[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
SECURING AIR COMMERCE FROM THE THREAT OF TERRORISM
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HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 9, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-8
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Peter T. King, New York, Chairman
Lamar Smith, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Daniel E. Lungren, California Loretta Sanchez, California
Mike Rogers, Alabama Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Henry Cuellar, Texas
Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Paul C. Broun, Georgia Laura Richardson, California
Candice S. Miller, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Tim Walberg, Michigan Brian Higgins, New York
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Patrick Meehan, Pennsylvania Hansen Clarke, Michigan
Ben Quayle, Arizona William R. Keating, Massachusetts
Scott Rigell, Virginia Vacancy
Billy Long, Missouri Vacancy
Jeff Duncan, South Carolina
Tom Marino, Pennsylvania
Blake Farenthold, Texas
Mo Brooks, Alabama
Michael J. Russell, Staff Director/Chief Counsel
Kerry Ann Watkins, Senior Policy Director
Michael S. Twinchek, Chief Clerk
I. Lanier Avant, Minority Staff Director
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION SECURITY
Mike Rogers, Alabama, Chairman
Daniel E. Lungren, California Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Tim Walberg, Michigan Danny K. Davis, Illinois
Chip Cravaack, Minnesota Jackie Speier, California
Joe Walsh, Illinois, Vice Chair Cedric L. Richmond, Louisiana
Mo Brooks, Alabama Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
Peter T. King, New York (Ex (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Amanda Parikh, Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Deputy Chief Clerk
Thomas McDaniels, Minority Subcommittee Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security....................................................... 1
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation Security........................................ 2
Witnesses
Mr. John Sammon, Assistant Administrator, Transportation Sector
Network Management, Transportation Security Administration:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
Mr. Stephen Lord, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues,
Government Accountability Office:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
For the Record
The Honorable Mike Rogers, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Alabama, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
Security:
Letter From the Airforwarders Association...................... 16
Appendix I
Mr. Douglas A. Smith, Assistant Secretary, Private Sector, Office
of Policy, Department of Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 33
Appendix II
Questions From Chairman Mike D. Rogers of Alabama for John P.
Sammon......................................................... 37
Question From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi
for John P. Sammon............................................. 40
Question From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for John
P. Sammon...................................................... 41
Questions From Chairman Mike D. Rogers of Alabama for Stephen M.
Lord........................................................... 43
Question From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for
Stephen M. Lord................................................ 45
SECURING AIR COMMERCE FROM THE THREAT OF TERRORISM
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Wednesday, March 9, 2011
U.S. House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Transportation Security,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:44 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Rogers, Brooks, Jackson Lee, and
Richmond.
Mr. Rogers [presiding]. I would like to welcome everybody.
The subcommittee is going to come to order now.
This is our subcommittee's second hearing in the new
Congress, and I want to thank our witnesses taking the time to
be with us today.
Today's hearing is on ``Securing Air Commerce from the
Threat of Terrorism.'' The strength of our economy depends on
the safe and secured flow of commerce, and air cargo security
is the important element of this effort. This hearing is an
opportunity to examine the state of air cargo security and the
many challenges that still exist in this environment.
We know that air cargo was a terrorist target. Last
October, two packages containing explosives originating from
Yemen were discovered in route to the United States. Both
packages were scheduled to fly on both passenger and all cargo
planes.
Fortunately due to an intelligence tip, both packages were
discovered and removed before they could explode but this
terrorist plot for which al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,
AQAP, claimed responsibility reinforced that terrorists are
constantly looking for new ways to exploit our systems and kill
innocent people. AQAP is one of the most significant threats we
face today.
At the February 9 hearing of the Full Committee, Department
of Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano reported that
the terrorist threat to the United States is at its most
heightened state since September 11, 2001. Michael Leiter,
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center added that
AQAP is probably the most significant risk to United States
Homeland.
It has been nearly 5 months since the Yemen attack was
thwarted. Since that time, TSA has worked in collaboration with
the industry to prevent this type of incident from happening
again. This collaboration is extremely important to prevent an
air cargo attack and similar steps need to be taken with TSA's
foreign partners to ensure that resources are being developed
and allocated in an intelligence-driven, risk-based manner with
an appropriate technology in place.
Recently, Secretary Napolitano announced that by December
2011, her department would be able to meet the mandate to
screen 100 percent of inbound cargo of international passenger
flights. While I applaud the DHS and TSA's progress in securing
cargo, we cannot lose sight of the fact that all cargo is not
treated equal. All packages should not necessarily be screened
the same way, particularly as it distracts us from the real
threats and result unduly slows commerce.
There is one thing for sure, no package will ever complain
about being profiled. For example, a package that is dropped
off in a country known to be a hot bed for terrorism by an
unknown individual who pays cash to have it shipped should not
be treated the same way as cargo being shipped by a trusted
shipper or business. Just like other areas of aviation
security, TSA in partnership with industry and its foreign
partners must focus its resources on the cargo that has been
deemed the highest-risk cargo in order to get ahead of the next
attempted attack.
Our witnesses today are Mr. John Sammon, Assistant
Administrator of the Office of Transportation Security Network
Management at TSA; and Mr. Stephen Lord, Director of Homeland
Security and Justice Issues at the Government Accountability
Office.
Mr. Sammon brings over 25 years of transportation
experience to his position. Mr. Lord is a recognized expert on
aviation security issues and has provided his expertise to the
committee on numerous occasions through several important
states.
Thank you both for your service to our Nation and for being
here. Before I recognize the Ranking Member for her opening
statement, I would like to add that over the next several
months, this subcommittee will continue its oversight of TSA on
air cargo and work toward developing legislation to improve the
air cargo security. I look forward to a continued dialogue with
both of the witnesses on this as well as our private
stakeholders.
I would like to state on record that this hearing should
serve as an opportunity to discuss any areas where Congress can
be helpful in improving the tools and authorities TSA has at
its disposal to carry out its mission to secure air cargo--a
vital sector of our economy.
The Chairman now recognizes Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, the gentlelady from Texas and my friend, Ms.
Sheila Jackson Lee, for any statements she may have.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that courtesy
and it is certainly a pleasure to work with you and we have
worked together as friends for a number of years. I want to
complement you for caring for the mission of this subcommittee
and the mission of this full committee. This is truly an
important hearing.
If I might be a little humorous, it doesn't ring the bells
and whistles. There are not 49 cameras here to hear us our due
diligence, but this is the kind of work that our constituency
assumes us to do a steady diligent, consistent oversight that
really answers the major question. For example, I will just
simply say no one would have expected the creativity of
individual franchising terrorist to pick out air cargo and
small packages and typewriters, if I might say another item
that might be without description to do harm to the United
States. That is why this hearing is so very important because
we are looking at the weeds and trying to work to find
solutions and to ensure that the homeland is safe.
So let me thank you again and thank the witnesses, Sammon,
Lord for testifying today on this issue. I know that both of
them know a great deal about it.
Mr. Lord, you have been before us before as has Mr. Sammon
with a number of insightful suggestions.
Today, the subcommittee will continue its oversight into
air cargo security. In the last Congress, we had two hearings
on the statutory mandate contained in the implementing
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act directing that all
cargo on passenger aircraft is screened for explosives. Without
doubt, this cargo screening mandate is critical to aviation
security. TSA has informed us that for domestic and out-bound
flights, industry has implemented screening procedures such
that all of the belly cargo on passenger aircraft is being
screened. We are certainly glad of this.
Might I say, even with that representation, I want to see a
TSA diligently overseeing that 100 percent cargo inception/
representation because that is what we are supposed to do.
In October of last year, we learned of a terrorist plot to
ship explosives from Yemen via passenger and all air cargo
craft to address this in the United States. Creative, unique,
not a lot of, if you will, overhead but unfortunately getting
the job done--the terrorist job done--the bad part of life.
Through intelligence and coordination between the U.S.
Government and air carriers, the packages containing explosives
were intercepted before being transported on flights to the
United States. But the incident showed that the terrorists are
still targeting aviation and that there is a potential
vulnerability to address with respect to air cargo security.
Mr. Sammon will talk about the need to implement 100
percent cargo screening on passenger flights inbound to the
United States, and I know TSA is working with the industry and
foreign government to achieve its milestones by the end of this
year. I look forward to receiving an update on this
international work from you today as well as an assessment of
the tools you need to accomplish this stance, what are the
proper protocols that will ensure that we truly are getting the
best response to the desires that we have made.
As I have said before, if enacted properly, fulfillment of
the passenger planes' cargo screening mandate will be a major
milestone in aviation security. Building and pointing out
previous mandates to conduct 100 percent screening of checked
bags, fortify cockpit doors, deploy Federal air marshals,
secure airport checkpoints and perimeters, and improve the way
we check passengers against the terrorist watch list.
Mr. Lord, in your report last year, GAO raised concerns
about TSA's ability to conduct effective oversight of domestic
certified cargo screening program known as CCSP. I look forward
to hearing an update from you on TSA's verification and
compliance efforts in ensuring that the private sector is
fulfilling the cargo screening requirement as well as TSA's
progress in certifying new and effective couriering technology.
Chairman, I know we share the same interest in securing the
aviation system while TSA has made great progress in
establishing security systems for cargo. This is not a time to
take our eyes off the ball. In fact, it is also important that
we assess and confirm that we are at the percentages that our
airline industry suggests and help them if we are not.
We must ensure that there is domestic compliance by the
private sector. We must work with foreign governments in
establishing a credible cargo screening system for air cargo
inbound to the United States, and we must emphasize Mr.
Chairman to our foreign friends and others that this is crucial
and we mean business. We are happy to work with them. We are
happy to work with them as we have goods traveling there but we
mean business about securing the homeland.
I would like to thank our witnesses for coming before us
today and helping us to shed light on this critical issue. With
that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back to balance up my time.
Mr. Rogers. I thank you, the Gentlelady.
We are again pleased to have two distinguished witnesses
with us today. I want to remind the witnesses that their entire
statements have been submitted for the record, and if you would
like to summarize them in 5-minute increments.
We will start with Mr. John Sammon. The floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF JOHN SAMMON, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
TRANSPORTATION SECTOR NETWORK MANAGEMENT, TRANSPORTATION
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Sammon. Good afternoon, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Jackson Lee, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I
would like to echo Ranking Member Jackson Lee's commitment to--
this committee has always been a partner working on--focused on
better security and we really do appreciate that from TSA's
standpoint.
I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today to
discuss the progress we have made in air cargo security. TSA
has put regulatory and compliance programs in place to ensure
that the industry meets the requirements to screen 100 percent
of air cargo transported on passenger aircrafts and flights
originating in the United States.
In the international arena, a different set of challenges
confront TSA. The discovery of explosive devices last October
on-board aircraft bound for the United States demonstrated the
need for continued vigilance in detecting terrorist devices on-
board all cargo as well as passenger aircraft. The Certified
Cargo Screening Program, CCSP, established in 2009 has been the
center of industry's overall ability to screen 100 percent of
U.S. air cargo. The program achieves our primary goal of
improving security without negatively impacting the movement of
goods.
Currently, we have 1,167 entities serving as CCSFs
contributing over 54 percent of the total screening volume. TSA
must remain vigilant in ensuring that certified companies
properly screen air cargo.
In fiscal year 2010, TSA increased its cargo inspection for
us from 450 to 500, plus we have 110 of the 120 deployed cargo
K-9 teams and conducted 6,000 inspections on CCSF and airline
screening operations. The CCSP program is voluntary and relies
on trust and verification. To that end, TSA has a vigorous
inspection and compliance program to ensure that participants
are screening as expected.
Our inspections have found several entities who were
violating the spirit and letter of the program requirements. We
have taken a wide range of enforcement actions ranging from
voluntary withdrawal from the program to civil enforcement, and
if necessary we will undertake criminal enforcement. TSA takes
the CCSP program very seriously and we intend to vigorously
protect its integrity.
For international air cargo, TSA has requested industry
comment on the feasibility of screening 100 percent of air
cargo on passenger air craft bound for the United States by
December 31, 2011. Air carriers were given a 45-day period in
which to comment on the proposed 100 percent screening
requirement after which TSA will review and evaluate comments
prior to making a final determination. We recognize that
closing the final gap poses operational challenges for the
airlines.
More importantly, however, TSA does not have the same
inspection and compliance authorities overseas that it has in
the United States. While TSA can inspect and aggressively
pursue enforcement action in the United States, any inspection
of air cargo screening overseas requires the voluntary
cooperation of our foreign partners.
To progress in that regard, TSA continues to review other
countries' National security programs. TSA's recognition of
other countries' cargo programs will provide us with Government
oversight of supply chain and screening process.
Last October, the global counterterrorism community
disrupted a potential attack when individuals in Yemen with
ties to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula attempted to ship
explosive devices in cargo on-board aircraft bound for the
United States. We have been working closely with air carriers
to continue to refine our counterterrorism strategy based upon
focused, measured intelligence-driven protocols.
The terrorists who are intended upon doing us harm would
like nothing more for the United States to adopt the reactive
and defensive posture in lieu of crafting thoughtful focused
approach. Our measures are designed to produce maximum security
capability without disrupting critical supply chains.
In conclusion, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before the subcommittee today, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The statement of Mr. Sammon follows:]
Prepared Statement of John Sammon
March 9, 2011
Good afternoon Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity
to appear before you today to discuss the progress that the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is making in fulfilling
air cargo security requirements established by Congress. I thank the
subcommittee for its leadership role in promoting transportation
security for the American public, and I look forward to our dialogue
today and your thoughts about how we can further improve air cargo
security.
TSA is pleased to report that, in conjunction with the air cargo
industry, we met the August 2010 mandate included in the Implementing
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) to screen
100 percent of cargo transported on flights of passenger aircraft
originating within the United States. A different set of challenges
confronts TSA as we continue to make substantial progress toward
achieving the 100 percent screening mandate on all international
inbound passenger flights to the United States. Additionally, the
discovery of explosive devices last October on-board aircraft
originating in Yemen and ultimately bound for the United States further
demonstrated the need for continued vigilance in detecting terrorist
devices on-board all-cargo aircraft as well as on-board passenger
aircraft.
Going forward, we need to utilize all available means at our
disposal for countering the terrorist threat, developing initiatives
with other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components and
offices, and continuing to work collaboratively with our partners
internationally and in the private sector. As we pursue intelligence-
driven initiatives both domestically and internationally, we will
continue to work closely with the subcommittee in examining how best to
protect the traveling public, facilitate the flow of commerce, and
guard against the actions of terrorists.
DOMESTIC CARGO SCREENING INITIATIVES MEET STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS
In fulfilling a key provision of the 9/11 Act, last August TSA
worked with partners in the air cargo industry to successfully meet the
100 percent cargo screening mandate on domestic and international
outbound passenger aircraft on schedule.
We met the deadline within a 3-year period with the assistance from
a wide spectrum of parties, including air carriers, the shipping
industry, freight forwarders and major associations, such as the Air
Forwarders Association and the Air Transport Association.
The Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP), which was permanently
established in 2009 through an Interim Final Rule, has been at the
center of industry's overall success. Under this program,
responsibility for cargo screening is voluntarily distributed
throughout the supply chain to improve security and minimize the
bottleneck and potential negative impact on the integrity and movement
of commerce that would be created by screening 100 percent of air cargo
at the Nation's airports. Currently, we have 1,167 entities serving as
Certified Cargo Screening Facilities (CCSF), contributing over 54
percent of the total screening volume. Without their participation, the
100 percent screening mandate could not have been met.
TSA must remain vigilant, however, in ensuring that certified
companies properly screen air cargo. In fiscal year 2010, TSA increased
its cargo inspection force from 450 to 500 and conducted 6,042
inspections on CCSF and airline screening operations. Our training must
be comprehensive and compliance must be rigorously enforced. To assist
in this effort, TSA recently created and released detailed screening
training materials to industry partners. The materials ensure a
consistent, high level of training industry-wide on TSA's requirements
for cargo handling and screening, facilitate compliance with our
security programs, and ultimately drive better security for air cargo.
Participation in the CCSP program is voluntary, but once accepted
into the program, a CCSF becomes a regulated party. TSA has a vigorous
inspection and compliance program to ensure that CCSP participants are
screening as required. If inspections uncover entities violating the
spirit and letter of the program requirements, there are a wide range
of enforcement actions ranging from voluntary withdrawal from the
program to civil enforcement, and if necessary we will undertake
criminal enforcement. TSA takes the CCSP program very seriously and we
vigorously ensure its integrity.
