[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
NARCOTERRORISM AND THE LONG REACH OF U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT, PART II
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
NOVEMBER 17, 2011
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Serial No. 112-81
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
------
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
TED POE, Texas BRAD SHERMAN, California
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESS
Mr. Derek S. Maltz, Special Agent in Charge, Special Operations
Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of
Justice........................................................ 8
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement..... 3
Mr. Derek S. Maltz: Prepared statement........................... 11
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 26
Hearing minutes.................................................. 27
NARCOTERRORISM AND THE LONG REACH OF U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT, PART II
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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 17, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:12 p.m., in
room 2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Royce. This hearing will come to order. The title of
this hearing is ``Narcoterrorism and the Long Reach of U.S. Law
Enforcement,'' and today we continue our look at that subject.
A few weeks ago the subcommittee heard testimony from
private witnesses on the growing nexus between drugs and
terrorism. This afternoon we are joined by the head of the Drug
Enforcement Administration's Special Operations Division.
Nothing better illustrates this threat than the Iranian-
directed plot to assassinate a foreign ambassador on U.S. soil,
detailed by the Justice Department last month. A key
conspirator in this plot approached a DEA informant seeking to
hire a Mexican drug cartel and their hit squad to carry out
this attack. The plot was planned over multiple meetings in
Mexico between the man now in U.S. custody and people he
believed to be cartel members. This foiled plot is the latest
example of how the DEA has reached beyond U.S. borders to
investigate, arrest, and bring to justice those involved in
terrorist conspiracies.
This plot wasn't a surprise to the subcommittee. In 2006 we
held hearings on the border where we heard testimony from local
law enforcement that the drug cartels would move, in their
words, anyone or anything, ``so as long as the price was
right.'' Iran apparently believed $1.5 million was the right
price for this brazen attack.
As we will hear today, an increasing number of U.S.-
designated foreign terrorist organizations are involved in drug
trafficking. As investigator Doug Farah testified last month,
in his words, ``growing ties between transnational organized
crime from multiple regions, and terrorist organizations, are
morphing into something new, which represents unprecedented
dangers'' for our country. Whether it is the Russian Mafia, or
the FARC, or the Chinese Triads, or Zetas, Hezbollah, the Qods
Force, al-Shabaab, many of these different groups may be
connected through ``super-fixers,'' as they are called,
``super-fixers,'' or ``shadow facilitators'' is a word used
sometimes here. These are individuals or groups that provide
the weapons, provide the sophisticated document forgeries,
provide the money-laundering capabilities, and they work for
both the terrorists, and they work for the drug cartels.
One premier ``super-fixer'' was Viktor Bout, who supplied
weapons to insurgents and militias and terrorists. Bout was
brought down by DEA agents in 2008 for conspiring to supply
weapons to the FARC, a designated terrorist organization. After
a long saga, Bout was extradited from Thailand to the United
States and this month was found guilty of all charges against
him.
The team that nabbed Bout is part of DEA's Special
Operations Division. They have had other high-profile
successes. As Mr. Maltz will testify, these operations
exemplify ``what DEA does best: Maximizing limited resources
while working closely with foreign counterparts and leveraging
[DEA's] vast array of confidential sources to infiltrate the
highest levels of the world's most significant and notorious
criminal organizations.''
But there are always ways to get better. A former top DEA
official told us last month that these shadow facilitators
haven't been ``attacked to the extent necessary.'' Even with
the will, the Special Operations Division has only two of these
field enforcement teams dedicated to narcoterrorism cases.
With a unique set of authorities, and human sources, and
experience in running complex organizations, the DEA has been
bringing a cutting-edge approach to attacking narcoterrorism.
But the DEA's presence in Africa is spread very, very thin.
Despite the dramatic increase in drug trafficking across West
and North Africa many of these countries are covered by DEA
offices in Europe. With a mix of al-Qaeda presence, ungoverned
spaces and weak institutions, the threat of narcoterrorism in
this part of the world is a real concern.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]
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Mr. Royce.I will now turn to Ranking Member Sherman for his
opening statement.
