[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THREATS TO THE AMERICAN HOMELAND AFTER KILLING BIN LADEN: AN ASSESSMENT
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 25, 2011
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Serial No. 112-25
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Vacancy
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 2
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
Mr. Lee Hamilton, Bipartisan Policy Center:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Ms. Frances F. Townsend, Senior Vice President, Worldwide
Government, Legal and Business Affairs, MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc.................................................. 15
Mr. Peter Bergen, Director, National Security Studies Program,
New America Foundation:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Mr. Evan F. Kohlmann, Flashpoint Global Partners:
Oral Statement................................................. 27
Prepared Statement with Laith Alkhouri......................... 30
Appendix I
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Information Submitted for the Record........................... 49
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas:
Charts......................................................... 57
THREATS TO THE AMERICAN HOMELAND AFTER KILLING BIN LADEN: AN ASSESSMENT
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Wednesday, May 25, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 9:33 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King [Chairman
of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Smith, Lungren, Rogers,
McCaul, Broun, Miller, Walberg, Cravaack, Walsh, Meehan,
Rigell, Duncan, Marino, Farenthold, Brooks, Thompson, Jackson
Lee, Cuellar, Clarke of New York, Richardson, Davis, Speier,
Richmond, Clarke of Michigan and Keating.
Chairman King. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order.
The committee is meeting today to examine the near-term and
long-term consequences and benefits to the security of our
homeland resulting from the successful killing of Osama bin
Laden. I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
First of all, let me welcome everyone here this morning.
Let me especially thank our witnesses. We have an outstanding
panel of witnesses, and I truly look forward to their
testimony. I want to thank the Ranking Member, as always, for
his assistance in this hearing. My remarks will be brief this
morning.
I believe this hearing is absolutely essential for a number
of reasons. One, all of us can take great satisfaction and
pride, quite frankly, in the killing of Osama bin Laden. I give
the President tremendous credit for having done it. It took
courage. It took basically ice water in his veins at the last
moment to make that decision, and I give him tremendous credit
for it.
The only concern I have is that too many, I think, of the
American people somehow feel that now with bin Laden dead, as
great a victory as this was, and we can discuss how great it
was, how significant it was, what the implications are, the
fact is I believe too many people think that with bin Laden
dead, somehow the war against terrorism is over, or the
terrorist war against us is over; that this will significantly
impact the war against us; and somehow maybe we should step
back and let our guard down, maybe we can relax, maybe start
cutting back in some of the programs that have kept us safe
over the last 10 years.
My own belief is that in the short run, the threat is
probably greater than it was. Long term, there is no doubt that
the death of bin Laden is extremely positive for so many
different reasons. But in the short run in particular, I think
it is very likely to assume--and just looking at al-Qaeda's own
language--the fact is that they feel they have to not just
avenge this, but they have to show the rest of the world, the
rest of the Muslim world, the rest of the terror world, that
they are viable, that they are vibrant as before, that they
have not been taken down, and they have to have a dramatic
showing. That, to me, would involve obviously an attack by al-
Qaeda or one of its franchise operations.
My belief is that because of the many programs that have
been instituted over the last 9, 10 years, it would be very
difficult for al-Qaeda to carry out another 9/11-type attack,
attack from overseas into the United States, certainly not on
the dimensions of the September 11 attacks. But at the same
time, starting several years ago, al-Qaeda did begin recruiting
in this country people under the radar screen. In addition to
that, we have had those who are self-radicalized, those who are
radicalized through the internet. We have seen a series of
cases, for instance, just in New York, Najibullah Zazi, the
subway bomber, who was totally under the radar screen, who was
taken to Afghanistan for training and came back to this country
and came within hours of carrying out a massive attack on the
New York City subway system.
We had Major Hasan, who was in a way self-radicalized
through his dealings with Awlaki over the internet, and what he
carried out at Fort Hood in the fall of the 2009. Then we had
Shahzad, the Times Square bomber, again, under the radar
screen, an American citizen trained by the Pakistani Taliban,
who came, again, very close to a successful attack in Times
Square.
So with all of this, I look forward to the witnesses
telling us exactly what they see both in the long term and the
short term, what it means that bin Laden is no longer here,
what it means as far as our defenses, where we should be
looking to for the next attack, the type of attack it could be,
the dimensions of that attack. Also, as far as the power
structure in al-Qaeda, who is going to take over? Is there
anyone who has the capability of having the type of evil
magnetism that bin Laden had where he could hold the various
ethnic groups together and keep al-Qaeda unified? Is there
anyone who can step up to that? Will it be Zawahiri; will it be
someone else? What is the role of someone like Awlaki, who is
outside the traditional al-Qaeda structure?
So these are all the questions that I look forward to
hearing the answers to. I look forward to the insights of the
members of our panel, all of whom have long records of
expertise and experience.
I, again, thank all of the witnesses for being here. I
thank the Members for having such a large turnout this morning.
With that, I yield to the gentleman from Mississippi, the
Ranking Member, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for
holding this hearing. I join you in welcoming our panel of
witnesses.
Before we consider the risk of a terrorist attack following
the death of bin Laden, I want to publicly add my voice to the
many who have commended the President, the National security
team, and our uniformed forces for successfully completing a
mission that began over 10 years ago. The success of this
mission was made possible by the administration's efforts with
reliable intelligence and the surgical use of force.
For many, the killing of bin Laden has always been the
ultimate goal of the war on terror. As the mastermind of the
terrorist attacks on September 11, he became the central focus
of our policies. Bin Laden became the personification of
terrorism for us. We went to war in Afghanistan to eliminate
bin Laden's training camps and base of operation. We went to
war in Iraq because we were told that Saddam Hussein had some
connection with bin Laden. In the last 10 years, many of our
policies at home and abroad have been based on forecasts and
predictions about bin Laden. For many, the elimination of bin
Laden will require a dramatic shift in thinking about and
analyzing the terrorist threat.
In the last 10 years, we have seen the migration and
mutation of the terrorist network and the terrorist threat. The
threat network has moved beyond borders, and operatives have
become decentralized. At the time of his death, bin Laden
remained a dangerous, charismatic figure, but his control was
not absolute, and his authority was not singular. We cannot
ignore the new challenges presented by his death. In every
group, the death of a leader causes disarray and confusion
among the followers. These periods of transition can last for
weeks or years.
When we consider the safety of our country, the question
that matters most is what will we do while the terrorists are
in the throes of transition? For fiscal year 2012, the answer
is not encouraging. The DHS appropriations bill recently
approved by the Republican-controlled Appropriations Committee
cut the Department's budget by more than $1 billion. Since bin
Laden's death, we have learned that al-Qaeda was targeting our
cities and critical infrastructure. I am glad to see that our
Chairman acknowledged the cutting back of some of those
desperately needed funds, and I look forward to at some point,
Mr. Chairman, working with you on getting many of those funds
restored based on this treasure trove of information that was
collected at the site of the killing of bin Laden.
Last week the Pakistani Taliban and al-Qaeda-allied groups
struck an American armored vehicle transporting American
Government personnel. They claimed the attack was in
retaliation for bin Laden's death. At a time when our
adversaries are seeking opportunities to attack us, cuts in
homeland security funding puts us in harm's way. Bin Laden's
death does not end the threat to this Nation. In many ways, the
picture has become more complex. Our focus must remain steady.
Our funding must match our focus.
I look forward to this hearing and to hearing from our
witnesses today about the dynamic threat environment we now
face.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The information follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
May 25, 2011
Before we consider the risk of terrorist attack following the death
of bin Laden, I want to publicly add my voice to the many who have
commended the President, the National security team and our uniformed
forces for successfully completing a mission that began 10 years ago.
The success of this mission was made possible by this
administration's efforts, reliable intelligence and the surgical use of
force.
For many, the killing of bin Laden has always been the ultimate
goal of the war on terror.
As the mastermind of the terrorist attacks on September 11, he
became the central focus of our policies.
Bin Laden became the personification of terrorism for us.
We went to war in Afghanistan to eliminate bin Laden's training
camps and base of operations.
We went to war in Iraq because we were told that Saddam Hussein had
some connection with bin Laden.
In the last 10 years, many of our policies at home and abroad have
been based on forecasts and predictions about bin Laden.
For many, the elimination of bin Laden will require a dramatic
shift in thinking about and analyzing the terrorist threat.
In the last 10 years, we have seen the migration and mutation of
the terrorist network and the terrorist threat.
The terrorist network has moved beyond familiar borders and
operatives have become decentralized.
At the time of his death, Bin Laden remained a dangerous
charismatic figure, but his control was not absolute and his authority
was not singular.
We cannot ignore the new challenge presented by his death.
In every group, the death of a leader causes disarray and confusion
among the followers. These periods of transition can last for weeks or
years.
When we consider the safety of our country, the question that
matters most is--what will we do while the terrorist are in the throes
of transition?
For fiscal year 2012, the answer is not encouraging.
The DHS appropriations bill, recently approved by the Republican-
controlled Appropriations Committee, cuts the Department's budget by
more than $1 billion.
Since bin Laden's death, we have learned that al-Qaeda was
targeting our cities and critical infrastructure.
We also know that AQAP is actively targeting our aviation sector.
Last week, the Pakistani Taliban, an al-Qaeda-allied group struck
an American armored vehicle transporting American Government personnel.
They claimed the attack was in retaliation for bin Laden's death.
At a time when our adversaries are seeking opportunities to attack
us, cuts to homeland security funding put us in harm's way.
Bin Laden's death does not end the threat to this Nation.
In many ways, the picture has become more complex. Our focus must
remain steady. And our funding must match our focus.
Chairman King. Thank you, Congressman Thompson.
[The statement of Hon. Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Laura Richardson
May 24, 2011
I would like to thank Chairman King and Ranking Member Thompson for
convening this hearing today focused on the current state of terror
threats to the American Homeland in light of the death of Osama bin
Laden. While the death of bin Laden has been a significant victory in
the war on terror for America as well as the rest of the world, the
implications of this victory need to be addressed. Thus, I would like
to thank our distinguished panel of witnesses for appearing before the
committee today to discuss these very important issues that lay before
us.
The death of bin Laden marks the most significant turning point to
date in our Nation's efforts to combat and eliminate al-Qaeda and its
worldwide affiliates. As the figurehead and symbol of global terrorism,
he inspired thousands of militants and extremists to wage war against
the West and commit unspeakable acts of violence.
While it is clear that his death has marked a significant blow to
al-Qaeda and its affiliates, most experts agree that bin Laden's death
alone is not likely to end the war on terror. In fact, as some of the
recent events in Pakistan have indicated, many terrorist groups are not
deterred by the recent death of bin Laden and are likely to continue to
plot attacks from safe havens world-wide.
As al-Qaeda attempts to regroup and reorganize after the death of
bin Laden, their leader, it is important that the United States assess
the new threat dynamic in order to ensure our National security efforts
remain strong and do not become complacent in the wake of bin Laden's
death. This means continuing to focus on al-Qaeda and its affiliates,
supporting the message of democracy that is now spreading across the
Middle East, and providing our counterterrorism officials with the
tools they need in order to build an effective capacity to combat these
world-wide threats.
Unfortunately, the fiscal year 2012 Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) appropriations bill that was recently approved by the House
Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee, will make these efforts
considerably more difficult with a decrease in funding of $1.1
billion--or 2.6%--below last year's level and $3 billion--or 7%--below
the President's request. These proposed cuts represent an unacceptable
blow to our National security and could undoubtedly jeopardize future
counterterrorism efforts.
As the representative of the 37th district of California, I
understand the importance of giving law enforcement officials the
resources they need to efficiently and effectively protect our local
communities. My Congressional district abuts the Nation's largest
ports, contains oil refineries that produce more than 1 million barrels
per day, and is home to a number of gas treatment and petrochemical
facilities that present a target-rich environment for those seeking to
do us harm.
Thus, it is imperative that we continue to provide counterterrorism
officials with the resources necessary to sustain their efforts to
disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda and strengthen the resilience
of our Nation against acts of terrorism.
Thank you again Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Thompson for
convening this very important hearing today. I look forward to hearing
from our distinguished panel of witnesses on these issues. I yield back
my time.
Chairman King. Our first witness this morning is former
Congressman Lee Hamilton. I had the privilege of serving on the
House Foreign Affairs Committee with Congressman Hamilton
during his extraordinary career. He was chairman of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs, the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, and everyone in the country knows of
his outstanding service as Vice Chair of the 9/11 Commission
with Governor Kean. He served on the U.S. Homeland Security
Advisory Council and led the Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars. He currently serves as co-chair of the
Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security Preparedness
Group. It has always been a privilege of mine to consider Lee
Hamilton a friend and colleague. I certainly welcome you here
for your testimony this morning.
Thank you, Chairman Hamilton.
STATEMENT OF LEE HAMILTON, BIPARTISAN POLICY CENTER
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you, Chairman King and Ranking Member
Thompson, and, of course, the other Members of the committee. I
am very pleased to have the opportunity to be with you today. I
have really appreciated the leadership that the Chairman and
the other Members of this committee have shown on the whole
question of the terrorist threat confronting the country. I am
deeply grateful for the sustained support coming from this
committee in reforming our National security institutions.
As the Chairman mentioned, I am appearing today as the co-
chair of the Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security
Preparedness Group, and very pleased indeed to be joined by two
distinguished members of that group, Fran Townsend and Peter
Bergen, here at the witness table.
Significant progress has been made, of course, since 9/11
in protecting the homeland, and our country is undoubtedly more
safer and more secure. But it also remains the fact that a
number of our key recommendations of the Commission have not
yet been implemented.
The attacks on 9/11 demonstrated the teamwork and
collaboration and effective communications at the site are
critical. We have made some movement towards establishing the
unity of command. One person has to be in charge when you have
a disaster strike. They have to make thousands of decisions
very quickly. I have heard simply from too many community
leaders and first responders across the Nation that many
communities, many regions still have not solved the problem of
a unified command structure in the event of a disaster.
Likewise, there has been some, but not sufficient progress
in establishing interoperable communications for first
responders. I know the Chairman and others on this committee
have been very, very good in calling the attention of the
country to that. This is a no-brainer. The people at the site
of a disaster--the chief players, the police, the first aid
people, the experts--all have to be able to communicate with
one another, and the Government has to allocate an additional
10 megahertz of the radio spectrum to public safety to enhance
the ability to communicate in a disaster.
There have been improvements in transportation and security
and border security, but transportation security technology
still lags in its capability to screen passengers and baggage
for concealed weapons and explosives. Several attempted attacks
over the past few years perpetrated by terrorists who could
have been detected by the U.S. immigration system demonstrate
that a more streamlined terrorist watch-listing capability and
improved information sharing among the intelligence agencies
and immigration authorities still have to be improved.
One area of significant progress is the deployment of the
biometric entry system, known as US-VISIT. But a biometric exit
component to determine which foreign nationals have left the
United States has not yet been deployed. I think if law
enforcement and intelligence officials had known for certain in
August 2001, prior to the attack, that two of the 9/11
hijackers remained in the United States, the search for them
could have taken on a greater urgency.
With respect to intelligence reform, the Director of
National Intelligence has certainly made progress in several
areas, including increased information sharing and improved
cooperation among the various agencies. But it is not clear
that the DNI is the driving force of the intelligence community
that the 9/11 Commission envisioned. Some ambiguity still
appears in the basic statutory structure over the DNI's
authority with regard to budget and personnel. Strengthening
his position in these areas would advance the unity of effort
in intelligence, whether that be done through legislation or
declarations from the President.
A major disappointment for all of us on the 9/11 Commission
has been the failure of the administration to empanel the
Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. This was a major
recommendation of the Commission, easily agreed to unanimously
by all members of the Commission. My information at this time
is that the President has only nominated two members to serve
on the five-member Board, and neither has been confirmed by the
Senate. I thank Ranking Member Thompson and other Members of
the committee for the letter that was sent to the
administration about the Board's vacancies. I encourage the
committee to push that in the months ahead.
Another disappointment, of course, is the failure of this
Congress to reform oversight of the intelligence community and
the Department of Homeland Security. This committee is well
aware, better than almost anybody else, of the fractured
oversight of DHS. I need not give the statistics to you. It is
an inefficient allocation of limited resources needed to secure
our Nation. The massive Department of the DHS will be much
better integrated if there is integrated oversight. I know
Members of this committee have been helpful on this. I have
some understanding of the difficulties of the problem and
working it out, but it is really a high priority and a National
security interest that the oversight of Homeland Security be
much more focused.
The capture and death of Osama bin Laden is the most
significant achievement to date in our efforts to defeat al-
Qaeda. That hard work, the cooperation, vigilance, the tenacity
over a period of years, as both of you in your opening
statements have acknowledged, has been critical. There is no
question that his capture and death came about as a result of
reforms that have recently been enacted in the Federal
Government that yielded much closer collaboration and
information sharing.
Of course, we now have a major new source of information
that the intelligence community can analyze in great detail. I
think it is likely that the information that we get is even
more important than the death of Osama bin Laden himself.
Whether his death is a turning point in our fight against
terrorism remains to be seen. You can kill a man. You cannot
kill a symbol. Osama bin Laden is dead. Al-Qaeda is not. It is
a network, not a hierarchy, as others have said. Over a period
of years, it has been adaptive, it has been resilient, and his
death is certainly a setback for al-Qaeda, but likely not its
demise. Its affiliates and al-Qaeda itself will almost
certainly attempt to avenge his death; however, that attack
will not necessarily occur soon.
Al-Qaeda's capabilities, as the Chairman noted, and its
ability to implement large-scale attacks are less formidable
that they were 10 years ago, but there isn't any doubt at all
about al-Qaeda's intent. They want to kill more Americans.
Al-Qaeda has been marked by rapid decentralization. The
most significant threats to American security come from
affiliates of core al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
al-Qaeda elsewhere. Its influence, which is on the rise in
South Asia, continues to extend to failing states like Yemen
and Somalia.
In assessing threats to the homeland security, senior U.S.
counterterrorism officials now call attention to al-Qaeda's
strategy of diversification. Mounting attacks involving a wide
variety of perpetrators of different national and ethnic
background make it very difficult to profile threats. Most
troubling is the pattern of increasing terrorist recruitment of
American citizens and residents to act as lone wolves. There
were two such attacks in just last year or 2, and it is very
distressing that Americans seem to be playing an increasingly
prominent role in al-Qaeda's movements.
We know that individuals in the United States are engaging
in self-radicalization, which is an alarming development. This
process is often influenced by blogs and other on-line content
advocating violent extremism. While there are methods to
monitor some of this activity, it is simply impossible to know
the inner thinking of every at-risk person. Thus, self-
radicalization poses, I believe, a grave threat to the United
States.
The National Security Preparedness Group will soon release
a report with recommendations for improving our defenses to
radicalization. That report has not yet been submitted to the
full group, but it will be done soon, and I hope it will be
helpful to you as you look at this problem.
Because al-Qaeda and its affiliates will not give up, we
cannot let our guard down. We will see new attempts and likely
successful attacks. We must constantly assess our
vulnerabilities and anticipate new lines of attack; not become
complacent, but remain vigilant and resolute. We have done a
lot. We have done much. We have had a great deal of progress.
But there is an awful lot more to do.
Thank you for inviting me to testify to this committee.
Most importantly, thank you for the long-standing leadership of
this committee on homeland security matters.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Hamilton follows:]
Prepared Statement of Hon. Lee Hamilton
May 25, 2011
i. introduction
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Thompson, Members of the committee: I
am pleased to have the opportunity to appear before you today. This
committee has been at the center of defending the country from the
terrorist threat we face. I am deeply grateful to you for your
sustained support of the 9/11 Commission's recommendations and
leadership in reforming our National security institutions. You have
done a great deal to ensure we are taking the difficult steps necessary
to confront this determined enemy and protect Americans, our allies,
and people throughout the world.
Today, I am appearing in my capacity as a co-chair of the
Bipartisan Policy Center's National Security Preparedness Group (NSPG),
a successor to the 9/11 Commission. Drawing on a strong roster of
National security professionals, the NSPG works as an independent,
bipartisan group to monitor the implementation of the
9/11 Commission's recommendations and address other emerging National
security issues.
I join in testifying today with two National security experts who
also happen to be members of the NSPG, Fran Townsend and Peter Bergen.
In addition to them, the NSPG is composed of:
Governor Tom Kean: Former Governor of New Jersey; Chairman
of the 9/11 Commission; and Co-Chair of the National Security
Preparedness Group;
The Honorable E. Spencer Abraham: Former U.S. Secretary of
Energy and U.S. Senator from Michigan, The Abraham Group;
Dr. Stephen Flynn: President, Center for National Policy;
Dr. John Gannon: BAE Systems, former CIA Deputy Director for
Intelligence, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council,
and U.S. House Homeland Security Staff Director;
The Honorable Dan Glickman: Former Secretary of Agriculture
and U.S. Congressman;
Dr. Bruce Hoffman: Georgetown University terrorism
specialist;
The Honorable Dave McCurdy: Former Congressman from Oklahoma
and Chairman of the U.S. House Intelligence Committee,
President of the American Gas Association;
The Honorable Edwin Meese III: Former U.S. Attorney General,
Ronald Reagan Distinguished Fellow in Public Policy and
Chairman of the Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at The
Heritage Foundation;
The Honorable Tom Ridge: Former Governor of Pennsylvania and
U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security, Senior Advisor at Deloitte
Global LLP, Ridge Global;
The Honorable Richard L. Thornburgh: Former U.S. Attorney
General, Of Counsel at K&L Gates; and
The Honorable Jim Turner: Former Congressman from Texas and
Ranking Member of the U.S. House Homeland Security Committee,
Arnold and Porter, LLP.
In recent months, our group has sponsored the following events:
BPC Domestic Intelligence Conference featuring FBI Director
Mueller and DNI Director Clapper--October 2010.
Bridge-Builder Breakfast: Addressing America's Intelligence
Challenges in a Bipartisan Way with House Intelligence
Committee Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Ruppersberger--
March 2011.
Press conference marking the release of the Bipartisan
Policy Center's National Security Preparedness Group report,
Assessing the Terrorist Threat--September 2010.
We will soon release another report with recommendations for
improving initiatives to prevent violent radicalization in the United
States.
We believe the depth of this group's experience on National
security issues can be of assistance to you and the Executive branch
and we look forward to continuing to work with you.
ii. significant progress has been made in addressing threats to the
american homeland since 9/11, yet important 9/11 commission
recommendations remain unfulfilled
Effect of the 9/11 Attacks
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 had a profoundly
dramatic impact on Government, the private sector, and our daily lives.
The suddenness of the attacks on American soil and the loss of so many
lives, made us feel vulnerable in our homes and caused us to question
whether our Government was properly organized to protect us from this
lethal threat. The economic damage resulting from the attacks was
severe. In short order, we shifted from a ``peace dividend'' at the end
of the Cold War to the expenditure of massive amounts of taxpayer
dollars on new security measures.
The consequences of the attacks for the private sector have been
striking. More than 80% of our Nation's critical infrastructure is
owned by the private sector, and protecting it from terrorist
operations has become an urgent priority. Working together, the
Government and private sector have improved their information sharing
and thus our security posture.
Businesses in all sectors have adapted to this new reality. They
have focused on how best to protect personnel and our food and water
supplies; prepared continuity plans in preparation for possible
disruptions; and altered how buildings are constructed, adopting
innovative safety features. U.S. importers, working with the Department
of Homeland Security, have pioneered new ways to ensure the integrity
of shipping containers that bring goods into the country. The insurance
industry's risk analysis has evolved to reflect new realities. These
necessary innovations have increased the costs of doing business.
Future innovations responding to the evolving threat may raise costs
higher.
The Government's Response
Over the past 10 years, our Government's response to the challenge
of transnational terrorism has been equally dramatic. Legal, policy,
and cultural barriers between agencies created serious impediments to
information sharing before the 9/11 attacks. The 9/11 Commission made a
number of specific recommendations to improve information sharing
across our Government, and many of these have been accepted and
implemented, in whole or in part.
Information sharing within the Federal Government, and among
Federal, State, local, and Tribal authorities, and with allies, while
not perfect, has been considerably improved since 9/11. The level of
cooperation among all levels of Government is higher than ever. The
CIA, FBI, and the broader intelligence community have implemented
significant reforms. In 2004, Congress created the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence and the National Counterterrorism
Center to ensure unity of effort in the intelligence community. This
was a major step toward improved information sharing.
State and local officials have a far greater understanding not only
of the threat and how to respond to it, but also, their communities and
those who may be at risk of radicalization. There are now 105 Joint
Terrorism Task Forces throughout the Nation, and 72 Fusion Centers in
which Federal, State, local, and Tribal authorities investigate
terrorism leads and share information. Since 2004, DHS has provided
more than $340 million in funding to the Fusion Centers. Information
sharing with the private sector has also become routine and is an
important part of our defenses.
An enormous amount of intelligence information constantly pours
into our National security system. And as evidence that there is still
room for improvement in handling this information, we saw missed
opportunities to stop the Christmas day bomber from boarding Northwest
Flight 253, as well as opportunities to intervene before the Fort Hood
shootings. But as a result of reforms in the last decade, many plots
have been disrupted and many terrorist operatives, including Osama bin
Laden, have been brought to justice.
Unfulfilled 9/11 Commission Recommendations
Despite the progress in information sharing and in other areas,
important 9/11 Commission recommendations remain unfulfilled. The 9/11
attacks demonstrated that teamwork, collaboration, and effective
communications at the site of a disaster are critical. Movement has
been made toward establishing a unity of command with one person in
charge of directing the efforts of multiple agencies. I have heard,
however, from too many community leaders and first responders that many
regions still have not solved the problem of having a unified command
structure.
There also has been inadequate progress in establishing
interoperable communications for first responders. That is why it is
vital that the Government allocate an additional 10 megahertz of radio
spectrum to public safety that will enhance their ability to
communicate during a disaster. I want to recognize the leadership that
Chairman King and Ranking Member Thompson and many Members of this
committee have shown in supporting a bill that will achieve this goal.
There have been improvements in transportation security and border
security. However, transportation security technology still lags in its
capability to screen passengers and baggage for concealed weapons and
explosives. And several attempted attacks over the past 2 years
perpetrated by terrorists who could have been detected by the U.S.
immigration system demonstrate that a more streamlined terrorist
watchlisting capability and improved information sharing between
intelligence agencies and immigration authorities must be implemented.
One area of significant progress is the deployment of the biometric
entry system known as US-VISIT. But a biometric exit component of US-
VISIT to determine which foreign nationals have left the United States
has not yet been deployed. If law enforcement and intelligence
officials had known for certain in August and September 2001 that two
of the 9/11 hijackers remained in the United States, the search for
them might have taken on greater urgency.
With respect to intelligence reform, the Director of National
Intelligence has made progress in several areas: Increased information
sharing, better analysis of intelligence, improved cooperation among
agencies, and sharpened collection priorities. But it still is not
clear that the DNI is the driving force for intelligence community
integration that the Commission envisioned. Some ambiguity appears to
remain with respect to the DNI's authority over budget and personnel.
Strengthening the DNI's position in these areas would advance the unity
of effort in intelligence, whether through legislation or with repeated
declarations from the President that the DNI is the unequivocal leader
of the intelligence community.
I also want to recognize that the FBI has gone through dramatic
change and has had strong leadership under Director Mueller. It
continues to move in a positive direction from a focus strictly on law
enforcement to preventing terrorism. This is a significant cultural
change that can be furthered by placing the status of intelligence
analysts on par with special agents, who have traditionally risen to
management at the Bureau.
The CIA has improved its intelligence analysis and removed barriers
between its analysts and operations officers. But recruiting well-
placed sources remains difficult and the CIA has had difficulty
recruiting officers qualified with the language skills where there is
the greatest need. Congress can help in the language area by supporting
programs that teach young people proficiency in foreign languages.
A major disappointment has been the failure of the administration
to empanel the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board. This was a
major 9/11 Commission recommendation that was strongly supported by all
Commissioners. At this time, the President has only nominated two
members to serve on the five-member Board, and neither of them has been
confirmed by the Senate. I commend Ranking Member Thompson and other
Members of the committee for the letter that they sent to the
administration about the Board's vacancies and encourage this committee
to continue to push the administration on this issue.
Another disappointment is the failure of Congress to reform
oversight of the intelligence community and the Department of Homeland
Security. The Commission recommended that Congress create a Joint
Committee for Intelligence or create House and Senate Committees with
the combined authorizing and appropriation powers. While these changes
have not been implemented, a positive step was the House Intelligence
Committee Chairman's commitment to include three Members of the House
Appropriations Committee in Intelligence Committee hearings and
briefings.
As this committee is well aware, oversight of the Department of
Homeland Security remains fractured. In 2009 alone, DHS officials
answered 11,680 letters, provided 2,058 briefings, and sent 232
witnesses to 166 hearings. This amounted to about 66 work years
responding to questions from Congress, at a cost to taxpayers of about
$10 million. This is an inefficient allocation of limited resources
needed to secure our Nation. Moreover, the massive Department will be
better integrated if there is integrated oversight.
iii. the capture of osama bin laden and the threat picture after his
death
The Bin Laden Operation
The capture of Osama bin Laden is a significant achievement of the
United States intelligence and military forces--the most significant
achievement to date in our efforts to defeat al-Qaeda. The raid took
hard work, cooperation, vigilance, and tenacity, over a period of
years. It involved surveillance, analysis of many bits of information,
interceptions, and the extraordinary skills of our Special Operations
Forces. The CIA and the military worked together seamlessly. The raid
was a culmination of intense and tireless efforts on the part of many
dedicated National security personnel over a period of many years.
It was a highly complex, innovative, and clandestine operation that
led us to Osama bin Laden. We would get a bit of intelligence from one
source, carefully analyze it, and then use it to drive further efforts
and operations. A simple intercepted phone call proved critically
important when the response to the caller said, ``I'm back with the
people I was with before''--that is, he had returned to Osama bin
Laden.
It used the full range of our capabilities, both in collecting
intelligence from human and technical sources, and subjecting it to
very rigorous analysis by our Government's leading experts on bin Laden
and his organization. There is no question that his capture came about
as a result of reforms that have recently been enacted in the Federal
Government that yielded much closer collaboration and sharing of
information among intelligence components and the military. That
cooperation paid dividends that assisted in locating bin Laden's hiding
place.
And we now have a major source of new information that the
intelligence community will analyze in very great detail. The trove of
information--the captured hard drive and documents--recovered from his
compound may eventually be even more important than his death.
Bin Laden's Death
Osama bin Laden was the most infamous terrorist of our time. He was
also the most successful. He brought together terrorist elements under
one movement, al-Qaeda. Most remarkably, as the mastermind of 9/11, he
persuaded 19 young men to go to their deaths for a cause. He also
directed the attacks on the American embassies in East Africa.
There is some difference of opinion on his role at his death. My
personal view is that for the last decade, Osama bin Laden has been a
figurehead more than a mastermind. I do not think that a man without a
telephone or access to the internet, relying on couriers, could have
been a prime mover in more recent terrorist operations. There can be no
doubt about his symbolic importance.
The single act of his death does not change everything--nothing
ever changes everything--it does not, for example, resolve two messy
wars. We should receive some satisfaction from his death, but not
exaltation. Men die, symbols do not. In his death, he can still inspire
terrorist attacks. But it is worth noting that in the Middle East, news
of his death was greeted with ambivalence, and even indifference.
Future of al-Qaeda
Whether it is a turning point in our fight against terrorism
remains to be seen. Although Osama bin Laden is dead, al-Qaeda is not--
it is a network, not a hierarchy. Over a period of years, al-Qaeda has
been very adaptive and resilient. Bin Laden's death is certainly a
setback for al-Qaeda but likely not its demise.
