[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
USING RESOURCES EFFECTIVELY TO SECURE OUR BORDER AT PORTS OF ENTRY
STOPPING THE ILLICIT FLOW OF MONEY, GUNS, AND DRUGS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 5, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-15
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Vacancy
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/General Counsel
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Chairwoman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Henry Cuellar, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Ben Quayle, Arizona, Vice Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Paul Anstine, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security................................... 1
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security.......................................... 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security.............................................. 6
WITNESSES
Panel I
Mr. Thomas Winkowski, Assistant Commissioner, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 17
Panel II
Mr. Stanley F. Korosec, Vice President, Operations, Blue Water
Bridge
Canada:
Oral Statement................................................. 39
Prepared Statement............................................. 41
Mr. Timothy J. Koerner, Vice President and Chief Security
Officer, CN:
Oral Statement................................................. 44
Prepared Statement............................................. 46
Hon. Richard F. Cortez, Mayor, McAllen, Texas:
Oral Statement................................................. 48
Prepared Statement............................................. 50
For the Record
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Statement of Colleen M. Kelley, National President, National
Treasury Employees Union..................................... 6
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security:
Statement of Nelson H. Balido, President, Border Trade Alliance 36
USING RESOURCES EFFECTIVELY TO SECURE OUR BORDER AT PORTS OF ENTRY
STOPPING THE ILLICIT FLOW OF MONEY, GUNS, AND DRUGS
----------
Tuesday, April 5, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Miller, Rogers, McCaul, Broun,
Quayle, Rigell, Duncan, Cuellar, Jackson Lee, Higgins, Clarke,
and Thompson (ex officio).
Mrs. Miller. Good morning. We are going to try to get the
committee going here this morning. So I certainly want to
welcome everyone and, you know, before I make my opening
comments, I just have a point of personal privilege to the
committee Members generally. This has nothing to do with the
witness, and we appreciate him coming today.
In the interest of efficiency, Government efficiency and
the Members' time, believe it or not, we do have some issues
going on in this country that the Congress is trying to deal
with, whether it is wars that we are already into, may get
into, continuing resolution, huge budget, et cetera, et cetera.
So I try to roll things here as we can as effectively and
efficiently as possible.
So since I have had this Chairmanship, I have tried to just
have one panel in an effort to make sure that Congress is able
to do our responsibility, which is Government oversight. I was
hopeful that we would be able to mesh our two panels into one
today. There is no reason that they couldn't be in one panel.
There certainly is precedent for it.
However, the Department of Homeland Security--you don't
need to comment on this, sir, I appreciate your coming--has
made a decision that we can't have the Department of Homeland
Security with our other panel because they say that this is a
time-honored tradition. My response to all of this is last year
in the other Congress--and I am not going to go through all of
these cites--I said to my staff, ``Wait a minute, we used to do
this all the time, what is the big headache here?'' There is
issue after issue, committee hearing after committee hearing,
where this has happened in the past.
If you go to the American taxpayers and say the Department
of Homeland Security does not want to sit on a panel with other
people, other stakeholders that they deal with on a regular
basis and they cannot sit on the same panel because their
comfort level isn't there, it is the most ridiculous thing I
have ever heard of. I do intend to take this up with the
Secretary who is well aware of my position on this. I have to
tell you, I am one of these folks in Congress who normally
doesn't get exercised over the small stuff. But this is so
small, it is below us to even be having this conversation as
far as I am concerned. If I didn't agree to this, I would just
tell the committee Members, we would not have had anybody from
the Department of Homeland Security show up at the committee
today, because they didn't have their comfort level to be on
the same panel with our second panel who is not adversarial to
what we are trying to do. Guess what? Even if they were,
welcome to the world. Okay?
How can you have a conversation if you don't even want to
be on the same table with folks that you might not necessarily
agree with or might have a differing opinion than yours?
So that is the point of personal privilege that I want to
make today. Again, I will be following up with a letter to the
Secretary as well.
Mr. Broun. Would the gentlelady yield?
Mrs. Miller. Yes, I would yield.
Mr. Broun. I would thank you for yielding, Madam
Chairwoman. I just want to add to that. I think it is
preposterous, exactly what is happening here. I just want to
encourage you as Chairwoman to continue to pursue this, because
I think it is absolutely inane that they refuse to sit on the
panel with other folks.
So I just want to associate myself with what you said and
just want to amplify that, put an explanation point on it. I
think it is absolutely preposterous, the Department of Homeland
Security, the way they are acting on this. I thank you for
bringing that point of privilege up and I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. I appreciate the gentleman's comment. I
recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much. As you and I had talked
earlier this morning, I would be happy to sit down with you and
with the Homeland folks to see if we can try to put this in the
most efficient way so we can move this as quickly as possible.
I know that there were instances where Homeland sat down
with Boeing. It had more to do with the SBI, because they were
the contractor. But I certainly want to sit down with the
Chairwoman and see how we can make this work the next time so
we don't get any surprises at the very end.
Mrs. Miller. I certainly appreciate that. One of the things
that I sincerely want to strive for is a bipartisan approach on
this committee. Border security is happening in Democratic and
Republican and independent districts. It is something that this
committee is focused on to reflect the political will of the
majority of the American people. We want to do our
Congressional oversight with the agencies involved, and we want
to get to our mission. But to not even be willing to sit down
on a panel with additional stakeholders, I am not sure if that
is a partisan thing, I don't want to believe that. But I have
to say I am extremely disappointed.
At any rate, let us go on with our committee here. Our
first two hearings examine security between points of entry by
focusing on the concept of operational control, focusing on the
right mix of technology, infrastructure, and personnel. Today I
want to pivot and focus on the security at our ports of entry.
So this hearing builds on the previous two by examining how
the Office of Field Operation uses the resources appropriated
by Congress to stop the illicit flow of money, guns, and drugs.
When we think about border security, I think one of the first
things we think about are discussions of Border Patrol agents
and fences and camera towers, et cetera, all focused on getting
control of the border again between the ports of entry.
However, I think it is very important that we understand
that we face just as serious challenges at the ports of entry
in our Nation. In fact, a recent Department of Justice report
said that nearly 90 percent of all the drugs that come into our
Nation flow through the official ports of entry. They are not
coming in between the ports of entry. They are coming through
the actual ports of entry. Where there are drugs, there will be
money, there will be guns. Make no mistake, the cartels are
running drugs across the Southwest border. They are very highly
sophisticated and they are an enemy with one goal, and that is
certainly for them to make as much money as possible.
That is why I think we have to be concerned when we have
fiscal year 2010 Congressional Justifications to Congress that
indicated that CBP apprehends only 30 to 40 percent of major
violators like drug traffickers at the air ports of entry and
less than 30 percent at the land POEs. It does trouble me that
CBP actually omitted this chart from the fiscal year 2012
Budget Justification documents to Congress.
When it comes to National security, we need to do better.
When it comes to border security, we need to do much better. So
I will be very interested to hear why those statistics were not
included in this year's budget documents and what we can do to
ensure that we are catching the overwhelming majority of drug
traffickers at or near the border.
Distribution of manpower at the ports of entry is also a
concern. Across the various ports of entry, CBP was funded for
over 20,000 officers in the CR and they have requested over
21,000 for fiscal year 2012 but it is having trouble exceeding
the 19,875 agents as of just a few months ago. So we recognize
that attrition is a big concern for the agency. We will be
wanting to know, are we hiring enough agents to replace the
ones we are apparently losing at a fairly quick pace and what
we are doing to stem attrition, if we can, so that we can keep
the well-trained men and women of CBP who do a fantastic job,
the men and women of CBP each and every day, 24/7. Our Nation
sincerely appreciates all of their service.
However, I don't think we can secure the border, as we
mentioned, just using manpower alone. I am also convinced that
we need to have additional manpower. But something that I know
many Members of this committee, particularly Mr. Rogers of
Alabama, have talked about many times are our canines. And they
certainly are force multipliers that we can and must leverage
to interdict illegal narcotics, concealed humans, agriculture
products, et cetera, at our Nation's POEs. However, there are
roughly the same number of canine teams today as there were in
2008. So this is something, again, that I think the committee
will want to get to.
The Office of the Inspector General noted that although
canine agents are only actually less than 4 percent of total
manpower, if we want to call it that, they were credited with
60 percent of narcotic apprehensions and 40 percent of all
other apprehensions. I am a big advocate of technology, but I
can tell you, you can have all the technology and the manpower
in the world, who is catching most of the drugs? The dogs. The
dogs are getting the drugs. It is very important I think that
we look at that.
Over the last 5 years, the Southwest border has seen the
largest increase in the number of canines in service at the
ports of entry, amounting to actually over 60 percent of all
the canines in service. One port, Laredo, actually has about 20
percent of all the canines there. However, on the second-
busiest border crossing on the Northern tier, the Blue Water
Bridge, we only have one dog. We only have one dog there.
So again, I don't know how we are expected to have our
agents there stop the flow of drugs on the Northern border
where we just have one dog at one port and only a few others in
some of the other sections along the Northern border as well.
An integral part of our security at our ports is the
maintenance and, where appropriate, the expansion of port
infrastructure. We cannot increase manpower at the ports of
entry if there are not enough truck lanes, passenger lanes, and
not enough facilities to accommodate an increase in our
officers.
The President's stimulus package allocated 720 million for
the Land POEs and the GSA-owned facilities, and 420 million for
CBP-owned locations. In three cases, it was allocated to ports
that CBP had decided to either reduce hours or close
altogether. So these projects are on hold, but it certainly
indicates, I think, a lack of foresight with the agency when
allocating those stimulus dollars.
Moving forward, I want to ensure that the limited
infrastructure funds available be targeted in such a way where
we are looking at volume of traffic, we are prioritizing it so
that we can maximize both security, as well as expedite the
flow of commerce and trade into our Nation.
I think a critical theme of this subcommittee will be
balance. I certainly will continue to remind CBP that we have
two borders, but both of them need to be secure. This committee
certainly wants to work with you to make sure that you have the
resources to do the very difficult job that you have, the
mission that we have given you.
Again, I want to just emphasize that my opening comments
are no reflection on you or any of the CBP agents, many of whom
I have had an opportunity to meet. They are just incredible,
incredible patriots and men and women who do a fantastic job
for our Nation.
At this time, I would recognize our Ranking Member, Mr.
Cuellar for his opening remarks.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I appreciate you
calling today's hearing on security of the American ports of
entry. As I have said before, as Members representing border
districts, both yourself and myself, we have areas of common
interest, both the Northern border and the Southern border.
Probably chief among them are issues that are related, whether
it is the Northern or Southern border, and that is to make sure
that the ports of entry have the necessary resources to operate
efficiently and effectively, finding that balance between
trade, tourism, retail, and then providing the security.
Members, I would ask you to keep one thing in mind; 88
percent of all the goods and people coming into the United
States come through land ports. Not through sea ports, not
through air ports, but through land ports. This is why I am
very excited about you having this meeting, as we have done in
the past also to emphasize this.
I know that Representative Higgins, Representative Clarke,
also have major ports of entry just like you do also. As
Members representing border districts, we have special
appreciation for the U.S. Custom Border Protection task in
achieving security while ensuring travel and commerce continues
to move as efficiently as possible.
I know one of our witnesses, Mayor Cortez, will be talking
about that. I represent a part of the United States where
border commerce has become part of the daily life. In the
border region of South Texas, families understand and value our
ability to exchange goods with our neighboring United States of
Mexico and how that benefits them at home. I know that Mayor
Cortez--I won't go into his testimony, but let me just talk
about my hometown, Laredo.
In my hometown of Laredo, it is the largest inland trade
post in the Southern area, the sixth-largest trade port. This
is a small community of about only 250,000 individuals. In
large part it has to do because of the trade that we have.
While the Nation's unemployment rose, Laredo's unemployment
remained steady at 8.6, despite having a 30 percent poverty
level. At the peak of its economic area, Laredo was passing
13,000 trucks a day. I emphasize, 13,000 trucks a day.
Every day there is about a billion dollars' worth of trade
between the United States and Mexico. This is one thing we have
to keep in mind, why this is so important that we find the
proper resources and find this balance between security and
trade and tourism.
I know that our friends, CBP, they have worked hard and I
appreciate, Mr. Winkowski, the efforts that you all have been
doing. I really appreciate the work that you have done. The
enhancement we have had for security has been something that
has paid dividends. We certainly have more work to do as the
Chairwoman said. But again, this is something that we have to
keep in mind, that we have to continuously be looking for new
technology, the personnel and, of course, keep in mind that
some of the footprints that we have, our bridges, there are
some like the Anzalduas Bridge that the mayor will talk about.
It is a new one. There is a lot of things that you can do. But
there are some older bridges, like Bridge No. 1 in Laredo;
there is a footprint that is so tight that we have got to think
about how we can provide that security and still provide the
efficiency of trade and tourism.
Cross-border travel and commerce is the lifeblood of
districts like mine and along our Nation's border. It is
essential to the American economy. We have to find this
security and this facilitation and we have to know that--to
have the personnel, the technology, and the infrastructure are
necessary to secure the ports of entry to make sure that we
facilitate the trade, tourists, and retail that is so
important. The more we invest in the resources, the more we can
enhance both security and facilitation.
One of the things that, Chairwoman and Members, I think in
the past we have done an--and I will say this generally. In the
past we have done a good job in investing in the men and women
in green, which is our Border Patrol. That is the areas between
the ports of entry. But we cannot forget our men and women in
blue, which is our CBP, our Customs folks. Certainly this is
something that I know we are all on the same page.
As a side note, I would also encourage CBP to keep in mind
one thing. We are the oversighters. We provide oversight. I
would encourage CBP to send us the complete staffing model for
CBP Office of Field Operation. I think we have asked several
times. We got some information, it wasn't done then. I know
that we asked the staffing model for Border Patrol, if you
recall, at the last meeting. We got something back. It is not
what the staffing model should be, or at least it is not the
information that we requested. We are asking the CBP to work
with us.
Again, I emphasize we provide oversight and I think we need
to look at the staffing models so we know how they distribute
staff at the Northern border and the Southern border both for
Border Patrol and for CBP. Again, it is part of our oversight.
So, Madam Chairwoman, I look forward to continuing to work
with you on these issues. I thank the witnesses for joining us
here today. Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman.
Now the Chairwoman recognizes the Ranking Member of the
full committee, the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Thompson,
for any statement he may have.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I
would like to ask unanimous consent that a statement provided
to the committee by the National Treasury Employees Union be
included in the record for this hearing.
Mrs. Miller. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
Statement of Colleen M. Kelley, National President, National Treasury
Employees Union
April 5, 2011
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, distinguished Members of
the subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to provide this
testimony. As President of the National Treasury Employees Union
(NTEU), I have the honor of leading a union that represents over 24,000
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Officers and trade enforcement
specialists who are stationed at 331 land, sea, and air ports of entry
(POEs) across the United States. CBP employees' mission is to protect
the Nation's borders at the ports of entry from all threats while
facilitating legitimate travel and trade. CBP trade compliance
personnel enforce over 400 U.S. trade and tariff laws and regulations
in order to ensure a fair and competitive trade environment pursuant to
existing international agreements and treaties, as well as stemming the
flow of illegal contraband such as child pornography, illegal arms,
weapons of mass destruction, and laundered money. CBP is also a revenue
collection agency, processing approximately 25.8 million trade entries
a year at the POEs and collecting an estimated $29 billion in Federal
revenue in 2009.
land ports of entry
The United States has more than 4,000 miles of land border with
Canada and 1,993 miles of land border with Mexico. Most travelers enter
the United States through the Nation's 166 land border ports of entry.
About two-thirds of travelers are foreign nationals and about one-third
are returning U.S. citizens. The vast majority arrive by vehicle. The
purpose of the passenger primary inspection process is to determine if
the person is a U.S. citizen or alien, and if alien, whether the alien
is entitled to enter the United States. In general, CBP Officers are to
question travelers about their nationality and purpose of their visit,
whether they have anything to declare, and review the travel documents
the traveler is required to present.
Each day CBP Officers inspect more than 1.1 million passengers and
pedestrians, including many who reside in border communities who cross
legally and contribute to the economic prosperity of our country and
our neighbors. At the U.S. land borders, approximately 2 percent of
travelers crossing the border are responsible for nearly 48 percent of
all cross-border trips. At the land ports, passenger primary
inspections are expected to be conducted in less than 1 minute.
According to CBP, for regular lanes the average inspection time per
vehicle is 30 to 45 seconds during which CBP Officers should handle
documents for all vehicle occupants and, if necessary, detain and
transfer suspected violators to secondary inspection. For FAST truck
lanes, the average processing time is 15 to 20 seconds. (``CBP:
Challenges and Opportunities'' Memo prepared by Armand Peschard-
Sverdrup for: Mexico's Ministry of the Economy: U.S.-Mexico Border
Facilitation Working Group. January 2008, page 5.)
In fiscal 2010, CBP Officers and CBP Agriculture Specialists at the
331 POEs inspected 352 million travelers and more than 105.8 million
conveyances--cars, trucks, buses, trains, vessels, and aircraft. Out of
the total 331 official POEs, currently only 24 major land POEs are
situated on the Mexico-U.S. border: Six in California, seven in
Arizona, one in New Mexico, and ten in Texas. On the Canadian-U.S.
border there are 150 land POEs. Land POEs have a series of dedicated
lanes for processing commercial traffic, passenger vehicles,
pedestrians, and in some cases rail crossings.
Between the United States and Mexico, 68.4 percent of the total
commercial two-way truck trade flow crossed through three land POEs--
Laredo, El Paso, and Otay Mesa. In rail traffic, trade is heavily
concentrated (97.8%) in five rail POEs--Laredo, Eagle Pass, El Paso,
Nogales, and Brownsville (``Facilitating Legal Commerce and Transit.''
2009 Memo prepared by Armand Peschard-Sverdrup for the Pacific Council/
COMEXI Joint Task Force on Re-thinking the Mexico-U.S. Border: Seeking
Cooperative Solutions to Common Problems, page 2).
Each year, 45 million vehicles cross into the United States from
Canada. Most of the trucks use 22 principal border crossings. By 2020,
the volume of truck traffic is projected to grow to 19.2 million per
year, an increase of 63% from 11.8 million in 1999. The six highest-
volume crossings on the Canada-U.S. border handled almost 90% of the
value and three-quarters of the tonnage and truck trips. According to
the most recent data NTEU has, the six highest U.S.-Canada POEs are
Ambassador Bridge (Detroit, Michigan), Peace Bridge (Buffalo, New
York), Blue Water Bridge (Michigan), Lewiston-Queenston Bridge (New
York), Blaine (Washington), and Champlain (New York). (``Truck Freight
Crossing the Canada-U.S. Border,'' September 2002, page 2, 6.)
Preventing the flow of arms, drugs, other contraband, pirated
merchandise, and undeclared cash, and invasive agricultural items,
while at the same time facilitating trade and the legal movement of
people as efficiently as possible is a daily challenge for CBP Officers
and Agriculture Specialists at the land POEs.
border violence at u.s.-mexico land ports
In the past 5 years, a new challenge also confronts CBP personnel
at the southwest land POEs. An epidemic of violence has erupted right
across the U.S. Southern border in Mexico due to an increase in Mexican
drug cartel activity there and the crackdown on drug and human
traffickers by the Mexican government. Drug violence in northern Mexico
has skyrocketed with more than 35,000 killed over the last 5 years.
This violence is fueled by arms smuggling and bulk cash drug proceeds
transiting south from the United States. The incidence of violence is
escalating daily at or near U.S.-Mexico POEs.
NTEU is providing information to Congress and the administration to
help assess security equipment and other needs to address the increased
threat to CBP personnel at the Southern border. Safety of CBP Officers
at the ports of entry is a major concern. Appropriate facilities,
staffing, and equipment are necessary at the Southern land ports to
ensure CBP Officers' safety.
The fiscal year 2010 DHS funding bill included $8.1 million for 65
CBP Officers and 8 support staff positions to be dedicated to
``Combating Southbound Firearms and Currency Smuggling.'' NTEU believes
that this staffing increase remains insufficient to address the
staffing needs at southern ports of entry. Outbound enforcement remains
a particular challenge. For example, according to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), ``from March 2009 through February 22,
2011 . . . CBP Officers seized about $67 million in illicit bulk cash
leaving the country at land POEs . . . the National Drug Intelligence
Center estimates that criminals smuggle $18 billion to $39 billion a
year across the southwest border, and that the flow of cash across the
northern border with Canada is also significant.'' (``DHS Progress and
Challengers in Security the U.S. Southwest and Northern Borders,'' GAO-
11-508T, page 7.)
cbp staffing at the ports of entry
In October 2009, the Southwest Border Task Force, created by
Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, presented the results of
its staffing and resources review in a draft report. This draft report
recommends the ``federal government should hire more Customs [and
Border Protection] officers.'' The report echoes the finding of the
Border-Facilitation Working Group. (The U.S.-Mexico Border Facilitation
Working Group was created during the bilateral meeting between
President George W. Bush and President Felipe Calderon held in Merida
in March 2007.) ``In order to more optimally operate the various ports
of entry, CBP needs to increase the number of CBP Officers. According
to its own estimate, the lack of human resources only for the San
Ysdiro POE is in the ``hundreds'' and the CBP Officer need at all ports
of entry located along the border with Mexico is in the ``thousands.''
