[House Hearing, 111 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE: CAN IT OVERCOME PAST PROBLEMS
AND CHART A NEW DIRECTION?
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING
THREATS, CYBERSECURITY,
AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 30, 2010
__________
Serial No. 111-84
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
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2011
__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, Chairman
Loretta Sanchez, California Peter T. King, New York
Jane Harman, California Lamar Smith, Texas
Peter A. DeFazio, Oregon Daniel E. Lungren, California
Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of Mike Rogers, Alabama
Columbia Michael T. McCaul, Texas
Zoe Lofgren, California Charles W. Dent, Pennsylvania
Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas Gus M. Bilirakis, Florida
Henry Cuellar, Texas Paul C. Broun, Georgia
Christopher P. Carney, Pennsylvania Candice S. Miller, Michigan
Yvette D. Clarke, New York Pete Olson, Texas
Laura Richardson, California Anh ``Joseph'' Cao, Louisiana
Ann Kirkpatrick, Arizona Steve Austria, Ohio
Ben Ray Lujan, New Mexico Tom Graves, Georgia
Bill Pascrell, Jr., New Jersey
Emanuel Cleaver, Missouri
Al Green, Texas
James A. Himes, Connecticut
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio
Dina Titus, Nevada
William L. Owens, New York
Vacancy
Vacancy
I. Lanier Avant, Staff Director
Rosaline Cohen, Chief Counsel
Michael Twinchek, Chief Clerk
Robert O'Connor, Minority Staff Director
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY
Yvette D. Clarke, New York, Chairwoman
Loretta Sanchez, California Daniel E. Lungren, California
Mary Jo Kilroy, Ohio Paul C. Broun, Georgia
William L. Owens, New York Steve Austria, Ohio
Vacancy Peter T. King, New York (Ex
Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi (Ex Officio)
Officio)
Dr. Chris Beck, Staff Director (Interim)
Ryan Caldwell, Clerk
Coley O'Brien, Minority Subcommittee Lead
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Yvette D. Clark, a Representative in Congress From
the State of New York, and Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Emerging
Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology............. 1
The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren, a Representative in Congress
From the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology:
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
Witness
Mr. Warren M. Stern, Director, Domestic Nuclear Detection Office,
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
THE DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE: CAN IT OVERCOME PAST PROBLEMS
AND CHART A NEW DIRECTION?
----------
Thursday, September 30, 2010
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and
Science and Technology,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:20 p.m., in
Room 311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Yvette D. Clarke
[Chairwoman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Clarke and Lungren.
Ms. Clarke [presiding]. The subcommittee is meeting today
to receive testimony on, ``The Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office: Can It Overcome Past Problems and Chart a New
Direction?''
Good morning. I want to thank the Members of the committee
and our witnesses for being here at this very important
hearing.
This subcommittee meets today to welcome Mr. Warren Stern
as the new director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. I
think it bears emphasizing that the title of today's hearing
is, ``The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office: Can It Overcome
Past Problems and Chart a New Direction?''
That pretty much sums it up, Mr. Stern. DNDO is tasked with
arguably one of the most important National security missions
there is--prevention of nuclear terrorism.
There are many facets to the mission. DNDO is responsible
for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, our overall
National strategy for locating and interdicting illicit nuclear
materials in this country. This means working with the
Department, across agencies, with the White House, with
Congress, and with international partners to find, deter, and
prevent nuclear smuggling.
You are the coordinator of the National Technical Nuclear
Forensics Center, focused on attribution of nuclear materials
and devices. You are responsible for supporting the operational
entities within the Department, such as CBP, the Coast Guard,
and the Secret Service, in carrying out their mission to stop
terrorists with weapons of mass destruction. You are
responsible for developing, procuring, and deploying cutting
edge technologies to support these missions.
The DNDO has had some low-profile successes and high-
profile failures in all of these areas. As we on this panel
know, that is sometimes the nature of public service. Despite
the challenges that DNDO faces, I would like to commend you,
Mr. Stern, for your dedication to your duty to protect this
country, as evidenced by your willingness to take on this
difficult task within a Department that is still in transition.
While I do assume that you understand full well that you
have a lot of work to do and a lot of problems that need to be
fixed, it is my responsibility as the chair of the subcommittee
to remind you of those problems and the work you need to do
nonetheless.
The Advanced Spectroscopic Portal, as one major example,
has morphed from a promising technology offering the hope of
improved security and commercial efficiency to a symbol of
failure for your office. You have to bring that program to a
satisfactory conclusion, one way or another, in the very near
future. Your credibility and the future success of DNDO depend
on it.
There are many other topics that I look forward to
discussing with you, and I once again thank you for being here
this afternoon.
I would like to welcome today as our sole witness Mr.
Warren Stern, the director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office at the Department of Homeland Security. Mr. Stern served
as the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA,
incident and emergency center from August 2006 to March 2010,
where he led international efforts to prepare for and respond
to nuclear and radiation emergencies and helped create the
IAEA's response assistance network.
Prior to that, Mr. Stern served as a fellow in Senator
Hillary Clinton's office in 2003, providing guidance on nuclear
energy, waste, safety, and security issues, and helping to
write the Dirty Bomb Prevention Act, and went on to serve as
the Department of State's senior coordinator for nuclear safety
and deputy director of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Safety,
and Security.
Mr. Stern began his career in 1985 at the Central
Intelligence Agency, then served as the senior technical
advisor in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, where
he advised senior U.S. officials on nonproliferation and
nuclear security issues from July 1990 until May 1999.
Without objection, the witness' full statement will be
inserted in the record. I now----
Mr. Stern, if you will just indulge us just for one moment,
my colleague, the Ranking Member of the committee, as you can
see, has made a timely arrival just in time to give his
statement, and so I would like to give him the opportunity to
do so before you get into your statement.
The Chairwoman now recognizes the Ranking Member of the
subcommittee, the gentleman from California, Mr. Lungren, for
an opening statement.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. I am
sorry. I apologize. I did not mean any disrespect to the
Chairwoman or to our speaker.
I was engaged in another meeting and this thing has frozen
up on me so many times that I should have been paying attention
and did not check the time myself as things were going on.
Simple statement--I meant to be here. My apologies.
If I could just submit my statement for the record?
Ms. Clarke. So ordered.
[The statement of Mr. Lungren follows:]
Prepared Statement of Ranking Member Daniel E. Lungren
September 30, 2010
Thank you Chairwoman Clarke for scheduling this important hearing
on what I believe is the most serious issue facing our Nation--a
nuclear or radiological attack in our Homeland.
The Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) was established to
help our country avoid such a tragedy by improving our detection
capabilities and preventing a nuclear device or its radiological
materials from being smuggled into the country.
This on-going threat was the reason DNDO was established in 2005 to
develop a global and domestic nuclear detection architecture and
thereby prevent a nuclear incident. The Office has an extremely
difficult mission--to detect and prevent nuclear materials from
illicitly entering our borders.
In pursuit of this mission, DNDO embarked on an aggressive program
to develop the next generation radiation detection portal monitors--the
Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Monitors (ASP). These monitors positioned
at our ports of entry were expected to not only detect nuclear
materials, as the existing PVT monitors now do, but also identify the
type of radioactive material that was being smuggled. ASP technology,
if proven to identify radioactive materials at our ports of entry,
would be a significant improvement over existing systems by minimizing
missed threats and false alarms. After 5 years of testing, the
Secretary announced last February, because of cost and performance
problems, that ASP will be limited to secondary screening only. Our
taxpayers have made a huge investment in this technology and we were
told--it's not yet ready for primary screening, if ever.
