[Senate Hearing 111-1096]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-1096
NUCLEAR TERRORISM: STRENGTHENING OUR DOMESTIC DEFENSES
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HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
PART I AND PART II
__________
JUNE 30 AND SEPTEMBER 15, 2010
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
JON TESTER, Montana LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
F. James McGee, Professional Staff Member
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Christopher J. Keach, Minority Professional Staff Member
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
Patricia R. Hogan, Publications Clerk and GPO Detailee
Laura W. Kilbride, Hearing Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Opening statements:
Page
Senator Lieberman............................................ 1, 21
Senator Collins.............................................. 3, 23
Senator Akaka................................................ 35
Prepared statements:
Senator Lieberman........................................... 39, 77
Senator Collins............................................. 42, 79
WITNESSES
Wednesday, June 30, 2010
Eugene E. Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and Environment,
U.S. Government Accountability Office.......................... 4
Micah D. Lowenthal, Ph.D., Director, Nuclear Security and Nuclear
Facility Safety Program, Nuclear and Radiation Studies Board,
National Research Council of the National Academies............ 6
Dana A. Shea, Ph.D., Specialist in Science and Technology Policy,
Resources, Science, and Industry Division, Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress.......................... 8
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
Hon. Jane Holl Lute, Deputy Secretary, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 25
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Aloise, Eugene E.:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 43
Lowenthal, Micah D., Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 58
Lute, Hon. Jane Holl:
Testimony.................................................... 25
Prepared statement........................................... 82
Shea, Dana A., Ph.D.:
Testimony.................................................... 8
Prepared statement........................................... 68
APPENDIX
``Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Inadequate Communication and
Oversight Hampered DHS Efforts to Develop an Advanced
Radiography System to Detect Nuclear Materials,'' Statement for
the Record by Eugene E. Aloise, Director, Natural Resources and
Environment, and Stephen L. Caldwell, Director, Homeland
Security and Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office,
released on September 15, 2010................................. 99
Letter from Nelson Peacock, Assistant Secretary for Legislative
Affairs, dated September 21, 2010.............................. 111
Responses to post-hearing questions for the Record from:
Ms. Lute..................................................... 113
Warren M. Stern, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detention Office,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security *..................... 119
* Mr. Stern appeared as a witness during the closed portion of
the September 15, 2010, hearing.
NUCLEAR TERRORISM: STRENGTHENING OUR DOMESTIC DEFENSES--PART I
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WEDNESDAY, JUNE 30, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman and Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. Good morning and welcome. This is the
eighth in a series of hearings our Committee has held since
2007 to discuss how our Nation is confronting the real and dire
threats posed by nuclear terrorism. And I must say that today
it seems to me, as I look back and look at where we are now,
that the threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on the United
States is growing faster than our ability to prevent a nuclear
terrorist attack on our homeland, and obviously as the Homeland
Security Committee this is of great and growing concern to us.
I know that most people would prefer not to think about the
unthinkable, but President Barack Obama, to his credit, has
clearly recognized the threat that brings us together this
morning. At the 47-nation nuclear summit held in April, the
President outlined the dangers here quite clearly:
``Nuclear materials that could be sold . . . and fashioned
into a nuclear weapon exist in dozens of nations. Just the
smallest amount of plutonium--about the size of an apple--could
kill and injure hundreds of thousands of innocent people.
``Terrorist networks such as al-Qaeda have tried to acquire
the material for a nuclear weapon, and if they ever succeeded,
they would surely use it.'' These are all continuing quotes
from the President.
``Were they to do so, it would be a catastrophe for the
world--causing extraordinary loss of life, and striking a major
blow to global peace and stability.
``In short it is increasingly clear that the danger of
nuclear terrorism is one of the greatest threats to global
security--to our collective security.''
Then, a month or so later, the National Security Strategy,
released by the Administration added: ``The American people
face no greater or more urgent danger than a terrorist attack
with a nuclear weapon. . . . Black markets trade in nuclear
secrets and materials. Terrorists are determined to buy, build,
or steal a nuclear weapon.''
The International Atomic Energy Agency's Illicit
Trafficking Database, which tracks all reported cases of
smuggling, theft, unexplained losses, or black market sales of
nuclear materials, reports there have been 1,340 confirmed
incidents of smuggling since 2007 that involve materials that
could at least be used to make a so-called dirty bomb. And of
those cases, 18 involved the smuggling of highly enriched
uranium or plutonium--the material that is critical to the
making of an actual atomic weapon.
In 2008, our Committee held hearings to examine the office
created in our government to counter this threat--the little-
known Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), within the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
At that time, the question was: How do we keep DNDO on
track?
Today, I ask seriously whether DNDO has been on the right
track and moving rapidly enough to achieve its critical
mission.
Though most Americans have never heard of DNDO, its mission
is clearly vital to our homeland security in the world in which
we live in today.
President George W. Bush established the DNDO in 2005 to
coordinate and oversee Federal efforts to protect the United
States against nuclear terrorism. Homeland Security
Presidential Directive 14 designated DNDO as the lead
organization for domestic nuclear detection and charged it to
work with the Departments of Defense, Energy, and State, and
others to develop a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
(GNDA).
Though it has never been defined in statute, the GNDA seems
to consist of programs across numerous agencies designed to
stop terrorists from getting nuclear materials or weapons, and
if they do get them, to stop them from bringing them into the
United States, and if they do bring them into the United
States, to stop them from successfully detonating them.
DNDO was given the critical job of coming up with an
overall plan about how the different departments would work
together to implement that plan and then to recommend what kind
of investments in technology would be needed.
This was a big mission that they were given, and in
fairness I should say that there have been some successes. For
instance, DHS has deployed nearly two-thirds of the more than
2,100 radiation portal monitors identified in its deployment
plan at established ports of entry on the Northern and Southern
Borders.
Today nearly 100 percent of the seaport containerized cargo
and 100 percent of vehicle traffic on the Southern and Northern
Borders are scanned for nuclear material.
But there also have been omissions and failures, and they
are serious. Cargo coming by rail from Canada or Mexico is
still not scanned, only a small percentage of international air
cargo is scanned, and DNDO apparently has no plans to scan
commercial aviation aircraft or baggage.
Five years into its existence, based on its record, it is
just inescapable to conclude that DNDO requires real retooling,
and quickly.
It has made too little progress on its major mission, which
is the development of the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture. Even DNDO seems to have concluded that its
approach to this task is fundamentally flawed and now seeks an
increase of $13 million in next year's budget for a new round
of studies to produce yet another overarching strategic plan
over the next several years.
The time for multi-year studies is over; the time for
urgent action really is now.
We are going to hear today that DNDO has spent hundreds of
millions of dollars trying to develop a new radiation detection
technology that the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
concludes is only marginally better than we have now.
Known as the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP), this
program has clearly drained resources from other programs,
including development and deployment of mobile, portable, or
hand-held technologies that could screen other types of inbound
cargo or bulk shipments, like those on international trains and
commercial aviation.
I know that the Administration is reexamining DNDO. We
hoped that DHS would come and testify today; they said that
they were not ready. We have set down a hearing for July 21 to
hear their response to what we are going to hear from this
distinguished group of independent evaluators of DNDO, and I
will say that it is certainly my expectation that what we need
to hear from DNDO, from the Department of Homeland Security, is
exactly what they intend to do with and to DNDO to make sure it
gets its critical mission right, and quickly.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Safeguarding our Nation against the threat of nuclear
terrorism is one of the most important responsibilities of the
Department of Homeland Security. The Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) Commission, in its 2008 report, predicted
that ``it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass
destruction will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere in the
world by the end of 2013.''
Technological innovation is a critical element in our
efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. It is, therefore,
troubling that the Department's efforts to develop a next-
generation technology for scanning cargo for nuclear materials
at ports of entry have been less than successful. As the
Chairman has pointed out, the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal
(ASP) program has repeatedly encountered problems since its
inception in 2004.
As a result, the ASP has been relegated to being a
potential secondary scanning tool, although that technology has
yet to receive certification from DHS for even this limited
function.
Given the unwavering ambitions of America's enemies, our
Nation cannot afford to repeat the mistakes of the past.
The DHS office currently responsible for making decisions
about the development, testing, evaluation, and acquisition of
detection equipment is the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
as the Chairman pointed out in his remarks. DNDO must make
well-informed and threat-based investment decisions to meet the
challenge of interdicting illicit nuclear material not only at
our Nation's borders but also within our country.
Given our Nation's significant investment in this critical
area, it is disappointing that DNDO has not made more progress.
DNDO must also serve as a responsible steward of taxpayer
dollars. Again, the Department has fallen short in this area as
well. As we navigate the road forward, the Department must have
a clearer strategy for developing the next-generation of
scanning technologies to detect and identify shielded and
unshielded nuclear materials.
The three organizations represented at our hearing today,
the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional
Research Service (CRS), and the National Research Council, have
all produced recent reports that have found significant
problems with the ASP program. They can give us valuable
insights into the challenges the Department confronts, and that
Congress must consider, as we move beyond the ASP program.
It is surely significant that the Department is not
represented here today. They are not represented because they
are not prepared to give us that strategy forward and to
respond to these reports. So the second hearing that the
Chairman has announced for next month is also going to be
extremely important.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Senator Collins.
We will go right to the witnesses with thanks for the
considerable work you did in preparing your reports and your
testimony, all of which will be entered by consent in the
record in addition to the testimony you will deliver.
Our first witness is Gene Aloise, Director of the Natural
Resources and Environment Division at the U.S. Government
Accountability Office. Thanks, Mr. Aloise, and please proceed
with your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF EUGENE E. ALOISE,\1\ DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES
AND ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Aloise. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking
Member Collins.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise appears in the Appendix on
page 43.
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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, I am pleased to
be here today to discuss the progress DHS has made in deploying
radiation detection equipment to scan cargo and conveyances
entering the United States by land, sea, and air for nuclear
and radiological materials and the development of a strategic
plan for the Global Nuclear Detection System. My testimony is
based on our numerous issued reports as well as current work
assessing U.S. Government efforts to deploy radiation detection
at home and abroad.
On the positive side, and as you have just mentioned, Mr.
Chairman, DHS has made progress and reports that it scans
nearly 100 percent of the cargo and conveyances entering the
United States through land borders and major seaports. On the
down side, however, DHS has made little progress in scanning
for radiation on rail cars entering the United States from
Canada and Mexico, international air cargo, and international
commercial aircraft, passengers, and baggage.