(``CBP: Challenges and Opportunities'' a memo prepared by Armand
Peschard-Sverdrup for Mexico's Ministry of the Economy: U.S.-Mexico
Border Facilitation Working Group, January 2008, pages 1 and 2.) It
should be noted that the number of inspection booths at San Ysidro POE
will increase from 24 booths to 63 inspection booths in the near
future.
The administration's fiscal year 2012 budget requests funds for
21,186 CBP Officer positions--an increase of 409 over fiscal year 2011,
but still 108 officers below the fiscal year 2009 level of 21,294 CBP
Officer positions. NTEU is disappointed that the fiscal year 2012
budget request includes no significant increase in frontline CBP
Officer or CBP Agriculture Specialist positions. After a net decrease
of over 500 CBP Officer positions between 2009 and 2011, CBP is seeking
appropriated funding to ``support 300 CBP Officers above the fiscal
year 2011 budget and additional canine assets to the Port of Entry
operations,'' despite independent studies that state that CBP is
understaffed at ports of entry by thousands of officers.
Of particular concern to NTEU in the fiscal year 2012 budget
request, is the decrease of $20 million in funding for inspectional
overtime at the air, land, and sea ports of entry. CBP states that
``proposed efficiency will require POE[s] to reduce overtime spending
during periods of increased workload, including but not limited to, the
annual peak summer seasons at our Nation's air and seaports.''
Overtime is essential when staffing levels are low to ensure that
inspectional duties can be fulfilled, officers have sufficient back-up
and wait times are mitigated. This is one reason why Congress
authorized a dedicated funding source to pay for overtime--customs user
fees pursuant to Title 19, section 58c(f) of the U.S. Code. CBP
collects user fees to recover certain costs incurred for processing,
among other things, air and sea passengers, and various private and
commercial land, sea, air, and rail carriers and shipments.
The source of these user fees are commercial vessels, commercial
vehicle, rail cars, private aircraft, private vessels, air passengers,
sea passengers, cruise vessel passengers, dutiable mail, customs broker
and barge/bulk carriers. These fees are deposited into the Customs User
Fee Account. User Fees are designated by statute to pay for services
provided to the user, such as inspectional overtime for passenger and
commercial vehicle inspection during overtime shift hours. In addition,
APHIS user fees and immigration user fees also fund ``fee-related''
inspection costs. User fees have not been increased in years and some
of these user fees cover only a portion of recoverable fee-related
costs. For example, CBP collects the extraordinarily low fee of $437 at
arrival of a commercial vessel to a port to recover personnel and other
costs to process and inspect the vessel's crew and cargo. This fee,
however, is capped at $5,955 per calendar year; no matter how many
times the commercial vessel enters a port that year. This fee was last
raised from $397 to $437 in 2007, but the cap has remained at $5,955
since 1986. Another example of an extraordinarily low user fee is the
fee paid by railcar owners of $8.25 per car at arrival for processing
and inspection, but the fee is capped at $100 per railcar per calendar
year.
CBP is seeking legislation to lift the exemption of passengers
arriving from Canada, Mexico, most of the Caribbean Islands and U.S.
territories from payment of the $5.50 per arrival fee for air and sea
traveler processing and inspection. NTEU supports lifting these user
fee exemptions allowing CBP to more fully recover the costs of
passenger processing and inspection, but believes that Congress should
review all user fees collected by CBP with an eye to more fully
recovering CBP's costs of these services to the user.
challenges with facilitating legal trade vs. stopping illicit flow of
money, guns, and drugs
Cross-border commercial operators are acutely concerned about wait
times and costs of delay at the land POEs. Wait times differ across
POEs and vary depending on whether the congestion involves pedestrians,
passenger vehicles, trucks, or railcars and whether the ports
participate in expedited crossing programs such as SENTRI for people or
FAST (Free and Secure Trade) lanes for trucks and railcars that are
certified as compliant with the Customs Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT) agreement. Wait times also vary with the day of the
week and the time of day and holidays on either side of the border.
Currently, not all available lanes are staffed to capacity. Antiquated
port infrastructure and CBP personnel staffing shortages contribute
directly to wait times at the land POEs.
NTEU believes that there is no way you can speed up the inspection
process in which CBP Officers are currently conducting primary
inspections in 30 to 40 seconds without increasing staffing. NTEU's
position was confirmed by the October 2009 draft report of the
Southwest Border Task Force created by Homeland Security Secretary
Janet Napolitano that recommends the ``federal government should hire
more Customs [and Border Protection] officers.''
The report echoes the finding of the Border-Facilitation Working
Group. (The U.S.-Mexico Border Facilitation Working Group was created
during the bilateral meeting between President George W. Bush and
President Felipe Calderon held in Merida in March 2007.) ``In order to
more optimally operate the various ports of entry, CBP needs to
increase the number of CBP Officers. According to its own estimate, the
lack of human resources only for the San Ysdiro POE is in the
``hundreds'' and the CBP Officer need at all ports of entry located
along the border with Mexico is in the ``thousands.'' (``CBP:
Challenges and Opportunities'' page 1 and 2. Memo prepared by Armand
Peschard-Sverdrup for: Mexico's Ministry of the Economy: U.S.-Mexico
Border Facilitation Working Group. January 2008.)
In 2007, in a GAO report entitled ``Border Security: Despite
Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's
Ports of Entry'' (GAO-08-219), GAO found that:
CBP needs several thousand additional CBP Officers and
Agriculture Specialists at its ports of entry.
Not having sufficient staff contributes to morale problems,
fatigue, and safety issues for CBP Officers.
Staffing challenges force ports to choose between port
operations and providing training.
CBP's on-board staffing level is below budgeted levels,
partly due to high attrition, with ports of entry losing
officers faster than they can hire replacements.
The conclusions of this report echo what NTEU has been saying for
years and, in order to assess CBP Officer and CBP Agriculture
Specialists staffing needs, Congress, in its fiscal year 2007 DHS
appropriations conference report, directed CBP to submit by January 23,
2007 a resource allocation model for current and future year staffing
requirements.
In July 2007, CBP provided GAO with the results of the staffing
model. The GAO reported that ``the model's results showed that CBP
would need up to several thousand additional CBP officers and
agricultural specialists at its ports of entry.'' (See GAO-08-219, page
31) And the Washington Post reported that ``the agency needs 1,600 to
4,000 more officers and agricultural specialists at the nation's air,
land and sea ports, or a boost of 7 to 25 percent.'' (November 6,
2007).
The staffing model reinforces the findings of the Border
Facilitation Working Group--``when you look at the budgets that are
normally handed out to CBP to POEs, one can conclude that this unit has
been traditionally under-funded.'' (See ``CBP: Challenges and
Opportunities,'' page 1.) To date, however, it is NTEU's understanding
that CBP's POE staffing model has not been made public or even
available for Congress to review.
impact of staffing shortages
According to GAO, ``At seven of the eight major ports we visited,
officers and managers told us that not having sufficient staff
contributes to morale problems, fatigue, lack of backup support and
safety issues when officers inspect travelers--increasing the potential
that terrorists, inadmissible travelers and illicit goods could enter
the country.'' (See GAO-08-219, page 7.)
``Due to staffing shortages, ports of entry rely on overtime to
accomplish their inspection responsibilities. Double shifts can result
in officer fatigue--officer fatigue caused by excessive overtime
negatively affected inspections at ports of entry. On occasion,
officers said they are called upon to work 16-hour shifts, spending
long stints in primary passenger processing lanes in order to keep
lanes open, in part to minimize traveler wait times. Further evidence
of fatigue came from officers who said that CBP officers call in sick
due to exhaustion, in part to avoid mandatory overtime, which in turn
exacerbates the staffing challenges faced by the ports.'' (See GAO-08-
219, page 33.)
Staffing shortages have also reduced the number of CBP Officers
available to conduct more in-depth secondary inspections. In the past,
there were three inspectors in secondary processing for every one
inspector in primary processing. Now there is a one to one ratio. This
has resulted in a dramatic reduction in the number of illegal cargo
seizures. For example, at the Port of Sweet Grass, Montana, from 2000
through 2007, there has been a 59% reduction in the number of seizures
of illegal drugs, hazardous imports, and other contraband. Port-by-port
seizure data is deemed law enforcement sensitive and it is now very
difficult to compare number of seizures at a port from year to year.
Without adequate personnel at secondary, wait times back up and
searches are not done to specifications. This is a significant cargo
security issue. A full search of one vehicle for counterfeit currency
will take two officers on average a minimum of 45 minutes. Frequently,
only one CBP Officer is available for this type of search and this type
of search will then take well over an hour.
Finally, NTEU has been told that when wait times in primary
inspection becomes excessive in the opinion of the agency, CBP Officers
are instructed to query only one occupant of a vehicle and to suspend
COMPEX (Compliance Enforcement Exams) and other automated referral to
secondary programs during these periods. This is an improvement over
the past practice of lane flushing, but is still a significant security
issue. Also, when primary processing lanes become backed up, passenger
vehicles are diverted to commercial lanes for processing
Again NTEU concurs with the October 2009 Homeland Security Advisory
Council Southwest Border Task Force Draft Report that calls on Congress
to authorize funding to increase staffing levels for CBP Officers. NTEU
urges Congress to authorize funding for CBP Officers and CBP
Agriculture Specialists at the levels specified in CBP's own workforce
staffing model, in addition to funding an increase in CBP Officer
staffing needed to expand outbound inspection and address the
increasing violence at the U.S.-Mexico border.
NTEU also strongly supports legislation expected again to be
reintroduced shortly by Representative Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) entitled
``Putting Our Resources Towards Security (PORTS) Act.'' Representative
Reyes' PORTS Act would authorize 5,000 additional CBP Officers and
1,200 additional CBP AS new hires, in addition to 350 border security
support personnel at the Nation's 331 official ports of entry over the
next 5 years. In addition, the bill authorizes funding for
infrastructure improvements at the existing ports of entry to repair
and improve the gateways into our country.
cbp agriculture specialist staffing
In 2008, NTEU was certified as the labor union representative of
CBP Agriculture Specialists as the result of an election to represent
all Customs and Border Protection employees that had been consolidated
into one bargaining unit by merging the port of entry inspection
functions of Customs, INS and the Animal and Plant Inspection Service
as part of DHS' One Face at the Border initiative.
According to GAO-08-219 page 31, CBP's staffing model ``showed that
CBP would need up to several thousand additional CBP Officers and
agriculture specialists at its ports of entry.'' And GAO testimony
issued on October 3, 2007 stated that, ``as of mid-August 2007, CBP had
2,116 agriculture specialists on staff, compared with 3,154 specialists
needed, according to staffing model.'' (See GAO-08-96T page 1.)
CBP fiscal year 2012 budget request includes funding for 2,394, CBP
Agriculture Specialists, 760 short of those needed, according to CBP's
own staffing model.
Also, NTEU continues to have concerns with CBP's stated intention
to change its staffing model design to reflect only allocations of
existing resources and no longer account for optimal staffing levels to
accomplish their mission.
Finally, NTEU strongly supports Section 805 of S. 3623, a bill
introduced in the Senate in 2009 that, through oversight and statutory
language, makes clear that the agricultural inspection mission is a
priority. The legislation increases CBP Agriculture Specialist
staffing, and imposes an Agriculture Specialist career ladder and
specialized chain of command.
end one face at the border
In 2003, DHS created a new Customs and Border Protection Officer
position and announced the ``One Face at the Border'' initiative that
purportedly unifies the inspection process for travelers and cargo
entering the United States. In practice, the major reorganization of
the roles and responsibility of the inspectional workforce as a result
of the One Face at the Border initiative has resulted in job
responsibility overload and dilution of the customs, immigration, and
agriculture inspection specializations and in weakening the quality of
passenger and cargo inspections.
NTEU believes the One Face at the Border initiative has failed to
integrate the different border functions it sought to make
interchangeable, because they are not. The Customs, Immigration, and
Agriculture functions performed at our borders enforce different laws
and require different training and skills. Consolidating Immigration
and Customs inspection functions has caused logistical and
institutional weakness resulting in a loss of expertise in critical
homeland security priorities.
For these reasons, NTEU urges CBP to reinstate Customs and
Immigration specializations, as it did with the Agriculture
specialization, at the POEs. The ``One Face'' initiative should be
ended, Customs and Immigration specializations should be reestablished
within CBP, and overall CBP inspection staffing should be increased.
NTEU suggests that the committees include the following provision
in any upcoming CBP authorization.
``SEC. __. ESTABLISHMENT OF SPECIALIZED CBP OFFICER OCCUPATIONS.--The
Secretary of Homeland Security shall establish within the Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection two distinct inspectional specialization
occupations for Customs and Border Protection Officers at the air, sea,
and land ports of entry; an immigration inspection specialization and a
customs inspection specialization.''
ratio of cbp supervisors to frontline cbp officers
NTEU continues to have concerns that CBP is continuing to increase
the number of supervisors when a much greater need exists for new
frontline hires. In terms of real numbers, since CBP was created, the
number of new managers has increased at a much higher rate than the
number of new frontline CBP hires. According to GAO, the number of CBP
Officers has increased from 18,001 in October 2003 to 18,382 in
February 2006, an increase of 381 officers. In contrast, GS 12-15 CBP
supervisors on board as of October 2003 were 2,262 and in February 2006
there were 2,731, an increase of 462 managers over the same of time.
This is a 17% increase in CBP managers and only a 2% increase in the
number of frontline CBP Officers. (See GAO-06-751R, page 11).
In 2009, CBP reports that there were 19,726 CBP Officers of which
16,360 were bargaining unit frontline employees--a ratio of one
supervisor for every five CBP Officers. According to CBP data, in 2009,
the number of CBP Agriculture Specialists was 2,277, of which 312 were
non-frontline supervisors--a ratio of one supervisor for every six CBP
Agriculture Specialists.
trade enforcement and compliance staffing
When CBP was created, it was given a dual mission of safeguarding
our Nation's borders and ports as well as regulating and facilitating
international trade. It also collects import duties and enforces U.S.
trade laws. In 2005, CBP processed 29 million trade entries and
collected $31.4 billion in revenue. In 2009, CBP collected $29
billion--a drop of over $2 billion in revenue collected. Since CBP was
established in March 2003, there has been no increase in CBP trade
enforcement and compliance personnel and again, the fiscal year 2012
budget proposes no increase in FTEs for CBP trade operations personnel.
In effect, there has been a CBP trade staffing freeze at March 2003
levels and, as a result, CBP's revenue function has suffered. Recently,
in response to an Import Specialists staffing shortage, CBP has
proposed to implement at certain ports a tariff sharing scheme. For
example, because CBP has frozen at 984 Nation-wide the total number of
Import Specialist positions, CBP is reducing by 52 positions (from 179
to 127) the number of Import Specialists at the New York City area
ports and shifting those positions to other ports. To address the
resultant shortage of Import Specialists at New York area ports, CBP is
implementing tariff sharing between the port of New York/Newark and JFK
airport. Currently, each port (Newark and JFK) processes all types of
entries and all types of commodities via the Harmonized Tariff Schedule
(HTS).
The reduction in trade personnel has resulted in each port being
assigned only parts of the HTS and each port only processing half the
commodities entering its port. Tariff sharing presents a number of
operational problems with regard to trade personnel performing cargo
exams on merchandise that is unloaded at the port of Newark, but the
only commodity teams that are trained to process it are at JFK and,
vice versa, when merchandise that can only be processed in Newark, is
unloaded at JFK. CBP proposes that instead of physical examinations of
the merchandise, digital photos can be exchanged between the ports.
This is a short-sighted solution that shortchanges taxpayers, trade
compliant importers, and the Federal treasury.
The fiscal year 2012 budget requests funding for CBP's enforcement
program to ``prevent trade in counterfeit and pirated goods, and
enforce exclusion orders on patent-infringing and other Intellectual
Property Rights violative goods.'' This request, however, includes no
increase in CBP trade operations staff at the POEs to implement this
trade enforcement program.
recruitment and retention issues
NTEU is pleased to commend Congress and the Department for
addressing two major CBP Officer recruitment and retention challenges--
lack of law enforcement officer retirement status and a lower rate of
journeyman pay than most other Federal law enforcement occupations. In
July 2006, Congress extended enhanced retirement prospectively to CBP
Officers and in October 2009, CBP announced an increase in the rate of
CBP Officer and CBP Agriculture Specialists journeyman pay from GS-11
to GS-12.
According to GAO, however, up to 1,200 CBP Officers a year are lost
to attrition and current hires are not keeping pace with this attrition
rate. NTEU expects that the extension of enhanced retirement and
increasing journeyman pay will help to attract and recruit new hires to
keep pace with attrition and achieve staffing levels currently
authorized. Since it usually takes about 1\1/2\ years to recruit, hire,
and train a CBP Officer, however, Congress needs to increase CBP
Officer staffing levels now to keep pace with current attrition rates.
NTEU commends the Department for increasing journeyman pay for CBP
Officers and Agriculture Specialists. Many deserving CBP trade and
security positions, however, were left out of this pay increase, which
has significantly damaged morale. NTEU strongly supports extending this
same career ladder increase to additional CBP positions, including CBP
trade operations specialists and CBP Seized Property Specialists. The
journeyman pay level for the CBP Technicians who perform important
commercial trade and administration duties should also be increased
from GS-7 to GS-9.
infrastructure issues
``The average land POE is 40-45 years old. Urban sprawl has
enveloped some of these ports, rendering them effectively landlocked .
. . Over time, eroding infrastructure and limits on the availability of
land--along with projected growth in the legal movement of goods and
people stemming from the continued deepening of economic integration--
will require both governments to erect new infrastructure.'' (See
``Facilitating Legal Commerce and Transit'' by Armand Peschard-
Sverdrup, page 4).
Infrastructure issues vary from port to port. NTEU does not dispute
that the infrastructure problems at the POEs need to be addressed. But
all port infrastructure solutions, including constructing additional
24-hour port facilities, will take years to achieve. What is necessary
today is to staff all existing lanes and to start now to recruit
additional personnel to staff proposed new lanes to capacity. Without
adequate staffing to achieve this, excessive overtime practices, as
well as increased wait times, will continue.
For example, ``Congress allocated $184 million to double the size
of the Mariposa Port of Entry in western Nogales through the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act, also known as the stimulus package. But
it did not set aside money to hire the 150 additional officers needed
to fully staff the port when it's completed in 3 years. Already, time-
consuming searches and seizures at the three busy Nogales ports mean
there aren't enough inspectors to keep all the lanes open--resulting in
waits of up to 4 hours to cross the border on holiday weekends or
during the winter produce season. Without more officers, the 4-year
upgrade of the port could be a waste.'' (``New Lanes at Border Face
Lack of Staffing,'' Arizona Daily Star, February 27, 2011.)
Also, the observations and suggestions of front-line CBP Officers
should be taken into account when planning new infrastructure
solutions. For example, since before 9/11, the lack of a manned egress
point for the Cargo Inspection facility at the Port of Blaine has been
noted by numerous port runner incidents. After years of lobbying by
Officers, Blaine has a manned egress booth, but it is not staffed 24/7,
and the CBP Officer assigned to the exit booth has no way to physically
stop a vehicle and driver who want to run the port. There are no gates,
no tire shredders, or deployable bollards at the new egress point.
Pulling into secondary is still largely dependent on the honor system.
This new manned egress point intercepts the lost drivers, and the
drivers who can't understand instructions from the primary officer, but
it doesn't stop deliberate port runners.
technology issues
Customs and Border Protection relies on technology to process
border crossings both in-bound and out-bound with greater efficiency
and speed. To compensate for the inadequacy of personnel at land POEs,
CBP is relying more on technology, such as Radiation Portal Monitors
(RPM) and Radio Frequency Identification (RFID). According to GAO,
however, ``as of March 2011, license plate readers were available at 48
of 118 outbound lanes on the southwest border but none of the 179
outbound lanes on the northern border.'' (``DHS Progress and
Challengers in Security the U.S. Southwest and Northern Borders,'' GAO-
11-508T, page 7.)
Technological advances are important, but without the training and
experience, technology alone would have failed to stop the millennium
bomber at Port Angeles, Washington. Today, primary processing is
increasingly dependent on technology. CBP Officers are instructed to
clear vehicles within 30 seconds. That is just enough time to run the
license through the plate reader and check identifications on a data
base. If the documents are in order the vehicle is waived through. The
majority of a CBP Officers' time is spent processing I-94s, documents
non-resident aliens need to enter the United States.
