[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
SECURING OUR NATION'S MASS TRANSIT SYSTEMS AGAINST A TERRORIST ATTACK
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HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 4, 2011
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Serial No. 112-22
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Vacancy
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Peter T. King, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 3
The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
Mr. John S. Pistole, Administrator, Transportation Security
Administration, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 8
Mr. W. Craig Fugate, Administrator, Federal Emergency Management
Agency, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 6
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 8
Mr. Richard Daddario, Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism,
New York City Police Department:
Oral Statement................................................. 12
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Richard L. Rodriguez, President, Chicago Transit Authority:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 16
Mr. Daniel O. Hartwig, Deputy Chief of Operations, BART Police
Department, San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART):
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 21
Appendix I
Statement for the Record of the American Bus Association......... 43
Appendix II
Question From Honorable Laura Richardson of California for John
S. Pistole..................................................... 45
Question From Honorable Laura Richardson of California for W.
Craig Fugate................................................... 45
Question From Honorable Laura Richardson of California for
Richard Daddario............................................... 45
Questions From Honorable Laura Richardson of California for
Richard L. Rodriguez........................................... 45
Questions From Honorable Laura Richardson of California for
Daniel O. Hartwig.............................................. 46
SECURING OUR NATION'S MASS TRANSIT SYSTEMS AGAINST A TERRORIST ATTACK
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Wednesday, May 4, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in Room
311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Peter T. King [Chairman
of the committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives King, Smith, Rogers, McCaul,
Walsh, Meehan, Long, Duncan, Marino, Farenthold, Thompson,
Sanchez, Jackson Lee, Cuellar, Clarke of New York, Richardson,
Davis, Higgins, and Keating.
Also Present: Representative Al Green of Texas.
Chairman King. Good morning. The Committee on Homeland
Security will come to order.
The committee is meeting today to hear testimony on the
security of our mass transit systems in order to identify where
progress has been made since the terrorist attacks of September
11, 2001, and where shortfalls remain. We shall examine issues
such as assessing the threat that mass transit systems face;
information sharing between the Federal Government and the
individual transit entities; the impact of the Transit Security
Grant Program; and the extent of coordination between Federal,
State, and local partners.
I will now recognize myself for an opening statement.
First of all, let me thank all of the witnesses for being
here today. This is a vital issue. I want to thank all of you
for being here, especially Craig Fugate, who has gone through a
terrible few weeks doing just a tremendous job in a very
horrendous situation in the South. Again, I want to thank you
for your service.
On a personal note, let me welcome Commissioner Daddario
from the NYPD, who does a terrific job in New York. Also, as a
point of mention, his late father was a United States
Congressman. So I thank you for being here today.
Again, thank all the witnesses for the work that you do.
You are literally on the firing lines.
Mass transit plays an absolutely critical role in our
Nation. Coming from New York--and, certainly, people from
Chicago, San Francisco, appreciate the same situation--so much
we do depends on mass transit. We have millions of riders every
day on mass transit.
Yet, the reality is mass transit is probably the most
difficult part of our transportation system to secure. It is
the most vulnerable. Having been to London and to Madrid and
seeing the terrible damage that was done there by al-Qaeda, you
realize, one, in some ways how much easier it is for terrorists
to attack mass transit and also how horrific the tragedy is
when it occurs.
So, my point today above all is, No. 1, to find out what
you think the level of security is; what more you think has to
be done; what level of information sharing there should be; but
also to try to get the debate going.
We do have to make cuts. There is no doubt that cuts have
to be made. There is no doubt that Government spending has to
be brought under control. We have to make sure that not one
penny or $1 is wasted that is allocated to security. On the
other hand, we cannot be achieving false economies by cutting
in areas that could lead to loss of human life, which could
encourage our enemy, especially now in the wake of bin Laden's
death.
We have to assume that al-Qaeda or its affiliates, al-Qaeda
in the Arabian Peninsula, any of the others, or any of the
radicalized terrorists here at home, self-starters, if you
will, lone wolves, or organized terrorist operations in this
country will launch a domestic attack. To me, clearly, if we
are talking about potential targets, no one is more of a
potential target than our mass transit systems.
So I would hope that we, again, look carefully at any cuts
that are made. At the same time, the burden is on, obviously,
Government agencies to make sure that every penny is properly
spent. But we cannot be making, I believe, false economies.
Because, apart from the loss of human life, apart from the
victory it would be for al-Qaeda if a successful attack should
be carried out, the economic consequences. I mean, you have one
mass transit attack in San Francisco or Chicago or New York,
and the economic consequences of that to the country would far
outweigh the dollar amount of any short-term cuts that may be
made.
So, basically, that is where I am coming from today. We
know how real these threats are. We saw with Najibullah Zazi,
when he was trained in Afghanistan, came to the United States--
came back to the United States; he grew up in New York--and he
was going to carry out a liquid explosive attack on the subway
system. We know here in Virginia, when we had Farooque Ahmed,
that there was going to be an attack on the D.C. transit
system. Again, we saw in Madrid, we saw in London. We know how
this is. It is such a high priority of al-Qaeda.
The fact, again, you add bin Laden's death, you add
radicals in this country, you add the fact that there could be
an overseas attack, what al-Qaeda has done before, no one is
literally more in the firing line today than those who are
responsible for the security of our mass transit system.
So I want to thank you for all the efforts that you have
made, that you are continuing to make. I assure you that this
committee, on both sides of the aisle, will work with you. The
Ranking Member and I, whatever differences we may have on some
other issues, certainly when it comes to security and when it
comes to mass transit security, for the most part, we speak
with one voice.
So, with that, I thank you for being here today. I look
forward to the hearing.
I now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from
Mississippi, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to ask unanimous consent that Mr. Green, a
former Member of this committee, be allowed to sit in for the
hearing.
Chairman King. I was going to object, but I can't for my
good friend, Mr. Green.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Thank you for holding today's hearing on surface
transportation security.
Thirty-four million people use the Nation's rail and mass
transit systems each day. Despite this reality and over my
objections earlier this year, the continuing resolution for
fiscal year 2011, which was passed by the House, decreased
discretionary spending for securing those modes of
transportation by $4.5 million below last year's level, 23
percent below the President's budget request.
Under this budget-cutting regime, the transportation
security program will be reduced by $50 million. While only
about $1 for each rider, these funds purchase a great deal.
Transit agencies use this Federal money to hire law enforcement
officers, acquire bomb-sniffing dogs, and install explosive-
screening devices. They also use this money to finance capital
projects that keep riders safe, such as hardening tunnels,
installing surveillance systems, and establishing perimeter
security controls. This $50 million cut will have an obvious
and immediate impact on the security of transit riders.
Unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, this funding cut is not the
only problem facing the Transportation Security Grant Program.
In 2009, GAO found that TSA had failed to incorporate
vulnerability information in the program. Although the
Department agreed with GAO's recommendation, it has not found a
way to comply. I hope today, if that compliance exists in this
information, I would like for the committee to be provided that
information.
In 2010, the Department's inspector general found that FEMA
had failed to develop a process to collect and analyze program
performance measures for TSGP grants. Without performance
measures, it is impossible to determine the effectiveness of
the program and whether the grant programs are achieving risk
reduction. If performance measures exist, I would like for FEMA
to provide them to the committee today.
Taken together, these reports set forth a clear need for
program reforms that bring about a risk-based and accountable
system.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to joining with you
to restore funding to this critical area. I take you at your
word that we need to do it, and I look forward to doing it,
especially in the wake of the Osama bin Laden killing. We have
an obligation to protect mass transit riders, those 34 million
people who rely on it every day.
With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman King. I thank the gentleman.
I remind other Members of the committee that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Hon. Richardson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Honorable Laura Richardson
May 4, 2011
I would like to thank Chairman King and Ranking Member Thompson for
convening this very important and timely hearing today focusing on the
protection of our Nation's mass transit system against potential
terrorist attacks. I would also like to thank our distinguished panel
of witnesses for appearing before the committee today to discuss what
progress has been made in this area and what else needs to be done.
Before I begin, I would like to take a brief moment to recognize
the recent events that took place over the weekend. As we all know,
Osama bin Laden, the 9/11 mastermind and leader of al-Qaeda, was
recently killed in Pakistan by U.S. forces. The precise planning and
execution that led to the capture and death of Osama bin Laden shows
that, through our strength and determination, America can step up to
any challenge. I would like to thank President Obama for his steadfast
leadership in this effort, as well as our men and women in uniform who
have fought bravely and sacrificed so much in order for us to finally
be able to see this day.
While the death of Osama bin Laden undoubtedly signifies a crushing
blow to al-Qaeda and its affiliates, they will continue to pose a
serious threat to us both at home and abroad.
Nowhere is this threat more serious than to our Nation's mass
transit systems. Over the last 20 years, al-Qaeda has shown a
disturbing preference to target mass transit systems around the world.
From the London subway bombing that killed 52 people in 2005 to the
Christmas day bomb plot that attempted to blow up Northwest Airlines
Flight 253, mass transit is a constant target for individuals seeking
to do America harm.
Additionally, according to the Department of Homeland Security, the
number of attacks and attempted attacks against the homeland between
August 2009 and May 2010 surpassed the number during any previous year
in our history. These troubling statistics show the increasing
importance that transportation security will play in our Nation's war
on terror.
In protecting against this threat, it is important that we
understand the unique and complex challenges posed by our Nation's mass
transit systems. As stated in Mr. Pistole's and Mr. Fugate's submitted
testimony, ``the characteristics essential to the efficient movement of
millions of people, i.e. an open architecture connecting large
populations in major metropolitan areas through multimodal systems
within multimodal infrastructures--create potential security
vulnerabilities.'' Thus, in order for us to stay one step ahead of our
enemies, it is vital that we learn of and protect against these
vulnerabilities before they can be exploited.
As the representative of the 37th district of California, I
understand the importance of securing our Nation's mass transit
systems. My district is located in Los Angeles County, the largest
county in the country and home to one of the country's largest metro
transit systems. Additionally, it contains the Alameda Corridor, a 20-
mile-long rail cargo expressway connecting the ports of Long Beach and
Los Angeles that runs through Compton's high-threat, high-density urban
area. These challenges represent a new and emerging need for us to be
increasingly more vigilant in protecting our Nation's mass transit
systems against the ever-evolving threat of terrorism.
I am pleased that Chairman King and Ranking Member Thompson
convened this hearing because it provides an opportunity for committee
Members to not only reflect on the enormous gains the Government has
made with regard to transportation security, but to also understand the
continuing challenges we face in protecting against terrorist threats.
I look forward to hearing from our distinguished panel of witnesses on
these issues. I yield back my time.
Chairman King. Now I would like to begin the testimony of
our witnesses today.
Our first witness is John Pistole, the administrator of the
Transportation Security Administration. I first worked with Mr.
Pistole when he was with the FBI, where he did, again, a
magnificent job on counterterrorism. A dedicated public
servant. Certainly, he has been no stranger to being on the
receiving end of attacks from various sources over the last 6
months in trying to do his job. It goes under the heading of,
``No good deed goes unpunished,'' but Director Pistole is,
again, an outstanding American, and we are really privileged to
have him here today.
Mr. Pistole, you are recognized for as close to 5 minutes
as you can.
STATEMENT OF JOHN S. PISTOLE, ADMINISTRATOR, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Pistole. Good morning, Chairman King, and thank you for
those comments. Ranking Member Thompson, distinguished Members
of the committee, it is good to be here this morning to discuss
the efforts of TSA in partnership with FEMA and our many State,
local, and industry leaders to ensure the best possible mass
transit and passenger rail security.
Obviously, the President's Sunday night announcement that
bin Laden had been located and killed gets to the heart of a
profound issue. How does it change the threat that we face here
in the United States, particularly as it relates to mass
transit?
Obviously, our efforts to combat terrorism go well beyond
any one individual, which is why we remain focused on the
critical mission of protecting the traveling public and our
transportation systems. TSA will continue to evaluate and
implement screening measures based on the latest intelligence.
We ask the traveling public to remain vigilant and report
immediately any suspicious activity.
Today, I am here to focus with my fellow witnesses on mass
transit systems and passenger railroads, which include subways,
bus transit systems, commuter ferries, Amtrak, commuter
railroads, among others. These systems are a critical part of
the transportation network TSA works in partnership to protect.
They also, unfortunately, remain a target, Mr. Chairman, as you
noted, having been the focus of numerous plots here in the
United States--unsuccessful, fortunately--as well as those
successful attacks you noted overseas and others.
A critical component of TSA's security efforts for mass
transit and passenger rail is our partnerships, the
partnerships we have with industry and local and regional
stakeholders. The DHS's Transit Security Grant Program is
currently the primary vehicle providing funding for security
enhancements to eligible transit agencies supporting State and
local government initiatives to improve security. We also work
closely with FEMA to fund projects that most effectively
mitigate risk at the highest-risk systems. In 2010, DHS
provided $273.4 million to the transit and passenger rail
industry, bringing the total to $1.6 billion since 2006.
In addition to grant funding, TSA supports the security of
mass transit and passenger rail systems by deploying Visible
Intermodal Prevention and Response teams, or VIPR teams, to
augment local security efforts. TSA currently has 25 dedicated
VIPR teams in operation, in addition to other assets that
perform VIPR operations. The fiscal 2012 budget request
includes funding for 12 additional teams.
VIPR teams work alongside local law enforcement officers
and are typically compromised of personnel with expertise in
inspection, behavior detection, security screening, and law
enforcement for random, unpredictable deployments throughout
the transportation sector with one goal in mind: To deter
potential terrorist acts. TSA conducted nearly 8,000 VIPR
operations in the last year, and I would be glad to get into
some more detail later on.
We also perform baseline and collaborative risk assessments
for mass transit and passenger rail. These assessments are
conducted with an emphasis on the 100 largest mass transit
passenger rail systems in terms of passenger volume, which
collectively account for over 80 percent of all users of public
transportation.
