our intelligence agencies continue to warn of
these threats.
For instance, in 2009, then-Director of National
Intelligence Dennis Blair said the following: ``The on-going
efforts of nation-states to develop and/or acquire dangerous
weapons and delivery systems in the Middle East and elsewhere
constitute another major threat to the safety of our Nation,
our deployed troops, and our allies.
``The threat from the proliferation of materials and
technologies that can contribute to both existing and
prospective biological and chemical weapons programs also is
real.''
The WMD Commission is measuring our Government efforts to
protect the Nation from WMD terrorism. We have seen excellent
progress in certain areas, such as laying groundwork for
improved security of biological laboratories, developing a
National strategy for bioforensic, and strengthening our non-
proliferation regime.
However, the Government did receive a failing grade on its
efforts to enhance the Nation's capabilities for rapid response
to biological attacks. I believe the legislation that is the
subject of this hearing--that is the one that Congress and our
Chairman, Peter King, and Congressman Pascrell have developed--
addresses the need for a rapid response, and we look forward to
hearing the witnesses thoughts on that.
Importantly, we cannot forget Congress' own shortcomings.
The WMD Commission gave Congress a failing grade for not
reforming its Congressional oversight to better address our
homeland security needs. That is a continuing problem. For any
of those who have been involved in that, we know that sometimes
old notions of jurisdiction seem to overwhelm the current and
continuing need for us to reorganize ourselves so that we can
better address our homeland security needs.
It is true, homeland security is a cross-cutting, cross-
committee enterprise, and we should not allow historical and
outdated committee barriers to stand in the way of passing
needed legislation.
Finally, I would like to thank my colleague, Chairman
Bilirakis, for his work to identify some of the remaining
capability gaps that we face with respect to developing medical
countermeasures, delivering them to the populations that need
them, and ensuring that DHS is doing its part to help us
prevent and prepare for threats to our health security.
I welcome our witnesses this morning. We look forward to
learning your views on what remains to be done and how Congress
may be helpful in these efforts, and I believe that the Ranking
Member of my subcommittee is detained. She will be here
shortly, and at that time, would ask her to make a statement.
So at this point in time, I would recognize the Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications, gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, for any
statement that he may have.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate it
very much. I am pleased the subcommittees are meeting today to
consider the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2011
authored by the representative, of course, from New Jersey, Mr.
Pascrell, and Chairman King.
This bill seeks to address the findings of the WMD
Commission's report, ``World at Risk,'' and enhance Federal WMD
prevention and preparedness efforts. A number of hearings in
the subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications have helped to inform this legislation.
The subcommittee has held hearings on the mission and
activities of Department of Homeland Security's Office of
Health Affairs and hearings on the research, development,
acquisition, distribution, and dispensing of vital medical
countermeasures for chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear emergencies.
I am pleased that this bill includes legislation I
introduced, which authorizes the Metropolitan Medical Response
Systems Program. MMRS has been very successful in helping
jurisdictions across the country enhance their abilities to
prepare for and respond to mass casualty incidents resulting
from terrorist attacks and natural disasters.
MMRS has been used to support the integration of public
health, emergency management, and emergency response, and to
strengthen medical surge capacity, CBRN decontamination, and
mass triage capabilities. The capacity gained under the program
is particularly important due to the threat of biological
terrorism facing the United States.
This legislation requires the development of the National
Medical Countermeasure Dispensing Strategy to provide guidance
to States and localities on the variety of options for
dispensing medical countermeasures. As I noted, the
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and
Communications held a hearing on the distribution and
dispensing of medical countermeasures earlier this year. We
heard from a coalition of emergency response providers that the
Federal Government has not sufficiently included them in
efforts to address dispensing needs.
We must ensure that emergency response providers are
provided with necessary vaccines and antibiotics so they are
protected in the event of a CBRN attack.
I am pleased that the bill requires the consideration of
the needs of emergency response providers in the development of
the dispensing strategy.
In this difficult economic climate, I am pleased to see
that this bill includes provisions that seek to eliminate
redundant and inefficient programs. The bill's requirement of a
comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis will
increase transparency, ensure coordination among all Federal
departments and agencies with a biodefense mission, and
eliminate redundancies.
The bill also eliminates the underperforming National
Biosurveillance Integration Center. The goal of NBIC was to
fuse many inputs of the biosurveillance data to provide early
detection of an event of National significance, such as anthrax
outbreak.
While effective National biosurveillance capability is an
important component of preparedness and response, NBIC has not
fulfilled its statutory mandates due in part to the lack of
cooperation from other Federal agencies, and we have limited
evidence that this situation will improve.
This bill rightfully realizes that continuing to fund NBIC
under the current operating scheme would be money wasted and
calls on White House leadership to develop a new plan to
implement a program that works effectively and efficiently.
This bill is a bipartisan effort that has benefitted from
input from a variety of experts in the field. I look forward to
receiving additional feedback at today's hearing on ways we
might further improve the bill and our Nation's ability to
prevent and prepare for a WMD attack.
With that, I thank the witnesses for being here, and I
yield back the balance of my time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. Before I recognize the Ranking Member of your
subcommittee, I just want to say I mean no disrespect to the
witnesses when I take my coat off. I just am a Californian, and
I can get used to heat. I have never been able to get used to
this humidity.
So, with that, I would recognize the Ranking Minority
Member of the Subcommittee of Emergency Preparedness, Response,
and Communications, the gentlelady from California, Ms.
Richardson, for any statement she may have.
Ms. Richardson. Good morning. I thank both Chairman Lungren
and Mr. Bilirakis for convening this hearing on the bipartisan
WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2011.
I would like to thank our witnesses and particularly our
colleague. It is always a pleasure when we have a fellow
colleague come before us and share their expertise. Clearly,
Mr. Pascrell, you are an expert in this area, and we respect
all of the work that you have done.
Today's hearing and the release of the WMD Act is timely
given the host of threats that we continue to face. As the WMD
Commission found in its December 2008 report, America needs to
move more aggressively to address our vulnerability to a
bioterror attack.
As an original co-sponsor of this particular act, I am
proud to take up this bipartisan legislation that addresses
this vital WMD issue from prevention to recovery.
I also want to applaud Mr. Lungren and Mr. Bilirakis for
pulling us together in this bipartisan effort and bi-committee
effort. We don't do this, I don't think, often enough, and I
really applaud your leadership in pulling this together.
This bill addresses the unique issues and promotes
improving our countermeasures development and dispensing
mechanisms. One of the key provisions in this bill includes
ensuring that we empower our citizens by providing WMD
preparedness guidance and early warning systems.
An area of particular importance to me is ensuring that we
consider the needs of all of our vulnerable populations, and
this is something Mr. Bilirakis and I have spoken about and
look forward to working on future legislation on.
Vulnerable populations would be including children, the
elderly, and people with disabilities. This bill addresses
these areas by recognizing the importance and the role of State
and local government and our first responders who will be
sharing with us today.
We must act now prior to any attack to ensure that our
personnel, our plans, our equipment, and other resources are in
place to effectively respond. The WMD Act ensures that first
responders are supported through training, exercise
participation, intelligence information, grant funding, and the
inclusion in the preparedness planning process.
As a representative of the 37th Congressional District in
California, I understand the critical importance of
preparedness for a potential terror attack utilizing chemical,
nuclear, biological, or radiological weapons.
It is time for us to act and to close these gaps now that
exist and provide the resources needed to ensure that we are
resilient and able to secure our homeland. I am proud to
support this legislation, and I thank Congressman Pascrell,
Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, Chairman Lungren,
Chairman Bilirakis for all of your leadership.
Again, I thank you for being here today, and I look forward
to your testimony.
[The statement of Ranking Member Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Laura Richardson
June 23, 2011
Good morning. I thank both Chairmen Lundgren and Bilirakis for
convening this hearing on the bipartisan WMD Prevention and
Preparedness Act of 2011.
I would like to thank the witnesses for appearing before the
committee today and express this committee's deep appreciation for your
service to our country.
Today's hearing and the release of the WMD Act is timely, given the
host of threats we continue to face.
As the WMD Commission found in its December 2008 report, America
needs to move more aggressively to address our vulnerability to a
bioterror attack.
As an original co-sponsor of the WMD Prevention and Preparedness
Act, I am proud to take up this bipartisan legislation that addresses
vital WMD issues from prevention to recovery.
The recent disaster in Japan provides us with a greater
understanding of the unique public health issues we must address as a
Nation.
This bill addresses these unique issues and promotes improving our
countermeasure development and dispensing mechanisms.
One of the key provisions in this bill includes ensuring we empower
citizens by providing WMD preparedness guidance and early warning
systems.
Our diverse communities require we consider the needs of all
individuals and have inclusive policies.
An area of particular importance to me is ensuring that we consider
the needs of vulnerable populations, including children, the elderly,
and people with disabilities.
This bill addresses these areas by recognizing the important role
of State and local first responders in the planning process.
The first responder community is an essential partner in our WMD
preparedness efforts.
They are on the frontline in our efforts to deter an attack; and
they will be there first to help affected citizens.
Therefore, Congress should provide our first responders with the
resources they need in order for them to meet the wide-ranging needs
associated with responding to a WMD terror attack.
We must act now, prior to an attack to ensure that the personnel,
plans, equipment, and other resources are in place to effectively
respond.
The WMD Act ensures first responders are supported through
training, exercise participation, intelligence information, grant
funding, and inclusion in the preparedness planning process.
I am proud that this committee is working together to move this
bill forward and address these concerns.
As the representative of the 37th district of California, I
understand the critical importance of preparedness for a potential
terror attack utilizing chemical, nuclear, biological, or radiological
weapons.
There are four nuclear reactors located in my State, with two of
them located within 50 miles from my district.
If these nuclear facilities ever became compromised, the issues
that we raise today would have a direct impact on the outcome of such a
situation.
It is time for us to act and close the gaps that exist and provide
the resources needed to ensure we are resilient and able to secure the
homeland.
I am proud to support this legislation and thank Congressman
Pascrell, Chairman King, and Ranking Member Thompson for their
leadership.
Again, I thank you all for being here today and I look forward to
your testimony.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentlelady for her comments. Other
Members of both subcommittees are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
June 23, 2011
Thank you Chairmen Lungren and Bilirakis for holding this hearing.
I also want to thank our witnesses for appearing to testify on our
efforts to counter the threat from weapons of mass destruction.
The Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and
Terrorism--``the WMD Commission''--produced a report entitled ``World
at Risk'' in 2008.
In that report, they told us that they believed that a terrorist
attack would occur somewhere in the world by 2013, and that it was more
likely to be an act of biological terrorism.
Further, during the 111th Congress, this committee heard testimony
from Senators Bob Graham and Jim Talent, then the Chair and Vice-Chair
of the Commission.
They testified that the Government's progress toward implementing
their 13 recommendations was slow and went as far as giving it a grade
of ``F'' in these two areas:
``failure to enhance the Nation's capabilities for rapid
response to prevent biological attacks from inflicting mass
casualties''; and
for a lack of progress on reforming Congressional oversight
``to better address intelligence, homeland security, and
crosscutting 21st-century National security missions.''
In a bipartisan response last fall, this committee voted favorably
to report H.R. 5498--the WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2010 to
the House.
H.R. 5498 was a comprehensive bill that addressed the major actions
recommended by the WMD Commission.
The bill included a range of provisions related to prevention,
deterrence, detection, preparedness, response, and recovery.
As a Nation, we have been fortunate that a WMD attack has not come
to fruition in the United States.
But we must move forward with closing the coordination and resource
gaps identified by the WMD Commission.
Today, I am glad to report that this committee is once again
working in a bipartisan fashion in order to enhance the Government's
capability to counter the pressing WMD threat.
This bill will reintroduce many of H.R. 5498 major initiatives
related to homeland security, intelligence, public health, and foreign
affairs matters.
Therefore, I look forward to working with Mr. Pascrell, Mr. King,
and our Members to once again push this legislation through the
committee.
As we move closer to the 10th anniversary of 9/11, we are reminded
of the consequences of fragmented security policies and inadequate
resources.
This bill provides a framework for biodefense that is inclusive and
recognizes the important role of first responders.
A potential WMD attack requires that we refashion policy and ensure
that our first responders have the resources needed to be effective.
Investments in emergency communications, planning, and response
equipment saves lives.
The first responder grant program's importance to WMD preparedness
should not be understated and must be provided at adequate levels.
I hope our conversation today provides an opportunity to understand
the role and needs of first responders related to WMD preparedness.
This bill ensures first responders have the committed and
collaborative Federal partner needed to address the unique issues of a
potential WMD attack.
I look forward to hearing the testimony of our witnesses, and I
yield back.
We are pleased to have two panels of witnesses before us
today on this important topic.
The first panel is entirely taken up by the gentleman from
New Jersey. Congressman Bill Pascrell is a distinguished Member
of the House of Representatives, former Member of the Homeland
Security Subcommittee on which he served in the 108th through
the 111th Congress. He is authored legislation that is the
subject of today's hearing along with Chairman King in both the
111th and 112th Congresses. Our hope is that we might actually
move this one this year.
Per an agreement between the Majority and Minority of both
subcommittees, Congressman Pascrell will be extended
Congressional privilege--be able to sit and will not be
answering questions from the Members.
We look forward to his testimony on the bill, and he is now
recognized.
STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM J. PASCRELL, JR., A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY
Mr. Pascrell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and it is an honor
to be here.
Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, who just came into
the room, thank you. Chairman Bilirakis and Ranking Member
Richardson for holding this joint subcommittee hearing.
I know that this committee particularly appreciates the
fact of trying to coordinate situations since there are four or
five other major committees that have to deal with this
legislation, and we are going to try to address that
bureaucratic nightmare, which is in my throat and in Mr.
Chairman Lungren's throat. How we do that, I don't know.
I want to recognize both Chairman King and Chairman
Thompson. Chairman King and I worked diligently on this, as you
well know, had bipartisan support. The last session,
unfortunately, we did not get this bill, because we could not
get cooperation beyond this committee. That is where it stood.
I also want to thank the committee for inviting Sheriff
Berdnik from my county, Passaic County, he sits right behind
me. He will be testifying in the next panel along with two
distinguished other individuals who have contributed so much to
what you all agree is the most serious threat to the United
States of America.
I know that the sheriff will be able to provide you very
valuable insights into the role his Department plays in
preparing and responding to a terrorist attack.
The folks on the ground, the boots on the ground are the
first to respond, not the Federal Government, in a catastrophic
situation, and that is why he is here to testify.
I want to discuss the WMD Preparedness and Prevention Act
of 2011, which Chairman King and I have introduced. We will
introduce tomorrow the actual bill. I am proud of all the work
that went into the legislation. I am especially proud that it
is bipartisan, and I want to say, Mr. Chairman, that the staff
has been very, very helpful.
We had another meeting yesterday in which they just were
terrific. They understand the issue. They are sensitive to the
bureaucratic situation which we face, and we were trying to get
some ideas on how we are going to have an end-run and get this
thing done. Because while we all say, you know, this is
important and significant, we haven't figured out the strategy
of getting through and getting it passed.
But I understand leadership wants this. So I hope, with
your great influence, Mr. Chairman, it will get done.
Last year, Chairman King and I came together to craft this
legislation based upon the WMD Commission's report, ``World at
Risk.'' Just as we need to read the 9/11 Report, we need to
read ``World at Risk.'' It is a tremendous document put out by
former Senator Talent and former Senator Graham of Florida.
I think this is must-reading for all of us who want to
protect this country. They gave us a report. We had some real
sobering findings when we read it. We had to go back and read
it again to make sure that we were reading what we were
reading.
The finding that under our current readiness, this attack
as you referred to just a few moments ago, Mr. Chairman, is
likely to occur before 2013 or by 2013. It gave us pause, all
of us--gave us a sense of urgency. Urgency is a tough thing to
deal with in Congress, regardless of who is in charge.
Today, even after the death of Osama bin Laden, we know
that terror groups like al-Qaeda are still out there probing
and plotting attacks against Americans. They continue to be
committed to obtaining nuclear and biological weapons,
regardless of where they come from.
Both Mr. King and myself being Members of the New York-New
Jersey region are too familiar with the devastation and the
tragedy that surrounds an attack with a weapon of mass
destruction. Sheriff Berdnik was a 9/11 first responder
himself.
We have to do everything in our power to ensure that
nothing like 9/11 ever happens on our soil. The thought of a
WMD attack anywhere in our region is too horrific for words. We
realize that. Using the commission's report as a guide,
Chairman King and I first introduced this legislation in 2010
with the support and endorsement of the commissioners.
While our bill passed this committee, it unfortunately was
never considered in the entire House. This is unacceptable, Mr.
Chairman. As you said--quoting you. As the WMD Commission
stated in the report, it is unacceptable that now nearly 10
years after September 11, we do not have a comprehensive,
National strategy to counter the threat that WMD poses to our
country. No one could put it better, Senator.
One year later, and hopefully a little wiser, there is
hope. I hope we will swiftly consider by this committee this
legislation, and that jurisdictional turf battles will not stop
the full House and Senate from passing the important
legislation as soon as possible.
Prevention, preparedness, protection, response, and
recovery. That is what this bill is all about. It contains some
important new provisions I would like, briefly, to highlight.
It addresses the findings from the Government Accountability
Office on the state of our biodefense enterprise and creates an
entirely new top-down approach centered at the White House.
This includes establishing a new special assistant to the
President for biodefense who will be responsible for crafting a
Federal biodefense plan and putting together a yearly cross-
cutting biodefense budget, which will help streamline cross-
agency efforts and improve efficiency.
It includes a new provision that would allow the Secretary
of Health and Human Services to make surplus vaccines with
short shelf lives from our strategic National stockpile to our
State and local first responders.
As we all know, our police and firefighters are on the
front lines of our homeland security, and if there is a
biological attack, they will be the first ones on the scene.
Ensuring that they are vaccinated will not only prevent them
from harm but better enable them to assist others and other
victims and perform their jobs.
Passage of the legislation is not a silver bullet that will
fully immunize us from the threats that a weapon of mass
destruction poses to our country. Our first responders still
lack a Nation-wide interoperable communications network.
We have talked about it on this committee. We have had
bipartisan support on this committee, and we still don't have
it. It is not the fault of this committee. It is the fault of
others in leadership, regardless of which party is in charge,
of getting this through and seeing the significance of
supporting and protecting the American people.
Funding for our various homeland security State and local
grant programs that help at-risk areas prepare and secure
sensitive infrastructure are under severe funding constraints.
We know that, but we must not back off what our
responsibilities are.
As the original Member of the Committee on Homeland
Security, created in the wake of those attacks, and
representing a district that lost 40 souls in the attacks,
these issues are near and dear to my heart as they are to you.
The committee, Congress as a whole, and the Executive
branch must be committed to doing everything in our power to
ensuring that something like this never happens again. We do
know, Mr. Chairman, that when everything is a priority, nothing
is a priority.
So I count on your diligence and your forthrightness and
your perseverance to get this thing through. Whatever I can do
and whatever Peter can do, as another Chairman, we are at your
beck and call.
I thank the committee and thanks for listening.
[The statement of Mr. Pascrell follows:]
Prepared Statement of Honorable William J. Pascrell, Jr.
Good morning, Chairman Lungren, Ranking Member Clarke, Chairman
Bilirakis, and Ranking Member Richardson, and thank you for holding
this important joint subcommittee hearing and for your invitation to
testify this morning. I want to recognize the Chairman and Ranking
Member of the full committee, Mr. King and Mr. Thompson, for their
friendship and leadership on the committee and their stewardship of its
important work.
I also want to thank the committee for inviting Sheriff Richard
Berdnik of Passaic County, New Jersey, to testify before you today on
the subsequent panel. Passaic County is a part of the Jersey City/
Newark Urban Area Security Initiative, one of the six Tier I regions
considered at greatest risk of a terrorist attack. I know that the
sheriff will be able to provide you all valuable insights into the role
that his Department plays in preparing for and responding to a
terrorist attack, and the effectiveness of the Federal Government's
State and local partnership efforts.
I am here this morning to discuss the WMD Preparedness and
Prevention Act of 2011, which I, along with Chairman King, will be
introducing tomorrow. I am proud of all the work that went into this
legislation, and I am especially proud that it is bipartisan. Democrats
and Republicans may not always agree on every issue, but I think there
is broad consensus on this committee, from Members of both parties,
that the safety and security of our country is our highest priority.
Last year, Chairman King and I came together to craft legislation
after the release of the WMD Commission's report: ``World at Risk.''
Under the leadership of Senator Bob Graham and Senator Jim Talent, that
report gave us some very sobering findings. I am happy to see my former
Small Business Committee Chairman, Senator Talent, here today.
Particularly, their finding that under our current readiness, a WMD
attack is ``likely'' to occur by 2013, gave us all pause and really
gave us a sense of urgency that action was needed.
Today, even after the death of Osama bin Laden, we know that terror
groups like al-Qaeda are still out there plotting attacks against
Americans, and that they continue to be committed to obtaining nuclear
and biological weapons. The Commission gave the country particularly
low marks for bioterrorism preparedness and our country's oversight of
laboratories working with some of the most dangerous diseases.
Both Mr. King and myself, being Members from the New York/New
Jersey region, are all too familiar with the devastation and tragedy
that surrounds an attack with a weapon of mass destruction. Sheriff
Berdnik was a 9/11 first responder himself. We must do everything in
our power to ensure that nothing like 9/11 ever happens on our soil
again. The thought of a WMD attack anywhere in our region is too
horrific for words.
Using the WMD Commission's report as a guide, Chairman King and I
first introduced this legislation back in 2010, with the support and
endorsement of the Commissioners. While our bill passed this committee,
it was, unfortunately, not considered by the entire House of
Representatives. This, to me, is unacceptable.
As the WMD Commission stated in their report, it is unacceptable
that now nearly 10 years after September 11, we do not have a
comprehensive National strategy to counter the threat that WMD poses to
our country. One year later, and hopefully a little wiser, we are
reintroducing this bill. I hope it will be swiftly considered by this
committee, and that jurisdictional turf battles will not stop the full
House and Senate from passing this important legislation as soon as
possible.
This year's legislation retains the comprehensive approach to
securing our country against weapons of mass destruction: Prevention
and Preparedness, Protection, Response, and Recovery. The updated bill
recognizes some of the progress that has been made by the
administration over the last year, particularly in laboratory
biosecurity, and also contains some important new provisions that I
would like to highlight.
Importantly, the bill addresses findings from the Government
Accountability Office on the state of our biodefense enterprise and
creates an entirely new, top-down approach centered at the White House.
This includes establishing a new Special Assistant to the President for
Biodefense who will be responsible for crafting a Federal biodefense
plan, and putting together a yearly cross-cutting biodefense budget,
which will help streamline cross-agency efforts and improve efficiency.
The bill also includes a new provision that will allow the
Secretary of Health and Human Services to make surplus vaccines with
short shelf lives from our Strategic National stockpile to our State
and local first responders. As we all know, our cops and firefighters
are on the front lines of our homeland security, and if there is a
biological attack, they will be the first ones on the scene. Ensuring
that they are vaccinated will not only prevent them from harm, but
better enable them to assist other victims and perform their jobs in
the response. All across the bill, language has been streamlined to
better integrate our State and local first responders and to encourage
their participation.
Passage of the legislation is not a silver bullet that will fully
immunize us from the threats that a weapon of mass destruction poses to
our country. For example, our first responders still lack a Nation-wide
interoperable communications network, one of the recommendations of the
9/11 Commission and an essential component of any response. Chairman
King has introduced legislation that I strongly support to establish
this network and I hope that Congress considers and passes it soon.
Additionally, funding for our various homeland security State and
Local grant programs that help at-risk areas prepare and secure
sensitive infrastructure, are under severe funding constraints. Grant
programs for our Cops and Firefighters to purchase equipment and ensure
they have adequate personnel are slated for cuts. We must find the
funding in the Federal budget to ensure that these programs are fully
funded, and that we have the resources we need to protect our country.
In the years since the attacks on 9/11 we have all said, on a
bipartisan basis, that our homeland security strategy must be proactive
and not simply reactive. As an original Member of the Committee on
Homeland Security, created in the wake of these attacks, and
representing a district that lost 40 souls in the attacks, these issues
are near and dear to my heart. The committee, Congress as a whole, and
the Executive branch must be committed to doing everything in our power
to ensuring that something like this never happens again. Passing this
bill into law will go a long way towards establishing a comprehensive
protection and response plan to a WMD attack, and it must be enacted as
soon as possible.
Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, very much.
Thank you, Congressman Pascrell, for your testimony and
your leadership on this issue along with the Chairman of our
full committee, Mr. King.
We will excuse you. We won't subject you to questions, and
we will move on to Panel II. Thank you very, very much.
We are, of course, joined by the Ranking Member of our
subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Infrastructure Protection, and
Security Technologies, the gentlelady from New York, Ms.
Clarke. If you have a statement to make at this time, we would
be happy to receive it. Meanwhile, we excuse Mr. Pascrell and
invite the next panel to come forward.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman.
To Chairman Lungren and Chairman Bilirakis, to Ranking
Member Richardson, and to my colleague present, good morning.
You know, Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, Chairman
Lungren, Chairman Bilirakis, and my fellow Ranking Member, Ms.
Richardson it is important for the safety of our country to
come together today in this joint hearing and to discuss the
legislation of our colleague and former committee Member,
Congressman Pascrell.
His hard work on a very complex issue has resulted in
legislation that many of us can and will support. Thank you for
calling this hearing.
The WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2011 is an
example of what we can achieve when we pull together instead of
pulling apart. It is an example of what can be accomplished
when we draw circles of interest instead of boxes of exclusion.
Those of us who represent high-density populations of the
Northeast are acutely aware of our shared vulnerability, how a
single weapon of mass destruction can devastate huge
populations and render infrastructure that serves millions of
our citizens unusable. Coming from Brooklyn, New York, having
been in New York City during the 9/11 attack, this hits home
for me, profoundly.
I am proud that this committee, who passed this bill in the
110th Congress with Members from all walks of life and
political persuasion, can take the findings of experts and
colleagues as we have received from the commission on the
prevention of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, and
terrorism, and use that kind of fact-finding and
recommendations to pass legislation, with truly bipartisan
support.
Senator Bob Graham of Florida and Senator Talent, who are
with us today, chaired the commission and gave selflessly to
this effort, devoting time and, most importantly, their
intellect toward a comprehensive look at gigantic challenges
posed by the thought of indiscriminate use of weapons of mass
destruction on innocent civilians.
I think the work they accomplished is something we are all
proud of, but I am not here to paint a rosy picture. The
scenarios before us are sometimes hard to grasp, especially
extraordinarily complex ones involving chemical, biological,
radiation, and nuclear threat.