Also, technology improvements can't overcome deficiencies in
equipment and in port infrastructure. For example, DHS recently touted
as a money-saving effort the transferring excess IT equipment within
the Department rather than buying new equipment. NTEU has learned that
at the El Paso cargo facility, CBP Officers ``barely get by with the
old computers'' they inherited 3 months ago when the facility received
newer, yet used, computers handed down from the CBP training facility
in Artesia, NM. It is questionable if this practice is efficient or
effective.
Also, expedited inspection programs, such as FAST, work very well
for the participants in these programs in that their clearance process
is reduced. CBP, however, needs a higher level of verification of FAST
participants because of the higher risk their expedited clearance
creates. For example, at the Blaine POE, many of CBP Officer's
narcotics seizures have come out of FAST-approved Carriers and
Consignees. Expedited inspection programs such as FAST and C-TPAT,
require additional CBP Officers to conduct these verifications.
nteu recommendations
As noted by DHS's own Advisory Council, for too long, CBP at the
POEs has been unfunded and understaffed. DHS employees represented by
NTEU are capable and committed to the varied missions of the agency
from border control to the facilitation of trade into and out of the
United States. They are proud of their part in keeping our country free
from terrorism, our neighborhoods safe from drugs, and our economy safe
from illegal trade. The American public expects its borders and ports
be properly defended.
Congress must show the public that it is serious about protecting
the homeland by:
increasing both port security and trade enforcement staffing
at the ports of entry to the level recommended by the draft
September 2009 Homeland Security Advisory Council Report and
Recommendations;
fully staffing all existing lanes and booths at the POEs to
capacity;
ending the One Face at the Border initiative by
reestablishing CBP Officer and CBP Agriculture Specialist
inspection specialization;
extending career ladder pay increases to additional CBP
personnel including CBP trade operations specialists, CBP
Seized Property Specialists and CBP Technicians,
ensuring that CBP Officers' and Agriculture Specialists'
overtime and premium pay system is fully funded; and
requiring CBP to submit a yearly workplace staffing model
that include optimal staffing requirements for each POE to
fully staff all lanes and reduce wait times.
The more than 24,000 CBP employees represented by the NTEU are
capable and committed to the varied missions of DHS from border control
to the facilitation of legitimate trade and travel. They are proud of
their part in keeping our country free from terrorism, our
neighborhoods safe from drugs and our economy safe from illegal trade.
These men and women are deserving of more resources and technology to
perform their jobs better and more efficiently.
Thank you for the opportunity to submit this testimony to the
committee on their behalf.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you again, Madam Chairwoman, for
conducting this hearing. Often when we talk about securing
America's borders, the focus is on challenges between the
Nation's ports of entry. However, securing those areas is only
one part of achieving border security. That is why I am pleased
that today's subcommittee is also examining the challenges we
face in our Nation's ports of entry.
During the previous two Congresses, this committee held
several hearings examining these issues, both here in
Washington and out in the field along our Northern and Southern
borders. The committee received testimony from Federal
officials, local community members, and border stakeholders to
solicit first-hand perspectives on the challenges involved in
securing ports of entry.
We also had the opportunity to see Customs and Border
Protection efforts to interdict guns, drugs, and money smuggled
through the ports of entry, as well as individuals attempting
to enter the country illegally.
In recent years, DHS has made significant strides towards
securing our border crossings. For example, DHS was
instrumental in implementing the Western Hemisphere Travel
Initiative, helping ensure that travelers have the appropriate
documents entering the country. DHS also has placed an
increased emphasis on stopping the flow of weapons and cash
into Mexico by conducting inspections of southbound vehicles
and screening 100 percent of southbound rail shipments for
contraband. These efforts and others are paying off.
In the last 2 fiscal years, DHS personnel interdicted more
than 6,800 firearm and more than 7 million pounds of drugs,
which represents a 28 percent and 16.5 percent increase
respectively over the previous 2 years. DHS also seized $282
million in illicit currency along the southwest border, a 35
percent increase compared to the previous years.
Of course, much more remains to be done. We know that the
Government Accountability Office, that thousands of more Custom
and Border Protection officers are needed to secure the ports
of entry. Also, aging infrastructure needs to be updated to
accommodate increased traffic and modern security technologies.
Unfortunately, H.R. 1, the Republican continuing
appropriation bill, fails to fund these security priorities and
instead would cut the funding for DHS border security programs.
I would also note that the title of today's hearing
references only securing concerns like guns, drugs, and cash
smuggling. However, I hope that the discussion will also
include the need to expedite the flow of legitimate trade and
travel. Crossborder commerce is essential not only to border
communities, but to the American economy as a whole. Indeed,
Canada and Mexico are the United States' second- and third-
largest trading partners and the first and second biggest
market for U.S. exports. Congestion in our Nation's ports of
entry serves as a hidden tax on the American consumer as
business interests pass the cost incurred by delays onto the
public at large.
We are fortunate to have Representative Cuellar, the
Ranking Member of the committee, as a Member representing a
district along the U.S.-Mexican border. He knows these issues
very well. Representative Higgins and Clarke represent
districts along the U.S. Canadian border and also have first-
hand expertise in these matters. These Members understand the
need to secure our ports of entry, but also the need to do so
while expediting trusted travelers and low-risk cargo into the
United States. They know the importance of these efforts, both
in their districts and to our Nation. Therefore, I look forward
to the hearing on their thoughts and the topic before us today.
I thank the witnesses for joining us also today.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman for his comments.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements might be entered into the record.
We go to our witness now. Mr. Winkowski was appointed the
Assistant Commissioner, Office of Field Operations, in August
2007. He is responsible for operations at 20 major field
offices, 331 ports of entry, 58 operational container security
initiative ports, and 15 preclearance stations in Canada,
Ireland, and the Caribbean. Previously he served as Director of
Field Operations in Miami, where he was responsible for
managing all inspection operations at the Miami International
Airport, Miami Seaport, Port Everglades, Fort Lauderdale
International Airport, West Palm Beach, Fort Pierce and Key
West as well.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Mr. Winkowski for his
testimony. We appreciate your coming, sir.
STATEMENT OF THOMAS WINKOWSKI, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, U.S.
CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Winkowski. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller, and Ranking
Member Cuellar and Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate
the opportunity to testify before your committee today and
continue our on-going discussions on how we secure the border
at our ports of entry.
I will tell you that I am coming on my fourth-year
anniversary as the Assistant Commissioner for Field Operations.
This is the first time I can recall having a hearing
specifically focusing in on the ports of entry. So I really
welcome this opportunity to testify at the hearing. Without
your full support and partnership, we would not have been able
to accomplish all of the successes we have had to date.
The Department of Homeland Security and Customs and Border
Protection employ a risk-based layered approach that, through
the help of this committee, has become a cornerstone of our
operations at the ports of entry.
Given my limited time, I want to take a few minutes to talk
about some of the really good work that we have been able to
accomplish. At the direction of Secretary Napolitano and
Commissioner Bersin, CBP has re-engaged in out-bound operations
over the past 2 years with much success: An increase in
currency, weapons seized at the border going south into Mexico,
100 percent rail inspection that Mr. Thompson mentioned. By the
end of this year, we will have hand-held license-plate reader
capability at all of our 111 out-bound lanes along the
Southwest border.
Furthermore, as we create new facilities, we are keenly
aware of the need to ensure the capacity of out-bound
inspections in our design as well as in our construction.
Another important initiative has been the Alliance to
Combat Transnational Threats, or ACTT, in Arizona. Since ACTT
began on September 5, 2009, we have seen significant
enforcement actions at Arizona ports of entry, more than $13
million in out-bound currency seizures, over 129,000 pounds of
marijuana, and 3,600 pounds of cocaine as examples.
Our success can be measured in many ways. Raw numbers tell
us something. But the smugglers' reactions help validate our
activities. Since we have increased our efforts and continue to
evolve our methods, the cartel has moved to more unique and
deeper concealment methods. For example, concealing drugs in
transmissions of vehicles and trucks and manifolds, cash in gas
tanks, the use of buses to smuggle drugs and cash, drugs
commingled with produce, as just some examples.
Critically important to our mission and related to the
violence seen on the Mexican side of the border is our effort
to give our officers the training and resources they need to
ensure the security of the ports. We have conducted
infrastructure surveys to improve the physical security of the
ports that we have spent over $3.2 million hardening our ports.
We have deployed what we call tactical enforcement officers who
are fully equipped with body armor and the long guns and all
the other associated equipment. We continue to improve and
enhance our special response team program.
I also would like to mention the much-needed infrastructure
projects we have taken and continue to pursue. Chairwoman, you
mentioned this along with Mr. Cuellar. The Commissioner and I
just had the opportunity to open up the new Peace Arch Port of
Entry in Blaine, Washington. Clearly it is a state-of-the-art
facility that showcases what an effective partnership we have
between all the stakeholders: The trade community, the
community at large, the general public, GSA, and what we can
produce at CBP. Really, the port of entry in Blaine, as I
mentioned, is state of the art; but it also is fully equipped
with all that we need from a standpoint of our requirements
with audit, video capabilities and primary and secondary as
well as ample space to process individuals.
Over the past year, we have opened two new ports of entry
in Anzalduas and Donna. San Ysidro has begun a well-needed
expansion and enhancement plan. I was just recently down there
for the groundbreaking. We will see enhancements in San Luis,
Arizona, as well.
The fiscal year 2012 budget request contains money for 300
CBPOs for new and existing infrastructure, and I look forward
to working with this committee to ensure that we have the
essential personnel resources going forward.
These improvements not only bolster security but also
enhance our ability to facilitate legitimate trade and travel.
Our focus should be to consistently and constantly find new and
innovative ways to reduce transaction costs. That comes through
working with our partners and take our trusted traveler and
trusted shipper programs to the next level.
I thank you for the opportunity to testify and I look
forward to answering your questions.
[The statement of Mr. Winkowski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Thomas Winkowski
April 5, 2011
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, Members of the
subcommittee, it is a privilege and an honor to appear before you today
to discuss the work of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
particularly the tremendous dedication of our men and women in the
field, both at and between our ports of entry.
My testimony today focuses on CBP's operational efforts that are
leveraged to combat narcotics, weapons, and cash smuggling along our
borders.
I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude to Congress for
its continued support of the mission and people of CBP. It is clear
that Congress is committed to providing CBP with the resources we need
to increase and maintain the security of our borders. We greatly
appreciate your efforts and assistance, and I look forward to
continuing to work with you on these issues in the future.
The creation of CBP, which established a single, unified border
agency for the United States, is a profound achievement, and our
responsibilities are immense and challenging. CBP is responsible for
protecting more than 3,900 miles of border with Canada and 1,900 miles
of border with Mexico, and 2,600 miles of shoreline. In fiscal year
2010, CBP officers at 331 ports of entry inspected 352 million
travelers and more than 105.8 million cars, trucks, buses, trains,
vessels, and aircraft. Each day, CBP officers process nearly 1 million
travelers entering the United States at our air, land, and sea ports of
entry and inspect more than 47,000 truck, rail, and sea containers.
In fiscal year 2010, CBP seized 4.1 million pounds of narcotics,
including more than 870,000 pounds seized at the ports of entry, 2.4
million pounds seized between the ports of entry, and 831,000 pounds
seized, assisted by CBP Air and Marine. These numbers demonstrate the
effectiveness of our layered approach to security. Violent crime in
border communities has remained flat or fallen in the past decade,
according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) Uniform Crime
Report, and some of the safest communities in America are at the
border. In fact, violent crimes in Southwest border counties overall
have dropped by more than 30 percent, and are currently among the
lowest in the nation per capita, even as drug-related violence has
significantly increased in Mexico.
Working with our partners, our strategy is to secure our Nation's
borders by employing and enhancing our layers of defense throughout the
entire supply chain (for goods) and transit sequence (for people)--
starting from their points of origin, transit to the United States,
arrival and entry at our borders, routes of egress, and ultimately to
final destination in the United States. This strategy relies upon
increased intelligence and risk-management strategies regarding the
movement and flow of both travelers and trade. We accomplish our
mission of expediting legal trade and travel by separating the
``knowns'' from the ``unknowns''. This risk segmentation allows us to
enhance security by focusing more attention on stopping illegitimate
trade, while at the same time facilitating legitimate travel and
commerce. Security and prosperity are mutually reinforcing, and the
United States and Mexico are closely linked by a common interest in
robust security and growing economies. DHS is committed to continuing
to work with Mexico to foster a safe and secure border zone, while
facilitating the legal trade and travel that helps our shared border
region prosper.
Thanks to the continued support of Congress, CBP now has 293 large-
scale Non-Intrusive Inspection (NII) systems deployed to our ports of
entry. Of the 293 NII systems deployed, 53 are deployed on the Northern
border and 145 are deployed on the Southwest border. Additionally, CBP
has deployed 60 backscatter X-ray vans to Southwest border land ports
of entry. To date, CBP has used the deployed systems to conduct over 32
million examinations resulting in over 7,600 narcotic seizures with a
total weight of 2.4 million pounds of narcotics, and the seizure of
over $19.2 million in undeclared currency. Used in combination with our
layered enforcement strategy, these tools provide CBP with a
significant capability to detect contraband, including illicit nuclear
or radiological materials. The deployment of NII technologies has also
enabled our staff to efficiently process a significant volume of
passengers and trade.
NII technologies are the only effective means of screening the
large volume of rail traffic entering the United States from Mexico.
CBP currently has rail imaging systems deployed to all 3 eight
Southwest border commercial rail crossings. These systems currently
provide CBP with the capability to image and scan 100 percent of all
commercial rail traffic arriving in the United States from Mexico. The
rail NII imaging technology is bi-directional which provides CBP with
the added capability to image southbound trains. In March 2009, CBP
began conducting 100 percent outbound screening of rail traffic
departing the United States for Mexico for the presence of contraband,
such as explosives, weapons, and currency.
southwest border operations
Over the past 2 years, DHS has dedicated historic levels of
personnel, technology, and resources to the Southwest border. In March
2009, DHS launched the Southwest Border Initiative to bring
unprecedented focus and intensity to Southwest border security, coupled
with a smart and effective approach to enforcing immigration laws in
the interior of our country. Under this initiative we increased the
size of the Border Patrol to more than 20,700 agents today, which is
more than double the size it was in 2004; and quintupled deployments of
Border Liaison Officers to work with their Mexican counterparts. With
the aid of the $600 million supplemental appropriation passed by
Congress in the summer of 2010, we are continuing to add technology,
manpower, and infrastructure to the border. This includes the addition
of 1,000 new Border Patrol agents and 250 new CBP officers; improving
our tactical communications systems; adding two new forward operating
bases to improve coordination of border security activities; and adding
additional CBP unmanned aircraft systems.
To continue to secure the Southwest Border, CBP must continue to
increase the probability of detection and apprehension of people
attempting to enter the United States illegally or engaging in cross-
border crime. Doing so requires integrated planning and execution of
operations across CBP, as well as seamless partnerships with other
government agencies and sustained collaboration with Mexico. In recent
months, we have taken additional steps to bring greater unity to our
enforcement efforts, expand collaboration with other agencies, and
improve response times. In February, we announced the Arizona Joint
Field Command (JFC)--an organizational realignment that brings together
Border Patrol, Air and Marine, and Field Operations under a unified
command structure to integrate CBP's border security, commercial
enforcement, and trade facilitation missions to more effectively meet
the unique challenges faced in the Arizona area of operations.
In March 2009, under the Southwest Border Initiative, CBP created
the Outbound Programs Division within its Office of Field Operations.
This division is focused on stemming the flow of firearms, currency,
stolen vehicles, and fugitives out of the United States. CBP also
increased its use of ``pulse and surge'' strategies for outbound
operations on the Southwest border. In fiscal year 2011, we have
continued to strengthen the use of these operations along the Southwest
border and to enhance our cooperative efforts with Federal, State,
local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies. These increased outbound
security operations have yielded significant results on both borders.
Our partnership with Mexico has been critical to our efforts to
secure the Southwest border, and we will continue to expand this
collaboration in the coming year. CBP is continuing to assess and
refine its outbound enforcement strategy to include coordinated efforts
with U.S. law enforcement agencies and the Government of Mexico to
maximize southbound enforcement. These activities serve to enforce U.S.
export laws while depriving criminal organizations in Mexico of the
illicit currency and firearms that fuel their illegal activities. In
fiscal year 2010, CBP and Mexican Customs participated in 22 joint
operations along the Southwest border that resulted in the seizure of
over $113,000 in currency, 23.75 kilograms of narcotics and the
recovery of five stolen vehicles.
In 2003, CBP opened an attache office at the U.S. Embassy in Mexico
City to oversee CBP operations in Mexico, including border operational
support at and between the ports of entry, bilateral coordination to
secure the shared border, and training for Mexican government agencies.
In addition to supporting our Mexican counterparts, the attache's
office provides subject matter expertise to the Ambassador and U.S.
interagency groups within the U.S. Embassy in support of the U.S.
Government's trade, travel, and security agendas.
As we have enhanced our collaboration with our neighbors to the
south, CBP also has continued to build upon our partnerships within the
United States. In September 2009, we initiated the Operation Alliance
to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT)--a collaborative enforcement
effort to leverage the capabilities and resources of more than 60
Federal, State, local, and Tribal agencies in Arizona and from the
Government of Mexico to combat individuals and criminal organizations
that pose a threat to communities on both sides of the border. While
ACTT's initial focus is on Arizona, as it continues to evolve, focused
operations will expand to other operational corridors.
CBP continues to work with its partners in the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) and the Southwest Border High Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area program to expand the National License Plate Reader
(LPR) initiative to exploit intelligence on drug traffickers and drug
trafficking organizations. The LPR initiative utilizes established
locations to gather information regarding travel patterns and border
nexus on drug traffickers for intelligence-driven operations and
interdictions. We have also established positions at the El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC), the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task
Force Fusion Center, and the DEA Special Operations Division and
continue to partner with fusion centers in States along the Southwest
border and participate in other multi-agency task forces such as the
ICE Border Enforcement Security Teams and Border Intelligence Centers
targeting drugs, weapons, and currency across the Southwest border.
These partnerships enhance interaction with the intelligence
community and law enforcement agencies to more effectively facilitate
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of actionable intelligence
in support of drug trafficking and money laundering investigations
along the Southwest border.
CBP's fiscal year 2012 budget request continues these efforts by
supporting 21,186 CBP officers who work around the clock with State,
local, Federal, and Tribal law enforcement in targeting illicit
networks trafficking in people, drugs, illegal weapons and money.
Included in the request is funding to support the deployment of 300 new
CBP officers and additional canine assets to port of entry operations
that have recently come on-line. The additional CBP officers and
canines will increase our enforcement capabilities to prevent the entry
of unlawful people and contraband while enhancing our ability to
process legitimate travelers and cargo. This reflects the largest
deployment of law enforcement officers to the front line in the
agency's history.
infrastructure
CBP has long recognized the need to maintain facilities and
infrastructure that effectively support our mission requirements.
Modern facilities must address our constantly evolving border
functions, increasing traffic volumes and staffing levels, and new and
updated technologies and equipment. To that end, CBP has implemented a
facility investment planning process, and capital improvement plan for
land border ports of entry. This process ensures that facility and real
property funding is allocated in a systematic and objective manner, and
is prioritized by mission-critical needs.
While CBP operates 167 land border facilities along the Northern
and Southwest borders, CBP owns only 27 percent of these facilities.
The U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) owns 58 percent, and
leases the remaining 14 percent from private, State, or municipal
entities. The average age of our facilities is 42 years old, which when
coupled with the rapid and continuing evolution of CBP's mission, has
left these vital assets in need of modernization and expansion so that
they can continue to support mission-critical operations. The
heightened responsibilities of the post-9/11 world are far beyond the
legacy missions that the ports were originally designed to support and
the capacity that they were designed to accommodate. For example, the
majority of these facilities were not built to incorporate all of the
enhanced security features that are now present at our ports of entry,
including Non-Intrusive Inspection technology (Radiation Portal
Monitors, Vehicle and Cargo Inspection System, X-rays) and License
Plate Readers.
Through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), CBP was
provided with $420 million for the modernization of CBP-owned land
ports of entry, and GSA was provided with $300 million for the
modernization of GSA-owned land ports of entry. Through the use of
innovative and cost-efficient construction management practices, CBP
was able to use ARRA funds to modernize 39 CBP-owned land border
crossings.
GSA received $300 million under ARRA for the modernization of GSA-
owned land ports of entry. The original GSA spend plan was for seven
projects, four on the U.S.-Canada border and three on the U.S.-Mexico
border. Due to cost savings, CBP and GSA also used funds to support
smaller projects at four additional land ports. With the aid of $200
million in ARRA funds, the Mariposa Port of Entry near Nogales,
Arizona, is currently undergoing renovations to expand capacity and
reduce wait times. These improvements will assist our officers in
focusing their efforts on finding illegitimate trade and travelers. The
Otay Mesa Port of Entry near San Diego is also undergoing a $75 million
upgrade to better facilitate commercial traffic. These are just a few
of the many port projects designed to enhance security and support and
expand trade and commerce along the border.
staffing and training
We have no greater asset than our human resources and we are
committed to continuing to recruit, hire, develop, and sustain a
premier officer corps. To achieve this goal we are currently refining
the recruitment and hiring processes, improving our retention
capabilities, and enhancing our deployment and staffing processes.
