[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
STRENGTHENING THE BORDER--FINDING THE RIGHT MIX OF PERSONNEL,
INFRASTRUCTURE, AND TECHNOLOGY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND
MARITIME SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 15, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-10
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
72-220 WASHINGTON : 2012
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Vacancy
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER AND MARITIME SECURITY
Candice S. Miller, Michigan, Chairwoman
Mike Rogers, Alabama Henry Cuellar, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Loretta Sanchez, California
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Ben Quayle, Arizona, Vice Chair Brian Higgins, New York
Scott Rigell, Virginia Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Paul Anstine, Staff Director
Diana Bergwin, Subcommittee Clerk
Alison Northrop, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Candice S. Miller, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Michigan, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security................................... 1
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security.......................................... 3
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
Witnesses
Mr. Michael J. Fisher, Chief of the Border Patrol, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security,
Accompanied by Mark Borkowski, Assistant Commissioner, Office
of Technology Innovation and Acquisition, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security and Michael
C. Kostelnik, Assistant Commissioner, Office of CBP Air &
Marine, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of
Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Joint Prepared Statement....................................... 9
Major General Hugo Salazar, Adjutant General, Arizona National
Guard:
Oral Statement................................................. 14
Prepared Statement............................................. 15
Mr. Richard M. Stana, Director, Homeland Security and Justice
Issues, Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
For the Record
The Honorable Henry Cuellar, a Representative in Congress from
the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Border
and Maritime Security:
Graph.......................................................... 32
STRENGTHENING THE BORDER--FINDING THE RIGHT MIX OF PERSONNEL,
INFRASTRUCTURE, AND TECHNOLOGY
----------
Tuesday, March 15, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border and Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Candice S. Miller
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Miller, McCaul, Quayle, Duncan,
Cuellar, Jackson Lee, Higgins, and Clarke.
Also present: Representative Green.
Mrs. Miller [presiding]. If I can turn my mic on, we will
get it going on here this morning. It is still early. I would
like to call the committee to order.
Certainly, first of all, let me just thank all of our
witnesses sincerely, every one of you, for taking time today to
provide the testimony that you are going to be providing to the
committee and answering our questions very forthrightly. We are
sincerely appreciative of that.
I want to say that the men and women of Customs and Border
Protection have our Nation's gratitude so very, very much for
all of the work that they do and they perform to keep our
Nation safe.
Certainly, Major General Salazar, we had a chance to chat
before we opened the hearing. We appreciate so much all the
work that the men and women in the National Guard all across
our country, engaged in theater. I mentioned to you my husband
spent many, many years in the Air National Guard, a blue
suiter--but we are very appreciative of the work that they do
everywhere and work that they are doing to work so closely with
CBP in securing our Nation's border today. We will be
interested in hearing about that.
Our first hearing, actually, examined the concept of
operational control of the border. We tried to define what
operational control is and the matrix that we are utilizing to
determine what operational control is of both the Southern
border and the Northern border and, I think, the difference
between what the American people commonly think when they hear
the term ``operational control'' and then what the Border
Patrol means when they say ``effective control.''
This hearing determines and tries to build on that
discussion by examining the three main pillars that allow
Border Patrol agents to be effective. That, of course, is a
combination of personnel, infrastructure, and technology. I
think we certainly need all three to be successful in securing
our borders.
Since the year 2004 we have invested literally billions of
dollars in every one of these categories, all three of the
categories. But we want to look at how they work in concert to
enable our agents to be effective. Today we are going to look
at the level of agents that we have in the field, the amount of
fencing that we have, infrastructure, and perhaps certainly one
of the most critical elements, and that is how we are utilizing
technology as well along our borders.
The Secure Border Initiative Net, SBInet, as everybody
calls it, was designed to be one of the solutions, technology
solutions to help secure the Southwest border. It has been used
as well on the Northern border, but after a number of years of
missteps and we didn't get what we wanted to out of the SBInet,
and as well we expended over $1 billion, the Secretary of
Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, decided to cancel this
program after the completion of an analysis of alternatives,
which determined that SBInet was just not economically
feasible.
So the logical question is, and one of the things that I
hope we get to today, is what is the follow on? What is the
follow on to SBInet? If not SBInet, then what is next if, you
know, we can't put enough agents on the border, we can't put up
enough fence to provide the level of security on the very vast
Southwest border, and certainly the Northern border, that is
required to protect our sovereignty and to meet the demands of
the American people? So, technology has to become a force
multiplier, a force multiplier to support the incredible
efforts, again, of our brave border agents.
In fact, I think that is what the Border Patrol envisions--
utilizing technologies to reduce the workload, to make them
more effective for the men and women in the field as well as to
enhance their effectiveness in identifying, apprehending,
whether it is drug smugglers or illegal immigrants, who might
only seek economic opportunity, but as well potential
terrorists and others, who would seek to cross the border
illegally.
The Department of Homeland Security's Analysis of
Alternatives, which formed a new technology plan for the State
of Arizona, consists of a combination of Remote Video
Surveillance Systems, Mobile Surveillance Systems, Unattended
Ground Sensors and other types of technology. The backbone of
the Arizona plan actually consists of Integrated Fixed Towers,
which look very similar to the original design of SBInet.
However, it now appears that the technology plan for the
entire Southwest border currently being prepared will not be
ready until July instead of March, as we had originally hoped.
I am concerned about the lack of a comprehensive technology
plan as well for the Northern border, which does not appear to
be something that CBP is considering at this time. I just would
once again, and I always say that I am totally cognizant and
very sensitive to all of the challenges that are happening on
the Southern border of our Nation, but I like to remind folks
we actually have two borders, so the Northern border as well.
Both of them need to be secured.
To fund this new technology plan, the President's fiscal
year 2012 budget included $242 million in the border security
fencing infrastructure and technology account, which will be
used to deploy the first three of five total, as I understand
it, Integrated Fixed Tower System deployments to Border Patrol
stations' areas of responsibility in Arizona.
Unmanned aerial systems are another critical tool employed
by CBP Air and Marine, which gives the agents the ability to
loiter over an area for long periods of time, making this
platform ideal for the surveillance missions required by the
Border Patrol. As well, I am a very strong supporter of using
UAVs--I know my colleague, Mr. Cuellar, is as well--and, you
know, which have proven to be so effective in theater in Iraq
and Afghanistan to scale a vast expanse of the borders.
Infrastructure is also critically important to our success
in gaining control of the border. Like technology, it is not a
solution by itself, but provides what the Border Patrol calls
persistent impedance, which either pushes illegal crossers into
more remote areas or gives Border Patrol agents more time to
respond.
I think we will be asking the question: Do we need more
fencing, or is 350 miles of pedestrian fence and 299 miles of
vehicle fence along the Southwest border adequate? Again, these
are some of the questions that the committee is seeking to have
answered today.
Finally, the National Guard has been surged to the border
several times since 2006, to perform a variety of missions.
However, I am very concerned that the National Guardsmen and
women are possibly constrained by DOD regulations. We don't
want it to be an exercise in good optics, obviously, to say
that we are sending all these National Guard troops to the
border, but then limiting their ability to actually do the job
that they have been trained to do and are able to do so
effectively and so well.
So we just want to certainly make sure that the Congress is
assisting and enabling the National Guard to be able to do the
job that they need to do along the border.
Of course, I would point out that each and every mile of
border is different. I am certainly cognizant again of the fact
that it will take a combination of technology, personnel, and
infrastructure to secure the border. There is no one-size-fits-
all solution for a border as vast and different, certainly, as
ours.
Again, I want to welcome all of the witnesses. I look
forward to all of your testimony today.
At this time the Chairwoman would recognize the Ranking
Member, Mr. Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here with us.
I think we both agree that we are at a very important stage
in our Nation's efforts to secure our borders. As border
security threats are continuing to evolve and our country is
facing new challenges that demand new resolutions, we must be
at the forefront of all measures to secure and protect our
homeland, including our many points of entry and exit on the
Northern and Southern border.
At our Northern and Southern borders, we have taken
critical steps to interdict the flow of illegal weapons,
people, drugs, and cash, but more work needs to be done.
Chairwoman Miller and I both represent districts along our
Nation's border, and I know we have several issues of mutual
interest.
Communities along our Nation's border and coastal areas
face a unique exposure to threats that concern all of us. In
the 28th District of Texas, which I represent, we have first-
hand knowledge of all the challenges along the Southern border
and the importance of providing the tools necessary to enhance
border security.
I believe strongly that technology and personnel play vital
roles in securing America's borders. DHS has increased its
efforts in recent years to enhance border security, and we,
both Democrats and Republicans, have provided the resources
necessary to help us just do that.
Since 2007 Congress has continued to increase border
security funding. As a result CBP now has over 20,000 Border
Patrol agents, more than 20,000 CBP officers at ports of entry
and pre-clearing stations, and over 1,000 air marine pilots and
vessel operators. Throughout the work of this committee,
Congress has also provided funding to enable DHS to deploy
technology in their security effort.
I am particularly interested in receiving an update on
CBP's use of unmanned aerial systems and how this technology
will be utilized in the future in securing the borders. We must
continue to mitigate border threats by deploying a combination
of manpower, technology, and resources to enhance our strategy
for securing our borders. I am interested in hearing from our
witnesses about how they believe we can achieve this important
goal.
However, I do want to remind everyone here that our
discussion about border security, we cannot continue to
overlook the importance of our land ports of entry, which plays
a vital role in combating the flow of illegal weapons, drugs,
cash, human smuggling, while facilitating legitimate trade and
travel.
CBP reports that on a typical day officers at the ports of
entry process 956,000-plus passengers and pedestrians and
64,000-plus trucks, rail, and sea containers. We cannot achieve
effective control of our borders if we do not provide the
needed resources to the ports of entry to enhance security and
facilitate commerce.
Madam Chairwoman, I look forward to continue to work with
you on this issue.
I also thank the witnesses for joining us today.
Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
March 15, 2011
In January, after over 4 years and nearly a billion dollars spent,
Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano canceled the SBInet
program.
Like the Department of Homeland Security's previous attempts to
deploy a ``virtual fence'' along the Southwest border, the program
never lived up to its billing.
Technology problems, integration challenges, and management
deficiencies plagued the program from its inception.
With so little return on the taxpayers' investment, I
wholeheartedly agreed with Secretary Napolitano's decision not to
continue to deploy SBInet.
However, I am concerned that there are some striking similarities
between the Department's new plan for border security technology and
SBInet and its predecessors.
It is my understanding that the new Arizona Technology Plan calls
for an integrated system of towers mounted with cameras and radars, as
well as Remote Video Surveillance Systems, Mobile Surveillance Systems,
and Unattended Ground Sensors.
Is my further understanding that the Arizona Technology Plan comes
with a price tag of several hundred million dollars.
All of this sounds very familiar.
We have been told that this time, technology is being selected
considering operational needs and cost-effectiveness.
Again, that sounds familiar, since DHS made similar promises when
SBInet was launched.
Make no mistake--I do not oppose the use of technology to sure our
America's borders.
To the contrary, I believe technology is an essential complement to
Border Patrol agents, Customs and Border Protection officers, Air and
Marine personnel, infrastructure, and other resources.
But technology must be both proven and cost-effective if DHS is to
avoid repeating past mistakes yet again.
I am interested in hearing from our witnesses about how the new
plan for border security differs from its predecessors, and how the
Department will ensure this technology succeeds where others did not.
DHS must do more than just put a new brand on the old way of doing
things.
It is my hope that under Secretary Napolitano's leadership, they
will get it right this time.
With respect to personnel, Customs and Border Protection has some
of the finest agents and officers not only within DHS, but across the
Federal Government.
They work along the front lines of our Nation's borders, often
under difficult and dangerous conditions, and we appreciate the work
they do.
As CBP has grown and the situation along the Southwest border has
intensified, the men and women that comprise its ranks face new and
more difficult challenges.
Specifically, today I would like to hear from Chief Fisher about
how the Border Patrol has been affected by its rapid expansion in
recent years.
I would also like to hear from General Kostelnik about what
personnel challenges his agency is facing.
Finally, I want to reiterate my support for a comprehensive border
security strategy as a means for achieving border security.
There is no single strategy setting forth how the relevant agencies
are going to work together to secure America's borders.
Given the number of agencies that play a role in this effort, such
a strategy is essential.
Again, I urge the Department to work with its Federal counterparts
and other border stakeholders to develop such a plan.
I thank the witnesses for joining us today and I look forward to
your testimony.
Mrs. Miller. We are again pleased to have a very
distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this
important topic. I think what I will do is read your bios, and
then we can just go on to the questions.
First of all, Chief Michael Fisher, who has been before
this committee before and appreciate him coming back, was named
chief of the U.S. Border Patrol in May of last year. Chief
Fisher started his duty along the Southwest border in 1987 in
Arizona.
He successfully completed the selection process for the
Border Patrol tactical unit in 1990 and was later selected as
field operations supervisor for the tactical unit assigned to
El Paso, Texas, for 4 years. Following this, he served as the
deputy chief patrol agent in the Detroit sector and as an
assistant chief patrol agent in Tucson, Arizona.
Mark Borkowski became the assistant commissioner for the
Office of Technology Innovation and Acquisition with U.S.
Customs and Border Protection of the Department of Homeland
Security in July 2012--excuse me, 2010. He is responsible for
ensuring technology efforts are properly focused on mission and
well integrated across CBP and for strengthening effectiveness
in acquisition and program management.
Prior to his appointment as assistant commissioner, Mr.
Borkowski was the executive director of the Secure Border
Initiative program executive office and was responsible for the
implementation of SBI at the U.S. Customs and Border
Protection.
Michael Kostelnik is the assistant commissioner, U.S.
Customs and Border Protection Office of Air and Marine. Office
of Air and Marine is the world's largest aviation and maritime
law enforcement organization. The Office of Air and Marine is
also the most experienced operator of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
systems--unmanned aerial systems in the homeland security
missions on the world stage.
The mission of the Office of Air and Marine is to protect
the American people and the Nation's critical infrastructure
through the coordinated use of integrated air and marine forces
to detect, interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism and the
unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and other
contraband toward or across the borders of the United States.
General Kostelnik spent more than 32 years on active
military duty with the U.S. Air Force, serving as a fighter
pilot flying
F-4 and F-15 aircraft.
Major General Salazar assumed the duties as the adjutant
general, Arizona National Guard, in December 2008 and
concurrently serves as the director of the Arizona Department
of Emergency in Military Affairs. Major General Salazar has
worked as a full-time member of the Arizona National Guard for
the past 18 years, received his commission from the Officer
Candidate School at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1983.
His military assignments include several command
assignments, Arizona Joint Counter Narcotics Task Force, senior
military advisor with the Multinational Security Transition
Command Iraq, and deputy chief of staff operations for the
Arizona Army National Guard.
As the commanding general for the Arizona National Guard,
his duties and responsibilities include managing the day-to-day
activities of the Arizona Army National Guard, Air National
Guard joint programs in the emergency management division.
Richard Stana is the director of homeland security and
justice issues at the U.S. Government Accountability Office.
During his nearly 35-year career with GAO, he served in
headquarters, field, overseas offices and has directed reviews
on a wide variety of complex military and domestic issues. Most
recently, he directed GAO's work relating to immigration and
border security issues.
So again, gentlemen, the committee welcomes all of you this
morning.
At this point the Chairwoman will recognize Mr. Borkowski,
who will testify on behalf of the Department's witnesses.
STATEMENT OF MICHAEL J. FISHER, CHIEF OF THE BORDER PATROL,
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, ACCOMPANIED BY MARK BORKOWSKI, ASSISTANT
COMMISSIONER, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND ACQUISITION,
U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, AND MICHAEL C. KOSTELNIK, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF CBP AIR & MARINE, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Borkowski. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, distinguished
Members of the committee, on behalf of the Department of
Homeland Security, thank you for this invitation to testify. I
will be joined by my colleague, General Kostelnik, who was our
assistant commissioner for the Office of Air and Marine, and
Chief Fisher from the Border Patrol, but I will give one
statement for all of us. We have submitted a detailed written
statement, and I will summarize that on all of our behalf.
First of all, I think as you characterize it, Madam
Chairwoman, Ranking Member Cuellar, Customs and Border
Protection is the agency responsible for security at our
borders, or very close to the border. That is the mission that
we perform. The men and women of Customs and Border Protection
are very proud of that mission, are very dedicated to that
mission.
As you also noted, we have over the last several years
significantly increased the resources applied to that mission.
Ranking Member Cuellar, you mentioned the 20,700 Border Patrol
agents, for example, which is more than twice what we had in
2004. Madam Chairwoman Miller mentioned the 649 miles of fence,
combined pedestrian and vehicle.
In addition to resources we have applied a lot of effort in
doing things more smart--for example, collaboration. Many of
you are probably familiar with the Coalition on Transnational
Terrorism, which includes 60 stakeholders, including our
Government, the Mexican government, Federal, State, local,
Tribal stakeholders.
We have created a joint force command in Arizona so that
within the CBP we now have a field commander--not in
Washington, but in the field--who can make decisions about the
use of CBP resources. So we have applied resources. We have
changed our ways of doing business. We believe that those have
already shown effects.
One of the ways we measure that is by apprehensions. I
think most of you are aware that over the last 2 years,
apprehensions on the Southwest border have decreased by a very
significant 36 percent and in fact are only a third of what
they used to be years ago at their peak.
Apprehensions, we believe, are a measure of the activity on
the border. They do measure the flow, so we are quite clear
that that also indicates that the flow of traffic between the
ports of entry has declined.
Last year we seized $147 million of currency both between
and at the ports of entry. That is a 34 percent increase from
the previous year. We seized 4.1 million pounds of narcotics.
So we think we have been increasingly effective.
Now, notice I said that carefully--``increasingly
effective.'' That does not mean we are completely done with the
mission. It does not mean we are where we would like to be. We
recognize we have more work to do.
One of the ways we think we get to that, as you have both
alluded, is with the application of technology. You have
suggested what the role of technology might be. I believe we
are focused at this point between the ports of entry, but you
have also noted, I think quite appropriately, that there is
technology at the ports of entry, above and below the ports of
entry, and the border.
But for the purpose of this discussion, let us start with
technology between the ports of entry. I think we are all
familiar with the Secured Border Initiative Network program,
the SBInet program, which was at one point intended to be the
backbone of our technology. As you also suggested, we have had
a series of problem with that. It is much behind schedule, much
over cost, and we have lost confidence in the SBInet program.
The Secretary conducted an assessment of that program and
has concluded it does not make sense to continue it. In fact,
the SBInet program, the whole concept of a backbone, seems
inappropriate. What seems more appropriate is a tailored mix of
technologies that are currently available to the border.
The Secretary conducted the assessment with, among other
things, an analysis of alternatives. You are going to hear a
lot, I think, about analysis of alternatives. It is a certain
term of art.
One thing, I think, we need to be clear about is an
analysis of alternatives is not in and of itself conclusive or
determinative. It has uncertainties, but it is a very
disciplined, structured process which frames decisions. The
decisions themselves are not from the analysis of alternatives.
They are from the decision-makers to receive the analysis of
alternatives. In that case, this is the Border Patrol.
So the Border Patrol decisions about technology and how it
should be procured and used on the Southwest border were
advised by this analysis of alternatives, but were actually
made by that Border Patrol. I think it is important that we
understand that as we go forward.
I should note, and I think you are aware, that GAO has been
with us for the past several months, reviewing this. That
review is not complete, and I understand we will talk about the
status of it, but the work continues. We still have some
differences in what our understandings of this are, although we
have philosophical agreement on what an AOA is and how it ought
to be used. But there is more work to be done.
I would just point out that we are in the process of making
a bit of sausage, but in the end I am certain that it will be a
sausage that is tasty and worthy, but we are not there yet, and
I just think it is important to highlight that.
A couple of other things--we should recognize the Northern
border. I know in particular, Madam Chairwoman, you are very
familiar with the activities on the Northern border, the
deployment of agents, the beginning of the application of
technology along the St. Clair River, along the Niagara River,
the deployment of mobile surveillance systems. We are very much
looking forward to joining you next week for the formal opening
of the new operational integration center.
One thing I would point out about the Northern border is
that we believe is a much different environment. I know that
Chief Fisher is prepared to talk to you about that, but the way
we look at the Northern border ought to be different from the
way we look at the Southwest border. We look forward to
pursuing that discussion as we go forward.
With that, thank you. We look forward to your questions.
[The joint statement of Mr. Fisher, Mr. Borkowski, and Mr.