Nationwide, about 1,400 radiation detection portal monitors
have been deployed. That is about two-thirds of the 2,100
monitors planned for deployment, and another 700 monitors are
needed.
Scanning for nuclear materials in international rail and
air cargo are presenting DHS with unique challenges. For
example, the length of trains presents a huge scanning problem
because trains can be up to 2 miles long, and separating cars
that trigger an alarm from other train cars for a closer look
is very difficult.
Air cargo is a problem because, among other things, there
is a lack of natural choke points in airports where fixed
detection equipment can be deployed, and until solutions can be
found, DHS goal of scanning 99 percent of air cargo at 33
international airports in the United States by 2014 is on hold.
The only scanning for radiation that is now occurring for
international rail and air cargo is being done with hand-held
detectors, not portal monitors.
In addition, DHS efforts to plug the gaps in the nuclear
detection system is just at the early stages of development.
Current gaps include land borders between U.S. ports of entry,
international general aviation, and small maritime craft such
as recreational boats and fishing vessels.
It is important to close these gaps because dangerous
quantities of nuclear materials can be portable enough to be
carried across borders by vehicles or pedestrians and on most
private aircraft or small boats. Closing the gaps is a major
challenge because the United States has over 6,000 miles of
land borders with many locations outside of established ports
of entry where people and vehicles can enter. Also, according
to the Coast Guard, small boats pose a greater threat for
nuclear smuggling than shipping containers because, among other
things, there are at least 13 million pleasure craft and
110,000 fishing vessels in the United States.
DHS is addressing these gaps by, among other things,
developing, testing, and deploying radiation detection
equipment and developing threat studies, but these efforts are
all in the very early stages.
Regarding DHS strategic plan for the Global Nuclear
Detection System, it has been 2 years since we testified before
this Committee and recommended such a plan, but no such plan
yet exists. DHS officials told us they are working on a plan
and hope to complete it by this fall.
The lack of a strategic plan has limited DHS efforts to
complete the Global Nuclear Detection System. Without a plan,
it has been difficult for DHS to address the gaps in the
system. Also, DNDO's failed 4-year effort to develop the next-
generation portal monitor, the ASP, is a consequence of not
reaching consensus on a strategic plan with other Federal
agencies. We believe the proposed deployments of ASP has
distracted DNDO from finishing the nuclear detection system and
closing the gaps in it.
In short, Mr. Chairman, because it had no plan to follow,
DNDO took its eye off the ball. Instead, DNDO focused on
replacing current equipment with questionably performing ASPs
in areas where a detection system was already in place.
At this moment DHS is at a crossroads. Because of the vast
land borders, coastlines, and airspace to protect, addressing
the gaps in the detection system is in many ways more
challenging than preventing nuclear smuggling through fixed
ports of entry. Now that the ports of entry are more secure, it
makes the gaps in the system more attractive to would-be
smugglers or terrorists.
With increasingly limited Federal resources, it is
especially important for DHS to develop a strategic plan which
prioritizes how it will address the gaps in the detection
system and allocate resources accordingly.
Given the national security implications and urgency
attached to combat and nuclear smuggling globally and that
multiple Federal agencies are involved, we continue to stress
that a plan needs to be developed as soon as possible.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks, and I would be
happy to address any questions you and the Ranking Member may
have.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Mr. Aloise. That was
right to the point.
Our next witness is Dr. Micah Lowenthal, Director, Nuclear
Security and Nuclear Facility Safety Program of the Nuclear and
Radiation Studies Board at the National Research Council of the
National Academies. That is a heck of a title. But we
appreciate very much your expertise and your testimony this
morning.
TESTIMONY OF MICAH D. LOWENTHAL, PH.D.,\1\ DIRECTOR, NUCLEAR
SECURITY AND NUCLEAR FACILITY SAFETY PROGRAM, NUCLEAR AND
RADIATION STUDIES BOARD, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE
NATIONAL ACADEMIES
Mr. Lowenthal. I look forward to having a shorter title
someday.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Lowenthal appears in the Appendix
on page 58.
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Good morning, Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member Collins,
and Members of the Committee. My name is Micah Lowenthal. As
noted, I am on the staff of the Nuclear and Radiation Studies
Board of the National Academies of Sciences. I am here to
testify on a congressionally mandated study on testing and
evaluation of ASPs for screening cargo as part of the Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture. I am the study director
supporting the Committee that wrote the study's interim report.
I will begin by providing background on the request for
this study, and then I will describe the report's
recommendations on evaluating costs and benefits.
Congress directed the Secretary of Homeland Security to
request advice from the Academy on procuring ASPs, specifically
on the testing approach, assessing the costs and benefits, and
bringing scientific rigor to the procurement process.
Due to delays in the test and evaluation program, the
Academy and DHS agreed that the study committee would issue an
interim report to provide advice on how the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO), could complete and make more rigorous
its ASP evaluation. The interim report was issued in June 2009
and provided advice on the difficult task of analyzing costs
and benefits of the ASPs.
To be effective, the Committee found, the cost/benefit
analysis must include three key elements: One, a clear
statement of the objectives of the screening program, including
describing the ASP's role in the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture; two, an assessment of meaningful alternatives to
deploying ASPs; and, three, a comprehensive, credible, and
transparent analysis of benefits and costs.
Throughout the study, the Committee considered what
information the Secretary would need to decide whether to
procure ASPs. The Committee criticized DHS certification
criteria and analyses as of June 2009 because even if the
criteria were met and the analyses completed, DHS still would
not know whether the benefits of the ASPs outweigh their
additional costs, or whether the funds slated for procuring
ASPs are more effectively spent on other technologies to meet
the same need or on other elements of the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture.
The analyses focused on operational efficiencies but not on
the security benefits, and the alternatives for cargo screening
and the opportunity costs in the Global Nuclear Detention
Architecture were not part of the analysis.
It is a complex task to evaluate the probability of an
adversary attempting to smuggle nuclear material into the
United States. In fact, that probability is impossible to know
definitively. And the consequences of such smuggling are
likewise uncertain for other reasons: The range of possible
consequences is very broad. These uncertainties make it quite
difficult to factor the benefits of preventing nuclear
smuggling into a cost/benefit analysis. Despite that
difficulty, however, it is important for analysts to understand
what they can about the risks and also the benefits of reducing
those risks.
The Committee offered several approaches for analyzing
security benefits of different alternatives. A capability-based
planning approach is a structured assessment of the options for
how a program can meet specific operational goals and of the
resources required for each option. This approach has been
applied in a number of defense applications. It can provide a
rich comparison of the security benefits emphasizing the
circumstances under which each option might be preferred.
Capability-based planning can, however, quickly lead to a large
and complex analysis, and analysts have to balance the
complexity against the need for simplicity to draw salient
insights about the system's capabilities.
Game theory could provide insight into the deterrence or
deflection benefits from different parts of the Global Nuclear
Detention Architecture. Studies of other security applications
have found that the simple presence of security can change
criminals' behavior. For example, looking at theft statistics
using game theory, Ian Ayres and Steven Levitt found that
increases in the use of hidden radio transmitter devices for
tracking stolen cars in a given area resulted in overall
declines in car thefts. In contrast, use of observable car
security measures just tended to shift or deflect the risk of
theft to other vehicles, but not lower the overall theft rates.
So having an effective defense in some cars, and no way for an
adversary to determine which cars have it, reduced theft rates.
Likewise, the existence of some radiation monitoring at
seaports and land border crossings may deflect adversaries,
simply causing them to focus on easier paths through the
Nation's security. Efforts to improve current screening
technology have sometimes been described as fortifying the
locks on the front door but leaving the windows open. For those
reasons, improving detection for truck-borne cargo may have
only a modest overall benefit as long as there are significant
gaps in the Global Nuclear Detention Architecture. Improved
detection should have more of an effect as those gaps are
filled.
The difficulty with game theory is that analysts have to
make assumptions about the adversaries' goals, resources, and
reasoning. What constitutes success and what are the costs of
being caught? But still, it can provide useful insights,
including reasoning through what fraction of the containers
entering the United States would need to be scanned or screened
to deter smugglers.
Finally, cost-effectiveness analysis and break-even
analysis are related approaches that have been used to assess
costs and benefits when performing a complete cost/benefit
analysis is difficult or impossible.
Because the goals of the ASP program may be difficult to
value monetarily, comparing program alternatives using cost-
effectiveness measures such as dollars per life saved or
dollars per attack avoided could provide insights into their
relative merits. Break-even analysis seeks the conditions that
must be met for benefits to exceed costs. In security
applications, these conditions could be a required reduction in
overall risk. In cases where break-even analysis identifies
meaningful bounds on decisions, that is, in cases where the
threshold conditions for a decision clearly exist, this
approach can simplify decisionmaking. The downfall of break-
even analysis is that those conditions do not always exist.
These and other methods for evaluating security benefits
can provide different insights based on their approach, and
none is likely to provide fully quantitative and definitive
results. But most policy decisions are made without fully
quantitative and definitive results, so DNDO should provide the
most informative cost/benefit analysis it can.
This concludes my testimony. Thank you for the opportunity
to testify, and I would be happy to elaborate in the question-
and-answer period.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you very much, Dr. Lowenthal.
Now we will go finally to Dr. Dana Shea, who is a
Specialist in Science and Technology Policy in the Resources,
Science, and Industry Division at the Congressional Research
Service. Thank you very much for being here.
TESTIMONY OF DANA A. SHEA, PH.D.,\1\ SPECIALIST IN SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY POLICY, RESOURCES, SCIENCE, AND INDUSTRY DIVISION,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
Mr. Shea. Thank you. Chairman Lieberman, Ranking Member
Collins, and other Members of the Committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify before the Committee today. My name is
Dana Shea, and I am a Specialist in Science and Technology
Policy at the Congressional Research Service. At the
Committee's request, I am here today to discuss efforts to
strengthen nuclear detection.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Shea appears in the Appendix on
page 68.
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My testimony today will address the Department of Homeland
Security's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, its coordination
of nuclear detection activities, and the January 2010 report to
Congress that describes them.
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14 established the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office in 2005. The Security and
Accountability For Every (SAFE) Port Act codified the office in
2006. The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office became responsible
for developing an enhanced Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture that multiple Federal agencies, including the
Departments of Defense, Energy, Homeland Security, Justice, and
State, would implement.
