[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
NARCOTERRORISM AND THE LONG REACH OF U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 12, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-67
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
ROBERT TURNER, New York
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
TED POE, Texas BRAD SHERMAN, California
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Douglas Farah, Senior Fellow, International Assessment and
Strategy Center................................................ 5
Mr. Michael A. Braun, Managing Partner, Spectre Group
International, LLC............................................. 21
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Ph.D., Fellow, Foreign Policy, The Brookings
Institution.................................................... 34
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Mr. Douglas Farah: Prepared statement............................ 8
Mr. Michael A. Braun: Prepared statement......................... 22
Vanda Felbab-Brown, Ph.D.: Prepared statement.................... 36
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 66
Hearing minutes.................................................. 67
NARCOTERRORISM AND THE LONG REACH OF U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT
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WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 12, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:30 p.m., in
room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Royce. This hearing will come to order. Today we're
looking at the topic of narcoterrorism. Our hearing comes as a
narcoterrorism-related case exploded into the public eye
yesterday afternoon.
The Justice Department detailed an Iranian directed plot to
assassinate a foreign Ambassador on U.S. soil. From what we
know, a key conspirator in the plot approached a Drug
Enforcement Administration informant seeking to hire a drug
cartel hit squad to carry out the attack here in Washington,
DC.
A plot was planned over multiple meetings in Mexico between
the man now in U.S. custody and people that he at the time
believed were cartel members.
Iran's Quds Force conceived of a plot to recruit Mexican
narcotraffickers in this assassination effort on U.S. soil. The
fact that they would do that I don't think should be a great
surprise. Clearly, this deadly force felt comfortable
navigating the expansive criminal networks south of our border.
For years, border security advocates saying that just
because we had one or two Hezbollah operatives come across the
border, that it was alarmism to say that this could ever
escalate into the type of situation that we face today. But
this plot proves just how important a secured border is to our
national security.
The Kourani case predates this. In that particular
instance, it was the brother of the head of Hezbollah's
security operation, the very individual, the very general who
was shelling Haifa. It was his brother who came across the
border in the trunk of a car and made his way up to Michigan to
be reunited there with a cadre of confederates that had
embedded itself there. And that, fortunately, was discovered at
that time.
I saw a little bit of his brother's handiwork because we
were in Israel, in Haifa during the Hezbollah War, and his
brother was in charge of the missile attacks which were coming
in to downtown Haifa, where they had even launched an attack on
the trauma hospital. Well, this was the individual's brother
who was apprehended here on U.S. soil.
Yesterday, incidentally, the trial of international arms
dealer, Viktor Bout, began in New York City. And Bout was
brought down by DEA agents in May of '08 for conspiracy to
supply weapons to the FARC, a designated terrorist group.
Another example of this type of nexus that occurs. And this
``shadow facilitator'' was notorious for supplying arms to
dictators and terrorists. After I and others pushed hard for
Bout's extradition from Thailand, the ``Merchant of Death'' is
finally getting his day in court. Michael Braun, who quarter-
backed this operation for the DEA, will testify a little bit
about this operation.
These cases illustrate two things. The first is the nexus
between drugs and terrorism, and the second is the long arm of
U.S. law enforcement.
Unquestionably, the links between drugs and terrorism are
growing at an alarming pace. Last year, the DEA tallied 18 of
44 State Department-designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations
as having links to the drug trade. And this includes the FARC,
Hezbollah, Hamas, and al-Qaeda.
Earlier this year, the Treasury Department designated
Lebanese Canadian Bank as a ``primary money laundering
concern,'' finding that as much as $200 million per month in
drug money was laundered through that bank into the coffers of
Hezbollah to fund their operations. Meanwhile, ties between
Hezbollah and Mexican drug cartels have obviously strengthened.
And this makes sense, drug cartels get Hezbollah's smuggling
and explosive expertise, and Hezbollah gets a presence on the
lawless Mexican border.
As Doug Farah will testify, the ties between transnational
criminal networks and terrorist organizations are ``morphing
into something new.'' Looking forward, attacking those links
will be critical to countering terrorist plots. As the U.S.
Attorney for the Southern District of New York recently said,
``The long arm of the law has to get even longer.''
With a unique set of authorities, human sources, and
expertise, the DEA has been bringing a cutting edge approach to
attack this nexus abroad. But as we will hear today, despite
its robust international posture in some continents like
Africa, the DEA's presence is spread very, very thin. And
that's just one of the many challenges it faces.
The subcommittee looks forward to hearing from the DEA in
the near future. And I'll now turn to Mr. Connolly for his
opening statement.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
holding this hearing.
And, obviously, the announcement yesterday of the
unbelievably bold plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador here
in Washington at a crowded restaurant that could involve
hundreds of people, innocent people, is really extraordinary to
contemplate. And it's very chastening, and yet maybe not
surprising that the plotters turned to drug traffickers skilled
in the arts, unfortunately, of murder and assassination, and
terror to carry out their plot. Where else would you go in
terms of the requisite skill set to pull off such an arrogant
and breathtakingly bold crime here in Washington, DC?
So, in some ways it really is a sobering reality that I
hope, as you suggest, Mr. Chairman, has the policy community
refocusing on this issue. It has been a while now since a
number of terror groups from the Beqaa Valley in Lebanon with
Hezbollah to the sort of unpoliced areas in the borders of
Laos, Cambodia, and Thailand, to large swaths of the Upper
Huallaga Valley in Peru and other parts of Bolivia and South
America, while we're seeing the nexus between terrorists and
drugs. Drugs are an easy source of financing.
Now, one of the things that has to concern us as Americans
is what is happening south of our border in the northern part
of Mexico, large swaths of which look more and more, frankly,
like a failed state that ought to be equally sobering for all
Americans. That's our border, that's our neighbor.
If we're looking for a model that mostly succeeded in
turning this threat around when it all looked lost it's
Colombia. And I will say that, having an honest discussion
about this here in this Congress is not always easy, because
there are some subjects some folks don't want to talk about.
Resources to deter the threat is one of them. Guns are
another.
When I went to Mexico in a codel last year to talk to the
Attorney General of Mexico about the pending threat the single
most efficacious thing he could cite that would make a
difference would be the reimposition of the assault weapon ban
here in U.S. law, because of the unfettered trafficking of
U.S.-made or U.S.-provided weapons going into Mexico.
We could sharp the ATF on a different committee I'm a
member of. We had hearings on the ATF, and much has been made
of Fast and Furious, but what isn't talked about, or isn't
always welcome is it's Congress that has prevented the ATF from
having a permanent directive for 6 long years. It's Congress
that has actually cut back on the resources ATF has requested.
We had one ATF agent who's a former cop from New York City
who testified that on one block in Manhattan there are more
police officers than there are the entire ATF force policing
the southwest border of the United States. So, we have to get
serious, too, about this threat. We can't just pontificate
about it, and rhetorically decry the nature of the threat,
which is very real. We also have to be willing to make some
tough decisions in terms of the allocation of resources to make
sure we're meeting that threat, and policy decisions that may
not always be welcome, but that also are a necessary part of
the dialogue.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Royce. Mr. Poe from Texas.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Farah, good to see
you again today.