The effect on our citizens are unimaginable, but it is the
difficult job of these subcommittees to imagine these events
and figure out a way to protect our citizens. Of particular
interest to those of us from the Northeast are programs built
around the Securing Our Cities initiative, the unified effort
among Federal, State, and local law enforcement in New York,
New Jersey, and Connecticut to defend against the threat of a
radiological or nuclear device.
DHS, the New York City Police Department, the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey, and officials from three
States and 91 localities are involved in that partnership.
The more law enforcement officials who have the ability to
detect and are on the lookout for nuclear radiological material
and are in touch with health officials monitoring biological
and disease incidents in and around New York City, the better
chance law enforcement has to prevent a successful attack.
I expect that we are going to hear some on-the-ground
testimony today from the sheriff from Passaic County, because
he is charged with carrying out the day-to-day preparation and
response plans for the kind of horrific event we contemplate in
these scenarios.
We must find ways to fund our front line of defense against
the kind of horrendous events we planned for and not how we can
greatly or arbitrarily reduce the resources we need to protect
our families.
So I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Clarke of New York
follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Yvette D. Clarke
June 23, 2011
Chairman King and Ranking Member Thompson, Chairman Lungren, and
Chairman Bilirakis, and my fellow Ranking Member Richardson, it's
important for the safety of our country to come together today in this
joint hearing to discuss the legislation of our colleague and former
committee Member, Congressman Pascrell. His hard work on a very complex
issue has resulted in legislation that many of us can support. Thank
you for calling this hearing.
The WMD Prevention and Preparedness Act of 2011 is an example of
what we can achieve when we pull together, instead of constantly
pulling apart. It's an example of what can be accomplished when we draw
circles of interest instead of boxes of exclusion.
Those of us who represent the high-density populations of the
Northeast are acutely aware of our shared vulnerability, how a single
weapon of mass destruction can devastate huge populations, and render
infrastructure, that serves millions of our citizens, unusable.
I'm proud that this committee, who passed this bill in the 110th
Congress, with Members from all walks of life and political
persuasions, can take the findings of experts and colleagues, as we
have received from the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass
Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism, and use that kind of fact-
finding and recommendations to pass legislation with truly bi-partisan
support.
Senator Bob Graham of Florida and Senator Talent, who is with us
today, chaired the Commission and gave selflessly to this effort,
devoting time and most importantly their intellects, toward a
comprehensive look at gigantic challenges posed by the thought of
indiscriminate use of a weapon of mass destruction on innocent
civilians. I think the work they accomplished is something we are all
proud of.
But I'm not here to paint a rosy picture, the scenarios before us
are sometimes hard to grasp, especially extraordinarily complex ones
involving chemical, biological, radiation, and nuclear threats, and
their affects on our citizens are unimaginable. But it is the difficult
job of these subcommittees to imagine these events, and figure out a
way to protect our citizens.
Of particular interest to those of us from the Northeast are
programs built around the Securing our Cities Initiative, the unified
effort among Federal, State, and local law enforcement in New York, New
Jersey, and Connecticut to defend against the threat of a radiological
or nuclear device. DHS, the New York Police Department, the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey, and officials from three States
and 91 localities are involved in this partnership.
The more law enforcement officials who have the ability to detect
and are on the lookout for nuclear and radiological material, and are
in touch with health officials monitoring biological and disease
incidents in and around New York City, the better chance law
enforcement has to prevent a successful attack.
I expect we are going to hear some on-the-ground testimony today
from the sheriff from Passaic County, because he is charged with
carrying out the day-to-day preparation and response plans for the kind
of horrific events we contemplate in these scenarios.
We must find ways to fund our front line of defense against the
kind of horrendous events we plan for, and not how we can glibly and
arbitrarily reduce the resources we need to protect our families.
Thank you Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Mr. Lungren. I thank the gentlelady for her statements.
Once again, all Members are reminded they may submit
comments for the record.
Now we have an opportunity to hear from our second panel.
Three distinguished gentlemen. The first is Senator Jim Talent,
who is vice president of the WMD Center and a distinguished
fellow at Heritage Foundation where he specialized in military
readiness issues.
From May 2008 to February 2010, Senator Talent served as
vice chairman of the Congressionally-authorized Commission on
the Prevention of the Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Proliferation and Terrorism, and the report that they gave us,
which I note is outlined in red, which usually indicates
urgency--and the fact that your report card is in blue is no
indication that it is less urgent or that consistency is less
necessary, and I want to thank you for your contribution to us
in that regard--elected by citizens in Missouri, you served 4
years in the U.S. Senate and 8 years in the House of
Representatives. So we welcome you back.
Dr. Robert Kadlec served 26 years as an officer and
physician of the United States Air Force where he held senior
positions in the Executive and Legislative branches. Until
January 2009, Dr. Kadlec served as special assistant to the
President and senior director for biodefense policy on the
Homeland Security Council.
While with the Homeland Security Council, Dr. Kadlec
drafted the National biodefense policy for the 21st Century,
which did become the Homeland Security Presidential Policy
Directive 10. He was also staff director of the Senate
Subcommittee for Bioterrorism and Public Health.
Richard Berdnik is the sheriff of Passaic County, New
Jersey, the position he has held since the beginning of 2011.
Prior to this position, he led a distinguished 28-year career
in law enforcement for the City of Clifton, New Jersey. He is a
graduate of the FBI National Academy.
While with the City of Clifton Police Department, he led a
team of officers in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11,
and we do thank you for your past service as well as your
continuing service.
The three of you will be invited to testify in the order in
which you were introduced. We would ask you to try and keep
your comments to around 5 minutes. We have your prepared
written statements. They will be made fully a part of the
record, and after you have completed your testimony, we will
have a round of questions.
So, Senator Talent, we would recognize you first.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JIM TALENT, VICE CHAIRMAN, WMD CENTER
Mr. Talent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both
Chairmen and both Ranking Members, and to the whole committee--
the subcommittee and the committee--for consistently acting
with an urgency that we at the WMD Center thinks is justified
by this threat.
Former Senator Bob Graham is the chairman of that center. I
am the vice chairman. Senator Graham could not be here today,
but he joins me in my comments, and I would ask that you would
submit the full comments in the record. I will just cover a
couple of points. One of them, and you covered pretty well in
your opening statement--in fact, several of the leaders of the
committee did--the history of the WMD Commission.
We were created by you all and the other body as a follow-
on to the 9/11 Commission in an attempt to answer the question
the
9/11 Commission asked, which is, you know, what happens if the,
you know, worst people get the world's worst weapon?
Bob and I were appointed as the chairman and vice chairman
of that. We work together in the Senate--been a real pleasure
working with him on that--the nine of us on that committee--it
was thoroughly bipartisan--our report was unanimous.
We didn't go into that with any bias in favor of looking in
particular at the biothreat. As a matter of fact, I didn't know
that much about it. I was more familiar with the nuclear
threat. But after almost a year of deliberations, you know, we
looked at all the material that you all look at at a regular
basis.
We interviewed witnesses, traveled all over the world, and
did reach the conclusion which you recited in your opening
statement that the danger of a WMD attack somewhere in the
world is growing, that it will reach a probability--become more
likely than not--by 2013, by which we meant, it is just a
short-term threat; it is not a long. I mean, it is not
something that is 20 years down the road. It is now.
In our judgment, it is more likely to be a bioattack than
anything else. We base that both on direct intelligence and on
the fact that a biological weapon is easier than a nuclear
weapon to develop. It is easier to deploy, and it is easier to
stockpile.
It doesn't mean that a nuclear threat is beyond their
capability. It just means that the bioweapon is easier, and
everything that we have seen since then has reinforced our
view, both of the threat and of the fact that we have to pay
particular attention to the biothreat.
Chairman and I were talking before the hearing, and it is
my opinion that the cyber threat and the biothreat are the two
biggest. We should try and prepare for all of them, but they
are the two biggest.
Our conclusion is--regarding the threat--was affirmed in
every particularity by the then-Director of National
Intelligence within a few weeks after we made it.
After we issued the first report with recommendations, as
the Chairman mentioned, we were asked by the leadership of
Congress to go back and to review the Government's success or
failure of progress in implementing our recommendations. Bob
and I both said that we would do it, but we made clear to the
Speaker, the Minority Leader, and the Majority Leader of the
Senate that if we gave our assessment, we were gonna say what
we thought. If they didn't want that, they shouldn't
reconstitute the commission.
Well, they did want it, and we gave our assessment. While
there was progress in certain areas, we did give a failing
grade to the Government's preparation for a bioattack. As you
know, Mr. Chairman, preparation is hugely important here, not
only because, you know, we can limit the loss of life and
damage should an attack occur, but because if you prepare well
enough, a biothreat is no longer a weapon of mass destruction.
It is a terrible weapon and it can kill people, but if it
doesn't have a big enough impact, it is not a weapon of mass
destruction and, therefore, it is much less likely that it will
be used. So preparation in this context, unlike the nuclear
context, is deterrence. This is a point that Senator Graham and
I have made on numerous occasions.
We have turned the WMD Center into a nonprofit, which is
the same thing that happened with the 9/11 Commission. I am not
going to go into great lengths, but we are preparing a really
stem-to-stern new report card, or evaluation, of the
Government's efforts.
Lynne Kidder, who is the president of the WMD Center is
with us today, is leading a team of people. We have pulled
together experts from all across the Government and nonprofit
world to look at the whole chain of resilience.
First thing they are doing is identifying what are the
metrics of success. You know, what does progress mean in this
context? Then they are going to measure how we are doing
against those metrics. That report is going to come out. That
assessment is gonna come out this fall, and we think it will
give you all the best assessment, you know, stem-to-stern, end-
to-end strategic assessment of our resiliency chain that you
have ever had.
I can't think of a committee that has done more to try and
solve this problem and achieve progress. I don't have much
time. I do want to say that we are very grateful for Mr.
Pascrell and Mr. King and all of you for the WMD Bill. It
addresses a number of key areas.
Just, very briefly, the National Biodefense Plan is very
important. The reforms in biosurveillance and detection, hugely
important. We do a lot of detection, a lot of surveillance, but
it is not integrated enough; it is not efficient enough, and it
is not real-time enough.
The reality is that we cannot have confidence today that we
will know an attack has occurred within the period of time we
need to know to do something about it. Just go look back at
H1N1. Anytime the President called up the Center for Disease
Control and asked them how many people were sick from that
disease, the reality is, they couldn't tell him. They didn't
know.
We had months to prepare for that. We are not gonna have
months to prepare for this. The first responder guidance,
hugely important. The sheriff will probably talk about that.
Real solid thinking in the bill about environmental cleanup and
what the standards are; how clean is clean. We have not worked
on that, and we don't have adequate guidelines for first
responders.
I will just conclude by saying this, and I thought of it
because of what my good friend, Bill Pascrell, said about
priorities--that if everything is a priority, nothing is.
Absolutely correct. Well if something is a priority, it means
that you are willing to sacrifice other things--even other good
things--if you have to in order to get it, right? I mean, my
15-year-old is a big basketball player, and it is a priority
for her, which means she sacrifices other extracurricular
things she could be doing to practice basketball. Okay?
If this is a priority that we think is justified by the
threat, and nobody has denied that this--at any hearing like
this--that this threat is as bad as we think it is. Well, it
means you have to sacrifice other things. Maybe you sacrifice
your jurisdictional turf.
Maybe the FDA is just gonna have to figure out a way to
approve these drugs quicker, even though it would like to use
its traditional standards, maybe it has got to do some solid
thinking. Maybe it means, even in an era of very difficult
budgets, that in areas where we need extra funding, you know,
we find it, because it is a priority.
So I think the Congressman from New Jersey had it exactly
right, and I am grateful for the opportunity to be here. Sorry
I went on a little too long.
[The statement of Mr. Talent follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Senator Jim Talent and Senator Bob Graham
June 23, 2011
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members, I am speaking today as the
vice chairman of the Bipartisan WMD Terrorism Research Center, better
known as the WMD Center. Even though former Senator Bob Graham (D-FL),
the chairman of the WMD Center could not be here today, please consider
this our joint statement.
The WMD Center is a not-for-profit research and educational
organization that Senator Graham and I founded, along with Colonel
Randy Larsen, USAF (Ret), at the conclusion of the Congressional
Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation and Terrorism (WMD Commission) in 2010.
wmd commission
In early 2008, the Commission was tasked by Congress to assess the
risk of WMD terrorism and to recommend steps to prevent a successful
WMD attack on the United States. During its tenure, the WMD Commission
interviewed hundreds of experts and reviewed thousands of pages of
research and testimony. Each commissioner quickly realized that the
United States was facing a growing threat of biological terrorism--a
conclusion that was unexpected for many. We learned that the lethality
of a sophisticated biological weapon could rival the lethality of a
Hiroshima-sized bomb, and that the development and delivery of such a
bioweapon would require far less money and technical expertise than a
nuclear weapon.
In the commission report, World at Risk, we stated that terrorists
are more likely to obtain and use a biological weapon than a nuclear
weapon. In the late fall of 2008, we concluded that unless we act
urgently and decisively, it was more likely than not that terrorists
would use a weapon of mass destruction somewhere in the world by the
end of 2013. On December 2, 2008, the Director of National Intelligence
publicly agreed with this assessment in a speech at Harvard University.
