[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
H.R. 1690, THE MODERN SECURITY
CREDENTIALS ACT
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 4, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-23
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Vacancy
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Chairman
Daniel E. Lungren, California Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tim Walberg, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois, Vice Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Mo Brooks, Alabama Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Amanda Parikh, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Thomas McDaniels, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security........................................ 7
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 9
Witnesses
Mr. Stephen Sadler, Deputy Assistant Administrator,
Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing,
Transportation Security Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Darrell S. Bowman, Group Leader, Advanced Systems &
Applications, Virginia Tech Transportation Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Ms. Jeanne M. Olivier, A.A.E., Assistant Director, Aviation
Security & Technology, Aviation Department, The Port Authority
of New York & New Jersey:
Oral Statement................................................. 19
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Mr. Martin Rojas, Vice President, Security & Operations, American
Trucking Association:
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
Mr. Randall H. Walker, Director of Aviation, Las Vegas Mccarran
International Airport, Clark County Department of Aviation:
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement............................................. 30
For the Record
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security:
Letter Submitted by the American Trucking Associations......... 3
Letter Submitted by the American Association of Airport
Executives................................................... 3
Letter Submitted by the Chamber of Commerce of the United
States of America............................................ 4
Joint Letter Submitted by the American Pyrotechnics
Association, the Agricultural Retailers Association,
Institute of Makers of Explosives, and the Fertilizer
Institute.................................................... 5
H.R. 1690, THE MODERN SECURITY CREDENTIALS ACT
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Wednesday, May 4, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:05 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Rogers, Walberg, Cravaack, Walsh,
Jackson Lee, Davis, Richmond, and Thompson.
Mr. Rogers. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security will come to order.
The committee is meeting today to hear testimony on H.R.
1690, The MODERN Security Credentials Act, and on-going efforts
to streamline and eliminate redundancies in various
transportation security credentialing regulations.
I want to take just a moment and let the audience know that
we have asked our panelists--we were going to have two panels--
we have asked them to combine into one, and they have
graciously agreed to do that, and the reason being we are going
to be called for a series of votes in about an hour and a half.
We would be gone for 2 hours, so I didn't want the folks to be
inconvenienced and have to wait for us to come back. So we are
going to try to knock this out in a more timely fashion before
that series of votes.
I would like to welcome everybody to the subcommittee's
legislative hearing today and thank our witnesses for being
here.
The subcommittee's hearing will focus on H.R. 1690, The
MODERN Security Credentials Act, which requires the Department
of Homeland Security to streamline and eliminate redundancies
in various transportation security credentialing regulations.
The bill takes a crucial step towards streamlining Government
regulations, which we expect to result in greater cost savings
and less red tape for our hard-working men and women who rely
on and need these security credentials for their livelihoods.
This is a critical issue, and in 2009, the U.S. Small
Business Administration named redundant and duplicative
transportation security credential regulations as one of the
top 10 regulatory areas needing reform.
This bill would make an important change to current law.
First, the bill would allow for the consolidation and
harmonization of the security threat assessment process for
transportation workers. This harmonization would eliminate
redundant background checks for applicants and streamline
threat assessment procedures, which should reduce costs for the
various credentials.
For example, a worker who needs to acquire two different
credentials would now only need one threat assessment. In
addition, through streamlining this process, the Transportation
Security Administration can realize cost savings as well. Since
these credentialing programs are fee-based, cost savings would
be passed onto the workers as lower fees. This legislation will
save hard-working folks in the transportation sector money.
I have had made it clear in this bill that TSA should not
start taking over additional processes and functions that it is
not currently carrying out. I strongly feel that local
authorities in the aviation arena can more effectively and
efficiently carry out credentialing functions such as access
control, enrollment, and criminal history record check
adjudication.
For example, this bill preserves the authority of an
airport operator to determine who has access to its own secure
area. Furthermore, I strongly support competition among airport
contractors to facilitate the criminal history record checks. I
do not believe that this bill would restrict this competitive
system in any way.
This legislation ensures that credentialing processes
currently carried out by the aviation facilities will not be
taken over by the TSA, and I intend to continue working with
stakeholders to ensure that this does not happen.
Next, this bill would link the security identification
display area badge security threat assessment standards to the
TWIC, the Transportation Worker Identification Card, standards
so that they are identical. This is essential to allow for the
harmonization that I have just described. It also ensures that
our transportation workers will all be subject to the same
level of security review.
There are vulnerabilities in all of our transportation
systems. Whether on a truck carrying security-sensitive
materials or a port where ships carrying liquid and natural gas
are moored up or in an airport, we need to maintain high levels
of security across all these venues.
To further streamline the process and save money for truck
drivers, this bill addresses redundant requirements that
truckers face when having to undergo security threat assessment
for both hazardous materials and TWIC. This bill would
eliminate the requirement for security screening as a part of
an HME, Hazardous Material Endorsement. It would instead
require those truck drivers who are transporting materials that
could have a security nexus to acquire one credential, a TWIC.
This would provide cost savings to individual drivers who
may carry hazardous materials such as paint or food coloring
that does not have a real connection to security or terrorism.
Furthermore, this bill requires DHS to ensure TWIC enrollment
centers have flexible operating hours and that centers are in
geographically diverse locations, helping to facilitate worker
enrollment in the TWIC program.
This bill has been endorsed by a number of organizations
and industry associations. At this time, without objection, I
would submit for the record four letters of endorsement for the
bill.
Hearing none, so ordered.
[The information follows:]
Letter Submitted by the American Trucking Associations
Washington, DC.
The Honorable Mike Rogers,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Rogers: I am writing to express the American Trucking
Associations support of the MODERN Security Credentials Act. This
legislation will bring welcome relief to trucking companies and truck
drivers who must obtain duplicative security credentials to haul
hazardous materials and enter port facilities.
The MODERN Security Credentials Act recognizes that not all
hazardous materials are weaponizable, and directs the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) to create a list of security-sensitive
hazardous materials. To transport these designated materials, a driver
would have to obtain a Transportation Workers Identification Card
(TWIC). Currently, if a driver hauls any hazardous material that
requires placarding, the driver is subject to a costly and time-
consuming fingerprint-based background check to obtain a hazardous
material endorsement (HME). If that same driver needs to enter a port
facility he must go through another identical, costly, and time-
consuming fingerprint-based background check and obtain a TWIC. By
separating security-sensitive hazardous materials from other hazmat and
returning the HMA to its original purpose of verifying driver safety,
the Act will eliminate the significant burden these multiple background
checks place on the trucking industry.
The MODERN Security Credentials ACT also would prohibit States and
their political subdivisions from requiring redundant background checks
for drivers transporting security-sensitive materials, unless the State
can demonstrate a compelling reason that a separate background check is
necessary to ensure the safe and secure transport of such cargo. ATA
believes this prohibition needs to be broadened to cover all hazmat so
that States do not establish redundant background checks for hazmat
that is not considered security-sensitive by DHS and therefore not
subject to a Federal background check. We look forward to working with
the Committee to make this change as the legislation proceeds to
markup. There are a number of different States that require truck
drivers to pay another fee, in addition to the fees assessed on the
drivers to obtain their TWIC and HME.
Since 2004, the trucking industry has sought legislation to address
redundant security background checks and duplicative security
credentials. In that time, truck drivers have incurred significant
costs and financial burdens to undergo those multiple checks and
security credentials. We applaud your efforts in moving this
legislation and look forward to the swift passage of this very
important bill.
Sincerely,
Mary B. Phillips,
Senior Vice President, Legislative Affairs, American Trucking
Associations.
______
Letter Submitted by the American Association of Airport Executives
May 3, 2011.
The Honorable Mike Rogers,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, Committee on
Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington,
DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Rogers: On behalf of the American Association of
Airport Executives, I am writing to thank you for your leadership in
crafting H.R. 1690, the MODERN Security Credentials Act and to offer
our support for this important measure.
The legislation represents a thoughtful approach to harmonizing and
consolidating the security threat assessment (STA) process for
transportation workers, focusing on inherently Federal vetting
functions while preserving and protecting the important local security
roles that airports have played in the aviation worker background
screening process for more than two decades. We are particularly
grateful for provisions added prior to introduction to clarify that
airport operators should maintain all roles and responsibilities they
currently hold, including final decisions on badge issuance and access
rights throughout their facilities.
As you know, the background check process for aviation workers has
long operated successfully as a Federal/local partnership with the
Federal Government holding sole responsibility for STAs and other
necessary Government checks for prospective workers and with local
airport authorities operating and managing enrollment, credentialing,
badging, criminal history background check adjudication, and access
control systems in accordance with strict Federal standards. The
current system for aviation provides a critical local layer of security
and strikes the proper balance between the airport's need for
operational flexibility and efficiency and the Federal Government's
need to set standards, maintain strict oversight, and perform critical
Federal vetting functions.
We are gratified that the MODERN Security Credentials Act seeks to
protect the existing, successful, locally controlled credentialing and
access control apparatus while encouraging the Department of Homeland
Security to consolidate, harmonize, and reduce redundancies within the
vetting processes directly under Federal control. This approach stands
in marked contrast to efforts underway within DHS to harmonize aviation
vetting programs with other, less mature transportation worker vetting
programs that the Department manages, namely TWIC and the hazmat
endorsement for trucking.
We are concerned that current, Department-led efforts appear intent
on establishing a highly centralized approach that would significantly
increase the role of the Federal Government in existing airport managed
and operated processes. We oppose such a centralized approach and are
pleased that your legislation clearly delineates between Federal and
local roles and responsibilities.
While the desire to centralize and Federalize all processes for
transportation worker vetting programs may be understandable from the
Department's perspective, airports are concerned about Federal
intrusion into existing processes that have worked well for decades.
Airports are also concerned about an approach that could force them to
help foot the bill for hundreds of millions of dollars in potential
costs for changes that provide them with no demonstrable security or
operational benefit. The current system in aviation operates
efficiently and effectively at a fraction of the cost of other
transportation vetting programs and at absolutely no cost to the
Federal Government in contrast to TWIC, which has operated with mixed
results and consumed hundreds of millions of dollars in Federal
resources.
By keeping DHS focused on improving its own vetting functions and
limiting the expansion of the Federal Government's responsibilities in
the aviation environment, the MODERN Security Credentials Act would, in
our view, accelerate efforts to harmonize security processes within the
Federal Government, limit unnecessary Federal and industry
expenditures, and protect a system that has served airports, the
aviation industry, and the Nation well for decades. We look forward to
working with you on this important initiative in the weeks ahead.
Sincerely,
Charles M. Barclay,
President.
______
Letter Submitted by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America
Washington, DC, May 2, 2011.
The Honorable Mike Rogers,
Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security, U.S. House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20510.
Dear Chairman Rogers: The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the world's
largest business federation representing the interests of more than 3
million businesses and organizations of every size, sector, and region,
submits this letter in support of the ``MODERN Security Credentials Act
of 2011.'' As we seek to remove unnecessary burdens from the backs of
American businesses, this legislation is effective in harmonizing
redundant Government credentialing requirements.
The Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) and the
Hazmat Endorsement (HME) are redundant credentials administered by the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA). Both programs query the
same databases for criminal, immigration, and other violations,
utilizing the same disqualifying criteria, appeal, and waiver
processes. Yet today, transportation workers must pay $94 for a HME to
carry hazmat, $132.50 for a TWIC to enter the ports, $50 for a FAST
card at the border, and $27 for a Security Identification Display Area
(SIDA) badge at each airport--a total cost of $303.50.
The Chamber believes that the redundant fees and background checks
of U.S. transportation workers is an unnecessary cost for businesses of
all sizes. These sentiments are echoed by the U.S. Small Business
Administration, which officially added the TSA's inaction in
implementing Section 1556 to its Regulatory Review and Reform (r3)
program's Top 10 list of most egregious regulations on small
businesses.
The Chamber commends your efforts to advance this legislation, and
is encouraged by past bipartisan support on this issue.
Sincerely,
R. Bruce Josten,
Executive Vice President.
______
Joint Letter Submitted by the American Pyrotechnics Association, the
Agricultural Retailers Association, Institute of Makers of Explosives,
and the Fertilizer Institute
April 29, 2011.
The Honorable Mike D. Rogers,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, U.S. House of
Representatives, Washington, DC 20515.
Dear Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Jackson Lee: The
undersigned\1\ are writing to express support for legislation to
eliminate burdensome duplication and redundancy in the Nation's
security threat assessment vetting and credentialing programs for
transportation workers that provide no commensurate security
enhancement. On May 4, 2011, the Subcommittee will hear testimony on
H.R.------,\2\ the ``Modernizing of Documentation and Elimination of
Redundant Identification and Security Credentials Act'' or the ``MODERN
Security Credentials Act,'' a bill that leads the way toward
accomplishing this objective.
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\1\ The American Pyrotechnics Association (APA) is the principle
trade association representing manufacturers, importers, and
distributors of fireworks in the United States. The APA has over 240
member companies. Along with their subsidiaries, APA's member companies
are responsible for 90 percent of the fireworks displayed in the United
States. Each fireworks display produced in the United States.
The Agricultural Retailers Association (ARA) is a not-for-profit
trade association that advocates on behalf of America's agricultural
retailers and distributors. ARA members provide goods and services to
farmers and ranchers, which include fertilizer, crop protection
chemicals, seed, crop scouting, soil testing, custom application of
pesticides and fertilizers, and development of comprehensive nutrient
management plans. Retail and distribution facilities are located
throughout all 50 States and range in size from small family-held
businesses and farmer cooperatives to large companies with multiple
outlets.
The Institute of Makers of Explosives (IME) is a nonprofit
association founded in 1913 to provide information and recommendations
concerning the safety and security of commercial explosive materials.
IME represents U.S. manufacturers, distributors, and motor carriers of
commercial explosive materials and oxidizers as well as other companies
that provide related services. Millions of metric tons of high
explosives, blasting agents, and oxidizers are consumed annually in the
United States. These materials are essential to the U.S. economy.
Energy production, construction, and other specialized uses begin with
the use of commercial explosives. These products are used in every
State and are distributed worldwide by all modes of transportation.
The Fertilizer Institute (TFI) is the National trade association
representing fertilizer producers, importers, wholesalers, and
retailers. TFI's mission is to promote and protect the use of
fertilizer from the plant where it is produced to the plants where it
is used.
\2\ April 27, 2011 (3:30 p.m.).
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The commercial explosives industry was the first private sector
industry subject to Federal security threat assessments in the wake of
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Since that time, Congress
has enacted a myriad of duplicative and redundant vetting programs,
some with credentialing requirements, that have impacted employees of
our member companies, especially those employees who drive trucks.
In addition to the security vetting program authorized by the Safe
Explosives Act of 2003, employees of our members may also be subject to
other vetting and sometimes credentialing requirements with an alphabet
soup of acronyms--HME, TWIC, FAST, CAC, IAC, CFATS, and soon to be
implemented ammonium nitrate rules. The majority of these programs
require a check for criminal history, a check to establish identity, a
check to determine legal status to work, and vetting against the
terrorist screening database.
In the last Congress, the House passed so-called ``SAFE Trucker''
legislation. This bipartisan piece of legislation proposed to allow the
TWIC threat assessment and credential to replace the HME threat
assessment. These two programs are currently the largest and most
expensive transportation sector vetting and credentialing programs, and
they have the greatest overlap.
The MODERN Security Credentials Act encompasses the provisions of
the SAFE Trucker legislation. This legislation provides that the TWIC
credential and threat assessment will replace the HME threat
assessment, for the preemption of non-Federal security background
checks of those who transport security-sensitive materials, and for a
task force to review the lists of disqualifying crimes to ensure that
they are accurate indicators of terrorism security risk. Additionally,
it gives statutory underpinning to the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) regulatory effort to harmonize threat assessment
processing and procedures across the Department's various vetting
program, which began in 2007. This legislation is consistent with
recommendations of the Surface Transportation Security Priority
Assessment issued by the White House in 2010.
There are two aspects of the bill that we urge the sponsors to
clarify and/or strengthen:
First, section 2 limits the ability of DHS to consolidate and
harmonize the security threat assessment process for transportation
workers ``to the extent possible under law.'' The duplication and
redundancy of the various vetting and credentialing programs stem from
various acts of Congress. For this legislation to achieve the goal to
eliminate wasteful duplication, DHS needs statutory authority to
supersede prior law that is the source of the duplicative vetting
programs. Section 2 should be strengthened to supplant all existing
Federal security threat assessments for transportation workers unless
otherwise provided by a subsequent act of Congress.