Among these assessments is the Baseline Assessment for
Security Enhancement, or BASE, a comprehensive security
assessment program designed to evaluate 17 security and
emergency management action items that form the foundation of
an effective security program. Through the BASE program, TSA
reviews security-related proposals jointly developed by us and
Department of Transportation, the Federal Transit
Administration, or FTA, and sector partners from mass transit
and passenger rails. These assessments help inform us as to
what judgments and actions we should take in partnership. Over
115 mass transit passenger rail agencies have participated in
this BASE program.
We also work with other Federal partners and others in
terms of other assessments and ways that we can help inform not
only our use of funds but their use of funds also.
So, in closing, Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, I
want to thank you for your support and for the support of the
committee. I look forward to answering your questions.
Thank you.
Chairman King. Thank you, Mr. Pistole.
Our next witness is Craig Fugate, who was the former
director of the Florida Division of Emergency Management and
has performed in his current position since May 2009.
As we all know, the natural disasters which struck the
southern part of our country in the last several weeks, Mr.
Fugate has been there, directing operations and serving with
great distinction.
I am pleased to recognize the gentleman for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF W. CRAIG FUGATE, ADMINISTRATOR, FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Fugate. Good morning, Chairman King and Ranking Member
Thompson, Members of the committee. My name is Craig Fugate,
and I serve as the administrator of FEMA.
But, also, in full disclosure, I am one of those 34 million
people that ride mass transit. Most days, I walk to work, but
when it is inclement weather, I ride the Metro. I ride the
Metro to go shopping. Oftentimes, my wife and I use Amtrak to
go home back to Florida. So I am one of the customers who, full
disclosure, I benefit from a secure mass transit system.
On behalf of Secretary Napolitano and my partner here from
TSA, Administrator John Pistole, we work with local and
providers of mass transit throughout this country, and we look
at this as a team effort.
Our job at FEMA is to support DHS overall efforts in the
safety and security of this Nation and a broad array of
preparedness grant programs, and today the focus is on the
Transportation Security Grant Programs. This is a partnership
where TSA is the subject-matter experts, and we provide the
grants administration to those programs in working with our
State and local partners. It is cooperatively managed.
As Ranking Member Thompson pointed out, the inspector
general and the General Accounting Office found that we did not
have procedures in place, we did not have formal agreements
with TSA to administer this program. I am proud to announce
that Administrator Pistole and I have signed a memorandum of
understanding to clearly outline the roles and responsibilities
as a team so that it is clear when we are working with our
State and local partners of how we are conducting our business.
These transportation security grant funds can be used both
for capital projects--as was pointed out, the physical
hardening and other enhancements--but also operational
projects, one of which many people that ride may be familiar
with, and that is the ``If You See Something, Say Something''
campaign, to incorporate and enlist riders of the transit
systems to report suspicious activity to the law enforcement
agencies.
We also provide additional training, exercises, and drills,
and a visible funding source--or a source for visible law
enforcement, boots on the ground, such as K-9 and police
patrols. As Administrator Pistole pointed out, our goal here is
deterrence. We want to be prepared. We want not just to have to
be able to respond to these events, but we want to deter the
threat of terrorists attacking our mass transit systems.
Again, these programs, as Administrator Pistole pointed
out, provide funding, but we continue to see the need for these
programs. We continue to work with our grant programs and our
applicants.
I think one of the things that, Mr. Chairman, I know that
you have expressed concerns about is, in drawing down these
funds, why do we still see funds that are outstanding versus
those that are coming down or being drawn down? I think it
comes back to the type of work we are doing.
That is, when we are doing capital projects--and as a State
administrative agency, I can tell you that, in building and
hardening facilities, that construction and those processes,
working with State and local governments, will oftentimes take
more time. It is a drawdown process where we reimburse them for
the work that is being done. Those that are operational in
nature tend to be drawn down faster because those are funds
that are expended for personnel, for training, for exercises.
So these balances I realize are a concern, but I think they
are an investment in capitalization of the hardening of these
facilities that oftentimes take more time than the operational
projects. It may be showing that, as these funds are still
there, that they may not be needed. That is not the case. We
firmly believe that, as our State and local partners are doing
these capital projects, as they are obligating their funds and
seeking that reimbursement, these funds are going, as intended
by Congress, to harden and fortify our mass transit against
threats.
Sir, that concludes my statement.
[The joint statement of Mr. Pistole and Mr. Fugate
follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of John S. Pistole and Craig Fugate
May 4, 2011
Good Morning Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and
distinguished Members of the committee. I am pleased to appear before
you today to discuss the efforts of the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
in the mass transit and passenger rail sector.
The mission of TSA is to protect the Nation's transportation system
to ensure freedom of movement for people and commerce. Mass transit
systems and passenger railroads are critical parts of the system that
TSA is charged with protecting. Together, these systems--which include
subways, bus transit systems, ferries, the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation (Amtrak), and commuter railroads, among others--provide
over 10 billion passenger trips per year.
In meeting this mission, TSA's goal is to maximize transportation
security in response to the evolving terrorist threat, while protecting
passengers' privacy and facilitating the flow of commerce.
The United States mass transit and passenger rail systems remain a
target for terrorist groups and have been the subject of numerous plots
in the United States, as well as attacks overseas. Serving large
populations in major metropolitan areas, many have substantial
underground infrastructure, bridges and transportation staging areas,
or hubs, which can include other forms of transportation. The
characteristics essential to the efficient movement of millions of
people--i.e., an open architecture connecting large populations in
major metropolitan areas through multimodal systems within multimodal
infrastructures--create potential security vulnerabilities.
tsa's mass transit and passenger rail programs
TSA utilizes a number of programs to secure and safeguard mass
transit and passenger rail operations. In keeping with the themes that
guided the March 2010 Surface Transportation Security Priority
Assessment, many of these programs enhance security by addressing
policy gaps and obstacles, enhancing coordination and unity of effort,
and maximizing the use of partner strengths and capabilities. TSA
supports Mission 1--Preventing Terrorism and Enhancing Security--of the
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review and are aligned with the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) programmatic activities and
organizational structure as found in the Bottom-Up Review Report of
July 2010.
For example, DHS has a comprehensive Transit Security Grant Program
(TSGP) that provides awards to eligible transit agencies to support
State and local governments in devising and implementing initiatives to
improve security. TSA also deploys Visible Intermodal Prevention and
Response (VIPR) teams in the mass transit and passenger rail domains
with local law enforcement entities to augment the security protocols
provided by the local systems. Determinations about where to locate
resources are based on risk and various mass transit and passenger rail
assessments. In all of our programs, we are committed to strengthening
local and State efforts while working collaboratively with our private
sector partners.
Collaboration between Federal, State, local, and private entities
is also demonstrated through the Public Transportation Security Annex
to the DHS/Department of Transportation (DOT) Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU) on security. The Annex identifies specific areas of
coordination among the parties, including citizen awareness, training,
exercises, risk assessments, and information sharing. To implement the
Annex, TSA--along with DOT's Federal Transit Administration and the
FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate--has developed a framework that
leverages each agency's resources and capabilities. This MOU also
provides a framework for coordination on programs like safety and
security roundtables, security standards, training, security data
collection and analysis, and technical resource documents.
The Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP)
The TSGP helps create a sustainable, risk-based effort to protect
critical surface transportation infrastructure and the traveling public
from acts of terrorism. Eligible agencies are determined by the Urban
Areas Security Initiative (UASI) urban areas list and the National
Transit Database based on unlinked passenger trips. The TSGP is
currently the primary vehicle providing funding assistance for security
enhancements to eligible domestic mass transit and passenger rail
agencies and employs risk-based prioritization for funding decisions.
TSA works with the FEMA Grant Programs Directorate to fund projects
that most effectively mitigate risks at the highest-risk transit and
passenger rail properties. In 2010, the TSGP provided $273.4 million to
the transit and passenger rail industry and a total of $1.6 billion
since 2006. Similar, but smaller grant programs, have supported over-
the-road bus operations.
Operational Deterrence Activities
One very effective and cost-efficient anti-terrorism TSGP effort
has been in the area of operational deterrence activities. These
activities include public awareness campaigns, training, drills, and
exercises. Since fiscal year 2006, the TSGP has awarded approximately
$175 million for these activities. One of the most well-known campaigns
is the ``If You See Something, Say Something,'' campaign, which was
originally implemented by the New York Metropolitan Transportation
Authority and is a simple and effective way to raise public awareness
of indicators of terrorism, crime, and other threats and emphasize the
importance of reporting suspicious activity to the proper
transportation and law enforcement authorities.
Anti-Terrorism Transit and Passenger Rail Activities
Additional TSGP funding has supported non-Federal law enforcement
positions for anti-terrorism activities. Since fiscal year 2006, DHS
has awarded $29.7 million for 60 canine teams and $93.9 million for 304
officers to create 77 anti-terrorism teams. These officers enhance
security, provide a visible deterrent and augment our nimble, risk-
based approach to provide assistance where it can best be put to use.
The TSGP also provides funds for transit, passenger rail, and law
enforcement agencies to hire non-Federal officers to serve as mobile
explosives detection screeners. The officers for each of these teams
are direct employees of the transit system/passenger rail/law
enforcement agency, and they are deployed according to security needs
within the local transit or passenger rail system.
Critical Infrastructure Protection Activities
Transit security grants have also been used for critical
infrastructure protection activities. These activities include
intrusion detection, physical hardening, and surveillance measures for
underwater tunnels, bridges, and multi-user high-volume stations. Since
fiscal year 2006, the TSGP has funded $155.2 million for underwater
tunnel hardening, $168.5 million for critical station physical security
measures such as perimeter protection and closed circuit television
(CCTV), and over $28 million for suspension bridge hardening.
In support of the TSGP, DHS has identified those assets it
considers Nationally critical to surface transportation. These assets
were then analyzed based on threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences
by both Government and industry stakeholders to guide our risk-based
assessment of high priority transit and passenger rail assets.
The budget bill passed by Congress last month for fiscal year 2011
provides $250 million in funding for public transportation security
assistance and railroad security assistance. Included in this amount is
a 5.8 percent (or $14.5 million) allowance for the FEMA Management and
Administration (M&A), $20 million for Amtrak, and $5 million for
Intercity Bus. TSA will dedicate $10 million for freight rail security,
leaving $200.5 million for the TSGP.
Mass Transit and Passenger Rail Assessments
By performing baseline and collaborative risk assessments in the
mass transit and passenger rail domains, TSA is able to engage State
and local partners on how to reduce vulnerabilities, assess risk, and
improve security efforts. These assessments are conducted with emphasis
on the 100 largest mass transit and passenger rail systems in terms of
passenger volume, which collectively account for over 80 percent of all
users of public transportation.
Transportation Systems Sector Risk Assessment
Through the Transportation Systems Sector Risk Assessment, TSA
evaluates threat, vulnerability, and consequence in a wide range of
terrorist attack scenarios for each mode of transportation. For mass
transit and passenger rail, this assessment considered more than 200
scenarios, rating threat capabilities and likelihood of execution;
vulnerabilities of rail and bus systems and infrastructure; and
potential consequences in casualties, property damage, and impacts on
the transportation network. The resulting risk ranking enables TSA to
set informed mitigation priorities, both across the sector and by
individual mode, for collaborative security strategies, program
development, and resource allocations.
Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement
The Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement (BASE) is a
comprehensive security assessment program designed to evaluate 17
Security and Emergency Management Action Items that form the foundation
of an effective security program. Through the BASE program, TSA reviews
security-related proposals jointly developed by TSA, the Department of
Transportation's Federal Transit Administration (FTA), and sector
partners from mass transit and passenger rail systems. The security
action items represent a comprehensive update of the Security Program
Actions for Mass Transit Agencies that FTA developed following the
attacks of September 11, 2001.
The assessment results provide critical data about security
priorities, the development of security enhancement programs, the
allocation of resources (including security grants), and a compilation
of the most effective security practices for mass transit and passenger
rail agencies. Over 115 mass transit/passenger rail agencies have
undertaken the BASE assessment.
BASE is intended to elevate the security posture and readiness
throughout the mass transit and passenger rail mode by implementing and
sustaining baseline security measures applicable to the operating
environment and characteristics of mass transit and passenger rail
systems. TSA implements this continuous improvement process through its
Transportation Security Inspectors--Surface (TSI-S), who conduct the
assessments in partnership with the mass transit and passenger rail
agencies' security chiefs and directors. These evaluations have
significantly contributed to an elevation in the mass transit security
posture.
Collaborative Risk Assessment Initiatives
TSA is developing and fielding a risk assessment capability focused
on individual mass transit and passenger rail agencies, their regional
security partners, and connecting and adjoining transportation systems.
This effort aims to produce several risk and vulnerability assessment
tools integrated into a single platform to enable TSA and its component
security partners in DHS to conduct joint assessments of mass transit
and passenger rail agencies, employing resources more efficiently, and
improving the audit process.
visible intermodal prevention and response team
TSA currently has 25 Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response
(VIPR) multi-modal teams in operation and the fiscal year 2012 budget
request includes funding for 12 additional VIPR teams. VIPR teams are
comprised of personnel with expertise in inspection, behavior
detection, security screening, and law enforcement for random,
unpredictable deployments throughout the transportation sector to deter
potential terrorist acts. TSA's VIPR teams work alongside local law
enforcement agencies throughout the transportation domain, enhancing
the agency's ability to leverage a variety of resources quickly to
increase security in any mode of transportation anywhere in the
country. VIPR teams also represent an on-going effort to develop surge
capacity to enhance security in public transportation systems. TSA
conducted over 8,000 VIPR operations in the past 12 months, including
over 3,700 operations in mass transit venues. VIPR operational plans
are developed with a risk-based methodology, in conjunction with local
transportation security stakeholders, and conducted jointly by TSA,
local law enforcement, and transportation security resources.