Several observations about this whole situation. I think
it's important that we be realists as Americans to know exactly
what's taking place. International terrorism we talk about, we
realize is a bad thing, and people in the name of certain
political beliefs want to cause harm to Americans. But we must
also understand that terrorists want to get into the United
States some way to do their mischief.
The easiest way to get in the United States, of course, is
to go through Mexico. If you get to Mexico, you can get to the
U.S., no matter--I mean, Mexico has a problem of two sea
borders, two land borders, and it's difficult to patrol. And I
think that's the reason the Iranian operative from the
government, in my opinion, sought help from the Zetas.
The Zetas, a notorious outfit. They remind me of the old TV
series ``Paladin.'' Probably none of you all remember that, the
chairman probably does. Paladin had a card that said, ``Have
gun will travel,'' and that was his business card. And that's
like the Zetas, they have guns and they will travel. And they
come to the United States, they'll go anywhere for money, and
any criminal enterprise that can facilitate them bringing in
money they'll be involved in.
We have to understand, in my opinion, that this is a
growing problem of international terrorist groups in the name
of some political philosophy working with the people who will
do anything for filthy lucre, money, and what we can do with
that.
It's still the same problem. We've got people and drugs
coming north, and we've got guns and money going south of our
international border with Mexico. We've done a lot, but the
drug trade still occurs down there in south Texas, so it's
important that we recognize the problem, and we actually have a
strategy to deal with this on an international terrorist basis,
as opposed to a kind of a hit and miss tactical strategy.
Don't get me wrong. I think our border patrol agents, the
DEA, they do a great job. They do a lot of good things the
American public never knows about for security reasons, but I
think maybe more boots on the ground, on the border to keep
those cartels from passing into the U.S. is something we need
to look harder at. Sure, it's the job of the Border Patrol to
be the first line of defense, but they need some help.
The Texas border is the same distance from New Orleans as
it is to New York City. That's a long border with just a
handful of folks trying to keep out the bad guys. So, I look
forward to hearing from you and have several questions for all
three of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Judge Poe.
We're now joined by our distinguished panel.
Mr. Doug Farah is a senior fellow with the International
Assessment and Strategy Center. For two decades, Doug served as
a foreign correspondent and investigative reporter for the
Washington Post covering Latin America, as well as West Africa.
In November 2001, Farah broke the story about al-Qaeda's
links to the West African diamond trade. In November 2007, Doug
co-authored ``Merchant of Death,'' detailing Viktor Bout's
deadly trade. He has been a valuable resource to this
subcommittee and its staff for many years, and we appreciate
him appearing here today.
We also have Mr. Michael Braun, managing partner at Spectre
Group International. Before entering the private sector, Braun
served for 34 years in law enforcement including nearly 4 years
as the Assistant Administrator and Chief of Operations for the
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. He was responsible for
DEA's 227 domestic and 87 foreign officers and several
divisions, so we thank him for his service and welcome him here
today.
Dr. Vanda Felbab-Brown is a fellow at the Brookings
Institution. She is an expert on illicit economies and national
and international conflicts, and she has done extensive
research on South Asia, on Burma, on the Andean region, and on
Mexico. She is the author of ``Shooting Up, Counterinsurgency
and the War on Drugs.''
All of the witnesses have their testimony in the record at
this time, so I'd ask them all to encapsulate this into 5
minutes, if they would, and we'll begin with Mr. Farah. Thank
you.
STATEMENT OF MR. DOUGLAS FARAH, SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL
ASSESSMENT AND STRATEGY CENTER
Mr. Farah. Thank you, Chairman Royce. It's always a
pleasure to be here and work with your committee.
As you described earlier, yesterday the Justice Department
announced the stopping of a plot by the Iranian Government
using special Quds Force operatives to assassinate the U.S.
Ambassador in the United States.
This is significant, I think, for multiple reasons. In my
written testimony, I describe there are multiple alliances
forming across Latin America among transnational criminal
organizations, drug trafficking structures, terrorist groups in
criminalized states that present a significant and perhaps
unprecedented challenge to U.S. national security interests
from that region.
The allegation that Iran, a criminalized state which
sponsors Hezbollah, one of the world's premier terrorist
organizations in dealing with the Zetas, a non-state drug
trafficking organization that controls key access points to
cross the U.S. border truly is a perfect storm.
This possibility, a hostile state using special forces and
proxy agents to engage in criminal organizations for operations
inside the United States has long been downplayed and sometimes
ridiculed in policy making circles. Yet, the signs of this type
of gathering storm have been evident for some time, including
possible collaboration on the transportation of WMD components.
As the recent White House strategy put forward by the NSC
to combat transnational organized crime noted, ``While many
terrorist links to transnational organized crime are
opportunistic, this nexus is dangerous, especially if it leads
to a transnational organized crime network to facilitate the
transfer of weapons of mass destruction and materials to
terrorists.''
This is not a remote possibility. As the Iran assassination
plot demonstrates, many things that were once unthinkable are
now possible. The ideological boundaries and operational
constraints that kept many groups from working together during
the Cold War have largely been eclipsed, and there is a
constant blurring of the lines that once separated organized
crime from terrorist groups.
The reasons are multiple and are driven, in part, by what
the Drug Enforcement Administration has accurately identified
as the crucial element in the logistical structure for both
groups. The emergence of a small group of super fixers or
shadow fixers, those who are able to provide specific, unique
services to multiple groups regardless of ideology, motivation
or location. And Viktor Bout, I think, is one of the premier
examples of that type of person.
These new realities render obsolete the usual definitions
and assumptions about non-state actors, nation states and how
they relate to each other. Hezbollah engages in criminal
activities in West Africa and Latin America, yet also acts as a
proxy for Iran's foreign policy and military intelligence
activities. The FARC in Colombia produces most of the world's
cocaine and is used as an instrument of power by the Bolivarian
Alliance led by Venezuela's Hugo Chavez.
It is the hybrid nature of these organizations and the
increasing support they receive from criminalized states that
makes the role of the shadow facilitators so vital. They
understand how to exploit the scenes in the international,
legal, and economic structures and work with both terrorist and
criminal organizations. They specialize in placing people and
products in the same pipelines, in the same illicit structures
and exploiting the same weaknesses.
Criminalized states frequently use transnational organized
criminal organizations as a form of state craft bringing new
elements that fundamentally alter the structure of global
power. The spread of criminalized states and the benefits they
offer are often overlooked in our policy making and in our
thinking about the changing world order; yet, its implications
are enormous.
Rather than operating on the margins of the state or
seeking to co-op small pieces of state machinery, the
transnational organized crime groups in this construct operate
in concert with the state on multiple levels. Within that
stable environment, a host of new operations open from the sale
of weapons to the use of national aircraft and shipping
registries, as Viktor Bout showed, to easy use of banking
structures, the acquisition of diplomatic passports, and other
identification forms.
Hugo Chavez and his allies in Ecuador, Bolivia and
Nicaragua have allowed Iran, a state sponsor of terror, to open
financial facilities, fund companies and dedicated shipping
lines to evade sanctions on his nuclear program. At the same
time, Iran is carrying out multiple mining activities in Latin
America that directly benefit his missile and nuclear programs
without transparency or public scrutiny.
As has historically been the case, nation states have been
slow in recognizing and adapting to the new series of threats
and dramatic shifts in transnational organized crime in
general, and particularly its relationship to terrorist
organizations.
