[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
FUTURE OF AL-QAEDA
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 24, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-21
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
VACANT
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
TED POE, Texas BRAD SHERMAN, California
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Bruce Hoffman, Ph.D., professor, School of Foreign Service,
Georgetown University.......................................... 5
Seth G. Jones, Ph.D., senior political scientist, RAND
Corporation.................................................... 11
Mr. Thomas M. Sanderson, deputy director and senior fellow,
Transnational Threats Project, Center for Strategic and
International Studies.......................................... 25
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
Bruce Hoffman, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 7
Seth G. Jones, Ph.D.: Prepared statement......................... 13
Mr. Thomas M. Sanderson: Prepared statement...................... 28
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 50
Hearing minutes.................................................. 51
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 53
FUTURE OF AL-QAEDA
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TUESDAY, MAY 24, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3 o'clock p.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R.
Royce (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Royce. This hearing of the subcommittee will come to
order. Today we consider the impact of the death of Osama bin
Laden on the al-Qaeda terrorist network and U.S.
counterterrorism policy.
Bin Laden was the symbolic, ideological and strategic core
of the al-Qaeda movement, and the primary source of inspiration
for that organization and many associated groups. His killing
is a very significant development in our struggle against al-
Qaeda.
With depleted ranks and resources, with polling showing
that its star is waning in the Middle East, some go so far as
to declare that al-Qaeda is ``in its death throes.'' As we will
hear today, that is wishful thinking. Unfortunately, al-Qaeda
has proven all too adaptive, and that is one of the subjects
that we are going to be looking at today.
One analyst notes that al-Qaeda operatives were not driven
by loyalty to bin Laden's personality. They were driven by his
twisted ideals. They embraced those twisted ideals. And, ``We
need to acknowledge at the outset,'' says a USAID report on
violent extremists, ``the power of ideas.'' It is the power of
ideas that drove this movement, and, ``We need to recognize
that many violent extremists are moved, primarily,'' as USAID
tells us, ``by an unshakable belief in the superiority of
certain values; by a perceived obligation to carry out God's
command, or by an abiding commitment to destroy a system that
they view as evil.'' God says that system is evil, so they must
destroy it.
The lesson here is that bad ideas matter. Bad ideas have
bad consequences.
Unfortunately, a growing number of affiliates, a growing
number of individuals, are looking to fulfill this vision that
bin Laden had. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, which has
already been linked to Fort Hood, and to the failed underwear
bomber, and the cargo plane plot. That is the most energetic
part right now of al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is
threatening with deep roots in North Africa, deep roots in
Europe. We have seen from bombings an increasing number of
European and U.S. citizens have traveled to Somalia to link up
with al-Shabaab.
Bin Laden's location, his hideout, has raised yet more
doubts about the intelligence services in Pakistan. Was its
intelligence service complicit, or was it just incompetent?
ISI has supported militant networks inside Pakistan and
Afghanistan that are targeting U.S. soldiers. Nuclear
proliferator A.Q. Khan received state support. A terrorism
trial in Chicago heard testimony this week that ISI provided,
``financial and military assistance'' to the LeT, the group
that killed more than 160 in the Mumbai massacre. By the way,
six Americans were killed there as well.
In the past 10 years, Pakistan has received $20 billion in
U.S. aid. Simply put, our Pakistan policy is not working.
Assuming connections between bin Laden and the Pakistani
military and intelligence services, a former top IAEA official
has asked, ``What is to say that they would not help al-Qaeda
or other terrorist groups gain access to sensitive nuclear
materials, such as highly enriched uranium or plutonium?'' This
is not such a far-fetched question.
Intelligence work, including interrogations were key to
tracking down bin Laden. It is notable that outside of
Afghanistan and Iraq there have been no reported U.S.
detentions of high-value terrorists under this administration.
For instance, an Indonesian behind the Bali bombings was taken
into custody by Pakistani authorities just months before our
operation that took out bin Laden. Found near Abbottabad, he
has been described as an intelligence ``gold mine.'' Yet, the
Obama administration has, according to the L.A. Times, ``Made
no move to interrogate or to seek custody of'' this individual.
Bin Laden's death comes with the unfolding of the Arab
Spring. The demise of autocracies in that part of the world is
welcome for sure, but there are legitimate concerns that
democracy in these countries may empower parties hostile to the
U.S., confounding counterterrorism cooperation.
One witness today will compare al-Qaeda to, in his words,
``a shark in the water that must keep moving forward no matter
how slowly or incrementally or die.'' We look to today's
witnesses for answers on how to kill this deadly predator. I
will now turn to our ranking member, Mr. Sherman, of Los
Angeles, for his opening statement.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for holding
these hearings. We have an excellent panel, and we hope that
they will shed some light on what we can expect from the most
significant terrorist organization in the world, now that its
leader and founder is dead.
We found out that bin Laden was more than just an ephemeral
figurehead, just an inspirational presence, but rather he
risked his own security in order to communicate with the
organization and tried to play a role in day-to-day and long-
term planning.
Whatever his role, it is obvious that Osama bin Laden's
death does not yet mean the end to al-Qaeda. What may be less
obvious is that the death of al-Qaeda would not mean an end to
our struggle against extremist Islamist terrorism. Other groups
of folks affiliated or unaffiliated with al-Qaeda will continue
even if that organization ceases, and al-Qaeda is a Sunni-
inspired organization, and its demise might have little effect
on the Iran-inspired Shia radical organizations, including,
especially, Hezbollah.
Bin Laden's death, I believe, should be viewed as a
milestone rather than a turning point. It is an important
accomplishment, but it does not mean the end of al-Qaeda, let
alone the end of terrorism.
I think among the important questions we can pursue today
is this. First, what impact does the Arab Spring, coinciding as
it does with the death of bin Laden, have on al-Qaeda and other
terrorist organizations? Is it part of a one/two punch against
al-Qaeda, as noted expert Peter Bergen contends, or does al-
Qaeda see an opportunity in these revolutions?
It is our hope that the democratic revolutions in the Arab
States will want the rejection of al-Qaeda, and violent groups,
and the extremist philosophy behind them. But, we can look at
history where again and again, whether it is the Russian
revolution, the French revolution, or an Iranian revolution, we
see circumstances where moderate pro-democratic forces take the
lead in deposing a tyrannical regime only to see anti-
democratic forces prevail in the end.
As long as we are focused on terrorism and its future, we
need to focus on Eastern Libya. According to a West Point
study, Eastern Libya provided more militants for the insurgency
in Iraq, more foreign fighters with American blood on their
hands, than, virtually, any other area on a per capita basis.
At least some of these militants are now part of the Eastern
Libyan insurgency against Ghadafi. What impact do they have on
the Libyan revolt and its power structure? Why have we not
pressed the transitional National Council to turn in these
terrorists with American blood on their hands over to the
United States? Or at a minimum adopt a formal policy to exclude
from their government and from their military forces those who
have sought to kill Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Having met with the person who was identified as the prime
minister of the transitional authority, he seems very intent
upon benefitting from the American military, and benefitting
from the military efforts of those who have tried to kill the
American military.