Second, the legislation requires new rulemaking to determine what
hazardous materials are ``security-sensitive.'' While we acknowledge
that not all shipments of hazardous materials currently triggering
security threat assessments of drivers would be attractive to
terrorists and thus ``security-sensitive,'' the legislation does not
recognize the extensive regulatory review completed a year ago by the
U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) in consultation with DHS that
establishes such a definitive list.\3\ Rather, section 2101(a)
authorizes DHS to establish a list of ``security-sensitive materials''
by notice and comment rulemaking, using, as the basis for the
rulemaking, the definition of ``security-sensitive material'' found in
section 1501 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission
Act of 2007 (9/11 Act). By itself, the 9/11 Commission Act definition
specifies a very limited list of materials based on consequences not
risk. While the list can be expanded based on rulemaking, DOT has just
accomplished that rulemaking. Additionally, we are concerned by those
advocating a list based on ``weaponizable'' materials. We do not know
what this means. Sugar, for example, can be used as an explosives
precursor. Or does the term mean a material that would contribute to
the consequences of a terrorist attack on the vehicle if released?
Technically, all hazardous materials present some consequence when
released. Finally, section 5(c) seems to undo the rulemaking that would
be accomplished by the MODERN Security Credentials Act, by amending 46
U.S.C. 70105(b)(2), which establishes the universe of individuals
required to obtain a TWIC, to authorize TWICs for truck drivers who
transport security-sensitive materials as that term is defined in the
9/11 Act. In fact, section 5(c) should at least be referencing the
rulemaking required by section 2 of the MODERN Security Credentials
Act. Ideally, section 2 would cite to or include verbatim the DOT HM-
232F list.
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\3\ HM-232F, 75 FR 10974 (March 9, 2010). Based on an evaluation of
the security threats associated with specific types and quantities of
hazardous materials, the DOT/DHS final rule narrows the list of
materials subject to security plan requirements and reduces associated
regulatory costs and paperwork burden.
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conclusion
Safeguarding security-sensitive materials while in transportation
is a top priority. Ensuring that security-sensitive materials are only
tendered to the custody of trusted transportation workers is a key
component of this initiative. Over the years, however, redundant
vetting and credentialing programs for the same population of trusted
transportation workers has become a time-consuming, costly endeavor
with no commensurate security benefit. We believe that the MODERN
Security Credentials Act takes important steps to eliminate needless
overlap that wastes scarce government and private sector resources that
could be devoted to other pressing security needs. We urge the
Subcommittee to act favorably on this legislation.
Respectfully,
Julie Heckman,
President, American Pyrotechnics Association.
Carmen Haworth,
Public Policy Counsel, Agricultural Retailers Association.
Cynthia Hilton,
Executive Vice President, Institute of Makers of Explosives.
Pam Guffain,
Vice President, Member Services, The Fertilizer Institute.
Mr. Rogers. The letters are from the American Trucking
Association, the American Association of Airport Executives,
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and a joint letter from the
American Pyrotechnics Association, the Agricultural Retailers
Association, Institute of Makers of Explosives, and The
Fertilizer Institute.
During the drafting process, this language was shared for
comment with multiple groups across the transportation sector,
and I look forward to continuing the work on the bill in a
bipartisan and collaborative way.
As with almost all legislation introduced in the House,
there is room for improvement. If there are prudent suggestions
or changes that could improve the bill, I will gladly consider
them as we have done with many of these groups represented in
this room and our counterparts on the other side of the aisle.
In fact, this is the reason we are having this hearing
today. I want to hear from different stakeholders represented
on how we can improve this legislation in order to further
eliminate redundant regulations, reduce costs, and streamline
Government procedures without reducing the necessary security
regime that these programs provide.
With that, the Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member
of the subcommittee, the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson
Lee, for any statement that she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Before I begin my statement, let me take a moment to first
express my concern and condolences for the people in your home
State of Alabama and some surrounding States. Our thoughts and
prayers are with them as they go through this very difficult
period of recovery.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to welcome the witnesses today
who are testifying on the Modernizing of Documentation and
Elimination of Redundant Identification and Security
Credentials Act. The credentialing process for aviation and
other transportation employees is one of the most critical
layers of security that we have, as it determines who will have
unescorted access to the most secure and sensitive areas at
airports and seaports.
For a long time I have worked on this issue, and I joined
Congresswoman Lowey in the early years of this committee to
discuss issues dealing with employee access to airports.
I visited the aprons of airports. I have walked on tarmacs.
I have visited with employees. I have watched trucks ingress
and egress. I have visited cargo sites where inspections are
carrying on. I have asked the intimate and intricate questions
of how do airports work and how are we assured that all that
are on those grounds have the responsibility but also the
credibility and the review that gives them the access that has
been given?
We can see with issues such as external attacks on
airports, meaning attacks on the perimeters, such as the issue
in Moscow and other places, we recognize that we have some
great challenges.
Industry experts agree that this type of employee screening
is one of the most useful tools in mitigating the insider
threat of individuals who wish to do harm. The credentialing
process for aviation and other transportation employees is one
of the most critical layers of security that we have, as it
determines who will have unescorted access to the most secure
and sensitive areas at airports and seaports.
With an issue as serious as this and a process as
complicated as this, I am concerned that we are rushing
legislative action for an issue that impacts many stakeholders,
none of whom have asked for this type of legislation.
In fact, I am told that the Transportation Trades
Department of the AFL-CIO is opposed to this bill and that
there are concerns being raised by the Airports Council
International. The subcommittee's oversight in this area needs
to continue before legislation is passed that could cost jobs
and raise operating expenses for the economically sensitive
transportation industry.
We have not had a hearing on the Transportation Worker
Identification Credential Program, the troubled biometric card
program in use in the maritime environment. Yet this bill would
aim to consolidate and harmonize the security threat assessment
processes of TWIC and SIDA credentials.
The question would be whether or not there would be an
increased number of employees that would be reviewing this.
There are already enormous complaints about how slow the
process is, whether or not in fact you are able to get a TWIC
card, how long you have to wait.
Now with the merger, even though the term is modernized,
consolidate, consolidate with what? Extra funding, more staff
members, more trained individuals? Will there be a shortened
time? What will be the benefit of modernizing with no staff and
no resources?
TWIC has well-documented challenges, and the bill we are
discussing today does nothing to address them. Instead, it
would seem that this legislation is potentially seeking to
overhaul a system that is not broken, except for the fact that
we need to improve its implementation. In the process, we may
place increased costs on the transportation sector when it is
already struggling with record fuel prices.
Mr. Chairman, a TWIC card costs $132. Would consolidating
and harmonizing mean an airport's SIDA credential, which
currently costs $29, would go up by $100?
How will adding new aviation-related disqualifying offenses
impact the employment of truckers and port workers? Will it
have a disproportionate affect on minorities and small
businesses? What assurances do we have that this legislation,
if enacted, would not put people out of work just when our
unemployment picture is finally turning around?
My understanding is that the aviation component will then
intrude and impact the employment or the process for truckers
and port workers, using aviation standards. What does that
mean? That the truckers and constituents of mine who have been
able to rehabilitate their lives, secure a TWIC card and work
at places that are a little bit different from airports are now
going to be knocked out of work?
I don't think any of us knows the answers to these
questions, which is why I think we should first do no harm and
not pass a bill that would actually make us and our
transportation system less safe.
I would like to continue working with you, Mr. Chairman, on
this issue as we move forward in drafting a transportation
security authorization bill, which I think is the appropriate
vehicle for major revisions to existing policies and practices.
This bill before us today goes way beyond eliminating
redundant background checks and credentials for transportation
workers, which was a key component of the SAFE Truckers Act,
which I support and which is contained in the second portion of
this bill.
That language has been vetted with industry and Government
officials, and it should be the focus of what we are discussing
today. Accordingly, I would like to propose on the record that
this subcommittee move the SAFE Trucker Act alone.
Finally, let me express my concern with the fact that the
final version of this bill was never formally transmitted to me
and other Members of this panel. Before moving on legislation
that could dramatically impact the employment of millions of
Americans, we have the responsibility to give thoughtful
consideration to this legislation.
The failure to distribute the final text severely limits
our ability to fully vet this bill. I believe the American
public wants us to focus on critical issues like mass transit
security, passenger screening protocols for body scanners and
pat-downs and rising international security standards, in light
of the demise of Osama bin Laden and the collateral damage that
may be resulting in terrorist acts, all of which I hope we
address in an authorization bill for TSA.
I look forward, Mr. Chairman, in working with you, and I
know that you have great concerns on the security of this
Nation. You have shown that, and therefore, I hope that you
will listen to my comments in the spirit that they have been
given, and that is that we will continue to work together and
fix problems that can be fixed but be assured that issues that
are detrimental are addressed as well.
With that, Mr. Chairman, thank you and I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. The Chairman thanks the gentlelady and the
Chairman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the full
committee, Mr. Thompson, for any statement that he may have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I would
also like to echo your words as well as that of the Ranking
Member in welcoming our witnesses to this hearing. I look
forward to hearing from each of you on the potential impact of
the proposed bill and how it can be improved.
At a time when our economy is still recovering,
unemployment remains stubbornly high and public anxiety over
TSA's screening practices is at an all-time high, it is
interesting to note that the bill we are considering today, at
our first legislative hearing this Congress, addresses none of
these concerns.
Indeed, the draft bill includes a sweeping authorization
for TSA to change the transportation worker credentialing
process. Without question, TSA's credentialing process deserves
our attention but in a way that provides enhanced security,
fosters efficiency and lessens, not increases, the burden
placed on workers. That is why I recently introduced H.R. 1105,
the Transitioning with an Improved Credential Program Act.
Unlike the legislation before us today, my bill would
provide certainty to transportation workers and stakeholders
alike by tackling a well-documented challenge within a TWIC
program.
I reviewed the bill and found myself asking, what exactly
is modern about the The MODERN Security Credentials Act? It
would establish a two-tiered system that permits airports to
deny workers a SIDA badge, even after successfully going
through the TSA waiver process. Is that modern? It does nothing
to move us closer to the adoption of biometric standards for
credentials. Is that modern?
It alters the list of disqualifying crimes for
transportation workers seeking security credentials without
justification for the relevance of the crime.
Is that modern? As a committee, we frequently question DHS
and its components on lessons learned from previous experiences
and how they will be used to inform future actions. Apparently,
we do not intend to heed our own advice.
As some of you will recall, it was not that long ago that
TSA overreached in a rulemaking for security in general
aviation. Ultimately, Congress was compelled to intervene and
rein in TSA. None of us wants a repeat of that experience.
Further, even without the passage of this bill, TSA has the
authority to issue a rulemaking on credentialing. In fact, we
have learned that there is a proposal pending right at this
moment at OMB. Will we not risk short-circuiting the OMB
vetting process by interceding with this bill and granting TSA
a blanket go-ahead?
Outreach to industry stakeholders and workers is critical
to ensuring that the potential impact of consolidating fees or
vetting processes, or even credentialing programs, are well
understood. Indeed, in prepared testimony, our witness
representing the Airports Council International states that the
bill includes conflicting requirements that will cause
unintended and unnecessary operational challenges and impose
additional costs for airports.
I think it is a safe bet that any additional costs incurred
because of these new regulations will be passed on to the
transportation workers and their employees. What will they get
for those additional fees? More security, more efficiency?
That said, Mr. Chairman, I support the second half of the
bill, the so-called SAFE Trucker legislation, which the House
approved as part of the 2009 TSA authorization bill. It takes a
common-sense approach to consolidation.
Let me close by expressing my concern about the process
surrounding this hearing. I applaud the witnesses, or at least
most of them, on their timely submission of prepared remarks.
This was a serious feat, given that the majority did not
circulate draft text to all subcommittee Members and witnesses
in advance of the hearing.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of the
time.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
I do want to clear up; I don't know what happened. I don't
withhold bills. We first gave the draft of this bill to the
Minority on the 6th of April, a month ago, and the final
version over a week ago, on April 27. So I don't know why it
didn't get to the Members because it was submitted to staff. I
would also offer----
Mr. Thompson. We got an answer for you.
Mr. Rogers. Tell me.
Mr. Thompson. Clerk, can you tell us about the distribution
of the bill?
Mr. Rogers. That is what I said, staff. I don't know about
any e-mails--but we gave it to your staff.
My point is simply this: I would never do that to anybody,
and I am going to make sure in the future we don't have this
kind of miscommunication, because that is just not the way to
do business, and I wouldn't do that.
Mr. Thompson. I absolutely appreciate that, and I know you
wouldn't. But, generally, the clerk will formally transmit the
information to us.
Mr. Rogers. Yes. They said something happened with the e-
mail that was a problem.
Mr. Thompson. All right.
Mr. Rogers. But, anyway, we are going to fix that.
But I also want to state, thinking about Ms. Jackson Lee's
comments, the whole reason we are holding this hearing is to
try to get the answers to the questions you raised. I mean,
this is just a process in the making; it is not a done deal. So
that thought is why we are doing this. I think you have raised
some legitimate concerns, and I want the answers as well.
All right. Having said that, the Chairman is now happy to
welcome our witnesses. We are very fortunate to have some
really classy folks who know what they are doing and hopefully
can help answer some of these questions.
Our first witness, Mr. Steven Sadler, is TSA's Deputy
Assistant Administrator for Transportation Threat Assessment
and Credentialing.
Our second witness, Mr. Darrell Bowman, is the Group Leader
for Advanced Systems & Applications at Virginia Tech
Transportation Institute, and he is the lead author of the
transportation research report entitled, ``Consolidated
Security Credentials for Persons Who Transport Hazardous
Materials.''
So with that, the Chairman now recognizes Mr. Sadler for 5
minutes to summarize your statement.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN SADLER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION THREAT ASSESSMENT AND CREDENTIALING,
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Sadler. Thank you, sir. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Jackson Lee and distinguished Members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify today about the
Transportation Security Administration's efforts to harmonize
security threat assessments across all modes of transportation.
TSA currently administers security threat assessment
programs for 28 transportation worker populations, covering
approximately 15 million individuals. Differing statutory
specifications, what constitutes a threat assessment, and a
lack of uniformity among user fees account for part of the
current incapability. To implement comparability across a wider
spectrum, TSA is working on a rulemaking that will further
harmonize threat assessments, the associated redress process
and user fees across modes of transportation, which TSA
conducts vetting.
This rule will improve the quality of data that TSA uses to
conduct vetting, thereby reducing applicant processing time,
eliminating redundancy by reducing the need for multiple
background checks, allowing workers to use a single assessment
for multiple purposes, offsetting costs for user fees, as
directed by Congress, and providing more robust redress
processes. The rule will also establish standardized enrollment
procedures and improve identity verification.
However, TSA cannot fully implement these improvements and
efficiencies in the credentialing process through a regulatory
change alone. New legislation is needed to amend statutory
security threat assessment requirements for aviation workers to
mirror the statutory requirements for other populations.
The current law governing aviation workers was enacted
prior to 9/11 and contains procedures that differ from the
newer standards for other programs. These statutory differences
prevent harmonization and cannot be changed to rulemaking. We
believe the standards Congress subsequently enacted for the
TWIC program support a more thorough threat assessment, thereby
enhancing security and increasing fairness through the redress
process.
The harmonization rule will have little effect on whose
physical credentials are required for certain privileges or
access to areas of transportation facilities. TSA believes that
the regulated entity is in the best position to determining
credentialing access control requirements.
Although TSA currently conducts background checks on 28
populations with varying degrees of overlap, TSA issues a
physical credential to TWIC only for workers on certain
maritime vessels and facilities and is required by law to do
so.
With respect to other populations subject to vetting, TSA
provides the results of the assessment to the entity that
actually grants the access or privilege. In many cases, these
entities issue their own credentials generally after the
individual meets additional competency and suitability
requirements.