Unfortunately, this isn't the only example of mismanaged technology
development programs at DNDO. The Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography
System (CAARS) was also initiated in 2005 but cancelled in 2007 because
of poor planning and oversight. DNDO failed to effectively communicate
with its CBP client over the operation limitations that would be placed
on these machines. The CAARS machines would not fit within the existing
inspection lanes at CBP ports of entry.
Director Stern, you have a very critical job--to develop a domestic
nuclear detection defense for our Nation. As a result of what appear to
be earlier mismanaged opportunities, we have failed to significantly
improve our domestic nuclear detection capability. I know this didn't
occur on your watch, but these management deficiencies are jeopardizing
the American people and must be eliminated. While we all want the very
best technology, we cannot ignore the planning, testing, and oversight
necessary to develop those technologies. Your first responsibility,
Director Stern, should be to restore the best management and
development practices to DNDO. This should help DNDO produce the most
affordable and innovative radiological monitors we need and desire.
I look forward to your testimony.
Ms. Clarke. So, without any further delay we now will hear
from Mr. Stern.
STATEMENT OF WARREN M. STERN, DIRECTOR, DOMESTIC NUCLEAR
DETECTION OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Stern. Thank you, and good afternoon, Chairwoman Clarke
and Ranking Member Lungren.
To the Ranking Member, I am very impressed with your
temporal precision, but I look forward to working with both of
you and the rest of the committee in the future.
As the Chairwoman noted, I am the new director of the
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office within the Department of
Homeland Security. I appreciate the opportunity to speak today
to testify to you, to answer your questions, to hear your
concerns, and so share my vision for the office in the future.
As a result of our dialogue today I hope you will conclude
that, in fact, we are now headed in the right direction.
As you noted, DNDO's mandate is to improve the Nation's
capability to detect and respond to illicit movement,
possession, storage of nuclear and illicit radioactive
material. We have accomplished a lot, and as you, Chairwoman,
noted, some of our problems have received a lot of attention
and some of our successes have received very little.
So this afternoon I would like to acknowledge some of the
challenges we have had in the past. I would like to first
address some of the issues that your staff has told me you are
most interested in, but also say a few words about some of our
successes.
I understand that you are interested, in particular, in the
Advanced Spectroscopic Portal device, the CAARS program, and
the status of our strategic plan for the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture, so I will address those those briefly--
first, and briefly.
Regarding the ASP, we are currently implementing
operational and field validation testing with CBP. We expect
these to be done early next year and we hope to, as you
suggested, be, in essence, done with the development phase of
the program sometime later next year. This will include after
the operation and field testing there will be a cost-benefit
analysis completed, which will then be presented to the
Acquisitions Review Board within the Department of Homeland
Security, and assuming ARB agrees with our recommendation it
will go to the Secretary of Homeland Security for her decision
on certification.
Just a quick note, and as we earlier notified Congress, our
intention is to seek certification for the use of the ASP in
secondary and no longer in primary inspection measures. This
relates to the concept of operations used by CBP and their
inspections, and we have discovered through extensive testing
that in secondary position it yields--the device yields a great
benefit over the current technology, whereas in a primary
inspection it does not. So we will be seeking certification in
secondary.
Regarding the CAARS program, which I think has received a
lot of attention since--in particular since our hearing on the
Senate side, I would like to inform you today that the CAARS
program will end essentially now. The technology that has been
developed and may be useful in other programs will be migrated
to those other programs, but the program known as CAARS will
terminate.
On the strategic plan, we are working closely with our
interagency partners so that we can have a complete and useful
strategic plan for the Global Nuclear Detection Architecture
delivered to Congress by the end of this year. All U.S.
agencies and DHS components that have a role are participating.
I have received a lot of support from each of the agencies and
I have no doubt that we will, in fact, complete this report in
time and it will guide our efforts into the future.
The strategic plan is just that. It is a very high-level
document that will address such issues as our mission,
agreement on what the architecture actually is, where it begins
and where it ends, what our objectives, what our goals are,
what are metrics we can use to achieve those goals? Likely it
will include also roles and responsibilities of each of the
agencies. Subsequently, we will be developing more detailed
implementation plans, written definitions of the architecture
in technical detail, but these will all fall under the umbrella
of the strategic plan.
Again, as you noted, some of our problems have received a
lot of attention; some of our successes have not. The ASP, the
CAARS program, and the strategic plan are all very important in
their own right but they should not be seen as a definition for
DNDO. We have developed, over the years, a world-class testing
and development program that other countries look to for
assistance in their testing and development programs, and this
testing program exists at a number of the U.S. laboratories.
We have conducted over 48 separate, very high-definition
tests within our program the last several years. We have
trained State and local officials and, with other agencies,
have succeeded in educating over 15,000 State and local
officials throughout the country, and we have a number of
programs related to supporting State and local officials.
We have deployed, with Customs and Border Protection,
nearly 15,000 portal monitors at our borders. We have, with
also CBP, nearly 3,000 handheld detectors. We have supported
over 25 TSA VIPR teams and radiation monitors.
With the Coast Guard we have supported deployment of over
6,500 detectors and we have helped the development of radiation
detection capabilities in 39 different regions within the
United States. As you noted also, we have the role of
coordinating technical nuclear forensics development within the
United States, and that capability is looked to, again, by
other countries and by other U.S. agencies.
So the programs that have received the most attention are
important. We are doing what we can to turn those around and to
terminate the ones that should be terminated, but we have also
accomplished a lot in the past 5 years.
But, as you noted, I am also new and I have my own views on
where we should go, and I do believe that we can turn our
efforts in a slightly different direction. I see the specific
path forward as completing the near-term programs that have
received so much attention.
We hope next year to complete the ASP--the development
phase of the ASP program and made a decision on whether to
deploy or not. We, as I mentioned, will terminate the CAARS
program; and we will complete the strategic plan of the Global
Nuclear Detection Architecture. But in order to move beyond
these we have to, as you noted, complete them, and we will.
We also, early next year, will begin to deploy the next
generation of handheld detectors in Customs and Border Patrol,
and a number of other U.S. Government agencies will begin to
use those, and into 2012 we look to deploy technology that will
help to relieve some of the helium-3 shortage issues we have
had in the past.
We will also continue to develop many of the more advanced
technology that you have heard of, so I believe we are at a
turning point and we are beginning to move in the right
direction. In terms of my personal views that will translate
into reality now that I am in DNDO, I believe we need to place
greater emphasis on the architecture--the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture. I am not sure we have done that in the
past.
To me, the architecture for DNDO is a great challenge--our
greatest challenge--but it is also our greatest strength. It is
the one area where we clearly lead and we need to focus more
attention on that, beginning with a strategic plan and, as I
mentioned, developing more detailed documents that can be used
in a rational, logical way to ultimately guide our deployment
into the future.
I also believe that we need to place greater focus on
programs that aid State and local officials. We have certain
assumptions in what we have done regarding how we will
ultimately find threat material, and I think those assumptions
need to change a little bit and we need to begin to look more
within the United States and not just at our borders, and that
means focusing more on supporting State and local officials in
their development of capabilities to detect and respond to
radiation emergencies.
Finally, I think that we intellectually need to look at the
lessons we have learned in the past--not just the procurement
lessons, which I think we have already begun to do in terms of
the large procurement programs like ASP, but also in terms of
how we define our strategy.
We don't have any cases of illicit movement of nuclear
material at U.S. borders or within the United States, but there
are small but significant cases abroad, and I think we need to
look very carefully at how those cases came to be, where the
material came from, and in particular, how they were detected,
and I think those lessons will help us guide the development of
our strategy.
So this concludes my initial prepared statement, Chairwoman
Clarke and Ranking Member Lungren. Again, I appreciate the
opportunity to present it to you, especially on this wet and
windy Washington day. I am very happy to answer any questions
you may have, and I look forward to working with you in the
future.