We have developed a Workload Staffing Model (WSM) to better align
resource needs and requests against levels of threat, vulnerabilities,
and workload. By using the model we can adjust optimal staffing levels
to changes in workload, processing times, new technologies and
processes, mandated requirements, and threats. The staffing model alone
does not determine how our officers are allocated; it is merely a tool
to assist us in determining the optimum allocation of officers at each
of our land, sea, and air ports.
CBP has also implemented numerous programs, initiatives, and
training to build our officer corps and enable officers to more
effectively respond to threats of terrorism, better utilize
intelligence information, and continue to develop skills, streamline
processes, and enhance inspection operations.
We have developed and implemented a comprehensive training
curriculum for CBP Officers and CBP Agriculture Specialists. This
training curriculum includes basic academy training, as well as
comprehensive, advanced, on-the-job and cross-training courses. CBP
continually strives to provide our frontline officers with recurrent
and additional training to help them better perform their jobs. For
example, CBP has extensive training in place for fraudulent document
identification--both in the CBP officer academy and embedded in 40
additional courses.
To make the best use of our training time and resources, we train
our officers when they need to be trained, and for the functions they
are performing. This means that not every officer completes every
cross-training module, but rather each officer receives the training
needed to do the job he or she is currently performing. CBP has
identified Field Training Officers to ensure that CBP Officers are
receiving the training they need to do their jobs, and that internal
measures are in place to monitor and assess training needs and
accomplishments Nation-wide. CBP is constantly reviewing and revising
its training, in accordance with the ever-changing border enforcement
environment.
Recognizing the complexity of our mission and the broad border
authorities of our agency, we have established specialty functions and
teams that receive additional focused advanced training. For example,
counterterrorism response teams were created for deployment within
secondary inspection areas. These teams are provided with a new and
intense training curriculum that teaches our officers how to detect
deception and elicit information. We have also established targeting
and analysis units, roving teams, and prosecution units. Our
enforcement officers receive additional advanced training to develop
expertise in the questioning of individuals suspected of being involved
with organized smuggling of aliens or drugs, terrorism, and document
fraud.
conclusion
Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you again for this opportunity to testify about the
work of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. CBP is committed to
continuing to secure our Nation's borders and safeguard our way of
life. Your continued support of CBP has led to significant improvements
in the security of our borders, and made our Nation safer. I will be
glad to answer any questions you may have.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very, very much. I appreciate that
testimony. As my Ranking Member said, sometimes we don't pay
enough attention to our men in blue, so I am appreciative of
you coming.
As we said, this committee's focus as we looked at
operational control of the border, as we have looked at some on
the follow-ons, the SBInet and technology and various things
that we might be able to utilize in between the ports of entry,
I think we do need to look more specifically at the POEs and
what is happening there. Again, what is the proper mix of
manpower and technology, dogs, et cetera? Those will be really
the impetus for my questions.
I guess I would start certainly with the manpower question.
Just trying to understand your assumptions, your matrix, if you
will, for manpower decisions. It has been explained to me that
you are in the middle of the crafting of a new staffing model.
But could you tell the committee to the best of your knowledge
what some of the assumptions are, crafting that, about what
your manpower needs actually are, and when we would be looking
for some of that information.
Mr. Winkowski. Yeah. I don't have a number for you, but I
can tell you that we have taken a whole new look at our
workforce allocation model. The old model that we had that Mr.
Cuellar referred to, in my view just didn't address really the
complexities of field operations. As I mentioned in my
testimony, we have re-engaged in the area of out-bound for
example. The old model that we had did not have that particular
criteria and that particular line item in there.
So as we continue to move forward with new infrastructure
that does take into effect our out-bound needs--so, for
example, in Anzalduas and Donna and even at Peace Arch, we have
a section of that port of entry, those ports of entry, that
have enough space and the technology needs for our officers to
do effective out-bound inspections. So the staffing model
didn't really contain that. So I took a step back and decided
to really redesign the staffing model.
The other thing that we need in that staffing model was the
ability to do a plug and play, if you will, from the standpoint
of airports, for example. I know we are talking about the
Southwest border and the Northern border, but we have 95
million passengers that come in every year at our international
airports. To be able to have a model that you could work with
the airlines on from the standpoint of their business model,
when they bring an international flight in, getting that
individual processed through Customs and Border Protection and
onto a connecting airline, how many booths you would need, how
many people you would need from a standpoint of about a 30-
minute turnaround or a 45-minute turnaround. The previous model
didn't have that.
So where we are, we have a good solid draft. We have
briefed the deputy commissioner, as well as Commissioner
Bersin. Commissioner Bersin had a series of questions and we
are back looking at that model. We will be going forward
briefing him and then up to the Department and OMB. So I hope
at some point we can at least sit down with the committee to
talk about the methodology behind the staffing model.
Mrs. Miller. I appreciate that, because as my Ranking
Member has talked about, the volume that is going through his
border and--we can all cite various volumes that are happening
at some of the POEs, et cetera. But you have different
dynamics, right? When you are looking at a manpower matrix, it
is not just volume. It is the type of threats--I mean, you do
have different dynamics in the types of threats just as you
mentioned at the air ports of entry.
Mr. Winkowski. Absolutely. So that model would take into
consideration, for example, the threat. Once you make a
narcotics seizure, you lose a whole host of officers to process
that particular seizure. You have got to make sure that you
have enough resources to continue to staff those booths so we
can facilitate legitimate trade and travel as well. So that
model takes all of that into consideration.
Mrs. Miller. We talked about manpower, and I am sure some
other Members of the committee might have some questions about
canines. I have to ask that because I am sort of on a mission
as well to understand why in the Northern border we essentially
don't have canines. We have maybe 1 or 2 dogs, and yet you have
got huge amounts at the Southern border. Again, I am not
minimizing that. I am just trying to understand how do you get
to a matrix where you don't really use dogs in some areas and
yet you use them very heavily in others, and what is the plan
for the agency as far as balancing that, if you have no plan to
balance it? Just explain to me what your thought process is on
all of that.
Mr. Winkowski. Yeah. As was mentioned, the canines are a
wonderful tool for us. They have been with us for many, many
years. We are big canine program supporters. But when you look
at the result side of it when you get down to pure numbers, say
the Northern border versus the Southern border, the results are
tremendous down in the Southwest border. So the decisions you
have to make are, well, do I take some of these existing
resources that I have up in the Northern borders--not only the
Northern border, but it is also airports--and move them, move
some of those down to the Southwest border where our cost-
effective ratio is so much higher. I have moved canines,
particularly from airport environments where they just don't
produce, and have moved them down to the Southwest border.
I think the other thing that we have to keep in mind is one
of the--I think the many good things about creating the
Department of Homeland Security and our Customs and Border
Protection, we have got one office now, one Commission that
owns the entire border at the ports of entry, and between the
ports of entry, as well as in the air and the water. The Border
Control has its canine resources. What we are doing is we want
to make those dogs fungible. The Customs Service had certain
standards and requirements and response protocols and Border
Control had their response protocols. They didn't all match up.
You need a different dog in a pedestrian environment versus a
cargo environment.
What we are doing is we are training all of those dogs so
those dogs are fungible from the standpoint that if you needed
a canine from field operations at a checkpoint, that dog is
trained for checkpoints as well as points of entry. Border
Control, the same thing. If we need a dog down at the ports of
entry, we can call Border Control and that dog is trained for
ports-of-entry response protocols; because when you look at the
numbers Nation-wide, we have in the area between us and Border
Control probably in the area of about 1,400-1,500 dogs. I think
in field operations, we have 606, if I recall correctly. The
bulk of those canines are down in the Southwest border.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you. I recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you again, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Winkowski, thank you again. I think you are doing a
great job and I appreciate the work that you are doing.
I have a series of questions. South-bound inspections, I
think is something Michael McCaul and I have been working on in
Texas. The State legislature is looking at passing some law to
allow more south-bound. I told some of my former colleagues,
look, it really doesn't matter what you all do, because it
still depends on CBP to allow you to go in.
I am a big believer that the more you can include the local
and State folks to do those south-bound, you can catch more of
the guns going down. Cash also. Cash, if you do the asset
sharing with the locals, for local police department or
sheriffs, that means a lot of money to them. I know that I have
asked some of the folks down in my district to do a little bit
more and they keep saying there are footprints.
We certainly don't want to impede the movement of vehicles
and create long lines going down. But why is it that we just
can't implement a policy to allow the border sheriffs, the
border police departments to work with you? Because if they are
willing to do it like in the city of Pharr where they set up a
low point, why not allow them? Because I know we are always
saying we don't have enough personnel. But if they are willing
to do that and work with you all, it is only common sense to
allow them to do this.
Mr. Winkowski. I totally agree. I can tell you that along
the Southwest border we have a great partnership with the State
and locals. I was down in I believe it was Pharr just not too
long ago. I met the sheriff. They have a trailer there right at
the port of entry.
Mr. Cuellar. A FEMA trailer that we got.
Mr. Winkowski. That is right. That is correct. They work on
a regularly occurring basis. As you know, Pharr and Hildago
have been very, very successful with their out-bound
operations. The sheriff has made--I think it is the chief of
police actually--made it very, very clear that they do get
money from asset sharing, and also with the different grants
that are out there able to pay for their overtime. So I believe
we have a very, very robust fingerprint on the Southwest border
with the State and locals.
Mr. Cuellar. Pharr is in my district. I am very familiar
with that. Could you instruct your folks at the Southwest--and
I assume in the Northwest--to actually not come up with some
excuses, because I know there are some areas where they are
doing that. But if the locals are willing to put the time into
it, that would help I think all sides; Mexico, for the guns to
go in; cash so we can stop the money from going to the drug
cartel. I would ask you to please send that instruction down
and be a little more aggressive on that.
The other thing that I have also, a matter of efficiency.
The last time we had Chief Fisher here, I asked him how many
Border Control he had at the headquarters. I think he had about
230. His response was we need all 230 there at the
headquarters.
It is the old thing about school districts. You get
teachers away, put them in administrative and--I know you need
some of those down at headquarters, but I think you can
contract some of those services out and put those people out in
the border.
My question to you: How many CBP officers do you have at
headquarters?
Mr. Winkowski. The way we count it, because we count the
National targeting centers in our headquarters numbers, I think
you are----
Mr. Cuellar. Let us get that sector away. Do you know how
many CBP officers you have at headquarters doing administrative
work that could be down in the border?
Mr. Winkowski. A combination of CBPOs and agriculture
specialists, I would say it is probably in the area that is
doing the staff work side of it, not the targeting operational
side of it, it is probably in the area of 150 to 175.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. I would ask you to do the same thing as
we asked Chief Fisher, is to evaluate to see if he can send any
of those to the Northern or the Southern border and allow some
of the contracting--have some folks--I can understand certain
areas you do need CBP. I understand that. But I would ask you
to look at that.
The other thing, I would ask you also--and if you can do
that in the next 10 days from today. The other thing is, it has
to do with technology. I was approached by the former Governor
of the State of Texas, Mark White. He had some technology that
they use in Europe at the checkpoints. It is a very simple
technology that when a trailer comes in, that they just check
to see if there is a heartbeat. That would tell you
automatically if there is somebody that is being smuggled in.
He went through the process for years and he couldn't break
the bureaucracy. He asked me to help him; and guess what? I
couldn't break the bureaucracy also. I mean, if there is some
technology out there that is proven somewhere else at another
place, let us say Europe, why can't we implement some of that
technology that would help us stop some of the smuggling coming
in?
Mr. Winkowski. Well, we are always in search. This
committee has been very, very supportive of our technology
needs. Just the Recovery Act alone was $100 million in NII. I
am always open for new technology. New technology is one of the
cornerstones of what we do at the ports of entry. Consider the
bureaucracy broke, I would be more than happy to meet with that
individual to talk through the product that he has.
Mr. Cuellar. Yeah. I know my time is up, but I would just
ask you--and I am not pushing this technology, I am just saying
technology that works out there. I would be happy to set that
up. But the problem is they will set up a meeting, and the
bureaucracy takes over and nothing happens, I still say if it
works somewhere else, why not use it here in the United States?
Thank you again for the good work that you have been doing.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. The Chairwoman recognizes the gentleman from
Alabama, Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you,
Commissioner, for being here again. Do you have enough
personnel?
Mr. Winkowski. Well, the bill for fiscal year 2012 calls
for 300 additional CBPOs, along with 42 additional targeters
for our--for our targeting center.
Mr. Rogers. I take it that means no?
Mr. Winkowski. Well, I support the President's bill. I
mean, from a standpoint of if additional resources were given,
we would have work for them to do.
Mr. Rogers. My concern is you are down 2,000 officers since
2009 and 300 sounds like a really light lift, given that you
are down 2,000; and you just talked about your reconfiguration
of your staffing and the new missions that you are trying to
achieve. The problem I have got in this committee as well as
the Armed Services Committee, is we count on professionals like
you to give us your unvarnished opinion. I recognize that you
have got orders from Commissioner Bersin, as well as the
President, that you don't deviate from. But we can't help you
if you don't tell us what you need. So it just seems to me that
while you like to have the 300 and you are saluting and saying,
yes, sir, I am for that, what we need to know is do you need
more than that?
Mr. Winkowski. I think certainly, as I said, if we were
given additional resources, we would have plenty of work for
them to do. I think along those lines, though, Congressman
Rogers, is we have got to look at why did the numbers come
down. One of the challenges that we have in field operations is
that about 37 percent of our staff are funded by user fees. So
when the economy is robust and people are traveling and cargo
is crossing and they are paying user fees, it gives us that
ability to go and hire additional officers. The last couple of
years, as you well know, we, this country, was going through a
very tough economic time, and passenger counts had dropped,
which means revenues have dropped from the standpoint of user
fees. So, for example----
Mr. Rogers. You are talking about budgetary matters and the
fact is this is the Homeland Security Committee. Our
responsibility is to make sure you have what you need to
provide secure ports of entry. Frankly, it shouldn't matter to
you whether our revenues are up or down. What we want to know
is from you as a professional, what do you need to secure the
ports of entry? It seems to me your personnel down there--it
may be because we are not paying them enough, we are having a
hard time recruiting, retention, whatever. That is what I am
getting at.
Mr. Winkowski. I don't mean to misdirect the question, but
we are tied to this user fee. So my point is, look at--it
should be appropriated, rather than a user fee.
Mr. Rogers. That is an excellent point.
Second question. Do you have enough canines? You said you
have 606. Obviously you have one on the Northern border. It
seems to me the answer is no.
Mr. Winkowski. I think the next step with our staffing
model is going to be directed at our canine program.
Mr. Rogers. Where do you produce your canines? Front Royal?
Mr. Winkowski. Front Royal.
Mr. Rogers. And El Paso?
Mr. Winkowski [continuing]. And El Paso for Border Control.
What we need to make sure that we are doing is, as I mentioned
earlier, is that we are effectively utilizing the existing
canines that we have on board.
Mr. Rogers. But you don't have enough?
Mr. Winkowski. I think it is too early to tell because----
Mr. Rogers. You only have one on the Northern border. You
can't have enough.
Mr. Winkowski. The question becomes from a standpoint of
effectiveness. I could go and put----
Mr. Rogers. I recognize that the only way to get 606, you
have got to allocate them where they are most effective. But
you are putting all 605 of them on the Southwest border and
only one on the Northwest border. So obviously you don't have
enough.
According to the 2010 Congressional Justification to
Congress from your Department, you are apprehending only 30
percent of the violators on the land POEs. We need to get you
some more assets. Basically I am here to help you, but you have
got to help me by saying, yeah, I need more. That is all I am
looking for, and I don't want to put you on the spot. I know
you have got folks above you trying to keep you in line. I am
sure there is somebody up in your legislative liaison office
back there with a gun pointed at you right now.
Last question. You talked about the state-of-the-art POE,
ports of entry, the new ones like Blaine. Can you describe for
me the characteristics of a state-of-the-art facility as
opposed to one of your antiquated facilities?
Mr. Winkowski. Yeah. I think No. 1, it has enough lanes to
process passengers. It reduces these wait times to an absolute
minimum. It is fully equipped with electronic signage so you
can direct traffic into lanes from a standpoint of--with the
complying documents only, to Trusted Traveler. It has got
complete audio/video capability in the booths as well as in
secondary. It is hardened from the standpoint of the necessary
barriers that we need. It has a very, very robust out-bound
section that our officers can use.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent. Thank you very much.
Mrs. Miller. The Chairwoman recognizes Mr. Clarke from
Michigan.
Mr. Clarke. Thank you, Chairwoman.
First of all, Commissioner Winkowski, I want to commend
your service with U.S. Customs Service working up through the
ranks. That is very impressive. I want to commend your mission
to help prevent terrorists and weapons and other contraband
from coming through our ports of entry.
I represent the Detroit border sector which includes the
Quincy Ambassador Bridge. There is a lot of long wait times
there and the wait times really add to the pollution and toxins
that pollute those neighborhoods that I represent.
Just your opinion, how does CBP balance its mission on
stopping these terrorist threats with facilitating cross-border
commerce? Is there a way that you see that we can reduce those
wait times without compromising security?
Mr. Winkowski. Yeah. Really that is really the challenge
that we have in field operations. If you come between the ports
of entry, you are a violator. I don't care if you are a U.S.
citizen or not a U.S. citizen. If you are coming through a port
of entry, we process legitimate trade and travel there, as well
as prevent bad people and bad things from coming into the
country. So our officers in blue are always working with that
fine balance.
What we have done is we have come up with a number of
programs that segregate risk. For example, the more that we
know about a particular traveler, the more that we know about a
particular company and shipment, the better judgment that we
can make from a standpoint of determining whether or not that
particular shipment, that particular individual, needs to be
inspected. Thus we created C-TPAT, Customs Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism; fast lanes that have fully vetted truckers
on the passenger side as our NEXUS program of which up on the
Northern border we have about 400-500,000 members. But we need
to make sure that our infrastructure, as you go forward here
with new infrastructure that they are talking about here,
addresses that kind of risk segmentation.
So the more I know about that particular company, the more
I know about that particular individual, the more--hey, I can
blow away from the needle. That is how we do it. That is a big
piece of how we do it.
Mr. Clarke. Just one follow-up on the Ranking Vice Chair's
question regarding staffing. Does your--and I am assuming lack
of CBP officers is an assumption that you may not have enough
that you need. How does that affect the burden that our local
first responders have to bear?
Mr. Winkowski. From the standpoint of emergency vehicles
coming in?
Mr. Clarke. Just in terms of security.
Mr. Winkowski. Well, again, you know we have enjoyed a
plus-up in staffing. When you look at the Northern border and
the Southern border, up in the Northern border from fiscal year
2006 to fiscal year 2011 here, up to March 12 of 2011, we have
had a 15 percent increase in CBPO, which you know in a time of
shrinking budgets I am very, very grateful for that. We also
have some flexibility with overtime and some of the other
compensations that we can give our officers.
Mr. Clarke. Thank you, Commissioner. I yield back.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman. The Chairwoman now
recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you
commissioner for being here today. I want to follow up on some
points that my colleague from Texas, Mr. Cuellar, made on the
south-bound interdiction efforts. The figures I have, there is
somewhere between $18- to $39 billion that flow from the United
States back into Mexico, and of course that is speculative but
that is the estimate, not to mention the guns and I know we
have the best teams down there. I have seen them, very
impressive. But really two questions. I mean, the other
information I have is that the Department from March 2009
through February 2011, the Department seized only $67 million,
which is less than 1 percent of all this illicit smuggling. It
seems to me that we could do a better job and I think that the
beauty of this program, if we can enhance it as we are
proposing out of this committee, is that it could be a pay-for
for a lot of our border security operations.
So my first question is, where we do seize the assets,
where does that money go?
Mr. Winkowski. That money goes into the Forfeiture Fund,
and that money is used for reimburse State and locals.
Oftentime State and locals are working with us; they get a
piece of that. Also we were able to get, I believe it was $10
million, out of the Forfeiture Fund for canopies for our south-
bound operations, those locations that don't have that outbound
footprint.
Mr. McCaul. My time is limited. So when the forfeiture
money comes to Washington, the Secretary controls that. Is that
correct?
Mr. Winkowski. It is actually controlled out of the
Treasury Department.
Mr. McCaul. Okay, and who determines where that money goes?
Mr. Winkowski. Treasury has a voice in it and the
Department.
Mr. McCaul. It seems to me that all the money we are
seizing down there ought to go back towards our border security
operations. It is my understanding that does not currently
happen. I think we need to fix that.