INTERNATIONAL CARGO SCREENING FACES UNIQUE CHALLENGES
All high-risk cargo on international flights bound for the United
States is prohibited from being transported on passenger aircraft. All
high-risk cargo goes through enhanced security procedures before being
shipped on all-cargo aircraft. Nevertheless, complex challenges exist
in reaching 100 percent screening of cargo loaded on passenger aircraft
in-bound to the United States. TSA is working assiduously to meet the
international requirement of the 9/11 Act mandate, and recent global
events have only further demonstrated the compelling need to heighten
security as soon as is practicable. In light of the latest threats and
the considerable progress made by air carriers in screening
international in-bound cargo, TSA has requested industry comment on the
feasibility of a proposed deadline of December 31, 2011 to screen 100
percent of the cargo that is transported on passenger aircraft bound
for the United States--2 years earlier than previously anticipated.
Air carriers were given a 30- to 45-day period (30 days for
domestic, 45 days for international carriers) in which to comment on
the proposed deadline, after which time TSA will review and evaluate
the industry comments prior to making a final determination.
Since passenger air carriers began providing detailed reports on
in-bound screening percentages in June 2010, it is apparent that more
cargo is being screened than TSA had earlier estimated. Many air
carriers, including a high number of wide-body operators, are already
at or close to 100 percent screening of air cargo in-bound to the
United States. However, we recognize that closing the final gap poses
some operational challenges for airlines. More importantly, TSA does
not have the same inspection and compliance authorities overseas that
it has in the United States. While TSA can inspect and aggressively
pursue enforcement action in the United States under the Interim Final
Rule, any inspection of air cargo screening overseas requires the full
voluntary cooperation of our foreign partners.
To address these challenges, TSA will continue to review other
countries' National Country Security Programs (NCSP) to determine
whether their programs provide a level of security commensurate with
the level of security provided by existing U.S. air cargo security
programs. TSA's recognition of other countries' NCSPs will provide us
with Government oversight of the supply chain and screening process. We
are aware that many country programs support a supply chain approach
similar to our CCSP. Since we cannot establish a CCSP program overseas,
the NCSP approach is a key element in helping industry to accomplish
the 100 percent screening goal while also enabling TSA to ensure that
inspections and compliance actions are well established by the host
government programs and commensurate with U.S. security standards. We
are renewing our efforts to ensure broader international awareness of
TSA's Congressional screening mandate, and to encourage countries to
share their NCSPs with us for review.
In addition, air carriers will be able to use Authorized
Representatives to perform screening on their behalf. Authorized
Representatives will allow for cargo to be screened by entities such as
freight forwarders, operating under the airline program, enabling them
to screen the cargo at various points in the supply chain.
SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOLLOWING THE AIR CARGO PACKAGES INCIDENT FROM
YEMEN
Last October, the global counterterrorism community disrupted a
potential attack when individuals in Yemen with ties to al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula attempted to conceal and ship explosive devices in
cargo on-board aircraft that traveled through several foreign nations,
and ultimately were bound for the United States.
TSA joined with another DHS agency, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), and immediately initiated additional measures to
enhance existing protocols for screening in-bound cargo. These included
temporarily disallowing all air cargo shipments originating in Yemen
destined for the United States and expanding the same policy to include
shipments originating in Somalia. TSA has also taken appropriate
measures to enhance security requirements for in-bound air cargo
shipments on passenger and all-cargo planes, and, together with CBP, is
in close collaboration with the international shipping community to
provide additional security measures for in-bound shipments on all-
cargo aircraft.
DHS has been working closely with air carriers to continue to
refine our counterterrorism strategy based upon focused, measured
intelligence-driven protocols. Our measures are designed to produce the
maximum security capability without disrupting critical shipping supply
chains.
TECHNOLOGY AND EXPLOSIVES DETECTION CANINE TEAMS
TSA's on-going layered efforts to ensure the highest possible level
of security for both domestic and international air cargo include a
variety of innovative and cost-effective programs, including an on-
going analysis of technology and the inclusion of authorized
representatives to screen on an airline's behalf. We will continue to
partner with our international partners and will remain an
intelligence-driven agency focused upon detecting, deterring, and
dismantling attempted terrorist attacks.
Technology will continue to play an important role in screening air
cargo. We will continue to evaluate screening technologies to ensure
that industry has the most effective equipment at its disposal.
Currently, approximately 80 equipment models are fully certified for
cargo, up from 20 in February 2009. In 2010, TSA added a new category
of technology, Electro Magnetic Detection (EMD), which has proven to be
an effective means of screening products such as perishable
commodities.
Our explosives detection canine teams are one of our most reliable
resources for cargo screening. These highly effective, mobile teams can
quickly locate and identify dangerous materials that may present a
threat to cargo and aircraft. Our Proprietary Explosives Detection
Canine Teams pair TSA Cargo Inspectors and explosive detection canines
to search cargo bound for passenger aircraft. These teams have been
deployed to several of our Nation's largest airports. They can also be
deployed anywhere in the transportation system in support of TSA's
mission during periods of heightened security.
Currently, TSA's proprietary canines in the United States perform
both primary and secondary (backup) screening at airline facilities in
20 major air cargo gateway cities, screening more than 53 million
pounds per month as of January 2011. TSA, working closely with the
private sector, has also launched a private sector canine pilot program
which, if successful, would enable industry to utilize privately
operated teams that meet the same strict standards to which TSA teams
are trained and maintained.
CONCLUSION
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee
today to discuss TSA's on-going efforts to increase air cargo security.
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Sammon.
Mr. Lord, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF STEPHEN LORD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Lord. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Rogers, Ranking
Member Jackson Lee, and other Members of the subcommittee,
thanks for inviting me here today to discuss air cargo
screening issues.
This is an important issue as each year over 6 billion
pounds of air cargo is shipped via U.S. passenger flights, and
the October 2010 incident in Yemen also highlights the
importance of establishing an effective air cargo screening
system. Today, I would like to discuss two issues--TSA's
progress as well as its related challenges in screening 100
percent of air cargo on passenger flights per the 9/11 Act
mandate.
As you know, the act required TSA to establish a system to
screen 100 percent of cargo not only on domestic passenger
flights but in-bound passenger crafts as well. The key message
I want to convey today is that TSA has taken several important
steps to establish a system to screen domestic air cargo but
still faces some important challenges related to screening the
in-bound air cargo.
In terms of progress in screening domestic air cargo and as
noted by Mr. Sammon, TSA created the voluntary--the so-called
certified cargo screening program to allow screening to take
place earlier in the air cargo supply chain essentially away
from airports. And TSA has also expanded its explosive
detection K-9 program and as Mr. Sammon noted, as of February
of this year, TSA has 113 explosive detection K-9 teams and is
in the process of adding seven more.
There is also a new rainfall regarding K-9s. TSA
established a new pilot program to test the feasibility of
using private sector K-9 teams train the TSA standards to help
inspect air cargo. These steps have helped TSA meet the
screening mandate as it applies to domestic cargo. However, I
would like to discuss some of the in-bound air cargo screening
issues I alluded to earlier and this merits special attention.
In terms of progress, TSA reports they will now meet the 9/
11 Act mandate as it applies to in-bound by December of this
year. This is 2 years earlier than the TSA administrator
reported to Congress back in November. What accounts for the
new optimism?
According to TSA, air carriers have changed their business
practices after TSA introduced new screening requirements for
shrink-wrapped and banded cargo. Shrink-wrapped and banded
cargo is a major method to move air cargo on wide body
aircraft. As a result of this, TSA says air cargo is now being
screened--more cargos being screened at the point of origin
before it is assembled into pallets, which has resulted in
higher levels of screening.
However, I think it is really important to hear industry
viewpoints on this matter because there is an old management
adage you spend 80 percent of your time worried about 20
percent of the problem, and TSA is reporting about 80 percent
of the in-bound cargos being screened. I think that last 20
percent could be problematic.
Moreover, as we previously reported, TSA does not have a
mechanism to verify the accuracy of the data reported air
carriers to judge whether, in fact, the mandate is actually
being met. Given the new deadline, it becomes even more
important for them to have good data. As Mr. Sammon noted,
another challenge is that TSA has limited authority to regulate
foreign government and entities. Foreign governments generally
cannot be compelled to implement or mutually recognize U.S.
security measures. It is all done on a voluntary basis.
A third very important challenge related to in-bound is
there is no technology that is currently approved or qualified
to screen large so-called ULD pallets and containers. Again, as
we previously reported, this is a major method of moving air
cargo from abroad. Thus, we have several open questions about
how this system is going to work in practice and whether they
are going to be able to meet this new December deadline.
In closing, an effective air cargo screening system not
only requires effective technology, timely intelligence,
capable and well-trained staff but also clearly define policies
and procedures and regular oversight such as by this committee
to help ensure the system works this design.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I look forward
to answering any questions that you or Ranking Member Jackson
Lee or other distinguished Members of the committee may have.
[The statement of Mr. Lord follows:]
Prepared Statement of Stephen Lord
March 9, 2011
GAO HIGHLIGHTS
Highlights of GAO-11-413T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Transportation Security, Committee on Homeland Security, House of
Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
The Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) is the Federal agency with primary responsibility
for securing the air cargo system. The Implementing Recommendations of
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 mandated DHS to establish a system to
screen 100 percent of cargo flown on passenger aircraft by August 2010.
GAO reviewed TSA's progress in meeting the act's screening mandate, and
any related challenges it faces for both domestic (cargo transported
within and from the United States) and inbound cargo (cargo bound for
the United States). This statement is based on prior reports and
testimonies issued from April 2007 through December 2010 addressing the
security of the air cargo transportation system and selected updates
made in February and March 2011. For the updates, GAO obtained
information on TSA's air cargo security programs and interviewed TSA
officials.
What GAO Recommends
GAO has made recommendations in prior work to strengthen air cargo
screening. Although not fully concurring with all recommendations, TSA
has taken or has a number of actions underway to address them.
Continued attention is needed to ensure some recommendations are
addressed, such as establishing a mechanism to verify screening data.
TSA provided technical comments on the information in this statement,
which GAO incorporated as appropriate.
AVIATION SECURITY.--PROGRESS MADE, BUT CHALLENGES PERSIST IN MEETING
THE SCREENING MANDATE FOR AIR CARGO
What GAO Found
As of August 2010, TSA reported that it met the mandate to screen
100 percent of air cargo as it applies to domestic cargo, but as GAO
reported in June 2010, TSA lacked a mechanism to verify the accuracy of
the data used to make this determination. TSA took several actions in
meeting this mandate for domestic cargo, including creating a voluntary
program to facilitate screening throughout the air cargo supply chain;
taking steps to test technologies for screening air cargo; and
expanding its explosives detection canine program, among other things.
However, in June 2010 GAO reported that TSA did not have a mechanism to
verify screening data and recommended that TSA establish such a
mechanism. TSA partially concurred with this recommendation and stated
that verifying such data would be challenging. As GAO reported in June
2010, data verification is important to provide reasonable assurance
that screening is being conducted at reported levels. As GAO further
reported in June 2010, there is no technology approved or qualified by
TSA to screen cargo once it is loaded onto a pallet or container-both
of which are common means of transporting domestic air cargo on
passenger aircraft. As a result, questions remain about air carriers'
ability to effectively screen air cargo on such aircraft.
TSA has also taken a number of steps to enhance the security of
inbound air cargo, but also faces challenges that could hinder its
ability to meet the screening mandate. TSA moved its deadline for
meeting the 100 percent screening mandate as it applies to inbound air
cargo to the end of 2011, up 2 years from when the TSA administrator
previously reported the agency would meet this mandate. According to
TSA officials, the agency determined it was feasible to accelerate the
deadline as a result of trends in air carrier reported screening data
and discussions with air cargo industry leaders regarding progress made
by industry to secure cargo on passenger aircraft. TSA also took steps
to enhance the security of inbound cargo following the October 2010
Yemen air cargo bomb attempt--such as requiring additional screening of
high-risk cargo prior to transport on an all-cargo aircraft. However,
TSA continues to face challenges GAO identified in June 2010 that could
impact TSA's ability to meet this screening mandate as it applies to
inbound air cargo. For example, GAO reported that TSA's screening
percentages were estimates and were not based on actual data collected
from air carriers or other entities, such as foreign governments, and
recommended that TSA establish a mechanism to verify the accuracy of
these data. TSA partially agreed, and required air carriers to report
inbound cargo screening data effective May 2010. However, TSA officials
stated while current screening percentages are based on actual data
reported by air carriers, verifying the accuracy of the screening data
is difficult. It is important for TSA to have complete and accurate
data to verify that the agency can meet the screening mandate. GAO will
continue to monitor these issues as part of its ongoing review of TSA's
efforts to secure inbound air cargo, the final results to be issued
later this year.
Mr. Chairman and Members of the subcommittee: I appreciate the
opportunity to participate in today's hearing to discuss the security
of the Nation's air cargo system. In 2009, about 6.5 billion pounds of
cargo were transported on U.S. passenger flights-approximately 56
percent of which was transported domestically (domestic cargo) and 44
percent of which was transported on flights arriving in the United
States from a foreign location (inbound cargo).\1\ The October 2010
discovery of explosive devices in air cargo packages bound for the
United States from Yemen, and the 2009 Christmas day plot to detonate
an explosive device during an international flight bound for Detroit,
provide vivid reminders that civil aviation remains a key terrorist
target. According to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA),
the security threat posed by terrorists introducing explosive devices
in air cargo shipments is significant, and the risk and likelihood of
such an attack directed at passenger aircraft is high.
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\1\ For the purposes of this statement, domestic cargo refers to
cargo transported by air within the United States and from the United
States to a foreign location by both U.S. and foreign air carriers, and
inbound cargo refers to cargo transported by both U.S. and foreign air
carriers from a foreign location to the United States. These cargo
statistics were provided by the Transportation Security Administration
from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics.
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The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted into
law shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks,
established TSA and gave the agency responsibility for securing all
modes of transportation, including the Nation's civil aviation system,
which includes air carrier operations (domestic and foreign) to, from,
and within the United States.\2\ For example, ATSA requires that TSA
provide for the screening of all passengers and property, including
cargo, transported on passenger aircraft.\3\ ATSA further requires that
a system be in operation, as soon as practicable after ATSA's enactment
(on November 19, 2001), to screen, inspect, or otherwise ensure the
security of the cargo transported by all-cargo aircraft-generally,
aircraft that carry only cargo and no passengers--to, from, and within
the United States.\4\ To help enhance the security of air cargo, the
Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11
Commission Act) mandated the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to
establish a system to screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger
aircraft--including the domestic and inbound flights of foreign and
U.S. passenger operations--by August 2010.\5\ The 9/11 Commission Act
defines screening for purposes of the air cargo screening mandate as a
physical examination or nonintrusive methods of assessing whether cargo
poses a threat to transportation security.\6\ The act further requires
that such a system provide a level of security commensurate with the
level of security for the screening of checked baggage. According to
TSA, the mission of its air cargo security program is to secure the air
cargo transportation system while not unduly impeding the flow of
commerce. Although the mandate is applicable to both domestic and
inbound cargo, TSA stated that it must address the mandate for domestic
and inbound cargo through separate systems because of limitations in
its authority to regulate international air cargo industry stakeholders
operating outside the United States.
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\2\ See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).
\3\ See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 110(b), 115 Stat. at 614-15 (codified
as amended at 49 U.S.C. 44901).
\4\ See 49 U.S.C. 44901(f) (requiring the system to be in
operation as soon as practicable after the date of enactment--November
19, 2001--but without establishing a firm deadline).
\5\ See Pub. L. No. 110-53, 1602(a), 121 Stat. 266, 477-79 (2007)
(codified at 49 U.S.C. 44901(g)).
\6\ Although TSA is authorized to approve additional methods for
screening air cargo beyond the physical examination or nonintrusive
methods listed in the statute, the statute expressly prohibits the use
of methods that rely solely on performing a review of information about
the contents of cargo or verifying the identity of a shipper. See 49
U.S.C. 44901(g)(5).
