[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICE: BUDGET, REORGANIZATION,
POLICIES
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION, AND TRADE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 14, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-12
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
______
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
VACANT
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman
TED POE, Texas BRAD SHERMAN, California
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESS
The Honorable Daniel Benjamin, Ambassador-at-Large, Coordinator
for Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State................. 6
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from
the State of California, and chairman, Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade: Prepared statement..... 3
The Honorable Daniel Benjamin: Prepared statement................ 10
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 28
Hearing minutes.................................................. 29
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 31
THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICE: BUDGET, REORGANIZATION,
POLICIES
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THURSDAY, APRIL 14, 2011
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:05 p.m., in
room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Edward R. Royce
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Royce. The hearing of the subcommittee will come to
order.
Today we are pleased to have with us Ambassador Daniel
Benjamin, the State Department's top counterterrorism official.
Welcome. This is an opportunity to review his office's budget,
especially important given our dire financial straits.
As part of a State Department reorganization, the
administration would elevate the Ambassador's Office of the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism to bureau status. Certainly,
the counterterrorism portfolio is vital. Nevertheless, a
certain skepticism is warranted in any reorganization in this
town. What would the elevation have the office do better than
it does today--or worse? Would the change portend a staffing
and budget increase? Should an existing bureau be downgraded as
an offset to this change? The administration requires
congressional authorization for this. So we look to the
Ambassador for answers on these questions.
The State Department's request for counterterrorism
activity is roughly $260 million. Its programs fund many small
projects. For example, the administration is requesting
$800,000 in antiterrorism assistance for Malaysia. The Obama
administration stresses that counterterrorism must be
strategic, attacking the political, social, economic and other
ills abroad that the administration believes drive militant
recruitment. But it is fair to ask whether these relatively
small efforts can make a dent against these daunting
challenges, and how do we measure their effectiveness?
There are policy issues involved here, too. The Bush
administration ill-advisedly removed North Korea from the state
sponsors of terrorism list as part of a fruitless nuclear
negotiation. Since its delisting, North Korea has proliferated
to state sponsors of terrorism. And I have concerns about
Sudan's likely delisting. We need to make sure its hands are
clean.
Subcommittee Member Poe has introduced legislation urging
the Secretary of State to remove the People's Mujahadin
Organization of Iran from the Foreign Terrorist Organization
List, and we will be looking at that. This Iranian exile group
lives in a precarious security situation, being harassed and
assaulted by Iraqi troops.
The Obama administration entered office committed to
addressing terrorism differently. This was exemplified by its
efforts to shutter Guantanamo Bay and bring 9/11 mastermind
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed to New York for civilian trial. After
bipartisan congressional action to prevent GITMO detainees from
being brought to U.S. soil, most agree that GITMO will not be
closed any time soon. And in a major reversal, Attorney General
Eric Holder announced that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed would not be
prosecuted in civilian courts but by a military commission at
Guantanamo Bay. Good.
The administration stressed that its predecessor's foreign
policy drove anti-American militancy. But a 2009 USAID report
notes the following. They say,
``We need to recognize that many violent extremists are
moved primarily by an unshakeable belief in the
superiority of certain values, by a perceived
obligation to carry out God's command, or by an abiding
commitment to destroy a system they view as evil or
oppressive. In other words, variables located in the
realm of identity, of faith, and spirituality matter a
great deal.''
Those were the words of that USAID reported in 2009. So
extremism is about much more than U.S. foreign policy.
Finally, Department of Homeland Security Secretary Janet
Napolitano recently claimed that security along our southern
border is better now than it has ever been. Frankly, that is
laughable, given its rampant violence. One of my constituents
was just kidnapped. I do want to thank the Ambassador for his
help on this because we were in consultation yesterday with his
office on this. But at the same time, the State Department
rescinded a travel warning that U.S. citizens could be targeted
by drug cartels in three Mexican states. Well, he was abducted,
it looks like from the information we received, by members of a
drug cartel. So I wonder about this judgment.
And there is growing concern over illegal southern border
crossings by individuals from Somalia, from Pakistan, from
Yemen, and other countries home to active terrorist
organizations. We had better start treating border security as
national security.
I will now turn to the ranking member for his comments, Mr.
