[Senate Hearing 111-649]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-649
NEW BORDER WAR: CORRUPTION OF U.S. OFFICIALS BY DRUG CARTELS
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, LOCAL,
AND PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS AND INTEGRATION
of the
COMMITTEE ON
HOMELAND SECURITY AND
GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MARCH 11, 2010
__________
Available via http://www.gpoaccess.gov/congress/index.html
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
58-385 PDF WASHINGTON : 2010
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman
CARL LEVIN, Michigan SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
MARK l. PRYOR, Arkansas GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JON TESTER, Montana
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
Michael L. Alexander, Staff Director
Brandon L. Milhorn, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel
Trina Driessnack Tyrer, Chief Clerk
AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, LOCAL, AND PRIVATE SECTOR PREPAREDNESS
AND INTEGRATION
MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas, Chairman
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada
MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio
JON TESTER, Montana LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
MICHAEL F. BENNET, Colorado
Kristin Sharp, Staff Director
Mike McBride, Minority Staff Director
Kelsey Stroud, Chief Clerk
C O N T E N T S
------
Opening statements:
Page
Senator Pryor................................................ 1
WITNESSES
Thursday, March 11, 2010
Kevin L. Perkins, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative
Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of
Justice........................................................ 3
Thomas M. Frost, Assistant Inspector General for Investigations,
Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security....................................................... 4
James F. Tomsheck, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Internal
Affairs, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security.............................................. 6
Alphabetical List of Witnesses
Frost, Thomas M.:
Testimony.................................................... 4
Prepared statement........................................... 23
Perkins, Kevin L.:
Testimony.................................................... 3
Prepared statement........................................... 19
Tomsheck, James F.:
Testimony.................................................... 6
Prepared statement........................................... 30
APPENDIX
Chart entitled ``CBP Growth: Staffing Levels FY 2004-2009,''
submitted by Mr. Tomsheck...................................... 32
Chart entitled ``Cities Reporting the Presence of Mexican Drug
Trafficking Organizations,'' submitted by Mr. Tomsheck......... 33
Chart entitled ``CBP Corruption Related Arrests FY 2005 to
Present,'' submitted by Mr. Tomsheck........................... 34
Questions and responses submitted for the Record from:
Mr. Perkins.................................................. 35
Mr. Tomsheck................................................. 37
Mr. Frost.................................................... 40
NEW BORDER WAR: CORRUPTION OF U.S. OFFICIALS BY DRUG CARTELS
----------
THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, Local, and
Private Sector Preparedness and Integration,
of the Committee on Homeland Security
and Governmental Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:07 a.m., in
room SD-342, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Mark L.
Pryor, Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senator Pryor.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR PRYOR
Senator Pryor. I will go ahead and call the Subcommittee to
order. I want to thank all of our witnesses for coming to the
Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness
and Integration. We are meeting in the Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs Committee room. I want to thank all of you
for being here and participating. What I would like to do is go
ahead and give my opening statement--Senator Ensign is on his
way, and maybe a couple of others; I am not quite sure--and
then I will turn it over to the witnesses. Then we will ask
questions.
Let me start just with a couple of facts. Fact No. 1 is
that Mexico ships over 50 percent of the methamphetamine and
marijuana into the U.S. market. Over 50 percent of it comes
from Mexico. And 90 percent of the cocaine in the United States
comes from Mexico. That is about a $25 billion industry in
Mexico, drugs, and drug trade.
As a result of that, fact No. 2 would be that the U.S.
border defenses have beefed up, and they have tried to squeeze
these drug routes, which has been good, and to some extent that
has been effective. But to gain an advantage, the cartels have
begun to infiltrate U.S. law enforcement. I think that is very
troubling for the Senate, and it is very troubling for most
Americans, and it is troubling for those agencies.
Our review suggests that the cartels are broadly targeting
Federal border law enforcement as well as State and local
governments. We are not going to focus on State and local
today, but we have to acknowledge that is a large concern as
well, and we will be working with the Federal agencies and the
State and local governments to try to get a better handle on
this and work through good strategies on how we can prevent
this from happening.
The Border Patrol seems to be the biggest target and have
the most corruption. A news report recently said that there has
been a 40-percent increase in U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) corruption arrests and there are dozens of
open investigations. Other possible Federal targets would be
the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI), Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and probably a
few more. But they seem to be less vulnerable, and I am
assuming that is because the CBP is on the front line and they
are the face of our border; and it has doubled its size in 10
years with a lot of new people coming, new faces, and new
personnel. I think we are starting to see some problems as a
result of that.
Our review suggests that CBP may not be using all of the
accepted tools to screen job applicants. I think they have a
goal of polygraphing all job applicants, but today they are
only doing about 10 percent. So we want to talk about that
today. And this is not just drugs, but there are guns and money
that are moving across the border; largely from north to south
across the border. And there is always the possibility of
terrorists coming into the country if we have a weakened
border.
So these cartels in Mexico are very powerful. We should not
underestimate their ability to try to corrupt U.S. law
enforcement agencies. Right now we think that the Mexican drug
cartels have drug operations in 230 U.S. cities. Three of those
happen to be in my State: Fort Smith, Fayetteville, and Little
Rock. And also in 2009, the statistics indicate that there were
6,500 drug war-related deaths in Mexico.
So this is a very serious problem. It is on our border.
There is a war going on down around the border and in Mexico
related to the drug cartels.
What I would like to do now is go ahead and give a brief
introduction for each of our witnesses, and I appreciate you
all for being here. And in a few moments, when Senator Ensign
comes, if he wants to make an opening statement, that would be
great.