This administration's transnational organized crime
strategy released earlier this year was the first strategy
released since 1995. In those 16 years, the world's illicit
economy globally grew to represent up to 9-10 percent of the
world GDP, or $6.2 trillion, a figure that ranks just behind
the US, and EU, and ahead of Japan and China as global economic
forces.
The United States, despite its sluggish response, is among
the most forward-looking nations in terms of policy relating to
the criminal terrorist nexus. There have been some remarkable
achievements by a small group within the government that have
understood the challenges in the move to face them in new and
innovative ways.
As the chairman mentioned, the DEA has been particularly
adept at identifying and capturing through complex operations
several of the world's most prominent super fixers, including
Monzer Al Kassar and Viktor Bout.
With a unique set of authorities and support from other
agencies, the DEA has broken new ground in tracking the network
of relationships among drug trafficking organizations and
terrorist groups around the world, but this is not enough. It
is, indeed, a brave new world we are facing. The challenges of
the transnational organized criminal state and terrorist nexus
are underestimated at our own peril.
Congress and the administration must insure that steps are
taken commensurate with the scope and scale of the emerging
global actor threat. Rather than tackling the enormous scope of
the problem, the transnational organized crime terrorist nexus
is generally treated as a slightly more serious version of what
we have seen in the past. Instead, the enormous complexity,
adaptive capacity and economic resources of the state and non-
state actors must be viewed as something far larger and more
dangerous than a simple iteration of past structures. It must
viewed as the dynamic, flexible, global phenomenon that can
react more quickly than government, has more resources than any
individual state, and has no underlying loyalty to the current
world order.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Farah follows:]
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Mr. Royce. Mr. Braun.
STATEMENT OF MR. MICHAEL A. BRAUN, MANAGING PARTNER, SPECTRE
GROUP INTERNATIONAL, LLC
Mr. Braun. Mr. Chairman, other members of this very
distinguished and critically important subcommittee, I
appreciate the invitation to speak before you today.
Doug Farah and I have long been on the same set of tracks
headed in the same direction, so he's basically covered most of
what I was going to say, but I want to highlight a few things.
And I know you're itching to ask us lots of questions, and I'll
just move on from there.
Mr. Chairman, you said early on in your statement that
basically half of the designated foreign terrorist
organizations are now involved in one or more aspects of the
global drug trade. I think it's far worse than that. That's a
very conservative estimate, as well it should be, but suffice
it to say that it is a growing phenomenon. And, quite frankly,
it's happened because of our successful prosecution of the
global war on terror.
Two things that have happened specifically is state
sponsorship declined significantly for terrorist groups after
9/11, which caused more of these groups to move to drug
trafficking and to a lesser degree some other transnational
organized criminal activity to fund their operations, to keep
the movements alive.
The second thing that we've done is our nation has done
yeoman's work working with coalition partners around the globe
to identify and significantly disrupt the funding streams from
very powerful private donors. Again, a second reason why more
and more of these groups are having to turn to the drug trade,
other organized criminal activity to keep their movements
alive.
I would also like to say that Doug is exactly right, Mr.
Chairman, Mr. Connolly, Mr. Poe, all of your comments with
respect to this event that took place yesterday is the perfect
example of what Doug and I have been preaching in this town for
8 or 10 years. And you talked about the very dangerous threat
posed by this growing phenomenon, this growing confluence of
drugs and terror. That is a very dangerous threat.
But what is just as threatening, and we need to understand
this, is this committee gets it. You understand it, but far too
many other folks in this town don't understand it, and they're
not embracing the idea that these very powerful threats are
coming together, and the consequences for allowing that to
happen. So, there's a lot of education that needs to take
place, as far as I'm concerned.
And then lastly, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you
personally. I was over at DEA back in 2008 when the Bout case
was playing out in those very critical days for several months
there, and I can say this; that had it not been for you and the
other members of this very important subcommittee, and some
others in Congress, had it not been for your leadership and
your push to get the Thais to extradite him, to do the right
thing, to stand by the rule of law, there is no doubt in my
mind that Viktor Bout would not be standing trial this week in
New York. And as I have said many times in the past, he is, as
far as I'm concerned, or was one of the most dangerous men on
the face of the earth.
So, I am looking forward to answering your questions, and
helping you and your staff members in any way that I can. Thank
you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Braun follows:]
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Mr. Royce. Well, thank you, Mr. Braun. Thank you for a very
risky operation on your part in terms of bringing him to
justice.
Let's go to Dr. Felbab-Brown for her remarks. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF VANDA FELBAB-BROWN, PH.D., FELLOW, FOREIGN POLICY,
THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Ms. Felbab-Brown. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Connolly, I thank you
for giving me this opportunity to address the committee.
Organized crime, illicit economies, especially when they
coincide with military conflict generate multiple threats to
states and to society.
Yet, although the negative aspects, the threats are clear,
the relationship between human security, crime, illicit
economies, and law enforcement is, in fact, highly complex. Not
understanding the complexity and nuances has the great
potential of undermining the effectiveness of policies, as well
as depriving law enforcement of a panoply of strategies for
dealing with this issue.
For many people around the world, participation in formal
or outright illegal economies like the drug trade is the only
means to satisfy their basic livelihoods. Any chance of social
advancement, even as they continue to exist in the type of
criminality, and security, and marginalizations. The more the
state is absent or deficient in providing the necessary public
goods, the more communities become susceptible to and sometimes
outright dependent on those state entities, be they criminal
groups or insurgents.
For this very reason, those belligerent groups, as well as
criminal groups can obtain not only large financial benefits
from sponsoring illicit economies, but also significant
political capital, significant political support.
But although criminal groups and belligerent groups often
interact in the domain of illicit economies, sometimes shear
tactics, sometimes coordinate their action, they have not
morphed into one homogeneous, monolithic entity. Rather, the
crime nexus is far from stable and not necessarily inevitable.
Frequently, relations between criminal groups and
belligerents are characterized by as much violence, as much
competition and resentment as by cooperation, and often even
tactical alliances collapse quickly. That is because criminal
groups are not only profit maximizers, but more often than not
they are risk minimizers.
Losing this nuance, losing this understanding of the
different motivations and incentive structures of belligerent
groups and terrorist groups would deprive law enforcement of
critical mechanisms to break up the nexus and minimize threats
to the United States and the international community.
Because of the complexities of illicit economies and the
fact they generate political capital for those who sponsor them
with respect to marginalized populations, effective state
response is rarely one solely of law enforcement. Rather, an
effective response will address all the complex reasons, why
populations turn to illegality, one of which is law
enforcement, but not a sole one.
Other aspects of an effective response would include a
multi-faceted state building effort to deprive the belligerents
or criminal groups of the potential to develop bonds with the
marginalized community. Some of these mechanisms might include
extending Rule of Law, access to dispute resolution mechanisms,
or systematic development with urban or rural.
In the case of the cultivation of illicit crop, eradication
has dubious effects on the financial profits of belligerents.
Only under the most auspicious circumstances can they use the
financial profits of belligerents. But the definite aspect of
eradication is that it antagonizes rural populations from the
government, from the counterinsurgent forces and denies--
deprives both of intelligence flows on the belligerent.