Brad Sherman from Los Angeles, California.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Royce follows:]
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Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding these
important hearings. The Obama administration's first
Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review presented a plan
for elevating the Office of Coordinator for Counterterrorism to
a new Bureau of Counterterrorism, which would give our witness
a major promotion. My hope is that if we were to take such
step, that new bureau could combat the pernicious effect of
what I call the Bureau of Kumbaya at the State Department. This
bureau inspired us to take North Korea off the list on the
theory that that would make them be nice. And the bureau also
inspired us to put the MeK on the list on the theory that Iran
would then ameliorate its proliferation and terrorism
activities. One of the questions for our witness is: How is the
that working out?
This reorganization could give new heft to our efforts
against terrorism, or it could be like rearranging the deck
chairs on the Titanic; moving things around but not really
accomplishing anything or, even worse, giving the appearance
that we have done something when in fact we would continue to
have the same policies that have been, I think, manifestly
inappropriate over the last several years.
There are increasing media reports that our efforts in
Afghanistan include giving money to the Taliban; either to
contractors who are actually a Taliban front or to contractors
who find it convenient to pay off the Taliban and then brag
about how successfully they carried out their development
program. I look forward to seeing what the Ambassador's office
can do to make sure that our antiterrorism efforts in
Afghanistan are not undermined by those who just want to move
the trucks as easily as possible, not looking at the real
impact.
In the early hours of Friday, last week, Iraqi forces
entered Camp Ashraf, which houses members of the Iranian
opposition group known as the MeK. Some 34 residents were
killed, 300 wounded. In private discussions, the Iraqi
Ambassador's office has said the blood is not on the hands of
the Iraqi Government but is at least partially on the hands of
the State Department because the MeK is listed as a terrorist
group and accordingly Iraq doesn't feel that it has to respect
the human rights of those in the camp.
At a Foreign Affairs hearing on March 1, I pressed the
Secretary of State to personally review the decision of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, which ordered the
State Department to review its decision with regard to keeping
the MeK on the list. A similar list is maintained by Europe,
and they have removed the MeK. This court decision is
unprecedented. Courts loathe to involve themselves in our
foreign policy. And so I believe that the office represented
here is the only office to have its processes and decisions
questioned by the second most important court in the United
States.
I would point out for the record the MEK's usefulness in
reporting what was going on in Natanz back in 2002, and what is
going on in TABA today.
The State Department's job is not just putting people on
the list, and I think the MeK was put on the list not on the
merits but rather to placate Tehran, but also to decide who
stays on the list.
On the other hand, we have got to put the right entities on
the list. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula wasn't put on the
list until days before their 2009 attempted attack. The
Pakistani Taliban was not designated until months after the
Times Square attack. The Afghan Taliban is still not on the
list notwithstanding their brutal murders not only of American
soldiers but American aid workers as well.
Finally, with regard to Libya, when Deputy Secretary
Steinberg was here I brought to his attention the fact that the
forces in eastern Libya include those who have fought and
killed Americans by fighting alongside al-Qaeda. I particularly
brought to his attention Abdel-Hakim al-Hasidi, who brags of
fighting us in both Pakistan and dispatching forces against us
in Iraq. Yet there has been no serious attempt by the State
Department to demand that the opposition council in Benghazi
either turn these terrorists over to the United States or even
disassociate themselves from these al-Qaeda-affiliated
fighters.
So I look forward to hearing our witness. I think one key
question before our committee is whether we need a new bureau.
And I hope very much if there is an opportunity to create a new
bureau, that it will fight inside the State Department for a
much stronger antiterrorism policy rather than simply being
assigned by the State Department to come over to Congress and
sing us lullabies and try to put us to sleep. I am sure that is
not what the witness has in mind here today.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Royce. Mr. Poe of Texas.
Mr. Poe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a few days ago, the
Iraqi army charged into Camp Ashraf. Here we have on the top
left-hand corner an Iraqi soldier coming in with an M-16,
supported by an American-made Humvee. On the far top right-hand
corner we have a member of Camp Ashraf being run over by one of
those Humvees. And contrary to what the Iraqi Government says,
that only three were killed, here are the victims of the
assault and attack on Camp Ashraf. Thirty-three men and women.
For some reason, the State Department sings the tune of the
Iraqi Government and only says three were killed. Well, there
are 30 more than three in these photographs. Real people, real
victims of crime.
I am very concerned, as my friend from California, Mr.
Sherman is, about the people in Camp Ashraf. Every time we have
a hearing on this issue, I ask the State Department Ambassador
or whoever is present what is going to be done when America
leaves. And we get the same song and dance: It will be fine.