What we are going to do is we are going to leave the record
open for a week or 2 weeks for some of the Senators who could
not be here today because of other committee hearings and what
is going on on the floor, so we may have some written questions
that we would ask you to follow up on.
Our first witness is Kevin Perkins, the Assistant Director
of the Criminal Investigative Division at the FBI. He began his
career as a special agent in 1986 and has served in operational
and investigative positions focusing extensively on white-
collar crime and public corruption. The FBI has established
several interagency Border Corruption Task Forces designed to
bring local, State, and Federal parties together as needed to
coordinate efforts on border-related corruption, but I
understand your real claim to fame is you are from Mountain
Home, Arkansas?
Mr. Perkins. Graduated in 1978.
Senator Pryor. There you go. We can talk more about that in
a few minutes, but thank you. That is great.
Mr. Perkins. Yes, sir.
Senator Pryor. Our second witness will be Tom Frost. He is
the Assistant Inspector General for Investigations of the
Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Frost has been involved in
and has served as a Federal law enforcement officer since 1976
in a variety of investigative, protective, and leadership
roles.
And then our third witness today is James Tomsheck. He is
the Assistant Commissioner of the Office of Internal Affairs at
CBP. Mr. Tomsheck is a former Deputy Assistant Director of the
Office of Investigations at the U.S. Secret Service as well as
the former Deputy Assistant Director of the Office of
Government and Public Affairs. The Office of Internal Affairs
has developed and implemented a comprehensive integrity
strategy designed to prevent, detect, and investigate all
threats to the integrity of the CBP.
With that, what I would like to do is call on Mr. Perkins,
and what we are going to do is if you could limit your remarks
to 5 minutes, please understand that we will put your written
statements in the record, so that will be part of the record.
But if you could limit your statements to 5 minutes, that would
be perfect.
Mr. Perkins.
TESTIMONY OF KEVIN L. PERKINS,\1\ ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, CRIMINAL
INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Perkins. Good morning, Chairman Pryor. I am pleased to
be here today to discuss the FBI's efforts to combat public
corruption.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Perkins appears in the Appendix
on page 19.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The FBI recognizes that fighting public corruption is vital
to preserving our democracy, protecting our borders, and
securing our communities. In fact, it is our top criminal
priority following only the national security priorities of
counterterrorism, counter-intelligence, and cyber crimes.
We are directing resources to root out public corruption
all across the country, but we cannot, and fortunately do not
have to, do it alone. We rely heavily on our partners at all
levels of law enforcement.
Through our vigilance, we have achieved some notable
successes. In the past 2 years alone, our efforts have helped
convict 1,600 Federal, State, and local officials. We have
approximately 2,500 pending corruption investigations ongoing
today.
The Southwest border is a particular focus of our
corruption-fighting efforts. Of the 700 agents leading our
charge against corruption, approximately 120 of those are
working along our U.S. Southwest border.
Our 12 Southwest Border Corruption Task Forces share
information with the Southwest Intelligence Group, the El Paso
Intelligence Center, and our Mexican legal attaches to both
identify and disrupt Mexican drug-trafficking organizations
from utilizing and soliciting U.S. public officials to commit
criminal activities.
One particular case highlights the potential national
security implications of public corruption along our Nation's
borders. In that case, an individual gained employment as a
border inspector for the specific purpose of trafficking in
drugs. Through our collaborative efforts and a year-long
investigation, this public official pled guilty to one count of
conspiracy to import more than 1,000 kilograms of marijuana
into the United States while at the same time receiving more
than $5 million in bribe payments. This individual has since
been sentenced to 20 years in Federal prison.
While the threat posed in the region is real, the Southwest
border is not and should not remain the only focus of our
efforts. Each day the Federal Government is charged with
protecting over 7,000 miles of land bordering Canada and Mexico
and over 300 ports of entry across the United States. Each of
these entry points has the potential for criminal and/or
terrorist organizations to exploit corrupt officials willing to
misuse their official positions for financial or personal gain.
In fiscal year 2009 alone, FBI field offices along the
Nation's Canadian border conducted nearly 300 public corruption
investigations.
The FBI has recognized the very real threat public
corruption poses at our Nation's borders and ports of entry. We
are working lock-step with our law enforcement partners to
address that threat. At FBI Headquarters, for example, we have
established our National Border Corruption Task Force.
Consisting of representatives of the FBI, U.S. Department of
Homeland Security Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Customs
and Border Protection-Internal Affairs, and the Transportation
Security Administration, this task force ensures general
guidance and oversight of border corruption programs ongoing
across the country.
Through trend analysis, intelligence and information
sharing, and the utilization of lessons learned and best
practices, we are uniquely positioned to address the very real
threat of border corruption and the risk it poses to our
national security.
To that end, our National Border Corruption Task Force is
coordinating with other impacted divisions at FBI Headquarters.
These include the FBI's Directorate of Intelligence, the
Counterintelligence Division, the Counterterrorism Division,
and our Weapons of Mass Destruction Directorate. By working
together, sharing information, and becoming more creative in
our approach, we are making great strides.
I thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify
before you today and share some of the FBI's work in combating
public corruption, and I will be able to answer your questions
at the appropriate time. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Pryor. Thank you. Mr. Frost.