[The statement of Mr. Stern follows:]
Prepared Statement of Warren M. Stern
September 30, 2010
Good afternoon Chairwoman Clarke, Ranking Member Lungren, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee. As Director for the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Domestic Nuclear Detection
Office (DNDO), I am here today to describe the work we have done at
DNDO to reduce the risk of nuclear terrorism. We know that this mission
is of critical importance to the committee, as it is to the Department
and the Nation. As a result of today's hearing, I hope that you will
agree that DNDO's efforts are increasing our country's security.
DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE
On April 15, 2005, President Bush signed National Security
Presidential Directive-43 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive-
14 directing the Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with
the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Energy, and the Attorney
General, to establish a jointly-staffed, National-level Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) within the Department. Subsequently,
the SAFE Port Act of 2006 formally codified the DNDO and added a
Presidentially-appointed Director.
DNDO's mandate is to improve the Nation's capability to detect and
report unauthorized attempts to import, possess, store, develop, or
transport nuclear or radiological material for use against the Nation,
and to further enhance this capability over time. With assistance and
participation from a wide variety of U.S. Government departments and
agencies, DNDO synchronizes and integrates inter-agency efforts to
develop technical nuclear detection capabilities, characterizes
detector system performance, ensures effective response to detection
alarms, integrates nuclear forensics efforts, coordinates the global
detection architecture and conducts a transformational research and
development program for advanced technology to detect nuclear and
radiological materials.
I would like to take some time to discuss several of our high-
profile programs, including the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal (ASP)
program, the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System (CAARS)
program, and the status of the overarching strategic plan for the
Global Nuclear Detection Architecture (GNDA).
ADVANCED SPECTROSCOPIC PORTAL (ASP) PROGRAM
In 2005, DNDO embarked on an aggressive program to develop the next
generation radiation portal monitor to address key detection gaps. The
ASP program was one such effort; at that time, we set a schedule
without sufficiently accounting for technical risk, which has caused a
number of delays. We have accepted many of the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO) recommendations and have substantially
improved program management and oversight. Under the leadership of the
Under Secretary of Management, the Department has developed Acquisition
Directive 102-01, which gives us greater insight into all acquisition
programs in the Department, and which we have leveraged to
significantly improve the ASP program.
The ASP program is approaching a key decision milestone. DNDO and
CBP are currently working together to resume field testing in October.
Upon successful completion, DHS will finalize the cost-benefit analysis
and proceed to the Acquisition Review Board (ARB). The ARB will make
its recommendation to the Secretary on ASP certification. We continue
to believe that if certification is realized, the ASP deployment will
enhance DHS' capabilities at the border to counter nuclear threats
without impeding the flow of commerce.
It is important to note that we will seek certification for the ASP
in secondary scanning only. While ASP serving in primary scanning was
once considered, ASP's demonstrated performance to date and DNDO's
preliminary cost-benefit analysis suggest ASP would be best utilized in
secondary scanning.
CARGO ADVANCED AUTOMATED RADIOGRAPHY SYSTEM
To complement passive detection systems, DNDO also embarked on an
ambitious program to develop advanced radiography systems. The CAARS
program sought to develop and demonstrate non-intrusive inspection
technology that could automatically identify dense materials used to
shield special nuclear and threat materials in cargo. In 2007, DNDO
recognized that the CAARS technology was not as mature as originally
anticipated. Accordingly, DNDO scaled the program back from an
acquisition program to a research and development program. The CAARS
program is now designed to demonstrate the potential future capability
of the technology through the development and evaluation of prototype
systems.
The CAARS research and development program has nearly reached its
conclusion. While it will not continue, a decision regarding the future
direction of the relevant technology is pending the CAARS final report,
expected later this year. DNDO will use technologies developed in the
program to advance other research and development efforts and will
continue to test commercially available non-intrusive imaging systems.
Development of improved algorithms to address shielded nuclear material
will also continue as part of DNDO's Advanced Cargo Imaging program.
Additional work to build upon what we have learned from the CAARS
technology will be included in DNDO and CBP's participation in the DHS
Science and Technology Directorate's CanScan program.
GNDA STRATEGIC PLAN
One of DNDO's core mandates is to develop a Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture (GNDA). The GNDA is a risk-informed,
multilayered network to detect illicit radiological and nuclear
materials or weapons. This involves interagency and DNDO efforts for
the development and deployment of effective detection solutions within
the United States and abroad, maintaining situational awareness,
working collaboratively and integrating with the intelligence
community, and sharing critical information related to detection.
GAO has highlighted, and Congress has reinforced, that the GNDA
should have a strategic plan to guide its implementation. We agree and
are working with other DHS components to rapidly complete a strategic
plan for the GNDA, with an interagency Assistant Secretary-level
committee providing guidance and oversight. The GNDA Strategic Plan
will be the first important step to define and form the GNDA in the
future, and will include a description, a vision statement, and time-
phased goals, objectives, and performance metrics. The strategic plan
will articulate what the GNDA must accomplish and outline its
development and implementation.
DNDO will complement the GNDA strategic plan with a revised GNDA
annual review report on the Joint Interagency Review of the GNDA, as
required by Congress, which will provide a means to document and track
progress to assist DNDO and the interagency in developing and refining
the GNDA. The GNDA strategic plan and annual report will be jointly
produced and agreed upon by the interagency, enabling a coordinated
implementation of the GNDA.
DNDO PROGRESS
While they are some of the most discussed aspects of our work, ASP,
CAARS, and the GNDA strategic plan do not define DNDO. Under its
mandate to develop a GNDA and implement the domestic nuclear detection
architecture, DNDO has created programs supporting Federal, State, and
local agencies and foreign governments within its core competence of
nuclear detection. At our borders, DNDO works with CBP to deploy
nuclear detection technologies at ports of entry and for the Border
Patrol. Working with our partners, DNDO has executed pilot programs to
evaluate nuclear detection equipment and operations in maritime and
aviation environments. Furthermore, DNDO has produced a world-class
development and testing program for radiation detection systems and has
become a coordinating entity for U.S. Government technical nuclear
forensics efforts. We have made progress in implementing and supporting
the GNDA as follows.
Interior
Building upon the layered structure of the GNDA, DNDO works within
the Nation's borders to develop radiological and nuclear detection
capabilities for urban areas, internal transportation vectors, special
events, and other State and local venues. DNDO works regularly with
Federal, State, local, and Tribal entities to integrate nuclear
detection capabilities in support of the GNDA. Our ``Securing the
Cities'' (STC) initiative, piloted in the New York City (NYC) region,
has brought together law enforcement and first responders to design and
implement a layered architecture for coordinated and integrated
detection and interdiction of illicit nuclear and radiological
materials.
STC involves 13 State and local partners, who represent over 150
jurisdictions in the New York City region, as well as the Department of
Energy, FBI, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The STC pilot
program provides assistance to State and local jurisdictions, which
enable these entities to build and sustain capabilities by: Leveraging
current technologies and deploying them regionally in a coordinated
manner; designing, acquiring, and deploying the components of an
operationally viable regional architecture for radiological/nuclear
detection focused on State and local jurisdictions; developing and
implementing a common, multi-agency concept of operations (CONOPS) for
sharing sensor data and resolving alarms; and instituting training and
exercising by the regional agencies to execute the CONOPS at a high
level of proficiency. Once capabilities are developed, DNDO will assist
regional partners in building a self-supported sustainment model
allowing for real-time sharing of data from fixed, mobile, maritime,
and human portable radiation detection systems. DNDO plans to evaluate
the STC pilot initiative in fiscal year 2011 to assess the detection
capability established in the New York City region and extract the
lessons learned from the pilot. DNDO will continue to support the NYC
region with experienced program management and subject matter experts
in radiological and nuclear detection technologies and operations, and
we will be actively supporting a regional full-scale exercise in 2011.