Now, Pakistan is, of course, important. Obviously, bin
Laden had support from inside Pakistan. Obviously, the ISI
supports various terrorist organizations, and does business
with others. We should not forget that Pakistan has also
suffered more from terrorism than I believe just about any
country, with the possible exception of Afghanistan. Even
today, we read of the recent attack on their naval base and the
destruction of assets and the death of Pakistani military
personnel there.
Finally, if I can take a minute, I think it is important
that Congress and this committee do its job. First, the
Constitution makes it clear that Congress needs to be involved
before we engage in military activities in Libya, and the War
Powers Act gives the President only 60 days, which has expired,
before obtaining congressional authorization. Congress should
demand that it play its constitutional role, its role under
U.S. law. We should not, in an effort to bring democracy and
the rule of law to Libya, ignore the rule of law and democracy
here in the United States.
I am pleased that in this room for the next 2 days we will
have hearings on Libya.
Second, the National Defense Authorization Act of Fiscal
2012 will come to the floor. It contains an authorization for
the use of force, known as the war on terror, that appears to
expand the authorization passed in the wake of September 11th.
I want to study this language carefully, but the study I would
like to engage in is to have a hearing on it before this
committee, have a markup on it before this committee, and have
this committee play its role under House rules, which is to
discuss, debate, markup, improve any act that authorizes force.
So, I may have to vote to stroke that language, even if I would
have supported it if it had been the product of a markup in
this room.
I yield back.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Sherman.
We will go to Mr. Higgins of New York for any opening
statement he might have.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, just briefly, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to hear the panel speak to the issue,
obviously, that is before us. But, just a thought. While, you
know, the killing of bin Laden symbolically and substantially
is very, very important, relative to the war on terrorism, I
think it is important, what I would like to get is a sense from
the panel, al-Qaeda morphed into al-Qaeda-ism a long time ago,
and it seems to me that al-Qaeda is younger, Egyptian-based,
more aggressive, and more sophisticated with respect to the use
of modern technology. And, you know, the world is smaller,
because we can all communicate. Everybody can plug in and play.
But, the only thing you cannot commoditize, in terms of the new
technology and the ability to communicate, is the imagination
that you bring to these tools of collaboration.
So, I am very interested in hearing from the panel as to
their sense of, you know, what the new al-Qaeda has emerged to
or has evolved to, in terms of its sophistication, its
aggression, and its youth.
So, with that, I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Higgins.
We will hear now from Dr. Bruce Hoffman, Dr. Seth Jones,
and Mr. Tom Sanderson, who are going to testify.
Bruce Hoffman is a professor in Georgetown University's
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. He held the
corporate chair in counterterrorism and counterinsurgency at
the RAND Corporation. He holds a doctorate from Oxford
University, and he is the author of the book, ``Inside
Terrorism.''
Dr. Seth Jones is a senior political scientist at RAND
Corporation, and he most recently served as the representative
for the commander, U.S. Special Operations Command, to the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations. Jones
specializes in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, and he
has a particular focus on Afghanistan, Pakistan and al-Qaeda.
Mr. Tom Sanderson is deputy director and senior fellow in
the Transnational Threats Project, at the Center for Strategic
and International Studies. Sanderson currently co-leads an al-
Qaeda Futures Project. He just returned, I had a chance to have
lunch with him the other day, from a month-long trip to North
Africa, to six African nations, gauging the current state and
future prospects for al-Qaeda on the continent.
All of the witnesses' complete written testimony, I will
remind you again, will be entered in the record, so we would
like to keep it to 5 minutes so that we can get to questions.
We'll start with Dr. Hoffman.
STATEMENT OF BRUCE HOFFMAN, PH.D., PROFESSOR, SCHOOL OF FOREIGN
SERVICE, GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
Mr. Hoffman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and
Congressman Sherman, and members of the committee,
subcommittee, for this opportunity to testify.
Confronted with the sudden death of a leader, terrorist
groups become cornered animals. When wounded, they lash out,
not only in hopes of surviving, but also to demonstrate their
remaining power and continued relevance.
Al-Qaeda is no different, and will keen for its leader by
killing, but it will not necessarily attack soon. Instead, we
should brace ourselves once the 40-day mourning period that
some Muslims observe ends.
Given al-Qaeda's stated determination, to punish the U.S.,
what should we prepare for in the near and further off future,
in terms of possible scenarios and potential terrorist attacks?
First, we should be concerned about planned al-Qaeda
attacks already in the pipeline. Just days before bin Laden's
killing, German authorities disrupted a planned al-Qaeda attack
in Berlin. We must assume that additional plots are already in
motion or will soon be.
Second, we need to worry about al-Qaeda harnessing the same
social networking tools that facilitated the Arab Spring to
spark a transnational spate of spontaneous terrorist attacks.
These lower-level incidents would, thus, pre-occupy and
distract intelligence agencies, in hopes that a spectacular al-
Qaeda attack might avoid detection.
Third, as the May 6, 2011, al-Qaeda statement indicates,
the group will seek to further strain Pakistan's relations with
America, by summoning both its jihadi allies and ordinary
citizens there against the Pakistani Government. Al-Qaeda will,
thus, hope to undermine Pakistan's fragile democracy by
creating a popular backlash against the U.S.
Fourth, we cannot discount the possibility of another major
Pakistani jihadi attack in India. Al-Qaeda will see in a such
scenario an opportunity to regroup and reorganize precisely
when the world is distracted by a major escalation of tensions
in the subcontinent.
Finally, al-Qaeda affiliates, like its Yemen franchise, al-
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, will remain largely unaffected
by bin Laden's death. They will, however, likely embrace
vengeance in order to further burnish their terrorist
credentials as rising stars within the movement's firmament.
Al-Qaeda has been compared to the archetypal shark in the
water that must keep moving forward no matter how slowly and
incrementally or die. And, al-Qaeda has always regarded this as
a generational struggle that goes beyond the purview or
interests of any one individual. The loss of bin Laden will not
affect that calculus.
Accordingly, the United States should continue to kill and
capture al-Qaeda leaders and operatives, as it has so
effectively done, especially, during the past 3 years of
stepped-up aerial drone attacks. At the same time, the U.S.
must continue to deprive al-Qaeda and its leaders of the
sanctuaries and safe havens that it depends on.
History has shown that al-Qaeda is nothing without a
physical sanctuary or safe haven, which is why it has invested
so much of its energy in recent years in strengthening the
capabilities of its affiliates and associates in Pakistan,
Yemen, Somalia, and North Africa.
Thus, the highest priority for the U.S. must be to
concentrate our attention on al-Qaeda as a network global
phenomenon. This will require both continued U.S. military
operations in South Asia, along side a continual scanning of
the horizon to counter al-Qaeda's presence and prevent its
expansion into failed and failing states.
But, equally critical are enhanced and better targeted U.S.
efforts to counter al-Qaeda's propaganda efforts in the
aftermath of bin Laden's killing. These should include
redoubling our efforts to water down the al-Qaeda brand,
targeted and enhanced communications directed toward the core
demographic from which al-Qaeda continues to draw its strength,
young people, enhanced use of the Internet along side
traditional media as part of a coordinated cohesive information
campaign, and making far better use of victims of terrorism,
their stories and their formidable ability to challenge the
jihadi narrative.