TESTIMONY OF THOMAS M. FROST,\1\ ASSISTANT INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR INVESTIGATIONS, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Frost. Chairman Pryor, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the work of the Department of Homeland Security Office
of Inspector General. As Assistant Inspector General for
Investigations, my office is responsible for investigating all
allegations of DHS employee criminal misconduct, including
those related to the security of the Nation's borders.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Frost appears in the Appendix on
page 23.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Our mission, in part, is to strengthen the effectiveness
and efficiency of DHS by conducting investigations and
exercising oversight that will help protect the Nation from
dangerous people and dangerous things. The OIG reports both to
the Secretary and the Congress, and our position provides
necessary objectivity to inspire the public trust and the
confidence of the DHS workforce. We have a staff of highly
trained and experienced criminal investigators deployed in 25
offices in the United States and complemented by a staff of
audit and inspection professionals.
Border-related corruption is not limited to one DHS
component. It can touch employees and contractors across DHS as
well as employees of State and local governments.
In fiscal year 2009, we opened over 839 criminal cases
involving DHS employees and programs. Our investigations
resulted in 313 arrests, 293 indictments, 281 convictions, and
59 administrative actions.
One of our strategies is to leverage existing resources and
share intelligence through our working partnerships with the
DEA, ICE, FBI, and others, and by participating on various task
forces including the FBI's Border Corruption Task Force
Initiative.
Law enforcement has recognized that the smuggling of people
and things across the border is large-scale business dominated
by organized criminal enterprises. As we disrupt traditional
smuggling routes and networks, organizations resort to
alternative tactics, including bribing DHS employees,
infiltrating our ranks, and engaging in fraudulent schemes to
acquire immigration benefits. We have found the tactics used by
the drug-trafficking organizations as they attempt to
compromise our employees are similar to tactics used by foreign
intelligence services to recruit spies.
CBP staffing and funding levels have increased dramatically
since 2003, creating the largest uniformed law enforcement
agency in the country, an agency that, along with ICE, occupies
the front line in securing our physical border.
Since 2003, we have made arrests of 129 CBP officers and
Border Patrol agents. For example, we recently arrested a CBP
officer for alien and narcotic smuggling in a joint FBI
investigation in Brownsville, Texas. The officer was sentenced
to 135 months in Federal prison.
As already noted, we are confronted with corruption in
other layers of border security. Law enforcement officers from
ICE and CBP have been corrupted for their access to sensitive
law enforcement information. Drug-trafficking organizations
have purchased information to vet their members, to track
investigative activity, and to identify cooperating
individuals.
At international airports, or even on interstate highways,
for that matter, you can have border corruption because these
organizations need to move their product and proceeds further
inland or out of the country. We have arrested TSA and other
DHS employees as they smuggled narcotics and weapons onto
aircrafts and even for selling TSA-screened baggage tags.
As an example, we conducted an investigation with DEA of an
ICE immigration enforcement agent who used his government
credentials to bypass TSA security. We arrested him when he
tried to smuggle 10 pounds of marijuana through the checkpoint
in his carry-on luggage.
Citizenship and Immigration Services employees are targeted
because drug-trafficking organizations need to have personnel
operating inside the United States to facilitate their
business, and criminal organizations use corruption and fraud
to obtain immigration benefits to place conspirators in
position to assist their criminal enterprises.
We have worked joint investigations along the Northern
border with Royal Canadian Mounted Police. We have worked a
case with the FBI where we arrested a Mexican chief of police
who attempted to bribe a Border Patrol agent offering him
$25,000 per load of marijuana. The police chief received a 90-
month prison sentence.
For all our successes, we recognize the need for continued
improvement. We suggest increased suitability screening for
prospective DHS employees, increased monitoring efforts on
backgrounds of current employees, increased employee training
through integrity briefings, enforcing administrative
regulation, workplace rules, ensuring all relevant allegations
are promptly and efficiently referred.
Acts of corruption within the Department of Homeland
Security represent a threat to our Nation and undermine the
honest and hard-working employees of the Department.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I will
be pleased to answer any questions. Thank you.
Senator Pryor. Thank you. Mr. Tomsheck.
TESTIMONY OF JAMES F. TOMSHECK,\1\ ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF INTERNAL AFFAIRS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Tomsheck. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity
to be here this morning and answer your questions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The prepared statement of Mr. Tomsheck appears in the Appendix
on page 30.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. Customs and Border Protection is responsible for
securing our Nation's borders while at the same time
facilitating the movement of legitimate travel and trade, both
key components to our Nation's economy. Our purview spans more
than 5,000 miles of border with Canada and 1,900 miles of
border with Mexico. CBP is actually the largest law enforcement
organization in the United States, comprised of 20,000 Border
Patrol agents deployed between the ports of entry and over
20,000 CBP officers actually stationed at the various land,
air, and sea ports of entry throughout our country. They are
joined by an 1,000-agent force of air and marine interdiction
agents, whose job it is to implement the air and maritime
responsibilities of CBP. There are an additional 2,300
agricultural specialists and other professionals that bring the
sum total of CBP staffing, as is reflected in the chart,\2\ to
over 58,000 individuals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The chart submitted by Senator Pryor appears in the Appendix on
page 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A snapshot of what it is CBP is able to accomplish with
that large workforce. In fiscal year 2009 alone, CBP processed
more than 360 million pedestrians and passengers, 109 million
conveyances, apprehended over 556,000 illegal aliens between
our ports of entry, and encountered over 224,000 inadmissible
aliens at our ports of entry. We also seized more than 5.2
million pounds of illegal drugs. Every day, CBP processes over
1 million travelers seeking to enter the United States by land,
air, or sea.
