[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
DENYING SAFE HAVENS: HOMELAND SECURITY'S EFFORTS TO COUNTER THREATS
FROM PAKISTAN, YEMEN, AND SOMALIA
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT,
INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 3, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-29
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Kathleen C. Hochul, New York
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/General Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, INVESTIGATIONS, AND MANAGEMENT
Michael T. McCaul, Texas, Chairman
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Billy Long, Missouri, Vice Chair Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Dr. R. Nick Palarino, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Tamla Scott, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight, Investigations, and Management:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable William R. Keating, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Massachusetts, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and Management...... 8
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
WITNESSES
Panel I
Ms. Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers, Managing Director,
International Affairs and Trade, Government Accountability
Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Mark Koumans, Deputy Assistant Secretary, International
Affairs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Ms. Shari Villarosa, Deputy Coordinator for Regional Affairs,
U.S. Department of State:
Oral Statement................................................. 25
Prepared Statement............................................. 27
Mr. James Q. Roberts, Principal Director for Special Operations
and Combating Terrorism, Office of Special Operations/Low-
Intensity Conflict and Interdependent Capabilities, U.S.
Department of Defense:
Oral Statement................................................. 32
Prepared Statement............................................. 33
Panel II
Mr. Steve Coll, President and CEO, New America Foundation:
Oral Statement................................................. 46
Prepared Statement............................................. 47
Mr. Bruce Hoffman, Director, Center for Peace and Security
Studies, Director, Security Studies Program, Georgetown
University:
Oral Statement................................................. 52
Prepared Statement............................................. 54
Mr. Daniel L. Byman, Security Studies Program, School of Foreign
Service at Georgetown University, and Senior Fellow, Saban
Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution:
Oral Statement................................................. 59
Prepared Statement............................................. 60
DENYING SAFE HAVENS: HOMELAND SECURITY'S EFFORTS TO COUNTER THREATS
FROM PAKISTAN, YEMEN, AND SOMALIA
----------
Friday, June 3, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, and
Management,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Michael T. McCaul
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives McCaul, Bilirakis, Long, Duncan,
Keating, and Clarke.
Mr. McCaul. Good morning. The committee will come to order.
I would like to welcome our witnesses to this hearing entitled
``Denying Safe Havens: Homeland Security's Efforts to Counter
Threats from Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.''
Although Osama bin Laden is dead, al-Qaeda and its
affiliates are not. They are hiding in safe havens, areas of
relative security that are exploited by terrorists to recruit,
train, raise funds, and plan operations.
The Department of State has identified 13 countries acting
as safe havens today. Today, we examine three that we believe
pose the most serious threat to the United States--and that is
Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia--and what is the U.S. Government
doing to deny these places as a refuge for terrorists.
Osama bin Laden was the most-wanted terrorist. Yet he lived
comfortably in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in a town that serves as a
headquarters for frontier force and infantry regiments only 31
miles from Islamabad, contrary to our belief that he was hiding
in some cave in the FATA or the frontier. He was not hiding in
a cave. He was not in the mountains. His compound was less than
1 mile--or about half the distance from here to the Washington
Monument--from the Pakistan Military Academy, or their
equivalent of West Point, where over 2,000 cadets are trained,
600 instructors teach, and approximately 2,000 representatives
from other countries visit and receive training each year.
CNN recently reported that Osama bin Laden sought a deal
with Pakistan in which he would not attack Pakistan in exchange
for protection. At this point, we do not know who in the
Pakistani government was aware of Osama bin Laden's presence,
but I am certain that some Pakistan officials knew that he was
living in plain sight, not exactly the average house in an
ordinary neighborhood. It stuck out like a sore thumb.
It is difficult to determine how many terrorist groups
operate out of Pakistan, but we do know al-Qaeda and the Afghan
Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban and other groups use this
country as a staging ground for attacks on U.S. troops, to kill
American citizens, and terrorize countries throughout the
world.
For example, Mullah Omar, the spiritual leader of the
Taliban, is believed to be in Pakistan. Anwar al-Awlaki is
hiding in Yemen. He is the equivalent of the bin Laden of the
internet. He provides spiritual guidance and recruits
terrorists via YouTube and Facebook. He has inspired more than
2 dozen terror plots against the United States in the past 2
years. The Fort Hood shooter, Nidal Hasan, e-mailed al-Awlaki
on numerous occasions before he killed 13 people, including
soldiers, and wounding 30 others. Abdulmutallab, the Christmas
bomber, was in contact with al-Awlaki before attempting to set
off an explosive on board Northwest Flight 254, an
international flight bound for Detroit.
With the death of bin Laden, many experts believe al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula based in Yemen will attempt to become
the successor. Because there is no central authority in
Somalia, al-Qaeda and other associated terrorist groups will
also use it as a base of operations to attack Western targets.
According to the 2009 Report on Terrorism issued by the
National Counterterrorism Center, al-Shabaab is also considered
by U.S. officials as one of the most deadly terrorist groups in
the world. Not only is Somalia a base for terrorists, but
pirates operating off the coast are a threat to international
shipping. This has contributed to an increase in shipping costs
and the delivery of food aid shipments. Ninety percent of the
world's food programs' shipments into Somalia arrive by sea and
ships and now require a military escort.
Numerous documents have addressed the problem of terrorist
safe havens. The 9/11 Commission's report to Congress concluded
the safe haven of Afghanistan allowed al-Qaeda operational
space to gather recruits and build logistical networks to
conduct attacks against the United States.
The Obama administration's National Security Strategy
states: We will deny safe havens and strengthen at-risk states.
This NSS report points out a whole-government approach that is
needed to include information sharing, law enforcement
cooperation, and establishing new practices to counter
terrorists. The document also requires the United States to
help countries build capacities for responsible governance and
security.
Existing U.S. law, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 and the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010, requires the administration to
produce a list of what each agency is doing to deny terrorists
safe havens.
The Government Accountability Office, or GAO, examined the
U.S. Government approach and concluded, No. 1, that safe havens
are a threat to the United States; and No. 2, a more
comprehensive list of agency efforts is needed so Congress can
adequately oversee and assess how the United States is denying
safe havens to terrorists. In other words, GAO concludes that
this administration is not complying with these requirements.
We currently have an incomplete picture of what each of
these countries is doing to eliminate safe havens, what they
are doing to prevent the proliferation and tracking of weapons
of mass destruction, and what they are doing to cooperate with
U.S. counterterrorism officials. This knowledge is vital to
Congress' ability to craft foreign policy that holds countries
accountable for aiding terrorists by looking the other way.
I applaud our Government's efforts, but more has to be
done. Eliminating the terrorist's base of operations where they
have the ability to recruit, train, and plan their operations
is the key to preventing future attacks on American soil. Osama
bin Laden orchestrated the 9/11 attacks from his safe haven in
Afghanistan. Anwar al-Awlaki has been able to inspire more than
2 dozen plots against the United States over the past 2 years,
including the Fort Hood shootings and the Christmas bomber.
This hearing will assess the role of the U.S. Government in
denying the terrorists the ability to reconstitute.
Before I yield my time to the Ranking Member, I do want to
thank the brave men and women of our Armed Services, the
civilians in the Departments of State and Homeland Security,
and those across Government agencies who serve overseas. They
constitute our best defense against the terrorists who want to
kill us.
[The statement of Chairman McCaul follows:]
Prepared Statement of Chairman Michael T. McCaul
June 3, 2011
Good morning. Welcome to this Oversight, Investigations, and
Management Subcommittee hearing titled ``Denying Terrorist Safe Havens:
Homeland Security's Efforts to Counter Threats From Pakistan, Yemen,
and Somalia''.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Although Osama bin Laden is dead, al-Qaeda and its affiliates are
not. They are hiding in safe havens--areas of relative security that
are exploited by terrorists to recruit, train, raise funds, and plan
operations. The Department of State has identified 13 countries acting
as safe havens. Today we examine three that we believe pose the most
serious threat to the United States--Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia--and
what the U.S. Government is doing to deny these places as a refuge for
terrorists.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Osama bin Laden was a hunted man, yet he lived comfortably in
Abbottabad, Pakistan, a town that serves as the headquarters for
Frontier Force and Infantry regiments only 31 miles from Islamabad. He
was not hiding in a cave. He was not in the mountains. His compound was
less than 1 mile--or about half the distance from here to the
Washington Monument--from the Pakistan Military Academy where over
2,000 cadets are trained, 600 instructors teach, and approximately
2,000 representatives from other countries visit and receive training
each year.
CNN recently reported that Osama bin Laden sought a deal with
Pakistan in which he would not attack Pakistan in exchange for
protection. At this point we do not know who in the Pakistani
Government was aware of Osama bin Laden's presence, but I am convinced
some Pakistani officials knew that he was living in plain sight. Not
exactly the average house in an ordinary neighborhood. It stuck out
like a sore thumb.
It is difficult to determine how many terrorist groups operate out
of Pakistan. But we do know al-Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani
Taliban and other groups use this country as a staging ground for
attacks on U.S. troops, to kill American citizens, and terrorize
countries throughout the world. For example, Mullah Omar, the spiritual
leader of the Taliban, is believed to be in Pakistan.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Anwar al Awlaki is hiding in Yemen. He is the bin Laden of the
internet because he provides spiritual guidance and recruits terrorists
via YouTube and Facebook. He has inspired more than 2 dozen terror
plots against the United States over the past 2 years. The Fort Hood
shooter, Nidal Hasan emailed al Awalaki on numerous occasions before
killing 13 people and wounding 30 others. Umar Farouk Abdulmuttalab,
the Christmas bomber, was in contact with al Awalaki before attempting
to set off an explosive on-board Northwest Flight 254, an international
flight on approach to Detroit.
With the death of bin Laden, many experts believe al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula, based in Yemen, will attempt to become the successor
to al-Qaeda.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Because there is no central authority in Somalia, al-Qaeda and
other associated terrorist groups will use it as a base of operations
to attack Western targets. According to the 2009 Report on Terrorism
issued by the National Counterterrorism Center, al-Shabaab is
considered by U.S. officials as one of the most deadly terrorists
groups in the world.
Not only is Somalia a base for terrorists, but pirates operating
off its coast are a threat to international shipping. This has
contributed to an increase in shipping costs and impeded the delivery
of food aid shipments. Ninety percent of the World Food Program's
shipments into Somalia arrive by sea, and ships into this area now
require a military escort.
Numerous documents have addressed the problem of terrorist safe
havens.
The 9/11 Commission's report to Congress concluded the safe
haven of Afghanistan allowed al-Qaeda operational space to
gather recruits and build logistical networks to conduct
attacks against the United States.
The Obama administration National Security Strategy (NSS)
states we will ``Deny Safe Havens and Strengthen At-Risk
States.'' The NSS points out a whole-of-government approach
(interagency collaboration) is needed including information
sharing, law enforcement cooperation, and establishing new
practices to counter terrorists. The document also requires the
United States to help countries build capacities for
responsible governance and security.
Existing U.S. law (the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004 and the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2010) requires the administration to
produce a list of what each agency is doing to deny terrorists
safe havens.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) examined the U.S.
Government approach and concluded: (1) Safe havens are a threat
to the United States, and (2) a more comprehensive list of
agency efforts is needed so Congress can adequately oversee and
assess how the United States is denying safe havens to
terrorists.
We currently have an incomplete picture of what each of these
countries is doing to eliminate safe havens, what they are doing to
prevent the proliferation and tracking of weapons of mass destruction,
and what they are doing to cooperate with U.S. counter-terrorism
officials. This knowledge is vital to Congress's ability to craft
foreign policy that holds countries accountable for aiding terrorists
by looking the other way.
I applaud our Government's efforts but more has to be done.
Eliminating the terrorists' base of operations where they have the
ability to recruit, train, and plan their operations is the key to
preventing attacks on American soil. Osama bin Laden orchestrated the
9/11 attacks from a safe haven in Afghanistan. Anwar al Awlaki has been
able to inspire more than 2 dozen plots against the United States over
just the past 2 years including the Fort Hood shootings and Christmas
bomber. This hearing will assess the role of the U.S. Government in
denying the terrorists the ability to reconstitute.
Before I yield my time I would like to thank the brave men and
women of our armed services, the civilians in the Departments of State
and Homeland Security and all those from other U.S. Government agencies
who serve overseas. They constitute our best defense against the
terrorist who want to kill us.
Also I want to thank our witnesses today and look forward to
hearing their testimonies.
Mr. McCaul. With that, I yield and recognize the Ranking
Member of this committee, Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you for
convening today's hearing on U.S. efforts to deny terrorist
safe havens and counter threats from Pakistan, Yemen, and
Somalia.
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were coordinated, as we all
know, from a safe haven in Afghanistan. The 9/11 Commissioners
later stated that the U.S., ``strategy should include offensive
operations to counterterrorism,'' and terrorists should no
longer find safe havens where their organizations can grow and
flourish.
Terrorism in America right now is our No. 1 security
threat. Denying safe haven to terrorists is a paramount concern
to our homeland security and an important step in keeping our
communities safe from terrorism.
We know that safe havens exist in ungoverned, under-
governed, and ill-governed areas of the world. These havens
provide terrorists with cover and allow them the space to
operate and plan vicious terrorist attacks.
There are multiple agencies that play a role in
implementing U.S. counterterrorism efforts, and I thank the
panel for taking their time today to join us as part of that
grouping.
The Departments of State, Homeland Security, Justice, and
Defense are all but a few of the U.S. agencies that combine
their efforts in countering this threat; and I am interested in
hearing today from our witnesses the level of cooperation that
presently exists among the various agencies and whether this
multi-agency approach is producing positive results for our
homeland security. I think cooperation is one of the challenges
that we all face in a threat so complicated and serious as
this, and it is important that coordination exist as seamlessly
as possible.
I am concerned that Congress receive a full and
comprehensive listing of our Government's efforts, especially
in light of the risk safe havens pose to the safety and
security of U.S. interests, both at home and abroad. One hand
needs to know what the other hand is doing, and the production
of this report in the manner intended by Congress will allow
that to happen.
While today's focus is on physical safe havens, we must
also consider the broader safe havens of the future. Electronic
infrastructure and global communications play an important role
in terrorist operations and allow for virtual safe havens that
are much harder to track, disrupt, and dismantle than physical
safe havens.
Furthermore, the May 1 killing of Osama bin Laden, who
escaped detection by hiding in a safe haven located in a
heavily populated area, governed area, that indicates that the
terms of safe haven does not always equate with remoteness, in
scarcely populated areas, or lawless areas.
I look forward to hearing from both panels and receive
their recommendations on strategies on the best approach for
addressing terrorist safe havens, and I yield back my time.
Mr. McCaul. I thank the Ranking Member, and I couldn't
agree with you more that the virtual safe havens are a threat
as well. I know we have had hearings on radicalization over the
internet, which I think poses one of the biggest threats we
have today.
Other Members are reminded that opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
June 3, 2011
Thank you, Chairman McCaul, for convening this hearing.
I would also like to thank our witnesses for their participation,
and I look forward to hearing their testimony.
Last month, the United States achieved a major milestone in our on-
going effort to secure our homeland from acts of terrorism.
The killing of Osama bin Laden, without a doubt, made the United
States, in particular, and the entire world, in general, a safer place
to live.
However, it did not remove the on-going threat from terrorist
forces that continue to seek to do us harm.
We know that terrorists rely on safe havens to organize, plan,
raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative
obscurity.
They also use safe havens to plan attacks--some of which focus on
killing innocent Americans--in an effort to further their ideological
goals.
These safe havens provide security for terrorists because in these
areas they are able to operate outside of the law, in uncontrolled
territory, with little or no government interference.
In August 2010, the Department of State identified 13 terrorist
safe havens, including areas in Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen.
These areas experience widespread terrorist activities that
illustrate the danger in identified safe haven locations.
According to the National Counterterrorism Center, in 2010 alone,
there were approximately 200 terrorist attacks in Yemen, more than 580
in Somalia, and 1,331 in Pakistan.
Terrorists from these countries have also sought to attack United
States interests.
For example, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, which
operates in Yemen, claimed responsibility for the attempted 2009
Christmas day bombing of a plane headed to the United States; in
addition to the attempted package bombings on U.S.-bound aircraft in
October 2010.
Congress has mandated that the U.S. Government issue reports that
identify where terrorist safe havens exist and assess U.S. Government
efforts in addressing them.
The reporting of this vital information to Congress is the first
step in ensuring Congressional oversight of Government-wide efforts in
denying terrorist safe havens and taking efforts to dismantle and
disrupt their existence.
Unless the United States identifies where safe havens are located
and the steps being taken to protect the homeland in light of their
existence, Congress cannot fully measure the adequacy of U.S. efforts.
Unfortunately, GAO will release a report today that indicates that
since 2004 Federal Government agencies have not fully complied with
Congressional reporting requirements.
As a result, not once has Congress received a comprehensive
Government-wide list of U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists,
as required by law.
Last year, several efforts were implemented to improve the U.S.
Government response to addressing terrorist safe havens.
The 2010 National Security Strategy declared that ``denying safe
haven to terrorists is an essential component of the U.S. strategy to
defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates.''
Furthermore, the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010 reiterated safe haven reporting requirements and I am pleased
to learn that for the first time ever, a more comprehensive report is
underway.
I look forward to receiving testimony from our Government panel
which should shed light on U.S. Government efforts.
I am also interested in hearing from our panel of experts regarding
the extent to which terrorist safe havens pose a threat to U.S.
homeland security.
I yield back.
Mr. McCaul. We are pleased to have a very distinguished
panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic, and
I want to introduce each of you. I hope we can get through your
testimony. We have a series of votes coming up probably in
about 30 minutes from now. It will be two votes, and then we
will return to the hearing.
First, we have Ms. Jacquie Williams-Bridgers, who is the
Managing Director of the International Affairs and Trade Team
for the U.S. Government Accountability Office. She began her
professional career in the GAO in 1978.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers has also been Inspector General of
the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, and it is a pleasure to have you here
today.
Next, we have Mr. Mark Koumans, who is the Deputy Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs at the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security. He is responsible for coordinating the
Department's international programs and policies.
Prior to joining DHS, he served in the U.S. Foreign
Service, concentrating on counterterrorism and security issues;
and it is an honor to have you here today as well, sir.
Next, we have Ms. Shari Villarosa, who is the Deputy
Coordinator for Regional Affairs at the U.S. Department of
State. Previously, she served as Chief of Mission in Burma; and
her expansive Foreign Service career has included overseas
assignments in Thailand, Brazil, and Ecuador, among others.
Next, we have Mr. James Roberts. He serves as the Principal
Director for Special Operations and Combating Terrorism in the
Office of Secretary of Defense. Mr. Roberts began his
Government career as a U.S. Army private in 1968 and served 24
years on active duty as a military intelligence officer. We
thank you for your service to our country and thank all of you
for being here today.
I have been informed that we are going to have votes in
about probably 5 minutes or so. In fact, they just called it
just now.
I think we can proceed with some of the testimony. They
usually keep the votes open for about 30 minutes.
So, with that, Ms. Williams-Bridgers is recognized.
STATEMENT OF JACQUELYN L. WILLIAMS-BRIDGERS, MANAGING DIRECTOR,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND TRADE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Keating, and Members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be
here to discuss the report the GAO is releasing today on U.S.
efforts to address terrorist safe havens.
Safe havens, as we all know, allow terrorists the freedom
to train, recruit, and plan deadly operations that constitute a
threat to the United States. As you mentioned in your opening
statement, Chairman McCaul, such was the case with the
attempted airliner bombing on December 25, 2009, which was
planned from safe havens in Yemen. Most recently, the discovery
of Osama bin Laden in a compound near a military base in
Pakistan makes this hearing particularly timely.
My testimony focuses on three questions: To what extent do
U.S. agency strategies focus on terrorist safe havens? What
terrorist safe havens have been identified? Has the U.S.
Government developed a comprehensive assessment of its efforts
to deny terrorists the ability to train, recruit, plan deadly
operations against us?
My first point is that the U.S. Government emphasizes the
importance of denying safe havens to terrorists in several
strategic documents. Three National security strategies
released since 2002 and the National Strategy for Combating
Terrorism, which was last updated in 2006, identify safe havens
as a National security concern.
The National Strategy for Combating Terrorism noted that
the elimination of terrorist safe havens requires the attention
of all elements of National power, with a particular focus on
information sharing, law enforcement, and foreign capacity-
building and security governance in development sectors.
In addition to National strategies, Defense, Justice,
State, USAID, and the Office of Director of National
Intelligence have issued strategic plans that include language
emphasizing the importance of addressing safe havens. However,
other agencies such as DHS that are significantly involved in
relevant law enforcement efforts overseas do not specify the
need to address threats from safe havens in their strategic
plans.
My second point, in compliance with Congressional mandates,
State Department annually identifies safe havens around the
globe which threaten U.S. National security. Congress mandated
that State perform a detailed assessment of each foreign
country whose territory is being used as a sanctuary to
terrorists. Since 2006, State has published this information in
its annual country reports on terrorism. Of note, since 2007,
only one country, Indonesia, and one region, the Afghanistan-
Pakistan border, have been removed from the list of safe
havens. State most recently, in its Country Report issued in
August of last year, identified 13 countries as safe havens.
Each of the three countries that are the focus of this
hearing today have areas that terrorists use as safe havens.
For example, in Pakistan, several terrorist organizations
maintain safe havens, including the core of al-Qaeda, the
Pakistani Taliban, the LET. Each group has either attempted
attacks against the United States or views American interests
as legitimate targets. For example, the Pakistani Taliban
claimed responsibility for the failed vehicle bombing in New
York City's Times Square in 2010.
In Yemen, the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, AQAP,
planned the attempted bombing of a plane headed to the United
States on December 25, 2009, and also claimed responsibility
for the attempted package bombing in cargo planes in late 2010.
Also, in 2010, the United States designated Anwar al-Awlaki, a
U.S. citizen and leader for AQAP, for supporting acts of
terrorism on behalf of AQAP.
In Somalia, al-Shabaab, whose core leadership is linked
ideologically to al-Qaeda, has claimed responsibility for
several bombings and shootings throughout Somalia, as well as
the deadly suicide bombings in Uganda. Just last year, the FBI
indicted 12 people, including five U.S. citizens, on charges of
providing support to al-Shabaab.
In addition, the FBI has expressed concerns about Americans
trained in Somalia who might plan to conduct attacks inside the
United States.
My third point is that, despite the express desire of the
Congress to receive comprehensive assessments of the United
States' efforts to deny terrorists safe harbor, the United
States Government has not developed such an evaluation.
Beginning in 2004, Congress required the administration to
submit reports outlining U.S. Government efforts to deny or
disrupt safe havens. In response, State submitted a report to
Congress in 2006 and subsequently updated its information in
its annual Country Reports.
While these reports, including the most recent update
issues in August, 2010, identify several U.S. efforts to
address safe havens, we found that State's report is not
complete for two reasons.
First, the Country Reports do not include at least 13
programs and activities that State funds to address safe
havens. For example, foreign military financing and State-
funded training provided through DHS to combat bulk cash
smuggling were not included.
Second, programs and activities funded by agencies other
than State Department, such as Defense, Justice, Treasury, were
not included. For example, DOD's Afghanistan and Iraqi security
forces funds and the 1206 program that is used to train and
equip foreign security forces were not included.
To enhance the usefulness of State's reporting we
recommended that State include an assessment of key U.S. agency
programs that addressed terrorist safe havens. State concurred
that its reporting should be more comprehensive but did not
agree that such a list should be part of its Country Reports,
citing another report that it issued. We examined that report,
an anti-terrorism report, and determined that it does not
constitute a Government-wide assessment of key U.S. efforts
because it, too, does not include the contributions of the
agencies, such as DOD.
In 2010, Congress again required the President to report on
U.S. counterterrorism efforts relating to the denial of safe
havens. We understand that the National Security Council has
been assigned responsibility for completing this report, but no
report has yet been submitted to Congress. To address this
reporting gap, we recommended that the NSC, in collaboration
with other agencies, complete the Congressional reporting
requirement to identify and assess Government-wide efforts
related to denial of terrorist safe harbors.
Chairman McCaul, Mr. Keating, that concludes my prepared
statement. I will be happy to answer questions at the
appropriate time.
[The statement of Ms. Williams-Bridgers follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jacquelyn L. Williams-Bridgers
June 3, 2011
gao-11-713t
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here to discuss the report GAO is
releasing today on U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens.\1\
Terrorist safe havens provide security for terrorists, allowing them to
train recruits and plan operations. U.S. officials have concluded that
various terrorist incidents demonstrate the dangers emanating from
terrorist safe havens, such as the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai,
India, planned, in part, from safe havens in Pakistan,\2\ and the
attempted airliner bombing on December 25, 2009, planned from safe
havens in Yemen. The discovery of Osama bin Laden in a compound in
Pakistan, from which, according to U.S. officials, he played an active
role in al-Qaeda focused on attacking the United States, makes this
hearing particularly timely.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its
Reporting on Terrorist Safe Havens, GAO-11-561 (Washington, DC: June 3,
2011).
\2\ See GAO, Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks
Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe
Haven in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, GAO-08-622
(Washington, DC: Apr. 17, 2008).
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My testimony today focuses on: (1) U.S. National strategies related
to addressing terrorist safe havens, (2) terrorist safe havens \3\
identified by the Department of State (State) and the threats emanating
from these havens, and (3) the extent to which the U.S. Government has
identified efforts to deny terrorists safe havens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ The 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism states that,
in addition to physical terrorist safe havens in geographic
territories, terrorist safe havens can also be nonphysical or virtual,
existing within legal, cyber, and financial systems. In this statement,
however, we focus on physical terrorist safe havens.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In our report, we found that U.S. National strategies emphasize the
importance of denying safe haven to terrorists and that, since 2006,
State has annually identified terrorist safe havens in its Country
Reports on Terrorism. However, we also found that, although there are
multiple reporting requirements, the U.S. Government has not provided
to Congress a comprehensive, Government-wide list of its efforts to
address terrorist safe havens. We made recommendations to both State
and the National Security Council to improve reporting on U.S. efforts
to address terrorist safe havens. State agreed with the importance of
comprehensive information regarding U.S. efforts to address terrorist
safe havens, but did not agree that this information needs to be
included in the Country Reports on Terrorism. The National Security
Council reviewed the report but provided no comments on the
recommendation.
u.s. national strategies emphasize the importance of denying safe
havens to terrorists
The United States highlights the denial of safe haven to terrorists
as a key National security concern in several U.S. Government strategic
documents. For example, National Security Strategies released in 2002,
2006, and 2010 emphasize the importance of denying safe haven to
terrorists. The current National Strategy for Combating Terrorism,
which was last updated September 2006, also stresses the importance of
eliminating terrorist safe havens. The document identifies eliminating
terrorist safe havens as a priority action against which all elements
of National power--including military, diplomatic, financial,
intelligence, and law enforcement--should be applied. According to
National Security Staff officials, an updated National Strategy for
Combating Terrorism is currently being drafted and its release is
expected in the coming months. However, these officials stated that
denying safe haven to terrorists will remain an important element of
U.S. counterterrorism strategy.
In addition to National strategies, plans issued by various U.S.
agencies, such as the Departments of Defense (DOD), Justice (DOJ), and
State/U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), as well as the
National Intelligence Strategy issued by the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, include language emphasizing the importance of
addressing safe havens. Figure 1 shows excerpts from these documents,
which discuss terrorist safe havens. However, other agencies that are
involved in U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens do not
include specific language on safe havens in their strategic plans. For
example, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--which contributes
to the law enforcement element of U.S. National power--does not
specifically address safe havens in its strategic plan but does have a
goal to ``protect the homeland from dangerous people,'' which includes
objectives related to effective border control.
figure 1: selected u.s. government strategic documents emphasizing the
importance of denying safe haven to terrorists
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
State's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism coordinates
policies and programs of U.S. agencies to counter terrorism overseas.
According to State, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
works with all appropriate elements of the U.S. Government to ensure
integrated and effective counterterrorism efforts that utilize
diplomacy, economic power, intelligence, law enforcement, and military
power. These elements include those in the White House, DOD, DHS, DOJ,
State, the Department of the Treasury (Treasury), USAID, and the
intelligence community. For instance, State funds programs to build the
capacity of U.S. foreign partners to counter terrorism financing
implemented by agencies such as DHS, Treasury, and DOJ.
since 2006, state has annually identified terrorist safe havens posing
risks to u.s. national security
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
(IRTPA) \4\ requires State to include a detailed assessment in its
annual Country Reports on Terrorism with respect to each foreign
country whose territory is being used as a terrorist sanctuary, also
known as a terrorist safe haven.\5\ State defines terrorist safe havens
as ``ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed areas of a country and
non-physical areas where terrorists that constitute a threat to U.S.
National security interests are able to organize, plan, raise funds,
communicate, recruit, train, and operate in relative security because
of inadequate governance capacity, political will, or both.'' Since
2006, State has identified existing terrorist safe havens in a
dedicated chapter of its Country Reports on Terrorism.\6\ As shown in
figure 2, State identified 13 terrorist safe havens in its August 2010
report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Pub. L. 108-458, section 7102.