For example, airport authorities that credential airport
workers and States that license commercial hazmat drivers rely
on TSA only for the assessment but not for issuing the
credential or license. Under the new rules, these
responsibilities would not change, since transportation
facilities need to have their own standards for suitability and
access control based on their specific operational needs,
business and statutory requirements, and availability of
resources.
To enable TSA to fulfill transportation security vetting in
a consistent, comparable way, TSA plans to assume the
adjudication of criminal background checks for airport and
aircraft operator workers, which are currently performed by the
airports and airlines.
For all other populations, TSA currently adjudicates
criminal history information, along with the other information
that comprises a security threat assessment. This will allow
TSA to assure standardized processes and criteria for
conducting and adjudicating security threat assessments,
including criminal history record information.
TSA does not however, intend to assume responsibility for
worker suitability or access control decisions from airports
and airlines and will continue to send a criminal history
record information to any airport that requests it for purposes
of making its own suitability or access control determinations.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. The harmonization of
threat assessments through regulatory and statutory changes
will allow TSA to fulfill its mission with greater efficiency
and effectiveness. I look forward to working with you towards
this goal in answering your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Sadler follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen Sadler
May 4, 2011
Good morning Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today about the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) effort to harmonize security threat assessments
(STA) across all modes of transportation.
We share the goal of Congress and stakeholders that STA programs be
harmonized to alleviate the burden and inconvenience placed on
individuals by the need to obtain multiple STAs, to the extent legally
possible. TSA currently administers STA programs for 28 transportation
worker populations, covering approximately 15 million individuals
across the transportation sectors. Differing statutory specifications
for what constitutes an STA and a lack of uniformity among user fees
account for part of the current incompatibility between STAs.
TSA has already established comparability standards and identified
comparable STAs to reduce the burden on individuals that are required
to have multiple STAs because of the nature of their work. For example,
individuals who have had successful background checks for purposes of
the U.S. Coast Guard Merchant Mariner Credential, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection Free and Secure Trade (FAST) card, or State
commercial drivers license hazardous materials endorsements (HMEs) are
entitled to a reduced fee when applying for a Transportation Worker
Identification Credential (TWIC). Also, the TWIC and HME background
checks may be utilized for many workers in the air cargo sector.
However, statutory, regulatory and infrastructure changes are necessary
to implement comparability across a wider number of background checks
and provide ease of use for the individual transportation worker.
To implement comparability across a wider spectrum, TSA is working
on a rulemaking that will further harmonize STAs, redress, and user
fees for individuals across modes of transportation in which TSA
conducts vetting, to the extent possible under current law. In addition
to addressing individuals who are already subject to STA rules, such as
those in the aviation and maritime sectors and commercial drivers
transporting hazardous materials, the rule will implement requirements
of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007
to conduct STAs on additional populations including certain freight
rail, passenger rail, and public transportation, and over-the-road-bus
workers--totaling an estimated 12 million workers over 5 years.
This rule will enhance the STA process in several ways. It will
improve the quality of data that TSA uses to conduct vetting, thereby
reducing applicant processing time; eliminate redundancy by reducing
the need for multiple background checks; facilitate STA ``portability''
for individuals who work in several modes of transportation or change
jobs by permitting workers to use a single STA for multiple purposes;
offset the costs of STAs through user fees as directed by Congress;
more equitably apportion the costs of STAs across all users by
including populations that are currently not required to pay a fee for
vetting; and provide more robust redress for many workers who do not
currently have access to appeals, waivers, and/or an administrative law
judge's review. The rule will also establish standardized enrollment
procedures and improve identity verification through new standards.
For example, a driver transporting cargo destined for an aircraft
and screened in accordance with TSA security requirements must have an
STA. That driver may also transport cargo from secure areas of a
regulated maritime facility, or transport hazardous materials, which
also require that he or she have an STA. Instead of applying for
multiple STAs, each of which is subject to particular, and possibly
conflicting, statutory, and regulatory standards and procedures, as is
the case today, this individual would only require a single STA to meet
the TSA background check requirement for all of these activities.
However, TSA cannot fully implement these improvements and
efficiencies in the credentialing process through regulatory change
alone. New legislation is needed to amend statutory STA requirements
for aviation workers to mirror the statutory STA requirements for other
populations. The current law governing aviation workers was enacted
prior to 9/11 and contains procedures that differ from the newer
standards for other programs. These statutory differences prevent
harmonization and cannot be changed through rulemaking. We believe the
standards Congress subsequently enacted for the TWIC program in the
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 support a more thorough
STA, thereby enhancing security, and increasing fairness through the
waiver process. For example, in the TWIC program, certain felony
convictions are disqualifying if the conviction occurred within 7
years, or if release from prison occurred within 5 years, of the date
of application. In the aviation sector, certain misdemeanors and
felonies are disqualifying if the conviction occurred within the
preceding 10 years, and there is no consideration of when the applicant
was released from incarceration. These types of incongruities need to
be harmonized.
TSA is also updating its information technology infrastructure in
order to improve the services provided to transportation sector
workers. Whereas the current infrastructure is not structured to
support portable and reusable STAs absent substantial investment and
costs, the TTAC Infrastructure Modernization (TIM) system will provide
an integrated, end-to-end solution to manage identities, credentials,
and assessment results for millions of transportation sector workers.
TIM will align, integrate, and modernize current TTAC processes,
services, and infrastructure allowing TSA to conduct mission
capabilities in a more effective and efficient manner. TIM will be
implemented on an incremental basis, allowing TSA to benefit from
modernization's capabilities as they become available.
The harmonization rule will have little effect on who issues
physical credentials required for certain privileges or access to areas
of transportation facilities. TSA believes that the regulated entity is
in the best position to determine credentialing and access control
requirements. Although TSA currently conducts background checks on 28
populations with varying degrees of overlap, TSA issues a physical
credential, the TWIC, only for workers on certain maritime vessels and
facilities and is required by law to do so. With respect to other
populations subject to vetting, TSA provides the results of the STA to
the entity that actually grants the access or privilege. In many cases,
these entities issue their own credential, generally after the
individual meets additional competency and suitability requirements.
For example, while TSA conducts STAs on Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) certificate holders, it is the FAA that issues the certificate.
Similarly, airport authorities that credential airport workers and
States that license commercial hazmat drivers rely on TSA only for the
STA and not for issuing the credential or license. Under the new rule,
these responsibilities would not change since transportation facilities
need to have their own standards for suitability and access control
based on their specific operational needs, business and statutory
requirements, and availability of resources.
One of TSA's critical missions is to apply risk-based threat
assessment methodologies in order to identify known or suspected
terrorist threats working in, or seeking access to, the Nation's
transportation system and critical infrastructure to prevent terrorism
or criminal acts. To enable TSA to fulfill this transportation security
vetting in a consistent, comparable way, TSA plans to assume the
adjudication of criminal background checks for airport and aircraft
operator workers, which are currently performed by the airports and
airlines. This will allow TSA to assure standardized processes and
criteria for conducting and adjudicating STAs, including criminal
history record information. TSA does not, however, intend to assume
responsibility for worker suitability or access control decisions from
airports and airlines and will continue to send criminal history record
information to any airport that requests it for purposes of making its
own suitability or access control determinations.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today. The harmonization of STAs
through regulatory and statutory changes will allow TSA to fulfill its
mission with greater efficiency and effectiveness. I look forward to
working with you toward this goal and answering your questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, sir.
The Chairman would now recognize Mr. Bowman.
STATEMENT OF DARRELL S. BOWMAN, GROUP LEADER, ADVANCED SYSTEMS
& APPLICATIONS, VIRGINIA TECH TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE
Mr. Bowman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, Members of the
Transportation Security Subcommittee and staff. Thank you for
the opportunity to testify before you today on a very important
topic, the MODERN Security Credentials Act.
I am hopeful that my testimony will give you a unique and
valuable perspective as you weigh the important policy
decisions surrounding this matter. My name is Darrell Bowman,
and I am a senior researcher at the Virginia Tech
Transportation Institute with more than 15 years of
transportation research experience.
I am here today to talk about pertinent findings from our
recent preliminary study, HMCRP-HM-08, ``Consolidated Security
Credential for Persons Who Transport Hazardous Material.'' This
study evaluated the hazardous material transportation worker
credentialing system to identify duplicative elements and
redundant costs.
The current hazardous material security credential system
requires workers to have a variety of security credentials as
they move through the hazardous material transportation
logistics change. Each credential has costs, both monetarily
and time to acquire, resulting in redundant cost and additional
time required by both the credentialing agencies and the
credential applicants. These costs provide a strong incentive
to evaluate opportunities for consolidation within the
hazardous material security credentialing system.
The following discussion focuses on three important
findings pertinent to today's topic of the hearing.
First, the most promising initial step appears to be the
consolidation of security threat assessments. There is strong
evidence that the security threat assessments, which include
background checks for several security credentials, could be
consolidated and still remain applicable across transportation
modes. In some cases, there are minor variations of how these
processes are completed or which databases are checked.
However, the overall processes are similar. More
importantly, the objective of these background checks is the
same for all security credentials. A system where security
threat assessments are standardized would increase efficiency
and likely result in a reduced cost.
The second pertinent finding is the inconsistencies and
disqualifying offenses for security credentials, creating the
need for a harmonized set of disqualifying offenses.
Consolidation of security credentials would require merging
disqualifying offenses from various credentials, creating a
standard threshold to which all applicants would be held
accountable. However, agencies must decide to the degree which
the disqualifying offenses should be harmonized to ensure that
the applicants are appropriately vetting, while not excluding
potentially eligible workers.
The third pertinent finding is the need to strike a balance
between the level of security and the user burden through the
inclusion of broad stakeholder input. While there is a clear
need for a secure hazardous material transportation system,
there is a competing need to minimize user burden, a complete
and effective security credentialing system can only be
developed with input from hazardous materials transportation
stakeholders, including the credential holders, the
administrators and other involved parties.
To conclude, the research suggests that consolidation of
security threat assessments could be an immediate solution for
the result--which will result in decreased costs, reduced time
burdens for stakeholders and elimination of redundancies. Its
success would require a standardization of the disqualifying
offenses and is dependent on the input of stakeholders at all
levels.
This final report is now in the National Academies'
Transportation Research Board editorial process and will be
published later this year as ``Hazardous Material Cooperative
Research Program, Report 6, Feasibility of a Consolidated
Security Credential for Persons who Transport Hazardous
Material.''
Again, thank you very much for the opportunity to testify
before you today on this important matter.
I will be happy to answer any questions you have regarding
these findings.
[The statement of Mr. Bowman follows:]
Prepared Statement of Darrell S. Bowman
May 4, 2011
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, Members of the
Transportation Security Subcommittee and staff, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before you today on a very important topic:
``The MODERN Security Credentials Act.'' I am hopeful that my testimony
will give you a unique and valuable perspective as you weigh the
important policy decisions surrounding this matter.
My name is Darrell Bowman, and I am a senior researcher at the
Virginia Tech Transportation Institute. In this position, I currently
serve as Group Leader for the Advanced Systems & Applications Group
within the Institute's Center for Truck and Bus Safety. I have more
than 15 years of experience as a researcher in the areas of
transportation safety and security. My research experience includes
various projects related to the safe and secure transportation of
hazardous materials, the development and testing of advanced commercial
vehicle information/safety systems, and the improved comfort of
occupants through enhanced vehicle component designs.
I am here today to discuss pertinent findings from our recent
study, HM-08, Consolidated Security Credential for Persons Who
Transport Hazardous Materials, which my group completed for the
Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program (HMCRP) of the
National Academies' Transportation Research Board. This project ended
in February of this year (2011). The final report has been accepted by
the HMCRP HM-08 panel and approved for publication by the Chair of the
Subcommittee for National Research Council Oversight. This final report
is now in the editorial process, and will be published later this year
as Hazardous Materials Cooperative Research Program (HMCRP) Report 6,
Feasibility of a Consolidated Security Credential for Persons who
Transport Hazardous Materials. It is important to note that this HMCRP
project was not intended to provide policy recommendations to the
Federal Government; instead, it provides fact-finding and policy
analysis.
This study evaluated the hazardous materials (HazMat)
transportation worker credentialing system to identify duplicative
elements and redundant costs. The research characterized the
application elements, the acquisition process, and the physical
characteristics for each identified credential. The key outcome of the
project was to determine the feasibility of consolidating many or all
of the existing local, State, and Federal credentials, necessary under
current regulations and policies, into one credential for all
transportation modes that is cost-effective while maintaining an equal
or greater level of security and safety.
background
According to Transportation Research Board Special Report 283, the
U.S. Department of Transportation (U.S. DOT) has estimated that about
817,000 shipments consisting of 5.4 million tons of HazMat are made
daily in the United States, which would total nearly 300 million
shipments and 2 billion tons of hazardous cargo per year.\1\ By its
risky nature, the safekeeping of HazMat in transit is paramount to the
safety and security of people everywhere. Vetting the personnel working
with and around HazMat through a credentialing process is essential for
maintaining the security of the transported materials as well as for
ensuring the safety of the general public.
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\1\ http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11198&page=11.
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The security of the Nation's HazMat freight in all transportation
modes relies on a layered, multi-faceted security program. This
comprehensive system is a constant monitor of the many facilities,
vehicles, and workers involved in HazMat transportation. One important
part of this comprehensive security system is worker credentialing.
Security credentials play an important role by vetting the individual
credential holder, and communicating pertinent information for facility
access control.
While the current credentialing program is comprehensive across all
transportation modes, some consider the U.S. credentialing process to
be lacking a coordinated vision and failing to recognize the multimodal
and intermodal nature of the transportation sector.\2\ This disjointed
vision has created a fragmented security credential system that
requires workers to possess various security credentials as they move
through the HazMat transportation logistics chain. Each credential has
costs, both monetarily and in time to acquire, resulting in duplicative
costs and additional time required for both the credentialing agencies
and the credential applicants. These costs provide strong incentive to
evaluate opportunities for consolidation within the HazMat security
credentialing system.
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\2\ http://www.truckline.com/Newsroom/ATA%20Comments%20Filed/
ATA%20R3%20TWIC%-
20Petition.pdf.
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pertinent findings
While the study report provided a detailed review of the current
HazMat credentialing system, the following discussion focuses on three
important findings pertinent to the topic of today's hearing.
First, the most promising initial step appears to be the
consolidation of security threat assessments.
There is strong evidence that the security threat assessments,
which include background checks, for several security credentials could
be consolidated and still remain applicable across all transportation
modes. Examples of these security credentials include the
Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC), Commercial
Driver's License--Hazardous Materials Endorsement (CDL-HME), Security
Identification Display Area (SIDA) badge, Free and Secure Trade (FAST)
card, NEXUS card, Secure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid
Inspection (SENTRI) card, Merchant Mariner's Credential (MMC), Merchant
Mariner's Document (MMD), United States Postal Service (USPS)
credential, Common Access Card (CAC), and the U.S. Passport.
Ten of these 11 security credentials identified shared both a
fingerprint-based background check (all but the Passport) and a name-
based background check (all but the USPS credential). The fingerprint-
based background check is performed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) using the National Crime Information Center (NCIC).
Regardless of the issuing agency, the FBI performs this portion of the
investigation and then provides the relevant data back to the issuing
agency (or adjudicating organization). A name-based search of relevant
databases includes a criminal history check (e.g., the U.S. Passport),
and a review of the Terror Watch List (e.g., TWIC, MMC, and HME) which
is also maintained by the FBI. The MMD and MMC require a drug test as
part of the application process, and results of the test are included
in the adjudication process. A review of the National Driver Register
is required for the MMD, MMC, and USPS credentials. Finally, an
interview with issuing agency personnel is required for the three U.S.
Customs and Border Protection-issued credentials (FAST, NEXUS, and
SENTRI).
The key difference for many of the credentials is the process of
adjudication. Each issuing agency receives the results of the security
threat assessments and determines the applicant's eligibility for the
credential based on agency-specific disqualifying offenses. One
exception would be the issuance of the HME by the individual States. In
this instance, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
provides the applicant's eligibility to the individual States.
In some cases there are minor variations in how these processes are
completed or which databases are checked; however, the overall
processes are similar. More importantly, the objective of these
security threat assessments (i.e., identifying any disqualifying
offenses) is the same for all credentials. The consolidation of the
security threat assessments would deal largely with the application
process, and would be transparent to the end user.