To enhance coordination and deterrent effects of VIPR team
operations, TSA and the representatives of the Transit Policing and
Security Peer Advisory Group (PAG) work together to improve
coordination, preparation, planning, execution, and after-action review
of VIPR deployments in mass transit and passenger rail systems. This
cooperation has grown since the mutually agreed upon operating
guidelines for ``Effective Employment of Visible Intermodal Prevention
and Response Teams in Mass Transit and Passenger Rail'' were
implemented in October 2007. The guidelines were distributed to Federal
Security Directors (FSDs), lead regional Surface Inspectors, and
Federal Air Marshal Supervisory Air Marshal in Charge (FAM SACs) around
the country to improve the effectiveness of the VIPR program.
collaboration and communication with state, local, and tribal
authorities and the private sector
TSA works with DOT's FTA and the Federal Railroad Administration,
trade groups representing mass transit and passenger rail interests,
and the transit and passenger rail agencies to improve security.
Through the National Infrastructure Protection Plan partnership model,
TSA chairs the Government Coordinating Council, and regularly consults
with the Sector Coordinating Council. To a large degree, TSA's role is
to empower our State and local partners through training and exercise
programs like the Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I-
STEP) and grant programs like TSGP.
Proactive and continuous collaboration is crucial for the success
of mass transit and passenger rail security operations. TSA
collaborates with senior executives, law enforcement chiefs, and
security managers for mass transit and passenger rail agencies; State,
local, and Tribal officials; emergency responders; and Federal partners
to foster regional security coordination and to integrate the spectrum
of available resources for enhanced deterrent and response
capabilities.
Meetings take place regularly with these key officials through such
collaborative forums as the Mass Transit Sector Coordinating Council,
the Transit Policing and Security Police Advisory Group, and the
Regional Transit Security Working Groups in higher risk areas, and the
annual Transit Safety and Security Roundtables that bring together the
law enforcement chiefs, security directors, and safety officers of the
Nation's 60 largest mass transit and passenger rail agencies with their
Federal security partners to discuss specific terrorism prevention and
response challenges and collaborate in advancing effective solutions.
These efforts aim to ensure coordinated development and implementation
of effective security strategies Nationally and to build collaborative
regional networks that expand capabilities to prevent acts of
terrorism, to increase resiliency, and to respond to and recover from
threats and security incidents.
Sharing Security Information
In collaboration with the U.S. Department of Justice and Amtrak,
TSA announced a significant step toward enhancing the security of the
Nation's rail infrastructure with the implementation of a Nation-wide
Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) capability throughout the entire
Amtrak rail system in 2010. The SAR initiative is a partnership among
Federal, State, and local law enforcement to establish a standard
process for law enforcement to identify and report suspicious incidents
or activity and share that information Nationally so it can be analyzed
to identify broader trends. Under this collaborative program, Amtrak
officers are also utilizing an upgraded reporting system--made
available by TSA--to refer suspicious activity reports to DHS and the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) for analysis and follow-up.
TSA also provides timely, accurate intelligence and security
information to mass transit and passenger rail agency officials through
joint DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis, TSA Office of
Intelligence (TSA-OI), and FBI classified intelligence and analysis
briefings. Briefings are provided to mass transit and passenger rail
security directors and law enforcement chiefs in major metropolitan
areas, as well as Amtrak, through the Joint Terrorism Task Force
network's secure video teleconferencing system.
TSA Mass Transit Security Awareness Messages provide intelligence
products to mass transit and passenger rail security and management
officials and State and local partners. TSA is constantly working with
our partners to enhance the scope, accuracy, timeliness, and efficiency
of information sharing to develop a unified, comprehensive intelligence
and security information-sharing platform for the mode, with reports
and other materials on security technologies as an essential component.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Thompson, I thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to answering
your questions.
Chairman King. Thank you, Mr. Fugate.
Our next witness is Commissioner Richard Daddario of the
NYPD.
Commissioner Daddario had a long record in the Justice
Department as a prosecutor, attorney on jury trials, arguing
appeals, and, most recently, prior to joining the NYPD, was the
Department of Justice's attache in Moscow.
If I may say, on a semi-humorous note, Commissioner
Daddario, as I look at people from other parts of the country,
if I did not pronounce your name first, I just tremble at the
thought of how it would be pronounced by some of the people
from other parts of the country who are not used to the ethnic
names we have in New York.
So, Commissioner Daddario, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD DADDARIO, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER FOR
COUNTERTERRORISM, NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT
Mr. Daddario. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Congressman
Thompson, and Members of the committee. Thank you for this
opportunity to represent the New York City Police Department at
this hearing on the subject of mass transit security.
Each year, more than a billion and a half people use the
New York City rail transit system, our subway. It is an old
system along and around which the city grew. The life of the
city depends on it. The Metropolitan Transportation Authority
takes care of the subway system's nuts and bolts, but the NYPD
has the job of keeping the people who ride the train safe.
Terrorism has made that job harder.
Under Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly's leadership over
the past 10 years, the NYPD has found ways to reduce crimes
city-wide to levels that few believed possible. But the
possibility of a terror attack in the subway has required the
NYPD to commit enormous resources to safeguard the public. More
than 2,500 police officers are assigned to the Transit Bureau,
most of whom have received specialized training to recognize
and respond to a terrorist plot. In addition, approximately
another 1,000 officers are dedicated to the Department's
counterterrorism mission.
The NYPD has also acquired advanced equipment to detect
explosives and radiation sources and has begun connecting
cameras in the subway system to the Department's Domain
Awareness System, which integrates public- and private-sector
security cameras, license plate readers, radiation detectors,
and other data.
The NYPD also conducts daily, highly visible
counterterrorism deployments in the subway system, including
random bag checks and ``Torch'' deployments consisting of
emergency service unit officers with heavy weapons and tactical
gear, K-9 officers, and detectives from the NYPD Intelligence
Division. All of this is necessary.
Post-9/11, hundreds of acts of terrorism have been directed
at transit systems around the world, including in London,
Moscow, Madrid, and, most recently, Minsk. In New York City,
plots have been directed at the PATH and subway systems, but
the transit system has been kept safe due to Commissioner
Kelly's intelligent and strategic commitment of police
resources to its protection.
The NYPD could not have accomplished so much without the
support of Congress and the Department of Homeland Security,
especially through the Transit Security Grant Program. Transit
security grants have supported the development of the Domain
Awareness System, which will be integral to the protection of
the transit hub at the new World Trade Center now rapidly
taking shape. They have also supported essential training for
officers working in the subway system, paid for equipment, and
helped cover the cost of their deployment. Transit security
grants express a commitment on the part of the Federal
Government to protect not only the trains and rails and the
stations that rise above them, but also the people who ride
those trains.
DHS has always recognized that New York City is at the top
of the target list for al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and it has
supported the NYPD's strategy that combines technology and
operational programs to protect the entire transit system.
Funding to support operations makes this strategy possible.
However, current legislation points to the implementing
recommendations of the 9/11 Act, which set a cap on operational
funds of 10 percent in 2011. However, I understand that the 9/
11 Act contemplated an accompanying increase in funding of more
than 70 percent between 2008 and 2011. That increase has not
been realized. In fact, authorized funding has decreased by
more than 30 percent since 2008.
Accepting the fiscal year 2011 appropriation of $250
million for the transit security grants, less than $25 million
would be available Nationally this year for vital operational
programs, like those the NYPD employs, if the 10 percent cap
was imposed. In contrast, $51 million was allocated last year
to fund operational programs.
Clearly, funding for capital improvements to enhance
security makes good sense, but the right balance between
capital and operations is important.
New York City's subway system is the fifth largest in the
world by ridership and the largest in the Western Hemisphere.
The NYPD is responsible for its safety and has worked long and
hard to find a strategy that works. That strategy demands the
extensive commitment of police officers on the platforms, in
the stations, and around the station entrances. That requires
sustained operational funding.
Again, thank you for inviting me to today's hearing, and I
will do my best to answer any questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Daddario follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard Daddario
May 4, 2011
Good morning Mr. Chairman, Congressman Thompson, and Members of the
committee. Thank you for this opportunity to represent the New York
City Police Department at this hearing on the subject of mass transit
security.
Each year, more than a billion and a half people use the New York
City rail transit system--our subway. It is an old system along and
around which the city grew. The life of the city depends on it.
The Metropolitan Transportation Authority takes care of the subway
system's nuts and bolts, but the NYPD has the job of keeping the people
who ride the trains safe. Terrorism has made that job harder. Under
Police Commissioner Raymond Kelly's leadership over the past 10 years,
the NYPD has found ways to reduce crime city-wide to levels that few
believed possible. Last year, no more than 6 felonies were committed
daily in a system with 468 stations, several hundred miles of track,
and 5 million riders per weekday. But the possibility of a terror
attack in the subway has required the NYPD to commit enormous resources
to safeguard the public.
More than 2,500 police officers are assigned to the Transit Bureau,
most of whom have received specialized training to recognize and
respond to a terrorist plot. In addition, approximately another 1,000
officers are dedicated to the Department's counterterrorism mission.
The NYPD has also acquired advanced equipment to detect explosives and
radiation sources and has begun connecting cameras in the subway system
to the Department's Domain Awareness System, which integrates public-
and private-sector security cameras, license plate readers, radiation
detectors, and other data.
The NYPD also conducts daily, highly-visible counterterrorism
deployments in the subway system, including: Random bag checks; and
Transit Operational Response Canine Heavy Weapons deployments, more
simply called TORCH, consisting of Emergency Services Unit officers
with heavy weapons and tactical gear, canine officers, and detectives
from the NYPD Intelligence Division.
All this is necessary. Post-9/11, hundreds of acts of terrorism
have been directed at transit systems around the world, including in
London, Moscow, Madrid, and most recently, Minsk. In New York City,
plots have been directed at the PATH and subway systems. But the
transit system has been kept safe due to Commissioner Kelly's
intelligent and strategic commitment of police resources to its
protection.
The NYPD could not have accomplished so much without the support of
Congress and the Department of Homeland Security, especially though the
Transit Security Grant Program. Transit Security grants have supported
the development of the Domain Awareness System, which will be integral
to the protection of the transit hub at the new World Trade Center now
rapidly taking shape. They have also supported essential training for
officers working in the subway system, paid for equipment, and helped
cover the cost of their deployment. Transit Security grants express a
commitment on the part of the Federal Government to protect not only
the trains and rails, and the stations that rise above them, but also
the people who ride those trains.
DHS has always recognized that New York City is at the top of the
target list for al-Qaeda and its affiliates, and it has supported the
NYPD's strategy that combines technology and operational programs to
protect the entire transit system. Funding to support operations makes
this strategy possible. However, current legislation points to the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Act, which set a cap on
operational funds of 10 percent in 2011. However, I understand that the
9/11 Act contemplated an accompanying increase in funding of more than
70 percent between 2008 and 2011. That increase has not been realized.
In fact, authorized funding has decreased by more than 30 percent since
2008.
Accepting the fiscal year 2011 appropriation of $250 million for
the TSGP, less than $25 million would be available Nationally this year
for vital operational programs like those the NYPD employs if the 10
percent cap was imposed. In contrast, $51 million was allocated last
year to fund operational programs. Clearly, funding for capital
improvements to enhance security makes good sense, but the right
balance between capital and operations is important.
New York City's subway system is the fifth-largest in the world by
ridership and the largest in the western hemisphere. The NYPD is
responsible for its safety and has worked long and hard to find a
strategy that works. That strategy demands the extensive commitment of
police officers on the platforms, in the stations and around the
station entrances, and that requires sustained operational funding.
Thank you again for inviting me to today's hearing. I will do my
best to answer any questions you may have.
Chairman King. Thank you, Commissioner.
Our next witness is president Richard Rodriguez, who is
president of the Chicago Transit Authority.
Prior to joining the CTA, Mr. Rodriguez served as the
commissioner of the Chicago Department of Aviation and has a
long and distinguished career in various levels of Chicago
government.
With that, Mr. Rodriguez, I am pleased to recognize you for
5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD L. RODRIGUEZ, PRESIDENT, CHICAGO TRANSIT
AUTHORITY
Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you very much, Chairman King, Ranking
Member Thompson, Representatives Davis and Walsh from my home
State of Illinois, and Members of the committee. I thank you
for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the Chicago
Transit Authority, commonly known as the CTA.
CTA provides 1.7 million trips each weekday on our bus and
rail network, including the ``L,'' or elevated, rail service
that has come to symbolize Chicago transit. As the second-
largest transit agency in the Nation, Chicago Transit Authority
continually examines ways to enhance measures for the safety
and security of our customers and employees. We focus on three
key areas: Infrastructure improvements, emergency
communications and coordination, and operational security.
I am proud to report that, in March of this year, the CTA
was recognized by the Department of Homeland Security for
achieving high scores in all categories of the security
inspection program for transit. The Baseline Assessment for
Security Enhancement, also known as BASE, was developed as a
comprehensive review of security programs and focuses on 17
categories identified by the transit community as fundamental
for a sound transit security program. These categories include:
Security program management and accountability; security and
emergency response training, drills, and exercises; public
awareness; protective measures for DHS threat levels; physical
security; personnel security; and information sharing and
security. Our system received high scores across all BASE
categories, which very few transit systems have achieved.
Since 2006, grants from the Department of Homeland Security
have been solely responsible for allowing CTA to make
significant technology upgrades to the security and
surveillance network, add the necessary security personnel, and
enrich training programs for these individuals so they are
ready to handle the situations that may pose a threat to our
system.
Our latest infrastructure initiative to combat crime and
deter terrorism is the installation of high-resolution digital
security cameras. DHS funding is being used to equip all 144 of
our CTA rail stations with multiple cameras at each station.
The networked camera allow CTA, the Chicago Police Department,
Chicago's Office of Emergency Management and Communication to
gain a clear picture of an emergency situation and respond
accordingly.
We are also planning on retrofitting CTA's railcar fleet
with security cameras. There are new railcars on order that
will come equipped with cameras, but we feel it is critical to
have the entire fleet be retrofitted. All buses in our fleet,
over 1,700 of them, have been equipped with cameras since 2003.
In recent years, the Transportation Security Administration
has provided additional resources in the form of Visible
Intermodal Prevention and Response, or VIPR teams, as they are
commonly known, which are deployed at airports and on transit.