\5\ We use the term terrorist safe haven, which, according to
State, has the same meaning as terrorist sanctuaries.
\6\ State annually releases the Country Reports on Terrorism.
State's August 2010 report includes a strategic overview of terrorist
threats and country-by-country discussions of foreign government
counterterrorism cooperation. While released by State's Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, the Country Reports on Terrorism
incorporates the views of the National Counterterrorism Center and
National Security Staff, as well as key agencies involved in addressing
international terrorism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
figure 2: terrorist safe havens identified in state's country reports
on terrorism released in august 2010
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Terrorist safe havens pose a threat to U.S. National security. The
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (9/11
Commission) noted that safe havens in Afghanistan allowed al-Qaeda the
operational space to gather recruits and build logistical networks to
undertake planning for the attacks on September 11, 2001. State reports
that denying safe havens is central to combating terrorism, which it
cited as the United States' top security threat. According to U.S.
agencies, a variety of groups that pose threats to the United States
operate in countries identified by State as terrorist safe havens. For
example:
Pakistan.--Various terrorist organizations operate in
Pakistan. First, al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was located in
a compound in Pakistan from which U.S. officials have stated he
was actively involved in planning attacks against the United
States. Additionally, according to State, al-Qaeda also uses
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) to launch
attacks in Afghanistan, train and recruit terrorists, and plan
global operations. State also reports that the Pakistani
Taliban has used the FATA to plan attacks against civilian and
military targets across Pakistan. The Pakistani Taliban have
claimed responsibility for several attacks against U.S.
interests, including an attack on the U.S. Consulate in
Peshawar in April 2010. Moreover, according to the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Pakistani Taliban has
repeatedly threatened to attack the U.S. homeland and claimed
responsibility for the failed vehicle bombing in New York
City's Times Square in May 2010. In addition, according to
State, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba--the group responsible for attacks in
Mumbai, India, in November 2008, which killed at least 183
people--continues to plan operations from Pakistan and views
American interests as legitimate targets.
Yemen.--The foreign terrorist organization al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is based in Yemen. According to the
NCTC, AQAP is pursuing a global agenda. For example, the group
attempted to bomb a plane headed to the United States on
December 25, 2009. AQAP also claimed responsibility for the
attempted package bombings of cargo planes in October 2010.
More recently, in response to the killing of Osama bin Laden,
AQAP issued a press release vowing revenge against the United
States. In addition, members of AQAP have been named Specially
Designated Nationals by the United States Government. In July
2010, the United States designated Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.
citizen and key leader for AQAP, for supporting acts of
terrorism and for acting for or on behalf of AQAP.
Somalia.--Al-Shabaab is a foreign terrorist organization
active in Somalia. Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for
several bombings and shootings throughout Somalia, as well as
the July 2010 suicide bomb attacks in Kampala, Uganda, which
killed more than 70 people. State reports that rank-and-file
members of al-Shabaab are predominantly interested in issues
within Somalia, rather than pursuing a global agenda. However,
NCTC and State note that al-Shabaab's core leadership is linked
ideologically to al-Qaeda and that some members of the group
previously trained and fought with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. In
2009, the Deputy Director of Intelligence at the NCTC testified
that a number of young Somali-American men traveled to Somalia,
possibly to train and fight with al-Shabaab, including one who
conducted a suicide bombing attack. While noting there is no
specific evidence that the Americans previously trained in
Somalia planned to conduct attacks inside the United States,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has expressed concern
that this threat remains a possibility. In August 2010, the FBI
arrested two U.S. citizens and indicted 12 others, including
five U.S. citizens, on charges of providing support to al-
Shabaab.
the u.s. government has not fully addressed reporting requirements to
identify efforts to deny terrorists safe haven
The U.S. Government has not fully addressed reporting requirements
to identify U.S. efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists. Congress
required the President to submit reports outlining U.S. Government
efforts to deny or disrupt terrorist safe havens in two laws--the IRTPA
and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2010.
The IRTPA required the President to submit a report to Congress
that includes an outline of the strategies, tactics, and tools the U.S.
Government uses to disrupt or eliminate the security provided to
terrorists by terrorist safe havens,\7\ and recommended that State
update the report annually, to the extent feasible, in its Country
Reports on Terrorism.\8\ In response to these provisions, State
submitted a report to Congress in April 2006, which it has updated
annually as part of its Country Reports on Terrorism. These reports
include a section on U.S. strategies, tactics, and tools that
identifies several U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens. In
the Country Reports on Terrorism released in August 2010, State
identified several U.S. efforts for addressing terrorist safe havens,
including programs such as State's Regional Strategic Initiative and
Antiterrorism Assistance programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Pub. L. 108-458, Section 7120(b).
\8\ Pub. L. 108-458, Section 7102(d)(2)(E).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, State's August 2010 Country Reports on Terrorism does not
fully identify U.S. efforts to deny terrorists safe haven. For example:
Some State-funded efforts are not included.--Selected State
strategic documents \9\ identify efforts funded by State that
may contribute to denying terrorists safe haven--such as
Foreign Military Financing activities and USAID development
assistance--that were not included in the August 2010 Country
Reports on Terrorism. In addition, agency officials identified
additional State-funded efforts that may contribute to
addressing terrorist safe havens--such as activities funded
through State's Peacekeeping Operations and State-funded DHS
training to combat money laundering and bulk cash smuggling--
but were not included in the report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ We reviewed the fiscal year 2012 Mission Strategic and Resource
Plans (MSRP) for the Philippines, Somalia, and Yemen, submitted in
April 2010, which included program funding information for goals
related to addressing terrorist safe havens for fiscal years 2009
through 2015.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Efforts funded by other U.S. agencies are not included.--For
example, according to DOD officials, the Department's
Afghanistan and Iraq Security Forces Funds and Section 1206
program efforts to train and equip the security forces abroad
address terrorist safe havens but are not included in State's
report. Additionally, according to DOJ and Treasury, their
training programs to build the capacity of foreign partners to
counter terrorism financing address terrorist safe havens, but
they are also not included in State's report.
In the IRTPA, Congress noted that it should be the policy of the
United States to implement a coordinated strategy to prevent terrorists
from using safe havens and to assess the tools used to assist foreign
governments in denying terrorists safe haven. State's report is
incomplete without a comprehensive overview of its own contributions
and those of its various interagency partners to address terrorist safe
havens.
To enhance the comprehensiveness of State's reporting on U.S.
efforts to deny safe haven to terrorists, we recommended that State
include a Government-wide list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist
safe havens when it updates the report requested under the IRTPA.\10\
In response, State concurred that reporting on U.S. efforts to deny
terrorist safe havens should be more comprehensive. However, State did
not agree that such a list should be part of its annual Country Reports
on Terrorism, citing the fact that they have completed other reporting
requirements related to counterterrorism. We maintain that the
provisions in the IRTPA recommend annual updates related to U.S.
efforts to address terrorist safe havens be included in the Country
Reports on Terrorism. Moreover, while it is possible that other reports
produced by State address IRTPA provisions, the antiterrorism report
cited by State in its comments does not constitute a Government-wide
list of U.S. efforts to address terrorist safe havens as the report
does not include the contributions of key agencies, such as DOD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ GAO-11-561.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In addition to the provisions in the IRTPA, Congress demonstrated
an on-going interest in the identification of U.S. efforts to deny
terrorist safe havens in the NDAA for fiscal year 2010. The conference
report accompanying the act noted that existing Executive branch
reporting on counterterrorism does not address the full scope of U.S.
activities or assess overall effectiveness. The NDAA for fiscal year
2010 requires the President to submit to Congress a report on U.S.
counterterrorism strategy, including an assessment of the scope,
status, and progress of U.S. counterterrorism efforts in fighting al-
Qaeda and its affiliates and a provision to create a list of U.S.
counterterrorism efforts relating to the denial of terrorist safe
havens. The required report is intended to help Congress in conducting
oversight, enhance the public's understanding of how well the
Government is combating terrorism, and assist the administration in
identifying and overcoming related challenges. As of March 2011, no
report had been submitted to Congress. While National Security Staff
officials taking the lead on the report stated they were working on a
draft, they were unsure when it would be completed.
To address this reporting gap, we recommended that the National
Security Council, in collaboration with relevant agencies as
appropriate, complete the requirements of the NDAA of fiscal year 2010
to report to Congress on a list of U.S. efforts related to the denial
of terrorist safe havens.\11\ The National Security Council reviewed
our report but provided no comments on the recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ GAO-11-561.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other Members of the subcommittee may
have at this time.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you so much for your testimony.
I have been informed we just have one vote, so I would ask
that we take a very short break, go make our one vote, and then
come right back to the hearing. I appreciate your patience.
[Recess.]
Mr. McCaul. The committee will come to order.
I appreciate the patience from the witnesses and everybody
in the room. Hopefully, we can now finish the hearing before
the next series of votes.
With that, Mr. Koumans, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF MARK KOUMANS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Koumans. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member,
and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for
the opportunity to testify on the Department of Homeland
Security's role in support of U.S. efforts to address terrorist
safe havens.
Protecting the United States from terrorism is the
cornerstone of homeland security, and denying terrorists safe
havens is one of the best ways to undermine their capacity to
operate.
The State Department defines terrorist safe havens as
ungoverned, under-governed, or ill-governed areas where
terrorists that threaten national security are able to
organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, and train
because of inadequate governance, political will, or both.
Let me first clarify that DHS is concerned about threats
from terrorists, foreign or domestic, whether or not they come
from safe havens. DHS bases its actions, for example, in
deciding who should be allowed entry into the United States on
the experience of our officers in the field and the best
available intelligence. We take the source and transit
countries for terrorist movements into account when making our
screening decisions and in the other work we do, but DHS does
not base those decisions on whether a particular area is
designated a safe haven.
To address the problem of safe havens, to prevent threats,
and to reduce risks, DHS works closely with the Departments of
State and Defense and other departments and agencies to protect
the homeland from terrorist attack and to deny terrorists the
ability to travel and finance their activities.
One important way the DHS conducts these efforts is to
strengthen the capabilities of foreign partners. We believe
that these efforts make partner countries stronger and make
them and the United States more secure by improving governance
and economic opportunity, fighting criminality, and supporting
the rule of law and so decreasing the likelihood of safe
havens.
DHS carries out many programs around the world to provide
training and technical assistance to strengthen our partners'
ability to confront terrorists. DHS is generally not authorized
to use its appropriated funds for foreign capacity building
purposes. Therefore, when our interests and priorities overlap,
DHS works with the U.S. agencies that hold the authority to
fund such foreign assistance. These cooperative efforts to work
with our international partners do not hinge exclusively on
whether a particular area is a terrorist safe haven but instead
are based on where our assistance can help build the partner's
capacity to increase security, fight transnational crime, and
combat terrorism.
For example, in Afghanistan, DHS has led efforts that have
significantly improved the ability of the Afghan government to
control its borders, increase customs revenue collection, and
facilitate legal trade, while increasingly preventing the
movement of illegal goods, including the components for
improvised explosive devices. This effort is based on previous
border security efforts DHS carried out in Iraq, efforts
Defense Department officials had supported and encouraged DHS
to carry out in Afghanistan.
Our work has included mentoring Afghan border and customs
officials at border posts, tackling bulk cash smuggling through
Kabul International Airport, and establishing a training
academy for Afghan customs officials.
To cite another example, following the attempted terrorist
attacks last October after two printers rigged with explosives
were found, TSA deployed a team to Yemen to assess air cargo
security programs. Subsequently, TSA trained Yemeni officials
to mitigate threats to air cargo security in Yemen.
Also, this April, ICE and CBP provided training in Pakistan
to counter bulk cash smuggling and identify homemade
explosives. We trained more than 50 officers from four
different Pakistani border control agencies, including the
Federal Investigative Agency, Customs Force, and Airport
Security Force.
At the same time, DHS is strengthening coordination among
its many components and offices operating internationally. DHS
has established its first international strategy and is
consolidating information about all DHS training and technical
assistance activities worldwide, in part to ensure that our
activities are closely aligned with our priorities. These
advances will help us work more effectively with the
Departments of State and Defense.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Clarke, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, I look forward to working with you
as we explore opportunities to advance our efforts and our
cooperation with international partners to deny terrorists safe
haven.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I have
provided a more complete written testimony. I look forward to
your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Koumans follows:]
Prepared Statement of Mark Koumans
June 3, 2011
Good Morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify on the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS)
role in support of the U.S. Government's efforts to address the problem
of terrorist safe havens. Terrorists operate without regard to national
boundaries. Protecting the United States and its people from terrorism
is the cornerstone of homeland security, and denying terrorists' safe
haven is one of the best ways to undermine their capacity to operate
effectively.
As set forth in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, preventing
terrorist attacks against the United States and enhancing our Nation's
security have been and continue to be two of DHS's most important
objectives. The Department's first Quadrennial Homeland Security Review
(QHSR), released on February 1, 2010, reiterates that preventing
terrorist attacks in the United States is the first of five primary
missions for the homeland security enterprise. DHS also integrates
preventing terrorism into the four other missions of the homeland
security enterprise--securing and managing our borders, enforcing and
administering our customs and immigration laws, safeguarding and
securing cyberspace, and ensuring resilience to disasters of all kinds.
The State Department defines terrorist safe havens as ungoverned,
under-governed, or ill-governed areas of a country where terrorists
that constitute a threat to U.S. National security interests are able
to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train, and
operate in relative security because of inadequate governance capacity,
political will, or both. Safe havens provide security for terrorist
leaders, allowing them to plan acts of terrorism around the world.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (IRTPA) of
2004 requires the State Department (DOS) to include in its annual
Country Reports on Terrorism the identification of terrorist safe
havens. Further, the 2004 IRTPA and the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) for fiscal year 2010 requests that the President submit
reports identifying U.S. efforts to deny terrorist safe havens. DOS
identifies terrorist safe havens in its Country Reports on Terrorism,
and in its most recent report, issued in August 2010, DOS identified 13
terrorist safe havens.
To prevent threats and reduce risk, DHS works closely with DOS and
other departments and agencies to protect the homeland and U.S.
citizens from terrorist attacks, to deny terrorists the ability to
travel, to deny them the ability to finance their activities, and to
deny them access to areas of the world where they can plot and train
for their attacks.
DHS directly supports these efforts--funded by DOS or other
Government departments--to strengthen the capacity of foreign
governments to deny terrorists safe haven.
how dhs counterterrorism efforts affect terrorist safe havens
DHS is concerned about threats from terrorists, foreign or
domestic, whether they come from safe havens or not. DHS bases its
actions--for example in deciding who should be allowed entry to the
United States--on the experience of our officers in the field and on
the best available intelligence collected throughout the U.S.
Government. We take the source and transit countries for terrorist
movements into account when making our screening decisions and in all
the other work we do. DHS also does its part to support the work of
other departments and agencies that are more directly focused in
disrupting terrorist safe havens. While we base our screening decisions
on intelligence and other factors, DHS does not base screening
decisions on whether a particular area is designated a safe haven or
not.
DHS carries out significant programs around the world to provide
training and technical assistance to build the capacity of foreign
governments to confront terrorists and strengthen our own security. DHS
generally is not authorized to use its appropriated funds for foreign
capacity-building purposes;\1\ therefore, when our interests and
priorities overlap, DHS works with the U.S. agencies that hold
authority to fund foreign assistance, including capacity-building
efforts. These cooperative efforts to work with our international
partners, and often to provide training and technical assistance, do
not hinge on whether a particular area is a terrorist safe haven, but
instead are based on where our assistance can help build a partner's
capacity to combat terrorism. Below are several of these key technical
assistance programs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ There are exceptions for training and the sharing of best
practices by TSA in locations that have non-stop flights to the United
States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
cross-border financial investigations/money laundering training
DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S. Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) conduct training on enforcement efforts
and interdiction of bulk cash smuggling, which includes cash courier
interdiction training for various nations. The training, conducted in
partnership with the Department of State, encourages countries' efforts
to comply with international standards, such as those established by
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). Training is scheduled based on
a number of factors, including the status of the country's financial
reporting laws, available resources, political will to enforce the laws
and the current security situation. The training includes such topics
as the host country's money laundering reporting requirements and laws,
currency smuggling techniques, interviewing, source development, red
flag indicators of currency smuggling, conducting investigations, and
evidence processing.
ICE Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), coordinated and funded
by the State Department, routinely conducts cross-border financial
investigations and money laundering enforcement training for key
foreign partner nations. HSI's training provides participating
countries with the capability to effectively implement relevant FATF 40
Recommendations and Nine Special Recommendations (which provide the
international standards for combating money-laundering and terrorism
financing), with special emphasis on R8 (New Technologies), R17
(Dissuasive Actions), R26-R32 (Competent Authorities), SR V
(International Cooperation), SR VI (Alternative Remittance), and SR IX
(Cash Couriers). These recommendations were developed to ensure that
terrorist and other criminal organizations cannot easily finance their
activities or launder the proceeds of their crimes simply by leaving
one jurisdiction and seeking refuge in another.
The HSI-led training and technical assistance workshops cover a
range of topics, including money laundering, movement and smuggling of
bulk currency, money service businesses, informal value transfer
systems, trade-based money laundering, cross-border fraud,
investigative techniques, kleptocracy, and asset forfeiture. The
training includes practical exercises that exhibit how terrorist and/or
criminal organizations collect, store, and move funds. Here are a few
examples of training and technical assistance activities designed to
address terrorist safe havens, as identified in the State Department's
2010 report:
Over the last 6 years, HSI has conducted cross-border
financial investigations training in:
Afghanistan;
The Philippines;
Indonesia;
Malaysia;
Pakistan;
Algeria;
Mali;
Mauritania;
Iraq;
Argentina;
Brazil;
Paraguay.
ICE Attache Sana'a has provided training to counter bulk
cash smuggling and money laundering to Yemen's Ministry of
Interior (MOI) and Financial Information Unit officials.
ICE Attache Casablanca has regional responsibility for
Algeria, and provided training in Algeria on bulk cash
smuggling investigations and interdiction in August 2010.
In April 2011, ICE Attache Islamabad and CBP provided bulk
cash smuggling and the identification of homemade explosives
and bulk explosives training to 53 officers from the following
four Pakistan border control agencies: Federal Investigation
Agency, Federal Board of Revenue (FBR) Customs, FBR Customs
Intelligence and Investigations, and the Airport Security
Force.
fraudulent document detection
In February 2011, ICE special agents and CBP officers shared best
practices and techniques with their Afghan counterparts on detecting
forged documents used by individuals and criminal organizations seeking
to circumvent the established immigration process in Kabul, Afghanistan
at Kabul International Airport. CBP currently has a fraudulent document
expert detailed to Iraq, where he is providing on-going passport
examination training to Iraqi immigration officers and police
investigators to enhance their fraudulent document detection skills.
export enforcement investigations and wmd
The Export Control and Related Border Security Program (EXBS)
program is funded through agreements with DOS. CBP and ICE are
responsible for training foreign law enforcement counterpart agencies
in other countries, chiefly customs and border guard officials. Foreign
officials are taught to investigate, conduct surveillance, detect,
enforce transfer and control laws, and interdict unauthorized transfers
of items and technology, including dual-use technologies, which are
covered by control lists of the multilateral nonproliferation regimes
and arrangements. Items that may contribute to a weapon of mass
destruction or missile program are also included.
CBP has recently conducted or will soon conduct EXBS-funded border
control and enforcement training for Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon,
Pakistan, and Yemen.
border, customs, and immigration police training
CBP builds capacity to implement more effective customs operations,
border policing, and immigration inspections through relevant training
programs including: Border Patrol Primary, Border Patrol Checkpoint,
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Anti-Narcotics, and Border Enforcement; as
well as targeting and risk management seminars and short- and long-term
advisory assistance.
In addition to the border control and enforcement training that is
provided directly to a number of the countries identified as safe
havens, CBP also provides this training to neighboring countries not
designated as safe havens to increase their capability, including:
Kenya, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. This demonstrates how
DHS employs a number of criteria to determine which countries would
benefit from the kinds of technical assistance we can offer to help
disrupt terrorist groups that threaten the United States and U.S.
interests.
In support of the World Customs Organization's Program Global
Shield, representatives from ICE and CBP are working with the Afghan
Ministry of the Interior (MOI) and Customs Department (ACD) to train
and equip border police to detect improvised explosive devices and drug
precursors. In addition, ICE Kabul is providing training in
investigative techniques and intelligence gathering to further exploit
illicit shipments of precursor chemicals.
ICE introduced the Kabul International Airport Action Plan (KIAAP)
in response to U.S. Embassy interest in enhancing the capacity of the
ACD, Afghan Border Police and MOI officials to increase revenue
collection and security at Kabul International Airport (KBL). KIAAP
focuses on capacity building while simultaneously allowing ICE access
to KBL, which is believed to be the conduit for much of the bulk cash
smuggling. The April 2011 approval of the Bulk Cash Flow (BCF) Action
Plan at KBL will be the centerpiece for the successful implementation
of KIAAP, which will improve security and revenue collection. ICE
Attache Kabul, in conjunction with other law enforcement components,
was instrumental in drafting the BCF Action Plan. ICE Attache Kabul
personnel have also completed formal document fraud and bulk cash
smuggling training for KBL Customs officers.
In June 2011, ICE and CBP, with funding provided by the Department
of Defense, are providing counternarcotics training tailored to the
needs of Afghan law enforcement agencies with counternarcotics
responsibilities. This training will highlight Program Global Shield
initiatives, and is designed to improve Afghan and U.S. capacity to
track shipping routes and compile and share targeting information about
legal shipments. There will be two 1-week courses provided to students
from the ACD, Afghan Customs Police, Border Police, and Counter
Narcotics Police.
In July 2011, ICE Attache Casablanca plans to provide training in
Algeria focusing on inspectional techniques and methodologies providing
foreign counterparts the skills and knowledge necessary to carry out
the effective inspection, detection and interdiction of contraband and/
or illegal aliens.
biometric data collection and information sharing
DHS's US-VISIT and Science and Technology Directorate together
build and leverage international partnerships to develop and promote
the use of biometrics using standards that allow for interoperability
with other countries' border and immigration biometric systems in order
to share actionable data. This sharing reinforces the security and
integrity of immigration and international travel between the United
States and our key international partners.
One of US-VISIT's notable projects is the Five Country Conference
(FCC) High Value Data Sharing Protocol (HVDSP). The HVDSP allows for
biometrically-based information sharing between the United States and
the four other FCC member countries: Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
and the United Kingdom. Separate bilateral memoranda of understanding
were developed between the partner countries to facilitate the matching
of immigration and nationality cases against each other's biometric
databases, and to exchange relevant information on cases where
biometric matches are made. All participating countries are using this
biometric information exchange to aid immigration decisions. There have
been cases where immigration or law enforcement officials of
participating countries have received new case information or taken
direct action as a result of sharing this biometric information. All
information exchanges are undertaken in full compliance with all U.S.
laws and regulations related to privacy and civil liberties.
In 2008, the United States began signing Preventing and Combating
Serious Crime (PCSC) agreements primarily with countries that
participate in the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). The agreements--which in
part satisfy a statutory information-sharing requirement to obtain or
maintain VWP designation--formalize the sharing of biometric and
biographic data for the purposes of preventing and combating serious
crime and terrorism. US-VISIT is currently working with the Federal
Bureau of Investigation's Criminal Justice Information Services
Division to begin implementing PCSC agreements with Germany and Spain.
maritime security and seaport interdiction
The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) assists partner nations in the
development of maritime security. USCG advocates Global Maritime Domain
Awareness as the foundation of these efforts, to enable collective
protection of the region's maritime transportation system. USCG also
assesses the effectiveness of anti-terrorism measures in foreign ports
using a country's implementation of the International Ship and Port
Facility Security (ISPS) Code as a benchmark. The USCG shares the
results of its findings with other Federal agencies, including DOS. In
the countries where port security is inadequate, the USCG imposes
conditions of entry, including additional security measures, on vessels
arriving to the United States from those countries. Conditions of entry
are currently imposed on 16 countries. Among the USCG's most important
capacity-building activities is the International Port Security Program
country visit, where they work collaboratively with foreign partners to
fully implement the ISPS Code and related requirements in their ports
and waterways. The USCG also works Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
Forum and the Organization of American States in the development and
execution of capacity-building activities in Asia and the Americas,
respectively.
In another example of maritime cooperation, the CBP National Marine
Training Center is planning to conduct Maritime Law Enforcement Officer
training for the Ecuadorian Navy during late summer 2011. Ecuador is a
neighbor of Colombia, which has been identified as a safe haven
country.
USCG international training partners include Indonesia, Pakistan,
the Philippines, and Yemen. USCG engagement in Yemen dates back to
2002, and the creation of the Yemeni Coast Guard was under the guidance
of the USCG. Several maritime capacity-building initiatives are planned
for Yemen pending the resolution of the current political crisis and an
improvement in the internal security situation. In 2011, the USCG has
facilitated the delivery of two new coastal patrol boats to Yemen, one
legacy high endurance cutter to the Philippines, and another high
endurance cutter to Nigeria. Once in service, these vessels will
substantially increase the maritime law enforcement capabilities of
these nations.
civil aviation security
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) supports the
efforts of other governments to prevent their territories from being
used by terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a threat
to U.S. security by assisting with the development of transportation
security systems, programs, and facilities. Specific assistance
includes technical and managerial expertise to assist with developing,
improving, and operating the civilian aviation security infrastructure,
standards, procedures, policies, training, and equipment. The tools TSA
uses to provide this assistance include tailored training, personnel
exchanges, information sharing, and lessons learned/best practices. TSA
works closely with its foreign government counterparts in these
locations to determine the exact tools used to meet the needs of the
host government.
TSA's authority for assessing security standards at foreign
airports is codified in 49 USC 44907. Specifically, the TSA shall
conduct an assessment of each foreign airport that serves as a last
point of departure to the United States. TSA uses the standards and
recommended practices contained in Annex 17 to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation as the baseline for these security
assessments. Additionally, TSA has the authority to conduct aircraft
operator inspections of both U.S. Aircraft Operators and Foreign Air
Carriers at foreign locations that serve as the last point of departure
to the United States. This authority is codified in 49 CFR 1544.3 and
49 CFR 1546.3 respectively. Further, the authorities vested to TSA by
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act of 2001 (Pub. L. 107-71,
115 Stat. 587 (2001)), include the authority to issue, rescind, and
revise TSA regulations, orders, and Security Directives/Emergency
Authorities that affect both domestic and foreign transportation
providers, and to enforce these authorities through civil penalties and
denials of authorization to operate in U.S. transportation venues.
In fiscal year 2010, 45 TSA assistance and training sessions were
provided to 28 countries. In fiscal year 2011, TSA is scheduled to
provide 51 sessions in 35 countries. For example, following the
attempted terrorist attacks on cargo operations this past October, TSA
immediately deployed a team to Yemen to assess cargo security programs.
Subsequently, TSA provided training to mitigate threats to the cargo
security network emanating from Yemen. TSA also works closely with the
International Civil Aviation Organization and other foreign partners to
eliminate duplicative efforts by coordinating training given by various
countries to nations in need of technical assistance.
In addition, CBP's Carrier Liaison Program (CLP) enhances border
security by increasing commercial carrier effectiveness in identifying
improperly documented passengers destined to the United States. In
2010, CLP provided training to carrier and airport security personnel
in Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil on fraudulent document
identification, passenger assessment, impostor identification, and
travel document verification.
reconstruction and stabilization
National Security Presidential Directive 44 on Reconstruction and
Stabilization tasks DOS with coordinating a unified, whole-of-
government approach to help fragile and failing foreign governments
exercise sovereignty over their own territories and prevent those
territories from being used as a base of operations or safe haven for
extremists, terrorists, organized crime groups, or others who pose a
threat to U.S. security, foreign policy, or economic interests.
Under this initiative, DHS participates by training and deploying
ICE special agents and CBP officers to Afghanistan and other locations
worldwide to help nations secure their borders and disrupt illicit
travel and trade.
In Afghanistan, CBP's primary mission is to oversee the Border
Management Task Force (BMTF), a mixed civilian and military task force
whose primary goal is to assist the Afghan government by providing
subject matter expertise relating to customs and border operations. The
BMTF initiatives are a critical part of U.S. efforts to assist the
Afghan government to gain control over its borders, defeat the
insurgency by attacking links to narco-trafficking, and promote
economic growth and stability.
iraq and afghanistan
Following the outbreak of war in Iraq in 2003, the Department of
Defense requested CBP assistance in developing Iraq's border control
agencies. In 2004-2005, CBP teams trained more than 3,700 Iraqi border
officers in the areas of border patrol and customs and immigration
operations at the Jordanian International Police Training Center
outside Amman, Jordan. Since January 2005, CBP has deployed personnel
to Iraq to provide training and advisory assistance to Iraqi border
control officials. More recently, DHS personnel provided advanced
mentoring in Baghdad to senior Iraqi border control officials with the
Department of Border Enforcement and the Port of Entry Directorate
within the Ministry of Interior.