The need for a harmonized security threat assessment was supported
by comments from actual HazMat security credential holders while
completing the project's on-line questionnaire. Examples of comments
related to security threat assessments include:
``Why so many background checks? Can't these agencies talk
to one another? Who gets the money? Why $83 for one check and
$132 for TWIC and $25 for TSA? Why isn't one background check
enough?''
``You have to go to [a] special place to get fingerprints
done rather than [a] local law enforcement office. Our place is
about 1.5 hours away which is not very efficient.''
A system where security threat assessments are standardized would
increase efficiency and likely result in reduced costs. Multi-agency
data sharing could also streamline the process for all stakeholders.
This harmonized system would require that the background investigation
results of an initial credential application be applicable to a
subsequent credential application. As is currently the case with the
TWIC, it would require the expiration of any subsequent credentials
(e.g., CDL-HME, FAST, MMD, and MML) to coincide with the expiration of
the first credential. That is, if an applicant is issued a TWIC in
2010, and then applies for a FAST card in 2012 using the security
threat assessment from the TWIC application, the FAST card would also
expire on the TWIC expiration date of 2015. Initially, this could cause
some issues with increased renewal processing demands due to non-
standard renewal periods. However, over time this should save money as
alignment and efficiency occur.
The second pertinent finding is the inconsistency in disqualifying
offenses for security credentials, creating the need for a harmonized
set of disqualifying offenses.
Disqualifying offenses are those offenses that would bar an
applicant from qualifying for a security credential. In many cases,
these are specific criminal violations. In some cases, the
disqualifying offenses are related to monetary infractions, applicant
flight risk, or suspicion of an applicant based on intelligence
information.
Currently, the various security credentials have disqualifying
offenses with differing nomenclatures and intents, which applicants
must satisfy. Consolidation of security credentials would necessitate
merging disqualifying offenses, creating a standardized threshold to
which all applicants would be held accountable. However, there are
several important factors that need to be considered when harmonizing
the disqualifying offenses, two of which are:
A highly restrictive harmonization of disqualifying offenses
could potentially limit the applicant pool, thus reducing the
qualified labor force.
Conversely, the least restrictive set of disqualifying
offenses would likely lower the overall screening effectiveness
of the security threat assessment, but increase the applicant
pool sufficiently to handle labor demand.
To illustrate this balance of harmonization, imagine a fisherman
mending his nets. He can make the size of the nets' openings so small
as to catch all fish--both wanted and unwanted species--or so large
that no fish are caught at all. Like the fisherman, agencies must
decide on the degree to which the disqualifying offenses should be
harmonized to balance the security needs (i.e., applicants are
appropriately vetted) of the HazMat transportation system with worker
eligibility (i.e., not excluding potentially qualified workers).
The third pertinent finding is the necessity to strike a balance
between level of security and user burden through inclusion of broad
stakeholder input.
The research results revealed the complexities of the existing
HazMat credentialing system through the identification of: (i) Multiple
security credentials, each with its own specific purpose, and (ii)
system redundancies such as vetting processes, costs, and time. While
there is a clear need for a secure HazMat transportation system, there
is a competing need to minimize user burden. A complete and effective
security credentialing system can only be developed with input from
HazMat transportation stakeholders, including end-users,
administrators, and other involved parties.
conclusions
The research suggests that consolidation of security threat
assessments could be an immediate solution that will result in
decreased costs, reduced time burdens for stakeholders, and the
elimination of redundancies. The majority of the security credentials
identified for transporting HazMat require very similar background
investigations. Through data-sharing agreements and standardization of
the adjudication process, a streamlined background investigation for
these credentials could be achieved. This consolidation would require a
standardization of the disqualifying offenses, which must be performed
to maintain each security credential's intended function as well as
balance the screening effectiveness with the qualified labor pool.
Finally, the success of consolidating processes within the HazMat
credentialing system is dependent on the input of stakeholders at all
levels.
As stated, this final report is now in the editorial process, and
will be published later this year as Hazardous Materials Cooperative
Research Program (HMCRP) Report 6, Feasibility of a Consolidated
Security Credential for Persons who Transport Hazardous Materials.
Again, thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to testify
before you on this important matter. I will be happy to answer any
questions you have regarding these findings.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Bowman.
The Chairman now recognizes Ms. Jeanne Olivier of the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey. She is here representing
the American Association of Airport Executives.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF JEANNE M. OLIVIER, A.A.E., ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,
AVIATION SECURITY & TECHNOLOGY, AVIATION DEPARTMENT, THE PORT
AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK & NEW JERSEY
Ms. Olivier. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Jackson Lee, and Members of the committee.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here on behalf of the
American Association of Airport Executives to discuss The
MODERN Security Credentials Act, legislation that AAAE is
pleased to support as a means of preserving and protecting the
important local role that airports play in aviation security.
I am active in AAAE through my work with the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey, where I oversee security operations
through the Port Authority's five airports. I currently serve
as vice chair of AAAE's Security Committee and as the chair of
the basic consortium, an airport-led effort to create a
biometric base solution for airport badging and access control.
I want to begin by thanking you, Chairman Rogers, and your
staff for the opportunity afforded to AAAE and other groups in
recent weeks to offer input on the legislation. The legislation
recognizes the critical local role that airports play in
enhancing security, and AAAE appreciates provisions included in
the bill that ensure airport operators maintain important
security functions and responsibilities they have held for
decades, including final decisions on badge issuance and access
rights throughout their facilities.
The background check process for aviation workers has long
operated successfully as a Federal local partnership, with the
Federal Government holding sole responsibility for security
threat assessments and other necessary Federal checks for
prospective workers. With local airport authorities operating
and managing worker enrollment, credentialing, badging,
criminal history background check adjudication and axis control
systems in accordance with strict Federal standards.
The current system for aviation ensures the highest level
of security by combining the unique local experience,
expertise, and knowledge with Federal standardization,
oversight, and vetting assets. Local involvement provides a
critical layer of security and gives airports the operational
control they require to ensure that qualified employees receive
the credentials they need to work in the airport environment.
AAAE is gratified that The MODERN Security Credentials Act
seeks to protect the existing airport security functions while
encouraging DHS to consolidate, harmonize, and reduce
redundancies within the vetting processes directly under
Federal control.
The approach reflected in the legislation stands in marked
contrast to efforts under way within DHS that appear intent on
establishing a highly centralized approach in aviation that
would parallel what exists at ports with the TWIC program.
Under the TWIC model, the Federal Government or its
contractors are responsible for worker enrollment, applicant
vetting, and credential issuance. The early results of TWIC
have been uneven at best, despite significant Federal
investments. The existing system in aviation works extremely
well and operates at low cost to the industry and at no cost to
the Federal Government.
Airport executives oppose any move to shift critical local
functions in aviation to the Federal Government and believe
that such a move would diminish security by eliminating a
critical extra layer of vigilance that is already in place in
airports and absent with the TWIC approach.
Additionally, pursuing the highly Federalized TWIC approach
in aviation would eliminate local operational control, stymie
significant efforts already under way at airports across the
country to upgrade and biometrically enable existing badging
and access control systems and significantly increase costs to
the aviation industry. Again AAAE opposes a centralized
approach and is pleased that the bill clearly delineates
between Federal and local roles and responsibilities.
Mr. Chairman, by keeping DHS focused on improving its own
vetting functions and limiting the expansion of Federal
Government's responsibilities in the aviation environment, the
MODERN Security Credentials Act would, in AAAE's view,
accelerate efforts to harmonize security processes with the
Federal Government, limit unnecessary Federal and industry
expenditures and protect the system that has served airports,
the aviation industry, and the Nation well for decades.
Before concluding, I want to highlight the proactive
efforts of the basic initiatives. Airports are committed to
moving forward to bring biometrics into the airport environment
as soon as possible in a manner that builds upon existing
capabilities and limits operational difficulties. The basic
initiative, which is being driven by airports in cooperation
with TSA, offers the best opportunity for making the promise of
biometrics a reality in a timely manner.
Thank you, I look forward to your questions.
[The statement of Ms. Olivier follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jeanne M. Olivier
May 4, 2011
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss the MODERN
Security Credentials Act, legislation aimed at consolidating and
harmonizing the Federal security threat assessment (STA) process for
transportation workers. We appreciate your recognition of the critical
role that airports play--and must continue to play--working with the
Federal Government to protect vital and security sensitive airport
facilities.
I am appearing today on behalf of the American Association of
Airport Executives, which represents thousands of men and women across
the country who operate and manage the Nation's airports. I am actively
involved with AAAE as Vice Chair of the association's Transportation
Security Services Committee and as Chair of the Biometric Airport
Security Identification Consortium or BASIC initiative, an airport-led
effort to create a biometric-based solution for airport badging and
access control. I currently serve as Assistant Director, Aviation
Security & Technology for the Aviation Department of the Port Authority
of New York and New Jersey. In this capacity, I oversee security
operations for New York's Kennedy and La Guardia airports and for
Newark Liberty International Airport and Stewart International Airport.
As you know, airports play a unique and critical role in aviation
security, serving as an important partner to the Transportation
Security Administration in helping the agency meet its core mission of
passenger and baggage screening. The significant changes that have
taken place in airports over the past decade with the creation of the
TSA and its assumption of all screening duties have been aided
dramatically by the work of the airport community, and we will continue
to serve as a critical local partner to the agency as it continually
modifies its operations.
In addition to partnering with TSA to meet its core mission,
airports as public entities also perform a number of inherently local
security-related functions at their facilities, including incident
response and management, perimeter security, employee badging and
credentialing, access control, infrastructure and operations planning,
and a myriad of local law enforcement functions. These important duties
have long been local responsibilities that have been performed by local
authorities in accordance with Federal standards under Federal
oversight.
Airport operators meet their security-related obligations with a
sharp focus on the need to protect public safety, which remains one of
their fundamental missions. The professionals who perform these duties
at airports are highly trained and have the first responder duties that
I know each and every Member of this subcommittee, the Congress, and
the country value immensely. From a security and resource perspective,
it is critical that these inherently local functions remain local with
Federal oversight and backed by Federal resources when appropriate.
preserving the local role of airports with badging and access control
is critical
As this subcommittee and Congress contemplate changes aimed at
enhancing the efficiency of the Federal STA process for the various
transportation worker populations who are required to have these
checks, it is important to understand and protect the unique role that
airports play with regard to the overall background screening process
for aviation workers and with badging and access control at their
facilities.
In the aviation environment, the background check process for
workers operates successfully as a Federal/local partnership with the
Federal Government holding sole responsibility for STAs and other
necessary Government checks for prospective workers and with local
airport authorities operating and managing enrollment, credentialing,
badging, criminal history background check adjudication and access
control systems in accordance with strict Federal standards.
The current system for aviation ensures the highest level of
security by combining the unique local experience, expertise, and
knowledge that exists at individual airports regarding facilities and
personnel with Federal standardization, Federal oversight, and Federal
vetting assets. Local involvement provides a critical layer of security
and gives airports the operational control they require to ensure that
qualified employees receive the credentials they need to work in the
airport environment.
In contrast to the long-standing locally controlled credentialing
and access control apparatus that exists in the aviation environment,
the credentialing/access control system in place in the maritime
environment with the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
(TWIC) program is relatively new. Under the TWIC model, the Federal
Government or its contractors are responsible for all aspects of the
process, including worker enrollment, applicant vetting, credential
issuance, and associated functions of access control. In our view, the
early results of TWIC have been uneven at best despite hundreds of
millions of dollars in Federal investments. The existing system in
aviation operates at no cost to the Federal Government.
increased federal role in local airport security functions will
diminish security
Some have suggested abandoning the successful local systems and
processes already in place at airports with badging and access control
to give TSA and the Federal Government full control over the entire
process as is the case with TWIC in the maritime environment. Airport
executives oppose any move to shift critical local functions in
aviation to the Federal Government and believe that such a move would
diminish security by eliminating a critical, extra layer of security
that is already in place in airports and absent with the TWIC approach.
Pursuing such an approach would scuttle a successful local/Federal
model that has worked well for decades, eliminate local operational
control, stymie significant efforts already under way at airports
across the country to upgrade and biometrically enable existing airport
badging and access control systems, and significantly increase costs to
the aviation industry with no demonstrable security benefit.
With that in mind, AAAE is gratified that the MODERN Security
Credentials Act introduced earlier this week by subcommittee leaders
seeks to protect the existing, successful, locally controlled
credentialing and access control apparatus while encouraging the
Department of Homeland Security to consolidate, harmonize, and reduce
redundancies within the vetting processes directly under Federal
control. This approach stands in marked contrast to efforts underway
within DHS as part of the TSA Transportation Threat Assessment and
Credentialing (TTAC) Infrastructure Modernization (TIM) program to
harmonize aviation vetting programs with other, less mature
transportation worker vetting programs that the Department manages,
namely TWIC and the hazmat endorsement for trucking.
One of the stated goals of TTAC's on-going effort is to ``harmonize
and standardize its enrollment process across its security threat
assessment programs, envisioning a centrally managed enrollment
service, phasing in applicant populations over time.'' TTAC budget
documents note different enrollment, vetting, and adjudication and
redress processes between various transportation programs and state
that TIM will ``combine functions and processes into a single, uniform
approach with common security requirements, methods, and information.''
While the desire to centralize and Federalize the process for all
transportation worker vetting programs may be understandable from the
Department's perspective, airport executives are concerned about
Federal intrusion into existing processes that have worked well for
decades. Airports are also very concerned about having to help foot the
bill for the costly TIM effort--estimated at $571 million through
2018--for changes that provide them with no demonstrable security or
operational benefit. The current system in aviation operates
efficiently and effectively at a fraction of the cost of other
transportation vetting programs and at no cost to the Federal
Government. We want to ensure that remains the case.
With the Federal Government and State and local governments
operating under historic budget constraints, it makes little sense to
devote hundreds of millions of dollars in scarce resources to
Federalize functions that airports have performed successfully for
nearly a decade. The TIM effort fails to take into account the long-
proven approach that exists in the aviation industry.
Again, AAAE opposes such a centralized approach and is pleased that
the MODERN Security Credentials Act seeks to clearly delineate between
Federal and local roles and responsibilities. By keeping DHS focused on
improving its own vetting functions and limiting the expansion of the
Federal Government's responsibilities in the aviation environment, we
believe the legislation will help accelerate efforts to harmonize
security processes within the Federal Government, limit unnecessary
Federal and industry expenditures, and protect a system that has served
airports, the aviation industry, and the Nation well for decades.
Mr. Chairman, AAAE sincerely appreciates the opportunity that you
and your staff have afforded for input on this important legislation.
We are particularly grateful for provisions that have been added prior
to introduction to clarify that airport operators should maintain all
roles and responsibilities they currently hold, including final
decisions on badge issuance and access rights throughout their
facilities. We look forward to continuing our work with you and with
other Members of the subcommittee as this measure moves through the
legislative process.
biometric airport security identification consortium (basic)
Before concluding, I want to take this opportunity to bring the
subcommittee up to date on a related topic and the efforts of the
Biometric Airport Security Identification Consortium or BASIC
initiative, which I chair. In simple terms, the objective of BASIC is
to define a comprehensive, airport-driven Concept of Operations that
will enable voluntary migration to biometric-based badging and access
control systems at airports--a goal that I know subcommittee Members
share. More than 40 airports of all sizes actively participate in
BASIC. I would note that BASIC airport participants are working
cooperatively with TSA on this initiative as well as with other groups,
including the Airports Consultants Council.
Many airport operators--including the Port Authority of New York
and New Jersey--are eager to move forward with biometrics, but concerns
remain about the prospect of overly prescriptive and costly solutions.
Airports are also eager to avoid repeating mistakes made in the past
where the Federal Government required costly and often proprietary
access control systems to be deployed in airports in a short period of
time. That approach proved both expensive and ineffective.
In an effort to avoid unnecessary regulations and a one-size-fits
all mandate regarding biometric-based systems, airports participating
in BASIC have identified several key principles that must be part of
any future biometric-based badging and access control systems,
including:
Safeguards on local control and issuance of credentials,
Leveraging of existing capital investments and resources,
Standards-based open architecture and local determination of
qualified vendors, and
Phased implementation that migrates over time.