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My statement today addresses TSA's progress and challenges in
meeting the 9/11 Commission Act mandate to screen air cargo on
passenger flights, both domestic cargo and cargo transported from a
foreign location to the United States, known as inbound air cargo. My
comments are based primarily on our prior reports and testimonies
issued from April 2007 through December 2010 addressing the security of
the air cargo transportation system, with selected updates in February
and March 2011.\7\ For these reports, we reviewed documents such as
TSA's air cargo security policies and procedures and conducted site
visits to four category X airports and one category I airport in the
United States that process domestic and inbound air cargo.\8\ We
selected these airports based on airport size, passenger and air cargo
volumes, location, and participation in TSA's screening program. For
the updates, we obtained information on TSA's air cargo security
programs and interviewed senior TSA officials regarding plans,
strategies, and steps taken to meet the 100 percent screening mandate
since December 2010. More detailed information about our scope and
methodology is included in our reports and testimonies. We conducted
this work in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing
standards. We shared the information in this statement with TSA
officials who provided technical comments that were incorporated as
appropriate.
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\7\ See GAO, Aviation Security: DHS Has Taken Steps to Enhance
International Aviation Security and Facilitate Compliance with
International Standards, but Challenges Remain, GAO-11-238T
(Washington, DC: Dec. 2, 2010); Aviation Security: Progress Made but
Actions Needed to Address Challenges in Meeting the Air Cargo Screening
Mandate, GAO-10-880T (Washington, DC: June 30, 2010); Aviation
Security: TSA Has Made Progress but Faces Challenges in Meeting the
Statutory Mandate for Screening Air Cargo on Passenger Aircraft, GAO-
10-446 (Washington, DC: June 28, 2010); Homeland Security: Better Use
of Terrorist Watchlist Information and Improvements in Deployment of
Passenger Screening Checkpoint Technologies Could Further Strengthen
Security, GAO-10-401T (Washington, DC: Jan. 27, 2010); Aviation
Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections Help
Enhance Security, but Oversight of These Efforts Can Be Strengthened,
GAO-07-729 (Washington, DC: May 11, 2007); and Aviation Security:
Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages
and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, DC: Apr. 30, 2007).
\8\ There are 462 TSA-regulated airports in the United States. TSA
classifies the airports it regulates into one of five categories (X, I,
II, III, and IV) based on various factors, such as the total number of
takeoffs and landings annually, the extent to which passengers are
screened at the airport, and other special security considerations. In
general, category X airports have the largest number of passenger
boardings, and category IV airports have the smallest.
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TSA REPORTS THAT IT MET THE SCREENING MANDATE AS IT APPLIES TO DOMESTIC
CARGO, BUT PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED DATA LIMITATIONS AND OTHER CHALLENGES
PERSIST
TSA took several actions to address the 9/11 Commission Act mandate
to screen 100 percent of air cargo as it applies to domestic cargo
transported on passenger aircraft by August 2010. As of August 2010,
TSA reported that it met the 9/11 Commission Act mandate to screen 100
percent of air cargo as it applies to domestic cargo, although in June
2010 we reported that TSA lacked a mechanism to verify the accuracy of
the data used to make this determination.
To help meet the mandate, TSA took several actions, among them:
TSA created a voluntary program to facilitate screening throughout
the air cargo supply chain.--Since TSA concluded that relying solely on
air carriers to conduct screening would result in significant cargo
backlogs and flight delays, TSA created the voluntary Certified Cargo
Screening Program (CCSP) to allow screening to take place earlier in
the shipping process, prior to delivering the cargo to the air carrier.
Under the CCSP, facilities at various points in the air cargo supply
chain, such as shippers, manufacturers, warehousing entities,
distributors, third-party logistics companies, and freight forwarders
that are located in the United States, may voluntarily apply to TSA to
become certified cargo screening facilities (CCSF).\9\ TSA initiated
the CCSP at 18 U.S. airports that process high volumes of air cargo,
and then expanded the program to all U.S. airports in early 2009.
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\9\ A freight forwarder is a company that consolidates cargo from
multiple shippers onto a master air waybill--a manifest of the
consolidated shipment--and delivers the shipment to air carriers for
transport. For the purpose of this statement, the term freight
forwarder only includes those freight forwarders that are regulated by
TSA, also referred to as indirect air carriers.
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TSA is taking steps to test technologies for screening air
cargo..--To test select screening technologies among CCSFs, TSA created
the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot in January 2008, and selected
some of the Nation's largest freight forwarders to use these
technologies and report on their experiences.\10\ In a separate effort,
in July 2009, DHS's Directorate for Science and Technology completed
the Air Cargo Explosives Detection Pilot Program that tested the
performance of select baggage screening technologies for use in
screening air cargo at three U.S. airports. In March 2009, TSA
initiated a qualification process to test these and other technologies
for air carriers and CCSP participants to use in meeting the screening
mandate against TSA technical requirements. In December 2009, TSA
issued to air carriers and CCSFs its first list of qualified
technologies which included X-ray and explosives detection systems
(EDS) models that the agency approved for screening air cargo under the
9/11 Commission Act. Over the past several years, TSA has evaluated and
qualified additional technologies and has issued subsequent lists, most
recently in February 2011. These technologies were in addition to the
canine and physical search screening methods permitted by TSA.
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\10\ Initially, the Air Cargo Screening Technology Pilot was
limited to high-volume freight forwarders (i.e., freight forwarders
processing at least 200 shipments annually per location that contain
cargo consolidated from multiple shippers). However, in November 2008,
TSA issued a second announcement seeking additional high-volume freight
forwarders and independent cargo screening facilities to apply for the
pilot.
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TSA expanded its explosives detection canine program.--As of
February 2011, TSA officials stated that the agency had 113 dedicated
air cargo screening canine teams--operating in 20 airports--and was in
the process of adding 7 additional canine teams. TSA headquarters
officials explained that two CCSFs are participating in a pilot program
to test the feasibility of using private canine teams--that meet TSA
standards--to inspect air cargo. Officials stated that the pilot is
expected to continue through summer 2011.
Even with these actions, TSA continues to face challenges that,
among other things, could limit the agency's ability to provide
reasonable assurance that screening is being conducted at reported
levels. Among the challenges and recommendations previously identified
in our June 2010 report are the following.
Reported screening data.--TSA does not have a mechanism to
verify screening data--which are self-reported by industry
representatives. In our June 2010 report, we recommended that
TSA develop a mechanism to verify the accuracy of all screening
data through random checks or other practical means.\11\ TSA
partially concurred with our recommendation, and stated that
verifying the accuracy of domestic screening data will continue
to be a challenge because there is no means to cross-reference
local screening logs--which include screening information on
specific shipments--with screening reports submitted by air
carriers to TSA that do not contain such information. Given
that the agency uses these data to report to Congress its
compliance with the screening mandate as it applies to domestic
cargo, we continue to believe that verifying the accuracy of
the screening data is important so that TSA will be better
positioned to provide reasonable assurance that screening is
being conducted at reported levels.
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\11\ GAO-10-880T.
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Screening technology.--TSA has not approved or qualified any
equipment to screen cargo transported on unit-load device (ULD)
pallets or containers--both of which are common means of
transporting air cargo on wide-body passenger aircraft--both
domestic and inbound aircraft.\12\ Cargo transported on wide-
body passenger aircraft makes up 76 percent of domestic air
cargo shipments transported on passenger aircraft. The maximum
size cargo configuration that may be screened is a 48 48 65 "
skid--much smaller than the large pallets that are typically
transported on wide-body passenger aircraft. Prior to May 1,
2010, canine screening was the only screening method, other
than physical search, approved by TSA to screen such cargo
configurations. However, effective May 1, 2010, the agency no
longer allows canine teams to screen ULD pallets and containers
given TSA concerns about the effectiveness of this screening
method for those cargo configurations. In addition, TSA is
working to complete qualification testing of additional air
cargo screening technologies; thus, until all stages of
qualification testing are concluded, the agency may not have
reasonable assurance that the technologies that air carriers
and program participants are currently allowed to use to screen
air cargo are effective. TSA is conducting qualification
testing to determine which screening technologies are effective
at the same time that air carriers are using these technologies
to meet the mandated requirement to screen air cargo
transported on passenger aircraft. While we recognize that
certain circumstances, such as mandated deadlines, require
expedited deployment of technologies, our prior work has shown
that programs with immature technologies have experienced
significant cost and schedule growth.\13\
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\12\ Qualified technologies have undergone a TSA-sponsored test
process. Approved technologies are conditionally approved for screening
operations for a period of 36 months from the date added to the
approved technology list while continuing to undergo further testing
for qualification.
\13\ See GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD's
Weapons Programs Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines, GAO-09-
543T (Washington, DC: Apr. 1, 2009).
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Inspection resources.--As we reported in June 2010, for domestic
air cargo, TSA amended its inspections plan to include inspections of
CCSP participants, but the agency had not completed its staffing study
to determine how many inspectors will be necessary to provide oversight
of the additional program participants that would support the screening
mandate. In our June 2010 report, we recommended that TSA create
milestones to help ensure completion of the staffing study. TSA
concurred and stated that as part of the staffing study, the agency is
working to develop a model to identify the number of required
transportation security inspectors and that this effort would be
completed in the fall of 2010. As of February 2011, TSA officials
stated that the study was in the final stages of review.
TSA HAS TAKEN STEPS TO ENHANCE THE SECURITY OF INBOUND AIR CARGO, BUT
PREVIOUSLY IDENTIFIED SCREENING DATA LIMITATIONS AND OTHER CHALLENGES
PERSIST
TSA has taken a number of steps to enhance the security of inbound
air cargo, as discussed below.
TSA moved its deadline for meeting the 100 percent screening
mandate as it applies to inbound air cargo.--TSA officials stated that
they plan to meet the 9/11 Commission Act mandate as it applies to
inbound air cargo transported on passenger aircraft by December 2011--2
years earlier than the TSA administrator reported to Congress in
November 2010. According to TSA officials, the agency determined it was
feasible to require air carriers to meet a December 2011 screening
deadline as a result of trends in carrier reported screening data and
discussions with air cargo industry leaders regarding progress made by
industry to secure inbound cargo on passenger aircraft.
Effective May 1, 2010, air carriers were required to submit inbound
screening data to TSA. According to TSA officials, in analyzing this
self-reported screening data, TSA found that carriers were screening a
higher percentage of air cargo than TSA had initially estimated. For
example, TSA previously estimated that 65 percent of inbound cargo by
weight would be screened by August 2010. Based on data submitted to TSA
by the air carriers, TSA officials stated that the agency estimates
that about 80 percent of inbound cargo by weight was screened for the
same time period. In addition to requiring air carriers to submit
screening data to TSA, in May 2010, TSA also required air carriers to
screen a certain percentage of shrink-wrapped and banded inbound
cargo.\14\ TSA officials stated that in implementing this requirement,
air carriers determined that it was more efficient to screen larger
groupings of cargo at the point of origin, which resulted in more than
the required percentage being screened. Therefore, according to TSA
officials, continued progress made by industry will help TSA to meet
its December 31, 2011, deadline to screen 100 percent of inbound
passenger cargo.
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\14\ Details on TSA's screening requirements are Sensitive Security
Information and are not discussed in this statement. Banded cargo is
cargo with heavy-duty metal, plastic, or nylon bands that secure all
sides of the cargo shipment or secure the cargo shipment to a skid.
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TSA is working with foreign governments to draft international air
cargo security standards and to harmonize standards with foreign
partners.\15\ According to TSA officials, the agency has worked with
foreign counterparts over the last 3 years to draft Amendment 12 to the
International Civil Aviation Organization's (ICAO) Annex 17, and to
generate support for its adoption by ICAO members. The amendment, which
was adopted by the ICAO Council in November 2010, will set forth new
standards related to air cargo such as requiring members to establish a
system to secure the air cargo supply chain (the flow of goods from
manufacturers to retailers). TSA has also supported the International
Air Transport Association's (IATA) efforts to establish a secure supply
chain approach to screening cargo for its member airlines and to have
these standards recognized internationally. Moreover, following the
October 2010 bomb attempt in cargo originating in Yemen, DHS, and TSA,
among other things, reached out to international partners, IATA, and
the international shipping industry to emphasize the global nature of
transportation security threats and the need to strengthen air cargo
security through enhanced screening and preventative measures. TSA also
deployed a team of security inspectors to Yemen to provide that
country's government with assistance and guidance on their air cargo
screening procedures.
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\15\ Harmonization, as defined by DHS, refers to countries' efforts
to coordinate their security standards and practices to enhance
security as well as the mutual recognition and acceptance of existing
security standards and practices aimed at achieving the same security
outcome.
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In November 2010, TSA officials stated that the agency is
coordinating with foreign countries to evaluate the comparability of
their air cargo security requirements with those of the United States.
According to TSA officials, the agency has developed a program, the
National Cargo Security Program (NCSP), that would recognize the air
cargo security programs of foreign countries if TSA deems those
programs provide a level of security commensurate with TSA's programs.
TSA plans to coordinate with the top 20 air cargo volume countries,
which, according to TSA officials, export about 90 percent of the air
cargo transported to the United States on passenger aircraft. According
to officials, TSA has completed a review of one country's air cargo
security program and has determined that its requirements are
commensurate with those of the United States. TSA considers air
carriers adhering to NCSP approved programs as being in compliance with
TSA air cargo security requirements, according to TSA officials. As of
February 2011, TSA continues to evaluate the comparability of air cargo
security programs for several other countries. TSA officials stated
that although the December 31, 2011, deadline to achieve 100 percent
screening is independent of this effort, the agency plans to recognize
as many commensurate programs as possible by the deadline.
TSA implemented additional security measures following the October
2010 Yemen air cargo bomb attempt.--On November 8, 2010, DHS announced
security measures in response to the Yemen incident. TSA banned cargo
originating from Yemen and Somalia from transport into the United
States; banned the transport of cargo deemed high risk on passenger
aircraft; prohibited the transport of toner and ink cartridges weighing
16 ounces or more on passenger aircraft in carry-on and checked
luggage; and required additional screening of high-risk cargo prior to
transport on an all-cargo aircraft. In addition, TSA is working closely
with CBP, industry and international partners to expedite the receipt
of advanced cargo data for international flights to the United States
prior to departure in order to more effectively identify and screen
items based on risk and current intelligence. Further, in December
2010, TSA, CBP, and the air cargo industry launched a new joint
technology pilot project referred to as the air cargo advance screening
program to enhance the sharing of electronic shipping information to
improve the identification of high-risk cargo. In February 2011, TSA
officials stated that this effort is currently focused on all-cargo
carriers and will expand to passenger carriers in the future.
Even with these steps to improve the security of inbound air cargo,
as we previously reported in June 2010, TSA faces challenges that could
hinder its ability to meet the 9/11 Commission Act screening mandate as
it applies to inbound cargo.
TSA lacks a mechanism to verify data on screening conducted on
inbound air cargo.--As we reported in June 2010, questions exist about
the reliability of TSA's reported screening data for inbound cargo
because TSA does not have a mechanism to verify the accuracy of the
data reported by industry. In June 2010, we reported that TSA's
screening percentages were estimated based on screening requirements of
certain countries and were not based on actual data collected from air
carriers or other entities, such as foreign governments. In this
report, we recommended that TSA develop a mechanism to verify the
accuracy of all screening data through random checks or other practical
means and obtain actual data on all inbound screening. TSA concurred in
part with our recommendation and issued changes to air carriers'
standard security programs that required air carriers to report inbound
cargo screening data to TSA. However, these requirements apply to air
carriers and the screening that they conduct or that may be conducted
by a foreign government, but does not reflect screening conducted by
other entities throughout the air cargo supply chain. As of March 2011,
TSA officials stated that current screening percentages are based on
actual data reported by air carriers, but stated that it is difficult
to verify the accuracy of the screening data reported by air carriers.
Given that TSA now plans to meet the 9/11 Commission Act screening
mandate as it applies to inbound air cargo by December 2011, it will be
important for TSA to have complete and accurate data in hand to verify
that this mandate is being met.
TSA has limited authority to regulate foreign governments or
entities.--TSA may require that foreign air carriers with operations
to, from, or within the United States comply with any applicable
requirements, including TSA-issued emergency amendments to air carrier
security programs, but foreign countries, as sovereign nations,
generally cannot be compelled to implement specific aviation security
standards or mutually accept other countries' security measures.