The second thing is if we are only getting less than 1
percent--and Mr. Rogers alluded to this as well and you may be
handcuffed to answer the question--but what can we do to
enhance the best teams and the operations on the south-bound
interdiction? You know, what more resources do you need down
there?
Mr. Winkowski. Well, I think from the standpoint of south-
bound, the technology piece is a big piece that is needed. We
have 111 south-bound lanes going into Mexico. I believe less
than half are covered by old license plate technology. We are
in the process of deploying, as I said in my testimony here,
handheld--standing up with handheld license plate readers which
I think are very, very important because that enables us to
trigger our systems. We have also employed our officers with
handheld ATS mobile systems which enables them to be out there
in the lane accruing names and running licenses. So we are
beginning to deploy that technology.
I think the other thing you have to keep in mind with that
number, and I have seen that number as well, you have got wire
transfers, you have got a whole host of ways that money is
leaving the United States, and I think we also have to keep in
mind tunnels. You know, we have seen an upshot in the number of
tunnels. I think last year we found 12. This year we are
already up to 11. I mean, that tells me a story that it is hard
to get between the ports of entry and it is hard to get through
the ports of entry, so they are going under us and, looking at
it from a money standpoint, leaving through the tunnels as
well. But I will say that the out-bound area, while we have
always been engaged in out-bound, certainly the last few years
we have really tripled our efforts and as part of that
footprint that we have got to make sure it is with the ports of
entry and we have got adequate----
Mr. McCaul. I think as has been mentioned before by the
Chairwoman and Mr. Rogers, I have seen the canines down there
running around those cars, and I hope that happens when we are
not there as well. I am sure it does. But they are impressive.
I mean they can sniff the stuff out and so, you know, I look
forward to working with you and my time is about ready to
expire. But I would like to work with you and the Department in
a bipartisan way to enhance this effort because I do think the
money confiscated could be directed back towards your
operations and make it safer.
Mr. Winkowski. Thank you.
Mr. McCaul. Appreciate it.
Mrs. Miller. The Chairwoman recognizes the gentleman from
Arizona, Mr. Quayle.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and thank you for
holding this very important hearing. Thank you for coming, Mr.
Commissioner.
I want to first off commend the men and women of CBP. I was
recently along with the other people of the Arizona delegation.
We went down to the various ports of entry in the southern part
of Arizona and the Yuma sector and the Tucson sector, and they
are top-notch and very professional people and we enjoyed our
time with them.
One of the areas that has really struck me was when we were
in Douglas and it really showed that the violence and the
amount of drugs that are coming across the borders really do
affect our ports of entry because we got there and about an
hour before the CBP actually pulled over a car that was driven
by a young woman with her two young children in the car, and
the dogs came out and they got about 200 pounds of marijuana
right before we were there. We also were able to watch a video
that the CBP put forth. It was on their surveillance cameras
because in Douglas, as you know, we are right there next to the
Mexican side and there was an incident about a few weeks ago
where a few fake police cruisers on the Mexican side of the
border went right past the port of entry, went to a restaurant,
unloaded three hundred rounds of ammunition, killing between
three and five and injuring about 20 people, depending on the
reports.
So the violence that you guys have to deal with in terms of
the proximity continues down there as the drug cartels up their
violent regime.
But one of the things I was going to ask about, and we are
talking a lot about the interdiction going south-bound, which I
saw first-hand and it is actually great to see how much cash
and weapons that you have been able to stop, but what sort of
help has the Mexican authorities been giving you in south-bound
interdiction and also, because you just mentioned it, with
regard to the tunnels because their involvement is seeing where
it starts on the Southern side is going to be so important
until we can actually have the technological advances to be
able to see those tunnels through the ground because in the
Yuma sector, which has been fairly secure, they just found a
tunnel a little while ago that was 40 feet deep underneath the
fencing.
So if you could talk to me about how the Mexican
authorities are actually working with you on that.
Mr. Winkowski. Well, we have a very, very strong
relationship with the Mexican government on the border. Matter
of fact, about a year ago we established binational port
security committee meetings that we meet every month with the
Mexicans. We were doing that before-hand but it wasn't as
structured and Commissioner Burson wanted to bring some
structure to that. So we have done that.
We run joint operations with the Mexican government. So we
are doing south-bound operations. They are doing north-bound
operations. So we have got this coordination piece, and I can
tell you in the 4 years that I have been in this job as the
Assistant Commissioner, the relationship on the communication
with our friends in Mexico has grown tremendously. We are very
good partners with them. We work very, very hard with them. We
meet with them on a regular and recurring basis at their ports
of entry. They are automating their ports of entry with license
plate readers. We have done a lot of training. We have sent
their officers to our training. We have worked on their
curriculum.
So the relationship is a very, very healthy and robust
relationship.
Mr. Quayle. Okay. My other question is the amount of
attrition that happens at CBP. It is fairly high. I was just
trying to figure out ways, and maybe you have some solutions,
to try to minimize that attrition because it takes what, about
a 1\1/2\ years to actually train an officer, and when you have
an increasing level of attrition, if that is occurring today--I
don't think it is right now because the economy is bad--but how
do we keep those levels so they are acceptable so that we can
keep men and women on the front lines there at our border who
have the experience to actually spot, you know, somebody who is
trying to get contraband across the border because I notice
that some of the people, it is just ingrained in them their
ability to be able to spot out some of these is a little off
but also it takes a lot of experience.
Mr. Winkowski. Well, our attrition rate right now is about
3 percent, which is not bad. A lot of that has to do with
really the work that the committee and subcommittee have done
over the years with us. The committee has been very, very
supportive of giving us CBP officers law enforcement retirement
coverage, which is very, very important, and we truly
appreciate that.
Also, last year we were able to increase the grade level
for the Border Patrol agents as well as for CBPOs as well as
our agriculture specialists. So back many years ago when I
started in this business as a customs inspector I became a GS-9
and asked my boss when I could become a GS-11, and he told me
15 years, and he was right. Today our officers go up to 11th--
7, 9, 11, 12--and it has to do with really the responsibility
that are placed on the men and women's shoulders in CBP and the
Department.
So our attrition rate is low right now. I like to think a
lot of that has to do with the fact that the retirement and the
grades, but we are also in some tough economic times. So it
will be interesting to see that as time goes on and we dig our
way out of this economic situation that we are in if there will
be more movement.
I think the other thing we have to keep in mind is unlike
when I came in this organization, I am under the civil service
retirement system. Once you are in, you are in. You leave, you
lose everything. These officers now are under FERS, and it is
401 and it is not unusual for this generation to have four or
five different jobs. So we are dealing with a whole different
clientele as well than from my generation.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you, Mr. Commissioner. Thank you, Madam
Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman
from South Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. Commissioner, I
appreciate the job you guys do and I will talk about that a
little bit.
I share President Reagan's vision for America as a shining
city on a hill, and when I heard President Reagan talk about
that, he talked about that city may have to have walls, and if
the city has walls, then there would be gates and that those
gates would facilitate the flow of legitimate travel, commerce,
and legal immigration.
We have had numerous hearings here in this committee about
our border. Being from South Carolina, we are about as far away
from the Northern and Southern border as you can get, and
although we have a natural port in Charleston and Georgetown,
where we do have some commerce and other issues come through
South Carolina, the issue that concerns my constituents are
what comes across our Southern border, and that seems to be the
glaring issue of the day.
So it is a concern of ours, and I want to thank you guys
because you man those gates that President Reagan talked about.
So as we talk about operational control with Chief Fisher and
with Secretary Napolitano, let me be clear that where they are,
the point they have arrived at with operational control and the
point that I am at and when I look at the Secure Fence Act of
2006 and the definition of operational control, they are 180
degrees apart. So I don't believe we are there.
But the line of questions I would like to talk with you
about today is the Operation Fast and Furious that the ATF has
and guns being smuggled across the U.S. border and comments of
the administration with regard to guns.
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said this: She said our
inability to prevent weapons from being illegally smuggled
across the border to arm these criminals causes the deaths of
police officers, soldiers, and civilians. The U.S. State
Department claims that 95 percent of all drug-related murders
in Mexico used firearms obtained in the U.S.A., and that seems
awful high to me.
I understand that since 2008 the ATF has been conducting
this operation known as Fast and Furious, 1,998 guns purchased,
797 of which were later linked to crimes. Two of these guns
were recovered at the crime scene where Border Patrol agent
Brian Terry was murdered this past December. Secretary
Napolitano has denied knowing about the program and Attorney
General Eric Holder has admitted that he knew of the operation
but stated that cross-border gun trafficking was not
acceptable.
I am greatly concerned about this administration's lack of
knowledge about those operations but also lack for concern for
the dangers to the American people on our Southern border. So
the question, one question I have for you is was CBP aware of
and involved in that operation?
Mr. Winkowski. Not that I am aware of, no.
Mr. Duncan. Not that you are aware of.
Mr. Winkowski. No.
Mr. Duncan. You are aware of the on-going border violence
along the border, as you deal with it every day. Many experts
believe that Mexican drug cartels and the terrorist
organization Hezbollah have been working together for years.
In the face of such threats to our National security,
operations like Fast and Furious only increase the threat of
terrorist attacks against America, I believe, and I am outraged
that this administration refuses to honestly assess the active
threats on our Southern border.
So I just ask that you and your area within the Department
of Homeland Security continue to be aware of the terrorist
threats along our Southern border. The fact that operations
such as Fast and Furious, although had the right intention of
trying to control illegally smuggled weapons across the border,
sometimes, Madam Chairwoman, the consequences can be damaging
to the liberties of Americans.
I am a strong advocate for the Second Amendment right and
agree with the Senator from Texas who recently said that he
didn't think that the solution to Mexico's problems was to
limit the Second Amendment gun rights in this country, and so
when I see that Secretary Clinton and others have pointed to
American weapons being smuggled and want to limit sales along
our border to Americans it concerns me. They want to limit new
purchases along the border, and my knowledge from studying this
is that the average age of a weapons seized in Mexico is over
15 years old, and so we need to be cognizant and aware of that.
So I just stop there, Madam Chairwoman. Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman, and the Chairwoman now
recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I just want to
raise the issue of congestion at land ports of entry, and it
poses a number of problems relative to security, but also
environmental problems as well, and idling truck engines emit a
lot of carbon dioxide and nitrogen oxide, which poses major
threats to the environment generally and to the areas
surrounding these land port ports of entry.
Do you have any data relative to--I represent the Buffalo
area, which includes the Peace Bridge, which is the biggest
Northern border crossing for passenger vehicles. Any data
relative to that issue? Have you heard from stakeholders in
that community? As you may know, from the past 2 decades we
have been planning to build more capacity at the bridge and a
new American Plaza as well. So just can you enlighten us at all
on that issue of congestion and mitigation efforts relative to
relieving that congestion?
Mr. Winkowski. Yeah, we meet on a regularly occurring basis
with the stakeholders, the bridge authorities up there in
Buffalo as well as other locations. A lot of the congestion has
to do with footprint issues that I know you are very familiar
with, Congressman.
Some of the things that we are doing is certainly looking
at wanting to get more and more people into trusted travel
programs, our NEXUS program and certainly on the cargo side C-
TPAT and Fast, so we can do that risk segmentation, we can get
those low risk people out and focus in on those individuals
that need to be focused in on.
We are also working a joint effort with Transport Canada
and CBSA and our DOT to get accurate wait time measurements,
okay, from the standpoint of using technology and we are going
to be testing some systems, I believe it is up in Blaine--
excuse me, up in Peace Bridge, Buffalo, and sometime this year,
as well as putting signage up as you have some of these other
crossings that aren't all that far away that aren't as busy and
can we come up with a system where if you are thinking of going
over Peace Bridge, instead of going over Peace Bridge we have a
sign that says if you go to Whirlpool, it is a 5-minute wait.
Mr. Higgins. We don't want to divert traffic. I think the
problem--let me also say this. I have only a couple of minutes.
The issue of using technology for like the NEXUS pass it
makes a lot of sense, but if you don't have the capacity at the
bridge to get those vehicles to those, you know, expedited
review and approval, then it doesn't do you much good and that
is part of the problem. The Peace Bridge you only have three
lanes and trucks can't get and passenger vehicles can't get to
those lanes because of the congestion.
Second, just on the issue, should border management--or
pre-clearance has been deemed dead by the Secretary.
Mr. Winkowski. Correct.
Mr. Higgins. Can you elaborate a little bit on this concept
of pre-screening?
Mr. Winkowski. Well----
Mr. Higgins. Is it workable?
Mr. Winkowski. I don't know what you mean by pre-screening.
I mean----
Mr. Higgins. Well, the President and the Prime Minister of
Canada have talked about cooperative efforts to make more
efficient----
Mr. Winkowski. Right, I am familiar with that. Well, you
know, I think it is working with the Canadian government and
getting as much advance information as possible so you can make
judgments and that you can make judgments from the standpoint
of what is deemed low-risk and what is not deemed low-risk and
being able to build on those pillars that are in that document.
You know, we are still working through a lot of these pillars
and a lot of these issues and working very closely with the
Canadian government, and we continue to look at new and
innovative ways. I guess one of the concerns that I have is you
know I went up to Peace Arch and I looked at that beautiful
facility and how much bigger can these things get, hundreds of
millions of dollars. You look at San Ysidro, $600 million at
the end of the day, and it is not all about brick and mortar.
Brick and mortar is important, I understand that, but it is
also how do we leverage advance information, how do we
segregate that low-risk traffic so at somewhere along the line
perhaps they don't even have to come through a port of entry as
we know a port of entry today. I think it is that kind of
innovation that we have got to work through with Canadian
government as well as the Mexican government.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentleman and before we go to our
next round of witnesses, our next panel, I have a follow-on
question for you as well, sir.
You know, I was trying to take notes when you were talking
about Blaine, Washington, and what you described as state-of-
the-art and some of the various things you said there: Enough
lanes, reduced wait times, electronic signage, audio-visual or
video in booths, hardened barriers, robust out-bound. I am sure
I missed a few. I was trying to write them down as you were
mentioning them all there.
But I say that because one of our next witnesses is going
to be from the Northern border, from the Blue Water Bridge, and
Mr. Higgins was just mentioning it with the Peace Bridge, and I
am sure this is so in many other areas, where the Canadians
have actually done their plaza expansion on their side and the
United States has not done the plaza expansions on our side and
much of the problems that we are having that are expediting is
obviously just not having enough capacity to accommodate what
we need to accommodate for expediting the traffic, as well as
ensuring all of our security concerns as well.
I am just wondering how you came to Blaine, Washington. I
know they need it. But I am just saying what is your
priorities--how do you prioritize where you are going to go to
expend those kinds of funds?
I ask that question because in regards to the city of Port
Huron, which is the municipality that holds the American side
of the Blue Water Bridge, where at the foot of that bridge is
actually the genesis of both I-69 and I-94, two major trade
corridors. It is the second-busiest. I sound like a broken
record here, but the second-busiest border crossing on the
Northern tier. We have been dealing with CBP and our Michigan
Department of Transportation, et cetera, GSA, to expand the
plaza on the U.S. side for a decade, and we had originally
started with 87 acres as a footprint, gone through a number of
different iterations. We are now at 16 acres. So they
significantly downsized what they were thinking about there,
and CBP still is not able to actually say that they are going
to have enough to put a little skin in the game there.
So we are not quite sure where this entire thing is going.
In the interim you have a community that essentially has got,
you can imagine, all the condemnation and funds that we have
gotten to tear down all of this. We now have a huge amount of
acreage sitting vacant in the middle of what was once a very
thriving, busy area. So we do have concern about that, and
again we want to work with CBP. We are happy to be an
international border agency.
But I am just wondering how you prioritize where you are
going with these various POEs and the plaza expansions, both in
the south and north. Do you have a list of what they are?
One follow-on thing, as you were mentioning, the NEXUS
lanes and the Trusted Travelers and that, I mean I have my
NEXUS card right here in purse. We have it on our Congressional
website. We try to promote all of these various things to help
our folks understand how important it is to be an active
participant, just as a citizen, of trying to get through
quickly.
But in regard to--for instance, in our area, much of the
traffic that is coming through there is automotive-related. So
we do have--the CBP, et cetera, has a number of different
programs that they deal with to expedite the flow of traffic,
but the whole issue, I am not sure if this is the correct
characterization of reverse inspection--that is what I call
it--the reverse inspection where you actually would pre-clear
before they come across the border, whether that is the north
and the south, and I know you have different dynamics and
relationships with the Mexican authorities as you do the
Canadian government.
Do you have any suggestions on how we may be able to assist
in trying to get a reverse inspection type of scenario, if you
think that would be helpful as far as expediting commerce as
well?
Mr. Winkowski. Well, a couple of points I would like to
make. First of all. Thank you for being a NEXUS member and
promoting the program.
These projects take 7 years from cradle, from the beginning
to the cutting the ribbon. So Blaine, you know, that was in--it
was in the works for about 7 years, as is San Ysidro, and we do
have criteria from the standpoint of need and congestion and
things of that nature, which I will be more than happy to brief
you on.
As far as reverse inspection, I think we need to work
through those ideas, and I think in terms I was telling Mr.
Higgins, I think one of the challenges that we have, a positive
challenge that we have, is I think a real strong relationship
with the Canadian government and the border vision. I think it
really opens up a lot of opportunity for us to be more
creative, because as I mentioned earlier, it can't all be about
brick and mortar, you know. I am very familiar with the Blue
Water Bridge and what everybody went through. I worked very
closely with stand on the Canadian side. I have known her for
many, many years.
But we have got to look at not only brick and mortar but we
have got to look at more innovative ways. The automobile
industry, extremely low-risk, extremely, as you well know,
time-sensitive, that backseat and that trailer going into an
automobile in 2 hours. We understand that, but it is looking at
those types of transactions and really asking the question why
do they even have to come through a port of entry as we know it
today. Okay. We know who GM is, their C-TPAT they are good
corporate citizens, Chrysler, Ford and many, many other
companies, and we got to stop looking at the border, as
Commissioner Burson would say, as the line that begins the
process. That process begins far interior in a foreign country,
whether it is Canada or Mexico or in Europe, and be able to
make sure that we design a system that addresses you know the
flows of people and things.
So I think, you know, I will be more than happy to sit down
on criteria that we use. As you know with Peace or Blue Water
Bridge, it is a funding issue associated with that and we
understand the urgency. We understand the need and very, very
much appreciate kind of reducing the footprint a little bit and
just handle the cargo side, as I recall, the initial layout.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much. Do you have any further
questions?
Mr. Cuellar. Just to say thank you very much for being here
with us.
Mrs. Miller. We certainly want to thank you very much for
your appearance and for your testimony, and with that, we will
call the second panel. Thank you.
Mr. Cuellar. Madam Chairwoman, as the witnesses are getting
into seats I will ask for unanimous consent to make part of the
record the testimony of Nelson Balido, President of the Border
Trade Alliance. As you know, this is a nonprofit that has been
serving as a forum for border trade for many years, since 1986,
and I would ask unanimous consent.
Mrs. Miller. Without objection.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Balido follows:]
Statement of Nelson H. Balido, President, Border Trade Alliance
April 5, 2011
The Border Trade Alliance appreciates the opportunity to submit
testimony for this important subcommittee hearing on security at our
Nation's ports of entry.
about the border trade alliance
Founded in 1986, the Border Trade Alliance is a non-profit
organization that serves as a forum for participants to address key
issues affecting trade and economic development in North America.
Working with entities in Canada, Mexico, and the United States, the BTA
advocates in favor of policies and initiatives designed to improve
border affairs and trade relations among the three nations.
BTA's membership consists of border municipalities, chambers of
commerce and industry, academic institutions, economic development
corporations, industrial parks, transport companies, custom brokers,
defense companies, manufacturers, and State and local government
agencies.
a discrepancy in agency resources
The committee will get no argument from the trade community and the
constituency that the BTA represents that the Border Patrol is not an
integral component of our Nation's border security strategy.
But the increased attention that Congress and this and previous
administrations has directed towards Border Patrol has left the agency
responsible for security at the ports of entry, Customs and Border
Protection, coming up short in the chase for dwindling human and
technological resources.
Border Patrol has seen a huge spike in agents since fiscal year
2004. That year, Border Patrol was allocated $4.9 billion to fund
10,817 agents. But by fiscal year 2010, Border Patrol was allocated
$10.1 billion to fund just over 20,000 agents.
According to a March 30, 2011 GAO report, the Border Patrol is now
better staffed than at any other time in its 86-year history.\1\
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\1\ http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11508t.pdf.
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The same rapid rise in staffing levels cannot be said for CBP
inspectors at our ports of entry.
2010 border security supplemental: ports come up short
The 2010 supplemental border security funding bill provides an
illustration of how port security often plays second fiddle to security
between the ports.