Kostelnik follows:]
Prepared Joint Statement of Michael J. Fisher, Michael Kostelnik, and
Mark S. Borkowski
March 15, 2011
introduction
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, it is a pleasure to appear before you
today to discuss U.S. Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) efforts to
secure our Nation's borders.
As America's frontline border agency, CBP is responsible for
securing America's borders against threats, while facilitating legal
travel and trade. To do this, CBP has deployed a multi-layered, risk-
based approach to enhance the security of our borders while
facilitating the flow of lawful people and goods entering the United
States. This layered approach to security reduces our reliance on any
single point or program that could be compromised. It also extends our
zone of security outward, ensuring that our physical border is not the
first or last line of defense, but one of many.
I'd like to begin by recognizing those at the Department who have
given their lives in service to our mission. The loss of these brave
agents is a stark reminder of the sacrifices made by the men and women
of DHS every day. It also strengthens our resolve to continue to do
everything in our power to protect against, mitigate, and respond to
threats and secure our border.
overview of border security efforts
Over the past 2 years, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
has dedicated historic levels of personnel, technology, and resources
to the Southwest border. In March 2009, DHS launched the Southwest
Border Initiative to bring unprecedented focus and intensity to
Southwest border security, coupled with a smart and effective approach
to enforcing immigration laws in the interior of our country. We
increased the size of the Border Patrol to more than 20,700 agents
today, more than double the size it was in 2004. DHS also quintupled
deployments of Border Liaison Officers to work with their Mexican
counterparts; and began screening Southbound rail and vehicle traffic
to look for illegal weapons and cash that, when smuggled across the
border, help to fuel the cartel violence in Mexico.
With the aid of the fiscal year 2010 Border Security Supplemental
requested by the administration and passed by Congress, we are
continuing to add technology, manpower, and infrastructure to the
Southwest border, including 1,000 new Border Patrol agents; 250 new CBP
officers at our ports of entry; improving our tactical communications
systems; and adding two new forward operating bases to improve
coordination of border security activities. The Supplemental also
provided CBP two new Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), further
strengthening our UAS operations, which now covers the Southwest border
from the El Centro Sector in California to the Gulf of Mexico in Texas.
We've also constructed 649 miles of fencing out of nearly 652 miles
where Border Patrol field commanders determined it was operationally
required, including 299 miles of vehicle barriers and 350 miles of
pedestrian fence.
In addition, President Obama authorized the temporary use of up to
1,200 additional National Guard personnel to bridge to longer-term
enhancements in border protection and law enforcement personnel from
the Department of Homeland Security to target illicit networks'
trafficking in people, drugs, illegal weapons, money, and the violence
associated with these illegal activities. That support has allowed us
to bridge the gap and hire the additional agents to support the
Southwest Border, as well as field additional technology and
communications capabilities that Congress so generously provided.
Secretary Gates and Secretary Napolitano agreed to equally fund this
National Guard support and submitted two reprogramming requests to
Congress to that end. Congress did not approve the reprogramming
requests; therefore, the Department of Defense has been funding the
full cost of this National Guard support.
Beyond these measures, in recent months we have taken additional
steps to bring greater unity to our enforcement efforts, expand
coordination with other agencies, and improve response times. In
February, we announced the Arizona Joint Field Command (JFC)--an
organizational realignment that brings together Border Patrol, Air and
Marine, and Field Operations under a unified command structure to
integrate CBP's border security, commercial enforcement, and trade
facilitation missions to more effectively meet the unique challenges
faced in the Arizona area of operations. We also are improving
coordination with military forces on the Southwest border. In
partnership with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and with
support from the Department of Defense, DHS is standing up the new
Border Intelligence Fusion Section (BIFS) in the El Paso Intelligence
Center, which will integrate and synthesize all available Southwest
border inteligence from Federal, State, local, and Tribal partners to
create a common inteligence picture to support border enforcement
activities on the Southwest border. By disseminating real-time
operational inteligence to our law enforcement partners in the region,
BFIS will streamline and enhance coordinated Federal, State, local, and
Tribal operations along the border. Additionally, we are continuing to
work with Mexico to develop an interoperable, cross-border
communications network that will improve our ability to coordinate law
enforcement and public safety issues.
Moreover, CBP has increased partnerships with Federal, State,
local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies, as well as with the public
and private sectors, as coordination and cooperation among all entities
that have a stake in our mission has been, and continues to be,
paramount. CBP is working closely with Federal, State, local, Tribal,
and international partners to increase inteligence and information
sharing. A Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED) cell has
been established at the Air and Marine Operations Centers (AMOC) in
Riverside, CA and Grand Forks, ND to enable essential information to be
provided to law enforcement across the Nation--increasing understanding
of evolving threats and providing the foundation for law enforcement
entities to exercise targeted enforcement in the areas of greatest
risk. This inteligence-driven approach prioritizes emerging threats,
vulnerabilities, and risks--greatly enhancing our border security
efforts.
An example of our collaborative efforts along the Southwest border
is the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT) in Arizona. ACTT
is a collaborative enforcement effort, established in September 2009,
that leverages the capabilities and resources of more than 60 Federal,
State, local, and Tribal agencies in Arizona and the Government of
Mexico to combat individuals and criminal organizations that pose a
threat to communities on both sides of the border. Through ACTT, we
work with our Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement
partners to increase collaboration; enhance inteligence and information
sharing; and develop coordinated operational plans that strategically
leverage the unique missions, capabilities, and jurisdictions of each
participating agency. Since its inception, ACTT has resulted in the
seizure of more than 1.6 million pounds of marijuana, 3,800 pounds of
cocaine, and 1,000 pounds of methamphetamine; the seizure of more than
$13 million in undeclared U.S. currency and 268 weapons; nearly 14,000
aliens denied entry to the United States at Arizona ports of entry due
to criminal background or other disqualifying factors; and
approximately 270,000 apprehensions between ports of entry.
While there is still work to be done, every key measure shows we
are making significant progress along the Southwest border. Border
Patrol apprehensions--an indicator of illegal immigration--have
decreased 36 percent in the past 2 years, and are less than a third of
what they were at their peak. We have matched these decreases in
apprehensions with increases in seizures of cash, drugs, and weapons.
Additionally, in fiscal year 2010, CBP seized $147 million in currency
(inbound and outbound) at and between the ports of entry (POEs), a 34%
increase from the previous fiscal year. CBP also seized 4.1 million
pounds of narcotics, including 870,000 pounds seized at POEs, 2.4
million pounds seized between POEs, and 831,000 pounds seized by Air
and Marine Interdiction Agents. These numbers demonstrate the
effectiveness of our layered approach to security. Violent crime in
border communities has remained flat or fallen in the past decade, and
some of the safest communities in America are at the border. In fact,
violent crimes in Southwest border counties overall have dropped by
more than 30 percent and are currently among the lowest in the Nation
per capita, even as drug-related violence has significantly increased
in Mexico.
Nonetheless, CBP still faces significant challenges. We remain
concerned about the drug-cartel violence taking place in Mexico and
continue to guard against spillover effects into the United States. We
will continue to assess and support the investments in the manpower,
technology, and resources that have proven so effective over the past 2
years in order to keep our borders secure and the communities along it
safe.
technology and border security
The Border Patrol utilizes technology for detection and
surveillance between ports of entry, enabling CBP to maximize its
effectiveness in responding to and disrupting illicit activity. In
other words, technology enhances situational awareness of the amount
and types of illegal activity at the border, enabling agents to spend
more time responding to incursions and less time detecting them.
Along the Southwest border, the primary technology system has been
the Remote Video Surveillance System (RVSS), a tower with a pair of day
and night cameras, which are monitored by personnel in a given area.
There are currently 250 of these systems deployed along the Southwest
border. More recently, CBP has added other systems, including Mobile
Surveillance Systems (MSSs), which are truck-mounted infrared cameras
and radars displaying sensor information on an integrated display
within the cab of the truck, and are considered one of the most
technologically advanced ground-based systems. There are currently 38
MSSs deployed along the Southwest border. In addition, there are more
than 130 aircraft (planes and helicopters) and 4 UASs deployed to the
Southwest border. Among the aircraft deployed to the border are
specialized, twin engine surveillance aircraft outfitted with a variety
of sensors. Two additional Multi-role Enforcement Aircraft are
scheduled to be delivered in May. These aircraft will provide robust
capabilities for surveillance and interdiction support over both the
land border and the maritime approaches. To increase effectiveness and
enhance situational awareness, these various aviation resources are
tied together by information sharing tools.
sbinet re-assessment
The Secure Border Initiative-network (SBInet) program, as conceived
in 2005, was intended to cover the entire Southwest border with a
highly integrated set of fixed sensor towers. Since its inception,
however, SBInet experienced repeated technical problems, cost overruns
and schedule delays which raised serious questions about the system's
ability to meet the needs for technology along the border. Given these
issues, in 2009, Secretary Napolitano asked CBP for an analysis of the
SBInet program. Based on this analysis, Secretary Napolitano froze
funding for SBInet beyond the on-going, initial deployments of Block 1
and ordered a Department-wide reassessment of the SBInet program that
incorporated an independent, quantitative, science-based Analysis of
Alternatives to determine if SBInet was the most efficient, effective,
and economical way to meet our Nation's border security needs with
respect to technology. The assessment focused on two fundamental
questions: Whether or not the SBInet system was technically viable; and
if SBInet was viable, whether it was cost-effective relative to other
lower-cost technologies and systems which could provide needed
surveillance capabilities.
The issue of viability was evaluated within the context of the
initial SBInet configuration, known as SBInet Block 1, which has been
completed in two areas of the Arizona border--Tucson-1 (TUS-1) and AJO-
1. Although it is too early to quantify the effectiveness of the SBInet
Block 1 technology, the qualitative assessments from the Border Patrol
suggest that select elements of the technology such as sensor towers,
integrated together to observe localized areas, enhanced operational
capabilities in some parts of the border. In the case of TUS-1, the
Border Patrol experienced improved situational awareness and increased
apprehensions of illegal entrants when they first started using the
system despite no apparent increase in illegal traffic. Over time, the
Border Patrol observed a decrease in activity, and consequently,
realized a fewer number of apprehensions. It appears that the use of
the TUS-1 system, combined with increased personnel and tactical
infrastructure, contributed to decreasing the flow of illegal entrants
and increasing the likelihood of apprehension.
To assess the cost-effectiveness of SBInet, DHS conducted an
Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). In the AoA, DHS quantified relative
effectiveness and relative costs of various technology solutions, and
compared these measures for each option. The results of the AoA showed
that the selection of technology for a given area of the border is
highly dependent on the nature of that area (e.g., terrain, population
density). Therefore, the SBInet concept of a ``one size fits all''
solution is not appropriate across the entire border. In fact, the AoA
suggested that the optimal technology deployment strategy would involve
a mix of technologies tailored to each area of the border and based on
the operational judgment of the experienced Border Patrol agents
deployed in that area.
new technology deployment plan
After completion of the AoA, CBP used the results to develop a
detailed technology deployment plan for different border regions across
Arizona based on current and anticipated operational activity.
Accordingly, the new plan incorporates both the quantitative analysis
of science and engineering experts and the real-world operational
assessment of agents on the ground and in the air.
The new border security technology plan will utilize existing,
proven technology tailored to the distinct terrain and population
density of each border region, including commercially available MSSs,
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, thermal imaging devices, and tower-based
RVSSs. Where appropriate, this technology plan will also include
elements of the former SBInet program that have proven successful, such
as stationary radar and infrared and optical sensor towers.
This new technology plan will provide better coverage of the
border, a more effective balance between cost and capability tailored
to each area of the border, faster deployment of technology, more
continuous and extensive surveillance of the Southwest border, and
better linkage between operations and technology. Through investments
in portable technology, the new plan provides flexible capabilities
that will enable the Border Patrol to move and adapt to evolving
threats. As part of the Southwest Border supplemental, CBP is
developing new Mobile Response Teams to provide surge capabilities to
send Border Patrol into a particular area of the border. The Department
recognizes that, as we tighten the security of one area, our
adversaries will attempt to find new routes in other areas. A more
mobile and flexible response capability will allow us to move with the
changes in illegal activity.
Based on the Border Patrol's assessment of priority needs and the
Department's 2011 and 2012 budget requests, the Department intends to
initiate procurements for the Remote Video Surveillance Systems and
cameras, thermal imaging systems, Agent-Portable Surveillance Systems,
imaging sensors, Unattended Ground Sensors, and Mobile Video
Surveillance Systems in fiscal year 2011, with deliveries scheduled
between 2011 and 2012. The integrated fixed towers will follow starting
with procurements in early fiscal year 2012.
The Department does not intend to use the existing Boeing contract
for procurement of any of the technology systems included in the new
Southwest border technology plan. Going forward, the Department will
conduct full and open competition for all elements of the new
technology plan.
budgeting for the new arizona technology plan
The budget for the Arizona technology investment plan will be
managed by CBP as part of the existing Border Security Fencing,
Infrastructure, and Technology (BSFIT) account. The budget line item is
called ``alternative border technology,'' and comprises the projects
identified in the Arizona technology plan (e.g., Integrated Fixed
Towers, Remote Video Surveillance Systems, Agent Portable Surveillance
Systems).
The original fiscal year 2011 President's budget request for BSFIT
technology was largely centered on the former SBInet plan. Recently,
the Department provided to Congress a report outlining the results of
the AoA, the resulting Arizona Technology Plan, and the termination of
further SBInet investment. CBP recommended to Congress a revised fiscal
year 2011 BSFIT spend plan that would re-allocate $185 million for
procuring the proposed technology systems covering all of Arizona,
except for the Integrated Fixed Towers. The fiscal year 2012
President's budget request will allow for the deployment of Integrated
Fixed Towers to Nogales, Douglas, and Casa Grande Stations, and these
new resources combined with the fiscal year 2011 funding will allow CBP
to fully complete three out of five border areas in Arizona.
next steps for technology deployment
The Department is in the process of conducting the same type of
analysis along the entire Southwest border as was conducted on the
Arizona border. The next three focus sectors are El Paso, San Diego,
and Rio Grande Valley. The initial Analysis of Alternatives for these
three sectors is complete, and the Border Patrol operational assessment
is currently underway.
Following these three high-priority sectors, the Department will
complete the same process for the remaining sectors along the Southwest
border. This will result in an optimum technology deployment plan for
the entire Southwest border.
future northern border technology deployments
Over the past 2 years, we have made critical security improvements
along the Northern border--investing in additional law enforcement,
technology, and infrastructure. Currently, we have more than 2,200
Border Patrol agents on the Northern border--a 700 percent increase
since 9/11--and nearly 3,800 CBP Officers managing the flow of people
and goods across ports of entry and crossings. With Recovery Act funds,
we are in the process of modernizing more than 35 land ports of entry
along the Northern border to meet our security and operational needs.
We have also deployed new technology along the Northern border,
including thermal camera systems, Mobile Surveillance Systems, and
Remote Video Surveillance System and recently completed the first long-
range CBP Predator-B unmanned aircraft patrol that extends the range of
our approved airspace along the Northern border by nearly 900 miles.
We have also expanded our strong partnerships with Federal, State,
local, and Tribal agencies, as well as the Canadian government, in
protecting our communities, borders and critical infrastructure from
terrorism and transnational crime. CBP is working closely with the
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the Canada Border Services
Agency (CBSA) to enhance coordination on port operations, conduct joint
operations between POEs, and jointly deploy new technology. In
conjunction with CBSA and RCMP, CBP recently announced the release of a
joint border threat assessment, which provides U.S. and Canadian
policymakers, resource planners, and other law enforcement officials
with a strategic overview of significant threats--to include drug
trafficking, illegal immigration, illicit movement of prohibited or
controlled goods, agricultural hazards, and the spread of infectious
disease--along the U.S.-Canadian border. To enhance cross-border
security and increase the legitimate flow of people, goods, and
services between the United States and Canada, last month President
Obama and Prime Minister Harper of Canada jointly announced a new bi-
lateral initiative, ``Beyond the Border: A Shared Vision for Perimeter
Security and Economic Competitiveness.'' By increasing collaboration
with Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement agencies, and by
working in concert with the Government of Canada, we can streamline our
operations and utilize our resources in the most effective and
efficient manner possible.
To continue to bolster our Northern border security efforts, our
fiscal year 2012 budget request includes $55 million to support
investments in technology systems that address security needs for the
Northern border maritime and cold weather environment, as well as
innovative technology pilots. It will also deploy proven, stand-alone
technology that provides immediate operational benefits. These
demonstrations and deployments explore how best to integrate various
border security organizations and mission operations in order to
enhance border security in this challenging environment.
In the coming year, CBP plans to continue to expand joint
operations by forming a joint command with the U.S. Coast Guard in the
Great Lakes Region. The Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC), which
includes representatives from the U.S. Coast Guard, as well as other
agencies, provides a comprehensive picture of the air environment in
the United States. The AMOC can monitor violations of U.S. airspace,
track potentially dangerous aircraft, and coordinate and direct an
operational response. Our fiscal year 2012 budget request continues to
strengthen the AMOC by fully incorporating the U.S. Coast Guard into
AMOC management and decision-making, and expanding AMOC's inteligence
capability.
conclusion
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify about the work
of U.S. Customs and Border Protection. CBP is committed to providing
our front-line agents and officers with the tools they need to
effectively achieve their primary mission of securing America's
borders. We look forward to answering any questions you may have at
this time.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, Mr. Borkowski.
The Chairwoman now recognizes Major General Salazar for his
testimony.
Major General.
STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL HUGO SALAZAR, ADJUTANT GENERAL,
ARIZONA NATIONAL GUARD
Major General Salazar. Good morning, Chairwoman Miller,
Ranking Member Cuellar, Members of the subcommittee. I have the
privilege of being appointed as the adjutant general by my
Governor, and I appear here this morning representing the 7,500
men and women in the Arizona National Guard as the adjutant
general.
As everyone knows, the Arizona National Guard has a dual
mission, State and Federal mission, but what I am here for this
morning is to discuss another mission, which is the support
that we provide our law enforcement agencies in the State of
Arizona through two different missions, as you mentioned,
Chairwoman Miller, as well as the Joint Counter Narcotics Task
Force, which I will talk about briefly.
The National Guard--program was created in 1989. It
authorizes up to 4,000 National Guard men and women to serve in
support of law enforcement agencies. In Arizona that program is
called the Joint Counter Narco Terrorism Task Force, which is a
mouthful and will be referred to as JCNTF.
Since 1989 JCNTF has continued to provide mission support
to law enforcement, providing a variety of different types of
missions, which I will discuss briefly. We currently support
over 30 law enforcement agencies and fusion centers, and we
perform primarily linguist support, investigative analyst
support, communications support, and the air and ground
reconnaissance observation mission.
In JCNTF the Governor does have the ability to conform the
State plan and prioritize the mission sets. In this case our
Governor has directed that I shift as many resources available
to form what we call the ground reconnaissance mission, and she
considers that a high-value mission, and we will continue to do
so as the resources become available.
Madam Chairwoman Miller, you mentioned Operation Jump
Start. That was the first Presidential declared operation in
2006, 2008. In that particular mission there were 6,000
National Guard personnel authorized the first year, 3,000 the
second year. Of that we received 40 percent of the workforce,
and so we had a substantial number of National Guard personnel
rotating through the State of Arizona for 2 years in support of
the mission sets that were dictated by the Department of
Homeland Security.
The primary missions that were provided there were entry
identification teams, which are personnel on a high ground,
basically, using different types of technology. There is always
some type of technology with these entry identification teams,
providing the eyes and ears for Border Patrol and communicating
what we see through those agents as we see them.
These operations are always going for 24 hours, 7 days a
week non-stop, and we rotate our soldiers and airmen through
those positions. In addition to the entry identification teams
in Operation Jump Start, there was quite a bit of maintenance
and engineering and aviation support as well.
A second mission, which is the mission that we are
currently performing, is called Operation Phalanx. This was
authorized by the President in July of last year, with
operations beginning on 1 October of last year. That mission is
scheduled to end this June with operations basically ceasing
the first or second week of June because of the funding.
The funding for Operation Phalanx was initially a program
for $135 million, and that number has been subsequently reduced
to $110 million. That authorized 1,200 National Guard personnel
for the four Southwest border States.
Again, because of the prioritization, Arizona received in
this case 46 percent of those forces, which equates to 560
personnel that we have had on the borders supporting Customs
and Border Patrol, performing primarily entry identification
teams, eyes and ears of 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, along
with a variety of different entry identification positions in
near proximity to the Arizona-Mexican border.
In addition to the entry identification teams, there is a
small handful that provide camera support as well as
inteligence analysis. But Operation Phalanx, the No. 1 priority
is entry identification team observation again.