In an unprecedented act, Congress extended the authorization of the
WMD Commission and assigned it a new task: To communicate its
assessment, explain the evidence behind it, and to work with Congress
and the administration to enact the Commission's recommendations. In
other words, we were charged with encouraging Congress and the
administration to take decisive action to prevent such an act of mass
lethality from taking place on American soil, and should such an attack
occur, to limit its consequences.
In 2009, we worked closely with Congress and the administration to
focus on the threat of bioterrorism. As our second year of work drew to
a close, we released a report card that assessed progress on a wide
range of WMD issues; however, the grade that garnered the most
attention in the January 2010 report was the failing grade for
America's preparedness to respond to a biological attack.
the wmd center and its bio-response report card
We founded the WMD Center to serve as an honest broker between
Government and the American public to ensure individual, community, and
National progress in strengthening the Nation's capabilities to respond
to biological threats. Our first major research project, scheduled for
completion in mid-October, is a report card focused solely on America's
capability to respond to a large-scale biological event, whether man-
made or naturally-occurring.
Lynne Kidder, the President of the WMD Center, is leading a highly
qualified team of experts in this study. During Phase I, our project's
board of advisors were charged with designing the metrics for
evaluating bio-response capabilities. Advisors include a former Deputy
Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration, the former Chief
Counsel at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the former
Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense (in the Clinton and
Bush Administrations), the Founding President of the Albert B. Sabin
Vaccine Institute, the Director of Disaster Medicine at the American
Medical Association, and the Director of RAND Health. (A complete list
of advisors is available at www.wmdcenter.org).
In Phase II of our study, a separate, independent team of subject
matter experts will collect data and provide analysis in each of seven
categories:
Detection and situational awareness;
Diagnosis and attribution;
Communicating actionable information;
Medical countermeasures (development and production of
vaccines and therapeutics);
Distributing/dispensing medical countermeasures;
Medical treatment and response;
Environmental remediation.
In order to ensure rigorous review and diverse perspectives, this
second team includes experienced practitioners and thought leaders from
academia, leading think tanks, former Government officials, and private
sector organizations that specialize in biodefense. These experts will
provide their analyses and insights to the WMD Center Board of
Directors, who will ultimately determine final grades, recommendations,
and report content.
Our report card will be released in mid-October. It will consist of
three parts: A review of the threat, an assessment of America's current
capabilities to effectively respond to act of bioterrorism, and
recommendations that will set us on the course to reach our goal:
Removing bioterrorism from the category of WMD. While we will never be
able to remove nuclear weapons from the category of WMD, it is within
our power to remove bioterrorism from the category.
Given the ubiquity of select agents readily found in nature and the
rapid advances in biotechnology that allow non-state actors the
capability to produce sophisticated bioweapons, a major part of our
biodefense strategy must be based on building a level of preparedness
that will effectively remove bioweapons from the category of WMD. An
attack would still cause casualties, but it would not be of a magnitude
that would change the course of history.
This is a realistic and achievable goal.
wmd bill
The WMD Center is not in the business of assigning grades to
specific pieces of legislation; however, if we were in that business,
this carefully-crafted, comprehensive bill would receive high marks. If
all articles within this legislation were to become law, it would
represent progress for America's biodefense capabilities.
We do understand the challenges of moving this legislation through
the various committees and subcommittees that will claim oversight
responsibility. It should be noted that the 9/11 Commission warned of
the Byzantine jurisdictional assignment of Congressional oversight of
homeland security. In January 2010, the WMD Commission gave Congress a
failing grade for the lack of response to its recommendation: ``reform
Congressional oversight to better address intelligence, homeland
security, and crosscutting 21st Century National security missions''.
The WMD Center fully supports many of the provisions of the
bipartisan bill you've introduced today. In particular, we support your
call for the re-establishment of the position previously called,
Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense. We are also pleased
with other provisions that are consistent with WMD Commission
recommendations, including requirements for:
A National biodefense plan;
A National bio-surveillance strategy;
A comprehensive cross-cutting biodefense budget analysis;
A National intelligence strategy for countering biological
threats;
Improvements in how the Government communicates the threat
of bioterrorism;
Improved detection capabilities;
First responder guidance on WMD;
Guidelines on environmental cleanup and restoration.
the road ahead
While we enthusiastically support this legislation, we also must
ask, is it enough? This legislation will help move the Nation toward
the WMD Center's goal of removing bioterrorism from the category of
WMD, but it will not get us all the way there. We will not reach this
goal during the tenure of the 112th Congress, but rather, it will
require a long-term commitment. We must ensure that the legislation and
policies we enact today and each year forward lead us toward that goal.
It is difficult to envision improvement without appropriate
leadership and organizational structure. The 2008 report of the Project
on National Security Reform, Forging a New Shield, examined the
``uneven performance of the Federal Government'' during several post-
cold war National security scenarios, from 9/11 to Katrina. The report
concludes:
``It is facile to blame all these regrettable outcomes on particular
leaders and their policy choices. Leadership and judgment matter, to be
sure, but as this Report demonstrates, no leader, no matter how
strategically farsighted and talented as a manager, could have handled
these issues without being hampered by the weaknesses of the current
system.''
While the WMD Center fully supports your call to re-establish the
position of Special Assistant to the President for Biodefense, we
understand that doing so will not fix all the deficiencies in
leadership and organizational structure for America's biodefense
enterprise. These will be among the most important issues we consider
in the assessment and recommendations of our report card.
We are fortunate to have the experience and wisdom of 2 dozen of
America's top biodefense and public health experts assisting our
project, but we are also considering the findings of recent reports by
the National Biological Science Board, the National Academies, the
Defense Science Board, and others.
Senator Graham and I look forward to providing you our assessments
and recommendations in October. While I can't provide specific details
today, I can predict that some of the recommendations will require
neither authorization nor appropriations, and yet will provide
significant improvements in capabilities. Other recommendations will
require Congressional authorization, and we know that will be
challenging given multiple committees with jurisdiction. Some
recommendations will require more funding--a huge challenge in this
fiscal environment. We will talk about partnerships between the public
and private sectors, and while that has been a great bumper sticker for
the post 9/11 era, it has proven far more challenging to implement.
multiple benefits
The good news is that many of our recommendations will have
multiple benefits for our families and local communities, whether or
not they experience a large-scale bioterrorist attack. Improvements in
the rapid diagnosis of disease, the capability to quickly produce safe
and effective vaccines and therapeutics, and increased surge capacity
in our medical care systems will benefit us all--for we know with
certainty that Mother Nature will present biological threats. These no-
regret initiatives will be a great legacy for our children and
grandchildren, and will also help keep America at the leading edge of
the biotech revolution.
the growing threat of bioterrorism
Removing bioterrorism from the category of WMD will neither be
quick nor easy, but it is vital to both America's economic and National
security. I would remind you that bin Laden had a background in
construction. It shouldn't be surprising that he chose to attack
buildings in America, because he understood what damage could be
wrought by flying fully-fueled, wide-body airplanes into those
structures. Al-Qaeda's new leader is just as determined to attack
America. His formal training was in medicine and infectious disease--
one more reason we worry about bioterrorism. But this is not just about
al-Qaeda.
If the FBI is correct in its assertion that Dr. Bruce Ivins was the
sole perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax letter attacks, then a single
individual with no training or experience in weaponizing pathogens, and
using equipment readily available for purchase on the internet, was
capable of producing high-quality, dry-powdered anthrax. The only
difference between producing enough material for several envelopes and
enough material to attack a city is just a matter of a few months'
production work in a laboratory, rather than the few hours of late
night work cited by the FBI investigation.
The bottom line on the feasibility of bioterrorism is quite clear.
Today, terrorists have ready access to pathogens, the capability to
weaponize them, and the means to effectively dispense a biological
weapon. There is no question on intent.
removing bioterrorism from the category of wmd
It is well within the capacity of our Nation to address this
threat. The issue here is less a question of resources or knowledge
than it is one of leadership and purpose. Our Nation must recognize
that the danger of a bioattack against the American homeland is a high-
priority threat.
At the explicit request of the leaders of Congress, the WMD
Commission recommended the steps necessary to defend the Nation against
that threat. The WMD Center report card will offer even more specific
recommendations this fall. The question is the same as when the WMD
Commission issued its first report in December 2008: Will our leaders
take bold actions commensurate with the seriousness of this threat?
Mr. Lungren. No, no, no. Thank you, very much. You don't
have to tell the gentleman from New Jersey he has it exactly
right, but we appreciate that.
Mr. Talent. I go back long enough for them to--he knows I
haven't always said that about everything he believes. But I
think he is correct on this one.
Mr. Lungren. Dr. Kadlec.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT P. KADLEC, FORMER SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE
PRESIDENT FOR BIODEFENSE
Dr. Kadlec. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
Representative Clarke, and the Members of the committee. I just
want to say what a privilege it is today to meet before you as
a private citizen having served 26 years in the military as a
colonel, I haven't worn that title very often, and this is one
of the occasions. Thank you.
I come here, really, to explain, or at least to talk about
one part of your bill, and that is the biodefense enterprise.
Having served as one of the three special assistants to the
President for biodefense during the Bush administration, it was
really our principle responsibility to ensure that the Federal
Government worked as one in all domestic preparedness efforts
for deliberate biological attacks and natural pandemics.
My job was literally to keep the eye on the biodefense ball
24/7. I certainly welcome this opportunity to come to you
today, and certainly acknowledge the bill that is before you
from Mr. Pascrell and Mr. King, and just basically say that
there are going to be parts of the bill--unfortunately not all
the parts of the bill--that I can specifically speak to today,
but at least highlight those that will make a significant
difference in our biopreparedness status today.
I have the unenviable position 30 June 2008 to actually
have to tell President Bush and members of the senior staff
that after 8 years of intense effort, numerous numbers of
political or policy documents and directives--$50 billion,
approximately, in funding, that if we experienced a moderate to
large scale anthrax attack in any major metropolitan area
today, than in 2008, that it would probably result in
catastrophic loss of life, and potentially loss of use of that
city for many months, maybe years.
So, it is with that--and again, to acknowledge the role of
the WMD commission, who have really played an integral part in
keeping the eye on the ball as we have moved forward--is to
note that, unfortunately, I was the last special assistant to
the President for biodefense policy.
By the way, this is not the first time it happened. Because
during the transition from the Clinton to Bush administration,
that position was also eliminated. It was during the Clinton
administration that it was first created in 1998, and a fellow
by the name of Admiral Ken Bernard held that position. In doing
so, he basically began what would be the precursors of the
Homeland Security Council and the domestic preparedness
efforts.
But again, this is not a partisan issue. It is just a
matter of perspective, and I am afraid it represents the
perspective that, somehow, we have not fully integrated the bio
problem as part of our National security priorities, to your
point, sir.
That, I think, in some ways, the fact that there is not a
position now in the White House with that title, certainly
doesn't prevent progress. In fact, I would like to highlight
some progress that has been made. First and foremost, there
have been a couple of new Presidential directives that build on
the ones that were originally issued by President Bush--one in
National preparedness, PPD No. 8--as well as a couple of
Executive Orders that deal with medical countermeasure
distribution as well as biosecurity.
I just have to say that also that the Obama administration
effectively managed the H1N1 pandemic, and fortunately, it was
a particularly not virulent one. But the point is that the
special assistant's role is not one that is really seen in
emergencies, but really in the mundane, day-to-day events in
the White House and are manifest in other ways.
I will point those out. First of all, if you see how the
biodefense portfolio is being managed today, it is not being
seen as a National security priority. If you look how OMB has
classified these programs, they are not subject to the same
consideration that National security or homeland security is
given, but actually has other health care programs. I think it
reflects the lack of priority.
The other way that, again, the role of the special
assistant plays in a senior political appointee--whether it is
a special assistant or not--it basically plays in this thing is
to basically educate, advocate, and coordinate, not only across
interagency, but across the White House.
So, unfortunately, today, we have seen very effective
communications, plans, programs subject to the nuclear threat
that is out there today, but we haven't seen similar efforts
for the biological problem. So we have had no Prague speech, we
have had no biological summit on this issue.
So, with that, I think one of the effective tools that you
have introduced into your bill is this idea of a National
biodefense plan. So, in some ways, I think it does demand that
we have--and, by the way, one does not exist today, so it is
necessary. The other thing is, because of extremely valuable
forcing function that basically we have experienced before,
particularly the preparations around the influenza pandemics.
So that is one area.
The other area is, really, the cross-cutting budget
proposal that you have. It is a mystery, not only to senior
members of the policy community in the White House, but also to
some members of OMB--what are we spending in certain areas in
the biodefense portfolio?
Areas like basic medical research and other areas, and some
of the areas are very under represented, and Senator Talent
mentioned the issue about environmental clean-up, an area that
deserves particular mention.
I would just like to mention, because of time, quickly two
other areas. One is in your bill and one maybe you should
consider including in your bill, and that one is, particularly
around the vaccination or pre-vaccination of first responders.
We know that in some ways we have a safe and effective
vaccine. We have surplus supplies in the strategic National
stockpile that are at risk of basically going bad. Quite
frankly, we should utilize those as we do for our front-line
soldiers. To realize that when they go to places like Iraq,
Afghanistan, or South Korea, that we afford them the best
protection. It is just odd to me that our first responders
don't deserve that in the major metropolitan areas that are at
risk.
The last group that I mentioned--and, again, it really does
relate to the first responder community--is our emergency
medical service community.
Somewhat under-represented and under-appreciated, and just
because of their nature and the fact that they really are--the
small office in the Department of Transportation, they are
really not eligible for a lot of the programs that we really
would consider being front-line in this area, and that is
subject to grants to either first responders or hospital
preparedness grants.