DHS efforts have helped strengthen the capacity of the Iraqi
government to control its borders. While there is more to do, the Iraqi
Ministry of Interior directorates dealing with Border Enforcement and
Ports of Entry have improved their capabilities from what they were
only a few years ago.
The current Department of Defense-funded CBP assistance project in
Iraq will terminate at the end of fiscal year 2011. Following
negotiations between the State Department and DHS to determine the
appropriate level of future support, DHS has committed to provide an 8-
person advisory team to support the U.S. mission in Iraq beginning in
fiscal year 2012. Funding for the CBP presence in Iraq will be provided
by State Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs.
In Afghanistan, DHS efforts have significantly improved the ability
of the Afghan government to control its borders, increase customs
revenue collection, and facilitate legal trade, while increasingly
preventing the movement of illegal goods, including components for
improvised explosive devices.
For example:
Working together, ICE and CBP personnel have been successful
in facilitating numerous changes at Kabul International Airport
to enhance security. Terminal controls of employees,
passengers, cargo, baggage, and currency have been implemented
in fiscal year 2011.
CBP officials assisted in the development of the Afghan
Customs Academy. The ACD and BMTF will collaborate to expand
the Academy, which graduated its first class of 48 in March
2010. The Afghan government and CBP have also broken ground on
a new Afghan Customs Academy in Kabul.
In December 2010, ICE officials established the Afghan
Vetted Investigative Unit, composed of 12 investigators from
the Afghanistan MOI Criminal Investigations Division.
CBP officials are assisting the Afghan government with
infrastructure improvements at a number of border locations, as
well as four international airports, which include baggage and
cargo scanners in addition to life support facilities for
civilian contract mentors and Afghan government border
officials.
CBP officials continue to provide training and mentorship to
the Ministry of Finance (Customs Officials), Ministry of
Interior (Afghan Border Police), and Afghan National Security
Directorate on the use of ammonium nitrate detection kits.
CBP officials continue to provide training and mentorship to
Afghan Airport Authorities on cargo/passenger enforcement
operations, and assist the Airport Interdiction Task Force with
bulk cash/capital flight operations at Kabul International
Airport.
CBP officials continue to assist senior Ministry of Finance
and Ministry of Interior officials in the crafting of a unified
Afghan national border strategy.
By the end of fiscal year 2011, CBP will increase its
presence in Afghanistan to a total of 11 permanent CBP
representatives utilizing DOS funding.
The BMTF will expand the border/customs mentoring program to
more than 50 contract mentors by the end of fiscal year 2011.
CBP representatives will manage and oversee the continued
operation and deployment of BMTF civilian contract mentors at
various border crossing points, inland customs depots and
international airports.
By the end of fiscal year 2011, CBP representatives will
identify requirements and oversee infrastructure improvements
to 14 Afghan border crossing points.
conclusion
DHS is continuing to strengthen coordination and cooperation across
all of its relevant components involved in the activities described
above. For example, efforts to establish agreed-upon international
priorities across all of DHS in key thematic engagement areas are well
advanced. At the same time, significant achievements have been made in
creating a departmental information-sharing architecture to consolidate
information about all DHS training and technical assistance activities
worldwide. We are now working to assemble this information and ensure
that DHS activities are closely aligned with our priorities. These
advances will allow us to work more effectively with those who help
fund our efforts, mainly the State and Defense Departments.
At the same time, we are also strengthening our outreach to DOS and
to embassies around the world, with more frequent and robust
interaction and information-sharing efforts to expand our partners'
understanding of the tools and capabilities that DHS brings to the
fight against terrorism. We are increasingly seeing the fruits of these
efforts as our programs are sought out by other departments and by
international partners.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, I look forward to working with you as we explore
opportunities to advance our efforts and our cooperation with
international partners to deny safe haven to terrorists. Thank you
again for the opportunity to testify. I am happy to answer any
questions.
Mr. McCaul. All right. Thank you for the testimony.
The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Villarosa for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF SHARI VILLAROSA, DEPUTY COORDINATOR FOR REGIONAL
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Villarosa. Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Clarke, and
distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to discuss State Department's efforts, in
coordination with our other agency partners, to eliminate
terrorist safe havens.
Our ultimate success against terrorism depends on
eliminating these safe havens which have generally developed in
remote areas where there is little to no effective governance,
frequently in border regions. This requires a whole-of-
government effort and a strategic approach to address both the
immediate security needs while building long-term governance
and rule of law, including the capacity to counter violent
extremism, to reduce terrorist recruitment, and delegitimize
violence in those virtual safe havens.
In order for our strategy to be effective, we must develop
regional approaches with the neighboring countries to shrink
the space in which terrorists can operate. We build this
regional cooperation by bringing our ambassadors together with
senior interagency officials to devise collaborative strategies
and action plans.
State works with Defense to build the capacity of military
and civilian law enforcement officials. State works with
Homeland Security to tighten border security. State works with
Treasury to restrict the flow of funds in and out of terrorist
safe havens. State works with Justice and FBI to improve
investigative and prosecutorial capacity so countries can build
effective criminal cases against terrorists. State works with
USAID to improve governance by establishing the rule of law,
assisting with the provision of basic services such as health
and education, and promoting peaceful conflict resolution.
We have achieved success with this approach. Jemaah
Islamiya can no longer travel freely between Indonesia and the
Philippines due to improved maritime surveillance procedures,
Indonesia's success in prosecuting terrorists, and greater
Philippine government control over territory formerly used by
JI for its training camps.
In the Trans-Sahara, the countries have a political will to
fight terrorism but lack the capacity and have welcomed our
assistance to build capacity and to counter violent extremists.
The countries of the region, with our assistance, have begun to
work together to take action against the al-Qaeda affiliates
operating in their territories.
The committee has asked us to address three of the toughest
challenges we still face: Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia. Our
complex relationship with Pakistan is well known. It is also
important to remember that, as a result of our cooperation, we
have been able to strike major blows against al-Qaeda's ability
to seek safe haven in Pakistan. The challenge remains to make
these advances durable and sustainable.
We are assisting the Pakistanis with delivery of basic
services and improved governance in the federally administered
tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. We will continue to press
Pakistan for increased action against terrorist groups
operating within its borders, but we must also continue to help
Pakistan help itself to eliminate terrorist safe havens.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, operating out of Yemen,
has tried multiple times to attack us. We had some success in
2009 and 2010 with our strategy. We worked with the Yemenis to
take action against imminent threats, and we also helped the
Yemeni government deliver basic services and security to its
people. We are hopeful that future Yemeni leaders will be solid
counterterrorism partners once the political situation there is
resolved.
Somalia has not had a functioning central government for 20
years. The main terrorist group, al-Shabaab, has links with al-
Qaeda and conducted a major attack outside of Somalia last
July, killing 76 people in Uganda. An offense launched earlier
this year by Somalian partner nation forces has reduced al-
Shabaab's territorial control and caused defections from al-
Shabaab. Clearly, more needs to be done to consolidate
political control over the newly liberated areas.
We have also begun a more incentive outreach to the Somali
diaspora and civil society to foster peaceful reconciliation.
In conclusion, our threat is formidable, but we are making
progress. Our strategic approach of capacity building,
countering violent extremism, and broader regional cooperation
provides us with the tools to make lasting progress.
Thank you very much, and I welcome your questions.
[The statement of Ms. Villarosa follows:]
Prepared Statement of Shari Villarosa
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members
of the committee: Thank you for the opportunity to appear before this
committee today. Denying terrorists safe haven plays a major role in
undermining terrorists' capacity to operate effectively and forms a key
element of what we're doing in the State Department on
counterterrorism. Terrorists operate without regard to national
boundaries. Safe havens allow terrorists to recruit, organize, plan,
train, and claim turf as a symbol of legitimacy. Physical safe havens
usually straddle national borders or exist in regions where ineffective
governance allows their presence. Examples include the Pakistan/
Afghanistan border, Yemen, the Trans-Sahara region, and Somalia.
To effectively counter safe havens, we increasingly operate in a
regional context with the goal of shrinking the space in which
terrorists operate. Through the Regional Strategic Initiative, we seek
to build regional cooperation to constrain terrorist activities. Under
Chief-of-Mission authority, we bring Embassy officials, Military, Law
Enforcement, and Intelligence agencies together to collectively assess
the threats, pool resources, and devise collaborative strategies and
action plans. We have established nine RSIs covering South East Asia,
Iraq and its neighbors, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Western
Mediterranean, East Africa, the Trans-Sahara, South Asia, Central Asia,
and Latin America.
I'd like to note that there are examples of success against
terrorist safe havens, particularly in Southeast Asia where we formed
our first RSI. Terrorists traveled freely among the nations of the
region by sea. So, through the U.S. military and Coast Guard we worked
with the nations of the region to improve maritime security first in
the Straits of Malacca, then in the Sulu Sea terrorist safe haven area.
With combined U.S. military and development assistance, the Government
of the Philippines now has increasing control of the island of Basilan
and is beginning to create stability on the island of Jolo. Both areas
are exploited by Indonesia-based terrorist group Jemaah Islamiya and
the Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf Group.
Improved law enforcement and criminal justice also works to shrink
safe havens as we have seen in Indonesia. After the 2002 Bali bombings,
Indonesia enacted new anti-terrorism laws and established a special
police force working together with trained prosecutors. As a result,
the police have successfully disrupted operations, such as the Aceh
terrorist training camp in February 2010, captured terrorists,
collected intelligence, and arrested additional suspects based on that
intelligence. Since 2003, over 500 JI operatives have been captured.
Since its formation in September 2006, the special prosecutor task
force has conducted 166 prosecutions, secured 133 verdicts, including
those responsible for the 2009 Jakarta hotel bombings, and is currently
prosecuting 36 defendants with additional cases being prepared for
prosecution. We also embarked on a program with the Government of
Indonesia to diversify the curriculum of religious schools, with math
and science, so children would develop the skills needed in a global
economy.
key terrorist safe havens
The State Department defines terrorist safe havens as ungoverned,
under-governed, or ill-governed physical areas where terrorists are
able to organize, plan, raise funds, communicate, recruit, train,
transit, and operate in relative security because of inadequate
governance capacity, political will, or both. This definition includes
consideration of both political will and the capacity of host
countries.
Pakistan/Afghanistan
I'll begin our discussion of terrorist safe havens with the
Afghanistan/Pakistan border. Al-Qaeda cannot be allowed to maintain its
safe haven and to continue plotting attacks. After he took office,
President Obama launched a thorough review of our policy and set out a
clear goal: To disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQ, and prevent it from
threatening America and our allies in the future. In pursuit of this
goal, the USG is following a strategy with three mutually reinforcing
tracks--three surges: A military offensive against AQ terrorists and
Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan; a civilian campaign to bolster the
governments, economies, and civil societies of Afghanistan and Pakistan
to undercut the pull of the insurgency; and an intensified diplomatic
push to bring the Afghan conflict to an end, and a more secure future
for the region.
Since 2009, we have worked with the Government of Pakistan and its
people at all levels. Secretary Clinton was there in late May. Pakistan
has been a victim of terrorism many times in the last few years. At the
same time, we are looking forward to Pakistan launching its own inquiry
as to how Osama bin Ladin was able to live in Abbottabad for more than
5 years.
We are working closely with the Government of Pakistan on a range
of counterterrorism-related capacity building projects. These include
numerous training courses for Pakistani police, which are administered
by the State Department's Diplomatic Security bureau. Our Bureau of
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement also works closely on
border security and other law-enforcement matters. It routinely
provides Pakistani security and police forces with equipment to counter
extremism. And it is truly a whole-of-government effort. For example,
the FBI and Department of Justice work with their Pakistani
counterparts on investigatory, prosecutorial, and training matters.
Treasury and DHS are also interacting with Pakistan on several
important matters relating to terrorism finance and improvised
explosive devises, respectively. Through USAID we are assisting the
Pakistanis with delivery of basic services and improved governance in
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Even as we've endured serious
challenges to the relationship, some of which continue to make
headlines, we've continued civilian and military assistance throughout
the country and solidified our cooperation.
It is no secret that we have not always seen eye-to-eye with
Pakistan on how to deal with its terrorist threats or on the future of
Afghanistan. But as a result of U.S. and Pakistan counterterrorism
cooperation and Pakistani military operations aimed at eliminating
militant strongholds in the FATA, the AQ core has had significant
leadership losses--including the recent demise of Osama bin Laden and
is finding it more difficult to raise money, train recruits, and plan
attacks outside of the region. Although the AQ core is clearly weaker,
it retains the capability to conduct regional and transnational
attacks. In addition, AQ has forged closer ties with other militant
groups in the region--for example Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan and the
Haqqani Network providing the group with additional capabilities to
draw on.
While Pakistan is making some progress on the counterterrorism
front, specifically against TTP, the challenge remains to make these
gains durable and sustainable. To this end, Pakistan must sustain its
efforts to deny AQ safe haven in the tribal areas of western Pakistan.
And we must continue to press Pakistan for increased action against
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and terrorist groups that undermine the security of
Pakistan, the region, and beyond. Secretary Clinton just concluded a
trip to Islamabad and discussed in great detail our cooperation with
Pakistan to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat AQ, and to drive them from
Pakistan and the region. We will do our part and we look to the
Government of Pakistan to take decisive steps in the days ahead. Joint
action against AQ and its affiliates will make Pakistan, America, and
the world safer and more secure.
Yemen
While the AQ core has weakened operationally, the affiliates have
become stronger. Consequently, the broader AQ threat has become more
geographically diversified. At the top of the affiliates list is al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, based in Yemen. It continues to
demonstrate its growing ambitions and strong desire to carry out
attacks outside of its region. AQAP is the first of the AQ affiliates
to make attacks against the United States homeland a central goal. As
you know, the group made its debut in this regard with its December 25,
2009 attempt to destroy an airliner bound for Detroit. Then, in October
2010 it sought to blow up several U.S.-bound airplanes by shipping
bombs that were intended to detonate while in the planes' cargo holds.
As those efforts and AQAP's failed attempt in August 2009 on the life
of Saudi Arabia's Assistant deputy interior for security affairs
minister demonstrated, the group is trying to evade existing detection
capabilities.
Obviously, we are talking here about a country in the middle of a
political crisis, that we see in the headlines every day. But to put
things in perspective, let me back up a bit. The gravity of the AQAP
threat was clear to the Obama administration from Day 1, and we've been
focused on Yemen since the outset. In the spring of 2009, the
administration initiated a full-scale review of Yemen policy that led
to a whole-of-government approach to Yemen. As part of that approach,
we strengthened our engagement with the Yemeni government on
counterterrorism. We also increased our efforts to coordinate with
other international actors. Our strategy seeks to deal with imminent
and developing threats at the same time that it addresses the root
causes of instability in Yemen to improve governance. Central to this
is building the capacity of Yemen's government to be responsive to the
Yemeni people, delivering the security and services they require.
Given that Yemen's political, economic, security, and governance
challenges are interrelated and mutually reinforcing, U.S. policy must
be holistic and flexible to be effective in both the short- and long-
term. U.S. strategy in Yemen is two-pronged: No. 1, strengthen the
Government of Yemen's ability to promote security and minimize the
threat from violent extremists within its borders, and, No. 2, mitigate
Yemen's economic crisis and deficiencies in government capacity,
provision of services, and transparency.
To help meet immediate security concerns, we have provided training
and equipment to particular units of the Yemeni security forces. In
coordination with our security efforts, the USG has also increased
development assistance to Yemen significantly. Development and
stabilization assistance for Yemen went from roughly $9 million in
fiscal year 2008 to $75 million in fiscal year 2010.\1\
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\1\ This includes funding from bilateral programs funded by DA,
ESF, and GHCS accounts, funding from regional and global programs/
accounts that were attributed to/spent in Yemen (CCF, TI, MEPI, and
DCHA funds), and Sec. 1207 transfer authority funds from DoD.
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While we are in a period of uncertainty, I'd stress that our shared
interest with the Yemeni government in fighting terrorism, particularly
defeating AQAP, does not rely solely on one individual; we are hopeful
that any future Yemeni leaders will be solid counterterrorism partners.
The Trans-Sahara
Before I talk about Somalia, I'd like to talk about West Africa,
where no group has made a bigger name for itself in the kidnapping-for-
ransom business than al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb. AQIM
has raised tens of millions of Euros in the past several years through
kidnap-for-ransom operations. We believe much of this ransom money goes
to logistically sustain the organization but there is plenty as well to
build truck bombs, which have been used in Mauritania and Niger with
limited success. AQIM has attacked and ambushed military forces in
Mauritania and Algeria recently as well as others in Niger and Mali;
the group is also working to increase its operational reach in West
Africa.
A moment ago I mentioned the importance of operating in a regional
context in our efforts to counter terrorist safe havens. The United
States created a regional partnership in North and West Africa, the
Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership in 2005 with the following
strategic goals: To build military and law enforcement capacity; foster
regional cooperation; and counter violent extremism. We want the region
to lead counterterrorism efforts, rather than have those efforts be led
by a group of Western allies. TSCTP is working to enhance a range of
military and civilian capabilities in the Sahel and Maghreb. It is also
facilitating cooperation between Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger,
Nigeria, Senegal, and Burkina Faso and our TSCTP partners in the
Maghreb--Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.
We believe this program is beginning to pay off with partners
taking a greater-than-ever role in counterterrorism operations in the
region. We have also seen positive signs of greater regional
cooperation among these countries, particularly between Algeria,
Mauritania, and Mali. Moreover, select Allies, such as Canada and
France, have also joined to bolster TSCTP efforts with their own
programs that complement our own.
Given all that is going on in Maghreb, successful democratic
transitions in Tunisia and Libya will be the best bar to inroads by
violent extremists in both countries and in North Africa more broadly.
In the short term, however, the instability in Libya and the transition
in Tunisia may provide AQIM with new openings, and we must continue to
adjust our strategy in response to evolving conditions, work with our
partners in the region to preserve the gains we've made through TSCTP
and bilaterally, and ensure that we remain on track to achieve our goal
of containing and marginalizing AQIM.
Somalia
The chronic instability in Somalia and the fragile hold on power
that the Somalia Transitional Federal Government exert, combined with a
protracted state of violent insecurity, long unguarded coasts, and
porous borders, have made Somalia an appealing location for
exploitation by terrorists, criminals, and other nefarious actors. The
terrorist and insurgent group al-Shabaab and other anti-TFG clan-based
militias exercise control over strategic locations in south and central
Somalia. Al-Shabaab is composed of a range of groups with varying
motivations and interests. Some of al-Shabaab's senior leaders have
links to al-Qaeda and are interested in waging a global struggle, while
other members have a purely Somali agenda or simply are in it for the
money. Al-Shabaab's widening scope of operations makes it a continuing
threat to East Africa and U.S. interests in the region. Last July, we
saw it conduct its first major attack outside of Somalia when it
claimed responsibility for twin suicide bombings at the time of the
soccer World Cup that killed 76 people in Kampala, Uganda. In addition,
al-Shabaab has a cadre of Westerners, including fighters of ethnic
Somali descent drawn from the global Somali diaspora and American
converts, which make it a particular concern.
The United States continues to pursue a dual track approach to
create stability in Somalia. On track No. 1, we support the Djibouti
Peace Process, while continuing to encourage the TFG to reach out to
moderates that support peace and stability in Somalia. On track No. 2,
we are broadening our outreach to include greater engagement with
Somaliland, Puntland, and regional and local anti-al-Shabaab actors and
groups throughout south-central Somalia in order to broaden security
and stabilization efforts throughout the country. We are also reaching
out to diaspora communities and civil society to foster dialogue and
peaceful reconciliation.
Additionally, the United States actively supports the African Union
Mission in Somalia, AMISOM. The recent offensive by the combined AMISOM
and TFG forces has shown some promise in fighting al-Shabaab in
Mogadishu. Outside of Mogadishu, Ethiopia- and Kenya-supported militia
in the western regions of south central Somalia are having some success
in reducing al-Shabaab's territorial control. However, a great deal
more work remains to be done to translate the success of the offensives
into political gains through the consolidation of political control in
these newly liberated areas.
We are also engaging with regional partners to build and sustain
their counterterrorism capabilities to address the threats emanating
from Somalia. The Partnership for Regional East African
Counterterrorism is the USG's program for long-term engagement and
counterterrorism capacity-building in East Africa not only in Somalia,
but also its neighbors to shrink terrorists' ability to transit the
region. PREACT has an expanded set of strategic objectives and program
indicators to more effectively systematize and streamline interagency
contributors and resources to support the program's counterterrorism
capacity-building objectives in East Africa.
how we are addressing terrorist safe havens
To begin with, we are working with our various interagency
partners, such as Homeland Security, USAID, the military, and the
intelligence community to keep Americans safe and our interests secure.
With this whole-of-government approach, we are comprehensively
strengthening our partnerships around the world by ensuring that all
U.S. Government assistance providers are working from the same
playbook, making sure that our assistance is more balanced to improve
both immediate security and long-term governance and rule of law.
Helping our partners more effectively confront the threat within their
borders is both good counterterrorism and good statecraft.
What we are doing in Pakistan, Yemen, and elsewhere is balancing
military programs with robust civilian efforts that include rule of
law, political and fiscal reforms; better governance through competent
institutions, reduced corruption and civil service reform; economic
diversification to generate employment and enhance livelihoods, and
strengthened natural resource management. I'd like to note that many
USG programs and activities simultaneously contribute to various
foreign policy goals. Governance and economic reform are not
specifically designed to counter terrorist safe havens but indirectly
serve that function and should be considered an essential part of the
assistance package we provide for a truly whole-of-Government approach
to shrink terrorists' operating spaces.
Since coming into office, the administration has been emphasizing a
more strategic approach to counterterrorism. The United States has made
great strides in tactical counterterrorism--taking individual
terrorists off the street, disrupting cells, and thwarting
conspiracies. But at the strategic level, we continue to see a strong
flow of new recruits into many of the most dangerous terrorist
organizations. Addressing the factors that drive radicalization--a
mixture of local grievances and the global terrorist narrative--is
necessary to further diminish terrorist safe havens.
One emphasis of strategic counterterrorism is building our foreign
partners' capacity. The heart of these efforts is to improve the rule
of law and governance. Ultimately, counterterrorism and rule of law
goals are closely aligned and reinforce one another. We are working to
make the counterterrorism training of police, prosecutors, border
officials, and members of the judiciary more systematic, more
innovative, and more far-reaching. We are addressing the state
weaknesses that terrorism thrives on--helping our partners to more
effectively counter the threat that they and we both face.
One of our most effective capacity building programs is the
Antiterrorism Assistance Program, the primary provider of U.S.
Government antiterrorism training and equipment to law enforcement
agencies of partner nations. Last year, in fiscal year 2010, $215
million in Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining, and Related
programs funds supported approximately 350 ATA courses, workshops, and
technical consultations that trained almost 7,000 participants from 64
countries. In fiscal year 2010, the ATA Program also completed 23
capabilities assessments and program review visits. These on-site
assessments looked at critical counterterrorism capabilities and served
as a basis for Country Assistance Plans and the evaluation of
subsequent progress.
The ATA program is most effective where countries have a
combination of political will and basic law enforcement skills to be
most receptive to the advanced training ATA provides. This relatively
successful formula has been especially evident in Indonesia, Colombia,
Turkey, and parts of North Africa. Through an emphasis on train-the-
trainer courses, we are working with partner nations toward the goal of
institutionalization and self-sustainment of capacities. We also are
moving toward giving advising and mentoring an importance similar to
training and equipping. Finally, we ensure that our programs are based
on long-term strategic country and regional plans, integrated with
other providers of security sector assistance at the State Department
and in the interagency.
In Colombia, ATA training of civilian and police law enforcement
has paid particular dividends, as Colombia now uses the lessons learned
to help train more than 20 countries, 11 of those in the Western
Hemisphere. USAID has supported efforts enabling Colombia to establish
an effective reconciliation and transition program for those willing to
lay down their arms. These efforts along with the Colombian military's
success in identifying the location of terrorist safe havens--which we
have assisted--has resulted in significant progress in reducing the
FARC's operating space in Colombia.
All of this work goes on in the context of vigorous diplomatic and
multilateral engagement. While we work in regional fora, I'd also point
to our bilateral engagement, which remains important. We have formal
bilateral counterterrorism consultations with numerous countries. Among
them are Australia, Canada, China, Israel, Egypt, Japan, Pakistan,
Algeria, Russia, and India; these consultations have strengthened our
counterterrorism partnerships so we can complement one another's
efforts in pursuit of a comprehensive approach to our common
challenges.
Before closing, I want to mention one other area of activity where
we are innovating--namely in our program to counter violent extremism,
a key part of our strategic counterterrorism work. Compared to
capacity-building work, which has been going on for many years, this
activity has a new focus. CVE focuses on three main lines of effort
that will reduce terrorist recruitment: delegitimizing the violent
extremist narrative in order to diminish its ``pull''; developing
positive alternatives for youth vulnerable to radicalization to
diminish the ``push'' effect of grievances and unmet expectations; and
building partner capacity to carry out these activities. We are working
with the interagency to develop programs that address the upstream
factors of radicalization in communities particularly susceptible to
terrorist recruitment overseas. Efforts include providing alternatives
for at-risk youth, encouraging the use of social media to generate
local initiatives, and enhancing the resilience of communities against
extremism.
Research has shown that radicalization occurs primarily at the
local level. To be effective, CVE work needs to be driven by local
needs, informed by local knowledge, and responsive to the immediate
concerns of the community. Furthermore, programs owned and implemented
by local civil society of government partners have a better chance
succeeding and enduring. These initiatives can enable communities to
address recruitment and radicalization, and can help deny terrorists
avenues to create ideological safe haven in such communities.
In conclusion, the threat is formidable but we are making progress.
I firmly believe that countering violent extremism, multilateral
engagement, and building local capacity--through our various programs
and with our Department and interagency partners--provide us with the
tools to make lasting progress in our fight against terrorism. Al-Qaeda
is having a tougher time now more than ever, although AQ and its
affiliates are still extremely dangerous and capable of attacking the
United State and our allies. In the race to protect the United States
and to stay ``one step ahead'' we should ensure that the tools of
civilian power continue to serve National Security interests. This is
an enduring challenge. Staying sharp, improving our offense,
strengthening our defense, and maintaining our intellectual edge--these
are all essential. I believe that we are on the right track. Thank you
again for providing the opportunity to testify.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Roberts for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JAMES Q. ROBERTS, PRINCIPAL DIRECTOR FOR SPECIAL
OPERATIONS AND COMBATING TERRORISM, OFFICE OF SPECIAL
OPERATIONS/LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT AND INTERDEPENDENT
CAPABILITIES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Roberts. Good morning, Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Clarke, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for inviting me to testify today and share with you the
Department of Defense's efforts to address under- or ungoverned
territories to preclude their use by terrorists in safe havens.
DOD recognizes that such efforts require close interagency
coordination, in fact, cooperation, as is reflected by our
panel here this morning. Eliminating terrorist safe havens is a
core element of the Defense Department's counterterrorism
efforts.
As Secretary Gates has written and said on numerous
occasions, in the decades to come, the most lethal threats to
the United States' safety and security are likely to emanate
from states that cannot adequately govern themselves or secure
their own territories, not from strong states or pure
competitors. Dealing with these fractured and failing states
is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time.
Your focus today on Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia highlights
the many and diverse challenges such states can present.
Today's strategic calculus demands that the U.S. Government
focus on building partner capacity, helping other countries
develop the tools for their security and governance to defend
themselves and to defend us by extension. We do this by
providing them with education, equipment, training, and other
forms of security assistance.
America's efforts to build the capacity of our partners
will always be defined by support for healthy civil-military
relations, respect for human dignity and the rule of law,
promotion of international humanitarian law, and the
professionalization of partner military forces.
Finally, as a long-standing member of the Special
Operations family, I would like to take a moment to
congratulate the special operators who killed Osama bin Laden
early last month. Even as we work to eliminate terrorist safe
havens, we remain grateful for the risks our Armed Forces take
in directly eliminating threats when necessary.
The Department is also grateful for the outstanding support
you in the Congress provide to our Nation's military forces in
general and, in my case, to our Special Operations Forces in
particular.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my opening remarks. I ask that
the written statement that I provided be entered in its
entirety in the record. I will be pleased to respond to any
questions. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Roberts follows:]
Prepared Statement of James Q. Roberts
June 3, 2011
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today and for the
opportunity to share with you the Department of Defense's efforts to
decrease under- or un-governed territories, thereby striving to
preclude their use by terrorists as safe havens.
Eliminating terrorist safe havens is a core element of the
Department's counterterrorism efforts. As the Secretary of Defense has
written and said on numerous occasions, in the decades to come, the
most lethal threats to the United States' safety and security are
likely to emanate from states that cannot adequately govern themselves
or secure their own territory. Dealing with these fractured or failing
states is, in many ways, the main security challenge of our time. Your
focus today on Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia highlights the challenges
such states can present.