Al-Qaeda will be searching for an effective leader. Its likely next
leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, will almost certainly struggle to keep al-
Qaeda relevant. He is likely to be the last man standing in the
struggle for leadership. We should not underestimate Zawahiri. He is
extremely pious, ruthless; he is not a lightweight; he has been
instrumental in al-Qaeda's strategy, development, and evolution over a
period of years.
Al-Qaeda's capabilities to implement large-scale attacks are less
formidable than they were 10 years ago, but al-Qaeda continues to have
the intent and reach to kill dozens, or even hundreds, of Americans in
a single attack. The war against terror is not won. The work is not
done. It is not time to declare victory.
Al-Qaeda and its affiliates will almost certainly attempt to avenge
him. They will not necessarily attack soon. The threat from al-Qaeda is
more diverse and more complex than ever--although less severe than the
catastrophic proportions of the
9/11 attacks. It continues to hope to inflict mass casualties in the
United States
Al-Qaeda has been marked by rapid decentralization. The most
significant threats to American National security come from the
affiliates of core al-Qaeda--like al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
under U.S.-born Anwar al-Awlaki's leadership. Al-Qaeda's influence is
also on the rise in South Asia and continues to extend into failing or
failed states such as Yemen and Somalia.
In assessing terrorist threats to the American homeland, senior
U.S. counterterrorism officials now call attention to al-Qaeda's
strategy of ``diversification''--mounting attacks involving a wide
variety of perpetrators of different National and ethnic backgrounds
that cannot easily be ``profiled'' as threats. Lone wolves, who are not
connected to formal terrorist organizations, are the most difficult to
detect, in part because they do not fit any particular ethnic,
economic, educational, or social profile.
Most troubling, we have seen a pattern of increasing terrorist
recruitment of American citizens and residents. In 2009, there were two
actual terrorist attacks on our soil. The Fort Hood shooting, claimed
the lives of 13 people, and a U.S. military recruiter was killed in
Little Rock, Arkansas. Indeed, many counterterrorism experts consider
2010 the ``year of the homegrown terrorist.'' Last year, 10 Muslim-
Americans plotted against domestic targets, and 5 actually carried out
their plots. Today, we know that Americans are playing increasingly
prominent roles in al-Qaeda's movement. And Muslim-American youth are
being recruited in Somali communities in Minneapolis and Portland,
Oregon, in some respects moving the front lines to the interior of our
country.
Moreover, we know that individuals in the U.S. are engaging in
``self-radicalization,'' which is an alarming development. This process
is often influenced by blogs and other on-line content advocating
violent Islamist extremism. While there are methods to monitor some of
this activity, it is simply impossible to know the inner thinking of
every at-risk person. Thus, self-radicalization poses a grave threat in
the United States, and as I noted earlier, our National Security
Preparedness Group will soon release a report with recommendations for
improving our defenses to radicalization.
Because al-Qaeda and its affiliates will not give up, we cannot let
our guard down. We must not become complacent, but remain vigilant and
resolute.
Evolving Mechanisms for Attacking the United States
Our enemy continues to probe our vulnerabilities and design
innovative ways to attack us. Such innovation is best exemplified by
the discovery in October 2010 of explosives packed in toner cartridges,
addressed to synagogues in Chicago, and shipped on Fed Ex and UPS cargo
flights from Yemen. This plot constituted an assault on our
international transportation and commerce delivery systems. And it was
done without the terrorists ever having to set foot within the United
States. Although it failed, terrorists will not abandon efforts to
develop new ways to inflict great harm on us.
Another way that terrorists can attack without ever physically
crossing our borders is through a cyber attack. Successive DNIs have
warned that the cyber threat to critical infrastructure systems--to
electrical, financial, water, energy, food supply, military, and
telecommunications networks--is grave. Earlier this month, senior DHS
officials described a ``nightmare scenario'' of a terrorist group
hacking into United States computer systems and disrupting our electric
grid, shutting down power to large swathes of the country, perhaps for
as long as several weeks. As the current crisis in Japan demonstrates,
disruption of power grids and basic infrastructure can have devastating
effects on society.
This is not science fiction. It is possible to take down cyber
systems and trigger cascading side effects. Defending the United States
against such attacks must be an urgent priority.
iv. international implications
The capture and removal of Osama bin Laden raises many urgent
questions. Among them are the following:
What is the future of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship? The discovery
of bin Laden in a large compound adjacent to a Pakistani Army
cantonment, just a 2-hour drive from the Pakistani capital, and about a
mile from Pakistan's West Point--not in a remote area over which the
government has limited control--requires answers from the Pakistani
government about whether its intelligence service, military, or other
officials were aware of bin Laden's whereabouts for some time, possibly
even providing support. It is difficult to imagine that bin Laden would
have chosen to live in Abbottabad unless he had some assurance of
protection from Pakistan military and intelligence officials. There is
intense debate over how hard to press Pakistan for answers about bin
Laden and what Pakistani officials knew.
While Pakistan has cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts,
relations with Pakistan have been strained in recent years. The United
States has provided large amounts of aid to Pakistan in return for its
assistance in hunting down al-Qaeda leaders, but Pakistan has been
known to look both ways--helping the United States and the Taliban as
well.
Pakistan has been less than a full partner in our counterterrorism
efforts and in Afghanistan. Pakistan's government has long been
internally divided about terrorism. Parts of its government are
sympathetic to terrorism, parts are unwilling to act aggressively
against it, and other parts are either incompetent or playing a double
game with and against terrorism. U.S. officials are now openly
skeptical about Pakistan's commitment to countering terrorist activity
within their borders, and they question whether Pakistan will be a
better partner in identifying and apprehending terrorists in the
future.
For its part, Pakistan will likely continue to demand that the
United States stop encroachments upon its sovereignty in
counterterrorism operations. Thus, the death of Osama bin Laden may
very well, in the short run, strengthen the extremists.
This difficult and complex relationship with Pakistan must be
managed, not dissolved, in order to advance our shared interests in
countering terrorism and ending the war in Afghanistan. The U.S.-
Pakistan relationship is central to the interests of both countries.
The United States needs cooperation with Pakistan in its fight against
terrorism in Afghanistan and ending the war there. Pakistan provides a
vital transit link for goods destined for U.S. forces in Afghanistan,
and its collapse, with internal terrorist groups and nuclear weapons,
could be catastrophic. This is already one of the most difficult
bilateral relationships in the world, which has been made worse by
recent events. We can only manage it, we cannot resolve all the
tensions.
After many demands to cut aid to Pakistan, extensive efforts are
now underway to ease tensions between the two countries. In the end,
the United States will need to be committed to working with Pakistan
despite the lingering questions. Of this we can be sure: More tense
times lie ahead in the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Our focus must be on
long-term interests, not short-term frustration. We need a healthy
Pakistan that fights extremism and terror, and that means we should
help democratic forces within Pakistan.
Another question is Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden's death creates
new opportunities to begin real negotiations to end the conflict. The
situation there is not good. The United States can clear and hold any
area--but only for as long as we stay there. The Taliban have been
pushed back, but they are not close to being defeated. Our gains are
fragile and reversible. And the corruption and incompetence of the
Karzai government is well-known.
With bin Laden's death, U.S. policymakers may be in a position to
consider whether a political deal can be cut with the Taliban, which,
from our view would require: (1) The Taliban to turn over al-Qaeda
leaders, (2) maintaining progress that has been made in Afghanistan
towards a more open society, and (3) bringing an end to the war. We can
get to that deal by more fighting. Or we can get to a deal by
negotiating a political settlement. Success in Afghanistan is not easy
to define, but it includes establishing an Afghan government that, in
time, can hold off the Taliban with a modest amount of American support
and help.
A third issue is whether and how recent events in the Middle East--
the so-called Arab Spring--may counter the violent extremist agenda of
al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Al-Qaeda has been unsuccessful in its
attempts to destabilize Arab governments and replace them with a Muslim
Caliphate that stretches across the region. It has not been relevant to
the revolutionary waves sweeping the Middle East. Where al-Qaeda
failed, peaceful protesters have succeeded through their grassroots
uprisings in achieving regime change and dramatic political reforms.
What is erupting today in the Middle East is profoundly important--a
quest for freedom, for personal dignity, for justice, for a better
life. These demands are not going to fade away.
But these revolutions are not without risks. It is by no means
clear that they will succeed. If they falter and fail to destroy
repressive governments and to build a new democratic world, al-Qaeda
and other violent extremist groups could emerge again.
In any event, we are headed for a more uncertain Arab world.
Today Muslim people have a chance, with real elections,
constitutions, and political parties. If the people want and demand
democratic change and accountable governments, no government will be
able to resist. None of us can predict the outcome, but we of course
can hope for, and support, more democratic regimes.
The United States must seize the opportunity provided by the Arab
Spring, welcome the changes toward self-determination and opportunity,
oppose violence and repression, promote reform toward democracy, and
support economic development for the nations moving in a democratic
direction.
Public diplomacy (and nontraditional diplomacy more broadly) may
also be a useful tool in facilitating the change sweeping through the
region. We should seek to foster reform, forestall gross human rights
violations, and work closely with the international community, while
avoiding putting the American imprimatur on the protests.
The key will be to engage pragmatically with the governments of the
region to help them build stable institutions and provide immediate
economic improvement to their people. We should support an agenda of
opportunity for the Islamic world. People-to-people exchanges--between
legislators, businesspeople, students, academics, civil servants, trade
unions, lawyers, scientists, and other groups--could be very productive
here. In the 9/11 Commission Report, we recommended that the United
States ``rebuild the scholarship, exchange, and library programs that
reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope.'' A
significant exchange program for emerging Middle East and North Africa
democracies should be a relatively easy lift for Congress, and would be
a tangible way of signaling U.S. friendship to the new democracies, on
the basis of mutual respect and without seeming to meddle or to seek
control.
The United States and European Union should also work together to
use trade and aid policies to give a quick economic assist, in terms of
market access, to the new democratic governments (once they emerge).
Such an initiative would be much more effective if done in concert with
the European Union.
v. conclusion
Significant progress has been made since 9/11, and our country is
undoubtedly safer and more secure. We have damaged our enemy, but the
ideology of violent Islamist extremism is alive and attracting new
adherents, including right here in our own country. Close cooperation
with American Muslim communities is the key to preventing the domestic
radicalization that has troubled some of our European allies. Positive
outreach and efforts to foster mutual understanding are the best way to
prevent radicalization and sustain collaborative relationships.
Our terrorist adversaries and the tactics and techniques they
employ are evolving rapidly. We will see new attempts, and likely
successful attacks. One of our major deficiencies before the 9/11
attacks was that our National security agencies were not changing at
the accelerated rate required by a new and different kind of enemy. We
must not make that mistake again.
The terrorist threat will be with us far into the future, demanding
that we be ever vigilant. Our National security departments require
strong leadership and attentive management at every level to ensure
that all parts are working well together, that there is innovation and
imagination. Our agencies and their dedicated workforces have gone
through much change and we commend them for their achievements in
protecting the American people. But there is a tendency toward inertia
in all bureaucracies. Vigorous Congressional oversight is imperative to
ensure that they remain vigilant and continue to pursue needed reforms.
Our task is difficult. We must constantly assess our
vulnerabilities and anticipate new lines of attack. We have done much,
but there is much more to do.
Thank you for inviting me to testify, and for this committee's
long-standing leadership on these critical issues.
Chairman King. Thank you, Chairman Hamilton.
Our next witness is a long-time friend, fellow New Yorker,
whose mother is a constituent of mine. So I figured I would be
very polite to you today, which I would be anyway, especially
with your mother watching.
Very seriously, Fran Townsend is a career Federal
prosecutor with a very distinguished record in the field of
counterterrorism in several administrations, not just in the
Justice Department, but in the Coast Guard and in the White
House as President George Bush's principal counterterrorism
advisor. She is currently senior vice president at MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, is a National security contributor and
analyst, and she serves on the President's Intelligence
Advisory Board.
Fran, it is great to have you here today, and thank you for
all your service. I certainly look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF FRANCES F. TOWNSEND, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT,
WORLDWIDE GOVERNMENT, LEGAL AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS, MACANDREWS &
FORBES HOLDINGS, INC.
Ms. Townsend. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Thompson, and Members of the committee. Thank you very much for
inviting me here today.
Before I begin to address the topic at hand, it seems to me
that though we are discussing today threats to the United
States from terror, the impact of natural disasters like that
in Missouri have captured our hearts and prayers. I know that
we all, I think, pray for the victims, families, and the
missing.
I have to say it is a special privilege for me to be here
with you all today. Like many who devoted a substantial part of
their professional lives in the hunt for bin Laden and to bring
him to justice, it is especially satisfying to be with you to
consider now the threats we face in a world rid of him. In
discussing the threat we face, we must consider the role bin
Laden played. Bin Laden was at the heart of what
counterterrorism professionals refer to as the al-Qaeda core.
Bin Laden was the father, the founder, and ideological author.
He was, as the name of the organization suggests, the base.
Our understanding of bin Laden's role was imperfect and
evolved over time. While he was always viewed as a charismatic
inspirational figure, key to recruitment, fundraising,
ideology, and leadership, the U.S. view of his operational role
was unclear. Bin Laden inspired loyalty from affiliates like
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, who swore allegiance, or bayat, to him. He had a
direct hand in cases like the 1998 East Africa embassy bombings
and September 11.
For years after 9/11, it was believed he played a less
active role until, of course, last year, when he seemed to have
had a more direct role in the summer 2010 threat in Europe.
Since the raid on the bin Laden compound in Abbottabad, public
reports indicate bin Laden has played a more active operational
role, encouraging attacks against the United States and
targeting Americans world-wide. There have been warnings about
attack plans against railways, reports of a potential attack
against oil tankers, and we should expect more such warnings
from the Government in the coming days.
But we should understand many of these targets were
aspirational. They were being considered. There had been past
attacks against rail in London and Madrid, and, of course, the
al-Qaeda attack against the MV Limburg, so that such plans were
being considered and discussed is not surprising. That bin
Laden played an active operational role makes his sudden
absence from al-Qaeda more devastating for them. We know now
that bin Laden was focused on attacking the United States, so
his death is not only justice for the victims of September 11,
the USS Cole, and East Africa bombings, America is safer
because he is dead.
So the question is, what remains? I break it down basically
into two categories: Who is a threat to us; and, second, where
does that threat emanate from?
First, the who. There are three main categories, in my
mind, of who directly threatens the United States. First, there
are the remnants of the al-Qaeda core; second, the al-Qaeda
affiliates; and then last, the other extremist groups.
First, what remains of the al-Qaeda core? Ayman al-
Zawahiri, bin Laden's deputy; recently we have heard again of
Saif al-Adel, who has resurfaced. But al-Qaeda has failed to
name a new leader because there is an internal power struggle.
There was no agreed-upon succession plan. There is no one of
bin Laden's stature to inspire and guide operations and quell
disputes. The al-Qaeda core without bin Laden is badly
weakened. The chaos at the top of al-Qaeda is an important
targeting opportunity for the United States.
The second category of ``who'' is perhaps more immediately
dangerous to the United States. The second ``who'' are the al-
Qaeda affiliates and, most importantly, al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, headed by the American-born cleric Anwar al-Awlaki.
Intelligence and counterterrorism officials have rightly
described al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, as the
most immediate threat to the United States homeland. AQAP has
both the intent to attack and had demonstrated some capability.
AQAP was behind the Nidal Hasan Fort Hood event, the attempted
Christmas day underwear bomber, and the recent computer
cartridges attempt.
Awlaki is a serious threat. Unlike Zawahiri, he is a
charismatic and inspirational leader. He uses the internet and
taped lectures to recruit and radicalize world-wide. There are
other affiliates that I won't go into in depth, one in North
Africa, those in Somalia, and Asia, but AQAP poses the most
immediate threat.
The third category of ``who'' are other extremist groups:
The Pakistan Taliban, which was responsible for the training of
the Times Square bomber. Mullah Omar and the Quetta Shura
remain our enemy and a direct threat. We must be careful not to
write off radical groups that appear only regionally or locally
focused, as was the initial belief of the Pakistan Taliban.
Lashkar-e-Taiba, LET, which was behind the Mumbai attack, is
currently the subject of the trial in Chicago right now. The
Haqqani network in the Pakistan tribal areas continues to
target and kill coalition forces in Afghanistan.
Last among these other groups, we must not forget
Hezbollah. Although a Shiite extremist group, they remain
bankrolled by Iran, and prior to September 11 were responsible
for killing more Americans than any other terror group. They
are armed, militarily capable, deployed world-wide, and remain
a significant threat.
The next category that I mentioned is the ``where'' the
threat emanates from. Again, I will talk about three concerns:
First, ungoverned or weakly governed states or places; threats
inside the United States; and, third, complacency.
First, ungoverned or weakly governed states and places.
That was Afghanistan of the 1990s, where al-Qaeda planned and
trained. Today we see hotspots in Somalia along the Mali-
Mauritania border, in Yemen, and in Pakistan. I know from my
own experience both Yemen and Pakistan are frustrating and at
times duplicitous partners, but events this week require that I
raise a note of caution. The sophisticated Pakistan Taliban
attack on the Karachi Naval Air Base suggests a weaker and more
humiliated Pakistan military than was previously thought. We
must remember that Pakistan has a nuclear arsenal, and, as both
President Obama and President Bush have said, the greatest
threat to our security is a terrorist group like the Pakistan
Taliban with a nuclear weapon.
While it is right that we reevaluate our bilateral
relationship with Pakistan, especially given the testimony this
week in the Chicago case that shows a link between the
Pakistani Intelligence Service and the LET terror group, we
must carefully consider what are the alternatives and
consequences to the partnership with Pakistan.
There is another weakly-governed space I must mention,
though it is not a traditional geographic space. You cannot
find it on a map. That is cyberspace and the internet. For all
the enormous good of the internet, al-Qaeda and other terrorist
groups have learned to use it to their advantage to recruit, to
train, to radicalize, and to fundraise. Every plot we uncovered
during my time in Government, computers were used. Just by way
of example, al Awlaki communicated via the internet with the
Fort Hood shooter, and bin Laden had the computers in his
compound.
The United States has tremendous capability, and a lot of
important work has been done in this area across both the Bush
and Obama administrations. Our soldiers and counterterrorism
professionals know this is a new 21st-Century battlefield just
as any other geography where we fight. It is important the
Congress and the American people understand we are fighting
there to.
The second ``where'' is here inside the United States. As
the United States has strengthened its border screening, al-
Qaeda has made it a priority to recruit Americans and permanent
residents who more easily cross our borders. This threats
manifests itself with single individuals who attempt attacks,
again, like Fort Hood, Times Square, and Christmas day attacks,
or in small groups like the Najibullah Zazi case against the
New York City subway with backpack bombs.
The last, ``where'' does the threat come from, doesn't fit
easily into any of these categories, but it is equally
pernicious and dangerous, and that is the threat of
complacency. Killing bin Laden was a difficult and courageous
decision by President Obama and an enormous success for the
Nation, but the global war on terror is by no means over.
Regardless of what you call it, the fight continues because our
enemies continue. We won an important and decisive battle, but
the threat remains. We have seized the momentum, but we must
not think this means we can reduce the investments that
produced this success. Our intelligence, military, and law
enforcement agencies need the budget and legal authorities to
succeed.
There is an important vote today in the Senate extending
the PATRIOT Act, and while I believe it should have been
permanently extended, it must be extended for the next 4 years.
The IDENT database should be properly funded. We must prevent
terrorists from getting nuclear or other biological weapons,
and that means we must ensure we have the ability to respond by
maintaining the Strategic National Stockpile and our other
unique operational capabilities.
In this time of continued financial crisis, there will be
pressure to find cuts. My caution to you is that all cuts are
not equal. Capability is built over time. What we found in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11 is that it cannot be quickly
reacquired in a crisis. President Obama's courageous decision
to authorize the bin Laden raid was enabled by an intelligence
community whose budget and capability was doubled over the last
decade, and this mission was executed by warriors better
resourced and trained over the last 10 years. You get what you
pay for, and to use the phrase from the MasterCard commercial,
the killing of bin Laden was priceless. It was the
accomplishment of a Nation and a moment of National pride. We
unequivocally told the world: No matter how difficult the task
nor how long the journey, we will never forget.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the privilege to testify
today. I thank the American people for the privilege of serving
them for more than 20 years.
Chairman King. Thank you.
Our next witness is Peter Bergen, who I assume is the only
one in this room that has actually was face-to-face with bin
Laden. I think you were the first Western broadcast journalist
to interview him. You wrote the book ``The Osama bin Laden I
Know'' and also ``The Longest War''. Obviously, you have a
tremendous depth of insight, knowledge, and a career of
expertise. I look forward to your testimony today, as always,
and thank you for once again being back before the committee.
STATEMENT OF PETER BERGEN, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES
PROGRAM, NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION
Mr. Bergen. Thank you, Chairman King, thank you, Ranking
Member Thompson, thank you to the Members of the committee, for
the privilege of testifying here.
The death of Osama bin Laden is hard to undervalue, as
Representative Hamilton and Fran Townsend have already made
clear. But just to amplify what they said, when you join al-
Qaeda, you don't swear an oath of allegiance to al-Qaeda or al
Qaedism. You swear a personal oath of allegiance to bin Laden
himself.
There are many differences between al-Qaeda and the Nazi
Party, but there is one similarity. When you join the Nazi
Party, you didn't swear an oath of allegiance to nazism. You
swore a personal oath to Adolph Hitler. When Adolph Hitler
died, nazism essentially died with him. Now, I am not going to
make the claim that al-Qaeda is going to die with the death of
bin Laden or al-Qaedism or bin Ladenism or whatever you want to
call it, but you cannot underestimate how important this is.
In 1988, bin Laden and about a dozen other guys founded al-
Qaeda. It was, of course, bin Laden's idea to attack the United
States on 9/11. He has been the founder of this group
throughout its history, he has been the leader of the group
through its history, and he is the intellectual author of the
9/11 attacks. It was, after all, against a lot of internal
advice and dissent he pushed the idea of attacking the United
States.
We now know from documents recovered and from
Representative Hamilton's work on the 9/11 Commission that
there were plenty of people in al-Qaeda who said actually
attacking the United States is going to be pretty
counterproductive, and it turned out to be very
counterproductive. Yet bin Laden, was able--because he enjoyed
what Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the operational commander of 9/11,
called--in testimony he put in the Zacarias Moussaoui trial, he
pointed out that when bin Laden decided something and 98
percent of the Shura Council of al-Qaeda was against him, it
was bin Laden's way or the highway. So take this guy out of the
equation, this is very damaging for al-Qaeda core.
Who can replace him? Representative King suggested we talk
a little bit about that. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the No. 2, is, of
course, his deputy. But as Fran Townsend pointed out, there is
no official succession plan. According to reporting that I did
for CNN, there is an interim leader of al-Qaeda--Fran also
mentioned him--Saif al-Adel. He is a former colonel in the
Egyptian Special Forces. Al-Qaeda recognizes that it is kind of
embarrassing that they haven't appointed a succession leader,
and so there was an interim person to take over, perhaps to
grease the skids for Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is also an
Egyptian, to take over the organization. But, in a way, the
best thing that could happen for the United States and for the
civilized world is for Ayman al-Zawahiri to take over al-Qaeda
because he would run what remains of the organization into the
ground.
If you remember Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's death in 2006, the
people who replaced him heading al-Qaeda in Iraq were nowhere
near as potent in al-Qaeda in Iraq, which basically ceased
being an effective insurgent organization while retaining some
capabilities today.
So the death of bin Laden, we just want to underline how
important it is.
A second point which hasn't been mentioned hitherto is in
the Arab Spring, because if al-Qaeda was a huge nail in the
coffin of al-Qaeda the organization, the Arab Spring is a
massive nail in the coffin of al-Qaeda ideology. Al-Qaeda, the
ideology, was already losing steam before the Arab Spring;
support for bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and suicide bombings being
cratering around the Muslim world for the very good reason that
Muslims have noticed that most of the victims of al-Qaeda or
allies have been Muslims themselves, which is not impressive
for groups that position themselves as the defender of Islam.
But the Arab Spring underlines this losing the war of ideas in
the Muslim world that has been going on for some period of
time.
One very striking thing to me is we haven't seen a single
picture of bin Laden carried by the protesters in Cairo or
Benghazi or any other city in the Middle East. We haven't seen
a single American flag burning, which was so pro forma in that
part of the world. We haven't seen a single Israeli flag
burning. Al-Qaeda's foot soldiers' ideas and their hope for
outcomes are just not part of the conversation.
That said--and these are all very, very good pieces of news
that we shouldn't look the gift horse in the face, in a sense--
threats do remain. I think that Fran has already mentioned al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. I am not going to go over that
same territory. But I think the death of bin Laden doesn't
really affect the operations of al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula. I don't think it really affects the operations of al
Shabab. I don't think it really affects the operations of al-
Qaeda in Iraq. I don't think it really affects the operations
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. These groups don't have--most
of them, absent al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula--don't have
huge capabilities. Al Shabab has been able to attack in Uganda
and also in Denmark, so it has shown some ability of outer
barrier operations. Al-Qaeda in Iraq had some role, it looks
like, in the Glasgow airport attack and also the attacks on the
American-owned hotels in Jordan in 2005. But the point is these
groups have been constrained in their ability to attack the
American homeland.
My final point, because I have run out of time, the New
America Foundation and Maxwell School at Syracuse University
have looked at the 180 jihadist terrorist attacks in the United
States since 9/11, and there is some really strikingly good
news and some bad news in this analysis. Only 17 Americans have
been killed by a jihadist terrorist since 9/11, which is a
pretty striking number, given the kind of fears we had after 9/
11. Not one of the cases we looked at involved chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, also kind of a
strikingly good finding, given the fears we had of that after
9/11. That said, we have had some pretty serious near misses.
The Chairman mentioned Najibullah Zazi. We had Faisal Shahzad.
We had Abdulmutallab. So these groups retained some
capabilities.
One final point on all this. The cases we looked at really
spiked in 2009 and 2010. We found 76 cases out of the 180. Just
to end on a sort of optimistic note, in the first half of 2011,
there has been a rather dramatic dip in the number of cases. So
we have only had six this year. So the question before the
committee and, in fact, before the Nation is: Was 2009 and 2010
sort of an outlier, or was it part of a pattern? I think that
is still very much an open question, but we have seen some good
news this year.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. Thank you, Mr. Bergen.
[The statement of Mr. Bergen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Peter Bergen
May 25, 2011
Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished Members of
the committee, thank you for the opportunity today to testify today
about threats to the American homeland after the death of Osama bin
Laden.
The death of bin Laden is devastating to ``core'' al-Qaeda, but
arguably just as important to undermining the terrorist organization is
the large amount of information that was recovered at the compound
where he was killed in northern Pakistan on May 2, 2011. That
information is already being exploited for leads. Between the ``Arab
Spring'' and the death of bin Laden, both al-Qaeda's ideology and
organization are under assault. That said, jihadist terrorism isn't
going away. Regional affiliates such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula remain threatening and there is a continued low-level threat
posed by ``homegrown'' jihadist militants inspired by bin Laden's
ideas.
Such militants might successfully carry out bombings against
symbolic targets that would kill dozens, such as against subways in
Manhattan, as was the plan in September 2009 of Najibullah Zazi, an
Afghan-American al-Qaeda recruit, or they might blow up an American
passenger jet, as was the intention 3 months later of the Nigerian Umar
Farouq Abdulmutallab, who had been recruited by al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula. Had that bombing attempt succeeded, it would have killed
hundreds. This level of threat is likely to persist for years to come.
However, al-Qaeda no longer poses a National security threat to the
American homeland of the type that could result in a mass-casualty
attack anywhere close to the scale of
9/11.
Indeed, a survey of the 180 individuals indicted or convicted in
Islamist terrorism cases in the United States since the 9/11 attacks by
the Maxwell School at Syracuse University and the New America
Foundation found that none of the cases involved the use of chemical,
biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, while only four of the
homegrown plots since 9/11 progressed to an actual attack in the United
States, attacks that resulted in a total of 17 deaths. The most notable
was the 2009 shootings at Ft. Hood, Texas by Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan,
who killed 13. By way of comparison, according to the FBI, between 2001
and 2009, 73 people were killed in hate crimes in the United States.
The number of jihadist terrorism cases involving U.S. citizens or
residents has markedly spiked in the past 2 years. In 2009 and 2010
there were 76, almost half of the total since 9/11, but in the first
half of 2011 the number of such cases has subsided rather dramatically.
This year there have been a total of just six jihadist terrorism cases
by the date of this hearing.
American officials and the wider public should realize that by the
law of averages al-Qaeda or an affiliate will succeed in getting some
kind of attack through in the next years, and the best response to that
would be to demonstrate that we as a society are resilient and are not
be intimidated by such actions because our overreactions can play into
the hands of the jihadist groups. When al-Qaeda or affiliated groups
can provoke overwrought media coverage based on attacks that don't even
succeed--such as the near-miss on Christmas day 2009 when Abdulmutallab
tried to blow up Northwest Flight 253 over Detroit--we are doing their
work for them. The person who best understood the benefits of American
overreaction was bin Laden himself, who in 2004 said on a tape that
aired on Al Jazeera: ``All that we have to do is to send two mujahedeen
to the furthest point east to raise a piece of cloth on which is
written al-Qaeda, in order to make generals race there to cause America
to suffer human, economic, and political losses.''\1\ Let us not give
bin Laden any more such victories now that he is dead.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Osama bin Laden, tape released November 1, 2004, http://
articles.cnn.com/2004-11-01/world/binladen.tape_1_al-jazeera-qaeda-
bin?_s=PM:WORLD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This testimony focuses on the threat from al-Qaeda, its affiliates,
and those motivated by its ideas, while recognizing that these are not
the only sources of terrorism directed against the United States.
The testimony will attempt to answer four questions:
What effect will the killing of bin Laden have on U.S.
security interests, and on core al-Qaeda's goals and
capabilities?
What threats emanate from Pakistan-based militant groups
other than al-Qaeda?
What threats emanate from al-Qaeda's regional affiliates?
What threats emanate from domestic militants motivated by
jihadist terrorist ideas?
1. What effect will the killing of bin Laden have on U.S. security
interests, and on core al-Qaeda's goals and capabilities?
After the fall of the Taliban in the winter of 2001 bin Laden
didn't, of course, continue to exert day-to-day control over al-Qaeda,
but statements from him have always been the most reliable guide to the
future actions of jihadist movements around the world and this remained
the case even while he was on the run. In the past decade bin Laden
issued more than 30 video- and audiotapes.\2\ Those messages reached
untold millions worldwide via television, the internet, and newspapers.
The tapes not only instructed al-Qaeda's followers to continue to kill
Westerners and Jews; some also carried specific instructions that
militant cells then acted on. In 2003, bin Laden called for attacks
against members of the coalition in Iraq; subsequently terrorists
bombed commuters on their way to work in Madrid and London. Bin Laden
also called for attacks on the Pakistani state in 2007, which is one of
the reasons that Pakistan had more than 50 suicide attacks that
year.\3\ In March 2008 bin Laden denounced the publication of cartoons
of the Prophet Mohammed in a Danish newspaper, which he said would soon
be avenged. Three months later, an al-Qaeda suicide attacker bombed the
Danish Embassy in Islamabad, killing six.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ IntelCenter, a U.S. Government contractor that tracks jihadist
publications, says bin Laden released 33 tapes in the 8 years between
9/11 and January 2010. IntelCenter Breakout of as-Sahab audio/video,
2002-26 February 2010. Email from Ben Venzke, February 26, 2010.