Regarding third crime terror nexus the priority for the
United States and the international community needs to be to
combat the most disruptive and dangerous networks of organized
crime and belligerents, those with the greatest links or
potential links to international terrorist groups with global
reach, and those that are most rapacious and predatory to the
society and equitable state, and those that most concentrate
rents from illicit economies to a narrow clique of people.
It is important to realize that indiscriminate and uniform
application of law enforcement, whether external or internal,
can generate several undesirable outcomes. One of these
outcomes is that the weakest criminal groups will be
eliminated. That, in fact, applying law enforcement or
interdiction might inadvertently increase the efficiency,
lethality, corruptive and coercive power of the remaining
criminal groups, might very well give rise to vertical
integration of the criminal industry.
The second need to prioritize is that uniform--not
prioritized application of law enforcement does not, in fact,
push criminal groups together into alliance with terrorist
groups. The opposite should be the goal of law enforcement to
generate incentives for the groups to be as much in conflict as
possible.
I think our law enforcement needs to be very much commended
for uncovering the plot that was announced yesterday. And I
think it's significant that there was a differential incentive
structure on the part of these members of the criminal
community that allowed this access to take place. And we need
to enhance such mechanisms for law enforcement. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Felbab-Brown follows:]
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Mr. Royce. Thank you, I appreciate your testimony, as well.
Let me go to Mr. Braun with the first question, which would
be on the DEA confidential informant who was at the heart of
this Iranian assassination plot. According to the Justice
Department, what we know is, presumably, Iran's Quds Force
approached the Iranian-American. It was last spring, and they
approach him with the idea of recruiting narcotraffickers into
the plot.
What I was going to ask you is, if this is the case, what
it would tell us is that Iranians were comfortable swimming in
those waters in terms of the cartels in Mexico. I'd like you to
discuss the relationship between the Quds Force and Hezbollah,
and the Mexican cartels to the extent you can. And how are
these confidential informants worked in a situation like this?
Mr. Braun. Mr. Chairman, some important points. The DEA on
any given day of the week has got several thousand confidential
informants that are working for the Agency domestically and
around the globe.
An important point to make about law enforcement
confidential sources, and I don't mean to in any way diminish
the importance of human intelligence sources within the Intel
community, but in law enforcement those sources have to pass
what I call the judicial test. And by that I mean at some point
in time when their case handlers are interviewing them for the
first time or the 100th time working with them what's in the
back of their mind is at some point in the future he, meaning
the informant, and/or me, meaning the agent, is going to end up
in a Federal courthouse testifying under oath about what's
happening, is going to be raked across the coals by a defense
attorney being paid way too much money, and it's not a pleasant
experience. So, the Agency goes to great lengths to corroborate
every piece of information that those sources reveal. Again,
one important point.
Another important point here is that it is not unusual for
the DEA, which is a single mission agency, but obviously multi-
faceted, as they're working the most complex investigations in
Federal law enforcement, targeting the most ruthless drug
trafficking cartels in the world for them to come against
terrorist organizations, against money launderers, hit men,
arms traffickers, what I refer to as the potpourri of global
scum, it happens routinely. Another important point.
But with that said, the DEA relies heavily on those
informants. They have over the last several decades relied
heavily--more heavily on judicially approved telecommunications
intercept operations that we use very effectively against guys
like Bout and others.
I don't want to--Mr. Chairman, I don't want to get into the
details of this particular case.
Mr. Royce. Just give me a little bit about the connection,
if you have any specifics on Mexican drug cartels and
Hezbollah.
Mr. Braun. Well, here's what I can tell you.
Mr. Royce. I know one specific instance.
Mr. Braun. Okay.
Mr. Royce. The Kourani case that I referred to earlier.
Mr. Braun. Here's what I can tell you. In places like the
Tri-Border area of Latin America, in places like West Africa,
and I particularly believe in some permissive environments
within Mexico, groups like very powerful drug trafficking
groups and terrorist organizations are coming together.
As Doug has said in the past, and I have said in the past,
they hang out in the same sweaty brothels, they rub shoulders
in the same city bars, and they stay at the same hotels. And
what are they doing? They're sharing lessons learned, they're
talking business.
I believe that those things are playing out, and have been
playing out for a long time. And I believe that it was that
kind of a scenario that enabled the informant to be at just the
right place at just the right time to be approached by an
Iranian-American, allegedly a member of the Quds Force as a
brother, and that's how that informant--that investigation
hinged on that informant and the important role that he played.
Mr. Royce. Thank you. Let me ask Dr. Brown a question.
Hernando de Soto's work in Peru on the Third Path in terms
of trying to install the rule of law by giving private property
rights to people that normally would be involved in the drug
trade. Is that the type of example that you were thinking of?
I'd just like to get your response to some of the concepts that
he has utilized in order to try to engage people who normally
would not have an interest in moving away from the narcotics
trade and, instead, giving them an alternative path. Let me ask
you about that.
Ms. Felbab-Brown. It needs to be a multi-faceted extension
of the state presence, one of which is bringing effective and
accountable law enforcement, one that is not abusive toward the
population, one that has the capacity to develop good relations
with the communities, so that the community is willing to
provide intelligence, and one that is effective at protecting
the community against non-state actors. Often, those state
actors themselves are providers of security.
Another aspect in extending Rule of Law in the form of
justice, a resolution mechanism, or access to justice so that
the population does not have to turn toward non-state actors
for the dispensation of rules and order.
And yet another aspect is providing the necessary socio
economic benefits, access to legal jobs, and access to
infrastructure, schools, clinics.
How one actually goes about it in the particular
circumstances will depend on the local circumstances. In
Mexico, Todos Somos Juarez is an example of such a program. The
U.S. component under Beyond Medidas called the Fourth Pillar.
But the goal is to satisfy the ability of the population to
have legal livelihoods, and access to Rule of Law through
official state mechanisms.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Dr. Brown. I'll return in the second
round for a question for Mr. Farah. Let me now go to the
ranking member, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, I'm happy if you wish to pursue
that, and I'll go----
Mr. Royce. Very good. I'll go with one question, then Mr.
Connolly, and then over to Dana Rohrabacher.
I wanted to ask you, Doug Farah, about the learning curve
that seems to be pretty rapid in these parts of the world as we
see the explosives used by the drug cartels, for example. They
started a few years ago with pipe bombs, and then all of a
sudden you've got these radio triggered plastic explosive car
bombs. And it does look as though there's an expertise that's
being shared. I was wondering if you had any information on the
types of expertise that gets transferred, and what kind of
support, outside support the cartels might be seeking?
Mr. Farah. Thank you. I think that it's one of the great
benefits of inhabiting permissive environments is exactly that,
the chance to sit down and do lessons learned. If you look
specifically at groups like the FARC, which are both a
terrorist organization and a drug trafficking organization,
they've gone out of their way to acquire lessons from ETA
Basque terrorists, from the remnants of the Irish Republican
Army, from numerous other terrorists groups which greatly
enhance their explosive capacity, and their ability to do
intelligence, counterintelligence.
And I think that if you look at Mexico, you see the
possible transfer, at least a great improvement in the types of
tunnels they're making. There's a lot of concern that that
might be coming directly from Hezbollah or other people who
have really perfected the art of tunnel building. And what they
really--they want a couple of things, and that is technical
expertise on intelligence gathering. Counterintelligence is one
of the things they value incredibly highly, and any sort of
games and toys they can get their hands on that will make the
lives of the cops more difficult.