International representatives have noted that National sovereignty
concerns limit the influence the United States and its foreign partners
can have in persuading any country to participate in international
harmonization efforts, or make specific changes in their screening
procedures. Thus, TSA authority abroad is generally limited to
regulating air carrier operations, including the transport of cargo,
into the United States. It has no other authority to require foreign
governments or entities to, for example, screen a certain percentage of
air cargo or screen cargo using specific procedures.
No technology is currently approved or qualified by TSA to screen
cargo once it is loaded onto a unit-load device.--As we noted earlier
for domestic air cargo, TSA has not approved any equipment to screen
cargo transported on unit-load device (ULD) pallets or containers--both
of which are common means of transporting air cargo on wide-body
passenger aircraft--on both domestic and inbound aircraft. As a result,
questions remain about air carriers' ability to effectively and
efficiently screen air cargo bound for the United States. This is
particularly important because, as we reported in June 2010, about 96
percent of inbound air cargo arrives on wide-body aircraft, and TSA has
limited authority to oversee the screening activities of foreign
governments or entities. We will be examining these issues as part of
our on-going review of TSA's efforts to secure inbound air cargo for
the House Committee on Homeland Security and Senate Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. We plan to issue the final
results later this year. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I
look forward to answering any questions that you or other Members of
the subcommittee may have.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Lord. We appreciate your
testimony. Both of you have taken the time to be here.
At this time, without objection, there is unanimous consent
to insert into the hearing record a statement from the
Airforwarders Association regarding on-going efforts to secure
air cargo and its recommendation.
Ms. Jackson Lee. No objection.
Mr. Rogers. That is excellent. So inserted.
[The information follows:]
Letter Submitted for the Record by the Airforwarders Association
March 9, 2011.
The Honorable Mike Rogers,
Chair, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, Committee on Homeland
Security, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20510.
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Transportation Security, Committee on
Homeland Security, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington,
DC 20510.
Dear Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Jackson Lee: The
Airforwarders Association (AfA), the voice of the freight forwarding
industry representing over 300 dues-paying member companies with 1,260
facilities and 6,300 employees, respectfully submits the following
comments in advance of the March 9 hearing on air commerce. Our members
include a broad range of businesses including both multinational
logistics companies with hundreds of employees and facilities as well
as small, ``mom and pop'' operations with a single facility.
We applaud the committee's dedication to active oversight of TSA
and engagement of industry stakeholders. The recent 100% screening
deadline for domestic cargo was a monumental achievement for homeland
security and was achieved through the hard work of all in the industry,
supported by TSA and Congress. As the next Herculean task is now at
hand, it is perhaps even more important that this committee continues
to work collaboratively and innovatively with TSA, CBP, and
stakeholders.
In December 2010, the Transportation Security Administration
announced that, due to the recent bomb plots originating in Yemen, all
international in-bound air cargo on passenger flights must be screened
by December 2011. This announcement was a notable departure from
previous estimates provided by TSA; with key administrators including
today's witness, John Sammon, stating that screening would not be
possible until 2013 at the earliest.
The Airforwarders Association is committed to improving aviation
security and understands that the seriousness of the recent threats
necessitates a change in TSA policies. It is this commitment to
ensuring real security--both physical and economic--is provided that we
urge the committee to examine a few areas of particular importance.
With today's hearing, it is our hope that you will be provided
satisfactory answers to updates on domestic screening, progress on
international screening, and the nature of the plan in place to achieve
screening by the deadline proposed.
These areas of concern are:
Harmonization of Screening and Security Programs.--TSA has worked
diligently with our international partners to reach agreements on
security protocols. However, this multilateral diplomatic effort is not
swift enough to include the majority of cargo passing through the
global supply chain en route to the United States.
Recommendations:
1. TSA should continue to aggressively review existing security
programs, including screening technologies and policies like
Known Consignor, and identify points of commonality to
streamline the international screening process. TSA should
approve other nation's security programs and immediately list
the locations where a level of security commensurate to
domestic cargo screening can be verified.
2. TSA must be directed to harmonize security standards and
programs. For example, several European nations are using
pallet-screening technologies that have met security standards
within their nation. These methods should be recognized and
approved by TSA for a limited duration of time leading up to
and beyond the 2011 deadline to ensure cargo continues to move
efficiently through the supply chain.
3. We encourage Congress to be vigilant in their oversight, and
regularly review both progress and policy details as agreements
are reached. Industry feedback would be particularly valuable
to evaluating the progress, efficacy, and unforeseen impacts of
reaching such an ambitious goal in such a short period of time.
Harmonization of Passenger and All-Cargo Security Programs.--While
the volume of international cargo carried by all-cargo aircraft and
integrated carriers is considerable, this should not be an excuse for
developing two distinct and separate levels of security for cargo. As
learned in Yemen, cargo is a target, regardless of the type of aircraft
it is flying.
Recommendations:
1. TSA should continue to work on the existing pilot program in
place internationally to obtain data manifest information, and
participants should be expanded to include the full universe of
air carriers and forwarders rather than just all-cargo
aircraft.
2. The working groups established by TSA should be made permanent
and carry reporting requirements in their charters. These
groups include participants of both passenger and all-cargo
operations and facilitate dialogue that will surely improve
aviation security.
3. Screening should include the methods being explored by CBP and
the pilot program. We suggest that data mining and risk
targeting be included in the definition of screening, as
defined in the ``Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act.''
Defraying Costs of an Unfunded Mandate.--It is widely believed
within the industry that the cost of international screening will be
borne by air carriers and forwarders, as it was with domestic
screening. Indeed, to accomplish 100% international screening in a
year, it seems inevitable that carriers, forwarders, and shippers will
bear additional responsibilities and costs to conduct screening prior
to loading with no financial assistance from TSA or Congress.
Recommendations:
1. Congress should direct GAO to work with TSA and the industry to
prepare a report on the state of the industry no less than 6
months after the December deadline. A full report detailing the
economic impact on industry, areas of concern as well as areas
for improvement will assist in ensuring that Congressional
intent--providing a more secure air cargo environment without
disrupting commerce--has been achieved with the existing
programs and technology.
2. Funding for industry-led screening initiatives should be
provided, be it through low-interest loans, grants, or tax
incentives. Without this funding, U.S.-based air carriers
transporting cargo to the United States are at a distinct
competitive disadvantage, in terms of time for screening and
additional costs passed on to the shipper due to screening.
The Airforwarders Association looks forward to continuing our
dialogue on these issues with the committee. The Airforwarders
Association is the only dues-based association that represents the full
spectrum of the forwarding industry and regularly polls our membership
to assess a true sense of the issues that affect forwarders.
Brandon Fried,
Executive Director.
Mr. Rogers. Now, we are going to move to our normal
question time. I will start with me and then we will alternate
between each side 5 minutes apiece in the order that Members
were here to follow the gap.
First, Mr. Lord, you just talked about achieving 100
percent cargo screening of in-bound cargo but that was just on
passenger planes. Am I right?
Mr. Lord. Yes, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. That is not anywhere close on cargo. Just
air cargo planes?
Mr. Lord. Yes. The 9/11 Act mandate only pertains to cargo
moved on passenger aircrafts. There is no 100 percent screening
requirement related to all cargo.
Mr. Rogers. Do you have any idea? If you don't, that is
fine. But do you have any idea of what percentage of air cargo
that is not on a passenger plane is being screened at present,
both domestic and in-bound foreign air cargo.
Mr. Lord. I have a general estimate in our June report, we
estimated there is about 18 to 19 million pounds are moved a
day on passenger aircrafts. That represents about 20 percent of
the total. So just doing the math, about 90 million pounds are
moved each day on the--in all cargo--you know, non-passenger
aircrafts. So the bulk of the cargo is moved on all-cargo
carriers that are not subject to the 9/11 Act requirements.
Mr. Rogers. Right. A few minutes ago in your opening
statement, you talked about how many pounds were being moved.
But how many packages that are crates or whatever they have
shaped in?
Mr. Lord. You know, I don't know. The way they measure how
much is moved is by weight, so it is not broken down in terms
of pieces. Perhaps Mr. Sammon would have a ballpark estimate. I
certainly don't.
Mr. Rogers. Do you, Mr. Sammon? Put your microphone.
Mr. Sammon. I don't have an estimate with me but we can get
one for the committee in terms of----
Mr. Rogers. Yes.
Mr. Sammon [continuing]. The pieces. It varies by segment
of business. The all-cargo folks will have much heavier weight,
fewer pieces. Federal Express, UPS will have--they have about
25 percent of the weight but their piece--low. It is probably--
maybe half over.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you very much.
In line of the recent air cargo bomb threat originating out
of Yemen, can you provide an update to this committee on the
work that TSA has done over the last 4\1/2\ months to secure
international airborne cargo? Obviously, you have made great
strides and you think you are going to get that target. Can you
describe for us what you have done, Mr. Sammon to have that
success?
Mr. Sammon. Well, we have--first of all, in Yemen, we have
had a team who have traveled to Yemen to provide screening and
training assistance to the Yemenis, offer of screening
equipment, to test their screening equipment, to calibrate it
but spend time with Yemenis to actually have cargo screened.
In addition to on-the-ground work, we have put in specific
security protocols for cargo coming out of Yemen, still
concerned in terms of the level of activity and terrorist
activity in Yemen, and so there are specific protocols in place
for Yemen.
Beyond Yemen, we realized that this threat is not confined
to that one country. Many more countries, these folks have
affiliates and friends throughout the Middle East, North
Africa, Europe, South Asia that we have been working closely
with the air carriers. I personally have been leading efforts
to work with the carriers to focus on how we stop the next
attempt.
The goal we have started everyone of those conversation is
that we don't want to lose a plane. It is a common goal, it is
the Government's goal, it is their goal, and it is not imposed
regulatory exercise. It is something that we have to figure out
how we do that.
We have developed with our intelligence people and carriers
a series of protocols. Those protocols were published last
Friday to carriers and secured WebBoards, become effective this
coming Thursday. But we do think it is--they are just both
focused, measured, and directed to what we perceive to be the
current intelligence-based threat.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Mr. Sammon, I understand that the latest
version of TSA's security directive and emergency amendment
related to the Yemen cargo incident will go into effect
tomorrow at March 10. I know that TSA has worked very hard and
collaboratively with industry stakeholders such as UPS, FedEx,
and DHL to develop a meaningful security directive to address
the current threat environment in a manner that makes sense.
Yet I am being told by some in industry that the latest
version of the security directive and emergency amendment is a
bit confusing to understand and subject to different
interpretations by different private sector entities. Can you
explain or offer some reasoning as to why the version is
confusing? Will TSA be working with industry in the coming days
to revise that?
Mr. Sammon. Again, we have--the amendment has it--or the
security directive as it went out, first of all, we did
separate mails--upon request to the mail, upon request to
carriers. There is a security directive, which applies
specifically to mail. That was again at the request of the
postal service and the carriers who handle auto-mail.
Next is that these directives are actually legal documents.
So again, they are not--in all these security directives, the
easiest things the world understand because they are basically
have to serve as a legal regulatory document.
We have hosted a--Doug Brittin is our General Manager of
Air Cargo, call us with the passenger carriers and the postal
service on Monday. We have hosted--we have published--we have
put them on the WebBoard on Friday night and we can read it
over. Monday, we had a call at PASMA carriers. In the postal
service, we had a call of the all-cargo carriers yesterday. We
will have another call, I think----
Mr. Rogers. If you have the conference call, you may insert
it.
Mr. Sammon. Okay. Yes, sir. It was upon invitation of the
ATA or the Cargo Aircraft Association, and so we are going
through this.
In this document, it is designed to be very specific. It is
not just go screen everything. We are trying to get very
specific in it and there are references to things that we need
to explain and we are going through in developing aids that
will describe in a flowchart how that actually works. But the
legal documents are--they are somewhat painstaking to read. I
don't disagree with the folks but we are taking the time.
Mr. Rogers. Yes. Well, I am glad to hear the detail. I just
want to make sure that, you know, when it is read, the person
knows exactly the message is being communicated and it is not
subject to really much interpretation or variance and
interpretation.
My time is up. I yield to Ranking Member Ms. Jackson Lee of
Texas.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Chairman, thank you very much. For the
witnesses, again thank you for both of your service and your
testimony.
Mr. Chairman, while I am--before open hearing, I wish to
offer my sympathy to the U.S. Marshals Service that encountered
an incident last 24 to 48 hours. We understand that one of the
U.S. marshals did not survive, and I offer my sympathy to their
families and wounded families, local officers and to all those
who serve in the National service, which we are greatly
indebted to.
I appreciate that there is a lot of hard work that is going
on on-air cargo screening. I think the GAO provides enormously
valuable service. It helps us that it raises some enormously
serious questions.
Let me, Mr. Sammon, go to you on the question of
certification of the airline industry on in-bound flights and
how comfortable we are with the protocols that are in place for
certification now.
Mr. Sammon. That is a----
Ms. Jackson Lee. This is a self-certification.
Mr. Sammon. That is a very good question. The issue as we--
in my statements, we talked about our authority and our ability
to inspect. In the United States, we have broad and we are
vigorously exercising that.
Overseas, we are relying upon people certifications and
statements as to what they are doing. It is very difficult.
There are a number of countries who have country programs. We
are certifying, approving. I will say we are a handful now and
we are going to continue but that risk will grow. In that case,
you will have a government inspector who will be inspecting the
carrier's activity according to program which is either the
same or very similar to our standards, but absent those country
certifications were based on someone's statement.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me be clear, absent countries or
absent a way to confirm airline certification. Are you saying
you want an extra level of oversight where the countries are
engaged given the inspector process?
Mr. Sammon. Yes, ma'am. What we found in the United States
is unless our inspectors are in that facility and see what is
going on and able to observe specific records in that facility,
you really don't know what is happening to be able to certify
that it is all being screened. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. To follow up, how much cargo screening is
going on at the large gateway airports? Do you believe airlines
are still at the 80 percent level?
Mr. Sammon. That is the figure that has been reported on a
monthly basis that they are reporting. Now, we have found--in
going through this process, and I think as Chairman Rogers
alluded to with security directors that people are--we are
finding that the questions referring back to their existing
programs, they may not be doing all of the things we thought
they were doing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, let me quickly move to Mr. Lord.
Your last words were, ``We need technology, intelligence stamp.
Define policy and procedures and oversight.'' Does it trouble
you that we are dependent upon self-certification on in-bound
cargo coming in? What are you seeking to when you walk for
those five bullet points?
Mr. Lord. In terms of the in-bound issue, I think it is
going to be exceedingly difficult to set up a system to screen
that cargo. So the fallback is you mutually recognize other
countries' programs that is providing a commensurate level of
security. TSA, to your credit, they are working that angle as
well. So it is just a fact of life.
Ms. Jackson Lee. If we don't have treaties or corporation
or the ability of our officers to go in or ability to assess
the kind of trained inspectors that are in France, Germany, or
anywhere else, isn't that a problem?
Mr. Lord. Well, it is a problem if you don't have access.
The good news is that air cargo flow is heavily concentrated in
20 countries. So if you establish some sort of treaty or system
to ensure that cargo is screened, you are dealing with about 90
percent of the problem.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you think we at least leave that kind
of cooperative treaty that would include the opportunity maybe
for our officers to select three inspects or to have an
inspection over a number of months or some involvement of our
TSO officers?
Mr. Lord. It is a very sensitive issue. Obviously, there
are some sovereignty concerns. Foreign governments are raised.
So I know TSA is working this angle as part of their inspection
program.
Obviously, if you can conduct joint inspections, that would
work effectively, or if you could be involved in some capacity.
But foreign countries in general, including our friends in the
European Union are very sensitive about given the appearance
that we have access a full regulatory authority in our market.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I understand that. Let me just quickly say
this. Mr. Sammon, if you can just give me a yes or no. We have
had some perimeter questions, intrusion on perimeter in terms
of incidences. Do you think we need to begin to look at the
perimeter security of airports?
Mr. Sammon. Yes, ma'am. We are doing a--setting standards
where the best practice standards for perimeter security and
doing a review of airports to see where they are. There is a
wide variety of technologies at JFK and New York. They are
spending a lot of money on radar detection systems that they
can detect whatever is at the perimeter.
At other airports, they have installed a wire they called
guillotine wire that as they try to drive to the fence, it
basically takes the car off. There is a wide range of--and some
places do not very good and they just have a fence.
So but we will--your question is extremely appropriate.