\3\ ``Istanbul rocked by double bombing,'' BBC News, November 20,
2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3222608.stm; Craig Whitlock and
Susan Glasser, ``On tape, bin Laden tries new approach,'' Washington
Post, December 17, 2004. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A3927-2004Dec16.html; Joel Roberts, ``Al-Qaeda threatens more oil
attacks,'' CBS News, February 25, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/
2006/02/27/world/main1346541_page2.shtml; ``Bin Laden tape encourages
Pakistanis to rebel,'' Associated Press, September 20, 2007, http://
www.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-09-20-al-Qaeda-video_N.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Bin Laden exercised near-total control over al-Qaeda, whose members
had to swear a religious oath personally to bin Laden, so ensuring
blind loyalty to him. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the operational commander
of the 9/11 attacks, outlined the dictatorial powers that bin Laden
exercised over his organization: ``If the Shura council at al-Qaeda,
the highest authority in the organization, had a majority of 98 percent
on a resolution and it is opposed by bin Laden, he has the right to
cancel the resolution.''\4\ Bin Laden's son Omar recalls that the men
who worked for al-Qaeda had a habit of requesting permission before
they spoke with their leader, saying, ``Dear prince: May I speak?''\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Substitution for the testimony of KSM, trial of Zacarias
Moussaoui, http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/
Substitution_for_the_Testimony_of_KSM.
\5\ Jean Sasson and Omar and Najwa bin Laden, Growing Up Bin Laden
(St. Martin's Press: New York, NY, 2009), p. 161 and 213.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Materials recovered from the Abbottabad compound in northern
Pakistan where bin Laden was killed paint a picture of a leader deeply
involved in tactical, operational, and strategic planning for al-Qaeda,
and in communication with other leaders of the group and even the
organization's affiliates overseas.\6\ The death of bin Laden
eliminates the founder of al-Qaeda, which has only enjoyed one leader
since its founding in 1988, and it also eliminates the one man who
provided broad, largely unquestioned strategic goals to the wider
jihadist movement. Around the world, those who joined al-Qaeda in the
past two decades have sworn baya, a religious oath of allegiance to bin
Laden, rather than to the organization itself, in the same way that
Nazi party members swore an oath of fealty to Hitler, rather than to
Nazism. That baya must now be transferred to whomever the new leader of
al-Qaeda is going to be.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane, ``Data show bin Laden plots,''
New York Times, May 5, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/06/world/
asia/06intel.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of course, even as the al-Qaeda organization withers there are
pretenders to bin Laden's throne. The first is the dour Egyptian
surgeon, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who is the deputy leader of al-Qaeda, and
therefore technically bin Laden's successor. But Zawahiri is not
regarded as a natural leader and even among his fellow Egyptian
militants Zawahiri is seen as a divisive force and so he is unlikely to
be able to step into the role of the paramount leader of al-Qaeda and
of the global jihadist movement that was occupied by bin Laden.\7\
There is scant evidence that Zawahiri has the charisma of bin Laden,
nor that he commands the respect bordering on love that was accorded to
bin Laden by members of al-Qaeda.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Jamal Ismail, interview by author, July 29, 2004, Islamabad,
Pakistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another possible leader of al-Qaeda is Saif al-Adel, also an
Egyptian, who has played a role as a military commander of the
terrorist group, and since 9/11 has spent many years living in Iran
under some form of house arrest. Adel has been appointed the
``caretaker'' leader of the terrorist organization, according to Noman
Benotman, a former leader of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a
militant organization that was once aligned with al-Qaeda, but has in
recent years has renounced al-Qaeda's ideology.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Peter Bergen, ``Egyptian Saif al-Adel now acting leader of al-
Qaeda,'' CNN.com, May 17, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-17/
world/mideast.al.qaeda.appointee_1_al-adel-al-qaeda-libyan-islamic-
fighting-group?_s=PM:WORLD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Benotman, who has known the leaders of al-Qaeda for more than two
decades and has long been a reliable source of information about the
inner workings of the terrorist group, says that based on his personal
communications with militants and discussions on jihadist forums, Adel
has emerged as the interim leader of al-Qaeda as it reels from the
death of its founder and eventually transitions, presumably, to the
uncharismatic Zawahiri.
A wild card is that one of bin Laden's dozen or so sons--endowed
with an iconic family name--could eventually rise to take over the
terrorist group. Already Saad bin Laden, one of the oldest sons, has
played a middle management role in al-Qaeda.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Douglas Farah and Dana Priest, ``Bin Laden son plays key role
in al-Qaeda,'' Washington Post, October 14, 2003, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/20/
AR2007082000980.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the key issues that any future leader of al-Qaeda has to
reckon with now is dealing with the fallout from the large quantities
of sensitive information that were recovered by U.S. forces at the
compound in Abbottabad where bin Laden was killed. That information is
likely to prove quite damaging to al-Qaeda's operations.
Jihadist terrorism will not, of course, disappear because of the
death of bin Laden. Indeed, the Pakistan Taliban have already mounted
attacks in Pakistan that they said were revenge for bin Laden's
death,\10\ but it is hard to imagine two more final endings to the
``War on Terror'' than the popular revolts against the authoritarian
regimes in the Middle East and the death of bin Laden. No protestors in
the streets of Cairo or Benghazi carried placards of bin Laden's face,
and very few demanded the imposition of Taliban-like rule, al-Qaeda's
preferred end-state for the countries in the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Reza Sayah, ``Blasts kill at least 70 in northwest Pakistan,''
CNN.com, May 12, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-12/world/
pakistan.explosions_1_drone-strikes-north-waziristan-
militants?_s=PM:WORLD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If the Arab Spring was a large nail in the coffin of al-Qaeda's
ideology, the death of bin Laden was an equally large nail in the
coffin of al-Qaeda the organization.
Media stories asserting that al-Qaeda has played no role in the
revolts in the Middle East provoked a furious response from the Yemeni-
American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, a leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula. In his group's Inspire magazine, a slick Web-based
publication, heavy on photographs and graphics that, unusually for a
jihadist organ, is written in colloquial English, Awlaki penned an
essay titled ``The Tsunami of Change.'' In the article, Awlaki made the
uncontroversial point that the regimes based on fear were ending in the
Arab world because of the revolutions and protests from Egypt to
Bahrain. But he went on to assert that, contrary to commentators who
had written that the Arab revolts represented a total repudiation of
al-Qaeda's founding ideology, the world should ``know very well that
the opposite is the case.''\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Anwar al-Awlaki, ``Tsunami of change,'' Inspire, March 2011,
http://info.publicintelligence.net/InspireMarch2011.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Awlaki also turned to this analyst, writing, ``for a so-called
`terrorism expert' such as Peter Bergen, it is interesting to see how
even he doesn't get it right this time. For him to think that because a
Taliban-style regime is not going to take over following the
revolutions, is a too short-term way of viewing the unfolding events.''
In other words: Just you wait--Taliban-type theocracies will be coming
to the Middle East as the revolutions there unfold further. Awlaki also
wrote that it was wrong to say that al-Qaeda viewed the revolutions in
the Middle East with ``despair.'' Instead, he claimed that ``the
Mujahedeen (holy warriors) around the world are going through a moment
of elation and I wonder whether the West is aware of the upsurge in
Mujahedeen activity in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen, Arabia, Algeria
and Morocco?''
We do not, of course, know the final outcome of the Arab
revolutions, but there is very little chance that al-Qaeda or other
extremist groups will be able to grab the reins of power as the
authoritarian regimes of the Middle East crumble. But while al-Qaeda
and its allies cannot take power anywhere in the Muslim world, these
groups do thrive on chaos and civil war. And the whole point of
revolutions is that they are inherently unpredictable even to the
people who are leading them, so anything could happen in the coming
years in Libya and Yemen, and much is unpredictable in Egypt, and even
in Saudi Arabia.
2. What threats emanate from Pakistan-based militant groups other than
al-Qaeda?
One of bin Laden's most toxic legacies is that even terrorist
groups that don't call themselves ``al-Qaeda'' have adopted his
ideology and a number of South Asian groups now threaten the West.
According to Spanish prosecutors, the late leader of the Pakistani
Taliban, Baitullah Mehsud sent a team of would-be suicide bombers to
Barcelona to attack the subway system there in January 2008. A
Pakistani Taliban spokesman confirmed this in a videotaped interview in
which he said that those suicide bombers ``were under pledge to
Baitullah Mehsud'' and were sent because of the Spanish military
presence in Afghanistan.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Fernando Reinares, ``A case study of the January 2008 suicide
bomb plot in Barcelona,'' Combating Terrorism Center Sentinel, January
15, 2009, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-case-study-of-the-january-
2008-suicide-bomb-plot-in-barcelona.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2009 the Pakistani Taliban trained an American recruit for an
attack in New York. Faisal Shahzad, who had once worked as a financial
analyst in the accounting department at the Elizabeth Arden cosmetics
company in Stamford, Connecticut, travelled to Pakistan where he
received 5 days of bomb-making training from the Taliban in the tribal
region of Waziristan. Armed with this training and $12,000 in cash,
Shahzad returned to Connecticut where he purchased a Nissan Pathfinder.
He placed a bomb in the SUV and detonated it in Times Square on May 1,
2010 around 6 p.m. when the sidewalks were thick with tourists and
theatergoers. The bomb, which was designed to act as a fuel-air
explosive, luckily was a dud and Shahzad was arrested 2 days later as
he tried to leave JFK airport for Dubai.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Benjamin Weiser and Colin Moynihan, ``Guilty plea in Times
Square bomb plot,'' New York Times, June 21, 2010, http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/06/22/nyregion/22terror.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Also based in the Pakistani tribal regions are a number of other
jihadist groups allied to both the Taliban and al-Qaeda such as the
such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and the Islamic Jihad Union
that have trained dozens of Germans for attacks in Europe. Two Germans
and a Turkish resident in Germany, for instance, trained in the tribal
regions and then planned to bomb the massive U.S. Ramstein airbase in
Germany in 2007.\14\ Before their arrests, the men had obtained 1,600
pounds of industrial strength hydrogen peroxide, enough to make a
number of large bombs.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Paul Cruickshank, ``The Militant Pipeline,'' New America
Foundation, February 2010, http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/
sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/cruickshank.pdf.
\15\ ``Four jailed over plot to attack U.S. bases,'' Associated
Press, March 4, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/35702791/ns/
world_news-europe/t/four-jailed-over-plot-attack-us-bases/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Mumbai attacks of 2008 showed that bin Laden's ideas about
attacking Western and Jewish targets had also spread to Pakistani
militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which had previously
focused only on Indian targets. Over a 3-day period in late November
2008 LeT carried out multiple attacks in Mumbai targeting five-star
hotels housing Westerners and a Jewish-American community center. The
Pakistani-American David Headley played a key role in LeT's massacre in
Mumbai traveling to the Indian financial capital on five extended trips
in the 2 years before the attacks. There Headley made videotapes of the
key locations attacked by the ten LeT gunmen including the Taj Mahal
and Oberoi hotels and Chabad House, the Jewish community center.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ USA v. David Coleman Headley, U.S. District Court Northern
District of Illinois Eastern Division Case No. 09 CR 830.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Sometime in 2008, Headley hatched a plan to attack the Danish
newspaper Jyllands-Posten, which 3 years earlier had published cartoons
of the Prophet Mohammed that were deemed to be offensive by many
Muslims. In January 2009 Headley traveled to Copenhagen, where he
reconnoitered the Jyllands-Posten newspaper on the pretext that he ran
an immigration business that was looking to place some advertising in
the paper. Following his trip to Denmark, Headley met with Ilyas
Kashmiri in the Pakistani tribal regions to brief him on his findings.
Kashmiri ran a terrorist organization, Harakat-ul-Jihad Islami, closely
tied to al-Qaeda. Headley returned to Chicago in mid-June 2009 and was
arrested there 3 months later as he was preparing to leave for Pakistan
again. He told investigators that he was planning to kill the Jyllands-
Posten's cultural editor who had first commissioned the cartoons as
well as the cartoonist Kurt Westergaard who had drawn the cartoon he
found most offensive; the Prophet Mohammed with a bomb concealed in his
turban.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Sebastian Rotella, ``Pakistan's terror connections,''
ProPublica, http://www.propublica.org/topic/mumbai-terror-attacks/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Harakat-ul-Jihad Islami,
the Islamic Jihad Union and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan are all
based or have a significant presence in Pakistan's tribal regions and
have track records of trying to attack Western and/or American targets
and should therefore all be considered threats to American interests.
The Pakistani Taliban, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harakat-ul-Jihad Islami have
also been able to attract American recruits. Already the Pakistani
Taliban has carried out attacks in response to bin Laden's death.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ Reza Sayah, ``Blasts kill at least 70 in northwest Pakistan,''
CNN.com, May 12, 2011, http://articles.cnn.com/2011-05-12/world/
pakistan.explosions_1_drone-strikes-north-waziristan-
militants?_s=PM:WORLD.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
3. what threats emanate from al-qaeda's regional affiliates?
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Anwar al-Awlaki, the American-born cleric living in Yemen has
increasingly taken an operational role in ``al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula,'' (AQAP) which was responsible for attempting to bring down
Northwest Flight 253 over Detroit on Christmas day 2009 with a bomb
secreted in the underwear of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a Nigerian
recruit. If Abdulmutallab had succeeded in bringing down the passenger
jet, the bombing not only would have killed hundreds but would also
have had a large effect on the U.S. economy already reeling from the
effect of the worst recession since the Great Depression, and would
have devastated the critical aviation and tourism businesses.
President Obama regards Awlaki as so dangerous that he has
authorized, seemingly for the first time in American history, the
assassination of a U.S. citizen. Awlaki's command of English and
internet savvy helped to radicalize militants such as Major Nidal Hasan
who killed 13 of his fellow soldiers at Ft. Hood Texas in 2009. That
attack happened after a series of email exchanges between Hasan and
Awlaki in which the cleric said it was religiously sanctioned for Hasan
to kill fellow soldiers.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Brian Ross, ``Major Hasan's email: `I can't wait to join you'
in the afterlife,'' ABC, November 19, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/
Blotter/major-hasans-mail-wait-join-afterlife/story?id=9130339.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In October 2010 AQAP hid bombs in toner cartridges on planes bound
for Chicago that were only discovered at the last moment at East
Midlands Airport and in Dubai.\20\ The skillful AQAP bomb-maker who
made those bombs is still at large, according to U.S. officials and
will continue to attempt to smuggle hard-to-detect bombs on to American
or other Western planes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Scott Shane, ``U.S. hunts for more suspicious packages,'' New
York Times, October 30, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/31/us/
31plane.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While carrying out bin Laden's overall strategy of attacking the
United States, AQAP was operating largely independent of him and so
will not be much affected by bin Laden's death.
Al Shabab
In September 2009, the Somali Islamist insurgent group Al Shabab
(``the youth'' in Arabic) formally pledged allegiance to bin Laden
following a 2-year period in which it had recruited Somali-Americans
and other U.S. Muslims to fight in the war in Somalia.\21\ Six months
earlier bin Laden had given his imprimatur to the Somali jihad in an
audiotape released titled ``Fight On, Champions of Somalia.''\22\ After
it announced its fealty to bin Laden, Shabab was able to recruit larger
numbers of foreign fighters, by one estimate up to 1,200 were working
with the group by 2010. Today, Shabab controls much of southern
Somalia.\23\ Worrisomely, Shabab has shown an ability to send its
operatives outside of Somalia, killing dozens in suicide attacks in
Uganda last year \24\ and dispatching an assassin to Denmark to kill
Kurt Westergaard, the Danish cartoonist who had drawn the cartoons of
the Prophet Mohamed that were deemed to be offensive. The cartoonist
only survived the assault because he had taken the precaution of
installing a safe room in his house.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Agence France Presse, ``Somalia's al-Shabab proclaims
allegiance to al-Qaeda chief,'' September 23, 2009.
\22\ Osama bin Laden, ``Fight on, champions of Somalia,'' March 19,
2009, http://www.nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/nefaubl0309-2.pdf.
\23\ BBC News, ``Somalia: government captures al-Shabab militia
bases,'' March 5, 2011, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
12657466.
\24\ Sudarsan Raghavan, ``Islamic militant group al-Shabab claims
Uganda bombing,'' Washington Post, July 12, 2010, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/12/
AR2010071200476.html.
\25\ BBC News, ``Danish police shoot intruder at cartoonist's
home,'' January 2, 2010, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8437433.stm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shabab has managed to plant al-Qaeda-like ideas into the heads of
even its American recruits. Shirwa Ahmed, an ethnic Somali, graduated
from high school in Minneapolis in 2003, and then worked pushing
passengers in wheelchairs at Minneapolis Airport. In late 2007 Ahmed
traveled to Somalia and a year later, on October 29, 2008, Ahmed drove
a truck loaded with explosives towards a government compound in
Puntland, northern Somalia, blowing himself up and killing about 20
people. The FBI matched Ahmed's finger, recovered at the scene of the
bombing, to fingerprints already on file for him. Ahmed was the first
American suicide attacker anywhere.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Spencer Hsu and Carrie Johnson, ``Somali Americans recruited
by extremists,'' Washington Post, March 11, 2009, http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/10/
AR2009031003901.html; ``Joining the fight in Somalia,'' New York Times,
interactive timeline, July 12, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2009/07/12/us/20090712-somalia-timeline.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the high death rate for the Americans fighting in Somalia, as
well as the considerable attention this group has received from the
FBI, it is unlikely that the couple of dozen American veterans of the
Somali war pose much of a threat to the United States itself. It is
however, plausible now that Shabab had declared itself to be an al-
Qaeda affiliate, that U.S. citizens in the group might be recruited to
engage in anti-American operations overseas.
Shabab has operated independently of al-Qaeda ``core'' and so will
not be much affected by bin Laden's death.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI)
In 2008 there was a sense that al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) was on the
verge of defeat. The American ambassador to Iraq, Ryan Crocker said,
``You are not going to hear me say that al-Qaeda is defeated, but
they've never been closer to defeat than they are now.''\27\ Certainly
AQI has lost its ability to control large swaths of the country and a
good chunk of the Sunni population as it did in 2006, but the group has
proven surprisingly resilient as demonstrated by the fact that it
pulled off large-scale bombings in central Baghdad in 2010 and 2011.
AQI has also shown some ability to carry out operations outside Iraq as
well: It attacked three American hotels in Amman, Jordan in 2005 \28\
and it had some sort of role in the attacks on Glasgow Airport 2 years
later.\29\ As U.S. forces pull down in Iraq, AQI may be tempted to
mount other out-of-country attacks against American or Western targets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\27\ Lee Keath, ``Al Qaeda is close to defeat in Iraq, U.S.
ambassador says,'' Associated Press, May 25, 2008, http://
www.boston.com/news/world/articles/2008/05/25/
al_qaeda_is_close_to_defeat_in_iraq_us_ambassador_says/?comments=all.
\28\ BBC News, ``Al-Qaeda claims Jordan attacks,'' November 10,
2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4423714.stm.
\29\ Raymond Bonner, Jane Perlez, and Eric Schmitt, ``British
inquiry of jailed plot points to Iraq's Qaeda group,'' New York Times,
December 14, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/14/world/europe/
14london.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The death of bin Laden is unlikely to affect AQI much.
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
In September 2006 the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and
Combat's leader Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, explained that al-Qaeda ``is the
only organization qualified to gather together the mujahideen.''
Subsequently taking the name ``al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb''
(AQIM), the group, which had traditionally focused only on Algerian
targets, conducted a range of operations: Bombing the United Nations
building in Algiers; attacking the Israeli embassy in Mauritania; and
murdering French and British hostages. AQIM has hitherto not been able
to carry out attacks in the West and is one of the weakest of al-
Qaeda's affiliates, only having the capacity for infrequent attacks in
North Africa.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Quoted in Peter Bergen, ``Where you bin?'' The New Republic,
January 29, 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
4. what threats emanate from domestic militants motivated by jihadist
terrorist ideas?
The New America Foundation and Syracuse University's Maxwell School
of Public Policy examined the 180 post-9/11 cases of Americans or U.S.
residents convicted or charged of some form of jihadist terrorist
activity directed against the United States, as well as the cases of
those American citizens who have traveled overseas to join a jihadist
terrorist group.\32\ None of the cases we investigated involved
individuals plotting with chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear weapons. Given all the post-9/11 concerns about terrorists
armed with weapons of mass destruction this is one of our more positive
findings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Peter Bergen, Andrew Lebovich, Matthew Reed, Laura Hohnsbeen,
Nicole Salter, and Sophie Schmidt at the New America Foundation, and
Professor William Banks, Alyssa Procopio, Jason Cherish, Joseph
Robertson, Matthew Michaelis, Richard Lim, Laura Adams, and Drew
Dickinson from the Maxwell School at Syracuse University all worked on
creating this database, which is available at http://
homegrown.newamerica.net.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The number of jihadist terrorism cases involving U.S. citizens or
residents has spiked in the past 2 years.\33\ In 2009 and 2010 there
were 76, almost half of the total since 9/11. This increase was driven,
in part, by plots that could have killed dozens, such as the Pakistani-
American Faisal Shahzad's attempt to bomb Times Square in May 2010, but
also by the 31 people who were charged with fundraising, recruiting, or
traveling abroad to fight for the Somali terrorist group, Al-Shabab.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ Note: From our count we excluded post-9/11 cases in the United
States involving either Hezbollah or Hamas as neither group has
targeted Americans since 9/11. We did include groups allied to al-Qaeda
such as the Somali group Al-Shabab, or that are influenced by al-
Qaeda's ideology such as the Pakistani group Lashkar-e-Taiba, which
sought out and killed Americans in the Mumbai attacks of 2008. We also
included individuals motivated by al-Qaeda's ideology of violence
directed at the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In 2002 there were 16 jihadist terrorism cases, in 2003 there were
23, in 2004 there were 8, in 2005 there were 12, in 2006 there were 18,
in 2007 there were 16, in 2008 there were 5, in 2009 there were a
record 43, in 2010 there were 33, and in 2011 the number of such cases
has subsided rather dramatically: There were 6.
The total number of deaths from jihadist-terrorist attacks in the
United States after 9/11 totals 17. Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan is accused
of opening fire at a readiness center at Fort Hood, Texas in 2009,
killing 13; Hesham Mohamed Hadayat killed two people at the El Al
counter at Los Angeles International Airport in 2002 before being shot
dead by an El Al security guard; Naveed Haq was found guilty of killing
one person at a Jewish center in Seattle in 2006; and Carlos Bledsoe
(aka Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammed) is accused of killing one soldier and
wounding another at a U.S. Army recruiting center in Arkansas in 2009.
The U.S. military, fighting wars of various kinds in five Muslim
countries, is firmly in the crosshairs of homegrown jihadist militants.
Around one in three of the cases examined by the Maxwell School and New
America involved a U.S. military target, ranging from Quantico Marine
Base in Virginia to American soldiers serving overseas. We found 57
individuals who were targeting U.S. military facilities or personnel
both at home and abroad; 35% of the cases. Bryant Neal Vinas, for
instance, a Long Island native admitted in 2009 to taking part in a
rocket attack on a U.S. base in Afghanistan, while in North Carolina
Daniel Boyd, a charismatic convert to Islam who had fought in the jihad
in Afghanistan against the Soviets, had some kind of plan to attack
American soldiers. Boyd obtained maps of Quantico Marine Base in
Virginia, which he cased for a possible attack on June 12, 2009.\34\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\34\ USA v Daniel Patrick Boyd et al. Indictment in U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, filed 7/22/09 http://
www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1029.pdf; and the
superseding indictment in the same case dated September 24, 2009.
http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1075.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rather than being the uneducated, young Arab-American immigrants of
popular imagination, the homegrown militants do not fit any particular
socio-economic or ethnic profile. Their average age is 30. Of the cases
for which ethnicity could be determined, only a quarter are of Arab
descent, while 10% are African-American, 13% are Caucasian, 18% are
South Asian, 20% are of Somali descent, and the rest are either mixed
race or of other ethnicities. About half the cases involved a U.S-born
American citizen, while another third were naturalized citizens. And of
the 94 cases where education could be ascertained, two-thirds pursued
at least some college courses, and 1 in 10 had completed a Masters,
PhD, or doctoral equivalent.
Chairman King. Our next witness is Evan Kohlmann. He has
served as an expert witness on al-Qaeda for the Department of
Defense in the military commission proceedings. He is an
international terrorism consultant. He has authored ``Al
Qaeda's Jihad in Europe''. He is the founder and senior partner
at Flashpoint Global Partners, a New York-based security
consulting firm, and appears on television as a terrorism
analyst.
Mr. Kohlmann, I welcome you to the committee for the first
time and look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF EVAN F. KOHLMANN, FLASHPOINT GLOBAL PARTNERS
Mr. Kohlmann. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
also, Ranking Member Thompson and the rest of the committee,
for having me here today.
I would like to start off with kind of beginning at the
very beginning. Over the last decade, one of the central
pillars of U.S. counterterrorism policy has been to
aggressively target al-Qaeda leadership--as you can see right
there--in their long-time sanctuary regions in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. As President Obama explained on television in 2009,
this is the heart of it. This is where bin Laden is. It is from
here you see attacks launched not just against the United
States, but against London, against Bali, against a whole host
of countries.
On May 1, that mission culminated in the now successful
killing of bin Laden at a hideout in Abbottabad. Were we still
stuck in October 2001, this might be the end of the narrative;
however, much has changed in the world since those early days
of the battle against al-Qaeda. The gaps in al-Qaeda's central
leadership created by the deaths of former al-Qaeda military
chief Abu Hafs al-Masri and other luminaries have been filled
by new, younger figures.
With the blessings of bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri,
regional al-Qaeda leaderships have emerged in critical
locations such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and North Africa.
Meanwhile, a new generation of home-grown lone wolf-style
jihadists has emerged, including many U.S. and European
nationals who may lack the military skills to plan the next 9/
11, but whose passion for violence and bloodshed can
nonetheless have deadly consequences.
To understand what the future of al-Qaeda will now be, one
must first assess the immediate reactions to the death of their
revered former leader among its most diehard supporters, and
what becomes obvious from the internal discussions taking place
right now is that the sudden word of bin Laden's death came as
a nasty shock to his followers. One of the most disturbing
parts of all this was the wealth of intelligence that was
recovered from bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad. One of the
most credible and respected users on al-Qaeda's top-tier
``Shamukh'' discussion forum, Yaman Mukhadab, posted a warning
advising that these are ``the most dangerous 72 hours in the
struggle of al-Qaeda with the Zionists and Crusaders in the
history of the jihadi struggle.'' He cautioned, ``It is
possible that America has infiltrated Mujahideen communications
and will seek to unveil the masterminds behind big terrorist
operations.''
As far as I see it, any group of Mujahideen that are
assigned to an operation should go forward and execute it
without hesitation or delay and to avoid completely attempting
to communicate with anyone.
Unfortunately, the sense of melancholy and panic that was
brewing in the hearts of al-Qaeda supporters and followers was
soon swamped by a tidal wave of rage, especially after images
of crowds of jubilant Americans were televised around the world
as they celebrated at Ground Zero and outside of the White
House.
One user on another al-Qaeda web forum, Ta'er Muhajir,
posted an open message addressed to ``You who danced in front
of the White House, we, too, will start to dance the next time
we hear about a massacre that befalls you, just as we danced
when your corpses were spread across the Pentagon and the World
Trade Center.''
In another message titled, ``Advice and Guidance for the
Lions Launching Attacks in the Land of America.'' Another user,
Azmarai, explained, ``We aren't merely seeking to kill a
soldier or an American civilian here or there, as this doesn't
change anything. Our goal is bigger than that. Like our Sheikh
Osama ordered us in his messages, it is critical to continue
jihadi operations both against the United States military and
economy. Their economic destruction is on-going, but it
requires more attacks and for the young men to strike at the
strategic points of the American economy.''
I now turn to the issue of al-Qaeda's remaining central
leadership figures. You will see a chart up there of those who
are still left post the death of bin Laden. Of course, with bin
Laden now gone, the question naturally turns to who will be
selected to replace his now vacant position as the overall
commander of al-Qaeda. Though the identity of that leader--that
new leader--remains still uncertain, the far most likely
candidate, as indicated on the chart here, is al-Qaeda's
present deputy commander, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Zawahiri,
who merged his Egyptian Islamic Jihad faction with al-Qaeda in
1998, has long stood alongside bin Laden as his closest
adviser. Al-Zawahiri has both played a key role in
operationally organizing and overseeing international terrorist
attacks and has also simultaneously spearheaded al-Qaeda media
efforts.
As far as supporters chatting on top-tier al-Qaeda web
forums, there simply has been no serious discussion of any
potential bin Laden successors other than Dr. Ayman al-
Zawahiri. Al-Qaeda's on-line constituents are so taken with the
idea that al-Zawahiri will be the next leader of al-Qaeda that
they have taken to casually referring to the group as Jund
Ayman, or the Soldiers of Ayman. Forum user Muheb Ruyat al-
Rahman insisted, our Sheikh Mohammad, may Allah have mercy on
him, is our Sheikh Ayman. Our Sheikh Ayman is our Sheikh Osama.
There is also the question of al-Qaeda's regional
affiliates faced with the resounding defeat on the peaks of
Tora Bora in late 2001. A group of high-ranking al-Qaeda
commanders decided to embrace the development of a more diffuse
and self-sufficient network of international operatives. Al-
Qaeda's beneficial website acknowledged that it was time for a
new phase in evolution. ``The al-Qaeda organization has adopted
a strategy in its war with the Americans based on expanding the
battlefield and exhausting the enemy. The more diversified and
distant the areas in which the operations take place, the more
exhausting it becomes for the enemy, the more he needs to
stretch his resources, and the more he becomes terrified.''
By mid-2004, nascent al-Qaeda franchise organizations were
already well ensconced in both Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Today
similar al-Qaeda franchises have expanded their reach even
farther, into Indonesia, Yemen, Algeria, Somalia, Lebanon, and
the Palestinian territories. These upstart regional branches
are capable of operating basically independently of al-Qaeda's
central leadership in Afghanistan. The growing affiliate
factions often have more expansive ambitions or just as
grandiose as those of bin Laden himself.
While al-Qaeda's regional efforts in Iraq and Saudi Arabia
may have suffered debilitating setbacks in recent years, that
is not the case in Yemen, where a growing al-Qaeda branch,
known as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, has demonstrated
its ability to launch repeated and sophisticated attacks
targeting U.S. soil.
Perhaps the most disturbing aspects of launching attacks
against the United States is their obsession with conceiving
plots aimed at causing catastrophic damage to the American
economy. In early 2008, AQAP published an approving interview
with a most wanted al-Qaeda suspect, who endorsed the idea of
striking at oil resources, petroleum resources. He explained if
the enemy's interests in the Arabian Peninsula were stricken,
and a supply of oil was cut off, and the oil refineries were
out of order, this would cause the enemy to collapse, and he
won't merely withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan, but he would
face total collapse. If he were struck hard from various
places, then he would scatter and turn around and flee
forlornly from the land of the Muslims.
Given the high-profile role that AQAP has played in
masterminding not only the underwear bomber, Omar
Abdulmutallab, but also most recently a cargo bomb plot aimed
at the United States, AQAP's passionate interest in launching
strategic attacks aimed at devastating the U.S. economy can be
ignored only at our own peril. It is also a telling reminder of
how, thanks to the new affiliate network of global franchises,
the underlying al-Qaeda terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland
is in some ways unchanged by the death of Osama bin Laden.
Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Kohlmann follows:]
Prepared Statement of Evan F. Kohlmann with Laith Alkhouri
May 25, 2011
(i) introduction
Over the last decade, one of the central pillars of U.S.
counterterrorism policy has been to aggressively target al-Qaeda's
senior leadership in their long-time sanctuary in regions in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. The prevailing wisdom behind this strategy is
quite simple: By mounting direct pressure on Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-
Zawahiri, and others within the highest echelons, al-Qaeda will
presumably lack the time, resources, and opportunity to conceive
complex international terrorist plots threatening U.S. homeland
security. As President Obama explained in 2009 during a televised
interview, ``This is the heart of it. This is where bin Laden is. This
is where [his] allies are. It's from here that you see attacks launched
not just against the United States, but against London, against Bali,
against a whole host of countries.'' Indeed, the American government
has invested billions of dollars and tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers
in order to carry out this mission and deny al-Qaeda the use of a
central base in South Asia. On May 1, the mission culminated in the
successful killing of Osama bin Laden at a hideout in Abbottabad,
Pakistan by a team of U.S. Navy SEALs. Evidence recovered by the SEALs
reportedly shows that bin Laden continued to play a direct operational
role in conceiving and micro-managing terrorist plots against the
United States.
Were we still stuck in October 2001, this might be the end of the
narrative for bin Laden's jihadi movement. However, much has indeed
changed in the world since those early days of the battle against al-
Qaeda. The gaps in al-Qaeda's central leadership created by the deaths
of former luminaries like Abu Hafs al-Masri and Abu Laith al-Liby have
been filled by new younger figures like Abu Yahya al-Liby. With the
blessings of bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, regional al-Qaeda
leaderships have emerged in critical locations such as Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Yemen, and North Africa. Meanwhile, a new generation of
homegrown ``lone wolf''-style jihadists has emerged (including many
U.S. and European nationals) who may lack the military skills to plan
the next 9/11, but whose passion for violence and bloodshed can
nonetheless have deadly consequences.
(ii) reaction to the death of bin laden
To understand what the future of al-Qaeda will now be, one must
first assess the immediate reactions to the death of their revered
former leader among its most diehard supporters. Late on the evening of
May 1, al-Qaeda's on-line social networking forums were shaken awake in
a spasm of activity as jihadi militants from around the globe rushed to
log in and discover for themselves if reports of the killing of bin
Laden were really true. With al-Qaeda's remaining leaders still hiding
quietly out of sight for the time being, these on-line forums provide
one of the most compelling available windows into the thinking of Bin
Laden's cadre as they mourn his passing.
At first, the response was largely one of chaotic disbelief.
Stunned forum participants insisted that the announcement had to be
part of a new scheme devised by the CIA to trick and demoralize bin
Laden's diehard supporters. With their patience quickly exhausted by
the deluge of anxious incoming inquiries, ill-tempered forum
administrators began threatening to permanently ban anyone who even
dared to express sorrow based on ``unverified crusader rumors'' of bin
Laden's demise. Finally, on May 6, al-Qaeda's central leadership issued
a formal communique acknowledging bin Laden's ``martyrdom.'' The
message defiantly insisted, ``Shaykh Usama didn't build an organization
to die with it and go away with it . . . The university of faith,
Quran, and jihad that was founded by Sheikh Usama bin Laden has not and
will not close its doors . . . those of us from the al-Qaedat ul-Jihad
network vow to Allah to continue on the path of jihad taken by our
leaders, headed by Sheikh Usama, without hesitation or question, and we
will not deviate or lean from that.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=108210. May 6, 2011.
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What first becomes obvious from the discussions taking place on al-
Qaeda's on-line chat forums is that--no matter what the organization's
leadership may claim in retrospect--the sudden word of bin Laden's
death came as a nasty shock to his followers, and was undoubtedly a
staggering blow. In the hours immediately following news of bin Laden's
violent demise, al-Qaeda forum users and administrators were also
preoccupied with another gnawing concern: The state of their own
personal security. By the morning after the raid, media sources were
reporting that U.S. Navy SEALs had seized an intelligence jackpot of
hard drives, flash data disks, and other records of electronic
communications from the bin Laden compound in Abbottabad. One of the
most credible and respected users on al-Qaeda's top-tier ``Shamukh''
web forum, ``Yaman Mukhadab'', posted a warning to fellow jihadists
advising that these were ``the most dangerous 72 hours in the struggle
of al-Qaeda with the Zionists and Crusaders . . . in the history of the
jihad struggle.''\2\ He cautioned, ``it is possible that America has
infiltrated mujahideen communications and will seek to unveil the
masterminds behind big [terrorist] operations.'' He further urged, ``As
far as I see it, any group of mujahideen that are assigned to an
operation should go forward and execute it . . . without hesitation or
delay, and to completely avoid trying to communicate with anyone . . .
or to seek new orders . . . Stopping and delaying while awaiting
something new will not achieve anything, and it won't change what has
already taken place.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107305. May 3, 2011.
\3\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107305. May 3, 2011.
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The palpable sense of melancholy and panic brewing in the hearts of
al-Qaeda's supporters on the web was soon swamped by a tidal wave of
raw, unbridled rage, especially after televised images of crowds of
jubilant Americans celebrating outside the White House and at Ground
Zero were broadcast around the world. One user, ``Ta'er Muhajir'',
posted an open message on al-Qaeda's web forums addressed to ``you who
danced in front of the White House . . . We, too, will start to dance
the next time we hear about a massacre that befalls you, just as we
danced when your rotten corpses were spread across the Pentagon and the
World Trade Center.''\4\ Another forum user, ``Mukhadab ad-Dima'' (a
nickname which translates to ``Drenched in Blood''), pointed to the
``big crowds in front of the White House'' and demanded, ``who will be
the hero who will turn their night into day and their morning into
hell, and who will renew the September glories--who will follow next in
the list of our heroes: Arid Uka, Faisal Shahzad, Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab, Nidal Hassan . . . ?''\5\ Echoing this sentiment, jihadi
forum user ``Jaish al-Islam'' scoffed, ``they are celebrating the
martyrdom of Shaykh Usama, but what they don't realize is that we are
all Usama.''\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107232. May 2, 2011.
\5\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107132. May 2, 2011.
\6\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107100&page=4. May 2,
2011
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Even as he acknowledged his ``sadness over the loss of our Shaykh
Usama Bin Laden'', jihadi forum user ``Abu al-Qassam al-Maqdisi'' vowed
to ``continue on this path.'' Openly addressing U.S. President Barack
Obama, he mocked, ``if you think that by killing Shaykh Abu Abdullah
you have finished off al-Qaeda, then you are totally delusional . . .
the martyrdom of Shaykh Usama didn't weaken us and didn't disappoint
us--it just gave us more passion to stay steadfast on this path. And if
you have killed Usama, then we are all Usama.''\7\ These repeated
declarations of defiance inevitably turned to the question of how best
to avenge the ``martyrdom'' of bin Laden. Another registered user,
``Abu Musab al-Maqdisi'', complained, ``unfortunately, the only thing I
see is men who are crying over nothing . . . It would have been better
to see the knife of Zarqawi being sharpened to the point that I can
behold its shine from here.''\8\ He urged fellow bin Laden supporters,
``Beware, and get ready. And I don't know if there is time to say
goodbye to your fathers, mothers, wives, children, brothers and
neighbors, as time can't wait and the Shaykh can't wait, and now the
battle has begun to eradicate the state of infidels, America, and
anyone who stands alongside it from within the Muslim lands. It's only
a matter of hours. Ohhh, hours are too many, just minutes, and even too
much . . . secondssss . . . I'm now sharpening my sword so you should
be sharpening yours.''\9\
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\7\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107175. May 2, 2011.
\8\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107288. May 2, 2011.
\9\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=107288. May 2, 2011.
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Jihadi forum users have also been tendering their own unsolicited
suggestions and insights to al-Qaeda's remaining leadership. In a
message titled ``Advice and Guidance for the Lions Launching Attacks in
the Land of the Enemy, America'', user ``Azmarai'' addressed ``those
who will be planning in the coming days, weeks, and months to carry out
operations in the United States'': ``we aren't merely seeking to kill a
soldier or an American civilian here or there, as this doesn't change
anything . . . Our goal is bigger than that . . . Like our Shaykh Usama
ordered us in his messages, it is critical to continue jihadi
operations both against the U.S. military and economy . . . Their
economic destruction is on-going, but it requires more attacks and for
the young men to strike at the strategic points of the American
economy.'' Towards the end of causing catastrophic damage to the U.S.
economy, user ``Azmarai'' suggested a range of possible targets,
including targeting hydroelectric dams, ``major electricity-producing
plants'', nuclear power plants, oil refineries, ``Federal Reserve Banks
and major financial centers'', and water-purification facilities.
``Azmarai'' was equally insistent on the need for al-Qaeda and its
supporters to specifically ``target the major companies that contribute
technologically in supporting the U.S. army with information and
technology, like the headquarters of DARPA . . . Killing America's
scientists and those who participate in advancing military research is
very important . . . Also target the headquarters of the big weapon
manufacturing companies, and specifically targeting their main
headquarters that include engineers and experts.''\10\
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\10\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=109881. May 13, 2011.
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Equally of note is a formal communique issued in response to bin
Laden's death by the official team of on-line couriers responsible for
distributing al-Qaeda's digital propaganda. The so-called ``Fajr Media
Center'' included a direct ``Message to the American People'':
``We say to you: killing the Shaykh was a big mistake, and a great sin,
and a deed that will bring catastrophes upon you that will sink your
joy. Obama has sacrificed your blood to remain in his position of power
. . . Obama is not different from his predecessor Bush in anything, as
the wars Bush started Obama continued and he didn't do anything to stop
them . . . Do not blame us after today; you elected him and you will
pay the price! Armies may protect Obama, but who protects you from our
reach?''\11\
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\11\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=109164. May 9, 2011.
Fajr Media Center also offered their own message of advice ``for
the Mujahideen'', urging al-Qaeda supporters to exact a heavy price in
revenge for the ``martyrdom'' of bin Laden--``the kind of revenge that
will make America forget her present euphoria and instead scream with
pain.'' Echoing the popular sentiments among jihadi forum users, the
group advocated ``every Muslim mujahid'' should ``focus on making
suitable preparations for any operation against the infidels, and we
encourage that the operations be unique, and terribly devastating to
the enemy . . . If the chance comes up, do not waste it, and do not
consult anyone in killing the Americans and destroying their economy.
The land of Allah is wide and their interests are widespread . . . We
encourage you to launch individual terrorist operations that reap major
results but which require only basic preparations.''\12\
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\12\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=109164. May 9, 2011.
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(iii) al-qaeda's remaining central leadership figures
It is perhaps inevitable that the killing of Osama bin Laden would
serve as a rather dramatic blow to al-Qaeda popular morale. However,
bin Laden's passing has been particularly difficult to accept for
jihadi supporters in light of the litany of other losses the group has
endured over the past 3 years. The list of top-tier casualties suffered
by al-Qaeda includes, among others: Senior military field commander Abu
Laith al-Liby, al-Qaeda Shura Council member Abu al-Hasan al-Masri,
senior al-Qaeda explosives expert Abu Khabab al-Masri, senior al-Qaeda
operational leader and spokesman Abu Mansour as-Shami, and al-Qaeda
Shura Council member and presumed No. 3 in command of the group Mustafa
Abu al-Yazid (a.k.a. Shaykh Saeed). Al-Yazid's death alone provoked the
release of at least two different audio-recorded messages from al-
Qaeda, including a confession from Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri that he was
``deeply saddened at the loss.''\13\ The killing of bin Laden has only
managed to create an even larger gaping hole in al-Qaeda's already
unsteady central hierarchy. In the wake of initial news reports about
bin Laden's passing, one jihadi chat forum user ``Abu Zubaydah'' posted
a message offering his deepest respects ``to the family of the martyr .
. . and also Shaykh Ayman Zawahiri, who in a single year lost Shaykh
Saeed and now his other companion on the path . . . By Allah, it is a
year of sorrow.''\14\
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\13\ http://www.al-faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?t=127650. July 30,
2010.
\14\ http://as-ansar.com/vb/showthread.php?t=37762. May 2, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
With bin Laden now gone, the question naturally turns to who will
be selected to replace his now vacant position as the overall commander
of al-Qaeda. Media speculation in recent days has ranged wildly--from
fugitive Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki to a relatively obscure
Pakistani jihadi militant named Mohammed Ilyas Kashmiri. Though the
identity of al-Qaeda's new top leader still remains uncertain, the far
most likely candidate is al-Qaeda's present Deputy Commander Dr. Ayman
al-Zawahiri. Al-Zawahiri, who merged his own Egyptian Islamic Jihad
faction with al-Qaeda in 1998, has long stood alongside Osama bin Laden
as his closest advisor. The former Egyptian pediatrician has both
played a key operational role in organizing and overseeing
international terrorist attacks, and has also simultaneously
spearheaded al-Qaeda media efforts--personally appearing in dozens of
audio and video recordings released by al-Qaeda's official media wing
(in fact, far more often than bin Laden himself). With bin Laden gone,
Ayman al-Zawahiri is by far the most recognizable face from among al-
Qaeda's remaining central leadership. He is one of a dwindling number
of commanders who can claim to be one of the original founders and
Shura Council members of al-Qaeda. His essential credibility as an
early pioneer of the jihadi movement in Egypt and Afghanistan would be
quite difficult to match by any potential challenger vying for control
of al-Qaeda.
As far as supporters chatting on top-tier al-Qaeda web forums,
there simply has been no serious discussion of any potential bin Laden
successors other than Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. Al-Qaeda's on-line
constituents are so taken with the idea that al-Zawahiri will be the
next leader of al-Qaeda that they have taken to casually referring to
the group as ``Jund Ayman'' (``The Soldiers of Ayman''). Forum users
have also taken it upon themselves to vigorously contest snarky
comments from al-Qaeda critics that ``Shaykh Usama made a mistake by
merging al-Qaeda with Shaykh Ayman.''\15\ User ``Muheb Ruyat al-
Rahman'' dismissed these prevalent critiques as ``poison'' from those
``pretending to be sympathizers'': ``Do you really think our Shaykh
Usama couldn't distinguish the worthless from the valuable, or the
beautiful from the ugly? Do you think . . . that he was somehow tricked
by Shaykh Ayman? Do you really believe that [bin Laden] . . . who
refused to surrender his faith in jihad would simply give up on what he
judged to be truthful and correct merely in order to satisfy Shaykh
Ayman?''\16\ Al-Rahman insisted, ``Our Shaykh Usama, may Allah have
mercy on him, is our Shaykh Ayman, and our Shaykh Ayman is our Shaykh
Usama.''\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=110085. May 16, 2011.
\16\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=110085. May 16, 2011.
\17\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=110085. May 16, 2011.
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Nevertheless, this is not to say that the ascension of Dr. Ayman
al-Zawahiri to the top of al-Qaeda's hierarchy is by any means
guaranteed, nor is it necessarily a fortunate development for the
organization. Since beginning his career as a jihadi activist in Egypt,
al-Zawahiri has acquired a notorious reputation as arrogant, self-
serving, and unconscionably ruthless. As early as 1990, at al-Qaeda's
own guesthouses in the Pakistani city of Peshawar, mujahideen fighters
began to loudly grumble that too many Egyptians--primarily al-
Zawahiri's cronies--were being appointed to senior positions in al-
Qaeda. Accusations of preferential treatment and corruption began to
fly back and forth. Former al-Qaeda lieutenant Jamal al-Fadl later
recalled during testimony in U.S. Federal court when he finally
confronted Osama bin Laden to complain that ``the camp was being run by
Egyptian people and the guesthouse--the emir from the guesthouse--is
Egyptian and everything [is] Egyptian people and [everyone is] from
[the Egyptian] jihad group, and we have people from Nigeria, from
Tunisia, from Siberia, [so] why is Egyptian people got more chance than
other people run everything?''\18\ Some of the dissidents within al-
Qaeda felt too ``embarrassed'' to say this to bin Laden's face, while
others--such as a Libyan fighter named Abu Tamim--were much more vocal
with their concerns: ``He say, why everything run by Egyptian
people?''\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023
(LBS). United States District Court, Southern District of New York.
Trial Transcript, February 6, 2001. Page 322.
\19\ United States v. Usama bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023
(LBS). United States District Court, Southern District of New York.
Trial Transcript, February 6, 2001. Page 322.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
During an interview in 2007 with the London-based newspaper Al-
Hayat, Sayyid Imam al-Sharif (a.k.a. ``Dr. Fadl'')--once a ``leading
figure'' in Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ)
movement and a founding member of al-Qaeda's own governing Shura
Council--personally accused al-Zawahiri of being a ``liar'', a
``gangster'', and a ``bandit.'' According to al-Sharif, ``Ayman is a
charlatan who used secrecy as a pretext . . . I can't think of anyone
in Islamic history who has committed such deceit, fraud, falsification,
and betrayal of trust . . . no one before Ayman al-Zawahiri.''\20\ When
I raised the subject of al-Zawahiri's status of authority within al-
Qaeda in a discussion with former Arab-Afghan mujahid Abdullah Anas, he
sighed for a moment and chuckled to himself. ``Can you imagine a great
religion represented by al-Zawahiri?'' he asked me. ``It's a
catastrophe.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ ``Interview with Sayyid Imam al-Sharif.'' Al-Hayat. December
8-10, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In light of al-Zawahiri's obvious shortcomings, and the likelihood
that he will one day meet an end analogous to that of bin Laden, it
behooves us to examine the other potential leadership candidates among
the top tier of al-Qaeda's inner sanctum. Those candidates include:
Abu Yahya al-Liby (a.k.a. Hassan Qaid)
Though he has undoubtedly far slimmer credentials than Dr. Ayman
al-Zawahiri, Shaykh Abu Yahya al-Liby has nonetheless also become a
strikingly influential figure in the international jihadist movement
ever since his stunning escape in July 2005 from a high-security U.S.
prison at Bagram air base (near Kabul). At the time of his initial
capture in Karachi, Pakistan in the wake of the events of 9/11, Abu
Yahya was at most a mid-ranking lieutenant within a faction of the
Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) directly allied with al-Qaeda. At
the time, he was best known as an expert in computer media and Islamic
jurisprudence. According to fellow former LIFG commander Noman
Benotman, Abu Yahya ``was a member of the Shariah committee of the
LIFG, and he was known within the framework of the LIFG, and joined it
relatively early on . . . almost in 1991 . . . He was there at the end
of the Afghan Jihad, meaning with the LIFG . . . But he wasn't from
amongst the top leadership.''\21\
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\21\ ``Industry of Death: Abu Yahya al-Liby.'' Al-Arabiya. July 4,
2009.
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However, the combination of Abu Yahya's public speaking abilities,
his natural charisma, and the compelling personal credential of having
brazenly slipped out of America's highest-security prison in
Afghanistan proved to be a powerful cocktail. Less than 6 months after
fleeing Bagram, Abu Yahya began to appear in video recordings produced
by al-Qaeda's official ``As-Sahab Media Foundation''--so often, in
fact, that his face has become virtually synonymous with As-Sahab. Over
the last 5 years, Abu Yahya has been the principle featured spokesman
for al-Qaeda in dozens of audio and video recordings released by As-
Sahab--appearing more often than either Osama bin Laden or Ayman al-
Zawahiri. Abu Yahya's recorded sermons are highly influential, and are
recycled and often re-published by other likeminded terrorist
organizations like Shabaab al-Mujahideen in Somalia. Though Abu Yahya
has never been granted an official title in al-Qaeda's leadership to
match that of bin Laden, al-Zawahiri, or Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, he is
widely considered to be within the very top echelons of the
organization--possibly even the new ``No. 3'' in the wake of al-Yazid's
demise last year. Yet, as far as his former comrade Noman Benotman is
concerned, Abu Yahya ``was never, and I doubt will ever be, a military
commander.''\22\
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\22\ ``Industry of Death: Abu Yahya al-Liby.'' Al-Arabiya. July 4,
2009.
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Shaykh Atiyallah al-Liby (a.k.a. Atiyah Abd al-Rahman)
Shaykh Atiyallah al-Liby is another Libyan national within the top
ranks of al-Qaeda who hails from the now-besieged coastal town of
Misrata. According to the U.S. State Department, Atiyallah first joined
bin Laden in Afghanistan ``as a teenager in the 1980s. Since then, he
has gained considerable stature in al-Qa'ida as an explosives expert
and Islamic scholar.''\23\ While in Afghanistan during the late 1990s,
the Libyan also forged a relationship with a young Abu Musab al-Zarqawi
in the western Afghan city of Herat.\24\ He also joined bin Laden and
his coterie of top aides as they fled under fire to the mountainous
redoubt of Tora Bora late in the fall of 2001.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/
index.cfm?page=atiyah_abd.
\24\ http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/
index.cfm?page=atiyah_abd.
\25\ http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/
index.cfm?page=atiyah_abd.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Following the battle of Tora Bora, Shaykh Atiyallah publicly
emerged as a key ideologue and spokesman on behalf of al-Qaeda's senior
leadership. As part of that role, according to the U.S. Government,
Atiyallah ``recruits and facilitates talks with other Islamic groups to
operate under al-Qaida'' and ``has been in regular contact with senior
ranking al-Qaida leaders.''\26\ In fact, the Libyan al-Qaeda leader has
been a major proponent of decentralizing al-Qaeda's network into an
autonomous web of franchise affiliates. According to an essay written
Atiyallah in 2004, the advantage of such a strategy is that
``collective organized work is not affected by the loss of individuals,
because individuals are easily replaced with others. The organization
exists not on any individual; rather it operates as number of
distributed responsibilities where the loss of individuals is
redundant. This is one of the secrets of the effectiveness of al-Qaeda
and their success in group operations.''\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ http://www.rewardsforjustice.net/english/
index.cfm?page=atiyah_abd.
\27\ Atiyatullah, Louis. ``The Badr Al-Riyadh Tape: A Well
Organized al-Qaeda's Media Strategy Revealed.'' The Global Islamic
Media Front (GIMF). 2004. Page 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since the death of Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, Shaykh Atiyallah has been
making an increasingly frequent number of cameos in al-Qaeda audio and
video recordings released by the As-Sahab Media Foundation. In his last
appearance in a video released on March 18, 2011, he urged Libyan
rebels to adopt an Islamist methodology and ``avoid allying with the
enemies of Allah.''\28\ He also sternly warned ``the enemies of Allah,
whether America or others, to even think about acts of aggression or
interference in the country [of Libya]. Otherwise, the Army of Allah
and the chivalrous men of Islam will make them forget the tragedies
they faced previously.''\29\
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\28\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=99893. March 18, 2011.
\29\ http://shamikh1.net/vb/showthread.php?t=99893. March 18, 2011.
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Abu Zaid al-Kuwaiti (a.k.a. Khaled al-Hussainan)
Though Shaykh Khaled al-Hussainan is a relatively new arrival to
the jihad in Afghanistan, he is far older than most of al-Qaeda's new
up-and-coming generation of leaders. Likewise, while he has had no
major military experiences to speak of, al-Hussainan has other
credentials that offer him a leg up within al-Qaeda's hierarchy--
namely, that he was once a respected cleric at the Al-Albani mosque in
Kuwait and a former state-sponsored lecturer at the Kuwaiti Ministry of
Religious Endowments.\30\ Al-Hussainan also reportedly worked as a
preacher at the Saad al-Abdullah Academy, which is responsible for
training Kuwaiti military officers. By 1996, Khaled al-Hussainan
encountered his first brush with the law when he faced criminal charges
in Kuwait in connection with what became known the ``Desert Flogging''
Case. Though he was later found innocent, al-Hussainan had been accused
of joining with a group of radical Islamists in forcibly abducting two
women and assaulting them with a whip in a remote location as
punishment for ``what they considered to be a shameful act.''\31\ In
2007, without any warning, al-Hussainan suddenly disappeared from his
pulpit in Kuwait and traveled to Afghanistan, reportedly by crossing
through Iranian territory. Less than 2 years later, in August 2009, al-
Hussainan was first publicly identified by al-Qaeda's media wing as a
prominent leader and spokesman for the group.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\30\ http://www.islamhouse.com/ip/288149. May 2011.
\31\ ``Industry of Death: Who is Khalid al-Hussainan?'' Al-Arabiya.
October 30, 2010.
\32\ http://www.al-faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?t=77715. August 7,
2009.
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That al-Hussainan is one of al-Qaeda's few remaining top-tier
originally from the Arabian Peninsula (and a graduate of the Imam
Muhammad bin Saud University in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) is hugely
significant.\33\ First of all, al-Qaeda's traditional wealthy financial
donors based in the Gulf region are generally predisposed towards
channeling their generous assistance to mujahideen organizations with
prominent Saudi or Kuwaiti leaders with whom they feel most
comfortable. Second, in countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan, the
fact that al-Hussainan can say that he is from the same sacred soil as
the holy city of Mecca and the Prophet Mohammed plays uniquely well
among local Islamists. In video messages released by al-Qaeda, al-
Hussainan has boasted of ``traveling in Afghanistan from village to
village and from city to city and from province to province, and praise
Allah, I speak in the mosques and encourage the Afghan people to
perform Jihad and encourage them to stand by the Mujahideen and
encourage them to expel the Crusaders who have corrupted the people and
land.''\34\
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\33\ http://www.islamhouse.com/ip/288149.
\34\ http://www.al-faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?t=82666. September
7, 2009.
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Though his background is exclusively clerical, Khaled al-Hussainan
has claimed to be participating in actual armed combat with Afghan and
coalition military forces. In August 2009, he issued an open message to
U.S. President Barack Obama, boasting, ``your soldiers besieged me. I
was besieged by your soldiers for 10 hours. I was besieged by 30 tanks
accompanied by helicopters and warplanes.''\35\ According to al-
Hussainan, ``We came to Afghanistan to be killed as martyrs in Allah's
path. We came to Afghanistan for the hereafter. This is the fact which
I want you to understand, Obama . . . We came to Afghanistan for Islam
to dominate, not be dominated.''\36\
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\35\ http://www.al-faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?t=82666. September
7, 2009.
\36\ http://www.al-faloja.info/vb/showthread.php?t=82666. September
7, 2009.
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Saif al-Adel (a.k.a. Mohammed al-Makkawi)
Saif al-Adel (sometimes also known as ``Mohammed al-Makkawi'') is a
former Egyptian military officer who went on to become a top leader of
the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and a founding member of al-Qaeda's Shura
Council. From early on, al-Adel served a critical role as al-Qaeda's
security chief, and as a manager of its covert overseas operations.
According to former al-Qaeda lieutenant Jamal al-Fadl, al-Adel earned a
reputation as ``one of the members very good with explosives . . . He
trained people for explosives.''\37\ By the late 1990s, al-Adel's
nefarious activities were well-known to U.S. law enforcement and he was
indicted along with Osama bin Laden in the Southern District of New
York (SDNY) for his role in the August 1998 bombings of two U.S.
embassies in East Africa.\38\ According to the mastermind of the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Khalid
Shaykh Mohammed, Saif al-Adel was also ``involved in the 9/11 attack''
and ``knew the identity of the pilots who had been chosen when the
Hamburg cell was picked in early 2000.''\39\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\37\ United States v. Osama bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr. 1023
(LBS). United States District Court, Southern District of New York.
Trial Transcript, February 6, 2001. Page 244.
\38\ http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/binladen/usbinladen-1a.pdf.
\39\ ``Substitution for the Testimony of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.''
United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui. Eastern District of Virginia
(EDVA). Cr. No. 01-455-A. Defense Exhibit 941.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Like other senior al-Qaeda leaders, in late 2001, al-Adel gathered
his family and fled with bin Laden to their rallying point in the Tora
Bora mountains. In a later treatise published by al-Qaeda, al-Adel
recalled how the group had dwindled to ``at best'' 1,900 men, with at
least 350 ``heroes'' lying dead on the battlefield. Facing potential
annihilation, al-Qaeda divided their ranks: ``some of them returned to
their countries, whereas the rest stayed to take revenge from Americans
and their allies.''\40\ Despite the capture of his wife and children in
Tora Bora, Saif al-Adel managed to escape and continue in his role
overseeing operations targeting coalition forces in southern
Afghanistan. After a battle with U.S. forces in Kandahar in 2002, al-
Adel insisted that ``the Americans are not up to ground battles . . .
They will not consider another experience in Kandahar, especially that
the military force based in Kandahar has, by the grace of Allah, a
level of the expertise that will make the U.S. a running joke for
centuries to come.''\41\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\40\ http://www.bkufus.com/images/img/
indexe.php?subject=2&rec=14&tit=tit&pa=0. January 2003.
\41\ http://www.bkufus.com/images/img/
indexe.php?subject=2&rec=15&tit=tit&pa=0. January 2003.
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Facing a renewed hunt by the U.S. military, Saif al-Adel allegedly
fled once again--this time to neighboring Iran, where he was reportedly
detailed and placed under house arrest. Al-Adel's exact status in Iran
has always been somewhat murky. Though some reports paint him as under
the strict custody of Iranian intelligence agents, other information
suggests that al-Adel may have continued playing an operational role in
al-Qaeda from the open sanctuary of Iran. In May 2003, U.S. National
security officials accused al-Adel of ``giving the go-ahead'' for a
dramatic wave of suicide bombing attacks in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia that
killed at least 34 people. According to one ``senior administration''
source quoted by the Washington Post, ``there are some senior members
of al Qaeda in Iran . . . who might have had a hand in this.''\42\
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\42\ Priest, Dana and Susan Schmidt. ``Al Qaeda Figure Tied To
Riyadh Bombings; U.S. Officials Say Leader Is In Iran With Other
Terrorists.'' Washington Post. May 18, 2003. Page A24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The controversial idea that a senior Sunni Muslim extremist like
Saif al-Adel would choose to hide out in a fundamentalist Shiite state
like Iran has not escaped the attention of al-Qaeda's sectarian
followers. In 2008, when Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri agreed to participate in
an open Q&A session with al-Qaeda's supporters on the web, he was
peppered with inquiries about Saif al-Adel. One questioner explained,
``I want to be rid of this doubt: why is Shaykh Saif al-Adel present in
Iran, which murders our sons, keeps our women prisoner, and has
perverted our religion and Quran--and yet he suffers no harm from them?
. . . His presence causes many question and exclamation marks. I ask
you by Allah to clarify to us, O' our noble Shaykh.''\43\ Though al-
Zawahiri acknowledged receiving these numerous questions about al-Adel,
he refused to give any further explanation. ``As for his question about
the location of Saif al-Adel,'' al-Zawahiri replied dryly, ``it is
something I am unable to tell him.''\44\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ http://myhesbah.com/v/showthread?t=174676. April 2, 2008.
\44\ http://myhesbah.com/v/showthread?t=174676. April 2, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Despite recent reports indicating that al-Adel has finally left
Iran and has returned to the Pakistani-Afghan border region, there are
compelling reasons to believe that he will not be appointed as bin
Laden's replacement in charge of al-Qaeda. Al-Adel has never served a
public role in al-Qaeda, and has deliberately avoided taking any sort
of political role within the organization or even being shown on
camera. In fact, al-Adel has based his entire career in al-Qaeda in
serving critical but low-key roles within the upper echelon of bin
Laden's operational arm. Assuming that al-Adel has indeed rejoined al-
Qaeda's central leadership in AFPAK, the question remains if someone
with as many lingering question marks as Saif al-Adel could possibly
jump the hierarchy of al-Qaeda and supersede others figures like Ayman
al-Zawahiri or Abu Yahya al-Liby who already have much more established
profiles among al-Qaeda's contemporary base.