In conclusion, it would be dangerously precipitous at this
time to declare a total victory. Al-Qaeda's hopes of renewal
and regeneration in the aftermath of bin Laden's killing rests
on its continued access of the geographical sanctuaries and
safe havens that the movement has always depended on, and
historically abused as bases from which to plot, and plan, and
launch international terrorism attacks.
Only by depriving al-Qaeda of those sanctionaries, by
destroying the organization's leadership, and disrupting the
continued resonance of al-Qaeda's message, will this movement
finally be defeated.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hoffman follows:]
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Mr. Royce. Thank you.
Dr. Seth Jones.
STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, PH.D., SENIOR POLITICAL SCIENTIST,
RAND CORPORATION
Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Congressman
Sherman, other members of the committee.
While Osama bin Laden's death is, and certainly represents,
a serious blow to al-Qaeda, I would like to focus my comments
here on two questions. What is the structure of al-Qaeda today,
and how will it evolve? And second, how will that impact the
threat to the United States' homeland, which, obviously, we
care a great deal about.
To take the first question first, I think al-Qaeda, and it
is certainly plausible that it has already moved in this
direction anyway, will likely become more decentralized and
diffused. It is unclear at this moment, for example, whether
Ayman al-Zawahiri, who does not have the same pedigree as a
front-line soldier the way Osama bin Laden had, will be able to
provide the same kind of oversight over the affiliated groups.
That is an open question.
In addition, there are questions about his focus on a day-
to-day basis on the United States. Osama bin Laden was focused,
predominantly, on targeting the U.S. homeland. Al-Zawahiri has
clearly focused on a range of issues, including Egypt, as well
as the U.S. homeland. So, there are questions about how much
some elements of central or core al-Qaeda will continue to
focus on the U.S. homeland.
What is important to recognize building off of some of the
work that Dr. Hoffman has put together, is to understand what
al-Qaeda looks like today. And, I will argue that it includes
at least five rings of concentric circle. The first is Central
al-Qaeda, which continues to be based in Pakistan today, and
which still is a dangerous organization led, among others, by
Ayman al-Zawahiri, an Egyptian, led as the primary general
manager, somebody who probably does not get as much credit as
he should, as a fundamental key figure, Atiyah abd al-Rahman,
Libyan, in taking a lot of the information coming from
affiliates and pushing it up for regular dedicated answers from
the al-Qaeda leadership, Ilyas Kashmiri, a Pakistani, involved
in operations, Abu Yahya, Libyan, involved in propaganda, and a
range of others. But, that Central al-Qaeda is still dangerous.
I will come back to that in a second.
But, outside of that then, there is a subsequent ring,
which is the affiliated groups, and others on this panel,
including Mr. Sanderson, will talk about the African connection
and others. But, those are, obviously, the key groups who have
changed their names, al-Qaeda in Iraq, al-Qaeda in East Africa,
al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula, but are affiliated organizations.
And, outside of that is the allied groups, and this is
where I think we are potentially most vulnerable, and where if
al-Qaeda does become a more decentralized organization some of
the more fundamental threats may come from these allied groups.
These are groups who will coordinate, they conduct joint
training, may conduct some joint operations, groups like
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Tehrik-e-Taliban, Pakistan, the Haqqani
Network, which pose a notable threat to the U.S. homeland, as
we have seen with Faisal Shahzad, the Mumbai style plots last
year and others. Then we have allied networks and inspired
networks.
But, let me finish with a couple of key points. One is that
al-Qaeda Central is still a very dangerous organization. We see
multiple plots emanating from the Pakistan theater. I would
remind everyone here that several key individuals that are
Americans, or have lived in America, still remain in Central
al-Qaeda, Adnan el Shukrijumah from Broward County, Florida,
continues to be involved at senior levels in al-Qaeda Central
in Pakistan, Adam Gadahn from California, the Riverside,
California area, still involved at fairly senior levels of the
propaganda realm.
Mr. Royce. Actually, Garden Grove.
Mr. Jones. That is right. I have, actually, interviewed
some of his family members, so they are still down there.
In addition, let me just conclude, just based on timing,
that I think one of the weakest areas of America's
counterterrorism strategy, certainly against al-Qaeda, is that
most of these individuals that, as Mr. Higgins mentioned
earlier, that people are listening to, including Anwar al-
Aulaqi. Look at his track record. He was arrested twice in the
San Diego area for soliciting prostitutes. He has no formal
education as an Islamic scholar.
Our ability to get those messages out, to make unclassified
his arrest records, is something I think that would be helpful.
Adnan el Shukrijumah, from Broward County, beat his sister's
girls, was arrested for felony for beating girls back in the
1990s, that stuff should be publicly available.
And then finally, just to build on one of Bruce's comments,
Winston Churchill observed over a century ago, during the
British struggles in the Northwest Frontier, that time in this
area is measured in decades, not months or years. It is a
concept that does not come easy to Westerners, including
Americans, but this struggle against al-Qaeda will continue, I
think, to be a long one, partly because I think we are seeing a
much more diffused organization across the globe.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
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Mr. Royce. Thank you, Dr. Jones.
Mr. Sanderson.
STATEMENT OF MR. THOMAS M. SANDERSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND
SENIOR FELLOW, TRANSNATIONAL THREATS PROJECT, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Sanderson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Royce, Ranking Member Sherman, distinguished
members of the committee, it is an honor to testify before this
subcommittee on the Future of al-Qaeda.
Mr. Chairman, we all agree that Osama bin Laden's death is
a victory. I see it as an opportunity to advance the still
necessary struggle against al-Qaeda and its ideology.
Most likely it was bin Laden's hope that by the time he was
killed or captured he would have helped establish and solidify
a durable, largely self-sufficient movement. He was successful
in this regard. Those who fought or trained in Afghanistan in
the 1980s and 1990s are the spine of today's al-Qaeda movement.
Veterans of the more recent wars in Iraq, Afghanistan,
Somalia, have served as a new generation of credible fighters,
and many of them now occupy senior leadership positions within
al-Qaeda, or its affiliated groups.
What are al-Qaeda's prospects going forward? I believe the
broader al-Qaeda movement will survive the death of bin Laden
for several reasons. First, al-Qaeda's many associates are
financially and somewhat operationally autonomous. Second, al-
Qaeda's narrative that Islam is under attack is embedded, and
continues to resonate with Muslims around the world, even if
its violent strategy does not. Third, existing conditions, such
as the safe haven in Pakistan, and the chaos in Libya, offer
lifelines for al-Qaeda.
I would like to offer you some very brief insights from
recent research in Africa, which took me to six nations in West
Africa, East Africa and North Africa, to investigate the
current state and future prospects for al-Qaeda and its
associated movements.
Field work took place in Morocco, Mali, Egypt, Ethiopia,
Kenya, and Tanzania, and included more than 40 interviews with
journalists, academics, intelligence officials, a member of the
Muslim Brotherhood, regional security officials, Muslim
community leaders, and others.
Libya emerged as our greatest concern. Those we interviewed
worried that the conflict there could soon become an arena for
jihad. On April 14th, Ayman al-Zawahiri called on, ``Egyptians
and western desert tribes to support their brothers in Libya.''
al-Zawahiri added that Muslims from the region, ``must rise to
fight both Ghadafi's mercenaries and NATO crusaders,'' if
American and NATO forces enter Libya.