In addition to building on the processes and regulations already in
place at airports today, BASIC is also working to adapt important
Federal standards regarding secure biometric credentials into the
airport's operational environment. For example, Federal Information
Processing Standard (FIPS) 201 and the more recent Personal Identity
Verification Interoperability (PIV-I) for Non-Federal Issuers are
reflected throughout the BASIC Concept of Operations and greatly inform
the recommended phased implementation for airports.
The BASIC working group, which meets on a regular basis, is moving
forward aggressively to develop a detailed Concept of Operations that
will define the biometric components and common business processes that
need to be added to airports' existing procedures to enable biometric-
based badge and access control systems in a reasonable and cost-
effective time frame. In fact, several airports have already begun to
implement the early phases of the BASIC Concept of Operations. Newark
Liberty International Airport, San Francisco International Airport,
Aspen Pitkin County International Airport, Los Angeles International
and Salt Lake City International Airport--to name just a few--have
implemented a secure messaging structure for the submission of
biographic security threat assessments and biometric criminal history
record checks that will ultimately enable the return of trusted
biometrics back to the airport for use on credentials or in access
control systems.
Airports are committed to moving forward to bring biometrics into
the airport environment as soon as possible in a manner that builds
upon existing capabilities and limits operational difficulties. The
BASIC initiative, which is being driven by airports in cooperation with
the Federal Government, offers the best opportunity for making the
promises of biometrics a reality in a timely manner.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to testify today and
for your recognition of the important role that airports play
partnering with the Federal Government to enhance aviation security.
Your efforts to preserve and protect the important role that airport
operators play with regard to badging, credentialing, and access
control at their facilities will help ensure that important efforts
within the Federal Government to harmonize its own internal processes
are not distracted by a costly and unnecessary attempt to Federalize
important local airport-controlled security functions, which provide
countless benefits, including a vitally important additional layer of
security.
I look forward to answering any questions you might have.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Martin Rojas, of the
American Trucking Association and we look forward to hearing
your testimony.
STATEMENT OF MARTIN ROJAS, VICE PRESIDENT, SECURITY &
OPERATIONS, AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATION
Mr. Rojas. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers and Members of
the subcommittee. Thank you for opportunity to testify today on
the MODERN Security Credentials Act.
My name is Martin Rojas, and I am vice president for
security and operations at the American Trucking Association.
The trucking industry is an essential component of our
economy, transporting more than 80 percent of our Nation's
freight bill and employing nearly 7 million workers, including
over 3 million commercial drivers.
It is these hard-working men and women who will gain the
most from this committee's efforts to implement The MODERN
Security Credentials Act.
First, I want to take a moment to recognize and thank the
Homeland Security Committee for its bipartisan efforts and
leadership in passing the SAFE Truckers Act of 2009.
Although the bill did not pass the full Congress, it
highlighted the importance for implementing a risk-based
approach in transportation security. ATA believes that the the
MODERN Security Credentials Act, if signed into law, will have
a positive impact by reducing burdensome background checks and
excessive fees and costs.
Presently the hazardous material endorsement screening
program and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential
impact large portions of the commercial driver population.
According to TSA, about 1.7 million screenings have taken
place under the hazmat endorsement program. Roughly 340,000
drivers have undergone the TWIC screening, making these drivers
the single-largest population of TWIC holders by job
description.
Today, drivers who pay $132.50 for a TWIC must also undergo
a separate yet identical screening to get a hazmat endorsement
on their commercial driver's license. That screening cost is
$89.
ATA calculates that commercial drivers have paid almost
$200 million in TWIC and hazmat endorsement fees. In 2004, TSA
stated that there were 2.7 commercial drivers with hazmat
endorsements. Today, after completing a full 5-year cycle of
endorsement and renewals, there are about 1.5 million truck
drivers with such endorsements.
This 40 percent drop in drivers with hazardous material
endorsements is not due to the applicants being disqualified.
Less than 1 percent of applicants have been disqualified and
mostly because drivers don't understand the program's appeal
and waiver process. ATA believes that drivers are simply
choosing not to renew or seek a new hazardous material
endorsement due to the cost and the complexity associated with
undergoing this screening process.
At a time when our economy is slowly recovering, trucking
faces a returning driver shortage. Unfortunately multiple
screening programs compound the challenge for trucking
companies to attract, hire, and add new drivers to their
payrolls. Potential drivers are likely to go find employment
elsewhere rather than be subjected to multiple fingerprint
applications to become a driver.
ATA supports a background check for drivers, but we oppose
multiple costly screening programs. This is why ATA has
supported the TWIC as a single application and enrollment
process for compliance with multiple screening and access
control requirements.
ATA supports the MODERN Security Credentials Act because it
establishes a risk-based approach for screening drivers who
will transport security sensitive materials. We also support
the bill because it defines the TWIC as the process for
compliance with the background check. However, ATA believes
that section 2104 needs to be amended to include all hazardous
materials to ensure a uniform background check screening
program. If section 2104 is left unchanged, non-Federal
political entities could continue to require background checks
on drivers transporting any type of hazmat, including paint,
hairspray, and soft drink syrup.
Again, on behalf of ATA and its members, I thank the
committee for its leadership on this critical issue and for the
opportunity to testify. I look forward to answering any
questions you may have.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The statement of Mr. Rojas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Martin Rojas
May 4, 2011
introduction
Chairman Rogers and Members of the Subcommittee on Transportation
Security, thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the MODERN
Security Credentials Act. My name is Martin Rojas and I am vice
president for Security and Operations at the American Trucking
Associations (ATA). Founded in 1933, ATA is the Nation's preeminent
organization representing the interest of the U.S. trucking industry.
Directly and through its affiliated organizations, ATA encompasses over
37,000 companies and every type and class of motor carrier operation.
The trucking industry is an integral component of our Nation's
economy transporting more than 80% of our Nation's freight bill and
employing approximately 7 million workers in trucking-related jobs,
including over 3 million commercial drivers. It is important to note
that the trucking industry is comprised primarily of small businesses,
with 97% of trucking companies operating 20 trucks or less, and 90%
operating six trucks or less.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ American Trucking Associations, American Trucking Trends 2011
(March 2011).
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More importantly, about 80 percent of all U.S. communities depend
solely on trucks to deliver and supply their essential commodities.
Included in these deliveries are roughly 800,000 daily shipments of
hazardous materials that provide chemicals for water treatment
facilities, medical products and supplies, vital manufacturing inputs,
and a number of other products that are important components of our
daily lives. In terms of product value, tonnage, and number of
shipments, trucks move more hazardous materials than all other
transportation modes combined.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ See Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 2007 Commodity Flow
Survey (January 2011).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
background
ATA and its members are grateful for the hard work and bipartisan
leadership demonstrated by the Homeland Security Committee and the U.S.
House of Representatives in passing the SAFE Truckers Act of 2009 (H.R.
2200) in the 111th session of Congress. By passing the bill, the House
underscored the importance of establishing a risk-based approach for
the transportation of hazardous materials and the need to consolidate
the multiple background checks required of commercial drivers.
Unfortunately, the SAFE Truckers Act was not passed by the full
Congress and did not become law.
ATA believes that the MODERN Security Credentials Act, if signed
into law, will have the same positive impact of reducing the burdensome
requirements of multiple background checks and of excessive fees and
costs faced by commercial drivers and trucking companies.
Both the Hazardous Materials Endorsement (HME) screening program
and the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) impact
large portions of the commercial driver population. About 1.5 million
drivers have undergone the HME screening since the program was
initiated in May, 2005, and roughly 340,000 ``known'' commercial
drivers have undergone a TWIC screening,\3\ by far the largest single
population of TWIC holders by job description operating at maritime
facilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ TSA compiled statistics show about 340,000 applicants who list
their job description as drayage drivers or truck drivers. However,
about half of all TWIC applicants have not specified their job
description, which could include commercial drivers.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ata concerns with current screening processes
To illustrate ATA's concerns with the present screening processes,
consider the following scenario: If a driver who possesses a TWIC,
after paying $132.50 for the credential, is required to also transport
hazardous materials, the driver must obtain an HME on his or her
Commercial Drivers License (CDL). Even though the driver has already
undergone a TWIC screening, an additional and identical screening under
the HME program must be done before a State can issue an HME on the
driver's CDL. The HME screening costs $89 if the driver resides in one
of the 38 States, plus the District of Columbia, that use TSA's
contractor to gather a driver's biometric and biographical information.
There are 12 States that collect driver information and fingerprints
using their own processes before sending it to TSA for adjudication.
Some of these 12 States charge less than the TSA contractor while
others charge more, some as high as $150.
By ATA's estimate, the TWIC and HME screenings have so far cost
commercial drivers nearly $180 million in fees alone,\4\ not including
lost wages for time off work to undergo the application and
fingerprinting processes. More time, and the related costs, is required
for a driver to pick up the credential and activate it at a TWIC
facility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ATA arrives at this figure as follows: 1.5 million commercial
drivers with HMEs $89 = $133.5 million, plus 340,000 drivers
$132.50 = $45 million, for a total of $178.5 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Using TSA's own numbers there were approximately 2.7 million
commercial drivers with HMEs in 2004.\5\ Today, after having already
completed a full cycle of HME renewals on the truck driver population,
there are approximately 1.5 million commercial drivers with HMEs.\6\
The drop in the population of drivers with HMEs is not a result of
applicants being disqualified during the screening process--less than 1
percent of applicants have received final disqualification letters and
those have mostly been issued because the drivers did not understand
and avail themselves of the screening program's appeal and waiver
process.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ 69 Federal Register at 68739 (November 24, 2004)
\6\ This number has been provided by TSA personnel during meetings
of the Highway Motor Carrier Government-Sector Coordinating Council.
TSA has stated that an average of 25,000 commercial drivers underwent
the HME Screening in the first full 5 years of the program: 60 months
25,000 = 1.5 million.
\7\ TSA has shared with ATA staff that applicants that have
received final disqualifications letters, for both the TWIC and HME
programs, represent less 1 percent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATA believes that the reduced number of HME holders is due
primarily to the costs and the burden on commercial drivers of the
fingerprinting and application process for getting an HME. Some
trucking companies with a small percentage of hazardous materials loads
have even stopped transporting such cargo to avoid burdening their
drivers with the HME screening. Keep in mind that the trucking industry
faces a continuing driver shortage of qualified commercial drivers. Any
requirements that increase the burden of entry for drivers, such as
multiple background checks, only compounds the challenge for trucking
companies to attract, hire, and add new drivers to their payrolls.
ATA and its members support a comprehensive security-related
background screening for commercial drivers. However, the trucking
industry opposes Government programs that require drivers to undergo
multiple background checks to perform the very same security threat
assessment. Because of the multiple screening programs in place today,
ATA has long supported the original concept of the TWIC: One
application and enrollment process, one fee, one security threat
assessment, and a single credential that transportation workers may
carry to demonstrate compliance with multiple access control security
requirements.
If the MODERN Security Credentialing Act becomes law, it will
establish an important precedent for consolidating multiple, costly
screening programs into a single security threat assessment and
credential with multiple applications for transportation workers. ATA
believes this is a very important and achievable goal.
key issues in modern security credentialing act
I would like to briefly highlight specific areas that have been
included in the proposed bill under Title XXI that the trucking
industry views as vital to ensure it meets its intended goals.
Sec. 2101 Transportation of Security Sensitive Materials
ATA strongly supports establishing a risk-based approach to the
transportation of security sensitive hazardous materials (SSM). The
bill recognizes that not all hazardous materials represent the same
security risk--paint, food coloring, and soft drink syrup are not
materials that can be utilized as weapons by terrorists.
This section also establishes the TWIC as the background check and
credential required to transport SSM. ATA also supports this provision.
Establishing the TWIC as the background check process and credential
not only mandates the consolidation of screening programs for drivers,
but it also returns the HME to its original purpose of establishing an
individual's fitness to safely operate a commercial vehicle
transporting placarded loads of hazardous materials. It is important to
remember that the HME was established as an additional ``safety''
component of a driver's CDL to ensure that a driver has the necessary
knowledge and understanding for the safe and compliant transportation
of hazardous materials.
Sec. 2102 Enrollment Locations
ATA supports this language to ensure that commercial drivers have
the greatest level of flexibility regarding the locations and hours of
operations for undergoing the application process and for receiving and
activating the TWIC.
Sec. 2103 Commercial Drivers from Mexico or Canada
ATA supports this section requiring commercial drivers from Canada
or Mexico to undergo a background check that is equivalent to what U.S.
commercial drivers are required to undergo. It should be noted that TSA
presently allows Canadian or Mexican drivers to satisfy the
requirements under 5103a of title 49 by successfully undergoing a
background check and obtain either a TWIC or Free and Secure Trade
(FAST) card.
Sec. 2104 Redundant Background Checks
ATA supports the proposed bill's mandate that the TWIC serve as a
uniform Nationally accepted background check screening program for the
transportation of SSM. This means that States and thousands of local
jurisdictions should not be allowed, without demonstrating some
compelling need, to require additional security background checks and/
or credentials for individuals that have a Federally-issued TWIC.
However, ATA believes the language Sec. 2104(a) should be amended
to read as follows:
``(a) IN GENERAL.--The Secretary shall prohibit a State or political
subdivision thereof from requiring a separate security background check
of an individual seeking to transport [security-sensitive] hazardous
materials.''
The change to ``hazardous materials'' is essential to ensure this
section achieves the goal of establishing a risk-based approach for the
transportation of hazardous materials. Otherwise, if this language is
not changed as suggested above, it could result in non-Federal
political entities continuing to require background checks on drivers
transporting any type of hazardous material. Furthermore, this very
same language was included by the Homeland Security Committee and
passed by the House of Representatives in the SAFE Truckers Act under
Section 2107.
Sec. 2105 Transition
ATA supports allowing commercial drivers that have already
undergone an HME screening to transport SSM until the expiration of
their present HME. ATA also supports the need for reducing the fees
associated with the TWIC.
conclusion
ATA supports the MODERN Security Credentialing Act. The screening
of individuals involved in the transportation of goods is important to
the trucking industry. Our industry has long supported a National,
uniform process to check a commercial driver's criminal history.
However, the present multiplicity of background checks for commercial
drivers, and their associated costs, creates a significant challenge
for the recruitment and retention of qualified drivers. Simply stated,
if there are comparable jobs in other sectors with less stringent
barriers to entry, potential drivers will likely seek those jobs first.
Again, on behalf of ATA and its members, I thank you for the
opportunity to share some comments and our suggestions regarding the
MODERN Security Credentials Act. I look forward to answering any
questions by the Members of this committee.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Randall Walker, director of
Aviation at Las Vegas McCarran International Airport for your
statement.
Welcome.
STATEMENT OF RANDALL H. WALKER, DIRECTOR OF AVIATION, LAS VEGAS
MCCARRAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, CLARK COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
AVIATION.
Mr. Walker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Jackson
Lee, and Members of the subcommittee, on behalf of members of
the Airport Council International, North America, thank you for
this opportunity to discuss and give comments on the MODERN
Security Credentials Act.
Before I give more detailed comments on the legislation, I
want to thank the committee for the provisions that reinforce
the airport operator's right to restrict an individual's access
to the secure areas and preserve the right to disqualify
individuals from employment based on a review of the criminal
history records check.
However, while the legislation does contain these
provisions, ACI has identified some concerns with the bill.
First, the legislation contains language requiring a TWIC-
like process, whereby the Secretary determines whether an
individual is qualified to receive unescorted access to secure
areas based on the review of the results of the criminal
records history check. This language appears to shift the
responsibility of adjudicating the results of a criminal
history records check from local airports to the DHS.
Such a change would most certainly lengthen the time to
complete the badging process and increase the costs for
airports. It could also prevent airports from imposing a more
stringent security requirement, which may be necessary to
address unique security challenges at individual airports.
Airports are concerned with the language of this bill, as
written, and believe that the results of the criminal history
record check must be adjudicated at a local level.
Additionally, ACI believes that there is no need for
individuals who have been denied unescorted access to secure
areas to participate in a formal waiver process through TSA.