In Colombia and Mexico you see the high premium placed on
encryption, different types of encryption that they can use
because, as Mike knows well, when the DEA used to buy something
it has to go through a process of acquiring it, and bidding,
and all that stuff. These guys go buy the best off the shelf
stuff and they're generations ahead sort of almost by default.
So, I think that those are the specific ways. But I think
one of the things you're finding is, I think it's both old and
new. I think you find this whole new range of technologies
being used. But more and more I'm seeing, particularly in
Central America and through Mexico the traditional routes that
have always been used for smuggling, the routes that the FMLN
used, the routes that the Contras used, the routes everybody
used for different things in those wars are still in use in
part because I think the way Vanda accurately describes it, the
culture of their legality. It's very difficult to establish
state presence in areas that have always used illegal methods,
or what they don't consider to be illegal methods for their
livelihoods, but the explosion of drug money into those
networks is what really changes the game.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Farah. Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Farah, and I may be pushing you beyond your area of
expertise, but based on what we know from announcements
yesterday, what is your understanding of the relationship of
the Quds to the government, the formal Government of Iran?
Mr. Farah. Well, I think that there has been a lot of
concern for a long time. The Quds Force is not directly
responsible to the formal government. Ahmadinejad does not
necessarily control the Quds Force, or the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard.
I think there's a lot of concern that the Quds Force does a
lot of things that are outside what would be the normal chain
of command that goes very high up into the clerical structure.
So, I would say that--I'm not an expert on Iran, but I--my
understanding is that there's significant possibility that
those who hold formal power in Iran do not actually have the
power to control the Quds Force. And the Quds Force is clearly
one of the tips of the spear and oversees acquisitions of
companies, front companies, money laundering, intelligence
gathering. They're the ones who are sent out, and if you look
at the Iranian Embassies growing particularly across Latin
America, they're enormous in comparison to what their listed
activity would normally require. Most of those people, a good
chunk of those people I think we can say now with a fair degree
of certainty from my research and a lot of other work that's
been done in the U.S. Government, a Quds Force inhabiting those
Embassies for specific intelligence purposes. Not responsive--
often they are carved out.
If you look at the Buenos Aires case in 1994, the AMIA
bombing, Quds Force had an entirely separate section of the
Embassy that the Ambassador did not have access to. So, I think
that that explains their ability to do things without
necessarily being formally tasked by the President to do it.
Mr. Connolly. Of course, one could also interpret that as a
convenient compartmentalization.
Mr. Farah. Oh, absolutely. I don't mean it's not officially
sanctioned. I just mean people in the formal structure who
think they control things, maybe not when the people above them
do. It doesn't detract from the fact they're state sponsors,
not at all.
Mr. Connolly. What I find so interesting and appalling in
the details that we know of that have been made public
yesterday, rarely has a sovereign state sunk this low in
attempting--I mean, I think of a handful of examples; the
Pinochet regime and the Letelier bombing here in Washington,
the Libyan regime under Gaddafi, both Pan Am at Lockerbie, and
also the bombing of a bar in Germany with U.S. service members.
These were state sponsored terrorist acts by fringy if not
outlaw states. And here's Iran, which has been doing--taking
great efforts to try to restore some of its respectability in
the international community, Ahmadinejad speaking at the U.N.,
albeit failing, perhaps, in that effort but, nonetheless,
making that effort.
This is astounding that a representative even though not
officially sanctioned of the Iranian Government would go and
seek out narcoterrorists to do his dirty work, and be quoted as
saying well, it's sort of the nature of the game that there'd
be a lot of civilian casualties, and maybe some political
casualty, as well. We've got to kill the sovereign Ambassador
of a sovereign state in the Middle East.
Mr. Farah. I would just say, sir, that if you look at
Iran's behavior, particularly in Buenos Aires in 1993 and 1994,
the bombing of the Israeli Embassy, and then the AMIA bombing.
That was--they didn't go to drug traffickers to carry it out,
but that was Quds Force, Hezbollah, and the Lebanese diaspora
community working in conjunction to carry out an attack--a
sovereign attack on a sovereign nation against a sovereign
nation. So, I don't think it's unprecedented for Iran.
I think that the fact that they're looking outside their
normal channels and into drug trafficking is a new element, and
one that we need to understand better. But I think that Iran's
main thrust into state sponsored terrorism is not new. And I
think if you--as we've talked about in this subcommittee and
elsewhere, the ability to deny that that relationship between
Iran and Venezuela is dangerous because of Iran's sponsorship
of terrorist organizations, and Venezuela's sponsorship of
terrorist organizations is just living in a world that doesn't
exist.
States are now willing to take on certain risks if it's in
their best interest, and if they think they can get away with
it. And I think Iran, particularly, is losing its fear of the
ability of people to retaliate, or the willingness of people to
retaliate against it because they have a much broader coalition
behind them, the Bolivarian states are arming Syria, et cetera.
So, I think it's very disturbing, but I think it's not
unprecedented, and it wasn't unthinkable that that would
happen, something general like that would happen.
Mr. Connolly. No, but (a) trying to do it here is for Iran,
I think, unprecedented. The link with the narcoterrorists to do
the actual dirty work I think is sort of a new low even for
Iran. And to me, I think the downside of this is--I'm sorry,
Mr. Chairman, I'm just taking a little bit more time, but you
talked about well, they're going to do it if they see it as in
their self interest.
It's hard to believe how even Tehran thinks that the public
release and disclosure of this act, this proposed act is going
to add any kind of respectability or soften sanctions, or win
Brownie points in the international community for it and its
various arms.
Mr. Farah. Well, I don't think they were counting on being
caught. I think that was--I don't think they were planning on
that being made public. But I think you're absolutely right. I
think the relationship with a narco organization is new and
extremely dangerous, and their willingness to do it in the
United States I think is also either desperation or incredibly
bold step of confidence, one of the two as to how they feel
they can operate. But I do think it sets an entirely new
precedent for how we have to view Iran's willingness to act in
this hemisphere. Thank you.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Mr. Royce. Congressman Rohrabacher from California.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I'd like to follow-up on the line of questioning that we
just had. And I think the categorization of this as perhaps
convenient compartmentalization is probably on target, so let's
take a look at what convenient compartmentalization means in
terms of where we are with this regime that has been implicated
in a very serious crime.
First of all let me just ask yes or no to the panel, do you
believe the leadership--the mullah leadership of Iran knew
about this scheme, just yes or no?
Mr. Farah. I think, certainly, elements of them had to have
known.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Mr. Braun. I believe they would have had to have known.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay.
Ms. Felbab-Brown. I don't think we have the information to
be able to answer that.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. So, you don't assume that when
someone is a vicious gangster and something happens that's bad,
that we could assume that the gangster knew about it even
though it was his henchman who did it. Is that what Brookings
teaches us?
Ms. Felbab-Brown. I think it would be inappropriate to jump
to conclusions about what elements of the Iranian Government,
in fact, knew about the operation at this point.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. All right. I would--so, two out of
three of you think that the mullah regime--now, let me ask you
this. If in this type of government, meaning the mullah-
controlled dictatorship in Iran, someone would launch a scheme
like this not approved by the mullahs, and the mullahs found
out about it and disapproved, that person would then be--what
do you think the punishment would be of that individual?