Mr. Sherman. I wonder how long we have until----
Mr. Royce. You have got 5 minutes, and you are faster than
me, so I think we are well suited here.
Mr. Sherman. I am more long-winded than you are.
I want to thank the chairman for holding these important
hearings. This hearing follows the subcommittee's hearing on
October 12th on the same topic, and that hearing had private
witnesses.
Narcoterrorism, where drug profits fuel terrorism, where
drug dealers adopt terrorist tactics in order to further their
own ends, has destabilized several countries of vital interest
to the United States. As one of the witnesses at the last
hearing mentioned, whether you want to smuggle foreign
nationals to enter the U.S. illegally, move AK-47s to a
terrorist group, or move cocaine, a trafficker often passes
through the same shadowy routes. The lines between terrorism
and narcotrafficking have faded in many parts of the world.
In our last hearing our witnesses had a number of
recommendations for dealing with this growing threat, including
expanding the DEA's confidential informant program in light of
the failed Iranian plot.
Frankly, I think we ought to go vote.
Mr. Royce. Let me suggest that we recess and come back
after the vote, and at that time we will reconvene. There are
actually a total of three votes, so it will be a few minutes.
[Recess.]
Mr. Royce. Judge Poe, would you like to make an opening
statement?
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate you holding this hearing. If you can get to
Mexico, you can get to the United States, so it makes sense
that world terrorists want to use the drug cartels, who are the
absolute best smugglers into the United States, to get into our
country.
Drug cartels like the Zetas remind me of the old TV series
Paladin with Richard Boone, and their motto is ``have gun, will
travel,'' and that, to me, is the Zetas. They will go anywhere,
do anything for money, and they will use their weapons if they
need to. If it means helping terrorists, I believe they are
fine with that as long as they get paid.
Terrorists meanwhile are realizing just how profitable the
drug trade is. Branches of al-Qaeda and the Taliban are thought
to rely on the drug trade as a source of income, especially
when other ways of raising money is dried up because of the
heat the DEA and other organizations in the United States and
other countries have put on them.
The point of all this is that the nexus between terrorists
and drug cartels matters. We need to have a strategy, we need
to know exactly what they are doing together, because they are
outlaws in cahoots with each other.
I believe strategy should include using the tools we have
to fight terrorists to also bring down the drug cartels. To me,
I think we should strongly consider, and I would like the
witness to weigh in on this, on his opinion, whether or not we
should put the Zetas and other specific drug cartels on the
foreign terrorist organization list.
I also believe we need to use more equipment. And we now
have ready, available equipment coming from Iraq. Over 2
million pieces of equipment are coming back to the United
States. If some of that can be used on the southern border of
the United States either with Federal officials or State and
local officials, such as Humvees, night surveillance equipment,
UAVs, then we have, I think, an opportunity to send that
equipment to the border to help fight the drug cartels and the
terrorists. I have introduced legislation to do just that, and
I would like the witness' opinion on that as well.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back the remainder
of my time.
Mr. Royce. Thank you.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
As I said earlier in our last hearing, our witnesses had a
number of recommendations for dealing with this threat,
including the DEA's confidential informant program in light of
the foiled Iranian plot, breaking down the barriers separating
counternarcotics and counterterrorism in our Government, and
responding to the new reality that the lines that once
separated organized crime from political terrorism, those lines
seem to be fading.
As we learned the day before, part I of these hearings,
U.S. law enforcement officials uncovered the ``guns for hire''
plot of the Iranian Government to kill the Saudi Ambassador on
American soil. The suspect is now facing trial in Manhattan.
Our witnesses from the first hearing believe that this bold
new plot by Iran to commit terrorism on American soil with the
help of a Mexican drug cartel signals a new tactic for state
sponsors of terrorism. But more importantly, we need to press
again and again, as I have said for 15 years, to take the
maximum possible actions to sanction Tehran for its sponsorship
of terrorism and, of course, its efforts to develop a nuclear
weapon. We need both stronger enforcement of existing laws and
a new, tougher law designed to not only cripple the Iran
Revolutionary Guard Corps, but to threaten regime survival. The
committee took an important step in that direction when it
marked up the Iran Threat Reduction Act on November 2nd and
voted in favor of it overwhelmingly, I believe, without
objection.