Somehow, we need to recognize them as a critical force
multiplier that, quite frankly, to date has not been optimized
and utilized in a way that could significantly bolster our
capabilities to respond to these events. We know they are going
to be there, and for some reason, we really haven't maximized
their capabilities in that area.
Simply, in closing, I would just like to say thank you.
Fortunately, we have not experienced the biological attack on
our homeland since the events of 9/11. I pray that we don't,
but I think the reality is here, as Senator Talent has
mentioned, that preparedness is deterrence. Because there is
really no other means to either prevent necessarily or
necessarily preempt these kind of attacks in the future.
Thank you, very much, and I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Dr. Kadlec follows:]
Prepared Statement of Robert P. Kadlec
June 23, 2011
Mr. Chairman and distinguished Members, I am speaking today as a
private citizen having had the privilege and opportunity to be one of
the three individuals who served as the Special Assistant and Senior
Director for Biodefense Policy during President George W. Bush's
administration. Retired Admiral (Dr.) Kenneth Bernard was the first and
Dr. Rajeev Venkayya was the second. Dr. Bernard had the singular
privilege of being the Special Advisor to the President's National
Security on the National Security Council during the second term of
President Clinton's administration. All three of us had the principle
responsibility to ensure that the Federal Government worked as one in
its domestic preparedness efforts for deliberate biological attacks and
natural pandemics.
I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today and to share
some of my experiences and insights during my tenure. I would like to
spend the preponderance of my time to comment on the Title I of your
draft bill entitled ``The National Biodefense Enterprise.''
First, I would like to acknowledge and compliment you Mr. Chairman,
Members of your committee and staff on this bill. It represents another
important step forward that the Nation should take to better prepare
for an uncertain future. The recent announcement of Dr. Ayman al-
Zawahiri as the replacement to Osama bin Laden, by all accounts a less
than mediocre leader at best but one who has and likely still aspires
to attack the United States with anthrax.
I would also like to take the opportunity to acknowledge the
important contributions made by Senators Graham and Talent in the
course of their leadership of the WMD Commission. I applaud their
continued leadership and commitment in establishing the WMD Center and
look forward to their evaluation of our bioterrorism preparedness
efforts this fall.
If there is a theme to my opening remarks, it is about leadership.
This committee has demonstrated it with this and other hearings and the
draft bill that seeks to improve our Nation's preparedness. Two former
Senators have displayed it with their successive reports and their
commitment to produce a preparedness report card. And hopefully the
Zawahiri tenure as leader will not only be short-lived, literally and
figuratively, but be the last leader for al-Qaeda.
Regretfully, I was a last too. I was the last White House Special
Assistant fully devoted to addressing the biodefense challenge. The
position I held was eliminated during the transition from President
Bush to Obama. This is not the first time a position of this type was
eliminated. During the transition from President Bill Clinton to George
W. Bush, the position that Admiral Ken Bernard held was eliminated from
the National Security Council. I am convinced that the decision to
eliminate a senior political White House position devoted to heath
security was not a partisan decision. It was reversed following the 9/
11 attacks and the anthrax letter mailings. It does however, reflect
that we have not quite yet achieved the maturity in our National
security thinking to embrace the notion that certain health security
issues rise to the level of being a first order National security
priority. It also clearly demonstrates that today, the threat of a
biological Hiroshima is not viewed with the same concern and urgency as
the potential for nuclear one. But if you believe Senators Graham and
Talent, it may be the catastrophe more likely to happen.
Of the number of issues addressed in your bill, there is no more
important one than the issue of leadership. The individual whose day-
in/day-out responsibility is to think about this problem and ensure
that the U.S. Government is taking all necessary steps to either
prevent a bioterrorist attack from happening; and if one should, making
sure all the resources available can be mobilized quickly enough to
mitigate needless morbidity and mortality. I have stated before that
second only to defending the U.S. Constitution, protecting and saving
American lives is the sacred duty of all those who serve in Government.
It is certainly disappointing that despite the dangers cited by
Senators Graham and Talent, no senior political White House official
currently has the title or the sole duty to address the problem posed
by biological weapons. To the credit of the Obama administration when
confronted by the H1N1 pandemic, they were able to mobilize a number of
career civil service and military detailees that helped guide the
administration through the early days and weeks of that event. Those
individuals from the Departments of Veteran Affairs (VA), Defense
(DoD), Homeland Security (DHS), and Health and Human Services (HHS)
performed magnificently and were appropriately recognized for their
contributions. The current Deputy Homeland Security Advisor under John
Brennan has demonstrated a deep understanding and personal commitment
to the biodefense problem and has worked it tirelessly but frankly is
only human and has a number of other important issues to manage day-to-
day.
The real value of a senior political advisee for biodefense is not
realized during an emergency. His or her contributions are made in
small yet significant ways that are not likely apparent to outsiders.
It is chairing meetings to update biodefense strategies, review plans,
and resolve gaps or disputes among Federal departments and agencies. It
is attending internal White House meetings concerning budgets, ensuring
that key elements of the President's biodefense priorities are
recognized and preserved. I have one anecdote to share from my tenure.
While I was meeting with the senior political appointee who oversaw of
the U.S. Government spending for civilian biodefense in the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Health Programs office, I learned that he
did not have a security clearance to read the periodic intelligence
reports or attend briefings where classified information about the
subject was discussed. Biodefense was only a very small part of his
enormous responsibilities and budgets for Medicare, Medicaid, and
Social Security. But it is the one part of his portfolio that had to do
with National security and he had no insight into the threats he was
responsible to mitigate. I helped him justify the need for a security
clearance so he could hear and understand the nature of the
bioterrorism threat. To the point, I served as the issue advocate
within the White House. I was senior enough to be invited to the
important meetings that detailees don't normally attend and I could
raise the issue or a stink about the issue if I felt the President's
agenda or interests were somehow being marginalized. I saw my role to
educate, advocate, and coordinate among the White House offices as well
as the Federal interagency. My job was keeping my eye on the biodefense
``ball'' 24/7. Without such person, it is likely the issue will not
necessarily be routinely discussed or considered.
Therefore, it is appropriate for Congress to request the
administration to request a National Biodefense Plan. Between the Bush
and Obama administrations there have been a number of well-considered
and -crafted policies pertaining to biodefense. If policies would solve
the problem, we would be more than half-way there. But the devil is in
the details. In 2004, Homeland Security Presidential Decision (HSPD) 10
roughly outlined a number of steps that Federal departments and
agencies should take. However those actions should be reviewed and
refreshed. The good news is that there has been progress across
biodefense domain, but I do not believe, nor does anyone who has
followed this issue believe; we have done enough and are prepared. The
excellent National Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan serves as a
useful model to look to for a future National Biodefense Plan.
I certainly endorse the need for better visibility across the
biodefense investments that are being made in related programs across
the Federal Government. We have invested over $50 billion dollars and
there are legitimate questions as to whether we spent too much in
certain areas or overlooked others. Getting better insight into how we
spending these dollars, particularly in light of the severe Federal
deficit we are facing, is not only prudent but an imperative. Any money
that we can save can surely be put toward a gap that exists in our
current efforts. One area that deserves special attention in such an
analysis is whether we are adequately resourcing efforts to remediate
and recover from a biological attack. In the course of natural
evolution of considering our preparedness and response to such an
event, we have appropriately initially focused on the life-saving
measures that must be taken. I am afraid not enough consideration has
been given to the cost of clean-up. As witnessed during the 2001
anthrax letter attacks, cleaning a couple of buildings cost over a
billion dollars. The cost of cleaning a city or subway system following
a large-scale anthrax release is mind-boggling. It is not clear that we
know the costs of environmental cleanup or even how to do it.
I would like to make special mention about the provision in your
bill devoted to biosurveillance. I can not think of any one issue that
we as a Federal Government have worked harder on than biosurveillance.
It is critical element in our biodefense strategy: To warn of an
impending pandemic, or detect a biological attack and guide our
responses to both. I admit that we have not achieved our objective of
collecting human, animal, and environmental health data, analyzing and
sharing it with all the responsible stakeholders at the local, State,
and Federal level. To say it is still a ``work in progress'' is an
understatement. While there are a number of Department- and sector-
specific biosurveillance strategies, there is yet no comprehensive plan
to knit them together into a National plan. I am heartened to know that
there is now a Department of Defense detailee working on the White
House National Security Staff whose full-time duty is addressing the
biosurveillance issue. I think the draft bill's provision asking a
National Biosurveillance Implementation Plan is needed and frankly
overdue. Hopefully, the process to develop a plan will resolve the
issues surrounding the National Biosurveillance Integration Center
(NBIC) at DHS. Originally conceived to take all-source surveillance
information concerning humans, animals, plants, and environment and
develop a common operating picture or situational awareness that is
shared with all Federal, State, and local stakeholders; it has not yet
met this objective. The concern I have is ``throwing the baby out with
the bath water'' that by doing away with NBIC, we fail to preserve the
essential function it was created to perform.
There are several other provisions included in your draft bill that
deserve mention and support. Related to biosurveillance and
specifically within your committee's jurisdiction is biodetection.
Having been involved with the creation of the BioWatch Program now
managed by the Office of Health Affairs in the Department of Homeland
Security, I have watched with some concern about the receding tide of
support and investment of this program. The current capabilities of the
BioWatch system today in terms of timeliness and coverage are not
optimal by any means. This was recognized when the program was
conceived and deployed. The initial system, however, has served two
incredibly important functions. First, it became a test bed for gaining
experience and confidence in domestic environmental detection and
improved local laboratory capabilities. There have been a number of
environmental positives that demonstrate the sensitivity of the
laboratory analyses. With that experience, the system and the protocols
supporting it have been refined over time. Second, it has enlisted the
public health, medical, and emergency management to work together to
consider the challenge and opportunities to recognize a potentially
devastating public health event. This evolution has not come easily. It
has resulted from the dedication of DHS, CDC, and EPA civil servants
working side-by-side with their State and local counterparts.
Environmental detection alone is not sufficient to address the risks
from biological attacks, clinical diagnosis, and laboratory
confirmatory testing are critical adjuncts. I hope that as further time
passes, the need to improve clinical laboratory diagnostics is viewed
as a compliment rather than a competitor to the requirement for near-
real-time environmental detection.
I also want to mention and endorse the committee's view on pre-
event vaccination, particularly with the currently available FDA
approved anthrax vaccine. There is little dispute within the
intelligence community that the greatest concern today is the risk from
an anthrax attack. The Department of Defense has judged the risk so
serious that military personnel are immunized against anthrax before
deploying to Iraq, Afghanistan, and South Korea. It would seem
similarly prudent to consider offering the same vaccine to domestic
Federal, State, and local responders who may be at increased risk of
exposure based on their occupation and the major metropolitan area they
live. It is generally the judgment of those who have considered the
likely evolution of a large-scale anthrax attack that time is of the
essence. It would be extraordinarily beneficial to have confidence that
critical responders such as police, fire, health care, and yes even
postal workers, who we may need to count on to save the lives of others
would be afforded the same protection afforded to our troops.
I would like to point out that there should be an additional
provision in your bill that is not in the draft that I reviewed for
this hearing. One of the most undervalued and appreciated group of
first responders that I know of, besides U.S. postal workers, are our
emergency medical service (EMS) workers. They are the critical link
between the incident where the attack, disaster, or accident happened
and the medical system. They suffer in the Federal grant programs,
depending on their jurisdiction, being neither fish nor fowl: Not
recognized as being a traditional police or fire first responder. They
are also not necessarily included for funding in the hospital
preparedness grant programs. I would suggest to you that considering
how best to optimize this group of ``force multipliers'' is not only
overdue but essential in any legislation you consider.
Finally, I would like to close by simply saying that so far, the
United States has not experienced the true nature a biological attack.
According to President Obama's Presidential Policy Directive 2, a
single unmitigated biological attack could place at risk potentially
hundreds of thousands of deaths and cost the Nation over a trillion
dollars. The letter attacks experienced in 2001 were just a small
indication about the potential power of these weapons. I believe we, as
a Government, do a bad job predicting the next disaster. The National
security challenges we face are unpredictable and require a robustness
and flexibility in capabilities that we have yet attained. I see your
bill as helping build that capacity and resilience and look forward to
supporting your efforts in the future. Thank you.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, very much, Dr. Kadlec, and thank
you for your service in the military. I am reminded that 67
years ago, this month, my father was a medical officer in the
United States Army marching across Normandy.
Although he only served a few years, when he passed away,
we honored him by indicating that on his tombstone, which is
one of the things he wanted. So I thank you for your service to
our country in all your capacities.
Sheriff? Again, thank you for your service, particularly as
one of those who responded to the ghastly attack that took
place on 9/11, and thank you for your continued service and, we
await your testimony.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD H. BERDNIK, SHERIFF, PASSAIC COUNTY, NEW
JERSEY
Sheriff Berdnik. I thank the subcommittees for the meeting
here today and the opportunity to appear before this joint
panel.
I would like to commend Chairman King and, of course, my
Congressman, Bill Pascrell, for their leadership on this issue
and their sponsorship of the WMD Prevention and Preparedness
Act of 2011.
I have seen Congressman Pascrell's continued leadership on
this issue, and I personally want to thank you and commend you
for your efforts. On January 1, 2011, I had the privilege of
becoming the sheriff of Passaic County.