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office developed an initial
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture and reported its first
budget cross-cut of Federal programs in 2006. Subsequently,
Congress enacted the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11
Commission Act of 2007, which directs the Secretaries of
Homeland Security, State, Defense, and Energy, the Attorney
General, and the Director of National Intelligence to conduct a
joint annual interagency review of their activities and ensure
that each agency assesses and evaluates its participation in
the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.
Additionally, the Secretary of Homeland Security is
required to evaluate technologies implemented in the domestic
portion of the architecture. The results of these reviews are
to be reported to Congress by March 31 of each year. The
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office issued reports in June 2008
and January 2010.
The January 2010 report has both strengths and weaknesses.
The report is the most comprehensive and integrated source of
information about the programs that make up the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture, the activities underway in those
programs, and how the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
categorizes the budgets of the programs by architectural layer.
The report discusses agency attempts at strategic planning and
developing metrics for the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture.
The January 2010 report draws heavily on the previous
report issued in 2008. The report does not address whether
agencies have shaped the reported budgets to align with the
priorities of the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. And,
finally, the report is retrospective in nature and was
submitted after its statutory deadline. As such, the report's
timeliness may be brought into question.
My analysis of this report and other documents raises a
number of policy issues. I will highlight three.
First, a key question for policymakers is: What activities
and programs should comprise a nuclear detection architecture?
While detection technologies for identifying and interdicting
smuggled nuclear materials have been a central focus of the
architecture, other counterterrorism activities, such as law
enforcement and intelligence collection, also impact nuclear
smuggling.
Similarly, while the Departments of Defense, Energy,
Homeland Security, and State are the main participants in the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, other entities, such as
State and local law enforcement and agencies overseeing
licensing of radiological materials, also have roles. Greater
assessment and inclusion of these investments might lead to
increased harmonization of nuclear detection efforts and, thus,
a stronger domestic architecture, but might also complicate
consensus planning activities.
A second policy issue is the adaptability of the
architecture. How adaptable is it to new threats and
capabilities? Periodic assessment of new nuclear detection
technologies will likely play an important role in the
government's ability to improve the architecture. The frequency
and formality of such assessments will affect both the utility
and the costs associated with this process. It is noteworthy
that the January 2010 report repeated the language of the
previous report's technology assessment.
Finally, a fundamental issue for policymakers is whether
Federal investments appropriately support the needs of the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture. The architecture is a
network of interrelated programs, and the ramifications of
shifting funding between these programs may be understood best
from a holistic architectural perspective. A single Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture budget submitted annually as a
budget supplement might provide policymakers with a more
transparent correlation between agency funding and the Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture. Alternatively, rather than
directly increasing or decreasing program funding, policymakers
might empower the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Director or
another official with the authority to review and assess other
Department and agency investments in the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture and comment on or recommend alternative
allocations.
Detection of nuclear smuggling and prevention of nuclear
terrorism are high national and homeland security priorities.
This multi-agency endeavor is complex and relies heavily on
coordination among the participating agencies. The Department
of Homeland Security and the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office
face significant challenges in coordinating these activities.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepared statement. I would
be happy to answer any questions that you or other Members of
the Committee may have.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Dr. Shea. We will go
ahead with a 7-minute round of questions.
I must say overall the reports that the three of you have
given I think represent a real alarm bell going off about DNDO,
and we all acknowledge that it has done some things that are
important to us, particularly with portals, both sea and the
established land ports. But it has not done a lot that it
should have done, and I want to explore a bit why.
Mr. Aloise, I was struck again by your testimony that the
development of a strategic plan had been recommended almost 3
years ago, and DNDO now says in its congressional budget
justification for fiscal year 2011 that it expects to complete
the strategic plan during fiscal year 2010.
To the best of your knowledge--and then I will ask others
if you have opinions--what happened here? Why didn't it do the
strategic plan more quickly?
Mr. Aloise. I am really not quite sure what the true answer
is on that, but as I mentioned in my statement, almost 4 years
ago now, they took their eye off the ball of what they were
supposed to do, and that is, complete the architecture with
existing equipment. And, of course, upgrading the equipment is
something you always want to do, but the urgency of the
situation we are facing now requires that this detection system
be completed first with what we have now, and DNDO followed the
path of pushing through the ASPs. It was an research and
development (R&D) program, too early to be deployed, and we
issued numerous reports and testified numerous times before the
Congress and this Committee, warning them that they were
falling into a trap, and they fell into that trap.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, that is really important because
you have said in that answer, I think, what is a critical
problem here, which is that it is not just that we asked them
to do a plan and were upset that they did not do the plan. What
I take from your testimony is that there is an absence of a
plan and clearly established priorities, particularly the
priority to develop an overall architecture--which I take to
mean how do you cover in some way all the points of
vulnerability that we are trying to cover. Am I right about
that?
Mr. Aloise. You are correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. And so they did not do that, and the
absence of a plan certainly facilitated what it sounds to me
like what you would say was the most significant mistake that
DNDO has made, which was to focus on spending a lot of money
improving their capacity to detect nuclear material coming in
at ports of entry--where they already had some coverage--
instead of covering areas such as you mentioned in your
statement: International rail transportation, international
cargo, passengers, and baggage. Right?
Mr. Aloise. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Lieberman. Now, I want to ask Dr. Lowenthal and
Dr. Shea to respond to that, if you agree with what Mr. Aloise
has said.
Mr. Lowenthal. Well, our study committee really was looking
at the testing and evaluation of the ASPs, and not the rest of
the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Lowenthal. The reason that the committee said something
about the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture was because
there was some ambiguity about the mission of the ASPs and the
objectives that they were trying to accomplish with these
devices. And the committee could not find an articulation of
that in the context of the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture. And so, yes, the committee said that the
justification has to be there somewhere. The committee said we
would like to see it probably in the context of a cost/benefit
analysis for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, some
trade-off studies, which would help set priorities, as you have
described. But because it did not exist there, the committee
recommended that they do it in the context of the ASP cost/
benefit analysis.
Chairman Lieberman. Dr. Shea.
Mr. Shea. To the question about the strategic plan, I would
point out that the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture is
implemented by many different agencies.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Mr. Shea. In DNDO's coordination role, I think that they
are challenged to both consider the strategic purposes of those
different programs in those different agencies and the goals of
those programs and also have those programs align with the
goals of the architecture. With the development of a strategic
plan solely by DNDO it might be difficult for the agencies to
fully adopt the purposes of that strategic plan, but also the
development of a strategic plan by an interagency process is
often a challenging activity. So that may be the source of some
of the difficulties with respect to----
Chairman Lieberman. So is part of this organizational? In
other words, does DNDO not have adequate authority to
coordinate across the various departments, even though the
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14 designated DNDO as
the lead organization and charged it to work with the
Departments of Defense, Energy, State, and others? Has it not
been up to the task? And should this be raised up either to the
departmental level or given to some centralized entity such as
the White House or the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)?
Mr. Shea. That certainly would be one approach to increase
the ability of agencies to come together in an interagency
process. I think that DNDO, of course, would be in the best
position to answer whether or not it believes it has sufficient
authority. But I would say also that the SAFE Port Act and
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14 do provide
authority to the implementing agencies to establish policies in
the areas that they are implementing their programs. So even
though the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office does have the
responsibility of developing the overarching architecture,
those implementing agencies also have their own independent
policy authorities in the areas where they are implementing
programs.
Another approach might be to provide some authority to the
implementing agencies to develop parts of the architecture in
conjunction with DNDO, for example, and then give DNDO the
responsibility of integrating the different architectural
frameworks into one more coherent and integrated architecture.
Chairman Lieberman. Mr. Aloise, let me come back to you
just to set the predicate here. I am right, is it not so, that
the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 14 made clear that
DNDO had this authority to work with other agencies for the
specific purpose of developing the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture?
Mr. Aloise. Yes, that is correct. GAO has been in this area
a long time. We had reported in the 1990s that each of the
agencies had their own programs--Department of Defense,
Department of Energy, and the State Department--and a major
problem was coordination. And DNDO had the role of coordinating
all those activities, not managing each of them, but
coordinating so everybody is headed towards the same goal.
When we started our work on ASPs, what we found was a major
management problem. DNDO was not even talking to these
agencies. They were not telling them what they were planning to
do with the ASP. It was GAO going in there telling them what
was going on, and it was not a pretty scene.
Chairman Lieberman. Your answer to the question really puts
on the record what we forget, which is that this attempt to set
up an architecture to prevent a terrorist nuclear attack on the
United States did not just begin on September 11, 2001.
Mr. Aloise. No, it did not.
Chairman Lieberman. There was a lot of background here
before.
Mr. Aloise. Right. The Department of Energy has been
securing nuclear material for years, and even the second line
of defense program, putting in portal monitors on other
countries' borders, and our efforts here in the United States
began in the late 1990s.
Chairman Lieberman. Just a last question for you. Do you
think DNDO can do this job based on its record? Or do we need
to kick it upstairs somehow and give it to OMB or the White
House? I hate to do that reflexively. We give too much to the
White House, really. So I want to invite your reaction to the
organizational structure here.
Mr. Aloise. I think our view is DNDO ought to use the
powers it has been given to coordinate effectively the creation
of this plan. And what that means is they have to get the buy-
in of the other Federal agencies, and then it is a consensus
plan. You have your goal. You can move forward. And we need to
move forward. So we think it can be done.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. Well, obviously, this is a
critical matter of homeland security, and you hate to see
either bureaucratic turf protection or just bureaucratic
inertia standing in the way of getting this job done.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Aloise, I want to go back to the issue of the strategic
plan because, like the Chairman, I think that is a really
critical issue that you have brought to the Committee. I want
to go back to the timeline because I actually think that the
failure of DHS in this area is even more acute than the
Chairman put forth.
It was 2 years ago that GAO last recommended that DNDO
complete a strategic plan, but it actually was more than 7
years ago, in October 2002, that GAO first established the need
for a strategic plan. Is that correct?
Mr. Aloise. That is correct, Senator, yes, and we were
recommending that Customs and Border Protection (CBP), or at
that time the Customs Service, develop that plan.
Senator Collins. So if the Department issues the strategic
plan for Global Nuclear Detection Architecture this fall, it
will actually be about 8 years since GAO first made that
recommendation.
Mr. Aloise. That is correct.
Senator Collins. That is so troubling to me given what is
at stake, and I know that it is to the Chairman as well. I am
wondering if this is a case where the Department became so
entranced with upgrading the technology of the radiation portal
monitors that, as you put it, it dropped the ball; and instead
of focusing on the gaps in the system, it just became entranced
by the technology. Is that a fair assessment based on your
analysis?