Within the United States, DNDO works with the Transportation
Security Administration's (TSA) Visible Intermodal Prevention and
Response (VIPR) teams to enhance security on aviation, rail, mass
transit systems, and maritime venues Nation-wide. VIPR teams have
augmented security at key transportation facilities in urban areas
around the country and work with local security and law enforcement
officials to supplement existing security resources, provide detection
capabilities, and a deterrent presence, and introduce an element of
unpredictability to deter and disrupt potential terrorist activities.
Currently, all VIPR teams are equipped with human portable radiological
and nuclear detection systems. Through September 22, 2010, TSA has
conducted 1,219 VIPR operations that have utilized radiological and
nuclear detection equipment.
DNDO's outreach also includes a State and Local Stakeholder Working
Group with 25 States and territories meeting quarterly to bring the
Nation's radiological and nuclear detection community together, inform
participants on activities within DNDO and the community, and obtain
feedback on DNDO's programs and initiatives. DNDO has conducted Nation-
wide radiological and nuclear detection situational awareness briefings
with 52 Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) regions and metropolitan
region emergency responder and law enforcement agencies.
DNDO has also created a Preventive Radiological and Nuclear
Detection Program Management Handbook created for State and local
authorities, which provides consistent guidance for building or
enhancing State and local radiological and nuclear detection programs.
Together with our Federal partners, DNDO provides technical input,
review, evaluation, and developmental improvement to the preventive
radiological and nuclear detection training curriculum. Since 2005,
DNDO has facilitated the training of more than 15,000 law enforcement
officers and public safety professionals in radiological and nuclear
detection operations.
Providing support to the operators of radiological and nuclear
detection equipment is critical to an effective architecture for
detection. The DNDO Joint Analysis Center (JAC) is an interagency
coordination and reporting mechanism and central monitoring point for
the GNDA. The JAC coordinates adjudication of nuclear detection events,
analyzes intelligence and sensor information, and facilitates technical
support for Federal, State, and local authorities. JAC staff partner
with the DHS Office of Intelligence and Analysis to produce relevant
intelligence-based analytical products, and develop linkages to State
and local fusion centers for information sharing.
Ports of Entry
The U.S. border is a key point at which where the United States has
full control over detection and interdiction. DHS has made a
considerable effort at the border to provide comprehensive radiation
detection capabilities with an initial majority of resources
concentrated at ports of entry. DHS has focused on these authorized
pathways at ports of entry, underscored by the SAFE Port Act's
requirement that ``all containers entering the United States through
the 22 ports through which the greatest volume of containers enter the
United States by vessel shall be scanned for radiation.'' A key
consideration is the need to effectively detect threats without
impeding the flow of commerce across the border. In 2005, when DNDO was
first established, there were a total of 552 radiation portal monitors
(RPMs) at our land and seaports of entry. As of this July, there are a
total of 1,426 RPMs. Our on-going work with CBP to facilitate container
security has resulted in the scanning of over 99 percent of all
incoming containerized cargo for radiological and nuclear threats at
our land and seaports of entry. As this work has matured over the last
few years, DNDO has shifted its workforce to place a greater emphasis
on our land borders between ports of entry, maritime, air, and the
interior.
Non-POE Land Border
DNDO has been working on a cooperative effort with the CBP Office
of Border Patrol (OBP) to develop a strategy for deploying a
radiological and nuclear detection capability that is focused on those
areas between the official ports of entry along our land borders. Under
the Phased Deployment Implementation Plan, DNDO and OBP have evaluated
selected radiation detection equipment and their concept of operations.
Indeed, the very presence of BP Officers on the border, performing
their duties with regard to enforcing immigration laws and preventing
smuggling, is a significant defense and deterrent against nuclear
smuggling whether or not they carry radiation detectors. This is an
example of how the normal activities of the Department contribute to
the prevention of nuclear terrorism.
Maritime
In the maritime environment, DNDO has worked closely with the
United States Coast Guard (USCG) and CBP Office of Air and Marine (OAM)
to provide radiological and nuclear detection capabilities. Through the
USCG Joint Acquisition Strategy, DNDO has equipped and trained USCG
boarding teams with detection technologies, and budgeted funds to
recapitalize existing USCG equipment and to acquire newly developed
systems. DNDO has also trained CBP OAM boarding teams and worked to
develop, acquire, and recapitalize CBP equipment.
DNDO has also established the West Coast Maritime Pilot (WCMP) to
work with authorities in Washington's Puget Sound and the San Diego
area to design, field, and evaluate a radiological and nuclear
detection architecture (specific to each region) that reduces the risk
of radiological and nuclear threats that could be illicitly transported
on recreational craft or small commercial vessels. The project develops
radiological and nuclear detection capabilities for public safety
forces to use during routine public safety and maritime enforcement
operations. One immediately recognizable lesson learned of the WCMP is
the value of the Maritime Transportation Security Act creation of Area
Maritime Security Committees (AMSC). WCMP efforts were coordinated
through the respective AMSC in the region, both of which established
subcommittees for the preventive radiological and nuclear detection
mission.
DNDO continues to work with Federal, State, local, and Tribal
participants in support of the WCMP efforts. CBP OAM and USCG will
continue to determine the best methodology for screening vessels based
on resources, geographic considerations, and security levels. The
lessons learned from the WCMP, particularly with regard to maritime
chokepoint operations, will inform and improve standard operating
procedures.
In addition to this pilot, we have tested boat-mounted detection
systems. Results of the fiscal year 2008 ``Crawdad'' Maritime test
campaign and early deployments of selected systems in the West Coast
Maritime Pilot in Puget Sound will shape the identification of an
effective boat-mounted radiation detection system. DNDO also conducted
the Dolphin Test Campaign to characterize several commercial off-the-
shelf (COTS) and Government off-the-shelf (GOTS) systems in the spring
of this year and is analyzing the results. If we can demonstrate that
operational and technical requirements of the maritime mission area can
be met by COTS/GOTS boat-mounted systems, they may be incorporated into
DHS acquisition programs. If not, DNDO will launch a program to develop
and test a prototype system that is both effective and suitable for
this mission.
Aviation
DNDO has similarly expanded efforts to secure the air pathway--both
commercial and general aviation. To address radiological and nuclear
threats in aviation, DNDO is working with CBP to enhance capabilities
to detect and interdict illicit radiological and nuclear weapons or
materials entering the United States via international general
aviation. These efforts have included a test campaign with CBP officers
at Andrews Air Force Base in 2008 that analyzed CBP's radiological
scanning capability and identified methods to improve effectiveness by
enhancing equipment and operational techniques. As a result of these
efforts, 100 percent of international general aviation flights are
scanned for radiological and nuclear materials by CBP upon arrival in
the United States. Also in partnership with CBP, DNDO has developed a
pilot to detect and interdict illicit radiological and nuclear weapons
or materials entering the United States via the commercial aviation
pathway. The Pax/Bag (passenger/baggage) Pilot was conducted during
fiscal year 2010 at the Seattle/Tacoma and Charlotte airports to
evaluate radiological and nuclear scanning capability for passengers
and baggage entering into the commercial airport environment from
overseas. The results of the pilot program will inform future
deployment strategies for airports and will provide input for research
and development efforts to optimize radiological and nuclear scanning
of passengers and their baggage in the airport environment.
Additional architecture studies will examine the aviation
environment holistically--looking simultaneously across multiple
aviation operations such as movement of passengers, baggage, cargo, and
the aircraft themselves. As with other domains, the application of
random, agile, and mobile solutions will create uncertainty in the
adversary across the various aviation operations. This approach will
also incorporate the detection and deterrence benefits provided by non-
radiological and nuclear security measures already in place, such as
scanning checked luggage with automated explosive detection machines.