Passaic County is a jurisdiction of approximately a half a
million people, encompassing 185 square miles just outside the
city of New York. It is actually northern New Jersey. Prior to
becoming the sheriff, I was a detective/lieutenant with the
Clifton Police Department for almost 30 years and served as a
SWAT team commander.
It was during that time with the Clifton Police Department
that I became a first responder to the World Trade Center on
September 11, 2001. In addition to being one of the worst days
in our Nation's history, I saw first-hand the deficiencies that
our emergency responders face.
That day, thousands of brave law enforcement officers and
emergency responders were called into service and showed great
courage and commitment to our country. Unfortunately, there
were many obstacles to overcome. We did not have the proper
equipment, training, and the ability to communicate during this
horrific event.
As the years have gone by, some of those issues have been
addressed but many have not been completely mitigated. It is
almost 10 years ago. The issues I observed, they still plague
us and our local public safety agencies today.
The passage of this bill is essential to our Nation.
Nationally, it is important that our Government has a system in
place for preventing and working through a WMD incident. It is
equally important that public safety, in general, has a system
to address these issues and resources to protect our citizens.
In New Jersey alone, the Home Security grants are slated to
be reduced by 50 percent this fiscal year. That is not only
shortsighted, but a dangerous public policy decision. In
Passaic County, the sheriff's officers benefit greatly from
funding through the Urban Area Security Initiative, and if the
sheriff's office deploys certified CBRN, HAZMAT, bomb squad,
SWAT teams as defined by NIMS.
The ability to train and equip these teams properly is a
direct result of the funding provided UASI. These proposed
reductions in funding will be devastating. They will cripple
the ability of these teams to respond in times of emergency. I
understand that members of this panel share my concerns.
In fact, recently, I just read an article in the Government
Security News where Representative Bennie Thompson, the Ranking
Member of the Homeland Security Committee, expressed these
exact sentiments. Additionally, the sheriff's officers and the
Department supports the county health agencies in bioterrorism
and provides CBRN detection and security for points of
distribution.
Funding is needed to test and evaluate these PODs to ensure
their efficiency and effectiveness and the delivery of vaccines
and medication during emergencies. We must also ensure that
first responders are equipped with the latest technology
available to support their mission.
Unfortunately, deficiencies in communication are still on-
going; still much of a problem in much of the State of New
Jersey. With the current trend moving toward shared dispatch
services, it is important to ensure that funding to enhance
interoperable communications is provided. Initiatives like
SafeCom are consistent with fulfilling with the objectives of
the National Emergency Communications Plan.
As demonstrated in the 9/11 attacks and other National
disasters, the inability for first responders to effectively
communicate with each other led to a substantial loss of life.
Funding must be allocated to purchase additional frequencies in
the D Block spectrum. This will enable deployment of the
Nation-wide broadband network for first responders.
Finally, there is no universal means to quickly and
efficiently notify the public impending emergencies. There
exists a patchwork of communication systems where agencies
currently deploy their own methods to notify their respective
citizens and responders. Currently, no comprehensive technology
exists to broadcast a message to all the residents of Passaic
County.
This needs to be corrected, and the only way to mitigate
this dangerous situation is through the availability of Federal
funding. This initiative will allow for the deployment of a
universal emergency alert system. The introduction of this bill
moves our Nation to establish a dialogue to ensure we are safe
from any future attacks.
The legislation helps address deficiencies in agency
planning coordination and training that our Nation so badly
needs to address. Though these issues cannot be solved with
money alone, our Nation needs to put the appropriate resources
toward this problem.
Again, I would like to thank the committee, its Chairman,
Congressman Pascrell, for the opportunity to speak before you
today. As a law enforcement professional, I am proud to be part
of this panel. I feel that our collective experience can assist
in crafting the appropriate public policy to make our Nation
safer from a potential weapon of mass destruction attack.
Thank you, again, for the opportunity, and I look forward
to addressing any of your concerns.
[The statement of Sheriff Berdnik follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard H. Berdnik
I would to thank the Chairman of the Homeland Security Committee,
the Chairs, and Members of the subcommittees meeting here today for the
opportunity to appear in front of this joint panel.
I want to commend Chairman King and my Congressman Bill Pascrell
for their leadership in this issue and their sponsorship of WMD
PREVENTION AND PREPAREDNESS ACT OF 2011. I have seen Congressman
Pascrell's continued leadership on this issue and I personally want to
thank and commend his efforts.
On January 1, 2011, I had the privilege of becoming the Sheriff of
Passaic County. Passaic County is a jurisdiction of a half million
people, encompassing 185 square miles outside of the City of New York
in Northern New Jersey. Prior to becoming Sheriff, I was a Detective
Lieutenant with the Clifton Police Department for almost 30 years and
served as the SWAT Team Commander. During my tenure with the Clifton
Police Department I became a first responder to the World Trade Center
on September 11, 2001. In addition to being one of the worst days in
our Nation's history, I saw first-hand the deficiencies that our
emergency responders faced. That day thousands of brave law enforcement
officers and emergency responders were called into service and showed
great courage and commitment to our country.
Unfortunately, there were many obstacles to overcome. We did not
have the proper equipment, training, and the ability to communicate
during this horrific event. As the years have gone by, some of those
issues have been addressed, but many have not been completely
mitigated. It is amazing that almost 10 years ago, the issues I
observed then still plague local public safety agencies.
The passage of this bill is essential for our Nation. Nationally it
is important that our Government has a system in place for preventing
and working through a WMD incident. It is equally important that public
safety in general has a system to address these issues and resources to
protect our citizens.
In New Jersey alone, the Homeland Security grants are slated to be
reduced by 50 percent this fiscal year. That is not only short-sighted,
but a dangerous public policy decision. In Passaic County, the
Sheriff's Office benefits greatly from the funding provided through the
Urban Areas Security Initiative. The Sheriff's Office deploys certified
CBRNE/HAZMAT, Bomb Squad, and SWAT Teams as defined by NIMS (National
Incident Management System). The ability to train and equip these teams
properly is a direct result of the funding provided by UASI. These
proposed reductions in funding will be devastating. They will cripple
the ability of these teams to respond in times of emergency. I
understand that members of this panel share my concerns. In fact, just
recently I read an article in Government Security News where
Representative Bennie Thompson, the Ranking Member of the Homeland
Security Committee, expressed these exact sentiments.
Additionally, the Sheriff's Office supports the county health
agencies in bioterrorism and provides CBRNE detection and security for
Points of Distribution. Funding is needed to test and evaluate these
PODs to ensure their efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of
vaccines and medication during emergencies. We must also ensure that
first responders are equipped with the latest technology available to
support this mission.
Unfortunately deficiencies in communication are still an on-going
problem in much of the State of New Jersey. With the current trend
moving toward shared dispatch services it is important to ensure that
funding to enhance interoperable communications is provided.
Initiatives like SAFECOM are consistent with fulfilling the objectives
of the National Emergency Communications Plan. As demonstrated in the
9/11 attacks and other National disasters, the inability for first
responders to effectively communicate with each other, led to
substantial loss of life. Funding must be allocated to purchase
additional frequencies in the D-Block spectrum. This will enable the
deployment of the Nation-wide broadband network for first responders.
Finally, there is no universal means to quickly and efficiently
notify the public of impending emergencies. There exists a patchwork of
communication systems where agencies currently deploy their own methods
to notify their respective citizens and responders. Currently no
comprehensive technology exists to broadcast a message to all of the
residents of Passaic County. This needs to be corrected and the only
way to mitigate this dangerous situation is through the availability of
Federal funding. This initiative will allow for the deployment of a
universal emergency alert system.
The introduction of this bill moves our Nation to establish a
dialogue to ensure we are safe from any future attacks. This
legislation helps address deficiencies in agency planning,
coordination, and training that our Nation so badly needs to address.
Though these issues cannot be solved with money alone, our Nation needs
to put the appropriate resources toward the problem.
Again, I want to thank the committee, its Chairman and Congressman
Pascrell for the opportunity to speak here today. As a law enforcement
professional, I am proud to be part of this panel and I feel that our
collective experience can assist in crafting the appropriate public
policy to make our Nation safer from a potential weapon of mass
destruction attack.
Thank you for this opportunity and I look forward to addressing any
concerns that the committee might have.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, very much, sheriff. We will now
have a round of questions, and I will begin with 5 minutes of
questions on my time.
Dr. Kadlec, we always have this problem of being prepared
and utilizing our resources properly, and you have heard some
of the testimony about a difficult budget circumstance we have.
You mentioned that the reports you had to give to the President
with respect to our vulnerability with an anthrax attack.
Golly, I think it was over 5 years ago that HHS indicated that
we needed to move towards the next generation of anthrax
vaccines.
As I understand it, we are still in the first generation,
which was developed in 1960s?
Dr. Kadlec. Fifties.
Mr. Lungren. Fifties? There have been some articles I have
seen that have criticized the cost involved, and you know, when
you are dealing with vaccine, and so forth--where are we, from
your view, in terms of a next generation anthrax vaccine, No.
1.
No. 2, are we doing as effective a job in utilizing our
resources in terms of purchasing the vaccines that are
available. If not, is there an alternative? We always talk
about competition being one way to bring costs down. That is
sometimes a strange concept when you are dealing with vaccines
that are stockpiled.
How do we answer that question? Where do you think we are
on that?
Dr. Kadlec. Well, when I was in Government, we were 5 years
away, and as we are today, we are 5 years away. So I think the
practical reality is it has taken longer than anybody
anticipated to develop a new generation or next generation of
anthrax vaccine. There are technical challenges that have to do
with the science that have not been resolved with that.
Subject to the issue of, you know, do we need one or should
we have one, I think one of the concerns--and it has more to do
about resilience than it has to do anything about a particular
product is being--relying on a single source for a product.
Particularly where that--is a National security measure or
capability, then you would like to somehow have some built-in
redundancy.
So I think the idea of competition here is not only who may
get there first. It is the idea that we have to ensure that we
have potentially two sources of this. There are a variety of
ways of doing it. Essentially a single manufacturer can have
two locations manufacturing of this product or whatever.
But, you know, not to get into those particulars, I think
the reality is is that in some ways, we are still a ways away.
We do have the benefit of a product right now that is FDA-
approved. It has been in several million individuals, mostly
military personnel. So it seems appropriate to consider that we
can use a product we already have in ways that we haven't used
it yet, particularly with the first responder community.
Mr. Lungren. Is that a matter of----
Dr. Kadlec. No, sir, I don't think so.
Mr. Lungren. Okay.
Senator? What is it that is not happening that must happen
to ensure the sustainment of a long-term commitment to this
issue? In other words, you have talked to us about the two
things that you think are the greatest vulnerabilities. What
are our self-imposed liabilities? What are we not doing that we
need to do? What would be the front-burner achievements you
would ask us to attempt?
Mr. Talent. Well, I don't want to anticipate the assessment
that is coming out in October from the WMD Center too much. I
would say we clearly have issues with the stockpile. I mean, we
have not stockpiled the range of countermeasures that we need
despite the fact that this has been an area where there has
been a rather considerable degree of funding.
Bob just talked about--you asked about anthrax, Congressman
Richardson raised the issue of children. Well, one of the
things we are going to study is whether the countermeasures--
whether we are considering the special needs of children who
may be victims of this and developing the countermeasures,
because children can't always take the same things that adults
are taking.
That is clearly an area--we have done almost nothing on the
whole clean-up issue, and if we are hit with anthrax, that may
be the biggest long-term issue, and we have no idea now what
standards should be followed.
We have a lot of detection and surveillance out there, but
we have not integrated it enough. We don't have enough real-
time. So these are all areas. Then I would just say more
broadly, getting the Congress and the administration beyond
certain groups like this committee to understand the urgency of
this and understand what that means in terms of decision
making, which is what Mr. Pascrell talked about, what I talked
about.
This is going to be with us for a while. If you think of
the world--and I think this is how we are to think about it--it
is a number of networks, you know, financial, communications,
transportation, and in societies like ours, the livelihood of
our people and the quality of life depends on their ability to
participate in those networks.
Everybody aspires to be in a society where everybody can
participate. In--elements around the world, Mr. Chairman. Right
now, it is, yes, the very extreme branch of Islam, but it could
be anybody. They understand that using asymmetric weapons is a
way to hit societies like ours.
So this is going to be an issue that is going to be with us
for a long time, and as a Government, we have to adjust to that
and act appropriately.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, very much, for your comments. Just
reminded me of something Dr. Kadlec said when he was talking
about the necessity of having a biodefense adviser to the
President. Part of it is just accessibility to the President
and his top people.
I mean, if you have got somebody that is in your network,
it is more likely you might pay attention to them. We all are
victims of and products of our environment, and if I pass you
in the hall, or when I go to--we used to call it the EEOB, now
I guess it is the Eisenhower Building--if I pass you in the
hallway or see you, I might be reminded to ask you a question
and pay attention to it.
At this time, I would recognize the Ranking Member of our
subcommittee, Ms. Clarke for any questions that she might have
in her 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank our panel for their very enlightened testimony
here this morning. I have a particular interest in white powder
incidents.
As I have said, I am from New York City, and there seem to
be repetitive events that take place from time-to-time in New
York City. Last year, in fact, we had white powder letters sent
to foreign embassies and consulates in New York City.
The FBI had briefed me on the status of their investigation
at the time, but I would like to ask if anyone on the panel has
any particular knowledge of these events, and do you think that
our intelligence efforts performed well or informed that
particular investigation or other white powder events in the
United States or around the world, in general?