One may question how influential al-Zwahiri is today, but
these statements reflect al-Qaeda's thinking at the senior-most
level.
The fears that such a scenario would greatly improve the
fortunes of both al-Qaeda and the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, as
well as former members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group,
some of whom were allied with Osama bin Laden. The steady flow
of people and weapons into and out of Libya, Algeria and Chad
suggest that AQIM has already taken advantage of this
opportunity.
My sources verified press reports that AQIM has acquired
shoulder-fired SA-7 anti-aircraft missiles in Libya, and
brought them to Mali. Given al-Qaeda's longstanding obsession
with targeting commercial aircraft, the possibilities are
obvious.
There are other militants based in Libya, which stand to
gain from the current crisis. As I mentioned, in the eastern
part of Libya one time LIFG fighters, Libyan Islamic Fighting
Group fighters, are active in the rebellion against Ghadafi.
The Arab Spring was a major blow to al-Qaeda. In what
appears to be his last statement, bin Laden voiced support for
the popular revolutions across the Middle East in North Africa,
but he may have been accepting reality while hoping to take
advantage of the situation in due time. The uprisings
implicitly vetoed several pillars of bin Laden's ideology.
In Egypt and Tunisia protests succeeded, where al-Qaeda had
failed, removing longstanding autocrats. The protestors' goals
were largely secular, their use of violence minimal, and their
calls for democracy and a strong world for women anathema to
al-Qaeda.
Only days ago I interviewed a young female member of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, who enthusiastically supported
democracy and human rights. I do not believe she represents the
future that bin Laden hoped for.
The trend toward political participation by Islamists is
also problematic for al-Qaeda. As Peter Bergen points out, al-
Qaeda has not provided for people's materials needs, while
Islamist organizations that actually participate in political
processes do, and do so under the banner of Islam.
Over the years, militants in and out of al-Qaeda have
debated how best to achieve their utopian vision of an Islamic
caliphate. Arguments over the wisdom of the 9/11 attacks and
the doctrine of takfir in particular, have roiled al-Qaeda and
focused criticism on bin Laden and his followers.
Alternative strategic approaches may now come to the
surface with the killing of al-Qaeda's founder and leader, and
we could very well see some examples in the months ahead.
As we do look ahead, al-Qaeda certainly will experience
setbacks in the wake of bin Laden's death. Some remaining al-
Qaeda leaders will lay low in fear of what is revealed in the
information gathered at bin Laden's compound, just as drone
attacks have injected risk into the calculations of terrorists,
so does the dramatic killing of Osama bin Laden and the data
that was gathered on site.
Maintaining pressure at a moment of transition for al-Qaeda
leaders could yield gains. Any adjustments by parts of the
movement could leave signatures useful to counterterrorism
officials.
The death of bin Laden rightly prompts talk about his
ongoing influence on the broader al-Qaeda movement, but it will
require much more time to sufficiently understand the nature of
his influence, and to then tailor our counterterrorism
policies.
Having said that, I think continuing what we have been
doing in large part is right, drone strikes, denying safe
haven, preventing the flow of funding, countering online
radicalization, supporting regional allies, and directly and
thoroughly addressing the conditions that make violence so
appealing for the young people that join the movement, will be
needed in greater degrees. But, I am mindful that this will
have to be done in a severely resource constrained environment.
Osama bin Laden succeeded in cultivating a far-flung,
mature and capable movement and an ideology that continues to
resonate. The Israel and Palestine situation, Western
influence, and lethal partners in the safe haven in nuclear-
armed Pakistan, and a long list of underlying conditions, will
facilitate recruitment and operations.
Pursuing policies based on the notion that Osama bin
Laden's death signals the end for al-Qaeda and its affiliated
groups would be a premature, unwise, and dangerous position to
take at this time.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sanderson follows:]
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Mr. Royce. Thank you, Tom.
Let me ask you about the comments the director or head of
MI5 in Britain made about the possibility of terror attacks by
al-Shabaab. He recently said that they are worried about
terrorism on the streets, inspired by those who learned that
craft alongside al-Shabaab fighters, because so many, a
``significant number,'' I think, was the quote, a significant
number of people were traveling to Somalia.
You were in Kenya and Tanzania, and you saw a little of
that. What do you think the prospects are for attacks on the
British homeland? We have also received reports that al-
Shabaab, along with the Somali Americans, are making the trek
to the region through Kenya.
Mr. Sanderson. They, in fact, have, Mr. Chairman. We are
aware that the first suicide bombing involving America was
Somali American who traveled from the States to the Horn of
Africa in an attempt to push back the Ethiopian invasion and
fight those individuals.
The Somalis have quite a significant diaspora. They have
individuals around the world, the UK, Australia, United States,
and the fact that they are members of an organization that is
extreme, and driven to push back neighbors such as Ethiopia
that have been supported by the United States, merits caution
and concern.
I think the director of MI5's comments are reasonable. I
think that we do need to look at this potential threat. At this
point, the individuals have gone and focused on Ethiopia and
focused on Somalia, or into claims in the area, not on the
United States. So, I don't want to put too much stress there,
but it is a valid thing to look at.
Mr. Royce. Mr. Hoffman, Mr. Jones, any thoughts on that
question?
Mr. Jones. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
One thing I would like to add is, one of the growing
concerns with al-Shabaab in the United States is not just for
communities in places like Minneapolis, but also what we are
seeing is an increase in special interest daily in networks
that are bringing Somalis into and out of the United States,
including those connected to, directly or indirectly, to al-
Shabaab.
So, we have a pipeline that can move individuals from the
United States to Somalia, through Latin America, particularly,
Mexico, as well as move them back. In some cases, it may be to
visit family, but I think there is a growing concern of the use
by al-Shabaab of a range of trafficking and other networks in
Latin America, especially, Mexico, that were they to decide to
fundamentally target the U.S. homeland there is a well-defined
ability to get into the U.S.
Mr. Royce. I would also like to ask you about the former
Pakistani commando by the name of Kashmiri. There have been
multiple terrorism plots that he's been linked to in Europe, in
particular, and sort of these large-scale Mumbai-style plots
that he's tried to pull off in cities there last summer.
You see some speculation he might try to take over the
organization. Do you have any thoughts on whether or not that
is plausible?
Mr. Jones. Mr. Chairman, in my view, partly because he is a
Pakistani, he is not an Arab, I think it would be unlikely he
has the strategic level support across the affiliates to,
actually, take control of the organization. But, he has a well-
developed network of operatives in Europe, in South Asia, and
in a range of other places, to put him in a very influential
operational level position.
So, I would not assess he would take over Central al-Qaeda,
but, certainly, plays a very important operational level role,
including links with David Headley, for example.
Mr. Royce. Right. Right.
Well, let me go to Mr. Hoffman here for a minute, because
on these Mumbai-style attacks there was the comment that the
LeT holds the match that could start the war between India and
Pakistan. A Mumbai attack itself could have led to that kind of
escalation.
What can we be doing to stop another one of these attacks
that would originate in Pakistan by organizations linked to al-
Qaeda, or linked to these terrorist networks, that attempt to
create this kind of mayhem in India, with a hope for tit for
tat.