This holistic approach examines the intersection of multiple aviation
pathways, including the commonality of systems and processes that can
be leveraged and shared.
Testing
DNDO has also established the U.S. Government's premier
radiological and nuclear detection system test and evaluation
organization. DNDO has conducted 48 separate test and evaluation
campaigns at more than 20 experimental and operational venues. These
test campaigns were planned and executed using rigorous, reproducible,
and peer-reviewed processes. Tested detection systems include pagers,
handhelds, portals, backpacks, mobiles, boat- and spreader bar-mounted
detectors, and next-generation radiography technologies. The results
from DNDO's test campaigns have informed Federal, State, local, and
Tribal operational users on the technical and operational performance
of radiological and nuclear detection systems to help select the most
suitable equipment and effective CONOPs as we work to keep the Nation
safe from nuclear terrorist threats.
DNDO constructed and operates the state-of-the-art Radiological and
Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex (RNCTEC) at the
Nevada National Security Site (N2S2) to allow testing against
significant threat quantities of special nuclear material. Further,
DNDO established the Rail Test Center (RTC) at the Port of Tacoma in
Washington State to conduct testing in an operational port environment.
DNDO's testing expertise and experience is sought by interagency
partners, such as the Departments of Energy and Defense, and
international partners such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Israel, the
European Union, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). DNDO
has recently entered an active partnership with the European
Community's Joint Research Center to conduct the Illicit Trafficking
Radioactive Assessment Program+10 (ITRAP+10), an ambitious 3-year test
program to evaluate nine classes of radiological/nuclear detection
systems in U.S. and European test facilities.
Research and Development
To support basic research and the long-term development of systems
with increased capabilities, DNDO is conducting R&D using advanced
compact high-performance handheld systems; advanced passive standoff
detection technologies; improved detection through networked and
distributed detection systems; better detector materials; and improved
material attribution and radiochemistry. Additionally, DNDO is pursuing
targeted technologies for the detection of shielded special nuclear
material through passive and active interrogation programs and
development of key supporting systems for varied deployment schemes.
Underlying these efforts is our work to ensure a continued pipeline
for human capital development and basic research, executed through
DNDO's partnership with the National Science Foundation for the
Academic Research Initiative. To date, the Academic Research Initiative
has awarded 36 grants to 27 Universities. DNDO will continue to
collaborate on these longer term research and development activities as
the transformational research and development programs transition to
DHS's Science and Technology Directorate pending Congressional approval
of the fiscal year 2011 budget.
Nuclear Forensics
DNDO's National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center (NTNFC), has
also done an impressive job coordinating and advancing U.S. Government
technical nuclear forensics efforts. Established in 2007, the NTNFC
serves as a National-level ``system integrator'' for joint planning,
exercising, and evaluating our National capabilities, while also
investing in technical capability advancement. The NTNFC led the
interagency effort to develop the ``National Strategic 5-Year Plan for
Improving the Nuclear Forensics and Attribution Capabilities of the
United States,'' which was signed by the President and submitted to
Congress in April. U.S. policy emphasizes that any nation or group that
enables a terrorist to acquire nuclear devices or materials will be
held accountable. Robust forensics and attribution capabilities help to
underwrite this policy.
PATH FORWARD
I look forward to continuing our work with our partner U.S.
agencies and Congress to prevent nuclear terrorism. We will complete
the ASP program so that a final decision on certification can be made;
we will end the CAARS technology demonstration this fiscal year; and we
will complete the GNDA strategic plan. Further, we will continue to
develop technologies and systems that will address gaps in our
capabilities to detect threats. Our development of new neutron
detection technology to replace helium-3 detectors will mitigate the
impact of the helium-3 shortage by decreasing and ultimately
eliminating the need for helium-3 in our radiation portal monitors. To
support operators in the field, DNDO will purchase current and next-
generation handheld systems for use by CBP, USCG, and TSA. DNDO also
will work with State and local agencies to establish new radiological
and nuclear detection programs in urban areas and train more than 4,000
additional law enforcement and emergency management officials in fiscal
year 2011.
We will continue to work on next-generation human portable
detectors for varied applications, including a focus on systems with
new detector materials and advanced algorithms, as well as smaller,
more capable systems. DNDO plans include the potential development of
helicopter-mounted, boat-mounted, and long-range radiation sensors to
allow more flexible operations. We will also continue our important
test and evaluation collaborations with Federal and international
partners. We will focus on addressing challenging operational
environments, such as international rail and break-bulk cargo, to
increase our ability to scan for radiological and nuclear threats.
Overall, we will place much greater emphasis on defining the GNDA,
both as it exists now and as we would like it to exist in the future.
The responsibility to define the architecture is DNDO's greatest
challenge and its greatest opportunity. Over the next several years,
our long-term architectural vision can be characterized by several
common themes that apply across all layers. In every layer and pathway,
we will seek to increase detection coverage and capability, deter
terrorists from planning or attempting nuclear terrorism, introduce as
much uncertainty as possible in the minds of the adversaries with
regard to the risk of interdiction, and take maximum advantage of pre-
existing activities that can contribute to the overall capability to
prevent nuclear terrorism.
In parallel, we will look carefully at the lessons we have learned
from past cases related to the illicit trafficking of nuclear and other
radioactive material. While there have been no cases within U.S.
borders, we have evidence of small but significant cases overseas. We
must continue to look at how illicit trafficking takes place and refine
our strategies accordingly. While this analysis is still incomplete, I
believe it will improve law enforcement efforts within the United
States.
I anticipate that future implementations of the GNDA will emphasize
mobile or agile detection components, which will increase our
capability to respond to escalated threat levels by focusing or surging
detection assets to interdict these threats. I recognize the important
contributions that other U.S. Government agencies and Congress make in
accomplishing the mission to prevent nuclear terrorism and I am
committed to working in coordination with all parties to develop
effective strategies and technologies.
My vision of DNDO is that of a highly competent agency that has a
broad spectrum of capabilities including nuclear detection, reporting
and analysis specialties, and nuclear forensics. My expectation is
that, over time, we will develop a reputation that allows us greater
leverage in defining detection architecture throughout the world. We
have made some significant steps in this regard. For example, under the
President's Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, DNDO
coordinated the international development of the Model Guidelines
Document for Nuclear Detection Architectures. This document promotes
the development of National nuclear detection architectures and
capabilities to combat the illicit trafficking of nuclear and
radioactive materials, weapons, and components. While this is an
important achievement, I recognize that there remains room for growth.
Chairwoman Clarke, Ranking Member Lungren, I thank you for this
opportunity to discuss the status of DNDO. I am happy to answer any
questions the subcommittee may have.
Ms. Clarke. I would like to thank you for your presentation
and testimony here today, and frankly, found your candor very
refreshing and look forward to continued dialogue as well. I
want to thank you for your testimony.
I am going to remind my colleague that we will have 5
minutes to question Mr. Stern, but I think we can use more time
given the fact that it is just you and I.
I will now recognize myself for questions.
Mr. Stern, in your testimony you stated that the ASP
program is approaching a key decision milestone. DNDO and CBP
are currently working together to resume field testing in
October. It was my impression that testing was finally to
conclude on the ASP at the end of this month.
What is this round of testing for? Will that be it for
testing? What if the test should fail?
I will strongly caution you that proposing several more
rounds of testing is not going to go over too well with me, my
Ranking Member, or other Members of this subcommittee, so I
just wanted to get some feedback from you on that.