As the adjutant general, I am extremely proud of the
support and demonstrated professionalism members of our
National Guard provide law enforcement through the enduring--
and during mission of the counter drug support program,
Operation Jump Start, and Operation Phalanx.
The unique skill sets that the military brings to bear in
support of law enforcement agencies is a force multiplier and
enhances the operational capabilities of the law enforcement
agencies we are supporting.
Rather than short-term missions like Operation Jump Start
and Operation Phalanx, an argument can be made that the
military support to law enforcement would be better served by
increasing a sustained National Guard JCNTF program. This
argument was reinforced in March 2009 and again in April 2010
by the Governor of Arizona, when she formally requested
additional aviation and an increase in JCNTF of the President
and the Secretary of Defense.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here this morning, and I
am here today to invite your questions and comments. Thank you.
[The statement of General Salazar follows:]
Prepared Statement by Major General Hugo E. Salazar
March 15, 2011
opening remarks
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, distinguished Members of
the subcommittee; I am honored to represent the men and women of the
Arizona National Guard. Since September 11, 2001, over 9,000 of our
Arizona Soldiers and Airmen have been mobilized and served, or are
currently serving in harm's way.
As you know, the National Guard has a dual mission and must be
ready and capable of performing both its State and Federal mission. In
addition to serving the Nation on a Federal deployment or mobilization,
members of the National Guard also serve the State and as such, stand
ready if called upon by the Governor when needed to assist in disaster
response to protect the lives and property of the citizens of the
State. As The Adjutant General of Arizona, I am a Federally recognized
General Officer but also have the privilege of serving as a State
employee appointed by our Governor to serve as the Director of the
Arizona Department of Emergency and Military Affairs. Today, I appear
before you in a State status representing the State of Arizona in my
capacity as The Adjutant General and Director of the Arizona Department
of Emergency and Military Affairs.
The dual mission and locality of National Guard forces located
throughout our communities make us a viable option for assisting both
our Nation and State in times of crisis. In addition to the
mobilizations already mentioned, the last 5 years have included a
response by the Arizona National Guard to two separate Presidential
declarations to enhance the efforts of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS); specifically, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
with detecting and deterring illegal activity along our border with
Mexico. I would like to take the opportunity today to address the role
of the Arizona National Guard with respect to these efforts.
national guard status--state active duty, title 32, title 10
Before discussing National Guard operations on the Southwest
Border, it is important to note the various authorities that Soldiers
and Airmen can operate under, as these directly impact mission sets,
command and control, and ultimately organization readiness. There are
three different statuses that a National Guard Service Member can
operate under while performing military duties: ``State Active Duty,''
``Title 32,'' or ``Title 10''.
Under State active duty status, the National Guard is, at all
times, a State Government entity operating under the command and
control of the Governor of Arizona and the Adjutant General. National
Guard forces under State Active Duty are paid with State funds and
perform duties authorized by the Governor and in accordance with State
law. While National Guard forces are in a State Active Duty status, the
Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S. Code, 1385), which restricts Federalized
troops from performing law enforcement duties, does not apply because
they are not under the command and control of the Federal Government.
The Posse Comitatus Act, along with its supporting legislation and
regulations, precludes Federal military forces from acting as a primary
instrument of law enforcement. It has come to symbolize the separation
of civilian affairs from military influence. Nonetheless, National
Guard troops in a State Active Duty status may participate in law
enforcement duties in accordance with the applicable provisions of
State law and as directed by the Governor of Arizona.
The U.S. Constitution also authorizes the National Guard to operate
under State control but in the service of the Federal Government--
``Title 32''. Title 32 of the U.S. Code, authorizes the use of, and
provides Federal funds to National Guard forces performing a Federal
mission while under the command and control of their respective
Governor. For example, National Guard forces were deployed by Governors
using Federal funds and in compliance with prescribed Federal
operational standards to our Nation's airports following the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Although, Federal appropriations were
used to fund National Guard forces for a Federal mission, Posse
Comitatus did not apply because National Guard forces were not under
the command and control of the Federal Government, but rather with
their respective Governors.
Title 32 funds are also provided to National Guard forces to
prepare and train Service Members for Federal missions. Title 32 U.S.
Code 502(a) authorizes Federal funding for weekend drills and annual
training assemblies to ensure unit readiness and military skill-sets.
If National Guard forces are needed on a full-time basis, section
502(f) provides for funds in addition to those requirements under
502(a). When National Guard forces are under Title 32 duty status,
section 502(f) of the same title provides for Federal funds to execute
the Federal mission. However, while troops are executing their mission
under 502(f), as a matter of fiscal policy, there is no requirement for
those troops to attend their monthly unit training assembly each month
or their 2-week annual training as provided for in section 502(a). A
review of the fiscal policy under 502(f) is needed to grant Governors
and Adjutant Generals the option of requiring Title 32 troops to attend
the monthly training requirements under 502(a) to maintain unit
readiness and not degrade military skill-sets.
A good example of requiring troops to attend drill while performing
the duties as a full-time National Guard member is the Arizona National
Guard's counter-drug program. Title 32 112 provides for the
authorization and funding for the Joint Counter Narco-Terrorism Task
Force, the Arizona National Guard's counter-drug program. Under this
section, National Guard members may be ordered to perform full-time
National Guard duty under section 502(f) of Title 32 to support the
Federally mandated counter-drug program. However, section 112(b)(2)(A)
requires National Guard members to also participate in the training
required under section 502(a). This is to ensure that the use of units
and personnel of the Arizona National Guard supporting the counter-drug
program does not degrade the training and readiness of such units and
personnel. This requirement recognizes the importance of requiring
National Guard members to continue to drill with their regularly
assigned units so that the program does not degrade the readiness of
each individual service member's assigned unit.
Finally, in addition to State Active Duty and Title 32 status,
National Guard troops can also be in a ``Title 10'' status. National
Guard troops under Title 10 U.S. Code are Federally funded and Federal
controlled for National defense purposes. The Federal Government has
the authority to ``Federalize'' National Guard forces to mobilize and
deploy troops for Federal missions. These troops are commonly known to
be in ``Title 10 duty status,'' meaning that the President and the
Federal Government solely command and control units under this title.
This approach places the Federalized National Guard forces in Title 10
status under the Command and Control of the President, the Secretary of
Defense, and a Combatant Commander. It severs the National Guard's
relationship with its State Governor.
arizona border operations--historical perspective
Geographically speaking, Arizona has a total area of just over
113,998 square miles and is the sixth-largest State in the Union. With
an estimated population of well over 6 million, Arizona is currently
ranked as the second-fastest-growing State by the U.S. Census Bureau.
Arizona shares 389 miles of international border with Mexico and has
seven major Ports of Entry. Found between Arizona's ports of entry are
a variety and combination of barriers that include pedestrian fencing,
vehicle fencing, Normandy barriers, triple strand barbed wire fencing
and cattle guard crossings located on Tohono O'odham Indian Reservation
only.
joint counter narco-terrorism task force (1989-current)
Pursuant Title 32, section 112 of the U.S. Code, the National Guard
Counter Drug program is authorized up to 4,000 National Guard members
performing drug interdiction or counterdrug activities in all 54 States
and territories. In Arizona, the State Counter Drug program is referred
to as the Joint Counter Narco-Terrorism Task Force (JCNTF). JCNTF began
operations in 1989 and is currently the third largest (behind
California and Texas) of all National Guard counterdrug programs in the
States and territories. The mission of the JCNTF is to provide military
counterdrug and drug demand reduction support to local, State, and
Federal law enforcement agencies and community-based organizations.
The JCNTF is currently staffed with 81 Army National Guard Soldiers
and 46 Air National Guard Airmen totaling 127 personnel serving on Full
Time National Guard Duty status in accordance with United States Code,
Title 32, Section 112. These Soldiers and Airmen are assigned to
National Guard units throughout the State and are authorized to perform
``Support-Only'' Counter Drug duties.
According to the President's budget request, the National Guard
Counter Drug Program is expected to remain flat for fiscal year 2012,
which, due to the rising cost of conducting business, continues to
slowly reduce the support available to Law Enforcement agencies.
Arizona's program has shrunk over the years from a program consisting
of well over 300 personnel in the early 1990s to a program of
approximately only 130 personnel today.
In fiscal year 2010, JCNTF's support to local, State, and Federal
drug law enforcement agencies resulted in a total of $7,025,300 in
property, 801 weapons, 450 vehicles and $39,634,210 in cash seized or
recovered. In addition, 1,421 lbs of cocaine, 4.3 lbs of crack, 150 lbs
of heroin, 131,221 lbs of marijuana, 726 lbs of methamphetamines and
20,044 marijuana plants were seized during operations supported by
members of the Arizona National Guard serving on JCNTF.
The JCNTF currently provides Supply Reduction support to over 30
law enforcement agencies and fusion centers such as the Metro
Intelligence Support and Technical Investigation Center throughout the
State. Currently, approved JCNTF support missions include the following
categories:
Linguist Support (2a).--Supports over 30 agencies with transcribing
pre-recorded tapes and other Spanish media in direct support of
criminal investigations.
Investigative Case and Analyst Support (2b).--Embedded analysts in
law enforcement offices throughout the State of Arizona serve to
improve information sharing between Federal, State, and local agencies;
provide deconfliction of on-going narcotics investigations; result in
better utilization of law enforcement resources; and enable supported
agencies to affect accurate strategic analysis for key Southwest border
initiatives such as Domestic Highway Enforcement.
Communication Support (2d).--Technical experts are assigned to law
enforcement agencies such as the United States Customs and Border
Protection at their stations along the international border and assist
with command and control operations. This support requires the mastery
of many complex monitoring devices, cameras, ground sensors, and voice
communication equipment and directly enhances officer safety in the
field.
Surface Reconnaissance (Nighthawk) (5a).--JCNTF's ground
reconnaissance teams support local, State, and Federal law enforcement
agencies with uniquely suited advanced optical technology such as the
FLIR RECON III system. These teams operate covertly in support of law
enforcement in field conditions and provide military-specific skills to
supported agencies' interdiction efforts against the flow of drugs that
enter the United States between Arizona's Ports of Entry. Based on
input from the Arizona Governor, the JCNTF is shifting available
resources towards its ground reconnaissance mission in order to
increase the footprint along the international border with what is a
proven military unique skill-set. Over the past 12 months, we have
added an additional Nighthawk team and will continue to shift JCNTF
resources to this mission as resources become available. Since 1
October 2010, Arizona Nighthawk teams have been instrumental in the
seizure of over 17,000 pounds of marijuana, 25 weapons, assorted
confiscated equipment, and the apprehension of over 200 smugglers and
undocumented aliens. When compared to the annual budget for the entire
JCNTF program, this mission alone provides a complete return on
investment for the operating cost of the entire 130 member task force.
Aerial Reconnaissance (5b).--JCNTF employs both the OH-58
helicopter and RC-26 fixed-wing aircraft as aerial observation assets.
Arizona National Guard OH-58 helicopters are available to support law
enforcement during both day and night operations using Forward Looking
Infrared systems, thermal imaging reconnaissance, Aviator's Night
Vision Imaging System, live video downlink and Nightsun illumination
systems. The RC-26 aircraft is employed as a regional asset for high
value counter-drug and narco-terrorism cases. This Air National Guard
fixed-wing platform provides superior stand-off capability for covert
operations. Both aerial assets provide enhanced officer safety,
improved interdiction operations in remote drug corridors, and other
forms of valuable aerial command and control capabilities.
Demand Reduction Support (6).--Drug Demand Reduction (DDR) teams
work closely with community-based organizations and support the
specific needs of local communities and school systems. All DDR efforts
are focused on identifying, supporting, educating, and mentoring/
coaching Arizona youth in collaboration with local community
organizations.
operation jump start (june 2006-july 2008)
Operation Jump Start was a Presidentially-declared, 2-year, $1.2
billion program spread across the four Southwest Border States. The
mission required 6,000 Guardsmen the first year and 3,000 the second
year. The Department of Homeland Security and Customs and Border
Protection allocated forces based on their assessed needs that resulted
with Arizona receiving 40% of the forces--the largest percentage of the
four Southwest Border States. Guard members from 51 of the 54 States
and Territories served in Arizona performing duties that included Entry
Identification Teams, camera operators, logistical support, aviation
support, and engineering support. During the first year of Operation
Jump Start, an average of 2,400 National Guard personnel conducted
operations in support of law enforcement efforts in Arizona. That
number was reduced to 1,200 personnel the second year.
operation phalanx (july 2010-current)
Operation Phalanx authorizes 1,200 Soldiers and Airmen across the
four Southwest Border States to support the Department of Homeland
Security. Arizona was authorized 560 of the 1,200 personnel for the
mission which equates to 46%. Operations began in Arizona on 1 Oct 2010
and plans are currently being finalized to end all operations in June
2011.
Like Operation Jump Start, National Guard personnel are funded
under Title 32 502(f)--in accordance with the published Department of
Defense order. The authorized missions for Operation Phalanx are: Overt
Entry Identification Teams (EIT); Remote Video Surveillance System
support; and Intelligence Analysts to support DHS. These mission sets
were selected by DHS without input from the respective State Governor
or Adjutant General and support was limited to only DHS Federal law
enforcement agencies. The key differences between Operation Jump Start
and Operation Phalanx are primarily in the total number of personnel
authorized for the missions as well as the types of approved mission
sets. Unlike Operation Jump Start where aviation and engineer support
were significant, aviation and engineer support are not authorized for
Operation Phalanx. Additionally, unlike Operation Jump Start, all
National Guard personnel on orders in Arizona during Operation Phalanx
are organic to the Arizona National Guard.
Of the 560 personnel authorized for Operation Phalanx in Arizona
the majority of the personnel are tasked to support entry
identification sites that operate on a 24-hour basis in close proximity
to the Arizona-Mexico border. Due to the increased threat and violence
along the International Border, Arizona National Guard personnel are
armed and assume a higher arming status than similar missions during
Operation Jump Start. Rules for the Use of Force have been clearly
defined, published, and provided to each member on the mission. Two of
the entry identification sites are supported with a Mobile Surveillance
System provided by Customs and Border Protection. All entry
identification team sites and camera support operations are conducted
in the Tucson Sector of Customs and Border Protection.
Funding for Operation Phalanx was initially programmed for $135
million but was reduced to $110 million. The cost of Arizona's portion
during Operation Phalanx is estimated at $34 million through 30 June
2011.
During Operation Phalanx, Arizona initiated numerous cost-saving
measures focused on a solid relationship with Davis Monthan Air Force
Base, Fort Huachuca and law enforcement partners. Use of existing
active duty installations for lodging and contracted apartments saved
an estimated $25,000 per day in lodging expenses. More importantly, it
also bolstered force protection and increased the safety for Soldiers
and Airmen. The relationship with law enforcement partners has been
exceptional with a positive partnership at all levels. Border Patrol
equipment (radios, vehicles, and thermal technology) has been entrusted
with our National Guard Soldiers and Airmen to enhance operations.
Additionally, using law enforcement provided equipment when available
has resulted in significant savings to the Arizona National Guard.
One of the limitations of having personnel on orders during
Operation Phalanx is a direct result of the type of funding source:
Title 32, Section 502(f). Personnel on 502(f) orders with Operation
Phalanx are not authorized, except under certain circumstances, to
attend monthly drills at their parent Arizona National Guard unit. This
creates a negative impact on unit readiness and especially when the
individual volunteering to serve on Operation Phalanx is in a
leadership position at his/her unit.
Throughout the duration of Operation Phalanx, the Arizona National
Guard has supported the Department of Homeland Security in a
commendable manner and the working relationship between National Guard
and Law Enforcement has been nothing short of exemplary. Currently,
Arizona National Guard plans are being finalized to end Operation
Phalanx on 30 June 2011. To complete all administrative and logistical
actions required, operations will effectively stop no later than the
second week of June.
closing remarks
As the Adjutant General of the Arizona National Guard, I am
extremely proud of the support and demonstrated professionalism members
of the National Guard have provided law enforcement agencies during
Operation Jump Start, Operation Phalanx, and the long-standing State
counter drug support program. The unique skill sets the military brings
to bear in support of law enforcement agencies act as a force
multiplier in their continued efforts to secure the international
border and deter the flow of illegal drugs and associated violence
along the border.
The Arizona National Guard's Joint Counter-Narco Terrorism Task
Force has enjoyed a positive working relationship with local, State,
and Federal law enforcement agencies for over 20 years. JCNTF soldiers
and airmen are aware of the impact they are making in the counter drug
and border security arenas, and individual readiness is enhanced from
their experience performing real-world missions on a daily basis. This
readiness makes our military units stronger and better trained for war-
time missions.
The Arizona JCNTF is currently staffed with 127 personnel serving
on Full Time National Guard Duty status. The military unique skill
sets, training, and specialized equipment that Arizona National Guard
members bring to the mission enhance the operational capabilities of
the law enforcement agencies they support. Rather than short-term
operations such as Operation Jump Start and Operation Phalanx, an
argument can be made that military support to law enforcement efforts
would be better served with an increase in funding to JCNTF. Increasing
JCNTF support would allow law enforcement elements--potentially in all
jurisdictions--to more effectively synchronize, plan, and integrate
National Guard resources and personnel, knowing they will have a
sustained and predictable level of support from JCNTF for an extended
period of time. This argument was reinforced on 11 March 2009 and 6
April 2010 when, to support the growing instability along the Arizona-
Mexico border, the Governor of Arizona formally requested additional
aviation assets and an increase in JCNTF personnel of the President and
the Secretary of Defense.
I appreciate the opportunity to be here today and invite your
questions and comments.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much, General.
At this time I recognize Mr. Stana for his testimony.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Stana. Thank you, Chairwoman Miller and Mr. Cuellar,
for the opportunity to testify at this morning's hearing.
After over 4 years and $1 billion, Secretary Napolitano in
January ended the SBInet program as originally conceived,
because it just doesn't meet cost-effectiveness and viability
standards. In its place the alternative Southwest border
technology program is one which I believe, Chairwoman Miller,
you described in your opening statement and Mr. Borkowski will
probably describe in greater detail in his question-and-answer
period.
But it consists of RBSs, MSSs, underground sensors,
handheld devices, and integrated fixed towers, which look an
awful lot like the towers, or will probably look an awful lot
like the towers, in the SBInet program.
For fiscal year 2011 DHS plans to use $185 million of funds
to begin the process of getting the non-towered technology buys
done. This would be the RBSs, MSSs, underground sensors,
handheld devices and so on. For fiscal year 2012 in the
President's budget, CBP has requested $242 million to fund the
first three of five planned integrated fixed tower buys, okay,
the first three sectors.
The fourth and fifth will be downstream. There will be a
total of five for a total cost of about $570 million. So all
told, we are planning on spending about $755 million in Arizona
alone and would essentially leave a gap of about 62 miles on
the Tohona O'odham nation, where none of this technology is
likely to be fielded.
If funding is approved, the integrated fixed tower
deployments in Arizona will likely begin in March 2013 and will
likely be finished by 2015 or maybe early 2016. Then the
process goes down the border until about 2021 or 2026,
depending on which estimate we use. The whole border will be
covered by the new technology deployment program.
Our work is on-going. We are doing the work for this
committee and this subcommittee, and I would like to just share
a few preliminary observations.
First, just to clarify things, the decision to cancel the
SBInet program pertained to the now obsolete SBInet system. It
did not pertain to the concept, or the underlying concept, of
using fixed towers with cameras, radars that feed into a COP.
That is likely still on the table, although it might not have
the same configuration that the current system has.
Second, the contract was not canceled with Boeing, but
rather its use will be limited to operation and maintenance on
TUS-1 and AJO-1 and maybe some other tactical infrastructure
needs. But the contract itself is still in place.
The second main point I would like to make is that SBInet
capabilities are still in place and working in the TUS-1 and
AJO-1 areas. Reports that we have had from the Border Patrol
indicate that it is useful. It provides continuous surveillance
and enhances the safety of the agents, because they can
recognize threats that are close by and take appropriate
action.
CBP plans to add a laser target finder, which now is
available on MSS units to the SBInet towers, which the agents
say they would find completely useful, and they would like to
have them.
The third point is the technology deployments in Arizona
were to be informed by an analysis of alternatives, or an AOA,
that analyzed the cost-effectiveness of fixed, mobile, handheld
and aerial components and a Border Patrol operational
assessment, which Mr. Borkowski mentioned, to determine the
appropriate mix of these technologies along the border.