There is not a common understanding of what are all of the
standards in place, what should the standard be, and how
specific airports relate to that standard. A very good
question.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for
your indulgence.
Mr. Rogers. Thanks, Ranking Member.
My colleague and friend from Alabama, Mr. Brooks, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sammon and Mr.
Lord, I am going to ask questions but feel free to volunteer,
they're directed to both of you and whoever wishes to field
that, go ahead and please do so.
What percentage of incoming international passenger planes
carry cargo shipments in their holds?
Mr. Sammon. In some fashion, from a single box to a large
pallets and--virtually--I would say virtually all.
Mr. Brooks. That being the case, how long in your judgment
will it be before TSA has arranged some kind of system or
agreement by which all of the cargo coming into United States
on passenger planes has been adequately screened?
Mr. Sammon. I think that is the issue that we are
discussing here in terms of whether it is self-certification
and how well you can verify it. I think that is why, in my
statement, I had the discussion of our own program and the
inspection and compliance aspects of it. We find that the
majority of folks, the large percentage of people all right are
complying with the program and doing what they want. Some are
misunderstood or confused and there are other who were out
like--outright trying the cheaper programs.
So we have a wide range and unless you can inspect on the
ground, it is very difficult to get--to be able to come back to
this committee and say I know that 100 percent is screened.
Mr. Brooks. Well, do you have a judgment as to how long it
will be before TSA has a process in place by which 100 percent
of all incoming cargo on international passenger flights is
screened?
Mr. Sammon. So what we have done right now is we have out
for comment that very issue in front of the carriers to see the
feasibility from the carriers. We are reviewing our comments
and we will be examining those comments and making a
determination on that to get that very answer because there has
to be the carriers and host governments who actually has to do
the screening. TSA personnel will not be doing the screening
overseas.
Mr. Brooks. Fair to say then that as of now you have no
judgment as to when we will be in position to safely screen all
cargo and incoming passenger flights?
Mr. Sammon. I think we have to digest those comments and
assess the feasibility because two issues are----
Mr. Brooks. My question is really a yes or no.
Mr. Sammon. Yes.
Mr. Brooks. As of now, you have no judgment as to when?
Mr. Sammon. Yes. Right.
Mr. Brooks. All right. Thank you.
You mentioned something about who will actually be doing
the inspections of cargo coming in from overseas. If I
understood you correctly, you said that there would be no TSA
personnel involved in that process?
Mr. Sammon. TSA personnel do inspections today upon
invitation in cooperation with the host government. Generally,
that involves the entity being aware of these inspections. So
if--you know, today you are going to be inspected, things might
look just fine. Tomorrow might be a different story.
Mr. Brooks. How much of the in-coming cargo international
passenger flights is now being screened by TSA personnel?
Mr. Sammon. None is being screened by TSA personnel.
Mr. Brooks. How comfortable are you with that situation?
Mr. Sammon. That is why we are working with the countries
diligently to try to get in place specific approvals of their
programs that will be comparable to our standards. That takes
time, and we believe that it is a timely process. That is why
we have asked the carriers for comments to see what their
opinion of that is because the carriers are the ones who
actually will have to screen the cargo--either the carrier or
the host government.
Mr. Brooks. My question is: How comfortable are you with
that situation?
Mr. Sammon. I am not comfortable with that. I know that I
can look at you in the eye and say it is all being screened 100
percent.
Mr. Brooks. I yield the remainder of my time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Richmond is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Richmond. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member.
Let's go back to that--from where my colleague just left
off and in terms of how comfortable you are with either the
carrier or the host country. I guess, what I would like to know
in your opinion, do you think the world is there on their part
to reach our same goal which is 100 percent screening?
Mr. Sammon. I think it is in many countries. For instance,
the European Union has a program very similar to our program--a
supply chain-based program but they have a 3-year window in
terms of getting other countries on--who are members of the
European Union up to that standard. So they are in a different
time frame than the end of this year.
Mr. Richmond. Another question that was already raised with
the perimeter security and you said that just setting standards
for perimeter security, what about once you enter the confines
of an airport in terms of security around a passenger plane or
that immediate area in the same security that would be around a
cargo plane because most of the time, when they are in a
different part of the airport to strictly cargo planes?
Mr. Sammon. Yes. But in terms of the security or the
personnel background check, badges and whatever they should be
comparable. The question, I think, is: How secure is the fence?
Can people throw things over the fence? Do people have access
through the fence--openings? There are vendor deliveries
through the fence and that is an issue, I think, that may vary
airport-to-airport, and I think that is one thing we want to
have awareness of and have standards so we know what should be
in place.
Mr. Richmond. So you would wanted to vary airport-to-
airport but you are comfortable in saying that it is consistent
within the airport with cargo and passenger planes?
Mr. Sammon. The standards are consistent. Yes, in terms of
the requirements for airport perimeter security, they are not--
there isn't a standard requirement. So we are looking at it as
what are the best--we have just completed a survey with the
Homeland Security Institute in terms of what are the best
practice perimeter requirements.
Some of these are very expensive, some of these are low-
cost and what we are doing is looking at that and then
measuring the airports and assessment by the airports to say
where do I stand vis-a-vis these elements of security.
Perimeter security is one of them.
Then to go back to say what are the gaps and we may come
back to this committee and say, here is what we see, here are
various airports that meet the standard and here are a number
of the don'ts, and how do you think we should see with that to
fix it. That is a very good question.
Mr. Richmond. What about cockpit security in terms of cargo
planes? I know in our passenger planes that we have gone
through just more enormous tries to make sure that it is safe.
On cargo planes, do you have the same strictly secured
cockpit on pallets? What do we have on?
Mr. Sammon. It varies. Some are air carriers have just put
it in and some has not.
Mr. Richmond. So for at least domestic or United States, we
don't have a standard--we don't have a rule.
Mr. Sammon. There is not hardened cockpit door requirement.
Again, the current requirement that is in place for the
passenger carrier is put in by the FAA but they are going to--
the security issue as you--you are getting to which is proper.
But there is not a standard for cargo aircraft in terms of the
door's security. No, sir.
Mr. Richmond. But many times, the cargo planes are
transporting things that require human escort. So you will
passengers on a strictly cargo plane.
Mr. Sammon. Yes, sir. There are--each cargo operator has a
cargo security program and those kinds of situation, I think we
will say live animals, horses, whatever else----
Mr. Richmond. Right.
Mr. Sammon [continuing]. Have trainers and attendants and
so on and so forth. But there are specific protocols they need
to follow for those situations, yes.
Mr. Richmond. Do you think that is something we need to
address in terms of making sure that those cockpits are
secured?
Mr. Sammon. It has been an issue we have had with the
conversations with the industry over the years. At this point
in time, we don't have it at the highest point on our focus at
this point in time but it is certainly something that comes up.
Again, the fact that certain carriers have felt that it is a
necessary thing and others haven't had a wide range of opinions
on that.
Mr. Richmond. Those that don't have it, are they required
to have a security personnel on the plane or----
Mr. Sammon. There are again security protocols, and I don't
want to give them ideas in terms of what they are but specific
security protocols in terms of what they are required to do in
terms of securing the aircraft and the contents that they are
flying.
Mr. Richmond. Mr. Sammon, thank you for your answers.
Mr. Lord, I apologize that I didn't get any to you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. Lord, I noticed you will say something in response to
Mr. Brooks' inquiry a little while ago.
Mr. Lord. Yes, I did. Thank you for the opportunity. In
terms of perimeter security and access, we issued a major
report in September 2009, which addressed this issue. The basic
point we raised in our report was we recommended that TSA do a
better job of assessing the nature of the problem at the
Nation's airports.
When we first went--started the engagement, we asked,
``Well, how big is the problem? And where does it vary?'' They
weren't able to answer the question. We asked, ``Have you
completed a vulnerability assessment?'' which basically shows
you why you are weak, and we found only 13 percent of the
airports we have looked at had completed a vulnerability
assessment, which basically shows you, you know, where the
problem areas are.
So in our report, we recommended and to TSA's credit, they
agreed with our recommendation to do a better job of studying
these airports to determine where the weak points where in
terms of perimeter access and security.
Mr. Rogers. Do you have an idea as to when they might have
that study complete?
Mr. Lord. No, they did not, and we will continue to monitor
that as we do with all our report recommendations. But I mean,
it is a basic question that difficulty answering, you know,
where are you weak by airport. Most of the airports did not
have a formal, what we call, a joint vulnerability analysis.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Sammon, how are you addressing that? Is
that something you are just charging each airport for to have
done on their own dime or what?
Mr. Sammon. What we are doing right now is we--and we
retained Homeland Security Institute to do the complete
assessment of study that is about over 100 airports compiling
what are the best practices for--how you do secure the
perimeters? We are creating a tool to do evaluation airport by
airport and to go back, in that way we will have, as Mr. Lord
is recommending, a standard or baseline of knowing what is out
there, what are the gaps? Not only what are the gaps, but how
people have approached that problem and done in the best
practice way as we----
Mr. Rogers. I noticed--on the same question, I will ask--
Mr. Lord, I want to ask you do you have a time line?
Mr. Sammon. The time line--I believe the initial assessment
in terms of the practice is complete, I believe the assessment
tool is going out next month or so, so hopefully by the end of
the year, we will have a better assessment of where this stand.
Mr. Rogers. Is this something you are doing in concert with
the Airport Executive Association?
Mr. Sammon. Yes, completely. For instance, one use of this
will be, I think, in terms of pointing out that those
vulnerabilities as airports apply for FAA funds were physical
improvements. This would be an excellent way to use that--to
get these things improved.
I think one of the more dangerous or misleading phrases I
have heard post-9/11 talking about airport security people say,
if you have seen one airport, you have seen one airport. I have
heard that a million times in the security, it is ridiculous
because there are standards, processes, protocols that are--it
doesn't matter where you are. We ought to be able to compare
LAX to O'Hare to JFK for those kinds of standards that you are
asking about.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent.
Now, when you talked just about air cargo planes and no
passengers, I know that there has been an effort to
dramatically increase the percentage of that cargo that is
being screened. I know that this committee has worked with your
Department to make sure that energy as primarily focused on
intelligence-driven, risk-based efforts but still there are
many who are planning for 100 percent screening of that air
cargo.
Tell me where you are in that area of your responsibilities
and what do you think is realistic, and what are some of the
means by which we can achieve 100 percent if it is physically
possible?
Mr. Sammon. Okay. I think--again, as I stated, in terms of
where we are going with this whole process, I personally have
been dealing with all the carriers, dealing with the carrier
calls, coming up with solutions, briefing the Secretary,
briefing the White House, briefing various other parties.
Basically, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is a clear war
on U.S. aviation. They fired the first two shots December 2009,
the cargo plot October 2010. So we are in the deadly serious
fight. It is no longer hypothetical. It is real.
So what--the question is: Do we push everybody to screen
everything everywhere, or do we try to focus on what we really
think they are coming at?
On the protocols we are rolling out, and I would love to
brief your committee in a private session of where the
intelligence--the discussions for the carriers, what we have
come up with, and why because what we are trying to do is
actually look at if not from a--we do this for passenger, we do
this for cargo. Here is the problem regardless of whether it is
passenger, it is all cargo, it is express carrier, it is mail.
We are trying to deal with it that way regardless of the way
people try to introduce into the stream.
So I guess, the question is and that we are getting
feedback from the carriers in terms of our--as I said, for the
100 percent, we did ask for comments. One thing in the comment
is: Do you want us to do everything, or do you want us to focus
on the real problem--the tactical problem we have right now
with people we are trying to take down aircraft? So I would say
that that is the issue, I think, we are facing with.
That is real. We have to deal with it. We have to make sure
that whether it is UPS, or whether it is American Airlines, or
whether it is Federal Express that we have protocols in place
so we don't lose a plane. That is the big issue we have.
Mr. Rogers. Yes. To what extent do you--and you know what
extent but to what extent do you think canines are being used
in air cargo screening and how effective are they?
Mr. Sammon. So in the United States, I would say about 17
percent of the cargo that has been screened has been screened
by K-9s. K-9s are very flexible and versatile, particularly for
pallets and individual packages also.
Overseas, there are programs--E.C., European Commission.
European Union has a set of standards. They have approved, I
believe, about six countries that have met those standards and
we have--we are recognizing those also. But I think,
particularly for larger skids and things like this, the K-9s
are a very effective tool.
I think they--we think highly of them. We have 120--about
130 teams right now that are dedicated to cargo because we
think that is a--K-9s are effective.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you very much.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me ask--the gentleman ask one more
thing, and this is for both of you. You are very interested and
I know I am very interested and several other Members on the
committee talked to me about their interest in trying to prove
a way needless and unnecessary rules and regulations.
In your discussions with your private sector counterparts--
our partners rather: Do you find that there are some particular
things that we can work to eliminate as far as redundancies are
antiquated regulations or rules that will make their lives
simpler and therefore like to spend more time on the stuff that
really needs to be done?
Mr. Sammon. We have--just in general, we do continuously--
we engage with the carriers, have a working group that is
involved and specifically getting rid and kind of taken out the
spring cleaning and taking out the old stuff and trying to
clean up what is relevant. I think again the old issue here is
given our ability to inspect overseas and given our focus in
terms of what people are actually trying to do is going forward
here is we focus on specific things or do--and do everything,
and that is really the big question at--before the House here.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Lord, have you found anything in your
review of the Department that would leave you--leave the best
in pruning to do?
Mr. Lord. Sure. In some of our past reports, although I
have to give TSA credits for addressing that, we found at least
in the early years, TSA would announce a security directive and
it would never sunshine. It would still be on the books even
though the carrier industries thought there was no additional
need for it or needed to be modified.
But under the current process as Mr. Sammon described it,
they have regular meetings with industry where they revisit the
need for the security directives and that has effectively
proven to--some on the regulation.
Although in terms of redundancy, I find when you are
discussing sensitive security issues, sometimes it is okay to
have some redundancy in terms of the actual layers. In case you
miss something on one layer, you may pick it up on another
layer. So on the security side, that is okay.
But at the same time, when you mentioned a need for 100
percent screening of all cargo, I think it is very important to
also assess the effect on commerce. Obviously, there is a
tension there. You could require very rigorous screening but if
commerce come screeching to a halt, you know, that would be
problematic, so you have to really decide where do you draw the
line. It is a delicate balance----
Mr. Rogers. That is the question the way I framed it, you
know, is in fact realistic. You know, as many on this committee
realized I am a big believer that canines are going to be the
only way that we ultimately ever to achieve anything close to
100 percent screening of air cargo so quick. It is an expensive
and it is effective, and it allows us to then spend the bulk of
our energy on risk-based intelligence-driven searches of things
that we need to be focused on.
You know, if Acme Widget Company is sending a crate of
widgets so they have been sending them every 3 days for 30
years, we have put a lot of attention on that crate from Acme
Widget Company.
But this guy that walks up from Yemen with cash and buys a
one-way ticket, you know, puts--or send it by the--pays to send
$100 printer to United States and it cost $200 of shipping
cost, we kind of not want to focus on that. That is all.
Mr. Sammon. I agree. I totally agree, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Now, I recognize Ranking Member.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I am going to put on the record several
questions and if you can give me as quick an answer that is
accurate as possible. I guess, I would just comment that in the
world of security, we live in a far more difficult structure
and have less latitude to talk about where regulations are not
valid.
I think it is important when the agency itself
constructively looks back what maybe, if you will, a regulation
that has been utilized sufficiently and there is stark and non-
debatable evidence that we don't need to move in that direction
anymore.
I would be very cautious in the security business to talk
about what we might and might not be able to live without. So I
think it is valid. The Chairman has made a point that we
streamline to the extent that we know that works and does not
work.
My questions travel along those--that line of reasoning.
To you, Mr. Lord, in your testimony here today, do you
think there is about 80 percent of screening on in-bound and
that is where you suggested the elements of technology
intelligence that define policies, and procedures, and
oversight, but you said the 20 percent was troubling. If you
can just hold the question, I am going to put out several
questions and I would like you to start with that one first.
Mr. Sammon, one of the continued date in front of us is
December 31, 2011 of which you believe that you will meet
dealing with 100 percent cargo on in-bound passenger aircraft.
What is your time line for reviewing industry comments and
making a final determination? What rule--excuse me--what role
is the DHS Office of Private Sector playing in the process?
Very quickly then, in addition, TSA has been criticized.