Unfortunately, we are encountering integrity challenges for
any one of a number of reasons. We are the largest law
enforcement agency in the country. For a large number of
reasons, we are the most vulnerable to integrity threats. We
deploy that very vulnerable workforce to the highest threat
environment for integrity threats--our Southwest border that we
share with the country of Mexico--and all of this is occurring
at a point in time that transnational criminal organizations
are doing all that they can to infiltrate CBP through our
hiring initiatives and at the same time compromise our existing
workforce through recruitment.
The overwhelming majority of CBP employees routinely
demonstrate the highest levels of integrity. Acts of
corruption, unfortunately, do occur. Since October 1, 2004, 103
of our agents or officers have been arrested for corruption.
These charges include drug smuggling, alien smuggling, money
laundering, and conspiracy.
Corruption is an issue that CBP takes extremely seriously,
and we are deeply concerned about our current state. CBP must
ensure its employees adhere to a culture of integrity. Although
the percentage of prosecutions for corruption is very small, no
incident of corruption is tolerated.
Please remember once again the overwhelming majority of CBP
agents and officers perform their duties with honor and
distinction. Those that do not put our country and our fellow
agents and officers at risk.
CBP's Office of Internal Affairs is fully committed to
working in a cooperative and collaborative relationship with
the FBI, DHS Office of Inspector General, Immigration and
Customs Enforcement's Office of Professional Responsibility,
and others to address all integrity-related issues within CBP.
This layered approach we believe is the appropriate response to
a multidimensional attack by those wishing to compromise our
workforce.
Placing the investigative resources of those agencies and
our other key partners in the environment of the FBI-led Border
Corruption Task Force (BCTF) facilitates the effective and
efficient sharing of information and resources. The BCTFs also
serve to deconflict investigations and enhance agent and
officer safety issues and also assure that those cases
presented for prosecution include all available evidence.
Today CBP Office of Internal Affairs manages a wide array
of integrity- and security-related functions or programs that
combine to form, again, what you referred to as our
comprehensive integrity strategy. This includes the three
pillars of prevention, detection, and investigation--three
initiatives that we believe are inextricably intertwined.
Prevention, which is the prevention of bad people from
entering CBP, we hope to accomplish through a combination of
background investigations and the strategic application of the
standard Federal law enforcement pre-employment polygraph
examination, detection of bad people who have found their way
into our workforce through a combination of research and all
available information within the organization, and a careful
analysis of our employees' behavior that may very well suggest
integrity problems. Also, the use of periodic reinvestigations
is a vital tool in the detection of corruption. Investigation
of those bad people that have found their way into our
workforce is accomplished in a partnership with the persons
sitting here at the table with me and others not at this table
but in this room.
Our Investigative Operations Division is comprised of 214
agents deployed to 22 locations currently there investigating
in excess of 900 cases.
Again, I very much appreciate the opportunity to be here
this morning and look forward to answering your questions.
Senator Pryor. Thank you very much. Let me follow up, if I
can, Mr. Tomsheck, with you. I see this Customs and Border
Protection chart we have here, and you can see the numbers have
grown on this chart.\1\ I know there are a lot of good reasons
why those numbers have grown, but my understanding is that the
CBP policy is to do a polygraph on all the applicants.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The chart referred to submitted by Senator Pryor appears in the
Appendix on page 32.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Tomsheck. That is our goal, sir.
Senator Pryor. And my understanding is you are only doing
about 10 percent right now. Is that right?
Mr. Tomsheck. That is accurate. At this point we concluded
calendar year 2009 testing closer to 15 percent of the
applicant pool. That occurred because near the end of the year
there was a dramatic decline in the size of the applicant pool.
We are unable to deploy any additional polygraph examiners or
agent polygraph examiners, but there were substantially fewer
applicants to be tested in the final weeks of calendar year
2009.
Senator Pryor. And is the polygraphing a resource issue for
you?
Mr. Tomsheck. It is, sir.
Senator Pryor. And of those who are polygraphed, what
percentage are found unsuitable for service?
Mr. Tomsheck. Approximately 60 percent.
Senator Pryor. Sixty percent. Can we extrapolate from that,
if there is 90 or even 85 percent of the folks that are on this
chart that have not been polygraphed, maybe 60 percent of them
might not pass the polygraph if they took the test?
Mr. Tomsheck. We and others have done that analysis,
Senator, and reached the same conclusion, that many of those
persons hired during CBP's hiring initiatives who did not take
a standard Federal law enforcement pre-employment polygraph
exam may very well have entered into our workforce despite the
fact that they were unsuitable.
Senator Pryor. What can we do to address that with those
employees now?
Mr. Tomsheck. Again, it is our goal to reach that point
that we are doing 100 percent polygraph screening of all of our
applicant pool as soon as possible.
Senator Pryor. How long will it take you to get to that
goal?
Mr. Tomsheck. At this point we are unable to expand our
polygraph program beyond where it currently is staffed with 31
agent examiners. It would require substantially more examiners
to be certain that we would have adequate resources to screen
just for that hiring that may occur by virtue of attrition
within our workforce.
Senator Pryor. Do you know how many more examiners you
would need?
Mr. Tomsheck. Approximately 50.
Senator Pryor. And would those have to be full-time, or
could you do them on a contract basis to get rid of the
backlog?
Mr. Tomsheck. We would have to utilize full-time employees
to accomplish those polygraph exams. There are fairly rigid
requirements associated with not allowing contractors to test
full-time government employees or law enforcement applicants.
Senator Pryor. OK. That 60-percent number is alarming to
me.