We know that drug production and drug trafficking is a
source of income for terrorist groups from Colombia to Lebanon
to Afghanistan. The FARC taxes local cocaine production to
finance its guerrilla war against the Colombian Government. The
Taliban taxes local opium farmers to finance its war against
our troops in Afghanistan. While Hezbollah was long dependent
on Iran for financing in recent years, it has developed other
sources of income, including drug trafficking.
In February of this year, the Treasury Department
designated the Lebanese Canadian Bank, Lebanon's eighth largest
bank, as a primary money-laundering concern under the PATRIOT
Act. Our Government found that Hezbollah operatives were
laundering $200 million per month in drug money. Bank managers
were found to be complicit in the activities and immediately
were linked to Hezbollah officials inside and outside Lebanon,
including Hezbollah officials in Iran.
Iran and Hezbollah have steadily increased their influence
in Latin America since the brutal bombings at the Israeli
Embassy in Buenos Aires in 1992 and the Argentine-Israeli
Mutual Association in 1994. All across Latin America, from
Argentina to Mexico, Iranian and Iranian-backed Hezbollah
activities are reportedly forming a nexus with--or their
activists are forming a nexus with drug-traffic organizations.
Finally as to Afghanistan, Afghanistan continues to be the
source of the vast majority of the world's opium. The DEA has
significantly boosted its enforcement activities in
Afghanistan. The agency is increasingly involved in not only
drug interdiction operations, but also financial investigations
to track how drug proceeds are used to finance the Taliban.
Several DEA officers who have been embedded in military units
have lost their lives in the service of our country.
One witness that I will preview--one question I will
preview for the witness is should we spray the poppy fields in
Afghanistan? This question needs to be looked at from three
areas, and I realize our witness is more inclined to and more
qualified to deal with only one. The first of these
perspectives is what effect would that have on the streets of
America, where another form of terrorism affects us every day,
and that is the tremendous harm to our cities done by the
selling of heroin? The second issue is what are the pluses and
minuses that that would have for our activities in Afghanistan?
We would be closing down a source of income for our enemies; at
the same time we would be making America considerably less
popular among many Afghans. And then finally, and I believe
more important than its effect in Afghanistan, what effect
would this have on Pakistan?
I have said in this committee--before this committee more
than once. Many think Pakistan is important because it is next
to Afghanistan. I think Afghanistan is important because it is
next to Pakistan. So our witness will address how our
Government is responding to the fading lines between terrorism,
narcotic traffickers and other criminal organizations, and what
role we in Congress should play, and I look forward to the
witness' testimony.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Duncan of South Carolina, do you have an opening
statement?
Mr. Duncan. No.
Mr. Royce. Okay. Very good sir.
We will go now to Mr. Maltz, our witness. He is Special
Agent in Charge of Drug Enforcement Administration's Special
Operations Division. What do you call that, SOD?
Mr. Maltz. Yes, sir.
Mr. Royce. Mr. Maltz began his career with the DEA in 1986.
He has had a variety of positions in the agency, winning
numerous awards for his accomplishments. And in 2005, he was
Special Agent in Charge, where he manages a staff of 300
personnel, and they have 20 different government agencies there
basically interlocking through your leadership. And this
multiagency center uses sophisticated technology and
intelligence resources to target narcoterrorism organizations.
He serves as the DEA's lead spokesperson on merging technology
and is the central link between the DEA and the Intelligence
Community.
Without objection, we are going to put your entire
statement in the record, Mr. Maltz, but I would ask you if you
could summarize your testimony and just give us 5 minutes here,
and then we will get into our questions. Thank you very much,
sir.