Now, our work to date, which is not yet finished, has
raised a number of questions regarding the technology
deployment plans. First, it is not clear how DHS used the AOA
and other inputs to inform the Border Patrol's operational
assessments to determine the appropriate mix of technology
plans for Arizona.
The AOAs did not show a clear-cut cost-effective technology
alternative for any of the analysis areas, and Border Patrol
judgment was very key in the final assessment. We have not been
given access to the documents yet that would allow us to
determine whether the appropriate judgments were exercised in
arriving at the mix of technology to be fielded in the
different sectors of Arizona. That is the key shortcoming at
this point in our ability to analyze for you to what this new
technology laydown really means.
The second thing, and I would like to turn attention to the
AOA itself, and that is they did it rather quickly. It was
limited in scope. It didn't consider a combination of
technologies. It didn't consider certain technology solutions
such as MSS units.
It didn't consider a baseline solution, nor does it
consider the possibility of reducing Border Patrol assets and
what additional strain there might be or need for technology
solutions. So that is a shortfall of the AOA. Subsequent AOAs
may consider those things.
Another point I would like to make is the Army Test and
Evaluation Command was to independently assess the SBInet Block
1 capability to evaluate effectiveness and suitability. The
results were not completed for the Border Patrol's technical
analysis, the operational analysis which prescribed the laydown
of different technology components, nor was it available for
the Secretary's decision on whether to continue SBInet.
Moreover, if we are going to use a fixed tower system
similar to that deployed in SBInet, the results of the ATEC
review would be very informative for the people making these
kinds of judgments.
I can answer other questions, you know, at the appropriate
time, but in closing I would just like to say that the new
alternative Southwest border technology plan is the fourth
generation of camera tower and other technology systems that we
have seen in the last 10 to 15 years or so.
The first three have not met with complete success, I
think, to be kind. I think this time we ought to get it right
with proper planning and proper analysis and judgment
exercised. Thank you very much.
[The statement of Mr. Stana follows:]
Prepared Statement of Richard M. Stana
March 15, 2011
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-11-448T, testimony before the Subcommittee on
Border and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
Securing the Nation's borders from illegal entry of aliens,
contraband, terrorists, and weapons of mass destruction, is a long-term
challenge. In November 2005, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
launched the Secure Border Initiative network (SBInet)--a program which
was to provide the Border Patrol, within DHS's U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), with the tools to detect breaches and make agent
deployment decisions by installing surveillance systems along the
border. Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology is DHS's new plan to
deploy a mix of technology to protect the border. This testimony is
based on GAO's on-going work conducted for the House Committee on
Homeland Security and provides preliminary observations on: (1) The
status of SBInet and user views on its usefulness, and (2) the
Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan and associated costs.
GAO reviewed planning, budget, and system documents, observed
operations along the Southwest border, and interviewed DHS officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO is not making any new recommendations in this statement but has
made prior recommendations to strengthen SBInet. While DHS generally
agreed most information in this statement, it did not agree with GAO's
observations on the AOA and the potential usefulness of ATEC's
analyses. GAO continues to believe its observations are valid. DHS also
provided technical comments which were incorporated, as appropriate.
border security.--preliminary observations on the status of key
southwest border technology programs
What GAO Found
In January 2011, the Secretary of Homeland Security directed CBP to
end the SBInet program as originally conceived because it did not meet
cost-effectiveness and viability standards, and to instead focus on
developing terrain- and population-based solutions utilizing existing,
proven technology, such as camera-based surveillance systems, for each
border region. According to DHS, the Secretary's decision on SBInet was
informed by: (1) An independent analysis of alternatives (AOA) to
determine the program's cost-effectiveness; (2) a series of operational
tests and evaluations by the U.S. Army's Test and Evaluation Command
(ATEC) to determine its operational effectiveness and suitability; and
(3) an operational assessment by the Border Patrol to provide user
input. The Secretary also stated that while the Alternative (Southwest)
Border Technology plan should include elements of the former SBInet
program where appropriate, she did not intend for DHS to use the
current contract to procure any technology systems under the new plan,
but rather would solicit competitive bids. SBInet's current
surveillance capability continues to be used in Arizona. Specifically,
there are 15 sensor towers (with cameras and radar) and 10
communication towers (which transmit the sensor signals to computer
consoles for monitoring), currently deployed in the Border Patrol's
Tucson Sector. In addition, on the basis of user feedback, the Border
Patrol considers the current SBInet capability to be useful, including
providing continuous surveillance in border areas where none existed
before and enhancing agent safety when responding to potential threats.
There are certain shortcomings including coverage gaps and radar
performance limitations in adverse weather.
The Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan is to
incorporate a mix of technology, including an Integrated Fixed Tower
surveillance system similar to that used in the current SBInet
capability, beginning with high-risk areas in Arizona. But, due to a
number of reasons, the cost-effectiveness and operational effectiveness
and suitability of the Integrated Fixed Tower system is not yet clear.
First, the AOA cited a range of uncertainties, and it is not clear how
the AOA analyses and conclusions were factored into planning and budget
decisions regarding the optimal mix of technology deployments in
Arizona. Second, the ATEC independent analyses were not complete at the
time of the Secretary's decision, thus any results on SBInet's
operational effectiveness and suitability could not inform the
decisions to proceed with the Integrated Fixed Tower system. The
President's fiscal year 2012 budget request calls for $242 million to
fund three of five future deployments of the Integrated Fixed Tower
systems in Arizona, although, depending on funding, the earliest DHS
expects the deployments to begin is March 2013 with completion
anticipated by 2015 or later. Consistent with its intent to solicit
competitive bids, CBP has initiated a new acquisition cycle, asking
industry for information about the commercial availability of the
Integrated Fixed Tower system. GAO will continue to assess this issue
and report the final results later this year.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss the status of
the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) key technology programs for
the Southwest border. The Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet)
technology program was intended to provide the Office of Border Patrol
(Border Patrol) within DHS's U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
with integrated imagery and related tools and information to detect
security breaches and make agent deployment decisions by placing
surveillance systems along U.S. borders, beginning with the Southwest
border with Mexico. Since fiscal year 2006, DHS has received about $4.4
billion in appropriations for SBI, of which it has allocated about $1.5
billion for SBInet and $2.9 billion for fencing and other tactical
infrastructure along the Southwest border. In January 2010, DHS
initiated an internal assessment of the SBInet program and, as
discussed below, in January 2011 the Secretary of Homeland Security
announced her decision to end the program as originally conceived
because it did not meet cost-effectiveness and viability standards and
proceed with a new technology program to secure the Nation's land
borders.
The Department's new technology deployment plan is called
Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology. Under this plan, DHS is to
deploy a mix of technologies, including Remote Video Surveillance
Systems (RVSS),\1\ Mobile Surveillance Systems (MSS),\2\ and hand-held
equipment for use by Border Patrol agents. It also is to include a new
Integrated Fixed Tower \3\ system, similar to that currently being used
in SBInet, which is slated for deployment along the border where the
Border Patrol deems it appropriate beginning with five high-risk areas
in Arizona at an estimated cost of $570 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ An RVSS is a remotely controlled system of daylight and
infrared cameras mounted to a permanent structure. The camera images
are transmitted to and monitored and recorded at a central location.
\2\ An MSS consists of camera and radar systems mounted on a truck,
with images being transmitted to and monitored on a computer screen in
the truck's passenger compartment.
\3\ An Integrated Fixed Tower ``system'' consists of various
components and program support activities. The components include fixed
towers, sensors (cameras and radar), a data communications network,
facilities upgrades, information displays, and an information
management system. Program support activities include those performed
to design, acquire, deploy, and test the system; and manage Government
and contractor efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Border Patrol is the Federal agency with primary responsibility
for securing the border between the U.S. ports of entry.\4\ CBP has
divided geographic responsibility for Southwest border miles among nine
Border Patrol sectors. Within CBP, the Office of Technology Innovation
and Acquisition (OTIA) has been responsible for overseeing the SBInet
program. DHS reports that the Southwest border continues to be
especially vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity, including the
smuggling of humans and illegal narcotics. CBP reported spending about
$3 billion to support the Border Patrol's efforts on the Southwest
border in fiscal year 2010, and Border Patrol reported apprehending
over 445,000 illegal entries and seizing over 2.4 million pounds of
marijuana.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ A Port of Entry is an officially designated location (seaports,
airports, or land border locations) where CBP officers or employees are
assigned to accept entries of merchandise, clear passengers, collect
duties, and enforce the various provisions of CBP and related laws.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
My statement today is based on preliminary observations and
analyses from our on-going work regarding these programs and activities
for the House Committee on Homeland Security. We plan to issue a final
report on this work later this year. As requested, my testimony will
cover the following issues:
1. The status of the SBInet program and user views on the
usefulness of its technology, and;
2. The Alternative (Southwest) Border Technology plan and costs
associated with these plans.
To conduct our work, we reviewed our prior reports on the SBInet
program, analyzed documents such as system descriptions, acquisition
plans and proposals, budget requests and justifications, cost-
effectiveness and system-effectiveness and -suitability plans and
analyses. Further, we observed various types of technology operating at
command centers at the Tucson Sector and its Tucson, Ajo, and Nogales
stations. Also, we interviewed relevant DHS (Border Patrol, OTIA) and
prime contractor \5\ officials about matters such as the decision to
end the SBInet program, its implications for the future of the program,
cost-effectiveness and operational effectiveness and suitability
analyses, and budget requests. We selected the Tucson, Ajo, and Nogales
stations because they are located in high-risk areas along the Arizona
border with Mexico and also because the Border Patrol has deployed
various types of surveillance technology in these areas, including
SBInet. We did our work for this statement from December 2010 to March
2011. We are not making any new recommendations in this statement but
we have made prior recommendations to strengthen the SBInet program.
While DHS generally agreed with the approach and status described in
this statement, it did not agree with our observations on the AOA and
the potential usefulness of ATEC's analyses to inform future technology
deployment decisions. GAO continues to believe its observations are
valid and will address these issues as our study proceeds. DHS also
provided technical comments which were incorporated, as appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ On September 21, 2006, CBP awarded a prime contract to the
Boeing Company for 3 years, with 3 additional 1-year options. As the
prime contractor, Boeing is responsible for acquiring, deploying, and
sustaining selected SBInet technology and tactical infrastructure
projects, and for supply chain management for selected tactical
infrastructure projects.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
We are conducting our on-going work in accordance with generally
accepted Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions, based on our audit
objectives.
dhs has ended the sbinet program but not the contract or key technology
capability which users consider useful
After an internal assessment initiated in January 2010, the
Secretary of Homeland Security announced in January 2011 that she had
directed CBP to end the SBInet program as originally conceived.
According to DHS, the Secretary's decision was informed by an
independent analysis of cost-effectiveness, a series of operational
tests and evaluations, and Border Patrol input. The prime contractor is
to continue limited performance under the SBInet contract using a 1-
year option for SBInet operations and maintenance services in Arizona
beginning on April 1, 2011, with a possible 6-month extension. Further,
according to CBP and the contractor, following a March 2010 decision by
the Secretary halting further deployment of SBInet beyond the Tucson
and Ajo Border Patrol stations, no additional SBInet deployments are
expected.
In addition, the Secretary's decision to end the SBInet program
limited Block 1 deployments to the Tucson and Ajo stations in the
Tucson Sector, but did not affect the current SBInet Block 1
capability, which was developed based on updated requirements from the
Border Patrol. The Block 1 capability consists of 15 sensor towers
(with day/night cameras and radar) and 10 communication towers, which
transmit surveillance signals to the Common Operating Pictures (COP) at
station command centers. This capability remains deployed and
operational in Arizona, as part of the Border Patrol Tucson Sector's
overall technology portfolio. According to contractor and Border Patrol
officials, there were several original SBInet concepts that were not
included in the Block 1 capability due to early design/cost trade-offs
and Border Patrol agent feedback that they did not need them to perform
their mission. Also, certain elements proved technically difficult and
costly to include in the Block 1 capability. For example, the concepts
to integrate transmissions from RVSS and MSS units into the COP,
transmitting COP images into agents' laptops in their vehicles and
tracking Border Patrol agent deployments on the geographic display were
not included.
OTIA and Border Patrol Consider Current SBInet Capability Useful
OTIA and Border Patrol officials told us that the SBInet program's
Block 1 capability has been useful since being deployed in February
2010 at the Tucson station and August 2010 at the Ajo station. For
example, a shift commander at the Tucson station described the
capability as considerably better than the technology that was
available at the sector prior to the SBInet deployment. Further,
according to COP operators in Tucson, the current SBInet sensor package
is responsive to key mission requirements by giving them the capability
to achieve persistent wide-area surveillance and situational awareness.
Officials at Border Patrol headquarters stated that the Block 1
capability gave them a capability they did not have before. These
officials also stated that, most importantly, the Block 1 capability
helped them achieve persistent surveillance and situational awareness
to enable an appropriate response to border intrusions and choose the
location of interdiction, which they described as a tactical advantage.
They also noted that the height of the towers allows for additional
surveillance into terrain and brush thereby allowing the Border Patrol
to shift personnel to gap areas where surveillance does not exist.
Other examples of system usefulness offered by Border Patrol
officials included a centralized point of data integration (through the
COP), increased probability of arrest upon detection (by controlling
the point of interdiction by means of camera and radar), improved agent
safety when responding to potential threats, verification of whether a
ground-sensor indicated a threat or not, efficiency and effectiveness
in directing agent responses, and a tiered deployment of technology.
For example, at the Ajo Station, a Border Patrol official explained
that tiered deployment included mobile technology units that are
positioned at the border line, and Block 1 sensor towers that are
deployed off the line where they can monitor intruders who might have
eluded interdiction at the border.
The Secretary's January 2011 announcement also stated that the
SBInet capability had generated some advances in technology that had
improved Border Patrol agents' ability to detect, identify, track,
deter, and respond to threats along the border. It further stated that
the new border technology deployment plan would also include, where
deemed appropriate by the Border Patrol, elements of the now-ended
SBInet program that have proven successful.
On the basis of limited data, the operational availability of
deployed SBInet components has been consistent with the relevant
requirement that expects SBInet to be operationally available 85
percent of the time. According to prime contractor operations and
maintenance statistics for a 1-week period in January 2011, SBInet in
the Tucson and Ajo Stations was operational over 96 percent of the
time. According to the contractor's logistics manager who oversees the
operation and maintenance of SBInet, since the deployment is relatively
recent, a full year's worth of data would be needed to make conclusive
determinations about long-term operational reliability and identify
areas of persistent problems. The times that SBInet was not available
were due primarily to camera malfunctions and power failures.
According to Border Patrol and prime contractor officials, the
SBInet Block 1 capability is receiving new features from the contractor
in response to on-going user input and feedback. These features include
adding an ``eye-safe'' laser target illuminator (the eye-safe feature
minimizes the potential for injury to a person exposed to the laser),
adding a ``standby'' mode to the radar (wherein scanning is suspended
until needed), and integrating the next-generation unattended ground
sensors \6\ into the COP. However, this applies only to new sensors
intended for Block 1--the Border Patrol has not selected a vendor for
next-generation sensors for elsewhere along the border and outside of
SBInet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Unattended ground sensors are sensors buried in the ground and
are intended to detect motion and transmit a signal to a central
monitoring location.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The usefulness of SBInet's Block 1 capability notwithstanding, OTIA
and Border Patrol officials told us that it has certain shortcomings.
These shortcomings include not having the mobility to respond to shifts
in risk, facing terrain coverage (line-of-sight) gaps, some of which
are mitigated through other technologies, and performing poorly in
adverse weather. Further, according to OTIA, the SBInet capability as
configured by the prime contractor is a proprietary and not an open
architecture. Thus, it is unable to incorporate, for example, next-
generation radar and cameras without significant integration work and
cost.
In addition, the SBInet capability has been costly to deploy and
maintain. Specifically, the total task-order cost for the Block 1
deployment in Arizona was about $164 million. The operations and
maintenance costs for the deployment are estimated to be up to about
$1.5 million per month, or about $18 million per year.
alternative (southwest) border technology is slated for deployment, but
cost- and operational effectiveness and suitability of the integrated
fixed tower system are not yet clear
DHS is implementing a new approach for acquiring and deploying
border security technology called ``Alternative (Southwest) Border
Technology'' to replace the SBInet program. As part of this approach
DHS is to deploy a mix of technologies, including RVSS, MSS, and hand-
held equipment for use by Border Patrol agents. It also is to include a
new Integrated Fixed Tower system that is slated for deployment along
the border where the Border Patrol deems it appropriate, beginning with
five high-risk areas in Arizona at an estimated cost of $570 million.
While other elements of the plan may be deployed sooner, the deployment
schedule for the Integrated Fixed Towers envisioned by OTIA and the
Border Patrol is planned to begin in 2013, depending on funding
availability. This plan suggests that OTIA and the Border Patrol have
determined that the Integrated Fixed Tower system is a cost-effective
solution in certain locations. However, due to the questions we have
about how the Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) \7\ analyses and
conclusions were factored into planning and budget decisions, the basis
for DHS's technology deployment plan is not yet clear. Further, the
results of independent analyses were not complete at the time of the
Secretary's decision to end the SBInet program, thus any results on
SBInet's operational effectiveness could not inform the decisions to
proceed with a possibly similar Integrated Fixed Tower system.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ The AOA process is a key first step in the acquisition process
intended to assess the operational effectiveness, costs and risks of
alternative system solutions for addressing a validated mission need.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
DHS Implementing Broader Border-Security Technology Approach to Include
Deploying a New Integrated Fixed Tower System
According to the Border Patrol, its operational assessment for
Arizona calls for deploying Integrated Fixed Tower systems to five
high-threat areas in the State, beginning with the Nogales, Douglas,
and Casa Grande Stations as part of this approach. These deployments
will include 52 sensor towers, which is less than the 91 sensor towers
envisioned under the original SBInet deployment plan. Border Patrol
officials explained that they reviewed the contractor's original
analysis of where to put the towers and determined that other
solutions, such as RVSSs and MSSs, were more appropriate due to terrain
and other factors such as population density.
According to OTIA and Border Patrol officials, depending on the
availability of funding, the deployments of the Integrated Fixed Tower
system component of the Arizona technology plan are expected to begin
around March 2013 and be completed by the end of 2015 (or possibly
early 2016), with other sector deployments sequentially following the
Arizona sector. OTIA estimates that the entire Integrated Fixed Tower
system acquisition for Arizona would cost about $570 million, including
funding for design and development, equipment procurement, production
and deployment, systems engineering and program management, and a
National operations center. In this regard, the President's fiscal year
2012 DHS budget request for BSFIT calls for $242 million to fund the
first three Integrated Fixed Tower system deployments for Arizona,
which include 36 sensor towers.
Border Patrol officials told us that the existing SBInet capability
and the requested Integrated Fixed Tower systems are intended to form
the ``baseline or backbone'' of its evolving technology portfolio,
where appropriate in high-risk areas in Arizona, with some exceptions.
For example, in the urban areas of the Douglas and Naco Stations, RVSS
units would likely be considered the backbone because they are better
suited for populated areas where SBInet's radar capability is not as
effective. A Border Patrol official said that Integrated Fixed Tower
systems could be an important technology component in additional areas
along the Southwest border, but that the agency had not yet made those
determinations, pending the outcome of forthcoming operational
assessments.
DHS Has Initiated Actions to Acquire an Integrated Fixed Tower System
Capability
In one of its first actions following the Secretary of Homeland
Security's announcement to end SBInet, DHS issued a Request for
Information (RFI) in January 2011 to industry regarding the commercial
availability of surveillance systems based on the Integrated Fixed
Tower system concept, consistent with its stated intent to acquire
future border technologies in its new plan through full and open
competitions. OTIA and Border Patrol officials explained that the RFI
would engender competition and better options for the Government, in
terms of finding out about state-of-the-art industry capabilities and
obtaining feedback on requirements to help refine them. However, they
expect similar benefits in terms of capability, performance, and cost
that such competition would yield, as compared to the SBInet Block 1
capability. For example, OTIA and Border Patrol officials acknowledged
that the surveillance system sought by the RFI is essentially the same
as the one deployed in Block 1 in terms of expected capability and
performance in meeting operational and effectiveness requirements.
In February 2011, DHS conducted an ``Industry Day'' to provide
potential vendors with a better understanding of Border Patrol's
technology needs on the Southwest border and collect information about
potential capabilities. During the session, DHS provided information on
potential procurements for Integrated Fixed Tower systems and a range
of other surveillance technology, such as RVSS and unattended ground
sensors.