Mr. Tomsheck. It is to me as well, sir.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Perkins, let me ask you, what Federal
agencies have been targeted for infiltration? You all have
covered this, but I just want to hear it again. My
understanding is maybe the FBI, DEA, TSA, ICE, as well as CBP.
Are there others that have been targeted for infiltration?
Mr. Perkins. I cannot speak directly to which other
agencies may have been infiltrated. I know speaking from the
FBI's perspective, we are constantly on the lookout for outside
on this--whether it is foreign government or a drug-trafficking
organization or anything along those lines trying to infiltrate
our ranks. We have fairly robust procedures in place involving
polygraphs and the like. All of our special agents are required
to maintain a top secret security clearance, which requires 5-
year reinvestigations and the like, which includes a national
security polygraph exam.
While we are constantly on the lookout for that, I do not
have the exact numbers of times attempts have been made to the
Bureau, but I do know that has occurred.
Senator Pryor. I know that we see some of these charts with
how many arrests have been made in these agencies. But one
thing that I think the Subcommittee is trying to get a handle
on is how pervasive is this problem. Whether it be a percentage
or a number, do you have a sense of how pervasive this problem
is?
Mr. Perkins. I can give an example that I think may get to
the answer we need here. It is without a specific number, but
if you look at the actual cases where we have had interdiction,
the Crispin case, in fact, I mentioned in my opening statement.
This individual was paid over $5 million in bribes. So when you
back into that amount, you quickly figure out from a business
standpoint exactly how valuable it is to the drug-trafficking
organizations to get their loads and other things across the
border that they are willing to pay an individual $5 million. I
can extrapolate from that to say it is significantly pervasive.
Senator Pryor. And in the Crispin case, I guess that is a
Mr. Crispin.
Mr. Perkins. Miss.
Senator Crispin. Miss Crispin.
Mr. Perkins. Margarita Crispin.
Senator Pryor. What was her job title? What did she do?
Mr. Perkins. She was a CBP officer, and essentially what
she was able to do was clear vehicles coming through her
checkpoint without inspection, knowing ahead of time which
vehicles they were, which ones to wave through, and these
vehicles were able to get into the country with no inspection
at all.
Senator Pryor. And do you know how long that went on before
she was caught?
Mr. Frost. Senator, that went on for many years. Prior to
2003, she was suspected of being involved in smuggling
operations. Additionally, Martha Garnica was an El Paso police
officer we believe was also recruited to further the smuggling
scheme by becoming a customs officer.
Senator Pryor. Well, Mr. Tomsheck, on this chart,\1\ I
think you mentioned that you have had 102 or 103 arrests, and I
think that chart reflects that at CBP. Does a chart like this
tell the whole story? I know you have some investigations, you
have some arrests, but does it--can we look at that chart and
say that this problem is getting worse and that this is
something that if we do not get on top of--we already have a
major problem, but it is about to get out of control?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The chart referenced by Senator Pryor appears in the Appendix
on page 34.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Tomsheck. Senator, I believe that excellent chart,
which I think was created by the ICE Office of Professional
Responsibility, is a good insight as to what our current state
actually is. It reflects the number of those persons who have
actually been arrested by DHS-OIG, FBI, and other agencies
participating in a collaborative way to accomplish that. But
those are the persons that have been arrested. Those are the
ones that we came to be aware of.
Our grave concerns are how many other persons are in our
workforce, how many other persons have gained access to our
workforce through the hiring initiatives that are not recorded
by that chart. But the chart would be a good indicator of how
many might be in our workforce.
Senator Pryor. Let me ask about your impression of this--I
know there is no empirical data on this, but is your impression
that there is a bigger problem with the new hires, that people
may be intentionally trying to infiltrate and go in and try to
do this on behalf of the cartels? Or is it the existing
workforce, people out in the field right now that just over
time get corrupted?
Mr. Tomsheck. I think both of those scenarios are true,
Chairman Pryor. The reality of it is we know from our analysis
of those persons that have been arrested, at the beginning of
my assignment at CBP, which began in June 2006, the vast
majority of those persons arrested had nearly 10 years of
service. Those numbers began to change significantly as CBP's
hiring initiatives came about. We see a bimodal universe of the
data at this point where there are two groups of persons being
charged with corruption. They include both the more senior
person who had been recruited, but they also include persons
who clearly came to CBP solely for the purpose of being corrupt
and taking advantage of the authorities they have as a CBP
employee, a CBP law enforcement officer to further their pre-
existing involvement in a criminal organization.
The polygraph program, also, and the careful review of the
information we obtain through the interviews following the exam
has given us an insight to the number of persons who may have
seized on our hiring initiatives to gain access to CBP.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Perkins mentioned the Crispin case, and
he mentioned a figure of $5 million. What is typical? How much
money does it take to corrupt a Border Patrol officer?
Mr. Tomsheck. Well, I am afraid, be it Border Patrol agents
or CBP officers, we find that some are willing to compromise
their authorities and sell out their allegiance to those that
would harm our country in any way they can and harm our fellow
agents in any way they can for remarkably small amounts of
money.
At the same time, some of the employees are determined to
be corrupt, appear to have done so only after having been
asked--or offered vast sums of money similar to what Ms.
Crispin was determined to have taken.
There is a wide array of what makes somebody decide to
become corrupt.
Senator Pryor. And we have talked about the polygraphs, but
also, as I understand it, CBP and all Federal law enforcement
agencies do a periodic reinvestigation background check on
their current employees as well. I think it depends on the
agency and the status of the employee. But how are there in
terms of your checking the workforce you have in place right
now?