Mr. Hoffman. Mr. Chairman, this was precisely one of the
scenarios I painted in my testimony, the fear that one of these
groups either operating on their own or operating at al-Qaeda's
behest, or, perhaps, someone else's behest, might attempt to
trigger some confrontation with India to deflect attention from
the war and terrorism and from Afghanistan.
I think groups like LeT are enormously valuable to al-
Qaeda, because they provide what al-Qaeda does not, the social
welfare services. They have gone beyond being a mere terrorist
group.
And, in LeT's case, I think they are extremely dangerous,
because the bottom line is that they are the Hezbollah of South
Asia. They are so embedded in Pakistani society, in terms of
running schools, clinics, training camps, a relationship with
the government, one could say even also a state-sponsored
relationship with the government, that their power is
dangerous. They have operatives and a presence throughout the
world I think that al-Qaeda could only dream of, and in this
sense they are so embedded in Pakistani society that they
represent a threat to, I think, its stability.
Mr. Royce. They have an open campus where they can
routinely recruit new graduates.
Mr. Hoffman. Well, precisely, and estimates of upwards of
2,000 facilities in total in Pakistan.
And, even when you spoke about Ilyas Kashmiri, I think you
put your finger on one of the dangerous trends we are seeing,
is that individual groups do not matter any longer. You see
people gravitating from one group to another, that joining a
group like LeT or Harakat-ul-Jihad, which was Ilyas Kashmiri's
group, is just a gateway to other groups. And, you see someone
like Kashmiri going from having served in the Pakistani army,
having trained the mujahideen in the 1980s, going to a radical
Pakistani jihadi group, and then being tasked by al-Qaeda to
engage in international terrorism. And, this loops back to what
you were asking about al-Shabaab.
This is an entity that 10 or even 5 years ago none of us
would have heard of or would have cared about.
Mr. Royce. Sure.
Mr. Hoffman. But, they are a group that now seeks to
operate on the international scene.
Mr. Royce. But, we did have a steady flow of information
coming in about these terrorist personalities, partly by the
information that we were getting from those that we were
interrogating, those who we were interviewing.
And, I mentioned earlier the highest ranking terrorist, I
guess you would call him, captured in the last several years is
this Indonesian, Umar Patek. Despite the fact that he is
described as a ``gold mine,'' we have not interrogated him.
What do you make of this? Do you have an explanation of why
the administration has been so reluctant to do so, and how big
a target is he? How valuable is the information he could
provide?
Mr. Hoffman. I do not, sir, have an explanation. I think
that like all terrorist leaders, he has a potential wealth of
information, even if it is not actionable intelligence, but
helping us to understand the wiring diagram of terrorist
organizations, helping us to understand the decision-making
processes, helping us to understand the relationships between
them, that has, as I just described, drifted people from one
terrorist group to another.
So, all that, of course, is enormously important, not just
in a tactical sense of killing and capturing other terrorists,
but also building up the strategic picture of how these groups
operate, so we can prevent their regeneration.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Dr. Hoffman.
Mr. Sherman.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
In this room for 15 years, I have criticized the State
Department for failure to enforce the Iran Sanctions Act and
its progeny, so I should bring up that they have done a good
day's work today, they just released a statement that seven
companies have been sanctioned, including the State Oil Company
of Venezuela.
Now, as to the issues of this hearing, Mr. Hoffman, one
thing that I am interested in is how much money did bin Laden
die with, and who controls it now? Do you have any insight or
knowledge of the answers to those questions?
Mr. Hoffman. No, sir, I do not, but one thing I would point
out is that in recent years al-Qaeda has turned more and more
to self-funded operations, on a modest amount of spending.
Mr. Sherman. He seems to have been rather stingy with his
own personal money, or his personal money was wildly
exaggerated. He notoriously only bought one-way airplane
tickets, saving money and tipping us off to some extent.
Mr. Jones, you preferred an interesting idea, and I think
it is a good idea that we try to discredit these terrorists,
whether it be at large or otherwise. We may not be believed,
but the public is interested in little salacious details.
I, for one, think that it would be a good idea not to
satisfy my own prurient interest, but rather as an effort to
discredit, to relieve some of the personal and embarrassing
things found in bin Laden's compound.
Do we have legislation to carry out the program you have
outlined? I mean, we have laws to protect life, liberty and
property of Americans, and yet, when you are a terrorist we do
take, you know, the SEALs do knock down your door, presumably,
they are willing to take their life, we are going to invade
their privacy. Is legislation necessary in order to say that if
you are indicted on terrorism and refuse to present yourself to
American authorities, that we can violate your privacy and talk
about your arrest record?
And, by the way, the individuals you were talking about,
are they easily indictable or have they been indicted on
terrorism?
Mr. Jones. Some of them, including Adam Gadahn, have been
indicted. He was indicted in the early 2000s.
Mr. Sherman. Okay.
Mr. Jones. I think, frankly, with most of the individuals
we are talking about, it probably is not necessary to establish
legislation to release information about them, especially,
because the vast majority are not even Americans.
And, even those like Adnan el Shukrijumah, who have lived
in the United States, he is not an American citizen. So, I
would suspect----
Mr. Sherman. I am not sure that the average guy in my
district who is an immigrant to the United States, but does not
have his citizenship, should just have his arrest record
released for the purpose of embarrassing him, unless, you know,
and then I draw a distinction between that individual and these
terrorists.
Go ahead.
Mr. Jones [continuing]. But, certainly, releasing Anwar al-
Awlaki's solicitation of prostitutes in San Diego, I think
would be helpful in denigrating his character. Whether it would
contribute to individuals not seeking his guidance, as we saw
with Major Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, is unclear.
But, I think making that information publicly available,
again, I am not sure if legislation is required, or if better
strategic thinking is required.
Mr. Sherman. Well, I look forward to getting your analysis
on a case-by-case basis, and would be willing to carry
legislation if it was carefully drafted.
Last question, is Peter Bergen right, is Saif al-Adel the
interim leader of al-Qaeda, and if so, or even if not, he spent
many years in Iran, supposedly, under house arrest. Was it
house arrest or was he a house guest?
Mr. Jones?
Mr. Jones. Sure. Sir, in my personal view, I have seen no
strong evidence that Saif al-Adel has taken on the role as the
senior leader of Central al-Qaeda in Pakistan.
He, certainly, has played a very historically important
role, sat on the inner shura, traveled to Iran after the
overthrow of the Taliban regime in December.
My understanding is it was ``house arrest,'' that many of
al-Qaeda's leaders in Iran were monitored quite closely, in a
few cases were encouraged to leave. Some have left, actually,
somewhat recently, but, certainly, not arrested.
Mr. Sherman. And, the fact that some have left Iran, it is
not like they had to evade Iranian law enforcement in order to
leave the country, is that correct?
Mr. Jones. I cannot give you details on every case, but
that is my understanding in at least some of them.
Mr. Sherman. Well, usually, if you are under house arrest
you cannot leave, and if you are a house guest you can, you may
even be asked to.
I yield back.
Mr. Royce. Mr. Poe of Texas.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have questions about Pakistan and then Libya.
How ingrained, if they are, are al-Qaeda or other terrorist
groups in the Pakistan Government?