There is an existing effective process which allows
individuals to seek redress if they have been denied a SIDA
badge due to the information received from a criminal history
records check or a security threat assessment. With language in
the bill that allows the cost of the TWIC waiver process to be
incorporated into if this security threat assessment fee, ACI
believes airports will be faced with increasing costs for
background checks. It makes no sense to force airport operators
to pay the costs of an unnecessary and duplicative waiver
process.
Airports believe that DHS should harmonize the system for
background check data submission for aviation workers. However,
the rulemaking language in the legislation is overly broad and
unnecessary for DHS and TSA to move forward with its rulemaking
to align the background check requirements and associated fees,
something that is already under way.
The rulemaking language, along with the proposal for the
Secretary, not the airport, to determine whether individuals
are qualified to be granted unescorted access to secure areas
could allow TSA to merge the process for security threat
assessments and criminal history record checks. If these two
processes are merged, it would be problematic for airports, as
not all airport credentials grant unescorted access to the
secure area.
Airports believe this bill includes conflicting
requirements that would cause unintended and unnecessary
operational challenges and impose additional costs for airports
without improving security.
Because of this, airports encourage the committee to direct
TSA to constitute a Government and industry working group with
the task of making recommendations for streamlining the current
process, which could be incorporated into a future rulemaking
process.
Finally, limitation language in the bill seems to protect
the current monopoly process with regard to the channeling
service provider airports must use for background checks. If
this legislation is enacted before TSA has changed its security
directive and regulatory guidance, which requires airports to
only use the transportation security clearinghouse, this could
be interpreted by TSA as a ban on competition for channeling
service providers, thus protecting TSA's sole source contract
with transportation security clearinghouse and preventing
airports from taking advantage of a competitive marketplace.
Mr. Chairman, when I first read this bill--and I was
comforted by your remarks--but when I first read this bill, I
actually found it ironic this Republican-controlled committee
would advance a bill that seemed to increase the Federal
control of this process at the expense of the local control.
In our opinion, such a Federalization of the process will
increase processing time, which, of course, to our tenants,
equates to money, and compliance costs without any improvement
in security.
Additionally, I would also find it ironic if this
legislation, which appears to perpetuate a monopoly on
channeling services, was enacted by this committee. Three years
ago, as chairman of ACI, on behalf of our members, I sent a
letter to the TSA administrator requesting that competition be
provided to our members. Currently the TSA is working on that
process, and I think they might be done sometime later this
year.
We look forward to working with the committee, DHS, and TSA
to identify procedures to increase the effectiveness and
efficiency of background check data submission process for
airport workers and preserving the ability for airports to
adjudicate the criminal records history process and make
decisions at the local level whether to grant access to our
airports.
Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to answer any questions.
[The statement of Mr. Walker follows:]
Prepared Statement of Randall H. Walker
May 4, 2011
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today
to offer the views of airport operators on the Modernizing of
Documentation and Elimination of Redundant Identification and Security
Credentials Act (MODERN Security Credentials Act). My name is Randall
Walker and I am the director of Aviation for the Clark County
Department of Aviation which operates McCarran International Airport in
Las Vegas, Nevada and four general aviation airports. I am testifying
on behalf of the 344 member airports of Airports Council
International--North America (ACI-NA) which enplane more than 95
percent of the domestic and virtually all the international airline
passenger and cargo traffic in North America. More than 350 aviation-
related businesses are also members of ACI-NA.
Before offering comments on the specific legislation, it is
important to first understand the processes and procedures in place at
airports to ensure applicants have been subjected to a background check
prior to the airport issuing a Security Identification Display Area
(SIDA) badge, which allows individuals to have unescorted access to
secure areas of the airport.
sida badge process
Currently, applicants wishing to receive a SIDA badge must undergo
a Security Threat Assessment (STA) to verify the individual's identity
and allow the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to utilize
the Terrorist Screening Database and other Government systems to ensure
that the individual is a lawful resident of the United States and does
not pose a security threat. TSA uses a variety of classified databases
in order to perform the STA. Because of the sensitive nature of the
results, TSA only provides airports with an approved status, indicating
that the airport may grant the individual unescorted access to secured
areas through the issuance of a SIDA badge, or a disapproved status,
indicating that the airport must not issue the individual a SIDA badge
or other form of identification. In addition, airports are required to
submit an applicant's fingerprints to the FBI which conducts a Criminal
History Record Check (CHRC). The results of the applicant's CHRC is
sent to the airport so they can determine whether the individual has
been found guilty (or not guilty by reason of insanity) of any of the
28 disqualifying crimes during the 10 years prior to the application
for the SIDA badge. Some airports, through their TSA-approved airport
security programs (ASPs), actually have a longer ``look back'' period
or include additional disqualifying crimes; a process they believe
enhances security at their airport and/or is required by State or local
laws.
There is a process in place which allows individuals to seek
redress if they have been denied a SIDA badge due to information
received from a CHRC or STA. If the individual has been denied airport
credentials based on the results of a CHRC, TSA regulations require
that the airport operator advise the individual that the CHRC discloses
information that would disqualify him or her from receiving or
retaining a SIDA badge and provide the individual with a copy of the
FBI record if the individual requests it. TSA regulations also allow
corrective action by an individual if he or she believes the FBI
records are inaccurate. Regulations state that the individual may
contact the local jurisdiction responsible for the information and the
FBI to complete or correct the information contained in his or her
record within 30 days after being advised that the CHRC discloses a
criminal offense. The individual must also notify the airport in
writing of his or her intent to correct any information they believe to
be inaccurate. The airport operator must obtain a copy, or accept a
copy from the individual of the revised FBI record or a certified true
copy of the information from the appropriate court, prior to issuing
the individual a SIDA badge granting unescorted access.
If through an STA, the TSA determines that an applicant does not
meet the requirements and is denied an airport-issued badge, TSA will
provide the individual:
(i) A statement that TSA has determined that the applicant does not
meet the eligibility requirements to hold an airport-approved
and/or airport-issued personnel identification media;
(ii) The basis for the determination;
(iii) Information about how the applicant may appeal the
determination; and
(iv) A statement that if the applicant chooses not to appeal TSA's
determination within 60 days of receipt of the Initial
Determination, or does not request an extension of time within
60 days of the date of service of the Initial Determination of
Threat Assessment in order to file an appeal, the Initial
Determination will automatically become a Final Determination
of Threat Assessment (FDTA) without further notification from
TSA.
TSA, not the airport authority, makes a determination as to whether
an applicant's STA reveals information that the individual does or does
not pose a security threat. Redress based on the STA will be handled on
a case-by-case basis due to the classified and/or security sensitive
information that may be involved. TSA is the final adjudicator of STA
results.
In addition to the STA and CHRC, TSA regulations require
individuals seeking a SIDA badge to complete training provided by the
airport.
Pursuant to regulatory guidance issued in 2002 and subsequent
Security Directives, TSA requires all airports and airlines to use and
pay the Transportation Security Clearinghouse (TSC) for its email
messaging services to consolidate and transmit the biographic and
biometric data necessary for TSA to conduct Security Threat Assessments
(STAs) and the FBI to conduct fingerprint-based criminal history record
checks (CHRCs). In accordance with the requirements, airports collect
the required biographic information of applicants for airport-issued
identification badges, input the data in a spreadsheet and transmit it
to the TSC. Similarly, airports collect the fingerprints of SIDA badge
applicants and transmit them electronically to the TSC. The TSC simply
consolidates the information and transmits it to the TSA.
The TSC is not uniquely qualified to perform this function. Indeed,
at least 18 companies, in addition to the TSC, have been certified by
the FBI as being qualified to transmit data pursuant to Federal
standards. With the expansion of background check requirements by State
and local governments and the commercial sector, the FBI has developed
a testing process for certifying companies that meet Federal standards
to perform the function.
Almost 3 years ago, as Chairman of ACI-NA, I sent a letter urging
TSA to provide a fair, open, competitive process by allowing airports--
and other industry stakeholders--to utilize other channeling service
providers. Around that time, several other airports sent letters with
similar requests to TSA. To date, TSA has not allowed airports to
choose between qualified vendors providing such services. My concern is
not specifically with the TSC providing channeling services. Rather, it
is that TSA has precluded fair and open competition in the marketplace
in not allowing airport operators a choice between FBI-certified
vendors that provide channeling services.
sida vs. twic
The SIDA background check process and that for the Transportation
Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) are distinctly different and
affect very diverse workforces between the transportation modes, all of
which may be faced with dissimilar threats. In the case of the SIDA
badging process, the airport (the employer in most cases) grants
unescorted access to certain areas of their individual facility. The
ability for airport operators to monitor and limit individuals' access
to certain areas at an airport is an essential layer of security that
would be compromised under TWIC, which would allow a badge holder to
access virtually any area of an airport. At a minimum, airports comply
with strict regulations for STAs and CHRCs but again, some airports,
because of State and local laws, go above and beyond the Federal
minimums with regard to disqualifying offenses. Airports must follow
TSA regulations, but unlike TWIC, identification badges are issued by
the airport, not the Federal Government. It is also important to note
that just because an individual has held or currently holds a SIDA
badge from one airport it does NOT grant them unescorted access to
secure areas of another airport. Due to the need for airports to limit
individuals' unescorted access to certain locations within the secured
area and given the vast differences between commercial aviation and
port facilities, airports do not believe it makes sense to align the
SIDA and TWIC processes.
modern security credentials act
Although they are both agencies under the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), current TSA and Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
regulations require separate and duplicative biometric and biographic
data submissions to support background checks for aviation employees
that are subject to the requirements of each agency. Rather than
requiring separate data submissions to satisfy various agencies such as
TSA and CBP, airports believe DHS should develop a consolidated system
for background check data submissions for aviation workers. Airports
support Congress helping to move TSA and DHS toward that goal.
With regard to the MODERN Security Credentials Act, airports
appreciate and support the language that reiterates the airport
operator's right to restrict an individual's access to secure areas.
Additionally, airport operators support the language which preserves
their right to disqualify an individual from employment based on their
review or adjudication of a criminal history record check. Although the
legislation does contain some protections, airports have identified
some concerns with the bill.
First, the rulemaking language is overly broad and unnecessary for
TSA to move forward with its rulemaking to align the requirements and
fees for background checks, something that is already underway. While
this language appears to only affect the STA process, proposed changes
to section in the U.S. code in the legislation actually affect the
process for CHRCs. This could mean that the STA and CHRC processes
would be merged under this rulemaking and that airports would no longer
be able to review or adjudicate CHRC results. Merging these processes
could be problematic, as not all airport credentials give unescorted
access to the secure area. Current TSA background check requirements
stipulate that certain individuals should only be subject to an STA. If
these processes are merged, it could mean that additional individuals--
who have no need for unescorted access to secured airport areas--would
be required to get a CHRC, simply because they operate near or in an
unsecured area of an airport. This could impose significant operational
issues and unnecessarily drain limited resources while significantly
increasing costs. For example, construction personnel working on
airport projects do not have unescorted access and therefore, are only
required to have an STA. Airports have existing effective measures in
place to ensure that these personnel do not go into the SIDA area.
Expanding the current requirement to include this population is
unnecessary and could cause significant delays in these projects while
workers wait for the processing of their CHRCs.
Airport operators agree that DHS should be required to consult with
various stakeholders, including airports as they develop the rule.
However, the consultation language provided in the bill does not
require recommendations by stakeholders to be considered as part of or
inform the rulemaking process, which allows the agency to disregard any
comments made by stakeholders during the consultation process.
Furthermore, the limitation language in the bill protects the
current process at airports with regard to the background checks. But,
if this legislation is enacted before TSA has changed the security
directive and regulatory guidance which requires airports to use the
TSC, this could be interpreted by TSA as a ban on competition for
channeling service providers, thus protecting the TSC's sole-source
contract and the requirement that airports use only TSC as their
channeling service provider. ACI-NA has long advocated for TSA to allow
airports a choice between qualified vendors, including the TSC, that
consolidate and transmit the required biographic and biometric
information for STAs and CHRCs. ACI-NA asks that the language be
modified to protect competition among channeling service providers.
Airports support the requirement in the bill that the agency
provide an analysis of how the STA process will be consolidated; any
reductions in fees or costs; and any other efficiencies that the rule
may realize. However, the new process put forth by the rule could cause
operational delays in getting responses back from TSA about whether
individuals are cleared. ACI-NA believes TSA should also be required to
conduct a thorough examination of the potential operational impacts
resulting from the requirements prior to issuing a notice of proposed
rulemaking.
Although the bill contains specific language preserving the current
process for airports to determine whether to issue individuals a SIDA
badge granting unescorted access to secured areas, it also contains
contradictory or conflicting language requiring the Secretary to
determine whether an individuals qualified to receive a badge based on
the results of the CHRC. This language would prevent airports from
adjudicating results of a CHRC or imposing more stringent security
requirements that are necessary for the unique security challenges at
their airports. Airports strongly oppose this language and believe that
the results of the CHRC should be adjudicated at a local level. Again,
some airport operators, to enhance security in accordance with their
TSA-approved airport security programs or because of State and local
laws, choose to include additional disqualifying crimes or a longer
``look back'' period than is required by Federal law. Airports
reiterate that it should remain a local decision to implement more
stringent security requirements.
Because there is a process in place which allows individuals to
seek redress if they have been denied a SIDA badge based on the results
of the CHRC, airports believe there is no need for individuals denied
unescorted access to secured areas to participate in the TWIC waiver
process. While airports appreciate the language in the bill which
protects the rights of airports to disqualify any individual from
employment based on a review or adjudication of a CHRC even if the
individual holds a waiver, there is concern about the potential for
implied pressure some airports might receive from TSA over granting
unescorted access to individuals that have received a waiver,
particularly for TSA's own employees as has occurred previously.
Airports also support the language which protects them from being sued
for refusing to provide unescorted access to individuals that have been
determined to have some derogatory information as part of their
background check.
As a result of the rulemaking required in the bill, airports will
be faced with a significant increase in fees for STAs, a cost which TSA
currently covers. Additionally, the legislation allows the costs of the
waiver process to be incorporated into the fee. With a process already
in place for individuals to correct inaccuracies identified in their
CHRC and STA results, airports do not believe there is a need for a
separate waiver process. ACI-NA is concerned that incorporating the
costs of a waiver process and imposing a new fee for STAs will
significantly increase costs. Again, while this may allow the fee for
other populations within the transportation sector to be lowered, it
will significantly increase fees in the aviation sector. Airport
operators do not believe they should be forced to pay for the costs of
a formal waiver process within TSA.
conclusion
Although ACI-NA supports the goal of developing a consolidated
system for the submission of data to support background checks for
aviation workers, this bill includes conflicting requirements that
would cause unintended and unnecessary operational challenges, and
impose additional costs for airports. In order to ensure that the
requirements are operationally feasible and commercially competitive,
airports encourage the committee to direct TSA to constitute a
Government and industry working group, tasked with making
recommendations for streamlining the current process, which would be
incorporated into a notice of proposed rulemaking.
Airports believe very strongly in and are determined to retain
their right to deny individual's unescorted access to secure areas at
their airport. If an airport operator chooses (whether because of State
and local laws or in order to enhance security) to include additional
disqualifying crimes or a longer ``look back'' period than is required
by TSA, it should be their prerogative to implement more stringent
security requirements.
While airports continue to urge DHS to develop a consolidated
system for background check data submissions for aviation workers as a
way to reduce costs and streamline the process, airports oppose the
implementation of a credential which would provide universal access for
aviation workers or for aviation workers to be absorbed into TWIC.
ACI-NA looks forward to working with the committee, DHS, and TSA to
identify procedures to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of the
background check process for aviation workers while preserving the
ability for airports to adjudicate results, make decisions about
whether to grant unescorted access privileges to individuals and to
determine the level of access based on job function.
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
I would point out on the competition issue, there are two
or three other entities that are supposed to be certified
within the month.
Mr. Walker. Correct.
Mr. Rogers. So hopefully we will have that competition,
because I agree. We want to see that come about.
I am not going to take my full time because I want other
Members to be able to ask questions before they call up the
votes.
However, I would ask, Mr. Walker, I am assuming that all
your concerns are in your statement. I would like to see some
suggested language changes that you would make, that you would
feel make it more comfortable for you to address some of those
concerns you just raised. You never know, I mean, we might be
able to work something out to allay many of your concerns.