Mr. Aloise. I think it is, Senator. I think there was this
promise from the ASPs--which, by the way, is not new
technology. What was new was the software.
Senator Collins. Correct.
Mr. Aloise. And there was a lot of marketing going around
that this was the silver bullet. But we had looked at that
technology and we had looked at the promise it offered, and
even our earliest review back in 2006 said this will only be a
marginal improvement, so, CBP, DNDO, and DHS need to do a cost/
benefit analysis to see if it is going to be worth that
marginal improvement, because if you are spending money on
ASPs, you are taking money away from somewhere else.
Senator Collins. And, Mr. Lowenthal, when you looked at the
ASPs, did you look at how much money was spent by the
Department on this technology? And as GAO has pointed out, it
was actually a software upgrade. Did you look at the amount of
money spent?
Mr. Lowenthal. We were focused on the cost of the devices
going forward, their life cycle costs and whatever benefits
they might offer. We did not look at the historical investments
within the ASP program and how they might have been spent
otherwise because the committee was chartered to look at the
testing and evaluation rather than whether DNDO is carrying out
its larger mission properly.
Senator Collins. Correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Aloise, but
I think the Department spent in the neighborhood of $2 billion
on the ASP technology. Do you know if that is correct?
Mr. Aloise. Well, that was what was planned to be spent.
Senator Collins. Planned to be spent.
Mr. Aloise. Yes. They have spent so far--not counting
testing--$224 million. We have actually asked for more updated
information. We wanted it for this hearing, but they did not
provide it to us yet. Hopefully they will have it for the next
hearing.
Senator Collins. I guess what is so troubling to me is here
the Department was prepared to invest $2 billion in one kind of
technology when, in fact, it had never worked out a plan for
railroads or for other means of smuggling nuclear materials
into the country; and then when the technology did not prove to
be as effective as hoped, there is this diversion of attention,
money, energy, to just one kind of technology. And I think you
put it so well that then what happened is the Department took
its eye off the ball and, thus, we are faced with the situation
that we have now.
Dr. Shea, you raised a really good point, that there are a
number of other departments that play a role--Energy, State,
Defense, as well as Homeland Security. Isn't that the reason
that having a strategic plan becomes even more important? How,
otherwise, do you know the investments that are going to be
made by other departments?
Mr. Shea. Yes, I agree. The agencies themselves have their
programmatic priorities and invest in those programs trying to
meet the programs' goals. But absent a strategic plan that lays
out what the architecture's goals are and how to measure
success towards those goals, it could be very difficult for an
agency to be investing with that purpose in mind, they would
not have that information to bring into their budgeting
process. So I think that a strategic plan that lays out the
strategic goals of the architecture and provides metrics within
that strategic plan for the agencies to align their program
goals with is key for getting all of the agencies to work
together in the same direction.
Senator Collins. And it also ensures that resources are
going to be allocated appropriately.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
I have a couple more questions. Let me go back to you, Mr.
Aloise. At the outset, you talked about the difficulty of
dealing with some of the areas of the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture that DNDO has not dealt with. You mentioned, for
instance, the length of freight trains coming in from Canada,
let us say. Do you have any doubt that this is an achievable
task that we are giving DNDO? In other words, it may be
difficult, but am I correct that you believe it is doable if
they had concentrated on establishing essentially at least
baseline defenses all across our country as opposed to focusing
on the portals?
Mr. Aloise. Actually, we do believe it is doable. We are
not going to say it is easy, but we have gone around the
country and looked at train depots, and we have seen where
people have set up train portal monitors at certain choke
points. It is not going to work everywhere, but there are
certainly ways, if given the resources and analysis, you could
do it.
So, yes, we do believe it can be done. In fact, when DNDO
made the push for ASPs and their proposal was to spend $2
billion, they said they could do trains. Now they say they
cannot, and they have to develop a new technology. We are not
sure a new technology is needed, but it may be. There may be
emerging technologies out there that would help.
Chairman Lieberman. They said at that point that the ASPs
could deal with the international rail cargo as well.
Mr. Aloise. Yes, the ASPs were to cover almost all forms of
entry into the United States.
Chairman Lieberman. And now they conclude that they cannot.
Mr. Aloise. Right.
Chairman Lieberman. Give us an overall view on the public
record here about whether there is any work going on within
DNDO now in these areas of the architecture that they have at
least underattended to.
Mr. Aloise. There are studies going on. There are
discussions going on. There is very little that actually has
been done. In the green borders between ports of entry, they
are starting to talk about using law enforcement more, which
makes sense. They are not going to seal the borders, but they
are going to have a presence at the borders.
Chairman Lieberman. And when they say law enforcement, what
do they mean?
Mr. Aloise. Well, have a presence at the borders with
customs officials.
Chairman Lieberman. Customs and Border Protection.
Mr. Aloise. Right, which sort of mirrors what the State
police do in hunting down speeders on your highways. You do not
know where they are, but you know they are out there, and you
could be caught if you speed. So it is a deterrent. And we
actually think that has merit, and they are looking at that.
Chairman Lieberman. Years ago, when I acquired a burglar
alarm system for my house, at the end of the installation the
man doing it gave me the stickers for the windows and the doors
and said, ``Ninety-five percent of what you are paying for are
these stickers.'' And he was an honest man. So I get your
point.
I want to get to the question about whether there ought to
be some consolidation across governmental departments of
budgets and authority with regard to nuclear detection and ask
each of you if you have a thought on that. I know we have said
that DNDO has the authority under the Presidential Directive.
Is there some value to the Committee, even by legislation,
considering centralizing more of that budget authority for this
function as a way to basically compel the various departments
to work together?
Mr. Aloise. I guess I will go first.
Chairman Lieberman. Please.
Mr. Aloise. I think our position is--and I know I sound
like a broken record here--we would like to see a plan first on
how we are going to complete this architecture. And by looking
at the plan, where our resources will be devoted, what our goal
is, and how fast we are going to get there, then I think we
could see if anything else is needed beyond that to get this
job done. But until we know what the job is, I am not sure what
fixes we could put in place.
Chairman Lieberman. Good enough. Dr. Lowenthal, do you have
an opinion on that
Mr. Lowenthal. Yes, the report did not address this, so I
will just say a few words.
First of all, the academy does not tell the Federal
Government how it should reorganize itself unless sopecifically
asked. It highlights problems and maybe some options for how to
do it.
Chairman Lieberman. You are really different than the rest
of America in that regard. [Laughter.]
Mr. Lowenthal. But I think that what Mr. Aloise said is
very consistent with what the Committee said in its report,
which is that you need to establish what the priorities are in
order to make trade-off decisions. And without a plan, it is
hard to do that.
Chairman Lieberman. Dr. Shea.
Mr. Shea. As I believe all the witnesses have said, there
are many agencies that are participating in the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture, and some of the programs of those
agencies, they are not solely dedicated to nuclear detection.
Bringing all of the budgets together into a single authority
might pose challenges, especially for the programs that have a
shared responsibility between nuclear detection and some other
role.
That said, the current budgetary cross-cut for the Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture is retrospective in nature. It
appears in the Joint Annual Interagency Review report, and as a
consequence, for planning purposes, it is not presented to
Congress at a time that would allow it to influence, for
example, budgetary decisions that were being made by Members of
Congress and congressional committees. If the request from the
President's budget was cast in such terms as is used in the
Joint Annual Interagency Review, then perhaps that would
provide some transparency for congressional policymakers in how
the funding at the various agencies is feeding into the Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture.
Chairman Lieberman. Based on what you know about the
development of the ASP at this point, would you recommend that
DNDO just stop any further work on the ASP and really focus on
the development of the parts of the nuclear detection
architecture that are undeveloped, the ones we have been
talking about all along, the areas essentially outside of the
official portals of entry?
Mr. Aloise. I think it would be our view that, yes, even if
you deploy the ASP, it is going to be of marginal value. And
what we need to do is close the gaps in the architecture first.
Chairman Lieberman. Dr. Lowenthal, do you have an opinion
on that?
Mr. Lowenthal. No, and I will just tell you what the
academy is doing at this point.
Chairman Lieberman. Go ahead.
Mr. Lowenthal. DNDO has been trying to respond to the
recommendations in our report from last year, and so our study
committee has been reconvened to evaluate their progress on
that. We are not going to come out in the end with any kind of
conclusion as to whether the ASPs should be terminated,
continued, or expanded.
Chairman Lieberman. Dr. Shea.
Mr. Shea. I think that the cost/benefit analysis that the
Department is currently performing with respect to the ASP
program will likely inform the office as to whether or not this
investment is a good investment for them to continue or not.
One of the recommendations out of the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) interim report was that such a cost/benefit
analysis be done in the greater context of the architecture,
and I think that the results of such an analysis would inform
that question as to whether or not continued investment in the
ASP would be beneficial.
Chairman Lieberman. But at this point, you are not prepared
to reach a conclusion yourself?
Mr. Shea. I do not think that I have the information.
Chairman Lieberman. Understood. Thanks. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman has raised an important issue about whether
government is organized correctly to have sufficient
coordination, and he raised the issue of whether there needs to
be a position within the White House or OMB. In fact, there
already is a position. It was created in 2007, and it is within
the Executive Office of the President, and it is the
Coordinator for the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction,
Proliferation, and Terrorism.
The reason no one remembers this position is neither the
Bush Administration nor the Obama Administration has ever
filled this position, which is a presidentially nominated,
Senate-confirmed position. So I do not think the problem is the
need for the creation of a new position. I think the problem is
that this position has not been filled. And that is an
editorial comment rather than a question for our witnesses.
Chairman Lieberman. I just want to join you in that op-ed.
[Laughter.]
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just have one final question, and it is for our GAO
witness. The GAO today is releasing a report that assesses DHS
management of its complex acquisitions. It finds that in almost
half of the DHS programs reviewed, there were no baseline
requirements for the program until more than 2 years after the
program began. Obviously, it is very difficult to have a
successful acquisition if you start the acquisition before you
establish the requirements.
Aren't we seeing some similar things when we look at DNDO's
acquisitions in the ASP program and, in general, its failure to
produce a plan before acquiring the equipment and technology?