Well, it is not fine. The Iraqi Government wants these people
removed. I think they are being supported by the Iranian
Government. And we have an obligation in the United States to
make sure these people are protected.
One way to do that is to remove the MeK off of the list.
Some of these people were members of the MeK. And I have been
to every classified briefing I know of about the MeK and I am
not convinced that they should stay on the Foreign Terrorist
Organization List. I am waiting for the State Department to
make its case or remove them. The State Department can't make
their case and they won't remove them, in spite of a court
order. I think that is appalling. And we have an obligation to
make sure that something occurs to protect these people.
The second note, I live in Texas. We have got a concern
about the Los Zetas that come storming across the Texas border
selling drugs. They are very violent, and I think that maybe we
should continue putting them on the Foreign Terrorist
Organization List.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Judge. Mr. Higgins of New York, I
don't think you have an opening statement, do you?
We will go to Ambassador Benjamin. Ambassador Daniel
Benjamin is currently the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at
the Department of State with the rank of Ambassador-at-Large.
Prior to this, Ambassador Benjamin spent time at both the
Brookings Institute as well as the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. He served on the National Security
Council during the Clinton administration, where he was the
Director for Counterterrorism in the Office of Transnational
Threats. Before entering government, Ambassador Benjamin worked
as a foreign correspondent for Time Magazine and for the Wall
Street Journal. He is an author of two books on terrorism. One
is ``The Age of Sacred Terror'' and the other is ``The Next
Attack: The Failure of the War on Terror and a Strategy for
Getting It Right,'' which was a Washington Post Best Book of
2005.
So, Ambassador, welcome. Thank you again for the assistance
with my constituent yesterday. I appreciate it.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL BENJAMIN, AMBASSADOR-AT-
LARGE, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
STATE
Mr. Benjamin. Thank you very much, Chairman Royce, Ranking
Member Sherman, distinguished members of the committee. I want
to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
have submitted testimony for the record that provides
additional detail about the State Department's concept of
strategic counterterrorism and our plans to work with Congress
to transform my office, SCT, into a full-fledged bureau.
Over the past 10 years, the United States has made great
strides in tactical counterterrorism--taking individual
terrorists off the streets, disrupting cells, and thwarting
conspiracies. Yet if we look at the strategic level, we
continue to see a strong flow of new recruits into many of the
most dangerous terrorist organizations. A Bureau of
Counterterrorism would continue to work aggressively with our
interagency counterparts to stop imminent and developing
threats, but it would also carry forward and expand the work
underway to undermine the appeal of extremist ideologies and
help many of our partners develop the tools to deal with the
terrorist threats they face.
Mr. Chairman, the wave of democratic demonstrations that
began to sweep the Arab world at the end of 2010 hold both
promise and peril. Because great numbers of citizens carried
out their public demands for change without resort to violence
or reference to al-Qaeda's incendiary world view, these events
upended that group's longstanding claims that change would only
come to the region through violence. At the same time, the
political turmoil distracted security officials and led to the
possibility that terrorist groups would exploit the new
openness and find it easier to carry out conspiracies, a
possibility with significant worrisome implications for states
undergoing democratic transitions. But should the revolts
result in democratically elected non-autocratic governments,
al-Qaeda's single-minded focus on terrorism as an instrument of
change could be severely delegitimized.
I would like to review some key aspects of the current
landscape, starting in South Asia, home to the group behind the
September 11 attacks. Pakistan, particularly the Federally
Administered Tribal Area region and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
Province, continues to be used as a base for terrorist
organizations operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan. While
Pakistan has made progress on the counterterrorism front,
specifically against Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, the challenge
remains to make these gains durable and sustainable. To this
end, Pakistan must sustain its efforts to deny al-Qaeda safe
haven in the tribal areas of western Pakistan. We continue to
press Pakistan for increased action against Lashkar-e-Tayyiba
and other terrorist groups.
Though the al-Qaeda core has become weaker, it retains the
capability to conduct regional and transnational attacks. In
addition, the affiliates have grown stronger. Over the last 2
years, we have seen the AQ threat become more distributed and
geographically diversified in Yemen, East Africa, and the
Sahel, for example. Terrorist violence from al-Qaeda in the
Arabian Peninsula has been directed inside and outside of
Yemen, threatening the security and the well-being of the
Yemeni people, the broader Arabian Peninsula, and the United
States.