Following its information-collection activities, should DHS decide
to move forward with requests for proposal for various types of
technology, including the Integrated Fixed Tower system, these actions
should be timed in such a way as to make maximum use of the results
from the cost-effectiveness analyses discussed below. While the initial
deployment actions will be in Arizona, it is envisioned that the
contracts could be used to deploy technology anywhere on the Southwest
border. However, to accomplish this, DHS will need to ensure that the
requirements specified in the request for proposal are sufficient for
deployment not just in Arizona but throughout the border.
Use of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis for the Integrated Fixed Tower
System Raises Questions
According to OTIA and Border Patrol officials, the Secretary's
decision on the future of SBInet and the Integrated Fixed Tower system
was informed by an AOA that analyzed the cost-effectiveness of four
options-mobile (e.g., MSS), fixed (Integrated Fixed Towers), agent
(e.g., hand-held equipment), and aviation (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles).
On the basis of our review of available information about the AOA to
date, there are several areas that raise questions about how the AOA
results were used to inform Border Patrol judgments about moving
forward with technology deployments, including the Integrated Fixed
Tower system. As we continue our work for the committee, we plan to
examine each of the following areas in detail to obtain additional
insights into DHS's decision making regarding the cost-effectiveness of
a range of border technology options. Specifically,
It is not clear how DHS used the AOA results to determine
the appropriate technology plans for Arizona. For instance, the
AOA identified uncertainties in costs and effectiveness of the
four technology alternatives in each of the four geographic
analysis areas, meaning that there was no clear-cut cost-
effective technology alternative for any of the analysis areas.
Yet, the AOA observed that a fixed tower alternative may
represent the most effective choice only in certain
circumstances.
Because of the need to complete the first phase of the AOA
in 6 weeks, the AOA was limited in its scope. For instance, the
AOA did not consider the combination of technology approaches
in the same geographic area and did not consider technology
solutions, such as RVSS units. Urban areas were outside the
scope of the AOA. Hence, it is unclear how DHS made decisions
for proposed technology deployments in such areas. Further, the
first AOA did not examine as an alternative the use of only
existing Border Patrol equipment and agents without the
addition of any new technology approaches. The AOA should have
assessed the technology approaches based on the incremental
effectiveness provided above the baseline technology assets in
the geographic areas evaluated. According to study officials,
the omission of a baseline alternative was corrected in the
second AOA and did not change the conclusions of the first AOA.
A more robust AOA could result in conclusions that differ
not just in the Border Patrol sectors yet to be evaluated in
future AOAs, but also in the Tucson and Yuma sectors considered
in the first AOA. While the primary purpose of the second phase
of the AOA was to expand the analysis to three additional
Border Patrol sectors (San Diego, El Paso, and Rio Grande
Valley), being able to conduct the analysis over several months
allowed the study team more time to consider additional
measures of effectiveness and technology options. DHS plans to
conduct another AOA that would cover the remainder of the
Southwest border. According to study officials, while the
potential for different results existed, the results from the
second AOA did not significantly affect the findings from the
first AOA.
Further, we have questions about how the AOA analyses and
conclusions were factored into planning and budget decisions regarding
the optimal mix of technology deployments in Arizona. Specifically,
according to OTIA and Border Patrol officials, the AOA was used to
develop the Arizona technology deployment plan and related procurement
plans and to provide cost data to be used for the Border Patrol's
operational assessment and the fiscal year 2012 budget request for
Integrated Fixed Tower systems. However, because AOA results were
somewhat inconclusive, it is not yet clear to us the basis for
including three of the four alternatives in the manner prescribed in
the budget request (the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle alternative was not).
For a program of this importance and cost, the process used to assess
and select technology needs to be transparent. The uncertainties noted
above raise questions about the decisions that informed the budget
formulation process. We have not yet examined the Border Patrol's
operational assessment to determine how the results of the AOA were
considered in developing technology deployment planning in Arizona and,
in turn, the fiscal year 2012 budget request.
Independent Evaluation of Test Results to Determine Operational
Effectiveness and Suitability Not Yet Completed
The Army Test and Evaluation Command (ATEC) was to independently
test SBInet's Block 1 capability and evaluate the results to determine
its operational effectiveness and suitability (i.e., the extent to
which the system fits it its operational environment and is useful to
Border Patrol to meet the agency's mission). Because the Integrated
Fixed Tower system could be similar to the sensor towers and COP used
in SBInet Block 1, the ATEC could inform DHS's decision about moving
forward with technology deployments. However, the testing and
evaluation was not complete at the time DHS reached its decision
regarding the future of SBInet or requested fiscal year 2012 funding to
deploy the new Integrated Fixed Tower systems, as discussed earlier. An
initial briefing on the emerging results from the testing was provided
to DHS on March 2, 2011, with a final report due sometime in April
2011.
As our work proceeds, we will further address the questions raised
about the AOA process, the test and evaluation results, and CBP's
proposed new acquisition strategy. We will also continue to assess the
status of the SBInet program in light of the Secretary's decision and
the actions emanating from this decision.
Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you may have.
Mrs. Miller. I thank all the witnesses for their testimony
today.
I would just make an observation at the beginning of my
questioning here. I will turn to myself, recognize myself to
begin my 5 minutes of questioning. You know, this committee was
formed, actually, after 9/11, and we have several pictures on
the walls here of the Trade towers. We all remember that
horrific day on 9/11.
Subsequently, the Congress formed this committee in a very
challenging environment, trying to bring together under an
umbrella various portions of different agencies, et cetera, et
cetera. As we think about homeland security, a big part of
that, of course, would be securing our borders.
I only mention that is why I always go back to the Northern
border, because we have similar challenges, but unique
challenges on both borders. On the Northern border, without
quantifying it, certainly it is known that we have four to five
times as many hits on the TIDEs list along the Northern border
as what we have on the Southern border--so, as I say, a
different type of challenge.
But along the Southern border, it seems to me that the
complexion and the dynamics of what is happening on the
Southern border is changing and has changed rather
dramatically, particularly in the last several years, where
perhaps before it was overwhelmingly illegal immigrants coming
here for economic opportunity, et cetera. Now you have the
spillover of the drug cartels.
To the extent that--I don't need to be alarmist here, but
certainly it does seem to be almost a war zone situation in
some areas. I would look for clarification on that.
But I mentioned the beginning of this committee, because I
am not sure at what point the Department of Homeland Security
and this Congress thinks about intermingling some of the
budgetary requests from the Department of Defense and the
Department of Homeland Security.
One of the things that we tried to do after 9/11 was share
resources in the Operation and Integration Center, and I would
like to get to that at some point, that we are going to be
opening next week as a great example of that of all the various
agencies, all the stakeholders sharing information, analyzing
data, intel, et cetera, and getting it out into the hands of
our stakeholders.
But, you know, we think about border security in theater,
in Afghanistan, et cetera, and then we have our own border on
the Southern border that we are having all of these challenges
with. So I have a question for Major General Salazar.
I, and I think most people, were very, very enthusiastic
about the President when he requested the National Guard along
the border. I have been there. I have seen some of the things
the Guard is doing, from putting up some of the fence to
various things that has been happening with our men and women
and our Guardsmen along the border there.
I am disappointed that the funding is going to run out in
June. That is one of the things, I think, this Congress and
this committee will be looking to think about what we really
need to do with the National Guard. I am just wondering if you
could flesh out a bit for us, first of all, the construct of
the Guardsmen and women who are there.
I am not quite clear where they are all from, how they
cycle through, the 2 weeks, 4 weeks, and various States that
they are coming from. I ask that question in the context do you
think it would behoove the Federal Government to mission the
Guard in the various States to have border security as a part
of their mission, where all States would participate in this
type of thing?
A follow on to that question, one of the things, certainly
in theater, that happens--I will tell you a bullet doesn't know
if you are inactive duty or you are a Guardsmen. That is so,
along our border as well, as you seek to be a force multiplier,
I think, for the proud men and women in Customs and Border
Patrol.
Do you think that the Customs and Border Patrol is armed
properly? Do you think, for instance, a Stryker brigade would
be advantageous along the Southern border and really utilizing
various types of armaments that we do use in theater to secure
that border against these drug cartels?
I know it is sort of a long question, but I am just trying
to understand how the Guard is being utilized, how we can most
effectively utilize the guard as we go forward, and perhaps
other units of the military.
Major General Salazar. Chairwoman Miller, I will try to get
all aspects of your answers there. Just as a point of order, we
have not been--we, being the Arizona National Guard have not
been building any fences since Operation Jump Start, which
ended in 2008.
Like all these missions that we do in the National Guard,
we do not dictate the mission sets that we provide. The
Department of Homeland Security has always prioritized the
mission sets. For Operation Phalanx and the counter drug
program, the JCNTF program, neither of those operations have
any kind of engineer or fence work that is part of their
mission sets.
As for the question about how we organize, in Operation
Phalanx, for example, we received what is called 502(f) Title
32 funding. Every person that is on the program is on the
program for an extended period. They are on active duty orders
serving the National Guard.
The one disadvantage with the type of funding we received
for Operation Phalanx, which was the same type of funding we
received for Operation Jump Start, is that those individuals
that are serving on Operation Phalanx are not allowed to go to
drill and perform the weekend drills. So when we have soldiers
or airmen that volunteer for this mission, they no longer
participate in their unit of assignment, which is a readiness
issue.
The difference between that and JCNTF, because of the type
of Title 32 Section 112 funding, does authorize those soldiers
and airmen to continue participating in their unit, maintaining
their readiness, both individually as well as the unit. So from
that standpoint, there is a significant difference.
Having experienced Operation Jump Start, which is where we
had units rotate through from all over the country, as opposed
to Operation Phalanx, which is the current mission, where it is
all being supported by Arizona National Guard personnel,
financially it is an extremely more expensive operation to be
rotating units through as opposed to the current mission of
just using Arizona National Guard organic units.
Given the size and scope of the mission set, yes, we are
pretty comfortable being able to field up to 500, 600 Arizona
National Guard personnel on the border.
Mrs. Miller. My time has expired, but just so I understand.
So in Arizona the National Guard that is in Arizona, for
instance, is only the Arizona National Guard. There are no
other State National Guardsmen or women there.
Major General Salazar. Yes, ma'am. That is true. The 560
personnel that are currently serving on Operation Phalanx are
all full-time National Guard, and they are all Arizona National
Guardsmen.
Mrs. Miller. Do you know if that is true in Texas as well?
It would be just the Texas National Guard?
Major General Salazar. For Operation Phalanx, I do know
that Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, California are all supporting
that mission with organic National Guardsmen in that specific
State. Operation Jump Start was significantly larger, and we
were the one State that required outside support from other
States.
Mrs. Miller. Well, I appreciate that answer, because it
does seem to me that other States should be assisting with
this, because if you take that amount--I don't know what
percentage that is--out of the Guards in the respective States,
but that would definitely be a readiness issue for that
particular State, where you have got sort of the big burden of
the border protection, where you are protecting the border for
the entire country.
That may be something that this committee and this Congress
wants to look at. So I appreciate that.
I am over my time. We think we will have a second round of
questions, but at this time I turn to my Ranking Member, Mr.
Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
In August 2010 we passed H.R. 6080, the 2010 emergency
border security supplemental appropriation, which provided $600
million to strengthen border security and to help reduce
violence along the Southwest border. This funding allowed for
the hiring of 1,000 new Border Patrol agents to be assigned to
the Southwest border.
In order for us to provide our legislative oversight and to
ensure that we appropriately are allocating resources to the
areas that need the most assistance, I have asked CBP where
these new border patrol agents would be assigned.
I am going to ask if they can put the chart up on the
screen.
Members, I am going to give you a handout in a few minutes
also that shows what is up there on the screen. Tucson, which
is already the largest CBP sector with 3,361 agents in fiscal
year 2010, will receive 500 new agents. El Paso, which is the
second largest sector with 2,718 pages, will receive 187 new
agents, which is the second largest allocation. The San Diego
area, which is the third largest sector with 2,588 agents and
the Rio Grande Valley, which is the fourth largest with 2,418,
each will receive 150 new agents.
The remaining sectors, Laredo, Del Rio, El Centro, Yuma,
Marfa, the fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth sector,
respectively, in the number of agents assigned, none of these
sectors will receive any of the new Border Patrols out of this
plus-up.
I have also asked for statistics regarding the number of
agents already assigned to each sector prior to this plus-up
and the number of apprehensions that each sector made in the
fiscal year 2010.
Mr. Fisher, you and I have talked, and when I asked you for
the factors to be used, you used apprehensions. Then later,
when I asked you to explain why those numbers were allocated,
you came up with some other vague threat, risk, other, without
being able to define those.
A few minutes ago Mr. Borkowski, you also said that CBP
uses apprehensions to measure how effective they have been with
the enforcement of border apprehensions.
In fact, Mr. Fisher, when I asked you to provide me the
factors, the only thing you gave me--Members--was
apprehensions. You all should get a copy of the handouts of
this one to see what each sector gets in apprehensions.
CBP provided the statistics for the creation of the graph
that I have displayed overhead, and I put this graph, which
lists all the Border Patrol sectors along the Southwest border,
shows the ratio as to how many undocumented persons were
apprehended per Border Patrol agent assigned to sectors in
fiscal year 2010.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Cuellar. I have listed the sectors in order, starting
with the highest apprehension rates to the lowest. For example,
Tucson, Members, is the one at the left side, which is the
apprehensions is the one in the blue. The red is the additional
numbers that each sector is supposed to be getting. Those are
done by 10s. Then the lowest is El Paso, which has the lowest
amount of apprehensions, but gets the second largest number of
officers.
So I have listed the sectors in order, starting with the
highest apprehension rates to the lowest. For example, Tucson,
as I mentioned, has a ratio of 62.3 apprehensions per Border
Patrol agent. El Paso has the lowest ratio of 4.4 apprehensions
per Border Patrol in fiscal year 2010. El Centro, which has the
second highest apprehension rate at 26.8, yet this sector is
not receiving any new Border Patrol agents.
Chief Fisher, I want to give you the benefit of the doubt.
I don't think these allocations are political, but to an
outside observer, it might sure look that way. It would look as
the amount allocated for El Centro was moved to El Paso. In
fact, if you look at the red, I think that red should be where
the second largest is. Maybe you made a mistake on that, but it
looks like that allocation is wrong.
I don't know--I don't see Ms. Sanchez here, but I am sure
that her or Dan Lungren from California and any other folks
would question as to why the second-highest apprehension rate
per agent is not receiving any agents, while the lowest sector
that has the lowest rate of apprehension is getting the second
allocation of new agents of 187 under the supplemental. Can you
explain that?
Mr. Fisher. Congressman, I would be happy to. As a matter
of fact, I want to make sure that I am clear, because I am not
explaining myself clearly as it relates to staffing.
It is true that apprehensions are a factor that we take
into consideration for a number of things, not the least of
which is staffing levels. It is inaccurate to suggest that it
is the only thing that we take into consideration, for
instance, the supplemental that you had mentioned.
Of those 1,000 Border Patrol agents for the supplemental,
500 of those agents will be going to the Tucson area. That is
permanent full-time equivalents. The other 500 will be
dispersed among four corridors along the Southwest border to
make up what is called the mobile response teams.
Now, although they are assigned to a sector, because we
have to assign them to those areas, the corridor concept in
those four locations are consistent with which we have
identified areas along the Southwest border to be able to
manage risk both in terms of the threat, which is the intent
and capability of all those seeking to do harm into this
country, and to identify threat along the Southern border in
particular in terms of volume of activity.
We also take into consideration vulnerability, which makes
up that threat picture. So it is true that----
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Fisher, I am sorry, but let me interrupt.
Mr. Fisher. Please.
Mr. Cuellar. Apprehension, No. 1. Give me in a concrete
manner what the second factor is.
Mr. Fisher. The second factor would be effectiveness, which
by our definition is the proportion of apprehensions subsequent
to a detected entry. In other words, of those individuals that
we detect coming between the ports of entry, we want to
proportionately increase the amount of arrests that we make
along the Southwest border. That is one additional----
Mr. Cuellar. Third factor?
Mr. Fisher. The third factor would be inteligence in terms
of what is happening along our border both respect to any
potential violence within that corridor, transnational criminal
organizations operating in that area, and any associated--to
give you a third and a fourth, any associated crimes related to
smuggling or other crimes within the border communities that
are taking place along the Southwest border.
Mr. Cuellar. The last time, I think--I don't know if it was
Mr. Duncan or somebody had asked you the question about the
definition, operational definition, and you were using
something different from what we had put in 2006. Part of that
definition talks about enforcing the border, that is, you know,
the intrusions into the United States, which means
apprehensions.
So are you coming up with other factors beyond that
definition that we put in statute in 2006?
Mr. Fisher. No, sir, not at all. Matter of fact, I believe
Congressman Duncan was referring to the 2006 Fence Act, whereby
operational control was defined by the prevention of all
illegal activity. I am just suggesting the manner in which we
do that is not inconsistent. It is a little bit more
sophisticated in terms of staffing models.
Mr. Cuellar. Well, I don't know what you mean by more
sophisticated, but given the benefit of doubt so we will
understand what you mean, again, apprehensions--and I just want
to have a sense, but I met with you, I have talked to your
staff, and we still have no idea what you are talking about,
with all due respect.
Apprehensions is one. Mr. Borkowski said that is the main
measure to look at stopping people about coming into the United
States What is the other one--threat?
Mr. Fisher. Well, Congressman, first, I would like to
clarify it wasn't my intent to be either condescending or in
using the word ``sophistication'' to allude to the fact that
this particular committee wouldn't understand it. I was
suggesting in terms of how we do our staffing models, we have
matured the way that we look at it, and we look at things
just----
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Fisher, let me ask you, why don't you put
that in writing and send that to us in a very succinct way?
Because this is the second time I have sat down with you, and I
still don't understand. I have been doing this probably not as
long as you, but I think I have a working understanding. Could
you provide that to the committee?
If I can just ask one question, the emergency supplemental
was signed into law in August 2010. The funds were available
immediately. How many Border Patrol agents have you hired under
the emergency funding? Because in talking to the homeland
appropriators, they said that you still haven't given them
answer as to how many you have hired. I understand it takes,
what, 18 months. Where are you exactly on hiring under that
emergency process?
Mr. Fisher. Congressman, I will have to get back
specifically for the question----
Mr. Cuellar. Whoa, whoa, whoa. You don't understand how
many people--you as the chief don't understand how many people
you have hired at this time?
Mr. Fisher. No, I can--we have over 20,000 Border Patrol
agents right now.
Mr. Cuellar. No, no, no. Under the supplemental bill that
we passed last August in 2010, you were supposed to hire 1,000,
because there was an emergency. The funds were available
immediately. How many Border Patrol agents have you hired under
the emergency funding?
Mr. Fisher. I don't know specifically under that specific
appropriations, but we have hired----
Mr. Cuellar. Mr. Chief Fisher, you are saying that as the
chief of the Border Patrol, an emergency bill that got passed
in August 2010, you are telling me that you don't know how many
people you have hired under that emergency? It didn't happen
last month. It happened August 2010.
Mr. Fisher. Under the specific appropriations, because
those numbers would be different depending upon when we started
hiring in October, both in terms of backfilling the attrition
positions and onwards to our goal this fiscal year of hiring
21,370, I don't know specifically against the emergency
appropriations how much of that total that we have done thus
far, but I would be able to follow up and get you that answer,
sir.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, first question, I still don't understand
you. Second question, I still don't understand your question.
Madam Chairwoman, I know you have been very indulgent.
But I would like to ask you to give us that information
also as to how many people under the emergency bill that we
passed in August 2010, 1,000 people, and they were supposed to
be so the National Guard can come in. The National Guard will
be stepping out, and Border Patrol is supposed to be coming in.
I am surprised that you don't know how many people you have
hired under that, how many have been interviewed, background
investigations, how many have been sent to the BPP Academy. I
would ask you to please submit that in writing to the
committee.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. At this time I would also look for unanimous
consent to have Mr. Green join our questioning of the witnesses
today. Without objection, that will be so ordered.
I would just comment to Mr. Green you have been to several
of our committee hearings, and we would invite--I think there
is a vacancy. We would certainly invite you to join us, because
you are a very, very active participant and very interested in
these issues, and we are appreciative of that.
Mr. Green. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I gratefully accept
your comments. Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. At this time the Chairwoman would recognize
Mr. McCaul of Texas.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Chief Fisher, I would also be interested in your answer to
Ranking Member Cuellar's question, if you could forward that to
my office as well that answer.
Mr. Fisher. I will, sir.
Mr. McCaul. I appreciate that.