Mr. Tomsheck. To be honest, Chairman Pryor, we are
challenged to keep up with the pace of the periodic
reinvestigations that are required once every 5 years for a
person in a sensitive position, as our CBP law enforcement
officers. We have a backlog of periodic reinvestigations at
this point, are doing everything we can to both improve the
quality of those investigations while at the same time keep
pace with the numbers that come due every year.
Senator Pryor. OK. The two words you mentioned are
``challenged'' and ``backlogged.'' Give me a sense of how far
behind you are, whether that is a percentage or a number or
amount of years. How far behind are you on the periodic
background checks?
Mr. Tomsheck. Today over 10,000 of our employees are
overdue to have their periodic reinvestigation concluded. By
the end of this calendar year, there will be an additional
9,000 of our law enforcement officers who are due to have their
periodic reinvestigations updated, conducted. And it is an
excellent tool to detect corruption in the workforce.
Senator Pryor. And how many do you think you will be able
to get done this year?
Mr. Tomsheck. At this point our current budget situation
does not allow for us to hopefully reach that 19,000 number.
The goal is to accomplish as many as we can. If we are able to
accomplish half, that may be what our budget situation
currently allows for this calendar year.
Senator Pryor. Half of the 19,000.
Mr. Tomsheck. Yes. Some of that answer resides in how many
persons are hired by CBP for the remainder of this calendar
year.
Senator Pryor. Right.
Mr. Tomsheck. The same personnel security resources that do
background investigations for new employees conduct those
periodic reinvestigations. If we do hire substantially in this
calendar year for attrition, we will have to divert some of
those resources from periodic reinvestigations to do new
applicant or new employee background investigations.
Senator Pryor. Do you have a sense of what your oldest
backlog is? In other words, if you have 19,000, are you 2, 3, 4
years behind on some people? Or do you know?
Mr. Tomsheck. That was the case at the beginning of this
fiscal year because the hiring of CBP employees decreased
drastically. In the last 3 months of calendar 2009, we were
able to address some of those oldest periodic reinvestigations,
and those were investigations that were a year or 18 months
overdue.
Senator Pryor. And I will ask a similar question as I did
with the polygraph. How many employees do you get that do not
pass one of these periodic background checks?
Mr. Tomsheck. A small number of the periodic
reinvestigations, actually less than 1 percent of the period
reinvestigations, as they are conducted today, detect
significant integrity issues.
Senator Pryor. And you said ``as they are conducted today''
because you indicated that you might also need to improve the
quality and the thoroughness of the background checks?
Mr. Tomsheck. We would like to see the periodic
reinvestigations evolve into a continuous monitoring scenario,
the never-ending background investigation, if you will. We
would like to have the resources to continuously monitor our
workforce, increasing and decreasing the intensity of that
personnel security investigation, depending on what that
employee is doing, what their assignment is, whether they are
assigned to a high-risk environment, whether there is any
information received that might indicate there is an integrity
issue.
Senator Pryor. OK. Do you have a sense of how many new
personnel you would have to have in order to get to the level
that you need to be?
Mr. Tomsheck. Right now the vast majority of our background
investigations and periodic reinvestigations are conducted by
contractors. We recently had to reduce the staffing of rehired
annuitants that were dedicated to personnel or to periodic
reinvestigations. To maintain our own investigative source and
to eliminate the use of contractors would require several
hundred individuals dedicated to doing periodic
reinvestigations.
Unfortunately, we just had to furlough or relieve of their
duties 99 of our persons that were rehired annuitants, retired
former FBI agents, DEA agents, Secret Service agents, ICE,
customs agents who were re-employed dedicated to doing periodic
reinvestigations. Unfortunately, last pay period we had to
release 99 of them--temporarily, hopefully.
Senator Pryor. And that is because of budget issues?
Mr. Tomsheck. It is, sir.
Senator Pryor. OK. Mr. Perkins, we talked about these task
forces or multiagency meetings that you have. Could you tell
the Subcommittee a little bit more about that, please?
Mr. Perkins. Certainly. Yes, Senator. Presently we have 12
Border Corruption Task Forces established. What these are,
these are operational entities that involve agents from the
agencies sitting here at the table as well as the
Transportation Security Administration. They work up and down
the Southwest border--and not only there, but they are also on
the Northern border of the country. They work specifically
cases involving corruption along the border, particularly the
Southwest border, obviously involving drug trafficking, but,
really, whatever else might come along, whether it is State,
Federal, local law enforcement individuals, members of CBP, or
the like. These turned out to be very--we are trying to stay
ahead of the curve as much as we can. We enjoy probably--in all
the task force operations the Bureau is in that I oversee on
the criminal side, these are among the best as far as
cooperative efforts, sharing of information, and people working
together along the border. We are looking to expand those to
other points of entry around the United States, but right now
we are focusing on the Southwest border.
Senator Pryor. How often do they meet face to face? Or is
this more of just a conference call meeting?
Mr. Perkins. No. These are actually collocated physical
space investigators.
Senator Pryor. OK. Good. And is it your experience that by
them sharing information and being around each other and
spending a lot of time with each other that they actually--the
Federal side is helping the State side and the county is
helping the Federal side?
Mr. Perkins. Without a doubt. It is vital to have those
types of relationships to leverage the resources each one of us
can bring to the table, the various expertise each one of us
can bring to the table, and the information sharing that comes
there also. Without a doubt, that is vital.