Mr. Aloise. Yes, Senator, it is very similar. The ASP
program had no mission needs statement, had no cost/benefit
analysis, had no life cycle cost analysis, and still does not
have a plan. It was not until 2007 when the appropriations act
said the testing should meet a significant increase in
operational effectiveness before certification, and it was not
until August 2008 that there were even any criteria established
for that language. So, yes, it is eerily similar.
Senator Collins. It is, and I appreciate your confirming
that because this is a problem that seems to permeate several
agencies within DHS acquisitions, and it causes schedule delays
and cost overruns and the procurement of the wrong kind of
technology. We saw it with the puffer detectors that the
Transportation Security Administraiton (TSA) used at airports
that turned out not to work. And straightening out that
fundamental planning process to me is absolutely critical, and
I think, unfortunately, the ASP program and the failures at
DNDO are regrettably additional examples of that. And when it
comes to DHS, the consequences for the security of our Nation
are enormous. So we have to get this right.
Mr. Lowenthal. Senator, can I add something?
Senator Collins. Yes.
Mr. Lowenthal. I think the academy report endorsed what Mr.
Aloise was saying and what you have said about articulating
what the needs are before you procure. The academy report also
said something more about how they should do this, how they
should proceed with deployment if they determine that they have
promise there. And it is not that they should make a single
decision that then means that they put these everywhere, that
they should instead deploy them in a limited number of places,
and see how they perform. These are complex pieces of
equipment, and the software is complex as well. And so this
should be an incremental deployment with some iterative
performance enhancements as they go rather than just one big
purchase.
Senator Collins. I agree. Dr. Shea, do you have anything to
add to this?
Mr. Shea. I do not have anything to add.
Senator Collins. Thank you very much, and I want to thank
the Chairman for holding this hearing.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Collins, for your
partnership in this. Thanks to the witnesses. I know that in
many ways you spend a lot of time and quite hard work, but I
really want to thank you because that work today has helped
inform the Committee, and you have really, from my point of
view, focused some tough questions. Some might say this has
been an indictment of past behavior but certainly a critique of
past behavior by DNDO and the Federal Government generally on
this critical question of homeland security. But more to the
point now, going forward, you have focused some questions for
the Department of Homeland Security to answer, and, again, we
are going to make clear to them--I hope somebody is here from
the Department; if not, we are going to ask them to read the
testimony--that they must be prepared to come in here on July
21 and answer the questions that your work and testimony and
the Committee have posed. And hopefully those answers will then
lead to corrective action so we will not have to be back here a
year from now with all or some of you telling us that they
still have not plugged the gaps that we need to have plugged.
So I thank you.
Do you want to add anything, Senator Collins?
Senator Collins. I do not. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. The record of the hearing will remain
open for 15 days for submission of additional statements or
questions. Again, I thank you very much.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:08 a.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
NUCLEAR TERRORISM: STRENGTHENING OUR DOMESTIC DEFENSES--PART II
----------
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph I.
Lieberman, Chairman of the Committee, presiding.
Present: Senators Lieberman, Akaka, and Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN LIEBERMAN
Chairman Lieberman. Good morning. The hearing will come to
order.
This is the second part of the Committee's investigation of
efforts by the Department of the Homeland Security (DHS) to
strengthen our Nation's defenses against the threat of nuclear
terrorism. I want to welcome Deputy Secretary of Homeland
Security Jane Holl Lute, who will be our primary witness today,
as well as the new Director of the Department's Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office, Warren Stern, and representatives
from other DHS agencies that have important roles to play in
preventing a nuclear terrorist attack.
The first thing to say is that this threat is real. In
fact, the National Security Strategy released by the
Administration in May contained the following stark warning,
``The American people face no greater or more urgent danger
than a terrorist attack with a nuclear weapon. Black markets
trade in nuclear secrets and materials. Terrorists are
determined to buy, build, or steal a nuclear weapon.''
At Part I of this hearing on June 30, witnesses from the
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional
Research Service (CRS), and the National Academies of Sciences
testified that one of the key offices assigned to protect us
from this threat, which is the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO), is woefully behind in its planning and
implementation efforts, despite $2 billion in funding since it
was created in 2005 as an office within the Department of
Homeland Security. And since our last hearing, DNDO has
provided further financial information to GAO that shows
another $2 billion was spent department-wide by Homeland
Security in support of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office's
mission.
And what has that $4 billion bought over 5 years? In part,
that money has gone to expanding existing programs at Customs
and Border Protection (CBP), the Coast Guard, the
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and other DHS
agencies that are critical to our defenses against nuclear
terrorism. But, unfortunately, there is too much evidence that
very little progress has been made with the funds that have
been targeted to enhancing our current nuclear detection
capabilities.
Most importantly, the overall nuclear terror defense plan
DNDO has been working on since it was created now 5 years ago,
the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, is still not
completed. And, in fact, last year, DNDO officials concluded
that the plan they were developing was too dependent on
unproven technologies and did not take into consideration the
contributions that law enforcement and intelligence agencies
could make with their existing assets.
I appreciate that designing a global system of systems and
coordinating the activities of agencies and other departments
that are part of that system is a big challenge. But the threat
is enormous here, and the size of the challenge, therefore,
cannot explain away the failure of DNDO to develop a strategic
plan for strengthening parts of the domestic layer of the
architecture operated within the Department of Homeland
Security and help guide the nuclear detection investments by
its fellow DHS agencies. So that will be a focus, the primary
focus of this hearing.
In our previous hearing, we also heard that DNDO has spent
hundreds of millions of dollars trying to develop new radiation
detection technology known as the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal
(ASP), that the GAO concluded is only marginally better than
what we have now. GAO has also provided the Committee details
about the failure of a second large DNDO technology investment
known as the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System
(CAARS). According to GAO, the Nuclear Detection Office awarded
contracts for the CAARS systems without ever determining if the
system could be used in domestic ports of entry or whether it
would meet the requirements of the Customs and Border
Protection agency, which is on the front lines of protecting
our borders.
GAO estimates that DNDO has spent approximately $400
million combined on the ASP and CAARS programs with little or
nothing to show for it. GAO also contends that had DHS
completed its strategic plan before making these investments,
it might well have considered the security benefits of other
mobile or portable detection systems.
Last year, GAO strongly recommended that DHS ``develop a
strategic plan for the domestic part of the Global Nuclear
Detection Strategy to guide the domestic nuclear detection
investments of DHS agencies.''
This is sound advice, but it apparently has not been
followed by DHS or DNDO in making expensive decisions about the
investments that they are making here at home. So this morning
we really need to hear a direct response from DHS to these
criticisms, and we need to know what corrective actions are
being taken now.
Because our Committee wants to make sure that in carrying
out our oversight responsibilities we do not cause the
revelation of any information that could be exploited by our
enemies, the hearing will adjourn at the appropriate time, to
be resumed in closed session in the Senate Security offices.
Finally, I would say that the problems that are facing the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and the Department of
Homeland Security in our efforts generally to design and
implement the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture are not
new, and they have been well documented. We held hearings on
this topic during the previous Administration, but now this
Administration is in charge and must step up to the plate and
close this gap in our defenses against nuclear terrorism.
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR COLLINS
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this second hearing on the efforts of the Department of
Homeland Security to prevent nuclear terrorism against our
country.
At our first hearing, we examined the Department's
inexplicable failure to complete a much needed strategy to
address this growing threat. As the Chairman has pointed out,
we know that time is not on our side. The 2008 report by the
Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction
predicted that it is more likely than not that a weapon of mass
destruction (WMD) will be used in a terrorist attack somewhere
in the world by the end of 2013. There is no more alarming
prospect than that of a nuclear September 11, 2001.
After all, a nuclear bomb is the ultimate terrorist weapon,
causing an unimaginable amount of death, suffering, and
horror--precisely the kind of frightening and inhumane outcome
that terrorists seek.
Terrorists have made clear their desire to secure a nuclear
weapon. Given this stark reality, we must ask: What has the
Department done to defend against nuclear terrorism on American
soil? The answer, unfortunately, is: Not enough . . . not
nearly enough.
Today the Department still lacks a strategic plan for the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, a necessity first
identified by the Government Accountability Office nearly 8
years ago. We cannot wait another 8 years or even another 8
months. The Department must complete this plan now.
As the Chairman has indicated, the office charged with this
effort at DHS, the office known as DNDO, has seemed more intent
in the past on investing in new technology than on the nuts and
bolts planning that should guide these acquisitions. The
office, for example, has spent approximately $282 million over
nearly 5 years on the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program,
with the goal of developing the next-generation primary cargo
scanning technology to detect unshielded nuclear and
radiological materials. But in February 2010, DNDO announced
that the ASP was no longer being pursued as a possible primary
scanning technology and now was only being looked at as a
possible secondary scanning technology. Unfortunately, the GAO
has determined that the technology is only slightly better than
the existing monitors.
GAO's statement for the record today highlights problems
with another scanning technology mentioned by the Chairman that
would X-ray the contents of cargo containers. GAO found that
DNDO failed to adequately communicate with Customs and Border
Protection about such basic issues as how large the equipment
could be to still fit within the port of entry inspection
lanes. I must say this is so frustrating. One of the reasons
that we worked so hard to bring all of the agencies together
under the umbrella of the Department of Homeland Security was
to enhance communication and to ensure that the right hand
knows what the left is doing. So to have this so basic a
communications lapse is really discouraging and inexcusable.
After more than 2 years of work, DNDO has decided to cancel
the acquisition of this technology and focus on more research
and development. DHS must be a responsible steward of taxpayer
dollars. Time and money have been wasted as DNDO has focused
almost completely on marginal improvements in technology,
rather than on identifying gaps in coverage and then
determining the appropriate technology to eliminate those gaps.
And as the Chairman indicates, this problem started in the
previous Administration, but it is discouraging to not see more
progress in this Administration which is now in charge.
Moreover, troubling gaps continue to exist that could be
exploited by terrorists seeking to smuggle illicit nuclear
materials into the United States. We know that terrorists are
constantly probing and testing our vulnerabilities.
Now, to be sure, the Department deserves credit for
deploying more than 1,400 radiation portal monitors, allowing
nearly 100 percent of cargo entering our seaports and nearly
100 percent of vehicle traffic on the southern and northern
borders to be scanned for unshielded nuclear material, and that
is significant. But cargo coming into this country by rail from
Canada or Mexico is still not scanned, and only a small
percentage of international air cargo is scanned. Effective
scanning technology for these shipments would form an important
part of a layered, risk-based defense to nuclear terrorism.