Al-Qaeda in Iraq in recent months has adapted to changing
conditions, diminished capacity, and dismantled leadership to
continue to carry out large-scale and coordinated attacks
against government officials, security forces, and even
civilians inside Iraq.
In Somalia, al-Shabaab has conducted frequent attacks on
government, military, and civilian targets inside Somalia, and
the group's leadership remains actively interested in attacking
regional, U.S., and Western interests. Last July, we saw al-
Shabaab demonstrate its ability and intent to carry out attacks
outside of Somalia when it claimed responsibility for twin
suicide bombings that killed 76 people in Kampala, Uganda
during the World Cup.
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is another threat. No group
has made a bigger name for itself in the kidnapping for ransom
business than AQIM, which relies on ransom payments to sustain
and develop itself in the harsh Saharan environment. AQIM also
conducts small-scale ambushes and attacks on security forces
throughout the region.
Let me now turn to the three pillars of our comprehensive
strategic counterterrorism work that will address these
challenges, and particularly those that arise in the new
political circumstances we find ourselves in: Reducing
recruitment, building partner capacity, and multilateral
engagement.
Our countering violent extremism work focuses on three main
lines of effort that will reduce terrorist recruitment:
Delegitimizing the violent extremist narrative in order to
diminish its ``pull''; developing positive alternatives for
youth vulnerable to radicalization to diminish the ``push''
effect of grievances and unmet expectations; and building
partner capacity to carry out these activities.
To counter AQ propaganda, we helped stand up the Center for
Strategic Counterterrorism Communication, the CSCC, under the
Bureau of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The CSCC,
working with the interagency, focuses not only on the violent
actions and human costs of terrorism but also on positive
narratives that can help dissuade those who may be susceptible
to radicalization and recruitment by terrorism organizations.
Successful CVE involves more than messaging, however, and
we are developing programs that address the upstream factors of
radicalization in communities susceptible to terrorist
recruitment. To be effective, CVE work needs to be driven by
local needs, informed by local knowledge, and responsive to the
immediate concerns of the community.
Micro strategies customized for specific communities and
even neighborhoods owned and implemented by local civil society
or government partners have a better chance at succeeding and
enduring.
Another central part of the Bureau's CVE effort is
strengthening our partners' capacity and engagement in CVE
work, propagating best practices and building an international
consensus behind the efforts to delegitimize extremists and
their ideologies. Ultimately, host governments are best
positioned to execute truly sustainable CVE efforts.
For several years now, we have supported local law
enforcement efforts to engage youth through police-led sports
programs and have worked with Morocco and Indonesia to counter
the spread of violence and extremist ideology in prisons.
The second pillar is building the capacity of our partners.
Weak states serve as breeding grounds for terrorism and
instability. When those states have the political will, we can
help with specific capacity-building programs to build
effective law enforcement capacity, fair and impartial justice,
and the rule of good law and governance. One of our most
effective capacity-building programs is the ATA, Antiterrorism
Assistance Program, which in 2010 was supported by $215 million
in NADR funds and which provided 350 courses, workshops, and
technical consultations that trained almost 7,000 participants
from 64 countries.
The third pillar is multilateral engagement. Building new
and strengthening existing partnerships is a cornerstone of our
CT policy. The U.N. And other multilateral bodies have
resources and expertise that we are working to leverage to
reduce the capacity-building burden on the United States. We
have been working on a new multilateral initiative, the Global
Counterterrorism Forum, that we believe is not only an
important step forward but would provide a reliable
intergovernmental platform for policymakers and practitioners
from different regions to engage on a sustained basis. I would
be happy to brief you further in private on this important
initiative, which has strong support from the White House and
Secretary Clinton.
Mr. Chairman, I think my time is out. There are a number of
other things I could say. We will talk about designations and
about the Homeland Security counterterrorism nexus. But at this
point I think it is probably best to open for your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Benjamin follows:]
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Mr. Royce. Thank you. Thank you very much, Ambassador. Let
me ask you a couple of questions, if I could, and then we will
go to Mr. Sherman for his questioning.
Your congressional budget justification mentions that your
antiterrorism assistance programs underwent 23 assessments last
year. Is the Department willing to share those evaluations with
Congress? Could we take a look at those reports? We would like
a better sense of the effectiveness of the programs, and this
will give us an opportunity to go through the 23 assessments
that were done.