The President in August signed the supplemental appropriations bill
that allocated $176 million to fund 1,000 new Border Patrol agents. The
same bill appropriated $68 million for 250 new CBP officers, which was
half of what the House of Representatives originally sought in July
2010.
a renewed commitment to improving port staffing levels
CBP in fiscal year 2010 was responsible for inspecting 352 million
travelers and nearly 106 million cars, trucks, buses, trains, vessels,
and aircraft at over 330 air, land, and sea ports of entry.\2\
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\2\ http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11508t.pdf.
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By increasing the number of frontline inspectors, Customs and
Border Protection can devote the manpower necessary to interdict those
individuals who would seek to do us harm. But the increased staffing
levels can play a marked role in the facilitation of trade and travel
by letting safe travelers and cargo pass more quickly into U.S.
commerce.
To that end, the BTA is encouraged that Rep. Silvestre Reyes is
likely to re-introduce legislation that would markedly improving CBP
staffing levels at the ports of entry.
His bill introduced in the last Congress, the Putting Our Resources
Towards Security Act, which we expect will serve as the basis for
forthcoming legislation, called for an increase of 5,000 CBP officers
over a 5-year period at the ports of entry.
The BTA was strongly supportive of that bill for two obvious
benefits a dramatic increase in port personnel offers: More inspectors
to curtail contraband smuggling, and more inspectors to facilitate
legitimate trade and travel. Simply said, there is no one single
resource as valuable as increased human capital at our points of entry
that results in increasing the flow of trade, thus increasing the flow
of tax revenue through international travelers' purchases of goods and
services on the U.S. side of the border.
customs-trade partnership against terrorism: improvement can strengthen
security, economy
CBP inspectors at the ports are charged with the important dual
mission of security and facilitation.
Inspectors, using technology and relying on experience, make quick
decisions on whether to release a shipment or traveler into the United
States or refer that cargo or vehicle to a secondary inspection area
for more intense inspection.
The Nation's major importers are especially sensitive to the role
CBP plays in a company's bottom line. If there aren't enough inspectors
to open up all the lanes at a land border port during a period of peak
traffic, then shipments can get stuck waiting in sometimes miles-long
backups, stalling just-in-time manufacturing operations and increasing
costs.
CBP and the private sector are working closely together to make the
international supply chain stronger and to help speed the passage of
legitimate cargo in order to allow our limited inspection resources to
focus on infrequent, less-known shippers.
The trade community is acutely aware of the economic damage that
our country would suffer if an unsecured supply chain were to
facilitate terrorist activity. And day in and day out, companies are
undertaking measures--both seen and unseen--to root out the scourge of
drug and human trafficking and the illegal export of guns and currency
that fuel the cartel violence to our south.
For example the vast majority of companies engaged in robust
international trade are members of the Customs-Trade Partnership
Against Terrorism, otherwise known as C-TPAT. Members of C-TPAT partner
with CBP to ensure that their supply chains are secure by strengthening
the physical security of warehouses and manufacturing facilities,
strengthening the security of conveyances by using special seals on
truck trailers and employing shipment tracking technology such as GPS
to ensure that a shipment is not tampered with, in addition to host of
additional measures designed to minimize as much as possible the chance
that a shipment could be compromised to smuggle contraband into the
United States.
In exchange for C-TPAT members undertaking the oftentimes expensive
steps to make their supply chains stronger from point of origin to
destination, CBP commits to facilitating expedited service at the U.S.
ports of entry. Unfortunately, the trade community of late has been
growing frustrated with the program's failure to deliver clearly
identifiable benefits to its members.
To that end, the BTA has produced a detailed recommendations paper
\3\ for ways to improve the program and has engaged in a thus far very
productive dialogue with CBP in exploring pilot programs to ensure that
C-TPAT is delivering on its promises to participating companies.
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\3\ http://www.thebta.org/btanews/bta-puts-forth-recommendations-
for-an-improved-c-tpat.html.
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curtailing the outbound flow of guns and money
Our membership is concerned about any illegal trade that could
disrupt supply chains and put our country's physical and economic
security at risk. We are especially sensitive to drug cartel violence
in Mexico and concerns that that violence could spill over the U.S.-
Mexico border.
We understand and support the desire to conduct out-bound
inspections of cars and trucks in the border region to prevent the
illegal export of firearms and currency into Mexico.
We would encourage CBP, however, to work with the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and local law enforcement agencies to
base its inspection operations on actionable intelligence whenever
possible. Random inspections are akin to a search for a needle in a
haystack, often resulting in increased delays and congestion to
residents and the trade. It is our hope that an open dialogue between
CBP, ATF, and other law enforcement agencies can shrink the size of the
haystack.
frustrated with the feds, states poised to engage in border inspections
Getting out-bound inspections right is critical for CBP and the
Department of Homeland Security because the border States are poised to
fill the leadership vacuum on this issue, which we believe holds the
potential to make a bad situation worse.
We are concerned that State legislatures, which have grown
increasingly frustrated with the Federal Government's failure to
adequately secure our borders, will direct State departments of public
safety to conduct their own border region inspection operations.
We do not want to see a needless turf war sparked between competing
State and Federal agencies in the border region. Legitimate cross-
border trade and travel is too vital to the economic health of a
country struggling to emerge from the throes of a deep recession to
risk it to unnecessary slowdowns in trade.
We strongly support the President's call to double U.S. exports
over a 5-year period. We will not achieve the President's goal,
however, if we make it harder for legitimate cargo to exit this country
due to poorly considered out-bound inspections.
a note about sbinet
The BTA recognizes that Members of this committee were dubious of
the effectiveness of SBInet, the so-called ``virtual fence'' in
southern Arizona that was recently canceled by DHS.
Being the only third-party organization allowed to visit the
program facility on a fact-finding mission late last year, and after a
presentation with Border Patrol agents in the Tucson sector where the
system is deployed and having studied the issue closely, we believe
that the system should have been allowed to continue, especially in
light of a recent request for information from DHS that calls for much
of the same technology already in use as part of SBInet in southern
Arizona.
While this testimony has focused mostly on security at the ports of
entry, we're not blind to the fact that our constituency is in the
midst of an uphill climb to direct attention to the ports when the area
between our ports is perceived as porous.
We believe that an effective SBInet program between the ports will
allow more human resources to be directed to the ports themselves. We
are encouraged that DHS still believes that technology is a vital
component to any border security strategy. We hope the Department gives
the system in southern Arizona another look as it moves forward with
the latest iteration of its border security strategy.
The Border Trade Alliance appreciates the opportunity to submit
these comments for the record. We welcome the opportunity to testify
before your committee in the future and we offer our 25 years of
experience in border affairs as a resource to your committee as you
investigate these and other important issues affecting border security.
Mrs. Miller. The witnesses are prepared. We will begin with
our second panel. I think what we'll do is just do the intros
first, and then we will start with our first witness.
The first will be Stan Korosec, who is the Vice President
of Operations of the Blue Water Bridge Canada. He was hired by
the Blue Water Bridge Canada as Vice President of Operations in
September 2003. He is responsible for the overall physical
security of the bridge and the plaza, overseeing the operations
and currency exchange departments, as well as the customer
service department, a member of numerous binational communities
and organizations dealing with border issues. Stan is also the
immediate past President of the Public Border Operators
Association, which represents all the publicly owned Ontario-
Michigan, Ontario-New York border crossings.
Our second witness will be Timothy Koerner, who is the Vice
President and Chief Security Officer of Canadian National
Railroad Company. He joined CN as an Assistant Vice President
of Risk Management in April 2008 after a distinguished career
in law enforcement and risk management, including 25 years with
the United States Secret Service, culminating as the Assistant
Director for the Office of Protective Operations. He was
responsible for overseeing risk management functions, including
the Canadian National Police.
Our third witness on the second panel is Richard Cortez,
who is the Mayor of McAllen, Texas. In 2005, Mayor Cortez was
elected--would you like to----
Mr. Cuellar. You are doing fine. I am very proud of Mayor
Cortez being here with us, but go ahead and continue.
Mrs. Miller. Okay. He was elected the 18th Mayor of the
City of McAllen. He was reelected for a second 4-year term in
May 2009, and in addition to being the Mayor is a member of the
Texas Border Coalition, the TBC. The TBC is a collective voice
of border mayors, county judges, and economic development
organizations focused on issues that affect the Texas-Mexico
border.
At this time, the Chairwoman would like to recognize Mr.
Korosec. Stan, welcome, and we appreciate your traveling here
to Washington and look forward to your testimony.
STATEMENT OF STANLEY F. KOROSEC, VICE PRESIDENT, OPERATIONS,
BLUE WATER BRIDGE CANADA
Mr. Korosec. Well, thank you very much, Chairwoman Miller
and Ranking Member Cuellar and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. It is a pleasure to appear before you today to
discuss issues with respect to manpower infrastructure and the
allocation of Customs and Border Protection resources at the
Blue Water Bridge.
As you know, the Blue Water Bridge provides a critical
transportation link for both the United States and Canada. As
the Chairwoman said, it is the second-busiest commercial truck
crossing on the Canada-U.S. border and ranks third overall when
including passenger vehicle traffic. Our crossing accommodates
approximately 15 percent of all surface transportation trade
between our two countries.
The bridge is also extremely important to our local
communities on both sides of the border, as you have heard.
At the Blue Water Bridge, many positive steps have been
taken and are being taken to ensure border efficiency and
security, and I would like to provide a couple of examples. We
at the Blue Water Bridge have formed strong partnerships with
CBP, its Canadian counterpart, the Canada Border Services
Agency, and with MDOT. In fact, we consider ourselves
collectively as a Blue Water Bridge team. In fact we will meet
with them in the next month for our annual pre-summer plan
meeting where we prepare for the busy summer traffic season
ahead of us.
As far as staffing is concerned, right now for CBP, there
is not a staffing issue at the Blue Water Bridge at the present
time. Summer of 2007 reminds us what can occur when staffing
levels are not adequate. Long delays in excess of 1 hour headed
into the United States, particularly during the summer months
of that year, were experienced virtually every day at the Blue
Water Bridge.
We appreciate the hard work of Congresswoman Miller for her
efforts in helping resolve that crisis, and as well Assistant
Commissioner Winkowski, who formed a dwell time task force of
which I continue to be a member along with other border
operators and stakeholders.
We are pleased to see that the I-94, I-69 reconstruction is
underway. Similar reconstruction of the Highway 402 project in
Canada is also underway. At Blue Water Bridge Canada we have
completed the first phase of a $110 million Canadian plaza
improvement plan.
A lot of positive things are happening. Efforts are being
put forth. It is not only because we are dedicated to
maintaining a safe and secure and efficient border crossing,
but it is also out of necessity.
I provided you with Appendix B, which clearly points out
the inadequacies of the present U.S. plaza infrastructure,
particularly regarding the current number of primary inspection
lines for CBP. You compare these to other facilities, you can
see that we put more traffic through our existing PILs than any
other border crossing on the Canada-U.S. border. In spite of
this, we still experience delays, particularly in the
summertime.
We talked about the new U.S. plaza. In May 2009 it received
a record of decision. The $530 million plaza will help resolve
all of these issues, facilitating legitimate trade and travel,
as well as security. Currently, there is no place on the
existing plaza in which to unload and inspect the contents of a
commercial vehicle. This is at the second-busiest commercial
crossing on the Northern border.
To unload a commercial vehicle, officers are forced to
escort the uninspected vehicle to the Port Huron community to
an off-site inspection facility. This procedure introduces
increased security risks and is an inefficient use of limited
CBP staff at the existing plaza.
The plaza, as we have heard, has been scaled down from a
$280 million Federal contribution to $110 million. Before
design and construction can begin CBP must secure funding in
the 2013 appropriations budget. As a consequence, construction
of the much-needed plaza is not expected to begin until 2015 at
the earliest.
Now, although this scaled-down plaza as currently approved
will resolve some of the present inadequacies, it does not
address recommendations addressed by the originally approved
plan. In particular, there are no accommodations in the scaled-
down version for out-bound inspection facilities. The existing
plaza that will remain a part of the latest design is elevated
some 26 feet above ground level supported by a platform over 60
years old, with a major thoroughfare traversing underneath it.
The connectivity between I-94 and I-69 is not properly
achieved, where we will have brand-new three lanes of I-94, I-
69 coming to a plaza that only accommodates two lanes. That can
do nothing but cause more traffic and safety concerns. In
either scenario, an increase in the number of primary
inspection booths will require the appropriate CBP resources to
staff the booths when required.
As construction for the new plaza is not likely to begin
until 2017, we have come up with a new way to expand some
capacity at the Blue Water Bridge in the interim. This was put
forth by a CBP field office in Detroit where we could add some
staggered booths and some stacked booths. Because we are an
elevated plaza, it is tough to do that. So this was put forth
in November, and as of March 26, it has had one conference
call, and nothing further, continues to be studied.
Blue Water Bridge Canada has offered to finance this
project because we believe in the interim it will allow
increased capacity and efficiency at this border crossing
without affecting security. We are disappointed that this has
not moved forward, and we look forward to some discussions in
the very near future.
In conclusion, we do the best with what we have. It is what
we have is the issue at the Blue Water Bridge. Thank you for
this opportunity to testify about some of the positive work
that has taken place at the bridge and some of the real
challenges and opportunities before us. I can assure you that
the Blue Water Bridge team will continue to ensure that this
gateway is safe, secure, and efficient and enjoyable for all
law-abiding travellers, and I look forward to any questions
that you might have.
Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Korosec follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stanley F. Korosec
April 5, 2011
introduction
Thank you, Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be
invited and appear before you today to discuss issues with respect to
manpower, infrastructure, and the allocation of Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) resources at the Blue Water Bridge Port of Entry,
between the State of Michigan, U.S.A. and the Province of Ontario,
Canada.
overview of the blue water bridge gateway
Ownership and operation of The Blue Water Bridge (BWB) is shared by
two independent entities, the Michigan Department of Transportation
(MDOT) and Blue Water Bridge Canada (BWBC). BWBC is a Canadian Federal
Crown Corporation which operates at arms' length from the Government of
Canada. BWBC owns and operates the Canadian portions of the twin
bridges connecting Sarnia, Ontario and Port Huron Michigan. MDOT
operates the U.S. portions of the twin bridges. BWBC is a totally self-
funded entity, receiving no appropriations from the Government of
Canada. BWBC is governed by a board of directors and reports to the
Parliament of Canada through the most senior elected official, the
Minister, of the Department of Transportation. Our mission is ``To make
our customers' gateway experience safe, efficient, and enjoyable.''
The BWB provides a critical transportation link for both the United
States and Canada. It is the second-busiest commercial truck crossing
on the U.S./Canada border and the most active livestock entry point
between our two nations. It ranks third overall when including
passenger vehicle traffic. The crossing accommodates approximately 15
percent of all surface transportation trade between our two countries.
Approximately 25 percent of the commercial traffic is related to the
auto industry, which is heavily reliant on predictable crossing times
for its just-in-time components delivery systems. The bridge's
geographic location, supported by direct highway access makes this a
crossing of choice for shipments headed into the States of Michigan and
Illinois and those in the southern and western regions. Commercial
dangerous goods and hazardous materials also cross this facility on a
regular basis.
The crossing is extremely important to the local communities on
both sides of the border, whose residents cross frequently to work and
for visits with family and friends, as well as for shopping and
recreational purposes. The recent strength of the Canadian dollar and
the improving Canadian economy have contributed to a large increase in
the number of Canadian visitors to the United States, which has
contributed to the local economic recovery efforts of Port Huron,
neighboring St. Clair Township, and the State of Michigan.
attributes of an efficient border crossing
1. For a border crossing to work safely and efficiently, we believe
that there are six (6) key components that must be considered.
They are: Integrated highway approaches, as well as local
access, to the border crossing itself.
2. Appropriate sized and configured plazas, including sufficient
infrastructure and inspection facilities for customs and
immigration functions.
3. Suitable conveyance capacity of the bridge structure and lanes.
4. Modern technology services and support systems.
5. Appropriate staffing levels at the primary inspection lanes.
6. Operational partnerships involving all primary stakeholders.
At the BWB, many positive steps have been or are being taken to
address these issues and I would like to provide some examples. We at
the BWB have formed strong partnerships with CBP, its Canadian
counterpart, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and with MDOT, in
order to make this crossing the best and most secure that it can be. In
fact, we consider ourselves collectively as the BWB ``team.'' I
acknowledge Chris Perry, Director of Field Operations, CBP/Detroit, CBP
Port Huron Port Director Dave Dusellier and Mike Szuch, MDOT General
Manager at the BWB, for their efforts and strong commitment to this
approach and the shared objectives of our team. The BWB team has worked
together diligently to develop practical and effective protocols for
maximizing the use of the restrictive and aging infrastructure,
primarily the U.S. plaza and Primary Inspection Lanes (PILs) for CBP.
Traffic and lane management during peak volumes ensures that both
commercial and passenger vehicle traffic move safely and efficiently,
with border security maintained. We will meet within the month for our
annual pre-summer planning session, in order to prepare for the busy
summer traffic season ahead. Our four agencies, along with local law
enforcement and emergency responders will discuss a coordinated
approach to traffic control, maintenance, construction, emergency
preparedness, and other activities that could affect the BWB and
surrounding area. Common strategies and protocols are maintained and
routinely updated, in an effort to mitigate any potential concerns and
threats. In shared initiatives regarding public awareness, information,
and education, CBP and CBSA officers have assisted BWBC at events in
local shopping malls and other public forums to promote the NEXUS and
FAST programs, because these programs make the border crossing safer,
more efficient, and enjoyable. BWBC alone has invested over $100,000 in
marketing and promoting the trusted traveler initiatives, as an
effective means of promoting a more secure and efficient border
crossing.
CBP staffing is not an issue at the present time. However, the
summer of 2007 serves as a reminder of what can occur when staffing
levels are not adequate. Long delays, in excess of one (1) hour heading
into to the United States particularly during the summer months were
experienced virtually every day at the BWB. In fact during the entire
2007 calendar year, there were 151 days where delays of 1 hour or more
occurred. We appreciate the efforts of Congresswoman Miller for her
efforts in resolving that crisis. The following year that number was
reduced to 32. In calendar 2010 the number rose to 37. See Appendix
``B''. We also appreciate Assistant Commissioner Tom Winkowski who
formed a Dwell Time Task Force of which I continue to be a member,
along with other border operators and stakeholders. The taskforce has
been successful in developing a coordinated approach to facilitating
legitimate trade and travel, while enabling CBP to continue to fulfill
its mission.
Continuing on the positive efforts, we are pleased to see that the
reconstruction of Interstate I-94 and I-69, which serve as approaches
to the BWB on the U.S. side, is underway. This $90-million project,
including the reconstruction of the Black River Bridge, is supported by
a $30-million TIGER grant and will greatly improve the safety and
efficiency of local and Canada-bound traffic. A similar reconstruction
of the Highway 402 approach to the BWB plaza on the Canadian side is
also underway and scheduled to be completed in 2012.
BWBC has completed the first phase of its $110-million Canadian
Plaza Improvement Plan. In June, a new $60-million facility, including
seven (7) new commercial PILs for CBSA, will open. The facility,
accredited as a Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design building,
will house the bridge contingents of CBSA, and the Canadian Food
Inspection Agency, along with several customs brokerage firms and our
BWBC administration. The structure is an integral part of our on-going
plans to further improve the safety, security, and efficiency of the
Canadian Plaza during the coming decades.
These many positive efforts are being put forth not only because we
are dedicated to maintaining a safe, secure, and efficient border
crossing, but also out of necessity. The attachment I have provided to
you (Appendix B), clearly points to the inadequacies of the present
U.S. Plaza infrastructure, particularly regarding the current number of
(PILs) for CBP, which are woefully insufficient considering current and
projected traffic needs, particularly when compared to facilities
provided at the other major land ports of entry (LPOE) along the U.S./
Canada border. The 2009 figures I have compiled demonstrate that the
BWB processes more vehicles per PIL than any other border crossing. In
spite of all our efforts described earlier, delays are very common for
U.S.-bound traffic, particularly during the busy summer months. These
delays have serious, adverse economic consequences of local, regional,
National and international concern. Further, they negatively affect our
shared environment, as hundreds of vehicles sit idling in long queues.
current infrastructure issues
In May, 2009, the United States Federal Highway Administration
(FHWA), MDOT, CBP, and the General Services Administration (GSA)
achieved a Record of Decision to proceed with a $583-million project to
expand the U.S. LPOE and the connecting I-94/I-69 freeways. The
proposed expansion project would increase the existing customs and toll
plaza from 18 acres to 56 acres. The project would also lower the
elevated plaza to grade, add seven (7) more PILs and provide CBP
appropriate space dedicated to secondary inspection areas for both
commercial and passenger vehicles. This was a critical consideration,
as additional space is needed to improve security associated with the
screening of commercial vehicles at the BWB LPOE. Currently, there is
no place on the existing LPOE in which to unload and inspect the
contents of a commercial vehicle--this at the second busiest commercial
crossing on the Northern border. To unload a commercial vehicle, CBP
officers are forced to escort the un-inspected vehicle through the Port
Huron community to an off-site inspection facility. This procedure
introduces increased security risks and is an inefficient use of the
limited CBP staff at the existing LPOE, resulting in increased delays
for legitimate shipments delivery goods into the United States. The
proposed BWB LPOE project will correct this existing deficiency and is
anticipated to reduce crossing delays coming into the United States
from an existing average of 28 minutes to a proposed average delay time
of 3 minutes.