Let me go back, however, to what I see as the essential
issue, and that is the lack of a strong strategic plan to
establish priorities, identify gaps, and to give our tactics
cohesion. Without that, we are going to continue to see slow
progress in an effective defense against terrorists' nuclear
ambitions. This strategy should also include a comprehensive
cost/benefit analysis that accounts for currently available and
potential future technologies as well as the personnel,
intelligence, and infrastructure needed to combat this threat.
In addition, to improve the coordination across government,
President Obama must appoint a coordinator for the prevention
of weapons of mass destruction, proliferation, and terrorism as
required by the 2007 Homeland Security Act written by the
Chairman and myself. This coordinator would help promote the
interagency collaboration needed to develop and implement an
effective strategy.
Inadequate planning causes schedule delays, cost overruns,
and the procurement of the wrong kinds of technology at great
cost to the taxpayer. And when we are talking about preventing
nuclear terrorism, those failures can lead to catastrophic
consequences for our Nation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins.
Deputy Secretary Lute, thank you for being here. You are in
the hot seat, I suppose, this morning because you can sense or
hear the frustration that the Committee has with how this
responsibility has been advanced over these two
Administrations, and that frustration has been deepened, of
course, by the independent reports, including GAO's. So I am
very anxious to hear your response to those critiques and where
you are going to lead the effort now.
TESTIMONY OF HON. JANE HOLL LUTE,\1\ DEPUTY SECRETARY, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Ms. Lute. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and good
morning. Good morning, Senator Collins.
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\1\ The prepared statement of Ms. Lute appears in the Appendix on
page 82.
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Members of the Committee, it is my pleasure actually to be
here before you today to discuss efforts by the Department of
Homeland Security to increase our security and reduce the risk,
as you both have pointed out, of nuclear terrorism.
Countering threats from terrorism is the Department's
primary mission, and preventing nuclear terrorism has been and
remains among our top-most priorities. The Department's first
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, which we released this
year, reaffirms this critical mission. DHS cannot meet this
challenge alone. Other Federal departments and agencies are and
must be engaged in this effort, as must State and local law
enforcement agencies, governments, and other responsible
parties around the world, as well as international
organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA).
Since the establishment of DNDO in 2005, this Committee has
engaged with the Department on the full range of issues
associated with preventing terrorists' use of nuclear weapons,
and we respect and appreciate that engagement and understand
the frustrations that have been expressed this morning. My
remarks today will focus on the core tasks we believe are
inherent in effective detection and interdiction, namely,
anticipating the threat and preventing hostile use.
This is a tough set of issues, as this Committee knows. We
believe we now have a better understanding of the challenges
that are posed by the limitations of technology, by operational
constraints, and by issues related to the scale of the
challenge of interdicting and detecting illicit nuclear
trafficking across or within our borders. And we must do more,
as you have noted, to synchronize and integrate the efforts of
all actors to fill gaps and minimize vulnerabilities.
Noting these challenges, however, should not detract from
progress that we have made in extending the coverage of our
domestic nuclear detection capabilities and increasing the
capacities of technologies and processes that are at the heart
of that coverage. I will address this progress but also the
challenges in greater detail when we have an opportunity to
meet in closed session. I do want to note that we have seen a
major expansion, as Senator Collins has noted, of monitors at
our Nation's ports of entry and at other locations, detectors
along our land and maritime borders, and there have been
sizable increases in the development, testing, and evaluation
of new detection systems. We have increased the training of
qualified detection officials and been continuing to work on
the development of new materials for potential future use.
As you have noted, I am pleased to acknowledge that DNDO
has a newly appointed Director, Warren Stern, whose expertise
and experience is valuable and will be directed and put to
great aggressive, vigorous use, as the leadership of DNDO. And
I know that the Committee is keenly interested in discussing
DNDO's programs further with him.
One of DNDO's core mandates is to develop the strategic
framework for a Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA),
which is a risk-informed, multilayered network designed to
detect illicit radiological and nuclear materials or weapons
and is, therefore, a key part of our overall effort to prevent
nuclear terrorism. I acknowledge the Committee has been
expecting this for some time. I acknowledge, understand, and,
in fact, share the frustration that this has not yet been
presented. That work is progressing, and we expect the
strategic plan to be completed by the end of the year, as I
have already testified before this Committee.
I know the Committee is also keenly interested in DNDO's
Advanced Spectroscopic Portal monitoring program. Again, I will
reserve more detailed comments for our closed session regarding
ASP.
This program has taken longer than anticipated, and while
its likely deployment in secondary screening differs from the
original plan, we believe it will offer a significant
contribution to our nuclear detection capabilities.
Moreover, many of the problematic aspects of ASP have
stemmed from our immaturity in developing and managing large
acquisition programs, and I believe that we have built on the
progress achieved by the leaders who preceded us at DHS and on
the work that has been ongoing to establish a much more
rigorous process for establishing requirements at the outset,
knowing what we need as an operational Department, and ensuring
that those requirements are validated through rigorous
operational testing. This was not the case when ASP was started
in 2005.
The Department has also recently established a Nuclear
Terrorism Working Group staffed by the heads of key components
in the Department. I chair it. We meet weekly. The working
group examines the Department's role and activities, the
components' roles and activities, and coordinates those
activities with DNDO and also with our Science and Technology
Directorate, headed up by Under Secretary Tara O'Toole, who is
also with us today. And we want to understand and develop our
plan for meeting the operational challenges on the ground.
DHS is now 7 years old, but as I have said to this
Committee before, it is not 1 year old for the seventh time. A
lot of progress has been made in those 7 years thanks in large
part to the aggressive, continued focus of this Committee and
the dialogue between us.
The Department has matured. Our understanding of the threat
has matured, and we have developed and tested several
technologies and explored operational requirements to devise
solutions for the gaps that arise.
For decades, the United States has led the world in efforts
to control nuclear weapons and materials and more recently to
counter the threat of nuclear terrorism. As the President
announced in his Prague speech of April 2009, the United States
intends to pursue a new international effort to secure all
vulnerable nuclear material around the world within 4 years.
Smuggling of nuclear materials has occurred, only in small
quantities that we know of thus far, and it remains a grave
concern. Controlling it is a very high priority.
While the ultimate aim of the United States is to make
nuclear terrorism near to impossible, our immediate goal is to
make it a prohibitively difficult undertaking for any
adversary.
But the responsibility to increase security and reduce the
overall risk of nuclear terrorism is not owned by any one
office, department, or even government. It must be a collective
effort.
Thank you again for this opportunity to come and speak with
you today about the Department's nuclear terrorism prevention
efforts. Mr. Chairman, I have submitted my full testimony for
the record, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Deputy Secretary Lute. We will
go ahead with 7-minute rounds of questions.
I must tell you--and I will go back again over your
prepared testimony, which I looked at yesterday--that I am
somewhat disappointed because a number of the questions that
the Committee specifically posed to you in our invitation to
testify today have not been dealt with, nor have there been
specific responses to the GAO, CRS, or Academy of Sciences'
critiques. Now, maybe some of those you are going to give us in
the closed session, but we have a lot of work to do. And,
again, I come back from this statement that the GAO prepared a
statement for the record today. Have you had a chance to see
that?
Ms. Lute. No, Senator, I have not.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, I want to ask you to take a look
at it and then respond in writing. In one case, they added a
new--I will call it an accusation, that the Department has been
misleading Congress with regard to the CAARS program. That is a
serious question, and I think it is very important that you
respond to it as soon as you can.
They also say in the statement filed for the record of this
hearing, and I quote again, ``To date, DHS has spent $4 billion
on various aspects of the Nuclear Detection Architecture, but
has not developed a strategic plan to guide its efforts to
develop and implement this architecture, as we recommended in
2008.''
And I know you expressed your own frustration with that. We
are now more than a year and a half into this Administration.
What is holding up that strategic plan? Why hasn't it been done
earlier, either by the previous Administration or this one?
Ms. Lute. Mr. Chairman, there are probably a number of
reasons that account. They may sound like excuses. It is not my
inclination to offer excuses. We now have a non-acting, head of
DNDO.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Ms. Lute. We have established an interagency group at the
Assistant Secretary level to guide and complete the
implementation of the GNDA Strategic Plan. And we now have that
strategic plan in draft form. So what I can tell you is that,
notwithstanding the lack of progress made to date, we expect to
deliver that plan before the end of this calendar year.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, the sooner the better, obviously.
I wonder if you are in a position to indicate to the Committee
in generality what the content of the plan will be. In other
words, will there be sufficient detail to enable DHS and the
Federal Government to accomplish what it set out to do 5 years
ago?
Ms. Lute. This is going to be a strategic plan, Mr.
Chairman, and as such, it will outline the vision, the goals,
the objectives, and the performance metrics. It will
necessarily be followed by an implementation plan which will
look specifically at the existing architecture that we have in
the domestic environment, look more specifically at those gaps,
and identify concrete pathways with respect to procedures,
acquisition, training techniques, and other elements necessary
to put that plan to full effect.
Chairman Lieberman. In the final version of your prepared
statement for this morning, which we saw later yesterday
afternoon, it looked to me like you were saying that DHS wanted
to de-emphasize the domestic part of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office's role and to emphasize the global aspects of
the role. Did I read that correctly?
Ms. Lute. That may be due to the inadequacy of my drafting,
Mr. Chairman. By no means.
Chairman Lieberman. That is not your intention?
Ms. Lute. By no means. There are, points of activity on
both fronts, both domestically and abroad, but the focus of the
domestic office begins domestically.
Chairman Lieberman. Has to be domestic, of course. I
appreciate that and am reassured to hear that.
As I understand it, since 2005, DNDO has spent, as I said,
about $400 million researching, developing, and testing the
CAARS machines and ASPs. You have had a chance now to look over
this, I presume, and I want to know what your conclusions are
about why DNDO put such a large investment into these devices.
Maybe, to the best of your ability before you answer, you
should give us a brief lay person's description of CAARS and
ASPs.
Ms. Lute. So I will speak to this to a certain degree, Mr.
Chairman. I am not an expert.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. If you want to call somebody else
up for the technical detail.
Ms. Lute. But we can also discuss some of this in the
closed hearing, with your indulgence.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Ms. Lute. I thank you for that invitation, so if I need to
use a lifeline, I will.
Chairman Lieberman. OK.
Ms. Lute. But ASP essentially is the next generation of
detection technology to be used at our ports of entry to screen
cargo. Why did we want it? We wanted it because we bring in
between 20 and 25 million containers of cargo annually, and we
need to be able to screen that cargo or scan that cargo. And we
also need to be able to keep commerce moving. We pursued ASP as
a fast means to detect reliably dangerous materials and fill
gaps that we had.