Mr. Stern. Thank you for the question, Chairwoman. I would
like to begin by explaining that there are really two types of
what we call testing, and they go for different names. One is
on the technical end, and that is to see if the device will
find the material that we are looking for, and that we have
spent a lot of time and money on, and that is what helps us
conclude that, in fact, there is a benefit--substantial--in
secondary inspection but not in primary inspection.
The other type of testing is more of a validation and an
operational testing to make sure that it fits reasonably well
within the process that the end user--in this case Customs and
Border Protection--within their process, without unduly
interfering with what otherwise happens and our ports of entry
and other locations.
So we are done with the technical testing. What we are
doing now, and we have actually been through before, we are
doing more the operational and the field testing, and this is
an iterative process, so I think it is highly likely that we
are, in fact, at the end, because again, for the field
validation we have been through this before. We learn; we tweak
the system; and then we bring it back to make sure it has fixed
the operational problems that we have had before.
So this isn't, as you noted, the last time we are at--this
isn't the first time we are at this point, but this is the
process. It is iterative. We are done with the technical
testing. We are making sure that it operates the way it needs
to operate, that the inspectors can use it, that it doesn't
unduly alarm, that it is not confusing, that it doesn't impede
the flow of traffic unnecessarily.
While it is a test, so I can't confirm that it will pass
that test, otherwise, of course, there would be no need for the
test, but I do feel that we are at the end of this process
because we have been through this iterative cycle and we think
we understand all of the problems that have been identified
before. So we do believe that this coming year, this--well,
this fiscal year, actually, we will be able to make a decision
on the ASP one direction or another.
But again, I caution you that I can't guarantee you that we
will pass the test, if you will, instead of having to go back
and tweak something because, again, that is what the test is
for, to make sure that it works the way we need to. But I do,
as I think you suggested you do also, want to move beyond the
ASP because that should not be seen as defining DNDO.
Ms. Clarke. Let me ask you, you have been able to
determine, through a detectable testing, that the ASP had a
secondary screening use. Ultimately, do you see DNDO qualifying
that as significant, and what is that significance if that is
the case?
Mr. Stern. Thank you, Chairwoman. Yes, there is a
significant benefit in secondary, and using it in secondary is
an important role. The concept of operations used by CBP at
most ports is that the conveyances are first put through a more
general device that examines whether radiation levels are too
high or too low--or rather too high.
If, in fact, they reach a certain level they are then sent
over to secondary inspection to find out if the reason the
radiation levels are too high are because of some legitimate
use of medical isotope, or many commercial materials have some
level of radioactivity, or whether it is a threat material. So
yes, that role in secondary is important.
It was always envisioned, actually, as a possibility from
the beginning of the ASP project--it was initiated with the
possibility of using ASP either in secondary or in primary
inspection. As discussion proceeded, it was--its primary
inspection has greater focus but it was never--the secondary
role was never ignored.
Again, the use of the term ``secondary'' sometimes comes
across as pejorative, as if, well if you can't use it in
primary we will use it in secondary, but that is not really the
way we look at it or the way it is. In fact, secondary is a
very important role within the concept of operations of the
CBP, and this is the role it will likely play.
Ms. Clarke. As you probably know, Mr. Stern, I am a New
Yorker and I have been a strong supporter of the Securing the
Cities, STC, program in New York. Last year the DNDO budget did
not contain any funding for STC. The stated reason was that
DNDO thought that the program was far enough along that local
funding could sustain it, and I can tell you that it is not
what I or the other members of New York's delegation were told
by the NYPD and others, and we would support an amendment to
restore funding for the STC in the fiscal year 2011
appropriations bill.
What are your intentions this year regarding the STC
funding?
Mr. Stern. Thank you. Just as a side note, I actually on
Monday was able to go up to New York City and view some of the
participants and the capabilities developed within the STC
program, and I was incredibly impressed with the level of
competence and dedication at the New York Police Department and
the officials involved in the program. I actually never really
thought that I would see a police force that knew how to use
radiation detection devices, and knew how to read them, and
knew what these meant. So I was very impressed with the people
that I met there.
We have a challenge in the sense that the STC was always
envisioned as a pilot program, 3 to 4 years, to see if, in
fact, we could reach certain milestones, and the intention in
fiscal year 2011 now is to evaluate the progress that was made
in the past in this program to see whether we should proceed in
the future. The question of whether STC will proceed or not is
only part of the question because we at DNDO view--and I view--
support of State, local, city officials in detecting nuclear
material to be a fundamental part of our obligation and our
role.
The question of whether this particular program proceeds
will depend in part on the outcome of this evaluation, but it
was always intended to be a pilot program to see if we can
create self-sustaining infrastructures, and that is one of the
things that will be measured.
Ms. Clarke. When do you envision this evaluation commencing
and ending?
Mr. Stern. We don't have a precise timeline, but it will be
during this--well, the next fiscal year, fiscal year 2011--it
will begin and commence.
Ms. Clarke. One part of your testimony gave me considerable
pause. You stated, ``DNDO has also established the U.S.
Government's premier radiological and nuclear detection system
test and evaluation organization. DNDO has conducted 48
separate test and evaluation campaigns at more than 20
experimental and operational venues,'' and, ``to support basic
research and the long-term development of systems with
increased capabilities, DNDO is conducting R&D using advanced
compact high-performance handheld systems, advanced passive
standoff detection technologies.''
This seems to go against the entire reorganization where
basic and transitional research and development activities as
well as performance were moved from DNDO to the science and
technology directorate. This was done for good reason, the most
well-known being the continued problems with research,
development, and testing of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal--
excuse me. So does your testimony indicate that we are going
back to the bad old days, or would you just want to give me
some----
Mr. Stern. No. We are not going back to the bad old days,
as you called them. This is, in my view, a turning point.
The explanation is perhaps two-fold. One is, of course,
that the--under the law the transfer hasn't--occurs when the
budget is approved. But the other is, of course, that--and this
is a rather complicated issue that has taken me quite some time
to understand, but within the testing of devices there are a
variety of different phases of testing and ways of approaching,
and it has always been envisioned, and the role of S&T--the S&T
under secretary overall is essentially regulating the testing.
So the testing of devices is still performed and has always
been performed outside of the directorate TAR that you
mentioned, and that would continue. But under the new law we
would fully transfer the transformation research and
development, the TAR directorate, to S&T, as envisioned by
Congress.
Ms. Clarke. I now yield to our Ranking Member, Mr. Lungren,
for his questions at this time.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman.
Mr. Stern, thank you very much. I realize you have only
been in this position a short time so I hope my questions
aren't unfair.
You talked about the CAARS program. You talked about how it
is being ended now--I presume you mean now.
What did we learn out of that? I mean, what did we learn
out of the mismanaged technology development program known as
CAARS?
Was it poor planning and oversight? Was it one part of the
operation not communicating with the other part of the
operation? Was it an idea that was a bad idea? Was it failure
to communicate with the CBP?
Was it someone at the front end not understanding what you
were going to do at the back end to design something that
doesn't fit the need? Seems to be elementary; maybe I am making
it too simple. But are there lessons learned to ensure that we
won't repeat this kind of thing again?
Mr. Stern. Thank you, Ranking Member Lungren. Yes, there
are definitely lessons learned, and I will elaborate a few of
them in a moment, but first I would like to make sure--clear
that the need for a technology to meet the objectives of the
CAARS program existed, and it actually still exists, and it is
why I mentioned some of the more useful technologies will be
migrated to other programs----
Mr. Lungren. Right, but who determines that need? Who tells
you of the need?
Mr. Stern. We define the materials that need to be detected
and the--we being DNDO--and the----
Mr. Lungren. Right.
Mr. Stern [continuing]. Approaches that are useful to find
those materials.