Citing funding limitations, officials from the CBP, the FHWA, the
GSA, and MDOT announced that their BWB Plaza Expansion Project will be
scaled back. The estimated construction cost of the lower-cost
alternative for the planned, expansion of the U.S. Plaza is $110
million.
Before design and construction can begin, CBP must secure funding
in the 2013 appropriations budget. At this time, CBP has indicated it
will be ready to commence design in 2013, pending the availability of
resources. As a consequence, construction of the much-needed plaza
expansion project is not expected to begin until 2015, at the earliest.
Although the plaza design, as currently approved, will resolve some
of the present inadequacies, including the addition of 12 new
commercial PILs, the scaled-down version does not address
recommendations addressed by the originally approved plan, which
centers on the specific purpose and need for the plaza redesign upon
which the project was initiated. In particular, no accommodations have
been made for out-bound inspection facilities. The existing plaza that
will remain a part of the latest design is elevated some 26 feet above
ground level, supported by a platform over 60 years old, with a major
thoroughfare traversing under it. In this latest scaled-down version,
the connectivity to I-94 and I-69 is not properly achieved, as per the
originally approved plan. Given the long-standing importance of the BWB
trade corridor, combined with the most recent bi-lateral initiative of
President Obama and Canadian Prime Minister Harper--Beyond the Border:
A Shared Vision for Perimeter Security and Economic Competitiveness, we
can assure you that the need for improved, secure facilities at BWB,
which had been effectively addressed by the originally approved plaza
design, has not diminished. In fact, the need for further essential
improvements will remain, despite the implementation of the scaled-down
alternative plan. In either scenario, an increase in the number of PILs
will require the appropriate CBP resources to staff the booths, when
required.
As construction for the new plaza is not likely to be completed
until 2017, or beyond, the BWB must make some interim improvements to
help facilitate the secure and efficient movement of legitimate trade
and travel that is currently being hampered by the lack of PILs. In
November, 2010, a proposal originally put forth by the CBP Detroit
Field Office and subsequently discussed with BWBC and MDOT, was
submitted to CBP Headquarters, in Washington. The proposal called for
the construction of 4 ``staggered PIL booths'' and 3 ``stacked PIL
booths,'' which would add significant capacity to this crossing, as
required. Realizing the tremendous benefits of this proposal and
acknowledging tight budgetary constraints in CBP, the BWBC Board of
Directors has approved financial assistance, in order to move this
proposal forward, so that the new booths would be functional by summer
2011. As of March 26, 2011, one conference call to move the initiative
towards reality has taken place and the project continues to be
``studied.'' To ensure the project progresses, BWBC offered on January
27, 2011, to supply up to seven (7) new PIL booths, already completely
fabricated and ready for delivery, to CBP as one part of BWBC's
contribution to the project. We are disappointed that this proposal has
not been given the support it truly deserves, considering the
significance of this border crossing to the economies of both nations
and the associated challenges we continue to face. I understand that
millions of dollars have been invested at much smaller ports on the
U.S./Canada border, while a relatively minor investment at BWB could
reap great benefits.
conclusion
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the
subcommittee, in short, we do the best with what we have, it is what we
have that is the issue. Thank you for this opportunity to testify about
some of the positive work that is taking place at the Blue Water Bridge
and some of the real challenges--and opportunities--before us. I can
assure you that the BWB team will continue to ensure that this gateway
is safe, secure, efficient, and enjoyable for all of its law-abiding
travelers. I look forward to answering any questions you may have at
this time.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much. The Chairwoman now
recognizes Mr. Koerner from CN Rail for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY J. KOERNER, VICE PRESIDENT AND CHIEF
SECURITY OFFICER, CN
Mr. Koerner. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman and Ranking
Member. Thanks for the opportunity to be here today. I am
pleased to be joined this morning by Karen Phillips, our Vice
President for Public and Government Affairs, and Mike Tamilia,
our Senior Manager for Transborder Operations.
CN is a Class I railroad, one of only seven in all of North
America. In addition to our transcontinental operations across
Canada, CN employs thousands of people in the United States. CN
owns and operates rolling stock, tracks, yards, and terminals
in 16 U.S. States. The smooth, yet secure, flow of legitimate
commerce between Canada and the United States is critical to
the economies of both countries and to CN. Roughly, one-third
of CN's revenues are generated from cross-border commerce.
Combined with the fact that CN operates on a scheduled railroad
philosophy, the smooth flow of cross-border commerce is
essential to our operations.
CN consistently strives to meet our customers' needs for
timely and efficient delivery. A fluid border is essential to
this on-time service. CN has a long, positive working
relationship with U.S. and Canadian Customs authorities. Our
combined efforts to enhance cross-border security have
increased substantially in the years following the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
Indeed, the governments of Canada and the United States
have been actively engaged since 2001 on a broad range of
security initiatives embodied in the Smart Border Declaration
and in subsequent programs. CN has been a willing and valued
partner in U.S. and Canadian initiatives intended to enhance
security while also ensuring the smooth flow of legitimate
cross-border commerce.
We are proud of the fact that CN was the first North
American rail carrier to participate in the U.S. Customs and
Border Protection C-TPAT, Customs-Trade Partners Against
Terrorism, and we have taken very seriously our responsibility
to make needed investments and ensure that the security of our
operations meet C-TPAT criteria.
CN has also been a participant for several years now with
CBSA's version of C-TPAT, which is called Partners-in-
Protection. In these programs we invite scrutiny from
government, law enforcement agencies. They come to us, they
examine our facilities, they review our security plans and
assess our substantial efforts. All of this is done in an
effort to ensure that both CBP and CBSA accept that CN is a
known partner when we arrive at the border.
CN has a police presence. It is kind of unique that we have
a police presence but we do, and it is on both sides of the
international border. The CN police officers work in
collaboration with Federal, State, provincial, local, and
Tribal law enforcement agencies toward the common goal of
safeguarding our nations and communities against harm. An
example of this is our collaboration with the and our
participation with the IBET team, the Integrated Border
Enforcement Team, that is in upstate New York outside of
Buffalo.
The CN police monitor border crossings with sworn law
enforcement personnel and the use of technical security
equipment such as barriers, alarms, and cameras with infrared
and thermal detection capability. The CN police also conduct
regular liaison and joint force operations with both U.S. and
Canadian customs and border agencies in an effort to maximize
the effectiveness of our collective resources.
In 2003, CN and Canadian Pacific Railway signed a
declaration of principles with customs agencies on both sides
of the border, and this introduced a screening system which is
known as VACIS. VACIS stands for Vehicle and Cargo Inspection
Systems. I am sure, Chairman, that you are familiar with it.
The effectiveness of this gamma ray screening is enhanced
by the data that is transmitted electronically by rail carriers
to the customs authority at least 2 hours in advance of
arriving at the port. As a result, CBP personnel can compare
what they see on the VACIS image with the rail manifest, which
specifies the intended content of each and every car and
container on the train.
CN crosses the U.S.-Canada border at seven crossing
locations with a total of about 45 trains per day operating
northbound and southbound across the border. Our largest
operation is at the Port Huron-Sarnia crossing at which we
operate about nine trains per day in each direction.
A key issue for CN is the harmonization of border
regulations between United States and Canada wherever possible.
While recognizing the unique priorities and sovereign rights of
both nations, CN has long been engaged in encouraging this
risk-based border security regulations that address security
issues while also facilitating cross-border trade.
Most recently, we are looking forward to participating in
the initiative announced on February 4 by President Obama and
Prime Minister Harper to pursue a perimeter approach to
security so as to accelerate the legitimate flow of people and
services and goods between the United States and Canada. The
two leaders noted their intent to use a risk management
approach to foster greater information sharing between agencies
of both countries and to work on innovative approaches to
security and competitiveness.
Safety and security are cornerstones of CN's operations. We
are proud to be actively engaged with government agencies in
both the United States and Canada to ensure the security of our
operations while also meeting the needs of our customers. We
urge the subcommittee to ensure that screening, targeting, and
inspection activities by government agencies associated with
cross-border commerce are governed by these risk management
principles. We also urge that agencies with border enforcement
responsibilities work together to ensure effective and
coordinated screening and inspection processes so as to not
needlessly impede legitimate commerce.
Madam Chairwoman, thank you again for the opportunity to
testify, and of course, I would be pleased to answer any
questions you or any of the Members might have.
[The statement of Mr. Koerner follows:]
Statement of Timothy J. Koerner
April 5, 2011
Madam Chairwoman and Members of the subcommittee: Thank you for the
opportunity for Canadian National Railway Company (CN) to testify on
using resources effectively to secure border ports of entry and CN's
experience with cross-border commerce and security initiatives.
Like other large railroads operating in the United States, CN is a
Class I railroad, as defined by the U.S. Surface Transportation Board.
CN is a publicly-traded company, with extensive North American freight
rail operations. In addition to our transcontinental operations across
Canada, CN operates in 16 U.S. States. The smooth yet secure flow of
legitimate commerce between Canada and the United States is critical to
the economies of both countries and to CN.
CN's traffic across the U.S./Canada border includes automobiles,
fertilizer, forest products, grain, intermodal, metals and minerals,
and petroleum and chemicals. Roughly one-third of CN's revenues are
generated from cross-border commerce. Combined with the fact that CN
operates a scheduled railroad, the smooth flow of cross-border commerce
is essential to our operations. CN consistently strives to meet our
customers' needs for timely and efficient delivery; a fluid border is
essential to this on-time service.
rail cross-border security initiatives
CN has a long-standing working relationship with U.S. and Canadian
Customs authorities on efforts to enhance cross-border security. Those
efforts have increased substantially in the years since the September
11, 2001 attacks. Indeed, the governments of Canada and the United
States have been actively engaged since 2001 on a broad range of border
security initiatives, embodied in the Smart Border Declaration and in
subsequent programs. CN has been a willing partner in U.S. and Canadian
initiatives intended to enhance security while also ensuring the smooth
flow of legitimate cross-border commerce.
CN was the first North American rail carrier participant in U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) Customs-Trade Partnership Against
Terrorism (C-TPAT), and we have taken very seriously our responsibility
to make needed investments and ensure the security of our operations
meet the C-TPAT criteria. CN also has been a participant for several
years in the Canada Border Service Agency's (CBSA) comparable Partners-
in-Protection (PIP) program.
CN has a police presence on both sides of the international border.
CN Police officers work in collaboration with Federal, State,
provincial, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies toward the
common goal of safeguarding our nations and communities against harm.
The CN Police monitor border crossings with law enforcement personnel
and the use of technical security equipment. The CN Police also conduct
regular liaison activities and joint force operations with both U.S.
and Canadian customs agencies in an effort to maximize the
effectiveness of our collective resources.
Also of note, CN and Canadian Pacific Railway in April 2003 signed
a Declaration of Principles with CBP and CBSA's predecessor agency,
under which 100 percent of rail traffic at border crossings equipped
with non-intrusive inspection technology would be screened at the
border by this equipment. As a result of this Declaration and the
subsequent expansion of the program across the border, 100 percent of
CN's rail traffic entering the United States from Canada at present is
screened by VACIS equipment, a far higher proportion than for any other
transportation mode.
The effectiveness of the gamma ray screening is enhanced by the
data transmitted electronically by rail carriers to CBP at least 2
hours in advance of a train arriving at the border for entry into the
United States. As a result, CBP personnel can more effectively target
at-risk shipments for additional screening and, if necessary,
inspection as well as to more accurately evaluate the cargo in each
conveyance as a train passes through the VACIS equipment. The advance
data transmittal was a provision of the Declaration of Principles as
well as more broadly implemented for rail and, with other applicable
time frames, for all transport modes in Section 343 of the Trade Act of
2002 (Pub. L. 107-210), as modified by Section 108(b) of the Maritime
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-295).
CN also complies with the requirements of the Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-471), which requires
advance notification to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) of food
that is imported or offered for import into the United States. We also
are subject to U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) agricultural
inspections of our cargo imported into the United States.
Last, much of the cargo transported by CN across the Canada/U.S.
border initially entered Canada through sea ports that are participants
in CBP's Container Security Initiative (CSI), at which CBP and CBSA
staff work together to screen cargo entering Canada and to target high-
risk cargo. Further, a large proportion of the traffic that enters the
Canadian CSI sea ports sails from other CSI-participating ports outside
of North America, which includes other security requirements. Most
Canadian sea ports also participate in CBSA's Joint Targeting
Initiative (JTI), through which CBP and CBSA share information and
collaborate on inspections; this provides an additional layer of
security.
cn operations at the u.s./canada border
CN crosses the U.S./Canada border at seven crossing locations, with
a total of roughly 45 trains per day operating northbound and
southbound across the border. Our largest operation is at our Port
Huron, Michigan/Sarnia, Ontario crossing, at which we operate nine
trains per day in each direction, with our crossing at Ranier,
Minnesota our second-largest operation, with eight trains crossing the
border daily in each direction.
At each border crossing, we provide cargo manifest data to CBP at
least 2 hours in advance of each southbound train reaching the border.
When we arrive at the border, the train slows to 5 miles per hour to go
through the VACIS machine. At the majority of border crossings, CBP's
VACIS equipment is located on the U.S. side of the border. However, at
the Port Huron/Sarnia and the Detroit, Michigan/Windsor, Ontario
crossings, CBP installed this equipment on the Canadian side of the
border to facilitate operations.
When CBP wishes to conduct an inspection of a particular railcar or
intermodal container, above and beyond the VACIS screening, we must
stop the train with the targeted railcars or containers. In such cases,
CN employs transborder specialists to assist Customs with the unloading
and reloading of goods in railcars and intermodal containers. This may
cause a train to have to cut that car and leave it behind, while the
rest of the train moves through. In the case of intermodal stack
trains, the railcars can be 200 feet in length and each carry up to 15
containers. The railcar that is cut from the train, with the container
or containers that have been identified for inspection along with the
other containers not targeted by CBP, will then be picked up by another
train after the inspection process has been completed. When inspections
such as these are conducted, it often requires the train to move back
and forth over the track many times to effect the desired result of
cutting out a specific car or cars.
issues and concerns
A key priority for CN is promoting harmonized border regulations
between the United States and Canada wherever possible, while
recognizing the unique priorities and sovereign rights of both nations.
CN has long been engaged in efforts to encourage risk-based, compatible
U.S. and Canadian border security regulations that address security
issues while facilitating legitimate cross-border trade.
More recently, we are pleased with the initiative announced on
February 4 of this year by President Obama and Prime Minister Harper to
pursue a perimeter approach to security, so as to accelerate the
legitimate flow of people, goods, and services between the United
States and Canada. The declaration by the two leaders noted their
intent to use a risk management approach, to foster greater information
sharing between agencies of both countries, and to work on innovative
approaches to security and competitiveness.
As part of this initiative, President Obama and Prime Minister
Harper announced their intent to establish a Beyond the Border Working
Group, composed of appropriate government officials from both
countries, which will develop a joint Plan of Action to realize the
goals of the leaders' declaration. The leaders also announced the
creation of a Canada/U.S. Regulatory Cooperation Council, which is
tasked with finding ways to reduce and prevent barriers to cross-border
trade, while maintaining high standards of public health and safety and
protecting the environment. Both governments are now engaged in a
consultative process with affected stakeholders, in which CN is eager
to participate actively.
conclusions
Safety and security are cornerstones of CN's operations. We are
proud to be actively engaged with government agencies in both the
United States and Canada to ensure the security of our operations,
while also meeting the needs of our customers. We urge the subcommittee
to ensure that screening, targeting, and inspection activities by
government agencies associated with cross-border commerce are governed
by risk-management principles, taking into account the C-TPAT status of
participants in the movements, the cargo manifest data transmitted in
advance of the traffic's arrival at the border, and other factors
relevant to the security of the cross-border operations. We also urge
that agencies with border responsibilities work together to ensure
effective and coordinated screening and inspection processes so as to
not needlessly impede legitimate commerce.
Madam Chairwoman, thank you again for the opportunity to testify. I
would be pleased to answer any questions that you or Members of the
subcommittee may have.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Koerner. At this
time, the Chairwoman would like to recognize Mayor Cortez for
his testimony and welcome him to Washington.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD F. CORTEZ, MAYOR, McALLEN, TEXAS
Mr. Cortez. Thank you. Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member
Cuellar, and committee Members, thank you for giving me an
opportunity to present our thoughts from our area to you today.
I had a prepared presentation of my testimony here today but
after listening to your opening comments, the Ranking Member's
comments, and the other panelists' comments, I would like to
rather maybe paraphrase and just kind of discuss some of the
highlights of my testimony with your permission.
Basically, my testimony is broken down into two parts. The
first part is the imbalance of investment in our ports of entry
and in between the ports of entry and the benefits that
commerce has to our areas, and second is even though we do
benefit from commerce and having these ports of entry, we also
have some concerns that we have because we are on the border,
and this does cause some problems being close to the border.
In answer to the question of Congressman Rogers, he asked:
Well, what personnel? Well, that information has already been
provided by Rich Stana from the Government Accountability
Office, which he estimated approximately 6,000 new inspection
personnel and about $5 billion to bring in facilities.
We talked about efficiency and wait times. You know, it is
interesting how sometimes we measure things, and if we look
from the beginning of the bridge and look at that vehicle and
then say, okay, to the end of the bridge and we trace that
time, when you say it was 5 minutes. Well, but the problem is
that that car that got to the beginning of the bridge has been
waiting for 2 hours to get to the beginning of the bridge. So
how you track wait times is very important.
But here is what we are asking for. We need to have more
investment in our legal ports of entry. We talk about
efficiency. How can you be efficient when you have antiquated
facilities like we do have in Hidalgo? When you have all of
this technology that requires electricity, we are down. Many
times our electrical grid just went down. All our computers,
everything in our legal port of entry just simply isn't
working. Imagine what an inspector is going to have do when you
are relying on just simple things like electricity, and at our
port of entry we constantly are breaking down and having to use
generators.
So the investment of legal ports of entry, Madam Chairwoman
and other committee Members, is extremely important because, as
you have already stated in your opening comments, it seems like
we are starting to do a pretty good job in defending our ports
of entry. We are capturing most of the violators, but why is it
that we are not doing that in our legal ports of entry?
Well, that goes into my testimony regarding how we are
affected by being close to the border. You see, the bad guys
cross in those legal ports of entry, and they come and do
violent crimes or certain business in our communities and then
they try to run back to that legal port of entry and leave. But
now we have no communication in place, no connectivity. There
is no connection between us saying: Hey, wait a minute, there
is the perpetrator that just left our city that is entering or
getting close to your port of entry, you know, how do we notify
you, how do we tell you that that is happening.
So what we are suggesting is that the reason that the other
side is so successful in breaching our security is they studied
us very well and they have been able to--how can they breach
our security 70 percent of the time when we have the canines.
We have so many people. I mean, it begs the question: Well, why
is that happening? Well, they know us very, very well. Well, we
need to do the same thing on our side. We need to have
surveillance and intelligence because we don't want to become
the breeding ground for criminal activity, and if we don't have
that personnel and intelligence working for us on our side and
then be able to communicate all our law enforcement agencies
that are empowered for this enforcement, then we cannot be
efficient.
So at the end, Madam Chairwoman, what we are asking is that
help us be more efficient by investing in our legal ports of
entry. We have two in the city of McAllen. We own two bridges.
One is an old bridge that needs investment. The other one, we
are not efficient because we don't accept any commercial truck
traffic. Well, imagine if you want to be efficient in commerce
and you have only one bridge that allows commercial traffic,
and yet there is other bridges all around. We need a system of
efficient bridges, not one bridge.
The other thing is that the Commissioner here from Customs
said it takes a long time by the time you make a decision and
you have the layers of funding ready in place to get something
done. Right now we don't have any southbound inspections in our
bridge. It is a brand new bridge. We have been there less than
2 years and we don't have any southbound inspections and we
don't have any northbound commercial truck traffic.
Well, I will tell you what is happening in the real world.
The real world, the business world, they want to find the
lowest cost. For the lowest cost right now to bring in goods
and products into the United States, from a lot of the produce
companies that used to go to the Nogales port is now coming to
Texas because they are saving $1,500 or $1,800 more in freight.
Well, business is readjusting itself to our area, yet we don't
have the necessary infrastructure and personnel to take care of
that business.
We cannot be secured as a country if we don't have economic
security.
My time is up. Thank you.
[The statement of Mr. Cortez follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard F. Cortez
April 5, 2011
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, committee Members: Thank
you for this opportunity to share my views on how to secure the border.