They provide a random, unannounced, highly visible,
supplemental security presence.
CTA has also received dogs from the TSA's Explosive
Detection K-9 Team. The K-9s are funded through DHS and are
part of the Chicago Police Department's transportation section.
The dogs are paired with handlers to detect explosives and are
used to respond to reports of unattended or suspicious items.
These dogs are trained to find improvised explosive devices and
are used on trains, buses, platforms, and stations.
DHS funding has allowed CTA to fully leverage technology to
enhance security, but the human element is still critical.
Training for employees and encouraging our riders to be part of
the security presence is always an important part of our
efforts. The FTA has launched a Nation-wide safety and security
awareness program called Transit Watch, which encourages
transit passengers and employees to report anything suspicious
or dangerous.
CTA's ``See Something, Say Something'' campaign is similar
to the Transit Watch program and provides information and
instructions to transit passengers and employees so they know
what to do and whom to contact in the event of an emergency.
This campaign was borrowed from the MTA in 2002 and encourages
riders to report any suspicious activity that they observe.
In addition, CTA has participated and continues to
participate in training for a number of scenarios using a range
of programs. We have increased the frequency of our system
checks, tightened access, and continually train our operations,
facilities, and maintenance employees to recognize suspicious
activity, packages, or substances.
CTA participates in drills involving the Chicago Police
Department, Chicago Fire Department, Office of Emergency
Management and Communications, and other agencies regarding
bomb threats, fires, and HAZMAT situations.
For everything that I have mentioned, DHS funding has been
the resource that has made these measures possible. Without
that funding, none of these efforts could continue. Neither the
State of Illinois, the city of Chicago, or CTA has the
financial resources to support these efforts.
Unfortunately, Congress, as was mentioned, was recently
forced to tighten its fiscal belt, and the FEMA Transit
Security grants took a one-sixth cut to its fiscal year 2011
budget, from $300 million to $250 million. In fiscal year 2010,
CTA was awarded $6.8 million under this program to install
security cameras on 400 railcars. The CTA planned to use fiscal
year 2011 funding to complete the camera retrofit of the
remainder of our legacy railcars in 2013, but the 16 percent
cut will likely force the CTA to finish installing these
important cameras in 2014 or 2015 at the earliest.
Before I close, I would be remiss if I didn't state how a
heightened state of alert impacts agencies like the CTA. CTA
actively monitors terrorism-related threats, incidents, and
events locally, Nationally, and internationally. When
circumstances warrant, the CTA takes a number of steps to
ensure our employees and customers remain vigilant. Steps
include communicating with our Federal, State, and local
partners; reissuing security bulletins to remind employees of
what activities to look for and what steps to take should they
encounter any suspicious or criminal activity during the course
of their duties; and reminding our customers that vigilance and
awareness of their surroundings is an important part of our
safety efforts and encouraging them to report any unusual or
suspicious activity to 9-1-1 or to CTA personnel.
Transit systems across our country are inherently open
environments, designed to move people quickly to their
destinations. At the CTA, we are determined to make our system
as safe and user-friendly as possible and to continue providing
ready transportation consistent with a commitment to safety.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to
testify at this hearing. As the others on the panel, I make
myself available for any questions you may have.
[The statement of Mr. Rodriguez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard L. Rodriguez
May 4, 2011
Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, I thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf
of the Chicago Transit Authority, commonly known as the CTA. I also
would like to acknowledge my two home-State Congressmen on the
Committee, Representatives Danny Davis and Joe Walsh. Accompanying me
today is CTA's Chief Safety & Security Officer, Amy Kovalan.
The CTA provides 1.7 million trips each weekday on our bus and rail
network, including the ``L'' or ``elevated'' rail service that has come
to symbolize Chicago transit. As the second largest transit agency in
the Nation, the Chicago Transit Authority continually examines ways to
enhance measures for the safety and security of our customers and
employees. We focus on three key areas: Infrastructure improvements,
emergency communications, and coordination and operational security.
I am proud to report that in March of this year the CTA was
recognized by the Department of Homeland Security for achieving high
scores in all categories of the security inspection program for
transit. The Baseline Assessment for Security Enhancement, also known
as BASE, was developed as a comprehensive review of security programs
and focuses on 17 categories identified by the transit community as
fundamental for a sound transit security program.
These categories include--
security program management and accountability,
security and emergency response training, drills, and
exercises,
public awareness,
protective measures for DHS threat levels,
physical security,
personnel security,
and information sharing and security.
Our system received high scores across all BASE categories, which
very few transit systems have achieved.
Since 2006, grants from the Department of Homeland Security have
been solely responsible for allowing CTA to make significant technology
upgrades to the security and surveillance network, add the necessary
security personnel, and enrich training programs for these individuals
so they are ready to handle situations that may pose a threat to our
system.
Our latest infrastructure initiative to combat crime and deter
terrorism is the installation of high-resolution digital security
cameras. DHS funding is being used to equip all 144 CTA rail stations
with multiple cameras. The networked cameras allow CTA, the Chicago
Police Department, and Chicago's Office of Emergency Management and
Communication to gain a clearer picture of an emergency situation and
respond accordingly.
We are also planning on retrofitting CTA's rail car fleet with
security cameras. There are new rail cars on order that will come
equipped with cameras, but we feel it is critical to have the entire
fleet be outfitted. All buses in our fleet have been equipped with
cameras since 2003.
In recent years the Transportation Security Administration has
provided additional resources in the form of Visible Intermodal
Prevention and Response or VIPR teams, which are deployed at airports
and on transit. They provide a random, unannounced, highly-visible
supplemental security presence.
CTA has also received dogs from the TSA's Explosive Detection
Canine Team Program. The K-9s are funded through DHS and are part of
the Chicago Police Department's Transportation Section.
The dogs are paired with handlers to detect explosives and are used
to respond to reports of unattended or suspicious items. These dogs are
trained to find improvised explosive devices and are used on trains,
buses, platforms, and stations.
DHS funding has allowed CTA to fully leverage technology to enhance
security, but the human element is still critical. Training for
employees and encouraging our riders to be part of the security
presence is an important part of our efforts.
The FTA has launched a Nation-wide safety and security awareness
program--called Transit Watch--which encourages transit passengers and
employees to report anything suspicious or dangerous.
The CTA's ``See Something-Say Something'' campaign is similar to
the Transit Watch program and provides information and instructions to
transit passengers and employees so that they know what to do and whom
to contact in the event of an emergency. This campaign was borrowed
from the MTA in 2002 and encourages riders to report any suspicious
activity they observe.
In addition, CTA has participated and continues to participate in
training for a number of scenarios using a range of programs. We have
increased the frequency of our system checks, tightened access, and
continually train our operations, facilities, and maintenance employees
to recognize suspicious activity, packages, or substances. CTA
participates in drills involving the Chicago Police Department, Chicago
Fire Department, OEMC and other agencies regarding bomb threats, fires,
and HAZMAT situations.
For everything I have mentioned, DHS funding has been the resource
that has made these measures possible. Without that funding, none of
these efforts could continue. Neither the State of Illinois, city of
Chicago, or CTA has the financial resources to support these efforts.
Unfortunately, Congress was recently forced to tighten its fiscal
belt, and the FEMA Transit Security grants that the CTA receives
annually took a one-sixth cut to its fiscal year 2011 budget--from $300
million to $250 million. Last year the CTA received $6.8 million under
this program, and the CTA will put the money to good use to install
security cameras on 400 rail cars this year. The CTA had planned to use
future funds to install cameras on the rest of its rail cars in 2012,
but the 16 percent cut will likely force the CTA to finish installing
these important cameras in 2013 or 2014 at the earliest.
Before I close, I would be remiss if I didn't comment on the good
news that President Obama announced late Sunday night, and how a
subsequent heightened state of alert impacts agencies like the CTA. The
CTA actively monitors terrorism-related threats, incidents, and events
locally, Nationally, and internationally. When circumstances warrant,
such as the death of Osama bin Laden, the CTA takes a number of steps
of steps to ensure our employees and customers remain vigilant.
Steps include communicating with our Federal, State, and local
partners; re-issuing security bulletins to remind employees of what
activities to look for and what steps to take should they encounter any
suspicious or criminal activity during the course of their duties; and
reminding our customers that vigilance and awareness of their
surroundings is an important part of our safety efforts and encouraging
them to report any unusual or suspicious activity to 9-1-1 or to CTA
personnel.
In a free country, there is no such thing as a closed and perfect
system. Transit systems across the country are inherently open
environments designed to move people quickly to their destinations. It
is a careful balance to strike between security and personal mobility
but we feel that we have found a good balance. We are determined to
make our system as safe and user-friendly as possible, and to provide
ready transportation consistent with the commitment to safety.
Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify here
today. I will be happy to answer any questions from you or the other
distinguished Members of the committee.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman King. Thank you very much, Mr. Rodriguez.
Our next witness is Deputy Chief Daniel Hartwig of the Bay
Area Rapid Transit.
Chief Hartwig was just appointed to his position, I
believe, about 6 weeks ago, and I congratulate you on that. It
comes after 29 years of service with BART. I want to thank you
for your service.
I now am pleased to recognize you for as close to 5 minutes
as you can be. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF DANIEL O. HARTWIG, DEPUTY CHIEF OF OPERATIONS,
BART POLICE DEPARTMENT, SAN FRANCISCO BAY AREA RAPID TRANSIT
(BART)
Mr. Hartwig. Good morning, Chairman King, Ranking Member
Thompson, and Members of the committee. My name is Dan Hartwig,
and I am the deputy chief of police of operations at the San
Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District Police Department,
also known as BART.
On behalf of BART's board of directors, our 3,500
employees, and our 350,000 daily riders, I appreciate the
opportunity to be given the chance to testify before you today.
BART's role as a backbone of the region's transportation
network is borne out both by what happens on a normal day and
by what happens when circumstances are atypical. A normal
weekday for BART means providing on-time service for about
350,000 Bay-area residents across 105 miles of trackway, 44
stations, in 4 counties and 26 cities. Most often, as a law
enforcement agency, we provide a safe and secure environment
for those within our system.
The most recent atypical day we experienced was November 3,
2010, when the BART system carried 522,200 customers to the San
Francisco Giants World Series Championship victory parade. The
presence of large crowds traveling through the BART facilities
for special events, such as the Giants celebration, presents a
predictable, target-rich environment for terrorist attacks and
magnifies the risk and consequence of a terror attack that
transit systems face daily.
The attack in Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004; the attacks
on London, England, on July 7 and 21, 2005; and the attack in
Mumbai, India, on November 26, 2008, illustrates with alarming
clarity the vulnerability of public transit facilities.
The United States Department of Homeland Security warns
that the Nation's mass transit systems, which are considered to
be a part of America's critical infrastructure, are at high
risk of being targeted by terrorists for mass casualty attacks.
Soon after September 11, BART's administration aggressively
focused upon identifying targets vulnerable to acts of
terrorism in the BART system. After completing four threat and
vulnerability assessments with three Government agencies and
one private security firm, early on BART identified a need to
complete an estimated $250 million in security projects.
Recognizing its most critical and vulnerable asset, BART
immediately invested capital funds to begin the hardening
process.
On Friday, July 8, 2005, representatives from TSA knocked
on BART's door, offering partnership and support in the wake of
the tragic attack on London's transportation systems, thus
beginning our partnership that continues to this day. Beginning
in 2003 and continuing through 2005, Urban Area Security
Initiative dollars helped to fund the specific projects to
further harden the critical infrastructure within the BART
system.
Receiving Transit Security Grant Program funds in 2006
through 2010 has allowed for the expansion of these security
projects to address the identified security needs of other
vulnerable critical assets. Today, we continue to use Transit
Security Grant Program funds, as well as other local, State,
and Federal funds, to strategically and methodically eliminate
identified vulnerabilities from the previously mentioned threat
and vulnerability assessments.
The engineering challenges to protect and mitigate the
effects of a terrorist attack have been greater than originally
imagined. Understanding the required expertise needed, we have
and continue to rely upon the Department of Homeland Security
and the Transportation Security Administration for support and
direction. Without their unwavering commitment to BART
specifically and to our allied transportation systems, our
ability to achieve success would be extremely limited.
Due to the environment in which our system is located, the
complexity of security projects has exceeded our local
resources, and it is the support from DHS and TSA that enables
us to move these security projects forward.
As for passenger screening, from the beginning it was clear
that post-9/11 security measures that were developed for
airports would not work in the subway systems for America. BART
is the Bay Area Rapid Transit, and if we lose the ``rapid,'' we
cease to serve our customers and the region. Although BART is a
fairly new system, our infrastructure was not designed to
accommodate the space and equipment required to screen large
numbers of passengers. Current technology cannot process large
numbers of passengers quickly enough for the mass transit
environment.
Further proof of the success brought to BART by DHS and TSA
are the following projects and programs: Financial support for
major capital projects to harden BART's critical
infrastructure; TSA explosive K-9s; Operational Pack funding
for our Critical Asset Patrol Team assigned to our critical
asset corridor; training for BART's front-line employees on
terrorism awareness and identification; VIPR teams partnering
with BART police officers to patrol critical assets and special
events; RailSafe, linking transit agencies across the country
at the same date and time, focusing on high visibility within
transit properties.
I would implore to you today, the funding source for
transportation agencies to solidify their properties is needed
now more than ever. We have failed in the past to pay close
attention to a threat that we considered to be foreign. We now
know the same threat exists within our own homeland. As we
approach the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, we cannot
allow complacency to undermine our efforts to keep America
secure.
Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the
committee, on behalf of BART Police Chief Kenton Rainey and the
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, thank you for
inviting me to testify today. I am also willing to answer any
questions.
[The statement of Mr. Hartwig follows:]
Prepared Statement of Daniel O. Hartwig
May 4, 2011
Good morning, Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson and Members of
the Committee on Homeland Security. My name is Dan Hartwig and I am a
Deputy Chief of Police for Operations at the San Francisco Bay Area
Rapid Transit District Police Department, also known as BART.