Ms. Olivier, your colleague, Mr. Walker just now in his
testimony, complains that the MODERN Security Credentials Act
will somehow restrict competition for background check
channeling services for airports to the benefit of AAAE's
transportation security clearinghouse. Do you agree with that?
Ms. Olivier. No, Chairman. Respectfully, as you pointed
out, the TSA has already called for competition. They have
already selected two additional channeling providers and are in
the process of certifying them, so I think that we are well
under the way for a competition which, in fact, I think myself
and my colleagues have all supported, including members of
AAAE.
Just as an additional point on that, when I referred to the
biometric airport security identity consortium that I work
with, these members all in drafting a concept of operations
working with the TSA-anticipated competition, and so as we try
to anticipate the path to biometrics, we are anticipating the
need for interoperability of credentials so that it will
facilitate this competitive environment.
Mr. Rogers. My last question for you, Ms. Olivier, you
heard Mr. Walker's concern about Federalization of this
process. Is that your organization's concern as well?
Ms. Olivier. Yes, Mr. Chairman. We continue to feel
strongly that airports need to have local control.
Mr. Rogers. Then do you see anything in this legislation as
a threat to that?
Ms. Olivier. In fact, we were very pleased to see that the
language culls out airports and respects the responsibilities
and the authorities that airports currently have.
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Last, Mr. Sadler, you have heard Mr. Walker's concerns.
What would be your response to him?
Mr. Sadler. I think the first thing I would say is that we
feel that the airport is in the best position to control access
at their facilities; that is No. 1.
No. 2, I want to clarify that the security threat
assessment is not the same as a credential.
So everyone mentions the TWIC process as somehow being the
security threat assessment process, and it isn't. The TWIC card
is the result; it is of the security threat assessment process.
What we are trying to do is we are trying to harmonize that
background check and those disqualifiers so we can treat all of
the transportation workers fairly and evenly across the board
and we can satisfy our security objectives.
So I just want to repeat, we don't intend and don't desire
to issue a credential at an airport. The TWIC does not control
access into a facility. What it does is it is another tool that
allows a facility operator to control access.
So if you get a TWIC card, which I have one, and I paid my
$132.50 for it, I can't get into every port in the country. I
can only get into a port if they want me to get in and if I
have a business reason to get in.
So I just want to be clear on that. Airports are in the
best position to control access into their facilities, and we
agree absolutely with that.
Mr. Rogers. Great. I want to yield the balance of my time
and go the Ranking Member, and I am very interested in hearing
her questions being answered.
With that, I recognize the Ranking Member, my friend from
Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman very much, and I am
going to likewise try to be succinct and then make a brief
comment, Mr. Chairman, and express my interest in reading this
bill thoroughly and working with a lot of stakeholders, some of
whom are in this room, on the final product.
This question is for--and let me again thank all the
witnesses for their presence here--this question is for Mr.
Sadler and Mr. Walker. The bill, in essence, creates a two-
tiered system for waivers. Under the TWIC program, an applicant
that secures a waiver from TSA is issued a TWIC card and can
work in our Nation's ports.
While under the airport credential program, an applicant
that secures a waiver from TSA does not get a credential if the
airport operator pulls its issuance, somewhat of what you just
finished saying, Mr. Sadler. Does this two-tiered system
trouble you, and how is this harmonization, Mr. Sadler?
Mr. Sadler. Thank you, ma'am for that question.
I want to make another clarification that currently under
statute, an individual is allowed to appeal the criminal record
information. So, basically, what they can do is they can
correct the record, and we consider that to be an appeal.
So the airport adjudicates to criminal history records. If
there is some issue of misidentification or maybe the record
itself is incomplete, there is an open disposition where the
individual wasn't convicted or, excuse me, the disposition of
that case wasn't added to the record, then that individual can
correct that record.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right, I understand that. But you are not
answering the question. The question is if you get a waiver
from TSA, you don't get a credential from the airport; is that
correct?
Mr. Sadler. No, that is not correct.
What I was trying to explain is it really isn't a two-tier
waiver system because there isn't a waiver right now in effect
under the current credentialing system. The applicant can
appeal the decision of TSA. We do the National security checks
and immigration check, and they can technically appeal the
criminal history record information from the airport by
correcting that record.
What TSA will do is if they find a disqualifying
conviction, a criminal conviction, they will allow the
individual to show TSA that they have been rehabilitated in
some way, whether they have paid restitution, they have cleared
parole.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right, and that is when you give a waiver.
Mr. Sadler. That is when you give the waiver.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Right. I am now leaping to the airport.
Please listen to my question.
While under the airport credential program, an applicant
that secures a waiver from TSA does not get a credential if the
airport operator opposes issuance, is that correct?
Mr. Sadler. Oh, that is correct. Yes, I am sorry, I
misunderstood the question.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is the point I am making. So you have
a two-tiered system basically. Do you have a comment on that?
Mr. Sadler. I believe that it is necessary for TSA to be
able to adjudicate the criminal history records, along with the
rest of the information we get on the individual, so we can
satisfy our transportation security objectives.
But I also believe that the airport should have the right
to determine who can go into that airport and conduct their own
suitability check.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, and there is a premise now that the
individual now can get a TSA waiver and might be able to work,
but, again, and I am not quarreling with you on this, the
airport can decide whether they have access or not. In the
modernization, I am confused and questioning whether or not
that option is removed.
Mr. Walker, do you have a comment on the point that I just
made very quickly, please?
Mr. Walker. No, I don't. I have listened to what Mr. Sadler
said. I agree with him on his comments. I think there are
reasons that airports need to look at the criminal history.
Obviously, there is an opportunity for----
Ms. Jackson Lee. But how does the modernization bill, as it
is now written, impact that ability?
Mr. Walker. Well, the way the bill is written today, we
think is very open-ended and would allow--and we have provided
some comments to the staff to make those changes, as you
suggested, Mr. Chairman--would allow the TSA to consolidate
that process and actually adjudicate all--for everybody. They
said they are not interested in doing that, but we believe the
language would provide that opportunity for them to do that,
and we are concerned with that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me quickly, thank you so very much.
As you know, at present, the cost of a SIDA airport
credential is $29, while the cost of a TWIC is $134. Both
programs are fully fee-funded and this bill establishes a new
potentially costly appeals and waiver process within the SIDA
program. As an airport operator, Mr. Walker, are you concerned
that TSA will raise the cost of the fees to accommodate all
these programatic changes?
Mr. Walker. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. Olivier.
Ms. Olivier. Yes, Ranking Member Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Okay.
Ms. Olivier. Certainly we feel that the process with the
airports now is an extremely cost-effective process and an
effective one.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Let me conclude, Mr. Chairman and raise the point. I
represent a very diverse community, a large number of
minorities, a large number of minorities who have rehabilitated
their lives and have become truck drivers and have access to
port and have gotten TWIC cards. The one point that I want to
have on the record, I will not support legislation that
eliminates jobs or eliminates the opportunities for minorities
who have had an unfortunate misstep in their lives.
We are now under the TSA process. They are able to secure a
waiver if enough information is given, keep their job. If it is
now merged and individuals will then be blocked, they may not
want to come to the airport. They may be able to do well going
to ports and driving trucks. I am not going to see African-
Americans and others denied work--if I have fought as hard as I
can--because of this merged process.
By the way, the TWIC card system is not perfect. It takes a
long time, and all I do is spend my time with a lot of my inner
city workers trying to work and trying to get a TWIC card. I do
not want to try to support something that is going to add extra
levels.
Let me yield back and thank you, Mr. Chairman.
As I said, I look forward to working with you.
Mr. Rogers. On that point, Mr. Sadler, my understanding is
the waiver helps people who have had a checkered background, is
that not true?
Mr. Sadler. That is correct. So what the waiver does it
allows----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I understand that, I understand that. But
if we merge it and have the same process as SIDA, SIDA has a
more extensive prohibition of disqualifying crimes, and that
means my guys, my inner city guys, rural guys, whoever it is
who are trying to support their families are thrown to the
wolves again, can't get a job.
Mr. Rogers. I want to come up with some language that will
alleviate with that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I would be happy to work with you.
Mr. Rogers. Let's work on trying to get that fixed because
Mr. Rojas doesn't want to prohibit people from getting into his
industry either. He says he has a shortage of drivers, so we
will work on that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from
Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for coming here today. I appreciate it,
especially crammed all together on that small little table
there, so I appreciate that.
One of the things I have got a couple of questions about,
with this modernization bill, I am just going to go real
quickly because of time, with this modernization bill, will it
increase the level of safety to the traveling public? If I
could just go down the row, I appreciate it.
Mr. Sadler. We think it will increase security if TSA is
allowed to adjudicate the criminal background checks in
addition to the other information and apply the look-back
periods that we have now for TWIC and HME drivers as well, but
it will also increase the fairness in the redress process.
Mr. Cravaack. Perfect.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Bowman. I would have to say our review of it was more
in line with the findings of our report, so I would not be able
to comment on your question.
Mr. Cravaack. Fair enough, thank you.
Ms. Olivier. Well, it does provide for airports to continue
with the level of responsibilities and authority that they
have, so we feel in that regard it allows us, airports, to
continue to do the good work that they have done to date.
Mr. Cravaack. So it doesn't impede on your ability to say
who you want on your tarmac?
Ms. Olivier. That is it.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay.
Yes, sir.
Mr. Rojas. I am not quite sure from the safety perspective
how it would impact, but certainly the ability of undergoing a
single background check rather than multiple background checks
is a very positive development for our drivers and to be able
to attract good people into the industry, and that would
certainly be a positive development.
Mr. Cravaack. Just a note for you, Mr. Rojas, it looks like
there will be, at the markup, there will be a manager's
amendment that will address the issue regarding carrying hair
spray and food coloring, so they will be addressing that issue
as well.
Mr. Rojas. Great. Thank you very much.
Mr. Cravaack. Mr. Walker.
Mr. Walker. I can't speak to the surface transportation
issue, but from an airport perspective, if the language is
strengthened to make sure that we continue to be able to do
what we are doing today, I don't think we will improve the
security, but we will certainly continue to maintain the high
level of security that we already have.
Mr. Cravaack. I am all about keeping the Federal Government
out of our backyards, so I agree with that as well. Okay.
Also down the line again, will it streamline and make more
efficient and effective the credentialing process and
procedures?
Mr. Sadler. By modernizing our system and harmonizing the
background checks, it will go from single systems for each
program, single programs, to a person-centric ability, and what
that means is we will be able to manage an individual from the
time they enroll to the time that they get issued a benefit.
So, therefore, if you need a hazmat endorsement, you don't just
have to apply for a hazmat endorsement. If you need a TWIC, you
don't have to just apply for a TWIC. If Steve Sadler comes in
and enrolls, he will enroll once and we will use it many times,
so it is going to increase the efficiency.
Mr. Sadler. So it is going to increase the efficiency.
Mr. Cravaack. Will it also decrease the amount of time and
fees associated with an individual waiting for credentialing?
Mr. Sadler. Well, we would hope that it would decrease the
amount of time that they would be waiting for the credential
because we would have a better system to do the work with.
As you know, Congress directed TSA to collect user fees to
sustain our programs. Right now, we are in the midst of
developing a regulatory evaluation on the fee structure. So I
am not in the position to be able to comment on that now. But
once we get that out, we are going to send it to our
stakeholders, and it is going to be very important for them to
comment on it, and we will understand what their issues are
with it.
Mr. Cravaack. Fair enough.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Bowman. To your first point, would it increase the
efficiencies, the bill's language seems to be in line with what
we found in our report, is that the consolidation of the
security threat assessments would, as Mr. Sadler was referring
to, would allow the information to be shared among the agencies
and increase those efficiencies so that, as far as your second
point, I would not be able to comment at this time.
Mr. Cravaack. I have got about 1 minute left. So if we
could go down the line, I would appreciate it.
Ms. Olivier. There are some aspects where it might help the
airport process, reaching into Customs and Border Patrol, for
example. At airports, there is a separate credentialing, a
separate background check process required by there. So if
those can be consolidated and harmonized, it will help expedite
the clearance of workers. There is a lot of turnover at
airports. We need that.
Mr. Cravaack. Sure. I understand. Thank you.
Mr. Rojas. I would say that eliminating the stovepiping
that Mr. Sadler mentioned is critical and certainly the
elimination of costs for as long as you reduce the number of
credentials required. That is a big reduction in cost. But we
also think that there are economies of scale, you could reduce
further the cost of the truck credential, for example.
Mr. Cravaack. All right. Thank you.
Mr. Walker. I agree with Ms. Olivier in terms of the TSA
and CBP process. If they can harmonize that, then we could have
one process that will save us some time and money as well.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you, sir.
I have 3 seconds left, and I will yield back, sir.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. The Chairman now
recognizes the Ranking Member of the full committee, the
gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
At least we get some good discussions.
Mr. Sadler, I understand that everybody here has spoken
about competition. I understand that there is an IDIQ out right
now for modernization that you plan to award without
competition. Am I correct?
Mr. Sadler. No, sir, not that I am aware of.
Mr. Thompson. Well, sole source it. I don't want to get
into semantics. You don't plan to sole source it?
Mr. Sadler. For our modernization effort?
Mr. Thompson. For the TTAC modernization----
Mr. Sadler. Not that I am aware of, sir. But I can
certainly go back and ask the acquisition folks if they have
anything that----
Mr. Thompson. Well, I really wish you would. If it is
competition, I think all of us want that.
Mr. Sadler. We plan to compete, just like we competed the
aviation channelling services. We had references to AAAE
passing the information at the TSA. We knew that needed to
change. We went out with a full and open competition. We
decided through technical and cost evaluations on three service
providers. We are going to do the same thing with the
modernization system. It is going to be full and open
competition. As a matter of fact, we already had an industry
day for modernization. We issued a draft RFP to stakeholders
for comment. We received approximately 450 comments on that
draft request for proposals, and they are being considered and
responded to now. But I will certainly go back and ask that
question.
Mr. Thompson. I am glad to see you looking for a full and
open competition.
Are you aware that TSA Assistant Administrator Weldon
attempted to relocate the office from Arlington to Annapolis
Junction, Maryland, without competition?
Mr. Sadler. I was there when that issue occurred.
Mr. Thompson. You are aware of it?
Mr. Sadler. I was there when it happened.
Mr. Thompson. You understand that people got involved and
said, you can't do it that way. Are there any plans to relocate
the office now?
Mr. Sadler. Not that I am aware of. What I am aware of is
when that issue occurred, the question was asked about moving
resources due to space restrictions up to another facility. The
result of that was, I believe, we have much more open
communications with our staff. Our staff is fully informed of
any decisions that we believe we may make in the future. We
have--and these may sound like minor things, but they aren't.
They are very important things. We have many town halls. We
have a new newsletter. We have staff meetings. So like I said,
I was there. It was a troubling time to be a part of that. It
was very serious. But some good things came out of it, and I
think we are in a much better position today than we were----
Mr. Thompson. So you are saying to us, if the relocation
comes back on the agenda, you plan to follow the protocols that
are required?
Mr. Sadler. Absolutely.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
I understand there are about 96 million people who are in
the TTAC small vetting programs that don't pay fees. You were
talking about in your rulemaking giving it authority by
Congress. Are you planning to start charging those individuals
a fee?
Mr. Sadler. Where it is appropriate to collect a fee, yes,
we plan to use our Congressional authority to do that. Because
as you just stated, we are directed by Congress to collect the
user fees to sustain any program that we have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the hearing.
With respect to airports during the vetting of employees, is
your testimony that TSA should not be involved in that process,
that it is a local issue?
Mr. Sadler. No. My testimony is that TSA should be involved
in that process because our mission is transportation security.
But on the flip side of that, we also believe that the airports
should have final control and the decision-making ability on
who comes into their airport. So we believe that we need to
adjudicate date----
Mr. Thompson. Explain just for my benefit the difference
between who comes into the airport and what you are talking
about now.
Mr. Sadler. So we have the background check that we do now
is based on certain disqualifiers. If you have been released
from incarceration within the last 5 years or convicted within
the last 7 years for certain felonies or if you have ever been
convicted of other felonies; so for instance, if you were
convicted of murder any time in your life, that is an issue we
need to look into.