Mr. Borkowski, it is good to see you again. I want to
allude back to, I guess, it was about a year ago. You and I and
Congressman Cuellar were down in Laredo on the Mexican border
and ended up at midnight, like something out of a movie, with
this equipment from the Department of Defense. I think you and
I and Congressman Cuellar were very impressed with this
technology.
Can you give me an update on the deployment of this
technology and what your plans are to use it?
Mr. Borkowski. Yes, thank you. I also recall that session.
In fact, if you were to look at the new Arizona technology
plan in total, it includes elements called agent portable
surveillance systems, APSSs, which are tripod-mounted, long-
range, infrared sensors. Those are among the things that we
looked at there.
So we are in fact in this plan intending to procure those
as part of the Arizona deployment. We are in fact procuring
them through an Army vehicle. So, yes, we did take advantage of
what we learned from that. We did incorporate it into the
operational assessment the Border Patrol did, and we do intend
to procure those systems.
Mr. McCaul. I am very glad to hear that. I look forward to
its deployment across the entire Southwest border, including my
State of Texas. We have 1,200 miles with Mexico.
Mr. Stana, you mentioned that 755 million in Arizona alone
for technology. What does that leave for the rest of the
Southwest border?
Mr. Stana. Well, I guess that depends on what the Congress
appropriates----
Mr. McCaul. Yes.
Mr. Stana [continuing]. But that is what this expenditure
is envisioned in just Arizona alone.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. You know, again, Congressman Cuellar
alluded to the politics of the situation. It just seems like
Arizona is getting all the attention, and Texas is not. I just
want to impress upon you that--and I understand the
apprehensions are very high in the Tucson sector, but we do
have a large, you know, 1,200 miles that we share. I think, you
know, our State should be given that attention as well.
Mr. Stana, you mentioned that this would not be completed,
the technology piece on the border would not be completed until
2021 or as long as 2026. Is that correct?
Mr. Stana. That is our understanding. They are starting
with Arizona, and they will go to neighboring sectors, but by
the time this sequential process is finished with the AOAs and
the judgments made by the Border Patrol and the fielding of the
technology, it would be 2021 to 2026 before the last Southwest
border sector would be--then to the Northern border.
Mr. McCaul. Okay. That is a long time, and you are talking
10 to 15 years. It took us a decade to put a man on the moon,
and yet we are talking about camera surveillance, you know,
that kind of stuff, that technology that, quite honestly, the
Department of Defense has already manufactured through R&D at
taxpayer expense.
I don't understand why this takes so long. You have a
crisis going on down there. Everyone knows it. We know how
dangerous it is in Mexico, and we know how dangerous it is at
the border. Why can't we ramp up this process? Why can't we
expedite it? What can we in the Congress do to send that
message to the administration that we need to do this faster?
Mr. Borkowski.
Mr. Borkowski. Yes, sir. Certainly, we could buy more, and
we could put them wherever we need to. In fact, the plan, one
of the differences in the new plan is that it actually has the
flexibility to adapt as the threat evolves. So it is very much
focused on Arizona, because, as you noted, that is where we
have over 200,000 apprehensions compared to the rest of the
border.
We do expect things to evolve, and we actually have funding
in the budget in the President's request for what we call
emergent requirements. Among other things, that is to deal with
what we see as a result of tightening up Arizona.
In addition, the systems we are buying are systems that the
military has provided. There are a whole set of these things.
The integrated fixed towers--there are such systems already
existing by the military. So we can buy them. The question is:
Where do we put the first ones and why do we put them there?
However, we will that allow us to respond. If there is a
movement of traffic somewhere else that requires us to deploy
somewhere else, we can shift our plan to adapt to that----
Mr. McCaul. I appreciate that. I hope we can do it more
expeditiously. If I have to go home and tell my constituents it
is not going to be until 2026 that this border is secure, they
are not going to accept that message. I think they are right in
not accepting that.
Last, on the question of the National Guard, General, your
deployment will end in June is my understanding. What is the
plan?
Major General Salazar. Congressman, we are not those that
create the plans. Basically, unless there is additional
funding, the mission is going to end. This is the Operation
Phalanx mission. The counter drug program, that is still
continuing. We have about 140 personnel there continuing doing
that mission, which we have been doing for over 20 years in
support of law enforcement.
Mr. McCaul. So it is over. The National Guard will be
removed from the border as of June.
Major General Salazar. For Operation Phalanx, yes, sir.
Mr. McCaul. I was always concerned that, you know, your
hands are tied. You are in a support role, not operational down
there to begin with, and I understand Posse Comitatus and the
concerns there, but, you know, they weren't doing what they are
trained to do, essentially.
I talked to my Governor about it. He said, you know,
eventually, the Guard's backing is a bit of a Band-Aid. We need
a permanent force down there. We talk about technology. You
need the response piece as well, the manpower to respond.
Mr. Borkowski, what are we going to do about the transition
as the Guard deploys out of the region?
Mr. Borkowski. Well, I think I would offer that to the
Chief. I could give you my perspective, but the chief is the
operational expert there. Would that be something that----
Mr. McCaul. Chief, do you have a response?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, Congressman. As a matter fact, along Texas
and across the other three States as well, the majority of the
National Guard are providing what is called entry
identification teams. It is a lookout post, observation post,
where National Guardsmen and women are put up on a high point
with optics, daytime/nighttime capabilities, to inform the
Border Patrol agents where the activity is.
Those missions and that requirement will remain, and Border
Patrol agents will be doing those, if those EIT sites are still
required.
Mr. McCaul. Well, it seems like there is going to be a big
gap missing as the Guard pulls out, and I think I would like to
see a very thoughtful plan as to how to replace them.
So with that, I yield back, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman
from Michigan, Mr. Clarke.
Mr. Clarke. Thank you, Chairwoman Miller.
You know, even though the Southern border has a lot more
documented illegal crossings than the Northern border, Chairman
Miller, properly cited, the Northern border faces unique
challenges.
I have got two questions. One is essentially how do we
increase Northern border control? Secondly, what are the
tailored mix of technologies, the likely existing technologies
that we could deploy to better secure that border?
But just before I go and pose the questions, I just want to
note that the Detroit border sector contains 10 percent of the
Nation's border miles, approximately 863 of those miles, yet
only four of them are under operational control, at least by
CBP.
Ranking Member Cuellar raised the issue that for me still
begs the question on what is operational control, especially as
a new Member, since Congress 2006 stated that it means
preventing all unlawful entries, but yet in the National border
patrol strategy, I believe at least in 2004, indicated that the
objective was to stop those penetrations in the high-priority
areas.
But even still, the GAO back in 2010 indicated that when it
interviewed certain border sector offices, including Detroit,
which is the area that I represent, those offices indicated
that additional resources were needed to better secure the
border.
This question is to anybody with CBP: What are the steps
that you are currently taking to address those identified
needs, either through more effective partnerships or through
additional resources? Then I have got a question regarding
technology after that.
Mr. Fisher. Congressman, I will take that answer to that
question, if that is okay. You are correct. As a matter of
fact, when I proudly served 2 years in Detroit, a huge
difference in terms of the threat and vulnerability that I was
experienced on the Southern border. That 860 miles that you
talk about is water border, so it provides a very unique
challenge to how we approach that particular threat.
What is interesting also is I don't believe that in order
to minimize the risk in an area like the Detroit or State of
Michigan, that we would want to overwhelm with Border Patrol
agents alone. Certainly, the infrastructure and technology or
the infrastructure and fence, for instance, wouldn't be
applicable.
Then so the question is to what extent do we need
technology, if in fact the threat as defined was the same on
the Southern border, which I don't believe it is. For instance,
there is, I don't think, enough camera poles that we would be
able to put a long even more so than the 860 miles, if you take
into consideration all the inlets, all the rivers and those
crossing points.
So the approach for Detroit in particular, and certainly
along the Northern border, and as we start our sustainment
strategy along the Southern border in the out years, is really
going to be predicated on three things. It is going to be
information and inteligence, which is really going to be a key
indicator on what that threat is and how we can minimize the
risk.
The second thing is going to be the integration. As you
aptly noted, operational integration, our ability to work with
a joint terrorism task force, the border enforcement security
task forces for ICE, for instance, working with our State and
local partners as force multipliers, that has in our history
and will continue in the future to be a key indicator on our
ability to not only know what is coming at us, but certainly to
build the operational plans as a law enforcement force, not
just the Border Patrol, but within the community against those
particular threats.
Mr. Clarke. Thank you, Chief.
Just to pick up on that, and this is for anybody in CBP,
the chief outlined the differences with the Northern border.
Much of the border is right in the middle of a body of water.
Other areas are in the middle of forest.
What are the tailored mix of technologies that you would
use to better secure that area, just using your term of art,
Assistant Commissioner Borkowski? But this is to anyone that
could address that.
Mr. Borkowski. Well, let me start, but I would also like to
suggest we should hear from General Kostelnik, because his air
and marine is a big part of the technology solution here.
But there are a number of technologies along rivers and
such. We do have radars, we do have cameras, and we have
started to deploy some of those. Within wooded areas that is a
little trickier, because radars and cameras don't help you. But
there are a number of sensors that we can use to detect
activity.
So for us the focus is on recognizing whether or not a
vulnerability is being exploited so we can respond to that
knowledge. It is not dealing with hundreds of thousands of
people trying to come across the border, which is a significant
difference. It is identifying where there is an issue so that
the resources we have can be properly focused on it. That is
how we would use technology, and we are investigating those
kinds of systems.
With that, I think it is probably important for General
Kostelnik to talk about how we use the air and marine assets.
General Kostelnik. Well, I could just add that over the
last 5 years, while there has been a lot of visible focus on
the Southwest border, in the long lead areas that are very
difficult to acquire high-end equipment, aviation in particular
and maritime to a lesser extent, the agency actually has been
investing heavily in the Northern border.
Over the last 6 years we stood up five new air branches,
Detroit obviously one of the big ones up there, but air
branches all across the Northern border to lay in aircraft and
aviation support to support our officers and agents on the
ground.
In the maritime, this committee has actually been part of
the plus-up in the maritime environment, and we have added
significant number of marine branches not only in the Great
Lakes, but in other areas across the Northern tier and
accordingly, because we have actually a faster lead time on
acquisitions, have fielded the very capable new generation of
SAFE boats.
You probably have seen these. Both we and the U.S. Coast
Guard operate these things. They are sealed aluminum hull
vessels. We operate the 33- and 38-foot boats on the Great
Lakes. These are boats that are capable of 60 miles on the
water, three manned armed crew. We are carrying not only Border
Patrol agents on these boats as crew, but also office of field
operation customs type doing port inspections.
Of course, with the UAVs it is a very more problematic
approach with the issues we have with COAs and problems with
civilian aviation traffic, but we have made a tremendous amount
of progress in the UAV program in the Northern tier as well,
having fully deployed an operational two aircraft in North
Dakota and having recently this past year, since we last
briefed the committee, acquired additional COA airspace.
We can now fly from Minnesota all the way across the
Northern tier to the west to Spokane, Washington, and, of
course, 2 years ago developed and do have the COAs for
operational work on the eastern side of the Great Lakes, having
flown and deployed to Fort Drum, partnered with the 10th
Mountain Ranger Division there, partnered with the Air National
Guard in Syracuse.
We have flown the St. Lawrence Seaway. We have flown Lake
Ontario. While we do not have dedicated UAVs or COAs active for
the Great Lakes proper, including Detroit, we do have as a
matter of record, you know, emergency COAs available to us from
the FAA such that should there be a National high-end
contingency event anywhere along the Northern border, we could
get the necessary COAs from the FAA for a National security
event in 1 day.
We do have the asset not only from the Northern tier asset,
but the ability to distribute a system to fly and operate
aircraft from any of our four operational launch and recovery
sites.
So while we continue to explore with new technology like
the OIC we are going to open next week and other types of
activities that A.C. Borkowski has talked about in terms of the
land investment, integrating these airborne assets, which are
very difficult to acquire, take time to get, a lot of that
infrastructure is in place.
Efforts like the OIC, through much quicker development
opportunities through OIT software and computers, is starting
to tie those aircraft, those boats not only to the COPs with
the command and control infrastructures, but also through
developments that we are applying in the Southwest border that
equally apply to bringing the agents into that connectivity.
Today we can see live streaming video from our Predators to
handheld devices that would fit in your hand--probably your
BlackBerry, you know, in the next few weeks. I mean, that is
how far technology has come.
So I would ask you just take a fair and balanced view that
we have not lost our focus on the Northern border. We have been
working it behind the scenes for a long period of time, and
much of the technological investments in particular that we
invest in the Southwest border we can quickly apply to the
Northern border, and that is always part of the plan.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
The Chairwoman at this time recognizes Mr. Quayle, of
Arizona.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Chief Fisher, I have a question. It is starting in June we
are going to have a drawdown of the 1,200 National Guard troops
from the Southwest border in Arizona. That is a little over
530. At the same time we recently canceled SBInet, so a lot of
the technological force multipliers that would have been in
place--hopefully, would have been in place--are now gone, and
they won't be in place till probably 2013, I think, at the
earliest, and maybe not until 2015 in Arizona, which is my home
State.
My only concern is what is the Border Patrol going to do to
kind of bridge that gap between the drawdown of the National
Guard troops and the implementation of the force multiplier via
technology, which we don't know when that is going to be
actually implemented?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, Congressman. I can tell you from the time
that we stood up the National Guard deployments in Arizona and
across the Southwest border, but in particular Arizona, to the
drawdown, which will be complete by June time period, we have
increased both in terms of permanent Border Patrol agents and
detailed Border Patrol agents into Arizona.
So the capacity that we have built in the State of Arizona
in terms of Border Patrol agents capability and for technology
is at or exceeding what the Guard has right now in terms of
those resources. So I don't necessarily think there is going to
be a huge gap.
In other words those entry identification teams will not go
unguarded, if you will. Border Patrol agents, if the operation
still requires it, will be manning those. It just won't be the
National Guard.
Mr. Quayle. Okay. Thank you.
Now, Mr. Stana, I saw in your testimony you discussed how
DHS has ended the SBInet program, but not its contracts or key
technology capabilities. What has DHS actually ended?
Mr. Stana. Well, what it has ended is the concept of moving
forward with the SBInet capability, which is a camera day and
night, radar on top of a tower that feeds into a COP that has
the possibility of certain other inputs as the primary vehicle
for using technology to be the force multiplier you mentioned.
It now is going with a more tailored approach sector by
sector, almost station within sector by station, to see which
kinds of technology is most appropriate for a certain area, a
certain terrain, a certain threat.
What our problem is to date is that we haven't seen the
documents--we hope to see them soon--but we haven't seen the
documents yet that translate their view of what the
alternatives are and the cost effectiveness of these
alternatives into operational assessments and budget and
planning. That is a black hole for us at this time, so I cannot
say today that I totally agree with the laydown that they have
prescribed.
Mr. Quayle. So you can't even say if there are significant
differences between the new technology laydown plan and what--
--
Mr. Stana. Well, there are differences in the mix of
technologies used, but I think one of the messages I bring to
you today is that if you think that ending SBInet means you
won't be seeing towers on the Southwest border with cameras and
radars on top of them that feeds into a COP somewhere in the
station house, no, that is probably going to be in the next
generation. The question is: Is that going to be the main
technology fielding?
Mr. Quayle. So do you think it is going to be the same
technology, just different contractor? Or and figure out----
Mr. Stana. Well, it could be. I mean, there are only so
many ways you can configure camera, radar on top of a tower
with a COP. I know that, for example, the contractor that
currently does SBInet is likely to compete again or throw its
hat in the ring again. Whether it is selected again or not is
hard to say at this time.
But, yes, I mean, there are only so many of these things
out there and fielded, and there are only so many to select
from. In fact, if you look at the RFI, the request for
information that CBP is putting out. It looks very similar to
the kinds of documents we saw when SBInet was beginning in
terms of the desired capabilities.
Mr. Quayle. Okay. Thank you.
Major General Salazar, first of all, thank you for your
service and what you do. I was just wondering have you seen or
do you have any concerns yourself from the drawdown that will
occur starting in June? First of all, what is the effect then
from your standpoint of being able to secure various areas,
especially in the Tucson sector, with the deployment of the
National Guard troops? Do you see any negative effect on the
drawdown coming up starting in June?
Major General Salazar. Congressman, I am not in the
position to be able to answer the question on what would be the
effect. That is really more of a question for law enforcement
and for one or the other members of the panel here.
As far as the impact on the National Guard, you know, it
boils down to a job, to be honest. Many individuals that, you
know, volunteered to perform this mission are going to be out
of a job. So those individuals will either go back to their
civilian employment, if they had it, or they will be continuing
looking for a job or deploying or doing whatever is needed to
put food on the table for their families.
The impact on the National Guard from a readiness
standpoint, there is none, because we still had the requirement
for the Federal and State mission. It is more of a personal
impact on those individuals that no longer will have
employment, because they are off orders in June.
Mr. Quayle. Thank you very much.
Mrs. Miller. The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman
from New York, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
In recent years Congress has provided very significant
increases for Border Patrol agents, border fencing and
technology projects such as SBInet. The GAO report is quite
critical that Customs and Border Protection received over $1
billion for the SBInet program with little to show for it due
to technology and integration problems.
Mr. Borkowski, I appreciate very much your emphasis on the
distinction between the Southwest border and that of the
Northern border. As part of the Northern border project of
SBInet, remote video surveillance systems were deployed along
the Niagara River in the Buffalo sector and in the Detroit
sector.
This technology was chosen because of the unique
operational area, which consists of coastal maritime Lake Erie,
riverine Niagara River, Irving, Buffalo, and rural
environments. How effective has this particular system been in
securing the Northern border against illegal border activity?
Mr. Borkowski. The feedback, Congressman, that we have
gotten from the Border Patrol, which would be the one who would
make the assessment, has been very positive. We now have
technology in areas where it has not in the past existed.
Now, there have in the past been RVSS, remote video
surveillance systems, and those are day and night cameras that
are remotely controlled on towers. There have been some of
those in Buffalo. This filled in some gaps in Buffalo.
We are also using, frankly, these are systems. We have
about 250 of these deployed along the Southwest border. Of
course, the environment--I was raised in Buffalo and
Rochester--it gets much colder there. We had problems with
lenses freezing over, those kinds of things.
So part of this was to take a look at how well they
actually held up in that environment. They do seem to hold up
very well. They went up actually very quickly, very cost
effectively, and the feedback that we got back from the Border
Patrol has been very positive in what that has allowed them to
do in terms of seeing what is going on.
I would like to make one point of clarification, if I
could. When we talk about SBInet and how much money has gone to
SBInet, we have had trouble with the definition of the term
``SBInet.'' I don't call what we put up in Buffalo or Detroit
SBInet. The system we were putting in Arizona is SBInet, and we
have been kind of loose with terminology in the past.
It is important, because the $1.5 billion that the GAO
talks about includes almost a billion for the SBInet in
Arizona. But the rest of it is for things like the Northern
border--mobile surveillance systems, tactical communications.
Just to be clear, we try to make a distinction among those
technologies.
Mr. Higgins. Okay.
And for both Mr. Borkowski and Chief Fisher, the GAO report
found that only 69 miles of the 4,000-mile border is currently
considered under effective control. Thirty-eight of those
effective control miles are in the Buffalo sector.
Mr. Fisher, in your testimony you emphasized the importance
of strong partnerships with the Federal, State, local, and
Tribal agencies, as well as the Canadian government, to protect
the border and expand inteligence and information sharing.
I recently visited the Border Enhancement Security Task
Force, BEST, in Buffalo, where they discussed their role in
securing the border. Their partnerships have allowed them to
make 284 arrests, 95 indictments, 44 convictions, and the
seizure of approximately 7,200 pounds of controlled substances,
2.3 million in U.S. currency, 49 firearms, 38 vehicles, since
the inception of the program in March 2008.
However, the recent GAO report referenced that numerous
partners have cited challenges relative to undermining the full
capability of the program. Can you help us understand that a
little bit better?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, Congressman, I will try. I mean, one of
the things when you look at operational control as defined and
applied and you look at the Northern border, I mean, one of the
deficits the Northern border chiefs had over the years is
because predominantly the definitions were predicated on
technology, they were predicated on fence.
We realized that in the Northern border in particular, a
lot of the personnel enhancements and the fence not only were
not going to go proportionately to the Northern border, but in
a lot of those areas it didn't make sense to put fence along
the Northern border. So what we asked the chiefs to do at the
time is take into consideration the relationships and the
operational coordination that you are doing.