But if I could go on, there clearly were many steps that
were taken that were the wrong steps, and there are two key
lessons for me that I take away, and I think we as a
Department, also. The first is the need for more intense,
better cooperation and coordination early on. As you noted
correctly, there wasn't such coordination and the program got
off track and it didn't satisfy--and wasn't going to satisfy--
the operational needs of CBP. That was wrong, and that won't
happen again.
In addition----
Mr. Lungren. So, you say it won't happen again. How are you
ensuring that it will not happen again?
Mr. Stern. Thank you. This is the second part of my answer.
It won't happen again because now we have a system in place
that we didn't have before.
At the Department of Homeland Security level we have
management directive 102.01, which requires that as the system
moves forward at each step certain things have to be met, and
some of those include, of course, a mission statement and clear
cooperation and coordination of those who will be the ultimate
end users.
Within DNDO we have devised a subsidiary system that is
fully consistent with the Homeland Security system but is much
more detailed so that we now have in place a system that
assures that that mistake of lack--non-coordination as well as
other mistakes won't happen again, and I see it as my role to
make sure that we follow that system so that it doesn't happen
again.
Mr. Lungren. So if I am CBP do I wait to hear from you that
you folks have developed a range of things that have to be
detected, or do I come to you and say, ``In our operations we
have determined that it would be particularly helpful if we had
a particular technology which allowed us to uncover this kind
of object''? See what I am saying? I am trying to find out who
starts the process, or is it a collaborative effort from the
very beginning, or do you have something which anticipates that
you could have the beginnings of a concept of the need from
either end?
Mr. Stern. Thank you, Congressman Lungren. The process
really begins in the interagency, particularly in the
relationship between us at DNDO and the Department of Energy,
where we define the threat materials--what does it look like?
What is the level of thing that we have to find? Which
materials? How big? What shape?
From that we derive the technologies, working very closely
with CBP, again, at every step, that will allow this material
to be detected. The importance of our coordination gets more
and more relevant as we get closer to the end goal.
We coordinate early on--I have to say also, some of my
first outreach efforts since I began has been to CBP. I have
met with the commissioner, the deputy commissioner. We now have
very good working relationships that we didn't have 2, or 3, or
4 years ago.
But the process is one that we work together. CBP starts it
by defining, again, with the Department of Energy and a few
other places, what the material is we are looking for. We work
on devices. Once we get closer to something that is tangible
CBP is a fundamental part of what we do.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you. Let me, if I might, ask you about
ASP.
Mr. Stern. Sure.
Mr. Lungren. We have been talking about this in this
committee and subcommittee for what, 5 years, 6 years,
something like that. Were we too ambitious when we hoped for
and were told that ASP would be one of the crucial answers to
the challenge that we had and would be used--at least as I
understood it, would be used as primary rather than secondary--
and I know you are saying secondary is still important, but we
were led to believe that it would be a crucial aspect of
primary not only in terms of being able to detect more
precisely but also to, in essence, speed up the system. At
least that was my understanding. You can correct me if I am
wrong.
But again, what have we learned from that? Is it that we
missed the mark in terms of what our ambition was? Or was it in
terms of the concept to achieve that? Or was it a failure,
then, if we had the proper mission, we had the proper concept,
it was the execution of the concept?
Because I appreciate what you say when you say, look, we
didn't lose everything; these are still valuable. Just like you
mentioned with respect to CAARS. We may cancel the CAARS
program but we are still using things that we developed out of
that, which is good--not as good as it should be, because
presumably you want it to take care of that which you first
designed it for.
So in the ASP, again, were we too ambitions? Was the
concept inappropriate? Or was it the execution of the concept
where you find the most problem?
Is it status accompli that ASP is only going to be used for
secondary, or are we still envisioning the possibility of it
being used as primary in the future?
Mr. Stern. Thank you, Congressman Lungren. In answer to
your first question, there are, like with the CAARS program, a
number of lessons to be learned.
The two of the three that you listed that I believe we
should have learned and did learn is, No. 1, that we moved too
aggressively. We were seeking, back in 2005 and even before, a
quick fix, and moved too quickly through the acquisition
program. That is, again, why--the development and acquisition
program--and that is, again, why we have the new management
directive and the more precise directive that I am in charge of
at DNDO.
The second element that rings true about the reasons are
this lack of coordination. Just like with CAARS, we didn't have
relations with CBP that would have allowed the process to move
forward in a smooth way. So those are two big-picture reasons
why the program has taken a much longer----
There are a few other more technical reasons, which I think
we would have reconsidered with the benefit of hindsight, one
of which was, at the outset we required that the intellectual
property be retained by the Government. That is a good approach
and used in many programs, but in this case it led a number of
the more advanced companies in the field to not participate, to
drop out of the program. In retrospect, for this program I
think that might have been a bad decision.
Mr. Lungren. I guess one of the concerns you would have
with that is if you don't retain the intellectual property with
respect to the Government, are you talking about a question of
security or you talking about a question of ownership and
therefore making money on it?
Mr. Stern. If it were a question of security it would be
clear we would regain ownership, and of course the devices and
things that they are detecting, they don't know. I mean, they
don't know what they look like----
So it is more of a commercial issue, and it is also the
desire to not be tied to one particular supplier. If we retain
the intellectual property rights we can have other suppliers.
So it is not a security--the decision, as far as I understand
it, wasn't made on security--out of security concerns.
Mr. Lungren. Thank you. The two examples we have been
examining here, CAARS and ASP, could, I suppose, lead you in
one of two directions. One is that we accepted less than the
best, or the other is the pursuit of the perfect interfered
with us trying to deliver usable items that would
quantitatively improve the status quo but wouldn't get to where
some would seek, you know, perfection--100 percent, et cetera.
How do you make sure you strike the proper balance between
those two problems?
Mr. Stern. Well, we work, really, on both ends, in the
sense that we have the R&D, which, as was noted, we have become
part of the different--part of DHS, so we can look at, if you
will, the perfect, the longer-term, and develop that along the
development cycle while also developing equipment that is based
on current technology that improves, in a significant but not
transformational way, our capability to detect threat material.
Again, we work on both ends.
The programs that you have listed were poorly implemented,
and my job is to ensure that in the future we implement our
programs in a more reasonable and more rigid way, following the
systems that my predecessors have correctly developed.
Mr. Lungren. Is there any analogy that is appropriate
between this situation and the arena of cybersecurity? What I
mean by that is, having discussions with some experts on
cybersecurity in the private sector, they were making the point
that you can develop something in one of two ways. You can
develop it using operating systems that are in the commercial
marketplace and bringing them together, integrating them in a
certain way; or you can, from the very beginning, demand that
they be sole idiosyncratic or sole--or require them to be
unique such that the reality is it will take a lot longer for
it to develop, you may scare away some potentials that are out
there, and you may not advance as quickly as you otherwise
would because in a sense you are reinventing the wheel or you
are trying to go around the wheel.
Is there anything analogous to what you do or are your
examinations so unusual that going to conventional,
commercial--I don't want to say off-the-shelf, but I think you
know what I mean, that that is not possible?
Mr. Stern. No. For certain applications it is possible and
we are looking increasingly to commercial, off-the-shelf cut
technology for our uses, and also in support of State and
locals. For example, one of our newer programs that I support
strongly is our GRaDER program, where we, working with the
private sector, offer them a mechanism where we will test their
devise, in essence, giving them a good-housekeeping--good
Homeland Security--seal of approval so State and locals know
they can buy them.
One of the lessons from the CAARS program was that while we
were developing our own technology the private sector made--for
other reasons, made a leap in its capability to do some of the
elements. So if you see a next generation of radiography, which
again, is the objective of the CAARS program, it will be a
combination of off-the-shelf and unique algorithms that we have
helped devise based in part on materials that are in the
classified form. So we certainly support using, where we can,
off-the-shelf technology.