Mr. Jones?
Mr. Jones. The Pakistan Government and its intelligence
service has had a history of providing direct assistance to a
range of proxy organizations to pursue its interests in India,
including Kashmir, as well as in Afghanistan.
So, a range of these groups includes Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, the
Afghan Taliban, Haqqani Network.
The concern I would have is that several of these groups,
including the Haqqani Network, as well a Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,
have a very close relationship with senior al-Qaeda leaders.
So, at the very least one could draw a conclusion that there is
a, to use the Kevin Bacon analogy, very close, perhaps, one or
two degrees of separation between elements of Pakistan's
Government and al-Qaeda.
Mr. Poe. Since the taking out of Osama bin Laden, there has
been a lot of discussion about how trustworthy an ally Pakistan
is. I think they are playing both sides, at least two sides,
maybe more sides than that.
If what you say is true, how should we be moving forward to
make sure that the intelligence service in Pakistan does not go
further and help these groups obtain uranium capability that
they can use? Is that a concern that we should have, the United
States should have, that the intelligence service in Pakistan
is working with these groups so that maybe they could obtain
uranium and move in a nuclear capability?
Mr. Sanderson, anybody want to answer that?
Mr. Sanderson. It is clearly a concern. I do think they are
playing both sides, because they have a lot of interests that
go beyond what we are interested in. But, I would yield to Dr.
Jones, given that is his area of expertise.
Mr. Poe. All right.
Mr. Jones?
Mr. Jones. I think it would be helpful, as a general
principle, as we consider future amounts of assistance and
types of assistance to provide to Pakistan, that they
increasingly rethink their policy of providing assistance to
proxy organizations.
There are clearly terrorist organizations that they have
fought, have died fighting. The Tehrik-e-Taliban in Pakistan is
one good example. So, they have serious threats to their
homeland, some of which overlap with ours, but some of which do
not.
I would suggest strongly encouraging them, including
through the types and amounts of funding we are providing to
them, that they must stop providing direct assistance in some
cases to militant groups, because it creates a sanctuary in
that country that is extremely unhelpful and dangerous for
America's national security.
Mr. Poe. Military support that we have sent to Pakistan,
our own Government is now saying that 40 percent of the bills
they give back to us are rejected by our Government as invalid
bills for what they are billing us for in Pakistan regarding
their military.
How do we know, or give me a take on what you think our
military support turns out to be going through Pakistan, the
intelligence service, and going to one of these groups ended up
being used against us. Is that a possibility, a probability, or
not?
Mr. Jones. I have seen no evidence, that does not mean it
does not exist, of abusing our equipment or any other monies
and pushing it toward militant groups.
But, as a general policy, organizations that we have a
relationship with in Pakistan have provided assistance.
So, in a sense, I am not sure it matters that much. At the
very least, they are taking knowledge in some cases, and
pushing it to some militant groups.
Mr. Poe. Last question is Libya.
Who is in charge of the Libyan rebels?
Mr. Sanderson? They are looking at you, so I will let you
answer.
Mr. Sanderson. Absolutely, Mr. Congressman.
I cannot answer that specific question for you. What I can
answer is your initial question as to the threat and role of
al-Qaeda there.
I do not know who is running the rebellion, but I can tell
you that al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is on the western
flank, has networks into the country, and can certainly trade
on the chaos there. On the eastern side, which we know from
previous statements, and from the West Point study, that is
where you had a tremendous number of extremists who traveled to
Iraq to fight, the second highest number per capita for any
country.
Then you have Libyan Islamic Fighting Group members, former
members, one of the senior former members of the LIFG recently
reported that in the last 18 months 40 former LIFG--or 40
Libyans, not, necessarily, LIFG, 40 Libyans have joined AQIM.
So, you have a crossover between the groups. You have the
rebels in the east being infiltrated by former LIFG members
into AQIM poised to make gains in this chaos.
And, that has, I think, great implications for what is
going on next door in Egypt, as they start to right themselves
you do not want that degree of instability next door in Libya.
Mr. Poe. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Poe.
We will go to Mr. Higgins of New York.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to just talk about al-Qaeda in Pakistan. And,
if you are talking about the future of al-Qaeda, I also think
it is fundamentally important to talk about, you know, how they
sustain themselves, you know, how do they exist.
And, in Afghanistan, which I have heard some estimates that
the heroin trade is about 60 percent of Afghan's entire
economy. And, Taliban does not own the poppy fields, but it
presides over it. It charges protection, it makes money in the
movement of drugs.
And, I also understand that drug movement becomes more
profitable the further away from its point of origin.
To what extent is al-Qaeda involved in the movement of
heroin from Afghanistan through Central Asia and South Asia?
Mr. Jones. My understanding, Congressman Higgins, is, and I
am not an expert on the drug trade, is they make some money off
of the transportation of opium-based products, but it is by no
means their primary source of assistance, which may come from a
range of other activities, Gulf financing, kidnapping.
So, they have, like many groups, significant redundancy in
where they get financing from. I would say they do not need a
large amount of funding, but other groups, including the Afghan
Taliban, are the primary beneficiaries, as well as government
officials on both sides of the border, of most of the drug
money.
Mr. Sanderson. Mr. Congressman, I cannot give you a figure,
of course, but I will say that you correctly characterized the
increasing amount of money as it goes out of Afghanistan. You
know, this is between 6,000 and 8,000 tons per year, with about
half of it going west through Iran, 20 percent going through
Central Asia, the rest through Pakistan.
Incidentally, we learned while on the Swahili Coast, and in
other parts of Africa, that heroin was coming down there and
causing problems among the Somali community.
So, this is tremendously dangerous and does increase in
benefit to them as it goes further and makes money for those
along the route.
Mr. Higgins. Well just, it seems to me that there is what a
book by Gretchen Peters called Seeds of Terror, she puts the
number at about half-a-billion dollars a year the Taliban makes
in taxing, charging protection, and presiding over those opium-
based products.
But, the point is, if an economy, you know, that is 60
percent, you know, heroin based, the movement around that
country cannot be all that profitable, but the heroin has to
get to more places where a lot of money can be made.
And, if you assume that the Taliban's involvement is
confined to Pakistan, then other elements are involved in
moving those opium-based products, as you said, throughout the
world and making an lawful lot of money.
Mr. Jones. Sir, if I can just add one issue.
Based on the fact that much of that opium, or a chunk of
it, does go to areas like Eastern Europe and Western Europe,
you see in Dubai, for example, where a lot of the drug money is
funded by large numbers of Russian mafia, so I think the end
areas where that drug money is coming, is going to, and
Gretchen has outlined this as well in her work, does mean that
a lot of the conduits are in areas like Dubai and in Eastern
Europe.
So, I would say those appear to be the primary recipients
of the assistance and the funding as it comes through on its
way to areas like Eastern Europe.
Mr. Higgins. Just a final question.
Again, you talked about al-Qaeda is now decentralized,
diffused, and other influences is gaining, but their popularity
seems to be declining, particularly, in the Islamic world, as
evidenced by the Arab Spring and other indicators.
So, you know, where would you put the relative strength of
al-Qaeda today, versus, let's say, 5 years ago?
Any of you.
Mr. Hoffman. I would say it is stronger, beyond any doubt.