Sheriff Berdnik. As a first responder speaking on the level
of sheriff, within Passaic County we have had white powder
incidents, and again, the ability to investigate them is there.
The important thing is actually working with, not only Federal,
State, and local agencies, but we have been successful in
tracking these incidents, and the fact that we are working with
the Federal authorities is definitely beneficial to us.
Mr. Talent. We need a National intelligence strategy for
dealing with the biothreat, and we don't have it. It is broader
than just this incident. Now, I think the FBI has really
stepped up in the course of the last few years in terms of what
it does domestically.
But the broader intelligence community, I am concerned,
hasn't. You all ought to, you know, I am sure you get those
briefings regularly anyway, but there are materials in there
that will tell you that they are not as conscious, that this is
a very serious threat as they ought to be.
So I am concerned on the intel. I don't have specific
knowledge of how the FBI has handled these incidents though,
ma'am.
Ms. Clarke of New York. It is of concern simply because,
you know, oftentimes these white powders are sent into, like,
the heart of the city. Once they reach their destination, you
know, now you are dealing with mitigating a potential threat--
--
Mr. Talent. Absolutely.
Ms. Clarke of New York [continuing]. As opposed to
preventing it.
As you know, there are those who believe that the nuclear
threat to be greater than the biological threat, and it is
apparent to me that part of the belief is based on a lesser
quantity of intelligence regarding the biological threat and
the different challenges associated with even collecting
information on the biological threat in the first place.
Do you believe this to be the case as well?
Dr. Kadlec. I do. During my time at the White House,
clearly, if you look at the volume of material, there is
certainly disparity. I think in some ways, that disparity
reflects the challenges, quite frankly, to get good
intelligence.
I mean, I recall the WMD Commission, sir, before yours that
looked at the events in Iraq and basically highlighted the fact
that the difficulty of collecting that kind of information
because of the--nature and the ambiguity that is inherent in
all that.
But also is the stigma that basically said that based on
their view, at that time, which I believe was 2005 and 2006, is
that in some ways, you know, they knew we would know less about
the biological threat 5 years hence than they did then. So I
think there is a real challenge there.
I would just highlight to you that I believe it was in the
2010 Intelligence Authorization Bill there was actually a call
to have a report from the DNI on this particular area, the
biological collection issue. So, I don't know where that is in
its evolution, but clearly I think it has been a matter of
concern by Congress and rightfully so.
Mr. Talent. If I could just----
Ms. Clarke of New York. Sure, quickly.
Mr. Talent. The old leader of al-Qaeda, who has met his
just desserts, his background was in construction. I don't
think it is any accident that the plan he developed involved,
you know, attacking a building.
The new leader of al-Qaeda's background is in medicine and
infectious diseases, and I do believe that the intelligence
community as a whole has never just really accepted the urgency
of this threat as they have in the nuclear area, and I think
you are right to be concerned.
Ms. Clarke of New York. I am sorry, sheriff, did you want
to add anything?
Sheriff Berdnik. Just, again, the fact is from the
perspective of a county, when we have these white powder
incidents--again, in our situations, it causes a lot of
pandemonium, a lot of hysteria. It causes the evacuations of
buildings. It causes an area to be contained, and from that
perspective, not just from the fact that it is a chemical
threat, but the fact that it does cause a public threat from
the hysteria that it causes.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Thank you, very much, gentlemen for
your feedback, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. Gentleman from Florida, Chairman of the other
subcommittee is recognized for 5 minutes or more.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it
very much.
Senator Talent, in your report you described Pakistan as an
intersection of nuclear weapons and terrorism. Since the death
of bin Laden, our relationship with Pakistan has been in a
state of flux. How is this affecting our ability to work with
the Pakistani government to secure nuclear materials in
Pakistan and defeat terrorist safe havens?
Do you think the fact that the bin Laden was found in their
country so close to their military training academy--has it
opened their eyes to the terrorist threat and given them a
greater sense of urgency to secure nuclear and biological
materials?
Mr. Talent. I will speak as, you know, Jim Talent, private
citizen here, because the WMD Center doesn't--we are not taking
a view on that. We said in the report that it was the epicenter
of our concerns--Pakistan was, and everybody knows it is
difficult to deal with Pakistan, in part, because it is
difficult to figure out exactly what is going on.
You know, it has been my opinion that it is a government
that has been penetrated pretty effectively, particularly in
security services by elements that are hostile to us and if not
friendly, at least open and receptive, and I think the incident
with Osama bin Laden is some indication of that.
Parts of the government that don't have that view are
nevertheless--they are not putting the same level of priority
at going after these terrorist elements as we are. I mean, they
are looking at that, I think, in the context of domestic
politics and broader issues like their relationship with India,
which makes it difficult to deal with them.
At the same time, given the position that we are now in in
Afghanistan and the fact that when what we are trying to do in
the region, you have to deal with the government of Pakistan.
So it is a situation where they have leverage. I am not going
to tell you that I think that they're entirely reliable;
although, there certainly are elements of the government that
have worked with us.
Yes, the way that that mission developed, and the fact that
he had been there that long is, in my judgment, a source of
concern.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Anyone else on the panel choose
to respond? Okay.
Next question, we know from think-tank research that--this
is for Dr. Kadlec, in particular. We know from think-tank
research that at least a dozen Federal departments and agencies
are involved in biodefense activities.
It seems that we shouldn't have to rely on think-tanks for
this information. The WMD bill directs that the White House
submit an analytical budget crosscut for its biodefense
expenditures. Having worked in the White House, what kind of
analysis do you think would come from this provision, and will
it help get us the analysis of redundancy and inefficiencies
that we are looking for? For Dr. Kadlec.
Dr. Kadlec. Thank you, sir. I would just simply say, I
think we would probably be surprised at the number of programs
that are identified as biodefense programs that may not be, No.
1.
No. 2, and that could be the circumstance that they are
labeled or they are doing something else, maybe chemical
defense. So the thing is that there is lack of, I think,
understanding how things are defined.
Clearly, sometimes it is in the benefit of the Department's
budget to basically characterize things in one light when in
actuality they are doing other things. So I think we will find
a few of those out there.
The other thing is, we will likely find that there are some
redundancies, some that maybe should be planned redundancies
but others that are, quite frankly, unintentional and
unrecognized. So, there are opportunities to leverage those in
terms of better programs. Again, certainly savings in that
area.
The third thing is, I believe, is that you will find that,
in some ways, the Department's interests and, again, we talk
about the environmental issues that we--and the concerns around
how well we are to clean up contaminated areas--that you will
find that there are multiple departments that are doing things
that are relevant and they don't even know they are doing those
things, meaning that someone else is doing something very
similar.
So they first can leverage those and the benefits of
increasing their knowledge base, but also to collectively work
on a problem cooperatively. Again, it gets back to this issue
of leadership at the White House and being able to not only
have that kind of cross-cutting budget that says what is being
spent and how and by whom, but then going the next step and
saying, well, how do we actually leverage it?
We actually tried that in the Bush administration subject
to medical basic research and development. Just between the
Department of Defense and NIH, and went through--and maybe
there is a success story there. I don't have the particulars of
it, but it was certainly challenging, and it certainly wasn't
necessarily bringing two willing departments together.
I think that is what you have to do is kind of force
unnatural acts between departments and agencies to do the right
thing.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Anyone else want respond?
Mr. Talent. I will, with your permission, because I don't
think I gave as good an answer to Chairman Lungren's question
to me as I should have. Because this really is, I think, the
No. 1 thing is getting somebody in charge of the whole
enterprise.
Getting somebody who has the clout, the ear of the
President, and the ability insofar as it is possible in our
Government to get people to work together and that also knows
everything that everybody is doing.
I think if we don't do that, then the other things that you
are working on legislatively--as important as they are, are
likely to fail in execution. So if I can amend my answer to
you, Chairman Lungren, that is probably the No. 1 thing.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you for your comments. I yield back,
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. Since some of the other Members had to leave,
we have time for a second round. So I will recognize myself for
5 minutes.
Dr. Kadlec. In your written testimony, you expressed
concern about doing away with what is known as the National
Biosurveillance and Integration Center, yet there appears to
be, even in your own testimony, consensus that it is not doing
what it should. It hasn't reached its objective.
You talk about let's not throw the baby out with the
bathwater, and I understand that, but what would you like to
see that strategy accomplish, that is a truly interagency
strategy, and how soon, realistically, do you think you could
have a truly National and integrated biosurveillance mechanism
and--well, first of all, purpose--goal and mechanism that
affects that goal?
Dr. Kadlec. Well, my understanding, there is active work in
that area right now. So I would say the good news is it seems
like there is activity, certainly in the Executive branch at
the White House, subject to the--that is the good news.
I am less concerned about the strategy than the plan,
because I think the strategy is pretty straightforward, I
think, in terms of having confidence in your ability to detect
across a range of spectrums--human, animal, plant,
environmental, things, agents, whatever that happened that you
would really need to know about quickly and be able to
disseminate that.
Mr. Lungren. Is it a lack of knowing what the specific
pieces of evidence should be, or is it a lack of putting up
some sort of chain and then integrating them? For instance, if
you are a first responder, you are a sheriff, you are a police
department, your eyes and ears are everywhere compared to
anybody in the Federal Government.
Is it a lack of training for officers to know that if they
see this, this is something that at least ought to be mentioned
and somehow we don't have a reporting requirement? Or is it
those things do get reported, but they are not integrated?
Dr. Kadlec. Well, I think it is the latter. So I would say
to use the law enforcement analogy, I have greater confidence
that information that has been collected in the field by law
enforcement officials, intelligence officials are being
synthesized and dissimilated rapidly. It is not that same way.
I think one of the challenges, particularly in our
inability to have a high degree of confidence of understanding
what is going on out there. Look at a disease outbreak, and I
will use Germany as an example with the latest E. coli
outbreak. I mean, the fog and friction of war applied to
outbreaks of disease and the ability to gather credible
information and evaluate it in real time.
So, in some ways, there is not only that, if you will, the
front-end problem, be able to get to know what you don't know
rapidly, there is also the idea of once you know it, how do you
manage it and how do you share it? I think there is a
reluctant--and this gets to a bureaucratic problem as well--
that, in some ways, departments and agencies with some of these
responsibilities are less than willing to share information,
particularly early on when their confidence levels are not very
high subject to the information they have.
Mr. Lungren. How would you define biosurveillance in this
context?
Dr. Kadlec. Well, I think it would be what we would want to
know about what is happening in humans; that it is happening
not only through public health departments, but more
importantly, emergency rooms and doctors' offices, in mini
clinics at Walmart and all the other places around and having
some confidence that, if there are suspect cases of either some
natural or deliberate event, that those would be hopefully
recognized early.
A critical enabler--there is a technology solution that
doesn't get a lot of identification, but it is point-of-care
diagnostic. Being able to provide a physician something that is
in his means to rapidly evaluate someone to ascertain whether
they have or not have something that is of public health
concern.
Mr. Lungren. How do you command that? In other words, I am
a pediatrician on my own. I see something of a certain disease,
communicable of some sort, I know I am required to report
certain things----
Dr. Kadlec. Right.
Mr. Lungren. Do I need to have that training when I am in
med school, continuous training, public health edicts, or
publications? What do you do?
Dr. Kadlec. Well, I think all of the above. I mean, the
reality is for, you know, practitioners--and I don't mean to
single them out here, but that is just the human element. But
yes, you really do need to have a sensitive--I will use
something, you know, mundane like measles as an example, where
we have outbreaks of measles, not because people are not
sensitive to it, it is just sometimes they don't recognize it,
and they are not aware of it, and they kind of lost that index
of suspicion.
So, in some ways, it is really sensitizing the whole system
to these kind of events. The challenge is a lot different
though if you have to look at food or animals or crops, because
those really rely on very different input to the system, where
the commercial sector has a huge role in it and, quite frankly,
is also somewhat reluctant to share that kind of information,
because you can imagine, you know, bad news about a product can
certainly impact sales as it often does.
So there is some, you know, it is not easy to say
homogenously, you know, how do you build this? I think part of
it is building a trusting place where NBIC was supposed to be
where people believe that you could share information and that
information would be handled responsibly and disseminated to
people who need to know when they needed to know it.
That is something that, quite frankly, has not happened
with NBIC.
Mr. Talent. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I am very hopeful.
Bob Graham and I, along with Colonel Larsen and Lynne Kidder
are very hopeful that our report is going to help you with
respect to this sort of thing.
We are going to have a piece on the threat, a piece on the
assessment, and then a piece on recommendations. I know it is
very difficult. You can't do everything. So, you know, what are
the priority things? What are the most important things?
I think, Bob talked about point-of-care diagnostics. I
think the current diagnostic test we have for anthrax takes 48
hours, does it? Well, of course, you have to respond within 48
hours. If it takes 48 hours to find out a person has anthrax,
you can't get them the Cipro in time.
So that sort of thing probably is the higher priority. Then
the only other point--and I am going to go back to a point you
made, and I am glad you are facing up to it, the extremely
complicated oversight rules here in the Senate in this issue
make it more difficult for agencies to develop the level of
trust with this body that they need to act freely and make
judgments. Because, as you know, oversight works when it is one
committee or two committees.
The Executive branch develops relationships. They know what
to expect, what is expected of them, et cetera. Then they can
feel free to make a judgment without fear that they are going
to be hung by somebody they don't even know, if you know what I
mean.