Chairman Lieberman. That was presumably better than the
current system? That was the goal.
Ms. Lute. That was the goal. We have learned some things.
We were perhaps too aggressive in trying to field unproven
technology. We have also known very fundamentally that good
programs have to be supported by good process, and good process
helps in turn generate good programs. We now have a solid
acquisition system in the Department, a management directive
that covers it, and that takes these large, complex
requirements to which we are trying to match novel
technologies, and walks us through the discipline of oversight
and engagement at every step of the way.
The test results of ASP, if we want to go into detail, Mr.
Chairman, with your permission, we will wait until the closed
session. But we did want it there fast in order to reduce false
positives and improve our capability both for detection and for
throughput.
Chairman Lieberman. How about the CAARS program?
Ms. Lute. So this was a Cargo Advanced Automated
Radiography System and, again, part of a multilayered defense
that we have, and we are not pursuing it. Beyond that, Mr.
Chairman, I would like to go into closed session.
Chairman Lieberman. Do you draw any general lessons from
these two investments about what should happen going forward? I
mean, obviously, they had good intentions, but they both sound
like they represented a considerable waste of money.
Ms. Lute. Yes, Mr. Chairman, I think there are some lessons
learned. Hope is not a method. We need to rely on the accuracy
of our understanding of the operations of this Department. This
is an operational Department. Technology must work in the
field. It must solve the problems that we have in the field. We
know this intuitively. You know it if you are an operator. And
now we have built our ability to test equipment before it is
fielded with field testing into our acquisition system.
We know that, again, good programs have to be supported by
good processes, and the process itself does begin with a deep
understanding of exactly what our requirements are from an
operator's point of view. In both of these cases, as Senator
Collins has pointed out, it is unacceptable that our research
and development arm would not talk to our operating arms.
Chairman Lieberman. I agree.
Ms. Lute. It is unacceptable.
Chairman Lieberman. So, presumably, that is one thing that
is not going to happen again.
Ms. Lute. No, not if I can help it.
Chairman Lieberman. Yes. And the Department maintains the
goal of improving the current monitoring equipment that we
have?
Ms. Lute. We do.
Chairman Lieberman. Am I right that the Department has over
the last 5 years, and more, increased the number of monitors at
ports of entry?
Ms. Lute. We have.
Chairman Lieberman. Significantly.
Ms. Lute. We have, and we are prepared to share greater
detail in closed session.
Chairman Lieberman. My time is up, but I want to indicate
to you that in the GAO statement for the record today that I
referred to, the charge of misleading was specifically with
regard to the CAARS program, and I will quote from it. ``The
description of the progress of the CAARS program used to
support funding requests in DNDO's budget justifications was
misleading because it did not reflect the actual status of the
program. For example, the fiscal years 2010 and 2011 DHS budget
justifications both cited that an ongoing CAARS testing
campaign would lead to a cost/benefit analysis. However, DNDO
officials told GAO that when they canceled the acquisition part
of the program in 2007, they also decided not to conduct any
associated cost/benefit analysis.''\1\
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\1\ The prepared statement from GAO appears in the Appendix on page
99.
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So that is a troubling statement. Part of that--it sounds
like it happened on your watch with regard to the budget, so I
hope you will take a quick look at that and respond.
Ms. Lute. Mr. Chairman, I apologize. Just before walking
in, I did see that statement. I did not realize it was
presented for the record of this hearing. I will certainly
revert back to the Committee with a written answer.\2\
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\2\ The response from DHS appears in the Appendix on page 111.
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Chairman Lieberman. OK, because it is a serious charge,
obviously.
Ms. Lute. Absolutely.
Chairman Lieberman. In terms of our trust from both
branches of government. Thank you.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Mr. Chairman, I am going to pick up
exactly on that point with Deputy Secretary Lute because it is
extremely troubling to read what GAO has written about the
Department's annual budget justifications.
There is no dispute between GAO and the Department that
DNDO made the decision in December 2007 to end its acquisition
and deployment plans for the CAARS program. Yet the
Department's last three budget justifications to Congress have
cited the development and deployment of the CAARS technology as
being feasible. And, indeed, when GAO looked at the budget
justifications for fiscal year 2010 and fiscal year 2011, the
Department cited an ongoing testing campaign that would lead to
a cost/benefit analysis for the CAARS program.
It is inconceivable to me that the Department is still
putting plans and money into its budget justifications for a
program that it had decided to abandon in December 2007. So how
could that happen? If DNDO ended its acquisition and deployment
plans for the CAARS program, for the cargo screening program
and as a result had decided not to proceed with a cost/benefit
analysis, why were they included in the DHS budget documents
that were submitted to Congress?
Ms. Lute. Senator, CAARS was transitioned in 2007, it is my
understanding, into a research and development (R&D) program. I
only quickly glanced at the statement of GAO this morning. We
will certainly provide a detailed response to this line of
inquiry.
Senator Collins. But that is not what the budget
justification says. The budget is still citing the development
and deployment of the CAARS technology, and this is long after
DHS decided to cancel the acquisition plans.
We have to be able to take at face value the information
the Department presents to us; otherwise, how can we proceed to
evaluate the budget justifications?
Ms. Lute. I absolutely agree with that basic point,
Senator. Absolutely. And, again, I will provide a detailed
response to you in writing.
Senator Collins. I just want to emphasize that I share the
Chairman's view that this is extremely troubling because this
speaks to the credibility of the budget requests. At a time
when we are scrutinizing the budget, squeezing every dollar, if
we cannot rely on the credibility of the information provided
by the Department for a program that, nearly 3 years ago was
abandoned, that is very serious. So I think we need an answer
to this question.
I hope, Mr. Chairman, you will put a time frame on it, that
within the next week we get an answer to this question.
Chairman Lieberman. Why don't we just agree that we would
like to hear back from you by a week from today on that
question.
Ms. Lute. Yes, absolutely. I would just like to say,
Senator, that there can be no question--and let me leave no
doubt in your mind--the Department seeks and works to achieve a
standard of highest fidelity and integrity in our interactions
with Congress and our interactions with the American people. I
do not accept at this point the characterization by GAO that we
were misleading Congress, but I will provide a written answer
in detail within the time frame we just agreed.
Senator Collins. The second issue related to CAARS that I
want to pursue further with you is the inexplicable lack of
communication between DNDO and the client agency that actually
was going to use the technology. And GAO's report says it very
well in a headline: ``DNDO planned for the acquisition and
deployment of CAARS without fully understanding that it could
not feasibly operate in a U.S. port environment.'' That is just
extraordinary. It said that when the officials from CBP and
DNDO finally met, CBP officials said that they made clear to
DNDO that they did not want the CAARS machines because they
would not fit in primary inspection lanes and would slow down
the flow of commerce through these lanes and cause significant
delays.
That is an extraordinary statement. That those basic
requirements were not identified before a single dollar was
spent is something that I just cannot understand. And it
clearly led to the waste of millions of dollars. How is it that
acquisition officials in DNDO could be proceeding with a
technology that did not meet the needs of the end-user agency
in a very fundamental way? It is not we need to tweak this a
little bit or we will need additional training for our
personnel. This is saying the technology will not fit in the
primary inspection lanes and would lead to significant delays.
How much more fundamental a specification is there than whether
or not it would fit? How can this have happened?
Ms. Lute. Senator, if it in fact happened, it is
inexcusable. You are absolutely right. And even in your
description of it, I find myself getting equally frustrated and
annoyed. There is no excuse in an operating department for the
acquisition of material that does not meet basic operational
purposes like does it fit. There is no excuse.
I would just offer, in addition to responding to the
specific question that you have asked on the transition of
CAARS into an R&D program, that we give you a full accounting
of how CAARS has unfolded to address these concerns.
What I can tell you, Senator, is that we have fixed that
problem. We have established an acquisition system that fully
integrates the needs of the operators with the acquisition
system itself. We have introduced points along that system for
active engagement and oversight. We have introduced an
operational testing phase as well--and that is a field testing
phase--to prevent these things from happening.
Senator Collins. You said ``if this happened.'' Do you take
issue with what GAO has told us in a written statement?
Ms. Lute. Again, Senator, I just glanced at the statement
before I walked in. I would like the opportunity to provide to
you in writing, in detail, in a fully transparent way to the
Committee the unfolding of this program.
Senator Collins. Let me just ask one final question on this
round since my time has expired.
Chairman Lieberman. That is OK.
Senator Collins. And that has to do with the strategic
plan, the need for which was first identified 8 years ago, a
source of huge frustration to the Chairman and myself, and a
cause of significant waste of time and money.
You have said that there is a draft plan underway. I am
going to ask you a very basic question. When will it be done?
Ms. Lute. Before the end of this calendar year.
Senator Collins. More precisely--I mean, the end of this
calendar year is a long ways away.
Ms. Lute. Senator, I cannot give you a precise date. I can
tell you before December 31.
Senator Collins. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would say that
December 31 is too long. The need for this plan has been
evident for 8 years, and in the meantime, the Department either
has to freeze all of its technology acquisitions, because it
does not really know what it needs--and that puts us at risk--
or it has to proceed with acquisitions that may end up wasting
more millions of dollars. So this has to be a priority.
Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks, Senator Collins. I agree. This
has been a long time in coming, and it is September 15 today.
Look, we cannot compel you by a court or other action to do
this by a given date, but the fact is it is long overdue. And
it would impress us at least if you got it done by sometime
significantly earlier than the end of the year.
Is this going to be just an overall strategy? We had a
little exchange before, but I presume this will be clear enough
that it will guide action. I understand there may need to be
details that follow, but I hope this will be a real working
strategic plan that will come forward.
Ms. Lute. Senator, it will be at a strategic level. It will
identify the vision we are trying to pursue, and it will
outline objectives and performance metrics.
Chairman Lieberman. Right.
Ms. Lute. From that, we will necessarily create an
implementation plan which will go into greater detail about
programs, technologies, execution, and timelines.
I think I would just like to offer as well that we are
following the original impulse of the Department when DNDO was
created, which was to look at our existing operations in the
three main areas that we work on to ensure the security of this
homeland: Our border regions, the interior of this country, as
well as abroad. And we have looked to reinforce existing
processes and procedures with the kinds of technologies that
give us a stronger hand in the ability to detect and interdict
the movement of illicit materials.