Without a strong and growing economy on the border, we cannot have
a growing National economy or achieve our security goals. Trade
directly generates one-third of the U.S. economy. Land ports of entry
are responsible for more than three-quarters of a trillion dollars in
trade annually with Canada and Mexico.
On the Southwest border, we need to assure that our economic
climate not only helps fund the security measures we need, but also
provides opportunity to the people in the region so they become part of
the solution and are not tempted to become part of the problem.
To achieve our economic security, we need well-built, well-
equipped, and well-staffed ports of entry that can facilitate
legitimate trade and travel and interdict lawbreakers.
We are grateful that Senators Cornyn, Graham, Kyl, and Feinstein
have asked the Senate Judiciary Committee to hold a hearing on U.S.
ports of entry and infrastructure on the Southern border.
We have an imbalance of investment and results on the border. Since
1993, we have increased our investment 800 percent in Border Patrol
personnel, mobility, communications, and technology. That effort
between the ports has been successful; the Border Patrol intercepts 70
percent of lawbreakers across the border; in the El Paso sector, the
success rate is 90 percent.
In contrast, we have let the land ports of entry fall into
disrepair. We currently have ports like the McAllen Hidalgo-Reynosa POE
in which the electrical grid is outdated and the infrastructure is
antiquated at a time when the most advanced technology and
infrastructure is needed to secure our borders. Over the same period,
the land ports budget has risen only 17 percent and our ability to
intercept criminals only 28 percent of the time.
That bears repeating. Between the ports, we catch the criminals 70
percent of the time. At the ports, we catch them less than 30 percent.
That is an imbalance Congress must help to correct.
The criminal cartels are exploiting our weakness. According to the
Department of Justice, 90 percent of the drugs smuggled into the United
States enter through the land ports. The physical bulk cash that exits
goes exclusively through the ports. There is no data on firearms, but
anecdotally, the ports are where they too traverse the border.
To achieve our economic security, we need well-built, equipped and
staffed ports of entry that can both facilitate legitimate trade and
travel and interdict lawbreakers. We need those improvements for our
National security, as well.
Rich Stana at the Government Accountability Office estimates we
need 6,000 new inspection personnel and more than $5 billion to bring
the facilities up to snuff. We don't expect you to wave a fiscal wand
and achieve this overnight. I do not advocate taking anything away from
the Border Patrol. But if there are additional resources to be
allocated, this year or next year, they should go to the ports of entry
as a first priority.
Secure and efficient ports of entry are very important to cities
like McAllen. They create jobs, sustain our economy, and improve our
quality of life. They expedite legitimate trade and traffic to flow
across our border and in our case, contribute to McAllen's $3 billion
retail industry. Without Federal-local coordination, efforts to
simultaneously secure ports and make them more efficient will not be
possible.
For example, it makes no sense to have an international bridge
where commercial truck traffic is not allowed to cross. Right now the
truck industry is moving away from crossing through the Nogales Port in
Arizona to our ports in South Texas. This makes it necessary to
increase our capacity to serve this new traffic. We cannot do that if
some of our bridges cannot accept commercial truck traffic like our
Anzalduas Bridge in McAllen. Our presidential permit states that a
southbound commercial truck facility should have been operational prior
to us opening the Anzalduas International Bridge.
However, we also have no southbound commercial truck traffic.
Please help us expedite that and allow us to better serve our area
businesses.
Year 2015 is just around the corner and we have no funding in place
for the construction of a northbound commercial traffic facility at the
Anzalduas International Bridge.
While our legal ports of entry have a positive effect on our
commerce, they have a negative effect on our border communities because
persons illegally in the United States commit crimes in our cities and
then they try and make their run back into Mexico.
One example would be what we experienced in 2010. Around 9:30 p.m.,
closing time, in one of our busiest shopping intersections, four (4)
suspects, all males from the state of Guerrero, Mexico and connected to
drug activity and illegally in our country shot and killed another
person. The victim was also a male from Mexico. He was shot twelve (12)
times. All four suspects then simply boarded their vehicles and raced
to Mexico. In this case we were very lucky that we were able to
apprehend them just short of the port of exit. Currently, there is no
communication system which allows us to alert our port of entry of what
is approaching or leaving the port.
Drug trafficking is nothing new in our area. During 2009/2010 our
officers seized:
75,000 pounds of marijuana,
2,000 pounds of cocaine, and
350 pounds of crystal meth.
Whereas before it was rare, today it seems to occur more frequent.
In a recent arrest, our officers seized 12,000 pounds of marijuana,
150 pounds of cocaine, one (1) 70 caliber machine gun, two (2) military
issue flak jackets, two (2) hand grenades, six (6) semi-automatic
weapons and 1,800 pounds of assault rifle ammunition. Eleven (11)
persons were arrested including a Texas National Guardsman.
We are in an area of many political jurisdictions. We need a Border
Financial Crime Task Force with personnel to provide intelligence and
surveillance. It needs to be well connected with all of our law
enforcement agencies. We must deter the idea that persons can simply
run back undetected to Mexico after committing crimes here. We need
uniformed south-bound checks at all ports of entry specifically looking
for fire arms and cash.
Thank you for allowing me to share this information with you, and
on behalf of all our citizens, we thank you for your service to our
country.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Mayor. I appreciate those
comments, and as you say, really the impetus for this hearing,
as Ranking Member Cuellar and I have talked about this a number
of times, you know, you see a lot of the attention on the
Southwest border really being paid attention to what is coming
across through the deserts and in between the ports of entry
and everything and, as we have focused on all of that, somehow
we just want to make sure that we are really looking at the
resources that are necessary to secure our ports of entry where
so much of this is coming across and we do have that issue, I
think, again, on both the borders.
My first question would be to Mr. Koerner from Canadian
National. Again, we appreciate your willingness to come today
and the testimony that you provided to this committee. You
mentioned about your VACIS machine, and I have had an
opportunity to be out there and actually see it and see some of
the images and various things that you have found there, and I
think it is a fantastic technology. If I am correct, you are
essentially screening 100 percent of everything that goes
through your tunnel; is that correct?
Mr. Koerner. That is correct. All seven of our border
crossing locations are 100 percent VACIS screened.
Mrs. Miller, Now, in regards to the one that comes under
the St. Croix River, I have often said and I just want to make
sure I am correct in saying this, that is the busiest rail
entry into the Nation. Is that correct? You mentioned your
volume there, 9 trains per day. Could you quantify that a bit?
Mr. Koerner. For the traffic that flows between Canada and
the United States, CN is the largest of all of those Class I
trains that would be moving freight from Canada into the United
States and vice versa, and of our 70 ports of entry, the Port
Huron-Sarnia border crossing is the largest for us.
Mrs. Miller. What does that mean, 9 trains a day?
Mr. Koerner. So a train obviously can carry many, many
containers or carloads but on an annual basis we bring
somewhere between 1,000,000 and 1,100,000 containers or cars
across the border.
Mrs. Miller. I see. Could you give us just an example? You
were mentioning about when the manifest perhaps doesn't match
up with what the VACIS machine is seeing there. Could you sort
of flush that out a bit so we can understand what triggers
something there?
Mr. Koerner. Certainly. At the border, and we are talking
again today about security primarily but a lot of things happen
at the border. CBP isn't just looking for the drugs and the
guns and the money. They are also doing things on behalf of
USDA and FDA and other Government agencies who say: Hey, we
also want to make sure that you are checking for X, Y, and Z. A
lot of the delays that occur at the border I think occur
because of these things as well.
But with regard to VACIS if we have some cars, cars are so
simple because it is clear that they are rail vehicles but
let's talk about a container that is closed, not easily looked
into. It is packed tightly and it has come from Europe and it
is coming through the port of entry at Port Huron. That
information is transmitted to us electronically. It is through
a system called EDI, Electronic Data Interface. It is
information that we share both with the Canadian authorities
and with the U.S. authorities.
By the way, that is critical that we are all in the same
system, so that we are all reading the same type of material
and we are not having to digest or change criteria from DHS to
beta or something like that, and so as that material is
transmitted they have got 2 hours at a minimum, probably more,
to go ahead and see if there is information about where that is
coming from, the goods that are in there that they want to
target. Let's say they don't need to target, they say hey, what
we are reading here insofar as this advanced data that is
coming to us says that this is good to go, but we know that it
is supposed to be widgets coming through, and as the train goes
through VACIS we see that it is not widgets but it is squares.
That X-ray then would say, hey, we have got an issue that we
need to do a secondary search. Just the same way you would be
searched at an airport, they would want to take that particular
car off of the train and unload that car and make sure that the
images that they saw actually correspond to what they believe
they were expecting.
That of course can cause a lot of issues for a train
because trains are hooked up many cars long and means you have
to stop and go back and forth and to cut a car or container out
of a train there is lot of work involved.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you. I appreciate that.
My other question would be to Stan Korosec, who we again
appreciate you coming to Washington as well. It has been a
pleasure to work with you. I look forward to continue to do
that in the future.
You were mentioning about the manpower and you think it is
okay. But we have had a lot of experience of huge backups at
the Blue Water Bridge, both directions, for various reasons.
One of the things you mentioned, Stan, was about the CBP. I
wrote some notes down when you were talking about the stacked
booths, that this is a subject that has been broached. But then
there hasn't been apparently a follow-up. I am not quite sure
what you are talking about there. How could we assist you with
that?
Mr. Korosec. This actually came out of the field office in
Detroit. Mr. Chris Perry, the DFO there, was a fantastic
gentleman, as they all are in the area there in working
together. The idea was in the interim--before this, before the
new plaza hopefully gets funded and built, we have got to do
something in the interim. A staggered booth--and I believe they
use these down in San Ysidro and I know they have one at the
Detroit Windsor tunnel they just put in, where you take an
existing booth which now becomes just a stop area. Behind that
booth is a series of maybe three or four other ones. In our
case, it would be four booths, kind of angled. You think coming
into Canada, the Blue Water Bridge, the far right lane there.
Coming into the United States, that would be a stop, and then
you would have a series of four booths there. So you wait there
until the next available booth. So it actually gives us
increases of three more inspection booths, which is
significant. One more inspection lane will help the throughput.
The proposal also called for three stacked booths, which
means your primary booth; and then behind that you have another
one. So if there is nobody there, the first car would go past
the first one, stop at the second. They are stacked like that.
It doesn't give you the full capacity of an extra lane, because
if the car in front of you is taking longer for inspection, you
are behind it and you are finished and you have got to wait.
But still, it is a great idea and something that we are hoping
that can be done hopefully for the summer 2011.
Again, this was proposed in 2009 or in November last year.
We at Blue Water Bridge felt so strongly about it, and we know
there are funding issues with the CBP that our board of
directors says, hey, we will contribute financially to this
project to make sure it moves ahead and it doesn't sit on a
desk somewhere here in the District of Columbia, gathering
dust, because it is going to cost money to do. This way we can
achieve legitimate trade and travel and it doesn't affect
security.
Then later on in January, we have some brand new inspection
booths that we won't be installing for a while. I offered them
up as a loan or whatever to help keep it moving forward, in
addition to any financial compensation that we could provide to
get this project going. We had one conference call in March to
say we are going to have another conference call and that is
the last I have heard.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you. Well, you and I will talk some more
about that and see what we can do to have that happen. That
would be a great idea.
With that, I would like to recognize the Ranking Member,
Mr. Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I want
to thank you all for being here, in particular the mayor, from
part of my Congressional district. Mayor, thank you very much.
It is too bad that our CBP folks left, because I think it is
always good that they listen to the end users or the folks that
are involved on a day-to-day basis, and hopefully sometime in
the future like you say, we can get everybody sitting there so
they can hear what suggestions that you all have.
The stacking is something that we brought up years ago, and
I know CBP at one time said that it was not going to save more
time. I hope they have changed their mind on that. To me, it is
only common sense that if you bring in two cars or whatever
number--but let us say two cars at one time--you can be a
little more efficient, especially for footprints in areas where
there is so--you can't expand. Anzalduas has a lot of space,
but in some areas they are pretty constrained. So only way you
can expand, then put the stack thing--has anybody heard
anything? Has CBP changed their mind on this? Because I know
years ago, 4 or 5 years ago when I brought this up to them,
they said they had looked into it and it was going to be more
time-consuming.
Mr. Korosec. Like I said, it doesn't give you 100 percent
extra lane. I think the figures that they provide us is about
60 percent increase in capacity. It would work perfectly at
Port Huron because, like I said, the plaza is elevated 26 feet
in the air and there is no room to go this way, so you have got
to go this way. The staggered booth kind of achieves the same
thing.
I know that in the Detroit Windsor Tunnel, they just did
that, which would give--which got them one extra lane down
there. At San Ysidro, I have been down there and I know that is
employed there.
Mr. Cuellar. Right. I think it is a good idea. In areas
that were constrained, we certainly have to think outside the
box how we can move that quicker.
Mayor, let me ask you a couple of questions. We need more
infrastructure dollars, you are correct. We need more
personnel. You are correct about that. What recommendations do
you have for the processes as to how we can improve the
efficiency of the movement of goods and people that are here
for legitimate purposes? I know you have got a lot of
experience on economics. Can you give us some suggestions that
you would have?
I know you mentioned one about better communication, and I
agree with that. But any other ideas and thoughts on processes,
how we can move things quicker?
Mr. Cortez. Sure. Thank you. We have two bridges in our
area that we are on. One is the Anzalduas, which is a brand new
bridge. Right now we are not allowing any commercial truck
traffic to go through Anzalduas. So one thing we could do
immediately is to allow empties, south traffic going south that
takes not a lot of effort, something we can do quickly.
Also, we need to accept north-bound traffic that--right
now, if the decision were to be made today to do that, it would
take at least a 3- or 4-year cycle time to get all of the
budgets and everything, personnel. That is a long time, because
you cannot have efficient trade if you don't have a system of
bridges helping you do that. So a very quick thing would be
that.
Obviously, if I were going to go to the doctor, I would
like to go to a doctor early in the morning than late in the
afternoon. Because if I am going to see the doctor who has seen
100 patients already, I would rather for him to see me early.
People get tired, and there has to be some correlation between
how many hours somebody works and shifts and things like that.
So, obviously, the most personnel, the most technology that
we have, and the best equipment is going to make us more
efficient not only to process legal trade, but also to catch
the bad people.
Now, getting back to the threat of violence. We live on the
border and those people can cross daily, often, and if they
commit any crimes, then it is a quick 4-, 5-, 6-minute ride
from our city back to one of those ports of entry.
So obviously there has to be some system of communication
with all of those that are involved in law enforcement. I don't
know where we fix responsibility, but I can tell you in talking
to my police chief and our people, we are lacking in that
communication. We need to be able to quickly tell someone there
has been a perpetrator in our city and probably, in all
likelihood, they are running towards your exit port. We don't
have that and I think that would be helpful.
I think those southbound inspections--again, nobody likes
to hear about more inspections, because it creates more lines
and more obstacles in doing things. But from our perspective,
it is a needed thing because there are bad things that are
going southbound.
Mr. Cuellar. Mayor, I want to thank you very much. My time
is up. But I would ask you if you can flush out this
communication. I like the suggestion you have, and if you could
submit that to the committee, we would appreciate it.
Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentlemen very much and I also
appreciate his comment about whether or not CBP should have
stayed here so that they could have heard this testimony. I
think that would have been helpful. But then of course it would
have begged the question: Why couldn't they just sit on the
same panel with them? Obviously again, I have a lot of
heartburn with that decision and the posture that the Secretary
has taken toward this committee, which I think is very
unfortunate, and I don't know why.
But at any rate, the Chairwoman now recognizes the
gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and to the
Ranking Member. Let me thank both of you for this hearing. I am
delighted to have been able to arrive before the conclusion of
the hearing. I apologize for not hearing all of the testimony.
I do want to thank the Chairwoman coming from Michigan and
making sure that we know full well that there are two borders,
Northern and Southern border. I can say that as one of the
Members on this committee, that I have been to the Northern
border quite extensively and am well aware of the concerns
there. I would attribute the needs of that border as much
importance as the Southern border.
Because of the uniqueness of the Southern border, Mayor
Cortez, I want to first of all thank you for your testimony and
allow me to pursue maybe a slightly different line of
questioning, and I think your testimony is enormously
instructive. If I might just quickly make note of the fact that
you have commented that the Border Patrol personnel in the area
between ports have increased investment 800 percent. But I
think the big numbers are they have intercepted bad guys 70
percent across the border and their success rate is about 90
percent. We are grateful for that. That is the land between
ports.
But isn't it interesting that we come to the land ports and
the infrastructure there is, if you will, very limited. I want
to thank this committee, but I also will acknowledge that there
will be a hearing--and I hope there will be some action behind
that hearing when the Senate holds a hearing to discuss the
importance of infrastructure.
So my first question to you is: Is this a good time to cut
into what are vital needs of infrastructure that, in my
understanding of what you are saying, will generate income,
revenue, and taxation if we can fix the land ports with better
infrastructure?
Mr. Cortez. Yes. We cannot have security without economic
security, and so much of our trade comes to legal ports of
entry. In the last years, we just simply have neglected to
continue to make financial investments for our legal ports of
entry. So we totally agree with that, Madam Congresswoman.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So Federal funding for infrastructure
would be a real investment, and this would not be the time to
cut that kind of investment?
Mr. Cortez. Absolutely. I couldn't agree with you more.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me cite another number for you.
According to the Department of Justice, 90 percent of the drugs
smuggled into the United States entered through the land ports.
That is actually the ports where people are supposed to enter.
You would think that someone else, just with that information,
would say oh, I know where they come, they come in between. But
you are giving us a fact, as the mayor on that border, that
that influx comes through those land ports where there is a
limited infrastructure. That doesn't make sense, does it,
Mayor, in terms of our investment? That is where we should get
the technology, increase the number of officers there.
Mr. Cortez. That is correct, Madam Congresswoman. Also our
data was verified by the Secretary himself as well as the CBP,
and a study made by the University of California in San Diego.
So there is an abundance of information that confirms those
percentages.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am a champion on Texas and, as I said, I
am very grateful to the Chairwoman for enlightening me on the
issues of the Northern border.
But I just note in your testimony as well, you indicated
that trucks are beginning to move away from the port in
Arizona, coming to our port. Again, infrastructure is needed to
make that a more viable pathway, is that correct, if they start
coming in large numbers?
Mr. Cortez. Yes, ma'am. It is just like Walmart. If you
have more customers, you need more doors for them to come in
and more cash registers to serve them as they are leaving.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I just want to follow up on this
questioning as well. Let me just cite another note that you
made that I think is very important. You mentioned the recent
arrests where officers seized 12,000 pounds of marijuana, 150
pounds of cocaine. Let me thank the local law enforcement for
their work and hope they are benefiting from the Cops on the
Beat program and they get extra dollars, 70 caliber machine
guns, two military-issued flak jackets, two hand grenades, six
semiautomatic weapons and 18,000 pounds of assault rifle
ammunition.
Mr. Mayor, you are a mayor that has to address the security
of your citizens. Can we do better by you in terms of what I
call gun regulation or the enhanced activity to help stop gun-
running that is coming out of the United States and going into
Mexico?
Mr. Cortez. Madam Congresswoman, I really would hate to
offer an opinion there because it would be a very lay opinion.
I can tell you that I have a lot of confidence in our law
enforcement people in McAllen. With the right resources, the
right network of intelligence and surveillance, I think we can
do a better job.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you think it would help if we had laws
in the United States that would stop the gun-running going into
Mexico?
Mr. Cortez. Well, anything that would stop cash and guns
going into Mexico would benefit both countries, the United
States and Mexico. So anything that can be done would be
helpful.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mayor, you are giving me wide latitude on
that, and I am certainly going to be looking for anything and
something, because those guns kill law enforcement officers.
I just end on this note. I understand recent news has just
indicated--and I am not going to point out the particular area
on the border. I would be inaccurate. Two individuals were
sitting at a land port and were shot dead in their car.
Obviously it may have been drug cartel-related, but they were
in line and they were assassinated at that point. That seems to
me that your point in your testimony about more dollars for
infrastructure and officers at that land port is a very
important message for this Congress to hear.
Mr. Cortez. Absolutely. We think that would be a good
investment because you are going to be receiving double
benefits. You are going to be enhancing the efficient trade in
our country as well as having and adding resources to interdict
criminals.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, and I yield
back.
Mrs. Miller. I thank the gentlelady for her questions. I
just remind all the committee Members that the hearing record
will be held open for 10 days if there are any other questions
or comments, and we will try to get those responded to as well.
I certainly want to thank all of the witnesses for their
testimony today. We are certainly appreciative of it. I think
it has been a very good hearing.
It certainly has enlightened many of us on the committee
here about some of the challenges that are faced by our ports
of entry, by various agencies, and all the stakeholders
involved. We have a lot of work to do as a Nation to be able to
secure those and get the resources that we need out to the
various ports of entry, wherever they are, the north, the
south, et cetera.
So again, we thank you all for coming, taking the time out
of your schedule to come to Washington and participate in this
hearing today.
With that, the committee will stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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