I guess the witnesses don't have to really guess on that,
but I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that if the mullahs found
out that someone in their government was involved with
something like this without their knowledge there would be
severe punishment, if not death for that individual in their
government who is being out on his own so much. So, I would
hope that our--we are a little more realistic when we're
assessing the activity of people who murder their own people.
The mullah regime--could this mullah regime, again a
question, this mullah regime--we hesitated to speak loudly
about the election fraud that happened in the last Iranian
election, even though the streets were filled with anti-mullah
protestors who were protesting the mullah dictatorship.
Do you think our lack of energy in condemning that type of
fraud leads to the mullah leadership going along with such
schemes as has been exposed in the last couple of days? Whoever
in the witness stand would like to answer that.
Okay, let me put it a different way. If we were tougher
with the mullah regime and they knew that we were a leading
force supporting the democratic elements in their country
rather than hesitant supporters of them, do you think that
might deter them from becoming involved with assassination
schemes that would take place in our own country?
Ms. Felbab-Brown. Possibly. We don't know the answer, but
possibly it might also encourage them to engage in other
provocative action in retaliation. I think it's an open
question.
Mr. Rohrabacher. We could certainly go out of our way to
encourage all kinds of bad guys to do things, couldn't we? Yes,
go right ahead.
Mr. Farah. I think one of the things that's empowering Iran
is the feeling that they're no longer internationally isolated.
It doesn't go directly to our policy, but I think our policy of
not dealing directly with the Bolivarian threat as it exists
through Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua particularly, is
one of the things that gives them this feeling that they can--
that the sanctions aren't going to bite. If you look at the
amount of money they've invested through Venezuela into Panama
and elsewhere to meet their basic needs, I think they're
feeling like sanctions were going to be a significant terrible
problem for them. And on their key issues, they're not as
significant and terrible a problem as they had thought they
would be. And I think they feel they have a little more margin
to move internationally.
The fact that Argentina this year didn't walk out when
Ahmadinejad stood up and did his usual talk at the United
Nations, all of this leads them to understand that they have a
lot more people willing to work with them. They're not the
pariah state that we had tried to make----
Mr. Rohrabacher. I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that the
conciliatory tone of this administration has encouraged if not
the mullahs themselves, but at least people who work for the
mullahs to involve themselves in the type of conspiracy that we
saw exposed just yesterday that would lead to the death of
American citizens, a bomb going off here, an act of such
terrorism.
Let's remember that during the Cold War, Romania was--we
sort of had a hands-off policy toward Romania. Well, where did
the man who shot the Pope, where was he held--where did he hole
up? He holed up in Romania. He was there in Romania. And I
think it's--the Romanian Government probably knew. And he was a
Turk, by the way, a Turk in Romania involved in an
assassination plot against the Pope.
Well, we had let Romania off the hook, and the Romanian
Government obviously knew about this man, but let him stay and
operate out of their country.
If we permit a reconciliatory approach to the mullah regime
and treat them as if they were a democratic regime, I think we
can expect more of the type of terrorist assassination plots
that were uncovered, luckily uncovered and foiled by our
agents. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. We go now to Jeff
Duncan from South Carolina. Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I don't think anyone that's followed the issue of the
Iranian and Hezbollah influence in the Western Hemisphere was
really surprised by the Quds Force working with the Mexican
drug cartel, albeit an undercover agent of the United States,
but under their understanding he was a member of the drug
cartel to plan and possibly carry out a very heinous act that
was thwarted by the FBI. And I want to congratulate them. But I
don't think anyone was surprised really that the Quds Force,
and Hezbollah, and a Mexican drug cartel were working together,
because if you followed this issue you've seen evidence of
that.
I'm very, very concerned about Iran's influence in the
Western Hemisphere, the fact that they've opened six Embassies
in South America over the last 5 years. We continue to see very
sophisticated tunneling by the drug cartels under the Mexican
border that resembles the tunnels Hezbollah digs in Lebanon.
So, that expertise I believe is being brought.
If you look at the number of folks tied to Hezbollah that
have been arrested in this country, the Mexican drug cartel
guys that are arrested in this country with Farsi tattoos, and
there are just a lot of things that show that we shouldn't have
been surprised.
I'm very surprised, though, that Quds Force, an Iranian-
sponsored group, would decide to carry out an attack on another
nation, to assassinate an Ambassador in the United States of
America. So, yesterday I drafted a resolution, and I've sent it
to your colleague, and I ask Mr. Connolly because of his
comments a little while ago to take a look at this, is House
Resolution 429.
Mr. Duncan. It's a Resolution on Iran and the Western
Hemisphere.
Mr. Royce. And it's a very timely resolution that documents
Iran's activity in this hemisphere. So, we look forward to
reviewing it.
Mr. Duncan. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Connolly. Will my colleague yield?
Mr. Duncan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Connolly. I thank my colleague, and I'd be glad to look
at it. And if--are you finished?
Mr. Duncan. I'm going to ask him a question.
Mr. Connolly. Oh, I'm sorry. I'd be glad to look at it.
Mr. Duncan. In my remaining 2 minutes, I've established
that I'm very concerned about Iran's presence in this
hemisphere. I'm concerned about Hezbollah's influence with the
Mexican drug cartel. I think it's very clear. And we've got to
really put some effort on that, so I'm going to ask Mr. Farah,
to your knowledge, is there any counter terrorism task force
that utilizes the efforts of Homeland Security, State, DEA,
CIA, FBI, any other intelligence agencies to focus on Iran's
presence, their influence, their activity in the Western
Hemisphere?
Mr. Farah. Thank you, Congressman. I had the opportunity to
work with your staff a little bit on that resolution.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you for that, too, by the way.
Mr. Farah. A pleasure. As far as I know, there's no task
force. I think individual components of the intelligence and
law enforcement community do look at that. So far, I think
yesterday's events will change that considerably. There's not
been traditionally a lot of effort put into that because of
resources allocated elsewhere in different--and I think a lack
of sense of that was a policy imperative that we needed to
understand that. I think that's wrong, but I think that that
was sort of the mind set there, that it was--nothing could
really come of that relationship.
I think it's also very important to reiterate something
Vanda said earlier, and that is that you have these multiple
crossings of these multiple terrorist and organized groups, but
it doesn't mean that that's one giant conglomerate out there
operating in unison or as a single force. Everyone has their
own interest. It's more like a series of one night stands than
trying to get married to someone. They cycle through
relationships fairly quickly.
What I think Iran and the Bolivarian groups bring to this
in the Western Hemisphere is more stability, more of a grounded
relationship that has the capacity to last much longer. And I
think that that--when you look at the criminalization of the
Bolivarian states where you have senior members of the Bolivian
Government deeply involved in drug trafficking, Nicaragua,
Ecuador, the President of Ecuador receiving money from the
FARC, as well as ongoing narcotics activities. I think there's
a more permanent criminalization that allows Iran to root
itself much more deeply than it had in the past when we did see
mostly the series of one night stands.
But I think it's dangerous, also, to conflate everybody as
acting in unison, in concert together in one giant conspiracy
when, in fact, it's multiple networks running multiple plans
that overlap at different places.