Mr. Benjamin. Quite frankly, Chairman, I am not sure about
the legal status of those documents or their classification and
the like, but we will take that back and get you an answer.
Mr. Royce. You have got about 100 personnel right now.
Would you anticipate that changing in terms of the upgrading of
the status of the bureau?
Mr. Benjamin. Mr. Chairman, the important thing about the
change to a bureau is that it will, I think, ratify and
rationalize what we are doing already. And while we would
expect perhaps marginal changes in personnel, we do not expect
any major changes; any significant ones.
Mr. Royce. I see. Thank you. Let me ask another question.
The Christmas Day bomber, as he is called, was in a situation
where his father warned us about his thoughts. I believe that a
State Department official had in fact classified him as a P3B,
which is possibly inadmissible on terrorism grounds. Despite
that classification, he got a visa.
Even though we obviously dodged a bullet on his attempt
that day, I assume the administration did a thorough post-
mortem on this. I was going to ask if your office was involved
in that and what changes have been made should a situation like
this arise again where a family member says that this
individual is designated as possibly inadmissible on terrorism
grounds, will he get that visa?
Mr. Benjamin. Mr. Chairman, it is an excellent question. We
are now in an era where our enemies are looking for people who
have very limited derogatory information on them so that they
can more effectively target us. This was obviously a very
potent wake-up call and my office was integrally involved in
the work in the interagency to ensure that we are protected
against this tactic by the terrorists.
We have issued new instructions to consular officers
worldwide to use much more technically sophisticated search
tools, advanced algorithms when researching watch-list
nominations. We have now a much better system for informing the
interagency about visa revocation processes. And we are working
closely with the Terrorist Screening Center.
We have done a lot to reevaluate the criteria upon which
individuals are watch-listed and to ensure, for example, that
the kind of information that you mentioned is mainstreamed into
the pool of information that relates to potential watch listing
much more efficiently and in a reliable manner.
So we have taken a lot of different steps to do this. There
have been a number of after-action reports that we would be
happy to supply you with.
Mr. Royce. I appreciate that.
Mr. Benjamin. It has been a comprehensive effort.
Mr. Royce. I think we can follow up. I appreciate that
opportunity.
Let me ask you another question. It has to do with al-
Shabaab, which has been really moving and evolving its
capabilities. The group has attracted, oddly enough, a number
of Somali-Americans who have lived in communities in this
country and have gone to the Horn of Africa. Now there are
reports about al-Shabaab exploiting our own southern border.
Last year, Texas law enforcement was ordered to be on the
lookout for a member of al-Shabaab. Recently, Ahmed Muhammed
Dhakane appeared in Federal court, where he has been accused of
attempting to smuggle several East Africans with terror links
into this country.
I mentioned my concern about Mexico in my opening statement
about the nature of the situation on the border today. How are
groups like al-Shabaab exploiting the controls the cartels have
along that border to their advantage?
Mr. Benjamin. Mr. Chairman, of course, border security is a
primary national security concern. The State Department,
together with the Department of Homeland Security, law
enforcement and the like, are looking very closely to ensure
that we have the best possible border security. I am aware of
the reports that you are discussing regarding attempted Somali
infiltration, or I should say al-Shabaab infiltration. I would
say we are much more alert on the Southern border than we have
hitherto been. I think if you want to know about the very
specific things that are being done on the border, the
questions are appropriately handled by DHS, which is
responsible for that. But we are, certainly in the
counterterrorism community, very much aware of the danger
there.
I would point out that we have seen a lot of violence in
Mexico, and the law enforcement situation is a matter of
concern. We, of course, are very supportive of what President
Calderon has been doing to try to diminish the support. To this
point we have not seen a significant linkup between the drug
cartels and terrorist groups themselves. But, of course, there
are human smuggling groups that make this a worrisome
situation.
Mr. Royce. I am aware of individuals, one in particular in
a Federal penitentiary, who was in fact part of a terrorist
group and made a payoff and got into the U.S. over the border
after illegally obtaining a visa to travel to Mexico. He then
payed to have himself smuggled in and then managed to find his
confederates or his cell group in the United States. He is now
serving time along with the other members of that cell group.
In fact, the border has been breached. And this latest
reporting on al-Shabaab members, especially the fact that our
law enforcement on the border has been told to be on the
lookout for these individuals who have already made the trek is
disconcerting.