Senator Pryor. I know this isn't the focus of this hearing,
but in those task forces, are you seeing evidence of State and
local corruption as well?
Mr. Perkins. Yes, sir, that is the case. And, in fact, one
of the things we are trying to do with everybody's budgets--we
have to work and live within them. Recently in the 2010
appropriation we were able to receive additional bodies to
fight gang violence across the United States. So instead of
parsing these out across the United States in little pieces, we
decided to go where we thought we could make a major impact,
and we went to the Southwest border, and we queried our SACs,
our agents in charge, to provide proposals to us so that we
could place, for instance, an entire squad--eight agents, an
intelligence analyst, staffing, and the like--into a field
office to address a particular issue.
What we wanted them to do was, one, have something to do
with gang violence; two, have some tie into public corruption
along those lines; three, have something to do with money
laundering. So it was kind of a joint, across-the-stovepipes
effort.
We have identified two of the three offices where we are
going to select those squads right now and go forward. So we
are trying to use that type of information that not only
addresses gang violence in these areas but addresses State and
local corruption along the border also.
Senator Pryor. This next question might be a little bit
sensitive, and if you cannot answer it, I understand. But one
of the concerns when you hear a story about this, about
corruption on the border and some problems with drugs, guns,
money, etc., coming in and out, would be terrorism. Are you
seeing any evidence of terrorists tapping into this and coming
into the country?
Mr. Perkins. I think what we are trying to identify, you
step back and you look at individuals, if they are willing to
wave a carload of marijuana or cocaine or illegal aliens
through, why wouldn't they be willing to wave through a known
terrorist or even perhaps some components to an improvised
explosive device of some type? It is all the same to us. That
is why we are trying to focus on this as seriously as we are to
address these issues.
If you recall back, I mean, history shows--it was on the
Northern border when components attempted to smuggle in back
during the millennium, back in 2000, an explosive device into
the country. At that point that was successfully interdicted.
So while I am not saying that--we are prepared for that. We
suspect that is possible, and we are trying to do what we can
with this effort to interdict those potentialities.
Senator Pryor. Thank you very much.
Mr. Frost, let me do a little follow-up with you. We have
talked about Customs and Border Protection. Can you give us a
sense, though, of ICE and TSA and other agencies in terms of
the frequency of corruption or the scope and nature of it?
Mr. Frost. Well, the numbers for ICE and CBP are quite
different, but also their mission is different and their
numbers of employees are different. Probably the--they are
right about half, if you look at arrests and case openings and
case investigations. But ICE also includes the element of ICE
that deals with detainees, alien detainees, and transport of
those individuals.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) is probably,
from a homeland security investigation standpoint, our area of
most concern. Immigration benefits are such a valuable
commodity to enemies of the United States, whether they are
drug-trafficking organizations or other persons that would do
us harm. And the ability of lower-level employees to make
decisions on immigration benefits is disproportionate, similar,
I would say, to CBP's authorities at the border where you have
your average employee who is making decisions about whether
someone could come in the country. Certainly with immigration
benefits, the impact is even more lasting and profound.
Senator Pryor. Do you have a sense of how these agents in
the various agencies, are being penetrated and corrupted? How
do they go from Point A to Point B in terms of being corrupted?
Mr. Frost. Well, we have looked at kind of comparing it to
the espionage-related corruption techniques where organized
criminal groups actually look for vulnerable employees, and it
may be someone that they already have a social relationship
with. People down on the Southwest border like to say that to
them the river is just a river. There is a lot of commerce,
family, and other interaction between people on both sides of
the border. And the same is true on the Canadian border where
DHS employees often go to have meals or entertainment or just
for tourism.
So recruiters try and target people that are vulnerable or
people that they know, people who are willing to talk about
their work. And then they assess those people, and they look
for those who have obvious vulnerabilities, who may be prone to
infidelity or alcohol abuse. And then they target them and
begin a relationship, a further relationship that starts with
small favors and expands until they are committed to these
levels of corruption that we believe are in some cases
traitorous.
Senator Pryor. There again, that is very concerning. So
besides polygraphs and background checks that are supposed to
happen every 5 years, what do you do to try to monitor your
workforce in all your various agencies?
Mr. Frost. Well, within the Department there are internal
affairs components, both with CBP, ICE/OPR, Secret Service,
TSA, Coast Guard, and we work closely with those internal
affairs components to monitor those administrative-type cases.
Senator from, I think, all of our perspectives,
administrative-type cases are important tells, if you will, of
employee misconduct. You know, a leaking faucet starts with a
drip, and the first sign of corruption is not generally when
someone is knee deep and already involved with an organization.
Senator Pryor. Which, really also raises another question
that we have not talked about, and that is, Mexico's commitment
to thwarting the efforts of these cartels. This is really just
for the panel at large, anyone who wants to answer. But what is
your sense of Mexico's commitment, Mexico's level of
determination to get these cartels under control and break them
up, however they do that under Mexican law? What is your sense
of their commitment level?
Mr. Perkins. Speaking from the Bureau's perspective, we
have a very good relationship with our colleagues on the
Mexican side through our legal attache in the embassy and
through other agents who are actually stationed and work in
Mexico. Really, for the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Drug
Enforcement Administration has the lead in working those
matters, but we do receive a great deal of cooperation from the
Mexican Government.
Obviously, of late, a number of leaders of various drug-
trafficking organizations have either been captured or killed
within the last 6 months, which has caused somewhat of a
destabilization in the area down there. That is kind of sorting
itself out right now, and I know the Mexican Government is
attempting to push harder and try to further destabilize these
organizations and break them into components that can be dealt
with directly.