STATEMENT OF MR. DEREK S. MALTZ, SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE,
SPECIAL OPERATIONS DIVISION, DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Maltz. Distinguished members of the subcommittee, on
behalf of the Drug Enforcement Administration, I would like to
thank you for this opportunity today to talk to you about the
ties between drug trafficking and terrorism. I would also like
to thank Chairman Royce and this committee for your tremendous
support to DEA to address this threat, specifically your
leadership in fully engaging in the issues that we faced during
a very difficult extradition process of Viktor Bout. I am proud
to say that this notorious arms trafficker that was causing
havoc around the world, after a successful trial in the
Southern District of New York, is no longer going to be a
threat to the public. It took less than 6 hours for the jury to
deliberate and find Mr. Bout guilty on all charges. The U.S.
justice system prevailed.
As the agent in charge of the Special Operations Division
since 2005, I have had the privilege of working with numerous
law enforcement agencies around the world, the Intelligence
Community and the Department of Defense. I have witnessed the
amazing results that we can accomplish when we share our
intelligence and we coordinate our efforts against the common
enemies.
SOD is a multiagency center that coordinates and
deconflicts investigations around the world. SOD personnel,
regardless of the agency, focus on connecting the dots of these
criminal networks, pooling the resources of all the
participating agencies to maximize the U.S. Government's
efforts to disrupt the criminal networks.
In response to the September 11th attacks on America, the
Department of Justice, the DEA and the FBI established a
Counter-Narcoterrorism Operations Center at SOD. That center is
responsible for coordinating all the narcoterrorism
investigations of the DEA and works closely with the FBI and
the National Joint Terrorism Task Force to pass any DEA
information around the world on terrorist activity timely.
Over the years clearly the nexus between drug trafficking
and terrorism has grown. The recent example of the plotted
assassination attempt on the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in the
U.S. illustrates the extent to which terrorists will align
themselves with drug traffickers to achieve their goals. In
this case the Iranian Qods Force operative approached an
individual to carry out the assassination. He thought the
person was a member of the Mexican drug cartels. Fortunately
for all of us, the individual he approached was a DEA
informant, and the plot was thwarted.
The American people expect the government to cooperate on
these types of investigations, and that is exactly what the DEA
and the FBI did. In addition to the coordination with our
fellow domestic enforcement agencies, our global partnerships
are critical as we battle these threats around the world.
DEA has one of the largest law enforcement presence
overseas, 83 offices in 62 countries, and works closely with
our host counterparts daily. Because of these relationships DEA
is extremely well positioned to go after the global threats.
DEA also has a vast worldwide confidential source network; a
robust judicial telephone intercept program; and talented and
dedicated personnel that have the passion, the heart, the
desire to pursue this critically important and often dangerous
mission.
Due to the immediate and dire consequences of international
narcoterrorism, DEA cannot take a reactive approach to this
threat. Only proactive investigative action can protect the
lives and property of the innocent victims. To accomplish this
the walls between counterterrorism and counternarcotics or
criminal investigations must come down. This is critical for
our safety and the security.
Drug proceeds in the billions are funding terrorist
activity around the world. By combining the expertise of
multiple U.S. Government agencies, we are able to utilize all
tools in the toolbox. For example, earlier this year we joined
with the Treasury Department and DEA and announced the
identification of the Lebanese Canadian Bank and all its
subsidies as a financial institution of primary concern on
section 311 of the U.S. PATRIOT Act. The organization was
moving multiton quantities of cocaine into West Africa and
North Africa up into Europe, into the Middle East, laundering
hundreds of millions of dollars monthly through the Lebanese
Canadian Bank. This action also exposed Hezbollah's links to
Lebanese Canadian Bank and the international narcotics-
trafficking and money-laundering network. This was the first
time a 311 action in this manner was done in conjunction with
law enforcement on a drug case, and I thank the Treasury
Department for their work in this case.
DEA has been extremely successful in attacking numerous
criminal organizations here in the United States, seized assets
of approximately $3 billion in cash over the last 5 years and
over $5 billion in assets domestically here in the United
States.
As state-sponsored terrorism is declining, terrorism fueled
by drug trafficking is on the rise. Criminals are operating at
full speed in their efforts to do us harm, and we must act with
greater speed to stop them. Though law enforcement and the
Intelligence Community has come a long way in sharing
information and working jointly, there is still more work to be
done to accomplish our shared goal, which is to protect this
country and go against all those who want to do us harm.