Azzam al-Amriki (a.k.a. Adam Gadahn)
Adam Yehiye Gadahn is a convert to Islam originally from northern
California. Raised on an isolated goat farm, Gadahn eventually moved
south to Los Angeles to live with his grandmother. While in Los
Angeles, Gadahn came into contact with a cell of computer-savvy al-
Qaeda militants planning to aid Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. In
1998, Gadahn moved to Pakistan and married an Afghani refugee. Shortly
thereafter, Gadahn was allegedly recruited by 9/11 mastermind Khalid
Shaykh Mohammed to assist in al-Qaeda's on-going media efforts.\45\ In
2001, Gadahn made his first public appearance on behalf of al-Qaeda,
when he lent his voice to help narrate an English-subtitled version of
al-Qaeda's first official propaganda video, ``The Destruction of the
U.S.S. Cole.''\46\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\45\ http://www.defenselink.mil/news/transcript_ISN10024.pdf. Page
17.
\46\ As-Sahab Media Foundation. ``The State of the Ummah'' (a.k.a.
``The Destruction of the U.S.S. Cole''). Released: 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Since 2004, Adam Gadahn has appeared in dozens of video-recorded
messages released by al-Qaeda. In 2005, in a video marking the fourth
anniversary of 9/11, Gadahn explained in English the role of As-Sahab's
multimedia in recruiting new al-Qaeda members:
``Allah is our witness that the numerous audio and videotapes issued by
Shaykh Usama Bin Laden, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, and other leaders of the
jihad have not been released merely to dispel rumors of their death--
or, as the Americans once ridiculously claimed, to send coded messages
to their followers. No, these communiques have been released to explain
and propound the nature and goals of the worldwide jihad against
America and the crusaders, and to convey our legitimate demands to
friend and foe alike, so that the former may join us on this honorable
and blessed path . . . ''.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\47\ As-Sahab Media Foundation. ``A Message to the People of the
West from the fighting brother Azzam the American on the Fourth
Anniversary of the Battles of New York and Washington.'' http://www.as-
sahaab.com. MPEG Video; 12 minutes in length. November 6, 2005.
Fingering an automatic weapon, Gadahn also added the following
comments, swearing revenge on his own former hometown: ``Yesterday,
London and Madrid. Tomorrow, Los Angeles and Melbourne [Australia],
God-willing . . . We love peace, but when the enemy violates that peace
or prevents us from achieving it, then we love nothing better than the
heat of battle, the echo of explosions, and [slitting] the throats of
the infidels. When it comes to defending our religion, our freedom, and
our brothers in faith, every one of us is Mohammed Atta. Every one of
us is Jamal Lindsey, and every one of us is Mohammed Boieri.''\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ As-Sahab Media Foundation. ``A Message to the People of the
West from the fighting brother Azzam the American on the Fourth
Anniversary of the Battles of New York and Washington.'' http://www.as-
sahaab.com. MPEG Video; 12 minutes in length. November 6, 2005.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of all the individuals discussed herein, Adam Gadahn likely has the
slimmest chance of ever ascending the ranks much farther beyond his
current position as a spokesman and media advisor. He has no formal
clerical or military credentials to speak of, and while his proficiency
in speaking Arabic is improving, it is still quite poor. Like Ayman al-
Zawahiri, Gadahn appears to be obsessed with his own celebrity, spewing
an endless train of childish threats for the benefit of television
cameras. Even with his conversion to Islam and the dramatic destruction
of his own U.S. passport, the fact that Gadahn is a Caucasian American
with Jewish (and even Zionist) roots would be difficult for many
Islamists to swallow. Gadahn may serve at times as a useful propaganda
tool for al-Qaeda to harass the White House and the American public,
but he hardly stands out as the most capable figure to actually lead a
terrorist organization based in South Asia.
(iv) the question of al-qaeda's regional affiliates
Prior to 9/11, Osama bin Laden's principle obsession was on
building a single armed force on a ``Solid Foundation'' with a
centralized leadership under his control. According to founding al-
Qaeda Shura Council member Mamdouh Mahmud Salim (a.k.a. Abu Hajer al-
Iraqi), ``Abu Abdullah [bin Laden] had tendency to favor a policy of
centralization . . . and felt obligated to assemble the Arabs in one
location, train and prepare them to be a single mobilized fighting
brigade.''\49\ However, bin Laden had apparently overestimated the
importance of group centralization, neglecting the substantial benefits
afforded by al-Qaeda's loose, amalgamated infrastructure. Already by
the late 1980s, those around bin Laden warned him that their attempts
to create strict administration and hierarchy within al-Qaeda were
ending in disaster. Mamdouh Salim--appointed by bin Laden to assist him
in the regimentation of the Arabs in Afghanistan--admitted in
mujahideen memoirs, ``we tried our best to correct the brothers, but I
should admit that . . . I was mistaken about the task of management. I
thought of people what I had read about them in books--if you were to
say to someone, `Fear Allah', then that's fine, he would fear Allah! .
. . I believed that just like I could flip a switch to make a light
turn on and off, I could also similarly handle people!''\50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\49\ Muhammad, Basil. Al-Ansaru l'Arab fi Afghanistan. The
Committee for Islamic Benevolence Publications; 1991. Page 199.
\50\ Muhammad, Basil. Al-Ansaru l'Arab fi Afghanistan. The
Committee for Islamic Benevolence Publications; 1991. Page 196.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For al-Qaeda, the real turning point came in December 2001, when
groups of hardened al-Qaeda fighters attempted to make a dramatic last
stand against U.S.-backed Afghan militiamen at a cave complex in the
Tora Bora mountains, near the Pakistani border. The cream of al-Qaeda's
leadership, including bin Laden himself, had gathered in Tora Bora for
what seemed like a fool's errand: To fight a mismatched conventional
military battle against an adversary with total air dominance and far
more sophisticated battlefield weapons. U.S. tactical airstrikes
smothered hundreds of fighters to dust: ``there was no difference
between the night and the day: the sky was raining fire and the Earth
was erupting volcanoes.''\51\ Abortive attempts at regrouping and
retreating caused the deaths of possibly hundreds of fleeing al-Qaeda
fighters caught underneath a hail of cluster bombs. As a result of the
defeats at Tora Bora and 3 months later at Shah-i-Kot, ``almost all
remaining al-Qaeda forces'' fled across the border with Pakistan
seeking refuge in the remote, mountainous, and ``lightly governed''
frontier provinces.\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\51\ Azzam, Abdullah. The Lofty Mountain. Azzam Publications.
London; UK. 2003. Page 136.
\52\ The 9/11 Commission Report. Final Report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. July 22, 2004.
Page 338.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Faced with a resounding defeat on the peaks of Tora Bora, a group
of high-ranking al-Qaeda commanders decided to fundamentally re-think
Osama bin Laden's military campaign against the West and to embrace the
development of a more diffuse and self-sufficient network of
international operatives. In 2002 and 2003, al-Qaeda's shift in
strategy became noticeable following a series of dramatic kamikaze
bombing attacks targeting Westerners in a host of countries, from
Indonesia to Morocco. Al-Qaeda's then-official website--the Al-Neda
Center for Islamic Studies and Research--acknowledged that these
attacks marked a new phase in evolution: ``the al-Qaeda Organization
has adopted a strategy in its war with the Americans based on expanding
the battlefield and exhausting the enemy, who spread his interests over
the globe, with successive and varied blows . . . Expanding the
battlefield has invaluable benefits. The enemy, who needed to protect
his country only, realized that he needed to protect his huge interests
in every country. The more diversified and distant the areas in which
operations take place, the more exhausting it becomes for the enemy,
the more he needs to stretch his resources, and the more he becomes
terrified.''\53\ By mid-2004, nascent al-Qaeda franchise organizations
were already well ensconced inside both Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Today,
similar al-Qaeda franchises have expanded their reach even further into
Indonesia, Yemen, Algeria, Somalia, Lebanon, and the Palestinian
territories. These upstart regional branches are capable of operating
independently of al-Qaeda's central leadership in Afghanistan--and
though the immediate purpose of forming these branches was to ramp up
local activity in particular countries of interest--the growing
affiliate factions often have expansive ambitions just as grandiose as
those of Osama bin Laden himself.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\53\ Al-Neda Center for Islamic Studies and Research. ``The
Operation of 11 Rabi al-Awwal: The East Riyadh Operation and Our War
With the United States and its Agents.'' http://www.faroq.org/news/
news.php?id. August 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Qaeda's decision to branch out and form semi-autonomous regional
affiliates has not been without its drawbacks. In Iraq, even as al-
Qaeda's local leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi drew international media
attention (rivaling that paid to bin Laden) for his unrelenting
campaign of suicide bombings and beheadings, al-Zarqawi's stubborn
insistence on doing things in his own particular style caused countless
problems for al-Qaeda and other Sunni insurgent groups. According to
fellow insurgents (including some acknowledged former Zarqawi allies),
al-Qaeda fighters are responsible for adopting arrogant, totalitarian
measures in Iraq that have acutely undermined their popular image in
the Islamic community as ``chivalrous knights'' working to safeguard
justice and the innocent. In October 2007, one such estranged insurgent
partner, the ``Iraqi Jihad Union'' (IJU), issued an open call to al-
Qaeda's leaders: ``What is happening out in the field is indeed a
disaster and we hope that you have merely been misinformed about [these
events]. However, it will be an even greater disaster if you are, in
fact, well-informed about these matters.''\54\ The IJU fingered al-
Qaeda fighters as the guilty culprits behind the slaughter and
mutilation of their own Sunni Muslim comrades: ``To make things worse,
they dug up their bodies from the graves, further mutilated them,
beheaded them, and showed them off from their vehicles while driving
through the towns. They even killed our men's wives and children.''\55\
Yet another armed faction--``Hamas al-Iraq''--scoffed in a separate
statement to its supporters, ``the al-Qaeda network has actually made
people here think that the occupation forces are merciful and humane by
comparison.''\56\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\54\ http://www.alboraq.info/showthread?t=33995. October 5, 2007.
\55\ http://www.alboraq.info/showthread?t=33995. October 5, 2007.
\56\ http://www.alboraq.info/showthread?t=33728. October 2, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Only 2 years after bragging that al-Qaeda had ``broken the back''
of America with a barrage of suicide bombings in Iraq, Dr. Ayman al-
Zawahiri was forced to reappear in April 2008 in order to defend
Zarqawi's cruel methodology in the face of sharp criticism from fellow
Muslims. During a public Arabic-language Q&A session sponsored by al-
Qaeda, one anonymous participant (who scornfully introduced himself as
``Your Geography Teacher'') jeered at al-Zawahiri, ``Do you consider
the killing of women and children to be Jihad? I challenge you and your
organization to do that in Tel Aviv . . . Or is it easier to kill
Muslims in the markets? Maybe it is necessary [for you] to take some
geography lessons, because your maps only show the Muslims'
states.''\57\ With a touch of anger building in his voice, Dr. al-
Zawahiri insisted, ``We haven't killed the innocents, not in Baghdad,
nor in Morocco, nor in Algeria, nor anywhere else.'' After a moment of
reflection, he added, ``And if there is any innocent who was killed in
the Mujahideen's operations, then it was either an unintentional error,
or out of necessity as in cases of . . . the taking of human shields by
the enemy.''\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\57\ http://myhesbah.com/v/showthread?t=174676. April 2, 2008.
\58\ http://myhesbah.com/v/showthread?t=174676. April 2, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nor have things gone especially well for al-Qaeda in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia, where the group's local leadership was forced to flee the
country or else be wiped out in a dragnet by security forces. During a
2006 interview in London, the prominent Saudi Islamist dissident Dr.
Saad al-Faqih suggested that the problem stemmed from a critical
shortage of locally-based skilled commanders following the death of the
founder of the Saudi al-Qaeda branch, Yusuf al-Ayyiri: ``Al-Ayyiri . .
. was appointed by Bin Laden . . . probably before [9/11]. He is
capable, you know. You know that this man is capable, right? [Al-
Ayyiri] is a learned scholar, highly professional as a fighter, he is
powerful in his articulation, has a dominating personality, he is a
strategist. He knows what he is doing.''\59\ However, in the absence of
al-Ayyiri, al-Qaeda's strategy in Saudi Arabia turned ``hopeless'':
``Their strategy in Saudi Arabia is in shambles . . . I see it as, in
their own standards, very stupid strategy . . . Bin Laden was not
fortunate to have an intelligent, capable person after al-Ayyiri. All
the persons who came after al-Ayyiri were good military leaders but
very bad strategists, very bad tacticians.''\60\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Author's interview with Dr. Saad al-Faqih at his residence in
London; U.K. February 2006.
\60\ Author's interview with Dr. Saad al-Faqih at his residence in
London; U.K. February 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In listing their various shortcomings, Dr. al-Faqih particularly
noted the inexplicable failure of Saudi al-Qaeda leaders to conduct
their activities in a way that might possibly have some popular appeal
among ordinary Saudis. Al-Faqih scoffed, ``when you confront them with
the question, `why do you go to foreigners and leave [Prince] Nayif?',
they can't answer. They answer very stupid answers. Sloganistic answers
. . . This is a very naive literal interpretation of the prophet's
teaching.''\61\ As a result, not only has the ``cadre from before the
Iraqi war been hit very hard by the regime'', but moreover, ``people
who had some sort of intention to join al-Qaeda inside the country
changed their mind. They also lost in terms of sympathy and
understanding.''\62\ According to Dr. al-Faqih, ``al-Qaeda did not lose
because of the technology of the Saudi government, did not lose because
of the effective, the `effective' media, cultural, and security
campaign, it did not lose because of the support from the Americans and
others. It lost because of its own mistakes.''\63\ After a heavy sigh,
he confessed, ``I cannot understand why they planned it this way.''\64\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\61\ Author's interview with Dr. Saad al-Faqih at his residence in
London; U.K. February 2006.
\62\ Author's interview with Dr. Saad al-Faqih at his residence in
London; U.K. February 2006.
\63\ Author's interview with Dr. Saad al-Faqih at his residence in
London; U.K. February 2006.
\64\ Author's interview with Dr. Saad al-Faqih at his residence in
London; U.K. February 2006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While al-Qaeda's regional efforts in Iraq and Saudi Arabia may have
suffered debilitating setbacks in recent years, the picture could not
be any more different in nearby Yemen--where a growing al-Qaeda branch
(known simply as ``al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula'') not only has
threatened to undermine the stability of the central government in
Sanaa, but moreover, has demonstrated its ability to launch repeated
and sophisticated international terrorist attacks targeting the U.S.
homeland. Without doubt, the defining event for al-Qaeda's network in
Yemen came in 2008 with the unexpected arrival of numerous Saudi
Arabian al-Qaeda operatives who had recently been freed after years of
detention in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. An influential partnership was
formed between the remnants of al-Qaeda's Saudi branch and loyal Yemeni
disciples of Osama bin Laden--including his former personal secretary,
Abu Basir al-Wahishi, and a graduate of Bin Laden's notorious Al-Farouq
training camp near Kandahar, Qassim al-Rimi. In total, at least 11
former Gitmo detainees from Saudi Arabia returned to al-Qaeda, most of
them by fleeing political rehabilitation centers and crossing the Saudi
border into Yemen.
Throughout 2009, a slew of latent warnings emerged indicating that
AQAP was developing advanced bomb-making skills, including the ability
to circumvent heightened security measures at airports and other
sensitive installations. Over the space of several months, al-Qaeda's
network in Yemen released successive video recordings showing the
fabrication of elaborate explosive devices, including bombs carefully
hidden in picture frames and video cassette boxes. Then, in August
2009, AQAP claimed responsibility for its most sophisticated operation
yet: The attempted assassination of the Saudi Deputy Interior Minister
by a ``surrendering'' al-Qaeda member with a bomb hidden in his
underwear. In an official communique released days later by AQAP, the
group trumpeted the ``first-of-its-kind'' suicide operation by the
baby-faced Abdullah Asseri who ``was able to enter the palace . . . get
past his bodyguards, and ignited his explosive device . . . after he
already managed to pass through all the security checkpoints at the
airports in Najran and Jeddah.''\65\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\65\ Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). ``Statement Claiming
Responsibility for the Assassination Attempt on the Tyrant Mohammed bin
Nayif al-Saud.'' August 29, 2009.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In a video testimonial produced by AQAP and first broadcast in
September 2009, Asseri bragged about the impressive technical
innovations of locally-based al-Qaeda bombmakers:
``This is my ammunition . . . Allah has made this available to the
mujahideen . . . The idol-worshipping tyrants of the Saudi family
thought that they closed the doors on the face of the mujahideen, by
banning all explosive substances from the markets. But Allah made
available to us something they cannot handle . . . Allah willing, we
will come to you with only 50, 100 or 200 grams. Allah willing, our
brothers in the explosives department will release some instructive
videos about how you can blow up the enemies of Allah with simple
ingredients available to all which they cannot ban, except if they kill
everyone or close all the stores. Sometimes you will be amazed that
explosives can be made with things we even eat.''\66\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\66\ Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP). ``The Progeny of Mohammed bin Maslamah.'' Released on August
29, 2009.
On Christmas day 2009, Nigerian national Umar Farouk
Abdulmutallab--armed with a remarkably similar explosive device
provided to him by AQAP and concealed in his underwear--attempted to
bring down a civilian airliner packed with holiday travelers en route
from Amsterdam to Detroit.
In the months since the failed airline bombing over Detroit, AQAP
has expressed particular pride in the fact that their recruit Umar
Abdulmutallab was so successful in evading strict international airline
security procedures. During a propaganda video produced by al-Qaeda's
network in Yemen, an unseen narrator smugly insists, ``security and
military solutions won't help providing security for the Americans and
their allies, as after 8 years of big and continuous spending for the
cause of advancing the security abilities, the mujahideen were able,
with the grace of Allah, to infiltrate all the boundaries; the brother
Umar Farouk--may Allah release him--took off and passed through five
international airports, including the Dutch airport in Amsterdam, and
neither their technology nor machines were able to uncover the
manufactured device.''\67\ The leadership of al-Qaeda even published an
eye-catching article on this subject in the official AQAP on-line
magazine, titled, ``Secrets of the Manufactured Device'':
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\67\ Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP). ``America and the Final Trap.'' Released on May 26, 2010.
``Among the secrets of the device is that it included the study of the
[currently] used scanning machines inside airports and other places,
whether the security side or the technical side in America and Europe .
. . studying all these gaps took place, and with the grace of Allah
what we wished for has occurred; the intended martyr brother crossed
four continents--Asia, then African, then Europe, then America--and he
passed through four international airports that have strict procedures
. . . The mujahideen have [also] acquired a highly-explosive material
with power that exceeds the classic high explosives like `PETN' and
`TNT' and `RDX' and others, and it is being prepared and tested.''\68\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\68\ Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP). ``Secrets of the Manufactured Device.'' Sada al-Malahem
Magazine. Issue No. 12; Released on February 14, 2010.
Until quite recently, the notion of such complex planning for
transnational terrorist activities taking place outside the narrow
confines of Osama bin Laden's inner circle in Afghanistan would have
seemed baffling and radically controversial to most observers.
The re-organized al-Qaeda network based in Yemen has also benefited
from the contributions of Yemeni-American cleric Shaykh Anwar al-
Awlaki, a charismatic, English-speaking missionary who had evolved from
a mainstream ``moderate'' voice into one of the most passionate global
advocates for violent jihad in any language. On his internet blog--
popular among British, Canadian, and American Muslims--al-Awlaki openly
applauded al-Qaeda attacks on Yemeni security forces: ``May this be the
beginning of the greatest jihad, the jihad of the Arabian Peninsula
that would free the heart of the Islamic world from the tyrants who are
deceiving the Ummah and standing between us and victory.''\69\ Al-
Awlaki has been publicly fingered by U.S. officials as the responsible
party in turning Umar Abdulmutallab towards al-Qaeda. Speaking in a
video interview produced by AQAP, al-Awlaki enthused that the Christmas
day airline bomb plot had ``accomplished goals for the mujahideen and
it is considered a reply and terrorizing operation to the Americans,
and this operation showed the gaps in the American security instruments
whether it be intelligence-wise or in the security. In the American
airports they spend more than 40 million dollars and yet the Mujahid
Umar Farouk was able to pass these security instruments. And also the
intelligence admits that it had put him under surveillance and in spite
of that he was able to reach the heart of America to Detroit. So the
operation accomplished great successes though it did not kill even one
person, in spite of that it accomplished great successes.'' After a
pause, al-Awlaki added, ``About the brother Umar Farouk, he is also
from my students, and also I am very proud that the likes of Umar
Farouk are from my students and I support what he did.''\70\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\69\ Al-Awlaki, Anwar. ``The Army of Yemen Confronts the
Mujahideen.'' August 1, 2009. Posted on: http://www.anwar-alawlaki.com.
\70\ Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
(AQAP). ``A Premiere and Exclusive Interview with the Islamic Preacher
Sheikh Anwar Al-Awlaki.'' Released on May 22, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Perhaps the most disturbing aspect of AQAP's interest in launching
international terrorist attacks on the United States is their long-
running obsession with conceiving plots aimed at causing
``catastrophic'' damage to the American economy. In October 2002,
following a suicide bomb attack on a French supertanker off the coast
of Yemen, al-Qaeda's Politburo lost no time in formally praising the
operation for ``revealing the true danger the mujahideen pose to the
strategic, commercial, and military interests of the enemy'':
``If a boat that once cost us less than $1,000 managed to ruin a
destroyer worth over $1 billion (its symbolic value beyond measure),
and a similar boat managed to devastate an oil tanker of such great
magnitude, imagine the extent of the danger that threatens the West's
commercial lifeline which is petrol. This region sits on the largest
[oil] reserves, owns the largest quantities and contains [the
industry's] most important passages and lanes. The operation that
struck the French oil tanker is not merely an attack against a tanker--
it is an attack against international oil transport lines and all its
various connotations.''\71\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\71\ Al-Neda Center for Islamic Studies and Research. ``Statement
from the al-Qaeda Organization Regarding the Explosion Targeting the
Christian Oil Tanker in Yemen.'' Al-neda.com. October 13, 2002.
When it was still based in Saudi Arabia, AQAP published a treatise
titled, ``Bin Laden and the Oil Weapon'', in which the affiliate group
argued that because ``the United States will remain dependent on the
Middle East in the near future, its oil will continue to be an easy
target for all the enemies of the United States . . . It is imperative
that we strike petroleum interests in all regions that the United
States benefits from, and not only in the Middle East. The goal is to
cut off its imports or reduce them by all means. The targeting of oil
interests includes oil production wells, export pipelines, loading
platforms, tankers--and anything else that will deprive the United
States of oil, force it to make decisions that it has avoided having to
make for a long time, disrupt and stifle its economy, and threaten its
economic and political future.''\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\72\ Al-Bassam, Adeeb. ``Bin Laden and the Oil Weapon.'' Sawt al-
Jihad (``Voice of Jihad'') Magazine; Issue No. 30. Al-Qaeda's Committee
in the Arabian Peninsula (Saudi Arabia). Published: February 8, 2007.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In early 2008, after al-Qaeda moved its local operations from Saudi
Arabia to Yemen, the reconstituted AQAP published an approving
interview with a most wanted Saudi al-Qaeda suspect Nayef Bin Mohammed
al-Qahtani (a.k.a. Abu Humam al-Qahtani). Again endorsing the concept
of striking at petroleum resources, al-Qahtani reasoned, ``if the
enemy's interests in the Arabian Peninsula were stricken, and his
supply of oil was cut off, and the oil refineries were out of order,
this would cause the enemy to collapse--and he won't merely withdraw
from Iraq and Afghanistan, but would face total collapse. If he were to
be struck hard from various places, then he would scatter and turn
around and flee forlornly from the land of the Muslims.''\73\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\73\ ``A Meeting With One of the Most Wanted.'' Al-Malahem Media
Wing; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Sada al-Malahem
Magazine. Issue No. 1; January 12, 2008.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Given the high-profile role that AQAP has played in masterminding
not only the ``Underwear'' bomber Abdulmutallab, but also more
recently, a plot to smuggle explosive devices into U.S.-bound aircraft
via UPS cargo shipments, AQAP's passionate interest in launching
``strategic'' attacks aimed at devastating the U.S. economy can be
ignored only at our own peril. It is also a telling reminder of how,
thanks to the new affiliate network of global franchises, the
underlying al-Qaeda terrorist threat to the U.S. homeland is, in some
ways, unchanged by the death of Osama bin Laden.
(v) the ``homegrowns'': al-qaeda as an ideology
Even further beyond al-Qaeda's existence as an organization and
then as a franchise model is al-Qaeda as a political ideology. Given
his obsession with group centralization, for many years, bin Laden
failed to fully grasp how the relative ``openness'' of his movement and
the perceived lack of hierarchy appealed to young jihadist recruits. In
the world of al-Qaeda and the Arab-Afghans, even the most junior of
operatives could potentially gain high status within the movement by
either demonstrating useful skills, or else by volunteering to
sacrifice themselves on behalf of the mission. In other words, al-Qaeda
offered an equal opportunity at fame and recognition to nearly any
sympathetic soul willing to risk death or imprisonment. When agents
from the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) apprehended a
junior al-Qaeda operative who helped build the suicide truck bombs used
to attack two U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998, he boasted of his
own role in the plot and explained that he ``was attracted to Usama Bin
Ladin and the group Al Qaeda because it did not matter what nationality
you were'' and because al-Qaeda members did not explicitly follow
``orders from a chain of command'' in the same way as more traditional
terrorist organizations.\74\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\74\ Government Exhibit GX-6 (Interview of Mohammed Sadiq Odeh by
FBI Agent John Anticev). U.S. v. Usama Bin Laden, et al. S(7) 98 Cr.
1023 (LBS). United States District Court, Southern District of New
York.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In retrospect, it now appears that it was not bin Laden, but rather
his younger and more web-savvy lieutenants who truly championed the
idea of spreading al-Qaeda as an ideology, including among homegrown
extremists living in non-Muslim countries. One of those lieutenants was
the founder of al-Qaeda's franchise affiliate in Saudi Arabia, Yusuf
al-Ayyiri. Addressing those who had criticized al-Qaeda for killing
innocent Arab civilians during the May 2003 attacks in Riyadh, al-
Ayyiri scoffed, ``Whoever asks why in [Saudi Arabia] should ask
himself--if he was honest--why in Chechnya, why in Kabul, why in
Jerusalem, why in Bali, and why in Mombassa. These countries are ruled
by agent Karzai-type rulers and occupied by Americans or Jews who are
considered infidels and untrustworthy in Allah's book.'' Moreover,
according to al-Ayyiri, ``this war is based on a strategy to widen the
battlefield. The entire world has become a battlefield in practice and
not in theory.''\75\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\75\ Al-Neda Center for Islamic Studies and Research. ``The
Operation of 11 Rabi al-Awwal: The East Riyadh Operation and Our War
With the United States and its Agents.'' http://www.faroq.org/news/
news.php?id. August 2003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Al-Ayyiri's strategy for developing a global ``homegrown''
terrorist movement has had an astonishing impact in motivating new
faces to try and join al-Qaeda's cause--if not directly, then
indirectly. Among both Arabic and English-speaking al-Qaeda supporters,
one of al-Ayyiri's books has been particularly popular and enduring:
``Constants on the Path of Jihad'' (``Thawabit ala Darb al-Jihad'').
The book attracted so much attention that fugitive AQAP cleric Shaykh
Anwar al-Awlaki dedicated an entire lecture series to explaining al-
Ayyiri's underlying message in ``Constants on the Path of Jihad'' to an
English-speaking audience:
``Jihad does not end with the disappearance of a person. Jihad must
continue regardless because it does not depend on any particular leader
or individual . . . Jihad does not depend on any particular land. It is
global. When the Muslim is in his land, he performs jihad . . . No
borders or barriers stop it. The message cannot be conveyed without
jihad. If a particular people or nation is classified as . . . `the
people of war' in the Shariah, that classification applies to them all
over the earth. Islam cannot be customized to suit the conditions where
you are, for instance Europe.''\76\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\76\ Shaykh Anwar Al Awlaki. ``Constants on the Path of Jihad''
(``Thawaabit Ala' Darb Al-Jihad.'') Audio recording transcribed at
http://sabiluna.sitesled.com/
Constants%20on%20The%20Path%20of%20Jihad.pdf.
According to Awlaki, al-Ayyiri also instructed that ``victory''
cannot be limited to mere ``military victories'' alone, and should also
include ``sacrifice. The Mujahid sacrificing `his self' and his wealth
is victory. Victory of your idea, your religion. If you die for your
religion, your death will spread the da`wa . . . Allah chooses Shuhada
(martyrs) from amongst the believers. This is a victory.''\77\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\77\ Shaykh Anwar Al Awlaki. ``Constants on the Path of Jihad''
(``Thawaabit Ala' Darb Al-Jihad.'') Audio recording transcribed at
http://sabiluna.sitesled.com/
Constants%20on%20The%20Path%20of%20Jihad.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By early 2003, jihadi recruiters in Europe who had previously
encouraged others to travel to training camps in Afghanistan, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, and Chechnya began radically changing their message. Just
as with al-Ayyiri and al-Awlaki, their new philosophy emphasized the
individual nature and responsibility of jihad. At a conference in
Leicester organized by the radical Al-Muhajiroun faction in October
2002, Abu Hamza al-Masri (a.k.a. Mustafa Kamel) admonished his
audience, ``We need to resist, we need to fight, even alone. And you
can't go now to learn in Afghanistan or Eritrea as before. Now, a war
zone is a war zone. There is no need for camping, there is no
facilities for camping . . . A lot of the skills you need for the
frontline, you can learn from here . . . Where are you? What can you do
in your area?''\78\ Al-Muhajiroun leader Shaykh Omar Bakri Mohammed
echoed these comments and added, ``the Ummah [should] know it is
obligatory upon them to engage in . . . preparation and to engage in
the jihad. And each one must find their own way. There is no need
yourself to contact somebody here or there. You find your own way!
Sincerely, you will get it. You do not want to put someone else in
trouble. You, look for yourself! . . . Seek it! You will get it!''\79\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\78\ Speech given at ``Iraq Today Mecca Tomorrow.'' National
Conference held in Leicester, United Kingdom; organized by Al-
Muhajiroun, P.O. Box 349 London N9 7RR. October 27, 2002.
\79\ Speech given at ``Iraq Today Mecca Tomorrow.'' National
Conference held in Leicester, United Kingdom; organized by Al-
Muhajiroun, P.O. Box 349 London N9 7RR. October 27, 2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Surprisingly, rather than al-Qaeda's central leadership, it is
arguably al-Qaeda's local affiliate in Yemen that has actually expended
the greatest amount of entrepreneurial efforts in trying to mobilize
homegrown jihadists and inciting them into action. Six months after the
botched ``Underwear'' bomb plot involving Umar Abdulmutallab, AQAP
released the first issue of a new English-language propaganda magazine
titled ``Inspire.'' An article from the first issue, ``Make a Bomb in
the Kitchen of Your Mom'', explains:
``There are many Muslims who have the zeal to defend the ummah but
their vision is unclear. They believe that in order to defend the ummah
they need to travel and join the mujahideen elsewhere and they must
train in their camps. But we tell the Muslims in America and Europe:
There is a better choice and easier one to give support to your ummah.
That is individual work inside the West such as the operations of [Fort
Hood shooter] Nidal Hassan and [failed Times Square bomber] Faisal
Shahzad . . . My Muslim brother, who wants to support the religion of
Allah: do not make too many calculations and forecasting of the results
and consequences. It is true that Umar Farouk and his brothers Nidal
Hassan and Shahzad were imprisoned, but they have become heroes and
icons that are examples to be followed . . . My Muslim brother: we are
conveying to you our military training right into your kitchen to
relieve you of the difficulty of traveling to us. If you are sincere in
your intentions to serve the religion of Allah, then all what you have
to do is enter your kitchen and make an explosive device that would
damage the enemy.''\80\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\80\ ``Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.'' Inspire Magazine.
Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Issue
No. 1; Released on July 11, 2010.