What has been called the war on terror is, in grim reality, a
prolonged, world-wide irregular campaign--a struggle between the forces
of violent extremism and those of moderation. Direct military force
will continue to play a role in the long-term effort against terrorists
and other extremists. But over the long term, the United States cannot
kill or capture its way to victory. Where possible, what the military
refers to as kinetic operations should be subordinated to measures
aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs that spur
development, and efforts to address the grievances among the
discontented, from whom the terrorists recruit. In short, we recognize
that the elimination of safe havens is a prerequisite to winning the
current conflict and inherently requires an interagency, whole-of-
government approach. To that end, Secretary Gates has repeatedly called
for increased resources for the Department of State to enable the
important work our friends across the river do in advancing U.S.
interests through diplomacy, foreign assistance, and development.
The recent past vividly demonstrated the consequences of failing to
address adequately the dangers posed by insurgencies and failing
states. Terrorist networks can find sanctuary within the borders of a
weak nation, and recruits within the chaos of social breakdown. The
most likely catastrophic threats to the U.S. homeland are more likely
to emanate from these zones of instability than from aggressor states.
This strategic calculus demands that the U.S. Government focus on
building partner capacity: Helping other countries develop the tools
for their security and governance, to defend themselves and us by
extension. We do this by providing them with equipment, training, or
other forms of security assistance. Where possible, U.S. strategy is to
employ indirect approaches--primarily through building the capacity of
partner governments and their security forces--to prevent festering
problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial
direct U.S. military intervention. In this kind of effort, the
capabilities of the United States' allies and partners may be as
important as our own, and building their capacity is arguably as
important as, if not more so than, the fighting the United States does
itself.
Given these realities, the Department of Defense has sought to
enhance the tools at its disposal for dealing with the threats from
terrorist groups that currently exploit opportunities provided by weak,
fractured, or failing states. Notably, new train and equip programs
allow for quicker improvements in the security capacity of partner
nations. Training and education programs allow us to make contact with,
and enhance the capabilities of, counterterrorism professionals in key
states.
We refer to these training, equipping, advising, and assisting
activities collectively as security force assistance (SFA). SFA
supports the professionalization and the sustainable development of the
capacity and capability of the foreign security forces and supporting
institutions of host countries, as well as international and regional
security organizations. SFA can occur across the range of military
operations and spectrum of conflict as well as during all phases of
military operations. These efforts shall be conducted with, through,
and by foreign security forces.
SFA activities are conducted primarily to assist host countries to
defend against internal and transnational threats to stability.
However, the Department of Defense may also conduct SFA to assist host
countries to defend effectively against external threats; contribute to
coalition operations; or organize, train, equip, and advise another
country's security forces or supporting institutions. The objective of
all SFA activities is to directly increase the capacity or capability
of a foreign security force or their supporting institutions.
This indirect approach, working by, through, and with our partners
also reduces the risk to--and burdens on--U.S. military personnel. We
train partners so that they--not U.S. forces--can patrol their
waterways and territories, take on terrorists, or undertake stability
operations. More capable partners in these missions will lessen the
pressure on U.S. forces. By engaging early in building a Nation's
capacity we may be able to avoid committing troops in the future. We
are better off helping our partners handle their own security than
``calling in the Marines'' when a long-simmering problem ultimately
blossoms into conflict. Furthermore, when a partner executes an
operation it confirms its sovereignty--when we conduct an operation on
their behalf, our mutual enemies will claim that partner has ceded its
sovereignty to the United States.
dod activities to deny safe havens
A subset of the Department of Defense's capacity-building
activities are directly focused on combating terrorist safe havens
around the world in places such as Yemen and the Philippines. Two
primary tools in this regard are our Global Train and Equip authority
(otherwise known as ``Section 1206'') and the Combating Terrorism (CbT)
Fellowship Program. Section 1206 is one of our most important tools in
the counterterrorism fight. This authority gives the Department the
ability--with the concurrence of the Secretary of State--to quickly
respond to build our partners' capabilities to confront urgent and
emerging terrorism threats and support those fighting alongside us in
Coalition operations. Using Section 1206 authority, the Department can
provide training, equipment, and supplies to partner nation military
counterterrorism forces. Both of these programs adhere to the
requirements to accomplish ``Leahy vetting'' for human rights in
accordance with relevant statutes on security assistance and related
activities.
The Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) was established
to meet emergent defense requirements to build partnerships and partner
knowledge about the struggle against terror. The program provides
targeted, non-lethal, CbT education and training. CTFP directly
supports DoD efforts by providing CbT education and training for mid-
to senior-level international military officers, ministry of defense
civilians and security officials. Education and training is a mixture
of existing, traditional classroom and mobile programs, and innovative
activities designed to strengthen individual, country, and regional
combating terrorism capabilities and capacities. CTFP provides
education and training at U.S. military educational institutions,
regional centers, conferences, seminars, or as part of other education
and training programs.
I should note that this indirect approach is not without
challenges. We focus our efforts and resources on places where the
terrorist threat profile is high and partner nation capability--for
whatever reason--is insufficient to meet that threat. Of course, the
political will of the partner nation is also a crucial determinant. In
this complex environment, our ability to conduct and sustain effective
capacity-building programs can be challenged by many factors, including
political instability and competing security concerns in the host
nation. For example, in addition to terrorism, Yemeni forces have
historically dealt with the Huthi rebellion in the north and the
secessionist movement in the south. Although the Yemenis clearly
recognize the threat AQAP poses to their internal security, CT is but
one of several security concerns. Even in cases where instability or
other security concerns do not distract our partners, factors such as
education levels, literacy rates, technological know-how, or
appreciation of the value of maintenance can make absorption and
sustainment of both the equipment and the training problematic.
We recognize the need to assess our building partner capacity
efforts across the board, to include those targeted at eliminating
terrorist safe havens. For example, DoD is initiating a more formal
assessment effort to better evaluate Section 1206 train and equip
programs. This effort will be built on information collected in the
program proposal process, which includes baseline information, expected
program milestones, and quantitative and qualitative metrics to measure
the program's effectiveness. We are designing a system with the intent
of measuring outcomes, not just outputs.
I'll outline below how we use both Section 1206 and CTFP along with
other authorities to build the capacity of our partners to counter
terrorist threats in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and the Philippines, by
way of example.
In Pakistan
The core objective of the United States in Pakistan is to disrupt,
dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and to prevent their
use of safe havens in Pakistan and Afghanistan. To this end, our
``train and equip'' programs with the Pakistan military and
paramilitary forces are central to pursuing our near-term objective of
eliminating terrorist sanctuary and disrupting and defeating the al-
Qaeda network.
The Department of Defense's train and equip programs in Pakistan
have helped the Pakistani military and paramilitary forces address
terrorist threats in ungoverned spaces along its borders and
particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Area (FATA). Section
1206 programs for the Pakistan Army Aviation helped improve its airlift
capability to support counterterrorism operations in the border region
between Pakistan and Afghanistan against enemies common to both
Pakistan and the United States.
We also provided training and equipment to the Pakistan forces to
help improve maritime counterterrorism capabilities and
counterterrorism efforts focused on the western border area and coast.
More recently, the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund has focused training
and equipping programs on building Pakistan's Command, Control,
Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and
Reconnaissance (C4/ISR) capability and its ability to conduct
intelligence-driven operations; expanding its air-mobility capacity;
and improving close air support capabilities, night operations, and its
counter-improvised explosive device (C-IED) capability.
The Department has also used CTFP in Pakistan to fund confidence-
building seminars with Afghanistan on border issues with the aim of
preventing al-Qaeda from establishing safe havens. Since 2009, CTFP has
funded a 4-day Bilateral Seminar that has engaged senior-level
Pakistani officials focusing on the benefits of a whole-of-government
approach to denying al-Qaeda safe havens, controlling the volatile
border with Afghanistan and strengthening civil-military relations in a
larger national security strategy. In 2010, the CTFP funded 10
Pakistani Members of Parliament to spend 3 days in Washington to meet
with representatives from the Departments of Defense, State,
Transportation, and Justice. The goal was to strengthen their
understanding and ability to provide good governance in Pakistan. In
2011, CTFP funded a Pakistani Brigadier General to serve as a visiting
professor and fellow at the College of International Security Affairs
(CISA) at the National Defense University. He will provide first-hand
knowledge of dealing with a terrorist organization embedded in a
society as well as lessons learned from Pakistani efforts to execute
counterterrorism operations.
We find ourselves at a critical juncture in our relationship with
Pakistan. Despite inevitable setbacks, our train-and-equip efforts
paired with persistent diplomatic engagement have tangibly enhanced the
Pakistani military's efforts against militants. The operations
conducted by their forces today would have been unthinkable 2 years
ago. Because of our enduring interests, and the fragile nature of the
gains made by the Pakistani military, we must continue to assist
Pakistan in dismantling militant safe havens and extending the reach of
its government into the remote tribal areas of Pakistan.
U.S. personnel have worked with select Pakistani military units to
provide them with an enhanced understanding of counterinsurgency and
counterterrorism fundamentals, inherent in which is the significance of
adopting a population-centric approach designed to turn the populace
away from supporting terrorists and thus, deny them established or
prospective safe haven. However, counterinsurgency is a methodical
process, and if the Pakistani government continues to lack adequate
capacity to conduct all facets--clear, hold, and build--of COIN
operations, it will be less able to transition to the follow-on phases.
Our efforts have bolstered Pakistani capabilities and capacity, but
much more remains to be done.
In Yemen
In fiscal year 2011 our Combating Terrorism Fellowship Fund
supported seminars and workshops in Sana'a, Yemen. Seminar speakers
included Yemen's Prime Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Chief
of the Defense Staff, a representative from the President's Office, the
Director for the National Security Bureau (the Yemeni security,
intelligence, and counterterrorism service), the U.S. Ambassador to
Yemen, and U.S. Congresswoman McCollum. The events focused on the
benefits of a whole-of-government approach to national security
strategy. Attendees included 650 Yemeni military and civilian officials
to include: Members of the Council of Ministers, Al-Shura Council (U.S.
Senate equivalent), House of Representatives, members of civil society,
Embassy representatives and students from the host High Military
Academy, and Yemeni CTFP alumni. The program specifically discussed al-
Qaeda safe havens in the south, the spread of al-Qaeda's extremist
ideology and influence, and how to counter it.
Our Section 1206 train-and-equip programs in Yemen have focused on
improving the Yemenis' ability to control its own territory and
territorial waters to combat terrorists currently exploiting ungoverned
and under-governed spaces. Programs have focused on improving border
security and increasing mobility, and have provided equipment to the
Yemeni Special Operations Forces, Air Force, Border Security Force, and
Coast Guard to help them deter, detect, and detain terrorists along
land borders, and at sea, though the security environment has been
challenging of late. The programs in fiscal year 2010 centered on
improving the operational reach and reaction time of counterterrorism
forces so that they could confront terrorists in previously unreachable
areas.
In Somalia
Because Somalia lacks an internationally-recognized permanent
government, many of our capacity-building programs are limited in their
ability to address safe haven there. As such Somalia has not directly
benefited from either Section 1206 funding or CTFP funding. However, we
are working closely with the Department of State to enhance the
capabilities of the multinational African Union Mission in Somalia
(AMISOM) forces and the National Security Force of the Transitional
Federal Government (TFG). These forces are currently operating in
Somalia to stabilize the security situation and create a safe and
secure environment in support of the Djibouti Peace Process and in
which the TFG can function in the midst of current threats.
Further, Somalia's lack of governance and sparse population make it
appealing as a potential safe haven for al-Qaeda. The U.S.-designated
Foreign Terrorist Organization al-Shabaab currently operates freely
throughout much of south/central Somalia. While al-Shabaab is not a
monolithic structure, its leadership has strong and increasing
connections to al-Qaeda. As al-Qaeda undergoes changes in its central
leadership and regroups from counterterrorism operations in Pakistan,
we need to ensure that it does not relocate its center of operations to
Somalia.
It is critical that we view Somalia from a regional Horn of Africa
perspective, not least because so many of the USG's traditional
security cooperation tools are restricted from being used in Somalia.
The Department of Defense is reviewing the status of its Joint Task
Forces to determine if any should be considered for transition to a
more permanent status, such as Joint Interagency Task Force. This
review includes the Combined Joint Task Force--Horn of Africa (CJTF-
HOA) based at Camp Lemonnier, Djibouti, whose mission is to build
partner nation capacity in order to promote regional security and
stability, prevent conflict, and protect U.S. interests.
U.S. Africa Command is concurrently undertaking a review of East
Africa to determine how our military efforts in the region can be most
efficiently applied to work in concert with those of our interagency
partners to achieve our collective regional goals. This review of our
East Africa strategy will also inform the Department's recommendations
on basing and funding for CJTF-HOA and Camp Lemonnier. Our ultimate
goal is a fully integrated DoD strategy under which security
assistance, capacity building, operational collaboration with regional
partners, and counterterrorism actions are synchronized to provide the
regional security and stability that is in the interests of the United
States, our regional partners, and the appropriate international
organizations.
In the Philippines
I will include some comments about DoD's capacity-building programs
in the Philippines, as they have enjoyed a degree of quiet success in
helping the central government in its efforts to expand governance. Our
education, equipping, and training programs there have helped deny safe
haven to a variety of malign actors. Some examples follow.
The Combating Terrorism Fellowship Program has funded Philippine
counterterrorism professionals to attend the Master's degree-granting
program at both the National Defense University's College of
International Security Affairs and the Naval Postgraduate School's
College of International Security Affairs. Both degree programs address
strategic security to include courses on countering the ideological
support for terrorism and countering violent extremism. Senior level
CTFP-funded Filipino leadership have led efforts mainly in the south
against groups such as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Moro National
Liberation Front, Abu Sayyaf, Rajah Sulaiman Movement, and Jemaah
Islamiyah.
Section 1206 train-and-equip programs in the Philippines have
focused on increasing maritime border security and decreasing land and
maritime ungoverned spaces. Although still in the stages of
development, United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) believes 1206
programs will be one of the highlights of the command's bilateral
counterterrorism effort. These efforts have expanded and broadened into
a growing maritime domain awareness network with links to command-and-
control centers in Manila that are capable of guiding air- and sea-
borne interdiction assets.
Importantly, we also have provided maritime domain awareness assets
to the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia in an effort to build
regional capacity to monitor waters that have historically been areas
of ``safe transit'' for terrorist and criminal elements alike. Section
1206 programs have also supported the development of naval special
operations forces and key air units who engage day to day with the most
acute terrorist threats in previously unreachable areas.
Civil Military Operations.--Since 2002, Joint Special Operations
Task Force--Philippines (JSOTF-P) has engaged the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines in a Foreign Internal Defense mission with
one of its primary objectives being to neutralize the safe haven that
Southern Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago afford to Jemaah Islamiyah,
the Abu Sayaaf Group, and potentially to other regional and
transnational terrorist groups. As part of this mission, the JSOTF's
advisers have continued to mentor their Philippine counterparts in the
utility and planning of targeted Civil Military Operations (CMO) as
part of a larger counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategy, and
have worked shoulder-to-shoulder with them in the execution of these
activities.
Over the 2010 calendar year, U.S. and Filipino civilian and uniform
personnel have worked together to plan and execute over $5.2 million in
CMO activities, amounting to 44 civic action projects, 38 km of road
construction, over 19,000 medical treatments, and close to 6,000
veterinary services performed. All of this has been part of the larger
U.S. effort to assist the Government of the Philippines in establishing
a stable environment in the Southern Philippines, garnering local
popular support, and increasing the legitimacy and governance of the
Government of the Philippines in these remote areas. The goal, of
course, is to separate terrorist group members from their local support
base and deny access to this prospective safe haven.
building dod's sfa toolkit for the future
Recognizing the important role that assisting our partners plays in
furthering our U.S. National security, and the enduring nature of this
requirement, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review laid out a series of
initiatives to support this mission area. Key themes were:
Strengthen and institutionalize general purpose force capabilities
for security force assistance.--Conducting missions to train, advise,
and assist partner forces has long been the domain of U.S. Special
Operations Forces. Our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the
irregular nature of today's conflict, have taught us that we need all
our forces to have these skill sets.
Enhance linguistic, regional, and cultural ability.--Operating in
partnership with host-nation security forces and among local
populations puts a premium on foreign language skills and regional and
cultural knowledge.
Strengthen and expand capabilities for training partner aviation
forces.--Providing training to partner aviation forces is an area that
QDR analysis suggests will continue to grow.
Strengthen capacities for ministerial-level training.--The
Department recognizes that in order to ensure that enhancements
developed among security forces are sustained, the supporting
institutions in partner nations must also function effectively.
Create mechanisms to facilitate more rapid transfer of critical
materiel.--We are exploring and beginning to implement options for
expediting the acquisition and transfer of critical capabilities to
partner forces.
Strengthen the capacities for training regional and international
security organizations.--The Department will improve its capacity for
enabling the United Nations and other multinational peacekeeping
efforts.
conclusion
Terrorist groups seek to evade security forces by exploiting
ungoverned and under-governed areas as safe havens from which to
recruit, indoctrinate, and train fighters, as well as to plan attacks
on U.S. and allied interests. Where appropriate, U.S. forces will work
with the military forces of partner nations to strengthen their
capacity and capabilities for internal security. We will coordinate
those activities with those of other U.S. Government agencies as they
work to strengthen civilian capacities, thus denying terrorists the
time, space, and resources they require. For reasons of political
legitimacy, as well as sheer economic necessity, there is no substitute
for professional, motivated, local security forces protecting
populations threatened by terrorists operating in their midst.
Efforts that use smaller numbers of U.S. forces and emphasize host-
nation leadership are generally preferable to large-scale military
campaigns. We have seen this approach work in the Philippines where,
over the past 8 years, U.S. forces and their Philippine counterparts
have trained together and worked to understand the organization and
modus operandi of the adversary. As their equipment and skills have
improved, Philippine forces have patrolled more widely and more
frequently, bringing security to previously contested areas.
As we place greater emphasis on building the capacity of our
partners, our efforts will continue to be informed by our long-term
determination to foster human dignity. This commitment is manifested in
human rights vetting and other controls that shape our efforts to
educate, train, equip, advise, and assist foreign forces and partner
security institutions. America's efforts to build the capacity of our
partners will always be defined by support for healthy civil-military
relations, respect for human dignity and the rule of law, promotion of
international humanitarian law, and the professionalization of partner
military forces.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Roberts. Let me, too, associate
myself with your remarks regarding the Navy SEAL operation to
kill bin Laden. No one will ever know the names or the faces,
but they are truly the unsung heroes.
In addition, I would like to also commend and recognize the
intelligence community and the analysts who were able to track
down the information that led us to bin Laden. They, too--we
will never know their names or faces--the public, at least--but
they deserve our congratulations as well.
With that, Ms. Williams-Bridgers, the GAO came out with
your report, and I want to go through some of the conclusions
with you and assess how that impacts our ability to go after
these terrorists in the safe havens.
But essentially, as I understand it, your report concludes
that the State Department did not fully comply with the level
of detail required by two laws, two statutes, one being the
National Defense Authorization Act and the second one being the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act. These Acts
require the President to submit to the Congress a report on the
strategy and activities of the U.S. Government to eliminate
terrorist sanctuaries. Can you tell me or tell this committee
how these reports were deficient and what impact that will have
on our ability to hunt down the terrorists in the safe havens?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the
question. I would be glad to respond.
With regard to the report that was mandated by the National
Defense Authorization Act, that required the President to
complete an overall assessment of U.S. Government-wide efforts
to address terrorist safe havens. That report has not yet been
completed. We understand the responsibility has been delegated
to the National Security Council.
In our conversations during the course of our review, the
National Security Council says they are in the process of
developing that report, so we are looking forward to receiving
it and having an examination of it. We think it is critically
important for there to be a high-level National statement of
the priorities, the goals, the objectives; and, hopefully, we
will see the level of detail in that assessment that will
afford the Congress the opportunity to measure over time
progress being made.
With regard to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist
Prevention Act, it specifically mandated that State Department
produce reports on an annual basis that rendered country by
country assessments, those countries that had been identified
as terrorist safe havens, and then to assess these countries in
terms of the actions the countries have taken to prevent
terrorism, actions that the countries have demonstrated as
being cooperative with the United States, and to explain the
level of knowledge that exists within these governments about
terrorist activity or the presence of safe havens in their
countries.
The one provision that Congress recommended that we did not
see in any of the country reports related to the provision that
would require State Department to report on actions taken by
countries to prevent the proliferation and trafficking of
weapons of mass destruction. This was absent in every single
country report.
To State's credit, during the course of our review they
acknowledged that that provision had not been adequately
responded to and they intended to incorporate in their next
report, which we expect to be issued some time this year.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. So, in other words, your testimony
indicates, and your report you issued, that these reports are
incomplete----
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Correct.
Mr. McCaul [continuing]. Are not in compliance with the
requirements under these two statutes.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Absolutely. Absolutely.
In addition, sir, I would also add that in the assessment
what we expected to see--and not what I believe Congress
expected to see in its articulation of its need to have a full
assessment of information on which it could provide adequate
oversight--we expected to see a listing of all activities
undertaken by the whole of the U.S. Government, all agencies
that have a presence and contribute in a relevant and
significant way toward the detection and elimination of
terrorist safe havens. That assessment was complete. That
listing of all other agency activities and programs was not
clear and it was not complete.
In the course of our own review, we identified at least 13
programs that are funded by State Department that we consider
to be most relevant, programs that speak to governance,
capacity-building, security, economic development activities,
this whole-of-government approach that was articulated in the
most recent National strategic statement.
We also did not see the listing of other agencies, not all
other agencies' programs and activities, such as DHS. As I
mentioned in my opening statement, activities that DHS advances
with regard to cash smuggling that leads to money laundering
that leads to financing of terrorist groups and operations,
that, too, was not included in the State country reports.
Mr. McCaul. So there's a lack of reporting by the National
Security Council--which they assured you that they will be
coming out with a report soon?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. Yes.
Mr. McCaul. But, coupled with the deficiencies in this
report by both DHS and the State Department, it is not allowing
Congress to do its oversight responsibility; is that correct?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. I believe it does not provide
Congress with sufficient detail and explanation and evaluation
that allows you to measure over time what progress has been
made.
For example, the removal of Indonesia from the country
reports. It took some digging for our team to look over time to
see what countries were in, what countries were out. There is
no explicit statement in any--the most current country report
that a country had been removed or the Afghan-Pakistan border
area had been removed. That took some concerted effort and
examining and data mining, if you will, of each of the country
reports over time. That kind of information needs to be
provided in order to give you a sense of progress or lack
thereof.
Mr. McCaul. So, as I understand it, there are no metrics
reported. Is that correct?
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. That is correct.
Mr. McCaul. So this committee, Foreign Affairs, Armed
Services, the Intelligence Committee cannot adequately perform
its job without this information.
Ms. Williams-Bridgers. It cannot adequately perform the job
without this information. This information is not currently
available in open sources. However, it may be available in
classified environment, and it might be most appropriate in a
classified reporting environment.
The Congress did allow State Department to provide it that
type of more sensitive information in a classified report.
State Department has chosen not to issue that type of report.
Mr. McCaul. I would like to give, obviously, the State
Department, Ms. Villarosa and Mr. Koumans, would like to give
you the opportunity to respond to the allegations in this
report. We will start with Ms. Villarosa.
Ms. Villarosa. Thank you, Chairman.
Again, we took to heart, we have talked with the GAO about
the deficiencies in our Country Reports of Terrorism and are in
the process of finalizing the 2010 version to make them more
comprehensive, as the GAO has recommended; and this will
include specifically addressing efforts that are done with
regard to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
We are working with the Bureau of ISN, International
Security and Nonproliferation Affairs, to provide that
information so that it is as comprehensive as possible.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. I mean, tracking the proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction seems to be a pretty serious thing
that we should be reporting. Why was that not included?
Ms. Villarosa. Again, I know that this is--our Bureau of
International Security and Nonproliferation tracks this very
closely, and I do not know in terms of what their reporting
requirements are. But we understand that we need to include
this information in the Country Reports of Terrorism and are in
the process of doing so now.
Mr. McCaul. I certainly hope so. I mean, that seems to be a
major oversight in the reporting requirement that is by law. I
think it harms our ability in the Congress, as the Chairman of
the Oversight Investigations Committee on Homeland Security, it
does not allow us to do our job. So I would hope that this
report would be updated as soon as possible.
I want to commend the GAO for calling this to our
attention. I don't think many people knew about that,
certainly, either on this committee or in the Congress as a
whole, and I think that is a major gap in the reporting
requirement.
Mr. Koumans, do you have any comments?
Mr. Koumans. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I come at this question from the point of view of having
been a Foreign Service Officer, as you mentioned in your
opening remarks, for 17 years before I came to Homeland
Security and, perhaps similarly to Ms. Villarosa, was posted
overseas during times when I had to write the first draft of
the counterterrorism Country Reports that are then submitted
back to Washington and further amplified by the Washington
interagency community. I know that the State Department sends
specific instructions with respect to legal changes that took
place in the country at that time, significant prosecutions, et
cetera. From our point of view, absolutely, if the training
that ICE and CBP have done with respect to bulk cash smuggling,
if that should be included, we report that through other
channels, we are more than happy to include that, absolutely.
Mr. McCaul. It is June 2011. This is a 2010 report. I would
hope that both DHS and State can update this report so that the
other branch of Government, that being the Congress, can do its
job.
So my time is way over expired. But I thank you for your
testimony.
I now recognize the Ranking Member, Ms. Clarke.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman; and I would
like to associate myself with your opening comments.
As a New Yorker, we are indebted and indeed grateful to our
armed services, our special forces and intelligence community
for eliminating the threat that was Osama bin Laden; and I
would like to just state that for the record.
Let me ask the entire panel, although terrorist safe havens
have been identified in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, they each
are unique and present different challenges for U.S. officials.
How do the three countries differ, especially as it relates to
our counterterrorism strategy? How does the United States adapt
to the differences?
Ms. Villarosa. I guess I will start with that.
Each of these are very unique countries. In the case of
Somalia, there hasn't been a functioning government for over 20
years. So we have a multi-pronged strategy in order to start
building stability with the Transitional Federal Government
forces. We are working with the African Union, who have
provided troops to assist the TFG in providing security and
stability in Mogadishu. We are also working with the nations
that surround Somalia, because they are also very threatened by
the threat that comes from Somalia. So we are helping
strengthen their borders.
We are also, because of the attraction of the turmoil in
Somalia to members of the Somali diaspora in the West and in
the United States and in Europe and in Australia, we are
reaching out more broadly to the Somali diaspora to educate
them about the situation, hopefully prevent people from
traveling to take part in the violence. But this will be a
long-term effort.
We are providing training for both the AMISOM forces as
well as the TFG forces. We are getting ready to--we are also
working with some of the other sort of islands of stability
that we find in Somalia. But our goal is a peaceful, stable
Somalia; and it will take a while.
In Pakistan, again, you have an established government
which has its challenges that we are trying to address. There
are some severe economic challenges. There are a lot of local
grievances. So we have tried to address those local grievances
through a lot of our USAID programs.
But, at the same time, we are trying to work--we have been
working closely with Homeland Security in terms of building up
border security and also preventing the movement of improvised
explosive materials into Afghanistan where they are killing our
troops. So we need to work on that. We need to work very much
with the security forces.
Pakistan has 147,000 troops in the border provinces that
they have been working to eliminate the terrorist threat there,
so we need to continue working with them through DOD to help
build their ability to take action. Once they clear out these
terrorists, then we want to help them hold that and start
providing those basic services that the people have not--that
have not been forthcoming in the past.
In the case of Yemen, it is on the front page of the
newspapers today. There is a very serious political dispute
going on. But, at the same time, there is a very real terrorist
threat in that country. Obviously, the political uncertainty
right now makes it difficult for us to do very much. But we had
been working to train the Yemeni security forces again to
exercise more control. As I mentioned earlier, we had a lot of
success in 2009 and 2010.
We are also working through USAID to reach out and, again,
assist in the provision of services and promote countering
violent extremism to delegitimize the violence. We have been
working with--there is a lot of European partners. The Saudis,
the Gulf states are interested in working with us to
delegitimize violence, prevent people from being recruited.
So we do--again, we have multi-faceted approaches to take
on the particular challenges of each one of these very complex
countries.
Ms. Clarke. I want to thank you.
My time has expired, and if time permits we will continue
on that question.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. McCaul. Well, thank you.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Missouri,
Mr. Long.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and thank you all for
being here today and your testimony.
To Ms. Villarosa in particular, I would like to state that
since I have been--I am a freshman, and since I have been here,
January 5 I believe we were sworn in, I believe I have been to
5,417 different events, one of which was at the State
Department where the Secretary of State invited the freshman
class over. I was just struck that night with the dedication of
everyone over there. You go to these events. When you have been
to 5,417 of them, it is kind of like, hi, how are you? Getting
moved in? Is everything going okay in the District of Columbia
for you?
But at the Department of State everyone was excited about
what they do. They were very engaging. People, some dating back
to working in the Reagan administration, are over there. If you
can just carry a message back to the Secretary and to your
coworkers how much that I appreciated that and their dedication
to what they do, I would appreciate it.
Ms. Villarosa. I am glad to deliver that message. Thank you
so much.