I am going to go to Mr. Sherman for his questioning.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have all seen the
gruesome pictures of what the Afghan Taliban has done to Afghan
girls, to aid workers. Why is the Afghan Taliban not on the
terrorist list?
Mr. Benjamin. Ranking Member Sherman, the Afghan Taliban is
in fact listed under Executive Order 13-224.
Mr. Sherman. I mean the terrorist list that you maintain.
Mr. Benjamin. At the moment, there is a desire in the
administration not to up-end President Karzai's reconciliation
efforts by making it more difficult through a designation of
the Taliban.
Mr. Sherman. So when we find the terrorists not too
objectionable--I mean, is this a principled list? The Afghan
Taliban is certainly responsible for lots of terrorism. And yet
you don't put them on the list that you maintain, not because
they don't have lots of blood on their hands but because you
hope to kiss and make up in the future.
By that standard, since every terrorist group we hope
redeems itself and renounces terrorism and does business with
us, you would think that you would cancel all listings. You are
not going to claim here that the Afghan Taliban doesn't have a
lot more blood on its hands than some of the other groups that
are listed. And when I say blood, I mean innocent blood through
terrorist actions.
Now, let's move on to the MeK. Your predecessor, Ambassador
Dell Dailey, recommended that the MeK be removed from the list.
Of course, he is not aware of information that has come out
since 2008. But I arranged for this subcommittee to have a
classified briefing. Your office was represented there but
didn't speak. And none of the information presented at that
classified briefing indicates that your decision to keep the
MeK on the list is justified by information revealed to
Congress but not available to Ambassador Dell Dailey.
Is there secret information that neither Ambassador Dailey
nor the members of this subcommittee are apprised of that
justify keeping the MeK on the list?
Mr. Benjamin. Well, first of all, listings have a certain
amount of judgment involved in them. Secretary Rice, who was
Ambassador Dailey's boss, disagreed with him, and that was why
she agreed to the listing.
Mr. Sherman. We already know that these are inherently
political listings. North Korea is not on the list. The Afghan
Taliban isn't on the list. It is whoever. But let me move on.
The State Department has so far not completed the expedited
review ordered by the court last summer. When will this
committee be informed of your findings?
Mr. Benjamin. You will be informed as soon as a decision is
made.
Mr. Sherman. When are you going to get the work done that
the court directed you to get done quickly?
Mr. Benjamin. In fact, we have just received new
information from the MeK last week, and we are declassifying
information to provide it to MeK counsel. So we are working as
expeditiously as we can.
Mr. Sherman. So it can take additional years?
Mr. Benjamin. I don't have a timeline, sir.
Mr. Sherman. Since you are the only State Department
official ordered by the court to get your work done, I would
hope that you could do that.
I mentioned Mr. al-Hasidi, al-Qaeda terrorist and commander
within the Libyan rebel forces. What steps has the State
Department taken to demand that this gentleman be turned over
to the United States or at least that best efforts be used to
accomplish that goal or to take action against any of the other
terrorists who are amongst the rebel forces?
Mr. Benjamin. Mr. Sherman, the TNC has on a number of
occasions, including in a public statement on March 30,
announced its revulsion for terrorism and that it would not
accept terrorists in its rank.
Mr. Sherman. They are in the ranks. You can wave a press
release in the air and say, look, the folks that are working
with terrorists say that they are not working with terrorists.
Next you will be telling me that you would like a press release
from the Afghan Taliban. Other than self-serving press
releases, again, what actions have we taken with regard to al-
Hasidi and the other al-Qaeda terrorists amongst the rebels,
other than read with joy these self-serving press releases?
Mr. Benjamin. Sir, I suggest that self-serving press
releases may not be any less reliable than self-serving news
stories. We don't in fact know that much about Mr. al-Hasidi's
involvement based on our own information. As a former
journalist, I can tell you that there are many differing kinds
of information that make their way into print.
Mr. Sherman. So it is your belief that there just aren't
any terrorists operating in eastern Libya or at least no
reliable information, and even the people who claim to be
terrorists shouldn't be classified as terrorists.
Let's talk about the IHH out of Turkey. This is a group
that has supported Hamas, in violation of U.S. law. Has the
United States expressed to the Turkish Government our
opposition to any future flotilla, given the reality that
Israel and Egypt have both established channels through which
humanitarian assistance can be delivered to Gaza. Given the
IHH's support for a U.S.-designated terrorist group, why has
the IHH not been sanctioned by the United States and designated
a foreign terrorist organization?