In the words of President Obama, ``Terrorists increasingly
are turning to crime and criminal networks for funding.'' For
example, this week a Malian citizen pled guilty in the Southern
District of New York on one of DEA's cases for his role as a
conspirator to provide material support to terrorists. He
agreed to transfer cocaine throughout Africa into northern
Africa, into Europe, with the intention to support al-Qaeda,
AQIM and the FARC. Al-Qaeda is clearly looking for additional
funding streams.
The Special Operations Division has established itself as a
multiagency law enforcement center that can immediately
deconflict investigative information, coordinate operations and
mitigate threats through its multiagency resources and global
capabilities. We have numerous successes behind us and will
remain focused on the emerging threats that we face in this
country.
Thank you for your opportunity to appear today to discuss
this important topic. I am happy to answer any questions that
you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Maltz follows:]
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Mr. Royce. I appreciate very much you coming down and
testifying today, Mr. Maltz. First let me congratulate the DEA
on its operation against the ``Merchant of Death,'' as he was
known in Africa, Viktor Bout, the international arms
trafficker. That was superlative work.
The operative in charge of that operation made an
observation, a former colleague of yours. He said, what in
God's name do we do when a terrorist organization has the
ability to collaborate with a Mexican drug cartel? Now we are
getting to that point where we are beginning to see exactly
that happen.
We had Jameel Nasr arrested in Tijuana, a Mexican national
with family ties to Lebanon attempting to set up a Hezbollah
network in Mexico. You referenced another case. The
sophistication of the explosives used by Mexican cartels that
have been picked up, some of that has been learned from sources
from the Middle East. I have been in some of those tunnels. You
saw in the paper, I think yesterday, another massive tunnel
operation linking Tijuana to San Diego, and as you go down
there, these are the types of state-of-the-art tunneling
operations that you also see on the Lebanon border, and
Hezbollah has an influence with because of their tunneling
capabilities.
The ability to exchange expertise between drug traffickers
and those who are involved in that kind of opportunity, it
really sets up an interesting dynamic. And I wanted to ask you,
how concerned are you about the possibility of this terrorist-
cartel nexus?
Mr. Maltz. Well, sir, I am very concerned. I have three
children, and, like all of us, we are looking out for the best
interests of the United States. Mexican drug cartels are
extremely violent. There has been over 40,000 folks killed in
Mexico since 2006. I remain very concerned.
We have seen the growing nexus between these Middle Eastern
terrorist organizations and different criminal organizations
around the world. As you know, we have linked 19 out of 49--we
have linked 19 out of 49 designated foreign terrorist
organizations to be connected with drug trafficking. So we
remain--we share your concern. We remain vigilant, working
jointly with the Mexicans. We have not seen any connection to
tunnels in Mexico coming into the United States, but obviously
we remain focused on that, and we share your concern.
Mr. Royce. I appreciate that.
Another case I was going to ask you about is this North
Korean case with the drug trafficking--150 kilos of pure
heroin--not too long ago produced in North Korea. This is one
of their exports. They do pretty well with counterfeit $100
bills, with missile exports, and with heroin and with meth.
This is one of their sources of hard currency. So we did break
up the operation there, I guess, on the way to Australia's
shores for distribution by organized triads that operate in
that part of the world.
But are you targeting North Korean drug activity now? Has
the State Department been asking you to make this a priority or
not?
Mr. Maltz. Sir, I have not had any conversation with the
State Department on the North Korea drug situation. We have
agents around the world. We have had information in the past
about drug trafficking in North Korea, but we would have to get
back to you on more details.
Mr. Royce. Here is what I am interested in. When the
Illicit Activities Initiative was at its height, we were really
trying to move on the counterfeiting over there and the other
sources of hard currency that assist the regime because they
are able to continue their weapons program because of the hard
currency they get overseas, they don't really have any domestic
capability of paying for the gyroscopes that they buy on the
black market and so forth, they need hard currency to do this.