Mr. Higgins. Stronger.
Mr. Hoffman. 20 years ago al-Qaeda, perhaps, had seven
international networks worldwide. Today it has 11.
You show me any entity in the past 2 or 3 years when most
governments throughout the world had been, you know, immersed
in cutbacks and laying off personnel and so on, al-Qaeda has
been able to expand by more than 50 percent its worldwide
presence.
So, I think that is a reflection of a conscious strategy,
both to decentralize, and as Dr. Jones said, but also to
deflect attention away from South Asia to strengthen the core
group, because the core group then still remains a player.
Mr. Royce. We are going to go to Mr. Duncan.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Folks, thank you for being here today.
You know, some say the attention given to the al-Qaeda
leadership struggle risks placing personalities and individuals
above ideas and ideology. And, I tend to agree with that.
And, I don't believe has been said about the threats to
world peace, and, definitely, peace in the Middle East, posed
by the Muslim Brotherhood. I don't believe we talk about the
Muslim Brotherhood's influence in the region enough, and you
are really just starting to hear about that in recent events.
And, furthermore, I cannot say enough about the despairing
language of terror within the administration. If you look at
the 9/11 Commission report, and the terms, it had words like
terrorism and jihad, and Muslim Brotherhood, and al-Qaeda and
others, mentioning that, and then look at the lexicons that are
out there in the services, intelligence services, even within
the administration.
I am concerned about that, because I believe you have got
to define your enemy.
Dr. Jones, I am going to take a different line of
questioning here, because I am concerned about closer to home.
What is your opinion on the threat level from the terrorist
organizations, Hezbollah and al-Shabaab in, say, Latin America,
and even closer to home in Mexico, along our border?
Mr. Jones. That is a very good question.
My personal view on the two you noted, Hezbollah and al-
Shabaab, is both do present a threat, but it is not clear that
it is an imminent threat to the U.S. homeland.
I am not an expert on Hezbollah, like some others,
including Dr. Hoffman here, and that general region, but I
would say that their primary focus still appears to be the
general Lebanon, Israeli area.
However, I would also note that an incident like Israeli or
U.S. attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities could obviously
change that very quickly.
The same thing is probably also true of Shabaab, whose
primary focus remains in and around Somalia. There are growing
concerns of a linkage between al-Qaeda East Africa, but I would
say the threat streams through Latin America to the U.S.
homeland, active plotting, based on al-Shabaab, I have not seen
evidence of a very serious threat.
I would say the most serious threats continue to come from
Central al-Qaeda, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and some
of the Pakistani groups, including Tehrik-e-Taliban in
Pakistan, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, all of which have some number
of networks operating through Central America.
Mr. Duncan. That is interesting.
Mr. Sanderson, and then I will ask Mr. Hoffman questions.
Mr. Sanderson. Thank you, Congressman.
I would just like to remind everyone that there is
significant penetration by Hezbollah supporters on the level of
a criminal nexus that clearly could also serve as the beachhead
of a future attack.
If you look at the trading, illegal trading of cigarettes
that came out of the Carolinas with the Hamoud brothers, the
profits from that were used to buy laser range finders, night
vision goggles, blasting caps that were sent back to the Bekaa
Valley.
A second group up in Canada bought pseudoephedrine tablets,
brought them in to the northern United States, traded them with
Mexican methamphetamine gangs, who then created
methamphetamines, and the profits from that were also sent back
to Lebanon.
So, that is a significant threat in my mind.
Mr. Duncan. Mr. Hoffman, last July we had the first IED
explode in this hemisphere, and in Mexico. Can you elaborate,
or can you talk about the influence that Hezbollah may have
with the Mexican drug cartel, any involvement there?
Mr. Hoffman. Well, sir, Hezbollah has long been involved in
the Western Hemisphere, going back at least several decades.
Its strength has always been in the triple border area between
Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina.
I think in recent years it has been able to establish a
more auxiliary beachhead in the northern part of Latin America
and Venezuela, in particular.
So, I think its influence in these areas, its involvement
in illegal smuggling narcotics trafficking, as Mr. Sanderson
described cigarette smuggling and so on, its presence in the
United States, I think, and its infrastructure throughout the
region is quite strong.
I have no evidence at all, but I would be skeptical that it
was necessarily engaged in an act of alliance with, for
instance, the Mexican drug cartels, because Hezbollah modus
operandi, as Dr. Jones has described, is, essentially, to lay
low and to be ready in the event some adversarial action is
taken by the United States or some other country against Iran,
or, perhaps, against Lebanon, and then to mobilize its
operatives in other hemispheres to strike.
It is not inconceivable that that technology would be
transferred by Hezbollah, but I think, unfortunately, what we
have seen since Iraq is that the IED technology has really
spread to many different theaters, and is not confined to any
one group any longer. But, that sort of technology not least
because of the Internet, not least as I described earlier
because of the flow of individuals now between multiple
terrorist groups, unfortunately, has spread, and may, indeed,
be a harbinger of the future when you see IEDs elsewhere.
Mr. Royce. Thank you.
We are going to go now to Mr. Connolly of Virginia.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
having this hearing, and welcome.
Mr. Jones made reference to the Haqqani Network. It seems
fairly convincing evidence that the elements of the ISI have
provided protection to them, to the Haqqani Network, which has
operated openly and with impunity in Pakistan, or at least
parts of Pakistan, Peshawar, to wit.
My question goes to, I mean, the title of this hearing is
the future of al-Qaeda, but I think we are particularly
increasingly focused on the Pakistani relationship.
How should the United States look at Pakistan? And, you
know, it seems to me that there are competing theories. You
could look at Pakistan and say, duplicitous, manipulative, and
we have to do something about that.
You could look at Pakistan and say it is a conveniently
compartmentalized government. So, there are legitimate elements
here of the Pakistani Government who are cooperating openly and
honestly with the United States in the fight against terror.
After all, they have lost Pakistani military personnel in that
fight.
And then, there are other elements in other compartments
that are not, or you could, I suppose, say given the money on
the table they know how to play us beautifully. We do not have
a lot of choices, given the fact that we have a nuclear
capacity, and so they are cynically opportunistic in our
relationship.
Now, I think there is a quandary up here on the Hill as to,
well, we need to figure out how, in fact, we see the
relationship, because there are so many conflicting variables
in this very complex relationship.
So, I want to give you all an opportunity to tell us what
you think, how you are advising the House Foreign Affairs
Committee, how should Congress look at this relationship, given
recent events?
Dr. Hoffman.
Mr. Hoffman. Well, sir, I think you have given a very
accurate description of the problem, it is all of the above. It
is all of those things. It is duplicitous and manipulative, it
is convenient and compartmentalized. I would argue it is also
very selective in its cooperation.
It cooperates with the United States against those groups
that it believes most directly threaten the Pakistani
Government, that is the TTP, the Pakistani Taliban. It gives
other groups, if not a pass, then turns a blind eye, or in some
respects is actually involved in supporting them.