On behalf of BART's Board of Directors, our 3,500 employees and our
350,000 daily riders, I appreciate being given the opportunity to
testify before you today.
BART's role as the backbone of the region's transportation network
is borne out both by what happens on a normal weekday and by what
happens when circumstances are atypical.
A normal weekday for BART means providing on-time service for about
350,000 Bay Area residents across 105 miles of track, 44 stations in 4
counties and 26 cities.
Most often, as a law enforcement agency we provide a safe and
secure environment for those within our system. The most recent
atypical day we experienced was November 3, 2010 when BART system
carried 522,200 customers to the San Francisco Giants' World Series
Championship victory parade. The presence of large crowds traveling
through the BART facilities for special events, such as the Giants'
celebration, presents a predictable, target-rich environment for terror
attacks and magnifies the risk and consequence of a terror attack that
transit systems face daily.
The attack in Madrid, Spain on March 11, 2004, the attacks in
London, England on July 7 and 21, 2005 and the attack in Mumbai, India
on November 26, 2008 illustrate with alarming clarity the vulnerability
of public transit facilities. The United States Department of Homeland
Security warns that the Nation's mass transit systems, which are
considered to be part of America's ``critical infrastructure,'' are at
high risk of being targeted by terrorists for mass casualty attacks.
Soon after September 11, 2001 BART's administration aggressively
focused upon identifying targets vulnerable to acts of terrorism in the
BART system. After completing four threat/vulnerability assessments
with three Government agencies and one private security firm, early on
BART identified a need to complete an estimated $250 million in
security projects. Recognizing its most critical and vulnerable asset,
BART immediately invested capital funds to begin the hardening process.
On Friday, July 8, 2005 representatives from TSA knocked on BART's
door offering partnership and support in the wake to the tragic attack
on London's transportation systems thus beginning our partnership that
continues to this day.
Beginning in 2003 and continuing through 2005, Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) dollars helped to fund the specific projects to
further harden the critical infrastructure of the BART system.
Receiving Transit Security Grant Program (TSGP) funds in 2006
through 2010 has allowed for the expansion of these security projects
to address the identified security needs of other vulnerable critical
assets.
Today we continue to use Transit Security Grant Program funds, as
well as other local, State, and Federal funds, to strategically and
methodically eliminate identified vulnerabilities from the previously
mentioned threat/vulnerability assessments.
The engineering challenges to protect and mitigate the effects of a
terrorist attack have been greater than originally imagined.
Understanding the required expertise needed, we have, and continue to,
rely upon the Department of Homeland Security and the Transportation
Security Administration for support and direction. Without their
unwavering commitment to BART specifically, and to our allied
transportation systems, our ability to achieve success would be
extremely limited.
Due to the unique environment in which our system is located, the
complexity of the security projects has exceeded our local resources
and it is the support from DHS and TSA that enables us to move these
security projects forward.
As for passenger screening, from the beginning, it was clear that
the post-9/11 security measures that were developed for airports would
not work in the subway systems of America. BART is Bay Area RAPID
Transit and if we lose the rapid, we cease to serve our customers and
the region. Although BART is a fairly new system, our infrastructure
was not designed to accommodate the space and equipment required to
screen large numbers of passengers and current technology cannot
process large numbers of passengers quickly enough for the mass transit
environment.
Further proof of the successes brought to us by DHS and TSA are the
following projects and programs:
Financial support for major capital projects to harden
BART's critical infrastructure;
TSA Explosives Detection K-9 Program;
Operational Pack funding the Critical Asset Patrol Team
assigned to the critical asset corridor;
Training for BART's front-line employees on terrorism
awareness and identification;
Visible Intermodal Protection and Response (VIPR) teams
partnering with BART police officers to patrol critical assets
and special events;
RailSafe, linking transit agencies across the country on the
same date and time focusing on ``high visibility'' within our
properties.
I would implore to you today, the funding source for Transportation
agencies to solidify their properties is needed now more than ever. We
have failed in the past to pay close attention to a threat that was
considered foreign. We now know the same threat exist in our own
homeland.
As we approach the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, we cannot
allow complacency to undermine our efforts to keep America secure.
Chairman King, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the Committee on
Homeland Security: On behalf of BART Police Chief Kenton Rainey and the
San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District, thank you for inviting
me to testify today, I can now answer any questions you may have.
Chairman King. Thank you very much, Chief Hartwig.
I want to thank all the witnesses.
My first question would be to Commissioner Daddario. In all
the years I have known Ray Kelly, the only time I saw him
really show concern was the night before Zazi was apprehended,
because the NYPD knew the plot had become operational, that
within 12 or 24 hours we could have had massive explosions on
the New York City subway system.
Can you put in some context what that plan would have
achieved if it had been carried out, if Zazi and his
confederates, his co-conspirators had been able to carry out
that plan, the impact it would have had on the New York City
subway system?
Mr. Daddario. Mr. Chairman, all these attacks on subway
systems are designed not to cause the system's infrastructure
to collapse; they are designed to terrorize the public, so as
to cause people to have grave concerns about boarding a train,
going to work, going to visit friends, going about their lives.
That type of terror, if applied in any type of consistent
way, could--would, in fact--substantially diminish the economic
life of a city, the vitality of the city. To a city like New
York, if you do that to the subway system, you are essentially
choking the city, sort of choking the air out of the city.
You potentially could--and this is, I think, part of the
whole reason why you attack transit systems, is you hope that
it will bring the life of the city to a--to basically kill it,
kind of impose a level of fear over the population so that all
of the activities that we need to engage in on a daily basis to
keep the city strong, vital, alive would be substantially
diminished.
That was the major concern about Zazi. Something like that
has not happened in New York. We want to make sure that it
doesn't happen, that everyone feels that they can board the
trains, move about freely.
I heard Mr. Fugate say how he uses, you know, the subway,
goes on Amtrak. He depends on it. He wants to be able to do
that without feeling he is going to be blown up or have someone
come in and shoot him to death.
I think every Member of this committee understands how
important mass transit is and public transportation is to the
economic life of the United States and its major cities--and
not just its economic life, its cultural life, its life. I
mean, moving about is not just a matter of finances and
economics; it is a question of how people live. What these
terrorist attacks are designed to do is to really attack our
way of life, to attack not just subways but all kinds of
activities in the public sphere so as to, you know, bring
life--ordinary, regular life that people depend on to an end.
So, we feel that the investments that this committee has
supported over the years is extraordinarily important. We
depend in large part on Federal funding to help us achieve the
type of security we want. We know we have the continued support
of the committee, you know, given these current budgetary
constraints, with the type of mission that we are engaged in,
Mr. Fugate, Mr. Pistole, and everyone here at this table is
engaged in day-to-day.
Chairman King. Okay.
Director Pistole, you touched on it in your testimony. Can
you amplify more on the VIPR system, how successful you think
it has been, how accepted it is, and do you see it expanding at
all--do you see the need to expand it? Explain what it is,
really, so all the Members will understand what it consists of.
Mr. Pistole. Mr. Chairman, the whole premise behind the
Visible Intermodal Protection and Response Teams are to provide
just that, an unpredictable deterrent to those who may want to
cause harm. So whether it is the 7/7 bombers in London who--
obviously, the five with the backpacks--nine backpacks; it is a
question of how many other people may have been involved.
The idea is, if we can present a visible presence, police
presence, ideally with K-9, CCTV--we know from debriefings of
people who have cooperated once they have pled that the three
main deterrents are the uniformed presence of a police officer,
a K-9, and CCTV. Now, the first two are absolutely the best.
CCTV is good if you don't have a suicide bomber. But, as we
know with the 7/7 bombers and the attempted ones on 7/21 of
2005 in London, that suicide bombers, one of them actually
looked at the CCTV before going in the London Underground.
So the idea is to be a deterrent. The measure of success is
difficult to quantify to say, did we deter a terrorist attack
today? The whole point is to attempt to deter and push off to
another day, which gives the rest of the intelligence
community, the law enforcement community, the opportunity to
identify and intercept a putative terrorist.
Chairman King. Thank you.
The Ranking Member is recognized.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Fugate, you referenced an MOU that has been signed
between FEMA and TSA. Could you make that MOU available to the
committee?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Is your testimony that it covers those items
that previously had been identified as weaknesses in the
system?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir. In addition to that, as you pointed
out, the performance measures are being implemented in the 2011
grant cycle, as recommended by the IG. So I think that we would
be more than happy to provide back to you and your staff and to
the committee as a whole the actions we have taken to address
the IG and General Accounting Office findings.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you. I am convinced that is an
important aspect.
To the operators of transit systems--and we will start with
New York first, if that is all right. If these funds were not
available to provide security enhancements, what would New York
have to do?
Mr. Daddario. Well, if they weren't made available, we
would have to try to find money from--we would have to try to
strip money away from other types of activities we are engaged
in that protect the public. Because, remember, the mission of
the police department----
Chairman King. Would you use the microphone?
Mr. Daddario. I am sorry.
If the money wasn't available, we would have to try to find
money from other sources, from State and local tax revenues, to
support our counterterrorism activities.
Some of what we do simply wouldn't be possible. The Domain
Awareness System that we have created, which is a fiberoptic
link around the city where we have computers which gather up
information from cameras, license plate readers, other data
sources in real time, simply wouldn't be possible without
Federal money, for example.
Some of our deployments that we have, where we really put
enormous amounts of officers on the platforms, would be very,
very difficult without Federal money. I think it would
compromise the level of security we have, quite frankly.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Rodriguez.
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, sir. The Chicago Transit Authority, the
only means that we would have for actually finding any
additional funds separate from the Department of Homeland
Security funds would be our operational funds. We generate half
of our own revenues from fare boxes, from our customers, from
advertisements and concessions. The other half truly comes in--
it is subsidized from sales taxes and a small amount from real
estate transfer taxes, both of which, unfortunately, given the
economic condition of our country, have been very challenging
for the past 2 years.
So if the question that you are posing is where we would
find the money, the answer is operational funds, meaning I
would have to further reduce service than what has already been
done. Unfortunately, Chicago Transit Authority, in February of
last year, had to reduce about 18 percent of our bus hours
service. So basically cut service about 20 percent across not
just the city of Chicago but the 40 suburbs that we service as
well. About 9 percent are rail hours, the number of hours that
we provide service on our railroad, as well.
We had to downsize our organization by 10 percent. So we
have taken a significant hit in terms of the capacity and the
service that we are able to provide. Any further reduction in
funds from Department of Homeland Security would impact that.
Separate and apart from that, there is about $50 million
that both the CTA and the Chicago Police Department, combined,
spend annually on safety and security-related expenses that are
not reimbursed by Department of Homeland Security. So, separate
from that, there is a greater need, as well.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Hartwig.
Mr. Hartwig. Sir, without the ability to continue the
partnerships that we have developed through these funding
services that are located from Federal sources, I fear that we
would cease to exist and cease to provide the level of security
that we currently have.
The restrictions placed upon State and local funding
resources in the State of California are extremely diminished.
I would agree with Mr. Rodriguez that we would refer to an
operational contribution, which would further impact the
services we supply at BART.
The value of these partnerships and the value of the funds
to complete these security projects, if they did not exist, we
would work with what we have, we would try to achieve more with
less. We would not achieve the success levels that we currently
experience.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, a point--I think you made it--is, given some
of the challenges that we are facing right now, I think it is
inconceivable that we ought to, as Members of Congress and this
committee, vote to cut any transit security dollars. Some
Members of this committee already have voted earlier in the
year to do that. I would just say that any further cuts, based
on the testimony from New York, Chicago, and the Bay area would
be absolutely detrimental.
So I would just like to make sure the record reflects that
this testimony from people who do it every day, as well as the
individuals who administer the programs for us, that the
personnel, the K-9s, the other enhancements that have gone into
securing these facilities would be seriously jeopardized if any
further cuts were made.
I yield back.
Chairman King. Yeah, I thank the Ranking Member.
I would just add to that, I know New York, and I assume the
other municipalities too, but New York certainly gets a very
small percentage in reimbursement compared to what it spends on
homeland security. So, as it is, the situation is tough enough
in New York with over a thousand police officers dedicated to
counterterrorism, and a significant portion of that on the mass
transit system.
With that, I recognize the gentleman from Alabama, the
Chairman of the subcommittee, Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. The only question I had was on the VIPR system,
for Mr. Pistole. Are these VIPR groups deployed solely based on
risk, or is there another criteria?
Mr. Pistole. Congressman Rogers, it is primarily based on
risk. We are obviously trying to make sure that we are in those
locations and at those times which present the greatest risk.
There may be some other criteria simply based on some ad-hoc
requirements or something, but almost always based on risk,
yes.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
That is all I have, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. The gentleman yields back.
I recognize the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Davis, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Davis. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank you for calling this hearing and thank all of the
witnesses for coming.
Mr. Rodriguez, I know that your tenure is about to expire
as president of the Chicago Transit Authority. I want to take
this opportunity to commend you for your tremendous public
service to not only the citizens of Chicago but certainly to
the Nation, because Chicago, as we know, is the transportation
hub and center of transportation for the Nation. So the
outstanding work that you have done as commissioner of
aviation, as well as the head of the Chicago Transit Authority,
speaks volumes for what you have meant to our city as well as
for the country. So thank you very much for that service.
You testified that the Chicago Transit Authority had
received high marks in all categories of security inspection.
My question is, one, how did you manage to obtain that rating
from Homeland Security? What is it that we need to do to make
sure that Chicago's Transit Authority can continue in the vein
that you have led it?
Mr. Rodriguez. Thank you very much for the kind words,
Congressman.
The two things that I can say to respond to both your
questions, No. 1, is, having obtained the high grades, I would
almost look to my colleague, Mr. Pistole here, who is the one
who came and gave us the reward on having received high marks.
But the reality is that we have a great team. We have a great
person, for example, Amy Kovalan, who is sitting directly
behind me, the chief of safety and security for the entire
organization. I give her full credit for having obtained the
award that we received.