So a special coordinator was tasking agencies like the DEA,
ATF, FBI, Secret Service, who tackle the counterfeiting part of
this. All of those were supposed to work in tandem to squeeze
North Korea on this illicit activity front. I wonder if that
has sort of fallen off the radar a little bit.
I bring it up because there are very real benefits to
getting a handle on their ability to use this kind of criminal
enterprise for the hard currency. You got to shut off the
spigot, and this is one way to do it. So I will bring that up
to you.
Let me ask you about North and West Africa as well. You are
spread pretty thin in Africa. And one of the questions I have
is West Africa in particular is a center of operations for an
awful lot of drug smuggling. It is expanding very, very
rapidly; Guinea-Bissau, Senegal, these areas are now covered by
the DEA from your Paris office rather than on the ground. I was
going to ask if that hampers your operations out there at all
and your opinion on that.
Mr. Maltz. Well, clearly we have seen increases of cocaine
flowing out of South America into West Africa for distribution
in Europe and the Middle East, so we are very concerned about
that drug flow. Of course, we are working closely with
counterparts throughout West Africa. We have had some
significant success. As you may know, in Liberia and Ghana on
some joint cases, we actually had the President of Liberia's
son doing undercover work for the DEA in a joint operation when
the Colombian traffickers were trying to corrupt officials in
Liberia to stash cocaine in the multi ton quantities.
So we have had success. We are going to continue to do the
best that we can with the personnel that we have on the ground
in Africa and in Europe, but like anything else, you know you
can always do better if you have more resources.
Mr. Royce. I appreciate that. And I do understand you are
going to open up potentially an office in Kenya.
Mr. Maltz. Yes.
Mr. Royce. I really hope we can get a focus, going back to
my point on North Korea. And maybe you and I can circle around
afterwards, but it has become a national security issue. This
regime has nukes. It is trying to get the money to pay to
miniaturize those nukes to put it on an ICBM. And while they
are running their gulags over there and involved in their
illicit activity, at times it is escaping the world's attention
because of all the other problems out there. And you have got
two teams to handle all of this. I hope we can beef up your
resources at some point, but I also hope we can keep this on
the radar. And we will talk later, Mr. Maltz.
We will go to Mr. Sherman.
Thanks for your good service to this country.
Mr. Maltz. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Sherman. I second that comment. And, Mr. Maltz, I kind
of previewed my questions.
Let us talk about the possibility of spraying the poppy
fields in Afghanistan. Let us put aside the policy aspect,
including the policy aspect of how that would affect public
opinion in Afghanistan toward the United States, and let us
just look at the technical biology here. If we really made an
effort, could we significantly reduce the amount of opium
produced in Afghanistan by spraying the crops?
Mr. Maltz. Sir, I run an operational center for the DEA,
and unfortunately I don't have the background to answer that
question appropriately. Spraying, of course, is run by the
State Department, and you know my concern is to go after the
threats to the best of our ability as an investigating agency,
and I really do not have the details to answer that question. I
apologize for that.
Mr. Sherman. So you are not involved in trying to stamp out
the production so much as to deal with the drug trafficking
after the poppies have been produced?
Mr. Maltz. Well, DEA, in working jointly with the
Department of Defense, State Department and the Afghan National
Police, are involved with going after the production of heroin
in Afghanistan. We have had very significant successes just
last month, in September, some of the largest seizures ever in
production of heroin.
Mr. Sherman. If I can, I am focusing now on the poppy. The
next phase, and more, perhaps, akin to what you do, is after it
has been refined into heroin, or at least partially refined
toward becoming heroin, then it becomes less of a ``stamp out
the crop'' process and much more of a deal with the drug
traffickers process. I gather from your answer that your focus
tends to be on the heroin and the money rather than the poppy
cultivation?
Mr. Maltz. No. We are concerned about the poppy
cultivation, but the State Department would have the oversight
and the lead on spraying, whether that is advantageous. And we
are going to continue to work with our partners in Afghanistan
on the ground to go after the lab operators and the kingpin
organizations to try to make a difference in that way.