So we are not frozen, Senator, and I know that is a concern
of yours. It would be a concern of mine as well. We are not
frozen in place. We are continuing to apply those technologies
and procedures, to train our personnel in field, to deploy more
trained personnel, and to develop our understanding of the
threat and vulnerabilities. But I equally share your
frustration--and certainly understand it--that this plan has
not yet been produced.
Chairman Lieberman. I really urge you to get it to us
before the end of the year if you possibly can. I think that
would be a significant step forward.
I have just a couple more questions. Incidentally, when you
look at the statement that GAO filed for the record on this
question of DNDO misleading the Congress, there is a final
sentence in the paragraph that says--and this is GAO speaking--
``During recent discussions with DNDO officials, they agreed
that the language in the budget justifications lacked clarity,
and they have no plans to prepare a cost/benefit analysis.''
So there has already been some acknowledgment. It may be a
difference of terminology. The GAO says it was a kind of
intentional act of misleading Congress. DNDO acknowledges that
it lacked clarity. But I want to ask you from your position as
administrative accountability and responsibility at the top of
the Department to give us your view of what happened here and
how it should affect our interactions.
We have talked some about the unacceptable--I think that is
the word you used--failure of some of the component agencies of
the Department of Homeland Security to cooperate and to
communicate in the development of some of the nuclear detection
systems. DNDO, as you know, is also given the responsibility
for coordinating nuclear detection activities of the Department
of Homeland Security with other departments of our Federal
Government--Defense, State, Justice, and Energy.
The question I want to raise is--I do not know whether it
is under consideration at all. In light of the fact that it is
not clear to me that DNDO has the authority to tell those
agencies what to do and, therefore, must rely on cooperation
from them, each with their own jurisdictions, sovereignties,
and perhaps stovepipes, whether we ought to be considering
giving additional authority to DNDO to coordinate this
responsibility for a defense against nuclear terrorism or
whether we ought to confine DNDO's responsibility in some sense
and have all these agencies accountable to someone higher up,
in the White House, in the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB), something of that kind. Is that under consideration at
all? And if not, do you have any first responses to that?
Ms. Lute. Senator, the situation is as you described. We do
not have the authority such as the Office of National Drug
Control Policy (ONDCP) has, and there have been some informal
discussions about this. The right way forward, I think, remains
to be decided.
We are certainly engaged vigorously with them, for example,
on the strategic plan for the Global Nuclear Detection
Architecture at the Assistant Secretary level, so DNDO is
moving out aggressively to establish the relationships and
operating pattern to achieve the kind of cooperation that is
expected. I think it is certainly a live consideration that
additional authorities be considered.
Chairman Lieberman. Well, I would welcome your thoughts on
that.
The final question I have is really the initial point, and
just to draw you out on it, I take it that the Department and
DNDO are operating on an assumption or a conclusion based on
intelligence that the threat of nuclear terrorism is real and
that terrorist groups continue to have an active interest in
gaining the capability to carry out a nuclear terrorist attack,
including within the United States.
Ms. Lute. Yes, Senator. Beyond that, I would like to
reserve our discussion for----
Chairman Lieberman. Understood, but I wanted to clarify
that.
The second may be a little harder but--which is--I know
there was a relatively recent IAEA report recording some cases
of attempts to smuggle quantities of enriched uranium out of
the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia. I guess I am
asking whether you have a concern about whether in terms of the
thoughts about Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, whether
the countries of the world, including Russia, are doing enough
to protect the nuclear material that they have.
Ms. Lute. Again, Senator, with respect to a more detailed
discussion on that, I would like to reserve it for the closed
session. But I think it is fair to say that no one should be
satisfied with the current state of efforts and that more has
to be done.
Chairman Lieberman. Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is my understanding that in preparing the strategy, the
Department is using these model guidelines. This is a document
for nuclear detection architectures that DNDO developed in
consultation with the international agencies as well as
national domestic experts. These model guidelines state that
the strategy should include a clear assignment of
responsibility to the Federal, State, or local agency that is
responsible for carrying out the strategies.
We are told that the draft strategy currently being
considered at DNDO does not include such basic elements as
which agencies are responsible for which strategic goals, and
that instead Congress is going to have to wait for yet another
plan to be produced and an implementation plan for the strategy
to be delivered at a yet unknown future date.
If the guidelines are recommending that agency
responsibilities be defined in the national level strategy for
the architecture, why isn't the Department doing that,
including that critical information and assignment of
responsibility within the strategy? Or are you going to, let me
ask?
Ms. Lute. Senator, that is why it is still a draft, so we
are using in part the model guidelines. We are mindful also of
getting something delivered. And we are mindful of getting
something delivered that forms a credible basis for the
implementation plan that follows, and we will ensure that it
has all the essential elements for that purpose.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Lieberman. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Akaka, good morning and welcome.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR AKAKA
Senator Akaka. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. It is good to be
here with you and our Ranking Member, Senator Collins. Thank
you so much for holding this hearing, and I would like to thank
the Deputy Secretary for being here with us today
Ms. Lute. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Akaka. Nuclear terrorism is among the chief threats
facing the United States. The Department's Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture is a crucial tool in stopping the
illicit movement of nuclear and radiological materials. I have
some ongoing concerns about the status of the improvements to
our nuclear detection capabilities, our international efforts,
and our ability to prevent the entry of nuclear materials into
the United States. I hope to hear more about these issues
today.
Deputy Secretary Lute, in 2009, I introduced the
Strengthening the Oversight of Nuclear Nonproliferation Act,
which was included as an amendment to this Committee's WMD
Prevention and Preparedness Act. My bill would require U.S.
analysis of the IAEA's ability to detect a country's diversion
of nuclear materials that could be used as a weapon and
recommend ways for the United States to further support the
IAEA.
Is DHS incorporating analysis of IAEA's detection
capabilities, and ways to further its support of the IAEA, into
its nuclear detection efforts?
Ms. Lute. We are, Senator, but I am not in a position to
give you a detailed accounting of how.
Senator Akaka. Fine. Madam Secretary, education, training,
and exercises can better prepare personnel charged with
stemming the illicit flow of dangerous nuclear materials. What
steps has DHS taken to put comprehensive training efforts in
place for these personnel throughout the United States?
Ms. Lute. Senator, DNDO has an aggressive program with
respect to education and training, and we can provide details
of the numbers of programs, numbers of trained individuals as
well, to you in writing.
Senator Akaka. Fine. International efforts to prevent
nuclear smuggling require information sharing between
international partners within a broad nuclear detection
framework. To what extent has the U.S. Government coordinated
with international partners to improve information sharing in
support of nuclear detection at both the strategic and
operational levels?
Ms. Lute. Senator, as you know, there are a number of
international programs that the government participates in on
this set of issues. Where the Department of Homeland Security
fits in, this is also part of our engagement as well. We have a
number of quite specific dialogues with international partners
regarding port activities, the issues of cargo movements, and,
indeed, the whole question of secure global supply chains
incorporates a set of issues that the United States is trying
to pursue with its international trading partners.
So it is an imprecise answer to your question in terms of
under which specific programs all of this is being conducted.
There are other departments--the Department of Energy, for
example--that have these dialogues as well, and equally there
is dialogue with the private sector. We can provide those to
you in writing. But as I mentioned earlier, we view homeland
security and the efforts that we undertake to ensure the
security of this homeland as entailing work abroad with the
international community.
Senator Akaka. Madam Secretary, in the DHS Bottom-Up Review
Report, the Department stated that it will increase efforts to
detect and counter nuclear and other dangerous materials by
prioritizing nuclear detection research and development and by
working with the intelligence community to develop new
capabilities.
How is DHS implementing these efforts? And what new
technologies and capabilities are being considered in these
efforts?
Ms. Lute. Senator, I would like to reserve any discussion
of technologies for our closed session, if you will, and I
would characterize at this point in an open setting our efforts
on the intelligence front. We want to understand the threat
fully. We want to understand who those individuals might be, or
groups, or other institutions, agencies, entities that exist
that might be trying to acquire illicit materials. What are the
lines of communication that they might exploit, what are the
means they might exploit to advance their threat? What are our
vulnerabilities? How can we best address them? Those are the
kinds of things that we are putting into our dialogue with the
intelligence community to more fully develop our understanding
of the threat.
Senator Akaka. According to the Bottom-Up Review Report,
DHS plans to enhance its risk assessment and management across
its mission areas. One related effort that DHS has considered
is conducting a homeland security national risk assessment. If
conducted, how do you foresee this assessment better informing
strategies, investments, and operations related to countering
the threat of nuclear terrorism?
Ms. Lute. As I mentioned in my opening statement, Senator,
we believe that eventually we would like to make it near to
impossible for anyone to acquire or attempt to use illicitly
nuclear materials and weapons. In the meantime, we want to make
it prohibitively difficult. That depends on creating
significant uncertainty in the minds of potential adversaries
through layered defenses that reduce risk and shore up our
ability to defend ourselves.
We believe this country can defend itself in this area as
well as others, and so we will use all the tools at our
disposal, including analyses and understandings of risks,
vulnerabilities, and capabilities of technologies, processes,
and our operating components to ensure that we keep this
country safe.
Senator Akaka. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. My
time has expired. Thank you.
Chairman Lieberman. Thanks very much, Senator Akaka, for
being here and for asking those thoughtful questions. I think
probably it is best now to adjourn to closed session. Look,
bottom line, I think you hear us. We are not happy or satisfied
with progress on the whole nuclear detection architecture and
the way that a considerable amount of taxpayer money has been
spent up until now without any substantial result. So we are
counting on you, Deputy Secretary Lute, and, of course,
Secretary Janet Napolitano, to really step in and take charge
of this.
Short term, we look forward to the response within a week
to this question of DNDO misleading the Congress on the budget
question. And then you set the goal, but it is September 15. If
you can get that strategic plan out sometime in November, that
would be a great step forward and a sign of encouragement to us
that things were changing.
I am tempted to ask Mr. Stern whether after this hearing he
wants to go forward and take over DNDO.
Ms. Lute. Of course he does
Chairman Lieberman. He does, I know. So I appreciate that
you do. It needs fresh new leadership, and we look forward to
working with you on the progress that we all want.
With that, we will reconvene for the closed portion of the
hearing as soon as our legs can take us to Room 217 in the
Senate Security Offices over in the Capitol Visitor Center.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:13 a.m., the Committee proceeded to other
business.]
A P P E N D I X
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