But from the Bureau's standpoint, we enjoy a very good
relationship with the Mexican Government in the sharing of
information.
Senator Pryor. Great.
Mr. Frost. Mr. Perkins is, I think, very correct that the
level of violence, our understanding from our DEA law
enforcement partners and ICE, who all have human intelligence
assets wherever they can get them down there, the level of
violence down there is very bad, and it causes the local
government closest to the border to make some very difficult
decisions about at what level and how they can cooperate with
us in trying to stem this smuggling.
Senator Pryor. Well, and I assume that a pretty healthy
amount of drugs are smuggled in via air. Is that right as well?
Or do they all come in vehicles over the road?
Mr. Perkins. I think it is a combination of all--land, sea,
and air--on that. The exact percentages I do not have with me.
Senator Pryor. One of the questions I have--and this is
more of an internal question--is I know you have IGs and you
have Internal Affairs and you have different agencies that may
have different structures and different personalities and
missions and turf. How are the agencies doing in your view, Mr.
Frost? How are the agencies doing internally in terms of making
sure that these cases are being handled properly within the
agency and if they need to work with another agency, that is
being done and there is cooperation? How is that going
internally?
Mr. Frost. Well, I think we are making great strides there.
You know, we have to recall that the Department of Homeland
Security is pretty new still, relatively. And we are continuing
to define our roles within the Department.
The good news, the best news of this is that we all want
the same thing. We are all dedicated to stopping this and to
locking up the bad guys, and I am very confident that minor
issues between agencies are things that will always occur and
that we will always be able to work it out as long as we have
that same goal.
Senator Pryor. Mr. Tomsheck, do you have any comment on
that?
Mr. Tomsheck. I would, Senator. I think we need to continue
to work really hard at working better together at each and
every level. Previously, I mentioned the FBI-led Border
Corruption Task Forces. I think having all of the agencies
involved, working well in that environment, is the right
response. I think working in genuine full partnerships in an
atmosphere where you know there is redundant verification that
information is being shared, that all available resources are
being brought to bear in a coordinated way, is the only way
forward.
I believe all of us sitting at the table and ICE/OPR and
other agencies need to bring to bear all of our resources
working in a highly collaborative way. I have concerns that at
the end of the day, resources being what they are in all of
those agencies, if we are working in a perfectly harmonious
way, we still may be short of what is needed.
Senator Pryor. OK. So still work to be done there, then.
Mr. Tomsheck. I believe it is something we need to
continually work at.
Senator Pryor. Now, I think almost everybody has mentioned
here that you may need more resources, especially you, Mr.
Tomsheck. You talked about at CBP you need more resources in
terms of polygraph, etc.
Aside from resources, can you all think of any changes in
the law, any changes in legislation that would help this? Or do
you see this as pretty much just a resource issue?
Mr. Tomsheck. Senator, I believe having the authority to
require polygraph examinations as part of the periodic
reinvestigation process would be helpful. I do not know that we
would necessarily administer periodic polygraph examinations to
everyone in the CBP workforce, but do it on a strategic basis
when we deem it is appropriate and necessary based on the
degree of risk this employee may pose, based on their
assignment, the nature of their duties, and other information
that the periodic reinvestigation may have developed. We do not
have that authority, and I think that is something that would
be enormously beneficial.
Senator Pryor. Good. Thank you. Anybody else on that?
Mr. Perkins. I would just say at this point we are
confident that we have the tools to move forward, but I will
leave it also in the fact that I meet regularly, if not
multiple times a week, with the Assistant Attorney General for
Criminal Division, Lanny Breuer, at the Department of Justice,
and these matters are always on the table and always being
discussed, and I would defer to the Department on those
matters. But for the time being, I believe we have the tools in
place.
Senator Pryor. OK. Well, that is encouraging, but please
check back with us if you find something else, and the same for
the other two witnesses.
We are going to keep the record open for 15 days, and there
will be some other questions from other Subcommittee Members
who got caught up at hearings or down on the floor, because we
have a busy floor schedule this week.
I guess I would be remiss if I did not mention before we
leave here that the vast majority of your agents and employees
do a great job and they are not corrupt and they are out there
putting their lives on the line every day to try to keep
America secure. And we cannot forget them, and we cannot paint
everybody with too broad of a brush here. But I do think that
we have a very serious problem here that we need to address,
and I think it is largely a resource issue. There may be a few
changes in the law that we can make here or there to make this
better.
But I really want to thank all of you for coming today and
being part of this hearing. I think you have helped us as a
Subcommittee to understand the scope and nature of the problem.
I think you have helped us identify some practical approaches
to solve this and gave us a snapshot of where we are, and I
think that is very helpful.
But I will say this: I do think that this is something that
is critically important that we address and address very
quickly and thoroughly and do it in the right way. So I think I
can speak for the whole Subcommittee and the whole Committee
and probably the whole Senate in saying that we need to
prioritize this and help you all solve this, because we are on
very dangerous ground here with corruption within our Federal
law enforcement agencies.
So we will continue to work with you on this, and we would
really appreciate your ideas, your suggestions, your
recommendations, other people that we can talk to help us get a
better feel for how we can address this, because it is a very
serious need.
But with that, what I will do is we will leave the record
open for 15 days, and if other Senators have questions, which I
know some will, we would love to get those back from you within
the next 15 days.
Unless there is something else, I will go ahead and close,
but thank you very much for all your participation, your
preparation, and your presence here today. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 12:06 p.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