Mr. Long. Okay. That should be an easy one for you to carry
back.
Mr. Koumans, in your opinion, do you think that the
Department of Homeland Security is doing all that it should to
deny terrorists safe havens today?
Mr. Koumans. Thank you for the question, Mr. Congressman.
There is an enormous amount that can be done. I am
satisfied with the amount of work that we are doing in
partnership with the Departments of State and Defense. There is
always more to do, and I think it becomes a question for
leadership in partnership with Congress, in partnership with
the Departments of State and Defense to determine where the
priority should be, where to direct the resources and to remain
nimble so always to be prepared to shift resources as
circumstances warrant.
Mr. Long. In your testimony, you kind of reiterated or
said, I guess, that you do work closely with the Departments of
State and Defense. In your opinion, to what extent does the
Department of State coordinate its efforts with DHS personnel
overseas?
Mr. Koumans. Mr. Congressman, I thank you for your comment,
your question.
I think we cooperate very closely. On the ground at the
embassies overseas, typically DHS personnel, ICE, CBP, TSA, and
others, are part of the ambassador's country team and partner
with the other members of the country team, with the Department
of Justice, Department of Defense, and others who are in the
law enforcement and intelligence and security cooperation
groups that get established at the post, coordinating with
respect to assistance, with respect to visits, with respect to
high-level engagement with the country leadership. It is an on-
going effort and one that requires a lot of work there on the
ground.
We try to copy that cooperation and build on it here back
in Washington, and I think the cooperation that we have is of
extremely high level.
Mr. Long. Ms. Villarosa made mention a minute ago--and I am
still on you, Mr. Koumans--made mention about Yemen. Can you
tell us how many DHS personnel you have in Pakistan and Yemen
and what their duties are?
Mr. Koumans. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.
We currently have three people in Pakistan, three ICE,
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, officers. We normally have
two in Yemen, also from ICE, but we currently have one there
due to the security situation and the departure that was
ordered. We are down to just one person there.
To answer your question as to their responsibilities, they
carry out the full range of ICE responsibilities with respect
to countering smuggling and trafficking of contraband of every
kind, partnership with local law enforcement in carrying out
investigations that could have roots to other parts of the
world where ICE is operating, and, of course, chiefly, of
course, the United States, carrying out those investigations,
partnering with the State Department with respect to travelers
to the United States, carrying out joint investigations, and
training and mentoring with local officials.
Mr. Long. Okay. Ms. Villarosa, you didn't think you would
get off that easy, so I do have a question for you.
It has been suggested that the Pakistan government has an
increasingly questionable partnership between known terrorist
organizations and the Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI, if you
will. Do you think the United States should continue to involve
Pakistan in anti-terror training programs and provide foreign
aid?
Ms. Villarosa. Mr. Congressman, thank you for that
question.
I very much believe that we should remain very closely
engaged with Pakistan. If we are going to succeed in our
ultimate goal of defeating al-Qaeda, we must work with
Pakistan. The security assistance that we are providing is
enabling them to take action against terrorists in Pakistan.
We have our differences with the Pakistani government, and
we reiterate them regularly. Secretary Clinton was just there
last week and highlighted the many concerns that we have. The
operation of terrorist groups represent not only a threat to us
but to Pakistanis themselves, are very serious, and I think
Secretary Clinton found that the Pakistani officials do want to
continue to cooperate.
We must find--we have to do it. It may be frustrating, but
I think it is very important that we stay engaged over the long
term.
Mr. Long. Okay. I know I am past my time, but if you will
allow me, Mr. Chairman, I also want to thank DHS.
Joplin, Missouri, is in my district, and we had a half-
mile, three-quarter mile by 11 miles wiped out by an F-5 last
week.
I got there at daylight the next morning. The White House
liaison for FEMA, which is under DHS, called and said, we want
you to know that we are coming, you will have everything you
need, and also said we will have boots on the ground shortly. I
said, no, you won't. They are already there. They came about an
hour ago and made introductions. Greg Fugate came in and Rich
Serino came in, the director and the deputy director.
So just everybody needs to keep Joplin in their prayers,
and I very much appreciate the attitude. The President came in
on Sunday, and I was thrilled with that, because he got to see
it with his own eyes.
So, anyway, if you can take the message to FEMA, we
appreciate what they are doing. Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Long.
Just in conclusion, let me say that proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction has always been a central threat
and issue for the Congress. We are talking about Pakistan,
going back to A.Q. Kahn who proliferated his nuclear capability
to Syria, North Korea, Iran. Pakistan has nuclear weapons. So
the idea that the report required by law under the National
Defense Authorization Act and the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act would not include information about
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to me is a
woefully inadequate report.
We are debating a Libya resolution today, and the issue is
what weapons of mass destruction do they have, whether it be
chemical weapons, 10,000 MANPADS.
So I would ask that all three agencies represented here
today, both DHS, Department of State, and Department of
Defense, fully comply with the law here and update these
reports in a more comprehensive way as soon as possible so that
Congress can do its job for the American people. The ultimate
job of this committee is to protect the American people, and
without that information we can't adequately do our jobs. So I
would ask you go back to your bosses and tell them we need that
information as soon as possible.
With that, we will go ahead and dismiss this panel of
witnesses. I want to thank you for your testimony and your
expertise and ask that the second panel take their seats as
well.
Our next panel, Panel II, has three distinguished
witnesses.
First, Mr. Steve Coll, who is President and CEO of The New
American Foundation. Previously, he spent 20 years as a senior
editor and foreign correspondent at the Washington Post,
serving as the paper's managing editor from 1998 to 2004. He is
the recipient of numerous professional awards, including two
Pulitzer Prizes.
On a sort of point of personal privilege, I recall reading
your book Ghost Wars many years ago, which is, in my judgment,
the definitive piece for the Afghan-Soviet and now the current
situation we find ourselves in today with Afghanistan and
Pakistan. It provides still I think the greatest insights into
the threat that we face today. So thank you for your great
contributions.
Second, we have Professor Bruce Hoffman, who is currently a
tenured professor at Georgetown University and director of both
the Center for Peace and Security Studies Program. He was a
scholar in residence for counterterrorism at the CIA between
2004 and 2006. Professor Hoffman also previously held the
Corporate Chair in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency at
the Rand Corporation.
Finally, Professor Daniel Byman, who is currently a
professor also at Georgetown University--we have some great
professors at Georgetown, it sounds like--and the research
director and senior fellow at the Saban Center for Middle East
Policy for the Brookings Institution. From 2005 to 2010, Dr.
Byman was a director for the Center for Peace and Security
Studies also at Georgetown. He has worked as a professional
staff member for the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
on the United States and the joint 9/11 inquiry, U.S. House and
Senate Intelligence Committees. Thank you for being here today.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Coll for his statement.
STATEMENT OF STEVE COLL, PRESIDENT AND CEO, NEW AMERICA
FOUNDATION
Mr. Coll. Chairman McCaul, thank you for the kind words.
Ranking Member Clarke and Members of the committee, thanks for
the opportunity to testify.
Almost a decade after the September 11 attacks, the threat
to the United States from al-Qaeda-related groups is
diminishing but remains persistent.
Most encouragingly, al-Qaeda has failed politically and by
doing so has isolated itself. Its violence and absence of
constructive ideas and programs has caused Muslim populations
to turn away, limiting its potential in recruitment and fund-
raising. The death of Osama bin Laden will challenge the group
to manage the first leadership succession crisis in al-Qaeda's
history.
The group's claims on the grievances and imaginations of
disenfranchised Muslims is waning. Yet no terrorist
organization requires a mass following to inflict substantial
and disruptive damage. Al-Qaeda remains capable from time to
time of killing dozens, even hundreds of American citizens at
once, including on American soil, as evidence from recent
plotting makes clear.
Mention has already been made of the Najibullah Zazi case
and the near-miss on Northwest flight 253. Both of these plots
involved safe havens abroad, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border in
the case of Zazi and Yemen in the case of the Christmas day
bombing attempt.
The State Department's Country Reports on Terrorism have
identified 13 terrorist safe havens. Of these 13, at least six
currently contain al-Qaeda or related groups that have
historically displayed international ambitions. The most
prominent areas are the Trans-Sahara, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Iraq. In my judgment, two of these havens
currently stand out as the places most likely to produce potent
cross-border attacks, Yemen and Pakistan.
In Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, headed by bin
Laden's personal secretary, has emerged as the organization's
most internationally ambitious and capable franchise. Because
of political changes and conflicts in Yemen resulting from
anti-government protests of this Arab Spring, the political and
territorial spaces enjoyed by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
are likely to expand in Yemen during the next few years. The
country now seems to be falling into civil war. It is likely
that al-Qaeda and historically aligned Yemeni Islamic groups
will seek and gain advantage in the country's coming turmoil,
as they have done in previous eras of Yemeni civil conflict.
In Pakistan, too, the current trend lines for American
counterterrorism goals look difficult. The discovery and
killing of Osama bin Laden in a walled compound not far from
the Pakistan Military Academy has brought U.S.-Pakistani
relations, already troubled, to a low point. This deterioration
will have an impact on American intelligence collection and
paramilitary activity in Pakistan.
The United States has an obvious interest in Pakistan's
success and stability. The country possesses the world's
fastest-growing nuclear arsenal and is adopting defense
policies that are likely to destabilize its military balance
with India in the years ahead. The level of violence and
pressure within Pakistan caused primarily by the Pakistani
Taliban is very disturbing. Ultimately, only a stable,
economically growing, pluralistic Pakistan with much stronger
civilian leadership, healthier civil-military relations, and a
more sustainable defense policy can prevent the country from
remaining a terrorist haven.
Over the long run, a more successful Pakistan will only
emerge if its military and civilian elites decide that it is in
the country's national interest to increase cooperation with
India, particularly cooperation that will lead to greater
economic integration in South Asia. Full peace is not necessary
to produce the economic growth that has altered similar
patterns of internal violence, government dysfunction,
terrorism, and failed civil-military relations in countries
such as Indonesia, Columbia, the Philippines, and Turkey.
Another reset in American policy toward Pakistan is on the
horizon. In the security realm, what seems required is a
clearer, more focused, more manageable effort to identify and
act on shared interests against al-Qaeda and in the transition
ahead in Afghanistan. Both countries may benefit now from a
period of less hopeful transformative America ambition and more
clear-eyed focus on shared interests. At the same time, it
would be helpful for the United States to reset its longer-term
planning to construct a pragmatic vision to promote regional
economic integration in South Asia as well as Pakistani
economic growth.
Thanks again for the opportunity to participate in this
hearing.
[The statement of Mr. Coll follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steve Coll
June 3, 2011
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, distinguished Members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.
In my testimony, I will address several of the questions the
committee is exploring, with an emphasis on those areas where my
experience is greatest. In particular, I will review: (1) An estimate
of the threat al-Qaeda poses today; (2) which overseas havens currently
pose the greatest threat to the United States; (3) the struggle of the
United States to construct a successful policy toward Pakistan; and (4)
some opportunities for improved Government reporting on terrorism
raised by the findings of the General Accountability Office report,
``Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Should Improve Its Reporting on
Terrorist Safe Havens.''
al-qaeda after the death of osama bin laden
Almost a decade after the September 11 attacks, the threat to the
United States from al-Qaeda-related groups is diminishing but
persistent.
Most encouragingly, al-Qaeda has failed politically, and by doing
so, has isolated itself. Its violence and absence of constructive
political ideas and programs has caused Muslim populations and
important constituencies to turn away, limiting its potential in
recruitment and fundraising. The death of Osama bin Laden will
challenge the group to manage the first leadership succession crisis in
its history. Al-Qaeda will likely struggle continue in the forms it has
presented since its founding in 1988. The odds are rising that it will
fragment into even more autonomous regional groups and that some of
those groups will turn increasingly to criminal activity such as
kidnapping-for-ransom. Such criminality will accelerate a positive
trend, namely, that al-Qaeda's claim on the grievances and imaginations
of disenfranchised Muslims is waning.
Yet no terrorist organization requires a mass following to inflict
substantial and disruptive damage. Al-Qaeda remains capable from time
to time of killing dozens, even hundreds of American citizens at once,
including on American soil, as evidence from recent plotting makes
clear. In September 2009, an Afghan-American who had been recruited by
al-Qaeda, Najibullah Zazi, planned an attack against subway trains in
Manhattan; Zazi had the intent and means to succeed, but fortunately,
intelligence and law enforcement officers intercepted him. Three months
later, Umar Farouq Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian who was recruited by al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, attempted to destroy Northwest Flight
253 as it vectored to land in Detroit. He, too, had the intention and
means to succeed, but fortunately, his bomb makers were imperfect.
External attacks of this scale have been attempted by al-Qaeda and
related groups at regular intervals since September 11. Attempts of
this magnitude are certain to continue. It is also conceivable that a
small, talented, clandestine group, probably originating from Pakistan,
could carry out a larger-scale, even more spectacular attack, for
example, of the media-driven type witnessed in Mumbai, India, in
November 2008. It would be very difficult for such a group to act
within the United States without being detected first, but the
possibility cannot be ruled out entirely, as the capacity and intention
of some radicals in Pakistan to attack the United States directly
clearly remains. Some Pakistani groups with international ambitions,
such as Lashkar-e-Taiba, draw on well-educated volunteers who include
scientists, doctors, and other talented urban professionals who might
have the creativity and resources required. In addition, the ability of
dangerous, determined groups to form and plan in Yemen is likely to
grow as that country's internal conflicts worsen.
More recently, homegrown attacks by radicalized individuals living
in the United States have increased in frequency and seriousness. The
most serious of these was the attack carried out by Maj. Nidal Malik
Hasan, who killed 13 people at Fort Hood, Texas, in 2009.
The nature and scale of all these threats must be kept in
perspective. Last year, the New America Foundation and the Maxwell
School at Syracuse University surveyed and analyzed the cases of the
180 individuals indicted or convicted in Islamist terrorism cases in
the United States since the September 11 attacks. The research found
that only four of the homegrown attacks caused casualties in the United
States, and that these attacks resulted in a total of 17 deaths--13
from the Fort Hood attack. By way of comparison, according to the FBI,
between 2001 and 2009, 73 people were killed in hate crimes in the
United States. About 15,000 Americans are murdered each year.
the safe haven map
In August, 2010, responding to a Congressional mandate, the State
Department's Country Reports on Terrorism identified 13 terrorist safe
havens: The Trans-Sahara (Algeria, Mali, Maritania, and Niger);
Venezuela; the Colombia Border Region (Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, Peru,
and Venezuela); the Tri-Border Area (Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay);
Yemen; Somalia; Pakistan; the Sulu/Sulawesi Seas Littoral (the maritime
boundaries of Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines); the Southern
Philippines; Afghanistan; Northern Iraq; Iraq; and Lebanon.
Of these 13, at least six currently contain al-Qaeda or related
groups that have historically displayed international ambitions. These
most prominent areas are the Trans-Sahara, Yemen, Somalia, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, and Iraq. Inside all of these havens violence and
kidnapping have been regular occurrences in recent years.
In the case of Somalia there is incipient evidence of international
terrorism, but most of the violence is local. But of the six havens
with an al-Qaeda presence, two currently stand out in the open sources
for the extent to which they have recently and will likely produce
potent attacks beyond the borders of the haven: Yemen and Pakistan.
Before we turn to those two cases, it is worth examining what is
not marked on the State Department map. Understandably, for reasons of
definition and foreign policy clarity, State defines safe havens in a
way that emphasizes the impunity that terrorists or financiers may
enjoy when they take root in ungoverned spaces or areas where local
authorities find it convenient to collaborate with terrorist groups,
for ideological or financial reasons, or because they are too weak to
oppose the terrorists. This approach to thinking about safe havens
inevitably produces a map biased toward weak states.
Consider, by way of contrast, what a map of the actual planning,
travel, and transit of convicted terrorists would look like. It would
show many individuals spending many hours in hotel rooms, dormitories,
and residential housing in the United States, Europe, Dubai, Asia and
elsewhere--very often undetected. It would show almost all of those
individuals using communications technologies rooted in the United
States and distributed globally. The point here is that in
conceptualizing the challenge of safe havens, it would be a mistake to
locate our thinking only in the cartoonish image of a Dr. Evil holed up
in a cave or foggy compounds beyond the reach of the law and Special
Forces. Modern terrorism is a media-leveraging tactic embedded in the
structures of our prosperous, globalized economy. It cannot be
successfully contained if it is only considered as an external threat
from weak states.
An implication of this argument is that in addition to the sort of
mapping analysis mandated of State in its Country Reports, it might be
useful to Congress, in its oversight role, to obtain analysis of the
terrorist threat that is more reverse-engineered from actual terrorist
activity. What does this activity show about their use of actual havens
and transit and communications corridors, whether of the traditional
ungoverned-territory type or the post-modern, internet-and-airport-
lounge type? What policy-relevant insights might be obtained from such
bottom-up analysis?
Certainly, traditional, external havens in weak states, such as
Pakistan and Yemen, remain very important. As I have argued,
considering the residual international threat posed by al-Qaeda, they
remain the two most important cases.
In Yemen, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, headed by Bin Laden's
former personal secretary Nasir al-Wahayshi, has emerged as the
organization's most internationally ambitious and capable franchise.
Because of political changes and conflicts in Yemen resulting from
anti-government protests of this Arab Spring, the political and
territorial spaces enjoyed by AQAP are likely to expand in Yemen during
the next few years. The country seems now to be falling into civil war.
In recent, earlier eras of civil conflict in Yemen, al-Qaeda has
exploited the fighting to gain space and allies, and it is likely to
attempt this again.
Al-Qaeda's roots in Yemen trace back decades. The bin Laden family
immigrated to Saudi Arabia from the Hadramawt, an interior region of
Yemen. Osama bin Laden identified with his family's roots in Yemen,
particularly after he was deprived of Saudi citizenship; he financed
and otherwise participated in Islamist uprisings there during the
country's civil conflicts between 1990 and 1992; he reportedly explored
moving to Yemen at later points; he took a wife from the country; and
al-Qaeda has continually funded violent activity there. The most
significant of these attacks was the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in
2000. Yemen's weak strongman President, Ali Abdullah Saleh, sought to
co-opt Islamist groups and to contain al-Qaeda, particularly to the
extent that its activity jeopardized American aid flows. His position
became more difficult after 2003, when a crackdown on al-Qaeda cells in
neighboring Saudi Arabia sent dozens of terrorist refugees scurrying to
Yemen. They regrouped, particularly in the southern Abyan Governate. In
general, Saleh's political influence has been weakened in the south by
a succession movement there.
The arrival in Yemen of American-born media innovator Anwar al-
Awlaki amplified these changes. Through his on-line magazine Inspire
and various self-produced videos, al-Awlaki has become a significant
voice in English-medium discourse for al-Qaeda, filling an important
gap in the group's language channels. The extent of his operational
role is not entirely clear from the open sources, but it is plain that
he has participated in plotting international violence and recruiting,
and that he has both the intent and the capability to facilitate
significant violence.
The course of anti-government protests against Saleh and their
implications for Yemen's political future are unclear. Civil war
increasingly seems a possibility, although who will win the current
military confrontation between Saleh and some of his tribal opposition
is difficult to predict. It is all but certain, however, that Yemen's
weak central government will weaken further and that its recent
internal conflicts--a mostly sectarian uprising in the north, a
secession movement in the south--will accelerate and mix in with new
conflicts.
On May 29, news reports indicated that armed men had seized the
town of Zinjibar in the Abyan Governate; officials in the capital of
Sanaa claimed the rebels had ties to al-Qaeda. Such claims by a
besieged dictator whose legitimacy in Western eyes has derived from his
(partial) willingness to accommodate Western counterterrorism policy
should be taken with a shaker full of salt. Nonetheless, it is likely
that al-Qaeda and historically aligned Islamist groups will seek and
gain advantage in Yemen's coming turmoil. During the civil war 20 years
ago, they played a role in the fighting and, following victory, were
rewarded by Saleh's relatively accommodating policies. They will likely
seek a fighting role again.
Saleh's irrational resistance to proposals for his resignation, and
the violence his resistance has precipitated, has already weakened the
state that his successor will inherit. All of this will make
intelligence collection and the pursuit of pressure on AQAP through
collaboration with Yemeni security forces more difficult. So far as is
apparent in the open sources, the ability of the United States to
collect intelligence and act unilaterally against al-Qaeda in Yemen is
considerably more limited than in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The
collapse of the Yemeni political order, the fragmentation of its
security forces and the prospect of sustained internal conflict will
make this harder still. Full-on civil war or a series of concurrent,
intensifying internal conflicts may draw AQAP into local battles for a
time but it may also provide them more resources and freedom of
maneuver, particularly in southern Yemen, which faces pirate-infested
sea channels across from ungoverned and al-Qaeda-influenced Somalia.
In Pakistan, too, the current trend lines for American
counterterrorism policy look unfavorable. The discovery and killing of
Osama bin Laden in a walled compound in Abbottabad, not far from the
Pakistan Military Academy, has brought U.S.-Pakistani relations,
already troubled, to a low point, comparable at least in the levels of
mutual mistrust to the breach in relations in the early 1990s. This
deterioration of relations will have an impact on American intelligence
collection and paramilitary activity in Pakistan. For example, Pakistan
has demanded that the United States reduce the number of American
military, diplomatic, and administrative personnel in the country; one
of Pakistan's motivations is to reduce American intelligence collection
capabilities within the country, and to channel a greater share of
American intelligence activity through joint operations, where Pakistan
can maintain greater control.
The discovery of bin Laden in Abbottabad has raised questions about
how and why sections of Pakistan's Army and intelligence service, the
I.S.I., might provide haven to al-Qaeda. Many of the specific questions
about whom in Pakistan's security services knew what about bin Laden's
sanctuary may never be answered satisfactorily. But a few points can be
made with relatively high confidence.
First, in the Pakistani political economy, it is simply not
possible to build an expensive, heavily secured, walled compound in a
closely-policed town such as Abbottabad without collaboration from at
least some government officials. For example, Pakistan has one of the
lowest rates of tax participation in the world, even among countries of
its economic profile. The reason is that police, intelligence officers,
and other government officials routinely extort payments from wealthy
householders to protect them from tax raids. It seems likely that at
least some Pakistani officials were on the payroll of bin Laden's
compound for this reason. Whether they would have known that bin Laden
was living there, or where the money came from, is another matter. If
I.S.I. officers were among those extracting supplemental incomes from
the Abbottabad compound, as would seem possible, if not likely, they
may or may not have informed their superiors. I.S.I. is a large,
complex organization, a state within the Pakistani state; it is also an
organized economic or criminal enterprise with diverse, autonomous,
self-rewarding cells scattered throughout.
Second, the circumstances in which bin Laden was discovered were
not by themselves unusual. Listed terrorist leaders from anti-Indian
organizations such as Lashkar e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have lived
for years in similarly ambiguous walled compounds and apartment
buildings around Pakistan. The fugitive mastermind of the 1993 bombings
in Mumbai, the underworld figure Ibrahim Daoud, has reportedly lived
and prospered in Karachi for many years. Sometimes the circumstances of
these listed terrorists are described by the Pakistani government as
``house arrest;'' other times they are described as ``fugitives in
hiding.'' The ambiguity is deliberately constructed by I.S.I. and the
Pakistani state to maintain the greatest degree of flexibility at home
and in its long-running struggle against India. Afghan Taliban leaders
known to be living in exile in Pakistan presumably enjoy the same haven
policies. That bin Laden, too, found a place in this much larger system
is shocking to Americans because of the scale of murderous violence he
authored on September 11. In the local context, however, the
circumstances of his hiding place were not unusual among terrorists
sheltering in the country.
In Yemen, ``safe haven'' is largely a function of weak state
formation. In Pakistan, the state is weak but the sources of haven are
more varied and more directly tied to state policy. Fundamentally,
Pakistan provides safe haven for violent Islamist groups, including
listed terrorists such as al-Qaeda, for two reasons. First, the Army
and I.S.I. find some of these groups to be useful levers in regional
competition with India and Afghanistan. Second, having nurtured
Islamist groups for three decades (initially, during the anti-Soviet
war in Afghanistan, in collaboration with the United States), Pakistan
has been weakened by their virulence and revolutionary ambition, and
the state now lacks the capacity to wipe out the groups without paying
a very high price and incurring great risks; accommodation, therefore,
seems the wiser policy, even in the face of rising evidence that this
approach may not work.
american policy in pakistan
The United States has an obvious interest in Pakistan's success and
stability. The country possesses the world's fastest-growing nuclear
arsenal and is adopting defense policies that are likely to destabilize
its military balance with India in the years ahead. The Pakistani
Taliban, influenced and perhaps aided by al-Qaeda, has mounted an
insurgency aimed at overthrowing the country's military and civilian
leadership. The Pakistan Army has contained the insurgency at a high
price, but the level of violence and pressure the Taliban is producing
within Pakistan is very disturbing.
Ultimately, only a stable, economically growing, pluralistic
Pakistan with much stronger civilian leadership, healthier civil-
military relations, and a more sustainable defense policy can prevent
the country from remaining a terrorist haven. American attempts to
construct a policy that will aid the emergence of this Pakistan--a
``normal'' if chronically troubled country--have evidently failed to
date. Unfortunately, it may be beyond the capacity of the United States
to decisively influence the outlook of the Pakistan Army and the I.S.I.
about India and Pakistani National security, and it is the Army's
outlook on security matters, more than any other factor, that has
created the landscape in Pakistan we see today.
Over the long run, a more successful Pakistan will only emerge if
its military and civilian elites decide that it is in the country's
national interest to increase cooperation with India, particularly
cooperation that will lead to greater economic integration in South
Asia. Full peace is not necessary to produce the sort of incentive-
changing trade and internal growth that has altered similar patterns of
internal violence, terrorism, and failed civil-military relations
during the past two decades, to varying degrees, in countries such as
Indonesia, Colombia, the Philippines, and Turkey. India's high rates of
economic growth are proving to be transformative within that country;
to change, Pakistan needs greater access to that regional engine of
growth and middle class formation.
American policy toward Pakistan has long been imprisoned by
compelling but narrow security imperatives--the invasion of
Afghanistan, nuclear proliferation and the rise of al-Qaeda and related
groups, to name three--at the expense of sustained, highly prioritized
policy to pursue regional economic integration and broadly distributed
Pakistani economic growth. Only the latter policy offers the hope of a
Pakistan capable of delivering on its obligations and interests in the
international system.
In the mean time, once again, the United States' security interests
remains trapped by short-term security needs. These are, currently, not
only the problem of terrorism and safe havens, but also supply lines
that run through Pakistan to support more than 100,000 American troops
in Afghanistan. The need to reduce troop levels without empowering the
Taliban or touching off civil war, a project that will require some
degree of Pakistan's cooperation.
Another ``reset'' in American policy toward Pakistan is on the
horizon. In the security realm, what seems required is a clearer, more
manageable effort to identify and act on shared interests--against al-
Qaeda, and in the transition ahead in Afghanistan. Both countries will
benefit from a period of less hopeful, transformative ambition and more
clear-eyed focus on shared interests. At the same time, it would be
helpful for the United States to reset its medium-term and long-term
planning to construct a pragmatic vision to promote regional economic
integration and Pakistani growth.
the gao report
In their report, ``Combating Terrorism: U.S. Government Should
Improve Its Reporting on Terrorist Safe Havens,'' researchers at the
General Accounting Office raise a number of interesting question about
Congressionally-mandated reports on safe havens and terrorism more
generally. Although this is not my particular area of experience or
putative expertise, as an independent analyst who often makes use of
this Government reporting, I thought I would offer a modest idea about
how the reporting might be improved.
Annual reporting on terrorism by State serves a number of purposes.
It provides Congress with a sound, specific basis for oversight. It
informs the public. It also coerces governments and security services
that harbor or might consider harboring terrorists by calling attention
to their activity in an influential way.
It should be the ambition of the United States to produce credible
reporting about states that support terrorism that is as effective and
impactful as the reporting the State Department publishes annually
about human rights. The State Department's annual human rights reports
are credible and constructive. They provide a basis for substantial
media reporting in countries where abuses occur; they provide cover for
international civil society activists challenging local authoritarians
and dictators; and they coerce and influence governments that receive
unfavorable, embarrassing notice. In my judgment, State's human rights
reports pull the occasional punch but in comparison to other Government
reporting of this type they are generally honest, forthright, and
highly credible. Partly this is because civil society investigators at
groups such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International produce
their own highly credible investigations; this marketplace effect helps
keep State's work honest.
The GAO points out a number of ways in which State's reports on
safe havens and the counterterrorism policies of foreign governments
could be improved. In my reading of the reporting, one problem is the
extent to which the published assessments are compromised by the need
not to offend flawed foreign security and intelligence services on
which the United States depends for cooperation. In comparison to its
human rights reporting, that is, the United States' counterterrorism
reporting is less forthright and convincing.