One of the issues that we--let me just change that. One of the
issues that is important to me is working with science and
technology. Particularly, as we work with these certified
screening facilities here in the United States, so to what
extent do you feel that you have worked with the most
sophisticated level of technology and to what extent are you
comfortable with the certification of your outside cargo
screeners?
Then last, to you, Mr. Lord, you had reported last time a
concern with TSA's resources for inspecting and otherwise
verifying that the private sector is effectively conducting
screening through the CCSP program. Does TSA now have enough
inspectors, regulatory administrative personnel, and is that
reflected in the President's budget request for fiscal year
2012?
Why don't I start with Mr. Lord on those two questions?
Mr. Lord. Sure. Your first question pertaining to 20
percent----
Ms. Jackson Lee. You are troubled?
Mr. Lord. Yes, I was troubled because the 20 percent
includes all the difficult items to screen. It includes
perishables, fresh produce, sealed pharmaceutical containers,
household appliances that are banded, or large items that are
shrink-wrapped or banded. So how did you screen these items if
it is originating not only in the last point of departure but
in another city that TSA literally has no access to? So that,
to me, is going to be challenging to do.
TSA reports that their deadline is for the new 100 percent
of the in-bound is December of this year, and to me that is not
a lot of time. I think it is important to note TSA has received
over 100 comments on this new deadline. So obviously, industry
have some concerns about being able to do this by December.
I can't reveal what the comments are that as sensitive
information, but there has been a large volume of comments
submitted on this new proposed move.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So that 20 percent is sufficiently of
concern. It may have an impact on securing the homeland.
Mr. Lord. Well, it is a--I am not saying they can't do it,
but another issue we haven't discuss is I am also concerned
about a possible mode ship. This is cargo shipped on passenger
aircraft that you make it too difficult or too expensive to
screen cargo on passenger. It could be a shift to the old cargo
mode. The question I would go to, are you any safer if shippers
simply transfer to the old cargo mode to the extent that is
possible?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Then, are there resources?
Mr. Lord. The resources--I am glad you raised this, madam.
This is something an issue we have been looking at for a couple
of years. We made a recommendation to TSA many, many months
ago. We thought that it is important that they complete an
analysis showing how many inspectors they would need to cover
this new business model when you have all these new entities
helping with the screening.
TSA still reports that they are in the process of preparing
the studies. We are getting a little impatient. I would like
to--you know, in general, like how to be patient. But I think
this study is needed to show how many additional inspectors you
need to provide adequate oversight as I indicated in my closing
remarks.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So you think--what you said that--what is
your comment on the individual proposed budget coming forward
either here in the House or the President's budget?
Mr. Lord. I have no basis to judge whether it is a number
of inspectors that are seeking the--they want support of what
funding is too many about the right amount or too few. I am
seeing the supporting analysis to judge.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Either report from TSA?
Mr. Lord. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So why don't you jump in, Mr. Sammon, and
take that one and the other two questions that I asked you?
Mr. Sammon. That is a very good question, and I will just
use some simple math. In terms of the total number of the CCSF,
the certified cargo screening facilities, are just under 1,200.
There are about 500 or so airport cargo handlers. So if you
went to a large airport and there are people that will screen
either the airline they are screening or they are screening for
the airlines.
So their total about 1,700 facilities. We have 500
inspectors plus 110 inspectors with a dog. So we have for 1,600
facilities 610 people. I think that we should be able to make
their rounds. We have conducted with our current people, just
on the CCSFs 6,000 inspections.
So I think it is pretty well--originally, we have stood up
the program. We thought we have many more thousands of shippers
who were participating the program when we would need a much
larger group as well.
Ms. Jackson Lee. But you have not answered Mr. Lord and
giving him a report on how many TSA----
Mr. Sammon. I will double-check in terms of what that
report is. But I think the math to me appears it is 600 people
for 1,600 facilities should be a ratio of about 3 to 1--three
facilities we need to inspect for every person that seems
reasonable.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. You want to go on to the other
questions, the DHS office to private sector and what role it
plays and then----
Mr. Sammon. Yes, the private----
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing]. Products and technology
cooperation.
Mr. Sammon. The private sector offers--there are a number
of working groups in cargo security. I think there are four
that we stood up back in January in terms of mail, in terms of
information sharing, in terms of cargo generally. Those groups
are working forward.
A number of people are involved in those groups that I
think they are due to report out some time later this month. So
there have been--and a particular issue that they have been--
for instance, I will give you an example of one particular
issue on the mail business we have, that mail bags, for
instance, if they come to the United States out of Frankfurt,
Germany, also Frankfurt may receive mail from--through the
Czech Republic. It may be trucked over to Frankfurt from the
Czech Republic to go air-bound.
If there is a problem with that air bag under mail
treaties, they can't open it in Germany. So this group is
focusing on some of those issues and never those kinds of
things that are impediments and issues that we have to do--have
to work on and go forward. They are due for their initial
report out in, I believe, the end of March.
Science and technology, we have had an open request for new
technologies for screening that has been up for about a year.
We just have not had a lot of response for that--to that
request. The time line that when you do with TSA in terms of
application coming in with the new product, we do laboratory
testing and field testing. It does seem like a long time.
Sometimes it is 6 months, sometimes it maybe up to a year.
But in the end, what we want to make sure is that those
machines can pass Mr. Lord's inspections, and if they will meet
all the criteria they were setup to be capable of. So it is a
long process, and I know it is rigorous. But again, we have
tried to set something up so in the end it is certifiable by
GAO and other entities would need to look at what you are
doing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I think my message is that it is important
work. You need to be diligent and energetic----
Mr. Sammon. Yes.
Ms. Jackson Lee [continuing] About new technology. It is
going to lead us into the 21st Century and it certainly impacts
on security.
With that, Mr. Chairman, let me than you and just indicate
that I think this is front-line work and crucial. One slip-up
can cause a loss of life, and I think this is a process of
security that we should continue our oversight on. With that, I
yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, the Gentlelady. I had one last
question. It has to do with unused equipment. Unfortunately, we
are seeing the Department buy some screening equipment that is
still in warehouses that has never been used as it has been
reported.
My question is: We have unused equipment or equipment that
maybe we have now bought something that is better and we don't
need the equipment we have been using previously. Is there an
impediment to us donating that to a foreign country that we
would like to see step up their game a little bit?
Mr. Sammon. No. Your--it is a very good observation. We
have been, I think, working protocols with the State Department
to get the equipment, and there have been a limited number of
requests. Another mode of transportation, for instance, with
the Greyhound Bus Lines, they are--we have TSA equipments that
they are using to screen people as Houston and in Los Angeles
and for--a pilot period. So we will make it available under
whatever protocols or we just have not had a lot of request
from foreign governments for that, but we would be happy to do
it for you.
Mr. Rogers. Would you like me to invite on this committee
legislatively to make that permissible?
Mr. Sammon. No, sir. No, sir.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent. Ms. Jackson Lee, do you have
anything else?
Ms. Jackson Lee. I don't, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Again, I want to thank the
witnesses. I know it takes time to prepare for these, and you
go out--you know, both have a lot of things you could be doing
so I appreciate you coming and helping us out, and also put
this information on the record, which I think is critically
important to do.
I will remind you that I may have--in fact, I know I have
some additional questions and some other Members may as well
but we are going to hold the hearing open for 10 days for
written questions to be submitted to you. I would ask if you
receive those to try to get a time to response back to the
committee Members at your earliest convenience.
With that, the hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:48 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X I
----------
Statement of Douglas A. Smith, Assistant Secretary, Private Sector,
Office of Policy, Department of Homeland Security
March 9, 2011
INTRODUCTION
I would like to thank Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee,
and the distinguished Members of the subcommittee for the opportunity
to provide testimony to discuss the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security's (DHS) efforts and activities to build genuine partnerships
with relevant stakeholders to improve air cargo security. Further, I
would like to thank the subcommittee for its leadership role in
promoting air cargo security for the American public.
In order to successfully advance the Department's core missions, we
must utilize all available resources, including a robust engagement and
partnership with the private sector. This is especially true for an
issue as complex and as critical to the global economy as air cargo
security. As the Assistant Secretary for the Office of the Private
Sector (PSO), I serve as the Secretary's principal advisor on the
Department's interaction with the private sector and coordinate the
Department's engagement with private industry, academia, and the
nonprofit community--both domestically and internationally--to foster
an on-going dialogue on how we can work together to best meet our
collective security challenges.
Security threats to air cargo are not new, but recent events serve
as an important reminder that we face an adversary who is patient,
adaptive, and relentless in its pursuit to inflict physical harm and
economic disruption wherever possible. There are a number of ways that
public-private partnerships play an integral role in countering
critical security and economic threats, including air cargo security.
Before discussing the benefits of a robust public-private partnership,
I want to stress the importance of avoiding the false choice between
security and economic prosperity--they are not mutually exclusive
ideas.
Security is a vital goal. But security cannot--and need not--come
at the expense of undermining the systems that facilitate legitimate
trade and commerce and enable the livelihoods and progress for so many
of the world's citizens. The challenge--to chart a middle course that
balances risk while facilitating the free flow of goods, people, and
information--is not one that can be met solely by Government or
industry, but only through partnership. I am an unapologetic optimist
who believes that by working together, we can secure both our country
and our economy.
It is in this spirit that Secretary Napolitano and DHS senior
leadership has approached air cargo security. The Department's effort
to engage stakeholders demonstrates our commitment to this principle of
collaboration. This is not to say that there will always be agreement
on every issue; we recognize though, that only by working together will
we find the best solutions to challenges.
The threats that we face today have little regard for borders. In
today's globalized world, the very nature of travel, trade, and our
interconnected economies means that vulnerabilities or gaps anywhere
have the ability to affect the entire supply chain. DHS is committed to
partnering with key stakeholders who have a role in ensuring a secure
and efficient international air cargo system that can adapt to the
evolving terrorist threat.
PROGRESS IN AIR CARGO SECURITY SINCE 2010
It is clear that the threats we face in the aviation sector,
including air cargo, are real and evolving, and we must confront them
with strong and dynamic security measures including intelligence,
technology, and screening processes to stay ahead of this constantly
evolving threat.
One recent example that illustrates the evolving and global threat
that we continue to face is the plot involving air cargo shipments
filled with explosives being shipped through Europe and the Middle East
to the United States. This failed attack in October 2010 made it clear
that significant, collaborative improvements in the air cargo system
were necessary to not only secure lives but also to ensure against
disruptions to the system that could result in severe economic
consequences.
In cooperation with the private sector and our international
partners, we have taken significant steps to strengthen the security of
international air cargo on all aircraft. This work on both passenger
and cargo security in the aviation sector continues today. I would like
to highlight some of the ongoing projects that DHS is working on, in
concert with industry partners, to address the more complex challenges
associated with the broader global supply chain.
AIR CARGO SECURITY WORKING GROUP
Following the October 2010 attempted attacks on the air cargo
system, PSO arranged meetings for Secretary Napolitano with the key
industry partners involved in the air cargo sector. Informed and
encouraged by these initial discussions, the Secretary asked PSO to
organize a process through which DHS could receive advice and input
from all stakeholders on a frequent, on-going basis. In January of this
year, DHS hosted the kickoff meeting of what we are now referring to as
the Air Cargo Security Working Group (ACSWG).
This private-public working group includes domestic and
international stakeholders from throughout the air cargo community.
Participation in the initial meeting was extensive, with
representatives from key stakeholders in the air cargo industry and
several other Federal partners. The ACSWG was established to ensure
close coordination between private and public stakeholders to establish
long-term policies, procedures, and programs that will further ensure
the security, efficiency, and resilience of the air cargo system.
Because we wanted to get this dialogue started quickly, we chose to
organize the ACSWG under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan
(NIPP) Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC)
process, which provides a unifying structure for the integration of a
wide range of efforts for the enhanced protection and resilience of the
Nation's critical infrastructure and key resources into a single
National program.
Serving as the organizational chair of the ACSWG, I work closely
with Commissioner Bersin from U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP)
and Administrator Pistole from the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA), who are jointly serving as co-chairs, to ensure
that the expertise and experience of both agencies is best utilized.
Due to the range and complexity of the issues to be addressed, the
ACSWG divided into four subgroups to focus on specific areas of cargo
security. Each sub-group is chaired by a DHS official and co-chaired by
an industry representative. The four subgroups are:
1. Information Subgroup.--The objective of this group is to examine
opportunities to leverage resources and expertise and enhance
intelligence and information-sharing among Federal stakeholders
and between the U.S. Government and private sector partners.
The group examines ways to ensure that timely and actionable
information is available, communicated to the appropriate
stakeholders, and can be acted upon to secure the goods
transported by air.
2. Technology and Capacity Building Subgroup.--The objective of
this group is to review technical standardization activities
and develop technologies to fill capability gaps and ultimately
build greater capacity.
3. Global Cargo Programs Subgroup.--The objective of this group is
to review and explore opportunities for enhanced public-private
coordination as DHS works to address statutory requirements for
100 percent screening of in-bound air cargo.
4. Global Mail Subgroup.--The objective of this group is to review
and examine refinements in current procedures specific to mail,
identify potential vulnerabilities for mail moving globally on
passenger and all-cargo aircraft, and to propose alternative
processes and procedures to ensure the safety of mail on air
cargo and passenger aircraft.
The input that DHS receives from these four sub-groups and from the
full ACSWG will help inform the Department's policies, procedures, and
programs to address security gaps in air cargo while maintaining a
robust and efficient air cargo system.
INTERNATIONAL MAIL
There are unique and complex issues associated with the transport
of international mail within the air cargo system that are important to
highlight. Immediately following the air cargo incident this past
October, TSA issued emergency security procedures to air carriers
regarding the transport of mail to the United States. TSA has continued
its work with National and international stakeholders, including the
United States Postal Service, to refine these security measures.
Moreover, TSA and other DHS components continue to evaluate the threat
and revise security procedures as necessary, while also monitoring the
impact on commerce through continued dialogue with industry
stakeholders.
It is through this continuing dialogue with industry that revised
procedures were issued specifically to address international mail and
facilitate the continued safe and secure transport of international
mail to the United States. The ACSWG Global Mail subgroup represents an
important part of that effort.
This ACSWG subgroup is currently drafting recommendations on
private sector coordination regarding international mail. These
recommendations will help improve information sharing and enhance
targeting capabilities, while ensuring the efficient and secure
movement of global mail. The ACSWG international mail subgroup will
also make recommendations to develop state-of-the-art technological
solutions and help the Department meet legislative requirements. DHS
looks forward to providing updates to Congress on the progress of these
efforts as we move forward.
CONCLUSION
While DHS and others across both the public and private sectors
will continue to identify and address vulnerabilities in the aviation
system, we know that some level of risk will always exist. Therefore,
it remains essential that we not only work collaboratively to mitigate
risk and close security gaps but also to develop policies and processes
to ensure the continuity of the system should a disruption occur.
Regardless of whether this disruption is caused by a terrorist
attack or a natural event, the time to find the best possible answers
to these questions is now--not reactively. As we continue to look
beyond the horizon of addressing the near-term security gaps and work
to create a more resilient supply chain, I look forward to an on-going
and robust dialogue with industry and other interested partners.
Again, I want to thank the distinguished Members of the
subcommittee for the opportunity to provide this testimony.
A P P E N D I X I I
----------
Questions From Chairman Mike D. Rogers of Alabama for John P. Sammon
Question 1. Given the new time frame, what efforts are currently
underway at TSA to meet the 2011 deadline to screen 100 percent of
international in-bound air cargo on passenger planes? What are the
reasons for the modified time frame in achieving 100 percent screening
by the end of this year?
Answer. Complex and sensitive challenges exist in reaching 100
percent screening of international in-bound air cargo on passenger
aircraft. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is working
hard to meet the international requirement of the 9/11 Act.
In accordance with the requirements of the 9/11 Act, and in line
with early screening reports from industry, TSA released proposed
security program changes in January 2011 that would require industry to
screen 100 percent of all in-bound passenger cargo by December 31,
2011. TSA is currently reviewing the comments received in response to
these proposed changes.
As TSA continues its on-going efforts in achieving the highest
possible level of security for both domestic and international air
cargo, it is diligently working on a variety of innovative initiatives.