Mr. Duncan. Well, I think it would be helpful. And I think
we've had so much focus on al-Qaeda, there's a Kronos article
I'll be glad to share that shows a connection--the nexus
connection between al-Qaeda and Quds Force. But we need to wake
up, America, that Iran and Hezbollah are very active in our own
hemisphere, very evident yesterday. And I hope that it won't be
evident in the future, but we do need a task force, I think,
dedicated to this. And I'll yield back.
Mr. Royce. I think Mr. Braun had a response to you.
Mr. Braun. Yes. Congressman Duncan, if I could just build
on what Doug said, and your concern that you voiced.
You mentioned the six new Embassies, Iranian Embassies that
have sprung up in Latin America, very fairly quickly, by the
way.
Understand that with those Embassies come the increased
number of IRGC and Quds Force operatives that we know are
flowing into the Western Hemisphere, not only through those
Embassies under diplomatic cover, but also clandestinely thanks
to Hugo Chavez, the undisputed gatekeeper for Middle Eastern
terrorist organizations that have got strategic interest in our
part of the world. Lebanese and Syrian individuals can enter
Venezuela without a visa these days, and are welcome.
Another point that I'd like to make with respect to
Hezbollah, there's growing clear evidence of this very, very
close relationship that we've known has existed, but there's
growing evidence of a very close relationship between Hezbollah
and the Quds Force when it comes to global organized criminal
activity. It would not surprise me one bit if we realized at
some point in the not too distant future that the Quds Force
was actually in command and control, sell our directorate, if
you would, for the Hezbollah's global involvement in the--the
growing involvement in the global cocaine trade.
The Hezbollah are absolute masters at identifying existing
smuggling infrastructures around the world, and leveraging them
for everything that they're worth. And if anyone for a moment
believes in our Government that the Hezbollah, and Quds Force,
and the IRGC do not realize that Mexican drug trafficking
organizations dominate the drug trade in over 230 cities in our
country and realize and recognize that for the strategic--for
its strategic value, then those folks simply don't understand
how the underworld works. We better wake up. Thank you.
Mr. Royce. Well, let me just say this before we go to Mr.
Connolly. I think you had a question. Then we'll go to Mr.
Sherman. Let's do it this way. Mr. Connolly, ask your question
first.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I just wanted to
follow-up with my friend from California. We play tag team
often at hearings. But Dr. Felbab-Brown, I wanted to follow-up
on a response I heard you give to Mr. Rohrabacher of
California.
You said that you thought it was inappropriate to assign
blame or responsibility to any part of the Iranian Government
and Tehran at this point.
Ms. Felbab-Brown. No. What I responded was that it is
premature, inappropriate to make judgments about what levels of
the Iranian Government were involved with the plot.
Mr. Connolly. Well, what judgment would you make?
Ms. Felbab-Brown. We know that a member of the Quds Force
was directing the operative. What we do not know is was the
sanction by the highest levels--some of the highest mullahs,
was it sanctioned by President Ahmadinejad? What role this Quds
operative had within the Quds Forces, was he a prominent member
of the Quds Forces? Was this directed? Was it a rogue
operation, or was it an operation at the highest levels of the
Iranian Government directed? I do not believe that we have this
information at this point.
Mr. Connolly. That may be technically true, but you heard
Mr. Farah point out that this is not an isolated incident by
elements of the Iranian Government, high and low, in actually
perpetrating murder, and assassination, and terrorism. And,
therefore, the preponderance of evidence would suggest whatever
level you want to assign it, we as a sovereign state witnessing
and uncovering a plot to assassinate the representative of
another sovereign state in our Capital City have a right to
hold the Iranian Government fully responsible irrespective of
what element, or what level of any element in that government
was, in fact, planning the plot. And that's why I'm very
puzzled by your answer to Mr. Rohrabacher that it's
inappropriate to exercise such a judgment.
Pray tell, when does a sovereign state have the right to
protect its own people and its own capital?
Ms. Felbab-Brown. Well, I think it's totally appropriate
that we condemn the act. I think it's appropriate and
encouraging that our law enforcement was able to uncover the
plot. And I think that shows the talent and intelligence
capacity of our law enforcement.
I also believe that it is appropriate, very much so, that
we make clear that no nation, Iran included, no nation cannot
conduct terrorist operations on our territory, and should not
conduct terrorist operations anywhere in the world.
Mr. Rohrabacher's question was was the regime fully aware,
and I don't believe we have the evidence of that.
Mr. Connolly. Well, I would just say to you, as I coined
the phrase, convenient compartmentalization. I don't think we
can afford the luxury of that kind of indulgence, with all due
respect. I think the United States must hold the Iranian
Government fully responsible until and unless they're able to
isolate a rogue element and hold them accountable, and take
appropriate measures.
Until and unless that happens, it seems to me that this
plot was planned for this capital, this city. It is
unacceptable, and it seems to me we have to hold that foreign
government fully responsible until and unless there's evidence
to the contrary. Thank you.
Mr. Royce. Let me go to one case where I know it's not
theoretical, and bring this up again: The Mahmoud Kourani case.
When we're talking about whether there's a nexus between
Hezbollah and the cartels, which we know in that specific
example there's no question. This was an individual who was
trained by the Quds Force in Iran, in Lebanon. He offered a
bribe to the Mexican consulate there, someone in the consulate,
$5,000 I believe. He was able to come illegally into Mexico.
His next step was, as a Hezbollah member, to team up with a
cartel who provided him a special arrangement to hide in a
compartment that was placed in a car. And they drove him over
the border, over our southern border in California. So that
would be one example.
I just ask Mr. Braun, because I had someone bring me a few
years ago a document from USCIS which showed terror connections
over the border, and illegal crossings over the border. When we
contacted the organization they basically said, well, you're
not supposed to have that. You're not supposed to comment on
that. But I was going to ask you, do you have information about
crossings like Mr. Kourani's case, evidence that individuals
who are involved in terror making an egress or an entry over
the border?
Mr. Braun. Mr. Chairman, I don't have any specific--any
other specific examples. But with that said, if you'll remember
probably I'm guessing maybe 8 months to a year ago there was a
report that the Mexican Federal Police, the SSP has rounded up
a Hezbollah recruiting cell just across the southwest border.
And I can't remember which city it was in. I talked to some of
my former colleagues while--some former high-level Mexican
Federal police officials that I had worked with and they said
that it did, in fact, happen, that the member was a--or that
the suspect that was arrested was a member of Hezbollah, and
that he had been sent into the country to recruit, basically.
And I would--so, I don't have any other specific----
Mr. Royce. We're finding them in the U.S. We don't know--in
the Kourani case, I think there were 50 other members of the
cell. We don't know how they all get here.
Mr. Braun. Sure.
Mr. Royce. But it's an interesting evolution as these cells
are established. And from time to time, of course, we manage to
break them up. Mr. Farah.
Mr. Braun. Chairman, if I could just say one last thing.
Mr. Royce. Yes.
Mr. Braun. And I really don't want to sound too crude here,
but I was in law enforcement for 34 years.
Mr. Royce. Right.
Mr. Braun. And my dad used to have a saying, ``Where you
see one roach, there are thousands.'' Now, I'm not saying there
are thousands of Hezbollah operatives, but where we see one or
two, and this is based on my 34 years in law enforcement, you
don't need an analyst, a very bright analyst sitting in a pod
to tell you that that's not the case. I've seen it one too many
times.
Mr. Royce. Well, I know where there was one in this case
there were 52 anyway for sure.