Mr. Benjamin. On the first question, I can assure you that
those messages have been sent loud and clear, including by me
personally but by many other interlocutors. On the second
issue, we do not comment on prospective designations. We are
looking at the IHH very closely.
Mr. Sherman. You don't comment in public or you don't
comment to Congress, private or public?
Mr. Benjamin. We do not comment at all.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you for involving this subcommittee in
your work. But I think that the Constitution calls for
consultation. I realize that I haven't given you as long to
answer each question as you would have liked. I invite you to
provide longer answers for the record, and regret that the
amount of time allocated is not as great as my interest in the
subject. And I yield back.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Sherman. Why don't we go to
Congresswoman Jackson Lee. I am pleased to welcome the
Congresswoman today and would like to ask unanimous consent to
allow her to ask a question. She is a nonmember of this
subcommittee, but we are always pleased with her attendance.
Your questions, please.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the chairman and the ranking
member of this very, very important committee, and let me
welcome the witness. We are near voting so let me try to be
quick and acknowledge a number of individuals in the audience.
They can acknowledge themselves. I know that the chairman has
already established a protocol.
I am appalled at what happened at Camp Ashraf with the
allegations of murder and attack. My first question is: The
U.S. military has completed an assessment of the carnage
inflicted on the residents of Camp Ashraf. We understand that
it is being either shared with the Iraqi Government but not
shared with the public. When will it be shared? And if not,
why? I am making a public request for that report to be made
public.
And let me, just before you answer a question, there are a
number of women on this poster. But it is a shame this young
lady that is only 28 was killed. This young lady that is only
19 was killed. I am just really disturbed with what seems to be
our Government's complacency with what is going on.
If you could just answer that very quickly because my time
is short, and I agree with the ranking member, we wish we could
give you longer time.
Mr. Benjamin. Of course, we all deplore the bloodshed, and
there is nothing the United States has done that in any way
condones or to my mind opens the way toward this bloodshed. The
report that you are referring to, I think that we need to be
clear. The U.S. military went in on a humanitarian mission. It
has not filed any kind of evaluation or any report. U.N.
Authorities have gone in. They have compiled a report. They
have returned to Baghdad. We have not seen the report yet.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Can I make an official request that if our
Government does any report, that they will make that public.
Secondarily, I think it is important for our Government to ask
that the United Nation's report be made public. Would you
convey that message or would you make that request?
Mr. Benjamin. We will make that request.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The human rights violations, I think, is
most glaring, particularly with Iran in the backdrop. Can I
find out why the Iraqi Government--I know the history; I am not
trying to suggest there is not history--but why the continued
human rights violation. People have died of various diseases.
They couldn't get to hospitals. I want to make sure that I ask
that question.
And then the fact that we lost 34 individuals living in
Camp Ashraf who fled because of persecution; 34 in essence were
murdered by individuals that we now fund and seek a peaceful
democracy in Iraq. Why are we continuing to support those who
would intrude into that camp and generate this loss of life?
Mr. Benjamin. Ma'am, I fully understand your concern and we
in the U.S. Government are also eager to get to the bottom of
what happened. But I have to tell you that we simply do not
know the facts of what happened. And that is what we are
waiting to hear from the U.N. And from other investigators. The
government in Baghdad has committed itself to a full and fair
investigation, and we are pushing them to do so.
Mr. Sherman. Will the gentlelady yield?
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes.
Mr. Sherman. Yes. I think the Iraqi Government has been
clear; they killed people at Camp Ashraf to make Tehran happy.
And they knew they could get away with it because the MeK is
still on the U.S. list. And the U.S. would not interfere. And
our keeping them on the list gives the political cover. That is
why there are 34 people dead in Camp Ashraf.
I yield back.
Mr. Royce. I remind the members we have 3 minutes left
until the hammer comes down on the vote.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me just finish on this. The chairman
is right on the vote. The ranking member is right. My plea is
to take them off of the list, but to stand up and be heard on
the violence and the killing, and the Iraqi Government cannot
get one more dime from me and this government if they don't
stop this kind of violence.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Royce. Thank you.
Mr. Ambassador, thank you. We have got votes. We have got
several issues to follow up with your office on. We will be
giving close consideration to your office's status. We thank
you for your testimony here today.
This hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:50 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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