What we are doing right now is trying to figure out: How do
we quantify that in terms of whether it is op con miles or a
greater sense of situational awareness? Because at the end of
the day, what we really want to know about is that information
and inteligence. Of those individuals that are intending to
come into this country on the Northern border, do they have the
capability? By what means would they try to come across the
Northern border, both in terms of location and techniques,
tactics, and procedures?
That is a little bit different model than taking a look at
the senior fence applications or camera systems across a broad
desert area. So we are trying to get better modeling to try to
put a little bit of fidelity in terms of how we assess that--
again, and assess the risk not necessarily in terms of linear
border miles, because it is a different operational environment
with a different threat as defined.
Mr. Higgins. I think my time has expired. Thank you, Madam
Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the gentleman from South
Carolina, Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Mr. McCaul asked for some answers to the questions from
Chief Fisher. If your office could make sure that--I think it
would be beneficial to everyone, but I would like to have a
copy of that as well. Thank you.
Chief Fisher, I want to say thank you for taking the
opportunity to meet with me recently as I try to understand
your on-going mission at the Southern border.
As you know, from South Carolina we are a long ways from
both the Northern and the Southern border, but it is an
interest to the folks back home when it comes to immigration
and illegal immigration and this situation with Hezbollah being
in bed with the cartel in Mexico and implications that may have
for years to come. So I know you have got quite a challenge and
continue to learn more and more at each hearing that we have.
I want to address my questions today to General Kostelnik.
I understand that UAVs are supposed to be a force
multiplier that could basically remain in the air much longer
than normal planes and require much fewer assets. The
employment of UAVs has been touted as a way to, I guess,
stimulate and expand the surveillance gaps affecting the remote
sections of the border.
However, during Secretary Napolitano's SBInet review, it
was determined that UAVs were not suitable to patrol large
swaths of border such as those along the Arizona-Mexico border.
These systems require ground control station and satellite
link, and costs have increased from $4.6 million to $10.5
million.
Can you just clarify what missions UAVs are best equipped
for and provide insight as to why UAVs were not chosen as an
alternative to SBInet?
General Kostelnik. Well, thank you, Congressman. I will be
happy to elaborate on that. In fact, I am not sure what exactly
those costs are relative to, but we actually have been
operating UAVs along the Southwest border for more than 6 years
now, first with the Border Patrol proper and then with U.S.
Customs and Border Protection.
Today we have three operational aircrafts sited at Sierra
Vista. We have one operational aircraft at NAS Corpus Christi.
We have COA airspace to fly from the State of Louisiana to the
State of California. So that is a lot of airspace to fly.
Basically, although the UAS is not a panacea, it does have
a very unique characteristic that manned aircraft just cannot
have. In fact, we operate 26 different kinds of aircraft in
homeland security. The Predators and the Guardians supply a
very unique capability. They are very small, so in many
circumstances can't be seen. That is an advantage over the
larger airplanes.
We don't carry crew, so there is man-related equipment on
the aircraft, so therefore, you can put all your payload into
sensor technologies and equipment. Because of the combination
of the technologies, we can fly these aircraft for 20 hours.
So you are in South Carolina. Not only are we concerned
with the Southwest border and the Northern border, we are also
now concerned with the littorals, which would cover the coast
of South Carolina. In fact, back in their hurricanes 3 years
ago, we actually put the UAVs in to work. We flew across your
State, the complete coastal environment, taking high imagery
synthetic aperture radar cuts of all the coastal
infrastructure.
Given the things that are going on in Japan, I mean, this
is another opportunity to highlight the uniqueness of what UAVs
can bring to bear. In that instance we now have a track record
of all the coastal environment from the isthmus of Florida all
the way to Dover, Delaware. Those were taken as a matter of
record with the Predator mission during the hurricane, a 2,300-
mile flight, a 20-hour mission.
Today, if we were to have a nuclear event like is going on
in Japan right now, I mean, the inability to fly manned
aircraft over those sites to understand what is going on, you
know, gives a unique opportunity for UAVs. If we had UAVs
deployed, the Predators over there, we could actually put the
UAV over the top of any of those reactors.
At the end of the day, you know, for 20 hours, it would
give unprecedented situational awareness--slow-motion video,
able to take high-definition radar cuts of all the physical
infrastructure, great for comparison. That would be a wonderful
capability to have for emergency response.
So not only are the Predators--we are flying nightly. We
have four operational sites. Last night we had weather at two
sites, but we did fly and extended mission in the Caribbean out
of our site at the Cape. That would be the aircraft that would
support issues in South Carolina all the way up the eastern
seaboard.
Mr. Duncan. General----
General Kostelnik. We also flew operational missions out of
Sierra Vista along the Arizona border. So not only are they on-
going force multipliers for the agents and troops on the
ground, but they are unique capabilities in unique
circumstances.
Mr. Duncan. General, I think we all appreciate the
capability of UAV, and I appreciate that you all are using
those on the Northern and the Southern border and over my State
at times, and definitely over Japan, what a tragedy.
But my understanding is that UAVs are not flying for 20
hours. The FAA is limiting those. Can you touch on that for me?
General Kostelnik. Well, there really isn't an FAA limit. I
mean, we have had this debate. There are clearly operational
issues with flight in the National airspace, but clearly with
the COAs that we have in the Northern tier, the COAs we have
all across the Southern tier and the isthmus of Florida, we
have more airspace today then we can fly.
Our constraints over the flying hours--a Predator Guardian
can fly 20 hours. That is our mission capability. But to do
that----
Mr. Duncan. How many hours are they averaging, would you
say?
General Kostelnik. Well, our missions, some of the higher
missions are 15 or 16 hours. A good many of the missions are 10
hours. Some of the training missions, depending on the
circumstances, are shorter. We are not flying to the full
potential, not because of aircraft or airspace limitations, but
because we are still building the force. We are still growing
the crews.
To fly a 20-hour mission actually takes three sets of
crews, two operational, because a crew has to fly the aircraft
when it is up and away, and a third crew to land. So you have
to launch the crew someplace, have two crews from the
distribute area, which we do, that fly it, and then have a crew
to recover.
So really, although they are unmanned, there is plenty of
manpower----
Mr. Duncan. How many people are on a crew?
General Kostelnik. Well, we fly the aircraft on most
operation missions with a two-man crew. One pilot flies the
aircraft, and one pilot operates the sensor.
Mr. Duncan. The Air Force requires 119 people per UAV,
based on the data that I was given.
General Kostelnik. Well, when you look at the----
Mr. Duncan. One hundred nineteen and two is a big
difference.
General Kostelnik. No, no, when you honestly get into it, I
mean, yes, there are more people involved if you need them or
want them, but you get more benefit from it. So the kind of
people that are involved in those, okay, so we have a control
set. It just takes two to operate the aircraft.
But taking the data takes more people. In our instance on
occasions we will have a Border Patrol agent or an office of
field ops in the control set, or we might have a lawyer with us
or other local law enforcement because of the mission. That
gives us more people involved in the mission that you can log
to that, but also more capability.
The data that comes out of our aircraft is now sent to
processing, exportation, and dissemination cells. This is
another distributed infrastructure. We have two of those, one
at the AMOC in Riverside, one at North Dakota. In that you have
your analysts.
That is another five people, full-time, that are in there
to tell the sensor operator where to look and the pilot where
to fly. They do real-time data reduction, and they are talking
to other intel specialists distributed throughout the system.
As we have stood up the new joint command in Arizona, those
people and with the warfighters are taking that information and
working on that. So when you look at it, you might have on one
of our given missions, because of all this distributed
interest, there could be 50 people involved. But, you know, if
it was unmanned aircraft feeding the same data set
infrastructure, it would be the same number.
Mr. Duncan. I would be curious to find out----
Mrs. Miller. Thank you. The Chairwoman is trying to be
lenient with the time, but we are way off our time here, and I
want to make sure everybody has an opportunity to question.
The Chairwoman would now recognize the gentlelady from
Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairwoman and the Ranking
Member.
Let me thank everyone who is here for their service.
I want to thank Ranking Member Cuellar for raising some, I
think, crucial issues that I would like to address.
First of all, I want to put on the table, Chief Fisher,
that the continuing resolution proposed has listed $500 million
in cuts to CBP's budget, and that would occur in 2011, meaning
that you have obligations, and it would occur at that time--if
you could keep that question on your mind.
If I could have Mr. Kostelnik to keep on his mind a
question on the impact of these cuts would have on ports. I
come from a city with a large port. Those are vulnerable. It is
a vulnerable area there, and I am very interested in that.
But let me just comment, and if you would include your
comments to me on this statement. I remember being able to go
to Mexico and have dinner with friends, dinner with families,
and then come back. Over the last couple of months, we have
seen teenagers leave El Paso and are shot dead. We have seen
our ICE agents attacked, one tragically losing his life.
I think we are, frankly, at the worst point that I have
ever seen, and I do not suggest the worst point I have ever
seen under this administration. I think it has been steadily
deteriorating, not with any respect for the hard work that our
men and women are doing on the border. I think it has been
challenging, whether it is on President Reagan's border,
President Bush I's border, President Bush II's border,
Clinton's border, Carter's border, or our present President.
My question, then, is as you answer the question about the
$500 million in cuts, are we ever going to get control? How
much more can our friends in Mexico do? Obviously, local
officials are killed, prosecutors are killed, law enforcement
are killed. The drug violence is an epidemic and out of
control.
So this is not a commentary on the individual work that is
going on, but it really is asking for a truthful assessment of
what is needed, how this cut will impact.
I will go to you just very quickly and thank you, Major
General Salazar, for your work. You made a good point that you
follow orders. Could I just ask you, however, would it be
helpful if this Congress decided to continue the mission of the
National Guard?
Major General Salazar. Congresswoman, you know, I am here
as the adjutant general and to basically echo the comments of
my Governor, who has been very vocal about the fact that she
believes that there should be an increased presence of National
Guard supporting law enforcement.
It has never been anything but supporting law enforcement
because of the unique skill sets that we bring. We are talking
about a lot of technology, communications, radar, sensors,
Predators. The National Guard, the military personnel, the men
and women in our Guard have those skill sets, and we can bring
that skill set to support law enforcement.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So it is not a wartime skill set. It is
you are going to be supportive of a civilian force. Is that
correct?
Major General Salazar. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So----
Major General Salazar. We use those skill sets to do the
mission that law enforcement is doing on the border.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So in the cutting, not providing funding,
States on the border like yours, I assume if I had my major
here from Texas, they might say the same thing.
Major General Salazar. Yes, ma'am. I think we will echo the
concerns of our Governors in that we need to do more to secure
the border. If that means utilizing the National Guard skill
sets to enhance the current operations of law in force, I would
agree with that.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Chief Fisher, would you answer the
question about the $500 million cut and the conditions at the
border with the drug violence?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, Congresswoman, I will. Matter fact, with
respect to the cuts, we are continuing even what we started
last year and when I became the chief and made to take a look
at contingency plans and efficiencies within the workforce. CBP
continues that effort today.
But in terms of what we are seeing in Mexico as it
relates--
Ms. Jackson Lee. What did you say about the cuts? I didn't
hear you.
Mr. Fisher. I beg your pardon. I said in terms of the cuts,
what we are doing and continue to do this year is taking a look
at efficiencies in the event that we had any cuts in our budget
in terms of discretionary funds, how we do that within the
Border Patrol in terms of----
Ms. Jackson Lee. But you would be in essence looking to cut
what you might need. You would be in essence leaving programs
out.
Mr. Fisher. Well, in some cases we may, depending upon if
they still meet our operational priorities. What it does----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have $500 million to cut out of a
budget that deals with horrific drug violence and the cartels
and the murderous activities that are going on? Do you have
that amount to cut?
Mr. Fisher. Well, what we are doing, Congresswoman, is
taking a look at all the cuts in different increments to be
able to see what the offsets are going to be. For instance, if
we identify some cuts within our operations in terms of
deployment, there is going to be an impact to that. What we do
is we minimize that impact across our borders and try to
minimize any impact that----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, then, you would be belt-tightening,
and there would be some programs that will be sacrificed.
Mr. Fisher. That is correct.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right.
Mr. Kostelnik, if you forgive me for pronunciation, but the
same question to you and tied into our ports.
General Kostelnik. We are, as you know, a force provider
for the Border Patrol. So we provide the maritime units along
the ports. Obviously, we have multiple air branches in Texas.
So 2011 was not a good year for us in terms of re-
capitalization anyway, but we do have follow-on acquisition
that is on-going for new maritime vessels that would be
unaffected by the continuing resolution and those expected
cuts.
For us it would likely manifest itself at some point into
reduction in flight hours or on the water hours, and----
Ms. Jackson Lee. So there would be an impact on homeland
security.
General Kostelnik. Depending on the level of the cuts and
timing, yes, there certainly----
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, first of all, we all believe in
belt-tightening. I think the question is whether or not
homeland security is a place to belt-tighten or be efficient.
So the question is ports across America would be impacted. You
would have to pull back on some of the resources or the
utilization of that. Is that correct?
General Kostelnik. Well, I think at some point, depending
on the level of cuts, there would have to be a reduction in
float and flight hours from air and marine.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well----
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much. Again, the Chairwoman is
trying to be lenient with the time, but I want to make sure
everyone has an opportunity to question.
At this time the Chairwoman would recognize the gentleman
from Texas, Mr. Green.
Mr. Green. Well, thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I especially
thank you for the unanimous consent request. Like you and other
Members of the committee, I believe that border security
transcends politics, and we should do what we can to work
together to make sure that we secure all of our borders.
I want to thank the persons who are here today. You are
doing a great service for our country, and it is most
appreciated. Because you do such a great service for the
country, as one American I want you to know that I am concerned
about the safety of our men and women, who work along the
border.
I am concerned about the border. Don't get me wrong. That
is of paramount importance--all borders, but also the safety of
the men and women who work along the border and as well as
those who work on the other side of the border.
You know of the incident that has occurred, and my concern
is whether or not our personnel on the other side of the
border, whether they are secure enough to work in that
environment and not be able to protect themselves with proper
armaments. Do they need to have weapons? I have an opinion, but
I would like to hear from the experts as to what we should do
to make sure that they can protect themselves.
Chief Fisher, if you would, do our agents on the other side
of the border need the ability to protect themselves? I
understand that they are guests, and they are in the host
country, but what about their safety?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, Congressman. First, thank you for your
concern, and I share your concern with any U.S. person that is
in Mexico.
But in particular the Border Patrol doesn't have that many
Border Patrol agents that are assigned in Mexico. Matter of
fact, the overwhelming majority are assigned at the embassy, so
the answer to your question would really depend on what their
function is and what they are actually doing.
So for those individuals working at the embassy and force
protection provided, we are doing everything we can in terms of
getting risk assessments and threat assessments, working with
NORTHCOM, for instance, and working with our CBP attache in
Mexico City, to constantly evaluate that and make
recommendations to us. All those will be taken into
consideration in the near term.
Mr. Green. Thank you.
Would anyone else like to respond?
Let me move to another topic. We obviously will do our
proactive prevention, and that is the best way, I think, to
help ourselves with this border protection, as opposed to
reactive apprehension.
I do want to talk to Mr. Stana--I seem to have lost--Mr.
Stana, you about a concern. Our staff--and I salute them, the
staff personnel, for what they are able to do. They literally
sift through the sands of information and find pearls of
wisdom. They have accorded me one pearl of wisdom that I would
like to share with you.
It reads that ``GAO has also noted that CBP currently does
not have the ability to detect illegal activity across most of
the Northern border.'' That is a fairly significant statement.
Will you please elaborate on what that actually means?
Mr. Stana. Yes, Mr. Green. In fact, that observation was
made in connection with the report on the Northern border
security that we just finished last fall. I know the Chairwoman
is well aware of that report.
The number of miles on the Northern border that is under
operational control is about 2 percent. That is mainly because
unlike the Southwest border, where you have maybe 19,000,
20,000 Border Patrol agents covering 1,900 miles, you have got
maybe 2,000 agents covering 4,000 miles--wide open spaces, no
tactical infrastructure, very little of the air assets, you
know, in comparison to other locations.
The radar capabilities for detecting low flying aircraft
aren't what the Border Patrol would like them to be. So there
are many risks, many vulnerabilities. This has been documented
not only in our reports, but in reports that have been done by
CBP and others.
You know, the threat is different. As has been pointed out
by other members of the panel, you can't expect that Border
Patrol or any other single organization to do it alone, or you
would be beefing up the size of the Border Patrol or any other
organization tremendously. But it is incumbent on the
organizations up there to coordinate and cooperate with the
resources that they have.
Mr. Green. I think it appropriate that someone have an
opportunity to respond. Who would like to respond?
General Kostelnik. I will respond to some of that, because
clearly the terrain and the geography is very different. While
there is a large amount of expansive space and fewer agents, it
really is a different environment.
Along a lot of it, particularly out in the western part,
there is no infrastructure on either side of the border to
really to support this kind of activity. So I think there is
some, you know, some merit in the case that there is a lot that
we don't know that is going on.
Certainly, we have a different threat base. There is a
different flow, whether it is weapons or cash or illegal
substance of some kind. So, really, I think, again built on
growing our technology and growing our capability, as we have
slowly been doing on the air piece and now we are starting to
do on both the water and the land piece, we are starting to
deal with some of these unknowns.
We worked closely with the Guard over the years to put in
ground-based radar to improve our look-up. We are slowly adding
more capability with look-down with the UAVs. We are
aggressively partnering, as we always have, with our Northern
neighbors on intel functions to target our activities where
there is need. But there are still a lot of unknowns, and those
are the kinds of things that we are going to have to track.
But behind the scenes in the areas that we think are
highest risk, we are employing our best effort in terms of
people, our best effort in terms of technology and supporting
infrastructure with aircraft or maritime. Clearly, in the area
of the Great Lakes, where there is more population, there is
more activity and therefore more risk.
I think you are seeing, you know, a concerted focus by the
vestiges of the old SBI, some of the new things that we are
doing like the OIC, what we have put specifically to boats,
what we have put in the new AW-139 helicopters. We are
increasingly going to grow those capabilities.
The world is an uncertain place. We have a broad area to
cover. Again, I mentioned that we still have the littoral. With
all of the pirating activity that is going on on the world
stage, there is not a lot of protected infrastructure on the
sides of the country--on both sides.
Our new commissioner has come and looked at that, and we
are starting to focus on thinking about how do you protect the
littoral part of the country as well. We have seen now fully
submersible submarines that can sortie out of Colombia with
more than 3,000-mile range. They can land north of where most
of our border protective infrastructure is.
So the world has become more complex, and it is a matter of
prioritization, where you put your assets and what are your
National priorities. The help, in a way, is the growth in IT
infrastructure and----
Mr. Green. My time has expired. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. Thank the gentleman.
We are going to go to a second round of questions here. I
know that those Members that are remaining have lots of other
questions as well, so we wanted to do so. I think this is just
an excellent panel that we have here today really getting to a
lot of our questions. We appreciate all of that.
I am going to go back to--well, first of all, let me talk
about the budget. For instance, it has been mentioned about the
$500 million on the CR. That is primarily the SBInet that
Secretary Napolitano has said is not necessary anymore. So that
is principally what that figure is.
But, you know, budgets really are a reflection of the
Congress reflecting the will of the American people, I think. I
think it is clear that the will of the American people is to
secure our borders. They certainly have that will. They have
the political will. I think it is for the Congress to
demonstrate the political will that the American people have,
and that is really what this hearing is trying to get at today.
So one of my earlier questions was about the potential to
co-mingle some of the budgetary issues between the Department
of Homeland Security as well as the Department of Defense.
I am going to go back to my question again, and perhaps to
Chief Fisher and to Major General Salazar as well, about the
utilization of not only the National Guard, but whether or not,
because of what is happening on the Southern border, which
seems to be a complexion that is now changing to the dynamic
that is very similar to a war zone situation with the overspill
of the drug cartels into our country, how we not only secure
our border, but to keep that kind of element out of America.
I wonder if it is something that we should be looking at as
actually using, as I say, perhaps a Stryker brigade. You know,
a Stryker brigade, my understanding, for instance, that the
Guardsmen, I think, maybe only Pennsylvania is currently
training and has a Stryker brigade, but it would be something
perhaps that this Congress should look at.
If you have a Marine Stryker brigade on the other side of
that border, I think those drug cartels are going to think
twice about coming across that. That is not, believe me, any
slap on what is happening with the Customs and Border Patrol at
all. You do a wonderful, fabulous job. But I think we need to
beef it up.
So I am thinking in those terms. I mean, we are talking
about UAVs, which is an off-the-shelf technology, has had great
impact in theater, and we are looking at other kinds of
technology.