One way to counter this problem would be to commission annual
analytic reports by independent experts--perhaps a standing commission,
perhaps a rotating panel. Just as American economic policy benefits
from the diverse views and debates generated by independent Federal
Reserve governors, so might American counterterrorism policy benefit
from assessments of safe havens, foreign government performance, and
U.S. policy from experts who have no bureaucratic or policy equities at
stake, and no operational need to shave the facts in order to get along
with a particular foreign government. Such work need not be expensive;
it would also have the benefits of aiding Congressional oversight,
informing the public, and putting pressure on under-performing
governments.
Thank you again for the opportunity to participate in this hearing.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Coll.
Now the Chairman recognizes Professor Hoffman.
STATEMENT OF BRUCE HOFFMAN, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR PEACE AND
SECURITY STUDIES, DIRECTOR, SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM,
GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Mr. Hoffman. Thank you Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member
Clarke, and Congressman Long for the opportunity to testify.
History has shown that al-Qaeda is nothing without a
physical sanctuary or safe haven. Indeed, this is why al-Qaeda
has invested so much of its energy in recent years to
strengthening the capabilities of its affiliated and associated
movements in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.
Al-Qaeda has thus created a networked transnational
movement in order to ensure its survival. Accordingly, rather
than the single, monolithic entity of a decade ago, today there
are several al-Qaedas, not just one, each of which has
different capabilities and presents different, often unique,
challenges.
This effectively negates a one-size-fits-all strategy on
our part. Indeed, countermeasures have to be tailored to the
specific conditions and realities in each of these places where
al-Qaeda and its franchises have taken root and indeed
flourished.
Al-Qaeda's strategy of survival in recent years has been
predicated on the expansion and consolidation of its safe
havens and sanctuaries in both South Asia and beyond. Its
greatest success, of course, has been in Pakistan, but
significant strides have been made in Yemen and Somalia as
well. Indeed, since 2004, every major terrorist attack or plot
against the United States or our European allies has emanated
from al-Qaeda or its affiliates and associates based in
Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia. The majority of these attacks and
plots have originated from Pakistan. Sizable numbers of Arabs,
Turks, Chechens, Chinese, and Uzbeks comprise an international
jihadi contingent based in Pakistan that, along with their
indigenous allies and hosts have planned local, regional, and
international terrorist operations on an ambitious scale.
Although fewer in number, the plots that have originated
from Yemen by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula have been no
less serious and, if anything, even more ambitious. Not
surprisingly, a succession of U.S. intelligence officials have
expressed concern at the rapidity with which AQAP has emerged
as a potent force in international terrorism, posing perhaps an
even greater threat to U.S. security than its parent body.
In al-Shabaab's case as well, American and European
intelligence officials have been alarmed by the global
ambitions and international radicalization and recruitment
capabilities of this relative new Somali militant organization.
All these incidents represent the fruition of al-Qaeda's
strategy to fight its enemies on multiple fronts and from
multiple bases. Accordingly, it conducts local campaigns of
subversion and destabilization in critical operational theatres
where failed or failing states provide new opportunities for
al-Qaeda to extend its reach and consolidate its presence.
Countries such as Pakistan, Somalia, and especially Yemen
figure prominently within this category.
Al-Qaeda also deliberately seeks to seek out citizens and
residents of enemy countries who can then be brought to these
sanctuaries and safe havens for training. Pakistan, Yemen, and
Somalia again figure prominently in this strategy.
Failing to deprive al-Qaeda and its affiliates and
associates of these safe havens and sanctuaries will almost
certainly give al-Qaeda new momentum and greater freedom of
action than an expanded geographical ambit facilitates. This
will require both continued U.S. military and intelligence
operations in South Asia, alongside a continual scanning of the
horizon to counter al-Qaeda's presence in and prevent its
expansion to other failed and failing states.
An effective strategy will combine the tactical elements of
systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities
alongside the equally critical, broader strategic imperative of
breaking the cycle of terrorist and insurgent recruitment and
replenishment that have respectively sustained al-Qaeda and
fueled its allies in Yemen and Somalia as well. Enhanced and
improved and better-coordinated information operations will be
a critical element of this approach. This will also entail the
building of host nation capabilities to a greater and more
sustained extent than currently exists.
In conclusion, it would be dangerously precipitous at this
time to declare a total victory. Al-Qaeda's hopes of renewal
and regeneration in the aftermath of bin Laden's killing rest
on its continued access to the geographical sanctuaries and
safe havens that the movement has always depended on and
historically has used as bases from which to plot and plan and
launch international terror strikes. Only by depriving al-Qaeda
of those sanctuaries, destroying the organization's leadership,
and disrupting the continued resonance of its message will al-
Qaeda finally be defeated.
Thank you very much.
[The statement of Bruce Hoffman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Bruce Hoffman*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
* Bruce Hoffman is Director of the Center for Peace and Security
Studies and Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown
University and a Senior Fellow at the U.S. Military Academy's Combating
Terrorism Center.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
June 3, 2011
History has shown that al-Qaeda is nothing without a physical
sanctuary or safe haven. Indeed, this is why al-Qaeda has invested so
much of its energy in recent years to strengthening the capabilities of
its affiliated and associated movements in Pakistan, Yemen, and
Somalia. Al-Qaeda has thus created a networked transnational movement
in order to ensure its survival. Accordingly, rather than the single,
monolithic, entity of a decade ago, today there are several al-Qaedas,
not just one: Each of which has different capabilities and presents
different, often unique, challenges. This effectively negates a ``one-
size-fits-all'' strategy. Instead, countermeasures have to be tailored
to the specific conditions and realities in each of these places where
al-Qaeda and its franchises have taken root and indeed have flourished.
the role of safe havens and sanctuaries in al-qaeda's strategy
Al-Qaeda's strategy of survival in recent years has been predicated
on the expansion and consolidation of its safe havens and sanctuaries
in both South Asia and beyond. It's greatest success has of course been
in Pakistan but significant strides have been made in Yemen and Somalia
as well. Indeed, since 2004 every major terrorist attack or plot
against the United States or our European allies has emanated from al-
Qaeda or its affiliates and associates based in Pakistan, Yemen, or
Somalia.
The majority of these attacks and plots have originated from
Pakistan. Arabs, Turks, Chinese, Uzbeks, and Chechens comprise an
international jihadi contingent based in Pakistan that, along with
their indigenous allies and hosts have planned local, regional, and
international terrorists operations on an ambitious scale. As Dame
Eliza Manningham-Buller, then-Director General of the British Security
Service (MI5), explained in a November 2006 speech, upwards of 30
terrorist plots and attacks in the United Kingdom alone had been
``linked back to al-Qaeda in Pakistan . . . through those links al-
Qaeda gives guidance and training to its largely British foot soldiers
here on an extensive and growing scale.''\1\ Among the 30 incidents she
referred were:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Quoted in BBC News, ``Extracts from MI5 Chief's Speech,''
November 10, 2006 accessed at http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/
pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hl/news/6135000.stm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The planned bombing of a London nightclub and a shopping
center in April 2004;
The 7 July 2005 suicide attacks on London transport that
killed 52 persons and wounded nearly a thousand others;
The abortive follow-on plot against the same target set in
London 2 weeks later; and
The attempt in August 2006 to bomb seven U.S. and Canadian
aircraft departing from London's Heathrow Airport.
More recently, the following additional plots and attacks emanating
from Pakistan, including several planned to occur in the United States
have been detected. They include:
The January 2008 plan to attack transportation targets in
Barcelona, Spain that in turn was linked to another plot by a
sister terrorist cell in Germany;
The abortive plan to bomb New York City's Pennsylvania
Station on Thanksgiving day 2008;
The plots uncovered to stage attacks in Manchester, England
in April 2009 and in New York City against its subway system in
September 2009;
The attempt to detonate an explosive-packed SUV in New York
City's Times Square; and,
The plan to attack transportation targets in Berlin, Germany
that was uncovered just days before bin Laden's killing on 2
May 2010.
Although fewer in number, the plots that have originated from Yemen
by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), have been no less serious
and, if anything, even more ambitious. Among them were:
The September 2009 attempted assassination of Prince
Mohammed bin Nayef in Saudi Arabia, the Deputy Interior
Minister responsible for counterterrorism in that country;
The Christmas day 2009 plot to explode a bomb aboard a
Northwest Airlines flight en route From Amsterdam to Detroit;
and,
The attempt to blow up American cargo planes uncovered in
September 2010 involving bombs disguised as photocopier printer
cartridges.
Not surprisingly, a succession of U.S. intelligence officials have
expressed concern at the rapidity with which AQAP has emerged as a
potent force in international terrorism posing perhaps an even greater
threat to U.S. security than its parent body.
And, from Somalia a January 2010 plot by members of the al-Qaeda
affiliate in that country, al-Shabaab (``The Youth'') to kill the
Danish cartoonist responsible for drawings of the Prophet Muhammad that
enraged the Muslim world. In al-Shabaab's case as well, American and
European intelligence officials have been alarmed by the global
ambitions, and international radicalization and recruitment
capabilities of this relatively new Somali militant organization.
al-qaeda's strategy of survival
All these incidents represent the fruition of al-Qaeda's strategy
to fight its enemies on multiple fronts and from multiple bases.
Accordingly, it conducts local campaigns of subversion and
destabilization in critical operational theatres where failed or
failing states provide new opportunities for al-Qaeda to extend its
reach and consolidate its presence. Countries such as Pakistan,
Somalia, and especially, Yemen prominently fall within this category.
Al-Qaeda accordingly provides guidance, assistance, and other help
to its local affiliates and associated terrorist movements. This
support often appreciably enhances attack capabilities and strengthens
the resilience of these groups thus presenting more formidable
challenges to national and local police, military forces, and
intelligence agencies. Al-Qaeda actively works behind the scenes to
``plus up'' the capabilities of indigenous terrorists both in terms of
kinetic as well as essential non-kinetic operations--including
information operations, propaganda, and psychological warfare.
Al-Qaeda's role in each of these theaters is thus critical. It
serves as a ``force multiplier'': providing training and advice and
otherwise building existing capacity among indigenous insurgent groups.
The standard basic insurgent training package of riflery and field
craft, for instance, is augmented by al-Qaeda instruction in advanced
ambush techniques and the use and emplacement of increasingly
sophisticated improvised explosive devices. Al-Qaeda additionally
provides overall strategic guidance and assists in the coordination of
operations between a variety of terrorist and insurgent groups. It
imparts useful non-combat skills as well: Teaching local jihadis how to
plan and execute psychological and information operations, make use of
the internet for radicalization and recruitment purposes, and generally
improve and strengthen operational expertise and organizational
resiliency.
Al-Qaeda also deliberately seeks out citizens and residents of
enemy countries, who can then be brought to these sanctuaries and safe
havens for training. Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia have figured
prominently in this strategy.
For example, members of each of the British terrorist cells
involved in the aforementioned plots and attacks in the United Kingdom
between 2004 and 2006 were trained at the same al-Qaeda camp in
Pakistan's Malakand Agency.
Like these British plotters, Najibullah Zazi, the Afghan-born,
Green Card holder who lived in Queens, New York, and ring-leader of the
2009 plot to stage suicide attacks against the New York City subway,
was also instructed in the fabrication of powerful homemade explosives
using ordinary commercial ingredients like hair bleach (hydrogen
peroxide) and acetone at an al-Qaeda facility in Pakistan.
Zazi and his two fellow conspirators told FBI agents, that they had
been trained in bomb making at an al-Qaeda camp in Pakistan. Senior al-
Qaeda commanders had overseen and directed the operation, which was
linked to another set of attacks planned from Pakistan to occur in
Manchester, England in April 2009. The superseding indictment of Zazi
and the two other men filed by the U.S. Department of Justice on 7 July
2010 unambiguously describes how this ``American-based al-Qaeda cell''
was commanded by ``leaders of al-Qaeda's external operations program
[based in Pakistan who were] dedicated to terrorist attacks in the
United States and other Western countries.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ United States District Court Eastern District of New York,
United States of America v. Adis Medunjanin, Abid Nasser, Adnan El
Shukrijumah, Tariq Ur Rehman, and FNU LNU, 7 July 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Umer Farouk Abdulmuttalab, the would-be Christmas day 2009 airline
bomber, for example, was trained and prepared for his operation in
Yemen by AQAP. It is believed that the group may have been responsible
for recruiting, training, and deploying at least 7 other bombers--and,
according to some reports, as many as 20--from Europe and the United
States.
According to Western intelligence sources, as of 2010, al-Qaeda has
been able to train and deploy back to their home or adopted countries
some 100 and 150 persons from Europe and the United States, among other
locales.
Finally, lest there be any remaining doubts about the importance of
physical safe haven and training facilities to terrorist organizations
in general and those within al-Qaeda's orbit in particular, the case of
the nearly 30 young Somali-Americans who left the United States between
2007 and 2008 to train in terrorism and guerrilla warfare in Somalia
provides a salutary remainder.
The youths were radicalized and recruited in the United States and
trained in Somalia by al-Shabaab, the local al-Qaeda ally that
deliberately emulates its mentor organization--down to its reliance on
training camps and use of the internet for propaganda purposes.
Indeed, it is believed that their trainer in Somalia was Saleh Ali
Nabhan, the longtime al-Qaeda commander implicated in both the 1998
bombing of the American embassy in Nairobi and the 2002 attack on
Israeli tourists at a hotel in Mombassa, who was reportedly killed in
September 2009 by U.S. special operations forces in Somalia. Two of
these youths have become the first-known Americans to have carried out
suicide terrorist attacks.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Spencer S. Hsu, ``Concern Grows Over Recruitment of Somali
Americans by Islamists,'' Washington Post, 4 October 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Annual Report 2008\4\ of the Netherlands' General Intelligence
and Security Service (Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst, or
AIVD), had specifically called attention to the growing threat then
posed by al-Qaeda and its allies because of the sanctuary they had
established in Pakistan and elsewhere. The AIVD, it should be noted, is
among the most professional and prescient of the world's intelligence
and security agencies. Though far smaller than many of its Western
counterparts,\5\ the AIVD is an elite and perspicacious service that is
impressive for its early identification and incisive analysis of
emerging trends.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ General Intelligence and Security Service, Annual Report 2008
(The Hague: Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2009). The
report can be accessed at: http://www.fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/
aivd-2008.pdf.
\5\ The AIVD reportedly employs some 1,100 people. See DutchNews LG
accessed at: http://www.dutchnews.nl/dictionary/2006/11/aivd.php.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
``Al Qaeda's ability to commit and direct terrorist attacks has
increased in recent years,'' the report, which was released in April
2009, unequivocally states. ``The AIVD received a growing number of
indications that individuals from Europe are receiving military
training at camps in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region.''\6\
Further elucidating this key point, the report goes on to explain how
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ General Intelligence and Security Service, Annual Report 2008,
p. 17.
``An analysis conducted in 2008 by the AIVD and verified by fellow
services indicates that core Al Qaeda's ability to carry out terrorist
attacks has increased in recent years. To a great extent, this is
explained by the many alliances Al Qaeda has forged with other networks
and groups, both in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region itself and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
elsewhere in the Islamic world . . .
``One development of particular concern is the growing evidence that
people from Europe are undergoing military training at camps in the
border region.''\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Ibid., p. 19.
The report's conclusion was as disquieting as it was sobering:
``This could increase the ability of (core) al-Qaeda and its allies to
commit or direct attacks in Europe.''\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Ibid., p. 17.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Earlier in 2008, Spanish authorities had uncovered a terrorist cell
in Barcelona, that was planning terrorist attacks against
transportation targets in that city. It was directed by the late
Pakistani Taliban leader Beituallah Meshud (who was killed in a
predator airstrike in 2009). In addition, terrorist cells of other
Pakistanis in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany, among other places
that were subsequently uncovered had similar plans and were also
directed by Meshud's Taliban faction from Pakistan. Further, the German
terrorists who in September 2008 were arrested and charged with
plotting to bomb U.S. military targets in that country had also been
trained in Pakistan at a camp run by the IJU (Union of Islamic Jihad),
an Uzbek jihadi group closely allied to al-Qaeda.
sanctuaries and safe havens matter to al-qaeda
Despite the evidence to the contrary, the centrality of sanctuaries
and safe havens to al-Qaeda and its allies and affiliates is often
dismissed or discounted. This willful ignoring of recent history may be
found in arguments claiming that al-Qaeda ``requires apartments and not
acres''\9\ and therefore that the risk of al-Qaeda sanctuaries in
failed or failing states is distorted and over-blown. It has been most
cogently articulated by Paul R. Pillar, a former senior CIA officer,
who maintains that planning for the 9/11 attacks did not take place in
Afghanistan but in ``apartments in Germany, hotel rooms in Spain and
flight schools in the United States.''\10\ Harvard University professor
Stephen M. Walt made the same point on his Foreign Policy.com blog in
2008 arguing that, ``The 9/11 plot was organized out of Hamburg, not
Kabul or Kandahar, but nobody is proposing that we send troops to
Germany to make sure there aren't `safe havens' operating there.''\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Dr. Austin Long of Columbia University coined this phrase in an
exchange on the foreign policy list-serve managed by Professor Robert
Art, 8 September 2009.
\10\ Paul R. Pillar, ``Who's Afraid of A Terrorist Haven?''
Washington Post, 16 September 2009.
\11\ Stephen M. Walt, ``The `safe haven' myth,'' Foreign
Policy.com, 18 August 2009 accessed at: http://walt.foreignpolicy.com/
posts/2009/08/18/the_safe_haven_myth.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, while it is true that follow-on, tactical planning did
indeed occur in those places; according to the authoritative 9/11
Commission Report,\12\ among other sources, the location and strategic
genesis of the 9/11 attacks, however, indisputably came from al-Qaeda's
physical sanctuary in Afghanistan. In late 1998/early 1999, for
instance, the operation's mastermind, Khaled Sheik Mohammed (KSM),
moved to Afghanistan at bin Laden's invitation precisely for this
purpose.\13\ KSM had admittedly been mulling over such an operation
ever since his nephew, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, had returned to Pakistan
following the 1993 Trade Center bombing--but the concrete steps towards
the plot's execution did not take shape until KSM accepted bin Laden's
invitation.\14\ Bin Laden subsequently took the idea forward in
discussions with his military chief, Mohammed Atef, and KSM at al-
Qaeda's al Matar complex near Kandahar in the spring of 1999.\15\ An
``elite'' training course was then organized for the four operatives
originally selected to pilot the hijacked aircraft at al-Qaeda's Mes
Aynak camp--also in Afghanistan.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States, The
9/11 Commission Report: Authorized Edition (New York & London, W.W.
Norton & Company, 2004).
\13\ Ibid., pp. 149-150.
\14\ Ibid., p. 153.
\15\ Ibid., p. 155.
\16\ Ibid., pp. 156-159.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It was only later, towards the end of 1999, that Mohammed Atta and
the three other Hamburg operatives entered the picture when they came
to Afghanistan to undergo training at al-Qaeda camps pursuant to
fulfilling their desire to fight (and die) in Chechnya. It was at these
al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan that they were then recruited for the 9/
11 operation.\17\ KSM confirmed all this when he was interviewed by
Pakistani journalist Yosri Fouda in 2002.\18\ And bin Ladin himself, in
the famous ``Kandahar Tape,'' captured by U.S. forces in that city in
November 2001 that was broadcast the following month, detailed his own
intimate involvement in the planning of the 9/11 attacks--from exactly
where he was sitting in Khandahar.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Ibid., pp. 160-166.
\18\ Yosri Fouda and Nick Fielding, Masterminds of Terror: The
Truth Behind the Most Devastating Terrorist Attack Ever Seen (NY:
Arcade, 2003), pp. 123-128.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additional al-Qaeda operations also were planned in Afghanistan.
The 1999 ``Millennium Bomber,'' Ahmad Ressam, was trained by KSM at al-
Qaeda's al Farouk facility in Afghanistan.\19\ And, the 2003 Istanbul
suicide bombings were originally conceived at al-Qaeda's camp outside
of Kandahar immediately following the 9/11 attacks.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon
the United States, The
9/11 Commission Report, pp. 177, 261 & fn. 5, p. 500.
\20\ Karl Vick, ``Al Qaeda's Hand In Istanbul Plot: Turks Met With
Bin Laden,'' Washington Post, 13 February 2007, accessed at http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/
AR2007021201715_pf.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
conclusion
To sum up, al-Qaeda's sanctuaries in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia
largely account for the movement's survival. These three safe havens
figure prominently in the threat that al-Qaeda continues to present to
the United States and the West but also to stability and security of
each of those countries today. Failing to deprive al-Qaeda and its
affiliates and associates of these safe havens and sanctuaries will
almost certainly give al-Qaeda new momentum and the greater freedom of
action that an expanded geographical ambit facilitates. Accordingly
sanctuary--and in the form of something larger than an apartment's
confines and in the kind of permissive environment that the border
straddling Afghanistan and Pakistan and parts of Yemen and Somalia
afford--appears to be extremely important to, and highly valued by, al-
Qaeda and its allies.
Al-Qaeda has been compared to the archetypal shark in the water
that must keep moving forward--no matter how slowly or incrementally--
or die. Whether al-Qaeda can in fact do so--and thereby prove that it
can survive following its founder and leader's killing last month--is
surely the most pressing question of the moment.
In these circumstances, the United States must remain vigilant and
avoid complacency and the temptation to lower our guard. Al-Qaeda has
always regarded this as a generational struggle that goes beyond the
purview or interests of any one individual. The loss of Osama bin Laden
will not affect that calculus.
Accordingly, the United States should continue to kill and capture
al-Qaeda leaders and operatives as it has so effectively done,
especially during the past 3 years of stepped-up aerial drone attacks.
At the same time, the United States must also continue to deprive al-
Qaeda and its leaders of the sanctuaries and safe havens that it
depends on.
Thus, the highest priority for the United States must be to
concentrate our attention on al-Qaeda as a networked global
phenomenon--not as in the past as one enemy, in one place, at one time.
Today, there are several al-Qaedas in a variety of places, each with
different capabilities. This will require both continued U.S. military
and intelligence operations in South Asia alongside a continual
scanning of the horizon to counter al-Qaeda's presence in, and prevent
its expansion to, failing and failed states.
At the foundation of the type of dynamic and adaptive strategy
needed to defeat terrorists and insurgents alike in these variegated
locales is the ineluctable axiom that successfully countering these
threats is not exclusively a military endeavor but also involves
fundamental parallel political, social, economic, and ideological
activities.
The predominantly tactical ``kill or capture'' approach and metric
encapsulated by the targeted assassination-focused drone program is too
narrow and does not sufficiently address the complexities of these
unique operational environments. The adversaries and the threats that
the United States faces today in Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and elsewhere
are much more elusive and complicated to be vanquished by mere
decapitation. What is required to ensure success is a more integrated
approach to a threat that is at once operationally durable,
evolutionary, and elusive in character.
An effective strategy will thus combine the tactical elements of
systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities alongside
the equally critical, broader strategic imperative of breaking the
cycle of terrorist and insurgent recruitment and replenishment that
have respectively sustained al-Qaeda and fueled and its allies in Yemen
and Somalia as well.\21\ Enhanced, improved and better-coordinated
information operations will be a critical element of this approach.\22\
These also will entail the building of host-nation capabilities to a
greater and more sustained extent than currently exists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Secretary Gates made exactly this point in his September 2008
speech at the National Defense University. ``In the long-term effort
against terrorist networks and other extremists, we know that direct
military force will continue to have a role. But we also understand
that over the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory.
Where possible, kinetic operations should be subordinate to measures to
promote better governance, economic programs to spur development, and
efforts to address the grievances among the discontented from which the
terrorists recruit.'' See U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Speech: National
Defense University (Washington, DC), As Delivered by Secretary of
Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, DC, Monday, September 29, 2008
accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/utility/
printitem.aspx?print=http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/
speech.aspx?speechid=1279.
\22\ Secretary Gates was explicit on this point as well. ``Retired
Marine Colonel T.X. Hammes has noted that where past insurgencies
consisted of military campaigns supported by information operations,
they now often consist of strategic communications campaigns supported
by military operations. In Iraq and Afghanistan, extremists have made
deft use of the internet and propaganda to misinform and intimidate
local populations. See Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In conclusion, it would be dangerously precipitous at this time to
declare total victory. Al-Qaeda's hopes of renewal and re-generation in
the aftermath of bin Laden's killing rest on its continued access to
the geographical sanctuaries and safe havens that the movement has
always depended on and historically have used as bases from which to
plot and plan and launch international terrorist strikes. Only by
depriving al-Qaeda of those sanctuaries, destroying the organization's
leadership, and disrupting the continued resonance of its message will
al-Qaeda finally be defeated.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
The Chairman now recognizes Professor Byman for his
statement.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL L. BYMAN, SECURITY STUDIES PROGRAM, SCHOOL
OF FOREIGN SERVICE AT GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY, AND SENIOR FELLOW,
SABAN CENTER FOR MIDDLE EAST POLICY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Mr. Byman. Thank you.
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Clarke, Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to present my
views today. Let me briefly summarize some of the points in my
written testimony.
As I think we all agree on this panel, the al-Qaeda core
has an active operational as well as strategic role and has
helped inspire and direct jihadists around the globe. The core
has recovered from its low point in 2002 and now has a base in
Pakistan from which it can plan and train. Maintaining pressure
on the core is vital to keep it off-balance.
Core operators also try to attract and direct the
attentions and the actions of affiliate groups. These
affiliated groups pose a range of dangers to the United States.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which is based in Yemen, is
increasingly important, given its record of near successes
against the United States.
The Shabaab in Somalia is another concern, given the
radicalization of small numbers of Somali Americans.
Affiliate groups, however, have different relations with
the core and often do not fully embrace its objectives.
The death of bin Laden is a serious blow to al-Qaeda. It is
a blow to its image of strength. Bin Laden was a charismatic
and capable leader, and in-fighting may occur now. In addition,
recruitment and fund-raising may suffer. These problems in turn
may make al-Qaeda less able to influence affiliate groups. The
core, however, is likely to survive, even if it is less
capable. It will be eager to conduct attacks to prove its
relevance.
The drone campaign is extremely important for striking the
al-Qaeda core. The United States has few alternatives to acting
in remote parts of Pakistan. Al-Qaeda has a finite number of
skilled leaders, and their loss is a tremendous blow to it. The
drone attacks also force the organization to communicate less,
forces leaders to reduce the number of associates, and these
leaders must also spend much of their time in hiding. This is
difficult for any organization, but it is especially difficult
for an organization that is having to deal with a major
leadership transition.
The Arab Spring also requires fundamental changes in U.S.
counterterrorism policy. The change sweeping the Arab world
undermines the al-Qaeda message, but, at the same time, it
offers terrorists far more operational freedom. The United
States must exploit the threat to al-Qaeda's message and
encourage a smooth transition to democracy in countries like
Egypt and Tunisia, while continuing counterterrorism
partnerships and building new ones.
In addition to aggressive efforts abroad, U.S. officials
must consider how American foreign policy can lead to domestic
radicalization. The case of the radicalization of Somalia
Americans is instructive, as a relatively minor
counterterrorism operation overseas helped create a potentially
dangerous problem at home. Also at home, the FBI and State
officials should redouble their efforts to know Muslim
communities and to gain their trust.
In the end, however, it is difficult to separate over there
from here. U.S. intelligence and Homeland Defense should focus
particular attention on seam areas where the United States is
attackable outside of U.S. soil, such as on airplanes
transiting from airports overseas to airports in the United
States.
I thank you for this opportunity to testify, and I would
welcome your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Byman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daniel L. Byman
June 3, 2011
Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, Members of the
subcommittee and subcommittee staff, thank you for this opportunity to
present my views before you today.
The death of bin Ladin poses a major setback for al-Qaeda.
Nevertheless, the al-Qaeda core remains a danger to the United States,
as do al-Qaeda affiliates. These organizations are capable of mounting
attacks against the U.S. homeland in the years to come, and the danger
they pose to U.S. allies in Europe and in the Muslim world is even
greater. However, al-Qaeda and its allies suffer from many weaknesses,
are fractious in the best of times, and in general are under
considerable strain.
I would urge this subcommittee to consider several recommendations
as it strives to improve U.S. homeland security. Fighting the al-Qaeda
core in Pakistan should remain at the center of U.S. counterterrorism
policy, even after bin Ladin's death. With the death of bin Ladin there
is an additional opportunity to weaken al-Qaeda's relationship with
affiliate groups, one of the core's most important sources of strength.
The aggressive U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan has played an important
role in weakening al-Qaeda and should be continued. The drone campaign
will not end the al-Qaeda presence in Pakistan, but it does keep the
organization on the run and reduces its operational effectiveness.
The ``Arab Spring'' also requires fundamental changes in U.S.
counterterrorism policy. The change sweeping the Arab world undermines
al-Qaeda's message but, at the same time, offers terrorists more
operational freedom. The United States must exploit the threat to al-
Qaeda's message and encourage a smooth transition to democracy while
continuing counterterrorism partnerships and building new ones.
In addition to aggressive efforts abroad, U.S. officials must
consider how American foreign policy can lead to domestic
radicalization and ensure that U.S. policy does not unnecessarily
alienate key domestic constituencies. At home the FBI and State
officials should redouble efforts to know local Muslim communities and
gain their trust.