Mr. Farah, you wanted to----
Mr. Farah. I was just going to say, that was the case of
Mr. Nasr, N-A-S-R, who was rolled up in there, and the Tucson,
Arizona Police wrote a report about his involvement with--there
are multiple cases that for different reasons have not been
made public. But if you look in the--if you talk to the police
forces on the border, particularly in Texas and Arizona, there
are other cases that have--I don't they're officially
classified but they haven't wanted to share very broadly. But
there are multiple cases not of big groups, but of individuals
coming across. And Mr. Nasr was the most prominent, most public
of those.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Farah. We'll go now to Mr.
Sherman, and Mr. Duncan. Thank you.
Mr. Sherman. We're going to get distracted here about
whether this official or that official of the Iranian
Government authorized this particular hit. And that can be our
excuse to do nothing, or to do a little inconsequential thing,
and then pretend that we've done enough, and then go on,
because that's what the State Department and multinational
corporations want us to do.
The fact is, this was a Quds Force operation. It was not a
rogue operation, but if no one in Iran is going to be held
accountable for violating--they're not going to extradite
anybody to the United States saying here's one of our citizens
who plotted an event in your country. But what we know is
authorized by the highest levels of the Iranian Government is
their nuclear program, and we know that we're just getting a
taste of what we're going to see with a nuclear Iran, that is
to say terrorism with impunity.
We've passed laws here. They have been deliberately
violated by the last three administrations. I refer to the Iran
Sanctions Act. Now, we're told that an attack was going to come
on our own territory, and what is the response? Four or five
Iranian individuals will be told that they cannot visit
Disneyland. And if they happen to have an account at Bank of
America, they will be subject to a $5.00 a month charge whether
or not they use their ATM card. That's our response.
Why such a timid response? Because that is what European--
multinational businesses and European diplomats expect of us.
And it is a reflection on the fact that the views of the
American people are not taken into a whole lot of account in
our foreign policy.
What we should do is require multinational businesses to
decide are they going to do business in Iran, or are they going
to do business in the United States? I don't know anybody--any
major multinational that would choose Iran. But that would
offend the multinational corporations. So, we have a problem.
How can we preserve a government policy that meets the needs of
multinational corporations, that is not displeasing to European
diplomats, while at the same time pacifying the American
people? And the answer is to wildly exaggerate the importance
of telling four or five Iranians they cannot visit Disneyland,
and to freeze the assets in the United States that those five
individuals don't have.
It is a pitiful response, but it will be one of many
pitiful responses that we will make as the centrifuges turn,
and as the terrorism plots continue. And soon we will be told
oh, we can't respond to this or that act of Iranian terrorism
because after all, they're a nuclear state.
Now, a question or two for the witnesses. Does this new
bold plot for Iran to commit terrorism on U.S. soil with the
help of Mexican drug cartels signal a new trend, state sponsors
of terrorism using criminal elements to carry out their
attacks, Mr. Braun?
Mr. Braun. Ranking Member Sherman, I don't know if it's
going to result in a new trend or not, but here's what worries
me about this, and to kind of build on that theme, if you will.
In permissive environments that are existing around the
globe where you have very powerful young sergeants and
lieutenants from both foreign terrorist organizations as well
as very powerful drug trafficking organizations that have been
dispatched by their leadership to move their agendas forward in
places like West Africa, as I said, the Tri-Border Area of
Afghanistan, the AfPak Region, and some other locations.
These tough young sergeants and lieutenants from both of
these threats are coming together. They're building close
interpersonal relationships today that in my mind, it's as
clear as can be, will develop into strong inter-organization,
or potentially could grow into strong inter-organizational
relationships and alliances in the future. Why? Because these
tough young sergeants and lieutenants are naturally going to
claw their way to the--within their organizations to key
leadership positions.
And it's one thing to say that we know that the Quds Force
has got the ability to pick up the phone and ask al-Qaeda for a
favor or vice versa. We know that happens, and we know it's
been happening for quite some time.
It's an entirely different scenario, though, when you stop
to think what are we going to do when a member--a key leader in
AQIM, or al-Qaeda, or the Quds Force has got the ability to
pick up the phone and call a ranking member within, or an
executive member of the Sinaloa Cartel, or the FARC, or the
Gulf Cartel and ask for a favor. I don't think that that's too
far down the road, if it's not already happening now.
Mr. Sherman. What we're going to do, of course, is make
sure that that person does not visit Disneyland, and we're
going to tell the American people that as a sufficient
sanction.
Mr. Farah, is there anything we can do to substantially
disadvantage the Iranian regime that would not anger
multinational businesses or European diplomats?
Mr. Farah. I think that's a trick question, sir. No, I
think, basically, I think the cost the Iranian regime is paying
now is much less than it would be because we're not--we look at
the Iranian Government in isolation instead of as part of a
broad group of countries that are aimed at enabling them to
break their sanctions. You have the entire Bolivarian--foreign
ministers of every Bolivarian country go to Tehran last year
and publicly say we're going to violate the sanctions, and we
hope the United States keels over dead, the press conference,
that's Venezuela, Bolivia, Iran, Ecuador, and other countries.
The circumstances, assuming that what we do on sanctions
matters is living on another planet. They now have access to
Central Banks across Latin America. They're clearly willing to
work with Syria. They were--so I think thinking about what we
can do is important, but I think it's much broader than what we
can do on Iran. And we have to recognize that there is a
coalition of countries out there that wish to harm the United
States, and share some basic underlying principles, and that is
primarily the--so, I think if you want to get at that issue,
you have to think of a much broader way of going about
sanctions and dealing with the government than just looking at
Iran. I think you have to go after the enablers, as well, and I
don't think we're even at the point of considering that.
Mr. Sherman. Or we're going to have to give up on non-
lethal action and focus on whether Israel or the United States
takes lethal action. But I'm still looking for the non-lethal
approach. I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Duncan. Doctor, do you want to answer that just real
quickly, real briefly, please.
Ms. Felbab-Brown. And even more important that whatever
support or whatever relations Iran has in Latin America is, of
course, the engagement that Iran has with Russia, China, and
India. And the gas and oil interest that these countries have
with Iran. As long as these relations are not changed, our
sanctions will inevitably be limited. And I would assume that
the plot that was uncovered would be a very important
opportunity to hone to countries like China, Russia, and India
that strong pressure needs to be applied on Iran not to engage
in such terrorist actions.
Mr. Duncan. Well, there's no other members of the committee
here, so we'll just conclude with thanking the ranking member
for participating today. I'd also like to thank our witnesses
and our panelists for being here and their excellent testimony.
And thank you for your time.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Chairman, if I could just note for the
record, I would have been here the entire hearing. The hearing
had to be scheduled at a different time because of very
important work that the chairman has to do, and that I strongly
support on the Financial Services Committee. So, I want the
witnesses to know that had this hearing been held at its
previously scheduled time, I would have had a chance to see
them deliver their opening statements in person instead of
reading them tonight. Thank you very much.
Mr. Duncan. All of you bring a wealth of experience, and
that was very evident today, and unique perspectives in the
nexus between drugs and terrorism. As Mr. Royce mentioned in
his opening statement, the subcommittee will be looking forward
to follow-up with the DEA in the future on this issue. And with
nothing further, we'll stand adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 1:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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