Mr. Sherman. Focusing on the testimony we had from Michael
Braun, he said at our first hearing on this subject that our
missions are stifled by the distinct operational authorities
and sources of funding, between those focused on
counternarcotics and those focused on counterterrorism. Do you
see advantages of combining our counterterrorism and
counternarcotics capacities and operations?
Mr. Maltz. Yeah. I mean, at SOD, like I said, we have the
counterterrorism operation, counter-narcoterrorism operations
center. And we work with the FBI's counterterrorism, we work
with the CIA and all the other agencies involved with
counterterrorism, and we are working jointly on these
operations. The case with the assassination attempt, clearly
that was a seamless operation between DEA and FBI, exactly what
the public would expect.
So there is a big advantage because criminals turn--I mean,
terrorists are turning to criminal networks for funding, so you
have to look at it as one network of bad guys around the world
that are looking to do this country harm. You cannot separate
out----
Mr. Sherman. So you don't think that there are
bureaucratic, stovepiping or barriers that prevent good
coordination and communication between those who, like
yourself, are involved in counternarcotics and those who are
focused on counterterrorism?
Mr. Maltz. Sir, I worked in the Special Operations Division
prior to 9/11, and I have been at the SOD operation now for
over 6 years, and I can say that the cooperation is continually
getting better. There is always going to be stovepiping because
it is a personality situation depending on where you are
working in the world.
Mr. Sherman. If I can interrupt to try to squeeze in one
more question. Those engaged in counterterrorism have to focus
not only on how to hit the terrorists, but also on winning over
the hearts and minds of those who might be terrorists or might
be thinking of becoming terrorists. Those who are engaged in
counternarcotics usually don't focus so much on the hearts and
minds of the criminals involved. Is there a clash of approach
between a law enforcement and anti--counternarcotics approach
that focuses on nailing the bad guys and a counterterrorism
approach that talks an awful lot about winning over the bad
guys?
Mr. Maltz. Well, all I can say is in our efforts, we are
looking to prosecute the bad guys. We have approaches where we
are looking to develop evidence, we are looking to work with
whoever we can work with around the world, combine the
resources to maximize your efforts. In counterterrorism
operations a lot of times they may be looking to disrupt
something that is going to happen, and they have to take action
immediately, and, you know, collecting evidence may not be as
important.
But to go back to your question, I think that there are
some walls that need to come down, there are some stovepipes
that need to come down, but the good news is we are making a
lot of progress, and we hope to make more progress.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
Mr. Royce. Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Agent Maltz, thanks for being here. I just came back
from Afghanistan and Iraq, and we met with some DEA agents over
there. I understand the good work that is going on to eradicate
some of the opium poppy fields and other things and turn those
areas into food production and the work that DEA is doing
there.
I want to focus on Iran and the threat in the Western
Hemisphere. I notice in your testimony you say this: Luckily
the individual who was allegedly approached was a DEA agent and
informant, or a DEA informant, and the plot was thwarted. Many
of us that have been following this issue for a long time--I
have been in Congress since January--this issue of Iran and
Qods Force; Hezbollah being involved with the Mexican drug
cartel; and drug trafficking utilization of tunneling, a lot of
the sophisticated tunnels we see are very similar to what you
see in maybe Lebanon. The issue with Qurani and ties to
Hezbollah are very, very clear. I think you guys got that. I
don't think you are completely lucky. I think you had the right
resources in place to be lucky. I would rather be lucky than
good any day, and that is an old saying, but I am glad you had
those guys in place.
A lot of folks question me why Iran, why Hezbollah would be
involved with the drug cartels. And I go back to the 1980 fatwa
by Hezbollah that gives rationale to that, why they should
engage in drug production and trafficking, and I am sure you
are familiar with that.
But I want to bring your attention to H.R. 429. It is a
resolution I have put forth that got bipartisan support, and
hopefully we are going to get some movement on it. But it
basically says that under the next counterterrorism strategy,
that will include North America--excuse me, the Western
Hemisphere in the area of focus, which I think was left out in
the 2011 area of focus. I think it should be part of the next
one.