The second issue of AQAP's ``Inspire'' Magazine once again returned
to the subject of individual jihad. Suggested tips included in the
magazine urged would-be al-Qaeda recruits ``coming from the West'',
``you might be asked by the mujahidin why you didn't partake in the
jihad inside your country . . . Many will tell you that attacking the
enemy in their backyard is one of the best ways to help the jihad . . .
Put yourself in the shoes of the leadership for a moment. They have
with them an individual who is not wanted by the intelligence services
and they could use that person to further the Islamic cause. That
person is you. I strongly recommend all the brothers and sisters coming
from the West to consider attacking the West in its own backyard . . .
These types of individual attacks are nearly impossible for them to
contain.''\81\ The same magazine also featured plans for ``the ultimate
mowing machine'', an ``idea to use a pickup truck as a mowing machine,
not to mow grass but mow down the enemies of Allah.''\82\ Above all,
however, the magazine urged that ``the best operation . . . is the one
where you come up with an innovative idea that the authorities have not
yet turned their attention to, and that leads to maximum casualties
or--equally important--maximum economic losses.''\83\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\81\ Inspire Magazine. Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Issue No. 2; Released on October 11, 2010.
Page 24.
\82\ Inspire Magazine. Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Issue No. 2; Released on October 11, 2010.
Page 24.
\83\ Inspire Magazine. Al-Malahem Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Issue No. 2; Released on October 11, 2010.
Page 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The identity of the reputed ``genius'' behind AQAP's latest
propaganda coup is symbolic of the evolving terrorist threat posed by
self-selecting ``lone wolf'' extremists. U.S. law enforcement and
intelligence agencies believe that ``Inspire'' Magazine was created on
behalf of AQAP by an American citizen and former resident of Charlotte,
North Carolina, Samir Khan. In 2004, at the age of 18, Khan acquired a
widespread reputation for his brash militancy on his well-traveled
English-language blog, ``InshallahShaheed'' (Martyrdom God-willing).
The blog routinely extolled the virtues of bin Laden and other al-Qaeda
leaders, along with terrorist attacks in Iraq and elsewhere. Yet, for
all his threats and internet tough talk, in real life, Khan looked far
more the part of hapless computer nerd than deadly assassin.
Nonetheless, in October 2009, 2 months before Umar Abdulmutallab
boarded a flight headed to the United States, the aspiring suburban
warrior Samir Khan left his own home in America and traveled to Yemen,
where he promptly disappeared and presumably joined al-Qaeda.\84\ In a
letter published recently in ``Inspire'', Khan has since confessed his
surprise at being allowed by U.S. Federal authorities to join AQAP
unhindered: ``I was quite open about my beliefs on-line and it didn't
take a rocket scientist to figure out that I was al Qaeda to the
core.''\85\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\84\ Gendar, Alison. ``Former New Yorker Samir Khan behind graphics
of new Al Qaeda recruiting magazine.'' New York Daily News. July 18,
2010.
\85\ ``The Ultimate Mowing Machine.'' Inspire Magazine. Al-Malahem
Media Wing; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Issue No. 2;
Released on October 11, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nor is Samir Khan alone. Internet chat forums run by al-Qaeda and
likeminded jihadi movements have become beacons for a variety of
extremists searching for a path to infamy in the guiding hands of al-
Qaeda. In April 2010, when the Pakistani Taliban claimed responsibility
for an attempted bomb plot in New York's Times Square, they chose to
release their claim via an exclusive English-language al-Qaeda chat
forum. One of the forum administrators--a mysterious ``lone wolf''
militant calling himself ``Asadullah al-Shishani'' (``the Lion of Allah
from Chechnya'')--immediately replied congratulating the Pakistani
Taliban on their operation, and further offering to provide ``help'' in
distributing their on-line propaganda.\86\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\86\ http://www.ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=21859. May 3, 2010.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Two months later, user ``Asadullah al-Shishani'' posted his own
homemade song on al-Qaeda's top-tier forums in honor of al-Qaeda's
slain ``No. 3'' leader Mustafa Abu al-Yazid. The lyrics to the English-
language song included the lines, ``You are a real hero, O' Mustafa Abu
Yazid. You spent your whole life fighting, Until you fell down Shaheed.
You are a real terror, Against America. You sent their soldiers
running, With shots of your Pee-Ka . . . Asadullah Alshishani salutes
you. And he prays for the day, That he meets you in Jannah And is
killed as a Fidaye. And I pray for the day, O that day, When I'm killed
as a Fidaye.''\87\ This was quickly followed by the web release of yet
another song performed in English by al-Shishani titled, ``When the
Jew's Blood Reds my Knife, then my Life is Free from Strife'':
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\87\ http://www.alqimmah.net/showthread.php?p=17492. June 1, 2010.
``Hiding behind rocks and trees, I'll find them with greatest ease.
Make them get down on their knees, Slaughter them despite their pleas.
Throw them in the ovens hot, Soap and lampshades sold and bought, Made
of the Jews that we shot. Mercy's something I have not. With the bomb
and machinegun, Blast at them and watch them run. We will have a lot of
fun, Shoot and kill Jews one by one.''\88\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\88\ http://www.ansar1.info/showthread.php?t=22963. June 3, 2010.
Given the picture that emerges of ``Asadullah al-Shishani''--a
hardcore fanatic volunteering as a manager on elite jihadi web forums,
who seeks to assist the Pakistani Taliban in launching attacks on the
United States, and who sings gaily about murdering innocent people--one
might imagine his real identity is that of a high-ranking al-Qaeda
terrorist in Iraq or Afghanistan. In fact, nothing could be further
from the case--``Asadullah al-Shishani'' is actually 21-year old Penn
State college student Emerson Begolly, a native of Pittsburgh. In
January 2011, FBI agents finally moved in on Begolly as he sat in a
vehicle outside a fast food restaurant in New Bethlehem. When he
noticed agents approaching him, Begolly attempted to resist arrest and
``allegedly bit the agents, drawing blood.'' Upon subduing and
searching their suspect, the agents recovered a loaded 9mm handgun.\89\
Further searches at Begolly's primary residence turned up homemade
video recordings of Begolly dressed in camouflage and jihadi gear,
armed to the teeth, and apparently practicing would-be military
maneuvers.\90\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\89\ ``Natrona Heights man accused of biting FBI agents.''
Pittsburgh Tribune-Review. January 6, 2011.
\90\ http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7yiHkuud8Yw. May 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Curiously, Begolly is neither Chechen, nor did he ever actually
visit local mosques or Islamic centers in Pennsylvania. In fact, as far
as the Muslim community in Pittsburgh is concerned, Emerson Begolly
never existed. His entire indoctrination and radicalization process
evidently took place on-line, exclusively via al-Qaeda social
networking forums. No amount of eavesdropping or inside sources
recruited from within a mosque would have led investigators to
Begolly--only his violent ramblings posted on the internet. This is the
biggest challenge facing U.S. law enforcement in the coming years.
While Begolly might not be capable of launching the next 9/11 all by
himself, al-Qaeda doesn't need to achieve that level of success in
order to stay relevant. Rather, as pointed out to me by jihadi veteran
Abdullah Anas, ``in order to spoil things and to stay on the front page
of the news and the satellite channels, they don't need much. Just one,
from one thousand. If you have one in the list to wear the jacket with
the TNT, that is enough.''
(vi) conclusions
Looking back on the tumultuous career of the late Osama bin Laden,
it is truly striking how far al-Qaeda has evolved from its humble
origins as a tightly-knit cabal largely based in Pashtun regions of
Afghanistan into a multi-national enterprise with associate branches
across the Muslim world--not to mention a blossoming ideological appeal
which propels seemingly-random individuals into taking this battle upon
themselves in their own backyard. The killing of Osama bin Laden
delivered a striking blow to the morale of this al-Qaeda enterprise,
and it has provided perhaps a brief interruption in their operational
planning. The substantial intelligence gathered from bin Laden's
compound in Abbottabad may yet lead us to the hideouts of further high-
ranking al-Qaeda leaders. Moreover, bin Laden's successor--be it Ayman
al-Zawahiri or someone else--could prove to be a far less capable
leader than Osama. But, ultimately, the terrorist threat faced by
America today is multi-faceted and no longer the exclusive product of
bin Laden and a handful of dusty terrorist training camps perched along
the Afghan-Pakistani border. Thus, whether we speak of al-Qaeda as a
centralized organization, a globally-franchised web of affiliates, or
simply as an organizing principle guiding homespun radical extremists,
it seems quite clear that al-Qaeda will continue to present a serious
and undeniable threat to the U.S. homeland for the foreseeable future.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman King. I thank all the witnesses for their
testimony.
I will start off the questioning, I guess Mr. Bergen and
Mr. Kohlmann first. Both of you have mentioned al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula. They are the one franchise which has shown
the most interest in attacking the United States, attacking the
homeland. We also have al Shabab, which has recruited at least
three dozen Americans. I have heard reports, and can you
confirm it at all, that the possibility of a linkup between
AQAP and al Shabab and using those combined facilities to
attack the mainland, attack the homeland.
Mr. Kohlmann. Yes. We do have evidence that both al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula and Shabab al-Mujahideen in Somalia
are in communication with each other. The communications in
fact are not necessarily even secret. About a year and a half
ago, Sheik Anwar al-Awlaki, the infamous fugitive Yemeni
American cleric who is serving as a spiritual adviser to AQAP-
engaged in an open exchange of letters over the web with Shabab
al-Mujahideen endorsing their struggle, offering advice and
support.
The other thing is that if you pay attention to propaganda
put out by AQAP in Yemen, you will notice that a disturbing
number of articles and interviews published in their magazine,
be it in English or Arabic or other languages, are actually
about Somalia, are about Shabab, are about the need to link up.
What they have discussed is the idea of actually taking control
of the straits leading into the Red Sea, controlling the
straits on the Horn of Africa side in the hands of Shabab, and
the other side controlled by AQAP, and shutting off shipping
through the channel. That may be a grandiose objective, but it
gives you an idea of them working together in a partnership in
the future.
Chairman King. The fact that you would have American
citizens in al Shabab, it would also give them, I believe, more
of an entree to the United States.
Mr. Kohlmann. That is correct. There are numerous Americans
now in both groups. There is Samir Khan, a former resident of
Charlotte, North Carolina, and of New York, New York, who is
currently serving as a media advisor to al-Qaeda in Yemen, who
is the editor behind their infamous Inspire magazine. In
Somalia, you have individuals such as Omar Hammami, the former
Alabama native who has gone over and not only is providing
advice to Shabab, but is actually a leader of Shabab; in fact,
appeared on camera in the past few days at a Shabab really
entitled ``We Are All Osama,'' giving a speech in English
indicating that Shabab would be at the forefront of trying to
carry out vengeance attacks in the name of bin Laden against
the United States.
Chairman King. Mr. Bergen.
Mr. Bergen. I would give a minor caveat to that. The
Americans who have gone to Somalia to fight, a lot of them have
died. It is very dangerous over there.
Second, they are very well-known to the American
Government, and some of the gentlemen that Mr. Kohlmann just
mentioned are very well-known. I think it is quite unlikely
that they come to the United States.
What is much more plausible is they might mount an
operation on an American target overseas, say, in Kenya. A lot
easier to do. You don't have the same set of problems of their
coming in the no-fly list and all the other things you face in
this country.
Chairman King. A question for Congressman Hamilton and also
Ms. Townsend. On the treasure trove of intelligence that has
been gathered, we are an instant gratification society, and
virtually the day after the intelligence was found, people were
asking, what did we find, what did we learn?
Based your experience at the 9/11 Commission and, Fran,
your experience in the White House, how long do you think it
will take us to have a real analysis of the intelligence that
was gathered, considering I think it is well over a million
pieces? How long that will it take to get a real analysis of
that, and where would that lead?
Ms. Townsend. Mr. Chairman, first you have got to look at
what is the total amount of material. Let us take out any
analysis related to the pornography that was found. By the way,
not a surprising find, not unique to seizures against raids of
Taliban and al-Qaeda hideouts in Afghanistan. So it was not at
all shocking to me, but it will take up a lot of space in terms
of the material.
When you look at then what is remaining, they have got a
24/7, my understanding, capability of sort of triaging it, if
you will. You are already seeing some of the things. What they
are going to look for are, first and foremost, potential plots,
and they will act against those immediately, not waiting to
complete the analysis; second, locational data for high-value
targets to take advantage of what may be in there, but
perishable; and then sort of a broader understanding of the
organization, how they communicate and how they operate.
This is going to be an on-going process. I think the one
thing we ought to take confidence in is they won't wait to
complete it to act on it. They will act on it as they reveal
the material.
Chairman King. Chairman Hamilton.
Mr. Hamilton. I think by all odds the most important thing
is to identify imminent threats to the United States and our
allies. So you want to go through the material quickly to see
if you can identify immediate threats. I suspect that process
has been pretty well completed.
Beyond that, of course, intelligence is a very tedious
business, and you look for bits of information from thousands
of sources and try to put that information together. That does
take time; not just a matter of hours or days, but it takes
months and even years to do it. So it is an extremely difficult
process, and, of course, all of this is in foreign language and
all the rest of it.
I can't predict for you how long it will be before we get
benefits from the information that we have. You have to keep in
mind that all of the information you want is never in a single
source; that is, you have to take this information and compare
it with information from other sources, and that takes time,
too.
So it is a trove. It is an enormous treasure for us. Will
it benefit us? Almost certainly the answer to that is yes. How
quickly? I have no idea how quickly it would be. But I think it
is a great find and kind of a benefit that perhaps we did not
anticipate when we went in to get Osama bin Laden.
Chairman King. Thank you, Chairman Hamilton.
I recognize the Ranking Member Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like unanimous consent to enter into the record the
2011 Grant Program Funding Summary for the House Homeland
Security Committee.
Chairman King. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Information Submitted for the Record by Ranking Member Bennie G.
Thompson
fiscal year 2011 grant program funding summary
Below is a summary of the funding allocations for each program
which is compared to fiscal year 2010 funding levels.
$526 million--State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSG)
will receive a cut of $315 million, which would result in
reduced funding for highest risk States due to the mandatory
minimums for States in Sec. 2004 of the 9/11 Commission Act of
2007. Each State or territory allocation will be cut between 22
to 50% and the new minimum allocation reduced to $5.1 million,
down from $6.6 million in fiscal year 2010.
Additional ``carve-outs'' within the SHSG program received the
following allotments:
Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS).--$39.3
million--a cut of $4.4 million for fiscal year 2010.
Citizen Corp Program (CCP).--$12.4 million--a cut of $2.5
million.
Operation Stonegarden (OPSG).--$60 million--a cut of $5.1
million.
Driver's License Security Grant Program (DLSGP).--$48
million--a cut of $3 million.
$10 million--Tribal Homeland Security Grant Program (THSGP)
was the only grant program not cut from fiscal year 2010
allocations:
$681 million--Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) would
receive a cut of $169 million, which would reduce the number of
Tier 2 urban areas receiving funding under the UASI program
from 64 in fiscal year 2010 to 31 in fiscal year 2011. Tier 1
urban areas represent the top 11 at-risk and will receive level
funding from fiscal year 2010. San Diego was moved up to Tier
1. Please see Appendix B for the list of localities funded and
those eliminated from the UASI program.
One additional ``carve-out'' is within the UASI program:
UASI Nonprofit Security Grant Program (NGSP).--$19
million--a cut of $38,000 from fiscal year 2010.
$14.1 million--Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Grant
Program receives a 75% cut from its fiscal year 2010 allotment
of $57.6 million;
$14.1 million--Regional Catastrophic Preparedness Grant
Program (RCPGP) would receive a cut of $19.4 million;
$329 million--Emergency Management Performance Grant Program
(EMPG) receives on [sic] minor cut of 0.2% or $659,000 for its
fiscal year 2010 enacted levels;
$235 million--Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) would
receive a cut of $32.9 million;
Additional ``carve-outs'' within the TSGP program received the
following allotments:
Freight Rail Security Grant Program (FRGSP).--$10
million--a cut of $4.5 million.
Intercity Passenger Rail (Amtrak).--$19.9 million--a minor
cut of $40,000.
Intercity Bus Security Grant Program (IBSGP).--$4.9
million--a $6.5 million reduction. IBSGP is a new carve-out
in fiscal year 2011.
$235 million--Port Security Grant Program would receive a
cut of $52.9 million.
Please Note.--The Buffer Zone Protection Plan (BZPP) grant which
assists State and locals to build security and risk-management
capabilities and Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Programs
were defunded.
Appropriations Committee Releases Fiscal Year 2012 Homeland Security
Appropriations Bill
May 12, 2011
Washington, DC.--The House Appropriations Committee today released
its proposed fiscal year 2012 Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Appropriations bill. The legislation will be marked-up in subcommittee
tomorrow, and is among the first Appropriations bills to move to
subcommittee this year.
Given the importance of providing adequate funding for the safety
and security of the Nation, as well as the urgent need to reduce
spending to rein in the Nation's unprecedented deficits and debt, the
legislation makes serious strides to focus funding in areas where it's
most needed, while significantly trimming spending elsewhere. Overall,
the fiscal year 2012 Homeland Security Appropriations bill provides
$40.6 billion in total non-emergency funding for the various programs
and agencies within DHS. This is a decrease of $1.1 billion--or 2.6%--
below last year's level and $3 billion--or 7%--below the President's
request.
Appropriations Chairman Hal Rogers made the following statement on
the legislation:
``To address our historic deficit crisis, we must make the most of
our limited resources and rein in unnecessary and wasteful spending in
virtually every area of Government--including homeland security. The
Department's budget has grown at a rapid rate--over 42% since 9/11--and
while it is critical that we maintain crucial measures to keep our
Nation safe, we must also protect our country from the very real
dangers of uncontrolled deficits and debt. This legislation will
prioritize funding for frontline operations and programs to uphold the
highest level of National security, while trimming back budgets in less
essential areas,'' Chairman Rogers said.
Homeland Security Subcommittee Chairman Robert Aderholt also
commented on his bill:
``Homeland security and fiscal discipline are National priorities
and the fiscal year 2012 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations
bill addresses both,'' said Chairman Aderholt. ``The recent storms that
swept the Southeast and the death of Osama bin Laden serve as sobering
reminders of our Nation's continued need for robust National security
and disaster recovery. The bill recognizes the critical importance of
the homeland security mission--fully funding all intelligence and watch
listing functions, as well as all frontline personnel. The bill also
reflects the unquestioned need for fiscal restraint, reduces spending
wherever possible, and prioritizes taxpayers' limited dollars toward
the vital security programs that will have an immediate impact on our
Nation's safety and security.''
Bill Highlights
Savings and Oversight.--The misleading and inadequate budget
request from the President for DHS overtly underfunded known disaster
relief costs of more than $4.9 billion (requesting only $1.8 billion),
relied on $650 million in increased revenue from fees that Congress has
not approved, and included undefined and unspecified ``administrative
savings'' of more than $803 million. In contrast, the committee's
legislation ignores these accounting gimmicks and provides real budget
savings, better efficiency, and stringent oversight of DHS spending
while prioritizing disaster response and the frontline operations that
most directly and immediately enhance our National security.
The legislation includes major cuts to programs that have
underperformed, been ill-managed, or not proven beneficial for the
cost. Also, the bill requires numerous expenditure plans from DHS in
order to improve its budget justifications and better align funding to
tangible security results.
FEMA State and Local Grant Reform.--The bill includes long-overdue
reform of the State and Local Grant program under the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA), which has been plagued by inefficiency and
has been unable to demonstrate a measurable return on taxpayer
investments. These grants often remain in Federal coffers for many
years--including a current backlog of over $13 billion in unspent
funds. To address these challenges, the bill reduces the total grant
funding by $2.1 billion, requires increased measurement, reporting, and
oversight of existing funds, and permits the Secretary of DHS to issue
grants in a competitive, merit-based process to prioritize areas with
the highest risk and greatest need--getting the most out of each and
every tax dollar.
Critical Security Operations and Programs.--The committee's
legislation prioritizes funding for frontline security operations,
including personnel, intelligence activities, and the acquisition of
selected essential tactical resources. This includes increasing
staffing levels of the Border Patrol, Customs and Border Protection
(CBP) field operations, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE),
Coast Guard, Secret Service, and other essential security personnel. In
addition, the bill fully funds all requested increases for intelligence
gathering activities, including ``watch listing'' and threat
identification.
Earmarks.--This bill contains no earmarks, as defined by clause
9(e) of Rule XXI of the House Rules.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection.--The bill contains $11.8
billion for Customs and Border Protection (CBP)--an increase of $443
million over last year's level. This funding provides for a total of
21,370 border patrol agents and 21,186 CBP officers, additional
training and canine units at ports of entry, $149 million for
Inspection and Detection Technology, and $500 million for Air and
Marine operations and procurement. The bill increases funding for CBP's
targeting systems by $15 million to enhance the identification of known
and suspected terrorists and criminals, and contains a total of $500
million for border security fencing, infrastructure, and technology.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement.--The bill provides $5.8
billion for Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which is $35
million above last year's level. This includes $1.7 billion for
domestic investigation programs, $147 million for international
enforcement programs, $81 million for the Office of Intelligence, $32.5
million for the Visa Security Program, and an additional $64 million
for continued expansion of the Secure Communities program. In addition,
the legislation includes $2.7 billion--an increase of $27 million above
the President's request--for ICE detention bed spaces, raising the
total number of beds to 34,000, the largest detention capacity in ICE's
history.
Transportation Security Administration (TSA).--The bill includes
$7.8 billion for the TSA, an increase of $125 million over last year's
level, and $293 million below the President's request. These funds will
be used to sustain the current cap level of 46,000 full-time screening
personnel, and for explosive detection systems, security enforcement,
cargo inspections, Federal Air Marshals, and other TSA activities. The
bill also includes an additional $10 million to address air cargo
threats. However, the bill does not provide $76 million requested by
the President for 275 additional advanced inspection technology (AIT)
scanners nor the 535 staff requested to operate them.
Coast Guard.--The bill contains $10 billion for the U.S. Coast
Guard, which is $196 million below last year's level, and provides
funding for maritime safety and security activities, counternarcotics
enforcement, facilities and equipment maintenance, and overseas
contingency operations including operations in the Persian Gulf. Within
the total, the legislation fully sustains military pay and allowances,
and provides targeted increases above the budget request for
communications, tactical training, and acquisition of critical
operations assets such as small boats and replacement helicopters.
Secret Service.--The bill includes $1.7 billion for the U.S. Secret
Service--an increase of $155 million over last year's level. This
includes $113 million for protective activities related to the 2012
Presidential Election, and $43 million for information technology
improvements including cybersecurity and threat assessment
capabilities.
Federal Emergency Management Agency.--The bill includes $5.3
billion for FEMA--a decrease of $1.9 billion from last year's level.
This total includes a cut of $2.1 billion to State and Local grants (as
noted above), and an increase of $850 million to the Disaster Relief
Fund (DRF). The bill provides $1 billion for FEMA's State and Local
Programs, and includes increased oversight, better prioritization of
funding to address critical needs and high-risk areas, and a report on
the expenditure of the current $13 billion in backlogged, unexpended
grant funds leftover from previous years. The bill fully funds
Emergency Management Performance Grants at $350 million and provides
$350 million for firefighting grants. To better address the costs of
both known and expected disasters, the legislation also includes a
total of $2.65 billion for the DRF.
Guantanamo Bay Detention Facility and Detainees.--The legislation
includes a provision prohibiting funds to transfer, release, or assist
in the transfer or release of Guantanamo detainees to or within the
United States or its territories. The provision also prohibits
immigration benefits to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or any other detainee.
Mr. Thompson. Again, we have tremendous experience. I would
like to kind of put a softball question on you and see how you
come back with it.
Given what you know about the threat we face since the
death of bin Laden, as well as before, are there some things
that you think we as Members of Congress ought to do that we
are not doing to keep the threat to the homeland to a minimum?
I will start with you, Congressman.
Mr. Hamilton. You always have to be careful when somebody
says they are throwing you a softball question. It almost
invariably means it is going to be hard to answer.
Well, I go back to the basics here. I don't think the
homeland security agenda is radically changed because of Osama
bin Laden's death. We still have items that we know we must
deal with in homeland security that we have not dealt with, and
they have been on the agenda for 10 years. I have mentioned the
radio spectrum issue, the ability to communicate, and the
ability to have unity of command.
But Congress has to get its act together in both
intelligence and homeland security. You folks are part of the
problem because you haven't put your act together with regard
to homeland security oversight and with your intelligence
oversight.
So rather than looking far away at a lot of things and
trying to come up with new ideas as a result of this dramatic
success, I think you have to kind of go back to the basics that
have been on the agenda for quite a long period of time. I
think what the Chairman said in his opening statement, and I
think several of the witnesses mentioned, for 10 years now
after 9/11, the American people have moved on to all kinds of
other interests and focuses, and so there is a kind of
complacency and lack of urgency that sets in.
What can Members of Congress do? I think Members of
Congress can emphasize to their constituents again and again
that this is still a very serious threat to the United States,
and we must not become complacent. These people will find a way
to attack us. I have very little doubt that we will be attacked
again in the future. We hope not. We have been very fortunate;
maybe more than fortunate. We have been very good protecting
ourselves. But the threat is still there. So what can you do?
You can keep people reminded of the fact that this threat is
still alive.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Ms. Townsend.
Ms. Townsend. Congressman, I appreciate the question, and I
am going to give you three specific things that I think are
available for you all to really help with. They are not new,
but we haven't adequately addressed them.
What do we know about al-Qaeda's targeting? They are
obsessed with the transportation sector of our infrastructure.
We have not done enough when it comes to rail security. We
still don't have 100 percent of cargo screening despite this
threat with the computer cartridges. So renewed emphasis and
investment on transportation security, including rail and cargo
and infrastructure generally, is very important.
Second, it is about technology. You heard me talk about the
need for both the Government investigators and intelligence to
have the resources, the capability that they need to not to
keep up with the bad guys, but to be ahead of them. Oftentimes,
even when they have the technology, the legal authority to
actually use it effectively lags behind. Of course, Congress
can help with that. I would reemphasize, Congressman Hamilton,
the need for bandwith for first responders.
Last is the only people who can really effectively address
what we call the low-probability, high-consequence event--
radiological, nuclear, biological--is the Federal Government. I
worry, because we have talked about it but not seen an attack,
that we haven't done enough. This is one of these we don't want
to think about it because of the horrible consequences, but, in
fact, we know from their own statements they are committed to
an anthrax capability, they are committed to obtaining nuclear.
I worry 10 years after
9/11 that the resources and commitment, whether it is the
Strategic National Stockpile or other such programs that help
prevent, detect, or respond to such things, are inadequate.
Mr. Bergen. I would just say that I think it is important
for the committee to communicate to the American people that
the threat is not just coming from al-Qaeda. When I say the
threat, I mean the threat to the domestic American homeland.
Pakistani Taliban recruited and trained Faisal Shehzad. The
Islamic Jihad unit, which is sort of an Uzbek group, recruited
guys to attack Ramstein Air Force Base in 2007. They
accumulated 1,600 pounds of hydrogen. That are now operating in
an al-Qaeda-like manner.
Mr. Kohlmann. Thank you, sir. I think that law enforcement
in this country has made tremendous leaps and bounds in terms
of their evolution since 9/11. But the FBI and Department of
Justice are still grappling with some issues relating to
virtual sanctuaries. We have gone after al-Qaeda in their
physical sanctuaries in places like Afghanistan and Pakistan,
but right now there are virtual sanctuaries for al-Qaeda on the
internet where al-Qaeda is able to put bomb-making
instructions, recruit people, communicate with each other out
of the view of the American public.
What most people wouldn't realize is that top-tier al-Qaeda
members in Afghanistan on the frontline are chatting with each
other over social networking forums that are hosted in western
countries by major corporations. That can't go on. So I think
one of the roles that the U.S. Congress can play is, No. 1, to
put pressure on law enforcement to continue to reform itself,
to continue to acquire high-tech tools, which will put the FBI
one step ahead of cyber jihadists. I think also, very
importantly, is to put pressure on the private corporations
that are serving as the unwitting hosts for this material.
Obviously, YouTube and Facebook don't want to have anything to
do with al-Qaeda. But I think it is time that both of these
companies, along with hosts of others that are responsible for
hosting al-Qaeda material, make more of an effort than simply
try to rely on volunteer efforts by people who are opposed to
the message of al-Qaeda, which is what they are doing right
now. It is time that these companies take the responsibility of
making sure that their resources are not being misused to
recruit people like Faisal Shahzad, like Umar Abdulmutallab and
push them to join al-Qaeda.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much. You hit the softball.
I would like, Mr. Chairman, unanimous consent that Mr.
Green, former Member of the committee, be allowed to sit for
this hearing.
Chairman King. Mr. Thompson, obviously I will not object.
But we are considering charging Mr. Green rent for all the time
he spends with us.
Recognize the gentleman from Texas, the Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Oversight, Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to first
take this moment just to publicly commend the Navy SEALs, the
intelligence community, particularly the analysts in both NSA
and CIA for a job well done in bringing him to justice. They
are really the unsung heroes whose names and faces the American
people may never know.
With that, this hearing that for us is the impact of al-
Qaeda after the killing of Osama bin Laden. There was a debate
going on as to where he was located. Was he in a cave? Was he
operational? Was he just a figurehead? Most people thought he
was more of an inspirational figurehead. From what I have seen,
that debate may be changing somewhat.
There were 27 terror plots over the last 2 years. I think
my first question is, of those 27, how many of those do you
believe may have been inspired by those like al-Awlaki who
inspired Major Hasan just north of my district in Fort Hood,
and other franchise operations, versus the bin Laden operation?
We know with the predator drones that the command and control
structure was greatly decentralized and damaged.
So with that, to me, that goes to the core of the question:
If you analyze the last 2-year terror plots, how many of those
do you believe were actually inspired or motivated by Osama bin
Laden?
Mr. Kohlmann. I would just say this: I work as a consultant
on behalf of the FBI, and I evaluate evidence and I serve as an
expert witness in terrorism trials here in the United States. I
have yet to see a single homegrown terrorism case in the United
States that did not include at least some material by Anwar al-
Awlaki. His recordings pop up in basically every single
homegrown terrorism case that is litigated by the Department of
Justice in this country; and, frankly, it appears in every
single case outside of this country as well.
That doesn't mean that bin Laden isn't influential, either.
His materials show up, too. The difference between bin Laden
and al-Awlaki is that al-Awlaki may not have military
credentials, but he speaks fluent English, he is extremely
charismatic, he is a good speaker, and he has religious
credentials which I guess take the place of the military ones.
He won't ever replace bin Laden, but he is a tremendously
influential figure. There is absolutely no doubt that he
continues to radicalize people. People right now, at this very
moment, are being arrested in the United States with
connections to al-Awlaki, have tried reaching out to al-Awlaki.
Very dangerous people.
Mr. McCaul. Most of these were homegrown radicalization
cases inspired by al-Awlaki. Does anybody else on the panel
have any comments on that?
Mr. Bergen. In the U.S. military, there is a document
called Commander's Intent, which means that General Petraeus
doesn't have to tell a soldier in Kandahar what to do, and bin
Laden was in charge of Commander's Intent. So al-Awlaki, the
reason he is important in these cases is because he speaks
English. It is that simple. If he was speaking in Arabic, he
wouldn't be that important. It is not that he is a significant
religious figure, or as Mr. Kohlmann said, a significant
military figure. It is that he is communicating in colloquial
English.
Al-Awlaki is no Osama bin Laden. He can't change the
strategic intent of al-Qaeda. At the end of the day, al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula is a branch of al-Qaeda Central,
operating to fulfill bin Laden's strategic guidance.