But, more importantly, to your second question, is what it
is that you can do to help us continue doing what we are doing
is it is a funding issue. The bottom line is that it is a
funding issue. As I had mentioned, separate and apart from the
grants that we currently receive, we out-of-pocket an
additional $50 million per year, both ourselves in combination
with the Chicago Police Department, on transit security-related
services. So any thought of reducing what we already receive
would be extremely detrimental to our system.
Again, keeping in mind that our name is somewhat of a
misnomer, although we are called the Chicago Transit Authority,
we serve the region, the city of Chicago and 40 different
suburbs. So it would be detrimental to the economy of the
entire region if we had to somehow continue to reduce service
to upkeep the security initiatives that we have in place.
So it is additional funding, sir.
Mr. Davis. Well, I want to thank you very much.
I want to echo the sentiments that were expressed by the
Ranking Member and by the Chairman, that it appears to me that
funding is absolutely essential--and that is, funding from the
Federal Government level. I don't see any way that State and
local governments can provide what is needed.
So I again commend you for your outstanding service.
Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions and would yield
back the balance of my time.
Chairman King. I would thank the gentleman.
I would ask the record to show that I showed restraint when
you said that Chicago is the leading transit system in the
country.
I want to join you in thanking Mr. Rodriguez for his
service.
I recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania, former United
States Attorney, Mr. Marino.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I can't compete with New York or other large metropolitan
areas, but, being a U.S. Attorney, I do understand what these
gentlemen have to deal with on a daily basis, and I certainly
appreciate what you do.
Aside from the funding--and we know that is the critical
aspect here--could each of you take about a minute, because I
have less than 5 minutes, and describe your relationship with
other agencies--Federal, State, and local--and how that is
going? I am not asking you to be critical, but I am asking you
to state the facts and how thorough we are in exchanging
information and cooperating from top to bottom and side to
side.
So, Mr. Pistole, please.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, sir.
So, for TSA, since I started last July, one of the first
things I learned is that TSA obviously can't be all things to
all people in all places at all times, when it comes to threat
mitigation, and recognizing that we can never fully eliminate
the risk, but we can do a lot of things in terms of mitigating
the risk.
But the best we do that is through our partnerships, and
whether it is through grant funding, whether it is through
joint training--I think agencies that train together perform
well together. It also gets to the issue of resiliency because,
unfortunately, I believe that it is not a question of if but
when there will be an attack here on the homeland.
So how do we prepare for that attack, and then how can we
respond to it; information sharing is a key part of that.
I will just try to keep my answer brief there.
Mr. Marino. Thank you.
Mr. Fugate.
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir. As the grant administrator, we work
with a lot of partners. But I have to, for your benefit and for
the Chairman's benefit, I cannot express how glad I am that
John Pistole took the position as the administrator of TSA. I
think we have a much stronger working relationship.
Obviously, when we are working with our locals, it is
important that DHS speaks with one voice, as they are the
subject-matter experts for the grant administrator. I think
John has been a strong partner in improving that relationship.
I cannot give him enough credit. He was instrumental in helping
us get the MOU with TSA and FEMA to make sure that we are
serving our locals and States with one voice from DHS.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Daddario.
Mr. Daddario. Yes, Congressman, we have, I think, an
excellent relationship with TSA and FEMA. We also have a very
close relationship with Federal law enforcement and the
intelligence community. We have over 120 detectives and other
officers at the JTTF in New York. We also have officers here at
LX-1 and NCTC and other Federal agencies and law enforcement
and public safety agencies.
We have very good relationships with the MTA, the
Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the Port Authority,
Amtrak, Long Island Rail Road, New Jersey Transit. We, in fact,
host various meetings to coordinate rail transit safety and
security issues. We also have very good relationships with
local law enforcement offices in the region through various
programs we have, where we have outreach and liaison
relationships, including joint training operations with other
law enforcement offices.
So I would say, overall, we have excellent relationships,
both Federal, State, and local.
Mr. Marino. Thank you.
Mr. Rodriguez.
Mr. Rodriguez. I would echo the exact same sentiment. I
would give accolades of the amount of information that we
receive in our region. We work very well with the Joint
Terrorism Task Force on the FBI side. We work very well with
FEMA, with the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, as well.
What the city of Chicago, I think, has done very well for
the past number of years is, we have what is called the Office
of Emergency Management and Communications. It is the hub for
Federal agencies, for State agencies, and city agencies to
communicate about any type of disaster preparedness for the
city of Chicago and its region.
So, one of the things, too, that I think has improved our
communication over the past few years has been the ability for
us to federate our CCTV network, our cameras. So the Chicago
Transit Authority, along with police networks and Federal
agencies, all have access to our cameras.
If you look at the transit system, as it spreads out from
the central business district and out through the region, we
have one of the best fiberoptic networks in the entire region,
and everyone loves to use our system. We welcome the use of our
system and of our cameras. So thousands of cameras, I think,
has improved the ability for us to communicate effectively and
very well.
Mr. Marino. Thank you.
Mr. Hartwig.
Mr. Hartwig. Congressman, twice yearly, sponsored by FEMA,
TSA, the safety/security executives from, I believe, the 50
largest transportation agencies meet. The expertise and the
knowledge that is exchanged at those meetings is invaluable.
That said, BART will celebrate its 40th year of service
September 11, this coming September 11. The gentlemen at this
table, the ladies and gentlemen in this audience, provide
support to my system specifically.
We are basically in the embryo stage of the transportation
business. I make many phone calls. I don't have a lot of
answers, myself personally, but I know a lot of people that
point me in the right direction. So the contacts that are
created through these transportation and safety and security
opportunities, again, are invaluable. Without the support of
these agencies represented here today, we would struggle.
Mr. Marino. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman King. I thank the gentleman.
I recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, for
5 minutes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
thank you for this hearing.
I think the more frequently we address our responsibilities
in oversight and security, the more effective and important our
committee becomes, in light of the recent incidents that showed
how great America is. I could not be in a Homeland Security
hearing without expressing, again, my appreciation to all of
the National security team, including our United States
military and the President of the United States, for a historic
effort that resulted in the demise of the face of terrorism,
Osama bin Laden.
That doesn't in any way diminish the responsibility of
those of you at this table for the general responsibility of
your jobs in Chicago and, I believe, San Francisco. Then the
administrators here in Washington, we now have the
responsibility to be ever ready for the potential of collateral
damage. So this hearing is enormously important for these
grants' focus on the infrastructure of transportation and how
we are continuing our protection.
Let me also acknowledge my concern and sympathy for those
in Alabama. My colleague and Chairman of the committee I serve
as Ranking Member on had his community impacted. I know that we
are forever vigilant on being able to help the people of the
region that suffered with the massive tornados.
Mr. Fugate, I would appreciate your returning my phone call
on the issues that I have just expressed, and I look forward to
us getting a meeting scheduled. I also would like, as an aside,
an update on the response to the fires in Texas. So, if your
staff can get with my staff, I would appreciate it.
What I do want to inquire--and I do want to add my
appreciation for the immediate work for FEMA that I perceived
as this tragedy moved forward. Let me just ask you quickly:
What is the role of FEMA in the transportation security grants?
Just very quickly, because I wanted to speak to Mr. Pistole,
please.
Mr. Fugate. Yes, ma'am. Our primary role is to administer
the grant programs to provide the oversight and monitoring of
the performance of those grants. But the subject-matter experts
is really with the Transportation Security Administration.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me say that you have done that well,
and my next points will not be a reflection on how FEMA has
handled it.
Let me, Mr. Pistole, focus on something that I am
particularly concerned about. You are quoted that, ``Surface
inspectors are the jack of all trades.'' If you believe that
they are specialists enough, would you call them experts? Would
you call the surface inspectors experts? If so, what kind of
experts are they? What is their educational background and
years of experience, in terms of the people that you would
hire? Because I think this is very much a part of the grants.
What kind of training is provided for surface inspectors? What
is the duration of the training, and how often is this type of
training occurring?
I would also ask the question why we don't merge the whole
administrative and selections process under TSA, because FEMA
certainly has a lot of other responsibilities.
But the main issue is the training of surface inspectors
and what kinds of individuals do you select.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Congresswoman----
Ms. Jackson Lee. How many hours do you believe they should
be in training?
Mr. Pistole. So the general construct is that all of our
surface inspectors go through a 5-week basic training. I
visited those, a class of 23, several weeks ago in Oklahoma
City at the FAA facility there. That basic training is to
ensure that, if we have a surge capacity need in any particular
areas, whether it is cargo, whether it is aviation, whatever it
may be, that they have the ability to assist on that.
Those who go on to specialized training then continue, and
whether it is 1-, 2-, 3-week schools, but that will continue
over the course of their career.
In terms of their baseline qualifications, the class of 23
that I just met with ranged across the board. Most came from
industry themselves, so they have a good understanding and work
experience before ever coming to TSA. So they understand how
things should be done and when things are not working right
what can be done to address it and remediate those problems.
I can, obviously, get you the exact statistics on--or the
figures on the demographics in terms of work experience, age,
all those things. I was struck by--because I went around, I
asked each one to give me their background--I was struck by the
wealth of experience that they brought to the table.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Pistole, it has come to my attention
that there is only 1-week training on surface transportation.
So I need you to explain that. How much training do you need
they need to become experts? I think we have a training
Achilles' heel.
Mr. Pistole. Well, I agree, Congresswoman, that the more
training that they can receive and the better on-the-job
experience and training and just their experience before coming
to TSA are all critical factors. So we are looking to expand
that training to specialize.
But I want every surface inspector to have a broad base,
but I also want to have those that have specialized training--
and they do. It is a question of how much can we do while they
are also doing the critical functions that we ask them to do.
Chairman King. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, could I just put a question
on the record for him to put in writing, please? I just want to
put it on the record.
Chairman King. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Pistole, would you provide me with the
staffing that are your closest advisors and the diversity and
the numbers of years or months that they have been in TSA? I
would like them by diversity and, as well, male/female, et
cetera, and ethnic diversity, your key advisors, please.
Mr. Pistole. Gladly.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
I would yield.
Chairman King. The time of the gentlelady has expired.
The gentleman from Pennsylvania, also a United States
Attorney and the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism and
Intelligence, Mr. Meehan, 5 minutes.
Mr. Meehan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think you probably passed over one of the more important
requirements or qualifications for this, as I used to regularly
take the subway into work when I worked as a U.S. Attorney in
Philadelphia. So I appreciate the tremendous challenges that
all of you are facing.
We have discussed a little bit of the issue today about
funding. That is certainly always a battle. I also appreciate
some of the important oversight responsibilities, because there
is nothing worse than sending money down the line that isn't
well-spent. But there is a real issue with money that is still
out there.
I am referring to a GAO report, Mr. Fugate, that discusses
that in only 3 percent of the funding from 2005 to 2007, in the
study, had found its way down the line. My understanding is
that, as of last year or early this year, we are still looking
at only 13 percent of the funding, which has already been put
in place, that is available, is in the line and being spent.
Where is the problem? What can we do to fix it so that
money that has already been appropriated, that is sitting
there, is well-used?
Mr. Fugate. Well, I think there are several pieces of this,
and I think it is challenging. I served as a State
administrator of agency, and whenever we got into a capital
project where we were going to do construction, we not only
have the grant program itself, we have our own State and local
regulations to work through--bids, construction. As these work
as reimbursement grants, some of these projects take multiple
years to fund and complete.
But we also recognize there is something we can do about
the lack of drawdown, and that is to bring visibility to the
remaining balances that States have that they are clear to
bring and seek reimbursement for. Oftentimes, as we go through
from local to State reimbursement processes and getting those
funds drawn down, by showing those outstanding balances to many
of the senior leadership, it is starting to move those dollars
more rapidly. They are making those requests more timely.
Again, I think this is part of our challenge, is
recognizing that, unlike operational costs, such as dog, K-9
units and other things, that you expend those funds, you seek
your reimbursement in that calendar year. These construction
projects have taken longer.
But we think that one of the key steps is to show the
remaining balances. That is causing a lot of the senior
leadership to recognize the urgency of getting those dollars
not just obligated--this is what we asked, they obligate the
dollars, but to actually draw them down as they complete the
work rapidly, so we can show that those funds have been
received by the State and locals.
Mr. Meehan. Is that where you are largely seeing these
things at least being focused on as construction-based projects
as right now as opposed to operational?
Mr. Fugate. Yes, sir. The operational, we see those coming
much quicker. But, again, as these work up through the system,
we are looking for where bottlenecks are. Oftentimes, through
the reimbursement process, it is important that, as we get
these in, that we actually show--you know, the terminology
sometimes drives me nuts, but the term ``obligated'' means we
spent the money against that grant. But if you haven't drawn
those dollars down, it still shows an outstanding balance.
So we are trying to move past--just merely obligating it
isn't addressing the issue. We actually need you to have those
dollars that have been spent be drawn down to reduce those
outstanding balances.
Mr. Meehan. But we have to get them into a project that is
doing something, as, for instance, enhanced camera security or
the other things.
Mr. Fugate. Yes.
Mr. Meehan. I mean, the essence is to get these protections
on the line.
Let me ask a question. Maybe, Mr. Pistole, you can
participate in the answer of this, as well. To the extent that
we are making these, how do we look to assure that what funding
is put is tied to vulnerability assessments, so that these
dollars that we get are being spent in the ways that the
professionals believe are going to have the greatest impact on
preventing somebody else from carrying out an act of terrorism
in our transportation system?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Congressman. So we work with both
the intelligence community, law enforcement community, and
industry to identify what we collectively see as the most
vulnerable points in the system. So, for example, whether it is
a PATH tunnel between New Jersey, New York, if something
catastrophic happened to one of those, what would be the
impact, not just to the loss of human life, but the economic
impact, as was described earlier.
So there is a thorough assessment that is done. There is a
ranking of those that is obviously closely held. We don't
publish that, obviously. But it is--obviously, we will make it
available to the committee. So we look at that and say, how can
we then use and basically invest those funds in the most
prudent way to buy down that risk?