Now, on the other hand, if they are ever going to be
overseen by two dozen different committees, it is much more
difficult to get that kind of a relationship and much more
difficult for them to know the discretion they have to act. So
I can't emphasize enough that getting that problem fixed I
think is going to help across a wide area of issues.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you, very much.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan is recognized.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My
apologies coming, I think, Senator, you are actually addressing
the issue that I think is really critical.
I am a new Member here. So many times, you know, also and a
former staffer. So last 2 days, we have had critical
legislation before this committee, and apparently, you know, we
haven't been able to get it implemented through Congress
because of all these other committees that have jurisdiction
over the issue.
To me it has become clear, is that if we want to protect
the American people, especially against the harms that this
legislation and other legislation this committee has considered
and passed, we need exclusive jurisdiction over these issues,
really.
You know, our enemy is out there plotting and they are
evolving with their threat. We have to outmaneuver them. Our
decision-making process has to be quicker. I mean, this is
really, like, outrageous.
So I just want to commend Chairman Lungren and Congressman
Pascrell for recognizing that. Just along the lines of that F
grade that you gave us in terms of oversight, could you just
expand on that a little bit, since I missed that, because I am
assuming that is relevant to unifying the committee
jurisdiction over these homeland security issues.
Mr. Talent. Sure. I have always been a fan of--I think
Congressional oversight adds a lot to the Executive branch work
on balance. Now, we all have been part of oversight hearings or
processes that haven't worked very well, and I think they can
add a lot to this. One of the reasons I think this legislation
is so important, even though some of it could probably be done
by an Executive branch order, as the President has done with a
National bioforensic strategy and the lab regulation and they
deserve credit for that--is because when the Congress does
something--when you all pass legislation, everybody in the
Government sits up and takes notice.
In the Executive branch, in a way, oddly enough, that they
don't necessarily is when the President says something. Because
you all control the money. You know, it is a sign of unity
across the branches of Government that I just think is hugely
important.
That is, you know, oversight represents that kind of
influence. But just for common-sense reasons, it just doesn't
work if you have taken a subject that ought to be confined to
one or two committees and you split it up among dozens and
dozens of committees and subcommittees.
Nobody is looking at the whole picture. Everybody becomes
parochial. Everybody cares about their program; their little
agency; their little slice of it, and few people care about
working together.
So an organization or a body that ought to be an
integrator--the Congress--that ought to be encouraging unity of
effort within the Executive branch, that ought to be overseeing
to make certain that, you know, the money goes to the right
places becomes an agent for the opposite of that. Either
nothing is done, or it just tears the effort apart.
That is bad enough in this body, but let me say, it is
worse in the other body, because, you know, those struggles are
worse over there and they also have confirmation power over
there, which means that, you know, they can do more mischief if
the oversight goes off the rails.
So I think you are correct, and this is not just a
Congressional reform thing you can write about and they will
teach about in colleges and doesn't really matter whether you
do it or you don't do it. I mean this is a big deal, and I
think you are right to raise it.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Thank you, Senator.
Just for the time I have left, I just want to give just the
panel a follow-up on a specific example, and that deals with
the regulation of facilities that have chemicals of interest on
their premises.
You know, yesterday we considered authorization of the
CFATS, Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards, and for
me, I represent metro Detroit that has a huge regional drinking
water and waste water system. Well, CFATS won't apply to those
systems. I think it is critical, you know, to protect the
American people--millions of people that could get harmed from
contaminated water--that we have some regulatory body in the
Federal Government whose charge is to regulate the security of
waste water and drinking water systems.
Apparently, there isn't that type of consolidated
regulatory oversight. Now, on an off-line conversation some of
you mentioned it, there likely may not be a great bioterrorist
threat to waste water systems, but there is a water system in
my area that is totally open to anybody, you know,
contaminating that water supply.
So it still concerns me that, No. 1, these systems are
still vulnerable to a bioterrorist attack and that, second,
there is the need to have a single regulatory oversight by the
Federal Government over these water and waste water systems.
Did your report, or your investigation, address any of
these issues specifically? I yield back----
Mr. Talent. I would certainly defer to either the sheriff
or Dr. Kadlec on this, because they are more expert, but our
feeling is that an attack would be less likely to come through
a water system, because it is not as good a--from the
standpoint of the attacker--not as good a means of
disseminating the toxin or the germ, because it gets diluted so
quickly in the water supply and might get filtered out.
Now, having said that, there are all kinds of reasons why
you don't want a water treatment system to be, you know,
unprotected. You know, for one thing, just the disruption of
that system, if not through a bioattack, through some other
attack would certainly disrupt that city.
So I think your concern is justified, and I would just say
that, as you move forward with the concept of some kind of
regulation, do try to do it in a way that integrates with the
authorities that are already out there so that we don't have
another one that we, sort of, don't know what it is doing, and
it doesn't know what everybody else is doing.
So this concept of trying to unify the regulatory structure
is very important.
Sheriff Berdnik. If I might just add to that. The Passaic
County Sheriff's Department does patrol the reservoirs. We have
actually eight sheriff's officers assigned to that function. In
addition to that, there is private security.
Also, we are working in conjunction now with the
prosecutor's office through grants that they had obtained to do
video monitoring of those sites as well.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Bilirakis recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it.
Sheriff, we heard concerns from witnesses in one of our
hearings on medical countermeasures dispensing that a
biological attack on an unprepared Nation would seriously
disrupt the critical infrastructure.
How important do you think it is to have a comprehensive
risk-based guidance for first responders to guide them in their
preparation for a CBRN attack?
Sheriff Berdnik. I think it is very important. I think that
every officer should be prepared. They should have the best
education available to them. Again, in a time of chaos and
panic, it is most important to have the ability to be able to
communicate and network amongst each other to deal with the
crisis.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you. Let me ask you one more question.
We are having a hearing on July 8 with regard to warnings and
alerts. How much trouble are you having--elaborate as far as
notifying your residents, your constituents----
Sheriff Berdnik. Yes, we have a substantial problem. If we
were to----
Mr. Bilirakis. Give me some suggestions.
Sheriff Berdnik. Okay. If an attempt to notify all the
residents of Passaic County, it is my understanding that
through a computerized reverse 9-1-1 system, it would take 7
days to make a complete notification.
I think the way that--and, again, not being a computer
expert, but my understanding is that through advancing the
fiber optic lines, there would be a way of increasing those
notifications at a much, much more rapid pace.
Mr. Bilirakis. Okay, very good. We will get those
concerns--your concerns will be heard. We are going to talk to
FEMA and FCC. So thank you, very much. Appreciate it.
Sheriff Berdnik. Thank you.
Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lungren. Gentlelady from New Jersey have additional
questions?
Ms. Clarke of New York. Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman.
My question is for you, Sheriff Berdnik. From your work in
local government in oversight work, I am sure you have some
strong views on the inherent challenges of moving forward from
a need-to-know mindset to a need-to-share mindset.
In response to a WMD threat, what specific challenges have
you identified that have impeded effective information sharing
between intelligence and law enforcement personnel? How do you
think these challenges can be met and overcome?
Then, finally, what are some of the success stories you
have regarding comprehensive cross-jurisdictional catastrophic
planning?
Sheriff Berdnik. Okay. Well, the one thing I have to say,
sharing information, as everyone knows, is a contemporary
topic. We in the sheriff's department work in conjunction with
the prosecutor's office, the Federal authorities, and most
recently, are enacting the ability to teleconference with the
City of New York.
I think this is the way of the future. I think this is the
technology that we in law enforcement need. Again, it is the
ability to communicate with each other. The ability to share
information. I think that if we have the funding in order to do
that as well as communicate with radios in the event of a
catastrophe or emergency, it would be paramount.
Again, as I stated, responding to September 11--tri-State
response--the unfortunate thing was we could not communicate
with each other.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Could you just, sort of, share any
of the success stories you have perhaps regarding comprehensive
cross-jurisdictional catastrophic planning. I know that they
are tabletop exercises that are taking place.
There are other methodologies you talked about, the
teleconferencing capabilities. Can you give us a clearer sense
of some of the, I guess, forward-leaning activity that you have
already engaged in?
Sheriff Berdnik. Well, being involved in a HAZMAT, we also
have a Tier II bomb squad, and the other thing, of course, is
working with the office of emergency management.
It is working with these agencies together that were able
to accomplish our goals.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Then, Senator Talent, it seems to
me that the Government needs to know who is in possession of
agents that are material threats to the Nation here in the
United States and throughout the world.
The military, of course, has long needed to make those
determinations in order to protect our troops when deployed
overseas. What is your perspective on this, and how concerned
should we be about knowing where these agents are today, for
both civilian and military purposes?
Mr. Talent. Well, that is certainly a piece of the remedy
is to know which labs are out there working on these special
agent lists, the most toxic and the worst kind of pathogens.
We had a section of our initial report dealing with that
where we recommended certain changes. You all put it in your
bill. The Executive branch has responded, we think,
appropriately with an Executive Order unifying regulations and
also moving in the direction of concentrating our regulatory
resources on the most dangerous pathogens, rather than trying
to oversee 80 different pathogens, for example, most of which
are not likely to be the source of an attack, focus on the top
six or eight.
We think that that makes sense. So a lot of progress has
been made. Now, we need to do more internationally. Other
countries are nowhere near as good as we are in terms of
looking at their labs. We also have to keep in mind one of the
reasons why the biothreat is so dangerous is that life science
research has proliferated.
Of course, it is a good thing. We like life science
research. It has proliferated to the point where it is probably
impossible to prevent this threat by keeping an eye on
everybody who is working with these agents.
Because it is just too easy for any reasonably well-
educated bioscientist to, you know, to isolate a deadly strain
of anthrax, E. coli, that sort of thing. But, yes, trying to
find out where these agents are and regulating it is a piece of
it. We have made some progress in recently. We do need to do
more internationally.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield
back the balance of my time.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Clarke do you have any other questions?
The gentleman is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to raise the issue that has been addressed by this
panel earlier about the need for interoperable communications.
I represent the metro Detroit border, and we share a border
with Canada, but our first responders cannot easily share
information with Canadian officials.
I will give an example. I was down in a local community in
my district, and local police and fire they said, you know, we
had an incident on the Detroit River, somebody needed rescue,
but we couldn't really get a hold of the Coast Guard that
easily because of our, you know, our radio equipment. Then, not
only that, you know, that they couldn't communicate with their
Canadian counterparts.
So these are just three issues that you could address: No.
1, how important is interoperable communications to battling,
you know, WMDs? Second, is there a way to measure how much
progress we have made nationally in really upgrading our
communication systems, our radios, technology? Then, third,
what is the approximate cost of fully integrating our
communications systems among our first responders?
I mean, to the degree that you have that information. If
you don't, that is no problem. We can talk off-line about this.
Sheriff Berdnik. From a local perspective, again, the area
of what seems that we are progressing towards is
regionalization of communications. At this time, with budgets
the way they are, a lot of the smaller towns are requesting
that the sheriff's office be involved in dispatching for them.
So I think, again, as time goes on and this occurs, we are
gaining the ability to communicate at a much rapid pace with
the municipalities. The State also has a--it is called SPEN. It
is a Special Police Emergency Network. This allows us to
communicate anywhere within the State; however, part of the
problem is the fact that it operates on a certain frequency. So
that may require individual towns to have more than one radio
in their car, which, again, is a cost factor.
If they are not able to budget for that, then that causes a
problem. We can have the system in place but what good is it if
they don't have the equipment to utilize it?
Mr. Talent. To answer your question on how important it is,
I think it is very important, because there is a concept here.
You know, America has these tremendous first responders, fire,
police, emergency management, and in every case they have a
culture of mutual cooperation, dedication, and we have seen it
time and time again.
Now, no matter how good a job that you all do here and the
President does here, there is gonna be gaps in this resiliency
chain. I mean it is just the nature of the thing. But if our
first responders and local officials are empowered adequately,
and some crisis occurs, they will figure it out on the ground
and fill the gap as well as it can be filled.
Part of empowering them is enabling them to communicate
with each other. So I do think it is very important as a
practical matter. I mean, when I was in the Congress, this was
an issue. I was always told that to do it Nationally all at
once would probably be prohibitively expensive.
So it is good, in my mind, that they are moving to regional
solutions and trying to adapt these systems over time and make
them better.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. Well, you know, what I am
recommending today in a resolution is we are devoting that kind
of money to fight terrorism--we are actually borrowing it, but
we are spending it in military aid to Afghanistan. So I am
saying let's take a share of that here and give our first
responders--our local police, local fire, local emergency
medical providers the equipment and the resources they need to
share information and to respond.
I think that is the most effective and cost-effective way
for our taxpayers to help protect the American people. Let's
protect our folks here at home. We don't need to have even
70,000 troops in Afghanistan. We could draw it down to 15,000,
take a share of the savings and redirect it here to Department
of Homeland Security to upgrade our communication systems for
our first responders Nationally.
Second, this is a political comment--this Congress in the
past has failed to deal effectively with the foreclosure crisis
that caused all these property values to drop. So our local
units of government can't raise the money to cover these costs.
We, in Congress, should do so and redirect and reallocate the
money that we are spending in Afghanistan to address this very
issue.
Thank you for allowing me to make that comment here.
Mr. Lungren. We have concluded all of our questions. So I
think the witnesses for your valuable testimony and for your
commitment to our country and, particularly, your commitment to
the issue that we have before us today.
Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions for witnesses. So we would ask if you would please
respond to these in writing after you have received them. The
hearing record will remain open for 10 days.
I want to thank Members of both subcommittees for
participating and, with that, the subcommittees stand
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:48 a.m., the subcommittees were
adjourned.]
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