In the end, however, it is difficult to separate ``over there''
from ``here.'' U.S. intelligence and homeland defense should focus on
``seam'' areas--where the United States is attackable outside of U.S.
soil, such as on airplanes transiting from airports overseas to
airports in the United States.
My testimony will address several issues: 1. The danger from the
al-Qaeda core in Pakistan after the death of bin Ladin; 2. The
importance of the drone campaign; 3. The role of al-Qaeda-linked
affiliate groups; 4. The nature of the threat to the U.S. homeland; 5.
The impact of the ``Arab Spring'' on counterterrorism; and 6. Policy
recommendations for increasing the security of the U.S. homeland.
i. the state of the al-qaeda core
Despite claims that the al-Qaeda core became largely irrelevant
after 9/11, in reality it remained active in proselytizing, plotting
anti-Western terrorist attacks, and supporting insurgencies in the
Muslim world.\1\ The al-Qaeda core revived after the collapse of the
Taliban in 2001 and its loss of a haven in Afghanistan. Over time, the
group became more entrenched in parts of Pakistan. While Islamabad had
made fitful efforts to uproot it, some of the jihadist groups that the
regime nurtured and tolerated to fight India and advance Pakistani
interests in Afghanistan have turned against the regime. Al-Qaeda now
has close ties to Laskkar-e Janghvi, Jaish-e Mohammed, and other groups
that have tens of thousands of supporters in Pakistan, and its reach is
considerable in non-tribal parts of the country.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For a leading proponent of the view that al-Qaeda was weak and
decentralized, see Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in
the 21st Century (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2008). However, several official U.S. and U.K. government statements
and documents support the assessment that the al-Qaeda core remains
active. National Intelligence Council, ``National Intelligence
Estimate: The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland,'' unclassified key
judgments (July 2007), p. 1; Dennis C. Blair, ``Annual Threat
Assessment of the Intelligence Community for the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence,'' February 12, 2009, pp. 5-6; ``Speech by
the Director General of the Security Service,'' Queen Mary's College,
London, November 9, 2006; and Jonathan Evans, ``Intelligence, Counter
Terrorism and Trust,'' November 5, 2007. Available at: www.mi5.gov.uk.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In this sanctuary al-Qaeda has planned, recruited, issued
propaganda, and trained the next round of attackers. Al-Qaeda played a
major role in the 2005 attacks on the transportation system in
London.\2\ Writing in 2008, terrorism expert Peter Bergen describes the
bombings as ``a classic al-Qaeda plot.''\3\ Al-Qaeda appears to have
organized, coordinated, or otherwise played a major role in foiled 2004
attacks in the United Kingdom on a nightclub or a shopping mall; plans
to bomb economic targets in several American cities; and the 2006 plan
to simultaneously blow up perhaps ten airplanes as they went from the
United Kingdom to the United States.\4\ Press reporting indicates that
operatives with links to Pakistan played a role in the spring 2009
Manchester plot that British security services disrupted--all those
alleged to be involved were of Pakistani origin.\5\ Terrorism expert
Bruce Hoffman found that al-Qaeda was actively involved in virtually
all major terrorist plots in the United Kingdom since 2003.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See ``Were They Directed from Abroad?'' Honourable House of
Commons, Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on
the July 2005 (London: The Stationary Office, May 2006), pp. 20-21;
Robert Winnett and David Leppard, ``Leaked No 10 Dossier Reveals Al-
Qaeda's British Recruits,'' Sunday Times, July 10, 2005 available at:
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article542420.ece; Bruce
Riedel, The Search for Al Qaeda (Brookings, 2008); Bruce Hoffman,
``Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations Command Posed by the
Global Terrorist Threat: Al Qaeda on the Run or on the March?'' written
testimony submitted to the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Armed Services Subcommittee on Terrorism, Unconventional Threats, and
Capabilities, February 14, 2007,'' pp. 11-13; Bruce Hoffman,
``Radicalization and Subversion: Al Qaeda and the 7 July 2005 Bombings
and the 2006 Airline Bombing Plot,'' Studies in Conflict and Terrorism,
32 (2009), p. 1102; and Bruce Hoffman, ``The 7 July 2005 Bombings,''
unpublished paper.
\3\ Peter Bergen, ``Al Qaeda, the Organization: A Five Year
Forecast,'' Annals of the American Association of Political Science
(July 2008), p. 15.
\4\ Hoffman, ``Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations
Command,'' pp. 11, 13-14; Richard Greenberg, Paul Cruickshank, and
Chris Hansen, ``Inside the Terror Plot that `Rivaled 9/11,' ''
MSNBC.com, September 16, 2008.
\5\ Sarah Laville, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Vikram Dodd,
``Student visa link to terror raids as Gordon Brown points finger at
Pakistan,'' Guardian, available at: http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/
apr/10/student-visa-terror-arrests-link; House of Commons,
``Examination of Witnesses,'' statement of James Fergusson, available
at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmfaff/
302/9042103.htm.
\6\ Hoffman, ``Challenges for the U.S. Special Operations
Command,'' p. 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Outside of the United Kingdom, German government officials claimed
that they disrupted a plot to attack U.S. and German targets in Germany
in 2007 involving three men, none of whom were of Pakistani origin, who
trained at camps in Pakistan.\7\ The Danish government also reported a
disrupted plot linked to Pakistan in 2007. France and Italy have also
reported al-Qaeda-linked plots.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Craig Whitlock, ``Germany Says It Foiled Bomb Plot,''
Washington Post, September 6, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Qaeda has carried out numerous terrorist attacks in Pakistan
today, working both on its own and with various Pakistani groups. It
tried to kill former President Pervez Musharraf several times and
probably was responsible for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in
2007.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Riedel, The Search for Al-Qaeda, p. 125.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Qaeda's own thinkers stress the importance of maintaining a
haven and seem to have little faith in decentralized, bottom-up
efforts. Al-Qaeda itself was consciously constituted as a vanguard. Bin
Ladin's deputy and heir-apparent, Ayman al-Zawahiri contended even as
his movement was being expelled from Afghanistan that, ``the mujahid
[fighter for the faith] Islamic movement will not triumph against the
world coalition unless it possesses a Islamist base in the heart of the
Islamic world.''\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Zawahiri, Knights under the Prophet's Banner. Serialized in Al-
Sharq al Awsat (London) 2-10 December 2001, trans. Foreign Broadcast
Information Service, document FBIS-NES-2001-1202, maintained on-line by
the Federation of American Scientists, http://fas.org/irp/world/para/
aymanh_bk.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The al-Qaeda core issues propaganda to radicalize Muslims and helps
recruit potential terrorists, trains them, and offers guidance for
specific attacks. As a result, local individuals become far more
dangerous when they are able to interact with al-Qaeda core members.
Impact of the Death of bin Ladin
Bin Ladin's death is a significant blow to al-Qaeda. Bin Ladin,
Hoffman notes, ``played an active role at every level of al-Qaeda
operations: from planning to targeting and from networking to
propaganda. ``\10\ Beyond his operational role, his survival was a form
of successful defiance. The world's biggest military and most powerful
country made him public enemy No. 1 for almost 10 years and failed to
find him. To bin Ladin's supporters, only God's protection explained
this mystery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Bruce Hoffman, ``The Leaderless Jihad's Leader,'' Foreign
Affairs, May 13, 2011, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67851/
bruce-hoffman/the-leaderless-jihads-leader.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because of the successful U.S. attack, the aura of divine
protection has diminished not only for bin Ladin, but by association
his cause. A new leader like Zawahiri is an effective operator but has
far less starpower than bin Ladin and is unlikely to inspire Muslims as
effectively. More prosaically, but no less importantly, al-Qaeda will
find it hard to recruit and fundraise without bin Ladin to lead their
cause.
Within the jihadist movement, bin Ladin often pushed back against
the tendency toward slaughter that manifested in Iraq and Algeria. In
such countries, so-called ``taqfiris'' (who saw other Muslims who did
not adhere to their extreme views as apostates) made war on their own
societies, killing other Muslims and often making civil strife a
priority over striking U.S. or regime targets. Bin Ladin counseled
against this tendency and tried to put his resources behind leaders who
embraced his agenda rather than killed their co-religionists on a mass
scale.
In short, bin Ladin was both a symbol of the movement and an
effective strategic and operational leader. It would be glib to assume
his death means the movement is finished. At the same time, however,
the organization has suffered a tremendous blow.
ii. the importance of the drone campaign
The U.S. drone campaign against al-Qaeda, begun under Bush and put
on steroids under Obama, has taken out dozens of al-Qaeda figures,
primarily in Pakistan. In 2010, the United States launched over 100
drone attacks in Pakistan, according to the New America Foundation.\11\
Those killed were far less prominent than bin Ladin, but in many cases
their skills were in short supply and difficult to replace. Al-Qaeda
struggles to find seasoned and skilled new leaders, and even when it
can it takes time to integrate them into the organization. Even more
important, but even harder to see, al-Qaeda lieutenants must limit
communications to stop U.S. eavesdropping that could lead to
airstrikes, reduce their circle of associates to avoid spies, and avoid
public exposure, all of which make them far less effective as leaders.
This makes it harder, though not impossible, for them to pull off
sophisticated attacks that require long-term planning.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ See data compiled by Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann,
``The Year of the Drone'' at http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/
drones.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Although innocent civilians do die in these attacks, the number of
non-combatant deaths is often exaggerated and has been declining.
According to Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, ``According to our
estimates, the nonmilitant fatality rate since 2004 is approximately 25
percent, and in 2010, the figure has been more like 6 percent--an
improvement that is likely the result of increased numbers of U.S.
spies in Pakistan's tribal areas, better targeting, more intelligence
cooperation with the Pakistani military, and smaller missiles.''\12\
Such innocent deaths are still considerable, and errant strikes have
the potential to worsen U.S.-Pakistan relations, but drone strikes are
often far less bloody than alternatives such as Pakistani military
attacks or U.S. attacks by manned fixed-wing aircraft. In addition,
drone strikes involve no risk of U.S. personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, ``There Were More Drone
Strikes--And Far Fewer Civilians Killed,'' Foreign Policy, December 22,
2010, available at: http://newamerica.net/node/41927.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Killing terrorist group lieutenants on a large scale can devastate
a group. There may still be thousands of people who hate the United
States and want to take up arms, but without bomb-makers, passport-
forgers, and leaders to direct their actions they are often reduced to
menacing bumblers, easier to disrupt and often more a danger to
themselves than to their enemies.
iii. al-qaeda affiliates
Because of the blows the al-Qaeda core has suffered, attention is
increasingly focused on al-Qaeda affiliates. The most notable of these
affiliates include al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), al-Qaeda
of Iraq (AQI), al-Qaeda of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al-Shabaab
in Somalia. Al-Qaeda also has ties to a range of other salafi-jihadist
groups, at times working with them against U.S. or allied interests and
in other cases simply supporting the local groups' struggles against
various regimes.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ AQIM remains focused on the greater Maghreb area, but it is
more anti-Western in its operations than in the past. On the road to
becoming AQIM the GPSC expanded its primary focus to include France as
well as the Algerian regime. The group also began to strike U.N. and
Israeli targets and go after Algeria's energy infrastructure, none of
which were a priority in the past. Suicide bombings, hitherto one of
the few horrors the GSPC did not inflict, grew more frequent, along
with Iraq-style car bombs. In addition, with the NATO intervention in
Libya AQIM should be a concern to Western officials. In Pakistan, where
al-Qaeda's influence has spread since 9/11, there were two suicide
attacks in 2002; by 2010 there were over 50, which killed over 1,000
people. Al-Qaeda allies in Pakistan attack both the Pakistani state and
support anti-U.S. forces in Afghanistan. And AQI, of course, attacks
U.S. forces in Iraq. See Lianne Kennedy Boudali, ``The GSCP: Newest
Franchise in Al-Qa'ida's Global Jihad,'' April 2, 2007, available at:
http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-gspc-newest-franchise-in-al-qaidas-
global-jihad; ``2010 bloodiest year in Pakistan since 2001,'' The
Economic Times Online, December 24, 2010, available at http://
articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-12-24/news/
27599872_1_suicide-khyber-pakhtunkhwa-province-personnel.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Yemen-based AQAP began to receive far more attention from U.S.
homeland security officials after the 2009 Christmas day bombing plot,
in which a Nigerian recruit almost blew up a passenger airplane landing
in Detroit. Al-Qaeda has long had operatives and associates in Yemen,
but for most of the last decade they focused on targets in Yemen or in
the region. The Yemeni regime effectively crushed the threat after 9/
11, but a 2006 jailbreak and a lapse in U.S. and Yemeni attention
reinvigorated the jihadists.\14\ At the same time the Saudi government
successfully suppressed what had briefly seemed to be a serious
jihadist threat to the regime, and many Saudi fighters fled to Yemen.
In 2009 the Saudi and Yemeni branches claimed to merge under the AQAP
banner and took a more global focus, attacking not just Yemeni and
Western targets in the region but also conducting international
terrorism such as the Christmas bombing plot and the October 2010 plan
to blow up two cargo planes as they neared U.S. cities.\15\ Some U.S.
officials claim that AQAP is more dangerous than al-Qaeda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ See in particular ``Testimony of Gregory D. Johnsen,'' before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 20, 2010.
\15\ For an overview of this danger, see Christopher Boucek,
``Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland--Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP),'' Testimony before the House Committee on Homeland
Security Subcommittee on Counterterrorism and Intelligence, March 2,
2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It is difficult to come to firm conclusions about how to view al-
Qaeda affiliates.\16\ There is no single way to join al-Qaeda, nor is
it always clear when a group should be viewed as under the al-Qaeda
core's control. Al-Qaeda does not demand sole allegiance: it supports
local struggles even as it pursues its own war against the United
States and its allies. So group members can be part of al-Qaeda's ranks
and loyal fighters in their local organizations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ For an excellent recent review of how al-Qaeda views
affiliation, see Barak Mendelsohn, ``Al-Qaeda's Franchising Strategy,''
Survival (Summer 2011), http://www.iiss.org/publications/survival/
survival-2011/year-2011-issue-3/al-qaedas-franchising-strategy/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Groups often straddle their old and new identities, trying to keep
up their local activities while also attacking more global targets.
Often this is a time of infighting within a group, with key leaders
pulling in different directions. Somalia's al-Shabaab, for instance,
appears to be in such a phase today.\17\ Some parts of the organization
cooperate with al-Qaeda, with foreign jihadis playing leading roles in
tactics and operations. But others within the movement--probably the
majority, in fact--oppose the control of the foreigners, with some even
publicly condemning terrorism and even working with international
humanitarian relief efforts. Al-Shabaab could become ``al-Qaeda of the
Horn of Africa,'' but this is not yet a done deal. And if it happens,
it could split the group.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ International Crisis Group, ``Somalia's Divided Islamists,''
May 18, 2010.
\18\ See Bronwyn Burton, ``In the Quicksands of Somalia,'' Foreign
Affairs (November/December 2009), available at http://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/65462/bronwyn-bruton/in-the-quicksands-
of-somalia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Benefits and Risks of Affiliation
Al-Qaeda seeks not only to change the Islamic world, but also to
shift the orientation of jihad from the local to the global--and here
affiliates play a crucial role. Historically, most jihadist resistance
movements have focused on their own territory or on throwing out
foreign troops, but bin Ladin successfully convinced groups that
striking the United States and its allies is more important to this
victory than fighting more proximate enemies.
For the al-Qaeda core, affiliates provide hundreds or even
thousands of fighters, donors, smuggling networks, and sympathetic
preachers who offer religious legitimacy. For example, when al-Qaeda
needed to get its fighters out of Afghanistan after the fall of the
Taliban, they relied on the logistical assistance of Sunni radicals in
Pakistan; the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group helped them obtain false
travel documents.
Al-Qaeda affiliates also offer access to immigrant and diaspora
communities--a group like Somalia's al-Shabaab, with its connections to
the Somali-American population, would be a prize asset. In 2010 a
Somali-American from Portland was arrested for planning to bomb a
Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland.\19\ (There is no
indication I have seen, however, that the individual was linked to the
al-Qaeda core).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ See ``Somali-American accused of plotting to bomb Oregon tree-
lighting event,'' November 27, 2010. http://articles.cnn.com/2010-11-
27/justice/oregon.bomb.plot_1_tree-lighting-justice-department-
portland-resident?_s=PM:CRIME.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Qaeda franchises, in turn, often get money from the al-Qaeda
core or others in its fundraising network. Al-Qaeda also has web and
media specialists, recruiters, trainers, and other experts in its
global rolodex, all available to help a local franchise.
In the past, an al-Qaeda label is also a potential recruiting
boon--it may help a group attract new members who hate the West and the
United States but were not motivated by the group's past, more local,
rhetoric. Less tangibly, the al-Qaeda brand also can give credibility
to groups struggling at home. Groups like al-Shabaab often have an
inchoate ideology; al-Qaeda offers them a coherent alternative. The
death of bin Ladin, for now at least, diminishes the attractiveness of
the al-Qaeda brand.
Gaining affiliates may raise al-Qaeda's profile and extend its
reach, but it also poses risks for the core. The biggest is the lack of
control. Nowhere was this more apparent than Iraq. Beginning at least
in 2005, al-Qaeda core leaders tried to push Iraqi fighters waging
guerrilla war under the banner of al-Qaeda in Iraq not to slaughter
Shi'a Muslims, and especially not Sunni civilians, but to no avail. As
the bloodshed rose, al-Qaeda funders and supporters pointed their
fingers not only at AQI leaders, but also at the al-Qaeda core.
The risk is even greater for affiliates. When they take on the al-
Qaeda label, they also take on al-Qaeda enemies. The United States not
only conducts direct attacks on al-Qaeda-related individuals and
targets their recruiting and financial infrastructure, but Washington
also can offer its allies intelligence, financial support, paramilitary
capabilities, and other vital forms of assistance, creating new
headaches for groups that are already beleaguered. They also move
farther away from their original goal of fighting the local regime.
Because of these risks, the decision to join al-Qaeda's ranks often
angers more sensible group members who retain local ambitions.
iv. the nature of the threat to the u.s. homeland
The U.S. homeland is safer than it was in the months before 9/11,
and the death of bin Ladin is a further blow to al-Qaeda. Yet the
danger of terrorism remains real. As I and others have noted, there is
a real chance that in revenge an al-Qaeda sympathizer or member will
attack a U.S. target, ideally (from the terrorists' point of view) in
the U.S. homeland but also, primarily for operational reasons, on U.S.
persons and facilities overseas. Al-Qaeda itself also has a strong
incentive to conduct an attack in order to prove its relevance at a
time when many question whether it can continue after bin Ladin's
death.
There have been few attacks on the U.S. homeland since 9/11, and
one only serious terrorist success--Major Nidal Malik Hasan's shooting
of 13 Americans at Fort Hood in Texas. Hasan does not appear to have
any direct linkages to the al-Qaeda core, but he was in email contact
with AQAP member, and U.S. citizen, Anwar al-Awlaki, the ideologue and
operator who was also linked to AQAP's attempted attacks on U.S.
aviation targets in 2009 and 2010.
Despite Hasan's action, in general the U.S. homeland has enjoyed
far more freedom from terrorism than I and many experts predicted in
the months after 9/11. I believe this good fortune stems from several
factors. The destruction of al-Qaeda's haven in Afghanistan and the
global intelligence and law enforcement hunt for group members and
supporters dealt major blows to the core's operational capability and
global reach. At home, the FBI and other organizations focused
intensely on al-Qaeda, making it harder for the terrorists to pass
unnoticed. Although there are individual exceptions, the U.S. Muslim
community is not radicalized. Indeed, in several important terrorism
cases community members have worked with U.S. law enforcement,
providing invaluable tips.
Ironically, the terrorism charges levied against various Americans
in the years immediately after 9/11 seemed to confirm how much safer
our country was. The FBI would often announce arrests of suspects with
great drama, but those charged were often common criminals or unskilled
dreamers, talking big but with little ability to carry out their
schemes. Those arrested had little or no training, and--just as
importantly--they did not seem to know how to get in touch with the al-
Qaeda core. In the end, the Government would often charge them with
minor, non-terrorism related crimes such as fraud or violating their
immigration status.
Yet there is reason to believe that all these factors are changing
for the worse in recent years. As discussed above, al-Qaeda has revived
somewhat in Pakistan, enabling it to plan and train more effectively
than it could in the years after losing its base in Afghanistan. This
revival is why the September 19, 2009, arrest of Najibullah Zazi is so
disturbing to homeland defense officials. Zazi, a legal Afghan resident
of the United States for many years, pled guilty in 2010 to planning to
bomb several targets in New York. Unlike the unskilled attackers who
were arrested in the past, Zazi admitted he was trained in Pakistan
where he was instructed to carry out a suicide bombing.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ United States Department of Justice, ``Najibullah Zazi Pleads
Guilty to Conspiracy to Use Explosives Against Persons or Property in
U.S., Conspiracy to Murder Abroad, and Providing Material Support to
Al-Qaeda,'' February 22, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nor is Pakistan the only problem. On October 28, 2008, Shirwa Ahmed
became the first American suicide bomber, killing himself in Somalia's
civil war on behalf of the Islamist group al-Shabaab.\21\ Ahmed was
part of two groups of perhaps 20 Somali-Americans who grew up in
Minneapolis and became radicalized after the Ethiopian invasion of
Somalia in 2006. The Somali-American community from which he came has
more in common with the Algerians in the banlieues in Paris than the
affluent Arab Muslim community of the United States. By one estimate 60
percent of the Somalis in the United States, a community estimated as
high as 200,000 people, live in poverty, and many young men drop out of
school and turn to crime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ In 2009, al-Qaeda's No. 2 Zawahiri called Shabaab advances in
Somalia ``a step on the path of victory of Islam,'' while Shabaab would
pledge allegiance to bin Laden. The group even used Alabama native Omar
Hammani, who spoke under the name Abu Mansoor al-Amriki (``the
American''), to do a video critique of President Barack Obama's speech
in Cairo earlier in the year.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the conflict in Somalia may seem distant to most Americans,
the U.S. role there is considerable--and Somali-Americans know it well.
In the minds of many Somalis, the 2008 U.S. airstrike that killed Aden
Hashi Ayro, a Shabaab leader, fused Somalia's historic enemy Ethiopia
and the United States. The result, in Somalia expert Ken Menkhaus'
words, was that ``fierce levels of anti-Americanism took root among
many Somalis at home and abroad.''\22\ In September 2009, the United
States struck again, killing another al-Qaeda figure there, Saleh Ali
Saleh Nabhan. So far, none of the Somali-Americans who went overseas
have planned to return home and attack, but the Shabaab's move toward
al-Qaeda and the anger at U.S. policy are a disturbing combination.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Testimony of Ken Menkhaus, ``Violent Islamic Extremism: Al-
Shabaab Recruitment in America,'' before the Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, March 11,
2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the biggest dangers involves ``seam'' areas that involve
borders, airspace, and other security spots that are the responsibility
of multiple countries--areas where homeland security meets foreign
policy. Al-Qaeda and affiliate groups have far more sympathizers in
foreign countries and better logistics networks there as well, making
it easier for them to launch attacks from there rather than in the
United States. Several of the most deadly terrorist plots in the last
decade--the 2003 ``shoebomber'' attempt to blow up American Airlines
flight 63 in 2001, the 2009 and 2010 AQAP attempts on civil and
commercial aviation, a United Kingdom cell's 2006 plan to bomb as many
as ten transatlantic flights--would have had devastating effects on the
U.S. homeland but were not based in the United States. Instead, these
involved the al-Qaeda core in Pakistan working with members and
sympathizers, usually in Europe, to attack the U.S. homeland.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ BBC News, `` `Airliners Plot': The Allegations,'' April 3,
2008, available at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/7329221.stm;
Riedel, The Search for Al-Qaeda, p. 131.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Radicalization from abroad is another homeland security problem.
Anwar al-Awlaki left the United States in 2002 and went to Yemen in
2004. From there, his fluent English and comprehensive understanding of
U.S. culture enabled him to radicalize individuals like Major Hasan and
perhaps others--activities that would have led to his arrest had he
remained in the United States.
v. counterterrorism and the arab spring
Al-Qaeda is dangerous not just because it has hundreds of skilled
fighters under arms, but also because tens of thousands of Muslims have
found its calls for violent change compelling. When dictators reigned
supreme in Arab lands, al-Qaeda could score points by emphasizing its
struggle against despotism. When dictators like Mubarak fall, however,
al-Qaeda loses one of its best recruiting pitches: the repression Arab
governments inflict on their citizens and the stagnant societies that
result. The possible emergence of less repressive and more dynamic
leaders would remove a popular issue from al-Qaeda propagandists.
Although the word democracy itself often means different things to
different audiences, polls suggest that the generic concept is quite
popular in the Arab world, as befits a region that knows first-hand how
brutal autocracy can be.\24\ In contrast, al-Qaeda believes that
democracy is blasphemous because it places man's word above God's.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ See for example http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1874/egypt-
protests-democracy-islam-influence-politics-islamic-extremism.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even more ominous for al-Qaeda is the way in which Mubarak and Ben
Ali fell. Al-Qaeda's narrative is that violence carried out in the name
of God is the only way to force change. Further damaging al-Qaeda's
message, change occurred without blows being struck first at the United
States. Al-Qaeda has long insisted that you must first destroy the
region's supposed puppetmaster in Washington (or Jerusalem) before
change will come to Cairo or Tripoli. Events have shown idealistic
young people dreaming of a new order--in, say, Jordan or Morocco--that
you do not need to strike at Westerners and that peaceful change is
possible.
Finally, bin Ladin must also have lamented that the youth of
various Arab countries are leading the revolution. Young people,
especially young men, are al-Qaeda's key demographic, the ones al-Qaeda
propagandists expect to take up arms. For over a decade, al-Qaeda
portrayed it fighters as audacious and honorable defenders of Muslim
lands. In some circles they are cool. Now youth in the Arab world are
afire with ideas of freedom and non-violent action.
Though the revolutions make al-Qaeda's message less compelling, it
may still gain traction in the Arab world through greater freedom of
operation. Arab tyranny often served U.S. purposes. U.S.
counterterrorism officials have long praised countries like Egypt for
their aggressive efforts against terrorism and their cooperation with
the United States. Even Qaddafi--long derided as the ``Mad Dog of the
Middle East''--since 9/11 has been valued as a partner against al-
Qaeda.
New governments in the Arab world will not necessarily be anti-
American, but if they take popular opinion into account, cooperation
will not be as close as it had been with governments like Mubarak's.
The security services that have fought al-Qaeda and its affiliates have
also imprisoned peaceful bloggers, beat up Islamist organizers to
intimidate them, and censored pro-democracy newspapers. Indeed, one
measure of how much progress the Arab regimes are making toward
democracy will be how much these services are purged. New security
officials will be inexperienced, and conspiracy theories about U.S.
intelligence have run amok in the Arab world. U.S. intelligence
officers would probably be seen as coup plotters rather than partners.
Islamists are likely to be particularly suspicious of intelligence
cooperation.
In addition, during the unrest some jails in Libya and Egypt have
emptied, and the ranks of newly-freed jihadists multiplied. In both
countries, many of the jailed jihadists turned away from violence in
the last decade, producing bitter polemics against al-Qaeda (and an
even more vitriolic al-Qaeda response) in recent years. Nevertheless,
among those released are some true believers in jihad who are willing
to wreak havoc upon their perceived enemies.
Even in countries where the autocrats cling to power, security
services are likely to be less effective against jihadists. At the very
least, the security services of Morocco, Algeria, and other countries
that have seen protests will make the democratic dissenters their top
priority, not suspected terrorists.
For now, there is reason to hope that revolutions in the Arab world
will end up a net plus for counterterrorism. But hope should be
balanced with the recognition that in the short-term al-Qaeda will gain
operational freedom and that the United States and its allies need to
act now if they are to prevent al-Qaeda from reaping long-term benefits
from the upheavals.
vi. policy recommendations
I would urge this subcommittee to consider several recommendations
as it strives to improve U.S. homeland security. First, fighting the
al-Qaeda core in Pakistan should remain at the center of U.S.
counterterrorism policy, even after bin Ladin's death. Having a secure
haven is often a make or break issue for terrorist groups, and al-
Qaeda's strength there is a deadly danger. Because of the danger this
haven presents, and because Pakistan is at best a fitful
counterterrorism partner, the United States must continue an aggressive
drone campaign. Drone strikes, however, are not a substitute for
forcing Pakistan to crack down on terrorist groups and secure its own
territory. Zazi, for example, managed to receive training after the
drone strikes began in earnest, and other terrorist recruits can do so
too.
Second, we need to consider how American foreign policy can lead to
domestic radicalization. Killing an al-Qaeda leader in Somalia can be a
blow to the organization there, but the decision on whether to pull the
trigger or not should also factor in the risk of radicalizing an
immigrant group here at home, not just the operational benefit of
removing one leader from the organization.
Third, bin Ladin's death also offers a further opportunity to
reduce links between the al-Qaeda core and al-Qaeda affiliates.