The other point that you raised, being overly precise in
your requirement, was, in fact, one of the lessons when I
reviewed the history of the ASP problems, one of the technical
lessons is we were too precise in things that we needed the
companies to deliver, which would likely raise the costs and
delay it a little bit.
Mr. Lungren. So, you just mentioned a moment ago create a
program dealing with local jurisdictions. Is that an
accomplished program, or is that something you are moving to?
If it is an accomplished program do we have any actual results
where that has been achieved?
Mr. Stern. Yes, well, the program requires that the
companies being tested take on the cost of the testing, and
that was, of course, a deterrent. We shifted a little bit so
this year we are allowing DNDO to cover half the cost of the
testing, and two companies have thus far signed up. I don't
believe they have actually been tested yet, but----
Mr. Lungren. You obviously have confidence that it is going
to work or you wouldn't be trying it.
Mr. Stern. Right. We think it will be a useful thing in
particular for State and locals so they have some guidance when
they----
Mr. Lungren. Is there any additional or enhanced
authorization that you need in order to carry out your
functions right now?
Mr. Stern. Thank you, Congressman Lungren. At this point,
having just been here for a month and a half, my answer has to
be no. As you know, an important part of the Global Nuclear
Detection Architecture--one of the unique features is most of
the thing that we are responsible for running, implementing,
coordinating falls under the authority of other agencies, so
there is, of course, an inherent challenge.
But I have found in the month-and-a-half I have been here
such incredible support and good will from all of the agencies
and the--such strong support from the White House that I am
confident that we will be able to work--and accomplish the
objectives we need to without additional authority.
Mr. Lungren. Okay. Well, I would just hope that you would
keep in mind that this committee stands ready to assist you,
and even though you find a number of these component parts the
jurisdiction of other agencies and you are supposed to sort of
put them together, sometimes we might be able to assist on
that, and again, I hope that you would keep us properly
informed so that if a gentle nudge is needed--or even a strong
nudge is needed--that we would know about it sooner rather than
later.
Mr. Stern. I very much appreciate that offer and I intend
to keep in close contact with you and your staff so that you
know what is going on at DNDO and can make decisions----
Mr. Lungren. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Ranking Member.
Mr. Stern, I found one part of your testimony almost
incredible: 100 percent of the international general aviation
flights are scanned for radiological and nuclear materials by
CBP upon arrival in the United States. We have been under the
impression that general aviation was actually a threat vector
which we had nearly zero coverage.
Am I understanding your statement correctly that we now
have this security gap closed?
Mr. Stern. That particular gap is closed. That statement is
accurate. There are other issues we have with the architecture,
although I would feel more comfortable discussing those gaps or
those issues in a different setting.
Ms. Clarke. Very well. Mr. Stern, I would like to give you
an opportunity to tell this subcommittee what new directions
you believe are important. What drives you? What do you want to
achieve? What things do you think this subcommittee should be
aware of or focus on?
Mr. Stern. Thank you, Chairwoman Clarke. What drives me is
the ability to look at the mistakes that have been made in the
past and try and correct them, to look at the events that have
occurred in Europe with illicit trafficking and see how that
can guide us in our architecture at home. That is a process we
have begun and actually will never end, but it is an
intellectual challenge which will help ensure that we do the
right thing in our architecture at home, so that is what drives
me.
I see and believe that one of the outcomes--one of the
results--will be--of this relook--will be that we shouldn't
focus as much on borders as we have but need to look within the
country for mechanisms for detecting nuclear and radioactive
material, which means working very closely with State and local
officials so that there is, you know, effective, ultimately,
detector on every block and every policeman can have a
manageable detector that will identify threat material.
We are not there yet, either in terms of research and
development or in terms of actual deployment, but those are the
directions I want to go, and again, I am working on the
architecture, taking advantage of the lessons we have learned
and supporting State and local officials.
Mr. Lungren. Can I just follow up on that?
Mr. Stern. Sure.
Mr. Lungren. Is that truly your vision, that we would have
that massive proliferation of devices so that we would have
that capability throughout the country?
Mr. Stern. That is illustrative. I mean, I can certainly
see and would hope in the future--I can't tell you when; 2
years, 10 years, 30 years--that every police officer would have
a device that would allow him, in the course of his normal
investigation, whether it is a drug bust or some other type
event, to, you know, whether there is nuclear or radioactive
around, we can't have--we need to close all of our gaps. We
can't assume that we will find materials at the borders, so if
we have to assume that the material will be in the United
States we need to do what we can----
Mr. Lungren. No, I agree that would be the perfect world. I
am just trying to make sure that you think that is a practical
goal, because if it is that would guide us in certain
decisions; if it is not, other decisions.
I guess what I am saying is, can you envision that not only
we could do that technologically, not only could we do it with
a scaling-down of the size of the instruments necessary so, in
fact, an officer could have a readily available piece of
equipment, but also in terms of the cost? Because if that is a
reasonable objective then we move in that direction and we
commit resources to that. If that is not, particularly the last
part of it, then we could spend a lot of time trying to devise
something that in the end we would never be able to make the
commitment to.
Maybe it is so early that it is--in your tenure and early
in the concept that that is an unfair question, but I would
just like your observations on that, if you don't mind.
Mr. Stern. Thank you, Congressman. It is not practical
today, but I was asked about my vision.
I can see, as we drive down the cost of detectors--right
now, one of the biggest problems is size--the size of
detectors. As we increase the accuracy of the detectors and the
ability to specify threat material, sure, in the future,
without, again, specifying a date, it is a possibility.
While I said every cop, well that may be every other cop,
or every 10 cops. Of course, in New York, under the Securing
the Cities program, a very large number--and I can't tell you
offhand how many--but a very large number of police officers do
have chirpers and handheld devices. So it is not an outlandish
concept. It is reaffirmation that I believe we need to focus
internally with State and local officials and see where the
analysis takes us----
Mr. Lungren. The other thing I would just ask you about is
I have some people very, very much involved in interstate
protocol--Internet Protocol version 6, and one of the things
they tell me is if we move to that we will have almost--I have
heard someone say we will have, but I have been corrected by
others who say an almost infinite number of locations on the
internet, and that that will allow us--as they would tell me,
you could put sensors every 2 feet along the southern border.
You could have sensing devices on every road in America.
When I start to envision that world what you just said--the
concept you just had--develops greater credibility. That is,
maybe not handheld devices but--with every officer, but you
could have them located on street corners, and yet you could
have them interconnected by way of the internet, which would
allow for this kind of advanced warning or something.
So I just find it intriguing that you mentioned that
because there are things that we have never considered
possibilities for in terms of detection--and of course--the
question of privacy rights and so forth.
But it is a whole different world than we have ever thought
of before, and I was just thinking, as you have your vision, if
you have that kind of a backbone to such a system you make it
far more credible than, I guess, under present circumstances
one would envision. So appreciate what you are talking about on
that.
Ms. Clarke. Director Stern, was there anything further that
you didn't cover that you would like to add at this time?
Mr. Stern. No. Again, I appreciate the opportunity to speak
with you today. It is a real opportunity to hear your concerns
and to let you know where I think I would like to take DNDO,
and just welcome to work with you.
Ms. Clarke. Well, thank you very much. I, too, am intrigued
by your vision.
Ranking Member Lungren, as you well know, as we do the work
that we do with this subcommittee there could very well be an
app for that not too long from now.
So I want to thank the witness for your valuable testimony
here today.
Thank you, Ranking Member, for making it in the nick of
time. If you have any questions--any additional questions--for
Mr. Stern, and I do too, I will make sure that we ask, that you
respond expeditiously in writing to those questions.
So, hearing no further business, this subcommittee stands
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:14 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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