If the new leader of al-Qaeda came along and said we are
not going to attack the United States anymore, you know, al-
Awlaki would still be out there and he may take a different
view. But at the end of the day, al-Awlaki is not in charge of
this movement. He is a number--you know, not insignificant
leader of a branch of the larger mother ship.
Mr. McCaul. I agree with that assessment. I always said the
death of bin Laden marked the beginning of the end. Because we
couldn't truly win the war on terror until we killed bin Laden.
So that is why I believe this is so significant.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. McCaul, if I may say so. I don't have a
detailed analysis of the 27 that you mentioned, but my answer
to the question of how many were inspired by Osama bin Laden
would be all of them. He was a symbolic figure, he was an icon,
and he had enormous influence here. I can't imagine any of
these terrorists striking without paying some homage and
allegiance to him. This man was extraordinarily charismatic.
Sitting in the 9/11 Commission listening to testimony, I
kept asking myself, how in the world could a man persuade 19
young men to go to their deaths? Now, you talk about persuasive
powers. That is persuasive power. I know it is a different
environment, a different religion and all the rest of it, but
the instinct for self-preservation is pretty strong. He
persuaded 19 people to kill themselves. That is the kind of
authority and charisma he had, in a very evil way of course. He
inspired all of them.
Chairman King. I will go to another gentleman from Texas,
Mr. Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank the witnesses for being here with us.
You know, when somebody comes into the United States,
Border Patrol will classify them as Mexicans or OTMs. That is,
other than Mexicans. The large number of folks who are coming
into the United States are Mexicans coming in for economic
reasons. Then after that you have Central Americans, and then
you have other folks. Traditionally, that is what the numbers
have been with the Border Patrol.
There was a CRS report that said that--and I am quoting:
``The sheer increase of non-Mexicans, the OTMs, coming across
the border makes it more difficult for United States Border
Patrol agents to readily identify and process each OTM, thereby
increasing the chance that a potential terrorist could slip
into the system. Moreover, there is no reliable data concerning
how many OTMs may evade apprehension and successfully enter the
country legally across the country.''
Then CRS raises a couple of potential issues. One potential
issue for Congress is whether to increase in OTM apprehensions
poses a threat to National security. Then another potential
threat, according to the CRS, for Congress, is the indication
that hundreds of people that come from countries known to
harbor terrorists or to promote terrorism are caught trying to
enter into the United States illegally across the land border.
If you look at the handout out there, and this is OTMs, the
OTM members, you should have a handout before you. This is not
Mexicans. This is OTMs. The large number of them are coming in
from Central America, 22,360. This is for fiscal year 2011.
Then you have India, and then you have South America. By South
America, you are talking about all the countries of South
America. Then China. Then Romania.
The second handout deals with just focusing not on the
Mexicans or the Central Americans, but this is the rest of the
OTMs. India in the fiscal year 2011 had 1,662, more than the
1,660, which includes all of South America. Every country put
together came in from there. Then you have China, and then you
have Romania.
Now, my question is, what sort of issues does this bring
up?
Keep in mind, I think you might be familiar, India and
Guatemala, I think it was back in 2009, entered into some sort
of agreement where they have a non-visa, or waiver of visas,
going into Guatemala. So maybe that is a pipeline that just
gets them coming in, like Brazil did some years ago.
But my question is, when you have folks coming in from,
let's say, India and the area that they come, what sort of
potential issues does this bring when we talk about threats to
the United States, if any? To any of the panelists.
Ms. Townsend. Seeing no one else step up to this one.
Congressman, this has been, as I am sure you know, during my
time in the Bush administration, I was a vocal advocate for
comprehensive immigration reform. I view comprehensive
immigration reform as a necessary, fundamentally necessary
thing to protect our National security.
During my time in the Government, there had been some
intelligence to suggest that al-Qaeda looked at this pipeline
coming across the U.S.-Mexican border. I will leave the
politics to those of you for whom it is a profession, and say
to you that I believe that the lack of comprehensive
immigration reform is a vulnerability. I would prefer to see,
as it was true in my time in Government, to have the Border
Patrol and the Immigration Service focus their resources on
people who are going to do us harm.
That does not mean I think we don't have to address the
phenomenon of illegal immigration in a fundamentally fair and
basic dignified way, but I believe that we need comprehensive
reform.
Mr. Hamilton. May I just add my word in support of
comprehensive immigration reform. We have to begin to look at
immigration through the prisms of both the National economy. We
need a lot of people at the top of the skill level and at the
bottom. We have to begin to look at immigration as a National
security matter as well. That means quite a change of
perspective on immigration for what we have had in years past.
At the border, you would know more than I, but I think we
have increased our manpower doubling it over a period of a few
years, the number of Border Patrol agents. I think we have made
substantial progress in letting illegal people into the
country. Obviously, we have to continue that for a long time to
come. We have still got to deploy a lot better technology. We
have got to get better on this US-VISIT exit system that I
mentioned in my testimony today. So there are a lot of things
that I think still need to be done.
But I very much agree with Fran's observation about
comprehensive reform. You cannot deal with immigration on a
piecemeal basis. You cannot do it.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman expired. Would the
gentleman ask unanimous consent to have his exhibits placed
into the record?
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, I do. Thank you.
Chairman King. Without objection.
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Chairman King. Also, before I recognize the next
questioner, I think we ought to acknowledge the fact that Mr.
Long is not here today; that he represents Joplin, Missouri,
where they lost so many lives and so much property. So all of
our thoughts and prayers are with Congressman Long today.
With that, I recognize for 5 minutes the distinguished
gentleman, Dr. Broun, from Georgia.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This morning on ``Washington Journal'' on C-SPAN, I had
referred to this hearing as a huddle between decisionmakers and
the experts so that we can come up with a game plan of where we
go from here. I appreciate you all being here. I appreciate
your valuable testimony. I agree with the Chairman, it is
absolutely essential that the American public not become
complacent. I think we have, Mr. Chairman, become complacent in
very many ways.
I had a number of callers talk about various things that
and even just dismissed the potential of al-Qaeda or other
entities being a danger to this country. I think it is
absolutely critical that the American public understand that we
have a clear and present danger. So I appreciate you all being
here to talk about that.
Now, I worry about the line of succession that the
elimination of bin Laden has put in place. Also, the current
climate within al-Qaeda poses numerous concerns, most regarding
the internal power struggle not only within al-Qaeda, but the
associated groups.
Mr. Kohlmann talked about some of the al-Qaeda central
people and al-Zawahiri as possibly being the successor to bin
Laden. I would like to hear from the other members of the panel
about who you all think might replace bin Laden as being the
central figure, and also whether the associated groups, AQAP
and the leadership there and the other entities, how do you all
see this sorting out? What can we do as Members of Congress and
what can Government do as we see this power struggle within the
al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda AP and other associated groups?
Mr. Hamilton. Dr. Broun, I believe that al-Qaeda is now
searching for another leader. I think the most likely leader,
so far as I know, and I yield to other members of the panel
here who may know more about it than I. But I think the most
likely is Zawahiri is probably going to be the last man
standing in the struggle. I think there are internal
differences within al-Qaeda. I don't think we should
underestimate him. He is ruthless, he is a religious zealot
much like Osama bin Laden. He is not a lightweight. He has been
instrumental in al-Qaeda's strategy, its development, its
evolution over a period of time. I think it would be a very
grave mistake to think that, with the removal of Osama bin
Laden, they will be led by a feckless leader.
So I think if the American intelligence community now will
be spending an enormous time trying to answer your question as
to who emerges. But from where I sit, he is the most likely guy
to emerge, and we must not underestimate him.
Ms. Townsend. Congressman, I agree with that. I think one
of the key things to watch, there has always been a tension
about leadership residing with the Egyptians because of just
historical differences that I will leave to Peter to discuss.
But the fact that Zawahiri and Saif al-Adel, the interim
leaders, are both Egyptians suggests that there will continue
to be this tension, this struggle between the Egyptian members
and the Gulf Arab members. So what that posits is continuing
tension between, or some increasing tension, between al-Qaeda
central and their affiliates, the strongest of which you have
heard us talk about today, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.
It reminds me of the tension we saw between al-Qaeda core
when that was bin Laden, and another affiliate, al-Qaeda in
Iraq, which was Zarqawi. Intelligence was replete with examples
of an on-going tension about vision. Zarqawi was a very strong
personality. He pushed back on al-Qaeda central. It was a
bonanza of targeting opportunity, and we all know Zarqawi wound
up targeted and killed as a result of it.
One would hope that al-Awlaki, feeling an opportunity here
to push back, that there will be this increasing tension
between Zawahiri and what remains of the al-Qaeda core and the
affiliate al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Because if that
tension increases, it provides a tremendous opportunity for the
U.S. Government.
Mr. Bergen. I totally agree with what Representative
Hamilton and Fran Townsend have just said, and I would add one
minor additional note.
Bin Laden was from Saudi Arabia. As you know, his family is
from Yemen. For religiously zealot people inside of al-Qaeda,
that is very significant because of the Holy Land, and they
want--the reason it is controversial to have an Egyptian is not
simply because there are disputes about strategy and targeting;
at the end of the day, the Egyptians really want to just have
kind of a Taliban-style government in Egypt. They are less
interested in attacking the United States. It is also about the
idea of having somebody from the Holy Land.
So I think there actually, as Fran has outlined, some real
opportunities for the intelligence community and the U.S.
Government to kind of be aware of the fractures that are going
to develop, and perhaps even exploit them if there are
opportunities.
Mr. Kohlmann. If I might quickly add. Towards your second
question about AQAP, about what can be done about AQAP, I think
the answer to that goes back to a comment that was made by
Anwar al-Awlaki, of all people, recently.
Al-Awlaki pointed to the current wave of instability in
Yemen. He laughed and he said, of course this is going to
accrue to our benefit. Of course this is going to accrue to al-
Qaeda's benefit.
I think that gives you the answer, which is that if you
want to damage AQAP, the answer is not just drone strikes, it
is not just U.S. special forces operations. A large part of
this is contingent upon stability returning to Yemen. Political
stability and stability that involves the tribes. Because right
now it is the tribes that are providing protection to people
like Anwar al-Awlaki, Qassim al-Rimi, the leaders of AQAP. They
are being hidden by Yemenis, and you have got to convince them
that it is not in their interests to work with al-Qaeda. Right
now there are large swaths of central Yemen that are outside of
government control. It is the exact nightmare scenario that we
have been trying to avoid in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and it
is writ-large in the heart of the Middle East.
Mr. Broun. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.
Chairman King. I would advise the Members, I understand
that Chairman Hamilton will have to leave at 11:45 and Ms.
Townsend at 12 noon. So I would ask Members to try to keep it
within 5 minutes or phrase their question in a way that allows
for a 5-minute answer.
The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. To all
of the witnesses, let me thank you for your service. I might
want to join you, Ms. Townsend, in offering our deepest
sympathy to our friends and neighbors and fellow Americans. It
seems that it is an unending attack of tornados in the Midwest.
But our deepest sympathy to them.
Again, in Homeland Security, thank all of you for
confirming the significance of the demise of Osama bin Laden as
well as the intelligence.
I want to thank my Chairman, and I hope that will allow me
to be able to get 2 or 3 or 4 or 5 minutes after the red light
comes on.
Chairman King. As much as I would love to do that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I want to thank him. He has been
consistent, along with my Ranking Member, on the focus, Mr.
Hamilton, Chairman Hamilton, as that you said. We have got to
get our act together. We have got to synergize, integrate the
oversight of Homeland Security with all the other agencies that
are doing so.
So I might mention to my Chairman that I have introduced
H.R. 1900, the Surface Transportation and Mass Transit Security
Act. We did it last year with bipartisan support. I frankly, if
I might, I was getting ready to say, I might, stay up nights
because I serve as the Ranking Member on the Transportation
Security about the vulnerabilities of our rail system, Federal
air marshals and utilization of them on many of our flights,
and the whole issue of air traffic controllers, though they may
have challenges sleeping, if you will, that is part of our
security. Many people don't remember how air traffic
controllers were so intimately involved on 9/11.
So let me just pose these questions which are related but
yet not. That is, help us understand this fascination with
transportation, but also rail. In fact, I just want to stick on
rail. Most of the times we hear our communities saying I don't
want hazardous materials coming through, their fear of various
incidents that may impact them, explosions, et cetera. But our
rail system, both what it transports along with people I
believe is a serious concern. I would appreciate comment about
us really focusing on rail security as the 9/11 Commission
suggested.
Then finally, my second question is, I co-chair the
Pakistan Caucus, have gone to Pakistan on a number of
occasions. Pierce into the Taliban, the Taliban of Afghanistan,
the Taliban of Pakistan. Do they leap to the United States? Do
they continue to terrorize the Pakistani people? You are right,
I am amazed at the attack on police and the ability to get on
rank-and-file but as well the hierarchy of the Pakistani
military. Do we give them the money? Do we give them the social
justice money? Where will they take their terror? Will it come
to the United States? Chairman Hamilton, if you can go down.
Hopefully I will get to all of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Hamilton. Well, I think on the first point the
fascination with rail transportation goes back to the
fundamental intent of al-Qaeda.
Look, they are very sophisticated people. They understand
symbolic targets. They understand where Americans congregate.
They understand how best to disrupt. The transportation of the
United States has enormous vulnerabilities. Rail, certainly.
But other forms, too.
So I attribute their fascination with it to, No. 1, their
skill, I guess, in analyzing our vulnerabilities; and, No. 2,
their desire to kill as many Americans as possible and to
disrupt American life as much as possible.
On the second question, you were raising the question about
Pakistan?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, do the Taliban translate to attack
on the United States?
Mr. Hamilton. I think I will yield to the others on that
question.
Ms. Townsend. Yes, ma'am. Look, the obsession with
transportation, as you pointed out, is writ-large. We saw the
tragedy of using aircraft. But trains represent a real
opportunity for them. By the way, also ferries. I mention that,
because as the Chairman knows, ferries are very big in terms of
transportation into Manhattan in the morning at rush hour.
But back to rail. We saw the attacks in London and Madrid.
We know that they continue, if nothing else, because of the
Zazi Najibullah case against the New York City subways. They
are not going to stop. It represents, because it is an open
system--of course, if you close it, it loses its effectiveness
in a place like an urban area like New York. But its open
system represents its vulnerability. The New York City Police
Department has done a tremendous job with sort of unpredictable
presence in different subways. None of that is 100 percent. But
I really think this goes back to when we talk about the grant
program--and I have not always been a huge fan of the Homeland
Security grant program. But this is a place where we can
actually incentivize State and local authorities to take
ownership of this issue and spend their money in a place that
really matters not just in the locality but writ-large.
Evan Kohlmann mentioned the priority of attacking our
economy. What better way than to attack our transportation
system?
The Pakistan Taliban does represent a direct threat to the
United States. We saw the Times Square attempted bombing, and
they made threats. I think we have got to learn to take these
terrorist groups at face value. They may not have tremendous
capability, but they have enough to come here and kill
Americans.
Mr. Bergen. Just to add to that point. A canary in the mine
on the Pakistani Taliban is they sent suicide bombers to
Barcelona in January 2008, and that is according to both
themselves and Spanish prosecutors. We should have taken, as
Fran--sometimes when people say that, we should take these
threats seriously. They, of course, also did a joint operation
in Khost that killed the 7 CIA employees and contractors.
What to do about Pakistan is obviously an enormous question
before many of the Members here. It is a very complex
relationship, and it would be very tempting perhaps to say,
well, we are just going to cut off aid. This would be
psychologically satisfying for about a week. At the end of the
day, they are the fifth-largest country in the world, about to
be, with nuclear weapons, headquarters of al-Qaeda and the
Taliban, and we need them.
Just one final point on this. More Pakistani soldiers have
died fighting the Taliban than U.S. and NATO soldiers combined,
and this is just something that is very important for us to
recognize and understand when we talk to them and when we think
about how to deal with them.
Mr. Hamilton. I might just add that if you are getting into
the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, this is already one of the most
difficult bilateral relationships in the world. We are not
going to solve the problems in this relationship. We just have
to manage them. There are so many voices I have heard coming
out of Capitol Hill to cut aid to Pakistan. I would be very,
very careful about that.
We have enormous interests in Pakistan. We have referred to
them already here this morning: The nuclear weapons. We use
Pakistan to transit much of our materials and people going into
Afghanistan. The nuclear weapons, of course, are huge.
In the end, we have to focus on the long-term interests of
the United States and not our short-term frustration. There are
plenty of reasons to be frustrated with the relationship now,
but that long-term relationship remains very valuable to us. I
think it remains valuable to the Pakistanis as well. All kinds
of problems in it, all kinds of questions arise. Sometimes I
think Admiral Mullen, the chairman of the Chief of Staff, has
been commuting to Pakistan. He goes over there so frequently to
try to work out these problems. It just indicates the delicate
nature of the relationship. It is a very difficult one, but we
have got to work through it.
Mr. Kohlmann. If I can just very quickly comment about the
Pakistani Taliban. My company has an office in Pakistan. One of
the subjects we spend most time on is the Pakistani Taliban. We
have been interviewing them in recent days. We have been
polling them in their opinions.
I can tell you this: No. 1, the Pakistani Taliban is far
more sophisticated than people give them credit for. They are
recruiting people right now, Americans, using YouTube. They
have not done this once, they have done this multiple times.
They are recruiting people using Facebook. They are
deliberately trying to come up with terrorist plots targeting
the United States. They are aggressively trying to target the
United States. Perhaps most disturbingly, unlike the Afghan
Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban are forging very close
relationships with al-Qaeda, with Arab Afghan al-Qaeda
militants, to the point where as has just been suggested by
Peter Bergen and I believe others, that the Camp Chapman attack
that took place in 2009, there is a substantial degree of
evidence indicating both the Pakistani Taliban and the Haqqani
network played a direct role in that attack.
It raises a lot of questions. It raises questions both
about the Pakistani Taliban and their reach into the United
States. It also reaches the inevitable question about what is
the relationship between the Pakistani Taliban, the Haqqani
network, and the ISI, the Pakistani Intelligence Service. Those
questions have yet to be fully resolved. But as long as you
have terrorist attacks being directed at U.S. targets,
including U.S. civilians, by a group that might have ties to
the Pakistani Intelligence Service, I think it is worthy to
look into those questions and resolve them. Because as much as
Pakistan is a critical partner, I don't think we can allow
terrorist groups to establish bases with the say-so of the ISI.
Chairman King. The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack,
is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much
for being here today. This has been quite enlightening. So
thank you for your comments.
First off, being a retired Navy captain, if you focus on
the current war, you are missing it altogether. We need to
focus on the next war. What we are seeing now, as Mr.
Kohlmann--cyber jihadists, I truly feel the previous notion of
asymmetric warfare, we have gone way beyond that into
something, a new realm, a new difference of what we are
actually seeing today.
Ms. Townsend, also we are at a war without borders, and I
very much appreciate your comments regarding the lone wolf. In
quickly reviewing your background, I would like you to comment
a little bit on that, because one of the votes we will be
taking very soon is regarding three components of the PATRIOT
Act. I was wondering if you could comment on that, if you
believe that these are necessary vehicles to make sure that we
can protect Americans within the United States without
jeopardizing any Constitutional rights that American citizens
would have.
Ms. Townsend. As you know, Congressman, the lone wolf
represents the greatest challenge to Federal investigators and
local authorities. It is unpredictable, it is difficult to
identify in advance, unlike an organization where people have
got to talk to one another and plan. So I believe that those
provisions in the Patriot Act are essential to the FBI's
continued ability to effectively do these investigations and
identify the threats.
To the extent--I can tell you during my time in the White
House when there was the initial renewal of the PATRIOT Act. To
the extent there are concerns, there are procedural mechanisms
for oversight and reporting that ought to give people the
confidence and the courage to vote to extend the PATRIOT Act.
Mr. Cravaack. Mr. Hamilton.
Mr. Hamilton. I support the provisions in the PATRIOT Act
as well, and I think they should be extended. Now, obviously,
what has happened since 9/11 is the power of the Government has
expanded dramatically in terms of intrusion into the lives of
people. For necessary reasons, I think all of us have supported
that expansion of power. These provisions, I think, Fran, I am
correct in saying, just kind of bring you up to date in terms
of your ability to keep track of these bad guys.
Having said all of that, may I also put in a plug for the
Privacy and Oversight Board, because I think that what you have
had over the period of the last decade is this environment in
which the security people win every argument, and for obvious
reasons, because we are very deeply concerned about our
security. But there is not a sufficient pushback on the side of
the civil liberties and privacy. That voice needs to be
strengthened, I think, within Government across the board, and
especially with regard to the intelligence agencies.
So I want a strong PATRIOT Act, but I also want a
counterbalance to that with a Privacy and Oversight Board, and
I want the President to get that thing up and moving.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it.
Mr. Bergen, in your testimony, you stated that Pakistan
Taliban in the tribal regions has been successful in attempts
to attract Western and American recruits and poses a threat to
Americans. Obviously, how much cooperation of the Pakistani ISI
are you seeing? Do you think that the relationships can be
salvaged moving forward?
Mr. Bergen. I think, Representative Hamilton, I was
surprised when he said one of the wisest things possible about
this, which is: We are not going to solve our relationship with
Pakistan; we are going to have to manage it.
As a point of information, four ISI buildings have been
attacked by the Taliban. So the ISI has a very complex
relationship with the Taliban.
Are we getting what we want from them? No. Is the Pakistan
government doing quite a lot? Yes. Serious military operation
in Southern Waziristan in 2009 unlike previous operations,
serious operation in SWAT in 2009 as well.
So the enemy of the perfect is not the reasonably okay.
What we are seeing right now is I think overall reasonably
okay. Could it be better? Yes. Will it get better? I am not
sure.
Mr. Cravaack. I appreciate your comments and the amount of
soldiers that have been killed in action against the Taliban.
That was quite telling.
Sir, I have 21 seconds left. So I yield back.
Chairman King. I thank the gentleman for his prudence. With
that, I am pleased to recognize the gentleman from Michigan,
Mr. Clarke.
Mr. Clarke of Michigan. I appreciate all of your collective
testimony. It is apparent that Osama bin Laden was a key figure
in global terrorism. His death has dealt a severe blow to al-
Qaeda. But the terrorist threat to our country still remains,
but it increasingly is coming from within the United States.
I represent metropolitan Detroit, the Detroit sector
border. Many times our first responders, local police, and fire
still can't communicate with their Federal counterparts or
their Canadian counterparts. Many of you have mentioned the
issue of interoperable communications and how that is going to
be important for us to be able to help address this terrorist
threat. We currently have a situation where our radios can't
talk to each other.
Now, I do thank the Department for releasing prior
allocated money, $4 million to Wayne County recently. That will
help us upgrade our radio system. But even still, our State and
local authorities don't have the revenue to provide their
resources and equipment for our first responders. Even in the
proposed 2012 budget for this very Department, it is the
Homeland Security grants that have been proposed to be cut by,
I believe, $2.1 billion compared to 2011 levels.
So all of this begs this question then: How do we best
prepare ourselves to deal with the threat of terrorism that
comes from within the United States? Where do we get the money?
Many have raised that the death of bin Laden poses the
opportunity to reassess our National security goals. My point
and my question is this: That the assessment could also involve
reevaluating our mission in Afghanistan to redirect a part of
our military aid that is currently going to Afghanistan, a
total of over $100 billion this current year, and to redirect
some of that back to the United States to homeland security to
protect ourselves from the threat that is increasingly coming
from within the United States. If any of you have any comments
on how we can best do that. Reassess our mission in
Afghanistan. Use some of the money that we are, I was going to
say spending, but it is more accurate that we are borrowing, to
invest in the military operations in Afghanistan, and to better
invest a small portion of that to this budget, the homeland
security budget, as a way of better protecting the American
people at home by investing those funds right here at home.
Mr. Hamilton. Congressman, I believe your priority is the
correct one. That is to say, we have got to get the ability to
communicate at the scene of the disaster. That is so
fundamental and so basic. I don't see how it can be argued
against.
Now, your question relates to, where do you get the money
to do it? I am not an expert on the Federal budget. It involves
a lot of questions, what money is in the pipeline that is not
being used, for example, that might be available.
You raised the question of Afghanistan. My own personal
view with regard to that is that the American people are
putting Afghanistan and Iraq in the rearview mirror, and they
have already made up their mind pretty much that the United
States should begin to withdraw. I don't think the question
today is whether or not you should pack up and leave. That is
not going to happen nor should it. I don't think the question
is whether you are going to achieve victory in Afghanistan.
Victory is very hard to define and I don't think that is in the
cards. I think American policy increasingly will focus on the
question of: What pace do we withdraw from Afghanistan? That
will create some funds obviously there. But it is not clear
that you can take those funds and immediately put it in some
domestic priority.
The question also is that as we withdraw our forces there--
this may sound contradictory, but I don't think it is--how can
we continue to help Afghanistan to achieve some of the goals
that we have a stable Afghanistan obviously is more in our
interest than one that is chaotic.
So I think there is a renewed interest in this, and I think
the operational question on policy is really the pace of
withdrawal at this point. Will it create some funds? Yes, I
think it will. That is probably a good thing. But that doesn't
necessarily mean you can take those funds and put it into the
question of communication.
The question of communication at the scene of the disaster
is a highest priority. If you cannot communicate at the scene
of the disaster, people lose their lives as happened in New
York, as happened in Katrina. This is a priority concern. This
is money that has to be found in order to solve this problem.
It is frustrating to me beyond measure that 10 years after 9/11
this obvious priority has not been fully met. I know some
progress has been made, I know some money has been made
available. But we are still not at the point where you can get
a seamless communication at the scene of the disaster, which is
absolutely what is necessary.
Ms. Townsend. Let me only add, I agree wholeheartedly and
enthusiastically with what Congressman Hamilton said.
Certainly, if he is not an expert in the Federal budget, I am
far behind him.
So, one, I think we can precipitously withdraw from
Afghanistan, as the Congressman said. I think as we begin to
withdraw down, you are going to find there are additional funds
available.
Let me make what I think is an unpopular observation. The
responsibility, while heavy on the Federal Government, to solve
this problem, and as the Congressman said, it should have been
solved by now, it is not unique to the Federal Government. My
concern--I mentioned earlier about grant programs. My concern
about grant programs is that what happens is the States then
abrogate their own responsibility to set aside funds, to make
investments in these sorts of things because they rely heavily
on the Federal Government.
Frankly, it is clear across the country during this time of
fiscal stress that States have not responsibly managed their
own budgets. Frankly, I do think that this has got to be a
priority not only for the Federal Government but with governors
when they are looking at their own State budgets.
Mr. Hamilton. The homeland security program ought not to be
a revenue-sharing program. We recommend that you are not just
handing out money to State and local governments. They need
money for all kinds of things, some of which are valid and some
of which are not. But I think one of the positive things is
that in the appropriators' bill, they award grants without
regard to the minimum allocations to lower-risk areas. In other
words, they followed through on one of the recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission, which is to allocate funds on the basis of
risk, not just hand out the money everywhere. There are certain
areas of the country. New York City is one, but there are
others, that are far--Detroit, far higher risk than rural
Indiana where I come from. So you have got to make sure that
there is enough discretion in the Federal to allocate funds on
the basis of risk. This is not a revenue-sharing program.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman is expired. I now
recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, former United States
Attorney, Mr. Meehan.
Mr. Meehan. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to this
very distinguished panel for your preparation and your
testimony here today.
I am going to ask Ms. Townsend and Mr. Bergen, both of you
had commented on something I would like to follow up a little
bit on. Ms. Townsend, my experience as a former Federal
prosecutor, there is almost a counterintuitive sense that when
you take down an organization, either organized crime or even a
violent drug gang, it is in the aftermath of that that you see
some of the greatest--it is not just a succession thing, but
some of the greatest disarray as they reassemble themselves
often in terms of violence. You both looked at this as almost a
point of opportunity.
What should we be looking for and what opportunities do
they actually present in the aftermath of the taking down of
Osama bin Laden and the subsequent attempts to try to
reorganize?
Ms. Townsend. This is a critical time. I mentioned in my
testimony the targeting opportunities. While we won't know
publicly what was in the compound, this is a time when they
will have to talk to one another. There was reports in the
Pakistani media about this meeting that led to the interim
leader being appointed the head of the Taliban, Saif al-Adel.
How can such a meeting take place when our Pakistani allies are
not providing us with targeting information? That would have
been a gold mine opportunity to have taken advantage of. But
that is what our military and intelligence community are
focused on right now.
They are in disarray. They will have to have discussions,
meetings in order to resolve their chaos. So all those
represent tremendous opportunities, and that is where you want
to focus your immediate military resources.
Now, it will be interesting to see whether or not this
chaos then permeates out into the affiliates, because right now
they represent, as far as I am concerned, the most immediate
deadly threat to us, particularly al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula. But we need strong allies. Make no mistake. We have
a world-class intelligence community and military capability,
but they need real partners. We have not had very good
partners--a real partner in Yemen in President Saleh, and we
have a very uncertain partner in Pakistan.
We need to look at ways to how do we--you know, the
Congressman said manage the Pakistan relationship. That is
right. But they need to produce. It is not that we can walk
away from them. They need to produce like a partner produces in
terms of targeting capability.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Bergen.
Mr. Bergen. I don't have anything to add to that.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you. Congressman Hamilton, I, as many in
this Nation, am tremendously appreciative for the work that you
have put into this effort since September 11. You have looked
at a lot of different elements. But I noticed twice today in
your testimony you focused on this issue of the VISIT exit
system. Can you tell me a little bit more about why that is
important to you and why you think that is relevant to our
protection of the homeland?
Mr. Hamilton. You just have to keep track of these people
when they come into the country. I think the easy thing to do--
we lose track of it. It is a difficult thing to do. Seeking a
biometric exit system I understand is expensive and has a lot
of problems in it, but I think we have just put it off far too
long.
It is not just a question of catching these people and
stopping it at the border. Some of these people are going to
get in. Once you have people in here illegally, or even legally
under restricted time limits, you have to be able to keep track
of them. That is why you need an exit system as well as an
entry system. So it is a real vulnerability in our system to
say, okay, we are going to catch these people at the border.
Everybody is for that. We don't want the bad guys coming in;
but if they do get in just forget about them. You can't do
that. You have got to keep track of them. That is what the exit
system is all about.
Mr. Meehan. Mr. Kohlmann, thank you for your testimony. You
identified the world on the internet and the communications
that are taking place there. In a free society, it is difficult
to try to limit activity on that, but you have given some
thought to this. How can we take advantage? In light of both
Ms. Townsend testified to about the current moment in which
wouldn't we want to be able to have them operating in such a
way that we would be able to at least have access to the
platform that they are using for communications as a means to
have a potential ability to influence their activities?
Mr. Kohlmann. Yes. I have often said that terrorist
websites are like the spy satellite that we never launched. If
we are diligent about it, these websites, these forums allow us
to monitor the communications taking place at a ground level
amongst both al-Qaeda's lieutenants, its supporters, its would-
be supporters, people in the West. Increasingly we are seeing
individuals who are popping up who were not recruited by any
individual or any individual cleric or any individual mosque.
They are being motivated purely by what they see on the web. I
think, though, I think you are right. I think part of it is we
have to keep our eyes on this.
The concern right now is that we are allowing these
websites to operate. It is not entirely clear that all elements
of our law enforcement and intelligence agencies are aware of
what is going on in there. I can tell you only this through
personal experience and through the fact that we have an
instance where we can point to directly, Fort Hood, where we
had a known individual who was infamous as being a recruiter
for al-Qaeda and extremist groups, Sheikh Anwar al-Awlaki, who
was in open communication with an individual who was a U.S.
military serviceman. Those communications, from what I
understand, were not entirely innocent or benign.