This requires an on-going analysis of technology as well as the
expansion of the use of authorized representatives to screen on the air
carriers' behalf. Authorized representatives can play a key role in
helping carriers attain 100 percent of cargo screening, if these
freight forwarders are permitted to screen cargo in accordance with the
carriers' security program requirements prior to consolidation and
delivery to the airports. Technology will continue to play an important
role in screening cargo, and TSA continues to evaluate screening
technologies. TSA is also evaluating and studying how to best utilize
and approve explosives detection canine teams at non-U.S. locations.
TSA also continues to communicate the benefits of National Cargo
Security Program (NCSP) mutual recognition to foreign government
counterparts. Such recognition would allow air carriers to comply with
a single security program, while still ensuring the highest level of
security and screening of in-bound air cargo. To date, TSA has received
interest from most of the top 20 high-volume countries shipping into
the United States, and has received the NCSPs of four of these
countries for evaluation.
TSA acknowledges that verifiable attainment of the 100 percent
screening mandate for international in-bound passenger cargo will
require additional time. TSA will have a better indication of the time
frame within which industry can meet the 100 percent in-bound screening
requirement once the industry comments and program changes have been
fully analyzed.
Question 2. In addition to the Secretary's high-level discussions
with members of the international community on this important topic,
what is TSA doing to help implement the increased security measures
that have been proposed?
Answer. Since October 2010, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has released multiple Security Directives and
Emergency Amendments based on intelligence analysis that is focused on
addressing the threat to air cargo and mail in-bound to the United
States. TSA also continues to communicate the benefits of National
Cargo Security Program mutual recognition to foreign government
counterparts. Such recognition would allow air carriers to comply with
a single security program, while still ensuring the highest level of
security control and screening of in-bound air cargo. Authorized
representatives can play a key role in helping air carriers attain 100
percent screening of international in-bound, if these freight
forwarders are allowed to screen cargo in accordance with the carriers'
security program requirements prior to consolidation and delivery to
the airports. TSA will continue to partner with our international
partners and remain an intelligence-driven agency focused on detecting,
deterring, and disrupting attempted terrorist attacks.
In addition to aligning enhanced security measures with TSA's
Standard Security Programs, TSA works closely with U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) on multiple Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) initiatives to secure in-bound air cargo and the international
supply chain, in line with the Secretary's high-level discussions.
Specifically, TSA and CBP are working side-by-side on the Air Cargo
Advance Screening pilot. This pilot is testing the feasibility of pre-
departure advance information collection, as well as baseline threshold
risk targeting for all in-bound air cargo prior to departing non-U.S.
locations. These coordinated efforts are in support of on-going DHS
discussions regarding global supply chain security.
Question 3. What is your perspective on the feasibility and timing
of developing international standards for air cargo? Can you give us an
update on the plans of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), an arm of the United Nations in setting increased aviation
security standards among its member nations?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has
directly engaged industry and foreign governments through the Global
Cargo Programs Working Group, one of the four sub-committees of the Air
Cargo Security Working Group (ACSWG) formed by Secretary Napolitano.
Through informal and formal dialogue with international organizations,
foreign governments, and international industry associations, TSA aims
to more effectively address current issues regarding air cargo
security.
TSA works with international organizations and partner countries,
including the European Commission (EC), the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO), and the Quadrilateral Working Group
(QUAD), to enhance and harmonize international aviation security
standards. ICAO recently strengthened air cargo supply chain security
measures in Amendment 12 to Annex 17 (Security) to the Convention on
International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), adopted by ICAO
Council in November 2010. Annex 17 outlines the requirements that ICAO
Member States must adhere to for aviation security matters through
Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs). TSA is currently working
through ICAO's Aviation Security (AVSEC) Panel of Experts to continue
to develop SARPs on air cargo security to be included in the next
Amendment to Annex 17 to address the current threat level.
Specifically, two Working Groups were developed during the last AVSEC
Panel meeting in March 2011 to address the creation of more robust air
cargo SARPs, the Air Cargo Security Working Group and the Working Group
on Amendment 13 to Annex 17. TSA is a participant in both working
groups, and therefore will assist in both the development of ICAO air
cargo best practices and new international standards. Due to the nature
of ICAO's review and approval structure, adoption of new SARPs may take
place in late 2012 at the earliest. However, the new and stronger air
cargo security SARPs adopted in November 2010 will go into effect in
July 2011, and TSA, as the U.S. representative to the ICAO AVSEC Panel,
will continue advancing more robust international air cargo security
controls. The EC Standards, for instance, are expected to be complied
with by the end of 2013.
Question 4. Can you describe for this subcommittee, the level of
coordination TSA has had with stakeholders on air cargo since the Yemen
cargo incident? Specifically, what is the status of the DHS working
group on air cargo and what progress has been made through that working
group?
Answer. During and since the Yemen events in October 2010, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has been in constant
communication with industry stakeholders, international partners, and
other Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components concerning the
continuing threat to air cargo and the enhancement of security measures
to counter that threat. This communication has been effectuated through
myriad forums, including frequent meetings, conference calls with air
carriers and other stakeholders, working groups, pilot activities, and
personnel deployment focusing on strategies to mitigate and respond to
the on-going threat to cargo security. TSA continues on multiple levels
to reach out to industry partners, such as the International Air
Transport Association, the Air Transport Association, the International
Air Cargo Association, the Cargo Airlines Association, and the Air
Forwarders Association. TSA also participates in working groups within
the International Civil Aviation Organization and the World Customs
Organization that are focused on enhancing and developing robust
international air cargo security systems.
In March 2011, TSA Administrator, John Pistole, met with officials
from the Universal Postal Union (UPU), an arm of the United Nations, to
discuss the challenges encountered by postal operators of other
countries. Mr. Pistole committed that TSA will continue to work with
the UPU in developing long-tem sustainable security measures for mail.
Follow-up discussions with the UPU took place most recently on May 12,
2011, where Mr. Douglas Brittin, General Manager for TSNM Air Cargo,
briefed the UPU on various TSA initiatives to secure mail such as the
National Postal Security Program (NPSP) recognition program, and the
Secretary's Workgroup on International Mail Security. Additional
bilateral discussions were held later with the French, Dutch, and
German postal authorities. Each were provided additional information on
NPSP, and currently preparing documentation for review by TSA.
Additionally, DHS components, including TSA and U.S. Customs and
Border Protection (CBP), are actively engaged in the DHS air cargo
security working groups. These working groups are a partnership between
DHS and industry, whereby each working group is co-chaired by either a
TSA or a CBP official and an industry representative. Over the past few
months, these working groups have held substantive discussions
regarding technology, advance information, global cargo programs, and
mail security. The working groups collectively presented
recommendations to the Secretary on April 12, 2011.
Question 5. How will TSA ensure that it does not waste vital time
and resources on known shippers and instead look more closely at those
shippers for whom we don't have adequate information?
Answer. For domestic air cargo, under the Transportation Security
Administration's (TSA) Known Shipper Program, shippers that transport
cargo using air transportation are vetted and become known shippers if
certain requirements are met. TSA has designed an automated system that
retrieves available data on companies. This data is retrieved from
publically available information.
TSA is working jointly with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in
pursuing the Advanced Air Cargo Screening pilot to test the feasibility
of utilizing baseline threshold targeting for additional scrutiny of
cargo at non-U.S. locations. TSA and CBP are also collaboratively
working on the Department of Homeland Security Trusted Trader program,
which includes a TSA Trusted Shipper concept for incorporation into
TSA's overall in-bound air cargo security strategy. Although in the
initial stages, TSA's Trusted Shipper concept would provide an ability
to focus on higher-risk cargo to establish appropriate security
measures for mitigation.
Question 6. What criteria will be used to determine whether
screening of international in-bound air cargo is achieved to an
acceptable standard?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) continues
to work multilaterally and bilaterally with its international partners,
and through its regulatory authority to validate and verify the
application of security requirements in the international in-bound
environment. TSA has established a risk-based scheduling methodology to
assess airports and conduct air carrier inspections as frequently as
possible at locations with the highest risks. While TSA can inspect and
aggressively pursue enforcement action in the United States, any
inspection of air cargo screening overseas requires the full voluntary
cooperation of our foreign partners.
TSA continues to review other countries' National Cargo Security
Programs (NCSP) to determine whether their programs provide a level of
security commensurate with the level of security provided by U.S. cargo
security programs.
Question 7. Can you describe the technology requirements for
screening air cargo? Also, can you describe the efforts under way
within both the Department and the private sector in developing
technologies that can adequately screen large palletized cargo units?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) would be
happy to provide a classified briefing on cargo screening. The
Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate
have an on-going Research and Development program to develop
technologies that can adequately screen palletized cargo. Private
sector companies fully recognize the commercial potential for such
systems and are actively pursuing their development.
Question 8. To what extent is TSA looking to expand its work under
CCSP to the international arena?
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) does not
have the same authority to conduct inspections and enforce compliance
in other countries as it has in the United States. Lack of
extraterritorial jurisdiction limits our ability to implement the
Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) internationally. TSA is
working on multiple initiatives that incorporate supply chain security
and screening concepts. These initiatives include the use of Authorized
Representatives (AR) at non-U.S. locations, the development of a
Trusted Shipper program, and the National Cargo Security Program
recognition program. Additionally, working through the International
Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), TSA is advancing enhanced
international standards for cargo security, and ensuring that countries
have the appropriate tools to implement their own supply chain security
programs.
The use of ARs would allow air carriers to designate trusted
business partners, including freight forwarders, as entities to perform
screening on their behalf. ARs will allow for cargo to be screened by
these entities while operating under the air carriers' security
programs, and enable them to screen the cargo at various points in the
supply chain. Although not established as a CCSP, it provides similar
benefits by enabling cargo to be screened prior to consolidation.
Question 9. What suggestions do you have for how Congress can help
you in your mission to secure air cargo?
Answer. In support of the Transportation Security Administration's
(TSA) mission in securing both the domestic and international cargo
chains, TSA believes there are multiple areas and avenues where
Congressional support and assistance will be essential. TSA requests
that Congress continues its support of air cargo screening programs and
pilots that focus on technology for screening consolidated cargos and
the use of canines within the United States. At the international
level, TSA believes that Congress can continue to show strong support
for TSA's and the Department of Homeland Security's overall strategy of
engaging both the international community and private industry, as TSA
continues to pursue security initiatives that focus on the evolving
threat clearly demonstrated by the events of October 2010.
Question 10. What processes does the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) have in place to identify high-risk cargo?
Answer. Since October 2010, the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) has released multiple Security Directives (SD) and
Emergency Amendments (EA) focused on addressing the threat to in-bound
air cargo and mail to the United States. Measures contained in SD/EAs
are based on intelligence and analysis of threats within the cargo
supply chain. SDs and EAs issued throughout November and December 2010,
and in January, February, and March 2011, focused on identifying high-
risk cargo, and the appropriate mitigation of potential threats to
aviation. Methods of identifying and screening such cargo are provided
in these SDs and EAs. These methods are considered Sensitive Security
Information, therefore, TSA would be happy to provide a security brief
at the committee's convenience.
In addition, TSA is working side-by-side with Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) on the Air Cargo Advance Screening (ACAS) pilot
project as well as the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Trusted
Trader Program, which includes a TSA Trusted Shipper component.
The ACAS pilot focuses on utilizing advance information provided by
the air carrier to target and identify high-risk cargo shipments for
screening and further mitigation. Both TSA and CBP are piloting this
effort in order to develop a long-term comprehensive strategy to apply
baseline threshold targeting to all in-bound air cargo. Although in the
initial stages, TSA's Trusted Shipper concept would provide an
additional layer of focus on higher or elevated risk cargo and
establish appropriate security measures for mitigation.
Question 11. What is the status of the TSA and CBP new joint
technology pilot project referred to as the air cargo advance screening
program (ACAS)? Do you think this program will be more successful than
if TSA developed its own targeting system to support the international
air cargo mission?
Answer. Immediately following the cargo-related incidents out of
Yemen in October 2010, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) accelerated efforts to
test and implement baseline threshold targeting through the Air Cargo
Advance Screening (ACAS) pilot. This pilot will include three phases.
Initially, the pilot will focus on the express air cargo carriers, then
move into the passenger air carrier environment, and then the all-cargo
environment. Pilot activities are focused on a proof of concept for
each of the key building blocks: Data, targeting, and enhanced
screening. These proof of concept activities are expected to culminate
in the implementation of a comprehensive pre-departure targeting and
screening regime.
Since November 2010, TSA and CBP have established a joint targeting
unit at the National Targeting Center--Cargo, where both TSA and CBP
targeting analysts review advance cargo information and perform
threshold targeting side-by-side. Leveraging existing systems provides
synergies between TSA and CBP programs, promotes efficiencies and cost-
effectiveness for both the Federal Government and industry, and will
expedite the implementation of this initiative.
Question From Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson of Mississippi for John
P. Sammon
Question. In the past, the Transportation Security Administration
has been criticized for its lack of coordination with the Department of
Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate, in particular, in
its role in developing and approving technologies for cargo screening
and security. What steps have been taken to enhance the Transportation
Security Administration's coordination with the Department of Homeland
Security's Science and Technology Directorate? Within the past year,
have there been any notable developments with respect to identifying or
certifying new technologies for air cargo screening?
Answer. The Department of Homeland Security's Science and
Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) and the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) collaborate on the research and development of air
cargo screening technologies. In addition to daily staff coordination,
S&T and TSA maintain a formally chartered Integrated Product Team that
meets monthly to coordinate a wide range of technology activities. S&T
and TSA also mutually conduct semi-annual formal technology program
reviews. Within the past year, S&T and TSA qualified large aperture
Enhanced Metal Detectors (EMD), which can screen up to skid-sized cargo
configurations. Use of EMDs is particularly desired for screening of
highly perishable commodities such as fresh fruit and flowers.
Questions From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for John P.
Sammon
Question 1. In response to my question during the hearing regarding
airport perimeter security you stated that while there is work being
done by the Transportation Security Administration to enhance airport
perimeter security, there is not a common understanding of the
standards in place, what the standards should be and how specific
airports relate to the existing standards. Please describe the work
currently being conducted by the Transportation Security
Administration, including vulnerability assessments at airports, to
address airport perimeter security protocols and inform the committee
of the extent to which stakeholder input is being solicited and
provided to address the issue of perimeter security at airports.
Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Security
Assessment Division within the Office of Law Enforcement/Federal Air
Marshal Service is responsible for conducting Joint Vulnerability
Assessments (JVA) at U.S. commercial airports. The assessments are
conducted in conjunction with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
and are in compliance with 49 U.S.C. 44904, Domestic Air
Transportation System Security. The FBI conducts a threat assessment,
while TSA conducts the physical security assessment. The JVA consists
of a comprehensive review of five areas of the airport: Perimeter,
terminal, airport operations, airport services, and infrastructure
systems. When conducting the assessment of the perimeter, the
assessment team evaluates the effectiveness of the perimeter fence,
access controls, security patrols, lighting, signage, culverts, clear
zones, and closed circuit television systems. The makeup of the JVA
team consists of law enforcement personnel, Transportation Security
Specialists, Transportation Security Inspectors (TSI), and stakeholder
representatives (airport operations or airport police). The Success of
the JVA process depends upon the cooperative relationship TSA enjoys
with its airport stakeholders. The role of the stakeholders usually
consists of assisting the JVA team with escorting, setting up
interviews, and explaining the security posture of the airport. They
are also encouraged to identify areas of concern that they believe to
be vulnerable.
Airports are required to develop an Airport Security Program (ASP)
which is approved by TSA under 1542.101 of 49 CFR Chapter XII. The ASP
outlines the security posture in which the airport must operate. For
example, it will identify the security requirements for the airport
perimeter. TSA TSIs are assigned to the airports and are responsible
for inspecting the airport for compliance with its ASP and ensure it
adheres to all regulatory requirements as provided in 49 CFR 1542 and
all current and applicable security directives.
Question 2. Please describe the respective roles and
responsibilities of an airport authority and the Transportation
Security Administration in addressing problems or vulnerabilities
raised in periodic perimeter security joint vulnerability assessments.
How much time is recommended for corrective action of vulnerabilities
raised in joint vulnerability assessments?