So we can't just spread out the money everywhere across the
country. In my hometown in Indiana, there has been--all the
years I have been doing this, there has never been anything in
the threat matrix identifying that hometown as a target. So we
try to look at those areas where there is the greatest risk and
vulnerability and how can we apply that money in a coordinated
fashion.
Mr. Meehan. Just one closing comment. I know in the
aftermath of the very wonderful events that happened just the
other day, I know we are also quite aware of the potential for
repercussions. One of the first places that we all look are in
the transit systems. I want to express my appreciation to those
of you who are on the front lines. I know you are already
beginning to work in a collaborative fashion to try to
strengthen the utilization of the resources we have dedicated
to it to keep them safer at this sensitive time. So good luck
to you.
Thanks.
Chairman King. I thank the gentleman.
The gentlelady from New York is recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Clarke of New York. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our Ranking Member.
Let me also thank our panelists for bringing their
expertise to bear on this very important hearing their morning.
My question is really to those of you who operate transit
systems. As has already been stated by a number of my
colleagues, in the wake of the demise of Osama bin Laden, we
must all prepare ourselves for possible retaliatory events. I
want to use this opportunity to implore all Americans to remain
vigilant and to remember if they see something to say
something.
Terrorist events around the world have shown that mass
transit systems, like other modes of transportation, are
oftentimes targets of attack. New York City has one of the
largest subway systems in the world, as well as one of the most
complex and intricate bus transportation networks. Millions of
people ride these systems every day. A plot to attack the New
York City subway system has been thwarted in September 2009.
The Metropolitan Transportation Authority has worked hard to
keep passengers safe, as I know our other transit systems have.
My question is: How would these cuts in transit security,
in the Transit Security Grant Program, potentially hurt your
progress made in training workers, equipment upgrades, and
repairing the system?
I personally believe that we must at least support a
maintenance of effort in terms of funding. But, at best, I
think we should consider a line-item funding from our Federal
budget that would keep our Nation's mass transit systems in a
forward-leaning posture. So I want to ask that of you.
Then, if you could, in the remaining time, also address
what your agencies are doing to exercise evacuation plans. The
public does not hear enough about that, and I know that, having
witnessed what took place on 9/11, there is always mass
hysteria.
So I would like you to try to tackle both those questions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Daddario. Congresswoman, certainly, if there is a
reduction in funding, it will compromise, to some extent, the
security of the transit system. There will have to be
reductions in training, some of the deployments we use. Quite
frankly, it would be impossible to compensate for the loss of
Federal money from local revenues. I just think that is--just
common sense tells you that.
With respect to evacuation plans, the police department has
evacuation plans for each bureau. We also have--I believe the
Office of Emergency Management, working right now with Federal
DHS money, on a catastrophic study which involves evacuation,
as well. The police department will begin working with OEM on
that, as well.
So from the New York City Police Department perspective, we
think we have sound evacuation plans in place.
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, ma'am. To answer that question, the
city of Chicago, along with, as I had mentioned earlier, the
Office of Emergency Management and Communications is basically
the centerpiece of us conducting any types of evacuations, both
in our subway systems and across the city itself. So they
pulled together the Chicago Police Department, the Chicago Fire
Department, Federal agencies as well. We have done some
exercises basically evacuating downtown areas completely in
case of an emergency. That is something that the mayor has done
very aggressively in his tenure there. The CTA and our network
has been used to basically reverse commute and move everyone
out, if that is the case.
So in terms of those types of evacuations, those continue.
They are funded with Department of Homeland Security funding,
so that would be a huge blow to us.
Separate and apart from that, I would very much welcome a
steady stream of on-going funds, because the reality is, again,
taking the cameras as a topic, as we have been discussing, is
the initiatives that we have to continue installing cameras,
thermal cameras, in our subway systems and throughout our
entire network. We would have to delay the project.
It is not just a one-time installation. Technology changes;
we have to continue maintaining these. We have cameras on our
system that are analog that are 5-year-old technology. With the
high-definition type of technology that is available now, I am
able to install one camera in the place of five old ones.
So, as technology continues to advance, we have to continue
making that investment. Analytics on the cameras, too, which
will require much less human monitoring of the cameras. So, as
technology advances, that is an on-going investment. A steady
stream of funds, a line item, as you say, would be very much
welcomed.
Mr. Hartwig. Congresswoman, again, on the funding issue,
the boots on the ground, uniforms, the front-line employees,
the people involved within my system that have received
training about terrorism awareness and recognition, will serve
them forever. That is a given.
What we will fail to have is to have the ability to do
enhanced layers of security that have a serious cost to them
within our infrastructure--technology.
My property has a unique, unique location, the second-
longest underwater tube in the world. The design process alone
is a huge challenge. How does that translate in what we look
at? In 1989, Loma Prieta earthquake. We represent earthquake
country in California. Our evacuation plans are directly tied
to the Office of Emergency Services. It is kind of a unique
system. When you look at a transportation agency, it is to
first get the people out of the transportation location and
control that chaos. We have witnessed it. We have been very
lucky. The lessons learned from those opportunities are to
enhance those evacuation plans. We train on a regular basis,
most recently 3 weeks ago, with all of our local first
responders within northern California and specifically the city
of Oakland, not just police and firefighters, medical, offices
of emergency services. Those drills go on on a regular basis. I
think we are well-prepared.
The training aspect is a fully funded source, as well. We
need those funds to continue to provide layers of security.
Training is at the top of the list.
Chairman King. Your time has expired.
The gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Walsh, is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Walsh. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member and
all the guests who came to testify.
Mr. Pistole, quick question. TSA has more than doubled the
size of its inspectors in its Surface Transportation Security
Inspection Program in the last few years. Explain how TSA
assesses how this increased number of inspectors is actually
improving security and where they are most needed.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Congressman.
There are a number of areas. I will highlight the most
significant.
One is in our Certified Cargo Screening Program. So we use
inspectors to go in and actually inspect over 1,160 companies
that do screening of cargo that go either on cargo planes or,
as we know, most go on passenger planes. So as opposed to TSA
trying to do that all ourselves, we work with private industry
to assure that that cargo is being properly screened,
especially given the Yemen cargo plot that we saw last October.
That allows us to trust, but we need to verify, in the sense
that we have to inspect each of those to ensure that they are
doing it to our standards.
I will note that we have found several instances where some
of that screening was being falsified. So there are on-going
investigations, both civil and criminal, as to individuals who
have certified they were doing the screening when it was not
being properly done.
So that is a key area. There are other areas, but that is
one of the biggest areas as we continue trying to promote the
free flow of goods and commerce and people with the best
possible security.
Mr. Walsh. Great, thanks.
To our guests operating the transit system, quick question
about training. What sorts of training do your workers receive
when it comes to security matters? Do we distinguish between,
you know, ticket agents and mechanics and the various types of
training they receive when it comes to security issues? If you
could each touch upon that.
Mr. Daddario. The police department provides security
through its police officers, so our training is primarily
provided to police officers. They receive a whole range of
training, including how to utilize certain equipment, like
bomb-detection equipment, to detect terrorist activities, how
to respond in the case of someone with a gun or a bomb, what is
the right type of response. Training is of that type. Much of
that training is provided with transportation security grant
moneys.
Mr. Walsh. Mr. Rodriguez.
Mr. Rodriguez. So, similar to what has just been said is we
look to the Chicago Police Department, Chicago Fire Department,
and those agencies to respond when there is an actual issue or
matter at hand. When it comes to our customers and our actual
employees, we have campaigns, as the one that has been
mentioned here, to see something, say something, for our
customers.
But our employees on hand, our customer assistance, our
actual maintenance--as you had mentioned, just a variety of
different job descriptions throughout the Authority--received
the basic training on how it is to basically remain vigilant.
We put notices out to our employees system-wide, all 10,000 of
them, basically notifying them that they are all to remain
alert and ensure that we are assisting our customers.
So the campaign process is what we use to really notify
everyone throughout the system, but we do also, again, do
individualized training, depending on the individuals, on the
job description.
Mr. Walsh. I mean, to the point where, if a ticket agent
sees a suspicious-looking package, is he or she trained in what
procedures to----
Mr. Rodriguez. Yes, absolutely. Again, we have what is
called our control center, our operations center. Everything
goes and flows through that information center there. Through
that booth there, we have individuals from the Chicago Police
Department, Chicago Fire Department that sit and visit there,
as well from the Federal agencies. So the communication gets
spread out through that hub there.
But individuals such as that are notified that they are
immediately to contact the control center, and we begin with
the experts to address the issue, again, send in whatever teams
need to be sent in to address the issue, be it a bag that is
unidentified--we have oftentimes things like that occur--or
individuals that are basically sometimes tourists who come in
and love to take tons of pictures of our systems. We are not
big fans of individuals coming in and taking pictures of our
system. So they are trained to identify the tourists from the
non-tourists.
Mr. Walsh. Mr. Hartwig.
Mr. Hartwig. Recognizing information from TSA specifically,
in 2007 we took advantage of a funding source from TSA that
trained our frontline employees--our station agents, our system
service workers, those people that interact with our patrons on
a daily basis. The police department recognized, if we want
true information, the best people to receive it from are those
people who work within those systems on a daily basis.
Operations from a trains sense and operations from a police
sense often dynamically oppose each other. The relationship
that we now have with our operations department is to
partnership and rely upon those employees. The distinction
between a suspicious package and a McDonald's bag or
newspapers, there is a big difference. Our agents know, have
learned what that is.
It is an on-going yearly certification program that they go
to. The police department provides updates, again, a source
that was provided by TSA.
Mr. Walsh. Great.
Thank you all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman King. Thank you, Mr. Walsh.
I recognize the gentleman from Massachusetts for 5 minutes,
Mr. Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, I would like to acknowledge the willingness of Mr.
Pistole to help in the airport security issues surrounding the
perimeter and tarmac issues, and I would like to publicly
acknowledge that.
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Keating. My question is more general, and I think it
would be directed at Mr. Pistole. That is, there has been
discussion this morning about the increased threats relating to
the events of the last few days and the killing of Osama bin
Laden. But it was just a few weeks ago that the Secretary of
Homeland Security told us that at no time since 9/11--this was
prior to the more immediate events--at no time since 9/11 has
this country been in greater danger.
I wanted to ask you if that includes, as well, these
increased threats. Does that also include threats to mass
transit? Particularly, my concern is in light of what is going
on in the rest of the world, with increased targets being bus,
rail, and other factors, ports.
So I wanted you to just address, from your perspective, in
mass transit, is that consistent, as well, or is it greater
even, in terms of the Secretary's remarks of the greater
threats we are facing right now?
Mr. Pistole. Thank, Congressman Keating.
I think we are in one of those periods of time where there
are so many unknowns, so many variables, that we are all trying
to ensure that we are vigilant as to those things that have not
come up on the intelligence community or law enforcement
community's radar, whether it is a lone wolf, as was mentioned
earlier, somebody who may be either inspired by what has
happened in this past week to take action on their own.
Without going into detail, of course there are no specific
threats to mass or rail transit right now in the United States.
We are very mindful about what has happened around the world,
particularly since the Madrid bombing back in 2004. So, we see
those vulnerabilities, we see what is happening in Moscow in
the subway there, we see what has--of course, other places
already mentioned.
So I think it is a relative term or assessment as to are we
more vulnerable now or less. The bottom line is we are
concerned today, just as we were yesterday and will be
tomorrow, that terrorists are try to go hurt us or try to kill
us in any means or mode that they can, and recognizing that
transportation is one of those key vulnerabilities that we know
both al-Qaeda, core al-Qaeda, and bin Ladin, Zawahiri, and all
the others, or al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, as we have
seen with the cargo plot and underwear plot coming out of AQAP.
We know that those are key modes that they are trying to
affect, not only our livelihood, and as Administrator Fugate
mentioned about the terrorist impact, but our economy. We saw
from Inspire Magazine, $4,200, you know, on the cargo plot is
all it cost them, and yet the billions that it could impact,
the global supply chain. So those are all things we are focused
on.
Mr. Keating. Quickly, I think this relates to funding as
well, but we have been told that there is greater concern about
domestic-based threats. It would seem to me that mass transit
targets would be easier, for lack of a better word, for
domestic-based threats than others.
So with that as a greater threat--and that has been
consistently told to us, that there is concern for domestic-
based terrorism--is it a feeling of yours that you are a
higher-level target as a result of domestic-based threats than
perhaps other types of threats?
Mr. Pistole. Well, yeah, absolutely, Congressman. I mean,
it complicates--we are not just looking for those coming from
overseas that may be more or easier to identify, hopefully. But
with over 300 million people here, based on my experience in
the FBI and all the investigations that we had on people who
were homegrown or facilitators, enablers, whatever, providing
material support--and, of course, this just going back to what
we have seen with Timothy McVeigh in Oklahoma City and Eric
Rudolph in the clinic bombings in the South or Ted Kaczynski,
the Unabomber. I mean, we have people born and raised here that
have caused us harm and killed hundreds of people, so that is
equally of concern.
Mr. Keating. I yield back the rest of my time, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman King. I thank the gentleman.
The gentlelady from California, Ms. Richardson, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all the witnesses for spending your time with
us today.
Mr. Fugate, last December, the inspector general released a
report on the use of Recovery Act funds by FEMA for TSGP. In
fact, I was a little delayed because I was in a Transportation
meeting discussing the same thing about recovery dollars.
The report provided two charts, one indicating the amounts
disbursed for operational and capital investments and the other
outlaying the amount of jobs that were created directly
correlating with the fund allocations. Some of the mass transit
agencies that received ARRA funds did not reflect any job
creation numbers, while others that received less were able to
create jobs.
Can you please explain how FEMA collects metrics through
which allocates and can be measured to effectively mitigate
threat and, in the case of ARRA funds, stimulate the economy by
creating jobs?
Mr. Fugate. Thank you for the question.
This goes back to even further, originally, findings from
the General Accounting Office and from the inspector general
that we did not have strong performance metrics tied to many of
our grant programs.