And we need to constantly be aware of the fact that Iran
opened six Embassies in the Western Hemisphere in the last 5
years that many folks have testified in front of our committees
that see that possible lily pad effect of Hezbollah and the
Qods Force using those Embassies and those relationships to
leapfrog into threatening this country.
And so one thing that you said concerns me, and I want to
ask you about the wall, the wall between the counterterrorism
and counternarcotics that you mention, and the fact that it
needs to come down, because that struck a cord with me, because
the 9/11 Commission identified the wall that existed between
government agencies that kept information from flowing that
could have thwarted that attack. So if you could delve into
that, the wall aspect that you mentioned, and what we can do as
Congress to help eradicate that wall and have more information
sharing.
Mr. Maltz. Thank you.
Well, the good news is, as an example, the United States
attorney in the Southern District of New York took
unprecedented action, and he broke down those walls. In his
prosecution--with his prosecution units in New York, there is
no longer a drugs and a terrorism unit, it is one unit of very
aggressive, very competent prosecutors that are going to work
together to go after the threats. The U.S. attorney for the
Eastern District of Virginia has done the same. He has
restructured his units so he has the best prosecutors available
to go after the biggest threats to the country.
So we are working on taking down these type of walls, and
we have made a lot of progress, but I am concerned because
there are different philosophies, different ways of looking at
going after a terrorist organization, a drug organization--I
don't know what happened to the sound.
Mr. Duncan. We can hear you.
Mr. Maltz. So I am still concerned about the walls.
And I worked very hard on trying to convince others out
there on the reasons we have to work very closely together.
Bottom line is it is about the money. If a terrorist
organization wants to carry out a terrorist act against this
country, they need money, and drugs are generating billions of
dollars around the world. So whether it is drug smuggling,
alien smuggling, arms trafficking, the bad guys are going to
generate money from criminal activity, and they are going to
provide that money to terrorists.
So we have to continue to look at this issue as a problem
of a criminal organization that wants to do harm to this
country and just do the best we can to share information with
everybody that has a role, all the law enforcement agencies and
the Intelligence Community.
Mr. Duncan. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Royce. Let me thank Mr. Duncan, too. He has legislation
that he has been working on in terms of Hezbollah's operations
in our hemisphere, and his staff has been working with the
committee staff on this legislation. We hope to move it, and we
wanted to acknowledge that.
Mr. Maltz, in your circumstances is there anything else
that you would like to share with us, you would like us to be
pondering, you think we should be thinking about?
Mr. Maltz. I am just very thankful of what this committee
has done already, the fact that you engaged very heavily. And I
read the letter that you wrote regarding the Bout extradition,
and I just appreciate that, personally appreciate that, because
we have done a lot of work in that investigation, and we were
very happy at the results. But just the fact that we are having
this hearing is appreciated by me.
Mr. Royce. I made several phone calls to people in more
than one government.
Mr. Maltz. I recognize that, sir.
Mr. Royce. But I know what you did as well. And I think it
is a great message to the next arms trafficker, the fact that
your team could go out there, reach out there, catch this
individual who was about to escape justice, make sure he faced
justice, bring him back to the Southern District of New York,
charge him, convict him. It is impressive. It is very, very
impressive, and I would say it has not gone unnoticed by others
that are involved in this type of work out there. So if you can
keep up that pace and remove somebody who has done as much
damage and brought as much destruction and death as Viktor
Bout, you have done something for world peace.
Mr. Maltz. Thank you, Chairman. I mean, after we arrested
Monzer Kassar, Mr. Untouchable, in Spain, and brought him to
justice in the Southern District of New York, and were able to
be recognized by the Klinghoffer daughters at a ceremony in New
York that we never forgot the killer of their father, we
appreciate your comments, and we are going to continue to
conduct business just like we have been doing.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, sir. Thanks for your testimony today.
And I thank the members of the subcommittee.
Mr. Maltz. Thank you very much.
Mr. Royce. We stand adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:25 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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