Answer. Vulnerabilities identified by the Joint Vulnerability
Assessment (JVA) process are presented to the Federal Security Director
(FSD) during an out brief at the conclusion of the assessment, where
representatives from the airport authorities are invited to
participate. A comprehensive report is submitted to the FSD within 60
days of the assessment. The report includes the vulnerabilities
observed, recommendations for mitigation, and any best practices
identified. The Security Assessment Division works collaboratively with
the Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) Office of Security
Operations to identify and implement strategies to mitigate
vulnerabilities identified by the JVA process.
Airports are required to develop an Airport Security Program (ASP)
which is approved by TSA under 1542.101 of 49 CFR Chapter XII. The ASP
outlines the security posture in which the airport must operate. For
example, it will identify the security requirements for the airport
perimeter. TSA TSIs are assigned to the airports and are responsible
for inspecting the airport for compliance with its ASP and ensure it
adheres to all regulatory requirements as provided in 49 CFR 1542 and
all current and applicable security directives.
There is no regulatory requirement for airports to implement
recommendations from the JVA findings. As the acceptance of the
recommendations is voluntary, there is no established time line for
implementation; however, if an airport decides to accept the
recommendations, the FSD works to establish changes to the ASP and
these changes may or may not have a specific time line.
Question 3. What is the status of the Aviation Security Advisory
Committee (ASAC)? Will ASAC be re-chartered and will it be a forum for
stakeholders to have input on the Transportation Security
Administration's security programs and policies?
Answer. As part of the Department of Homeland Security's efficiency
review of advisory committees, charter renewal actions were placed on
hold, and the charter for the Aviation Security Advisory Committee
(ASAC) subsequently expired on April 3, 2010. However, the efficiency
review re-affirmed the need for the ASAC, and the Transportation
Security Administration is in the process of re-establishing the
committee (i.e. charter approval, membership appointment). It is
anticipated that the ASAC will meet in 2011 to provide advice and
recommendations for improving aviation security measures.
Question 4. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2012
essentially level-funded the cargo security programs carried out by the
Transportation Security Administration. Are you adequately resourced to
provide oversight both domestically and abroad to ensure that cargo
shipments are being properly screened and that the screening data
provided can be validated?
Answer. The President's 2012 budget fully supports TSA's air cargo
activities.
Question 5. The Transportation Security Administration has
established a system to certify independent facilities and firms to
screen cargo. Please tell us what provisions you are requiring of these
firms in terms of securely transporting screened cargo to the aircraft
and whether there exists vulnerability in this process?
Answer. Once the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
certifies an entity as a Certified Cargo Screening Facility (CCSF), it
must follow the specific Chain of Custody (CoC) requirements mandated
in its TSA-approved Standard Security Program (SSP). The SSP requires
that all personnel who handle screened cargo at CCSFs undergo a
Security Threat Assessment. The SSP also requires certification and
verification procedures for cargo, tamper-evident technology
requirements, and vehicle security requirements. If any single element
of these processes is missing or incomplete, the cargo must be fully
rescreened before loaded on an aircraft. In addition, passenger
airlines and indirect air carriers have acceptance procedures outlined
in their TSA-approved SSPs to ensure that proper CoC procedures are
maintained. TSA continually evaluates established SSP requirements for
further security enhancements.
Transportation Security Inspectors for Cargo (TSIC) conduct
inspections throughout the U.S. air cargo supply chain on a regular
basis. TSICs perform a thorough review of cargo screening, as well as
implementation of CoC measures throughout the supply chain and during
ground movement. TSA acknowledges that there are violations of the CCSF
Program requirements, and TSA ensures that any instance of non-
compliance is immediately corrected and is aggressively addressed
through appropriate enforcement action.
Question 6. How are employees at certified screening facilities
trained in the screening and secure transport process? Does the
Transportation Security Administration train the employees or does it
train the trainer at these facilities? With staff turnover, how will
the Transportation Security Administration ensure that employees at
these facilities remain compliant?
Answer. The Certified Cargo Screening Facilities (CCSFs) are
required to either develop their own training or use the Transportation
Security Administration's (TSA) developed training to train their
employees. TSA training covers TSA's mission, general program
requirements, personnel and facility security, screening requirements,
Chain of Custody (CoC) procedures, Improvised Explosive Device (IED)
recognition, and technology screening protocols. If a CCSF decides to
create its own training program, TSA requires that the CCSF's training
curriculum covers all areas outlined in the TSA-developed training. TSA
does not train private sector employees directly, as it is the
responsibility of the regulated entity to comply with all security
requirements (including training requirements); the entity must ensure
that its employees are cognizant of such requirements and competent to
abide by them. Furthermore, TSA Transportation Security Inspectors
(TSIs) provide routine regulatory oversight for quality control.
To ensure that employees at these facilities remain compliant,
TSA's Air Cargo Compliance Office also conducts unannounced and regular
inspections of CCSFs. These inspections involve, among other things, a
thorough review of air cargo security training and cargo screener
training. TSA TSIs review training records, observe employees and
agents carrying out security functions, conduct interviews to assess
knowledge base and competence, and conduct tests to ensure compliance.
When discrepancies are noted, the TSIs initiate investigations and take
enforcement action as appropriate. These actions could include
resolution of noncompliance through on-the-spot counseling, development
of a corrective action plan, monetary civil penalties, or suspension of
operations (withdrawal of certification) depending on the nature and
extent of noncompliance. All CCSFs must be inspected twice per year at
a minimum, but most are inspected more often based on the Air Cargo
Compliance Office's risk-based approach to inspections; entities deemed
higher-risk are inspected more often.
Questions From Chairman Mike D. Rogers of Alabama for Stephen M. Lord
Question 1. Given the new time frame, what efforts are currently
underway at TSA to meet the 2011 deadline to screen 100 percent of
international inbound air cargo on passenger planes? What are the
reasons for the modified time frame in achieving 100 percent screening
by the end of this year?
Answer. As of March 23, 2011, TSA officials were in the process of
evaluating industry comments on DHS' proposal to accelerate the
deadline to December 31, 2011 for screening 100 percent of cargo bound
for the United States on passenger aircraft. TSA officials stated that
they plan to complete their review by the end of April 2011. TSA moved
its deadline for meeting the 100 percent screening mandate as it
applies to inbound air cargo on passenger aircraft to December 2011 as
a result of reported air carrier screening data and discussions with
air cargo industry leaders regarding progress made by industry to
secure inbound cargo. Based on data submitted to TSA by the air
carriers, TSA estimates that about 80 percent of inbound cargo by
weight was screened as of August 2010. One factor contributing to
increased screening levels is TSA's May 2010 decision to require air
carriers to screen a certain percentage of shrink-wrapped and banded
inbound cargo. In implementing this requirement, air carriers
determined that it was more effective to screen larger groupings of
cargo at the point of origin, which resulted in more than the required
percentage being screened. Therefore, according to TSA officials,
continued progress made by industry would help TSA to meet its proposed
December 31, 2011 deadline to screen 100 percent of inbound passenger
cargo.
Question 2. In addition to the Secretary's high-level discussions
with members of the international community on this important topic,
what is TSA doing to help implement the increased security measures
that have been proposed?
Answer. TSA has taken several steps to enhance the security of air
cargo on domestic and inbound flights. Following the October 2010 Yemen
air cargo bomb attempt, TSA banned cargo originating in Yemen and
Somalia from transport into the United States; banned the transport of
cargo deemed high-risk on passenger aircraft; prohibited the transport
of toner and ink cartridges weighing 16 ounces or more on passenger
aircraft in carry-on and checked luggage; and required additional
screening of high-risk cargo prior to transport on an all-cargo
aircraft.
As we reported in December 2010, TSA has worked with foreign
partners to enhance security standards and practices by, among other
things, drafting Amendment 12 to International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO's) Annex 17 which will set forth new standards
related to air cargo such as requiring ICAO members to establish a
system to secure the air cargo supply chain. TSA has also worked with
foreign governments to address other areas of aviation security. For
example, TSA has coordinated with foreign governments to develop
enhanced screening technologies that will detect explosive materials on
passengers. According to TSA officials, the agency frequently exchanges
information with its international partners on progress in testing and
evaluating various screening technologies. For example, in November
2010, TSA hosted an international summit that brought together
approximately 30 countries that are deploying or considering deploying
advanced imaging technology (AIT) units at their airports in order to
discuss, among other things, AIT policy, protocols, and best practices.
In addition, following TSA's decision to accelerate the deployment of
AIT in the United States, the Secretary of Homeland Security encouraged
other nations to consider using AIT units to enhance passenger
screening globally. As a result, several nations have begun to test or
deploy AIT units, and one country, Australia, has committed to
introducing AIT at international terminals in 2011. Finally, TSA
conducts foreign airport assessments, which serve to strengthen
international aviation security. Through TSA's foreign airport
assessment program, TSA assesses the security measures used at foreign
airports to determine if they maintain and carry out effective security
practices. During assessments, TSA provides on-site consultations and
makes recommendations to airport officials or the host government to
immediately address identified deficiencies.
Question 3. What is your perspective on the feasibility and timing
of developing international standards for air cargo? Can you give us an
update on the plans of the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), an arm of the United Nations in setting increased aviation
security standards among its member nations?
Answer. On a global basis, ICAO has established security standards
and recommended practices to help ensure a minimum baseline level of
international aviation security among member nations. These
international aviation security standards and recommended practices are
detailed in Annex 17 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation,
as adopted by ICAO. Amendment 12 to Annex 17 will set forth new
standards related to air cargo such as requiring members to establish a
system to secure the air cargo supply chain. Although Amendment 12 has
been approved by the ICAO council, it is not expected to become
applicable until July 2011.
Question 4. Can you describe for this subcommittee, the level of
coordination TSA has had with stakeholders on air cargo since the Yemen
cargo incident? Specifically, what is the status of the DHS working
group on air cargo and what progress has been made through that working
group?
Answer. As we reported in our March 9, 2011 testimony, following
the Yemen cargo incident, DHS and TSA reached out to international
partners, IATA, and the international shipping industry to emphasize
the global nature of transportation security threats and the need to
strengthen air cargo security through enhanced screening and
preventative measures. TSA also deployed a team of security inspectors
to Yemen in late 2010 to provide that country's government with
assistance and guidance on their air cargo screening procedures. We
also reported that TSA is working closely with CBP, industry, and
international partners through the air cargo advance screening program
pilot project, initiated in December 2010, to expedite the receipt of
advanced cargo data for international flights to the United States
prior to departure in order to more effectively identify and screen
high-risk cargo. According to TSA officials, two all-cargo carriers are
included in the pilot and are examining the feasibility of transmitting
pre-departure manifest data in advance of the current requirement,
which is 4 hours prior to flights landing in the United States. TSA
officials stated that early test results have been positive, but that
providing manifest data in advance may prove challenging for some air
carriers. Before expanding the pilot to include passenger carriers, TSA
is working to establish written protocols to determine the appropriate
course of action following the identification of a high-risk shipment.
The DHS Air Cargo Security Working Group consists of four ``sub''
working groups focusing on the areas of global mail, global cargo
programs, information, and technology/capacity building. According to
industry stakeholders, the sub groups plan to report their findings to
the DHS Secretary and CBP Commissioner in April 2011, which will
include recommendations to enhance air cargo security and identifying
opportunities for private-public cooperative action.
Question 5. How will TSA ensure that it does not waste vital time
and resources on known shippers and instead look more closely at those
shippers for whom we don't have adequate information?
Answer. Suggest directing question to TSA.
Question 6. What criteria will be used to determine whether
screening of international inbound air cargo is achieved to an
acceptable standard?
Answer. GAO assumes this question refers to the requirement to
screen 100 percent of inbound passenger cargo by the proposed December
31, 2011 deadline. As we reported in March 2011, TSA is coordinating
with foreign countries to evaluate the comparability of their air cargo
security requirements with those of the United States. According to TSA
officials, the agency developed the National Cargo Security Program
(NCSP) to recognize air cargo security programs of foreign countries
that TSA deems provides a level of security commensurate with TSA's
programs. TSA plans to coordinate with the top 20 air cargo volume
countries, which according to TSA officials, export about 90 percent of
the air cargo transported to the United States on passenger aircraft.
According to officials, TSA has completed a review of one country's air
cargo security program and has determined that its requirements are
commensurate with those of the United States. As of March 2011, TSA
continues to evaluate comparability of air cargo security programs for
several other countries. TSA officials stated that although the
December 31, 2011, deadline to achieve 100 percent screening is
independent of this effort to review the air cargo security programs of
other countries, the agency plans to recognize as many commensurate
screening programs as possible by the December 2011 deadline.
Question 7. Can you describe the technology requirements for
screening air cargo? Also, can you describe the efforts under way
within both the Department and the private sector in developing
technologies that can adequately screen large palletized cargo units?
Answer. TSA allows air carriers transporting cargo to the United
States to use a variety of methods and non-intrusive technologies to
screen such cargo. For example, air carriers are allowed to use
physical search, X-ray and explosives detection systems to screen
inbound air cargo. However, in March 2011, we reported that TSA has not
approved any equipment to screen cargo transported on unit-load device
(ULD) pallets or containers--both of which are common means of
transporting air cargo on wide-body passenger aircraft--both domestic
and inbound aircraft. The maximum size cargo configuration that may be
screened is a 48 48 65-inch skid, much smaller than the large pallets
typically transported on wide-body passenger aircraft. This is
particularly important because as we reported in June 2010, about 96
percent of inbound air cargo arrives on wide-body aircraft, and TSA has
limited authority to oversee screening activities of foreign
governments or entities. We will continue to review TSA's efforts to
secure inbound air cargo, including TSA's efforts to test technologies
that could be used to screen ULD pallets or containers.
Question 8. To what extent is TSA looking to expand its work under
CCSP to the international arena?
Answer. Suggest directing question to TSA.
Question 9. What suggestions do you have for how Congress can help
you in your mission to secure air cargo?
Answer. Suggest directing question to TSA since TSA is charged with
this mission. We are currently reviewing TSA's efforts to secure
inbound air cargo for the House Committee on Homeland Security and
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and will
report on opportunities to enhance these efforts later this year.
Question 10. What processes does the Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) have in place to identify high-risk cargo?
Answer. As discussed in the response to question 4 above, TSA is
working with CBP, industry, and international partners through the air
cargo advance screening program pilot project to examine the
feasibility of expediting the receipt of advanced cargo data for
international flights to the United States prior to departure in order
to more effectively identify and screen high-risk cargo. In the
interim, TSA implemented additional security measures following the
Yemen cargo incident, such as banning the transport of cargo deemed
high-risk on passenger aircraft, and requiring additional screening of
high-risk cargo prior to transport on an all-cargo aircraft.
Question 11. What is the status of the TSA and CBP new joint
technology pilot project referred to as the air cargo advance screening
program (ACAS)? Do you think this program will be more successful than
if TSA developed its own targeting system to support the international
air cargo mission?
Answer. As discussed in questions 4 and 10 above, in December 2010,
TSA, CBP, and the air cargo industry launched the air cargo advance
screening program pilot project to enhance the sharing of electronic
shipping information to improve the identification of high-risk cargo.
In March 2011, TSA officials stated that two all-cargo carriers were
voluntarily participating in the pilot, and the pilot will expand to
additional all-cargo carriers and passenger carriers in the future.
Given that this pilot is new, it is too soon to evaluate its
effectiveness, but we will monitor the pilots' progress as part of our
on-going review of TSA's efforts to secure inbound air cargo for the
House Committee on Homeland Security and Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs.
Question From Ranking Member Sheila Jackson Lee of Texas for Stephen M.
Lord
Question 1. In previous testimony before the committee, the
Government Accountability Office has expressed concerns about the
Transportation Security Administration's ability to verify domestic
cargo screening data. What steps has the Transportation Security
Administration taken to implement mechanisms that strengthen the
verification of cargo screening data?
Answer. As we reported in June 2010, questions exist about the
reliability of TSA's reported screening data for in-bound cargo because
TSA does not have a mechanism to verify the accuracy of the data
reported by industry. We recommended that TSA develop a mechanism to
verify the accuracy of all screening data through random checks or
other practical means and obtain actual data on all inbound screening.
TSA concurred in part with our recommendation, stating that as of May
1, 2010, the agency issued changes to air carriers' standard security
programs that require air carriers to report inbound cargo screening
data to TSA. As of March 2011, TSA officials stated that current
screening percentages for inbound air cargo are now based on actual
data reported by air carriers rather than estimates. However, the
agency has not yet developed a mechanism to verify the accuracy of this
data, as called for in our recommendation.
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