So what we would do is we would do the adjudication based
on those disqualifiers which we hopefully would harmonize with
the TWIC and the HME programs. If the airport decided to
adjudicate that criminal history record information based on
standards that they have or increased standards, they should
have the right to do that. So there could be a case where TSA
would approve someone to get a SIDA badge, but because of the
requirements of the airport--and as I understand it, certain
airports have more strict requirements than others. It does
happen. They should have the ability to deny that credential
because they are going to allow the access into that facility.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
If I might, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Walker.
Mr. Walker. That creates a great concern for us as
airports. Because what Mr. Sadler just said is they are going
to start adjudicating records that they are not doing today. So
what cadre of staff are they going to hire to do that? What is
the time going to be? This is going to lengthen the time for us
to be able to get badges issued to people that have already
been hired and ready to go to work and they can't until they
get their badge.
This is going to create--any time the Federal Government--
excuse me--starts controlling a process, I have never seen it
become more timely and less costly. So that is our concern as
airports. We have lots of turnover, and these people are going
to be waiting longer for their badges. They won't get paid as
soon. I don't see the necessity of them adjudicating. They can
set the rules. We can review the records and adjudicate like we
are doing it today. They can monitor and audit us like they do
today to make sure that we are in compliance with their rules
and regulations. But taking over the program is just going to
add cost and time to it, and I don't see how that is going to
improve security at all.
Mr. Thompson. Taking over the program, Mr. Chairman, is not
what I see as the spirit. I thought we were trying to give the
local airports the authority. It just appears that somehow it
is getting interpreted altogether different. I don't have a
problem with the local airports doing it, but it looks like we
are going down two different directions.
Mr. Sadler. Thank you, sir. The first thing I want to say
is that if you pull the airport population from this universal
rule and do not allow us to do that criminal adjudication, then
you pull over a million workers out of comparability and
harmonization, and you also deny TSA the opportunity to vet
those individuals completely with all of the information.
The second thing I would say is the information that we are
talking about here as far as costs, fees, times are all within
the universal rule and that will be out for notice and public
comment. Those are very important to us.
The third thing I would say is we have been doing this a
long time. We have got a lot of people and with the Hazmat
Threat Assessment Program, we had 33 States that used the TSA
agent as opposed to collecting their own information when we
started in 2005. We have an additional five States now. So we
have 38 States and the District of Columbia because those
States were having difficulty with their process. They knew we
were doing a good job. They knew we could do a good job, and we
are doing a good job.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, let me read, if I may, Mr.
Sadler's statement: TSA plans to assume the adjudication of
criminal background checks for airports and aircraft operator
workers, which is currently performed by the airports and
airlines.
I mean, that is your statement.
Mr. Sadler. I think you have to continue on. Let me find
that. Do you have the page number there?
Mr. Thompson. Yeah.
Mr. Sadler. Here we go. Hold on. If you go down to the
bottom of that page, we also say that TSA does not, however,
intend to assume responsibility for worker suitability or
access control decisions from airports and airlines and will
continue to send criminal history record information to any
airport that requests it for the purposes of making its own
suitability or access control determination.
So what we are saying is we think we need, in order to
fully implement harmonization and comparability, to adjudicate
the criminal records for aviation workers.
We do not think we need to issue credentials. We do not
think we need to control access at an airport. We think that is
best done by the airport themselves. They are in the best
position to do that.
But in order to implement comparability and harmonization,
we need to include that population if we are going to do it
correctly and in order to achieve our transportation security
mission.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois,
Mr. Walsh, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Walsh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Lee.
Folks, if I am repetitive, I apologize. Mr. Sadler, a
couple of quick basic questions. What is the difference between
an appeal and a waiver? Succinctly.
Mr. Sadler. An appeal is an objective determination of
whether you were the person who got convicted, whether your
record is correct. So if Steve Sadler has an issue, I can come
back and say, I wasn't convicted of that crime; the crime was
expunged; I was convicted of a lesser offense. So basically, I
am not the guy or the record is incorrect.
A waiver is a subjective determination by TSA based on the
rehabilitation of the individual. So the individual has been
convicted of a disqualifying crime; he or she sends information
into us; we convene a waiver board, and we merit a
determination that we feel they aren't a security threat.
Mr. Walsh. Basic question No. 2, in airports right now, do
workers currently have access to an appeal, a waiver process,
or both?
Mr. Sadler. They have access to appeal in the form of
correcting their criminal history record information or they
can appeal an immigration or a National security decision made
by TSA, keeping in mind that the airports adjudicate the
criminal history records at this time. They don't have access
to waivers.
Mr. Walsh. Third final basic question, is it fair in your
estimation that truck and port workers have appeal access and
access to a waiver process but airport workers only have access
to an appeal process and are not allowed to have access to a
waiver process?
Mr. Sadler. It is an interesting question. We were directed
by law by the NHTSA Act to include a waiver process with an
administrative law judge review. That does not exist for
aviation workers at this time, but we think it is the right
thing to do. An example of that is, we took the waiver process
from the TWIC rule and we included it with the hazardous
material endorsement rule. So we were not directed by law to
include that in the hazardous materials process, but we did
anyway because we thought it was the right thing to do. We
think it is the right thing to do with aviation workers.
Mr. Walsh. So they should have access to both?
Mr. Sadler. We think so, yes
Mr. Walsh. Mr. Rojas, a quick question, this act, the
MODERN Security Credentials Act, will it reduce costs and cut
through redundant regulations for your drivers?
Mr. Rojas. Yes, if we achieve the goal of a single
credential, a single background check process that will allow
the drivers to comply with multiple security requirements, yes,
it will reduce the cost; one single payment, one process,
period. In addition to the fees, obviously there are time off
requirements off of work in which they lose salary and
everything else. So we do believe it would be a positive
development.
Mr. Walsh. Ms. Olivier, clear up one thing for me. You have
expressed valid concerns about the direction you see TSA
heading towards Federalizing some of these local security
processes. In your view, would this Act help protect local
security processes and functions?
Ms. Olivier. Yes, Congressman. That is the way we saw the
legislation that specifically called out the local authorities
and responsibilities at the airport.
Mr. Walsh. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to just yield to one quick
question from my colleague from Minnesota, Mr. Cravaack.
Mr. Cravaack. I thank you for yielding, sir.
Just a quick question for Mr. Walker. Mr. Walker, you rely
on TSA right now presently to do part of your background checks
for your local airport, correct?
Mr. Walker. They do the STA checks, yes.
Mr. Cravaack. Right now, the TSA is doing that for free,
are they not?
Mr. Walker. I believe so, correct.
Mr. Cravaack. Right now, Mr. Sadler, since you are doing
those background checks for free right now, basically you are
disseminating the costs associated with the background checks
for the airports over to possibly the truckers and everybody
else. Would that be a correct statement?
Mr. Sadler. We do that work through appropriations.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay. Well----
Mr. Sadler. So, basically, we are--the taxpayer is paying.
Mr. Cravaack. So, in essence, the one you actually go
through to the TWIC card, as I understand it--correct me here
if I am wrong, sir--those that would actually be receiving your
service would be the ones that would be paying for it. Would
that be a correct statement?
Mr. Sadler. That is correct. We would be collecting user
fees to sustain the program.
Mr. Cravaack. So it wouldn't be spread on a trucker for an
aviation background check?
Mr. Sadler. No. Our intent is to charge fees for services
provided.
Mr. Walker. It means our fees are going up. I guarantee it.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay, sir, but you are not paying for
anything now, correct?
Mr. Walker. No. All of our fees. They are going to do the
adjudication, and then they are going to send it to us. We are
going to have to do it. We are going to have to pass those
costs along to our tenants. The costs for people who work at
the airport are going to go up with the process that the TSA is
proposing. It might come down for Mr. Rojas. That is great.
They are going to go up for aviation, and that is going to pass
costs onto the airlines and our tenants, which is not good for
creating jobs.
Mr. Cravaack. Okay, sir, but just to be clear, they would
be paying fee for service, correct, sir?
Mr. Walker. We are going to start duplicating services
because they are going to do the things that we are already
doing, and then we are going to have to do them ourselves a
second time. That costs money. They are going to pass that cost
on along to us. Then we are going to have the same costs we
already have today. That is a duplicative cost that is going to
get passed to our users.
Mr. Cravaack. I will yield back to Mr. Walsh.
Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Walsh. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlemen.
The Chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Illinois,
Mr. Davis, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sadler, I appreciate the fact that TSA has long sought
authority from Congress to raise the ticket fee. In your
testimony, you indicate that the rulemaking TSA is currently
working on would require, quote, new populations to pay a fee
for vetting by TTAC. Which new populations will be covered? You
talked about travelers using Secure Flight or flight crews. If
yes, then it sounds like it might be a backdoor effort to raise
the ticket fee. Is that what----
Mr. Sadler. There is no effort on our behalf to raise the
ticket fee, sir. It is all about security threat assessments
for transportation workers and fee fairness and equitability
for that fee across transportation modes. By ticket, I am
assuming you are speaking to an airline ticket?
Mr. Davis. Yes.
Mr. Sadler. Yeah. No, that was not our intent.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rojas, let me ask you, what are some of the challenges
associated with the current credentialing for individuals who
would haul hazardous materials?
Mr. Rojas. Well, I think part of the program--when we first
analyzed the program, one of the issues that we had and that we
pushed for was that it be developed as a National--National
uniform system. Right now, as Mr. Sadler mentioned, there are
38 States that use a TSA contractor. However there are 12 other
States that do their own sort of program. Some of those fees
can be higher than the cost associated with using a TSA
contractor. So the lack of uniformity is one of the concerns
that we certainly had Nation-wide. One of the--and that is why
we continue to push--the fact is one of the biggest issues that
we have within the hazmat environment is that, of course, not
all hazardous materials are created equal.
So there are certain materials that could be considered
weaponizable per se, toxic by inhalation, perhaps some
radioactives, some explosives. But there are a number--a large
universe of materials that did not qualify as a security threat
per se. We don't think drivers that are going to be
transporting some of these less secure, low-risk materials
should be undergoing a fingerprint-based background check for
the purpose of performing their duties.
Mr. Davis. So you are suggesting that there might be
differentials which would allow individuals to transport some
materials but not others?
Mr. Rojas. That is correct. I mean, in essence, if you want
to transport certain types of materials that represent a higher
security risk, then you should be required to undergo a
fingerprint-based background check for the purpose of
transporting those materials but not the hairsprays, the Coca-
Cola, and syrup and everything else.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Mr. Walker, let me ask you, what are your opinions in
establishing an appeals and waiver process to see that
credentialing and whether or not you have had any really
expressions of concern from tenants and operators about this
process?
Mr. Walker. I am not aware of significant concerns in that
process for airports. If it was determined that there should be
a waiver process, what I would recommend, then, is that the TSA
develop some regulations of how that would work and let us
continue to function the way we are.
We can handle that process under regulatory oversight, just
like we do the processes we have today. I don't see that we
need to have one-size-fits-all in a very diverse transportation
community, airports or not, the same as surface transportation.
It seems to me that TSA is trying to get a one-size-fits-all,
and it just doesn't work. If they want to add that to the
process, if this committee feels that is important, then they
can establish the rule and we can very effectively handle that
kind of a process just like we do the processes today.
Mr. Davis. Would you suggest that there is need for
considerable time to review and analyze to make a
determination, given the large numbers of individuals who seek
these credentials?
Mr. Walker. We don't have a large number of people that are
denied badges in the first place, because most of the employees
that come to us for badging are processed by a private-sector
employer. Out of 18,000 employees, our people who have badges,
I report about 1,400 who work for us at airport. So they do
their own screening. So we don't have a lot of denials in the
first place. If there is a need to have that kind of a waiver
process, and this committee establishes that in regulations, we
will do a very effective job in managing that process like we
do the processes that we have today.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. I am confused now. AAAE,
which is in the airport business, just like your organization,
does not see these concerns that you have got. What is the
deal? Ms. Olivier, can you tell me? Does this bill scare you as
much as it scares Mr. Walker?
Ms. Olivier. No, Mr. Chairman. I am encouraged by the way
this seeks to preserve the authorities of the airports, and it
did concern me that the TSA said that they would be the
adjudicator. This bill preserves the authority and the
responsibilities as they are now, the procedures conducted by
airports. With that is the adjudication and criminal history
records check. So what we feel is, of course, the TSA needs to
concentrate, and I think the focus of this legislation does
that, encourages the DHS to focus on the parts that they are
responsible for. That is the STA process, and that is ensuring
that the criminal history records based on fingerprints are
related to the airports for adjudication.
Mr. Rogers. I can assure you what we are after is to make
it simpler. One of the problems I have heard from my trucking
organizations is how unreasonable it is to require a trucker to
go on two separate days to get two different investigations,
pay for both of them when--if he is a security concern, we
ought to be able to knock it out at one time. That is what we
are after, trying to simplify things and at the same time be
effective. So we want to work out these concerns you have got
to the extent we can. I can assure you, I don't want any more
big Federal Government in your business than we have got to
have. We are going to work to that end. Also to maintain your
autonomy because I don't want to be in the airport business
either. So we want to work with you.
Ms. Jackson Lee, if you have anymore questions, you are
recognized.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Just to say, Mr. Chairman, I am glad that
you are seeking to dissect confusion.
My point is modernization has a positive premise. We have
to delineate responsibilities. We have to know what Mr. Sadler
is actually going to do. If he does not want to yield--does not
want to secure adding authority to adjudicate, it needs to be
clear. Then additionally, we need to make sure that our job is
to create jobs and not to end jobs.
I make the final point that people who have been
incarcerated range across ethnic lines. I don't want to
highlight one particular group, but there is a disproportionate
impact in some inner city minority communities and rural areas.
I would simply say to you that our work over the years has not
seen a former burglar, per se, mastermind the demise of the
World Trade towers. We need to give Americans the chance to be
rehabilitated, to work and provide for their families. That is
what I would like to see happen.
Mr. Rogers. I agree.
The Chairman now recognizes Mr. Cravaack.
Mr. Cravaack. Well, I can hear with just all the bells
working. We are going to go and vote here.
Mr. Walker, you bring up some good points. Being an airline
pilot, the last thing we want to do is increase fees to
airlines. But my question is: You say your fees will increase.
Is that because you are doing a duplicative background check to
what the TSA is already doing?
Mr. Walker. No, right now, the criminal history record
check information comes to us. Our staff reviews it and
adjudicates whether the person is eligible for a badge under
the regulations that we have. Then the TSA has oversight, and
they audit us to make sure we are doing the job correctly. What
I heard Mr. Sadler say is that they intend to adjudicate, and
then they would send us if we so request the same information,
which then we would have to go through the same process to
determine whether we are going to issue a badge. That is
duplicative. That will add additional cost to our process,
which then we will pass on. The ultimate payers, as you know as
an airline pilot, are the airlines at the airport. They fill
the gap.
Mr. Cravaack. It is actually the consumer at the tail end.
Mr. Walker. The consumer at the tail end.
Mr. Cravaack. Mr. Sadler, do you think that there is some
ground here that you could work together with the concerns of
Mr. Walker?
Mr. Sadler. Well, that is part of our regulatory evaluation
and fee structure rule that we are going to put out for notice
and comment. We can also meet with the stakeholders prior to
the issuance of that MPRM, and we do frequently. We are
certainly willing to do that.
Mr. Cravaack. Thank you very much for that because the last
thing that any of us as consumers would want would increase
fares, especially with our rising gas prices as well.
Thank you very much, sir, and I appreciate it.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
I do want you all to know I appreciate you making the time.
This has been very helpful for me, very informative for our
staff and the other Members of this committee. I can assure you
my staff will be reaching out to you all again as we look at
other modifications that will allay some of the concerns that
were raised here today. Our Majority staff is going to be
reaching out to the Minority staff to make sure we address some
of the concerns that we were raised by the Minority Members
here today as well.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, likewise, I would like an
equal opportunity for those persons who have been very nice and
informative witnesses to reach out to both sides of the aisle
so that we can have information working together as this
committee has done over the tenure that we have been together
and previously as well. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. So with that, thank you. I do want you to know
that the committee hearing will be held open technically for 10
days. Members who weren't here may have questions that they
want to submit to you in writing. I would ask that you respond
to those. With that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:31 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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