Zawahiri does not have bin Ladin's charisma, and in the past his
leadership has been more polemical and divisive. Affiliates may be more
reluctant to follow him, particularly if al-Qaeda core fundraising
efforts suffer after bin Ladin's death and the drone campaign makes it
difficult for Zawahiri to communicate regularly with affiliate leaders.
Conversely, atrocities by one branch of al-Qaeda discredit the core, as
has happened with AQI.
Fourth, the United States needs to prepare for low-end threats as
well as high-level dangers. For homeland defense purposes, the al-Qaeda
core represents an unusual set of leaders and operatives: Most are
highly skilled and dedicated, well-trained, and meticulous about
operational security. Affiliate members, however, are often less
careful--their organizations grew up amidst a civil war, and
accordingly focused more on maintaining an insurgency as opposed to a
limited number of high-profile terrorist attacks.
A vexing dilemma for U.S. policy concerns groups that may be moving
toward al-Qaeda but have not yet made the leap. Many al-Qaeda
affiliates always hated the United States and its allies and, even
before they took on the al-Qaeda label, had members who trained or
worked with al-Qaeda in a limited way. Their focus, however, was
primarily on local issues. Because their groups had some ties to al-
Qaeda, the Bush and Obama administrations began to target them and
encourage others to do so. As a result, the groups became more anti-
American, creating a vicious circle. Administrations are damned either
way: ignoring the group allows potential threat to grow worse and risks
an attack from out of the blue. But taking them on may mean driving
some deeper into al-Qaeda's fold.
Fourth, U.S. intelligence and homeland defense should focus on
``seam'' areas--where the U.S. homeland is attackable from outside the
country, such as on airplanes transiting from airports overseas to U.S.
soil. U.S. officials should continue to try to improve integration
between domestic and foreign-focused agencies and, at the same time,
ensure that domestic-focused agencies are in touch with the relevant
non-U.S. agencies in key countries.
Fifth, at home the FBI and State officials should redouble efforts
to know local Muslim communities and gain their trust. Counterterrorism
involves not only drone attacks, but also social services for immigrant
communities and courtesy calls to local religious leaders to hear their
concerns and assure them that the United States continues to welcome
them. Whether it be concerns over radicalization of Somali-Americans or
other recent immigrant groups, outreach and successful immigration is
vital for counterterrorism.
Finally, U.S. counterterrorism policy must incorporate the ``Arab
Spring'' into its strategic planning, and U.S. regional policy toward
the new regimes (and surviving old ones) must continue to emphasize
counterterrorism. U.S. public diplomacy efforts should relentlessly
highlight al-Qaeda's criticisms of democracy and emphasize the now-
credible argument that reform can come through peaceful change. The
message should be spread by television and radio, as always, but
specific attention should be given to the internet given the importance
of reaching young men in particular.
Washington also needs a new policy towards Islamists. Ignoring the
Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist movements seemed prudent to both
Republican and Democratic administrations when they had little chance
of gaining power. In particular, the United States should make it clear
that it does not want these movements frozen out of government, but
rather wants them to participate. The price for this participation is
more moderate policies at home and abroad. Inevitably, this will lead
to tension, as these Islamist groups seek policies that do not jibe
with U.S. preferences, but their alienation could be a disaster for
U.S. counterterrorism.
More quietly, the United States should renew efforts to train the
intelligence and security forces of new regimes, particularly if there
are widespread purges. The first step is simply to gain their trust, as
the new leaders are likely to see their U.S. counterparts as bulwarks
of the old order and a possible source of counterrevolution. Many of
the security services' leaders will be new to counterterrorism. Even
more important, they will be unaccustomed to the difficult task of
balancing civil liberties and aggressive efforts against terrorism.
Here the FBI and Western domestic intelligence services have much to
offer.
Recognizing these dilemmas and implementing (or continuing to
implement) these policy recommendations will not end the threat from
terrorism. However, they can make the United States more secure as the
terrorism threat continues to evolve.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Professor Byman.
Let me start out with just a personal experience I had.
A couple of years ago I visited Afghanistan and Pakistan,
and in Afghanistan I visited our troops around the 4th of July
on the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan. At that time, they
told me at one of the bases three of their soldiers had been
killed the day before we arrived, and they are very barbaric in
the way they kill our soldiers. But they said to me,
Congressman, they are coming out of there--and they point at
Pakistan--and they are coming over here, and they are killing
us.
I remember coming back here and met with the President,
then President Bush, and talked to him about the threat of the
tribal area in Pakistan, in the Fattah, that they were breeding
there, they were training in the tribal area. He recognized
that that was a serious concern, and I think not too long after
that conversation we had the drone project that you mentioned,
Professor Byman, which I think has been very successful in
terms of taking out high-value targets, and I think their
command-and-control structure has been greatly damaged by the
drone project.
But the question I wanted to ask before I go on about that
issue is, just Pakistan in general, Mr. Coll, I think all of
you are experts, but I wanted to ask you particularly, when I
visited them, they would talk about Madiyar, for instance, and
they would study his battle plans from the Soviet days and how
can we battle with him.
But the ISI continues to be a troubling issue for the
American people and the Congress in the sense that they always
play this double game, if you will, or they like to play both
sides of the fence, while on the one hand cooperating with us
on some high-value targets and on the other hand protecting
extremists when it is in their best interests, like for
interest in the Kashmir area where you mentioned the issue with
India. Cooperation with India I think would go a long ways.
But this double game I think really came to a head when we
saw the killing of bin Laden and we saw where he was living for
quite a few years. It is very troubling to me, because if you
look, there is a diagram up there about the compound, the
location. As I mentioned in my opening statement, it is less
than a mile away, which is half the distance between here and
the Washington Monument, to what is the equivalent of
Pakistan's West Point Academy. You have retired military in
this community surrounding this compound; and you have ISI
agents, as I understand, in the area as well. This is not a
normal house. It really was a large compound, very heavily
fortified, very suspicious looking in a sort of military area.
It leads me to the question of our relationship with
Pakistan and where do we go from here. Because, in my judgment,
it is hard for anybody to believe that they didn't know he was
there, and the question is at what level did the Pakistani
government know about this. I believe that either they are
complicit or they are incompetent. Either they are complicit in
providing material support to the most wanted terrorist by
providing him a safe haven, or they are totally incompetent to
not know he was there.
So, with that, let me just throw that question out first to
you, Mr. Coll, in terms of what is your assessment of this
picture and how does this affect and impact our relationship
with a very dicey country, Pakistan, who has been known to
proliferate nuclear weapons?
Mr. Coll. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would associate myself with your observations and
analysis. I think you described the picture well.
The circumstantial evidence about the house in Abbottabad
raises very disturbing questions about the knowledge that
almost certainly must have been present in at least some
sections of the Pakistani government about this unusual
compound. I hope that over time we will discover more about how
far up the chain of command in Pakistan such knowledge might
have gone.
Just a couple of quick observations about the compound.
Pakistan has one of the lowest rates of tax participation
in the world, even for a poor country. One of the reasons why
official tax participation is so low is that if you build a
million dollar house in the middle of a security town, someone
knocks on your door and says, I have a way for you to avoid
taxes, and that is put me on your payroll.
The person who knocks on the door is almost always at least
a regional official of the government, the police. In a town
like Abbottabad, it certainly raises the question of whether
ISI wouldn't have been involved in such a racket. ISI is best
understood as a criminal enterprise as well as a security
agency. It is involved in many rackets around the country.
Second, it is important for Americans to understand I think
that the ambiguity and the nature of the haven that bin Laden
found in Pakistan is not by itself unusual in the country. From
India's perspective, there are five or six listed terrorists
living around the country in similar circumstances. Sometimes
they are judged to be under house arrest. Sometimes they are
notional fugitives. Sometimes they really are difficult to
find. But many of these people have either admitted to or been
credibly charged with mass killings on Indian soil.
So these patterns look outrageous to the United States when
the personality is somebody like Osama bin Laden, but in the
context of the way Pakistan has evolved over the last 10 years,
his circumstances were not by themselves unusual.
Just on the question of what it poses by way of challenge
to the United States and Pakistan, I think it is a useful wake-
up call to both sides. The fundamental problem, as you point
out, is that the Pakistani military and intelligence service
has not been held accountable over a long period of time
adequately by its partners or by its own people. It has made it
difficult for its own people to hold the services accountable
by often ruling directly or suppressing those who question the
military's supremacy.
But I think for the United States this is an opportunity to
come to a more effective grip with the fact that the United
States and Pakistan do not always see these very important
security questions the same way and to try to hold Pakistan's
military to greater account, even while acknowledging the
sacrifices that its soldiers have made in their own war on
terrorism and the shared interests that will endure between the
two countries.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
I think it also calls into question as we go into the
appropriations cycle the billions of dollars we provide to
Pakistan in foreign aid. We have known they have played this
game for quite some time. Like you, boy, they need to be held
accountable; and we need some answers as to whether they are
complicit with us or not.
Professor Hoffman and Professor Byman, do you have any
observations?
Mr. Hoffman. Thank you, sir.
I agree with your remarks and also Mr. Coll's. But I would
suggest there may even be a third explanation that goes beyond
complicity or incompetence but rather willful ignorance, is
that it was simply better and preferable not to ask.
But I think on this question of the double game you talk
about, it extends even beyond whatever protection may have been
afforded to Osama bin Laden. As I am sure you know, right now
in Federal District Court in Chicago there is a trial of
someone named Tahawwur Rana, and testimony is being made by
David Headley, who is an agent of the ISI, to the effect that
one of his ISI handlers, someone named Major Iqbal, not only
knew of the Mumbai plot but also made absolutely no effort to
stop the plans of LeT to target American citizens, both at the
Jewish Chabat House but also at the hotel. Yet we haven't seen
any convincing denials from Pakistan. We haven't seen any, at
least to my knowledge, any investigations about who this Major
Iqbal is and what his role is, and I think this is another area
where we need to hold Pakistan very accountable.
Mr. McCaul. That is a great point. How many other of these
wanted terrorists are being provided with safe haven by
Pakistan, who we provide so much aid to and purportedly work
together with to eradicate the terrorists?
Professor Byman, do you have any comments?
Mr. Byman. To briefly add, Pakistan has long had what it
feels are strategic interests in both Afghanistan and India in
terms of ensuring a friendly government to Afghanistan and I
would say one dominated by Pakistan and India in preventing
Kashmir from becoming I will say a normal part of the Indian
union and, as a result, its work with a range of militant
groups.
We think of al-Qaeda, of course, as a terrorist group, but
it is also an organization that has put a tremendous amount of
energy into working with insurgencies around the region. In
this capacity, I will say it is hard to say where al-Qaeda
begins and where some of the components of its network begin.
But certainly components of the network have been extremely
useful to Pakistan and India and in Afghanistan. So it is very
hard for us to make progress on the counterterrorism front
without making progress on Afghanistan and Kashmir, which makes
this exceptionally difficult.
Mr. McCaul. I think you and Mr. Coll have raised that same
issue, and I think it is a very good point.
My time has now expired. I recognize the Ranking Member,
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank Ms.
Clarke, too. I appreciate that.
I think the greatest concern we have right now is the
possibility of terrorists getting hold of nuclear weapons, and
that brings Pakistan front and center in that regard, the way
we are proceeding with Pakistan, I think clearly some of the
issues about weak governance and some of the strong anti-
American sentiment that exists there and the limited ability we
have to really monitor the programs.
Now, the President has said he is going to call forth now
to really measure accountability in metrics, in real metrics.
For the entire panel, could you comment on what kind of metrics
this could be measured in? How can this be tangibly monitored
and how can we hold Pakistan accountable?
Most everyone now, I think Senator Kerry when he returned
from a meeting in Pakistan, had said that it is going to be
more what you do, not what you say. So it seems like Senator
Kerry and the President are on the same page. They are looking
for tangible metrics that can be measured.
So if you can comment on how you think we could measure
what those metrics should consist of, I would be appreciative.
Mr. Coll. I think that is an excellent question and subject
and a very important direction for U.S. policy.
You can start with the observations that the Chairman made
about these compounds in Pakistan. The first metric would be
the status under the law of listed terrorists known to be
residing in Pakistan. There is a substantial body of open-
source evidence about a number of listed terrorists, a U.N.
list of terrorist, so it doesn't even have to be something
coming directly from the United States, whose status under the
law is confused or unsatisfactory.
I think there are two other important areas where the
United States has the capacity itself to monitor the conduct of
Pakistani security services in its relations with militant
groups. There is always a debate about what the true capacity
of the Pakistani state is to do more.
The Pakistanis use their own weakness as a defense against
accountability, but there are some areas where the state's
capacity to control terrorist activity is clear. One of those
is in the cross-border movements of militants from Pakistani
territory into Indian-held Kashmir, for example.
That border is essentially a military zone. Nobody moves
across that border without the Pakistan Army's permission. The
Indians have been watching the Army send armed young men with
groups like Lashkar across that border with impunity for years,
and the United States has not made a priority of holding
Pakistan to account for the rates of infiltration. It would be
unreasonable to say you should have zero infiltration in this
complex territory, big mountains, but the rates of infiltration
that Pakistan has allowed suggests state policy.
Similarly, on the Afghan border where American lives and
security interests are even more directly at stake, surely
there are metrics to monitor the actual conduct of Pakistani
security services to prevent cross-border infiltration,
applying some rule of reason as to what the state's capacity
really is and then holding the state to that account.
Mr. Keating. Do any of the other panelists wish to comment
on that?
Mr. Hoffman. Well, I agree completely with what Mr. Coll
has said. I would only add that I think some of the metrics are
the degree of cooperation, and I think now at least publicly
cooperation is flattening rather than increasing. The number
of, for instance, U.S. military trainers in Pakistan has
decreased. The number of CIA intelligence operatives has also
decreased. So I think it is really the strength of cooperation.
Some of these things, the metrics may be able to be
publicly stated but the reporting of them may have to remain
classified. But I think these are enormously illustrative of
the degree and extent that Pakistan is sincere about
cooperation against terrorism.
Mr. Keating. I just have a few seconds left, so I apologize
for giving a difficult question so quickly. But how would you
suggest and what would be some of the benefits or dangers of
linking our foreign aid to these measurable metrics? Do you
think there is a way to do that? Do you think there is a danger
in doing it too closely, or do you think there is a benefit?
Mr. Hoffman. I don't think we have much choice. I think
that the problem is that from the Pakistani perspective, they
believe in essence they have us over the barrel. They know that
we require their cooperation. Yet I think it has been either a
blank check during the Musharraf time, or now what they see as
an open checkbook. So I think it is our only leverage that we
can exert over them.
Mr. Keating. Do any of you think that that could be
measured so that there is some accountability for their own
actions?
Mr. Coll. I think there has always been or there has often
been from Congress sources of conditionality attached to U.S.
aid to Pakistan. But it has often been the Executive branch's
prerogative to judge Pakistan's performance and the criteria
have often been general or abstract. Whatever the degree of
sort of automatic trigger that such accountability might
involve, I think it would be a helpful change to attach
specific metrics of the sort we are talking about to that
finding. Even if the Executive branch retains some discretion,
our Executive branch ought to be held accountable around some
of these same specific issues, rather than just a generalized
sense that things are good enough.
Mr. Keating. I just want to thank you. I couldn't agree
with you more. I think that some countries use their own
weaknesses as an excuse. So thank you very much.
I yield back my time.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you. I agree. This is excellent testimony
as we go into the foreign aid appropriations cycle that we need
to use these metrics, because clearly the location of the bin
Laden compound I think calls into serious question Pakistan's
cooperation with the United States.
With that, I recognize the gentleman from Missouri, Mr.
Long.
Mr. Long. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A question for all three of you, I guess, however you can
best answer it. But it has been said that al-Qaeda on the
Arabian Peninsula has put its American supporters on a noble
quest to vanquish injustice and save the world from invading
evil. However, we know that al-Qaeda has killed far more
Muslims than it has Americans.
So how do we as the U.S. Government go about debunking and
countering this message?
Mr. Byman. Mr. Long, I will take the first shot at this
one. To me this is the great weakness of al-Qaeda, and it is
something that Muslim thinkers and commentators have noticed
and repeatedly mentioned and it has caused tremendous dissent
within the broader, certainly Islamist, but even within the
jihadist community, the question of killing Muslims, especially
Muslim noncombatants.
To me, I would recommend several things to emphasize this.
One is that when the United States does public diplomacy we not
make it about the United States. I think if we end up trying to
sell our policies, whether it is in Iraq or Israel-Palestine,
we are not going to win on that one. But we do put it in their
court when we make it about the killing of Muslim
noncombatants.
Also, we should be elevating credible voices that make
these statements that condemn al-Qaeda. Here I would say this
is a particularly difficult issue for Congress, however,
because many of these credible voices are actually quite anti-
American on a number of other things. So you might have a quite
eminent sheikh who says you should not kill Muslim women and
children, al-Qaeda is wrong and evil, but you should go to Iraq
and kill American soldiers there.
Of course, I understand why we do not want to support
anyone making that statement. But if you are trying to reach
into the radical community, someone who is on the other extreme
is not going to have any resonance there. So people with
credibility to condemn al-Qaeda are going to have views that we
often disagree with, at times quite strongly.
Mr. Long. When you say public diplomacy, walk me through
that again. Our public diplomacy should what?
Mr. Byman. I am sorry, in my view often our public
diplomacy emphasizes how good it is to be a Muslim in the
United States, the validity and justice of U.S. policies, and
these are legitimate activities. But to me it is far more
credible, given the unpopularity of al-Qaeda's message, when we
make the public diplomacy about their message, in a way this is
negative campaigning. They have done many things and stand for
many things that are extremely unpopular in the Muslim world
and have been criticized even by elements within the radical
fringe, and we need to amplify those voices and make that what
the debate is about rather than trying to insert ourselves into
this, which I think backfires.
Mr. Long. Okay. Professor Hoffman.
Mr. Hoffman. I think this question of al-Qaeda and its
affiliates claiming far more Muslim lives than its enemies is a
very important one and an unexploited one, but I would say
generally we do a very bad job in countering the al-Qaeda
narrative and countering their message of radicalization and
recruitment.
First, I think within the United States Government these
types of activities are both poorly resourced and have a very
low priority. I think we also tend to look at the world through
our own eyes, not through the eyes of the audience we have to
communicate with. For example----
Mr. Long. How do we change that attitude? How do we change
that?
Mr. Hoffman. Well, I think we have to understand our enemy
and understand our target audience much better than we do. I
think just as Professor Byman was saying, that too often it is
either directed from an American prison or through an American
lens.
I will give you a specific example. Much has been made in
recent weeks about the videotape of Osama bin Laden sitting on
the floor with the blanket around him in very austere
surroundings wearing a wool cap. It almost gives the sense that
this is some broken pathetic old man watching old films of
himself. But yet we haven't thought of what that image actually
portrays to Muslims elsewhere, to the Muslim world.
For example, they see a man who lived until the end, who
was true to his own commitment to forsake a life of comfort and
luxury to wage jihad. Someone who lived simply, who like the
prophet cloaked himself in a blanket as a pious Muslim, wore a
head covering. So we see this as someone sitting there
humiliated in essence, but that is not necessarily the image
that other people, especially the audience that we need to
reach, sees him as.
In terms of how we can better counter this narrative than
we have done, the victims of terrorism, especially the Muslim
victims of terrorism, a young woman in Washington named Carie
Lemack literally on her own with a very small network has
created a survivor's group that has been motivated, and their
mission basically is to better illuminate the role that victims
and survivors of terrorism can play in countering this message.
Of course, the documentary that she made on a shoestring
``Killing in the Name'' was nominated for an Academy Award. But
this is an important message that I think we have really under-
exploited and under-used.
Mr. Long. Mr. Coll.
Mr. Coll. Well, I agree entirely with Professor Byman and
Professor Hoffman. I guess the only thought I would add is that
the Arab Spring does offer an opportunity to advance the
recommendations that both of the previous speakers have
outlined. There is going to be an opportunity for the United
States and many other countries around the world, wishing well
to the nascent democracies forming in countries like Egypt and
Tunisia to support civil society groups, credible voices, to
strengthen speech and to bring forward the underlying opinion
in many of these societies that al-Qaeda does not represent
their ambitions and is in fact an evil in their midst. So that
indirect opportunity speaks to the strategies that they have
both outlined.
Mr. Long. Thank you all for being here today. I have no
time to yield back, but if I did, I would.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you for your generosity.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from South
Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
gentleman for being here. The little bit of time I have been in
here has been very enlightening.
I will direct this question to Dr. Hoffman. I am just
trying to understand some of the relationships on the Arabian
Peninsula and North Africa. What is the relationship, if any,
between al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood?
Mr. Hoffman. Well, it is a relationship that perhaps at one
time in history ideologically was similar, but I think in
recent years really they have been two inimical forces, where
Ayman al-Zawahri, I suppose the titular leader of al-Qaeda now,
but until recently bin Laden's deputy, certainly in recent
months has attacked the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, also
Hamas, which is part of the Muslim Brotherhood network in Gaza,
for even attempting to make peace, for instance, with Israel or
enter into any kind of negotiations in Egypt, for deigning to
participate in any kind of a democratic process.
So I think we are actually talking about phenomena that, as
I said at one time, had some ideological similarities, but
really now is quite separate and different.
Mr. Duncan. Any other gentlemen have anything to add to
that?
Mr. Byman. Zawahri managed to write a book denouncing the
Muslim Brotherhood essentially while on the run and being
hunted. I have difficulty writing a book sitting in my office
for years on end without such interruptions. So the fact that
he put such effort into it. He has also had quite bitter
relations with Hamas, the Palestinian terrorist group that is
also a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot. So I think it is what the
people refer to as the narcissism of little differences, where
they were close enough ideologically that their subsequent
split in terms of where they have gone, where they moved to,
grates all the more.
With the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt now, you have an
alternative, you have a political alternative. This is a group
that is, so far, and we should perhaps knock wood here, is so
far moving on the path to being part of regular elections in a
democratic society. If that is a success, that is quite a
different message and quite a different hope that should be
encouraged. It will come with a lot of bumps, even if it is a
success, but that in itself could be a blow to al-Qaeda.
Conversely, if the Muslim Brotherhood is excluded from
power, that will send a message to many young members that the
world will not allow them to take power peacefully, so that
exclusion could be quite dangerous and radicalizing to a small
group of these people.
Mr. Duncan. Just kind of a follow-up about al-Qaeda. What
is the relationship between al-Qaeda and the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps, is that the Qods Force? Can you talk
about that, because I am reading a lot about that now and I
really would love to hear some testimony on that.
Mr. Byman. Congressman, I would urge you to try to get a
classified briefing on this, because the unclassified material,
which I have studied extensively, is actually noticeable by its
absence. There is clearly significant things going on. We have
had senior al-Qaeda members transit Iran. Some have found haven
in Iran, but perhaps under different degrees of house arrest.
Iran has a history of working with a wide range of groups that
it actually does not see eye-to-eye to, and certainly in this
case they are often violently in disagreement. But Iran is
quite pragmatic.
So we have seen cooperation in the past. We have seen some
degree of cooperation since 9/11. But in my judgment it is a
very fraught relationship. There are ideological differences.
Iran is much more cautious in its use of terrorism than al-
Qaeda. These groups in the end strongly, I would say, even hate
one another is the right word, but they have other problems as
well.
But this is an area I think where both Iran and al-Qaeda
for their own reasons have been trying to keep any relationship
as secret as possible. It is politically damaging to both of
them.
Mr. Duncan. Clearly al-Qaeda is in Iran, the CIA just
canceled a program over there tracking those individuals. I was
going to ask a question how you feel about the CIA canceling
that tracking program.
Mr. Byman. In my view, tracking where al-Qaeda individuals
are should always be a priority. I cannot speak to this
particular program though. I don't know its strength and
weaknesses.
Mr. Duncan. A news report just came out today. I read it
this morning.
So thank you very much. I yield back the balance of my
time.
Mr. McCaul. Just in closing, I want to make a couple of
comments. When we heard from the previous panel that the
administration is not providing a complete and accurate picture
of the threat assessment, specifically as it relates to
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, so when we look
at countries like Pakistan and others that have nuclear
capability, I think that is absolutely essential that they come
forward as required by law and report these findings to the
Congress. I would assume you would all agree with that
assessment as well.
AQAP, Awlaki has troubled me for the last 2 years, almost
more so than bin Laden did, because of his ability to impact
Muslim youth in the United States and radicalize them. As the
Ranking Member talked about, this is a virtual safe haven, and
he is in a safe haven in Yemen, a failed state. But his ability
to use the internet very deceptively to radicalize remains--I
think the testimony I have heard, you probably agree that
Awlaki is emerging as one of the top leaders of al-Qaeda and
one of the biggest threats.
My last question, and if anybody else would like to ask a
question, I will recognize them. We talked about the Predator
drones, Professor Byman. I believe they have been very
effective, the surgical strikes, but they have had some
controversy obviously within Pakistan and Yemen as well. How
effective are these drone strikes?
Mr. Byman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In my view, the drone
strikes are effective. But let me begin with three caveats:
When you bomb people, at times you miss or at times you kill
innocent people nearby. The drones are far more surgical than
our traditional fixed-wing aircraft that are manned, and, of
course, they are far more surgical than Pakistani military
range. But nevertheless, we have to accept innocent death as
part of this.
Second, the drones are unpopular in Pakistan. When you are
conducting military operations on the soil of another country,
that is understandable. Often they are less popular farther
away from the areas where the drones are operating. I think
that in some ways people are farther away, it is easier to take
offense when you don't have to deal with the militants nearby.
The third caveat is the drone itself is not a strategy that
solves the problem. In my view, it reduces the problem, but
this is something that will be solved more fundamentally or not
by the actions of the Pakistani state.
But the drones do reduce the skilled number of al-Qaeda
leaders, and their bench, while deep, is not infinite. I think
even more important, it forces them to operate in a different
way. They spend much of their time playing defense. It is very
hard to quantify, but if instead of spending 12 hours a day
organizing, planning and training, they spend 2 because the
other remaining 10 are spent moving from place to place,
avoiding dangerous communications, that is a huge impact on an
organization, and I will say especially given the leadership
transition going on.
With the death of bin Laden, Zawahri needs to lead. He
needs to be out there, he needs to be communicating, he needs
to be showing that he is taking over, and that is much harder
because he risks exposing himself to U.S. intelligence and the
U.S. military if he does, and his death in a short period of
time would be an extreme blow to this organization, reducing
continuity.
Mr. McCaul. Mr. Coll and Professor Hoffman, do you agree
with that assessment?
Mr. Hoffman. I do. I would just add a couple of points. I
think it has been a highly effective tactic. I think though we
have run the risk of confusing an effective tactic with an
overall strategy, and I think this is just one arm of the war
on terrorism.
But I think what concerns me the most is I predict we are
going to see diminishing returns from the drone program. I
think we already are. When we see the publicly-released lists
of targets that have been killed, the 130 or so people, you
look at that list, there is a diminishing number of actual high
value targets of the senior leaders of al-Qaeda. There is
nothing wrong with disrupting the mid-level as well, but I
think as a means of decapitation, we are going to find it that
it pays fewer dividends. I think also that our opponents will
take increasing countermeasures to frustrate the drones and to
make sure that they are not the victims.
But I would end with the point that one of the lessons or
messages we should take from the highly successful SEAL
operation in Abbottabad is that we also have the capacity
perhaps in the future not just to take out and kill high-value
targets, but also to use that capability to capture them and
therefore gain the necessary intelligence, both tactically and
also strategically, that often high-value targeted killings
don't enable us to obtain.
Mr. McCaul. That is a great point. The treasure trove we
found in the compound, do you believe Pakistan is fully
cooperating with us on getting that information?
Mr. Hoffman. One hopes so, but it is difficult to say. At
least publicly it is not clear. I mean, they did of course let
the CIA--there was one important development. They did let the
CIA team into the compound to do their forensic scans with
equipment and with capabilities that the Pakistanis don't have.
But beyond that, how the treasure trove of information is
actively being applied in terms of actionable intelligence, it
is just not clear. It may be happening, but I am not aware of
it.
Mr. McCaul. Mr. Coll.
Mr. Coll. Just on that last point, it is my understanding
that the access to the wives and other civilians who were in
the compound and who were left behind was difficult for the
United States to obtain in the early days and the circumstances
in which those individuals were held by Pakistan raised
questions about the Pakistani government's intent in terms of
maximizing cooperation. So it does seem as if from the open
source evidence things have improved, but certainly in the
first 48 hours or 72 hours there were some real breaches in
cooperation, I think.
On the larger subject, I agree very much with both of the
previous speakers. I do think that, to Professor Hoffman's
points about the diminishing returns, I think the open source
evidence makes clear what he asserts, and also bin Laden's own
circumstances suggest what life is like if you are on the run
from a world of drones. You do not sit in the spaces that you
know the drones will be actively patrolling.
Mr. McCaul. I would say that is a great point.
Okay, with that, I want to thank the witnesses for an
excellent discussion here today.
Members have 10 days to submit questions in writing. If
they do so, I would hope you would answer those. Thank you so
much again for appearing here today.
With that, this hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:20 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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