In the case of the Transportation Security Grant Program,
we are implementing that for 2011. So we are still having to go
back on Recovery funds and try to get the information and show
those connections and look at what was created.
I think you have pointed out that it was not equal, as we
saw others. Some agencies did create a lot of jobs. Others went
into projects and capital improvements that maybe were not
showing those jobs. So we will work to collect that information
for you.
But we are working to build those tools into the 2011 grant
cycle so we are able to pull out that information and show the
accountability.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you.
Mr. Pistole, on January 26, 2009, you spoke at the TSA
headquarters and stated that we want to put some focus on
surface transportation--rail and transit and the like. Turn
your attention to the following area.
Then my follow-up question is: What actions have you taken
since that speech to focus resources within TSA for programs to
support mass transit security? I know you have been talking
about it today, but specifically in reference to your speech,
what did you do differently?
Mr. Pistole. I am sorry, Congresswoman. You said the speech
was in 2009?
Ms. Richardson. Yes, January 26, 2009.
Mr. Pistole. So I started TSA July 1, 2010, so it may have
been in a different context or something, so I am not quite
sure what that statement was.
But that being said, what I have been focusing on since I
became the administrator last July is ensuring that we can
leverage strategic partnerships, given the funding that we
have, based on TSGP and other opportunities we have for
training, for K-9s, whether it is through--there are a number
of different programs I could go into--I-STEP, different
intelligence-sharing mediums and mechanisms that we have used.
But the key is that it is partnership between industry,
State and local law enforcement, and, obviously, Administrator
Fugate and FEMA. How we can best leverage those limited,
frankly, limited funds that we have in the most informed
fashion that, again, reduces or mitigates risk without trying
to eliminate risk?
Ms. Richardson. Okay. The little whisper in my ear tells me
it was 2010. So January 26, 2010.
Mr. Pistole. Okay. I was still at the FBI----
Ms. Richardson. Well, we can follow up and give you the
notes of your own speech.
Mr. Pistole. Sure.
Ms. Richardson. We would be happy to.
Administrator Fugate and Mr. Pistole, my final question,
the Transit Security Administration has proposed changes to the
Transit Security Grant Program guidance for 2011, which may
have detrimental impacts on transit authorities and the
partnership that has been developed since the program's
inception. I have been informed that these changes are needed
in order to be able to provide quantitative results of the TSGP
by focusing on a majority of the funding on 62 distinct assets,
meaning bridges, tunnels, stations, et cetera. This could
potentially limit TSGP's flexibility.
I have a two-part question, which essentially is: Can you
discuss how you developed the list of the 62 assets? No. 2, do
you see these changes--how would I phrase it? Do you think that
it fails to recognize the true nature of the risks associated
with the transit systems and fails to acknowledge that transit
is a system of systems?
For you, Mr. Pistole, I would like to know, were you
involved with Mr. Fugate as these changes were proposed?
Mr. Pistole. Thank you, Congresswoman. Yes, a multipart
question there. Let me address the part about the, let's say,
the 62 and looking at those critical infrastructures that we
assess--we, the intelligence, law enforcement community, with
the industry--that we assess as being most vulnerable.
So it gets back to the issue of: How do we best invest our
dollars, Federal dollars, with State and local dollars to buy
down that risk? If there is a critical infrastructure, whether
it is a bridge or a tunnel under a river, underwater tunnel or
something, how can we best leverage our assets at the Federal
level with State and local, in terms of what they are doing,
whether it is on hardening that particular target, whether it
is through additional K-9s or patrol officers or things like
that? So those are all part of that.
The MOU that Administrator Fugate mentioned earlier is, I
think, a key step in moving us to the next level as we make
informed judgments about where we can best invest the money
that Congress provides to us.
Ms. Richardson. Are you working with him directly on that?
Mr. Pistole. Yes.
Ms. Richardson. Okay.
Mr. Fugate. Yes, Congresswoman. The working relationship
with TSA is, as the subject-matter experts, they identify,
prioritize what the threat is based upon the interaction that
the administrator talked about. We are responsible for then
ensuring that we have the grants administration but also
building, as you point out, the matrices of how we measure that
performance.
Again, we understand that, as these decisions are being
made, our ability to communicate and implement that as we go
into each grant cycle is key to that success. But it also means
working with TSA as the subject-matter expert on what that
threat is, how to prioritize that as a subject-matter expert so
that we can make sure the grant conforms to that threat.
Ms. Richardson. Thank you.
I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman King. I want to thank all the witnesses for their
testimony. Thank you for your service.
Mr. Rodriguez, we wish you the very best, and thank you for
your service in Chicago.
Members of the committee may have additional questions for
you, and we will ask you to respond to them in writing. We will
keep the record open for 10 days.
Chairman King. Without objection, the committee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:40 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X I
----------
Statement For the Record of the American Bus Association
May 4, 2011
Mr. Chairman and Members of the committee my name is Peter J.
Pantuso and I am President and CEO of the American Bus Association. The
ABA is the trade association for the private over-the-road bus
companies and represents the tour, travel, and transportation
industries. The ABA represents 800 motorcoach companies and nearly 60
percent of all motorcoaches on the Nation's highways. In addition, the
ABA represents another 3,000 tour operators, destinations, attractions,
convention and visitors' bureaus, hotels and restaurants, as well as
companies that manufacture motorcoaches and those that provide
equipment and services to bus companies. ABA motorcoach operator
members provide a variety of transportation services (scheduled
service, point-to-point, tour and charter, commuter and airport and
employee shuttle) to 760 million passengers a year.
On behalf of the ABA and its members, I want to thank you, Mr.
Chairman for convening this hearing. Transportation security is the
highest priority for the ABA and its members. Motorcoach operators as
well as the destinations that rely on motorcoach business, require
security. Since fiscal year 2002 the appropriations process has allowed
the private over-the-road bus industry to compete for funds to enhance
the security of our facilities, equipment, and passengers. The program,
better known as the Intercity Bus Security Grant Program (or IBSGP) is
a competitive grant program administered by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). From fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2010 the IBSGP has
granted approximately $10 million dollars annually for bus security.
For fiscal year 2011 the amount available for the IBSGP was reduced to
$5 million dollars. By comparison, the domestic airlines, the Nation's
transit system and Amtrak have been awarded billions for security
funding in the years since 9/11.
From fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2009 170 bus companies have
been awarded IBSGP grants in the amount of a little over $83 million
dollars (A copy of a chart detailing the grantees and the amounts
awarded is attached to the end of my testimony). These grantees were
awarded varying sums depending on their operational ``footprint'',
resources, and size. Each grantee was required to provide at least a 25
percent match to the amount of the grant and have in place a company-
wide security plan. In addition, the IBSGP had two tiers of awards; one
for larger and scheduled service operators and a second for smaller,
and generally charter and tour bus operators. The funds granted have
been used for several purposes. Among them: The establishment of
passenger screening procedures, the development of driver shields to
deter attacks on drivers, provision of emergency communications between
bus dispatch, drivers, and emergency first responders, the development
of security systems that allow the operator to ``kill'' a bus's engine
via a radio signal, to the purchase of digital cameras for bus staging
areas, maintenance facilities, and garages, and the purchase of Global
Positioning Satellites systems (GPS) to give the operator real-time
information on bus locations. The relatively minor sums of the IBSGP
are not completely responsible for the security upgrades noted above
but the IBSGP funds along with the bus operators' own funds have
contributed to these security advances.
My plea to the committee is simple. The bus industry is in need of
continued security funding. The fact that the grantees so far have been
domiciled in all fifty States is testimony to the nature of the threat.
Tourist destinations, transportation facilities and the buses
themselves are targets. It is instructive to note, according to the
Mineta Transportation Institute, that worldwide over the last century
buses and bus facilities have been prime terrorist targets. Moreover,
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) in its recently
released threat assessment of the intercity bus industry in effect
applauded the IBSGP as necessary to protecting the Nation's many bus
passengers. Finally, in April of this year the Highway Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (Highway ISAC) released a document
detailing the ``Potential Threat Towards Buses'' stating that:
``Motorcoaches are considered as potential targets by terrorists
because they are relatively `soft targets' . . . Motorcoaches may be
targeted for the number of passengers they transport, and the potential
for them to be used as weapons. Motorcoaches are often views as
innocuous to law enforcement and are able to gain close access to
critical infrastructure.'' (A copy of the Highway ISAC report is
attached). All the information at hand points to the continuing need
for an IBSGP.
While the need for bus security funds may seem obvious and the sums
heretofore appropriated for it relatively minor, ABA is concerned about
two recent developments. The first is the reduction of funds for bus
security grants. The reduction of the IBSGP by more than half is, in
our view, not consistent with the conclusion that bus security for its
760 million passengers must be a high priority especially when compared
with the billions of dollars spent on air and rail security. The second
development is the merging of the IBSGP into transit security. ABA and
its members do not contest the view that transits must be secure.
However, we are concerned that IBSGP applications will receive lessened
consideration and fewer resources when placed alongside applications by
transit agencies for vastly more security resources.
In summary, ABA asks for a restoration of the IBSGP funding to the
level prior to fiscal year 2011. In addition we ask that the IBSGP
remain an ``independent'' program. The security needs of these two
modes are not identical and each should be considered separately. In
ABA's view, the bus industry's security needs are best met with, as
they have been until now, with a series of relatively small grants to a
wide range of bus operators over the many States. This is in contrast
to the large grants made to small numbers of large transit agencies
with smaller ``footprints'' but larger coverage areas.
The ABA and its members ask for your support for the IBSGP. The
Nation and the 760 million passengers who ride the private over-the-
road buses are depending on your support to continue to keep them safe.
Thank you for your consideration.
A P P E N D I X I I
----------
Question From Honorable Laura Richardson of California for John S.
Pistole
Question. What is the status of TSA/FEMA efforts to develop
measures of effectiveness for TSGP grants and the administration of the
grant program?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question From Honorable Laura Richardson of California for W. Craig
Fugate
Question. What is the status of TSA/FEMA efforts to develop
measures of effectiveness for TSGP grants and the administration of the
grant program?
Answer. Efforts to measure the effectiveness of the Transit
Security Grant Program (TSGP) grants are underway but require
additional work. FEMA has developed a few performance measures and is
working to collect the data for these measures through its programmatic
grants monitoring tool. The information that was used in the fiscal
year 2010 monitoring process looked at TSGP projects completed, as
compared to the total projects approved for the agencies monitored.
Data for this measure are derived from the information that is
collected from TSGP grantees during monitoring desk reviews and site
visits conducted by FEMA's Grant Programs Directorate (GPD) Program
Analysts. Beginning in fiscal year 2010, Program Analysts used a
Programmatic Grants Monitoring database to track grantees' progress
toward the implementation and completion of TSGP projects, including
projects' alignment to the preparedness cycle (planning, operational
packages, equipment, training, and exercises). The progress scores for
projects were extracted from the monitoring database and the results
were imported into a monitoring report for analysis.
GPD and National Preparedness Directorate (NPD) are also working
together to develop additional performance measures that will aid in
determining how well the grants are managed and the overall
effectiveness of the grant programs, including the TSGP American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) awards. As GPD and NPD
collaborate, they will also work with the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) to develop more meaningful measures.
Question From Honorable Laura Richardson of California for Richard
Daddario
Question. What are the roles and responsibilities of the New York
Police Department across New York's Metropolitan Transportation
Authority?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Laura Richardson of California for Richard L.
Rodriguez
Question 1. You mentioned in your testimony that the CTA had
planned to use future funds to install cameras on the rest of its rail
cars in 2012, but because of a reduction in funding, this action will
have to be delayed.
What effect does the delay in installing these security cameras
have on the Chicago Transit Authority's ability to protect citizens?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. Will these cameras simply have to be temporarily
replaced by more of a ground presence by the Chicago Police Department,
or does it mean something more significant?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Questions From Honorable Laura Richardson of California for Daniel O.
Hartwig
Question 1. When compared to New York and Chicago transit systems,
the Bay Area is by far younger and faces different challenges than
those presented to older and condensed systems.
Can you briefly explain some of these challenges and elaborate on
some of the security improvements that transit security grants have
allowed you to make over the last few years?
Answer. Challenges: To secure funding to complete security projects
identified by four different Threat and Vulnerability assessments of
the Bay Area Rapid Transit System. To protect our most critical and
vulnerable asset based upon location and environment (on the bottom of
the San Francisco Bay) attaching the East Bay (Oakland) into the West
Bay (San Francisco) Direct TSGP funding has already been allocated to
this location to ultimately provide a ``surface barrier'' as well as a
``marine barrier''. Without this funding, we would not be able to
protect these critical assets at the level required.
Alarms, infrared sensors, and CCTV-enhanced and upgraded at this
location with TSGP grants. Tube, tunnels, and underwater transit
locations are identified as at ``high risk''. Our system is made up of
approximately \1/3\ tubes, tunnels, and underwater locations.
Question 2. Mr. Hartwig, can you please provide us with specific
examples on how the use of TSGP funds has mitigated risks for terrorist
attacks?
Answer. Mitigated risks: TSGP funds allow us to directly impact our
most vulnerable and at-risk properties. Creating multiple layers of
security hurdles to prevent the successful delivery of a terrorist
attack. Training of police officers with current and reliable
intelligence regarding threats against transit properties. Training
front-line employees to be additional ``eyes and ears'' of our system
provides another layer of security. Educating our ridership to
recognize and react. ``See Something, Say something.'' Collaboration
and partnership with local regional transit properties, produced
unified message posted in all transit properties (Transit Watch).
Utilizing Operational Packs to create a ``Critical Asset Patrol Team''
that is assigned to our critical asset corridor. Riding on trains day
and night in random patterns to deter and mitigate the effects of any
act of terrorism. K-9 teams trained to detect explosives.
Alarms, sensors and CCTV applications.
If Ms. Richardson would like, I can be available to speak with her
via phone to discuss our Security Sensitive Information (SSI) projects
which are heavily funded by the TSGP.
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