One of the things that this committee is going to be
looking at as well is other types of, in addition to the UAVs,
the land systems, robotic land systems, again, that we have had
excellent success with in theater. The terrain in Afghanistan
certainly is rougher in most cases than what we have on the
Southern or Northern border, so if it can be utilized there,
again, the taxpayers have already paid for this fantastic
technology, and I think it has application for homeland
security as well.
So I would just throw that out in regards to a Stryker
brigade or other beefing up of military along the Southern
border to either Chief Fisher or Major General Salazar, if
either one of you would like to comment on your thoughts on
that.
Mr. Fisher. Chairwoman, thank you very much. I will go
first, and the general, if he chooses to respond as well.
We have been working with Department of Defense for the
last 20 years or so both in terms of the counter drug missions
under Title 10, Title 32, and we continue to work with the
Department of Defense, and through our primary point of entry
is NORTHCOM.
We identify to NORTHCOM by way of Joint Task Force North in
El Paso, Texas, our operational requirements on a yearly basis.
Matter of fact, we are just starting to do that on a quarterly
basis now so that we can have a lot more mobile and flexible
deployments on that. So we welcome any continued opportunity to
work with the Department of Defense under a border security
mission.
Mrs. Miller. General, again, I am not sure whether or not
Guardsmen and women have had the opportunity to train on a
Stryker brigade, but if you are familiar with the Stryker, I
mean, I think it has application for a homeland security type
of mission because of the ability for it to run on just regular
roads--and everything else. I think it just has that type of
application, but your comments on that.
Major General Salazar. Yes, ma'am. Excuse me.
I guess, just to be honest, it would have to come down to:
Do we feel that using a Stryker brigade would be a demonstrated
use of force? Is that going to have an impact? Because when you
talk about specifically capabilities of what we can provide to
law enforcement, we could provide the same type of observation
and reconnaissance with a much smaller package like the entry
identification teams that we are doing now.
A Stryker brigade, in my opinion, would probably be a
little bit too much, unless the use of force is the objective,
which I wouldn't be able to analyze or provide any kind of
input if that is really an effective use of a Stryker brigade.
Mrs. Miller. I appreciate that. I think you can see from
the questions of our committee here that there is great
consternation about the runoff--and the runout in June of the
National Guard along the border. So I am sure we are going to
be talking amongst ourselves about that.
Major General Salazar. Yes, ma'am. If we are talking fiscal
responsibility here, and so we can, in my personal opinion and
from experience in Arizona, you would get a lot more bang for
the buck using the funds to enhance entry identification team
type support as opposed to the huge cost of bringing in a
Stryker brigade.
Mrs. Miller. I appreciate that.
General Kostelnik, in regards to the UAVs, and I think you
have answered most of my questions, but I was wondering a bit
about the UAVs around the Northern border in regards to the
type of drones that you are using there, et cetera.
Is there any problem with weatherization on those drones?
It might be a simple question, but I wonder about that
sometimes. Do you have de-icing? Do you run into any particular
weather problems with the type of equipment that you are using
there?
General Kostelnik. Well, you may recall that last year--I
mean, a couple of years ago, we actually put the Predator for
the first time into the climatic lab down at Eglin Air Force
Base, first time any of the family series had ever been there.
To their credit, the Army put in a Warrior at the same time, so
we actually understand a fair amount about the aircraft.
It does not have a de-icing system. Most aircraft don't.
Most manned aircraft have anti-icing systems, but there are
many scenarios where manned aircraft have trouble in icing, so
you fly out of it. The Predator is very much the same.
We have been up now operational for, I think, 3 years in
North Dakota. There are days, clearly, in certain forecasts
when we can't fly. It is not a panacea. It is limited, but
there are the same limitations on manned aircraft. But most of
the time icing is not an issue. I mean, we can fly clearly in
winter weather. Those aircraft have flown in 28-degree weather
routinely, but they have the same limitations as manned
aircraft do.
Mrs. Miller. General, you also mentioned about the CAOs. I
would just mention to you in addition to Homeland Security, I
also sit on the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee,
and our committee has just passed out the reauthorization for
the FAA, which the House will be taking up, I think, next
week--excuse me, in 2 weeks.
But at any rate, one that we put in there is a plan to
expedite, actually, the CAOs for various agencies and try to
develop a plan quicker because of some of the problems that we
are well aware of that you are facing. Again, I understand the
agency, FAA, and their mission may be different than ours, but
we are all Americans first and foremost, and we need to be
integrating some of these areas.
I will just mention the Detroit sector in particular. At
Selfridge Air National Guard Base, we thought in 2010 that we
were going to get a ground mission for UAVs, and I don't know
where that is now. In the Detroit metropolitan area, because of
the size of that hub, they are talking about moving it--the
ground mission--somewhere else, because the FAA won't give you
the CAO on that, so if you have any comment on that.
General Kostelnik. Well, I mean, flight of the National
airspace and the COAs are really all about, you know, managing
risk. The system you fly has a lot to do with it, and that is
why we chose the Predator B. It is the safest of all of the
UAVs out there. You know, we lost our first aircraft back in
2006, but we have had really no major accidents since then. All
of our aircraft are, you know, kind of operational.
But when you get into the metro areas, where there is a lot
of commercial traffic, you know, that is where the FAA is most
concerned. They like to have more studies. They like to have
more information. They are very careful of who they authorize
to fly in the National airspace, because there is such a wide
variety of risk associated with the aircraft, a very small
handheld UAV like model airplanes all the way up to the Global
Hawk and everything, you know, kind of in-between.
But I think we have given as a matter of National security
the FAA, you know, the best model, the best platform and the
best mission requirements pool, you know to further the policy
of what aircraft should be allowed to fly. I think, quite
frankly, we have made a lot of progress.
With the brackets that we have had in upstate New York and
the experience we have had in North Dakota and the progress we
have made out west, I believe the Great Lakes, you know, is
going to come.
But we are still growing pilots. We don't have enough
pilots for the aircraft we currently have. There is clearly a
lot of significant focus going on in the Southwest border, and
we have a lot of National contingency response. So I think is
going to come, but it is still going to take some time.
As far as the ground controls, you know, it is just a
matter of getting the GCSs. While it is easier to get the
aircraft on contract, it is much more problematic to get the
ground control stations as fast as we get the aircraft.
So although we are funded for added ground control stations
as well as Predators this next year, we will get the two
Predators that this committee helped us get delivered this
calendar year, one in October and one in December, but we won't
get the GCS for another year after that. So that kind of delays
where and when we can fly things on the ground.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you.
My last question--I am giving myself a little bit of extra
time here--and I do have to mention about the Operational
Integration Center, which is at the Great Lakes branch of the
Northern border wing there. We are very excited to have that
grand opening next week.
I have had an opportunity to tour that facility several
times as it has been under construction, and just as recently
as several weeks ago. I think it is going to be a critical
component, an excellent component of a complete total force
concept along the Northern and the Southern border. Certainly
it is a pilot there, but it could be utilized at either border.
One of the things that we learned from 9/11 and the 9/11
Commission recommendation, which in my office I keep telling my
staff this is not shelfware. We need to look at this often and
remind ourselves that some of their key recommendations was,
again, how we had to move from the need to know to the need to
share.
The Operational Integration Center, just for the committee
to understand, is again, essentially all of the various
stakeholders in that sector, including our counterparts, our
Canadian counterparts, State police, local first responders,
Air and Marine, the Customs and Border Patrol, the Coast
Guard--I am sure I am missing a few, but everybody who has a
stake in the entire thing--and then analyzing all of this data
properly.
To the very best of our ability, again, so that you put
something--there is no second for information, good
information, in all of your businesses, good information and
intel--and getting that information out into the hands,
ultimately, of the men and women who are on the front lines so
that they can utilize that kind of information to be so much
more effective.
So I am very, very enthusiastic about the OIC. I don't know
if you have any comment about--either of you--how you might see
that unfolding.
Mr. Fisher. Yes, we do share your enthusiasm,
Congresswoman, and look forward to the implementation and
getting that information used for operational effectiveness.
Thank you.
Mrs. Miller. Mr. Borkowski.
Mr. Borkowski. Just to add to that, we are very excited
about it for several reasons. One of them is that that
Operational Integration Center was designed with the unique
nature of the Northern border in mind. It is also true that we
expect to gain some lessons for the rest of the border, but as
Chief Fisher and General Kostelnik have indicated, a lot of the
effectiveness on the Northern border is based on that sharing.
The second thing I would point out is that the way we
designed and developed the Operational Integration Center
represented a change from how we designed, say, SBInet and some
of our past history, as did the deployment of the RVSS. It was
a much more structured acquisition process. It was a much more
detailed relationship with our operational users. The result
was to produce something with a lot less problems then we had
with the SBInet.
I don't want to--so there is something learned there about
how to buy things, that I don't want to pretend that our
processes are all mature, because they are not. Many of our
processes are still very rudimentary--even our analysis of
alternatives, sound but rudimentary compared to DOD.
But I think what you are seeing with the OIC and with some
of the other things that we have started to build processes for
is the effectiveness of those processes. I don't want to say we
are all the way there, but we are starting to show the results
of some of that discipline.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
At this time I recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Cuellar.
Mr. Cuellar. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Chief Fisher, the new CR, H. Res. 48 that I believe we are
going to vote on this afternoon, will cut $107 million for
construction of Border Patrol facilities. These funds were for
replacements of existing Border Patrol facilities in four
States, including Texas, Washington, Maine, and New York.
I believe the ones in Texas--one of them was in Freer. I
don't represent that area, but I just passed it just about 2
days ago on Sunday, so I am very familiar with that station. If
there was any need shown to upgrade these facilities, why
weren't these projects moved up forward last year? If it was so
important, why are we letting go of this money?
Mr. Fisher. Congressman, I will tell you as we look at all
facilities within the Border Patrol and our deployments, we
take a look at interior stations, for instance, and we look at
deployments, if we are going to be increasing staffing or
attriting down staffing in different locations.
All of that was taken into consideration when we make the
recommendations on which Border Patrol stations or facilities--
some cases, if we are going to be doing co-location, it would
just make sense to do that as opposed to continuing building,
either adding to pre-existing facilities or adding new
facilities. That is all the process that we went into to make
our recommendations to the department.
Mr. Cuellar. Again, I speak of Freer, because I am familiar
with that, and I don't know if you would like to work there,
but I am sure the men and women that work there would like to
have a better place. If you are in a small rural area, I think
the folks in a small rural area would appreciate a better
place.
So when did this change from a priority to a non-priority
so you can let go of this unobligated $107 million that we are
going to be voting on this afternoon to cut?
Mr. Fisher. Well, the specific time on the priority,
Congressman, I would have to get back to you on that. But I do
share your interest. Certainly, the men and women of the United
States Border Patrol require adequate facilities, because we
are asking them, you know, quite honestly, to protect this
country. We are focused on that as well.
Mr. Cuellar. Can you put that in writing and again share it
to all the committee?
Mr. Fisher. Yes, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. Second thing is let us talk about
administrative costs at Border Patrol headquarters. How many
agents do you have at headquarters?
Mr. Fisher. Approximately 230.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Can you afford, without affecting your
mission they are at headquarters, to move some of those to the
border, where there has been an emergency declared?
Mr. Fisher. We have in some instances, Congressman, yes.
Mr. Cuellar. Could you put it down in writing? Well, let me
ask you this: How many do you think you can afford leaving from
headquarters and allow them to go down to the border?
It is like in the State, when I was in the State
government, there was always a concern about the
superintendent's office having this overhead, administrative
costs, putting more for the teachers in the classroom. This is
the same type of logic that I am using. How many folks can you
let go from headquarters and send them back to the border,
where they can provide security at the border?
Mr. Fisher. We will provide you that report, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Do you have any idea right now?
Mr. Fisher. I do not.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Could you let go of some?
Mr. Fisher. I beg your pardon?
Mr. Cuellar. Could you move some to the border?
Mr. Fisher. I don't know at this point.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. As the chief of the Border Patrol, I
have asked you several questions today, and you have not been
able to answer at least three of them.
Mr. Fisher. Well, Congressman, I will tell you specifically
when--you know, with 230 Border Patrol agents in our
headquarters, that was an increase from 34 as we were
transitioning to the Department of Homeland Security.
One I receive requests from the field in terms of increased
staffing levels, there is a whole host of things that are taken
into consideration, and I have got a very competent staff that
informs me on their judgment on what the impacts are going to
be whenever you moved any Border Patrol agent. I expect that
will be the process of this case as well.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Will you specifically let us know if you
can move any of your Border Patrol agents who are at
headquarters, without affecting the mission there, down to the
border, where I believe they were--where they were supposed to
have been going to?
Let me ask you this: Under the supplemental bill that you
don't have the answer as to how many you have hired so far, is
there any intention to have any of those people go up to
headquarters?
Mr. Fisher. Not at this point, sir.
Mr. Cuellar. Not at this point.
Mr. Fisher. Not to increase our authorized levels of
headquarters.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay. Again, if you can put that in writing
and share with the subcommittee.
This is a general question. According to a recent GAO
report, CBP had, I believe it was $639.4 million, Mr. Stana, on
our obligated balance, and it is a customs user fee account as
a result of excess collections from the temporary fee increase
and elimination of North America Free Trade Agreement country
exemption from January 1, 1944 to September 30, 1997.
I think GAO first identified these unused funds in 2008.
Bottom line is we got $639 million there in a bank account. Is
that correct, Mr. Stana?
Mr. Stana. Yes, that is my understanding.
Mr. Cuellar. Okay.
Gentleman, if you had $639 million sitting in an account,
why have we not moved it? I can understand probably the answers
will be, well, are we authorized to use this money or not? If
not, has any brought that to our attention? I am sure that
Chairman Miller, myself could find a lot of ways to use this
money to help borders both at the Northern or at the Southern
border.
Mr. Kostelnik, we would be happy to get you more UAVs. I am
a big supporter, and I like the job that you are doing.
Same thing, Mr. Borkowski.
I am just saying is there a way that we can move this
money? Because if you talk to border sheriffs, they will say,
``Hey, we will take a share of this.'' If we talked to
Homeland, instead of giving money back, we would love to take
that. What can we do to help you, in other words, to get this
$639 million unobligated balance, if it is still there?
Mr. Borkowski. Congressman Cuellar, we can give you much
more detail, but we do have some legislative proposals about
how to use those fees. In the past there have been times where
we have been able to move some of that, but it is important to
understand that in large measure those funds from our officers,
we have to project the cost of those officers, we have to
project the cash flow. Right now we are looking at a deficit,
not a surplus.
So we will give you the detail, but in the past when we
have had surpluses that we thought would be continuing
surpluses, we have sometimes been able to move those funds to
other purposes. Right now we are very concerned about paying
the salaries of our existing officers. We will get you some
more detail on that.
Mr. Cuellar. Yes, I have got to close, but can you just get
us and work with Mr. Stana as to--they are unobligated $639
million. Give us some suggestions how we can help you, at least
the one-time purchases like equipment?
Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
Any last questions?
We will go to the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr.
Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Just a follow up, General. Out of the 10,000 new Border
Patrol agents and 20,770 plus or minus agents, how many of
those are involved in the UAV program? This is a follow-up to
our question earlier, General.
General Kostelnik. Well, it is a complex answer. I mean, we
have only hired, you know, dedicated 24 new UAV pilots. During
this same time period of that growth, our total pilot force has
increased from a force of about 535 in 2005 to a force of about
850 today.
What we do is we are dual qualifying our pilots who fly
manned aircraft to also fly the unmanned. It reduces risk on
the unmanned side. It is more of a popular mission, because
flying UAVs isn't a popular mission for most of the pilots.
They would rather fly really aircraft.
So actually we have probably about 60 pilots either
dedicated or dual qualified that are flying in some part of our
mission, and it is still not enough. We are growing more. We
are training pilots not only for the up and away flying with
the launch and recovery as we speak.
It is the biggest shortfall in all of the UAV community.
Not only us, but Department of Defense has the same issue.
There are not enough pilots actually to fly the airborne
equipment that we have.
Mr. Duncan. Well, that segues into including staff and
maintenance cost. What is the cost per flight hour for the UAV
versus the Custom Border Protection's manned aviation assets?
General Kostelnik. Well, you know, that is a good question.
Again, it is complex in how you put it, but I asked our head
budget guys, because I thought I would probably get that
question today, because it is kind of the assent that they are
expensive. The reality is while not, you know, cheap, they are
not really expensive compared to the manned thing.
So in the newest aircraft we have the Guardian, which is a
Predator with a sea view radar. It does a comparable mission to
our P-3s. So a P-3, for example, with a nine-man crew, that is
the aircraft that if you bought it new today, it would probably
cost you about $80 million. It costs us around $7,000 per
flight hour to fly that aircraft.
The Predator, you know, costs us about $20 million total
for the total system--actually about $18 million, aircraft,
satellite time, the ground control station, everything you
need, and it costs us a little over $3,000 to about $3,500 an
hour to operate the Predator.
Now, if you looked at an aircraft in between, like the MEA,
which is a King Air light twin engine aircraft with similar
capability, that aircraft costs about $20 million. In fact, we
have five of them up in Hagerstown, Maryland. We get the first
multi-role enforcement aircraft this summer. It costs us about
$20 million for the aircraft. It is a similar mission as the
Predator, only it is manned, but it can only fly about 6 hours.
It costs us just about the same, about $4,000 an hour to
operate.
So the operational costs are really about the same. Of
course, getting to your point earlier about the flight time, it
is a very important piece of aviation, because the bulk of the
cost, if you look at the whole cost, not just the flying our
cost, but the whole operational cost for a system, it is
heavily driven by the launch and recovery pieces. That is where
you burn up tires, you know, you expend your extra fuel in the
high speed.
So much of the cost to operate an aircraft, that actually
is in the launch and recover phase. So oddly enough, the longer
you can fly an aircraft, the more cost-effective it is going to
be. So if we had the pilots, we would certainly be flying our
Predators for 20 hours they are capable of, and we would get a
much better full loaded operational cost of the system.
Mr. Duncan. We have got some airframes that are, you know,
20 years old. I mean, you get a lot of--you spread that cost
out over a lot of years on a regular aircraft. Is that similar
in a UAV? I mean, technology is changing. Are you going to be
able to get the 20 years out of an airframe UAV?
General Kostelnik. Well, you know, it is actually you have
to go back to the history, because originally back in 1994
these were kind of conceived as high-risk throwaway items in a
combat zone. The original Predators cost about $2 million
apiece and were considered, you know, you would lose a lot of
them in combat.
Today the Guardian and the Predators are much more
sophisticated, but they are still plastic airplanes. They are
still built with unique and novel technologies that are fairly
easy to repair. Over the last 5 years, launch and recover, and
particularly landing, has been a problem not only for us, but
all of the services. We have had several landing incidents,
where the aircraft, or piece of it, was damaged.
For very small amounts of money, we have been back, because
it is basically a plastic aircraft and a fairly simple engine
to go back and make repair on all those aircraft. There is not
a lot of data on the long-term service life of Predators,
because they were never intended for that.
But now as the services, the big services and the DOD, have
procured more of these and are going to procure even more over
a long period of time, there will come a time when service life
becomes an issue. But because of the composites these aircraft
are designed to, replacing wings, replacing tails, they are
going to be much easier and much cheaper to accomplish than the
classic, you know, metal type aircraft.
So I think the story in the long run is going to be a good
one just because of the construction technique. The reality is
the strength and the long-term viability of these things are
going to be driven by the sensors that you carry. So we are not
only flying the sensors that the DOD is, but we are looking at
new technologies for radiation sensors, for supporting groups
on the ground with systems like beta, which will help detect
moving things. I think these aircraft are going to be around
for a long time.
Of course, in our manned aircraft fleet, we have aircraft
still in service today that are approaching 40 years old. So if
you keep them safe and modernize them, they will still be the
best value for the service.
Mr. Duncan. I appreciate that. We are spending a lot of
money on technology and other things, and I think a lot of
times simpler is better. I keep going back to what the folks in
South Carolina think we should do, and that is concrete still
and barbed wire, and maybe think of a simple approach.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman for the leniency.
Mrs. Miller. Thank you very much.
Again, I want to thank all of the witnesses. I think this
has been an excellent hearing. We certainly have had, I think,
very good questions on both sides and excellent answers as
well. I just appreciate all of your service to the Nation.
Certainly as you represent the men and women in Customs and
Border Protection and Air and Marine and National Guard, GAO as
well, we thank you so very, very much for all of you appearing
here today.
The hearing record will be held open for 10 days. If any
committee Members have any additional questions that they would
like to ask, we will try to get them responded to as well.
Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:12 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