That is a warning sign. It is a warning sign that as much
as this information can provide tremendous clues, if we allow
this to proliferate unmonitored, we are giving these folks
virtual sanctuary to do whatever the hell they want. That is
very worrying.
So it is fine to keep these websites and these forums on-
line as long as we are closely monitoring them and tracking the
people that are using them, obviously without violating freedom
of speech. But the folks that are on the there are dangerous.
It is not just computer nerds. The people that are on these
forums include bomb makers, include top-ranking Yemeni al-Qaeda
operatives, include recruiters for Pakistani Taliban. So we
really have to make sure that the FBI and other Government
agencies are really watching what is taking place.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman has expired. The
gentlelady from New York, Ms. Clarke, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Ms. Clarke of Michigan. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
and thank you Ranking Member Thompson. To the panelists, great
insight and illumination of the challenges we face.
I am pleased with the discourse of this hearing, because it
is important to point out that we must harden our posture of
vigilance in keeping our Nation safe in the fight against al-
Qaeda and other declared and undeclared terrorist organizations
and individuals.
On behalf of the people of the 11th Congressional District
of New York, we are really grateful to the Obama
administration's leadership, the U.S. military, the CIA
intelligence and counterterrorism professionals who carried out
that heroic operation to get bin Laden. I would like to say
that, as a Member of the committee, it is important to point
out that we must continue to remain vigilant. As New Yorkers, I
think, unlike maybe other parts of the Nation, are very
sensitive, extremely sensitive. I think we are doing very well
in terms of our posture of vigilance and awareness in the
public. But I think that perhaps one of the things that we can
do is get some public service announcements rolling that is
aired Nationally, to get people into the understanding of see
something, say something, which is something we live with in
New York City. So again, I want to thank you for your
insightful discussion today.
Bin Laden was an iconic figure of global terrorism. He has
inspired militants across the world to commit acts of violence.
I wanted to ask, just generally speaking, there is some concern
that perhaps at the end of the 40-day mourning period, that
many or some Muslims practice that maybe we might see an
uptick.
Is there any indication of that? Does 40 days mean
anything? I think it is important that if there is mythology
out there, we try to get so many plain understanding. I believe
we can be hit at any moment. But for those out there who are
looking for an indication, would you shed some light on that?
Ms. Townsend. I am happy to take the first shot at this.
Congresswoman, let's be clear. As you know, al-Qaeda and
those who subscribe to the ideology are not observant Muslims.
These are not real Muslims. So we have already seen what have
been called retribution attacks inside Pakistan, whether it is
against their military, their police. So those people in the
Pakistan Taliban, for example, are not observing any 40-day
mourning period.
This is my experience with al-Qaeda, has been they attack
when they have the capability and they are positioned to do it,
and they will not be, I suspect, constrained by any religious
observance.
Mr. Kohlmann. I would echo. I think it is mythology. I
think al-Qaeda will strike when they have the capability to do
so. I believe they will try to carry out some kind of revenge
attack for the death of bin Laden. But I think it is more
likely in the short term that we see something like that
against U.S. interests in Pakistan as opposed to inside the
United States.
Ms. Clarke of Michigan. I am glad that you pointed that
out. I don't want people to have a false sense of, well,
timing. Right? It is important that we are vigilant every
moment of every day.
Mr. Kohlmann, I wanted to ask you about threats to water
facilities. You know, last Congress the House approved
legislation to regulate water and wastewater facilities for
security. In your testimony, you described the on-line chatter
of various extremists after bin Laden's death and how some of
them openly discuss targeted hydroelectric dams, nuclear water
plants, and water purification facilities to cause damage to
the U.S. economy. Can you elaborate on the threat to critical
infrastructure? More specifically, can you articulate what
concerns, if any, you have about the terrorist threat to U.S.
water facilities, especially given how essential these
facilities are to our communities?
Mr. Kohlmann. In fact, the particular section that you are
referring to in my report, the individual specified saying it
is not even necessary to poison the water supplies because
potentially there are other Islamists out there who might drink
this and die. The idea is to create panic, to create terror, to
create an urban environment where people are afraid to consume
water whether or not there is actually anything wrong with it.
That is the point here, is al-Qaeda is not looking just--
again, they are not looking just to kill one American here or
there. That is fine to keep them in the headlines. Ultimately,
these folks, whether you are talking about the central
leadership, the affiliates or the homegrown guys, they are
looking for very simple tactics where they can cause mass panic
and mass terror and upset the U.S. economy. Now, the weak
points they are looking at are major U.S. cities and
infrastructure. Whether that is rail, airports, water
facilities, hydroelectric trends, anything that will stun the
U.S. economy.
They perceive right now that we are under the gun in terms
of economic pressures, and that any small push in the wrong
direction will cause catastrophe for us. That is their game
plan. They are trying to push the United States out of the
Middle East. They are trying to create a new world order. You
don't do that by killing a few soldiers at Fort Hood. You don't
do that by shooting a few soldiers outside an airport in
Germany. You do that by creating mass panic in a city like New
York or Los Angeles or Detroit. That is what they are gunning
for. They may not achieve it, but that is what they are gunning
for.
Chairman King. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The
gentleman from South Carolina.
Mr. Duncan. Let me thank you for your diligence on keeping
our homeland security safe. This is one of the most informative
hearings that we have had. I thank the panelists for providing
their testimony today. I want to thank Congressman Hamilton for
your service to this Nation and also the 9/11 Commission.
Interesting, I have been one that has talked about this
numerous times, but the 9/11 Commission detailed a lot of
different terms that seem to have disappeared from the lexicon
of the intelligence agencies, whether FBI, counterterrorism,
National intelligence strategy, even the report protecting the
force lessons from Fort Hood.
In the 9/11 Commission report, they mentioned jihad 126
times. They mention the Muslim Brotherhood five times. They
mention Hamas, Hezbollah, al-Qaeda numerous times, but now that
seems to have disappeared. I am very alarmed that our
administration is not identifying who our enemy is. I think you
have clearly got to identify and focus on the threat to this
country, and you guys have very articulately expressed those
threats today.
One thing about being a junior Member of this committee,
freshman Member, is all the great questions got asked before it
gets to me. So what I would like to do is just delve into
something that is interesting to me, and that is the threats on
our Southern border. I understand that al-Qaeda and Hezbollah
and al Shabab have a presence and influence in Latin America,
particularly the tri-border region.
So I am going to address this to Mr. Kohlmann. Do you
believe the United States may see increasing threats from these
groups so close to our Southern border?
Mr. Kohlmann. It is true that there is a presence below the
border of a number of different groups, most prominently
Hezbollah and Hamas, not necessarily so much al-Qaeda. I think
some of those threats have been blown up, but I think there is
a reality that right now we put a tremendous amount of
attention on the Northern border. Ever since the days of the
Ahmed Ressam, the Algerian who tried crossing over in 1999 in
Bellingham, Washington, there has been a lot of focus on the
Canadian border. There has been less focus on terrorists
crossing the Southern border. Terrorists are aware of this.
There are indications of groups like Shabab placing people in
Mexico who are able to get folks across the border.
Now, the reality is that a lot of the people they are
smuggling across are probably just illegal immigrants, but it
is very easy to sneak someone in that group. It is not the most
overwhelming issue we have. Really, al-Qaeda would rather
recruit someone who is already inside the United States who has
a U.S. passport. But these groups are trying to get people in
however they can, however it works best. So if they find that
they can't recruit someone directly in the United States, I
think it is very plausible that they will go for the Southern
border.
Mr. Duncan. Do you see them working in tandem with the
Mexican drug cartel at all? We see some evidence of that, and
that is our untalked-about third war possibly.
Mr. Kohlmann. I think when it comes to groups like Hamas
and Hezbollah, there is a potential of individuals doing that.
With an ideological group like al-Qaeda, it is much less. Al-
Qaeda doesn't seem to like to work with thieves, with drug
runners--not publicly anyway. For instance, Shabab al-
Mujahideen in Somalia has greatly distanced itself from the
pirates, the big problem with piracy in northern Somalia, and
they argued simply they don't want to be associated with that,
that that is not jihad; that is just thievery.
So as of right now, I don't think you see those
connections. The problem is that there are individuals who are
in Venezuela and elsewhere who have connections to Hamas and
Hezbollah and also connections to the drug-trafficking rings.
The issue is can someone like that be marshaled by a terrorist
group to serve as an intermediary to get someone into the
country? It is possible. But I still think it is relatively
far-fetched. The groups really, al-Qaeda, Shabab, they are
looking to recruit people who are already within U.S. borders,
who already have U.S. passports, who can walk to the middle of
Times Square and say, I am a terrorist, and nothing can be
done. That is the kind of recruitment.
Mr. Duncan. There is a lot of focus on the lone wolf
provisions in the PATRIOT Act coming up and sleeper cells. What
can we do more--you talked about the marketing, the internet,
Inspire, and other things targeting those groups. What can we
do more than maybe some of the things you alluded to earlier?
Mr. Kohlmann. I think one of the issues is that the United
States has not been engaged in an effective deradicalization
campaign, a counterradicalization campaign.
Mr. Duncan. The Chairman has.
Mr. Kohlmann. So far the U.S. Government has been content
with simply saying al-Qaeda is bad, al-Qaeda is wrong. But the
reality is that there are plenty of voices from within al-
Qaeda, from within the Muslim community itself, who will stand
forward and will say that these folks are completely on the
wrong path, that they are insane, and that the things they are
doing are wrong not just from an American perspective, but from
a Muslim perspective; from any perspective, from a humanist
perspective.
I think it is important that we try to galvanize those
resources and engage in an effective deradicalization campaign.
So far a lot of the efforts that we have made have fallen on
deaf ears, whether it comes through sponsoring television
stations and radio stations in Iraq that nobody watches, that
nobody listens to, at least not our enemies; or whether it
comes to simply broadcasting messages that have no impact.
We also have to realize the effects of negative publicity.
Right now we talked about jihadi message forums. What a lot of
people don't realize is that even on the top-tier al-Qaeda
forums, there is as much argument and nasty back-biting as
there is agreement about attacking America. These folks fight
with each other on a daily basis. They say nasty things about
each other. After the death of bin Laden, a whole bunch of
people got their accounts removed from al-Qaeda's top-tier web
forums because they dared to ``crusade'' their claims about the
death of bin Laden. These are people expressing sorrow about
the death of bin Laden who were removed, kicked off.
I think it is important that the United States take note of
the social networking dynamics that are taking place within al-
Qaeda and try to exploit those differences. If there are people
that don't like Ayman Zawahiri, start pumping information about
how terrible Ayman al-Zawahiri is. Trying to sell the United
States as a good actor might never work, but explaining the
negative things about al-Qaeda and about the people that lead
it, you could go on forever. You could write a thousand-page
encyclopedia about that.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman has expired.
Mr. Hamilton. Mr. Chairman, excuse me for extending this.
Chairman King. How can I say no to you?
Mr. Hamilton. The National Security Preparedness Group now
has in draft form a report on preventing violent radicalization
in America. It is the most comprehensive thing I have seen--and
it is not yet final--dealing with this problem. It makes all
kinds of recommendations as to how the government--local,
State, National governments--ought to respond to the problem
you are raising and which Mr. Kohlmann has talked about.
We consider that a very important report. We will make it
available to you as soon as it is ready. It should be ready in
the next few months. I think you will find it helpful.
Chairman King. Thank you.
The gentleman from Massachusetts Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Just one quick question, because Mr. Kohlmann just touched
on this. Social networking. What if many of the very
sophisticated devices, deep packet kind of technology, that is
involved in--really getting involved in using--potentially
using social networking as a weapon, the fact that this kind of
technology can detect who is involved and not only filter it,
but can actually use that to get information to crack down on
people themselves--is it conceivable to you that that kind of
sophisticated technology that is available in other countries
right now--one of the companies even in the United States that
are dealing with this--what is the potential of them gaining
access to that kind of technology and using that to crack down
on the very people that you and I both agree can serve a very
positive role in fighting this?
Mr. Kohlmann. Well, deep packet inspection rates has a lot
of privacy concerns, particularly among groups like EFF; the
Electronic Frontier Foundation. I think those fears are
grounded except the fact that what you are saying is true is
that one of the few ways you can actually find out where
someone is located, despite them using proxies or obfuscation
techniques, is with deep packet inspection. However, the good
news is that that is not the only way. There are other ways,
including ways that don't violate U.S. law and don't require us
to increasingly impinge upon personal privacy.
One of the good points about this is that al-Qaeda makes
mistakes. The folks that create these websites make mistakes. A
year and a half ago, my company was able to get the entire
database from one of the top-tier al-Qaeda websites, including
all their private messages, their IP addresses, everything else
like that. We did it without hacking. We did it without deep
packet inspection. We did it without infiltration. We just did
it using our heads.
So I think as much as having deep packet inspection would
be a wonderful tool for law enforcement to have, and it would
certainly alleviate a lot of the problems that they are
currently facing tracking people, that is not the only way. So
if there really are significant privacy concerns, I think the
point is just making sure that the Bureau and that other law
enforcement agencies and Government agencies have the
technological tools to be able to do the job, whether it is
deep packet inspection or something else.
I would say right now they are still struggling with this.
One of the reasons is because of the legal loopholes that allow
foreign law enforcement to use this technique, but not so much
for U.S. law enforcement.
Mr. Keating. Specifically, what about the terrorist
organizations themselves being able to obtain that technology?
Mr. Kohlmann. I think that is relatively far-fetched. I
think that is the good news. The good news is that most of the
people right now that populate al-Qaeda's social networking web
are more interested in blowing themselves up than they are
hacking websites. That might change. That probably will change.
There are people that are increasingly showing the kind of
capabilities you would expect from someone working for the NSA.
I hope that doesn't happen, but I think it is a reminder
that the United States needs to be concerned about not just
monitoring the communications that are taking place in social
networking forums, but making sure our own cybersecurity is up
to snuff, because whereas China or Russia may not have hackers
who are going to seek to deliberately cause economic
catastrophe in the United States, al-Qaeda is a different
story. So once they develop those kind of capabilities, it is a
serious concern.
Mr. Keating. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
Chairman King. The gentleman from Michigan Mr. Walberg is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
witnesses today for giving us insights that are both
encouraging and challenging as well.
In kind-of going back to previous questioning and talking
about the impact of trying to grow homegrown terrorists here in
the United States, and showing an alternative to the message
that they are putting out, I have had a lot of contacts in my
district from Assyrians and others concerned with what is going
on in Syria, in Libya, and other places. I guess my question
would be what impact, if there is--what impact could our
actions or inactions in Libya or Syria have in growing al-Qaeda
efforts in recruitment of terrorists and terrorist action
against the United States?
Chairman King. If I can just interject. I understand
Chairman Hamilton has to leave at 11:45. Whenever you feel you
have to leave. Thank you very much for your testimony.
Mr. Hamilton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate that. I will leave to my colleagues to answer these
simple questions that have been asked.
Mr. Walberg. That is as simple as I can be, I guess.
Mr. Bergen. I just don't think that is really a relevant
question right now for the discussion we are having. Somehow
the war actions in Libya--and Evan can correct me if I am wrong
on this issue--I don't think are something that is really of
great interest to the jihadist community, partly because they
know very well that the whole point of their exercise was to
overthrow these dictators like Qadhafi. That was the point of
these groups. So it would be very dissonant for them to say,
well, now America is involved in actually producing the very
thing that we tried to do in the first place. So they are kind
of ignoring it.
One of the things that was very interesting to me is bin
Laden really never replied to the Arab Spring because what was
he going to say; at last it was happening. Belatedly we have a
minor tape from him. But he was commenting on even the most
minor news events before his death. This enormous seismic shift
in the Middle East he didn't really acknowledge publicly before
his death. So I think that this is not going to be a problem.
But on the issue of the Muslim American community, we are
never going to be able to take down these jihadi websites. The
internet doesn't work like that. What the Chairman and the
Members of the committee and, I think, Lee Hamilton and his
group, what we need to be thinking about with the Muslim
American community is counternarratives. There are plenty of
people in the Muslim community that want to get out there and
put out a counternarrative to bin Laden and others. One of the
problems they face is they are not necessarily that computer
literate. They don't understand Google bombing or these kinds
of issues, ways to make their messages more attractive.
So that is the way forward. It is not taking down
objectionable websites. They are only going to pop up again. It
is about creating a counternarrative. At the end of the day,
that is the Muslim American community, not the U.S. Government.
But that is the way forward.
Mr. Kohlmann. I think I agree with Peter. I would just say
this. It is not clear exactly what is going to fall out of
Libya, but there are indications that al-Qaeda supporters and
its leadership are getting very frustrated by the fact that the
Libyan rebels seem more intent upon courting crusader support
than they are al-Qaeda support.
A few months ago a group of foreign fighters from Egypt
went to Libya, and they later wrote about their experiences.
They showed up, and what they found was: (A) Chaos; (B) as soon
as they identified who they were, the Libyan rebels said, we
don't want you here, go away. Then they basically went out to
the front anyway, and they discovered it was chaos there, too.
They came back and said, these guys don't know what they are
doing, they don't like us, and they are not fighting under a
banner of Islam. It was deeply demoralizing for them.
I think if you read between the lines in the last couple of
speeches that have been given by Ayman al-Zawahiri and other
senior al-Qaeda leaders, you do kind of hear desperation in
their voice, saying to the Libyans, don't work with NATO, don't
work with NATO. It is wrong. It is wrong. It is wrong.
Mr. Walberg. Is there a similar response in Syria as well?
Mr. Kohlmann. Syria, unfortunately, is a much different
picture. I think part of the problem is that it is not clear in
Syria what exactly Syrian demonstrators want. Some want
democracy, that is for sure. But the Syrians are not
necessarily being mobilized and have the same concerns as the
Libyans do. I think that is part of the issue.
One of the major concerns with Syria is that the Muslim
Brotherhood branch in Syria is far more conservative and I
think you can say far more radical than in other States,
particularly in Egypt. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, numerous
members have joined al-Qaeda. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood is
obviously 100 percent opposed to the existence of the State of
Israel. It is 100 percent opposed to the idea of peace with the
Israelis. If you have the Brotherhood start influencing major
impact on Syrian policy, I think as a starting point you can
say forget about it to Middle East peace.
I think this is really what we are talking about. Syria is
in a different location. It is far more strategically located.
The political dynamics there are far more complicated than
Libya. I don't think you are going to see John McCain visiting
Syria anytime soon. Also, you have the additional factor of
Iran. Libya, Muammar Qadhafi really doesn't have any allies to
speak of other than Hugo Chavez. Right. Syria has Iran. Though
Iran, I think, is worried about what it is seeing there right
now, the Iranians, I think, will back Bashar al-Assad to the
hilt.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and the
Ranking Member for allowing me to continue to interlope. I
thank you also for conducting and having this hearing today.
I would like to say to the panelists as sort of a predicate
for my eventual question, I believe in America, and I believe
that if the world did not have the United States of America, we
would have to create it. It may not be the glue that holds the
world together; I do believe, however, that it is an
indispensable ingredient in that glue that holds the world
together.
I am finding more and more that I am hearing the notion
that we are interlopers; that we should not concern ourselves
with Hezbollah and Nasrallah in Lebanon. We should not concern
ourselves with the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria and in Egypt. We
should not concern ourselves with Hamas in Palestine. We should
not concern ourselves with the vituperative comments of Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad with reference to what he thinks of another country
and how he doesn't see the existence of that country.
This notion that we should remove our assets, bring our
resources home, seems to be gaining some degree of credibility.
I would ask each of you to just explain whether this would
bring about the peace within that some seem to think is
available to us if we would but only withdraw our assets.
I will start with Ms. Townsend, please. Thank you.
Ms. Townsend. Thank you, Congressman.
The most recent, let me say historical, example was we
waited far too long to exert our leadership in Afghanistan, and
look what happened. It was an ungoverned space that al-Qaeda
used to plan and to train to attack the United States on
September 11, but before that. We can't abrogate our sense of
leadership without jeopardizing our own security. That does not
mean that we need to lead alone. It does not mean that we don't
have allies and build coalitions, all of which is right and
appropriate. But we are going to have to lead because it is--
there has been a discussion now about Syria and Hezbollah.
Hezbollah remains an incredibly strong threat to us because
they are a client of Iran's, and they are a destabilizing force
not only in Syria, but throughout the Middle East and to the
peace and security of Israel.
I agree with you wholeheartedly that we need to continue to
engage and not--my fear is that as we begin to engage less, we
engage more rhetorically and are unwilling to put ourselves at
risk. I think it is incredibly important. If we care about the
outcome in Libya, we need to more than just answer
rhetorically, and we need to be willing to put our assets
against a real and very credible problem there.
Chairman King. If the witnesses can keep their answer to 1
minute.
Mr. Bergen. I want to take an opportunity about
Afghanistan, because obviously many Members of the committee
are going to have to think about this pretty carefully. We are
spending $118 billion there.
First of all, 68 percent of Afghans have a favorable view
of international forces. This is an astonishing number for a
Muslim country. That is a BBC poll taken in December.
Second, we are not there because of al-Qaeda; we are there
because every Islamic terrorist or insurgent group in the world
was headquartered or based there before 9/11, and they have
migrated across the border to Pakistan, where they are now
being guests of the Pakistani Taliban.
Third, when we overthrow a government, we have somewhat of
a responsibility, I think, and I think many others would share
this, to kind of leave the place in a somewhat stable
condition.
Fourth, the most likely place in the world for a nuclear
war is between Pakistan and India. An unstable Afghanistan
leads to an unstable Pakistan. We have already seen that.
Fifth, the Taliban are the Taliban. We have seen what they
have done just recently in Pakistan. This is not a bunch of
Henry Kissingers in waiting. You know who they are. Just to
amplify something that Fran just said, we have already run this
experiment twice before in Afghanistan. We closed our embassy
in 1989, zeroed out aid in the 1990s, and we did it again in
2002. We got what we paid for. We did it on the cheap. So we
were attacked from Afghanistan, as you know.
So we need to be very careful about how we are going to
pull out obviously over time. The Afghans were freaking out at
the idea we were leaving this year in July, as we said, or
seemed to say. So we need to think very carefully about how we
manage that withdrawal over time.
Mr. Kohlmann. I wish I could say that I thought that U.S.
forces could be withdrawn from Afghanistan by and large and
that everything would be peachy, but I don't think that is the
reality. As much as I wish U.S. forces could come home right
away, I do remember what it was like before 9/11, meeting with
folks at the NSC at the White House, talking about the issue of
Afghanistan as a sanctuary, and their frustration with the fact
that the U.S. Government was doing nothing about it.
So whenever I think about withdrawing, I think back to
those days and back to the idea that the last thing we need
right now is for Afghanistan to once again become a sanctuary
for al-Qaeda after all of the effort we put in to try to
prevent it from becoming so.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The former attorney general of California, Mr. Lungren.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am sorry
to the panelists that I had to leave for a while to Chair
another committee, so I hope I am not repeating what has been
asked of you before.
First of all, just a comment. We talked about the necessity
for a deradicalization program, a counterradicalization
program. In order for us to get that support for such a
program, we have to admit there is radicalization going on. The
Chairman held a hearing on that, and the message that we
thought we were going to get out about the radicalization of
youth in the Muslim communities in America, with testimony by a
parent and an uncle of two that had been so radicalized, was
lost in the coverage, and, frankly, the Chairman was attacked
because we dared to deal with the issue. So I appreciate the
fact you recognize that we have to do something about a deep
radicalization or counterradicalization program, but first you
have to assume there is a radicalization by putting that on the
record.
Second, I would like to ask the three of you this: We
started out this hearing by talking about the treasure trove of
intelligence that we got from the successful mission executed
against Osama bin Laden. I was asked this question when I was
home recently at a town hall meeting. They said, what possible
benefit was given to us by our releasing the fact that we had
gotten this treasure trove of intelligence; and, second, by
giving out some parts of that intelligence; and third, by
revealing the manner and means by which we obtained the
intelligence when we executed the mission?
Frankly, I was at a loss to try and answer that with my
constituents. My only answer was perhaps there was a judgment
that this would put them on notice that we were after them. But
at the same time, that is certainly not what we did during
World War II and every other thing. We thought the utilization
of intelligence was enhanced by the fact that the enemy didn't
know we had it. Could the three of you have help me in that
regard?
Chairman King. I know Ms. Townsend is supposed to leave at
noon. We should be finished with the hearing by about 12:05.
Ms. Townsend. Thank you, Chairman. I am good. Thanks.
Let me say, you mentioned the radicalization issue.
Quickly, this is a fact. Quite frankly, whether or not there is
radicalization of youth here in the United States is not a
political issue open to debate. So people just need to suck up
and get over that. It is a fact. It is happening. We have
credible instances of it. So it should not be an issue of
debate.
On the treasure trove, I will say to you, having served in
the White House, when you have a successful disruption, I can
tell you that I have suffered under the sort of excruciating
pressure from the press to get some details out to inform the
American people. You do want, because it goes to the
complacency issue. If you can explain to the American people a
successful disruption, you can get their support for further
operations. So there is this balance.
Let me quickly add that releasing the fact that there was a
trove, the details of the operation, and the manner and means
in which it was executed are terribly harmful. I feel that
releasing those details--we are going to have to have future
operations, and we are going to have to put men and women in
harm's way. Releasing those details, we know that al-Qaeda
monitors what we call open-source material, news reports. We
found them in the caves of Afghanistan. So have no doubt that
the details that we release will be used against men and women
in future operations. So, on balance, I would not have released
the level of detail that was released.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Bergen.
Mr. Bergen. I think there is a certain utility in letting
al-Qaeda know that we have found the Rosetta Stone, for the
following reason. They are in a kind of Catch-22. They can
communicate with each other and, therefore, open themselves to
being detected, or not communicate forever, in which case they
are sort of out of business.
What did we really release in terms of actual details of
the information trove? I think we said that the plans were in
New York, and Washington, and Chicago, and Los Angeles. Well, I
think we knew that.
So I think there is--Fran has explained, as she was really
there for many, many years, what the pressures are. Let us see
what comes out of this. But there might be a certain utility in
letting al-Qaeda know this.
Mr. Lungren. Mr. Kohlmann.
Mr. Kohlmann. I appreciate the idea of sending a chilled
fear down al-Qaeda's spine, and I understand that potentially
this also could be simply a way of trying to get al-Qaeda
operatives to start moving around out of fear and see where
people are moving to, who is moving. There was a convoy
attacked in the last few days. Mullah Omar. Perhaps he was
afraid that his hiding place had been discovered, and he
decided to high-tail it.
So I understand that there is a utility to this, but I,
too, recognize the fact that al-Qaeda has a dramatic interest
in open-source intelligence. AQAP has an entire section of
their Inspire magazine dedicated to open-source intelligence.
They are parsing through every single statement put out by the
White House, they are parsing through every single news
conference. They are watching very carefully for every detail
they can glean, and they will use it against us. They have in
the past, and they will in the future. That is a concern.
I think there were certain things that probably could have
been stated about the raid, but some things that were released
I am not sure provide any benefit. The releasing of the videos
of bin Laden, I think, would have been a tremendously amount
more effective had there been sound, because right now all we
have are the description of U.S. officials saying, well, he is
mumbling here. Well, that is not what we are seeing. When we
see the video of bin Laden wrapped in a shawl watching TV, it
is 5 seconds long. There is no context to it.
So I think some of this information was released with the
right intent, but I am not sure the execution was there.
Chairman King. The time of the gentleman has expired.
The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Walsh.
Mr. Walsh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It has been a long
morning, so let us close.
Ms. Townsend, you have given me my best takeaway line of
the hearing: It is a fact, radicalization here at home. Just
your overview thoughts on this topic.
It is a fact, but we know politically it is also a debate
in this country. Why is it still a debate? Fort Hood, you
referenced that we saw warning signs. Why weren't they heeded,
and what needs to be done to make sure they are heeded again?
It is a fact, but why doesn't the whole country seem to
understand that?
Ms. Townsend. I will take a stab at this. I think part of
it is it is a fact. If you can point to cases and examples, the
conversation tends to stay reasonably rational, in my
experience.
So you point to Nidal Hasan. There is no question he was an
American soldier who was radicalized, and that is part of a
pattern that we know of Anwar al-Awlaki. But I think we also
have to acknowledge that there are Muslim Americans, while they
don't often wish to be named publicly, who have cooperated with
law enforcement agencies like the FBI, like the Department of
Homeland Security. These aren't either/or issues. Both facts
happen to be true. There are many Muslim Americans who abhor
al-Qaeda, who abhor the ideals and ideologue of al-Qaeda, wish
to be helpful. This is not a single ``ummah'' of the Muslim
world who subscribe to this.
But to Congressman Lungren's point, until people accept the
fact of radicalization of American youth, we can't effectively
combat it. So what we need to do is, frankly, the best way to
fight it is this whole notion of a counternarrative. We need to
employ, encourage, and recruit Muslim Americans to participate
in that counternarrative.
Mr. Bergen. Fran used the helpful phrase ``it is not an
either/or.'' I think there is another either/or which is part
of this, which is, as I mentioned earlier, 17 Americans have
been killed in jihadist American attacks since 9/11. In the
same time, 73 Americans were killed in hate crimes, according
to the FBI, which have different motivations. So jihadist
terrorism is obviously a National security problem of the
United States, but there are other problems. It is not the only
one.
So I think part of the controversy around the hearing, Mr.
Chairman, was the idea that this was the only or the most
important problem. I think the Muslim American community felt
there were other issues that were important as well.
Chairman King. If I can just address that. Obviously it is
the most important homeland security issue. There are other
issues in the Judiciary Committee and other committees, but the
Department of Homeland Security was set up to counter the
attacks of September 11. Other issues we have had before, and
they are certainly appropriate for other committees to discuss,
but I felt this issue in particular was essential for this
committee.
Mr. Walsh. Just to leapfrog on that for a second, it is my
fear that that sensitive attitude we might have might continue
us down this path--and, Mr. Kohlmann, you can close this whole
thing--with us not heeding the warning signs of another
potential Fort Hood because we are afraid of whatever.
Mr. Kohlmann. I feel tremendous sympathy for the Muslim
community in this country and around the world. I understand
that the vast majority of Muslims have no interest in terrorism
or al-Qaeda. I understand why they are sensitive about this. It
is very difficult when it seems like your faith is under
attack, especially in the context of Koran burnings and the
whole thing about the Ground Zero mosque. It is understandable
that people get sensitive about this.
I agree with Fran. I don't think it is a question, it is
not a political question. There is radicalization going on. I
think it is in the interests of the Muslim community above all
else to be at the forefront of making sure that we deal with
this problem because it is their children who are being
recruited to go off and join foreign terrorist organizations.
It is their children who are watching videos of people being
beheaded on the internet and think that is a good thing. It is
not their fault, but it is an issue that needs to be addressed.
I think one thing that Muslims should understand is that this
is not just an attack on Islam, it is not an attack on mosques.
In my written testimony I describe an individual who was
radicalized inside this country in Pennsylvania, who never
attended a mosque, who never went to an Islamic center, who
wasn't really a Muslim.
Again, I understand their sensitivity, but this is not
about them. It is about terrorism, it is about terrorists, and
it is about how all Americans can try to prevent radicalization
and people being pushed to join extremist causes.
Mr. Walsh. Thank you. Go get lunch.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. Thank you, Mr. Walsh.
First of all, let me thank all the witnesses. This has been
a great, great panel, great hearing, and speaking for the
Ranking Member, it was extremely illuminating and informative.
Members of the committee may have additional questions for
the witnesses. I will ask you to respond to them in writing.
The record will be kept open for 10 days.
Without objection, the committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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