The trial, I think, currently underway in Chicago, that
involves Tahawwur Rana, a Pakistani National based in the
United States, and David Headley another, actually, a dual
Pakistani American citizen, sheds a lot of light on this,
because, of course, according to David Headley's testimony the
senior major in the ISI, Major Iqbal, was one of his handlers,
and not only knew about the Mumbai attacks, but had an active
role, and he certainly did not try to stop the attackers when
he learned that Americans were being deliberately targeted, and
for that matter American Jews were also being, specifically,
targeted in a Chabad House. And, I think that, and the trial,
and that information, controvertibly, I think, provides us a
wedge to push back.
We cannot completely forsake Pakistan. We need their
assistance clearly, and as you, yourself, pointed out, not all
elements of the Pakistani Government are uncooperative or
inimical to U.S. interests, but I think we have to make it
clear that their selective backing of some groups and going
after other groups has to end, and that should be one of the
main pre-conditions for aid in the future.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Mr. Jones.
Mr. Jones. I think it is useful, in answering your
question, to understand what motivates, what likely motivates
Pakistan as very similar to what motivates all countries in
that region, maximizing its own national security interests.
It acts to protect its own borders. It has serious concerns
about its relationship with India. It has serious concerns
about India's very close relationship with Afghanistan.
It has, since its creation in 1947, used proxy
organizations, because it is a relatively weaker state, to deal
with the Indians. It did it from the moment it was established
in the Kashmir area.
So, I would say in general the more I think that we can
argue that policy of providing assistance to proxy groups ends
up undercutting Pakistan's own security interests in the long
run, because any of these groups will and have turned on
Pakistan itself. It cannot control these groups in all aspects,
certainly undermines its own security.
But, I would just say very bluntly that I find it very
difficult to believe we can continue to provide the amounts and
degrees of assistance that we provide them, to the government,
who is structured, if you look at the structure of the ISI, to
provide assistance to proxy groups. That just--I do not think
that is the best way to provide American taxpayer dollars to a
country that continues as a matter of foreign policy to provide
assistance to militant groups.
Mr. Connolly. Mr. Chairman, would you indulge me, not for
me to ask anymore questions, but to allow Mr. Sanderson to
respond as well?
Mr. Royce. Certainly, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. I thank the chair.
Mr. Sanderson. Thank you, Congressman. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
I would echo Dr. Jones' comments about the interest, and no
doubt about it, we are left with a terrible choice, and we are
held over a barrel to a degree here.
But, the recent attack on the Pakistani naval base, I
think, is a good reminder to the Pakistanis about how unwieldy
some of these internal groups can be.
And, speaking of interests, we also have to look beyond our
specific interests on extremism in al-Qaeda, to interests in
Asia, and we do not want to move away too much from Pakistan,
given their relationship with China, and our interests with
India and China, at large.
So, I think that leaves us in a position where we have
clear to continue, but certainly not at these numbers.
Mr. Royce. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson of Ohio.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Hoffman, you noted that decapitation strikes have
rarely provided a decisive end to a terrorist movement, instead
they often paralyze a group, only to see the rise of an even
more dangerous successor. Hamas, which has had several of its
top leaders eliminated is a case in point, some argue. Yet, the
death of al-Zarqawi, al-Qaeda's leader in Iraq, is believed to
have seriously degraded that group.
Why was the case of Zarqawi different, and where does the
death of bin Laden fall on that scale?
Mr. Hoffman. Well, sir, that is an excellent parallel to
draw, and you are absolutely right, the death of al-Zarqawi in
May 2006 degraded al-Qaeda in Iraq, but, of course, it did not
eliminate the threat. Al-Qaeda in Iraq continues today, weaker,
but, nonetheless, still with an ability to inflict pain and
suffering on the Iraqi people and to target--tend to undermine
the fragile democracy in Iraq.
Mr. Johnson. Okay. Many point to the Internet as an
increasing source of radicalization for home-grown terrorists.
In a message after bin Laden's death, al-Qaeda's online
propaganda arm sought to rally supporters by low-tech means,
and they said something like this: ``We say to every mujahid
Muslim, if there is an opportunity do not waste it. Do not
consult anyone about killing Americans or destroying their
economy. We also insight you carry out acts of individual
terrorism with significant results, which only require basic
preparation.''
How do you assess U.S. efforts to combat what one analyst
has called a virtual caliphate?
Mr. Hoffman. Anemic, I think under resourced, under
prioritized. I think that in the past 10 years that is the one
arm on the war on terrorism that we have not devoted sufficient
attention or resources to.
I think it is something that people tend to shy away from,
because the metrics are not clear. And, because the metrics are
not clear, there is a devaluation of it, but I think it is
absolutely essential. In and of itself, it is not going to win
the war on terrorism, but in a sense it is an essential adjunct
to kinetics to killing and capturing terrorists.
For example, the Voice of America's budget, over 90 percent
of it is dedicated to traditional media sources, television,
radio and newspapers, and it has been that way for years. Yet,
we are in the 21st century in the Internet age, and yet, only
roughly 6 or 7 percent of its budget is designed to communicate
across the Internet.
There are only a handful of individuals in the State
Department, I think, in the single digits, that, actually,
engage in counter messaging.
So, I think we have this nascent capability, but it is one
that is being completely under resourced and, really, I think,
completely unexploited.
Mr. Johnson. And, am I interpreting your answer correctly,
do you see this as a significant security threat?
Mr. Hoffman. Absolutely, sir, and, of course, the example
of Inspire magazine, which al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
has produced, is clear evidence of that.
There is now a raft of individuals that have been inspired
by Inspire, Major Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, Faisal
Shahzad, for example, in terms of the Times Square bombing,
Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, the Christmas Day bomber, and the
list goes on. This is a very effective tool. It is a way to
animate, to mobilize, and, ultimately, I think, to activate or,
actually, to engage individuals, just as you described, in low-
level violence, that I say reflects an al-Qaeda strategy that
is designed to throw at us this multiplicity of low-level
threats, in hopes of creating so much noise, and so many
distractions, that it is al-Qaeda's hope that bigger, more
spectacular attacks or attempts will then prove more
successful.
Mr. Johnson. Mr. Sanderson, bin Laden has been credited
with unifying Islamist terrorist groups to target the far
enemy, the U.S. and the West, and wage a defensive jihad to
protect all Muslims against the West's reported war on Islam.
Without bin Laden, some argue that the al-Qaeda affiliates
will further fracture and focus on local issues, as they were
postured prior to al-Qaeda's rise in the '90s.
Is that where you see the organization going, and if not,
where?
Mr. Sanderson. Thank you, Mr. Congressman.
Bin Laden was successful in overlaying his global jihad
with the local goals of a number of associated groups around
the world, and that was effective, and I think there are
elements within some of those groups that still believe in
that.
But, I do think that with his death some will reconsider
that.
There are also competing theories out there and strategies,
Abu Musab al-Suri pointed out the consequences of targeting the
far enemy, a technically advanced United States, that resulted
in the destruction of the Islamic emirate in Afghanistan.
So, there were already people who were challenging that
focus, and I do think that as his influence recedes, with his
death, to the degree that it will, I think others will start to
voice their opinions, and you will see people push in different
directions.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Royce. Well, let me just thank our witnesses, not only
for their testimony and traveling here today, but for their
expertise. Bin Laden is dead, but we have a lot to grapple with
in the aftermath.
Thank you all for appearing at this hearing. We stand
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:20 p.m., the subcommitted was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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